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diff --git a/78130-0.txt b/78130-0.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1c517ed --- /dev/null +++ b/78130-0.txt @@ -0,0 +1,57046 @@ +*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 78130 *** + + + + + NAZI CONSPIRACY + AND AGGRESSION + + _VOLUME IV_ + + _Office of United States + Chief of Counsel For Prosecution + of Axis Criminality_ + + [Illustration] + + UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE + WASHINGTON · 1946 + + + + +CONTENTS + + + _Pages_ + + Document number 1409-PS through document number + 2373-PS arranged numerically 1-1107 + + (A descriptive list of documents appears at the end of the last + volume.) + + + + +A collection of Documentary Evidence and Guide Materials Prepared by +the American and British Prosecuting Staffs for Presentation before the +International Military Tribunal at Nurnberg, Germany, in the case of + + THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE FRENCH REPUBLIC, THE UNITED KINGDOM + OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND, and THE UNION OF SOVIET + SOCIALIST REPUBLICS + + --against-- + + HERMANN WILHELM GOERING, RUDOLF HESS, JOACHIM von RIBBENTROP, + ROBERT LEY, WILHELM KEITEL, ERNST KALTENBRUNNER, ALFRED ROSENBERG, + HANS FRANK, WILHELM FRICK, JULIUS STREICHER, WALTER FUNK, HJALMAR + SCHACHT, GUSTAV KRUPP von BOHLEN and HALBACH, KARL DOENITZ, ERICH + RAEDER, BALDUR von SCHIRACH, FRITZ SAUCKEL, ALFRED JODL, MARTIN + BORMANN, FRANZ von PAPEN, ARTHUR SEYSS-INQUART, ALBERT SPEER, + CONSTANTIN von NEURATH, and HANS FRITZSCHE, Individually and as + Members of Any of the Following Groups or Organizations to which They + Respectively Belonged, Namely: DIE REICHSREGIERUNG (REICH CABINET); + DAS KORPS DER POLITISCHEN LEITER DER NATIONALSOZIALISTISCHEN + DEUTSCHEN ARBEITERPARTEI (LEADERSHIP CORPS OF THE NAZI PARTY); DIE + SCHUTZSTAFFELN DER NATIONALSOZIALISTISCHEN DEUTSCHEN ARBEITERPARTEI + (commonly known as the “SS”) and including DIE SICHERHEITSDIENST + (commonly known as the “SD”); DIE GEHEIME STAATSPOLIZEI (SECRET STATE + POLICE, commonly known as the “GESTAPO”); DIE STURMABTEILUNGEN DER + N.S.D.A.P. (commonly known as the “SA”) and the GENERAL STAFF and + HIGH COMMAND of the GERMAN ARMED FORCES are as defined in Appendix B + of the Indictment, + + Defendants. + + + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1409-PS + + 1938 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 1709 + + Order concerning the Utilization of Jewish Property of 3 December 1938 + + +On the basis of Article 1 of the Second Regulation by the Administrator +for the Four Year Plan based on the Decree of November 24, 1938 for the +Reporting of Jewish-owned Property (RGBl I, 1668), the following is +decreed in cooperation with the competent Reich Ministers: + + + Chapter I _Industrial Enterprises_ + + Article 1 + +The owner of a Jewish industrial enterprise (Third Regulation under +the Reich Citizenship Law of 14 June 1938, RGBl I 627) may be ordered +to sell or liquidate the enterprise within a definite time. Certain +conditions may be stipulated in the order. + + + Article 2 + +1. A trustee may be appointed for Jewish industrial enterprises, the +owners of which have been ordered to sell or liquidate (Article 1), for +the temporary continuation of the enterprise and for the completion +of the sale or liquidation, especially if the owner of the enterprise +has not complied with the order within the definite period and his +application for an extension of time has been rejected. + +2. The trustee is empowered to undertake all judicial and extrajudicial +actions and legal measures, which the business of the enterprise, +its liquidation or sale require. His authority replaces any legally +required power of attorney. + +3. The trustee must exercise the care of a responsible businessman and +is subject to State control. + +4. The owner of the enterprise is to pay the expenses of the trustee in +connection with his work. + + + Article 3 + +1. The owner of the Jewish industrial enterprise is to be notified of +the instructions specified in Articles 1 and 2. + +2. In case of absence of the person affected, notification may +take place through publication in the Deutsche Reichsanzeiger and +Preussische Staatsanzeiger. In these cases the day of publication is to +be considered the day of notification. + + + Article 4 + +As soon as the owner of the enterprise is notified of the order through +which a trustee is appointed according to Article 2, he loses the right +to dispose of the property for the administration of which the trustee +has been appointed. He regains this right only if the appointment of +the trustee expires. + + + Article 5 + +The consent for the sale according to Article 1 of the Decree based +on the Decree of April 26, 1938, for the Reporting of Jewish-owned +Property (RGBl I, 415) is necessary also in such cases in which the +sale has been ordered; this also applies to the sale by a trustee. + + +Chapter II _Land and Forest Enterprises Real Estate and other Property_ + + Article 6 + +A Jew (Article 5 of the First Regulation under the Reich Citizenship +Law of November 14, 1935) (RGBl I, 1333), may be ordered to sell +wholly or partly his land or forest enterprise, his other land or +forest properties, his other real estate or other properties within a +definite time. Certain conditions may be stipulated in the order. The +regulations of Article 2 to 4 are to be applied accordingly. + + + Article 7 + +1. Jews cannot legally acquire real estate and mortgages. + +2. The regulations of Article 2, 4, 5 and 6 of the Decrees based on the +Decree of 26 April 1938, for the Reporting of Jewish-owned Property +(RGBl I, 415) are to be applied accordingly. + +3. At the foreclosure of real estate, the court ordering such sale must +reject bids if there is reason to suspect that the bidder is a Jew. + +4. The rejection according to Paragraph 3 loses its force if the bidder +protests against it immediately (Article 72, Paragraph 2 of the Law +Regarding Foreclosure) and if he proves that he is not a Jew. + +5. If, as is provided in (4) the bidder protests the rejection of an +offer, the decision on the public adjudication must not be made before +two weeks after the conclusion of the auction. + + + Article 8 + +1. Jews require authorization to dispose of real estate and mortgages. +They require authorization to dispose of other property if the sale +has been ordered according to Section 6 of this decree. This also +applies in the case of a trustee disposing of said property. + +2. The regulations of (1) also apply to contracts in which an +obligation to sell is assumed. + +3. The regulations of Article 1 (2) and Article 2 of the Regulation +under the Decree of 26 April 1938 for the Reporting of Jewish-owned +Property (RGBl I, 415) are to be applied accordingly. In disposing of +immovable property, the regulations of Articles 4, 5 and 6 of said +Decree are also to be applied accordingly. + +4. In case of foreclosure of a piece of land, the bidder requires +authorization for his bid; a bid for which the necessary authorization +is not proven immediately is to be rejected. Where the Reich Law +regarding Foreclosure and Forced Administration is in force, in cases +of Article 81, (2) of said law, public adjudication to a person other +than the highest bidder is permissible only if the person can prove +that consent was given for this deal. + + + Article 9 + +1. The authorization according to Article 8 replaces those +authorizations required according to the Regulation regarding Traffic +in Real Estate of 26 January 1937 (RGBl I, 35), the Settlements (RGBl +I, 659), the First Decree for the Execution of the Law of 17 August +1937, Regarding the Protection of the Reich Frontiers and Reprisals +(RGBl I, 905) as well as according to price fixing regulations. + +2. At the sale of land or forest enterprises or the granting of +usufruct in such enterprises, the authorization according to Article +8 replaces the authorization according to Article 1 of the decree +based on the Decree of 26 April 1938 for the Reporting of Jewish-owned +Property. + + + Article 10 + +1. If a Jew sells a piece of land which is situated within the confines +of Berlin, the Reich Capital Berlin has a right of preemption for the +purpose of carrying out the measures of the General Building Inspector +for the rebuilding of the City. + +2. Articles 12 and 13 of the Decree of 5 November 1937 Regarding the +Reconstruction of the Reich Capital Berlin (RGBl I, 1162) are to be +applied accordingly. + +3. The right of preemption does not exist if the Reich, one of the +German States, or the National Socialist Party is involved in the legal +transaction as a buyer. + + + Chapter III _Compulsory Deposit of Securities_ + + Article 11 + +1. Within a week after this decree goes into effect, Jews must deposit +all their stocks, shares in mines, bonds, and similar securities at a +foreign exchange bank. New securities must be deposited within a week +after their acquisition. The holder of securities belonging to a Jew +may not deliver them to anyone but a foreign exchange bank for the +account of the Jew. + +2. Insofar as securities are already deposited at a foreign exchange +bank on behalf of Jews or titles registered or coupons deposited +with an administrative authority for which preferred annuities will +be granted, the Jews must immediately notify the said bank, the +Administration of Public Loans or the administrative authority by a +written declaration of the fact that they are Jews. In case of (1) +Sentence 3, this declaration must be made to the said holder. + +3. The deposits and the registered titles are to be marked as Jewish. + + + Article 12 + +The disposing of securities deposited as Jewish, as well as the release +of such securities require the consent of the Reich Minister of +economics or an authority named by him. + + + Article 13 + +The provisions of Articles 11 and 12 do not apply to foreign Jews. + + + Chapter IV _Jewels, Gems and Objects of Art_ + + Article 14 + +1. Jews are forbidden to acquire, pawn or sell objects of gold, +platinum or silver as well as precious stones and pearls. Such +objects, except in the case of existence of attachments on behalf of +a non-Jewish creditor at the time when this decree goes into effect +may only be acquired by public purchasing offices, established by the +Reich. The same applies to other jewels and objects of art insofar as +the price of the individual objects exceeds one thousand Reichsmarks. + +2. The provisions of (1) does not apply to foreign Jews. + + + Chapter V _General Regulations_ + + Article 15 + +1. The authorization for the sale of Jewish enterprises, Jewish real +estate, or other Jewish property can be given under conditions that may +consist in the payment of money by the buyer on behalf of the Reich. + +2. Authorizations of the kind mentioned in Paragraph 1 may also +be granted with the proviso that the Jewish seller is to receive +obligations of the German Reich or registered titles against the German +Reich instead of the total or partial consideration as provided for in +the sales contract. + + + Article 16 + +The regulations specified for Jews in Article II also apply to +industrial enterprises as well as organizations, foundations, +institutions, and other enterprises which are not industrial, insofar +as they are to be considered Jewish according to the Third Regulation +under the Reich Citizenship Law of 14 June 1938 (RGBl I, 627). + + + Article 17 + +1. The higher administrative authorities are qualified to issue +instructions based on the regulations of Article I and II insofar as +the special provisions of Paragraphs 3 and 4 are not to be applied. The +higher administrative authorities are also to supervise the appointed +trustees. + +2. Section 6 of the Decree of 26 April 1938 determines which +authorities are higher administrative authorities within the meaning +of this Decree Regarding the Registration of Jewish Property +(Reichsgesetzblatt I, p. 414) with the proviso that the following +authorities are qualified: + + In Anhalt--the Anhalt State Ministry, Department of Economics; + + In Baden--the Baden Minister of Finance and Economics; + + In Wuerttemberg--the Wuerttemberg Minister of Economics; + + In Austria--the Reich Commissar for the Reunion of Austria with the + German Reich or the authorities named by him; + + In the Sudeten German territories--the Government Presidents. + +3. Insofar as it is a question of agricultural property, the +Oberpraesident in Prussia (Agricultural Department) and the Higher +Settlement Authorities in the non-Prussian States take the place of +the higher administrative authorities. Insofar as it is a question of +forest property, the Higher Forest Authorities take the place of the +higher administrative authorities. + +******* + +[Articles 18 to 23 are not necessary for understanding of law] + + + Article 24 + +This decree goes into effect on the day of publication. + + Berlin, 3 December 1938 + + Reich Minister of Economic Affairs + Walter Funk + + Reich Minister of Interior + Frick + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1412-PS + + 1938 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 1579 + + Decree relating to the payment of a fine by the Jews of German + nationality of 12 Nov. 1938. + +The hostile attitude of the Jewry towards the German people and Reich, +which does not even shrink back from committing cowardly murder, makes +a decisive defense and a harsh punishment (expiation) necessary. I +order, therefore, by virtue of the decree concerning the execution of +the 4-year Plan of 18 Oct. 1936 (RGBl I, page 887) as follows: + + + Section 1 + +On the Jews of German nationality as a whole has been imposed the +payment of a contribution of 1,000,000,000 Reichsmark to the German +Reich. + + + Section 2 + +Provisions for the implementation are issued by the Reich-Minister of +Finance in agreement with the Reich-Ministers concerned. + + Berlin, 12 November 1938. + + The Commissioner for the Four Year Plan + Goering + General Field-Marshal. + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1415-PS + + 1938 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 1676 + +Police Regulation of the Appearance of Jews in Public of 28 November +1938 + +On the basis of the Decree of 14 November 1938 Regarding the Police +Decrees of the Reich Ministers (Reichsgesetzblatt I, P. 1582), the +following is decreed: + + + ARTICLE 1 + +The Government Presidents in Prussia, Bavaria, and the Sudeten German +areas, the proper authorities in the remaining provinces of the old +Reich, the district captains (the Mayor in Vienna) in Austria and +the Reich Commissar of the Saar district may impose upon Jews, both +subjects of the German State and stateless Jews (Article 5 of the +First Decree of 14 November 1935, Regarding the Reich Citizen Law, +Reichsgesetzblatt I, p. 1333), restrictions as to place and time to the +effect that they may not enter certain districts or may not appear in +public at certain times. + + + ARTICLE 2 + +Whoever wilfully or negligently violates the regulations of Article I +is to be fined up to 150 Reichsmarks or punished with imprisonment up +to six weeks. + + + ARTICLE 3 + +This police decree goes into effect the day after its promulgation. + + Berlin, 28 November 1938 + + The Reich Minister of Interior + + By order: + + Heydrich. + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1416-PS + + 1935 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART 1, PAGE 1146 + + The Reich Citizenship Law of 15 Sept 1935 + +The Reichstag has adopted unanimously, the following law, which is +herewith promulgated. + + + Article 1 + +1. A subject of the State is a person, who belongs to the protective +union of the German Reich, and who, therefore, has particular +obligations towards the Reich. + +2. The status of the subject is acquired in accordance with the +provisions of the Reich- and State Law of Citizenship. + + + Article 2 + +1. A citizen of the Reich is only that subject, who is of German- or +kindred blood and who, through his conduct, shows that he is both +desirous and fit to serve faithfully the German people and Reich. + +2. The right to citizenship is acquired by the granting of Reich +citizenship papers. + +3. Only the citizen of the Reich enjoys full political rights in +accordance with the provision of the laws. + + + Article 3 + +The Reich Minister of the Interior in conjunction with the Deputy of +the Fuehrer will issue the necessary legal and administrative decrees +for the carrying out and supplementing of this law. + + Nurnberg, 15 Sept 1935 at the Reichsparteitag of Liberty + + The Fuehrer and Reichs Chancellor + Adolf Hitler + + The Reichs Minister of the Interior + Frick + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1417-PS + + 1935 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART 1, PAGE 1333 + + First Regulation to the Reichs Citizenship Law of 14 Nov. 1935 + +On the basis of Article 3, Reichs Citizenship Law, of 15 Sept. 1935 +(RGBl I, page 146) the following is ordered: + + + Article 1 + +1. Until further issue of regulations regarding citizenship papers, +all subjects of German or kindred blood, who possessed the right to +vote in the Reichstag elections, at the time the Citizenship Law came +into effect, shall, for the time being, possess the rights of Reich +citizens. The same shall be true of those whom the Reich Minister of +the Interior, in conjunction with the Deputy of the Fuehrer, has given +the preliminary citizenship. + +2. The Reich Minister of the Interior, in conjunction with the Deputy +of the Fuehrer, can withdraw the preliminary citizenship. + + + Article 2 + +1. The regulations in Article 1 are also valid for Reichs subjects of +mixed, Jewish blood. + +2. An individual of mixed Jewish blood, is one who descended from one +or two grandparents who were racially full Jews, insofar as does not +count as a Jew according to Article 5, paragraph 2. One grandparent +shall be considered as full-blooded if he or she belonged to the Jewish +religious community. + + + Article 3 + +Only the Reich citizen, as bearer of full political rights, exercises +the right to vote in political affairs, and can hold a public office. +The Reich Minister of the Interior, or any agency empowered by him, can +make exceptions during the transition period, with regard to occupying +public offices. The affairs of religious organizations will not be +touched upon. + + + Article 4 + +1. A Jew cannot be a citizen of the Reich. He has no right to vote in +political affairs, he cannot occupy a public office. + +2. Jewish officials will retire as of 31 December 1935. If these +officials served at the front in the World War, either for Germany or +her allies, they will receive in full, until they reach the age limit, +the pension to which they were entitled according to last received +wages; they will, however, not advance in seniority. After reaching the +age limit, their pension will be calculated anew, according to the last +received salary, on the basis of which their pension was computed. + +3. The affairs of religious organizations will not be touched upon. + +4. The conditions of service of teachers in Jewish public schools +remain unchanged, until new regulations of the Jewish school systems +are issued. + + + Article 5 + +1. A Jew is anyone who descended from at least three grandparents who +were racially full Jews. Article 2, par. 2, second sentence will apply. + +2. A Jew is also one who descended from two full Jewish parents, if: +(a) he belonged to the Jewish religious community at the time this +law was issued, or who joined the community later; (b) he was married +to a Jewish person, at the time the law was issued, or married one +subsequently; (c) he is the offspring from a marriage with a Jew, in +the sense of Section 1, which was contracted after the Law for the +protection of German blood and German honor became effective (RGBl I, +page 1146 of 15 Sept 1935); (d) he is the offspring of an extramarital +relationship, with a Jew, according to Section 1, and will be born out +of wedlock after July 31, 1936. + + + Article 6 + +1. As far as demands are concerned for the pureness of blood as laid +down in Reichs law or in orders of the NSDAP and its echelons--not +covered in Article 5--they will not be touched upon. + +2. Any other demands on pureness of blood, not covered in Article +5, can only be made with permission from the Reich Minister of the +Interior and the Deputy of the Fuehrer. If any such demands have +been made, they will be void as of 1 Jan 1936, if they have not been +requested from the Reich Minister of the Interior in agreement with +the Deputy of the Fuehrer. These requests must be made from the Reich +Minister of the Interior. + + + Article 7 + +The Fuehrer and Reichs Chancellor can grant exemptions from the +regulations laid down in the law. + + Berlin, 14 November 1935 + + The Fuehrer and Reichs Chancellor + Adolf Hitler + + The Reich Minister of the Interior + Frick + + The Deputy of the Fuehrer + R. Hess + (Reich Minister without Portfolio) + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1419-PS + + 1939 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 864 + + Law concerning Jewish Tenants of 30 April 1939 + +The Reich Government has enacted the following law which is hereby +promulgated: + + + Article 1 _Abatement of the Tenancy Protection Provisions_ + +A Jew cannot invoke the protection of the tenancy laws where the +landlord in giving notice to vacate the premises can furnish him with a +certificate from the communal authorities that his shelter is assured +for the time subsequent to the expiration of the tenancy. This does not +apply where the landlord is also a Jew. + + + Article 2 _Premature Dissolution of Lease_ + +A lease may be dissolved, where only one of the parties to it is a +Jew, by the other party at any time within the legal term of giving +notice, notwithstanding that the lease is signed for a specified time, +or that the stipulated time of giving notice is longer than that fixed +by law. The landlord, however, may not give notice for vacating the +premises earlier than the term agreed upon, where he does not furnish +certificate from the communal authorities that the shelter of the +tenant has been assured elsewhere subsequent to the vacating of the +premises. + + + Article 3 _Sub-Leases_ + +Sub-leases may be concluded only between Jews and Jews. Permission to +sublet is not necessary where the house owner is also a Jew. + + + Article 4 _Billetting_ + +1. Where the communal authority so requires, a Jew shall be required to +receive Jews as tenants or as sub-tenants in premises which he occupies +as owner or on the basis of a tenancy, or has rented from another +Jew. Where he refuses to make an appropriate agreement with the new +tenant, the communal authority may fix the terms of such an agreement +with binding force on both parties. The amount of the rental and the +compensation to the owner for the sub-lease shall be determined by the +communal authority, and where it is not the controlling rent authority, +in concurrence with the competent rent control authority. + +2. The commune is entitled to receive fees for establishing agreements +and sub-leases. + +3. A tenancy, or sub-lease entered into under (1) may be dissolved +by the owner or the sub-tenant only with the consent of the communal +authority. + + + Article 5 _New Tenancies_ + +Jews may rent to others new or vacant premises only upon the consent of +the communal authority. The provisions of Article 4 shall apply to such +premises respectively. + + + Article 6 _Application to Cases of Limited Ownership_ + +Where the application of Articles 1-5 depends on the premise that +the lessor is a Jew, the owner of the parcel of land, or the person +entitled to its use shall be considered the lessor, notwithstanding he +cannot sign a lease, or has not signed the lease because of limitations +upon his power over such property. + + + Article 7 _Mixed Marriages_ + +Where the application of this law depends on the premise that the +lessor or the lessee is a Jew, the following shall apply in cases of a +mixed marriage of a lessee or a lessor: + +1. Where the wife is a Jew, and where there are offsprings from the +marriage, even where the marriage is no longer valid, the provisions of +the law do not apply. + +2. Where the husband is a Jew and there are no offspring, the +provisions shall apply, no matter where the wife or the husband is the +tenant or the lessor. + +3. This does not apply to offsprings who are considered as Jews. + + + Article 8 _Right of Disposal_ [_Verfuegungsrecht_] + +1. Where the right of disposal of a parcel of land (property or right +to use) [Nutzungsrecht] is transferred by a Jew to a non-Jew, after +the effective date of this law, the provisions of this law shall apply +as before the transfer, though a giving of notice to vacate before the +time fixed is not permissible. This applies also to further transfers +of the right of disposal. + +2. The provision of (1) shall not apply to premises which the +beneficial owner shall desire to occupy himself, or to premises +which shall not be claimed for use of Jewish tenants by the communal +authority. A certificate from the communal authority is sufficient +proof that claim to these premises has been relinquished. + + + Article 9 _Term of Vacating Premises_ + +1. Where a Jew is forced to vacate premises under the provisions of +this law, an extension of the time limit for vacating may be granted +to him only where he can furnish a certificate from the communal +authorities that other shelter cannot be found for him, owing to +obstacles, or where the immediate vacating of the premises cannot be +undertaken without serious danger to the health of one of the persons +affected. The term fixed may be extended in accordance with the same +premises stated above. + +2. The provision of (1) shall respectively apply insofar as the person +forced to vacate has not terminated the lease, where the obligation to +vacate has not been pronounced in a judgment, or where the premises for +the granting of a time extension do not occur until after the judgment +has been pronounced. The local court having jurisdiction over matters +of vacating shall render a decision on the extension of time on the +application of the person required to vacate. Where a time extension +is granted and no judgment to vacate has been rendered so far, the +decision shall contain also the statement that after the expiration of +such extension the premises shall be vacated; this decision shall be +the equivalent of an executable order of dispossession. + +3. An immediate appeal against a decision refusing to grant an +extension of time is permissible, even in such cases where only a +decision against time extension is being protested by the tenant. + +4. Until the premises are vacated, both parties to the renting +agreement shall be held to observe the same rules and regulations as +before the termination of the agreement. + +5. The procedure under (2) shall be subject to the same court costs and +lawyer’s fees as the procedure for temporary stay of distraint. For +the estimate of costs Article 10 (1) shall apply correspondingly. + + + Article 10 _Order of Definition_ + +1. Who shall be considered a Jew, shall be determined by the definition +given in Article 5 of the First Regulation under the Reich Citizenship +Law of 14 November 1935 (RGBl I, 1333). + +2. The definition of Jewish enterprises under Article 1 of the Third +Regulation under the Reich Citizenship Law of 14 June 1938 (RGBl I, +627) shall be followed except insofar as Article 9 applies. A change in +the ownership of a Jewish enterprise shall be considered as a change of +the right of disposal in the sense of Article 8. + + + Article 11 _Treatment of Pending Legal Actions affecting Leases_ + +1. Where a legal action against a Jew or the marriage partner of a +Jew is pending when this law takes effect, the court may stay the +proceedings on the application of the plaintiff, in order to make it +possible for him to give the notice required under the provisions of +this law. Where the plaintiff has given notice to terminate the lease, +he may petition for the reopening of the case and change the plea from +termination to dispossession. Where the legal action is terminated by +the quitting of the tenant, or his acknowledgment of the obligation to +vacate, the court costs shall be voided; the costs out of court shall +be borne by the tenant. + +2. Where the tenant retracts the legal action for lease termination, +the court costs shall be voided and the costs out of court shall be +borne by each of the contending parties for himself. + + + Article 12 _General Reporting Requirement_ + +1. The communal authority may issue orders for reports on premises +rented to Jews, or on premises which may be used for the shelter of +Jews in accordance with the provisions of this law. + +2. Whoever shall not, either wilfully or through negligence make such +obligatory report, shall be punishable by a fine up to 150 Reichsmarks +or by custody. + + + Article 13 _Claims for Indemnity_ + +No claims shall be made for indemnity against orders issued by the +communal authority in accordance with the provisions of this law. + + + Article 14 _Exceptions; Authorization_ + +1. The effectiveness of this law in the Ostmark and in the Sudeten +German Territories shall be reserved to a later date. + +2. The Reich Minister of Justice and the Reich Minister of Labor +with the concurrence of the Reich Minister of the Interior shall +be authorized to issue instructions for the administration and +the enforcement of this law, as well as introduce the appropriate +provisions in Austria and in the Sudeten German Territories. + + Berlin, 30 April 1939 + + The Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor + Adolf Hitler + + The Reich Minister of Justice + Dr Guertner + + The Reich Minister of Labor + His Deputy: Dr Krohn + + The Deputy of the Fuehrer + R. Hess + + The Reich Minister of the Interior + Frick + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1422-PS + + 1943 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 372 + + Thirteenth Regulation under the Reich Citizenship Law of 1 July 1943 + +Under Article 3 of the Reich Citizenship Law of September 15, 1935 +(RGBl I, 1146) the following is ordered: + + + Article 1 + +1. Criminal actions committed by Jews shall be punished by the police. + +2. The provision of the Polish penal laws of 4 December 1941 (RGBl I, +759) shall no longer apply to Jews. + + + Article 2 + +1. The property of a Jew shall be confiscated by the Reich after his +death. + +2. The Reich may, however, grant compensation to the non-Jewish legal +heirs and persons entitled to sustenance who have their domicile in +Germany. + +3. This compensation may be granted in the form of a lump sum, not +to exceed the ceiling price of the property which has passed into +possession [Verfuegungsgewalt] of the German Reich. + +4. Compensation may be granted by the transfer of titles and assets +from the confiscated property. No costs shall be imposed for the legal +processes necessary for such transfer. + + + Article 3 + +The Reich Minister of the Interior with the concurrence of the +participating higher authorities of the Reich shall issue the legal +and administrative provisions for the administration and enforcement +of this regulation. In doing so he shall determine to what extent the +provisions shall apply to Jewish nationals of foreign countries. + + + Article 4 + +This regulation shall take effect on the seventh day of its +promulgation. In the Protectorate Bohemia and Moravia it shall apply +where German administration and German courts have jurisdiction; +Article 2 shall also apply to Jews who are citizens of the Protectorate. + + Berlin, 1 July 1943 + + The Reich Minister of the Interior + Frick + + Chief of the Party Chancellery + M. Bormann + + Reich Minister of Finance + Count Schwerin von Krosigk + + Reich Minister of Justice + Dr. Thierack + + + PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1430-PS + + [Excerpt of Volume 222 issued by the Reichsfuehrer of the Chief of the + Reichs Security Main Office--RSHA] + + SECRET + + SEIZURE OF LEADING MEN OF THE SYSTEM ERA. + + [Nazi expression for the 14 years of the Weimar Republic] + + June 1939 + + + CONTENTS + + I. Index and Statistics Page 1 + + II. Synopsis of Various groups Page 3 + + III. Statistics of Various groups Page 8 + + IV. List of all the persons Page 17 + + + INDEX AND STATISTICS OF ALL PERSONS SEIZED + + In all the following were seized: 553 Persons + + Divided thus: + Group 1. Marxists--Communists 192 Persons + Group 2. Liberalists--Pacifists 82 Persons + Group 3. Confessional Parties 76 Persons + Group 4. Right Opposition [Rechtsopositienen] 73 Persons + Group 5. Prominent Austrians of the System Era 48 Persons + Group 6. Scientists 17 Persons + Group 7. Artists 18 Persons + Group 8. Writers--Journalists 47 Persons + + + STATISTICS + + Of all the people seized the following are: + Jews 58--(10%) + Free Masons 45--(9%) + Temporarily, or at the present time + still in protective custody, + prison or penitentiary 102--(19%) + + I. In the country there are: 349--(63%) + 1. Remaining in their old professions or + returned to them. + (Mainly State or official positions) 61--(11%) + 2. People receiving pensions 109--(20%) + + II. Living Abroad 204--(37%) + 1. Politically prominent people working on + emigration 138--(25%) + 2. Distribution in the various countries: + France 61 + Switzerland 26 + England 19 + The States 17 + + + PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1435-PS + + Speech of Min. Speer on 24 Febr. 1942 to the Gauleiter meeting. From + Vol. 38--1 + +******* + +_Gauleiter meeting 24 Febr. 1942. Munich_ + + [_Page 4_] + +I am grateful to fact that, also Party member Dr. Todt, in +January, personally ordered the complete stoppage of work on his +Reichsautobahnen as well as released all specialists and German Workers +for the railroad construction in the East and his PWs for the armament +industry. + + [_Page 8_] + +I therefore proposed to the Fuehrer at the end of December that _all_ +my labor force, including specialists, be released for mass employment +in the East. + +Subsequently the remaining PW’s about 10,000, were put at disposal of +the armaments industry by me. + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1437-PS + + 1938 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 262 + + Second Order + supplementary to the law concerning the re-uniting of Austria + with the German Reich + Dated 18 March 1938 + +The following order is issued by virtue of Article III of the law +concerning the re-uniting of Austria with the German Reich, dated 13 +March 1938 (RGBl I, page 237). + + + Article 1 + +The Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of German Police in the Reich Ministry +of the Interior can take measures necessary for the maintenance of +security and order, even beyond the legal limits otherwise set on such +measures. + + + Article 2 + +The Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of German Police in the Reich Ministry +of the Interior can delegate his powers to other departments. + + Article 3 + +The order comes into force on the date of publication. Berlin, March +18th, 1938 + + The Reich Minister of the Interior + Frick + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1438-PS + + 1938 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 1453. + + 3rd. Order + + supplementary to the decree of the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor + concerning the administration of the Sudeten-German territory + Dated 22nd October 1938 + +The following order is issued by virtue of Section 9 of the decree of +the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor concerning the administration of the +Sudeten-German territory, dated 1st. October 1938 (Reich Law Gazette, +Page 1331): + + + Article 1 + +The Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police in the Reich +Ministry of the Interior can take the administrative measures necessary +for the maintenance of security and order, even beyond the legal limits +otherwise set on such measures. + + + Article 2 + +The Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of German Police in the Reich Ministry +of the Interior can delegate his powers to other departments. + + + Article 3 + +The order comes into force on the date of publication. + + Berlin, 22nd. October 1938. + + The Reich Minister of the Interior + Frick + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1439-PS + + TREATY OF PROTECTION CONCLUDED BETWEEN THE GERMAN REICH AND THE STATE + OF SLOVAKIA, + + March 23, 1939 + + [From 1939 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART II, PAGE 606.] + +Between the German Government and the Slovak Government, a treaty +was signed on 18 March 1939 in Vienna and on 23 March 1939 in Berlin +extending protection by the German Reich to the State of Slovakia. + +The treaty became effective on March 23, 1939; its text is published +hereinafter. + +Berlin, March 24, 1939. + + VON RIBBENTROP + Reich Minister of Foreign Affairs + + _Treaty of Protection to be extended by the German Reich to the State + of Slovakia_ + +The German Government and the Slovak Government have agreed, after +the Slovak State has placed itself under the protection of the German +Reich, to regulate by treaty the consequences resulting from this fact. +For this purpose the undersigned representatives of the two governments +have agreed on the following provisions. + +ARTICLE 1. The German Reich undertakes to protect the political +independence of the State of Slovakia and the integrity of its +territory. + +ARTICLE 2. For the purpose of making effective the protection +undertaken by the German Reich, the German armed forces shall have +the right, at all times, to construct military installations and +to keep them garrisoned in the strength they deem necessary, in an +area delimited on its western side by the frontiers of the State of +Slovakia, and on its eastern side by a line formed by the eastern +rims of the Lower Carpathians, the White Carpathians and the Javornik +Mountains. + +The Government of Slovakia will take the necessary steps to assure +that the land required for these installations shall be conveyed to +the German armed forces. Furthermore, the Government of Slovakia will +agree to grant exemption from custom duties for imports from the Reich +for the maintenance of the German troops and the supply of military +installations. + +Military sovereignty will be assumed by the German armed forces in the +zone described in the first paragraph of this Article. + +German citizens who, on the basis of private employment contracts, are +engaged in the construction of military installations in the designated +zone shall be subject to German jurisdiction. + +ARTICLE 3. The Government of Slovakia will organize its military forces +in close agreement with the German armed forces. + +ARTICLE 4. In accordance with the relationship of protection agreed +upon, the Government of Slovakia will at all times conduct its foreign +affairs in close agreement with the German Government. + +ARTICLE 5. This treaty shall become effective as of the date of its +signature and shall be valid for a period of twenty-five years. The two +governments will reach an understanding on the extension of this treaty +in due time before the expiration of that period. + +In witness whereof the representatives of the two parties have signed +the above treaty in duplicate. + +Vienna, March 18, 1939. Berlin, March 23, 1939. + + For the German Government: + VON RIBBENTROP + + For the Slovak Government: + DR. JOZEF TISO + DR. VOJTECH TUKA + DR. F. DURCANSKY + + [Cf. Document 2793-PS, which is the secret protocol to this treaty.] + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1445-PS + + Berlin, 15 June 1940. + + Minutes about the Conference at the Reich Ministry of Economics on 14 + June 1940, 1600 hours + +_Represented_: + + Ministry for Foreign Affairs (Ambassador Clodius) + + Representative for the Four Year Plan (Director of Ministry Gramsch) + + Reichsfuehrer S.S. + + Foreign Exchange Department + + Clearing Institute + + Reich Ministry for Economics (various representatives) + + O.K.W., Wi Rue Amt (I a M3) + +_Subject of the Conference_: + + Utilization of the Belgian Dutch capital investments in South East + European corporations. + +_Result_: + +After a discussion of several hours the following regulations were +considered as necessary: + +_a._ Immediate order by the Reichskommissar for the Netherlands and the +Military Commander for Belgium. Issue of a regulation for prohibition +of the disposal, destruction or transfer of securities held in these +countries, furthermore a compulsory registration of the owners and +trustees, an embargo on bank deposits, finally the cancellation of +regulations about securities which contain change of locations of +firms. (Compare paragraph A of document I a M3 of 23 May 1940.) + +_b._ In addition to this, after thorough consideration, shall be issued +a legal regulation corresponding to the German law for foreign exchange +regarding the disposal of foreign securities. In this law it shall +be made possible to void with retroactive power change of locations +of firms which took place since the beginning of the war. Provisions +shall be made also for the appointment of Commissars to corporations +and holding companies where after expiration of the registration date +securities are hidden. + +_c._ In addition to this it shall be put into effect in the South-East +states by the Mission chiefs that, where a permit is already required +for the transfer of shares, no permit of any kind shall be granted and +that in regions where no permit for the sale of shares is necessary, +a law for these permits shall be established, but as a matter of +principle these permits shall not be granted. + +_d._ Finally the attempt shall be made to gain an influence through the +Dutch holding companies over their owned subsidiaries in view of the +German economic warfare. (Compare with paragraph B of notice I a M3 of +23 May 1940.) + +_e._ A confiscation of securities shall be disregarded because this +would be against international law. + +_f._ The regulation drafts shall be completed by the Reich Ministry +of Economics (R.W.M.) with assistance of the Labor Board of the +Reich Ministry of Finance (A.A. des R.F.M.) and the Army High +Command--Economy Armament Division (O.K.W. Wi Rue Amt.) + + + PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1456-PS + + Berlin, 20 June 1941 + + Chief of Agency for + Armament Economy + [Chef Wi-Rue Amt] + Colonel Jansen + + MEMORANDUM + +Following is the new conception of the Fuehrer, which Minister Todt has +explained to me and which has been confirmed later on by Field Marshal +Keitel: + + Par. I + +The course of the war shows that we went too far in our autarchical +endeavors. It is impossible, to try and manufacture everything we +lack, by synthetic procedures or other measures. For instance, it is +impossible, to develop our motor fuel economy to a point where we +can entirely depend on it. All these autarchical endeavors ask for a +tremendous amount of manpower, and it is simply impossible to provide +it. One has to choose another way. What one does not have, but needs, +one must conquer. The commitment of men which is necessary one single +time, will not be as great as the one that is currently needed for the +running of the synthetic factories in question. The aim must also be to +secure all territories, which are of special interest to us for the war +economy, by conquering them. + +At the time the 4-year-plan was established, I issued the statement +where I made it clear that a completely autarchical economy is +impossible for us, because the need of men will be too great. +Nevertheless, my solution was always to provide the necessary reserves +for missing stocks resp. to secure the delivery in wartime through +economic alliances. + + Par. II + +In a conference between Todt--Pleiger--Thomas, it was determined: + + Matter: “Detailed orders to the mining industries”. + + Par. III + +Todt suggests the construction of heavy special machinery at Krupp’s +and Skoda’s. + + [Signed] THOMAS + + + PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1458-PS + + “THE HITLER YOUTH” + + by Baldur von Schirach + + _Published by Koehler und Amelang, Leipzig 1934._ + +_In place of a foreword._ + +My Fuehrer! It is five years now since you gave me the mission to +take over leadership of the National Socialist youth. At that time +you explained to my collaborators and to me the idea of this youth +organization. What you preached to us at that time as aim and demand, +my Fuehrer, has taken on shape here before you. You asked at that +time from me and my collaborators that we should create a community +of youth in which no other law should be binding for the process of +reconstruction but the law of achievement. + +Here, among the leaders of the Hitler youth are the sons of the +poorest who exercise command over hundreds of thousands. What do the +conceptions of poverty and richness mean in face of the reality of +this community? In future days only those will be called poor who did +not belong in their youth to this community. And further, my Fuehrer, +you demanded from my collaborators and from me that we should not only +unite the youth in enthusiasm, but also by discipline and order. We +fought for years laboriously for this end, but today even this demand +is fulfilled and proudly we feel ourselves as a worthy part of your +great National Socialist Movement. + +But we were powerless regarding one of your demands. You told us then +it would appear as a great success to you if we succeeded to hold +together in one organization of the German one hundred thousand German +youth. My Fuehrer, you forgot, that you had given this organization +your name. + +You asked for one hundred thousand, and it was all who came. There is +one thing which is stronger than you, my Fuehrer, that is the love of +the young Germany for you. + +There are many gay hours in the year of the youth. This one, however, +is in every year our happiest. Because more than other people, my +Fuehrer, we feel to be chained to your person by our name. Your name is +the happiness of the youth, your name, my Fuehrer, is our immortality. + +Baldur von Schirach to the Fuehrer at the occasion of the inspection of +the Hitler Youth at the Reichs party day 1936. + + + Chapter 1 + + From Union [Bund] to Nation [pp. 13-19] + +That which was formerly called the German youth movement [Jugend +bewegung] is dead. This statement has nothing to do with ill will. + +No youth leader of our time will deny the merits of the scout +[Wandervogel] Karl Fischers in his work with the German youth movement. +That youth movement was as right for its own time as the Hitler Youth +is right for the present. Without any doubt, many ideas and the form +of life [Lebensform] of the Youth Movement helped to create the +prerequisites on which the H J is building: The idea of self-leadership +on the part of the youth, the declaration to fight against the +standards of bourgeois society, the will to folkdom, homeland, or +comradeship and many others, are akin to the feelings of the H. J. And +yet: The first step into public life, the meeting which took place +on 11 and 12 October 1913 on the “Hohen Meissner”, remained only an +impulse. The best thing about the speech on the “Hohen Meissner” were +the people who listened to it [p. 14]. What today’s youth is looking +for in this, for the youth movement so important meeting, is the +sincere will to form, to create. + +We, today, see clearer than the generation of that time that the value +of their youth movement was in their silent work. The greater German +idea and the really valuable return to folkdom and simplicity are +achievements of the youth movement which seem to us more significant +than the numerous manifestoes which were handed down to us. They +had the courage to let themselves be ridiculed, a courage which the +National Socialist Fighter of a decade later also had to have. And we +must, if we want to do justice to this youth movement, look less to +the picture of their actual appearance but more to the determination +with which they followed their ideals. The political reality of youth +was their cleanness, their decent behaviour, their political change +[Umbruch]. The Youth movement was one of the few pleasant phenomena of +the Wilhelmman era and it is characteristic for that time that youth +was so delightful because it declared war on its time. Few leagues +[Buende] of the postwar time have a right to refer to the former youth +movement. They were a true copy of its weaknesses without its virtues. +They ignored the lesson of the great war. They forgot that the time of +a free and easy youth movement had undergone a break by the death of +two million, which imposed on them the duties of unity and masculine +constraint [Gebundenheit und maennliche Zucht--p. 15]. What was right +up to 1 August 1914 was wrong after 9 November 1918. + +Some attempts were made to create a synthesis of youth and a militant +movement [Wehrbewegung], attempts which started from the right +principles. These attempts failed because their leaders were either +representatives of pure militarism or at best of some lesser political +ideas. Therefore, it was reserved to Adolf Hitler, the creator and +supporter of an ideology [Weltanschauung], to determine the road of +German youth. From the former youth movement the Hitler youth took over +this or that form, out of the front of the World War it was given its +content by Adolf Hitler. Its organization also has its prerequisite in +the great war; its bearing is military, as was the bearing of those +who came from the youth movement and who died in their gray coats in +Flanders. + +Just as the youth of the “Hohen Meissner” felt, the front as the more +important, so do we. Between the summer of 1914 and the spring of today +lies a long dreary time through which we all passed consciously or +unconsciously. Even those of us who had not been born at that time know +it, every German knows it. As long as the German people will live, this +time will live in their minds [p. 16]. + +That at that time a whole nation stood in arms, Catholics and +Protestants, beggars and millionaires, peasants and clerks, merchants +and laborers, and that they all obeyed one will and were only Germans, +nothing but Germans, that also started us on the march. No title, no +privilege of birth, not a lot of money nor anything special of any kind +made a difference then. + +We also want the same thing. The black years of war have passed, the +spirit of the warrior remains. Again youth in Germany does not want +profits, nor personal gain, but renders service and sacrifices to the +community. That is the idea of the HJ: A comradeship of those Germans +who do not want anything for themselves. Because they do not want +anything for themselves they can do everything for their great nation. +Not a youth with new rights--a generation of strict fulfillment of duty. + +The postwar period showed a sad picture of party-bound youth. “Whoever +controls youth, controls the future” was the slogan, given the German +National club to the Communist thieves’ den. Every lobby was dealing +in youth. And they were successful. Young Germany took everything for +gospel truth, sold itself today to this one, tomorrow to that one +till finally, disappointed and disgusted, it turned its back on all +these activities. Then came the time of exclusive sports, of exclusive +indulging in entertainments and living to the fullest, the time of +exclusive study, [p. 17]. “Politics is nonsense,” was the reply given +to party functionaries. + +When Adolf Hitler began to speak this attitude was shaken. But now the +satisfied citizen used the same argument which youth had found against +him. He called for peace, for self-possession, for order. “Youth should +not mix in politics,” because the defensive slogan of all the bourgeois +parties which began to lose their young people to the Fuehrer. Anyone +who at that time, 1924-25, among youth stood up for Adolf Hitler +might have found that even youth leaders anxiously tried to avoid the +alleged danger of influencing youth politically in the direction of +National Socialism. Many comrades and I myself had to leave a militant +organization [Wehrorganisation] to which I had become quite attached, +because I had made a speech for Adolf Hitler there. At that time, many, +like myself drew a dividing line between themselves and their friends +and relatives and exchanged fight for the new ideal for the quiet life +of a well protected home. + +We were not yet able to account for our conception in detail, we simply +believed. And when Hitler’s book, “Mein Kampf” was published it was our +bible which we almost learned by heart in order to be able to answer +the questions of the doubters and superior critics. Almost every one +who today is leading youth in a responsible position joined us during +those years [p. 18]. + +Again Youth was divided by politics but this time the problem was +different. It was no longer a matter of national parties, of liberal +and democratic ideas, it was this: Germany or Marxism, Germany or +reaction. But youth also had been slightly infected with party ideas. +Youth did not want to be convinced, it wanted to be overruled. Not +the accuracy of the idea was questioned, but an attempt was made to +prove that with such a small following it could not be successful. The +National Socialist movement was regarded as a fractional party, the +honest but, because of its pettiness, hopeless attempt of a man of +whom it was not known if he had the necessary knowledge, the essential +education. A bricklayer from Vienna, a man without college education, +a self-taught person should liberate Germany? That was at best very +doubtful. + +As there are old people who are young, there are also among the youth +some who are old. I have met them in the universities, in the youth +movement, everywhere. The people who are old in their hearts are like +a pestilence to a healthy people. They represent the tenacious and +embittered resistance against every new idea. But youth is an attitude. +The paralyzed Chamberlain whose lips are forming words which only his +wife can read and transcribe represents eternal youth as much as the +old Goethe in his last days. His Faust, the Ninth Symphony and the will +of Adolf Hitler are eternal youth and know neither time nor death [p. +19]. + +Yet there are men who are born old and are living their lives as if +they were 70 years old. During the years of our fight we overcame +those people and we fight them again and again. They are the living +dead. Their coldness kills every slight stir of a new life. Only the +collective force of passionate youth is able to destroy them. + +Let us do away with the old! Only eternal youth shall have its home _in +our Germany_. + + + Chapter 2 + + The development of the Hitler Youth movement [p. 20, par. 1]. + +The idea for the foundation of a National Socialist youth organization +came from the Fuehrer himself, while the name Hitler Youth was +originated by Julius Streicher, who also named the Brown House. The +name of the man who deserves the credit for having set up the first +groups of the H. J. is Kurt Gruber. + +At the time of the beginning of the H. J. Kurt Gruber had just +graduated from Law School. He devoted himself with great energy to his +new task. From a small cellar in Plenen which served as Reichs office, +we first organized a number of Saxonian H J groups, energetically +assisted by the present Reich Governor in Saxony, Martin Mutschinanon. + +******* + +Here I would also like to mention that since 1928, Alfred Rosenberg +also took a special interest in the National Socialist Youth. At that +time we were trying to come to an understanding with the leagues. +Alfred Rosenberg negotiated with the Eagles and Falcons, the “bensen”, +and other leagues without fundamental results. I realized at that time +that an understanding with the leaders of the leagues would never be +possible [p. 23] and devoted myself to the principle of the totality of +the Hitler Youth, which in the year 1933 cost all those leagues their +independent existence. + +When, in 1930, the Fuehrer himself took over the high command of the +SA [Storm Troops] and Ernst Roehm started his new office as Chief of +Staff, the National Socialist Youth organizations were centralized in +the SA. Kurt Gruber resigned. His nervous state was such that he was +physically unable to continue his work. On 30 October 1931, the Fuehrer +appointed me as Reichs youth leader of the NSDAP with the rank of a Lt. +General [Gruppenfuehrer] in the SA. My old comrade, Dr. von Reuteln was +given the leadership of the students’ league and also the leadership of +the HJ, under my command. Now the organization of the HJ was thoroughly +overhanded, which was necessary because Kurt Gruber had not been able +to fully devote himself to his tasks as a leader especially during +the last months of his activities. Dr. von Reuteln continued his +work as a consultant for economic questions in the Executive Office +[Reichsleitung] of the NSDAP but still found time for official trips +and for night work at his desk to which the HJ owes the tightening of +the threads of its organization which had become rather loose. At that +time I had to go temporarily to Kufstein where I stayed with friends in +a little mountain inn in order to avoid a prison term of three months +[p. 24]. The previous year I had spoken against the Versailles dictate +from the steps of Cologne University, violating a government order +and, to begin with, was locked up in the Cologne prison, the so-called +“Klingelpuetz”, which then often housed Dr. Robert Ley, at that time +regional leader of Koeln-Aachen and another leading party comrade, +Tom Winkelnkemper. There I stayed for 8 days till my case came up in +court and was then sentenced to 3 months in prison without a time of +probation according to the emergency decree by the Reichs President. I +was very lucky to be set free after the sentence was passed. With great +joy I still think of the dear Cologne party comrades who, headed by Dr. +Ley stood in a mass before the gates of the prison when I was released. +It was high time, I flew to Munich. The following day I took the train +to Graz and was able to give to the Graz Student meeting the directive +which was needed by the Fuehrer. The National Socialist Student League +[Studentenbund] won its decisive victory. A National Socialist was +unanimously elected leader of the German student body [Studentenschaft]. + +Since that time around 12 months had gone by and I had reason to fear +that I would be torn away any day now from my organizational work +with the National Socialist Youth. My co-workers came to Kufstein for +the most important conferences and I frequently crossed the border at +night, raced through [p. 25] Germany in our “Nurnberg”, announced a +meeting in Chemnitz while I made a speech in Berlin, and thus I escaped +my well-deserved “vacation” in Cologne. Then came the time of Groener. +One evening the Fuehrer came to my apartment in Munich and informed me +that he intended to appoint me Reichsleader of the NSDAP the following +day, and to take the National Socialist Youth organizations out of +the SA. Since prohibition of the SA was threatening we might have +avoided the simultaneous prohibition of the HJ. The Fuehrer bases the +necessity of such a measure on the principle for which he stood from +the beginning, and which I have used in this book as a motto: “Youth +must be led by Youth”. + +By some accident the prompt announcement of my appointment was held +up. Soon after this conversation the SA and with it the HJ were +forbidden by Mr. Groener. Through Reuteln I raised some half-hearted +objections with Groener, referring to the fact that at the time of +prohibition I was no longer a member of the SA, but, of course, without +results. There was no other way out but to continue work underground. +Thus originated the National Socialist Youth movement, the NSJB [NS +Jugendbewegung] without uniform, without insignia. At that time we +traveled through Germany dressed like bandits. Blue sailor caps, white +shirts [p. 26] and a brown sweater or some kind of civilian coat. But +we recognized each other everywhere. At this time the HJ gained its +best human material. Whoever came to us during this illegal time, boy +or girl, risked everything. Thousands upon thousands were thrown out of +their schools or became unemployed--but they clung the more tenaciously +to our flag. It was a great time and as strange as it might seem we +were never happier than at that time when we lived in constant danger. +With pistols in our pockets we drove through the Ruhr district while +stones came flying after us. We jumped every time we heard a bell ring +because we lived in constant fear of arrests and expected our houses to +be searched. I have hardly one piece of furniture in my possession that +was not attached. + +One day even my “Nurnberg” was confiscated. That was going too far. +They could have all the wardrobes and chests as far as I was concerned, +but the car to us meant freedom, mobility, our work. The Fuehrer was +then at Obersalzberg. I called him up and out of his own pocket he gave +me the money to pay the printer who had the car attached. I breathed +freely again, we were able to continue our work. + +At about this time I had a conference with Dr. von Reuteln, as a result +of which I also took over the leadership of the Students’ League and +the HJ as [p. 27] such. This came about in the most friendly manner. +Reuteln wanted to get free anyhow to devote himself to his great +tasks in the economic-political field, I myself wanted to exchange my +somewhat formal responsibility for the HJ into a real one. We parted +as the comrades which we still are today. Between us never existed any +fundamental difference on essential points and The National Socialist +Youth owes a deep gratitude to the man who outlined their road in a +severe and straightforward manner. + +The membership of the National Socialist Youth organisation had grown +to about 35,000. The number of applications was mounting day by day. +We requested more office space from Reichs Treasurer Schwarz and +he created generous working possibilities for us by putting at our +disposal the entire top floor of the hotel “Der Reichsadler” in Munich. +For the time being we had some space. + +With the moving into the hotel “Reichsadler” an unpleasant tension +began to make itself felt which existed between the youth and Gregor +Strasser, who had installed the offices of the organizational +department in the same building. In my apartment on Koenigenstrasse I +was lucky enough to be able to express my apprehensions about Strasser +to the Fuehrer. Otherwise I never discussed these things with anybody, +with the exception of Julius Streicher. But I received [p. 28] reports +from all parts of the Reich through the youth organization. I knew +what course Strasser was taking, who, at that time, was at the heights +of his power. I knew of his connections and, from the beginning on, +I was instinctively convinced of his unreliability in regard to his +character. Gregor Strasser was an enemy of the National Socialist Youth +out of the same instinct. It was, after all, a Hitler-Youth and not a +Strasser Youth. + +The greatest worry of the years of struggle of 1930/31 was the lack of +money. Very often we did not have the few gallons of gasoline which +we needed for traveling. Another drawback was that none of us was, +at that time, a member of the Reichstag and, therefore, had no free +transportation. The reason was that we had not reached the necessary +age of 25. Our compensation for expenses was just sufficient to cover +our bare living expenses. By writing and lecturing I was able to make +enough money to pay my own fare. Despite all the difficulties we were +able to make all the necessary trips. The success of my staff was based +on its mobility. Good leadership is not characterized by answering +letters on time but by its contact with the fighting community. Thus +the Fuehrer had brought us up and he preached again and again not to +lose myself in paper work--one of the greatest and wisest teachings +which I received from him. + +******* + +The HJ [Hitler Youth] used the winter of 1932/33 for many +demonstrations [p. 31]. We drove through all of Germany and called the +youth to the HJ. I will never forget a Fuehrer appeal in the beginning +of January in Berlin, at the start of which I was searched for weapons +by the police. Twenty days later we were in power. The most magnificent +success was the conquest of the formerly Marxist industrial workers +youth of the German West. Here my co-worker Hartmann Lauterbacher +achieved great things. + +I will never forget the hour when we were sitting in the office of the +district Ruhr-Niederrhein during an intermission between demonstrations +on 30 January and received the news of Adolf Hitler’s appointment to +the post of Reichs Chancellor. That same night I spoke in Herford in +Westphalia. We all felt saved. The policemen [Schupos] who, on the +previous day, were still persecuting us, greeted us with raised hands. +It was one great fraternization. I spoke in two meetings, and going +from one to the other I caught such a cold that shivering with fever +I had [p. 32] to go home the next day, but in all my fever phantasies +one thing remained vivid, that which we had won on that day: Hitler in +power, Hitler in power. As soon as I had recovered I went to Berlin via +Wuerzberg, Nurnberg where we had 2 demonstrations. Now the problem was +to apply the victory of the movement to the entire youth. Our cabinet +ministers were overburdened with their new tasks and were working +day and night. We could not wait till they would find time to solve +the youth question by their own initiative. Therefore, we had to act +ourselves. My co-workers met in my Munich apartment and advised me +to occupy the Reichs committee [Reichsausschuss] of the German Youth +Leagues. I commissioned General [Obergebietsfuehrer] Nabersberg with +50 members of the Berlin HJ to make a surprise raid on the Reichs +Committee in the Alsenstrasse early the next morning. This was done +and at noon the press had the report that the HJ had taken over the +leadership of the Reichs Committee. The Reichs Committee was headed +by an excellent man, General Vogt. As much as a surprise the turn of +events was to him at first as quickly did this Prussian officer adjust +himself to the new situation. I took his job away from him but he +understood that this was a necessity and that only from the HJ the +great unification of German Youth would be possible, on which, after +all, he had worked all his life. General Vogt did not step aside [p. +33] and was not offended, but remained intensely and truly interested +in the objectives of the HJ and its aims. His book, “The German +Boy-Service” [Der deutsche Jungendienst] is one of the most valuable +books of German youth literature. And we are all proud of the fact that +General Vogt today belongs to the Reichs Youth leadership and wears the +Gold Honor insignia of the HJ. + +In the Reichs Committee [Reichsausschuss] we got a tremendous amount +of material. All at once we were able to determine the strength of all +the German youth leagues and to summon the influential personalities +in these youth leagues. From this point I recognized the necessity of +coming to grips with the Greater German Union. I appointed my co-worker +Karl Nabersberg as my representative on the Reichs Committee and +traveled through Germany in order to take a stand against The Greater +German Union in many demonstrations. In the meantime I gained control +over the Reichs league for German youth hostels [Reichsverband fuer +deutsche Jugendherbergen] in a manner similar to the one employed +with the Reichs Committee; with its leadership I commissioned a young +merchant from Hamburg and bearer of the Golden Honor Insignia [Goldenes +Ehrenzerchen] of the NSDAP, Johannes Rodatz. + +The Greater German Youth League [Grossdeutscher Jugendbund] was a +combination of various leagues and organizations which came under the +leadership of the deserving chief of staff of the fleet, Admiral von +Trotha. This admirable man, who had served our Fatherland in war and +peace with unselfish [p. 34] devotion fundamentally had the same ideas +and plans for the Greater German League as I had for the Hitler Youth. +That the Greater German League [Grossdeutscher Bund] could not fulfill +these tasks was not the fault of the “Admiral”, as he was respectfully +called by his Youth, the difficulties lay in the period itself. The +Greater German League was not a political union, that is, leagues +which partly were opposed to National Socialism were to be found in +the Greater German League as well as organizations which ideologically +were in agreement with the NSDAP, without, however, drawing any +conclusions from it. The unification of youth could never be achieved +by the external centralization of partly opposed leagues, but only by a +philosophy of life which had to be accepted by the young generation as +a new law for life. Only the Hitler Youth represented this idea. + +The differences between the Greater German League and the HJ grew from +day to day. Friction, even frequently actual fighting, were day-by-day +occurrences. This state of affairs could not be settled by compromise. +We could not be satisfied with incorporation of the Greater German +League as, always the incorporation of a youth league into the HJ for +us was not even discussed. As all of us once, and that during difficult +times, gave our unconditional pledge to Adolf Hitler, especially today +every young German must be able to do so [p. 35]. The so-called and +often praised individual life [“Eigenleben”] of such leagues is, in the +last analysis, nothing but another form of “joiner tendency”. “Either +all or nothing” is the principle of National Socialism. + +The position which I gave to the HJ was not strong enough to overcome +the last quaint introspection [Eigenbroetelei] within the youth. Nobody +saw that as clearly as the Fuehrer who was convinced of the necessity +of giving to the leader of the HJ that backing by the state which he +needed for his work. When we discussed these things I asked the Fuehrer +to refrain from attachment to one specific ministry, a wish which was +readily recognized by the Fuehrer. The Fuehrer himself stated that a +ministry cannot exist without bureaucracy, but bureaucracy is death to +youth. He intended to create an agency which in its freedom should have +the possibility to work. Thus, in the Reichs Chancellory, in the middle +of June 1933, he appointed me Youth leader of the German Reich [Jugend +fuehrer des deutschen Reiches] by clasping hands. Reich Minister Dr. +Frick, as their competent minister for youth questions, drew up the +respective document. I was given authority to appoint representatives +of the states [Landesbeauftragte] to carry out my instructions and I +appointed the district leaders to these positions in all the states in +execution of my right. + +The first thing I did was to dissolve the Great German league. Since I +headed all [p. 36] German youth organizations and I had the right to +decide on their leadership, I did not hesitate for a moment to take +this step, which was for the HJ the elimination of an unbearable state +of affairs. The leader of the Great German Bund, Admiral von Trotha, +set an example of rare human greatness to German youth when he, after +the incorporation of all leagues and organizations had been completed, +one day made an end to all the fights and quarrels of the past years +and, after his appointment to Honorary Leader [Ehrenfuehrer] of the +Navy Hitler Youth, devoted himself unconditionally to the service in +Adolf Hitler’s youth movement. Only to great personalities it is given +to put youth to shame and at the same time obligate by a noble example. +At that time many a German boy will have asked himself if he would +be able to act in the same way in a similar situation and honestly +answered with a “no”. From an educational point of view it was the +most important deed that the Admiral, after his organization had been +smashed, again adjusted himself to the tasks of the new generation out +of his military sense of duty and his love for youth. When, today, the +blue columns of our Navy Hitler Youth pass by their honorary leader, +their eyes are not only shining with enthusiasm for the Admiral who +once at a grave hour won eternal honor for the German Reich, but they +also know in their hearts that this man is part of [p. 37] themselves. +Following the incorporation of the “Stahlhelm” into the SA we were +able to carry out the incorporation of the “Scharnhorst”, the youth +organization of the “Stahlhelm”. But the “Scharnhorst” had to give +up it’s individual existence when it joined the HJ. The individual +“Scharnhorst” boys were detailed to the local branches of the HJ. This +step would never have been possible without the initiative of Reichs +Minister Saldte who was completely convinced of the necessity to create +a large youth organization, which, also according to his opinion, +could only be the HJ. That the many small and unimportant groups and +leagues were incorporated goes without saying and took place without +any resistance. The Marxist youth as well as all political youth +organization I prohibited after the occupation of the Reichs Committee. +The one million members of the HJ which we had on 30 January 1933 had +now grown to a round three million. Only the two large confessional +groups, the Protestant and the Catholic youth, were opposed to us. They +already had lost a great number of their members to us but they still +remained powerful factors in the life of German youth. Again and again +I called together the district leaders [Gebietsfuehrer] of the HJ in +order to discuss this subject. Again and again these true and tenacious +fighters announced: We won’t stop now. From the last boy to the Reichs +Youth leader we agreed that the HJ never should and would give in as +regards this question. + + + Chapter 3 + + Hitler Youth and Confessional Youth [p. 38] + +Towards the end of 1933 discussion about the eventual incorporation of +the evangelical youth took place between the newly appointed Reichs +Bishop Ludwig Mueller and myself. With great satisfaction we from the +HJ could ascertain that the Reichs Bishop was fundamentally ready to +lead the members of the evangelical youth leagues into the HJ, a point +of view which differed somewhat from that of the chairman of the Young +Men’s Protestant Work [Evangelisches Jungmaennerwerk], Dr. Stange. Dr. +Stange actually tried to interfere with this new development against +the will of the majority of his followers, but without success. And +in December 1933 the Reichs Bishop and myself were able to inform the +Fuehrer that incorporation of the protestant youth into the HJ had +become a reality. + +Through the agreement with the Reichs Bishop the HJ believes to +have shown the way by which a later understanding with the Catholic +Youth Leagues also would be possible. By this agreement evangelical +youth organizations in the old sense, that is leagues, which overlap +the activities of the HJ are no longer in existence. As spiritual +communities the Protestant [p. 39] groups continue to live in their +innate field, namely that of the Protestant creed. The HJ guarantees +their protestant members a certain evening each week for their +confessional, religious activities. The agreement with the Reichs +Bishop follows verbatim: + +1. The Protestant Youth Work [Evangelisches Jugendwerk] recognizes +the unified state political education of German youth by the National +Socialist State and the HJ [Hitler Youth] as representatives of the +philosophy of the State. + +The youth of the Protestant Youth Work below 18 years of age is to +be incorporated into the Hitler Youth and its subordinated branches. +Anyone within this age group who does not become a member of the HJ, +from now on shall not be a member of the Protestant Youth Work. + +2. Education in regard to open air sports (including gymnastics and +sports) and in regard to state politics, up to 18 years of age, shall +take place only within the HJ. + +3. All members of the Protestant Youth Work shall wear the official +uniform of the Hitler Youth according to their membership in the HJ. + +According to this agreement the Protestant youth was incorporated into +the Hitler Youth. With very few exceptions the young followers of the +Reichs Bishop were glad to be freed from the inner struggle of the past +months [p. 40]. The Reichs Bishop acted like a true spiritual advisor +of this young community when he, by this agreement, opened for them the +doors to the HJ and thus the doors to the people and the State. + +The confessional youth league [Konfessioneller Jugendbund] has no right +of existence in our time. While the young German in the period of +National Socialism is drawn to the community and thereby the attitude +and way of living of the HJ, sometimes some dark pang of conscience +holds him back to give in to this urge, to follow really his innermost +thoughts. Particularly the catholic youth societies led their members +into moral conflicts for which an educator of the youth cannot account. +By promises for a life beyond they tried to hold the youth back from +the disinterested surrender to the state. As if the all powerful would +condemn this service on the people and could see anything objectionable +in it. Because the youth does not make any difference between poor and +rich, Protestant and Catholic, I am accused of being a “heathen” who +does not believe in anything and instills the seed of the antichrist +in the hearts of the unsuspecting youth. And yet, considering the +confessional composition of our people, a real community of our +youth can only exist if confessional questions are not discussed in +this community, special confessional leagues are not tolerated. The +Christian doctrine is attacked in the HJ as little as any [p. 41] other +doctrine; the HJ does not care for class or confession but only for +the Germandom. In this sense my slogan is to be understood; “The HJ is +neither Protestant nor Catholic, it is German”. + +The church proclaims its right for a religious education. An +uncontested and uncontestable right. The state, on the other side, +demands through the HJ to exercise the ideological, political education +and here the state has a claim which is as valid as that of the church. +In fact a number of Catholic youth leaders are not concerned with this +religious education. They occupy their youth organizations with tasks, +accomplishment of which falls into the domain of the HJ. Home evenings +(social gatherings), hikes, camps, games, sports, and training do not +need a confessionally directed leadership, and yet it is exercised +stubbornly by a certain circle of catholic youth leaders. Instead of +bringing the German youth together where it can be united and should +be united, these so called educators and youth leaders try to present +even the cooking on hikes as a religious matter and think the young +boy’s soul could be harmed if he saw that outside of the Catholic youth +organization other people lived. The fact that since National Socialism +seized the power, about 1½ millions of youths from the camp of the +Catholic youth organizations joined the HJ manifests that the spirit of +the followers is better than that of the leadership and shows how in +the long run confessional, bourgeois thinking must capitulate before +German socialism. + +A short while after the National Socialist revolution the beaten +political parties undertook another feeble attempt to keep at least +the youth somehow. The attempt failed; the youth of the bourgeois +parties pledged itself to the socialism of Adolf Hitler. The youth +leagues followed this example. Even the Protestant youth recognized the +demand of the time and followed in faithful fulfillment of their duties +the voice of their conscience. But on the spot where once the proud +Zentrum stood that we could see work hand in hand with the Marxist +traitors of the people in the Reichstag, there stands today a group of +the Catholic youth organizations and opposes the “We” of our community +with the “I” of their societies. + +Who wants Germany without compromise is an arch-enemy of any +confessional principle in a state organization. Who would retreat here +a hand’s width and be he a minister of the new Germany, would betray +the tragic fight of the German people for its freedom. May the German +people recognize the lesson of the last thousand years and for the +first time proclaim an unconditional negation of all separating forces. + +There is no reason why there should not be found a solution in the +question of the youth education to the satisfaction of the church as +well as of the HJ, so much the more as the HJ does not restrict in +any way the religious activities of its members. Neither attendance +at the Sunday services nor participation in other church gatherings +is being made difficult for the Catholic Hitler boys on the part +of the leadership of the HJ. If, on the occasion of some big youth +demonstrations which don’t take place too often, it was occasionally +difficult for technical reasons to make it possible for the young +people to attend church services it is by no means an indication of a +sometimes alleged “anti-religious” attitude of the HJ. I even am of +the opinion that religious meetings and arrangements in particular +religious youth leagues are not at all in contradiction to the +totalitarian claim of the HJ. Every effort which aims to deepen and +intensify religious life must not only be welcomed by a responsible +youth leadership but also be furthered. I believe to have shown by the +treaty with the Reich bishop of the Protestant church that the HJ is +willing to concede necessary space to the religious youth education. +However, it must be demanded that under the cover-name of religious +education the youth should in no way be influenced politically. +The experiences of the past taught us that the confessional youth +organizations do not occupy themselves exclusively with religious +questions. The National Socialist movement as pillar of the state +cannot be blamed if by reason of past experiences it makes security +arrangements which should ban all dangers for the future. + +If the church visits of the youths do not correspond the expectations +of the churches, it is not the fault of the youth. The real cause +of this attitude of the youth is to be looked for in the want of +comprehension with which some catholic youth leaders and unfortunately +too many priests oppose the education of the HJ. They believe not to +be able to part with the sport education of the catholic youth and +overlook that the religious education itself suffers by the fight over +the competences. + +Many Catholic Germans look with disgust at the mean fight which certain +catholic youth leaders lead today for their existence and hundreds +of thousands of catholic Hitler boys don’t have any appreciation of +it that there should exist outside the HJ sport a catholic sport and +catholic calisthenics. As faithful Catholics they stick to the church +but they cannot see why this church demands all of a sudden territory +which has nothing to do with religious education. + +No reasonable man in Germany can give a reason for the necessity of +the existence of catholic youth organizations in their present form +(catholic boys scouts, “German Jugendkraft”, etc.) and many important +leaders of the catholic church have long been of the opinion that these +organizations have no right of existence in the National Socialist +state. The catholic youth itself--this I maintain by reason of the +continuous going over, even of whole groups to the HJ--wants to +cooperate in the National Socialist state. And not as confessional +specialist league but as HJ. + +Catholics and Protestants have the same rights in Germany. This is +not only valid for their relationship to the state but especially for +their relationship to the National Socialist movement. If, however, +the catholic youth is advised not to join the HJ, then this part +of the German youth is deprived of a right which today every other +young member of the community possesses. “Give to the emperor what +is the emperor’s and to God what is God’s”. This profound wisdom of +Christ shows us even today the possibility to terminate the tension +between HJ and confessional youth organization. If the HJ leader works +exclusively according to the instructions given to him and only cares +for the ideological (that is to say the physical, mental and moral) +education of the youth in his charge in Adolf Hitler’s sense and the +priest just as exclusively for the religious, moral education within +direction of the church and is nothing but a German servant of God, all +prerequisites of a peaceful and confident work are given. + +For the solution of the catholic youth question in Germany there is +but one way, which is agreeable to both parties; The Catholic youth +organization restricts itself to the spiritual realm and gives up the +expensive and unnecessary administration and leadership apparatus +of the general presidents and secretaries [General praesidenten +und sekretaere]. If the priest of every locality cares spiritually +for the youth as part of his community, the church has sufficient +occasion to exercise its religious education. The thought, to appoint +Protestant and Catholic so called field chaplains or HJ chaplain +is against our comradeship and therefore cannot be accepted. If a +celebration of the National Socialist youth is held by a catholic and +protestant clergyman, every boy and every girl feels the difference +of the confession as a wall between them. Where a short while ago two +young Germans marched shoulder to shoulder goes then a Catholic and a +Protestant and with them the sorrow of the German history. + +Unity and community then becomes disunity and cleavage. Then the two +millions of the great war would really have died in vain and so would +the dead of the Feldherrnhalle [p. 47]. And those twenty one who as +pioneers of the new unity were hunted to death by the Marxists and +“Zentrum” leaders won’t belong to us any more. + +But we are spirit of their spirit. The idea for which they died is also +the idea of our life. Their fight is our destiny [pp. 64-65]. + +Self-leadership of youth is not to be understood from the bureaucratic +point of view that every one at the age of 30 must resign from +leadership. The principle: “Youth must be led by youth” is to be +understood according to its meaning and not literally. Therefore, I +principally do not apply any age limit. All set patterns are deadening. + +Germany is the country of the youth movement. Youth movement and youth +self-leadership of youth are inseparable. It is not the purpose of the +youth movement to give to young people a possibility to satisfy any +power instincts. On the contrary, youth leadership means to be more +severe with oneself than with the following. The HJ is a school for +leaders. A leader in the true sense of the word is always the creative, +the disciplined one. + +Therefore, the way to leadership shall be made difficult for a boy. +If he is destined for it he will overcome the difficulties. But never +shall there be another key to the gate of leadership than achievement. +It is a matter of indifference who holds the key, the son of a worker, +the son of a peasant or the son of a scientist. Only one thing is +decisive: He must be of the aristocracy of achievement, of the only +aristocracy which is known to the new youth [pp. 68-69]. + +A single will leads the HJ. The power of authority of the HJ leaders, +that of the smallest as well as of the largest unit is absolute, +i.e., he has the unlimited right to give orders because he bears the +unlimited responsibility. He knows that the responsibility of the +higher one comes before that of the lower ones. Therefore, he submits +silently to the instructions of his leaders even if they are directed +against him personally. To him as well as to all young Germany the +history of the HJ is proof of the fact that a youth community also +can only be successful if it unconditionally recognized the authority +of leadership. The success of National Socialism is a success of +discipline. The structure of National Socialist Youth is built on the +foundation of discipline and obedience. The teachings of the time of +persecution apply even more to the period of victory and power. The +small boy [Jungvolkjunge] who joins the movement of Adolf Hitler at the +age of ten learns to subordinate his own little will to the laws which, +strictly followed, are building states and making nations happy but +which, when violated, result in the loss of freedom, in the collapse of +folkdom. In the course of the following years he learns that discipline +and subordination are not inventions of despotism that they have not +been created by a few with a lust for power in order to secure their +personal positions but that they are the prerequisites for the life of +the nation and thereby for his own life. + +The great value of the organization for the youth lies in the +following. In the circle of boys of his own age he gains, partly while +playing, a knowledge which must be employed, especially to the life of +the adult. And while he is being trained for discipline in a manner +corresponding to his emotional life and his capacity to learn, he will +see that his blind obedience affords the possibility of success to his +group [Gefogschaft]. What is acquired in young years in the struggle +with small tasks later serves the state in its big tasks. + + + Chapter 4 + + Work Abroad [pp. 154-162] + +The Reich Youth leadership does not pursue foreign politics. + +The Fuehrer created the Office of Foreign Affairs for the foreign +activities of the National Socialism. What is done within the Foreign +Department of the Reich Youth leadership never means an overcrossing of +Party offices and State offices. The HJ deals with the youth and not +with big politics. And even where the youth contacts the youth of other +nations to exchange young people for study trips or camps, contact is +made outside the political sphere. It is the purely human agreement +of youth among themselves which in this way the Reich Youth leadership +attempts to achieve. + +During the last year the most important meetings between German and +foreign youth were: + + The visit of the HJ in Hungary. + + The counter visit of the Levente youth in Germany. + + The German-English Youth Camp near Hamburg. + + The trip of Department Leader Nabersberg to England and Turkey. + + A lecture of Karl Nabersberg in Paris on the occasion of a meeting of + the “Sohlbergkreis”. + + The visit of a Finnish Study Group [Studiengesellschaft]. + +Also on the occasion of the visits of foreign youth leaders (i.e. +Greek, Chinese and Japanese) to the Reich Youth leadership, contacts +were made with foreign youth organizations. + +Every nation has the interest that its youth has a political outlook +reaching as far as possible. Especially the National Socialist Germany +is strongly interested that her youth knows and respects other nations +as early as possible. The better the youth of Europe understands +each other, the nicer for the future. A basic principle of the youth +exchange is: no propaganda. Hitler boys who go abroad do not travel +as propagandists of National Socialism; their task is not to teach, +but to learn. They should see the beauty of the foreign landscape and +explore the national characteristic of the host-country. I believe +in a cooperation of the European youth at the basis of an agreement; +its only program point should be: to know each other. It would be an +utopian idea to believe that such a cooperation would improve the +world. Probably the world would not improve but the people could become +juster. In this connection we welcome the international exchange of +pupils and only desire that it might be extended beyond the circle of +pupils to the youth of all professions. The activity of the Foreign +Department of the Reich Youth leadership is not only concerned with +the relationship of the HJ to the youth of other nations, although +this field is most clearly in evidence. It cares, in close cooperation +with the League for Germandom Abroad [Volksbund fur das Deutschtum im +Ausland], for the youth of the German settlements abroad, in Europe and +South America, and awakens in the Reich German Youth the understanding +for the brothers and sisters abroad. + +In a special main branch, the Central Office for Volksdeutsche Youth +Work [Mittelstelle fuer Volksdeutsche Jugendarbeit], which took over +the main tasks of the Central Office of German Youth in Europe, which +in 1933 was attached to the organization of the Reich Youth leadership, +the following fields are being worked on: + + 1. Borderland trips and trips abroad of the entire German youth. + + 2. “Volksdeutscher” labor service. + + 3. Schooling in the Reich of German youths living abroad. + +The borderland trips and trips abroad offer the possibility to give the +young Germans abroad the contact with the new Germany by Reich German +Youth hiking groups in form of performances (folk songs, folk dances +and plays performed by laymen). At the same time, a selection by these +youth hiking groups should be made in the German settlements abroad +among those who appear suitable as youth leaders and therefore are to +be called to the Reich for schooling. + +All borderland trips and trips abroad of youth hiking groups and +individual youth hikers have to be authorized by the hike office of the +central office. Thereby the hikes of the “wild hikers” should finally +be prevented which were not always to the good of the German reputation +abroad. On the other side the hikes should be arranged according to a +certain plan, so that they can be directed into certain sections where +a visit seems really appropriate. + +A special task of the central office is the so-called Volksdeutsche +Labor Service which has the task of a systematic schooling of German +Youth leaders living abroad. In four specially suited labor camps the +sense of the labor service is clearly demonstrated to the Germans +living abroad by special schooling methods, in order that they can +apply what they learned in their home organization. + +Another branch of the Foreign Department has the task to combine the +Reich German boys and girls inasmuch as is possible in youth groups in +which National Socialist ideas are conveyed to them. To this effect +the groups receive books and youth literature free of charge and +especially such which establish the spiritual contact with the Reich +German HJ. The work program provides the establishment of schooling +camps of several weeks duration for German youths from abroad who above +all should convey to the future leaders the experience of the present +fatherland. Through our own press service, the Foreign Department tries +to protect the rights of the German youth abroad in the Reich German +Press. The daily appearing press service “Space of the East” [Ostraum] +brings short news about the movement of the German youth organizations +abroad and the German school abroad for Lithuania, Letland, Esthonia, +Poland, Czechoslovakia, Austria, Rumania, and Yugoslavia. Another +paper “The School Review for Germans Abroad” [Die Auslandsdeutsche +Schulschaù] is delivered to a great number of German schools of higher +learning. Furthermore the branch participates in the youth periodicals +published by the Reich Youth leadership or in cooperation with it, and +furnishes the German daily newspapers with articles of a principle +nature about questions of the youth abroad, as well as the German +newspapers abroad with news from the Reich and the German groups beyond +the frontier. The branch “Press” in the Foreign Department is thereby +the rallying point for the news on the movement of the German Youth +abroad and the schools in the Reich for the Germans abroad. + +The branch “School” of the Foreign Department is of special importance. +Its task is essentially to communicate to the HJ sufficient knowledge +about the Germandom of the borders abroad and of foreign politics. +To carry through the schooling in the units, borderland and foreign +lecturers were appointed who on central instruction of the chief +lecturer had to carry out the schooling in the individual units. The +first instruction week for lecturers abroad on a systematic execution +of the training program, was held from 4 to 10 December 1933 in +Potsdam. The training program uses the following aides: + + 1. A regularly appearing schooling-letter with a publication of 65,000 + + 2. Literature on the subject in general which is distributed to the + lecturers abroad + + 3. The periodical “People and Reich” + + 4. Contributions in newspapers and periodicals + +The training of the co-workers staff is to be extended by a number +of additional training weeks and by supply of training material and +establishment of competent libraries in the Oberbanne. Furthermore, +special attention for the localities less than 100 km from the frontier +is intended. + +The colonial branch keeps awake the memory of the cultural, scientific, +economic and military achievements in the former German colonial +territory within the organizations under the order of the Reich Youth +leadership. Beyond this, the German youth shall be informed about the +importance of colonial possession for the supply of the home economy +with colonial products and raw materials. It will be taken into +consideration concerning this schooling that the guiding line of the +German population policy which aims at the utilization of the space +in the East will not be violated. In the historical schooling the +“colonial-guilt-lie” and the thereby intended defamation of the German +people--also in regard before the colored nations--will be emphasized +and it will be pointed out that equal terms for the German people are +only obtained when these parts of the Versailles shame dictate are also +rectified. + +Special colonial lecturers who are assigned to the headquarters of +the HJ and BDM down to the Bann and Unterbann will attend to the +carrying out of these tasks. These lecturers also will be prepared for +the solution of their tasks in courses in the Reich Leader School in +Potsdam and within the districts and subdistricts. The literature at +present on hand about colonial questions which, however, is only for +limited use for the schooling within the HJ since it was written under +different political conditions, will be put at the disposal as work +material. New material, in accordance with timely requirements, is in +preparation and will serve in the future as basis for all work. The +youth should be informed every three months by a “schooling-letter” +about everything worth while in the field of the colonial question +which should come down to the sub-leaders of the whole HJ and BDM. In +this direction, friendly cooperation with the biggest society, the +German Colonial Society, takes place; material is exchanged. As much as +the promised shipping space is available, members of the HJ (colonial +lecturers) should be sent to the former German colonial territories so +that they can learn at the spot the present-day conditions and give the +Germans there a sign of our attachment. Supported by what they have +seen and lived, they should after their return work here to enlighten +the HJ in the country. + +It would lead us astray to go into the details of the activities of +the Foreign Department. Generalobergebietsfuehrer Karl Nabersberg +devoted much energy to these duties and gave up even the leadership of +the staff of the Reich Youth leadership with which he was charged for +a time in favor of this task which had his particular interest. The +thought that every Hitler boy and every BDM girl regardless in which +part of the world they are, form a great comradeship and march together +in spite of local separation in one direction and live and work in the +same spirit was realized by the Foreign Department of the Reich Youth +leadership. + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1462-PS + + 1939 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 709 + + First execution order to the law for the HITLER YOUTH (General + Regulation) of 25 March 1939 + + Based on Article 4 of the law for the Hitler Youth of 1 December 1936 + (Reichsgesetzblatt I, page 993), I Order: + + + Article 1 + +1. The youth leader of the German Reich is solely competent for all +missions of the physical, ideological and moral education of the entire +German youth of the Reich area outside of the house of the parents and +the school. The competence of the Reichminister for science, education +and public orientation remains unaffected as far as private education +and social education are concerned. + +2. The following problems are transferred from the sphere of action +of the Reich and Prussian Minister for science, education and public +orientation to the sphere of action of the youth leader of the German +Reich: + + All affairs of youth care, the youth hostel system as well as of the + accident and liability insurance in the interest of youth care. + + The question of competence for the year’s service on farms [LandJahr] + is left to a special regulation. + +3. The youth leader of the German Reich with the Hitler youth is +subordinated to the Financial authority of the NSDAP. + + + Article 2 + +1. The Cadre Hitler Youth [Stamm HJ] exists within the Hitler Youth. + +2. Whoever was a member of the Hitler Youth since 20 April 1938, is a +member of the Cadre Hitler Youth. + +3. Juveniles, who have had at least one year of good conduct in the +Hitler Youth, and fulfill the conditions of ancestry for the acceptance +into the NSDAP, may be accepted into the Cadre Hitler Youth. More +specific regulations will be issued by the Reich Youth leader of the +NSDAP in agreement with the Fuehrer’s deputy. + +4. The acceptance into the Cadre Hitler Youth of persons over 18 years +of age, who are to be used in the leadership and administration of the +Hitler Youth, can take place immediately. + +5. Only the Cadre Hitler Youth is an affiliate of the NSDAP. + +6. Membership in the Cadre Hitler Youth is voluntary. + + + Article 3 + +The Reichminister of the Interior will appoint the national agencies, +subordinated to the youth leader of the German Reich, in agreement with +Fuehrer’s deputy and the Reichminister of Finance. + + + Article 4 + +The members of the Hitler Youth are entitled, and are obliged, if +ordered, to wear the prescribed uniform. + + Berlin, 25 March 1939 + + The Fuehrer and Reichs Chancellor + Adolf Hitler + + The Deputy of the Fuehrer + R. Hess + + The Reichsminister and Chief of Reich Chancellery + Dr. Lammers + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1463-PS + + Diary of the Navy 1944 + + The Commander in Chief of the German Navy, Admiral Doenitz. + + “This war is a naval war and it will be decided on the High + Seas.”--Admiral Doenitz. + +Admiral Karl Doenitz was born in Berlin-Gruenau on 16 September 1891, +the son of an Engineer. He attended school in Berlin, Jena and Weimar. +He entered the Imperial German Navy as a cadet on 1 April 1910 and +was promoted to Lieutenant on 27 September 1913. As an ensign he was +ordered to the light cruiser “Breslau”. There he witnessed the outbreak +of the first world war when he was in the Mediterranean sea. His +experiences while on this cruiser which later became the “Midilli” of +the Turkish Navy he described in a little book published during the +last war while he was a lieutenant (jg). The title of the book was +“The cruises of the ‘Breslau’ in the Black Sea”. Doenitz who served +as watch officer and adjutant received the Iron Cross 2nd class on 7 +January 1915. For a time he was air observer near the Dardanelles and +subsequently in charge of a naval aviation squadron near San Stefano. +On 5 May 1916 he received the Iron Cross first class and in the fall of +that year returned to Germany. + +For a long time it had been the young officer’s burning desire to +become an officer on a submarine. This wish of the young lieutenant +(jg) was fulfilled when he was ordered to submarine school 2 +December 1916. This proved decisive in the life of this officer +who indefatigably worked for the development of his weapon. Doenitz +became at first watch officer on the Submarine “U-39” whose commanding +officer, Lt (sg) Forstmann was one of the most successful submarine +officers of the last war. Inspired with great daring, Forstmann was an +officer who knew how to train aggressive and responsible commanders. +Doenitz always remembers with special gratitude the decisive influence +of his former teacher. After an artillery course Doenitz on 1 March +1918 became Commander of “UC-25” and later “UB-68”. With these boats he +carried on successful warfare against merchant shipping in the Atlantic +and the Mediterranean. + +Lt. (jg) Doenitz placed himself at the disposal of the German Navy, +dishonorably mutilated by the Versailles dictate, and aided in its +reconstruction. He became a staff officer; he took over, during the +attempted coup d’etat of Kaff, the command of the torpedo boat V5 +which was usable but without a commander. For three years then he was +commander of a torpedo boat, and became afterwards officer in charge +of torpedo inspection and for another three years filled a responsible +position with the Naval High Command. After one year’s sea duty as +navigation officer on the light cruiser “Nymphe” Doenitz became chief +of the first squadron of Torpedo boats newly built for the German Navy. +In the fall of 1928 Doenitz was promoted to lieutenant commander. +While Doenitz already earlier was making plans for the reconstruction +of the German U-boat fleet his new position for the first time, gave +him the opportunity to put down his experiences and suggestions in +the form of memoranda written for his superiors and other influential +personalities. During this time, the organizational plans and other +prerequisites were already formulated which made possible the +subsequent rapid construction of new German U-boats. This was followed +by another period during which he attended service schools and +undertook sea duty. On one of his trips he went to India for several +months. In 1934, he became Commanding officer of the Light cruiser +“Emden” which at that time undertook a cruise in the Indian Ocean. + +When in 1935 Doenitz returned from this trip the Commander in Chief of +the German Navy during a tour of inspection in Wilhelmshaven told him +to his surprise that he was appointed Chief of the “Weddigen” U-boat +flotilla. From this date, 27 September 1935, started the ceaseless +construction of the new U-boats. At first two 250-ton boats were +built. Doenitz lately promoted to Commander, devoted himself to his +new duties with passionate zeal and after untiring day and night work +he was able in a very short time to present an extensive plan for the +reorganization of U-boat warfare. Again Doenitz donned his working +clothes to drill and train his young officers, personally and with +pitiless pace. He succeeded in closing a gap of 17 years, during which +no training took place, with a few months of tireless work. Day after +day, night after night, week after week he stood on the bridge of one +of his U-boats indoctrinating the men in his charge, by hard thorough +training, with the spirit of the men who manned the submarines during +World War I. At the same time he collected new technical experience +and new improvements in the development of different submarine types. +Doenitz knew no let-down for himself. Regardless of weather, season or +time of day he went with the boats, instructed and trained their crews, +and led them through thousands of miles in the Baltic and North Sea * * +* + +One must recall, that after World War I a skillfully directed British +propaganda campaign created a world-wide general impression that the +submarine as a naval weapon was a thing of the past since superior +defensive measures had been instituted, namely the convoy system, and +that in future naval engagements, submarines would be of only secondary +importance. Commander Doenitz’ opinion was diametrically opposite; “The +massing of boats in convoy must be answered by massing of U-boats to +attack the convoy.” This maxim became the basis of his whole training +program. The wolf pack tactics which later became so famous were +originated and tested at a time of complete peace. The cruises in the +Baltic and North Sea were followed by the first Atlantic maneuvers * +* * Doenitz surrendered personal command over the U-Boat only after +the number of flotillas increased, in order to devote himself to +higher tasks of leadership. After the outbreak of the war, about 4 +years after the first U-boats were commissioned, the new weapon was in +excellent condition and carried the stamp of a personality which was +our ideal combination between commander and front-line officer. Doenitz +on 28 January 1939 was promoted Commodore of U-boats and entered the +war with but 40 of his elite boats. They attacked immediately within +the first day. And at once this new weapon was a brilliant success. +On 18 September 1939, Doenitz received a cluster to the Iron Cross +1st class, for his success in the Baltic during the Polish campaign. +When the position of “leader of U-boats” was changed into that of +“Commander” Doenitz was promoted to Rear Admiral on 1 October 1939. +* * * Prien went to Scapa Flow. There was a fighter. He knew it and +said over and over: “I was only the paw of the Big Lion. What I did, +I could do because I was his disciple.” All the “old guard” thought +the same way and so did the commanding officers who returned to their +bases with flags of victory flying. The crew likewise was inspired by +the old man. With unparalleled enthusiasm and matter of factness, they +undertook every dangerous mission against the life-line of the enemy +who controlled the sea, a control which they undermined, and brought +again the terror of the U-boats to the Seven Seas to the surprise of +the whole world. In an endless chain, the U-boat Commanders reported +success after success to their chief. In spite of the fact that his +duties took on unmeasurable proportions since the beginning of the +huge U-boat construction program the Chief was what he always was and +always will be, leader and inspiration to all the forces under him. +A clear regard for the essential and the decisive, power to act and +aggressiveness are his main characteristics. In spite of all his duties +he never lost touch with his men and he showed a masterly understanding +in adjusting himself to the changing fortunes of war. + +Doenitz was in charge of the Naval operations Command Post situated on +land. It is one of the strange and difficult characteristics of this +form of Naval warfare that the Commander cannot be with his men, cannot +make decisions on the spot but is forced to study the situation and +give orders thousands of miles away from the actual location. The very +strong ties between Doenitz and his men proved themselves in this case. +They never felt, and that was said many times in mess halls and on +enemy missions, that they had to make any of their difficult decisions +alone. Tiny, brief answers following rendered radio reports proved that +the Chief day and night was monitoring painstakingly their reports just +as if he was with them, as if he stood on the bridge beside them * * * + +On 21 April 1940 Doenitz received the Knight’s Cross to the Iron Cross, +a reward of the Fuehrer, which put the unique accomplishments of this +battle-tested officer in its true light. On September 1940, he was +promoted to Vice Admiral, a year and a half later on 14 March 1942 +he was promoted to Admiral, a reward for the heavy damages inflicted +on the new enemy, the U.S.A. On 30 January 1943 Doenitz received the +Supreme Command of the Germany Navy from the Fuehrer and concurrently +was promoted to Gross Admiral. + +For the huge successes of the U-boats Doenitz received on 7 April +1943 in recognition of his unique achievements in U-boat warfare from +the Fuehrer personally as the 223rd Soldier of the Wehrmacht, the Oak +Wreath to the Knights Cross of the Iron Cross. + +Even though the field of activity of the C in C of the German Navy has +experienced a tremendous extent on his personal leadership in U-boat +warfare and the personal care for his submarines, sailors, and for all +units of the German Navy will also in the future remain the supreme law +of all his action. Confidence merits confidence. The navy of Greater +Germany will prove that it is worthy of its C in C. + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1472-PS + + [CABLE] + + Date 16 December 1942 + + URGENT--SECRET + + TEXT: + +In accordance with the increased recruitment of manpower into the +concentration camps, which was ordered by 30 January 1943, the +following may be applied in the Jewish sector. + +1. Total amount: 45,000 Jews. + +2. Start of transportation 11 January 1943. + +3. Completion of transportation 31 January 1943. + +The Reichsbahn [German State owned railway] cannot make available +special trains for the evacuation during the period 15 December 1942/10 +January 1943 on account of the increased leave traffic of the Armed +Forces. + +4. Breakdown: The 45,000 Jews consist of 30,000 Jews from the +Bialystock district, 10,000 Jews from the Theresienstadt Ghetto. Among +those are 5,000 able-bodied Jews who, so far, have been utilized in +the Ghetto for necessary minor jobs, and 5,000 Jews who are generally +incapacitated; also Jews over sixty years of age, in order to reduce +in the interest of the extension of the Ghetto the excessive number +of inmates to slightly below 48,000. I request special permission for +this. As heretofore, only the Jews who have no special connections and +relations, and who have no important decorations, have been earmarked +for deportation; 3,000 Jews from the occupied areas in the Netherlands, +2,000 Jews from Berlin which equals 45,000. In the total of 45,000 +are included physically handicapped [underlined] and others (old Jews +and children). In making a distribution for this purpose, at least +10,000 to 15,000 laborers [underlined], will be available when the Jews +arriving at Auschwitz are assigned. + + The Chief of the security police and the SD + Dept. IV, Div. B, Sec. 4, a-2093/42 g (391) + + By Order of MUELLER + SS Gruppenfuehrer + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1481-PS + + 3.2.28 [in pencil], Fi 6/25 1. + + Secret State Police + Munich State Police District Office + B. No. 52401/37 11 B. + + Munich, 20 January, 1938. + + Decree + +By virtue of par. 1 of the Reich President’s order for the protection +of people and state of the 28.2.33 (RGBl 1 p. 83) the following decree +is issued: + +The Guild of the Virgin Mary [die Marianische Jungfrauenkongregation] +of the Bavarian diocese, including the diocese of Speyer, together +with its branches and associations and the Societies of Our Lady +[Jungfrauenvereinen] attached to it, is by police order to be dissolved +and forbidden with immediate effect. + +The property belonging to the dissolved Guild is to be confiscated by +the police. Not only is property in cash to be confiscated, but also +any stock on hand and other objects of value. All further activity is +forbidden the dissolved Guilds, particularly the foundation of any +organization intended as a successor or as a cover. Incorporation +as a body into other women’s societies is also to be looked on as a +forbidden continuation of activity. Infringement against the above +prohibition will be punished according to para. 4 of the order of +28.2.1933. + + Reasons + +In a parish in Nurnberg the Guild of the Virgin Mary, going outside +the sphere of the work proper to it, has occupied itself for years, +to a most far reaching degree, with arrangements of a worldly and +popular sporting character. Furthermore the president of the society +has continuously supplied the Guild of the Virgin Mary, from its +committee-members down to the women in charge of its groups, with +seditious material, which served for seditious discussions. Furthermore +the Guild of the Virgin Mary, particularly its leading circles, were +trained and mobilized for purely political and seditious tasks. + +The whole behaviour of the Guild of the Virgin Mary had therefore to +be objected to from various points of view. It could be repeatedly +observed that the Guild engaged in purely worldly affairs, such as +community games, and then in the holding of “Social Evenings”. + +This proves incontestably that the Guild of the Virgin Mary was active +to a very great degree in a manner unecclesiastical and therefore +worldly. By so doing it has left the sphere of its proper religious +task and entered a sphere of activity to which it has no statutory +right. The organization has therefore to be dissolved and forbidden. + + Signed. Beutel. + + certified copy--[signature illegible] + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1482-PS + + Berlin, 20 July 1935 + + The Reich and Prussian Minister of the Interior + III P 3701/5 + + Secret + Special Delivery Letter! + + [Stamp] + + The Reich Governor in Bavaria 22 July 1935--one enclosure + Sign: Fi 6 July 22 + [apparently signature, illegible] + +SUBJECT: Confessional youth organizations. + +A direct endangering of public security and order has resulted from +the recently observed intensive activity of confessional, particularly +Catholic youth organizations, which have in numerous cases considerably +overstepped the limits imposed on them by political development and +therefore in many places led to clashes with the organizations which +stand behind the government, particularly the Hitler youth. + +I therefore respectfully request that, on the basis of paragraph 1 of +the decree of 28 February 1933, the confessional youth organizations +be forbidden to wear uniforms or uniform-like clothing and to assemble +publicly with pennants and flags and that the wearing of insignia and +the wearing of uniform costume as a substitute for uniforms as well as +any outdoor sport activity be prohibited. + +I respectfully request that I be immediately informed of your +disposition (of the matter). + + Signed: Dr. FRICK + certified: [signature illegible] + Ministerial Chancellery Secretary + [stamp] settled 1 August + +To the provincial governments (for Prussia: to the deputy chief and +inspector of the Prussian secret state police) + +Munich M [signature illegible] + + Copies + + To Reich Minister Kerrl, Reich Minister for Science, Education, + and Public Training, and the Reich governors with a request for + cognizance. + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1498-PS + + The Reich and Prussian Minister of the Interior, VI 7770/3014 + + Berlin NW 40, Koenigsplatz 6, 6 Nov. 1934 + [telephone numbers, cable address] + + [Stamp] + + Reich Governor of Bavaria 7 Nov 1934----enclosures + GG 1/7 .m. + + SPECIAL DELIVERY LETTER + +To the State Governments for Prussia: + + _a._ The Prime Minister--office of Secret State Police. + _b._ The Minister of Science, Art and Public Education. + _c._ The provincial Presidents and District Presidents. + +_For Information_ + + To The State Secretary and Head of the Praesidium Chancellery. + + The State Secretary and Head of the Reich Chancellery. + + The Minister of Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda. + + Reich Governors (of the States). + + Executive Board of the NSDAP, Division for the Cultural peace in + Berlin. + + The Reich Bishop in _Berlin-Charlottenburg_. + +Subject: Evangelical Church Controversy. + +Lately there is an increase in cases in which ill-timed reports +regarding the Evangelical Church reach the public. I therefore +forbid--till further notice--all publications in the daily newspapers, +in pamphlets or handbills, which are concerned with questions of +the Evangelical Church, except only official announcements of the +Church Government of the Reich. My edicts of 17 August 1934--III +3033/3014--and of 1 November 1934--III 7570/3014--are to that extent +abrogated. + + [signed] FRICK + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1514-PS + +Command of Mil. District VI + +Dept. of Prisoners of War V Az. K 3 Nr. 1417/44 secret. + + Soest, Westphalia, 27 July 1944 + Phone: 1455/140. + + SECRET + + Reference: 1. OKW Az. 2f 24. 19b Chief of PW/general (Id) Nr. 1998/44 + secret of 16.7.44 + + 2. OKW Az. 2f 24. 19b AWA/PW general I (VIb) Nr. 2339/42 + secret of 27.8.42 + + 3. Mil. District VI, dept PW’s Az. K 8/a Nr. 751/42 secret + of 4.9.42 + + 4. Mil. District VI, dept PW’s V Az. K 18/VI Nr. 1948/44 of + 11.7.44 + + 5. OKW Az. 2f 24. 11 Chief of PW/general (VIa) Nr. 979/43 + secret of 19.4.43--reported by decree Mil. District VI, + dept PW’s Nr. 1015/43 secret. + + 6. Mil. District VI, dept PW’s Az. K 8 R Nr. 314/42 secret + of 7.4.42 + + 7. Mil. District VI, dept PW’s V, Az. K 11 Nr. 1125/44 + secret of 11.7.44 + +Subject: Delivery of prisoners of war to the secret state police. + +Enclosed is the decree I referred to. + +The following, summarizing ruling is issued with respect to the +delivery to the secret state police: + +1. _a._ According to the decrees 2 and 3, the commander of the camp +has to deliver Soviet prisoners of war in case of punishable offenses +to the secret state police and to dismiss them from imprisonment of +war, if he does not believe that his disciplinary functions suffice to +prescribe punishment for violations committed. Report of the facts is +not necessary. + +_b._ Recaptured Soviet prisoners of war have to be delivered first to +the nearest police office in order to ascertain whether punishable +offenses have been committed during the escape. The dismissal from +imprisonment of war takes place upon suggestion of the police +office, Section A 6 of the decree referred to in No. 4 regarding the +contraction of all regulations on the Arbeitseinsatz prisoners of war +who have been recaptured and refuse to work. + +_c._ Recaptured Soviet officers who are prisoners of war, have to be +delivered to the _Gestapo_ and to be dismissed from imprisonment of +war. (Section C 1 of the decree referred to under 4 and under 5). + +_d._ Soviet officer prisoners of war, who refuse to work and those who +distinguish themselves as agitators and have an unfavorable influence +upon the willingness to work of the other prisoners of war have to be +delivered by the responsible Stalag to the nearest state police office +and to be dismissed from imprisonment of war. (Section C 1 of the +decree referred to under 4 and 5). + +_e._ Soviet enlisted prisoners of war, refusing to work who are +ringleaders and those who distinguish themselves as agitators and +therefore have an unfavorable influence upon the willingness to work of +the other prisoners of war, have to be delivered to the nearest state +police office and to be dismissed from imprisonment of war. (Section C +2 of the decree, referred to in 4). + +_f._ Soviet prisoners of war (enlisted men and officers), who with +respect to their political attitude have been sifted out by the +special purpose command [Einsatzkommando] of the security police and +the security service, have to be delivered upon request by the camp +commander to the special purpose command and to be dismissed from +imprisonment of war. (Decree referred to in 6). + +_g._ Polish prisoners of war have to be delivered if acts of sabotage +are proven, to the nearest state police office and to be dismissed from +imprisonment of war. The decision rests with the camp commander. Report +of the deed is not necessary. (Decree referred to under 7). + +2. A report on the delivery and dismissal from imprisonment of war +in the cases mentioned under #1 of this decree, to the Mil. District +Command VI, dept of prisoners of war, is not necessary. + +3. Prisoners of war from all nations have to be delivered to the secret +state police and to be dismissed from imprisonment of war, if a special +order of the OKW or of the Mil. District Command VI, department for +Prisoners of War, is issued. + +4. Prisoners of war under suspicion of participating in illegal +organizations and resistance movements have to be left upon request to +the Gestapo for the purpose of interrogation. They remain prisoners of +war and have to be treated as such. The delivery to the Gestapo and +their dismissal from imprisonment of war has to take place only by +order of the OKW or of the Mil. District Command VI, dept of prisoners +of war. + +In case of French and Belgian prisoners of war and interned Italian +military personnel, approval of Mil. District command VI, dept. of +prisoners of war, has to be obtained--if necessary by phone--before +delivery to the Gestapo for the purposes of interrogation. + +By order of the Mil. District Commander + + The commander of prisoners of war + + The deputy + [signed] FLEMM + +1 enclosure. + +Distribution: + + Oflag VI/A, B, C, D.6, + + Stalag VI/A, C, D, F, G, J.326 (VI/K) + + Construction work battalion of PW (BAB) 6, 7, 12, 17, 18, 26, 35, 39, + 45, 46, 106. + + PW Roof repair battalion VI, XVI + + PW Glass installation Battalion VI, XVI + + District commander rear area of PW/Z.V. Staff/Counter intelligence + officer + + file 5 + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1517-PS + + TOP SECRET + + MEMORANDUM + + About Discussions [of Rosenberg] with the Fuehrer on 14 December 1941 + +To begin with, I [Rosenberg] asked the Fuehrer about my speech in the +Sportpalast and referred to several points which seemed to call for +further discussion. The Fuehrer was of the opinion that the speech was +given prior to the declaration of war by Japan and therefore under +different suppositions, but in view of this, still desires to think +over several points. It probably would not be appropriate if I were +to officially say that the provinces in the East were to remain under +Germany. I said thereupon that I, too, had considered this point, that +one can probably only say that the Eastern Provinces [Ostland] will +remain under German protection. The Fuehrer was of the opinion, only to +go so far that the provinces never would come under communism and now +from the German side appear as secured. + +I remarked on the Jewish question that the comments about the New York +Jews must perhaps be changed somewhat after the conclusion (of matters +in the East). I took the standpoint, not to speak of the extermination +[Ausrottung] of the Jews. The Fuehrer affirmed this and said that they +had burdened the war upon us and that they had brought the destruction; +it is no wonder if the results would strike them first. + +The Fuehrer further said that he did not deem it necessary to order +forth the other nations to contribute as yet, since they can produce +therein a legal claim for later. He does that from time to time in +single negotiations. I told him that I, too, had written that down +as a question. I would comply with these instructions to edit more +carefully the corresponding paragraphs in my speech. The Fuehrer agreed +throughout that I had touched upon the Asiatic conflict. + +Following, I laid before the Fuehrer the outline of a religious +tolerance decree, to which the Fuehrer consented after careful +consideration. + +Then I came to talk about the lecture of Professor Schuessler, to +whom Dr. Dietrich had given instructions to evaluate the political +testament of Peter the Great in an address. Dr. Dietrich had not +previously informed me thereon. Upon my indication that this testament +is a forgery out of the 18th Century, the Fuehrer thought that the +authenticity was contradicted by a German scholar in the 19th Century. +Thereupon I pointed out that this so-called testament was written in +Polish circles and that it then was converted and changed by Napoleon +in the political strife. However, I would make an accurate check. I +asked the Fuehrer for a general rule that if the Fuehrer had specific +desires over the press to have Dr. Dietrich inform me of these to +insure a regulated working arrangement. + +The Fuehrer replied to the question by the military commanders in the +occupied Eastern territories about the marriage of persons belonging +to the Armed Forces with inhabitants of these territories that no +marriages will be permitted during this war. After the war a relaxation +could be introduced to agree with the political limits and blood +relationship. + +I then spoke about the relation with Reich Commissioner Koch and told +the Fuehrer that Koch had, through various declarations, created the +impression among the officers of the High Command of the Armed Forces +(OKW) as if he dealt directly with the Fuehrer and otherwise decided +to rule without Berlin. Similar utterances that he made the law were +made to collaborators and he also told me once that he regarded himself +as coordinated. I made it clear to him that here exists a distinct +official relation. I spoke with him regarding the above and I hope that +clarification over the cooperation will result. I have only the wish +that the Fuehrer no longer will receive Koch alone but only in my +presence. The Fuehrer agreed immediately. + +Then I told the Fuehrer of the visit by General Kitzinger, who said +that he was assigned with the thrashing of the harvest. For this +purpose he was promised several divisions which have not yet arrived. +Moreover, they took from him other units. The Fuehrer said that he +would see to it that a change will be enforced and that divisions will +be given him. On the conditions of the captured prisoners Kitzinger +remarked that because of malnutrition [Entkraeftung] in the camps in +his territory, some 2500 prisoners die daily. Anyhow, they are already +unable to consume good food and one must count on it that not very many +will remain. Aside from that, the manpower in the country is large +enough--the land even partly over-populated. + +I further asked the Fuehrer if he had scrutinized the memoir on the +establishment of Turkish legions. What I surmise, since the High +Command of the Armed Forces (OKW) issued an order, is that beside the +Turkish-Aserbeidschander Legion, other Caucasian legions will be set +up also. The Fuehrer affirmed the question, and I once more referred +to the danger of a Panturanian movement. I reported further about the +petition of the Crimean tartars from Constantinople and the request +to visit the prison camps and to inspect the countrymen. I told the +Fuehrer that I had denied this request which he absolutely affirmed. +The only thing one could do would be to segregate the 250 captured +Crimean tartars with respect to Turkey, and to handle them accordingly. +In conclusion, the Fuehrer once more emphasized that he later wished +to have the Crimea cleaned out. I told him that I, too, had given +much consideration to the renaming of the towns and thought to rename +Simferopol to Gotenburg and Sevastopol to Theodorichhafen--this +according to the instructions of the Fuehrer himself. + +Then I suggested a boundary settlement between Nikolajew and +Transnistry to the Fuehrer, because the way things are, the Rumanians +can look into all the shipbuilding installations; just an insignificant +regulation will prevent this. I had also made this suggestion to +General Field Marshal Keitel. The Fuehrer looked at the map and agreed +to such a boundary regulation. + +Finally, I told the Fuehrer that I had in mind to go to Riga in January +and to visit other territories during the next year. I begged the +Fuehrer to allow me to obtain several coaches for a special train. I +have already started dealings over the procurement of such coaches in +Holland. The Fuehrer thought this all right and agreed with my wish. + +Thereupon I gave the Fuehrer an aforementioned letter of a Japanese +scholar over the Japanese and National Socialistic Philosophy of Life +as related to Christianity, over which we talked for a long time. The +Fuehrer took the memoir with him, which immediately engrossed him. + + Berlin, 16 December 1941 + + R/H + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1519-PS + + The National Socialist German Workers Party Party Chancellery + + Fuehrer Headquarters + 30.9.1941 + + The Director of the Party Chancellery + + [Stamp] + + Gau Training Office, Franken + No. 2131 + Received 8 Oct. 41 + Sent + + CONFIDENTIAL + + Circular No. 21/41 Confidential + + (not for publication) + +_Subject: Treatment of Soviet Prisoners of War_ + +For your information please find enclosed a regulation of the Supreme +Command of the Armed Forces, dated 8.9.1941 on the treatment of Soviet +prisoners of War. This regulation is _confidential_! + + Heil Hitler! + + sgd. Bormann + +One appendix overleaf + +Certified: + +Distribution: + + Gauleiters + Kreisleiters + + # # # # # + + Supreme Command of the Armed Forces + Az. 2f 24.11 General Armed Forces Dept./P.W. (I) + No. 3058 41 Confidential + + Berlin--Schoeneberg, 8.9.1941 + + 2 Appendices Badenschestrasse 51 + + CONFIDENTIAL + + _Subject_: Regulation for the treatment of Soviet prisoners of war. + + _Reference_: 1. OKW/P.W. 26/41 Most Secret dated 16.6.1941 (only for + the P.W. commandants in Service Command I and the + General Government). + + 2. OKW/P.W. 2144/41 Secret dated 26.6.1941. + + 3. OKW/P.W. 2401/41 Secret dated 17.7.1941. + + 4. OKW/P.W. 15 No. 5015/41 dated 2.8.1941 + +Appended is a collation of and/or additions to the orders already +issued in various directives on the treatment of Soviet prisoners +of war. The directives, already issued by Supreme Command General +Headquarters for the operational areas, have been considered. By this +order any orders on this subject become invalid so long as no direct +reference is made to them in the appendix. + + Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces + + By order of + + Reinecke + + # # # # # + + Appendix to Diary--No. 3058/41 + Confidential dated 8.9.1941. + + CONFIDENTIAL + +Regulation for the treatment of Soviet PWs in all prisoner of war camps. + +I. _Treatment of Soviet PWs in general._ + +_Bolshevism is the deadly enemy of Nazi Germany._ For the first time, +the German soldier is encountering not only a military opponent, but +one, at the same time, steeped in the ideas of Bolshevism so pernicious +to the people. The fight against National-Socialism has become part +of his system. He conducts it by every means in his power: Sabotage, +seditious propaganda, incendiarism, murder. The bolshevist soldier has +therefore lost all claim to treatment as an honourable opponent in +accordance with the Geneva Convention. + +It is therefore in keeping with the respect and honour of the German +Armed Forces, that _every German soldier_ should hold himself severely +aloof when dealing with Soviet prisoners of war. Treatment must be +cool but correct. Any indulgence or even friendly disposition is to +be punished very severely. The feeling of pride and superiority of +the German soldier ordered to guard Soviet PWs, must at all times be +visible even in public. + +The order for ruthless and energetic action must be given at the +slightest indication of insubordination, especially in the case of +Bolshevic fanatics. Insubordination, active or passive resistance must +_immediately_ be broken completely by force of arms (bayonets, butts +and firearms). The regulations on the use of arms in the Armed Forces +can be applied only to a limited extent as these regulations apply +under the assumption that _conditions will be generally peaceful_. With +Soviet PWs it is already necessary for reasons of discipline, that the +use of arms should be severe. Anyone carrying out an order, who does +not use his weapons or does so with insufficient energy, is punishable. + +PWs attempting to escape are to be fired on without previous challenge. +No warning shot must ever be fired. The regulations already made, in +particular H. Dv. 38/11, page 13, etc., are invalid with regard to that +point. On the other hand, no arbitrary action is permitted. PWs who +are obedient and willing to work are to be treated correctly. However, +caution and mistrust must never lapse when dealing with PWs. The use of +arms against PWs is, as a rule, legal. + +Any contact between PWs and the civilian population must be prevented. +This applies particularly to the occupied area. The segregation of +higher-ranking PWs (Officers and NCOs), which has already been effected +by the field forces, must be strictly maintained in the area of the +Armed Forces Commanders and within the Reich. Any communication between +higher-ranking personnel and the men, even by signs, must be rendered +impossible. + +Camp-police must be formed from suitable Soviet PWs in the camp and in +the larger fatigue details to be employed in carrying out the orders +and upholding the discipline of the commandant. Within the wire fence, +the camp police may be armed with sticks, whips or other similar +weapons to enable them to carry out their duties effectively. The use +of this kind of weapon by _German soldiers_ is absolutely forbidden. +With the offer of better food, treatment and accommodation, an +executive body should be created in the camp; this would decrease the +work of the German guard personnel. + + +II. _Treatment of members of racial groups._ + +In accordance with orders issued to date, PWs have already been +divided up, according to their race, in the “Home Organisation” +[heimatorganisation] (General Government and Service Command I) as +well as in the camps within the Reich. The following racial groups are +concerned: + + Racial Germans + Ukrainians + White Russians + Poles + Lithuanians + Latvians + Esthonians + Rumanians + Finns + Georgians. + +In so far as it has been impossible for special reasons to carry +out this separation, it must now be done at once. This applies, in +particular, to PWs newly captured in the Area of the Armed Forces +Commanders. + +Members of the following racial groups must be speedily sent home: + + Racial Germans + Ukrainians, White Ruthenians + Latvians + Esthonians + Rumanians + Finns + Lithuanians + +Special orders will be issued on the manner in which this release is to +be effected. + +Should the attitude of individual members of these racial groups arouse +the suspicion that they could be detrimental or dangerous to the German +people or to National-Socialism, they are to be debarred from release +and will be dealt with in accordance with section III. + + +III. _Segregation of civilians and politically undesirable PWs taken + during the Eastern campaign._ + +1. _Intentions._ The Armed Forces must rid themselves of all those +elements among the PWs which must be considered as the driving +forces of bolshevism. The special conditions of the Eastern Campaign +demand _special measures_ which can be carried out on their own +responsibility, free from bureaucratic and administrative influences. + +2. _The way to reach the appointed goal._ A. Apart from directing PWs +into camps according to their nationality (see section II) PWs (also +members of racial groups) and any civilians in the camps are to be +divided as follows: + + _a._ those politically undesirable + + _b._ those politically harmless + + _c._ those especially reliable in the political sense (who could be + employed in the reconstruction work in the occupied areas). + +B. Whereas the work of separation according to nationality, rank, etc., +is undertaken by the camp organisation itself, the Reichsfuehrer-SS has +assigned _Special purpose units of the Security Police and the Security +Service_ for the work of classifying PWs according to their political +opinions. They are immediately subordinate to the Chief of the Security +Police and the SD, have received special training for their special +duties and carry out the measures and inquiries, within the framework +of the camp organisation, according to regulations which they have +already received from the Chief of Security Police and the SD. + +There must be the closest cooperation between the commandants, +especially their defense officers, and the special purpose units. + +3. _Further treatment of groups segregated in accordance with No. 2._ +A. _Military personnel._ The special purpose unit of the Security +Police and SD decides what persons are to be segregated as “politically +undesirable elements”. Should individuals, considered as suspicious, +later prove themselves to be _unsuspicious_, they should be sent back +to the camp with the other PWs. Requests made by the special purpose +units for other persons to be handed over, must be complied with. +Officers will very often be liable for segregation as “political +undesirables”. Even soldiers captured in civilian clothes, count as +military personnel. + +B. _Civilians._ If they are harmless, efforts must be made to send them +back quickly to the occupied area. The competent Armed Forces Commander +(and/or the commander in the army area to the rear) decides the time +this is to be brought about, with the approval of the competent office +of the Chief of the Security Police and SD. The condition for this +return is the assurance of employment in some work in their hometown +or in specially created Labour-formations. The Armed Forces Commander +(and/or the commander in the army area to the rear) is responsible for +guarding them on the return journey. If possible, the camp will provide +an escort unit. Politically undesirable civilians are to be treated as +under A. + +C. _Reliable persons_ are to be separated from politically undesirable +persons and directed into some other work of camp administration. + +(Special attention must be paid to racial Germans: it is, however quite +possible that, even among these, there may be elements that must be +considered as “politically undesirable”.) + +Should the reliable persons seem especially suited for employment in +the reconstruction work in the occupied area, a request for release +made by the special purpose unit of the Security Police and SD can be +opposed only if there is an interest in any specific individual from +the point of view of defense. + + +IV. _Employment of Soviet PWs._ + +1. _General._ Soviet PWs may be employed only in squads completely +separate from civilians and PWs of other nationalities. (Employment +in groups). The only places of work which can be considered are these +where the PWs can work under the _constant_ supervision of the guard +personnel. The separation from civilians and PWs of other nationalities +must be enforced, not only in the billets, but also at the place of +work. It must be stressed, in this connection, that the guard personnel +must not be prevented from immediate use of their weapons out of +consideration for a third person. + +2. _Special regulations for employment within the Reich._ The main +principle for the employment of Soviet PWs within the Reich, is the +assured security of German life and German property. + +The Armed Forces authorities in charge of employment have the sole +responsibility for the orderly employment of Soviet PWs. + +Therefore, employment, first and foremost, must be taken up in work +connected with the Armed Forces. In the case of employment in the civil +sector, the local employment authorities can make suggestions, but +the decision, contrary to the regulations on the employment of other +PWs, rests with the Armed Forces authorities. In cases where all the +conditions for constant supervision and complete separation from the +civilian population cannot be complied with by a civilian place of work +employment cannot be approved. Should one of these conditions lapse +later on, the fatigue detail is to be withdrawn forthwith. + +In addition, the instructions OKW/PW (15) No. 5015/41, dated 2.8.41 is +to be followed in detail. Anyone breaking it will be severely punished. + +3. _Guard duties._ The best possible trained energetic and prudent +guard personnel are to be chosen to guard the Soviet PWs and constantly +instructed by the Training Officer of the Military base camp [A. O. des +M. Stammlagers]. + +At least one guard must be assigned to each 10 PWs. There must, +however, never be one guard alone on duty. Should a fatigue detail +consist of _no more than_ 10 men, 2 guards must be employed to guard +them. Guards should be equipped with hand grenades if possible. Those +guarding larger squads must also be issued with machine guns or +sub-machine guns. + +Places of work must be frequently examined by officers or experienced +NCOs. They are responsible for seeing that the orders given are carried +out to the letter. + +The notes, attached as an appendix, are to be made available for +thorough and detailed perusal. + +The billets of Soviet PWs on fatigue details are to be under constant +guard, even at night, and are to be inspected from time to time by the +supervising authorities. + + +V. _Final remarks._ + +PW-commandants are to be made personally responsible that under +all circumstances the above regulations are strictly observed by +subordinate units. This duty may in no case cease or be influenced by +a change in offices. Therefore all offices and units newly concerned +and employed in this sphere must be made thoroughly acquainted with the +content of the regulations. + + # # # # # + + Appendix to the Order of OKW/Gen. Armed Forces Dept. PW section No. + 3058/41 Secret dated 8.9.1941 (for free distribution!) + + Notes on the guarding of Soviet Prisoners of War. + + +_Bolshevism is the deadly enemy of Nazi Germany_ + +For the first time in this war, the German soldier is encountering +not only a military opponent, but one, at the same time, politically +educated, who sees in communism his ideal and in National-Socialism, +his most provocative enemy. In the fight against National-Socialism, +every method is, to him, legal: sniping, guerrilla warfare, sabotage, +incendiarism, seditious propaganda, murder. Even a Soviet soldier in +captivity, however harmless he may appear on the surface, will snatch +any opportunity to show his hatred of everything German. It is quite +possible that the PWs received corresponding instructions on how to +act in captivity. It is essential, therefore, to treat them with the +utmost vigilance, the greatest caution and complete mistrust. + +The principles to be followed by guard personnel are: + +1. Ruthless action at the slightest indication of insubordination +or disobedience. Weapons are to be used unsparingly to put down +resistance. PWs attempting to escape are to be fired on immediately +(without a challenge) with the firm intention of hitting them. + +2. Any _conversation_--even on the march to and from the place of +work--unless it concerns absolutely necessary official instructions, +is _utterly forbidden_. No smoking at all is allowed on the march to +and from the places of work--as well as during work. In the same way, +all conversation between PWs and _civilians_ is to be prevented, if +necessary by force of arms--even against the civilians. + +3. At the place of work also, a constant and careful supervision by +German guard personnel is required. Each guard must always _keep a +sufficient distance_ from the PWs to enable him, at any time, to use +his weapons _without delay_. Never turn your back on a PW. + +4. Slackness is out of place even with a _PW who is obedient and +willing to work_. He interprets it as weakness and draws his own +conclusions. + +5. When German soldiers are ruthlessly carrying out given orders with +all severity and harshness, any arbitrary action, maltreatment and, +above all, the use of clubs and whips is forbidden. This would be out +of keeping with the honour of German soldiers as armed men. + +6. The appearance of seeming harmless on the part of bolshevist PWs +must never lead to the slackening of the above instructions. + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1520-PS + + Notes about a discussion with the Fuehrer at the Fuehrer Headquarters + on the 8th of May 1942. + + Present at first Reich Minister Dr. Lammers [also Bormann and + Rosenberg, the author of the notes]. + +I began with reporting to the Fuehrer about the results of the 1941/42 +collection of the NSDAP of books for the German Armed Forces resulting +in more than 9 million books, from which 46,000 libraries were formed. + +Then I dealt with certain reproaches raised against the Ministry East. +The article in the “information service” of the Ministry for Propaganda +concerning construction and aims of the Ministry East appeared without +any knowledge whatsoever on my part. I had, as a matter of principle, +agreed with the Ministry for Propaganda that no publications whatsoever +regarding the occupied Eastern Territories should be published without +my express consent. This became essential because even ministers talked +about the “_Policy of Colonisation_” in the East.--Then it was also +said that I had declared 650 men as unfit for war service and thus +deprived the armed forces of them, and that I also left 90 officers +without work as an advance command in Taganrog. I want to state that, +because of the newly reinforced decree, the Ministry East has handed +over 650 men; however, up to a few weeks ago only 240 men have been +called away. As concerns the 90 men in Taganrog, this is not a measure +taken by me but by the Economic Staff East and the armed forces +armament staff, resp. Therefore, this matter was none of my affair. +Furthermore, this advance commando has been dissolved. + +As regards the resettlement of the Germans from Lithuania, the Fuehrer +said that he was under the impression that people who had already +settled here would have to be resettled again. I told the Fuehrer that +it was not so, this was a matter concerning more than 30,000 settlers +capable of resettlement who were still detained in camps and who were +worn down by the prolonged camp life. + +At last I referred to the new Molotov memorandum regarding supposed +horrors and our economic measures, which, as a matter of fact, refers +to some statements in the so-called “Green Folder” of the economic +staff East of the 4-year Plan. Presumably such statements had been +discovered on the body of a shot agrarian leader; a year ago I had +already expressed my concern about the too-clearly expressed tendencies +of those statements. A number of agrarian leaders already had been +killed, also three territorial commissioners already have been killed +fighting the partisans. + +Thereafter I described to the Fuehrer the considerations which caused +me to grant _self-administration_ to the Baltic countries. First of +all this was not proclaimed by Law, but it was only my _decree_ to the +Reich Commissioner with the corresponding directives. In practice it +meant nothing beyond a confirmation of an already existing state of +affairs and the abolition of a certain uncertainty. We were very short +of officials and were thus forced to be most economical with human +material. However, frequently efforts were noticeable to meddle with +the trivialities of life which necessitates new demands and withdraws +too many soldiers from the armed forces. It left the doors open for +some people to escape army service. Furthermore, self-administration +was connected with an increased willingness to work. After all there +were enough safety clauses whereby the self-administration could not +undertake anything without the sanction of the Commissioner General. +In order to eliminate any possible political danger, an exception +has been made with _Riga_. Riga has 10-12,000 officials and was to +receive a German mayor who is not subordinated to the Lithuanian +self-administration. Thereby a personal political policy of the +Lithuanian Directorate would be avoided. By this measure Riga would be +an experiment for annexed administration. + +We also created an historical alibi and had demonstrated that we were +meeting the Baltic nations more than half way. If at a later date this +would not be acknowledged, we had every justification to proceed more +drastically. The Fuehrer kept all decrees and regulations in order to +examine them. Yet during the whole of the report he made no comments. + +Afterwards the Fuehrer asked how all those economical measures were +looked upon by the part of the Germans, whereupon I replied that, of +course, the entire economical management was in German hands, and +that this fact had produced a deterioration of the morale. Generally +speaking the monopolistic companies and the ZHO [Zentralhandelsges. +Ost--Eastern Central Trade], are fundamentally necessary, only they +have to be supervised. Dr. Lammers interjected that private profits had +to be throttled in order to avoid too strong a group of profiteers. +I once more referred to the question of monopolies and wished to +ascertain whether the Fuehrer intended an absolute tobacco monopoly +for here, whereupon he declared that he was particularly interested in +the retail monopoly. The question of arranging for the producers could +still be settled at a later date. I replied that the economic leaders +have not yet agreed upon the question of the producers. The opinion is +frequently prevalent, that the production itself need not necessarily +be a direct state monopoly. I told the Fuehrer that I shall have the +whole question examined once again. + +Then the problem of _religious freedom_ for the occupied Eastern +territories was discussed. The Fuehrer consulted Reichsleiter Bormann, +who already had gathered much experience by the preparations for +the Wartheland and for Austria. I explained the situations in the +East was that various large ecclesiastical groups being formed, but +that one should not allow such development to take place without +supervision, but that one ought to direct same and that the intended +decrees, respectively orders, were for the purpose of protecting +us from unanticipated surprises. Bormann entirely agreed with this +attitude, he merely questioned if the Reichminister East, who also had +some standing in Germany, would not produce too close a dependency +by a law which might have repercussions inside the Reich. What was +to be understood under “religious freedom” was to be interpreted +_by the Churches_, and he could anticipate, that such a law would +produce hundreds of new letters and complaints on the part of the +churches within the Reich. The Fuehrer considered a number of twists +and forms which would eliminate such a danger, and after discussing +its suitability the Fuehrer read the decree and gave his consent. +Finally it was agreed that the whole question was not to be settled _by +myself_ in the form of a law, but that the Reich Commissioners take the +existing religious freedom so to speak for granted and would decree +the necessary executive orders. I was then to watch the development +continuously and retain the executive control. It is easily possible +that the leaders of the churches in the Ukraine would combine in order +to elect a patriarch. I pointed out that this was already the case for +all practical purposes and that a steering of the matter is necessary. +The Fuehrer asked me if I really thought that all the Ukrainians +were faithful adherents of the church. I replied that with the older +generation and the women it was certainly the case, the youth were +already somewhat unaccustomed to church. Furthermore I had transported +from Kiev to Berlin the “Atheist Museum”. In this the writings of the +national writer of the Ukraine, Schewischenko, are quoted and may be +possible to publish them in the Ukrainian language in a sense which +in truth was not for the church. Also such freedom of expression of +opinion has also to be guaranteed. Moreover the Fuehrer emphasized +that after the war he would proceed against the churches with the +fitting measures; he believed that he was still able to do something +because of his authority which at a later date would be difficult for +anybody else. He would not forget the attitude of the church during the +war. I told the Fuehrer that I carried out church political lectures +in a small circle in my lecture house in Dahlem, in which the whole +problem was thoroughly examined, so that in the future the necessary +ideological fight would also be carried out with the necessary +knowledge and on the necessary scale. + +Then the treatment of the countries which were Germany’s wards was +discussed. I pointed out that some representatives interpreted the +point of view of the master race, by travelling up and down the +country with the whip. It is true, formerly one used to say of the +Slavs that they liked to be thrashed. But this had changed radically. +Now the situation was that the public thrashing meant the same as for +the Orientals “the losing of face.” Even the Bolshevics mistreated +the prisoners abominably behind the walls, but never in public view. +A number of incidents had occurred caused by thoughtless talk. It +is necessary that our foreign representatives also know how _to +keep silent_. The Fuehrer read the draft of my decree for the Reich +Commissioner Ukraine and gave his consent to it. + +I then described to the Fuehrer the reception of the _three delegations +of farmers_ in grateful acknowledgment of our agrarian legislation +and produced all our propaganda, such as circulars, pamphlets, +posters, translations of German writings, etc. The difficulty here, +too, was that it had taken a long time until the 18 waggons could be +transported. A part had remained in the Government General. The whole +action was very successful. I then submitted to the Fuehrer photographs +of Ukrainian men and women who were working in the Heinkel works. The +Fuehrer expressed his surprise at the extraordinary good looks and even +beauty of the people. + +I then dealt with the _employment of foreign workers_ in the occupied +Eastern territories. I had appointed a special delegate for this who +had been very active lately to cultivate all those existing connections +and to institute new ones. At first the Danish minister Larsen had +travelled the Eastland with the General-Director Junker who was +the chief of the Danish committee for employment in the East. This +journey already had produced tangible, practical results: in Port +Kunda a large cement works was being rebuilt, the machinery would be +delivered within a few weeks. After an initial starting time about +75,000 tons of cement will be produced annually. Further erections of +cement works would be possible. The completion of peat works could now +be prepared in order to benefit from it in the following year. Two +experts had to be sent there, and within a few weeks one could start +with the installations. The same applies to large plaster factory, +to the completion of concrete and wooden shoe factories. Since it +will probably become impossible in the future to continue to provide +the population with leather shoes. The factory will be capable of a +daily output of 10,000 shoes. Furthermore, a number of other business +plannings are also being considered. Especially the oil factory at +Libau is ready to be taken over, also creameries, shipbuilding plants, +etc. All those works thus promise a considerable increase in production +for the coming years. Negotiations had taken place also with the Dutch, +and Reich Commissioner Seyss Inquart had just now submitted a first +draft regarding the employment of Dutch people in the region of Libau. +It is planned to hand over to the Dutch people 500,000 ha of land to +be cultivated under stipulation that after delivery of all that is +claimed by the German administration, they are permitted to export +the surplus to Holland. Some of the details had still to be settled. +The Fuehrer thought one could as a matter of principle admit Dutchmen +to the East, because if there were not more than 1000 people, then +they would be absorbed. He did not wish large colonies. The matter +was left undecided, to be thoroughly investigated. Moreover the DAF +German Workers Front had bought a wharf at Varna in order to tackle the +building of concrete ships. + +I then reported to the Fuehrer the planning of central office for +planning in the East, and I gave him the names on the committee for the +general policy, economics, etc. The supreme authorities of the Reich +had sent their emissaries. Naturally nothing would be done at this +stage in which might somehow hamper the war production. + +Then the discussion turned to Caucasia and _the policy of the AA_ +[Foreign Ministry] towards the Eastern territories. I reported to +the Fuehrer that, for some time, we had picked out the best of the +prisoners by commissions of the Ministry East. The OKW had now +established the Turkestan Legion through direct collaboration with +us. According to my information received from the manager of chief +section “Policy”, the camp is in perfect condition, the Commander has +learned the Turkestan language, and the Turkestans have accepted German +military terms and have an anti-Bolshevist attitude. The legions of the +Caucasians would be modeled on similar lines. If one had not in the +beginning on the part of the SD, called all those peoples “Asiatics”, +had them shot or left to their fate, there would be more troops at the +disposal of the German Reich today. A new flag was created for the +Turkestan legion, the half moon was done away with and in its place +put bow and arrow. I showed the Fuehrer the individual symbols for the +designs for flags for the Georgians, Armenians, Aserbeidschanians, +Cubancossacks, and Kalmucks. The Fuehrer had no objections against +these designs, however, he asked my opinion about the Armenians. +I stated that Armenia was the best bolt between Turkey and +Aserbeidschan, and thus could stop a Panturanian movement towards the +East. Generally speaking the Armenian people themselves are stationary, +a people of farmers who had considerable industrial skill. + +I then described to the Fuehrer our relationship with the Foreign +Ministry. The Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs claimed the political +handling of the Eastern territories, in as far as it has not been taken +over directly within our administration. I said that the Reich Foreign +Minister had formed a large Eastern committee and had despite our +protests convoked in increasing measure the most varied emigrants. I +read to the Fuehrer a list of emigrants from Turkey, from Paris, from +Switzerland, all of whom were staying at the Adlon Hotel in Berlin. +Two of them, according to our information, were well-known espionage +agents. I thought it extremely risky to assemble here these emigrants +from all parts of the world. The Fuehrer listened in surprise. I said +that we prepared years ago already for the Eastern question. In this +connection we had made possible the studies of Dr. Benzing and assigned +him upon request for a certain period to the AA. The AA then created +for him a separate department for planning and appointed him to be a +Regierungsrat [Advisor of the Government]. + +It subsequently refused to return him to us. The same applies in the +case of the Turkestanian Kayum. The questions had long been discussed +with him. We had merely loaned him to the AA for the purpose of +broadcasting propaganda. Now the AA was sending him to Paris, in order +to collect emigrants. The Fuehrer gave the strictest instructions to +the Reich Minister Dr. Lammers, to inform the AA officially that it +had to discontinue its activities in the East instantly. It was also +to release the retained personalities to the Ministry East, and he did +not wish any further inquiries. I further explained that I had talked +to State Secretary v. Weizsaecker a few weeks ago and requested him +to inform the Reich Foreign Minister that I was looking forward to +speaking to him personally. Weizsaecker said that the two points of +view differed. When Weizsaecker was asked about it after some time, he +said that he did not understand from this talk that _he_ was to arrange +the meeting between Ribbentrop and myself. We have interpreted this +remark that the matter was to be put off until after the Congress of +emigrants had been convoked in Berlin. Some days ago we were informed +by a liaison man of the AA that they did not at all consider the +attitude which I had reported to the Fuehrer in regard to the Caucasian +people, as binding for them but that it was of a purely private +character. The Fuehrer once more emphasized his point of view. + +I then reported to the Fuehrer on the work of the preparatory +reconstruction staffs. With the exception of a few personalities whom +the Fuehrer preferred not to have employed or preferred to be used +in Germany the Fuehrer accepted the proposed list of personalities. +The tasks of Reich Minister Speer and his relationship with me were +then thoroughly discussed. The Fuehrer said that he, for example, +had made the worst experiences in regard to the matters of railroad +traffic by the fact that the Government General had its own railroad +administration between the front lines and the Reich. Because of these +circumstances a lot of misunderstandings and frictions were caused. +The separate administrations did not function and interfered with the +uniform technical direction so that very nearly catastrophic conditions +resulted, if the _entire_ administration of railroad traffic had not +been transferred to the Reich Ministry of Communication. Only by these +means had it become gradually possible to increase the daily number +of trains from 125 to 220. For the construction of main thoroughfares +and armament works it is also necessary that a central office has +control, and Speer already proved at the beginning of his official +duties that he knew how to tackle a job well. He succeeded to solve +many a technical task in very short time, which normally would have +taken months, and he, the Fuehrer, was most satisfied with this choice. +I told the Fuehrer that I had promised my utmost support to Speer from +the very beginning and that I had accepted in principle his first +drafts for an arrangement, with the only exception of two points, that +is this arrangement should remain in force beyond the duration of the +war and secondly, that the department Chief of the O.T. [Organisation +Todt], who should have a rank of about Oberregierungsrat, should be +able to pass a decision against the Reich Commissioners. + +The Fuehrer thereupon stated repeatedly that the Reich Ministry Speer +would be dissolved on the very day peace was declared and all his +present tasks would be split up. The management of the artery roads +through the East, however, had still technically to be centrally +conducted. They are, therefore, tasks for the immediate war effort. +Speer also neither has the intention nor the commission to start +building houses now, but he must be empowered to prevent the building +anywhere of large administrative palaces or similar buildings, which +are not war essential. Dr. Lammers suggested to include by way of +agreement or decree of the Fuehrer, that this decree was only for +the duration of the war. I then described to the Fuehrer the present +general situation, according to which new plenipotentiaries-in-chief +endeavoured to carry out direct actions in the occupied Eastern +territories, overlooking those dignitaries who were appointed by the +Fuehrer himself. At the moment the problem of the employment of labor +was under discussion. In those places where the commissioners-in-chief +had been informed in good time and had the possibility to enlighten +the populations concerned, it was possible to achieve a considerable +voluntary readiness for work. In many other instances one adopted +measures of enforcement immediately, without taking any consideration +of the commissioner-in-chief, with the result that in certain towns a +flight into the woods took place, in order that they would not be--to +use their own phrase--deported. Those men would decidedly increase +the number of partisans and thus endanger our lines of supply. Other +forced laborers had left the trains going into the Reich during the +night, with the result that they arrived half empty at the frontier +of the Government General. They, too, would constitute a danger. As a +result at places which were included in the Four Year Plan themselves, +the very Four Year Plan had withdrawn workers who were partially +lost, and thus the opposite result was achieved, that is a noticeable +deterioration of the situation and ill feeling of the population. I +already received a number of reports from the Ukraine and from Latvia +which confirm this state of affairs. If now medium or lower technicians +proceeded similarly without regard of the commissioners-in-chief, these +conditions would deteriorate considerably without thereby achieving +the technical effects. I point out that development. If Reich Minister +Speer would retain his authority in its old form, I would be forced to +decline the responsibility for conditions in the future and, in any +case, could not be subjected to criticism if the political situation +would worsen very decisively thereby. The Fuehrer listened to the +report most attentively, as was my impression, and then he said that, +in any case, the arterial roads had to be secured by technical means +in order to supply the frontier with guns and ammunition. The matter +was then discussed once more. I pointed out what great effort it took +me to restrain the supreme Reich authorities from interfering with +the occupied Eastern territories; the arguments, however, were so +convincing, that one realized to a large extent that the direction +of the East could only be carried out centrally. If this painfully +achieved position was now to be broken by such a far-reaching decree +for Speer, the tendency would revive everywhere to interfere with +the occupied Eastern territories disregarding the Ministry East. The +Fuehrer said that under no circumstances should that happen, and he +instructed Dr. Lammers, that he was to reject such demands on the +Fuehrer’s orders. + +Dr. Lammers was ordered to draft a formulation of the tasks of Reich +Minister Speer in the occupied Eastern territories in relationship to +myself for the duration of the war. + +In the course of the discussion a number of other matters were also +dealt with. The Fuehrer approved the final version regarding uniforms +of the occupied territories. I reported to him the results of the +exhibition in Agram, Bruxelles and of the work progress of the +exhibition “Fight for Europe”. + +The question of the awarding the iron cross to the Estonians, +Lithuanians, and Latvians to a problem of the OKW. The Armed Forces are +in favor of such awards. However, there are some political objections. +The Fuehrer believes to see a danger in it, that in case of future +complications the bearer of the EK [iron cross] might have to be +subjected to disciplinary punishment. I explained that soldiers of the +Baltic nations--according to many utterances--looked upon an award as +a guarantee for Reich citizenship. Thereby the political effect of +a Germanisation and on the other hand the skimming of nationalistic +forces would become possible. The matter was to be examined once again. + +I informed the Fuehrer of my intention to start my first official +journey into the Eastland on the 14th May. The Fuehrer authorized me to +extend his greetings to the appointed administrative corps. + +I then reported to the Fuehrer the results of metal collection in the +Eastland which produced 2,500 tons. By collecting those metals still +available in the economy, the figure would be raised to 3,500 tons. The +collection of wools too had reached the average of the Reich. + +I handed the Fuehrer a file note regarding the development of rubber +plantations, which has been fostered by the foreign policy office of +the NSDAP since 1936. Despite all the official refusals the plants were +at first cultivated in Athens, later on the Reich Food Minister granted +a few acres of land in Germany. Now it is cultivated in the Wartheland +and in the Government General, and later on in the Ukraine where from +1943 on more than 100,000 ha will be worked. The harvest will then +provide enough to fill the gap which is still open from synthetic +rubber production. + +During the report I turned the conversation toward the planning +departments of the ministry. I said that after nearly one year no +high official had yet been appointed because of the many discussions +with the competent Reich departments. I mentioned the case of party +member Cranz who was supposed to be my immediately subordinated chief +of press in the East, but whom the ministry of finance did not want to +grant to me as a Ministerialdirektor. Dr. Lammers was of the opinion +that one could not start right away with the highest ranks. If Cranz +was now appointed Ministerialrat then he could be promoted within a +year. I said that Cranz was already a year in the Ministry. Nor was +it a question of appointing the _major_ Cranz, but of the journalist +who had followed this profession for nearly 20 years. I said that +the ministry also had to be on an equal footing in its negotiations +with the Reich Commissar. This was not an ordinary Special department +ministry [Ressortministerium], but it had other, far more extended +tasks. The Fuehrer agreed with this point of view and asked about +how large the Reich Commissioners Offices were. After mentioning the +number of rooms I added that a Reich Commissioner was in reality like a +minister president, who was governing a large country. Here, too, the +Fuehrer agreed, and he said that to begin with he was not much in favor +to create a ministry for the East Commission. I was surprised, because +Dr. Lammers had made out to me that just the creation of a ministry was +the wish of the Fuehrer. I told the Fuehrer that at that time I had +made special propositions. I then requested Dr. Lammers to give me his +support in this matter. + + Signed: R. + + Berlin, 13th May 1942. + R/H. + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1521-PS + + BAVARIAN POLITICAL POLICE + + Copy + + Munich, Briennerstr. 50, August 24th, 1934 + + Telephone 28341-46 + +Reg. No. 33668 I 1 Nh must be quoted in further correspondence. To the +Bureau of Secret State Police--Central Office + + _Berlin S.W. 11_ + Prinz Albrecht St. 8. + +Reference + + National mourning on the occasion of the death of Reich President and + Generalfeldmarschall von Hindenburg; here--the carrying out of para. + III of the decree of the Reich Government dated 2.8.34. + +Enclosure + +1 Copy + +Several telephone reports which reached here as early as the evening +of the 2nd of August, 1934, from offices of the Party and regional +[Bezirk] authorities, concerning refusal to sound the funeral knell +ordered by the Reich Government, and also numerous written reports, +caused the Bavarian Political Police to come to the decision, a copy of +which is enclosed, and which has already been submitted to your office. + +The result was as follows: In more than 70 parishes bells were not +tolled on the 2nd of August, in 20 parishes on the 2nd and 3rd of +August, and in 4 parishes on the 2nd, 3rd and 4th of August. The reason +given in about 56 cases was that no definite order had been issued +from the responsible diocesan office, or dean’s office. Of the clergy +involved, 32 in all are politically tainted--two of them read holy +mass on the 26th of July for the deceased Chancellor of the Austrian +Confederation Dollfuss, or remembered him in a sermon and had prayers +said for him. It appears that no special order of the senior church +authorities was necessary for this. In one case the sacristan was +interrupted in ringing the knell by the priest. + +When asked for an explanation by enraged fellow Germans and fellow +party members, every possible excuse was used--let us only call +attention to the following ones, to show what type they were: + +Alleged disturbance of the religious service. + +Nothing is done on orders from lay authorities. + +Absence, either accidental, or alleged to be by reason of duty. + +Alleged state of decay of the belfry. + +Alleged defectiveness of the bells. + +Alleged ignorance of the decree of the Reich Government. + +Hindenburg was a Protestant; by a decree of the Bavarian Ministry of +Public Worship and Education (Resolution of the State Minister for +Education and Public Worship, dated 29.6.34, No. I 19763) the vicar was +only pledged to obey the order of the church authorities with respect +to the ringing of church bells. + +Alleged incompetency. + +Bells had only been rung in the morning on the occasion of the 20th +anniversary of the outbreak of war. + +On his own authority, the bishop of Wuerzburg, Matthias Ehrenfried, +a _sufficiently well-known_ cleric, fixed the ringing of bells for +the morning, between 11-0 and 12-0 o’clock. [pencil note referring to +underling] How so? + +Another minister had the incredible lack of taste to point out that +the enforced ringing of church bells when Kurt Eisner was shot, had +been the occasion of the order that this should in future only be done +by order of the church authorities. The mentioning of the name of the +immortal President of the Reich von Hindenburg in the same breath as +an incident connected with Eisner, the traitor and Jew, is the most +despicable feature [Gemeinheit] of the affair. + +From the foregoing it is not difficult to see that the Catholic clergy +in their intolerance, have done their utmost to disturb the peace +between laymen and clergy. There is no doubt that the obstructive +attitude of the clergy is due, on the one hand, to that fact that the +deceased Reichpresident was a Protestant, and on the other, to the +fact that the Catholic Church was to obey a suggestion made by the +National-Socialist Reich Government. The conduct shown in this case +provides once more a clear evidence of the international attitude and +lack of German feeling and perception in Catholic clerical circles. + +In three cases the taking into protective custody, in order to +guarantee them personal safety, of refractory clergy could not be +avoided, in the interests of the maintenance of public security and +order, and on account of the anger of the people. + +The following clergy are in question: + +The Parish priest, Father Johann Quinger of Altenkunstadt BA., +Lichtenfels. He was taken into protective custody on 3.8 on the express +order of the State Ministry of the Interior, because he assaulted SA +leaders and SA men who were ringing the bells against his wishes. He +was released from custody on 10.8.34. + +The Parish priest, Father Ludwig Obholzer of Kiefersfelden BA +Rosenheim. For his personal safety he was in police custody from 2400 +hours on the 2.8.34, till 1000 hours on 3.8.34. On 5.8.34, he said +sarcastically in his sermon, referring to the SA men who had carried +out the ringing of the funeral knell on their own account, “Lord +forgive them, for they know not what they do!” + +The Parish priest, Father Johann Nepomuk Kleber of Wiefelsdorf, BA., +Burglengenfeld, refused to ring the church bells on the 2nd and 3rd. +He is badly tainted politically and had to be taken into protective +custody from the 5th to the 8th of August 34 in the interests of his +own safety. + +The behaviour of the diocesan office of the _archbishopric of Munich +and Freising_, [underlined in red pencil], which is in accordance with +the principle “Attack is the best defence” deserves special note. In +two letters of the 10th and 11th of August 1934 a touching complaint +is lodged about the behaviour of members of the SA and the Party on +ringing the church bells without authorization, and also about the +fact that the clergymen named above were restricted in their personal +liberty. In this connection it should be stressed that the clergy +concerned were treated with extreme leniency. We could refer here to +the case of Quinger, where the SA men, in spite of the injuries which +the clergyman inflicted on them, with exemplary discipline did not +return the assaults. The State authorities did everything to ensure +the continuance of worship undisturbed. Moreover, the length of +imprisonment was confined in all cases to the minimum. + +It must again be pointed out, most emphatically, that the unspeakable +behaviour of the clergy concerned in this matter leads us to deduce +the existence of a very special frame of mind, and spotlights the true +internal attitude of the Catholic clergy to the National-Socialist +State. It is not to be wondered at if here and there, in face of +the incredible behaviour of the clergy and the threadbare excuses +they used, the people and the SA resorted to an act of self-defense +which was not perhaps in conformity with strict law, but was very +understandable. Narrow-minded jurisprudence, as the elders of the +church choose to practice it, is not in place here, and is not +understood by the mass of the people, as events have shown. + +Since the diocesan office of the archbishopric of Munich and Freising +has announced that it will also “report” the incidents to the Reich +Ministry of the Interior, it is absolutely necessary to acquaint the +above office with the contents of the present report. + + By order + + signed Brunner + [Stamp] + + Reich Governor of Bavaria + 28 Aug. 1934 1/1 + enclosures + Mark Ge 2/28.8 + +(Above) _Copy_ to the Reich Governor of Bavaria, for the attention of +State Secretary Hofmann, Munich, requesting that it should be noted. + + By order + + Jenner [?] + + Copy checked 24.9.34. [Several illegible initials] + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1526-PS + + Copy + + Prof. Dr. Wolodymyr Kubijowytsch, + Chairman of the Ukrainian Main Committee. + + Cracow, February 1943. + + To the Governor General, Reich Minister Dr. Frank. + + Your Excellency: + +Complying with your wish I send you this letter, in which I should +like to state critical conditions and the painful happenings, which +create especially grave conditions for the Ukrainian population within +the General-Government. As to the German-Ukrainian relations and the +general situation of the Ukrainian people, I have included all that in +my letter, known as well to you, which I addressed to the Secretary +of State Dr. Buehler as far back as December 1942. In that letter I +stressed mainly the alarm of the Ukrainian population in regard to the +uncertainty about their national future within the New Europe. Here I +would like to quote some real happenings and add my reflections on them. + +The center of these is the question: Shall the Ukrainians work +successfully in favor of final victory; they must be granted the +security which, while absolutely necessary to them, unfortunately +does not exist. For under the present conditions the Ukrainians are +neither sure of their possessions nor of their lives. The matter of +re-privatisation has not yet been settled. Inhuman treatment, severe +pressure to forced labor, unfounded arrests, and lastly the shootings +of great numbers are happenings not too infrequent these days. + +I. _Question of Re-privatisation._ + +Of primary importance for the further shaping of German-Ukrainian +relations is the problem of re-privatisation. The whole Ukrainian +people have connected with the German victory in the East their hope +that now all remainders of the Bolshevist Regime shall be extinguished +finally. + +The views of the Ukrainian people are basically those of private +property and economy. The Ukrainian peasant is prepared to undergo the +greatest privations and sacrifices in favor of the State, if only he +be allowed to work in tranquility; this feeling of inner tranquility +he can but gain in the knowledge that the soil on which he and his +ancestors have toiled, will remain his property in the future. The +Ukrainian population received with gratitude the proclamation of your +Excellency of 1 August 1941 in which, you Sir, have solved this problem +at its roots and have stated re-privatisation to be the general rule +for the economy of the State. Now, however, the attitude of some +authorities looks as if the re-privatisation would be questioned still +and as if in the new social order there was no place for private +property. This situation is very cleverly made use of by the hostile +whispering propaganda. Especially widely has the rumor been spread that +private property has not yet been reintroduced for the reason that a +large action of resettlement of the Ukrainians from Galicia to the East +is to be expected. + +Actions, such as measures of adjusting real property at the expense +of peasant property (in the districts of Tarnopol, Rawa, Ruska, +Kalusch, etc.), survey of real property of peasants (in the district of +Czortkow) and imposing of fees for the use of land (Czortkow, Zloczow, +etc.) give such rumors the appearance of probability (enclosure 1). + +It is clear that for this reason there appears a great alarm and +nervousness amongst the rural population which must badly influence the +inclination for work and the output of agricultural production. + +The uncertainty as well as all the consciously false interpretations of +such measures through the whispering propaganda, could only be ended by +a definite carrying out of the principle of the Proclamation mentioned. + + +_II. Measures for finding labor._ + +The general nervousness is still more enhanced by the wrong methods of +finding labor which have been used more and more frequently in recent +months. The wild and ruthless man-hunt as exercised everywhere in towns +and country, in streets, squares, stations, even in churches, at night +in houses, has badly shaken the feeling of security of the inhabitants. +Everybody is exposed to the danger, to be seized anywhere and at any +time by members of the police, suddenly and unexpectedly, and to be +brought into an assembly camp. None of his relatives knows what has +happened to him only months later one or the other gives news of his +fate by a postcard. + +I beg to mention some instances with their respective proofs: + + _a._ During such an action a pupil in Sokol lost his life and another + one was wounded (enclosure 2). + + _b._ 19 Ukrainian workers from Galicia, all provided with identity + cards, were assigned in Cracow to a transport of “Russian + prisoners-of-war” and delivered into a punitive camp in Graz + (enclosure 3). + + _c._ 95 Ukrainians from Galicia, recruited for work in Germany by + the labor offices in the middle of January, were sent to Pskow in + Russia, via Eastern Prussia, where most of them died under + distress (enclosure 4). + + _d._ Seizure of workers under pretext of military recruitment + (Zalesczyki); kidnapping schoolboys during school time (Biala + Podloaska, Wlodawa, Hrubieschow) (enclosure 5). + + +_III. Question of Personal Security._ + +Treatment of human beings. + +Already the kind of treatment meted out to our compatriots by the lower +instruments of the German authority, adds much to make the general +situation more grave. The Ukrainians expected the treatment of members +of those nations who fought against Germany, because they belong to +a people who have never done anything against the Germans and their +interests. Now every Ukrainian cannot fail to become convinced that +most of the Germans do not make any distinction, and that they are +accustomed to treat all peoples of the East similarly, whether friend +or foe. Too often the Ukrainian is exposed to the danger, when dealing +with the lower authorities, to be personally insulted, to be slandered, +even to be ill-treated. Innumerable instances could be mentioned +proving this sort of treatment. In the enclosure I give only a small +selection of especially grave cases (enclosure 6). + +Wholesale shootings. + +Of much worse character are the wholesale shootings of absolutely +innocent persons, such as happened in Lubycza Koroliwska and then in +Lwow and Czortkow. + +In Lubycza Koroliwska, district of Rawa Ruska, 46 peasants, including +31 Ukrainians, were shot without trial (4 October 1942) (enclosure 7). + +During the second half of November 1943, 28 Ukrainians were shot in +Lwow, 56 in Czortkow, also without trial. (enclosure 8). + +Arrests in December 1942. + +In December 1942 the police undertook a cleansing action among the +so-called disturbing elements, leading very soon, however, to wholesale +arrests of innocent, quiet citizens. They are under arrest and in +danger to lose their good health for certain, if not their life. +(enclosure 9). + +How acute and well founded this fear is, is proved by what happened to +6 Ukrainian girls from Kolomea, who were arrested in February 1942 and +who disappeared without leaving any trace. (enclosure 10). + +Revision in the St. George Cathedral, Lwow. + +In connection with the cleansing action mentioned above a raid was +carried out even in the St. George’s cathedral in Lwow. The fact +itself, especially because of the behavior of the police at this place +which is sacred to the Ukrainians, produced a deep resentment and bad +feelings amongst the population. This was used by hostile propaganda at +once. Generally, it is pointed out that not even during the Bolshevist +occupation raids took place on the hill of St. George, and that several +visits by Bolshevist professors and students were always undertaken +with great respect for the place and the person of the Metropolitan. + +Special action against the asocial elements. + +Since 15 January a special action began against the so-called asocial +elements in Galicia. In the whole area about 5,000 persons were +arrested. The purpose of this action was said to be the removal of +those elements, who did not wish to work, were active in the black +market and by so doing made the work of the authorities more difficult. +This action however, did not obtain the right result, and the victims +were leading personalities of the Ukrainian cultural and economic life +as well as employees of several state authorities and members of the +Ukrainian Aid Committee. + +These wholesale arrests raised an extraordinary nervousness and anxiety +among the delegates of our committee and in large spheres of the +Ukrainian population. + + +_IV. Irregular conditions and Partisan nuisance in the District of + Lublin._ + +[This chapter deals with partisan activity and the risks to which the +loyal Ukrainian population is exposed thereby. Irrelevant]. + + +_V. Collective responsibility._ + +General remarks. + +The Ukrainian people consider as particularly painful the application +of methods of collective responsibility. The large masses of the +people generally have no understanding for the principle of collective +responsibility; they take it as absence of justice to be punished for a +deed one has neither done nor approved of. Generally, the principle of +collective responsibility may be considered as justified if applied to +a racial community which is homogenous. The partisan nuisance, however, +is particularly spread out in the mixed Polish-Ukrainian areas, and +the Ukrainian community can by no means bear any responsibility for +misdeeds done by Poles. But even in areas with the almost homogenous +population, as e.g. in Galicia, the Ukrainian people could only be held +responsible if they were possessed of some means of executive power +towards those members. Today they have no such means. For the reasons +stated, the application of the principle of collective responsibility +against the Ukrainian people is unjust and inexpedient in its present +state of organization and especially in the mixed areas. The collective +responsibility often hits the leading circles in town and country whose +feelings are pro-German, but who are powerless against both the Polish +dissenters and against their own irresponsible hot-heads and despairing +persons. + +Thus it happens that the collective responsibility which has the +purpose of exterminating anti-German elements quite to the contrary +annihilates or weakens positively pro-German elements and creates bad +feelings and bitterness. Thus in the district of Lublin about 400 such +Ukrainians perished. + +We mention but some of the most convincing instances: + +Wholesale shootings. + +On 25 December 1942 the military police surrounded the village of +Przewale, in the district of Zamose, area of Lublin, herded together a +large number of Ukrainians and Poles. When the manager of the estate +declared he needed the Poles for work, the Poles were set free, the +Ukrainians, however, numbering 16, were shot dead; among the persons +shot was a 15 years old girl, Eugenie Tybyczuk (encl. 15). + +In the village of Nodosow (district of Lubin) 8 pro-German Ukrainians +who had been persecuted by the Poles because of their patriotic views +in pre-war time, were shot on 30 October 1942. + +On 29 January 1943 in the village of Sumyn (collective community of +Tarnowatka, district of Lublin) 45 Ukrainians, including 18 children +between the ages of 3 and 15 were shot, and on 2 February 1943 in the +villages of Pankow and Scharowola (collective community of Tarnowatka) +19 Ukrainians were shot, including 8 children, aged 1 to 13 years +(encl. 16). + +The greatest bitterness is created by the killing of innocent children, +because the population is unable to understand that the German +authorities could consent to or order such deeds. + +The tragic events in Lubycza Koroliwska and Kubycza Kniazi (districts +of Rawa Ruska, area of Lublin) have been mentioned above (encl. 7). + +Conclusion. + +The happenings in Galicia mentioned in this report have been submitted +to Governor Dr. Waechter and the Department Head Dr. Bauer in writing +and verbally. We repeat them herein, in order to complete the picture +of the General Government. + +* * * * * * * + +Cracow, 25 February 1943. + + # # # # # + + +_Table of Enclosures._ + + 1. The surveying measures in the area of Czortkow. + + 2. The events at Sokal. + + 3. The behavior of the Polish employees of the labor office. + + 4. Minutes (fate of the Ukrainian workers in Pskow). + + 5. Memorandum for the files (false recruiting of workers to the + Reich). + + 6. Memorandum for the files (ill-treatment of Ukrainians). + + 7. Shooting of 46 peasants in Lubycza Koroliwska, district of Rawa + Ruska. + + 8. Shootings in Lwow and Czortkow in November 1942. + + 9. Arrests in Galicia in December 1942. + + 10. Uncertain fate of arrested Ukrainian women students from Kolomea. + + 11. List of some well-known Ukrainian citizens, arrested in January + 1943 in the area of Kolomea, Stryj, and Kamionka Strumilowa. + + 12. Arrests and shootings of persons unfit for work in the district + of Sanok. + + 13. Anti-Ukrainian activities of persons unfit for work in the + district Biljoraj. + + 14. Activities of partisans in the district of Biala Podlasko during + the second half of the year 1942. + + 15. Shooting of 16 Ukrainians in the village of Przewale. + + 16. List of the Ukrainians shot in the village of Sumin, community of + Tarnowatka on 29 January 1943. + + +_Enclosure 1._ + +_The Surveying Measures in the District of Czortkow._ + +In September of last year the Chief Inspectorate of agricultural land +[Hauptlandinspektion] in Czortkow was formed under the management of +the former District Surveyor [Kreislandinspektor]. + +Employed were the engineers-surveyor Jwanenko, a Russian, and the +draughtsman Sach, a Pole; further the land-surveyors from Brzezany +and Tarnaopol and some other German employees who were brought to +Czortkow. Travelling in the district of Czortkow they drew maps showing +the position of the communities with special regard to all farms and +marking the better farms. About the middle of December the activities +of this institution ceased, probably up till the end of April 1943. +Rumor has it that German peasants to the number of 50,000 who are to be +transferred from Germany into this district should be settled on these +better farms. + + +_Enclosure 2._ + +_The Events at Sokal._ + +On 24 October 1942 between 13 and 14 hours, when the school boys went +home from school, they were stopped by detachments of military police +on the street and together with other people were formed into one +unit. There was a panic as nobody knew what was going to happen to +these people. People began to flee from the streets. The school boy +Jaroslau Meda who was just passing with his father, the secretary of +the collective community of Parchacz also started to run. The father +tried to calm him and called him back as there was no danger. A +military policeman, however, saw him fleeing and shot at him wounding +him fatally, so that he died in the local hospital half an hour later. + +At the same time two military policemen went into the Ukrainian hostel +for schoolboys and took away some boys. The others were at lunch in +the dining-room and therefore remained unnoticed. In front of the +schoolboys’ hostel the schoolboy Wassyl Krawtschuk was caught by a +military policeman and wounded so seriously in the thigh by a bayonet +that he had to be taken to hospital. + +The student of theology Osyyp Karawan was severely beaten until he +fainted. + +The public school teacher Michael Duliba was beaten publicly. + +It is to be stressed that nobody knew that this action of collecting +people was to procure workers to load carrots at the station. When +the headmaster of the public school informed the manager of the local +labor office by phone and asked for his help, the latter replied he +had no time to spare for this matter at the moment. Thereafter, the +headmasters of the Ukrainian schools informed the manager of the local +labor office that they would put their boys at the disposal of the +authorities in every case there was unforeseen and undelayable work to +be done in town after having received fair warning provided no other +labor was available. + + +_Enclosure 3._ + + Copy + + Zborow, 6 Oct. 1942 + + Ukrainian Aid Committee, Branch Zborow. + To the Ukrainian Main Committee in Lwow. + Department for food. + + Subject: The behavior of the Polish employees of the labor office in + Cracow towards our laborers. + +We present the minutes prepared by our office together with Mr. Procyk +Lukas on 28 September 1942 who returned from Germany. + +He reports: + +Ukrainian laborers coming to Cracow, though provided with certificates +and identification papers, are being transferred by the Polish +employees of the labor office together with the transports of Russian +civilian and brought to punitive camps. + +Many Ukrainians fell victim to such Polish provocations. The situation +of these people is all the more tragic, as they do not know the +German language and their certificates and identification papers were +destroyed by the above mentioned Polish employees. + +Below we give a list of the Ukrainian laborers who are in the punitive +camp in Graz as Russians and refugees: + + [Follows a list of 19 names]. + +The situation of the above named is tragic. I was lucky to escape. With +complete confidence in me and tears in their eyes they asked me to +report their condition to the Committee. + + [signed] Procyk Lukas. + + +_Enclosure 4._ + + Minutes. + +Michaljlo Kost, Bohdan Janiw, Iwan Baran (son of Iwan), Iwan Baran +(son of Mykola) and Olexa Chimjak, all from Koniuschky, Koroliwiski, +district of Komarow, were sent by the labor office for work to Germany +on 12 January 1942. + +They came to Pwzemysk, where they stayed for a whole week awaiting +medical inspection. After the medical inspection they were joined to +the transport which was to go to Germany. However, they were driven via +Warsaw, East Prussia to Russia and were brought to the town of Pskow. +With them were 95 Ukrainian lads from Galicia, including 18 lads from +the village of Koniuschky, Koroliwiski. They were accompanied by a +military escort. On 28 January 1942 they arrived in Pskow. At first, +they worked in the woods felling trees, later building a bath-house. + +In the beginning they received half a loaf of bread as daily ration, +and later one loaf for seven persons daily, black coffee at breakfast +and supper and soup at dinner time. + +They never had a day off, they had to work even on Sundays. Terrible +frost persisted throughout--to 58 centigrades (below zero), but the +lads got no warm clothes, they worked in the clothes they had brought +with them. After arriving in Pskow the workers lived in unheated huts +without beds. The huts were made from wood and it was very cold there; +only after two weeks were they billeted in a hall with beds, but they +were unable to get warm with the blankets they had brought with them. +Many of them fell ill from hunger and cold, 18 had to be taken to +hospital (there was no room for several persons) where they remained +for 2 to 3 weeks. The sick were refused bread, because they were said +to be simulants. In the hospital the sick received 50 grammes of bread +and some warm water and some soup and potatoes at about 16 hours. + +Anyone unfit for work was sent away forcibly. Many escaped from +the huts during the winter, one died. 13 lads from the village of +Koniuschky, Koroliwiski escaped, three were arrested, and we know +nothing about the others; they certainly did not return home. + +5 of the above mentioned lads were declared unfit for work by a +military commission and sent to Lwow and then home where they arrived +completely exhausted. Of the 95 persons in the hutments in Pskow up +to April, only 14 remained, 8 from the district of Jarowiw and 1 from +Grodek. Those 14 persons, hungry and weak, were released to go home. + +These workers received no pay. + + Komarow, 22 April 1942. + + Confirmed by signature: Mychajlo Kost, + Bohdan Janiw, + Iwan Baran. + + +_Enclosure 5._ + +_Memorandum for the files._ + +In November of last year an inspection of all males of the age groups +1910 to 1920 was ordered in the area of Zaleschozyki (district of +Czortkow). After the men had appeared for inspection, all those who +were chosen were arrested at once, loaded into trains and sent to the +Reich. Such recruiting of laborers for the Reich also took place in +other areas of this district. Following some interventions the action +was then stopped. + +The labor office in Biala Podlaska carried out the recruiting for work +of the students at the commercial college. When the officials recruited +more students than ordered, the main doors and doors to the class-rooms +were locked; consequently a panic amongst the students broke out, and +even some students fled through the windows. + +Similar events occurred in Wlodawa and Hrubieschow in consequence of +which the schools were closed for some time. + + +_Enclosure 6._ + + _Memo for the files._ + _Re: Ill-treatment of Ukrainians._ + +_a._ On 11 November 1942 Irene Malaschtschuk, a public school girl +working in a German food store in Czortkow, was, whilst working +(attending to German customers) hit in the face several times by a +Security Policeman without any reason whatsoever. When questioned why +he did it, she received the answer: because you did not pay any special +attention to me. + +_b._ In September 1942 a meeting took place in Chodorow in the presence +of the District Farmer of Stryj, the District Agricultural Expert, +the Chairman of the Ukrainian Aid Committee, the Land Commissioner, +the District Farmer, the Chairman of the Delegation in Chodorow, +and mayors and bailiffs of the district of Chodorow concerning the +delivery quotas. During the discussion of the quota action the District +Farmer said that the communities of Hranky, Kuty, and Bortniky had not +delivered their ordered quota of vegetables, then he ordered the Mayor +of Hranky, Kuty to come up and hit him in the face in front of the +assembly. + +_c._ The chief of the price control office in Zloczow, H. Mok, who +personally controls the delivery of foodstuffs into the town, stopped +a woman on the way who was carrying a few kilos of carrots. Mr. Mok +ordered his interpreter, a Jew, to search the woman; the Jew did it +in such a manner as to offend the dignity of a human being and of the +woman. + +_d._ The District Farmer Benzin in Biala Polaska shot at innocent +Ukrainian peasants from the villages of Polenow and Nosow, whilst on +duty on 30 July 1942, two of whom died. Benzin was arrested, but the +event caused great indignation in the whole area. + +_e._ On 9 August 1942 the Ukrainian student Iwan Wowtschyschyn was +beaten without any reason whatsoever by a Polish railroad policeman on +the station in Przemysl; when the student tried to defend himself, he +was fatally wounded with the bayonet. + +Generally, there are strong complaints all over the country about the +way Polish members of the railroad police treated Ukrainians. + + +_Enclosure 7._ + + _Shooting of 46 peasants in Lubycza, district of Rawa Ruska._ + +In the early morning on Sunday, 4 October 1942, some groups of the +Special Service detachments, stationed near Belsez, came to the +village of Lubycza Koroliwska and Kubysca Kniazi and called out all +male villagers. The men were convinced that it was a matter of some +urgent work for the village and obligingly hurried to the place of +assembly. There they were formed in rank and file and requested to name +2 saboteurs within two minutes otherwise every fifth man would be shot. +As, however, no acts of sabotage had been committed in the village, no +saboteurs could be named. Then, 45 men and 1 woman were chosen from the +crowd and shot dead in two groups in the presence of their relatives, +viz. in Lubycza, Koroliwska and Kubycza, Kniazi. + +Amongst the 46 shot were 31 Ukrainians. + +The pretence for these tragic mass-shootings was a fire which occurred +in the stables of the said Special Service detachments near Belsez +during the night of 3-4 October, when 3 horses were said to have +perished. Probably this fire was set alight by the carelessness of the +stable-boys and was extinguished at once. + +The community of Lubycza, Koroliwska has been known as one of the most +loyal of the whole district. The very same day (4 October 1942) the +Governor of the province of Galicia, during a celebration in Lwow, +especially mentioned the community as one conscious of their duties +regarding the delivery of their quotas; this was officially published +(Lwiwski Wisti) (Lemberger Nachrichten 6 October 1942). + +The village Kubycza is 8 km. away from the place where the fire took +place. The above mentioned stable is not within the village boundaries +of Lubycza, Koroliwska. + +It should be noted here that in spite of repeated assurances given by +the District Captain [Kreishauptmann] the injured families in Lubycza, +Koroliwska have so far not received any compensation. + + +_Enclosure 8._ + +As a reprisal for the shooting of a member of the German police in +Lwow who was killed by an unknown perpetrator in the second half of +November 1942, 28 Ukrainians were shot in Lwow, and 56 in Czortkow who +were at the time in prison in these towns. Nobody was told the reason +for the shooting, and the shootings in Czortkow were carried out in +broad day-light before the eyes of the frightened population. Among +the persons shot were many suffering from typhoid who were taken from +the hospital whilst unconscious, loaded on to trucks, and taken to the +place of execution. + +These shootings were to be considered as reprisals against the +so-called “Bandera” group. Among the persons shot were elderly citizens +who had no connection whatever with the activities of this group, as +for instance Dr. Olexa Kossak, lawyer from Kolomea, engineer Andrij +Pjaseckyj, head-gamekeeper in Janiw near Lwow all of whom had been +vouched for not only by myself and Dr. Kost Pankiskyj, but by Reich +Germans as well. + + +_Enclosure 9._ + +_Arrests in Galicia in December 1942._ + +In December 1942 the police made arrests among the so-called restless +elements. + +In the whole province of Galicia arrests were made, especially among +the young people among whom followers of the partisans were looked for. +On this occasion a number of elderly citizens were arrested, who were +but vaguely connected with the suspects. Thus, for instance, the owners +of houses where the suspect lived as a lodger were arrested as well as +guests present in the house at the time of arrest. On interventions +by the representatives of the Ukrainian Main Committee in Lwow the +police answered in order to release the persons arrested by mistake. +Since then 2½ months have passed and the persons arrested by mistake +are still in prison. They are treated there as criminals and are not +certain of their lives. + +A typical example of this is the fact that 50 Ukrainians died of misery +and hunger in the prison in Czortkow. The Ukrainian Aid Committee in +Czortkow tried to obtain a permit to send food to the prisoners, but +without success; although the commander of the police agreed, the +prison-commander insisted that the command of the Lwow police had to +grant permission. + + +_Enclosure 10._ + +_Uncertain fate of arrested Ukrainian women students._ + +On 5 February 1942, 6 Ukrainian women students and school girls from +Kolomea were arrested and in the spring sent on to Czortkow. Since then +their relatives are unable to obtain any news about their fate. + +The personal data of the arrested: + + [follow 6 names together with names of respective parents and date + and place of birth]. + + +_Enclosure 11._ + +_List_ of some well-known Ukrainian citizens, members of the Ukrainian +Aid Committee and employees of the State Administration, the +Self-Government and the Economic Authorities, also of the old men and +students who were arrested in January 1943 in the districts of Kolomea, +Stryj, and Komionka, Strumilowa: + + [follows names by localities.] + + +_Enclosure 12._ + + _Arrests and shootings of persons unfit for work in the District of + Sanok._ + +During the period from 18 to 24 January 1943 about 300 persons were +arrested in the neighborhood of Sanok in accordance with lists compiled +some time before by the local mayors on orders of the authorities. Some +of them were soon set free, but the fate of the rest is unknown to us +and their families. The shootings which are daily taking place on the +Jewish cemetery promise no good. + +On 17 and 18 January 1943 many persons from the districts Sanok and +Jaslo were arrested in the station in Tarnow whilst riding in the +direction of Cracow; so far their families have no news about their +fate. Thus, for instance 4 persons were arrested from the village of +Losie, district Jaslo, viz.: + + [follow 4 names and addresses.] + +One of them went to see a doctor in Cracow, the others were on business +trips to Warsaw. + +On 18 January 1943, 14 persons who were unfit for work were shot +together with 80 Jews in Ustrzyki Dolne; they were buried together in +a ditch. Among these 14 were old men and invalids, for instance from +Lutswyska; Iwan Lesky, 68-70 years old, invalid of the Austrian Army +who worked as a tiler, Jurko Schkrabak and his wife, both about 70 +years of age, and 3 other unknown persons, a female beggar from Ustrzky +called “Haramsymka”. We do not know the names of the other people +shot. It should be pointed out that the Ukrainians celebrated a second +Christmas evening on that day called “Schtschedryj Wetschir”. + +As this holiday is celebrated by the Ukrainians with great piety, +the shootings of these innocent people on this holy day caused great +indignance and embitterment. These events depress the Ukrainian +population. The view is current that now the shootings of the Jews +come to an end those of the Ukrainians begin. The case of Ustrzyki is +commented upon as follows: The Germans do not care about any non-German +sanctity and holidays, they even shoot Ukrainians on the Ukrainian +“Schtschedryj Wetschir” (the case in Ustrzyki). + +The Ukrainian population is suspicious of all orders given by the +German authority and even keep away from the soup kitchens, for fear +that those in need may be considered as beggars and shot. + + +_Enclosure 13._ + +_Anti-Ukrainian activities of partisans in the District of Bilgoraj._ + +* * * * * * * + + +_Enclosure 14._ + + _Activities of partisans in the district of Biala Podlaska during the + second half of 1942._ + +* * * * * * * + + +_Enclosure 15._ + +_Shooting of 16 Ukrainians in Przewala._ + +On 17 December 1942 the population of Zubowice, district of Tyschowce +was moved away and racial Germans were settled in their place. The +Polish population of Zubowice, warned the day before by a certain +Kolesche of the coming evacuation fled, but the Ukrainians stayed and +were evacuated to the little town of Tyszowce and its suburbs, with +the help of the representatives of the Ukrainian Aid Committee. This +evacuation affected 128 Ukrainian families, 486 persons in all. + +Some days later a few farms in Zubowice and the surrounding country +as far as the village of Przewale were burnt down. It is obvious that +these fires were started by escaped Poles who hid in the forests or +the neighboring Polish villages, for all farms burnt down belonged to +Poles prior to the evacuation; the Ukrainians who were evacuated in +an organized manner and went willingly to destinations far off, viz. +Zamlynie and Dubyna, were certainly not interested in burning down +farms in Zubowice, particularly not their own farms. + +As reprisal the arrests in Zamlynie and the shooting of persons in the +village Przewale, near Zubowice, were carried out on 24 December 1942. +This village is inhabited by 337 Poles and only 122 Ukrainians. On +intervention by the Local Farm Administrator Poles have been separated +and released from amongst the people arrested at random, the remaining +Ukrainians, however, among them the 58 years old Ukrainian teacher +and trustee of the Aid Committee in Zamosc, Banda Onofer, and his 75 +years old mother-in-law Marie Rewus were shot. The names of the other +Ukrainians who were shot are: (follows a list of 10 names including one +of a person aged 80 years). + + +_Enclosure 16._ + + _List of the Ukrainians shot on 29 January 1943 in the village of + Sumin community of Taranwatka._ + +[Follows a list of 45 names, giving family state, age, and remarks. +Remarks to No. 16: Wounded, in hospital, to No. 19: Village Mayor, to +No. 31: Wounded, in hospital, No’s: 39 & 45: wounded, in hospital.] + +Total 8 men, 19 women, 18 children. + + The delegate: Pastor Matwijtschuk. + + # # # # # + + _List of Ukrainians shot 2 February 1943 in the villages of Pankow + and Scharowola._ + +[Follows a list of 19 names, giving family state, age and remarks. +Remarks to No’s: 4, 14, 15, 16, 17: Wounded]. + +Total 4 men, 7 women, 8 children. In the village Pankow 5 Poles have +been shot. In the village Scharowola 6 Poles have been shot. + + Delegation Ukrainian Aid Committee Tomascho Lubelsko. + Delegate: Matwijtschuk. + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1531-PS + +I. + + Reich Security Head Office Amt IV + Bk. No. 409/39 Top Secret + + Berlin, 26 October 1939 + + _Top Secret_ + +_a._ To all State Police District Offices. + +_b._ To the Gestapo office (according to restricted distribution C.) + +_For information_ + +_a._ To all inspectors of the Security police and the SD. + +_b._ To the Inspector-General of the reinforced SS-Death’s Head Units +(with 8 copies for the camps). + +_Subject_: Execution of protective custody. + +By order of the Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police, +all prisoners under protective custody due for transference to a +concentration camp will, during the war, be assigned to a special +penal section. The only exceptions will be prisoners under protective +custody, who are assigned to a camp as a preventative police measure, +(particularly those under index A), or those who are expressly exempt +on the nominal role. + +* * * * * * * + +In order to achieve a further deterrent effect, the following must, in +future, be observed in each individual case. + +* * * * * * * + +3. _The length of the period of custody must in no case be made known_, +even if the Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police or the +Chief of the Security Police and the SD has already fixed it. + +The term of a commitment to a concentration camp is to be openly +announced as “until further notice.” + +In serious cases, there is no objection to the increasing of the +deterrent effect by the spreading of a cleverly carried out _rumor +propaganda_, more or less to the effect that, according to hearsay, +in view of the seriousness of his case, the arrested man will not be +released for 2 or 3 years. + +4. In certain cases, the Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German +Police will order flogging in addition to detention in a concentration +camp. Orders of this kind will, in future, also be transmitted to the +State Police District Office concerned. In this case too, there is no +objection to spreading the rumour of this increased punishment as laid +down in Section 3, paragraph 3, in so far as this appears suitable, to +add to the deterrent effect. + +5. Naturally, particularly suitable and reliable people are to be +chosen for the spreading of such news. + +* * * * * * * + + By Order + + (signed) Mueller + Authenticated: (signed) Bleeck + Chancellery employee + + # # # # # + + II + Chief of the Security Police and the SD + Bk. No. IV--226/42 Top Secret + + Berlin, 12th June 1942 + 120 Copies 110th Copy + + + TOP SECRET + + _As Top Secret_ + + to all Chiefs of the Security Police and the SD + + to all Directors of Groups IV A, IV B, IV C, and IV E of the Reich + Security Head Office + + to all Commanding Officers of the Security Police and the SD + + to all Heads of the State Police District Offices + + _For Information_ + + to the Inspectors of the Security Police and the SD + + _Subject_: Third degree + + + _Enclosure: 1 receipt_ + +In order to simplify things the Decree of the Chief of the Security +police and the SD of 1.7.37 Bk. No. 28 (II) 301/37 Secret (to be +destroyed according to sealed orders) will be superseded by the +following new ruling, with immediate effect: + +1. Third degree may only be applied if it is clear from preliminary +investigation that the prisoner can give information on important +facts, as social or subversive to the State and to the Reich, but will +not disclose what he knows, and the information cannot be obtained by +investigation. + +2. Third degree may, under this supposition, only be employed against +Communists, Marxists, Jehovah’s Witnesses, saboteurs, terrorists, +members of resistance movements, parachute agents, anti-social +elements, Polish or Soviet-Russian loafers or tramps. In all other +cases, my permission must first be obtained. + +3. Third degree may not be used to extort confessions of a prisoner’s +own crimes. Also this method may not be employed against persons who +are temporarily detained by law for further investigations. + +My previous permission is also necessary in exceptional cases. + +4. Third degree can, according to the circumstances, consist, among +other methods, of very simple diet (water and bread), hard bunk, +dark cell, deprivation of sleep, exhaustion drill, but also in the +administration of flogging (for more than 20 strokes a doctor must be +consulted). + + I. V. + (signed) Mueller + Authenticated: (signed) Nellmuth + Registered Secretary (Female) + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1534-PS + + Berlin, W.8., Wilhelm Street 79, 30 January 37 + + My Fuehrer: + +I thank you for the confidence which you have placed into me during +the four years of your leadership and for the honour you do me in +offering to admit me to the party. My conscience forbids me however to +accept this offer. I believe in the principles of positive christianity +and must remain faithful to my Lord and to myself. Party membership +however would mean that I should have to face without contradiction +the steadily aggravating attacks by party offices on the Christian +confessions and those who want to remain faithful to their religious +convictions. + +This decision has been infinitely difficult for me. For never in my +life I have performed my duty with greater joy and satisfaction than +under your wise state leadership. + +I ask to be permitted to resign. + + With German Greetings! + Your very obedient, + (signed) Baron v. Eltz. + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1536-PS + + TOP SECRET + + Reich Minister for Air and C-in-C Air Force [initials written in ink] + + 12 August 1938 + + Draft + + General Officers only + 2 copies 2nd Copy + Access only through officer + + General Staff 5.Division No. 21/38. Top Secret General Officers only + (Ic) + + Re: Freudenthal Affair + + Ref: Abwehr II No. 42/38. Top Secret General Officers only. + +A. As Appendix 1 please find enclosed a translation by Major d.G. +Moericke on which the following comment is made: + +1. The report from the Abwehrstelle Breslau still does not prove that +the real circumstances are known to the two Sudeten Germans or even +widely in Sudeten German circles. Nevertheless, there is still no need +for Czech authorities to have any knowledge of them. + +If the worst comes to the worst it is a question, in eventual remarks +made by Macholdt to Pilz, of suppositions which are nevertheless very +near to the truth of the matter. + +2. For the time being there is no reason for stopping preparations for +the Fr. operation. + +3. Punishable behaviour on the part of Major Moericke cannot be deduced +purely from the Abwehrstelle report. Rather, as far as can be seen +from here, has Major Moericke carried out the task allotted to him +skilfully and provided good evidence. + +B. In the course of further preparations, the following measures are +recommended: + +1. Not a single word on the matter will be mentioned to informers +[V-Leute]. + +2. The fields will not be purchased through middlemen. Neither will +any influence be brought to bear on the owners in order to effect any +change in the cultivation of the land according to local custom and the +time of the year. + +3. In the event of the suspected endangering of our plans, as a result +of treachery, then it will be a question of sham reconnoitring of +landing grounds in other areas and spreading of rumors as a camouflage. + +4. It is worth considering whether Macholdt and Pilz cannot be called +back to Germany on some pretext and retained here temporarily. + +C. Further to the preparations which have already been carried out, the +following proposals have been made by the Luftwaffe: + +1. Continual supervision of the state of the agricultural cultivation +of the landing grounds in question, in accordance with Appendices 2, 3, +4. + +2. Continual supervision of the area around Freudenthal with regard to +whether Czech defence measures against their intended employment are +being undertaken. + +Reconnoitring of further landing grounds, if possible by 10 September, +in the following areas: + + _a._ Freudenthal--Spachendorf--Hof--Braunseifen--Freudenthal. + + _b._ Around Sternberg (up to a radius of 5 km). + + _c._ Around Olmuetz (up to a radius of 10 km). + +As landing grounds are considered flat open stretches, above all dry +meadows and clay strips with a surface area of approximately 500 × 500 +m. and larger. + +If possible it is requested that photographs similar to Appendices 3 +and 4 are brought along. + +By order of + + Schmidt + +Distribution: + Abwehr II, 1st Copy received with 4 appendices + General Staff 5th Division (Ic), 2nd Copy 13/8 + [signature illegible] + + # # # # # + + Appendix 1 to Reich Minister for Air and C-in-C Air Force. General + Staff 5th Division. No. 21/38. Top Secret General Officers only + dated 12.8.38. + + TOP SECRET + + Berlin 4.8.1938 + General Officers only + Access through Officer only + + Transaction + +Major of the General Staff Moericke, Air Attaché at the German +Legation, Prague, states: + +I was ordered by the General Staff of the Air Force to reconnoitre +the land in the region Freudenthal/Freihermersdorf for landing +possibilities. + +For this purpose I obtained private lodgings in Freudenthal with the +manufacturer Macholdt, through one of my trusted men in Prague. + +I had specifically ordered this man to give no details about me to M, +particularly about my official position. + +I used my official car [Dienst Pkw] for the journey to Fr. taking +precautions against being observed. + +The manufacturer M. is head of the Sudeten German Glider Pilots in +Fr. and said to be absolutely reliable by my trusted man. My personal +impression fully confirmed this judgment. No hint of my identity was +made to him, although I had the impression that M. knew who I was. + +At my request, with which he complied without any question, M. +travelled with me over the country in question. We used M’s private car +for the trip. + +As M. did not know the country around Beneschau sufficiently well, +he took with him the local leader of the F.S., a Czech reservist of +the Sudeten German Racial Group, at the time on leave. He was in +uniform. For reasons of camouflage I was entirely in agreement with +this--without actually saying so. + +As M., during the course of the drive, observed that I photographed +large open spaces out of the car, he said “Aha, so you’re looking +for airfields!” I answered that we supposed that, in the case of any +serious trouble, the Czechs would put their airfields immediately +behind the line of fortifications. I had the intention of looking over +the country from that point of view. + +To my question as to when the farmers in this part were generally in +the habit of ploughing up the fields he answered: “Always immediately +after the harvest.” + +I thought that in this way he wanted to express the fact that the +Czechs would no longer be able to use the fields as airfields even +shortly after harvest. + +Before leaving Fr. I bound M. to absolute secrecy as regards what he +had seen. + +From the conversation between M. and the Leader of the F.S. in +Beneschau, whose name I do not know, I noticed that they knew several +of the Abwehr informers [V-Leute] in Freudenthal and Beneschau. Both M. +and the 2nd companion are minor informers [V-Leute]. + +As I have at the moment no incentive to believe that M. has not kept +his promise, I can only presume that Pilz is the same person as the +leader of the F. S. in Beneschau, who, accompanied us at the time, +and a subordinate informer [V-Mann] to the informer [V-Mann] in the +Security Office [Abwehrstelle] at Breslau. + +I believe it to be out of the question that the real purpose of my +reconnaissance be known. + +Should measures be invoked against Macholdt or Pilz on the grounds of +the report from the Security Office at Breslau, I urgently request a +hearing beforehand. + + Moericke, Major d. G.H. + + g. w. o. + + Schmidt, Maj. d. G. + + # # # # # + + Appendix 2 to Reich Minister for Air and C-in-C of the Air Force, + General Staff 5th Division. + + No. 21/38. Top Secret General Officers only dated 12.8.38. + + [Section of map] + + General Officers only + + Access through Officer only + + Appendix 3 to Reich Minister for Air, etc. + + [photograph] + + Landing-ground south of Freudenthal; taken from southern edge of + Freudenthal looking west. + + Appendix 4, Sectional picture of airfields _a_ and _b_ [4 + photographs]. + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1538-PS + + SECRET + + Office Foreign Intelligence Dept Foreign Affairs Nr 173/41 (g.K.Chefs + III org) + + May 24, 1941 + + [Stamp] Air-Corps-Operational, 7 copies + + Staff I a, 2 copies + + May 24, 41 + + No. 279. + + [Stamp] TOP SECRET + + (to be forwarded) By Officer only + + To be presented to the Chief of the Armed Forces High Command. + +[Marginal note:] + +The Military Attaché Tokio reports with No. T 47 signed May 23. + +In interview with Akita on handling of relations between Japan and USA +in the press, desire was expressed to hear Okamoto on the form in which +Japan would start hostilities in case of a war between USA and Germany. +Instead of a reception by Okamoto visit with Akita who explained: + +[Marginal note:] + + To be presented to the Chief of the Office Foreign Intelligence + (simultaneously for ZL). + +1. In case USA enters war, Japan acknowledges treaty obligations at +once. However, would not open hostilities immediately. Preparations for +attack on Singapore and Manila stand. + +2. Possible war Russia-Germany causes USA entry into war. Japanese +action as mentioned under 1 plus preparation of possible attacks (on) +Vladivostok and Blagowesqensk. + +[Marginal note:] + + (To be presented to the) Operational Staff of the Air-Forces I. C. + +3. Conclusion of conflict with China important before new tasks for +Japanese Armed Forces. I am stressing first that Japanese recognition +of obligations under treaty needs confirmation by immediate opening of +hostilities. + +Signature: Bueckner + + U R Ia + + Schmid [in crayon] + + May 24 + + Copy to: + + L. + + 3 Skl + + Sonderstb H.H.K. + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1541-PS + + TOP MILITARY SECRET + + The Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces High Command/armed forces. + + Command Staff/armed forces, Section L Nr. 33 406/40 + + TOP SECRET + + Matter of Chief Fuehrer #9 + Only through Officer 13 December 1940 + [illegible notations] 12 Copies, 9th Copy + + Direction Number 20 + + Operation Marita + +1. The result of the battles in Albania is not yet decisive. Because +of a dangerous situation in Albania it is doubly necessary that the +British endeavor be foiled to create airbases under the protection of a +Balkan front, which would be dangerous above all to Italy as well as to +the Rumanian oil fields. + +2. My plan therefore is (_a_) to form a slowly increasing task force in +Southern Rumania within the next months. + +(_b_) After the setting in of favorable weather, probably in March, to +send this task force for the occupation of the Aegean North coast by +way of Bulgaria, and if necessary to occupy the entire Greek mainland +(Operation Marita). The support of Bulgaria is to be expected. + +3. For the _concentration of the task force_ in Rumania are necessary: + +(_a_) The 16th Panzer Division which arrives in December on an army +mission, and whose task remains unchanged. + +(_b_) Following will be a task force of about seven divisions (final +wave) to be dispatched to Southern Rumania. Engineers in the required +strength for the preparation of the Danube crossing can conveniently be +attached for transport to the 16th Panzer Division (as instructional +troops). The field commander of the army will await my decision for the +proper moment for them to be employed on the Danube. + +(_c_) Preparations are to be made for further transport to take in the +calculated maximum for the operation Marita (total of 24 divisions). + +(_d_) It is the mission of the Air Force to give air protection to the +concentration, as well as preparing the necessary primary and reserve +installations on Rumanian soil. + +4. The _Operation Marita_ itself is to be prepared on the following +basis: + +(_a_) The primary mission of the operation is the occupation of the +Aegean coast, and the Bay of Saloniki. It may be necessary to continue +the attack across Larissa and the Isthmus of Corinth. + +(_b_) Flank protection against Turkey will be the task of the Bulgarian +forces, although it is to be secured and strengthened through the +alerting of German Forces. + +(_c_) It is not certain whether the Bulgarian forces will take part +in the attack. Likewise the Yugoslavs position cannot yet be clearly +determined. + +(_d_) It will be the mission of the _Air Force_ to support the drive of +the army in all phases, to liquidate the opposing air force, and, as +far as possible, to occupy British strongpoints on the Greek Islands +through airborne landings. + +(_e_) The question in which fashion the Operation Marita is to be +supported by the Italian forces, and how coordination of the operations +is to take place, awaits a later decision. + +5. The military preparations which will produce exceptional political +results in the Balkans demands the exact control of all the necessary +measures by the General Staff. + +The transport through Hungary and the arrival in Rumania will be +reported step by step by the General Staff of the armed forces and are +to be explained at first as a strengthening of the Germany Army mission +in Rumania. + +Consultations with the Rumanians or the Bulgarians which may point to +our intentions as well as notification of the Italians are each subject +to my consent; also the sending of scouting missions and advanced +parties. + +6. After the completion of the Operation Marita it is contemplated to +use the access of the forces used therein for a _new undertaking_. + +7. I anticipate reports from the Chiefs concerning their plans, which +has already taken place as regards the Army. I want to be presented +with exact timetables for the planned preparations, as well as for the +necessary recallings from the armament industry (reconstruction of +Furlough Divisions). + + Signed: Adolf Hitler + + Witnessed: [signature illegible] Captain in the General Staff + +Distribution: + + Commander of the Armies (Operational Section), 1st Copy + + Commander of the Navy (Sea War Direction), 2nd Copy + + Commander of the Air Force (Air Force General Staff), 3rd Copy + + Chief of the German Army Mission to Rumania, 4th Copy + +_Supreme Command of the Armed Forces:_ + + Command Staff, 5th Copy + + Section L, 6-9 Copies + + UNV, 10th Copy + + Chief of Army Transport Forces, 11th Copy + + Foreign Counter Intelligence Office, 12th Copy + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1544-PS + + File Memorandum + + on my parting visit with the Chancellor + +After an exchange of irrelevant courtesies, the conversation turned +to the speech of the Chancellor [Bundeskanzler]. I said to him that +though he had used very cordial expressions on the German mission of +Austria his dramatic advocacy of her independence which he apparently +considered threatened had drowned out this testimony to a large extent, +to say nothing about some unnecessary pinpricks against Germany. To +his assertion that he had reestablished his authority in the country +by this speech I added that this speech also had provoked a debate +yesterday in the French Chamber. In my opinion it was greatly to be +regretted that the Austrian question had again become the center of +European discussions. For Germany an Austrian independence supported +by French and Czech crutches was intolerable, for it would lead to +arguments which might easily endanger the peace concluded recently. + +The Chancellor admitted this without qualifications and requested +me to inform the Reich Foreign Minister as soon as possible that +neither he nor any other political agency in Austria had instigated +this debate in the French Chamber, and that he shared my opinion on +its extraordinarily disrupting effects. On my request he stated his +willingness to publish Sunday morning an article in the official paper +“Wiener Zeitung” (Viennese Newspaper) in which he would clearly detach +the problem of Austrian independence from French interests. And he had +instructed the Austrian press to carry only meagre excerpts of the +debate in the Chamber. + +I then introduced into the conversation the widespread opinion that +he had acted under “brutal pressure” in Berchtesgaden. I myself had +been present and been able to state that he had always and at every +point had complete freedom of decision. The Chancellor replied he had +actually been under considerable moral pressure, he could not deny +that. He had made notes on the talk which bore that out. I reminded +him that despite this talk he had not seen his way clear to make any +concessions, and I asked him whether without the pressure he would have +been ready to make the concessions he made late in the evening. He +answered: “To be honest, no!” It appears to me of importance to record +this statement. + +In parting I asked the Chancellor never to deceive himself that Austria +could ever maintain her status with the help of Non-German, European +combinations. This question would be decided only according to the +interests of the German people. He asserted that he held the same +conviction and would act accordingly. + +Vienna, 26 Feb 1938 + + /s/ Papen + + + PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1546-PS + +N. THE OCCUPATION OF NORWAY ON 9 APRIL 1940. + + [RAEDER MEMORANDUM] + +In the beginning of October 1939, I had a discussion on the Norwegian +question with the Commander of Naval Group East, Admiral Carls, with +whose opinions I completely agreed. After that I gave the Fuehrer an +oral report on the dangers of an occupation of Norwegian bases by +the British and on the possibilities to forestall such a move. The +Fuehrer to whom I submitted a short memorandum promised to think it +over. About at the beginning of December, the Fuehrer received reports +on the activity of the National Samling movement in Norway under the +leadership of Quisling and its successes. The incorporation of Norway +into a Germanic empire under German leadership and with elimination +of English influence was the aim of this movement. These matters were +obviously carried to the Fuehrer by Rosenberg. Around the 12 Dec. +1939 the Fuehrer commanded the OKW to effect the preparations for +the occupation of Norwegian bases in the coming spring. As it was a +question of an operation of _all three branches of the Armed Forces_ +it had to be worked out by the Armed Forces High Command in which the +special Naval adviser took the chief part and took the lead in working +it out in accordance with a memorandum prepared by the Sea Warfare +Command and in close cooperation with the Sea Warfare Command. + +I had left the _Danish Question_ open in my report to the Fuehrer +supposing that after the occupation of the Norwegian coast the English +influence in Denmark could be completely eliminated in such wise that +the intelligence service there could not cause any more harm and the +Danish Government would comply with the demands of the German High +Command without function. However, the Fuehrer decided to occupy +Denmark at the same time. + +The Navy made the decision to transport the _first group_ of the +occupation troops with their equipment on warships and to land them +under their immediate protection. Even though the combat-readiness +of the warships was impaired by loading them with troops, by this +method the possibility of a punctual landing at the ordered time was +best provided for. Further groups with munition and supplies were to +be loaded on steamships which were to arrive simultaneously or soon +after the warships. The difficulty was that at that time the divisions +of the army still demanded to be transported with all equipment and +“rear echelon service” while a considerable limitation of their +equipment would have been necessary and possible. Considerable demands +of transport space were made by the Air Forces for their ground +organization for which no experience existed at all up till then. +The Navy had already in peacetime an organization of “Naval Service +Offices” in all large German ports which worked in close touch with +the Merchant Marine and were at all times exactly informed of the +location and the readiness for sailing of the German merchant ships of +their area. Material for the rebuilding of these ships for transport +purposes was at their disposal, plans for such rebuilding were ready in +their hands. In January these offices received directives to have the +necessary transport space ready in spring. A transport in a westerly +direction was given as the reason for camouflage purposes. The Air +Force did not join this organization that also was very favourable for +secrecy, but gave the order for their extensive transports to a certain +firm with which it had already cooperated at the time of the transports +to Spain. This included certain dangers for secrecy and eliminated the +experience of the Navy. Moreover, the command of the Air Force did not +approach with particular enthusiasm this task in the work of which not +the Air Force, but the not so well liked Navy, had the leading part. In +the Navy the impression existed that some things could have been better +done with regard to the reconnaissance of airfields in Norway and to +the preparations for the improvement and the building of airfields. + +The preparations for the enterprise were rendered more difficult +by the long and very cold winter of 1939/40 which delayed quite a +bit the bringing up of the steamers involved in the transport from +the eastern part of the Baltic Sea and their loading. With all the +effort to forestall the English in the occupation--their unneutral +action against the German supply ship in Flekkefjord in 1940 made the +apprehension of the German Command appear only too well founded--the +date for the landing was fixed by the Fuehrer not earlier than on +April 9, 1940 in which regard it could not be helped that according to +the latest information received the English planned an enterprise in +Norwegian waters for April 8--it remained open whether mine-laying on +occupation of air bases. My request to fix the landing on April 7 was +unfortunately not granted by the Fuehrer. + +The general order for the execution of the landing was signed by the +Fuehrer; detailed directives valid for all armed forces were given +by the High Command in which, as already mentioned, the special Navy +adviser took the lead. The ports of embarkation were distributed from +Wesermmende to Stettin-Swinenmende along the coast. The transportation +of the troops to the ports was undertaken only in the last hours before +departure without their knowing where they were being transported. It +was particularly difficult for the keeping of the secret that for the +enterprise in Northern Norway some units of Southern German mountain +troops were destined whose appearance in Northern Germany was already +conscious enough by itself. But we succeeded in keeping them uncertain +about the destination until to their complete surprise, they were +embarked on the destroyers in Wesermmende in the night of April 7. The +number of the Army and air units I cannot state anymore from memory at +present. Also, the composition of the landing troops I can give only in +general terms. + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1551-PS + + 1936 REICHS MINISTERIALBLATT i.V., PAGES 946-948 + + Assignment and Channels of the Chief of German Police within the + Ministry of the Interior of 26 June 1936 + +(1) For your information, I publish in the enclosures my edicts, +concerning the appointment of a chief of regular police and that +of a chief of security police (enclosure (1)), and concerning the +administrative divisions within the realm of the German police +(enclosure (2)), effective today. + +(2) Official communications in regards to police matters with Reich and +Prussian Ministry of the Interior are to be handled as follows: + +(_a_) Letters and communications for me personally, as well as letters +and communications of fundamental importance, are to be addressed: + +To the + + Reichsleiter SS and Chief of German Police in the Reich Ministry of + the Interior + + Berlin SW 11 + Prinz-Albrecht Str. 8 + +(_b_) Letters and communications, which refer to matters to be handled +by the headquarters of the regular police according to my edict about +the administrative divisions within the realm of the Chief of German +Police, are to be addressed: + +To the + + Reichsleiter SS and the Chief of German Police in the Reich Ministry + of the Interior (Chief of Regular Police) + + Berlin NW 7 + Unter den Linden 74 + +(_c_) Letters and communications, which refer to matters to be handled +by the headquarters of the Security Police according to my edict about +the administrative divisions within the realm of the Chief of German +Police, are to be addressed: + +To the + + Reichsleiter SS and the Chief of German Police in the Reich Ministry + of the Interior (Chief of Security Police) + + Berlin SW 11 + Prinz-Albrecht Str. 8 + +Phone # Chief of German Police: A2 (Flora) 0040 + +Phone # Chief of Regular Police: A2 (Flora) 0034 + +Phone # Chief of Security Police: A2 (Flora) 0040 + +To the lower agencies, the communities and community organizations as +well as bodies of public law. + +To the highest Reich officials, the Prussian Prime Minister, the +Prussian Minister of Finance, the General Manager of the German +Railroad, the Directorate of the Reichsbank by copy. + + # # # # # + + Berlin, 26 June 1936 + +Inclosure #1 + + The Reichleiter SS and Chief of the German Police in the Reich + Ministry of the Interior + +Appointment of a Chief of Regular Police and a Chief of Security Police + +(1) On the basis of the execution edict of the Reich Minister of the +Interior to the edict of the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor, in reference +to the appointment of a Chief of German Police, I herewith appoint +General of Police Kurt Daluege as chief of the regular police and SS +Gruppenfuehrer Reinhard Heydrich as Chief of the Security Police. + +(2) From the entire police force [Vollzugspolizei] the following come +under: + + The Chief of Regular Police: + Safety Police [Schutzpolizei] + Rural Police [Gendarmerie] + Local Police [Gemeindepolizei] + + The Chief of Security Police: + The Political Police + The Criminal Police + +(3) The authority over fields of action of the Chief of German Police, +not mentioned here, is explained in the plan of administrative division +(Inclosure #2) + +To the (a) General of Police Daluege, (b) SS Gruppenfuehrer Heydrich. + + # # # # # + + Inclosure #2 Berlin 26 June 1936 + +The Reichleiter SS and Chief of the German Police in the Reich Ministry +of the Interior O/S No 2/36 + + Administrative division within the realm of the Chief of German Police + +On the basis of #1 of the edict of the Reich and Prussian Minister of +the Interior of 25 June 1936 (not published), for the execution of the +edict of the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor regarding the appointment of +a Chief of German Police, I therefore order (with permission of the +Reich- and Prussian Minister of the Interior): + +1. The functioning of the branches, under the jurisdiction of the Chief +of German Police, will be handled by two (2) headquarters: + +_a._ The regular police, which will include the following branches: + + Household, pay, welfare, economy and police law. + + General administrative affairs of the state police, as far as they + concern the regular police. + + Safety police. + + Traffic police. + + Rural police [Gendarmerie], local police [Gemeindepolizei], civil + service legal affairs. + + Medical and veterinary affairs. + + National defense and army matters, as far as they have been put under + the jurisdiction of the regular police. Personnel affairs of + officials of the regular police. + +(The security police is to participate in all actions, which affect the +security police). + +The headquarters “Regular Police” is entrusted with the functioning of +the following branches in conjunction with the headquarters “security +police” if the latter are concerned: + + Administrative police; and + + Personnel affairs of police presidents and police directors. + +_b._ The security police, which will include the following branches: + + Political police, + + Lodge affairs, freemasonry, fraternity affairs, criminal police, + + Disciplinary affairs within the criminal police, + + General administrative affairs of the state police, as far as the + security police is concerned, + + Press law, + + Weapons law and traffic with arms, + + Passports affairs: + General cases. + Special cases. + + Agreements with foreign states about the free passage of the border + [kleinen Grenzverkehr]. + + Foreign legionnaires (passport matters). + + Immigration of Jews from the East. + +National defense and army matters, as far as they have been put under +the jurisdiction of the security police. + + Alien affairs: + General cases. + Police regulations for foreigners. + Special cases. + Fugitives [refractaere], deserters. + Deportations. + Reimbursement. + Foreign workers. + Border disputes. + Extradition of foreigners. + Registration of foreigners. + Statistics of foreigners. + + Border disputes; Foreign Legion. + + Personnel affairs of all officials of the security police. + + Personnel affairs of all officials of the political and criminal + police. + +(The regular police is to participate in all actions, which affect the +regular police). + +2. I confer the leadership of the headquarters Regular Police upon +General of Police Daluege. I confer the leadership of the headquarters +Security Police upon SS Gruppenfuehrer Heydrich. + +3. The chiefs of the headquarters Regular Police and Security Police +will sign: + + For the Chief of the German Police + “acting for” + + For the Reich and Prussian Minister of the Interior + “by order” + +The chiefs of the headquarters Regular Police and Security Police in +their offices, in which cases their department heads and assistants are +to sign: + + “by order” + +* * * * * * * + + To _a._ General of Police Daluege + + _b._ SS Gruppenfuehrer Heydrich + + Communication to ______________________ + +Report on Sterilization in Germany and occupied countries to be sent to +the members of Committee I Submitted by Dr. B. Ecer ANNEX B + +Detailed Statement on the murdering of ill and aged people in Germany + +1. The murdering can be traced back to a secret law which was released +sometime in Summer 1940. + +2. Besides the Chief Physician of the Reich Dr. L. Conti, the +Reichsfuehrer SS Himmler, the Reichs Minister of the Interior Dr. Frick +as well as other men, the following participate on the introduction of +this secret law: + +_a._ The Councillor of the Ministry Dr. Herbert Linden of the Reich’s +Ministry of the Interior. + +_b._ Dr. Staehle-Nagold, the Chief Physician of Wuerttemberg. + +_c._ Councillor of Medicine /Obermedizinalrat/ Dr. Hermann +Pfannmueller, Director of the Sanatorium and Nursing Institution +Eglfing-Haar near Munich. + +_d._ Professor Dr. Werner Heyde, Director of the Psychiatric and +Neurological Clinic in Wuerzburg. + +* * * * * * * + +3. As I have already stated, there were / after careful calculation +/ at least 200,000 mainly mentally deficient, imbeciles, besides +neurological cases and medically unfit people /these were not only +incurable cases/, and at least 75,000 aged people. + +4. The murders were mainly accomplished in Muensingen/Wuerttemberg and +Linz o/Danube; several gas-chambers with cremation chambers directly +attached were constructed there. As the gas-chambers are next to the +training grounds of the troops in Muensingen, it is believed that the +mentally deficient who were murdered there, were used for experimenting +with new poison-gases. + +5. The transport from the institutions to the gas-chambers is carried +out by SS Kommandos. These call themselves “Gemeinnuetzige Transport +A. G., Berlin, Luetzowufer.” This Limited Company also stores the +individual medical case histories of the murdered inmates of the +institutions. + +6. The inmates of the many smaller and middle-sized institutions +were murdered almost without exception. The larger institutions are +partly--to keep up the pretence to the outside world--still at hand, +but they now only have a fraction of the original number of their +inmates; for example there are now only some 500 inmates instead of +2500 in Berlin-Buch; in Stadtroda/Thueringen only about 150 instead +of 600; in Kaufbeuren/Bayern only 200 instead of 1000, etc. Of the +larger Sanatoriums and Nursing Institutions the following were already +closed down completely some time ago; Illenau/Baden 800 inmates; +Berlin/Herzberge 2500 inmates, Kreutzburg/Oberschlesien 1500 inmates; +Sonnenstein/Sachsen 800 inmates; Werneck/Unterfranken-Bayern 111 +inmates; Steinhof/Wien 3000 inmates, and others, most probably now also +Schleswig with 1000 beds. Guenzburg with 400 etc. etc. + +* * * * * * * + + Written in December 1941, + /sgd/ Dr. T. Lang + +This is to certify, that the above report by Dr. T. Lang dated Dec. +1941 is part of the original report of the Czechoslovak War Crimes +Commission. + +Nurnberg 8. Dec. 1945 for Col. Dr. Ecer + + Capt. Dr. Hochwald + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1573-PS + + SECRET + + Copy + + The chief of the Security Police and the Security Service. IV D 3-3 + B/41 g.Rs.- + + Berlin, 18 Jun. 1941 + + TOP SECRET + + Express letter + +To all state police Administrative office + + (To the State Police, attention SS Stubaf. RR. Nosske or + representative at Aachen) + + _Subject_: Measures to be taken against Emigrants and civilian + workers who came from the great Russian areas and against + Foreign workers. + + _Reference_: None + +To prevent the unauthorized and arbitrary return of Russian, Ukrainian, +White Ruthenians, Cossack and Caucasian emigrants and civilian workers +from the territory of the Reich to the East and to prevent attempts +at disorder by foreign workers in the German production, I decide as +follows: + +1. The managers of the branch offices [Stuetzpunkt] of the +Russian, Ukrainian, White Ruthenian and Caucasians trustee office +[Vertrauensstellen] as well as the relief committee and the leading +members of the Russian, Ukrainian, White Ruthenian, Cossack and +Caucasian emigration organisations are to be notified immediately that +they are not allowed to leave their domicile without permission of +the security police until further notice. Also they are to be told +to apply the same measures to the members who are under their care. +Their attention is to be called to the fact that they will be arrested +because of unauthorized leaving of the place of work and domicile. +I request you to have a check up of the attendance of branch office +leaders if possible by daily requests in these concerns. + +2. Emigrants and foreign workers are to be arrested if it seems +necessary in the situation if there is no doubt of their guilt and if +they are under the suspicion of having been active for the U.S.S.R. +in transmitting news. The measure is to be in readiness, however, it +should not be executed before the pass word “Fremdvoelker” has been +transmitted by means of Urgent telegram. + +3. In case of refusals to work or in making propaganda for the enemy or +suspicion of sabotage among all foreign laborers arrests and protective +custody should be applied most strictly. + +4. Persons who violate issued decrees or who try to provoke +disturbances in factories or meetings by inflammatory speeches to the +emigrants or foreign workers are also to be arrested. + +5. It is an absolute necessity for the maintenance of German production +to its capacity that emigrants and foreign workers remain at their +places of work. In case, conditions in certain communities require +that special measures be taken to reach this objective. I ask for +appropriate action and report. + +The RSHA to be kept posted how these measures are carried out. The +decree also is to be applied to emigrants who came from the Baltic +states--Lithuanians, Latvians and Estonians. + +By order + + /s/ MUELLER + Certified correct: /s/ Signature + (L.S.) Chancellery clerk. + + # # # # # + + Aachen, 3 July 1941 + + _Note_: The original decree can be found under IIIc under File No. + 20/41 top secret + + Koernert + Krim-Assistent + + + SECRET + + Secret State Police, State Police Bldg.-Aachen + II E br.-No. 6/41 top Secret + + Aachen, 22 Jan. 1942 + +1. The written record of these proceedings was worked out and sent +through as a secret matter under II E under No. 303/41. + + 2. R II deliver taken care of 22. Jan. + +3. To the Top Secret File + +By order + + [illegible] Koer + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1574-PS + +SECRET STATE POLICE [Gestapo] + + Secret Police Office, Reich Security Head Office. IV C 2--5719/ + 4540/43 g + + Berlin SW 11 Prinz Albrecht Strasse 8. 19 January 1944 Warrant for + “Protective Custody” + + Christian Name & Surname: _James_, Cook Steele. + Date and Place of birth: 29.20.1918 at Malseta, S. Rhodesia + Occupation: Warrant Officer + M or S: Married + Nationality: British Subject + Race (to be stated in case of non-Aryans) + Address: Gresham Farm Marandellas, S. Rhodesia + + is being taken in protective custody. + + Reasons + +It has been established by the State Police that he/she endangers the +existence and the security of the people and the state by his/her +conduct, in that he/she has been proved to be guilty of activities to +the detriment of the German Reich and there is reason to suspect that +he would, if released, commit acts prejudicial to the interests of the +Reich. + +received 23.1.44. 1400 hrs + + [initials] + + (Sgd) Dr. Kaltenbrunner + Certified correct: (sgd) Kriminalrat + +Steele should not know of the existence of this warrant [written in + pencil; illegible initials follow]. + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1582-PS + + Bra/V + SS-Untersturmfuehrer Dr. med. Sigmund RASCHER + MUNICH, Trogerstr. 56 + +Dear Dr. Rascher: + +Shortly before flying to Oslo, the Reichsfuehrer SS gave me your letter +of 15 May, 1941, for partial reply. + +I can inform you that prisoners will of course be gladly made available +for the high-flight researches. I have informed the Chief of the +Security Police of this agreement of the Reichsfuehrer SS, and +requested that the competent official be instructed to get in touch +with you. + +I want to use the opportunity to extend my cordial wishes to you on the +birth of your son. + +I shall refer as soon as possible to the second part of your letter. + + Heil Hitler + + By order [initials] R Br + SS-Sturmbannfuehrer + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1583-PS + + SECRET + + Reichsfuehrer SS. + RG/V + + Field Command Post 16 November 1942 + + Personal Headquarters, Reichsfuehrer SS + +1. To SS Lt. Gen OHL, BERLIN + +Dear OHL, + +The following struck me during my visit to Dachau on the 13 Nov 1942 +regarding the experiments conducted there for the saving of people +whose lives are endangered through exposure [Unterkuhlung] in ice, snow +or water and who are to be saved by the employment of every method or +means: + +I had ordered that suitable women are to be set aside from the +Concentration Camp for these experiments for the warming of those who +were exposed. Four girls were set aside who were in the Concentration +Camp due to loose living, and being prostitutes, they formulate a +danger of contagion. Among those four was a 21 year old girl named +Ursula Kraus, who naturally was not to be set aside for this. Kraus +was a person under the care of the State [Fuersorgezoegling] and has +already been sick twice with venereal disease. Nevertheless she belongs +to that type of girl upon whom the attempt must be made in order to +save her for the German people and for her own later life. + +In addition, I found during this opportunity that some madmen in the +women’s Concentration Camp had told the feminine prisoners at the +time of selection of prostitutes for the Camp brothel, that those who +volunteered would be released after a half year. + +I order: + +1. Only such prostitutes are to be selected for the Camp brothel who +from the beginning can be taken for granted as not being able to be +saved for a later regulated life, judging from their previous living +and bearing. Also, that we are not guilty of spoiling a person who +could still be saved for the German people. Such women can only be +released from the Concentration Camp if they according to their age, do +not constitute a destruction to the youth, to health (by contagion), or +to the public welfare and security. The money which they earn in the +camp brothel shall be an old-age security for them. + +2. Fundamentally, all youths who can still be saved are to be +segregated from the older prostitutes in living quarters and work. A +difference must be made between those who cannot be reformed,--who must +remain isolated in the camps, and those who came into the camp to be +reformed and can eventually be saved. The best and most ideologically +inclined custodians are to be employed for the latter. + +In addition, I refer to the fact that the whipping penalty as a whole +but especially for women, is to be the last measure, it is only to be +used + +_a._ if all other punishment such as arrest, solitary confinement, diet +of bread and water, hard labor, were of no avail. + +_b._ in individual cases of desertion or in actual attacks, which +must be inflicted for intimidating and especially exemplary reasons. +The whipping penalty is no instrument for responsible commanders or +supervising custodians who are too lazy or incompetent to reeducate. In +all cases in which food was stolen, the guilty one is to be placed on +bread and water from 3 to 5 days as punishment for first offense. The +whipping penalty is only then to be inflicted upon repeated offenses. + +I ask you to personally check the conditions in the women’s +concentration camps. Otherwise we must feel guilty since girls who +could still be saved will be ruined for always through false treatment +and repeated bad company in which we placed them (exactly as is the +case in the prisons and reform schools of the law). + + Heil Hitler! + Your + (signed) H. Himmler + +2. Inspector of the Concentration Camps, Oranienburg + +Carbon copy with request for acknowledgment. + + SS Lt. Col. + + + PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1584-I-PS + + Teletype Goering to Himmler, dated 14 February 1944 + + TOP SECRET + + CHIEF REICH SECURITY OFFICE + + Teletype Section + + URGENT + + Transmitted by [Initials] + + Received + + -------+-------+-------+-------+-------+------------- + Hour | Day | Month | Year | from | by + 240 | 15 | 2 | 44 | E2 | [Initials] + -------+-------+-------+-------+-------+------------- + +FS--No. 24411 + +t-KR-RM Asien Nr. 0170 14/2 2030--QEM--GKDOL--to Reichsfuehrer-SS +Reichs Minister Himmler, Berlin SW 11-Reference: Letter Journal No. +72/44.- + +Subject: Formation of the 7th Airforce group squadron for special +purposes 7 (Z.B.V.7) + +I received your request to form another squadron of airforce group for +special purposes 7 (Z.B.V.7) and ordered examination by the air force +operational staff [Luftwaffenfuehrungsstab]. At the same time I ask you +to put at my disposal as great a number of Concentration Camp [K Z] +convicts as possible for air armament, as this kind of manpower proved +to be very useful according to previous experience. The situation of +the air war makes subterranean transfer of industry necessary. For work +of this kind Concentration Camp [KZ] convicts can be especially well +concentrated at work and in the camp. Such installations are necessary +in order to secure production of the now fully developed most modern +airplanes. The Fuehrer upon his visit in Insterbrug has attached great +value to these airplanes. Intermediate negotiations have already been +held between my and your departments. I would be especially grateful +for your support in carrying out this task. + +Heil Hitler--Yours Goering, Reich Marshal of Greater Germany. ADF +391/44 GKDOS. + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1584-III-PS + + TOP SECRET + + The Reichsfuehrer-SS Field Command Post. + Personal Staff 10 March 1944 + Diary No. + _Subject_: Use of Prisoners in the air craft industry-M. + To the SS-Brigadefuehrer FEGELEIN + _Fuehrer Headquarters_ + + Dear Hermann! + +Enclosed I am sending you copy of a letter for your information. It was +given to the Reich marshal on 9 March 1944 by the Reichsfuehrer-SS. + + Heil Hitler! + (initialled) DR + +1 enclosure + + # # # # # + + 9 March 1944 + 1879/44 secret Field-command office + Subject: Employment of prisoners in the aviation industry. + Reference: Teletype of 14 February 1944. + Top Reich Secret + + Most honored Reichsmarshal + +Following my teletype letter of the 18 Feb. 44 I herewith transmit a +survey on the employment of prisoners in the aviation industry. + +This survey indicates that at the present time about _36000 prisoners_ +are employed for the purposes of the air force. An increase to a total +of _90,000 prisoners_ is contemplated. + +The production is being discussed, established and executed between the +Reich ministry of aviation and the chief of my economic-administrative +main office, SS-Obergruppenfuehrer and General of the Waffen-SS, Pohl +respectively. + +We assist with all forces at our disposal. + +The task of my economic-administrative main office, however, is not +solely fulfilled with the delivery of the prisoners to the aviation +industry as SS-Obergruppenfuehrer Pohl and his assistants take care of +the required working speed thru constant control and supervision of the +workgroups [Kommandos] and therefore have some influence on the results +of production. In this respect I may suggest consideration of the fact +that in enlarging our responsibility thru a speeding up of the total +work, better results can definitely be expected. + +We also have for some time adjusted our own stone-quarries to +production for the airforce. For instance in Flossenbuerg near Weiden +the prisoners employed previously in the quarry are working now in the +fighter plane program for the Messerschmitt corporation, Regensburg, +which saw in the availability of our stone-mason shops and labor forces +after the attack on Regensburg at that time a favorable opportunity for +the immediate partial transfer of their production. Altogether 4000 +prisoners will work there after the expansion. We produce now with 2000 +men 900 sets of engine cowlings and radiator covers as well as 120,000 +single parts of various kinds for the fighter ME 109. + +In Oranienburg we are employing 6000 prisoners at the Heinkel works now +for construction of the HE 177. With that we have supplied 60% of the +total crew of the plant. + +The prisoners are working without fault. Up till now 200 suggestions +regarding the improvement of work have been handed in at Heinkel from +the ranks of the prisoners, which were used and were rewarded with +premiums. We are increasing this employment to 8000 prisoners. + +We also have employed female prisoners in the aviation industry. For +instance at the mechanical workshops in Neubrandenburg 2500 women +are working now in the manufacture of devices for dropping bombs and +rudder control. The plant has adjusted the total serial production to +employ prisoners. In the month of January 30,000 devices as well as 500 +rudder controls and altitude regulators have been manufactured. We are +increasing employment to 4000 women. The performance of the women is +excellent. + +In our own plant in Butschowitz near Bruenn [Brno] we produce also +for the air force, there however with civilian workers. This plant +supplies 14,000 wooden-built rear control apparatus for ME 109 to the +Messerschmitt corporation, Augsburg. + +The movement of manufacturing plants of the aviation industry to +subterranean locations requires _further_ employment of about 100,000 +prisoners. The plans for this employment on the basis of your letter of +14 Feb 1944 are already under way. + +I shall keep you, most honored Reichsmarshal, currently informed on +this subject. + + Heil Hitler + (initialed) HH + + + Use of Prisoners for the Aircraft Industry. + + -----------------------+---------------+---------+----------------------- + | Number of | | + | Prisoners | Man-Hrs | + +-------+-------+---------+ + Camp & Plant |planned| used | January | Production + -----------------------+-------+-------+---------+----------------------- + _Auschwitz_: | | | | + | | | | + AA fortification staff,| | | | + Auschwitz | 250 | 191 | 48,788 | Construction of AA + | | | | positions. + | | | | + Ost-Maschinenbau GmbH, | | | | + (Factory), | | | | + Schwientochlowitz | 1,500 | 730 | 196,067 | AA gun production: + | | | | _prod. result Jan_: + | | | | 105 guns. + | | | | + Siemens & Schuckert, | | | | + Auschwitz | 1,500 | 90 | 19,240 | at first completion + | | | | of plant, later + | | | | switch and control + | | | | instruments for night + | | | | fighters. + | | | | + _Buchenwald_: | | | | + | | | | + Erla-Maschinenwerk | | | | + GmbH., Leipzig | 2,800 | 1,550 | 176,105 | air plane parts + | | | | production + | | | | _prod. result_ + | | | | _Jan_: + | | | | 360 wings for BF 109 + | | | | 290 fuselages BF 109 + | | | | 304 tail assemblies + | | | | + Junkers-Flug-& | | | | + Motorenwerke AG., | | | | + Schoenebeck | 2,000 | 1,310 | 362,619 | air plane parts + | | | | production + | | | | + Polte, Arnstadt | 100 | 87 | 24,112 | finishing of AA + | | | | cartridge cases; + | | | | _prod. result Jan_: + | | | | 181,000 AA + | | | | cartridge cases. + | | | | + Leichtmetallwerke | | | | + Rautenbach Wernigerode| 1,200 | 772 | 189,832 | production of cylinder + | | | | blocks for airplane + | | | | motors + | | | | + _Dachau_: | | | | + | | | | + High frequency research| 15 | 15 | 3,290 | high frequency + | | | | development + | | | | + BMW, Munich-Allach |12,000 | 3,434 | 908,606 | air plane motor + | | | | production-- + | | | | construction & + | | | | subterranean building + | | | | + Dornier Works GmbH., | | | | + Neuaubing | 3,000 | 60 | 9,527 | at first construction + | | | | of workers’ camp, + | | | | later plane part + | | | | production. + | | | | + Engineer Kimmel, Munich| 25 | 23 | 7,925 | building of radio + | | | | measuring instruments + | | | | _prod. result Jan_: + | | | | 35 RC-generators. + Air force research | | | | + institute, Munich | 400 | 40 | -- | building of air force + | | | | research institute + | | | | Ottobrunn + | | | | + Messerschmitt AG., | | | | + Augsburg-- | | | | + ” Haunstetten | 3,400 | 2,695 | 740,640 | air plane production + | | | | Me + ” Gablingen | 600 | 352 | -- | air plane production + | | | | Me + ” Dachau | 600 | 192 | 35,766 | manufacture of plane + | | | | parts + ” Kottern | 1,000 | 341 | 57,050 | first building of + | | | | factory, then plant + | | | | parts production + | | | | + Air force planning | | | | + office, Sudelfeld | 25 | 25 | 4,660 | building of + | | | | experimental station + | | | | for high frequency + Praezifix, Dachau | 400 | 356 | 94,067 | production of standard + | | | | plane parts and + | | | | screws + H. Sachse KG. Kempten. | 1,000 | 374 | 91,630 | first building of + | | | | factory/start + | | | | production of + | | | | propeller control + | | | | instruments. + | | | | + _Flossenbuerg_: | | | | + | | | | + Dt. Erd- & Steinwerke | | | | + GmbH, Floss. | 4,000 | 1,911 | 422,158 | plane parts production + | | | | for Me _prod. result + | | | | Jan_: 900 noses & + | | | | radiator covering; + | | | | 120,000 parts. + | | | | + Erla-Maschinenwerk | | | | + GmbH, | | | | + Johanngeorgenstadt | 600 | 564 | 117,524 | air plane parts + | | | | production. + Milsen | 500 | 30 | -- | air plane parts + | | | | production. + | | | | + Geramic Works Bohemia, | | | | + Neurohlau | 100 | 100 | 10,764 | plane parts + | | | | production. + | | | | + Luftfahrtgeraetewerk, | | | | + Zwodau | 1,500 | 199 | 28,314 | instrument prod. for + | | | | air force. + | | | | + _Herzogenbusch_: | | | | + | | | | + Dt. Erd- & Steinwerke | | | | + GmbH. Herzogenbusch | 600 | 411 | 35,248 | air plane + | | | | disassembling plant + | | | | _prod. result Jan_: + | | | | 12 planes + | | | | disassembled + | | | | 35 motors ” + | | | | 120 wings ” + | | | | + Air force field | | | | + construction office 3 | 1,000 | 265 | 64,800 | runway construction + | | | | for airport. + | | | | + _Mauthausen_: | | | | + | | | | + Dt. Erd- & Steinwerke | | | | + GmbH., Mauthausen | 500 | 423 | 82,632 | plane parts + | | | | construction for Me + | | | | _prod. results + | | | | January_: + | | | | 25 plane fuselages + | | | | + Flugmotoren GmbH., | | | | + Wiener-Neudorf | 3,000 | 1,983 | 417,328 | first building, later + | | | | plane parts prod. + | | | | + Heinkel-Werke AG, | | | | + Schwechat | 3,200 | 2,065 | 486,206 | air plane parts + | | | | production + | | | | + _Natzweiler_: | | | | + | | | | + Dt Erd- & Steinwerke | | | | + GmbH, Natzweiler | 400 | 261 | 63,221 | disassembling of Ju + | | | | motors & welding of + | | | | air torpedoes. + | | | | + _Neuengamme_: | | | | + | | | | + Jastram, | | | | + Hamburg-Bergedorf | 80 | 80 | 21,554 | air plane parts + | | | | production + Messap GmbH., | | | | + Hamburg-Langenhorn | 120 | 110 | 31,422 | production of fuse + | | | | mechanisms + | | | | _prod. result Jan_: + | | | |16 800 balance wheels + | | | | S30 + | | | |53 900 balance wheels + | | | | S60 + | | | |15 600 time fuses S30 + | | | |46 700 time fuses S60 + | | | | + _Ravensbrueck_: | | | | + | | | | + Air ministry testing | | | | + ground, Peenamuende-W | 600 | 598 | 125,000 | building + | | | | + Geraetewerk Pommern | | | | + GmbH, Stargard | 550 | 283 | 81,129 | production of aerial + | | | | torpedoes + | | | | + Heinkel-Werke AG, | | | | + Barth. | 2,000 | 1,721 | 435,155 | air plane production + | | | | + Mechan. Werkstaetten | | | | + GmbH. Neubrandenburg | 4,000 | 1,981 | 529,126 | production of bomb + | | | | release mechanism and + | | | | Fz.G.76; _prod. Jan._ + | | | | 23,000 lock 50/X + | | | | 1,500 lock 2000 + | | | | 150 PVC 1006 + | | | | 500 rudder + | | | | machines + | | | | 400 ER 4 L-“2” + | | | | + Siemens & Halske, | | | | + Berlin, work | | | | + Ravensbrueck | 2,400 | 872 | 242,867 | communication + | | | | equipment + | | | | product. (e.g. throat + | | | | microphones) + Silva-Metallwerke | | | | + GmbH, Genthin | 600 | 596 | 154,224 | production of AA + | | | | ammunition + | | | | _prod. result Jan._: + | | | | 518 200 2-cm shells + | | | | 927 500 2-cm shells + | | | | (various styles) + | | | | 965 000 13-mm shells + | | | | + Veltener-Maschinenbau | | | | + GmbH., Volten | 600 | 596 | 146,873 | production of plane + | | | | parts. + | | | | + _Sachsenhausen_: | | | | + | | | | + Heinkel-Werke AG, | | | | + Oranienburg | 6,500 | 5,939 |1,699,978| plane mass production. + | | | | _Prod. result_ + | | | | 15 plane bodies He 177 + Luftschiffbau Zepplin | | | | + GmbH, Oranienburg | 300 | 221 | 54,006 | production and repair + | | | | of balloons + | | | | _prod. result Jan_: + | | | | 120 balloons repaired + | | | | and part work for + | | | | 40 new balloons. + | | | | + _Ostland | | | | + Concentration | | | | + Camp_: | | | | + | | | | + Air force field | | | | + building direction. | | | | + Spilve | 1,000 | 1,000 | 280,776 | building of airport. + | | | | + Field building | | | | + direction 3/I, Kauen | 1,000 | 829 | 222,186 | building of airport. + | | | | + AA booty repair shop, | | | | + Kauen | 200 | 162 | 4,920 | rebuilding of booty AA + | | | | + Kopperschmidt & Soehne,| | | | + Riga | 20 | 20 | 6,160 | production of plane + | | | | turrets. + | | | | + It was recently agreed | | | | + to use further: | | | | + | | | | + _Buchenwald_: | | | | + | | | | + Anhydrit |10,000 | -- | -- | plane production of + | | | | Ju underground + | | | | + Ago, Oschersleben | 1,500 | -- | -- | plane production + | | | | Focke-Wulf fighters. + | | | | + _Gross-Rosen_: | | | | + | | | | + Famo, Bunzlau | 1,500 | -- | -- | servicing of FW night + | | | | fighters, Ta 154. + | | | | + _Mauthausen_: | | | | + | | | | + Esche II |10,000 | -- | -- | kind of production to + | | | | be decided by air + | | | | Ministry. + | | | | + _Natzweiler_: | | | | + | | | | + Geraetewerk Pommern | | | | + GmbH., branch | | | | + Diedenhofen | 600 | -- | -- | production of aerial + | | | | torpedoes. + |90,785 |35,839 |8,733,495| + -----------------------+-------+-------+---------+----------------------- + + The Chief of the + SS Economics Administration Main Office + Berlin, 21 February 1944 (signed) Pohl I. [?] + SS Obergruppenfuehrer and General of Armed Forces SS. + +The Reich Minister for Armament and War Production + +TAE-No. 475/44 top secret + +(Signed) Pohl + +[Initialled] HH + + Berlin, Pariser Platz 3, 17 April 1944. + + Phone: 11 00 52 + + Pohl + + TOP SECRET + +Fighter staff, attention: Field Marshal MILCH + +Fighter staff, attention: Chief of office SWR + +_For Information_ + + Reichsfuehrer-SS and chief of the German Police, Reichleader HIMMLER + + Head of armament office Lt Gen Dr Ing. h. c. Waeger + + Plenipotentiary-General for Construction, Director Stobbe-Dethleffsen + +1. Using tables and drawings as an illustration I have in conjunction +with Field Marshal Milch informed the Fuehrer on the work of the +fighter staff in pointing to the extraordinarily pleasing and +successful cooperation of the newly created organization with all +offices and works. He is cognizant of the fact that the greatest part +of the transfer has been fixed according to plan and that as the +first step the decentralization above the ground can be concluded by +approximately August and that the second step aiming at the total +subterranean security of the most sensitive works will be concluded by +the end of the year. + +2. Field Marshal Milch has reported as a result of the meeting on +construction of the “central planning” to the Fuehrer, that of +the amount of construction demanded, because of the extraordinary +aggravation of the all-over situation, only the most important part of +the construction work could be accomplished. The Fuehrer demands that +in spite of that both the large plants, each of at least 600,000 qm, +which he demanded should be constructed with all energy. He consents +that one of these works will not be built in concrete but in accordance +with the proposal as an enlargement and in the immediate vicinity of +the present central works as the so-called central construction and +will come under the management of the Junkers works. + +The Fuehrer agrees to the suggestion that the second large building +project will, because of lack in labor and material, not be carried +out on German territory, but on suitable ground (first of all gravel +foundation and possibilities for transportation) in the immediate +proximity of the border, on French, Belgian or Dutch territory, +as long as the plant is constructed behind a fortified zone. The +suggestion to build on French territory is favored by the fact that +it will then be much easier to make the necessary labor available. In +spite of that the Fuehrer asks to try, to construct this second works +in an essentially secure territory, namely in the Protectorate. If +the labor can not be supplied there either, the Fuehrer wants to get +in touch in person with the Reichsfuehrer SS and will cause him to +provide the approximately 100,000 men required, thru the securing of +corresponding Jewish contingents from Hungary. The Fuehrer demands that +a meeting take place with him shortly in order to discuss the details +in the presence of the men concerned. + +3. An immediate task for the central construction besides assuring the +supply of the bottleneck products of the Junkers works which is to be +executed step by step, is the planning and securing of ME 262 at the +rate of 1000 a month and of an additional fighter plane at the rate of +2000 a month. + + Heil Hitler + + signed: SPEER + + Certified: Capt. Stein + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1590-PS + +[several illegible notations] + +Re: Taking of hostages + +OKH received: 1 Oct. 1941 + + 5 copies--copy + + OKH/Gen. Qn. + + (W. Bfh. Suedost) + + Military Commander, South-East + +Attacks on members of the Armed Forces lately committed in the occupied +territories gave reason to point out that it is advisable that military +commanders always have at their disposal a number of hostages of +different political tendencies, namely: + +1. nationalist + +2. democratic-bourgeois, and + +3. communist + +It is important that among them shall be well-known leading +personalities or members of their families, whose names are to be made +public. + +Depending on the membership of the culprit, hostages of the +corresponding group are to be shot in case of attacks. + +It is asked that commanders be accordingly instructed. + +[partly illegible notation] + + Chief of the Armed Forces High Command + + (signed) Keitel. + +Complied with in France and Belgium. + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1600-PS + + The State-Picture Gallery in Dresden + + The Director. Dresden-Al, 1 June 1940. + + To: Ministerialrat Dr. Hanssen + + Berlin W 8, Wilhelmstr. 64 + + Dear Ministerialrat! + +Permit me to express my thanks for having sent me the copy of the +letter of the State Secretary Dr. Landfried. + +I herewith enclose a copy of my letter of 16 March 1940 to Reichsleiter +Bormann, referring mainly to the _confiscated property of the convents +in the Ostmark_. In accordance with the Fuehrer’s decree on Jewish +property, a generally applicable procedure may be recommended in this +case, too; the Fuehrer should have the final word in the distribution +to the individual consumers, rather the first option on any purchase. +This regulation should be made to be retroactive as of the time of the +assumption of power if possible. + + Heil Hitler! + + Yours faithfully + + H. Posse. + +1 enclosure. + + # # # # # + +At the Fuehrer’s present HQ, 16 Jan 41 Bo/Fu + +R.L.M.B. + +1. Director Dr. Posse, _Dresden-Hellerau_ + + _Personal!_ + + _Registered!_ + + Tunnigtweg 14 + + Dear Dr. Posse! + +Enclosed herewith I am sending you the pictures of the altar from the +convent in Hohenfurth near Kruman. The convent and its entire property +shall be confiscated in the immediate future because of the attitude, +hostile towards the State, of its inhabitants. + +It shall be up to you to decide whether the pictures shall remain in +the convent at Hohenfurth or be transferred to the museum in Linz after +the latter shall be completed. + +I await your decision in the matter. + + Heil Hitler! + + Faithfully yours, + [initialed by Bormann] + +Enclosures + +2. Presented again: 3 May 1941. + + # # # # # + + Dresden-Al, 16 May 1941 + + The State-Picture Gallery in Dresden. + +The Director. + +The Reichsleiter Martin Bormann, + +Berlin W 8, Wilhelmstr. 64 + +_Personal!_ + +Dear Reichsleiter! + +I report that I have returned today from a weeks trip to Oberdonau and +Vienna. Besides checking on the confiscated convents and monasteries, +the main reason for my trip to Linz and Oberdonau was to find out +_whether any of the confiscated convents offered facilities suitable +for temporarily storing the collections acquired by the Fuehrer_. + +After having seen the convents at Hohenfurth, St. Florian, +Krenesmunster, Schloegel, Wilhering etc., and after having discussed +the matter with Gauleiter Eigruber and his deputies, I found that +the _convent in Krenesmunster is extremely suited for this purpose_. +There are in this convent 50-60 rooms that can be locked; the various +new acquisitions can be stored there temporarily. There is also +the “Emperor’s Stall” there, 25 m long, and a flight of 7 rooms in +good shape, at present the picture-gallery of the convent, not very +valuable, is on exposition. From time to time, the newly acquired +collections may be presented to the Fuehrer there. + +Krenesmunster is situated in the woods, far away from industrial area; +therefore, a threat from the air hardly exists. + +In case the Fuehrer should agree with the proposal to have +Krenesmunster as a depot for Linz, it is suggested that the Germans +from Bessarabia who are at present living in the convent, be moved into +another convent, in order to safeguard the stocks, particularly against +fire. + +Therefore, I beg to have the Fuehrer state his intentions regarding +their proposal which is also supported by Gauleiter Eigruber not only +is the collection Lanz in Amsterdam, packed in the meantime, awaiting, +also several other collections of paintings for which there’d hardly +be space enough in Munich, are ready, and so is Dr. Topfer’s library +which was bought in Switzerland. Also very rich stocks, already packed +and stored in Vienna, confiscated from Jewish owners, and many new +acquisitions from Vienna could be brought to Krenesmunster. This +way, room could be made in Vienna and what remains of confiscated +art-treasures could be distributed. + + Heil Hitler! + + Yours faithfully + H. Posse. + + # # # # # + +Report on the trip, undertaken on orders to Cracow and Warsaw, so as to + ascertain the kind and the amount of confiscated art-treasures. + +It was impossible to carry out the order as such, as well as that part +of it which drafting of a plan as to how to dispose of the confiscated +art treasures, since most of them were still packed away in cases and +were either stored in Cracow, or in other places, particularly in +Warsaw ready for shipment to Cracow. + +Since 6 October, under the direction of Understate secretary Dr. +Muhlmann, as the special deputy of General Field Marshall Goering +and as the Director of the Department of Science and Training, the +storing of all the valuable Art treasures has been in full swing with +assistance of suitable experts from Berlin, Vienna, and Breslau, and, +so far as I could determine it has been almost completely carried out. + +Works of art and culture, mainly from Warsaw were saved, particularly +from the badly damaged chateau of the Kings whose furniture and +interior decorations were salvaged to a large extent. In Cracow, +box-cars containing the works of art secured from public, clerical and +private ownership arrived almost daily. The Art treasures are being +collected in the particularly suitable building of the Jagellonic +Library in Cracow and are being set up there properly, a task which may +be finished by February 1940. As soon as the task of collecting shall +be finished and an inventory is made so that a complete survey of the +entire valuable Polish Art-treasure can be made, I shall again travel +to Cracow so as to carry out the order given me. + +The official pictorial service is photographing all important works of +art little by little. The governor general shall present these pictures +in the form of a photo-Album to the Fuehrer. + +I was able to gain some knowledge on the public and private collections +as well as clerical property in Cracow and Warsaw. It is true that +we cannot hope too much to enrich ourselves from the acquisition of +great Art works of paintings and sculptures there with the exception +of the Veit Stoss-altar and the plates of Hans von Kulmbach in the +Church of Maria in Cracow, the Raffael, Leonardo and Rembrandt from +the collection Czarborpki and several other works from the National +Museum in Warsaw--works of a rather high value of whose existence we +in Germany had already known. Richer and more extensive is the Polish +stock of “objects d’art”, such as handicraft in gold and silver of +German origin to a large part, (particularly from the Church of Maria +and the cathedral of Wawel) tapestries, arms, porcelains, furniture, +bronzes, coins, valuable parchment-scrips, books, etc. Those were the +principal fields of interest for Polish collectors, besides their +interest in Polish National Art, particularly of the 19th century. It +is characteristic that apart from original paintings so many copies +can be found in Polish castles and private collections (for example +Czartoryski, Wilano etc). However, many thousand works of art of all +kinds ought to be found in the Jagellonic Library. + +As I said before, I shall not be able to make proposals regarding +the distribution as long as an inventory of the entire material +does not exist. However, I should like to reserve for the museum +in Linz the three most important paintings of the Czartoryski +collection, namely the Raffael, Leonardo and Rembrandt which are at +present in the Kaiser-Frederick Museum in Berlin. We in Dresden are +particularly interested in the interior decorations of the castle +of the Kings in Warsaw since Saxonian architects and artists have +created them; therefore, the suggestion is made that the salvaged +parts of it (panellings, doors, inlaid floors, sculptures, mirrors, +glass-chandeliers, porcelains etc) be used for the interior decoration +of the Pavillion of the “Zivinges” in Dresden. + +A number of fine drawings of Albrecht Durer’s and other old German +masters kept in the Ossolinemm in Lemberg, has fallen into Russian +hands. Maybe at least Durer’s 27 pieces could still be salvaged for +Germany. + +While in Warsaw, a Polish colleague of mine whom I have known, for +quite some time told me that the storing of the art treasures was +begun already in June 1939; by the end of July the entire official +museum property was packed in cases and ready for shipment. In spite of +that the Poles did not manage to carry any important stocks away and +save them for themselves, with the exception of the famous tapestry, +collection of Wawel, the riding costumes kept there also, arms and +historically valuable pieces like the blood-banner of the Prophet +which, as far as I could ascertain, fell into Russian hands. + + /s/ Hans Posse. + + + PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1602-PS + + Dr. med. Sigmund RASCHER MUNICH, 15 May 1941 + + Trogerstrasse 56 + +Dear Reichsfuehrer, + +My sincere thanks for your cordial wishes and flowers on the birth +of my second son. This time, too, it is a strong boy, though he has +come 3 weeks too early. I may send you a picture of both children +incidentally. * * * + +For the time being I have been assigned to the Luftgaukommando VII, +Munich, for a medical course. During this course, where researches +on high-altitude flights play a prominent part (determined by the +somewhat higher ceiling of the English fighter planes) considerable +regret was expressed at the fact that no tests with human material had +yet been possible for us, as such experiments are very dangerous and +nobody volunteers for them. I put, therefore, the _serious_ question: +can you make available two or three professional criminals for these +experiments? The experiments are made at “Bodenstaendige Pruefstelle +fuer Hoehenforschung der Luftwaffe”, Munich. The experiments, by which +the subjects can, of course, die, would take place with my cooperation. +They are essential for researches on high-altitude flight and cannot +be carried out, as has been tried, with monkeys, who offer entirely +different test-conditions. I have had a very confidential talk with a +representative of the air forces Surgeon who makes these experiments. +He is also of the opinion that the problems in question could only be +solved by experiments on human persons. (Feeble-minded could also be +used as test material). * * * + +I hope sincerely, highly esteemed Reichsfuehrer that, in spite of the +immense burden of work you carry, you are in the pink of health. + +With my heartiest wishes, I am with Heil Hitler your gratefully devoted + + (signature) S. RASCHER + +(Z--2) + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1616-PS + +Dr. S. RASCHER SS-Hauptsturmfuehrer + + Munich, 17 February 1943 + + To the Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police Mr. Heinrich + Himmler + +Berlin SW 11 Prinz Albrecht Str. 8 + +Dear Reichsfuehrer! + +Enclosed I present to you in condensed form a summary of the results of +the experiments made in warming up people who have been cooled off by +using animal heat. + +Right now I am attempting to prove through experiments on human beings +that it is possible to warm up people cooled off by dry cold just as +fast as people who were cooled off by remaining in cold water. The +Reich physician SS, SS-Gruppenfuehrer Dr. Gravitz doubted very much +that that would be possible and said that I would have to prove it +first by 100 experiments. Up to now I have cooled off about 30 people +stripped in the open air during 9-14 hours to 27°-29°. After a time +corresponding to a transport of one hour, I put these subjects in a +hot bath. _Up to now_ every single patient was completely warmed up +within one hour at most, though some of them had their hands and feet +frozen white. In some cases a slight fatigue with slightly rising +temperature was observed on the day following the experiments. I have +not observed any fatal results from this extremely fast warming up. I +have not so far been able to do any warming up by “Sauna” as ordered +by you, my dear Reichsfuehrer, as the weather in December and January +was too warm for any experiments in the open air, and right now the +camp is closed on account of typhoid and I am not allowed therefore to +bring the subjects to these experiments into the SS-Sauna. (I have been +vaccinated several times and continue myself to make the tests within +the camp in spite of the typhoid in the camp.) It would be best if I +were transferred to the Waffen-SS soon and could go together with Neff +to Auschwitz and * * * the question of the warming up of persons who +have frozen on land * * *. + + [rest of document missing] + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1617-PS + + SECRET + +The Reichfuehrer SS + +Berlin, SW 11, B. Prinz Albrecht Strasse 8 Field Command Post + + November 1942 + +Dear Comrade Milch! + +You will recall that through General Wolff I particularly recommended +to you for your consideration the work of a certain SS Fuehrer, +Dr. Rascher, who is a physician of the air force on leave [Arzt des +Beurlaubtenstandes der Luftwaffe]. + +These researches which deal with the behavior of the human organism +at great heights, as well as with manifestations caused by prolonged +cooling of the human body in cold water, and similar problems which are +of vital importance to the air force in particular, can be performed +by us with particular efficiency because I personally assumed the +responsibility for supplying asocial individuals and criminals who +deserve only to die [todeswuerdig] from concentration camps for these +experiments. + +Unfortunately you had no time recently when Dr. Rascher wanted to +report on the experiments at the Ministry for Aviation. I had put +great hopes in that report, because I believed that in this way the +difficulties, based mainly on religious objections, which oppose Dr. +Rascher’s experiments--for which _I_ assumed responsibility--could be +eliminated. + +The difficulties are still the same now as before. In these “Christian +medical circles” the standpoint is being taken that it goes without +saying that a young German aviator should be allowed to risk his life +but that the life of a criminal--who is not drafted into military +service--is too sacred for this purpose and one should not stain +oneself with this guilt; at the same time it is interesting to note +that credit is taken for the results of the experiments while excluding +the scientist who performed them. + +I personally have inspected the experiments, and have--I can say this +without exaggeration--participated in every phase of this scientific +work in a helpful and inspiring manner. + +We two should not get angry about these difficulties. It will take at +least another ten years until we can get such narrow-mindedness out +of our people. But this should not affect the research work which is +necessary for our young and splendid soldiers and aviators. + +I beg you to release Dr. Rascher, Stabsarzt in reserve, from the air +force and to transfer him to me to the Waffen-SS. I would then assume +the sole responsibility for having these experiments made in this +field, and would put the results, of which we in the SS need only a +part for the frost injuries in the East, entirely at the disposal of +the air force. However, in this connection I suggest that with the +liaison between you and Wolff a _“non-Christian” physician should +be charged, who should be at the same time honorable as a scientist +and not prone to intellectual theft_ and who could be informed of +the results. This physician should also have good contacts with the +administrative authorities, so that the results would really obtain a +hearing. + +I believe that this solution--to transfer Dr. Rascher to the SS, +so that he could carry out the experiments under my responsibility +and under my orders--is the best way. The experiments should not be +stopped; we owe that to our men. If Dr. Rascher remained with the air +force, there would certainly be much annoyance; because then I would +have to bring a series of unpleasant details to you, because of the +arrogance and assumption which Professor Dr. Holzloehner has displayed +in the post of Dachau--who is under my command--about me in utterances +delivered to SS Colonel Sievers. In order to save both of us this +trouble, I suggest again that Dr. Rascher should be transferred to the +Waffen SS as quickly as possible. + +I would be grateful to you if you would give the order to put the low +pressure chamber at our disposal again, together with step-up pumps, +because the experiments should be extended to include even greater +altitudes. + + Cordial greetings and Heil Hitler! + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1618-PS + +S. RASCHER + +Intermediate report on intense chilling experiments in the Dachau Camp, + started on 15 August 1942 + +_Experimental procedure_ + +The experimental subjects (V P) were placed in the water, dressed in +complete flying uniform, winter or summer combination, and with an +aviator’s helmet. A life jacket made of rubber or kapok was to prevent +submerging. The experiments were carried out at water temperatures +varying from 2.5° to 12°. In one experimental series, Occiput and brain +stem protruded above the water, while in another series of experiments +the Occiput (brain stem) and back of the head were submerged in water. + +Electrical measurements gave low temperature readings of 26.4° in +the stomach and 26.5° in the rectum. Fatalities occurred only when +the brain stem and the back of the head were also chilled. Autopsies +of such fatal cases always revealed large amounts of free blood, +up to ½ liter, in the cranial cavity. The heart invariably showed +extreme dilation of the night chamber. As soon as the temperature in +these experiments reached 28°, the experimental subjects (VP) died +invariably, despite all attempts at resuscitation. The above discussed +autopsy finding conclusively proved the importance of a warming +protective device for head and Occiput when designing the planned +protective clothing of the foam type. + +Other important findings, common in all experiments, to be mentioned. +Marked increase of the viscosity of the blood, marked increase of +hemoglobin, an approximate five fold increase of the leukocytes, +invariable rise of blood sugar to twice its normal value. Auricular +fibrillation made its appearance regularly at 30°. + +During attempts to save severely chilled persons, it was shown that +rapid re-warming was in all cases preferable to slow re-warming, +because after removal from the cold water, the body temperature +continued to sink rapidly. I think that for this reason we can dispense +with the attempt to save intensely chilled subjects by means of animal +heat. + +Rewarming by animal warmth--animal bodies or women’s bodies--would be +too slow. As auxiliary measures for the prevention of intense chilling, +improvements in the clothing of aviators come alone into consideration. +The foam suit with suitable neck protector which is being prepared +by the German Institution for textile research [Deutsches +Textilforschungsinstitut] Muenchen-Gladbach deserves first priority +in this connection. The experiments have shown that pharmaceutical +measures are probably unnecessary if the flier is still alive at the +time of rescue. + + (signed) Dr. S. Rascher + +Muenchen--Dachau, 10 September 1942. + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1621-PS + + SECRET! + + The Reichsfuehrer SS Personal Staff + File Nr. 19/9/43a/Pers/V + + Command Post, 12 November 1942 + [Rubber Stamp] + Personal Staff, Reichsfuehrer SS + [illegible notation] Administration + Secret/ + + SECRET! + +1. To SS Major General Rauter + +The Hague + +Dear Major General, + +The SS Captain Dr. Rascher is in need of medico-physiological +appliances. He points out that there are sufficient appliances at the +University of Leyden and at the University of Utrecht, which could be +put to use. + +The Reichsfuehrer SS asks you to attempt to obtain these appliances, +which would still have to be listed in detail by SS Captain Dr. +Rascher resp. by SS Colonel Sievers, through the Reich Commissar. +SS-Hauptsturmfuehrer Dr. Rascher resp. SS-Standartenfuehrer Sievers +will submit the list directly to you. + + Heil Hitler! + + (signed) Brandt + +Transmitted to + + 2. SS Colonel (SS-Standartenfuehrer) Sievers + + 3. SS Captain (SS-Hauptsturmfuehrer) Dr. Rascher, with the request + that the above be noted and the necessary steps taken. + + [Signed illegible] + SS-Lieutenant Colonel + + # # # # # + + SECRET! + + [Rubber Stamp] + Personal Staff Reichsfuehrer SS + (illegible notation) + SECRET + +Dr. S. Rascher, SS Captain + + SECRET! + +File Memorandum. + +Procurement of medico-physiological appliances is so difficult in +Germany that the continued conduct of experiments is seriously +endangered. If the necessary appliances cannot be procured, it will +be very much more difficult to build up the Institute for Functional +Research in Military Science within the framework of the Ancestral +Heritage Organization [Ahnenerbe]. + +The Institutes of the Universities of Leyden and Utrecht, however, are +very plentifully equipped with the very best scientific appliances at +both these universities is not feasible, however, since the University +of Leyden is, and will remain, closed, notwithstanding all rumors, +and since the University of Utrecht works with only half its usual +enrollment. + +SS Lieutenant Colonel Sievers therefore suggests that the Reichsfuehrer +SS write a letter to Reich Governor Dr. Seyss-Inquart saying that it is +request that the Reich Governor put the appliances of the University +Institutes concerned at the disposal of the Ancestral Heritage +Organization [Ahnenerbe], initially on a loan basis. + + (signed) Dr. Rascher + +Munich, 12 November 1942 + + [Handwritten notation] + + Dr. Brandt to Reuter + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1637-PS + + 1938 REICHS MINISTERIALBLATT, i. V., PAGES 1089-1091 + + Acceptance of members of the Security Police into the SS of the + N.S.D.A.P. of 23 June 1938. + +Ministerial-Blatt of the Reich and Prussian Ministries of the Interior, + Berlin, 1938 + +No. 28, p. 1090 + +_Appointments, Wages, Maintenance, Service Regulations_ + + Circular of the Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police in the + Reich Ministry of the Interior for 23.6.1938--S-V 3 No. 72/38 + + -------------------------+-------------------------+-------------------- + The | The | Corresponds to the + -------------------------+-------------------------+-------------------- + Criminal-assistant | Office helper | SS Sergeant + aspirant in preparatory | [Amtsgehilfe | [SS + service | Betenmeister] | Unterscharfuehrer] + [Kriminal-Assist-Aniv. | | + im Verbereitungsvienst] | | + -------------------------+-------------------------+-------------------- + Criminal-Assistant | Superintendant | SS-Staff Sergeant + aspirant | [Hausmeister] | [SS- + [Kriminal-Assist-Aniv] | | Scharfuehrer] + -------------------------+-------------------------+-------------------- + Criminal assistant | Police office assistant.| SS-Technical + [Kriminal-Assist] | [Pol-Buereassist] | Sergeant [SS- + | Police-Prison-Technical | Oberscharfuehrer] + | Sergeant. [Poli- | + | Gefaengnisoberwachtm] | + -------------------------+-------------------------+-------------------- + Chief Criminal | Police-Prison-Master | SS-Master Sergeant + Assistant. | Sergeant [Pol- | [SS + [Krim-Oberassist] | Gefaengnis-Hauptwachtm]| Hauptscharfuehrer] + -------------------------+-------------------------+-------------------- + Criminal secretary | Police-secretary | SS-Lieutenant + [Krim-Sekretar] | [Pol-Sekretar] | [SS- + Criminal district | Office-Secretary | Untersturmfuehrer] + secretary | [Kanzleisekretaer] | + [Krim-Bez. Sekretar] | Police secretary first | + | class | + | [Pol-Obersekretaer] | + | Technical secretary | + | [Techn-Sekretaer] | + -------------------------+-------------------------+-------------------- + Criminal inspector | Ministerial registrator | SS-First + [Krim-Inspektor] | [Min-Registrator] | Lieutenant [SS- + Criminal commissar up | Police inspector | Obersturmfuehrer] + to 15 years of service | [Pol-Inspektor] | + [Krim-Kommissar] | Assessor | + | [Assessor] | + -------------------------+-------------------------+-------------------- + Criminal commissar with | Police inspector | SS-Captain + over 15 years of | [Pol-Inspektor] | [SS- + service | with 300 Reichsmark | Hauptsturmfuehrer] + [Krim-Kommissar] | additional salary. | + Criminal counsellor | Police inspector first | + [Krim-Rat] up to 15 | class | + years of service. | [Pol-Oberinspektor] | + | Government-Assessor | + | [Reg-Assessor] | + | Police counsellor up to | + | 15 years of service. | + | [Pol-Rat] | + -------------------------+-------------------------+-------------------- + Criminal counsellor with | Police counsellor with | SS-Major + over 15 years of | over 15 years of | [SS- + service [Krim-Rat] | service. [Pol-Rat] | Sturmbannfuehrer] + Criminal director | Office-counsellor | + [Krim-Direktor] | [Amtsrat] | + Government and criminal | Government-counsellor | + counsellor | [Reg-Rat] | + [Reg. u. Krim-Rat] | | + -------------------------+-------------------------+-------------------- + Government counsellor | Government counsellor | SS-Lieutenant + first class and | first class | Colonel [SS- + criminal counsellor. | [Oberreg-Rat] | Obersturmbann- + [Oberreg.-und Krim.-Rat] | | fuehrer] + -------------------------+-------------------------+-------------------- + Government and criminal | Government director | SS-Colonel + director | [Reg-Direktor] | [SS- + [Reg.-und Krim.- | Ministerial | Standartenfuehrer] + Direktor] | counsellor [Min-Rat] | + Reich-criminal director | | + [Reichskrim-Direktor] | | + ------------------------+-------------------------+-------------------- +With the aim of fusing members of the German Police with the +“Schutzstaffel” of the National Socialist German Workers Party into one +uniformly turned out State Protective Corps [Staatsschutzkorps] of the +National Socialist Reich, I decree as follows: + +I. (1) Members of the Security Police can upon request be received into +the Schutzstaffel of the _NSDAP_ if they + + 1. fulfill the general requirements of the SS and + + 2. _a._ Up to 30.1.1933 (inclusive) have been members of the NSDAP + or of its affiliates (the Sturmabteilung, the National Socialist + Motor Corps, the Hitler Youth) even if they have meanwhile + honorably resigned from these affiliates. + + or + + _b._ for a static period [seit einem ... liegenden Zeitpunkt] + before 30.1.1933 were sponsoring members of the SS + [Foerderndes Mitglied] + + or + + _c._ Have seen service for at least three years in the Security + Police under the direction of the Reichsfuehrer SS and have + proven themselves. + +(2) Permit for admission of a wider circle of persons I reserve for +myself. + +(3) Admission according to the general requirements is not affected by +this circular. + +II. 1. Upon transfer into the SS, the grade held in the police will be +changed to a corresponding one in the SS. Former members of the SS, SA, +NSKK (National Socialist Drivers Corps) who held a higher rank, will be +incorporated with the same high rank. When promoted within the security +police, an assimilation of ranks will take place in every case. + +3. I myself will make decisions about incorporation of members of the +security police with higher ranks. + +4. The employees of the security police will be put into that SS rank +which corresponds to their rank as civil servant, according to their +jobs. + +5. Members of the security police incorporated into the SS up to +the publication of these ordinances will be promoted to the SS rank +corresponding to their police rank, provided they do not already hold +such, or a higher SS rank. + +III. 1. Members of the security police incorporated into the SS will be +assigned to the units of the security service of the Reichsfuehrer-SS, +according to more detailed instructions of the chief of the security +police and of the security main office of the Reichsfuehrer-SS. + +2. The chief of the security police and of the security main office +regulates the SS-service relations [Dienstverhaltnisse] and obligations +of the members of the security police who were incorporated into the SS. + +IV. 1. The applications of members of the security police for admission +to the SS are to be directed to the chief of the security police +through service channels. + +2. The applications are to be submitted according to the following +sample: + + _SAMPLE_: + + (Place and date) + + I herewith request admission to the security service of the + Reichsfuehrer-SS in conformity with the circular of the + Reichsfuehrer-SS and Chief of the German police in the Ministry of + the Interior of June 23rd, 1938-S.V.3 number 72/38 (R M Bli V. page + 1089) + + First and last name: _______________________________________ + ____________________________________________________________ + (rank and office) + + Day, month and year of birth: ______________________________ + + Place of birth: ____________________________________________ + + Party membership number, district [Ortsgruppe]: ____________ + + Last SS-, SA-, NSKK or HJ rank and number, + last SS, SA-, respectively HJ district + [Dienststelle]: ____________________________________________ + ____________________________________________________________ + + Separated from the SS etc. on the __________________________ + + (with indication, whether transferred directly to the police, or, if + otherwise, which service relations in the meantime) + + Day of joining the NSDAP, SS, SA, HJ _______________________ + + Helping member [Foerderndes Mitglied] of the SS since: _____ + + Working in the security police since: ______________________ + + To The Chief of the security police through channels. + +* * * * * * * + +V. This circular is to be brought to the attention of all members of +the security police. + +To the Reichsstatthalter, the state governments, the Reichscommissioner +for the Saarland, the Prussian supreme and government presidents, +the office of the secret state police [Gestapo], the Reich criminal +police office [Reichskrim-Pol-Amt], the federal police main offices +[Staatspol-Leitstellen] and federal police office [Staatspol-Stellen], +the criminal police main offices [Krim-Pol. Leitstellen] and criminal +police offices [Krim-Pol Stellen], the commander of the leaderschool of +the security police [Kommandeur der Fuehrerschule der Sicherheitspol]. + +To the SS main office, the main office for security +[Sicherheitshauptamt], the security service leaders [SD-Fuehrer] of the +higher levels of the SS [SS-Oberabschnitte] and the security service +lower levels [SD-Unterabschnitte]. by copy. + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1638-PS + + 1938 REICHS MINISTERIALBLATT, iV, PAGE 1906 + + Cooperation of the Agencies of the General and Interior Administration + with the S.D. of the Reichsfuehrer SS (SD) of 11 Nov. 1938 + +(1) The Security Service of the Reichsfuehrer SS (SD) has, as the +intelligence organization for Party and nation--in particular for the +support of the Security Police--important missions to fulfill. The +SD thereby becomes active on a national mission. This necessitates a +close and sympathetic cooperation between the SD and the authorities +for general and internal administration. Therefore, inquiries of the SD +are to be answered in the same way as inquiries of all national office +are treated. Likewise, the sections of the SD are obligated to furnish +information to the general and internal administration. + +(2) Business between the SD and the Reich Ministry of the Interior +proceeds solely through the Chief of the Sicherheitshauptamt, business +between the SD and the remaining authorities of general and internal +administration only through the higher levels of the SD. Business +between the authorities for general and internal administration of +the SHA proceeds through the Reich Ministry of the Interior, business +between the authorities for general and internal administration and +the other SD offices in Prussia through the Regierungs-Praesident or +Ober-Praesident, in the other provinces through the corresponding +authorities. In doubtful cases the combined decision of the Reich +Ministry of the Interior and of the Reichsfuehrer SS should be obtained. + +Supplement for municipalities, municipal groups, other corporate bodies +of the public law: I request, to act accordingly. + +To lower authorities municipalities, municipal groups, other corporate +bodies of the public law. + + + PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1639-A-PS + +Mobilization Book for the Civil Administration 1939 Edition [Pages 2-18] + + Armed Forces High Command Berlin, 18th Feb 1939 + No. 265/39 g.Kdos. I IVa. 125 copies, 101st copy + Re: Reprint of Mobilization Book for the Civil Administration. + +1. Enclosed is the Reprint for 1939 of the “Mobilization Book for the +Civil Administration” with the request to destroy Mobilization Books +(Z), hereby made obsolete, at the beginning of the new mobilization +year. + +2. The Reprint takes effect on the 1st April 1939. The annexes V, XIX, +and XX will be forwarded after their completion. + +3. An expression of opinion on the proposals handed in here will not +take place in detail any more, insofar as the expression has not +already been made. + +4. The necessity of cooperation between Ministers and the highest Reich +agencies is not always pointed out in the column “Remarks”. It is to be +understood that the cooperation needed for preparations and carrying +out of the measures must be guaranteed, even without an express +directive. + + Chief of the Armed Forces High Command. + Keitel. + +Distribution list on the next page. + + Distribution’s List: Copy + + Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor 1 + + Deputy of the Fuehrer 2- 3 + + Attention SS Brigadier General _Knoblauch_ + Prussian State-Ministry 4- 5 + + Attention Counsellor of the Ministry _Bergbohm_ + Ministry for Foreign Affairs 6- 7 + + Attention Counsellor of the Legation Dr. _Freiherr v.d. + Heyden-Rynsch_ + + GBV [Plenipotentiary-General for Administration] Chief of + Operational Staff + + Attention State Secretary Dr. _Struckart_ + for Reich Ministry of the Interior 8- 9 + for Reich Ministry of Justice 11-12 + for Reich Ministry of Science, Education and Popular + Culture 13-14 + for Central Reich Office for regional planning 15-16 + + GBW [Plenipotentiary-General for Economics] Chief of the + Operational Staff + + Attention Ministerial Director _Sarnow_ for GBW + [Operational Staff] 17-18 + for Reich Ministry of Economics 19-20 + for Reich Ministry of Food and Agriculture 21-22 + for Reich Labor Ministry 23-24 + for Reich Chief Forester 25-26 + + Reich Ministry of Finance 27-28 + Attention Counsellor of the Minister, Privy Counsellor + Dr. _Bender_ + + Reich Ministry of Finance 29-30 + Attention Finance President _von Dietz_ + + Reich Ministry of Communications 31-33 + Attention Chief of Section of the Ministry _Baur_ + + Reich Ministry of Communications 34-35 + Attention State Railway Director Dr. _Ebeling_ + + Reich Postal Ministry 36-37 + Attention Counsellor of the Ministry _Honold_ + + Reich Ministry for Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda 38-39 + Attention Lt Colonel _Wentscher_ + + Reichbank Directorate 40-41 + Attention Reichsbank Director Dr. _Mueller_ + + Inspector General of the German Highways 42-43 + Attention Government Construction Counsellor _Henne_ + + OKH (Army High Command) (2nd Section of the General Staff + of the Army) 44-73 + + OKM (Navy High Command) (A.II) 74-81 + + Reich Ministry for Air Travel and Air Force High Command + (2nd Section of the General Staff of the Air Force) 82-93 + + _OKW_: (Armed Forces High Command) + L Ia 94 + L Ia Prop. 95 + L II 96 + L IVa 97 + L IVb 98 + L IVd 99 + WNV 100 + W Stb 101-103 + + A Ausl./Abw. (Foreign Intelligence Section) 104-106 + AWA (J) 107 + WH 108 + Being kept by L IVa 109-125 + + # # # # # + + Part I + +_of the Mobilization Schedule for the Civil Administrative Authorities_ + +_Introduction to the Mobilization Schedule for the Civil Administrative + Authorities._ + + + A. _Principles & Concepts_ + +1. Preparedness for defense on the part of the whole nation is the +condition for an effective defense of the Reich. + +2. It is through _mobilization_ that Wehrmacht, Economy, State and +People are carried over from a state of peace to a state of war. + +The mobilization of the Wehrmacht comprises: + +(_a_) The securing of the necessary foundations for the establishment, +leadership and supplying of the needs of the war-Wehrmacht, + +(_b_) the building up of peace units to war strength, + +(_c_) the establishment of new war units, + +(_d_) the establishment of the reserve Wehrmacht. + +_The Mobilization of Economy_ comprises the collecting of all +_economic_ forces and holding them in readiness to work at their +highest capacity in the service of the conduct of the war. + +_The Mobilization of State & People_ comprises: + +(_a_) the turn-over of State Leadership and the life of the people +to the requirements of the conduct of the war as regards politics, +sociology and constitutional law; and + +(_b_) making available for the conduct of the war all the material +forces of the people. + +3. A case of war can arise instantaneously or start as a result of +foreign political tension. The preparation and schedule of mobilization +must take both possibilities into account. + +The “_state of defense_” and the “_state of war_” in the sense of R.V. +Law will be ordered expressly in accordance with the Reichs defense law +by the Fuehrer and Reichs Chancellor. + +With the declaration of the “_state of war_”, the war laws and +regulations come into force without further orders. The legal +consequences provided in other laws for the state of war also become +effective. + +If no “_state of defense_” has previously been ordered, the regulations +concerning the state of defense will come into force with the +declaration of the state of war. + +It is to be reckoned with that foreign political considerations (war +guilt question, etc.) will not give rise to a declaration of a state +of war, even if it should come to armed conflict with a foreign enemy. +Legal provision is therefore to be made by which regulations for “war” +in various laws will come into force for the case in question. These +regulations must be formulated in such a way that no “war” exists as +understood in international law. + +For this reason the legal consequences provided in the various laws for +the “the case of war” will not come into force with the mobilization +decree (X or mobilization case). + +4. The _period of tension_ possibly preceding a case of war must be +exploited to the limit of foreign political endurance in order that the +Reich may be made ready for war. + +For these reasons the _3 following stages must be distinguished from +each other in the schedule of mobilization_. + +4. _a._ “_The period of tension_” + +During the period of tension the fundamentals for the reliable +execution of the mobilization proper should be created, and individual +measures for mobilization should be taken in advance, whereby as far as +possible foreign political liability and any kind of provocation abroad +are to be avoided. + +These “_advance measures_” will be arranged in the mobilization plans +of the armed forces, according to stages of tension. Within these +advance measures there will be no distinction of special stages for +the civil administration, since it is necessary to have a much more +flexible regulation. + +The advance measures will be executed on the basis of peace +legislation. The fact and the purpose of the advance measures are to +be camouflaged as much as possible within the civil administration +concerned. + +The “_period of tension_” as such will not be ordered; it is merely the +technical term for a period of special political tension in foreign +relations, during which preparatory measures (advance measures) can be +ordered. + +4. _b._ _Mobilization without public announcement_ (“_X case_”): + +While its purpose is to be camouflaged as far as possible, it is to +bring about the systematic mobilization of the armed forces, and +if necessary the camouflaged mobilization of the state, economy and +people. A possibility exists that “Case X” will only be ordered for the +armed forces or parts of it. + +If no official announcement of the state of defense is made, the +execution of the mobilization must be assured through administrative +channels. The peace time laws: Law relating to Participation in +Defense measures, emergency service decree, etc. (Wehrleistungsgesetz, +Notdienstverordnung, u.a.) adapted for camouflaged mobilization will +serve as legal basis. + +Case X may be ordered without being preceded by the measures provided +in sub 4a. + +4. _c._ _General mobilization with public announcement._ +(“_Mobilization case_”--“_Mob case_”): + +This includes the mobilization of the armed forces and the state of +the national economy as well as of the entire people, if no special +limitations have been ordered in the mobilization decree (for instance +local limitations). In the normal case, the order for general +mobilization initiates the provided mobilization measures of the armed +forces, and of all civil authorities and offices, with the exception +however of specially designated measures for the supervision and +checking of the information service. + +In all cases these measures will only come into force by a special +order of the Supreme High Command of the Armed Forces. + +Just as in Case X, the execution of general mobilization is based on +the peace laws adapted for a camouflaged mobilization. + +The general mobilization (Mob case) can be ordered without being +preceded by the period of tension or by mobilization without official +announcement (Case X). + +5. _Publication and Execution of Mobilization Measures._ + +5. _a._ The measures provided for the _period of tension_ will be +ordered singly, in groups or in their entirety by the Fuehrer & +Reich Chancellor (after considering proposals from the appropriate +Reich Dept.) on the application of the Chief of the OKW, or of the +Plenipotentiary for the Reich Administration or the Plenipotentiary +for Economy who will act in conjunction with the Chief of the OKW. +The measures ordered by the Fuehrer and Reichs Chancellor will be +communicated to the highest civil administrative authorities through +the OKW, and to the Departments under the Plenipotentiaries for the +Reich Administration and Economy through the latter. + +The measures ordered have to be carried out according to the +instructions of the highest Reich authorities, provided that the +authorities of the Armed Forces have not been specially ordered to +charge the intermediate and lower civil authorities with the execution +of the measures. + +This is applicable for the following cases (or, as circumstances may +dictate, not till the incidence of Case X or general mobilization). + +(1) _Evacuation and clearing of battle territory_ according to +directives for the “evacuation of Reichs territory threatened by the +enemy”, Vol. 1, Nos. 14 and 15, or (respectively) “clearing of the +battle territory of the west” and the corresponding provisions for the +East. + +(2) _Establishment of the Frontier Guards_ incl. initiation of the +attached special intelligence network acc. to the provisions for the +VGAD of Sept. 1937 No. 24 & Appendix 10, No. 12. + +(3) _Establishment of the VGAD_ incl. initiation of the special +intelligence network acc. to the provisions for the VGAD of Sept. 1937, +App. 1, No. 2 & App. 10, No. 12. + +(4) _Establishment of Field Police Units--Key Words_ (not code numbers) +may be agreed with the military authorities for these measures. + +The purpose of all other key words made known to the civil authorities +by the military commands is exclusively that of informing the +authorities concerned about measures coming within the _military_ +sphere. Those key words are not to be entered in the mobilization +calendar, but are to be added on a special sheet. + +Notwithstanding all this, a _mutual understanding_ with military +authorities concerning the _preparation_ of the various measures +in time of peace and their _execution_ (after proclamation through +civilian channels) in war time is absolutely necessary wherever +military and civil measures come into contact. + +5. _b._ Case X _(Mobilization without public announcement)_ is ordered +by the Fuehrer and Reichs Chancellor. Publication to the highest Reichs +authorities is carried out in the same manner as for the “advance +measures”. + +Various mobilization measures will be decreed within the civil sphere +through release [Ausloesung] of code words, or through special order if +Case X applies only to the armed forces or parts of it. + +The measures for mobilization are carried out by the highest Reichs +authorities under their exclusive responsibility with the limitation +that the fact of mobilization must not be mentioned publicly +(diplomatic channels, press, public proclamations and announcements, +radio, etc.). To achieve this purpose it must be stressed that it is +necessary to camouflage the individual measures as much as possible +without endangering their execution ... The main purpose is not to +offer legal grounds to the prospective enemy for the opening of +hostilities or their own mobilization. For that purpose, the necessary +suspension of various measures contained in Section II (mobilization) +of the mob. calendar will be ordered by the High Command of the Armed +Forces. + +In principle every proclamation and suspension of code numbers during +the period of tension or in case X must be made known to the High +Commands of the three branches of the Armed Forces by the High Command +of the Armed Forces. + +5. _c._ _General mobilization with public announcement_ (case of +mobilization): + +The general mobilization will be decreed publicly by the +“Mobilization-order” of the Fuehrer and Reichs Chancellor. + +5. _d._ Preparations are being made to enable parts of the Wehrmacht +to move out at increased speed. In order that the units of the Army & +the Navy to whom this applies may be _prepared to move out_ and the +Luftwaffe _prepared to take off_, the civil administration authorities +are required to render special assistance. This measure may be ordered +during the period of tension. + +As this preparedness (for moving out or taking off) only applies +to certain territories of the Reich and only affects certain +administrative authorities, the latter will receive their instructions +direct from those Wehrmacht authorities in whose territory the +preparedness for moving out or taking off is being established. In +addition, the order to prepare for the march-out or take-off will be +communicated to the appropriate Reich ministries, the G.B. and so on, +by the OKW. + +6. _Dissemination of the mobilization orders through the various +administrative channels_: + +In case of mobilization the general mobilization with public +announcement (case of mob.) will be announced to the Reichs authorities +etc., the intermediate and lower civil authorities by a mob. cable +through the DRP [German Reichs Postal Service]. + +The DRP organizes for that purpose a dissemination plan in agreement +with the other Reichs authorities. The “general mobilization” will also +be made public by means of radio, public announcements, etc. + +The highest Reichs authorities will issue individual orders in their +spheres for the “period of tension” and for “Case X”. Announcements +concerning the stages of mobilization and the measures to be taken +therefor will not be circulated through district cables by the DRP. + +All mobilization orders are to be passed on by the quickest means to +the subordinate authorities. + +If the orders are passed on by phone, the identity of the civil servant +transmitting the order is to be ascertained by appropriate questioning, +in order to guard against deception. If doubts remain as to the +identity of the person calling, they are to be dispelled by a further +call. + +The ordering of measures which concern, directly or indirectly, offices +of the armed forces or authorities of other departments must be made +known to those authorities. + +If an authority learns about the stages of mobilization through +unofficial channels, then it must immediately be ascertained through +contact with superior authorities whether measures may be taken. The +means of dissemination of mob. orders must be defined in the mob. +calendars of the authorities. It is assumed that the night and day +telephone service will be organized within the framework of the advance +measures for the period of tension. + + + _B. Preparations for Mobilization._ + + _Principles for the drafting of the “Mobilization Schedule for the + Civil Administrative Authorities”._ + +7. The mobilization plans of the Wehrmacht and the Mobilization +Schedule for the civil administration provide the responsible State +Government with a general survey of the volume of preparations for +mobilization and of their political scope. They have been so adjusted +to each other that the unification of the entire mobilization is +secured. + +8. The mobilization schedule for the civil administrative authorities +comprises in general all the measures of the civil state administration +which on the one hand directly support the operational capacity of the +Wehrmacht, or on the other hand serve the preparedness for war on the +part of state, economy and people. + +9. The mobilization stages discussed sub. no. 4-- + + (a) period of tension + + (b) mobilization without public announcement (Case X) + + (c) general mobilization with public announcement (mob. case) + +form the _basis_ for the drafting of the “mobilization schedule for the +civil administration”. + +9. _a._ The _advance measures for the period of tension_ form the +content of _Section I_ in every part of the mobilization schedule. + +The advance measures for the civil administrative authorities in the +period of tension are made flexible to conform to any development of +the political & economic situation. Insofar as the advance measures +for the civil administration give direct support to the Wehrmacht, +they will be ordered from case to case so as to conform to the advance +measures of the Wehrmacht. + +9. _b._ The measures for _mobilization_ form the content of _Section +II_ in every part of the mob. schedule, with the proviso that in +the case of “mobilization without public announcement (Case X)” +they will be carried out according to the provisions of No. 4.b +without publication, whereas in the case of general mobilization with +public announcement (mob. case) they will as a rule be subject to no +restrictions. The specially designated measures (code number) for the +supervision and checking of the intelligence service will in _no_ case, +however, come into force except by special order of the OKW (No. 4.c). + +The advance measures for the period of tension are printed in red in +Section II (mobilization). + +The purpose of the said summary in Section II is to afford a complete +survey in case mobilization should arise suddenly (without a previous +period of tension). + +The mob. measures common to all administrative authorities are listed +in a special _Part II of the mobilization schedule_. They are not +included in the separate parts of the mob. schedule. + +10. Every part of the “Mobilization Schedule for the civil +administrative authorities” (and therewith all the highest Reich +Departments) is furnished with certain _code numbers_ with which the +various measures are to be designated at all times. + +The purpose of these code numbers is to enable certain measures to +be put into effect quickly and under certain circumstances to be +camouflaged. In order to guard against confusion with the code numbers +of the Wehrmacht units, the letter _Z_ (for Zivilverwaltungen- i.e. +civil administration) is to be set _before_ the code number wherever +code numbers are given in the mob. schedule of the civil administration. + +11. The “mobilization schedule for the civil administrative +authorities” contains in-- + + _Part I_ + + The introduction to the mob. schedule No. 1-100 + for the civil administrative + authorities + + _Part II_ + + Measures applicable to all Code No. 0101-0500 + administrations and in its subsequent + parts measures of the various + supreme Reich Departments. + + _Part III_ + + Foreign Office Code No. 0501-1000 + + _Part IV_ + + Reich Ministry of the Interior Code No. 1001-1500 + + _Part V_ + + Reich Ministry for Popular Code No. 1501-2000 + Enlightenment & Propaganda + + _Part VI_ + + Reich Ministry of Justice Code No. 2001-2500 + + _Part VII_ + + Reich Ministry for Science, Code No. 2501-3000 + Education and Popular Culture + + _Part VIII_ + + Reich Traffic Ministry (Motor Code No. 3001-3500 + traffic, shipping & waterways) + + _Part IX_ + + Reich Post Code No. 3501-4000 + + _Part X_ + + Reich Traffic Ministry Code No. 4001-4500 + (Railway Sections) + + _Part XI_ + + General Inspector for German Code No. 4501-5000 + roadways + + _Part XII_ + + Special measures of the Plenipotentiary Code No. 5001-5500 + for Economy + + _Part XIII_ + + Reich Ministry for Economy Code No. 5501-6000 + + _Part XIV_ + + Reich Ministry for Food and Code No. 6001-6500 + Agriculture + + _Part XV_ + + Reich Ministry of Finance Code No. 6501-7000 + + _Part XVI_ + + Reich Ministry of Labor Code No. 7001-7500 + + _Part XVII_ + + Reich Forests Director Code No. 7501-8000 + + _Part XVIII_ + + Reichbank Directorate Code No. 8001-8500 + + _Part XIX_ + + Reich Department for Space Code No. 8501-9000 + Regulation + + _Part XX_ + + NSDAP Code No. 9001-9500 + +12. The various civil administrations will in their own sphere of +authority keep _mobilization calendars_ based on the general measures +set forth in the “mobilization schedule for civil administrative +authorities”. + +These calendars will comprise the individual measures and explanations +necessary for the execution of the general measures in the same order +and with the same code numbers as in the mobilization schedule. + +That the code numbers of the mobilization schedule should agree with +those on all mob. calendars is necessary to enable the measures ordered +in accordance with the mob. schedule to be passed on quickly and +camouflaged. + +_The mobilization calendars of the civil administrative authorities_ +shall be drafted and passed on in the same way in compliance with the +executory provisions laid down by the OKW. + + +_C. Securing of sufficient money to cover mobilization._ + +13. The money set aside in the Reichsbank establishments for the +purposes of the armed forces and the civil administration in the case +of mobilization may be used for the advance measures and for the +mobilization without public announcement (“Case X”). + +The absolutely necessary payments before the publication of a +mobilization order are to be entered under a special section of +the present budget appropriations for the time being and will be +transferred to the war budget later on, unless otherwise directed. This +regulation is to be added to all mobilization calendars. + + +_D. Dates for Mob. Preparations in the Civil Administration._ + +14. In order that a new measure should be included in the mobilization +schedule for the civil administrative authorities, application must be +made to the Chief of the Reich Defense Committee (Section Defense of +the Reich in the OKW). + +15. In order that consistency may be preserved in preparing measures +for the calendar for any mobilization year, alterations, and where +possible, new measures should only be applied for once a year--at the +latest--November 1st. + +On the basis of such applications the mob. schedule will be altered by +the following 1st of February in such a way that it will be decisive +for calendar preparations for the current mob. year (April 1-March 31). + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1642-PS + + +Distribution List for the Secret map of the Soviet Union (European part) + + OKW--(Supreme Command Armed forces): + Keitel, Jodl, Warlimont, Munch, Wedell, Canaris 6 + + Office for the Four year plan: + Koerner, Neuman, Gramsch and 12 others 15 + + Foreign office: + Grosskopf 2 + + OKH--(High Command Army): + Brauchitsch and Quartermaster-General 3 + + OKM--(High Command Navy): + Raeder and 1 other 2 + + Propaganda Ministry: + Goebbels, Gutterer 3 + + Reichs Ministry for Economy: + Funk 11 + + Police: + Himmler and 3 others 4 + -- + 36 + + Own Ministry: + Sch., Mall., Leibl, Siew., Korpp, Meyer, Dreyer 8 + -- + 44 + + [illegible] 2 + -- + 46 + + and 50 persons + + _Title of map_: + Union of the Socialist + Soviet republics + European part + scale 1 : 400000000 kilometer + + + Map I + + OKW /(Supreme Command of the armed forces) + Office for Economy and armament/ + Economy + (Wi Rue Amt/Wi) + 1. March 1941 + +[Explanatory note: The map was found among the Rosenberg documents in a +red folder carrying the remark “Frontiers”, with a distribution list in +Rosenberg’s own handwriting. This distribution list refers apparently +to plans worked out by Rosenberg for the administration of the occupied +territories as the map shows lines in blue pencil indicating possibly +the extent of the intended administration through the Rosenberg +Ministry.] + + + SYNOPSIS OF DOCUMENT 1643-PS + + Synopsis of letter written 29 November 1942 by Dr. Casdorf to various + Reich officials: Leader of the SS; Chief of the German police; Main + Government Office of Economics of the SS. + +Invitation extended to various responsible officials for a meeting +to be held on 17 December 1942 at 10 o’clock, for the purpose of +discussing the legal aspects of the confiscation of property by the SS +for enlarging the concentration camp at Auschwitz as suggested in the +attached letter. + + # # # # # + + Synopsis of letter written 7 November 1942 by SS General Pohl to the + Reich Minister of Finance for the enlargement of the concentration + camp at Auschwitz. + +The Reichsfuehrer of the SS expressed the wish that the territory of +Auschwitz concentration camp should be increased to about 4640 acres +and become a private estate owned by the Reich. The area in question +(to be confiscated as soon as possible) belonged to various owners such +as (1) Jewish and Polish private land owners, (2) towns in which most +of the industrial property belonged to the Poles and the Jews, (3) the +Polish State, (4) the community, (5) the church, (6) racial Germans. + +Different authorities were in charge and different rules had to be +applied which made the transfer of property an impractical legal +procedure. For this reason, the Minister of Justice introduced a +new regulation on 23 May 1942 which made a new system of property +registration possible. + +The SS suggests that the Reichskommissar, for the securing of the +German element, should be authorized to transfer estates under +categories 2-6. Racial Germans should be compensated for their estates +in money or in allotting other ground properties to them. + +It is desired that all authorities concerned should be notified and +invited for a discussion on this subject. In this meeting, Dr. Fiedler +(Office of the Reichskommissar for the strengthening of the German +element) and Mr. Korch [Zentralbodenamt] should participate. + + # # # # # + + Synopsis of teletype letter from the Chief of the ORPO to the + Regierungspraesident in Kattowitz, 8 December 1942, forwarded to the + Reich Minister on 9 December 1942. + +The chief of police orders: + +The creation of an independent police district for the concentration +camp and quarters [Lager und Wehnsiedlung] for inmates in Auschwitz, +headed by the camp commandant. This new regulation will not +affect the police functions of the Landsrat in Bielitz or of the +Regierungspraesident in Kattowitz. The commander of the camp will be +the police chief of the town of Auschwitz. The disciplinary measures +ordered by the camp commander against the camp inmates should not have +the character of police measures, and his functions as camp commander +and police chief should be kept distinct. The field police can be +ordered by the camp commandant for special duty within the camp itself; +but such an order can be given only by the camp commander. + + # # # # # + + Synopsis of a copy of minutes of meeting held on 17 and 18 December + 1942 about the confiscation of territory for the enlargement of the + Auschwitz concentration camp. + +In order to be able to enlarge the territory of the Auschwitz +concentration camp, it would be expedient to transfer all the estates +to be confiscated to the “Zentralbodenamt” which is an agency of the +Reichsfuehrer SS. However, in order to carry out this transaction, all +those agencies which are at present responsible for the various types +of real estate in question, have to give their approval. + +The officials in charge of the church property and of the former Polish +State property gave their consent to release the estates under their +jurisdiction to the Zentralbodenamt. However, the representative of +the Reich Minister of the Interior claimed that he had no authority to +dispose of the property. + +Of the community, in spite of arguments to the contrary from other +officials, a further discussion on 21 December 1942 was to be held +between the representatives of the Reich Ministry of the Interior and +the Reichsfuehrer SS. + +On 18 December 1942 the representative of the Haupttreuhandstelle Ost +agreed to release the estates under their jurisdiction and empower +the officials in charge to initiate the transactions. The still +remaining legal requirements for the release of properties belonging +to industrial enterprises, racial Germans, and the town of Auschwitz +were finally discussed. The list of participants appears on page +4. Attached, an authorization from the Reich Minister of Finance +(Haupttreuhandstelle Ost) issued 12 January 1943, giving full power +of attorney to the Bodenamt of the Reichsfuehrer SS to make out the +necessary declarations in regard to the real estates. + + # # # # # + + Synopsis of teletype letter from Dr. Hoffman, representing the Reich + Ministry of the Interior, to the Regierungspraesident in Kattowitz, + dated 22 January 1943. + +The territory of the Auschwitz concentration camp will be changed into +an independent estate. For this purpose it must become the property +of the Reich, represented by the Reichsfuehrer SS. This transaction +must be carried out quickly. Land belonging to the Auschwitz district +or to former Reich communities will be transferred after individual +agreements have been made between the owners and the Reichsfuehrer SS +or his agencies. The other community property will be transferred to +the Bodenamt from the respective communities through the mediation of +the Regierungspraesident. Regardless of how much of a property will +become part of the new concentration camp estate, it will have to be +purchased in its entirety. After the measurements have been completed, +the part not needed for the camp estate will be returned to the +original owner. In the Interior the Reichsfuehrer will administer the +property. + +Finally the legal aspects of the compensation are discussed. + + # # # # # + + Synopsis of letter from Dr. Hoffman, representative of the Reich + Ministry of the Interior, to the Oberpraesident of Kattowitz, dated + 9 June 1943. + +Inquiry as to whether the new Auschwitz estate has already been formed. + + # # # # # + + Synopsis of letter from the Chief President of Upper Silesia to the + Reich Minister of the Interior, dated 16 August 1943. + +Since the new estate of the concentration camp Auschwitz could not +be created fast enough because two private properties could not be +purchased, the President of Upper Silesia issued a decree creating +a new district for Auschwitz. This decree, issued 31 May 1943, is +attached in two copies. It gives a detailed description of the border +line of the newly created Auschwitz district. Relevant maps are +enclosed in folder. + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1650-PS + + SECRET STATE POLICE--STATE POLICE OFFICE COLOGNE + + Branch Office, Aachen + + To be transmitted in secret--To be handled as a secret government + matter. + +DOR. BERLIN NUE 19 507 March 4 1944 1430--WF-- + +To all State Police Directorates except PRAGUE and BRUNN--Inspectors of +the Security Police and of the Security Service. + + Subject: Measures to be taken against captured escaped prisoners of + war who are officers or not working non-commissioned officers, + except British and American prisoners of war. + +The Supreme Command of the Army has ordered as follows: + +1. Every captured escaped prisoner of war who is an officer or a not +working non-commissioned officer, except British and American prisoners +of war, is to be turned over to the Chief of the Security Police and of +the Security Service under the classification “Step III” regardless of +whether the escape occurred during a transport, whether it was a mass +escape or an individual one. + +2. Since the transfer of the prisoners of war to the security police +and security service may not become officially known to the outside +under any circumstances other prisoners of war may by no means be +informed of the capture. The captured prisoners are to be reported +to the Army Information Bureau as “escaped and not captured”. Their +mail is to be handled accordingly. Inquiries of representatives of +the Protective Power of the International Red Cross, and of other aid +societies will be given the same answer. + +3. If escaped British and American prisoners of war who are officers or +not working non-commissioned officers, respectively, are captured they +are to be detained at first outside the prisoner of war camps and out +of sight of prisoners of war; if Army owned buildings are unavailable +they are to be placed in police custody. In every instance the Corps +Area Command will request speedily the Supreme Command of the Army +(Chief, Prisoner of War Section) for a decision as to whether they +are to be turned over to the Chief of the Security Police and of the +Security Service. + +In reference to this, I order as follows: + +1. The State Police Directorates will accept the captured escaped +officer prisoners of war from the prisoner of war camp commandants and +will transport them to the Concentration Camp Mauthausen following the +procedure previously used, unless the circumstances render a special +transport imperative. The prisoners of war are to be put in irons on +the transport--not on the station if it is subject to view by the +public. The camp commandant at Mauthausen is to be notified that the +transfer occurs within the scope of the action “Kugel” [translator’s +note: the literal translation of “Kugel” is “bullet”]. The State +Police Directorates will submit semi-yearly reports on these transfers +giving merely the figures, the first report being due on 5 July 1944 +(sharp). The report is to be made under the reference “Treatment of +Captured Escaped Prisoners of War who are officers within the Scope +of the Action ‘Kugel’.” In the case of special events, reports are to +be submitted immediately. The State Police Directorates will maintain +exact records. + +2. For the sake of secrecy, the Supreme Command of the Armed Force has +been requested to inform the prisoner of war camps to turn the captured +prisoners over to the local State Police Office and not to send them +directly to Mauthausen. + +3. Captured escaped British and American officers and not working +non-commissioned officers are to be detained in police custody in a +city in which a State Police office is located provided the Army has no +suitable quarters. In view of the existing crowding of police prisons, +the State Police officer will accept captured prisoners only if the +Army actually does not dispose of any suitable space. The prisoner of +war camp commandants are to be contacted in reference to their quarters +immediately after the receipt of this order. In the interest of the +secrecy of this order, confinement outside of police jails, e.g. in +Labor Education Camps is not permissible. + +4. If escaped prisoners of war who are officers and not working +non-commissioned officers except British and American prisoners of +war are captured by police authorities, reasons of practicability +render it unnecessary to return the prisoner to the prisoner of war +camp commandant once the facts have been clarified adequately. The +prisoner of war camp is to be informed of the capture and is to be +requested for a transfer under the classification “Step III”. Captured +escaped British and American prisoners of war who are officers and +non-commissioned officers are always to be turned over to the Army. + +5. The city and county police authorities are not to be informed of +this order. + + Chief of the Security Police and of the Security Service + IV D5d--B.NR. 61/44 GRS.--For the Chief--(signed) Mueller. + SS General. + Branch Office Aachen. Aachen 6 March 1944 + _IV D No. 26/44 g Rs_ + + 1. Two extract copies were made of this order. + 1st Copy to IV A--6 March. + 2nd Copy to IV D--2 March. + 2. To be filed with IV C.--IV 3 Noted. + + ROSCHER 19 June + [two illegible signatures] + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1652-PS + + 1933 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 135 + + Decree of the Reichs President for Protection against treacherous + Attacks on the Government of the Nationalist Movement 21 March 1933 + +On the basis of Article 48, Par. 2 of the constitution the following is +decreed: + + + Par. 1 + +1. Any person possessing a uniform of an organization supporting the +government of the nationalist movement without being entitled thereto +through membership in the organization or otherwise, will be punished +with imprisonment up to two years. + +2. Any person wearing the uniform or an insignia representing +membership of an organization designated in Par. 1, without being a +member of the organization, will be punished with imprisonment of at +least one month. + + + Par. 2 + +1. Whoever commits a punishable act against persons or objects or +threatens the same and while so doing wears or carries with him +the uniform or insignia designating membership in an organization +of the kind listed in Section 1 (1) without being a member of the +organization, will be punished with a penitentiary sentence; in case of +mitigating circumstances, with imprisonment of not less than 6 months. + +2. If the offense was committed with the intention to incite a revolt +or to create fear or panic among the populace or to cause difficulties +for the German Reich in its foreign affairs, the punishment is a +penitentiary sentence of from 3 years to life. In especially severe +cases the death penalty may be exacted. + +3. According to these regulations a German can also be prosecuted if he +has committed the offense in a foreign country. + + + Par. 3 + +1. Whoever purposely makes or circulates a statement of a factual +nature which is untrue or grossly exaggerated or which is apt to +seriously harm the welfare of the Reich or of a state or the reputation +of the national government or of a state government or of the parties +or organizations supporting these governments, is to be punished, +insofar as no more severe punishment is decreed in other regulations, +with imprisonment up to two years and, if he makes or spreads the +statement publicly, with imprisonment of not less than three months. + +2. If through this deed, heavy damage for the Reich or a state +resulted, penitentiary punishment can be exacted. + +3. Whoever commits an act through negligence, will be punished with +imprisonment up to 3 months, or by a fine. + + + Par. 4 + +Whoever has acquired membership in an organization surreptitiously is +counted as a non-member in the application of this decree. + + + Par. 5 + +This decree becomes effective on the day following its publication. + +Berlin, 21 March 1933 + + Reichs President + von HINDENBURG + + Reichs Chancellor + Adolf HITLER + + Reichs Minister of the Interior + FRICK + + For the Reichs Minister for Justice + The Deputy of the Reichs Chancellor + von PAPEN + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1653-PS + + 1934 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 81 + +First regulation concerning the new building of the Reich of 2 February + 1934 + +Under the authority of Article 5 of the law on the Reconstruction of +the Reich from 30 January 1934 (Reichsgesetzblatt I, page 75), the +following decree is published herewith: + + + Article 1 + +To exercise sovereign rights--a function which was transferred from +the provinces onto the Reich--shall be a function exercised by the +provincial governments as a mandate and on behalf of the Reichs, since +the Reich shall not make use of its right to exercise this function, +either generally or in individual cases. + + + Article 2 + +Treaties or agreements in the realm of administration which the +provinces may have concluded among each other or with the Reich shall +not be affected by this transfer of the sovereign rights from the +provinces onto the Reich. + + + Article 3 + +1. Laws need the assent of the competent Minister of the Reich. + +2. In his own domain the competent Minister of the Reich may order that +the drafts of laws be submitted to him before the law is published. + + + Article 4 + +The highest echelons of the provincial governments shall, within the +realm of their tasks, obey the orders issued by the competent Ministers +of the Reich. + + + Article 5 + +Employees of the provincial governments may be transferred into the +Reich’s civil service, and employees of the government of the Reich may +be transferred into the civil service of the provinces. + + + Article 6 + +This decree became valid on 30 January 1934. + +Berlin, 2 February 1934 + + The Minister of the Interior + FRICK + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1654-PS + + 1935 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PAGE 369, Nr. 28 dated 16 March 1935 + + TO THE GERMAN PEOPLE! + +When in November 1918, the German people trusting the assurances given +in Wilson’s 14 points, laid down their arms, after four and a half +years of glorious resistance in a war which they never wanted, they +believed, not only to have rendered a service to tortured mankind but +also toward a great idea. Suffering the most, under the consequences +of this insane battle, millions of our people faithfully grasped at +the thought of a reorganization of the relationship between people. +This would be improved by the elimination of secret diplomatic cabinet +politics on one hand, and the horrible means of war on the other. The +harshest results of defeat which are history appeared, to many German +people as the necessary sacrifices in order to free the world once and +for all of similar horrors. + +The idea of the League of Nations has probably not aroused a more +hearty approval in other nations than in the German which lost all +earthly happiness. And so it was easy to understand, why the German +people occupied and fulfilled the inane requests for destruction of +armaments. The German people, and especially the administration, were +convinced that through their fulfillment of orders for disarmament, +laid down at Versailles, an international disarmament program was +going to be started and guaranteed. For only in a fulfillment of +these orders, by both sides, lies a moral sensible justification for +a demand, which if unilaterally imposed and executed, will lead to +eternal discrimination and with that, to a declaration of inferiority, +of a great nation. But such a peace treaty could never be the +prerequisite for a real inner reconciliation of the people and with +that lead to a pacification of the world; but it would only create an +eternal burning hatred. Germany has fulfilled the imposed disarmament +obligations laid down by the Inter-Allied Control Commission. + +The following were the works of the destruction of the German military +power and its means which were certified to, by this commission. + + + A. Army + + 59 897 guns and barrels + 130 558 machine guns + 31 470 trench mortars and barrels + 6007 000 rifles and carbines + 243 957 machine gun barrels + 28 001 gun carriages + 4 390 trench mortar carriages + 38750 000 projectiles + 16550 000 hand and rifle grenades + 60400 000 fuzes + 491000 000 small arms ammunition + 335 000 shells + 23 515 cartridges and bullets + 37 600 powder + 79 500 empty shells + 212 000 telephones + 1 072 flamethrowers + 31 armored trains + 59 tanks + 1 762 observation cars + 8 982 wireless stations + 1 240 Field bakeries + 2 199 pontoons + 981 pieces of equipment for soldiers and + 8230 350 sets of equipment for soldiers + 7 300 pistols and revolvers + 180 machine gun sleighs + 21 mobile workshops + 12 AA gun carriers + 11 caissons + 64 000 steel helmets + 174 000 gas masks + 2 500 machines of former war industry + 8 000 rifle barrels + B. Air + + 15 714 fighter planes and bombers + 27 757 Airplane engines + + + C. Navy + + 26 battleships + 4 coast guard vessels + 4 destroyers + 19 small destroyers + 21 school and special ships + 83 torpedo boats + 315 U-Boats + + + Remarks to A and B + +Further under the destruction duties; vehicles of all kinds, means of +gas attack and partly gas defense, gas and explosives, searchlights, +sighting mechanisms, range-finding and sound-ranging devices, optical +apparatus of all kinds, harnesses for horses, narrow gauge equipment, +field printing shops, field kitchens, workshops, slash and stabbing +weapons, steel helmets, ammunition transport material, normal and +special machines of the War industry as, buildings, blueprints thereof, +airplane and zeppelin hangars, etc. + +Following this unprecedented historical fulfillment of a treaty, the +German people had the right to expect the redemption of the introduced +duties also from the other side. + +Because: + +1. Germany has disarmed. + +2. In the peace treaty it was plainly required that Germany must be +disarmed in order to set precedent for general disarmament; this means, +it was said that only in Germany’s armament alone lies the basis for +the armament of other nations. + +3. The German people were filled with such principles in its +governments and in its Parties which completely agreed with the +pacifistic-democratic ideals of the League of Nations and its founders. + +While Germany however had fulfilled its obligations on one side of the +treaty, there remained the redeeming of the obligations on the other +side. That means: the high treaty-makers of the former victorious +states have unilaterally released themselves from the obligations of +the Versailles treaty! + +Not enough that every disarmament, was in some way or another +comparable to the German destruction of arms, discontinued, no: +Not even a standstill in the armament was seen, on the contrary +the armament of a whole number of states became visible. What was +discovered during the War in the way of new destructive machinery +now was completed in a methodical-scientific way. In the field of +creating mighty tanks, fighters and bombers, uninterrupted and terrible +improvements took place. New large guns were constructed, new high +explosive, incendiary and gas bombs were developed. + +In the meantime however, the world resounded again with war cries as if +there never had been a World War and never a Versailles Treaty. Germany +was an empty powerless space, among these highly armed War states, +which continually made available the most modern motorized equipment +[Kraefte] and had no defense against any menace or threat. The German +people recall the disaster and suffering from fifteen years of +economical distress, political and moral humiliation. It is therefore +easily understood when Germany began to ask loudly for the redeeming of +the promise of the disarmament of the other nations. + +Because this is clear, the world would not tolerate a hundred year long +peace but it must be an unmeasurable blessing to her. But it would not +endure a hundred year long break between conqueror and conquered. + +The feeling regarding the moral rectification and necessity of an +international disarmament was not only active in Germany but also +within many other nations. Out of the pursuance of these strengths +resulted attempts to try and direct an armament reduction by means +of conferences and thereby bring about a general international +assimilation on a lower level. + +And so resulted the first proposition for an international armament +abrogation, of which we have the memory of the MacDonald Plan as being +significant. + +Germany was prepared to accept this plan and to take it as foundation +of a final agreement. + +It failed due to the rejection by other nations and was finally +abandoned. Since the German people and Reich under such circumstances +found no realization in the equality of rights solemnly guaranteed in +the December declaration of 1932, the new German government saw in +themselves, the guardians of the honor and the living rights of the +German people; they were not in the position to continue to take part +in such conferences or to belong to the League of Nations. + +Even after the leaving of Geneva, the German Government was still +prepared not only to consider proposals by other nations but also to +make several practical proposals themselves. They undertook thereby +the conception, which was coined by other nations themselves, that the +creation of short services Armies are inappropriate for purposes of +aggression and therefore are to be recommended for a peaceful defense. + +They were therefore prepared to convert the long-service Reichswehr +into a short service Army according to the wishes of other nations. +Their proposals of the winter 1933/34 were practical and easy to +accomplish. Their rejection as well as the final rejection of the +similar proposed Italian and English plan however led us to believe +that the inclination toward a further sensible fulfillment of the +Versailles disarmament provision no longer exists. + +Under these circumstances, the German government was forced to take +every necessary measure which would guarantee the termination of +conditions, which are just as unworthy as menacing; of the helpless +defenselessness of a great people and Reich. + +They started out from the same motivations as the very true expression +given by Minister Baldwin in his last speech: + +“A country, which is not willing to seize the necessary precautionary +measures for its own protection will never have might in this world, +neither moral nor material might.” + +The Government of the present day German Reich however, only wishes one +single moral and material might; it is the power to be able to protect +the peace for the Reich and with that, peace for all of Europe! + +Therefore she did everything that was in her power and what could serve +toward the furtherance of the peace. + +1. For a long period of time she has proposed to all her neighbor +nations, the signing of non-aggression pacts. + +2. She has sought and found an agreeable arrangement with the eastern +neighbor nation, which, thanks to the great arbitrary understanding, +has for ever decontaminated the menacing atmosphere which existed when +they took over the power, and it will lead to a lasting understanding +and friendship between the two peoples. + +3. She has finally given France the solemn security that Germany, after +the effectuated arrangement of the Saar question will not place or +raise any more territorial claims against France. She believes thereby +to have created, in a historically rare form the prerequisite for the +termination of a hundred year long conflict between two large nations +through a great political and essential sacrifice. + +However, the German government must witness to its regret, that for +months a continually rising rearmament is taking place in the world. +She sees in the creation of a Soviet-Russian Army of 101 Divisions, +which means 960,000 men in present peacetime strength, an element which +could not be foreseen at the time of the composition of the Versailles +Treaty. + +She sees further signs of rejecting the disarmament idea, proclamated +in its time, in the overdoing of similar measures. It is far from the +German Government to reproach any nation. However, she sees today that +through the present resolved introduction of the two-year military +service in France, the basic ideas of the creation of a short service +defense Army has been abandoned in favor of a long-service organization. + +This, however, was one of the arguments used in the demands on Germany, +to surrender its Reichswehr. + +* * * Under these circumstances, the German government feels that it +is impossible longer to postpone taking the necessary measures for the +security of the Reich, or even to hide them from the knowledge of the +world. + +Therefore, if it now complies with the desire, expressed in the +speech of the English Minister Baldwin on November 28, 1934 for a +clarification of the German intentions, then this is done: + +1. IN ORDER TO GIVE THE GERMAN PEOPLE THE CONVICTION AND THE OTHER +STATES THE KNOWLEDGE THAT THE MAINTAINING OF THE HONOR AND SECURITY OF +THE GERMAN REICH WILL, FROM NOW ON, AGAIN BE ENTRUSTED TO THE GERMAN +NATION’S OWN POWER. + +2. But in order, by fixing the extent of the German measures, to +invalidate these assertions which wish to imply that the German people +are striving for a position of military hegemony in Europe. + +What the German government desires, as the guardian of the honor +and interests of the German nation, is to guarantee the extent of +those means of power which are required not only for maintaining the +integrity of the German Reich, but also for the international respect +and esteem of Germany as a co-guarantor of the general peace. + +For in this hour the German government renews, before the German people +and before the whole world, the assurance of its determination never +to trespass the limit of guarding German honor and the freedom of the +Reich, and especially of its determination to (wish to) form, in the +national German armament, not an instrument of military attack, but +rather exclusively one for defense, and thus for maintaining the peace. + +In so doing, the German Reich Cabinet expresses the confident hope that +the German people, which thus regains its honor, may be permitted, with +independent equal right, to make its contribution to the pacification +of the world in a free and open cooperation with the other nations and +their governments. + +In this spirit the German Reich Cabinet has today passed the following +law: + + + Law for the Organization of the Armed Forces of March 16, 1935. + +The Reich Cabinet has passed the following law which is herewith +promulgated: + + + Section 1 + +Service in the Armed Forces is based upon compulsory military duty. + + + Section 2 + +In peace time, the German Army, including the police troops transferred +to it is organized into: + + 12 Corps and + 16 Divisions. + + + Section 3 + +The Reich Minister of War is charged with the duty of submitting +immediately to the Reich Ministry, detailed laws on compulsory military +duty. + +Berlin, March 16, 1935 + + The Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor + ADOLF HITLER + + The Reich Minister of Foreign Affairs + FREIHERR VON NEURATH + + The Reich Minister of the Interior + FRICK + + The Reich Minister of Finance + GRAF SCHWERIN VON KROSIGK + + The Reich Minister of Economics + Acting: HJALMAR SCHACHT + President of the Board of Directors of the Reichsbank. + + The Reich Minister of Labor + FRANZ SELDTE + + The Reich Minister of Justice + DR. GUERTNER + + The Reich Minister of Defense + VON BLOMBERG + + The Reich Minister of Post and Traffic + FREIHERR VON TELTZ + + The Reich Minister of Nutrition and Agriculture + R. WALTER DARRE + + The Reich Minister for Public Enlightenment and Propaganda + DR. GOEBBELS + + The Reich Minister for Air + HERMANN GOERING + + The Reich Minister of Science Education and Popular Culture + RUST + + The Reich Minister without Portfolio + R. HESS + + The Reich Minister without Portfolio + KERRL + + The Reich Minister without Portfolio + Dr. HANS FRANK + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1659-PS + + 1938 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 303 + + Second order concerning plebiscite and election for the greater German + Reichstag of 24 March 1938 + +On the basis of par. 4 of the Second Decree regarding the Reichstag +election law of 18 March 1938 (RGBl I, p. 258) the following is decreed +in supplement to pars. 8 and 32 of the First Decree of 22 March 1938 +for the people’s vote and for the election to the Greater German +Reichstag: + + + Article 1 + +1. The ballot is printed as follows: + +[Illustration: + +PEOPLE’S VOTE AND THE GREATER GERMAN REICHSTAG BALLOT + +Do you agree with the accomplishment, on 13 March 1938, of the + +REUNITING OF AUSTRIA WITH THE GERMAN REICH and do you vote for the list +of our Fuehrer ADOLF HITLER? + +YES NO + +] + +2. The ballot for the qualified voters with the exception of the +Austrian qualified voters (par 8 of the First Decree) consists of white +or yellow paper. + +3. The ballot for the Austrian qualified voters (par. 32 section 1 of +the First Decree) consists of green paper. + + + Article 2 + +1. The ballot for soldiers of the former Austrian Army (par 32 section +2 of the First Decree) is printed as follows: + +[Illustration: + +PEOPLE’S VOTE ON THE 10 APRIL 1938 BALLOT + +Do you agree, German Soldier, with the ratification on the 13 March +1938 of the + +REUNITING OF AUSTRIA WITH THE GERMAN REICH? + +YES NO ] + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1660-PS + + 1938 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 631 + + Decree for the registration for the active service in Austria in the + year 1938 of 16 June 1938 + +I. The registration for the active service in the army for the year +1938 in the country of Austria will be conducted during the time from +16 August until 10 September 1938. + +II. To be called for registration: + +1. All those subject to duty, born in the year 1917, without regard to +their physical fitness and regardless whether they were exempt from +induction in spring of the year 1938; + +2. All those volunteers of other years of birth who were considered +“general service”; + +3. All those subject to duty considered “general service” or “limited +service” at the time of induction of the class of 1915 and 1916 who +have registered with reserve commands and who have as yet not been +trained; + +4. The volunteers who have reported, or want to report, in June 1938, +for induction into active service for the fall of 1938 (for the +Luftwaffe also for the spring of 1939), without regard whether or not +they have been physically examined. + +III. Charged with this task are-- + + in the higher administrative echelons: + + The Landeshauptmaenner (governors of provinces); in Vienna the + mayor, + + in the district police echelons: + + in the cities, the mayor, and the State police officer, as far as + they are on hand, + + in Vienna the Chief of Police, + + in the rural districts the district governors. + +IV. This decree is based upon Article 37, Section 2 of the draft law +dated 21 May 1935 (Reichsgesetzbl. I, page 609) and the decree of the +Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor regarding the transfer (carrying over) +of the institutional law according to the draft law dated 22 May 1935 +(Reichsgesetzblatt I, page 615) and the decree on the introduction +of the general draft in the country of Austria dated 15 June 1938 +(Reichsgesetzblatt I, page 631). + + Berlin, 16 June 1938 + + The Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces + Keitel + + The Reich Minister of the Interior + Frick + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1662-PS + + 1938 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 1580 + + Order eliminating Jews from German economic life of 12 November 1938 + +On the basis of the Decree of 18 October 1936 for the execution of the +Four Year Plan (RGBl I, p. 887), the following is ordered: + + + Article 1 + +1. From January 1, 1938, operation of retail shops, mail order houses, +independent exercise of handicrafts is forbidden to Jews. (Article 5 of +the First Decree to Reich citizenship law [Reichsbuergergesetz] of 14 +Nov 1935--RGBl I, 1933). + +2. Moreover it is forbidden to Jews from the same date to offer goods +or services in the markets of all kinds, fairs, or exhibitions or to +advertise such or accept orders therefor. + +3. Jewish shops operated in violation of this order will be closed by +police. (Third Decree to Reich citizenship law of 14 June 1938-RGBl I, +627). + + + Article 2 + +1. No Jew can manage a firm according to the interpretation of the term +“manager” under the law for national labor of 20 Jan 1934. (RGBl I, 45). + +2. If a Jew is a leading employee in a business concern he may be +dismissed with notice of six weeks. At expiration of this period all +claims resulting from the employee’s contract, especially claims of +compensation or pensions, become null. + + + Article 3 + +1. No Jew can be a member of a cooperative society. + +2. Jewish members of cooperatives lose membership from 21 Dec 1938. No +notice is necessary. + + + Article 4 + +Competent Reich Ministers are empowered to issue rules required by this +decree. They may permit exceptions so far as this is necessary for +transfer of Jewish firms into non-Jewish hands or for liquidation of +Jewish concerns and in special cases in order to insure supplies. + + Berlin, 12 November 1938 + + The Commissioner for the Four Year Plan + Goering + General Field Marshal + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1665-PS + + 1940 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 1270 + + Order concerning treatment of property of Nationals of the former + Polish State of 17 September 1940 + +On the basis of the Decree to Implement the Four Year Plan of 18 +October 1936 (RGBl I, 887) in conjunction with the Decree for the +Introduction of the Four Year Plan in the Eastern Territories of 30 +October 1939 (RGBl I, 2125) the following is decreed for the area of +the Greater German Reich, including annexed Eastern territories: + + + Article 1 + +1. Property of nationals of the former Polish State within the area +of the Greater German Reich, including annexed Eastern territories, +is subject to confiscation, administration by commissioner and +sequestration in accordance with the following regulations. + +2. This does not apply to the property of persons who have gained +German citizenship in accordance with Article 6 of the edict of the +Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor concerning organization and administration +of Eastern territories, dated 8 October 1939 (RGBl I, 2042). The +competent authority (Article 12) may permit additional exceptions. + +3. Nationals of the former Free City of Danzig who are of Polish +nationality are considered as nationals of the former Polish State. + + + Article 2 + +1. Confiscation will be applied in case of property belonging to: + +_a._ Jews. + +_b._ Persons who have fled or who have absented themselves for longer +than temporary period. + +2. Confiscation may be applied: + +_a._ If the property is needed for the public good, especially for +purposes of national defense or the strengthening of German folkdom. + +_b._ If the owners or other persons entitled to it immigrated into the, +then, area of the German Reich after 1 October 1918. + +3. Confiscation may be limited to individual articles of property. + +4. As a rule the following articles are to be exempted from +confiscation: + +_a._ Movable articles destined exclusively for personal use. + +_b._ Cash, bank and savings bank deposits as well as stocks and bonds +up to a total value of one thousand marks. + + + Article 3 + +Properties are stationary and movable objects (with all accessories), +credits, shares, judgments, and interests of all sorts. + + + Article 4 + +1. With the sequestration the previous owners lose the rights of +disposal of the sequestered properties. The competence of the general +governor in accordance with the ordinance for public administration of +farm and forestry industries and territories in the annexed Eastern +areas of 12 Feb 1940 (RGBl I, 355) remains unaffected. + +2. Whoever has sequestered property in his possession or custody, must +administer it until further notice. Changes or disposal of the property +or its profits are only to be permitted within the limits of regular +business. All measures which go beyond this, especially the disposal +of plots of land, must have the permission of the competent office +(Article 12). + + + Article 5 + +1. The commissarial administration can be ordered for property which is +subject to sequestration, insofar as ordinary administration demands it. + +2. Orders by the commissarial administration serve as confiscation at +the same time. + + + Article 6 + +1. The commissarial administrator is appointed by the competent office +(Article 12). He will receive a written appointment. He can be recalled +at any time. + +2. In the direction of businesses, he must use the same caution which +a regular businessman or administrator would and is responsible for +all the damages which result through breach of duty. He must report to +the competent office (Article 12) at all times all of the information +requested by it and insofar as nothing else is determined he still +must report it concerning his administrative activity monthly without +further request. + +3. The commissarial administrator can be held to the fulfillment of his +obligations by the competent office--without prejudice to his criminal +responsibility--by means of an automatic fine of up to 10,000 RM. + + + Article 7 + +1. The commissarial administrator is empowered to take all judicial and +extrajudicial actions, which the administration of the property entails +within the limits of ordinary business. + +2. The administrator needs a special permission of the competent office +(Article 12) prior to: + +_a._ Selling or mortgaging lots. + +_b._ Changing the subject or the legal form of an enterprise. + +_c._ Doing legal business which results in the sale or winding-up of an +enterprise or of a management or the sale of an administrated stock of +goods or other property which is not divided. + +_d._ Renting professional, agriculture and lumber enterprises and farm +and timber lots over 10 hectars. + +_e._ Undertaking other legal business whose settlement is made +dependent upon previously established authority of the competent +office (Article 12) by means of public announcement in the German +Reichsanzeiger and the Prussian Staatsanzeiger. + +3. Legal affairs which are undertaken without the authority required by +Article 2 are not valid. + + + Article 8 + +1. The administrator will receive a remuneration for his activity which +will be determined by the competent office. + +2. The costs of the commissarial administration including the +remuneration will be borne by the concern, property, or portion of +property, administered. + + + Article 9 + +1. Sequestered property can be confiscated in favor of the Reich by +the competent office if the public weal, particularly the defense of +the Reich or the consolidation of the German nationality [Volkstums], +requires it. + +2. Before confiscation the sequestered property is to be determined +according to more detailed directives of the competent office (Article +12). + +The Reich is the security for the debts of the confiscated property up +to the amount of the sale value of the confiscated property. Judgments +against confiscated properties remain valid. + +4. The disposal of confiscated property is granted the office which was +competent for the confiscation (Article 12). In the case of disposal +of agricultural property an accord will be reached between the Reich +Commissar for the strengthening of German nationality and the Reich +Minister for Food and Agriculture. + +5. The regulation of the type and extent of compensation which will be +granted for property losses attendant upon the carrying out of this +decree remains withheld. For measures of the competent agency (Article +12), on the basis of Articles 16 and 17, no compensation will be +granted. + + + Article 10 + +1. A commissarial (provisional) administration can also be established +over the property of legal persons, societies, clubs and other +associations of individuals in which subjects of the former Polish +State in the year 1939 still either had a preponderant capital interest +or whose administration was decisively influenced by members of the +former Polish State. + +2. During the existence of the commissarial administration the +authority of chief and of the other persons authorized for +representation or administration will be dormant; the same thing for +the powers of all other organs. + +3. Only the shares and holdings of subjects of the former Polish State +are subject to confiscation in this case. + + + Article 11 + +1. The sequestration or the regulation of the commissarial +administration are upon request of the competent authority (Article +2) to be entered into the register of deeds or any other appropriate +public register. The entry of the name of the commissarial +administrator can also be demanded. + +2. Insofar as the register of deeds or other appropriate public +register becomes incorrect as a result of measures on the basis of this +decree, it is upon request of the competent authority to be corrected. +Article 1, section 3 to 5 of the second decree for the execution and +completion of the law on the granting of compensation in case of +confiscation or transferral of property of 18 March 1938 (RGBl I, 317) +is to be applied appropriately. + + + Article 12 + +1. For measures and decisions on the basis of this decree the +commissioner for the four year plan--chief-trusteeship East--is +the competent authority; for agriculture including agricultural +side-enterprises, the Reich Commissar for the strengthening of German +nationality. + +2. The competent authorities according to subparagraph (1) can delegate +the exercise of their powers entirely or partially to other agencies. +Complaints against their decisions will be directed to the competent +authority according to Sect (1). The complaint will have no delaying +effect. It is not permissible if more than one year has gone by since +the issuance of the disputed decision. + + + Article 13 + +If anybody opposes the sequestration or the ruling of the commissarial +administration with the assertion that he is a member of the German +people, then the proceedings are to be suspended. The competent +authority (Article 12) will entrust the decision concerning membership +in the German people to the local governor [Regierungspraesident]. +The person concerned also has the right of requesting that his +nationality be determined. Complaint against the decision of the +Regierungspraesident to the Reich Minister of the Interior is +permissible. The decision on membership in the German people is +binding, upon the proceedings of the competent authority (Article 12) +on the basis of this decree. + + + Article 14 + +The regulations to be issued according to Article 2, 5 and 10 will +be effected by a written order which is to be made known to person +concerned. This personally making known may be substituted by a sign, +poster, or public proclamation. + + + Article 15 + +1. Disposal of property and property rights of subjects of the +former Polish State, who do not come under the regulations governing +exceptions of Article 1, Section 2, need the approval of the +competent authority (Article 12) to be valid. This is not true for the +disposition of claims upon interest and other continuous earnings. + +2. The competent authority decides whether approval according to +Section 1 is necessary. The decision is binding upon courts and +administrative agencies. The competent authority (Article 12) must upon +demand issue a certificate that approval is not necessary. + + + Article 16 + +1. All sorts of compulsory sales of objects are by this decree +subject to sequestration may only be begun with the assent of the +competent authority (Article 12). If one of the competent authorities +according to Article 12 has assented, it has no influence upon further +proceedings, if it has wrongly asserted its competence. + +2. If it is to be feared that the debtor will escape the compulsory +sale, or an immediate seizure is called for, for some other reason, +then upon order of the court authorizing the compulsory sale the +compulsory sale can be begun before issuance of the necessary approval, +according to Section 1. It should, in this case, be limited to the +measures permissible in the execution of an attachment and be continued +from this point only when the approval has been issued. Upon demand of +the competent authority (Article 12) the court authorizing a compulsory +sale must order the lifting of the temporary attachment measures. + + + Article 17 + +1. If in the incorporated Eastern territories bankruptcy proceedings +are opened on the property of a bankrupt, then the provisions of +Article 16 are valid accordingly, for the liquidation of the property +belonging to the estate of the bankrupt. + +2. If the opening or discontinuance of bankruptcy proceedings in the +incorporated Eastern territories depends upon whether the value of +the bankrupt estate corresponds to the cost of the proceedings, then +objects which according to this decree are subject to confiscation, +shall only be regarded as belonging to the bankrupt estate, if the +competent authority (Article 12) has agreed to their liquidation in +bankruptcy proceedings. + + + Article 18 + +It can be publicly announced that property coming into consideration +for sequestration is to be registered. The announcement of registration +for agricultural property takes place in agreement with the Reich +Minister for Food and Agriculture. + + + Article 19 + +The competent authority (Article 12) can demand information of +everybody for the carrying out of its tasks. Administrative agencies +and courts must give it official help, especially they must question +witnesses and experts upon its demand. + + + Article 20 + +1. Whoever undertakes to deprive the agencies indicated in Article +12 or those empowered to dispose of the property by said agencies or +otherwise in any way undertakes to thwart, to evade, or to prejudice +the effect of the sequestration in order to create a profit for himself +or another, will be punished with imprisonment and fine or one of these +penalties. + +2. In aggravated cases the punishment will be confinement to a +penitentiary. If the culprit acts out of insubordination against the +political new order or the case is otherwise especially aggravated the +sentence of death is to be given. + + + Article 21 + +1. Whoever intentionally or carelessly fails to fulfill or fulfills +incorrectly, or incompletely, an obligation to report or give +information incumbent upon him according to an executionary regulation +issued to implement this law or a regulation issued according to +Articles 18 and 19, will be punished with imprisonment and fine. + +2. The criminal prosecution will be instituted only upon request of the +competent authority (Article 12). + + + Article 22 + +1. The following remain unprejudiced: + +_a._ The regulation for the securing of the necessary establishments +for the fitting out of the Reich’s war harbor Gdynia of 21 December +1939 (RGBl I, 2475); + +_b._ The decree on the public exploitation of agricultural and +sylvicultural enterprises and real estate in the incorporated Eastern +territories of 12 February 1940 (RGBl I, 355) with the provision that +upon the undertaking subject to public exploitation the provisions of +Articles 1, 2, 3, 4 Section 1, Articles 9, 11, 12 Section 1, Articles +14, 18, 19, 20, 21 and 23 of this decree will be applied; + +_c._ The ordinance on the handling of enemy property of 15 Jan 1940 +(RGBl I, 191) with the provision that property of the subjects of the +former Polish State, who have their residence or permanent domicile in +the territory of an enemy state, will be treated according to this +decree, insofar as it is located in the Greater German Reich including +the incorporated Eastern territories. + +_d._ The decree on confiscation in the occupied former Polish +territories (except Eastern Upper Silesia) of 5 Oct 1939, P. 25. + +_e._ The decree on the employment of Jewish property of 3 Dec 1938 +(RGBl I, 1709) with following: + +1. The sequestration according to Article 2 and the regulation of a +commissarial administration according to Articles 5 and 10 of this +decree do not take place in the case of property of Jews, which the +Jewish owners had already been ordered to sell on the basis of Articles +1 to 6 of the decree on the disposal of Jewish property at the time +this law came into effect. The proceeds of this sale can be confiscated. + +2. The approval according to Article 15 of this decree is not necessary +insofar as a license is prescribed by Article 8 of decree on employment +of Jewish property; + +_f._ The decree of the Reich protector in Bohemia and Moravia on Jewish +property of 21 June 1939 [Verordnungsblatt des Reichsprotektors in +Boehmen und Maehren p. 45] and the decree of the Reich protector in +Bohemia and Moravia on the removal of the Jews from the economy of the +protectorate of 26 Jan 1940 [Verordnungsblatt des Reichsprotektors in +Boehmen and Maehren P. 45] with the provision that the proceedings for +the removal of Jews will also be carried out in regard to the property +of subjects of the former Polish State according to these provisions, +in agreement with the chief-trusteeship East; for the sequestration and +confiscation the agencies named in Article 12 remain competent. + +2. Furthermore all regulations conflicting with this one, issued since +28 August 1939 in the incorporated Eastern territories including +the territory of the former Free City of Danzig, especially such +regulations which grant the right to sequester, to install commissarial +administrators or trustees, or to confiscate, become invalid. + +3. The measures and legal transactions of the commissariat +administrator undertaken with the approval of the competent agencies +are not subject to the necessity of being approved according to +the decree to assure the orderly development of the economy in the +incorporated Eastern territories of 31 Jan 1940 (RGBl I, 255). In the +case of property disposal an understanding will be established with +the competent Reichs governor or provincial governor or the highest +Reichs authority, which according to Article 3 Section 2 of the decree +of 31 Jan 1940 have withheld their consent. If in cases of especial +importance such an understanding cannot be established, then the +commissioner for the four year plan will make the decision. + +4. Measures of the competent authorities (Article 12) which have been +taken before this decree became effective, are valid if they are in +accordance with the provisions of this decree or with the law as it +stood previously. + +5. Insofar as sequestrations, confiscations, or the installation of +commissarial administrators have been carried out by anyone else +but the competent agencies (Article 12), their confirmation is to +be applied for in writing. If the confirmation of them is not then +forthcoming, the previously directed measures become null and void. The +same is true if a decision is not reached on the confirmation before +31 October 1940. The competent agencies are authorized to prolong this +period to a reasonable degree in individual cases. + +6. The provisions of Section 5 are not valid for trustees, who at the +time this law came into effect were installed according to Articles +2 and 6 of the decree on the employment of Jewish property of 3 Dec +1938 (RGBl I, 1709) for the temporary carrying on, transferral, or +winding up of Jewish business undertakings or for the administration +or transferral of other property of Jews. The legal position of these +trustees remains unchanged. + + + Article 23 + +1. The commissioner for the four year plan will issue the necessary +legal regulations for the carrying out of this law--for agriculture +including subsidiary enterprises pertaining to agriculture--with +the agreement of Reich commissar for the strengthening of German +nationality and of the Reich Minister for Food and Agriculture. + +2. The commissioner for the four year plan in agreement with the Reich +Minister of Finance and the Reich Minister for Economic Affairs can +decree by means of legal regulations a simplified settlement, diverging +from the provisions of the law as it stands, of the legal affairs of +those persons whose property is subject to confiscation according to +this decree. + +3. The necessary administrative regulations for the carrying out +of this decree will be issued by the commissioner for the four +year plan--Chief Trusteeship East--in agreement with the competent +authorities. + + + Article 24 + +1. This decree becomes effective one week after its proclamation. + +2. The commissioner for the four year plan will fix the time of its +becoming invalid. + + Berlin, 17 September 1940 + + The chairman of the ministerial council + for the defense of the Reich and commissioner + for the four year plan + + GOERING + Reichs Marshal + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1666-PS + + 1942 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 179 + + Decree of the Fuehrer concerning a plenipotentiary general for the + utilization of labor of 21 March 1942 + +In order to secure the manpower requisite for the war industries as +a whole, and particularly for armaments, it is necessary that the +utilization of all available manpower, including that of workers +recruited [angeworbenen] abroad and of prisoners of war, should +be subject to a uniform control, directed in a manner appropriate +to the requirements of war industry, and further that all still +incompletely utilized manpower in the Great German Reich, including +the Protectorate, and in the General Gouvernement and in the Occupied +Territories, should be mobilized. + +Reichsstatthalter and Gauleiter Fritz Sauckel will carry out this task +within the framework of the Four Years Plan, as Plenipotentiary General +for the utilization of labor. In that capacity he will be directly +responsible to the Commissioner for the Four Years Plan. + +Section III (wages) and Section V (utilization of labor) of the Reich +Labor Ministry, together with their subordinate authorities, will +be placed at the disposal of the Plenipotentiary General for the +accomplishment of his task. + + Fuehrer-Headquarters, 21 March 1942 + + The Fuehrer + Adolf Hitler + + The Reich Minister and Head of the Reich Chancellery + Dr. Lammers + + The Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces + Keitel + + + 1942 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 180 + + Ordinance for the execution of the Fuehrer’s decree concerning a + Plenipotentiary General for Arbeitseinsatz of 27 March 1942 + +In pursuance of the Fuehrer’s Decree of 21 March 1942 (RGBl I, 179), I +decree as follows: + +1. My manpower sections [Geschaeftsgruppen Arbeitseinsatz] are hereby +abolished. (Circular letter of 22 Oct 1936/St. M. Dev. 265). Their +duties (recruitment and allocation of manpower, regulations for labor +conditions [Arbeitsbedingungen]) are taken over by the Plenipotentiary +General for Arbeitseinsatz, who is directly under me. + +2. The Plenipotentiary General for Arbeitseinsatz will be responsible +for regulating the conditions of labor (wage policy) employed in the +Reich Territory, having regard to the requirements of Arbeitseinsatz. + +3. The Plenipotentiary General for Arbeitseinsatz is part of the Four +Year Plan. In cases where new legislation is required, or existing laws +require to be modified, he will submit appropriate proposals to me. + +4. The Plenipotentiary General for Arbeitseinsatz will have at +his disposal for the performance of his task the right delegated +to me by the Fuehrer for issuing instructions to the higher Reich +authorities, their branches and the Party offices, and their associated +organisms and also to the Reich protector, the General-Governor, the +Commander-in-Chief, and heads of the civil administrations. + +In the case of ordinances and instructions of fundamental importance +report is to be submitted to me, in advance. + + Berlin, 27 March 1942 + + The Deputy for the Four Year Plan + Goering + Reich Marshal + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1669-PS + + NATIONAL SOCIALIST GERMAN WORKERS PARTY + + Deputy of the Fuehrer + H/J + + Munich, Briennerstrasse 45 + Tel: 54901 and 58344 + Munich, 28 August 1933. + + Mr. Dr. Albrecht Hanshofer + + BERLIN + + Society of Geography, Wilhelmstr, BERLIN + + My dear Doctor: + +Many thanks for both your letters of the 23 and 24 of this month. I +made all necessary arrangements concerning the Standartenfuehrers, +immediately. + +I would like very much to speak to Haselblatt before his convention +starts. Probably I will be at Berlin around September 7. I don’t know +yet if I shall be able to attend the Convention myself. + +Concerning the American, would you please tell him, that in one case +it is no longer the question of a “party” in the sense of the “custom” +practiced since Washington’s time, that we are striving for, but this +party is a section of the State itself. It is of utmost interest to me +to know, whether any American official representatives ever attended +meetings of the fascist party. + +I reported the statements of the Polish Chief of Staff. + + With hearty greetings + your + [Signature] Rudolf Hess. + +Registered! + + # # # # # + + Berlin, August 1933. + + EAST PRUSSIA + Dear Mr. Hess: + +Today I have only two reports to pass on to you, having received them +from a generally well informed source. + +Primarily: Assertion of the Polish Chief of staff: “Once the damned +civilians thwarted our East Prussian aim with their scruples & +hesitation. That will not happen again. Precaution has been taken that +these people are sent to a Concentration Camp if they should still dare +to obstruct us.” + +Secondly: A very delicate matter. It is known to yourself, that +at some place in your organization, there are people, unable to +subordinate their personal initiative for the benefit of the common +good. I am informed that a personage very highly esteemed abroad, +but completely retired at home, H * * * h B * * * g has to fear for +her individual safety. The source of this insecurity, I was told is +S.A. Standartleader Schoeneberg. I don’t have to point out to you the +repercussions, abroad, which any personal accident would provoke. * * * +Could you take care of internal curbing. + + With hearty Greetings + Always Your + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1674-PS + + 1938 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PAGE 1044, 17 Aug. 1938 + +The second decree for the execution of the law regarding the change of +the surnames and forenames of 17th August 1938. + +On the basis of Article 13, of the law of 5 January 1938 +(Reichsgesetzblatt I.S.9) concerning the change of the surnames and +given-names, the following is ordered: + + + Art. 1 + +1. Jews may be given only such given-names as are cited in the +directives issued by the Ministry of Interior concerning the +utilization of given-names. + +2. Para. (1) is not applicable to Jews who are foreign citizens. + + + Art. 2 + +1. In so far as the Jews are still using some other given-names +different from those which are at their disposal according to Art. +1,--they are obliged to assume by the 1st January 1939, a second, +additional given-name as follows; for males, the given-name Israel and +for females the given-name Sara. + +2. The person having to assume an additional forename according to para +(1) is obliged to give a written notification in this matter to the +registration office at which his birth, and marriage are registered. +The same notification is to be given to the proper police-official +in the registerer’s place of residence or customary habitat. The +notifications are to be reported within a month from the date requiring +him to assume an additional given-name. + +3. In so far as the birth or marriage of the person who must register +has been verified by a German diplomatic representative of a Consul, or +has been verified in a German protectorate,--the notification, which +must be made, is to be forwarded to the Register-Office I, Berlin. If +the place of residence or customary habitat of the person registering +is abroad, the notification in question, mentioned in Para (2), +sentence (1) is to be forwarded to the competent German Consul instead +of to the competent police-official. + +4. For people who are unable, or are partially unable to conduct +their own affairs, the obligation to register rests upon the legal +representative. + + + Art. 3 + +As far as is customary in juridical and business procedure to indicate +the given-names, the Jews are obliged always to indicate at least +one of their given-names. In so far as they are required to assume +an additional given-name as mentioned in Art. 2,--this additional +given-name is to be indicated also. The present directives regarding +the management of a business are not hereby altered. + + + Art. 4 + +1. Whoever deliberately disobeys the directives of Art. 3 is to be +punished by imprisonment of up to six months. Cases of negligent +disobedience will be punished by imprisonment of no more than one month. + +2. Whoever deliberately or carelessly neglects to give the proper +notification according to Art. 2 is to be fined or punished by +imprisonment of no more than one month. + +Berlin, 17th, August 1938. + + Reichs Minister of the Interior: + Representative, Dr. Stuckart. + + Reichs Minister of Justice: + Dr. Guertner. + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1676-PS + + Voelkischer Beobachter + Southern Germany Edition + 28/29 May 1944 + + A Word on the enemy air-terror + by Reichsminister Dr. Goebbels + +Nowadays, it is no longer disputed by anyone that the enemy air-terror +pursues almost exclusively the aim of breaking the morale of the German +civil population. The enemy wages war against the defenseless, against +women and children in particular, in order to compel the men of our +country to yield. This intention of his is proved on one hand by the +facts themselves and on the other hand by the abundance of existing +statements by enemy publicists. As far as the facts are concerned one +needs only to visit one of the often bombed towns in the Reich or in +the occupied territory in order to determine without doubt by one’s own +examination that our war potential is damaged by perhaps at the most +only 1% by enemy air-terror and the remaining 99% plainly falls upon +the civil sector. + +A short time ago, the leading representatives of the French, and +Belgian Episcopate, who certainly cannot be suspected of acting +according to German orders, objected with flaming protest directed +to the international public against the enemy’s barbarous methods of +aerial warfare, which kills old people, women and children, as well as +destroys churches, venerable cultural monuments and thickly settled +civilian residential sections, without any military objectives being +apparent. To this we need to add nothing more. + +Our enemies do not try to conceal their intentions in this matter. One +does not need to look far in British and American press in order to +find substantial proof of this. “Lay the great cities in ruins and you +will crush the will to fight”. Thus wrote the English air expert T. M. +Epaight in his book “Air power and the cities” in 1930. Nothing in this +tendency of the British aerial warfare has changed since then. “It is +not possible to draw a boundary-line between the civil population and +the combatants”. With this cowardly excuse the “Daily Mail” attempts to +justify publicly this rough and low method of the enemy aerial warfare. +Much more explicit becomes influential British naval officer who states +in the English military publication “The Army Quarterly”: “Does the +concept of non-combatants exist at all? A small child is neither in +peace nor in war a useful member of the national community. No one has +in reality the right to demand inviolability for himself even if he +can attempt to do so in the name of humanity. Germany must become more +desolate than the Sahara Desert”. + +The well known London’s newspaper “News Chronicle” is not missing in +this choir of hatred. It adds “We favor that every living being in +Germany be wiped out. Man, woman, child, bird and insect. We would not +let even a blade of grass grow”. This causes the respected British +author H. G. Wells to name the following demand: “Treat the German +people like a troublesome native tribe”. The American publicists are +no less robust. One of their leading spokesmen Raymond Clapper writes +with evident pleasure: “Terror and brutality are the best sides of +aerial warfare!” One might object, perhaps, that not all influential +Americans and Englishmen think this way. Wrong! Even the Anglican High +Church declares in its official organ “Church of England” on the 28 +of May 1943: “It is a perverse view of Christianity to suppose that +civilians must not be killed”. Even the Archbishop of York, Dr. Cysill +Barbett, blesses the barbaric methods of the Anglo-American aerial +terrorism in his pastoral letter of June 1943 with the words: “It is +only a small evil to bomb German civilians.” + +We had so far desisted from making known to the German people the +meanest of the statements from which we have only presented a small +selection and which all together represent a simple demand for the +murder of women and children, because we were afraid that in view of +this cynicism it would take measures of self-defense and revenge itself +with the same measures upon the enemy pilots who bail out of shot down +enemy planes. In the meantime, however, circumstances have arisen which +prevent us from continuing to maintain this reserve in the future. + +The Anglo-American terror flyers in the last few weeks, besides +indiscriminately bombarding the residential quarters of our cities have +taken to attacking the German civilian population openly, directly +and without even any superficial respect, for the international rules +of warfare, by strafing them and slaughtering them in cold blood. No +more excuses can be brought toward in this matter because the enemy +planes sweep low over villages, fields and highways, and direct their +machine-guns upon harmless groups of people who are minding their own +business. This has nothing more to do with war. This is naked murder. +There is no rule of international law which the enemy can call on in +this matter. The Anglo-American pilots place themselves through such +a criminal mode of warfare, outside the pale of every internationally +recognized rule of warfare. On last Sunday, for example, to take only +one of a thousand examples, in the rural countries of Saxony, groups of +playing children were attacked by strafing, and suffered considerable +casualties. + +No one will be astonished by the fact that the population concerned +which, as is known in the whole world, can understand any soldierly +type of warfare has been seized with a terrible rage on account of +these cynical crimes. It is only possible with the aid of arms to +secure the lives of enemy pilots who were shot down during such +attacks, for they would otherwise be killed by the sorely tired +population. Who is right here? The murderers who after their cowardly +misdeeds await a humane treatment on the part of their victims, or the +victims who wish to defend themselves according to the principle: “An +eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth”? This question is not hard to +answer. In any case it would be demanding too much of us if it were +asked of us that we use German Soldiers for the defense of murderers of +children against the parents who seized with blind rage, having just +lost their most valuable treasure through the brutal cynicism of the +enemy, take measures of self-defense. If the English and Americans as +they themselves say, regard and treat us as troublesome native tribes, +then it is our business whether we stand for it. The German people is +known in the whole world for the fact that it gives to war what war +demands from it. But too much is too much and here the boundaries of +what can be borne have been far overstepped. + +It seems to us--hardly possible and tolerable to use German police +and soldiers against the German people when it treats murderers of +children as they deserve. Even the arbitrary methods of warfare of the +Anglo-Americans must end somewhere. The pilots cannot say that they as +soldiers acted upon orders. It is not provided in any military law that +a soldier in the case of a despicable crime is exempt from punishment +because he passes the responsibility to his superior, especially if the +orders of the latter are in evident contradiction to all human morality +and every international usage of warfare. Our century has obliterated +to a great extent the boundaries between warfare and crime on the part +of the enemy. It would be demanding too much of us to expect that we +should silently accommodate ourselves as victims to this unlimited +barbarity. + +We reach these conclusions in a completely objective manner. In these +questions our people think much more radically than its government. +It has always been our wish that the war should be conducted in a +chivalrous manner. The enemy, apparently, does not want this. The whole +world is a witness for that. If this revolting condition continues, it +will also be witness for the fact that we can find ways and means to +defend ourselves against these criminals. We owe this to our people +which decently and bravely defend its life and therefore has in no way +deserved to be declared fair game for the enemy killers. + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1678-PS + + DOCUMENTS OF GERMAN POLITICS, VOLUME 5, PAGES 372, 373 and 376 + +Statement of accounts of the Reich Organization Leader of the NSDAP, +Dr. Ley, at the 5th yearly session of the German Labor Front in +Nurnberg, on 11 September 1937. + +In speaking of “Soldiers of Labor” I have to demand that such soldiers +of labor exist in reality. I have to demand that everybody march at +the same cadence and in the same spirit. The factory-community is +only then complete when every manager takes his place as an ordinary +work-crew member among his crew. We shall not rest or relax before this +is accomplished. Otherwise everything would be reduced to beautiful +phrases resulting only in beer sessions and distribution of cigarettes. +No, same cadence and stride, same pack and same marching, then no +outward distinction between the entrepreneur and the worker shall exist +anymore, and sometimes a worker might even look better from a racial +point of view than the entrepreneur. And if the latter was adequately +polished and drilled, he will lose his feeling of superiority and +“curse” exactly like the others. That is necessary, and with this I +come to another point. + +My collaborators and myself found no rest. We too wanted to to have +laws and legal foundations, I was constantly pursued with that request. +I asked the Fuehrer myself: “My Fuehrer, can’t we too get a law?” + +The Fuehrer refused. That’s why I say: He was of greatest help to us. +Had the Fuehrer given in at the time, we would be in bad shape now. The +Fuehrer said: “I think it’s wrong. For once I want you to make a law +through habit in Germany. For once I want to try if it isn’t possible +in Germany to set up an authority without having to issue laws and +decrees on the part of the State. It must be possible to create a great +institution and establishment, based only on a law through habit and it +must be possible to make this law through habit of a much greater force +than any other law and justice.” + +Once I said to the Fuehrer: “My Fuehrer, actually I am standing with +one foot in jail, for today I am still the trustee of the comrades +“Leipart” and “Imbusch”, and should they some day ask me to return +their money, then it will be found that I have spent it, either by +building things, or otherwise. But they shall never again find their +property in the condition in which they handed it over to me. Therefore +I would have to be convicted.” + +The Fuehrer laughed then and remarked that apparently I felt extremely +well in this condition. + +It was very difficult for us all. Today we laugh about it. * * * + +* * * * * * * + +We have only 70,000,000 altogether. Therefore we must use everybody. We +have work for at least 300,000,000 and that figure is increasing from +year to year. We must have new space. We want to repeat that again and +again. We have told the world often enough. We are a people without +space and we shall never forget that factor in all our social measures. + +We need space, and we must never give this up in all our measures. We +must never lose sight of that. That’s why we need a healthy people and +healthy men. + +We succeeded--and this is about the most important accomplishment for +the German Labor Front--in eliminating the association-character of +the trade unions and the employer-associations, and for it we have +substituted the conception “Soldier of Labor” [Soldat der Arbeit]. + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1680-PS + + 10 Years Security Police and SD--Die Deutsche Polizei, + + 1 February 1943. + +When the Fuehrer assumed the direction of the fate of the German Reich +and people on 30 January 1933, he found in the domain of the police, +as in all other fields, a situation which bore all the signs of the +irresponsible incapability of the Weimar system. The concept of a +police force, together with the Marxist-Liberal tendency and their +characteristic practices were the main reasons for the insufficiently +organized and therefore in many respects helpless condition of the +police. + +This was particularly obvious in that part of the police system to +which was assigned the task of the safekeeping of the community against +inner-political dangers from the beginning of all historical state +activity. The activities to which we are accustomed today under the +concept of “Security Police” was, under the “Weimar Interim State” in +its political police field, exclusively directed towards a prevention +of the unavoidable collapse of its system, especially against the +National Socialist movement, with the use of more or less brutal means +of power of the state, and was decisively handicapped in the domain +of criminal police by the organizational splintering as well as the +liberalistic sympathy towards crimes and criminals which existed at +that time. + +The task of the New National Socialist Security Police, which became +apparent with the assumption of power in 1933, had to include as a +nucleus the creation of an organism with the view towards the vital +necessities of the people and without consideration of the individual +interest the safeguarding of the communities against all disturbances +and destructions. The prerequisite for its organization was the strict +coordination of the political and criminal police, which were split +through the federal state regulations and which alone could provide +the necessary striking power for the struggle against the enemies +of the nation and in the service of the commands of the leadership. +The foundation for this achievement of restoration were the National +Socialist views of the world, the occupation of important positions by +proved national socialistic fighters and the inner core of a large part +of the police officials which had remained unharmed in spite of all the +attempts to rouse them. + +The fight against the political, as well as the individual criminal +which was the responsibility of the political departments of the police +administration and of the criminal police and which is now combined +under the term of “Security Police” took a continuously developing form +in the execution of its central goal, as well as in its content as in +its organization. With the knowledge that the police in the National +Socialistic State, of which it is a distinguished representative, +must not only be the best friend of the people but also, and just for +the same reason, the most pitiless adversary of all the enemies of +the nation, the preventive fight against criminals was added to the +activities of the security police which was previously mainly punitive +and executive. This constitutes a decisive innovation in the general +development of the police. The activities of the security police were +furthermore considerably supported by the communication service, and +partially made possible only by the development of the security service +of the Reichsfuehrer SS, which was created upon the assumption of power +which came into ever closer personal and organizational contact with +the security police in the course of years. + +The general development of the police since 1933 was outwardly +characterized by: + + The Reichs Reconstruction Law [Reichsneuaufbaugesetz] of 1934 + (central directive law for the federal states in individual + domains). + + The merger of the Reichs Ministry of the Interior and the Prussian + Ministry of Interior of 1934. + + The Fuehrer decree concerning the creation of a Chief of the German + Police dated 17 June 1936. + + The law about finance measures in the domain of the police of 1937, + the German Police official law of 1937. + +Within the general development of the police since 1933, the following +regulations were of decisive importance for the security police and SD: + +Decree of the Reichsfuehrer SS and the Chief of the German Police +in the Reichs Ministry of the Interior of 26 June 1936 (Transfer of +Direction of the Security Police, newly created from the political, +secret state and criminal police to the SS Gruppenfuehrer HEYDRICH +as chief of the Security Police.) Decree of the Reich and Prussian +Ministers of the Interior concerning appointment of inspectors of the +Security Police, dated 20 Sept 1936. + +Decree of the Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police of 27 +Sept 1939, concerning the merger of the central bureaus of the security +police and the SD along with the + +Decree of execution of the chief of the Security Police and the SD of +the same date concerning the creation of a Central Bureau of Reich +Security [RSHA]. + +The organizational development of the three branches, Secret State +Police [Gestapo], Criminal Police, and Security Service [SD] of the +Reichsfuehrer SS, which are now merged under the leadership of the +Chief of the Security Police and SD took place in its details, as +follows: + + +1. _The Secret State Police_ [_GESTAPO_] + +The first step towards the creation of a Secret State Police +replacing the Political Police Forces of the various federal states +was undertaken in Prussia by the law concerning the establishment +of a Secret State Police, dated 26 April 1933. The same day a +circular decree was issued by the Prussian Ministers of the Interior +regulating the tasks and responsibilities of the Secret State Police +and establishing a State Police Bureau in each government district of +Prussia as a subordinate to the Secret State Police Bureau. The creator +and Chief of the Secret State Police in Prussia was Prime Minister +Hermann GOERING. The State Police Bureaus were separated from their +organizational connection with the District Government or the police +administrations of the State and appointed as independent authorities +of the Secret State Police, in the spring of 1934 by a circular decree +of the Prime Minister and the Chief of the Secret State Police. + +Parallel to that development in Prussia, the Reichsfuehrer SS Heinrich +HIMMLER created in Bavaria, the Bavarian Political Police, and also +suggested and directed in the other federal states outside of Prussia +the establishment of Political Police. The unification of the Political +Police, of all the federal states, took place in the spring of 1934 +when Hermann GOERING appointed Reichsfuehrer SS Heinrich HIMMLER, who +had meanwhile been nominated as Commander of the Political Police +Forces of all the federal states possible. The Prussian law about the +Secret State Police, dated 10 Feb 1936, then summed up the developments +hitherto and determined the position and responsibilities of the Secret +State Police in the executive regulations issued the same day. + +A new decisive chapter of the development began with the appointment +of the Reichsfuehrer SS as Chief of the German Police by means of the +Decree of the Fuehrer mentioned above dated 17 June 1936, and the +nomination which followed of SS Gruppenfuehrer Maj Gen HEYDRICH, who up +to then, had been Chief of the Secret State Police Bureau and Chief of +the Central Security Bureau of the SS, as Chief of the Security Police +(Secret State Police and Criminal Police). The term “Secret State +Police” was decreed by the Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German +Police on 28 August 1936 in the process of establishing uniformity +for all the political police forces of the federal states and their +organization adapted to the one existing in Prussia by the creation +of State Police Bureaus. The Chiefs of the State Police Bureaus +assumed the functions of the political executive with the current +“Oberpraesident” (later on also with the Reich Governor), that is the +president of the Government, according to the decree of the Reich and +Prussian Ministers of the Interior, dated 20 Sept 1936. + +On the basis of these forms of organization and with the help of the +powers bound up with them, the fight against the open and hidden +political enemies of the National Socialist peoples State was taken up +by the Secret State Police after the assumption of power and is still +being tried on today. Its activity is not only limited to solving +political crimes already committed or to seizing their perpetrators, +but they are equally interested in the prevention of these crimes, +thus eliminating these dangers for the community at their very start. +Constant investigation and observation of the enemies of the State and +quick action in the case of recognition or after commitment of the act, +thus go hand in hand. The Secret State Police by carrying out these +tasks, contributed decisively to the fact that the National Socialist +construction work could be executed in the past ten years without any +serious attempts of interference by the political enemies of the nation. + + +2. _The Criminal Police_ + +The subordination of the Criminal Police of the Reich under the +Chief of the Security Police, as decreed on 26 June 1936 became the +fundamental basis for the uniform development throughout all Germany of +the Criminal Police, which had been organized differently in all the +federal states up to this time, namely for the establishment of the +Reich Criminal Police in its present form of organization. The circular +decree of 20 Sept 1936 stated the first fundamental regulations for +the reorganization of the Criminal Police of the State, separating +the Prussian State Criminal Police Bureau, in locality as well as +function, from the Police Presidency in Berlin and charging it with the +professional direction of the Criminal Police of all the German federal +states, State as well as communal. The Reich Central Bureau for the +struggle against the international and professional criminals as well +as against habitual instinctive criminals, which was attached to the +State Criminal Police Bureau, was particularly characterized in the +course of this process by its close relationship to the practices of +the Criminal Police. + +The whole territory of the Reich was simultaneously divided into +Criminal Police Bureaus on the basis of criminal geographical +delineation of spheres of competence in place of the State Criminal +[Police] offices. The new spheres occasionally combined several +criminal police offices. Insofar as Criminal Police District Offices +are not affiliated to State Police Administrative Offices, local duties +falling within criminal police jurisdiction are to be taken care of by +the crime sections of these State Police Administrative Officers. + +In the course of further organizational development, the title of +Reichskriminalpolizeiamt [Reich Criminal Police Bureau] was conferred +on the Prussian State Criminal Police Bureau through a decree of 16 +July 1937. This bureau was directly subordinated to the Chief of +Security Police. + +This newly created organizational system rendered possible the +successful activity of the German Criminal Police, which also became +increasingly more perfect in technical fields. From then on Criminal +Police did not limit itself to repressive activity, but paid much +attention to preventive combatting of crime on the basis of national +protective ideology. The correctness of planning and development +is demonstrated most clearly in the decline of criminality in the +subsequent period. + + +3. _The Security Service of the Reichsfuehrer SS (SD)_ + +Recognizing that accurate knowledge of the enemy, of his methods and +aims, is one of the most important bases of any successful struggle +the Reichsfuehrer SS created an intelligence service organization as +early as 1932 under the then SS-Standartenfuehrer (Colonel) Reinhard +HEYDRICH. From the beginning members of the SS were the full-time +agents of the SD, which had emerged from the SS. + +After the seizure of power the leaders of the National-Socialist +movement felt the necessity for current objective information about +newsworthy events. This caused the NSDAP to issue an ordinance on 9 +June 1934 which merged all information facilities then existing within +the Party organization with the SD, and declared the latter to be sole +Party information service. The original task of intelligence coverage +of the enemy was thereby expanded to general intelligence activity. + +In the course of the development as a whole, an increasingly closer +cooperation of the SD with the offices of the Security Police resulted +as a matter of course. The successful combatting of all activity +hostile to the state by the Security Police can be traced back to +a considerable extent to the intelligence groundwork of the SD. In +addition the field of activity of the SD was progressively expanded, +because top Reich authorities delegated to the SD in a series of +agreements the task of informing these authorities about the effects of +official measures upon popular morale. These agreements also regulated +the details of cooperation between these top Reich authorities and the +SD. Today the exploration of the situation in all fields of life from +the information point of view is incumbent upon the Security Service +(SD) of the Reichsfuehrer SS, with special consideration of the morale +factors and repercussions among the population. The results of its +variegated and responsible activity transmit an objective, always +up-to-date picture of the situation to the leading authorities of Party +and State. In addition they form valuable hints for current planning of +the competent authorities. + +The organizational structure within which the SD became active +during the first years of its existence and was headed by the Chief +of the Main Security Bureau of the SS, to whom in turn the regional +subdivisions were subordinate. The elimination of SD-Oberabschnitte in +September 1939 resulted in direct functional connection between the +SD-Abschnitte, as the regional subdivisions were now termed, and the +Main Security Bureau as central authority. The current close personal +and organizational connection between the SD and the Security Police +resulted from the Decree of the Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of German +Police, dated 27 September 1939. This Decree amalgamated the central +authorities of the security police and of the SD, and vested it in the +newly-created Chief of Security Police and SD, and above him in the +Reich Main Security Bureau. Since that time the SD-(Leit)-Abschnitte +and their subordinate offices have been under the jurisdiction of the +Reich Main Security Bureau. + +The above description of the history of the Secret State Police +[Gestapo], of the Criminal Police and of the Security Service [SD] of +the Reichsfuehrer SS only recounts the external stages of development. +It can express only incompletely the great degree of personal +initiative and unlimited National-Socialist prowess in work and +organization which was brought to bear by the authoritative leadership +personalities in building up the undertaking. However, the result +of this concentrated effort is such that in these decisive times an +apparatus was created on an entirely new basis which was from the +beginning a necessary and effective instrument in the hands of the +nation’s leadership and proved that it is capable of protecting the +national community against protracted interference with communal life. +It is obvious that these entire tasks could be handled only by men who +are deeply rooted in National Socialist ideology, and who are ready to +devote not only their total working capacity, but also their life, to +the comprehensive realization of the National Socialist idea in the +course of the fulfilment of their duties which is frequently dangerous. +Because of this, and according to the wish of the Reichsfuehrer SS +and of their late Chief, General Heydrich, it is the duty of the +Security Police and of the SD not only to form a perfectly working +administrative machinery, but in addition it is their duty to form +a battle community sworn to a common ideology and brotherhood. The +currents of strength generated by this battle community in fulfilling +its difficult task of continuous combatting of everything inimical to +the nation, a task which has to be accomplished in inglorious silence, +shape the National Socialist idea ideologically. These currents of +strength also shape the basic law of the SS, from the members of +which Security Police and SD are recruited in increasing measure. +Tangibly they shape the continuous work in thoroughly training the +individual. Ideological schooling, comradeship, professional education +and physical fitness are inculcated without cease; they take up a +prominent position side by side with the professional daily routine +proper, especially in the schools of the Security Service and the SD +established for these purposes. + +Trained in such a manner, Security Police and SD could do justice even +to the great additional requirements, which the four year battle for +the living rights of the German people brought in its train. In all +battle areas, and in all occupied territories, the men of the Security +Police and of the SD stand side by side with the Armed Forces. In a +struggle full of sacrifice they devote all their strength to keep the +rear of the front free, and to help make secure German reconstruction +in occupied territory. In the offices of the home front, on the other +hand, the men employed make certain that the fight for life of the +German people is not impaired by criminal elements. Through increased +effort they equalize the additional tasks and the additional work, +which are necessitated by the war as such and especially by the reduced +number of personnel due to drafting of men for front-line duty. All +faithful to the words of the Reichsfuehrer SS, to do more than their +duty in time of war. + +* * * * * * * + + + PARTIAL COPY OF DOCUMENT 1689-PS + + CZECHOSLOVAKIA FIGHTS BACK + A Document of the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs + Published by + American Council on Public Affairs + Washington, D. C., 1943 + [Pages 110, 111, and 114] + +On December 2, 1942, a special order issued by the “Protectorate” +Ministry of Agriculture excluded the Jews not only from buying +unrationed foods, but even from receiving them as a gift from any +private citizen. The same order has left it to the discretion of the +Ministry of Agriculture to exclude Jews entirely or partially from +obtaining rationed food, thus exposing the remnants of the Jewish +community to death by starvation. + +One hour on five days a week has been allowed for shopping, this hour +being fixed at a time when after, first the Germans and then the +Czechs, have done their buying, the small stocks are mostly exhausted. + +After the occupation of Poland, Hitler designated Lublin and its +immediate district as a reservation in which all Jews from the occupied +countries were to be concentrated. Some 2,000 Jews of Moravska Ostrava +were the first to be sent there. A year later, at the end of October +1941, 48,000 Czech Jews were already picked out for deportation. Men +between the ages of sixteen to fifty were sent to labor camps, while +their womenfolk and children were taken to special settlements in +Eastern Poland. + +At the end of June, 1942, deportation to Poland began on a large scale. +The Gestapo was instructed to prepare by every Monday and Thursday +contingents of a thousand Jews each. Those to leave were given a day +or two’s notice. The Nazi records of the Jewish registration were out +of date and it often happened that the call-up cards were addressed to +persons who had died years ago, had left the country or had already +been deported. In such cases the daily quota of a thousand was made up +by people simply picked up from the streets or dragged from their beds +at night-time. The Gestapo took a delight in so selecting the deportees +that families were split, wives separated from their husbands, and +even small children from their mothers. Those left at home were never +allowed to bid farewell to their relatives or friends. But sometimes, +on early summer mornings, their Czech friends could watch those gloomy +processions of the outlawed marching to the railway station and passing +for the last time through the streets of Prague. + +At the end of 1942, no Jewish life in Bohemia and Moravia was left. Out +of the 90,000 Czech Jews more than 72,000 have been deported. + +Although the deportations went on, leaving at the end of August, 1942, +only some 20,000 Jews in Slovakia, most of them in ghettos the Nazis +were still not satisfied. At the end of November, 1942, a special +committee was set up to consider the final expulsion of the remainder +of the Jews. By then, out of the 95,000 Jews, 76,000 had already been +deported. + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1696-PS + + THE REICHSMINISTER OF THE INTERIOR + IV g 4178 /39-5100 + + Berlin, NW 40, Koenigsplatz 6, 16 November 1939 + Telephone: + Dept. Z, I, II, V, VIII, 11 00 27 + Dept II, IV, VI + (Unter den Linden 72); 12 00 34 + Tel. Address: Reichsinnenminister. + + To the Head of the Hospital (for Mental cases) + Kaufbeuren + or his Deputy in Kaufbeuren. + +With regard to the necessity for a systematized economic plan for +Hospitals and Nursing Institutions, I request you to fill up the +attached Registration Forms immediately, in accordance with the +attached instructional leaflet, and to return them to me. If you +yourself are not a doctor the Registration Forms for the individual +patients are to be filled in by the superintending doctor. The filling +up of the questionnaires is, if possible, to be _done on a typewriter_. +In the column “Diagnosis” I request a statement as exact as possible, +also a short description of the condition if feasible. + +In order to expedite the work, the registration forms for the +individual patients can be despatched here in several parts. The last +consignment must, however, in any case have arrived at this Ministry +_at the latest_ on 1 January 1940. I reserve for myself the right, +should occasion arise, to institute further official enquiries on the +spot through my representative. + + p.p. (Sd.) DR. CONTI + + Certified. + (Sd.) Illegible + Administrative Secretary. + + # # # # # + +_Registration Form 1_ + + _To be typewritten._ + + Current No. __________ + Name of the institution: _______________________________________ + at: ____________________________________________________________ + Surname and Christian name of the patient: _______ at birth _______ + Date of birth: _____ Place: ________ District: _________________ + Last place of residence: ____________ District: __________________ + Unmarried, married, widow, + widower, divorced: ________ Religion ________ Race[1] __________ + Previous profession: ________ Nationality: __________ Army Service + when? 1914-18 + or from 1.9.39 + ______________ + War injury (even if no connection with + mental disorder) Yes/No __________________________________________ + How does war injury show itself and in what + does it consist? _________________________________________________ + Address of next of kin: ____________________________________________ + Regular visit and by whom (Address): _______________________________ + Guardian or nurse (Name, address): _________________________________ + Responsible for payment: ___________________________________________ + Since when in that Institution: ____________________________________ + Whence and when handed over: ___________ Since when ill: __________ + If has been in other Institutions, where and how long: _____________ + Twin yes ___ Blood relations of unsound mind: ____________________ + no + Diagnosis: _________________________________________________________ + Clinical description (Previous history, course, condition; in any case + ample data regarding mental condition): ____________________________ + Very restless? yes ________ Bedridden? yes _______________________ + no no + Incurable bodily illness: yes (which) ___________________________ + no + Schizophrenia: Fresh attack _______ Final Condition ____________ + good recovery + Mental debility: weak _________ Imbecile ________ Idiot ________ + Epilepsy: psychological alteration ___________ Average frequency + of the attacks _______ + Therapeutics (Insulin, Cardiazol, Malaria, Permanent result: yes ___ + Salvarsan etc. When?) _________________ no ____ + Admitted by reason of para. 51, para. 42b StrGB etc ________________ + through ________________ + Crime: ___________________ Former punishable offences: _____________ + Manner of employment (detailed description of work): _______________ + Permanent } Yes ______________ + } Employment, independent worker + Temporary } No ______________ + + Value of work (if possible compared with average performance of healthy + person) __________________________________________________________ + This space to be left blank. + _________________ Place, Date ________ + __________________________________________ + Signature of the head doctor or his + representative (doctors who are not + psychiatrists and neurologists please state + same.) + + +FOOTNOTES: + +[1] German or of similar blood (of German blood), Jew, Jewish mixed +breed Grades I or II, Negro (mixed breed). + + # # # # # + + PUBLIC UTILITY + AMBULANCE TRANSPORTATION G.m.b.H. + Dept. II/d, H/K + + Berlin, W. 9. 12th. May, 1941 + + To the Director of the Hospital of the District association of + Swabia, + Kaufbeuren/Bavaria. + + Potsdamer Platz 1. + + Dear Director, + +By order of the Reich Defence Commissioner I must remove mental +cases from your institution and from the Branch at Irrsee to another +institution. A total of 140 persons are to be transported, 70 on 4th +June and 70 on 5th June. I forward you herewith Transport Lists Nos. +8, 9, 10 and 11 in triplicate. The additional names on the lists are +intended for possible deficits (discharged meanwhile, died, etc.). + +The marking of the patients is most suitably done by means of a strip +of adhesive tape, on which the name is written in ink-pencil, to be +pasted between the shoulder blades. At the same time the name is to be +put on an article of clothing. + +The hospital reports and personal histories are to be prepared for the +transportation and to be handed to our Director of Transport, Herr +Kuepper, in the same way the personal possessions of the patients, as +well as money and articles of value. + +I enclose property information cards and information cards as to the +defrayer of the expenses, which, accurately filled out, must be handed +in at the time of transportation. Money and articles of value, besides +being noted on the property information cards, must also be noted on +separate special lists (in duplicate). Transportation takes place: + +On 4th June, 8.46 a.m. from Kaufbeuren--70 patients. + +On 5th June, 8.46 a.m. from Kaufbeuren--70 patients. + +Our director of transport, Herr Kuepper, will visit you the previous +day, in order to discuss further details with you. + +I further request you to provide the patients with food (2-3 slices of +bread and butter each and some cans of coffee). + +[Pencil note illegible] + + Heil Hitler! + [signature illegible] + Public Utility Ambulance Transportation G.m.b.H. + + # # # # # + + PROVINCIAL ASSOCIATION FOR SOCIAL WELFARE SWABIA. + + Address: Augsburg 1, P.O. Box Regierungspraesident + + Tel No. 5842 + Cashier’s Office: Principal Govt. + Cashier’s Office Augsburg. + Post Office check account: + Munich No. 1624 + Enclosures: + + Director: Dr. Faltlhauser, of the Hospital, Kaufbeuren. + + Your reference: 2080. Your letter of 13.11.40. Our ref: (to be + given always) II-B-7-2. + + Augsburg, 6.5.1941 + + Concerning the transfer of patients. + +I have the honour to inform you that the female patients transferred +from your institution on 8.11.1940 to the institutions in Grafeneck, +Bernburg, Sonnenstein and Harthein all died in November of last year. + + [signature illegible] + + # # # # # + + Copy + + No. 5255 c 39 + Ministry of State of the Interior. + Oberregierungsrat Gaum. + + Munich, 24th November 1942 + To the Director of the Hospital, + Kaufbeuren, Obermed. Rat + Dr. Faltlhauser. + + To Head Physician Dr. W. Leinisch + Guenzburg. + + Re letter of 13.11.1942. + + Dear Doctor, + +In your letter of 13.11.1942 you requested me to send suitable +epileptics for the carrying out of your research work. I had an +opportunity of discussing this with the Obermedizinalraeten Dr. +Faltlhauser and Dr. Pfannmueller. Both will willingly deliver you +suitable patients. For various reasons patients from the Institution +at Kaufbeuren are primarily to be chosen. If this institution has +no suitable material, I agree to the transfer of patients from +Eglfing-Haar to Guenzburg for your research work. I request you to get +into touch with Dr. Faltlhauser. + + Heil Hitler! + (Sd.) GAUM. + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1701-PS + +Copies distributed to Gauleiter Dr. Wilhelm von Allwoerden [?] + + 11 Aug. + H + Berlin, 9 August 1943 + + The Reich Minister of the Interior + Pol. SV A I No 844/43 + To the Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellory _in Berlin + W8_ + For the information of the other Reich ministers. + _Subj_: Law on the treatment of enemies of the society. + In addition to my letter of 19 March 1942-- + _Enclosures_: 55. -- + +After the draft of the law on the treatment of enemies of the society +has been completely rewritten, I am sending the enclosed new draft +with the consent of the Reich Minister of Justice, Dr. Thierack and ask +that the law be approved in a circulatory manner. The necessary number +of prints is attached. + +The Chief Plenipotentiary for the Reich Administration has again +agreed on the importance of the law in war, considering the existing +directions for curbing the making of laws and the administrative +activity. Furthermore I refer to my letter of 19 March 1942 and to the +reasons attached to the draft. + + /s/ Frick + + # # # # # + +The Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories + + Berlin W 35, 22 Dec 1943 + + Tele--letter + +To the Reich Minister of the Interior for the information of the +Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellory and the other Reich +Ministers. + + _Subject_: Law on the Treatment of Enemies of Society. + To Pol. SVA 1 No. 844/43 of 9 August 1943 + +I have basic objections against the draft of the law. In Par 2, Dir. 4, +I assume that the police will inform the penal prosecuting authority +also of such cases in which it does not consider--for legal or actual +reasons--that a punishable act has been committed or can be proved, +especially if it wants to connect the behavior of the culprit with +consequences adverse to him. The penal prosecuting authority should +be able to determine also in dubious cases whether the possibility of +penal prosecution exists. I therefore suggest to formulate Par. 2, Dir. +4, of the law draft about as follows: + +“If there is suspicion of a punishable act by enemies of society, the +police will inform the penal prosecuting authorities about it.” + +Because, in the framework of the draft, the basic regulation of the +connections between penal justice and police has become mandatory, +an exact definition of the respective competence seems necessary to +me. In the expected executory decree it should hence be made clear, +as it was already provided in the draft of the executory decree (Par. +4) for the first draft of the law, that police actions because of the +same matter are not admissible anymore if a court has freed (a party) +because of proven innocence or lack of proofs, except for custody +measures in case of freeing for lack of proofs. Furthermore, it should +be determined that the police can not take other than custody measures +after the penal term of a person judged by a court because of the same +facts. Further, I think it necessary to have a fundamental clearing +of the question whether, and if so--to what degree police measures +are admissible after refusal of a decree of custody or other judicial +directions, regardless of the reason for refusal. + +Finally, I mention for consideration if the words “the regime of the +time of the system” in Dir. 3 of the official document, taken from +the newspaper language, could not be replaced to advantage by another +expression. + +I especially direct your attention to the printing mistake in the +last but two dir. of the reason, in which in the third line it should +probably read “protective surveillance” instead of “protective custody”. + + Rosenberg + attested: + chancellery employee + + Offic. Stamp + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1702-PS + + Rec’d: 1025/44g + encl: 1 Aug. 44 + + Copy + SECRET + + II 1C + + Evacuation Report + of District Commissariat of Kasatin + [Illegible notes] + + REPORTER: District Commissar STEUDEL, Kasatin. + Time of report: 8 November to 28 December 1943. + +1. The military situation in November/December 1943. + +Immediately following the capture of Kiev by the Soviets on 7 November, +the district town of Wassilkow as well as the important railroad +center Fastow, belonging to the district of Wassilkow, fell into enemy +hands, (8-9 November). The following day, the Soviets attempted to +advance farther along the rail line Fastow-Kasatin. They succeeded in +capturing with weak armored and infantry spearheads in one move, the +stations of Kozanka, Popilnva and Browki, situated along this line, and +to execute further sudden advances past the station of Czernorudka. +For this reason the district of Wtscheraische had to be evacuated on +15 November. I withdrew the Germans committed there to the district +of Rushin situated 20 kilometers to the South. The withdrawal was +effected according to plan and without friction, with all implements, +after all camps had been evacuated previously; the cattle--above +all the valuable breeds (Oxen and colt stables) led back. German +tractors and farm machines transported away and all businesses had +been crippled. (Fundamentally, the chief command of the 4th Armored +Army, in whose zone these battles took place, had ordered that in the +district West of the Dnjepr, in contrast to the ones to the East, no +destructions of farm goods or businesses should take place). + +* * * * * * * + +_The results of the hereby described military events_ between 8 +November and 20 December were as follows: + +In a conference, called by me, of the authoritative leaders of all +offices of the civilian sector on 8 November, I ordered the immediate +start of, and discussed in detail, measures for the most far-reaching +decentralization. At the same time, the leaders of all vital, above +all of the economic food industry, were informed to effect, in case of +an evacuation, the crippling of factories (by taking away important +and hard-to-replace machine parts, belts, etc.,) and to prepare this +already now. Up till then, however, all factories had to be kept +running at full capacity. It should be emphasized here, praisingly, +that all measures ordered by me in strictest accordance with the army +economic leader [A.W.F.] of the chief command of the 4th Armored +Army, were executed by the responsible parties and their staff in an +exemplary manner, and with the greatest conscientiousness. Although the +delivery of cars, for conceivable reasons, did meet with considerable +difficulties, we succeeded, due to the splendid cooperation of the +authoritative Reich German organizations of military and civil +government, in transporting to the West approximately 80% of the most +vital goods (grain, cattle, sugar, etc), or in making them available +for the armed forces for immediate use as provisions for the fighting +troops. + +* * * * * * * + +5. In the midst of the conditions, almost restored to normal, I +received _a call on_ _the eve of the 25th of December from the Army_ +according to which _the Soviets_ with superior forces of tanks and +motorized troops, had exerted a strong renewed pressure on the line of +Kotscherowo-Brusilow-Fastow and along the street Kiev-Shitomir with the +main advance in a South West direction. Shortly afterwards, the long +distance calls, as per attached inclosure number 2, was put through +according to which the able-bodied male population in the ages between +15 and 65 as well as the cattle had to be led back in the direction +East of the line Kililowka-Berkitschew-Shitomir. The transporting of +the able-bodied population was charged to the military authorities by +the chief quartermaster of the army, while beginning with the morning +of 26 December. I discussed and ordered in detail, during an immediate +conference for the whole district the shipment of all the cattle. +This action started successfully on that day according to plan, while +the discussions over the seizure of the male population were not +yet concluded in the afternoon hours of the 26th of December and no +positive measures of any kind were taken. + + # # # # # + + Enclosure II + + SECRET + + Kdt. rueckw. A. Geb. 585 + _Abt. Qu. Nr. 452/43 geh._ + + In the field 25 December 1943 + +To the District Commissar KASATIN + +1. The able-bodied male population between 15 and 65 years of age and +the cattle are to be shipped back from the district East of the line +Belilowka-Berditschen-Shitomir (places excluded). + +* * * * * * * + +4. Destruction of farm goods and factories in all places must not take +place, only a crippling of factories for several weeks will be executed +by army economic leader (A.Wi.Fue.). + + In charge + [signature illegible] + Lt. General + + Distribution: + See original. + + # # # # # + + Enclosure III + + Copy + + SECRET + + High Command of the 4th Armored Army + O. Qu/Qu 2 Nr. 1662/43/ secret + + Army Headquarters, + 26 December 1943 + + Re: Evacuation measures. + +1. The city of Berditschew is to be evacuated of Reich Germans, German +[Volksdeutschen] agencies of the civil government, government of +the country, able-bodied population. The cattle is to be taken away. +Execution of evacuation measures is charged to the civil government. + +* * * * * * * + +4. No destructions are to take place as far as they are not expressly +ordered by the armored army. All factories are to be prepared for +crippling so that this can be accomplished in the shortest possible +time. The electricity and water plants are to be taken over by the +technical troops. + +* * * * * * * + +6. The same measures are to be prepared for Kasatin in such a way that +they can be started at once at the command of the armored army. + + For the High Command of the Armored Army + The Chief of the General Staff + In charge + Original signed MUELLER + Colonel, General Staff + + Correct: + [signature illegible] + Lt Colonel, General Staff. + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1708-PS + + National Socialistic Yearbook 1941 + Edited by: Dr. Robert Ley + Published by: Central Publishing House of the N.S.D.A.P. + Franz Eher, successor Munich + + The program of the NSDAP + +The program is the political foundation of the NSDAP and accordingly +the primary political law of the State. It has been made brief and +clear intentionally. + +All legal precepts must be applied in the spirit of the party program. + +Since the taking over of control, the Fuehrer has succeeded in the +realization of essential portions of the Party program from the +fundamentals to the detail. + +The Party Program of the NSDAP was proclaimed on the 24 February 1920 +by Adolf Hitler at the first large Party gathering in Munich and +since that day has remained unaltered. Within the national socialist +philosophy is summarized in 25 points: + +1. We demand the unification of all Germans in the Greater Germany on +the basis of the right of self-determination of peoples. + +2. We demand equality of rights for the German people in respect to the +other nations; abrogation of the peace treaties of Versailles and St. +Germain. + +3. We demand land and territory (colonies) for the sustenance of our +people, and colonization for our surplus population. + +4. Only a member of the race can be a citizen. A member of the race can +only be one who is of German blood, without consideration of creed. +Consequently no Jew can be a member of the race. + +5. Whoever has no citizenship is to be able to live in Germany only as +a guest, and must be under the authority of legislation for foreigners. + +6. The right to determine matters concerning administration and law +belongs only to the citizen. Therefore we demand that every public +office, of any sort whatsoever, whether in the Reich, the county or +municipality, be filled only by citizens. We combat the corrupting +parliamentary economy, office-holding only according to party +inclinations without consideration of character or abilities. + +7. We demand that the state be charged first with providing the +opportunity for a livelihood and way of life for the citizens. If it +is impossible to sustain the total population of the State, then the +members of foreign nations (non-citizens) are to be expelled from the +Reich. + +8. Any further immigration of non-citizens is to be prevented. We +demand that all non-Germans, who have immigrated to Germany since the 2 +August 1914, be forced immediately to leave the Reich. + +9. All citizens must have equal rights and obligations. + +10. The first obligation of every citizen must be to work both +spiritually and physically. The activity of individuals is not to +counteract the interests of the universality, but must have its result +within the framework of the whole for the benefit of all. + +Consequently we demand: + +11. Abolition of unearned (work and labour) incomes. Breaking of +rent-slavery. + +12. In consideration of the monstrous sacrifice in property and blood +that each war demands of the people personal enrichment through a war +must be designated as a crime against the people. Therefore we demand +the total confiscation of all war profits. + +13. We demand the nationalization of all (previous) associated +industries (trusts). + +14. We demand a division of profits of all heavy industries. + +15. We demand an expansion on a large scale of old age welfare. + +16. We demand the creation of a healthy middle class and its +conservation, immediate communalization of the great warehouses and +their being leased at low cost to small firms, the utmost consideration +of all small firms in contracts with the State, county or municipality. + +17. We demand a land reform suitable to our needs, provision of a law +for the free expropriation of land for the purposes of public utility, +abolition of taxes on land and prevention of all speculation in land. + +18. We demand struggle without consideration against those whose +activity is injurious to the general interest. Common national +criminals, usurers, Schieber and so forth are to be punished with +death, without consideration of confession or race. + +19. We demand substitution of a German common law in place of the Roman +Law serving a materialistic world-order. + +20. The state is to be responsible for a fundamental reconstruction +of our whole national education program, to enable every capable +and industrious German to obtain higher education and subsequently +introduction into leading positions. The plans of instruction of +all educational institutions are to conform with the experiences of +practical life. The comprehension of the concept of the State must +be striven for by the school [Staatsbuergerkunde] as early as the +beginning of understanding. We demand the education at the expense of +the State of outstanding intellectually gifted children of poor parents +without consideration of position or profession. + +21. The State is to care for the elevating national health by +protecting the mother and child, by outlawing child-labor, by the +encouragement of physical fitness, by means of the legal establishment +of a gymnastic and sport obligation, by the utmost support of all +organizations concerned with the physical instruction of the young. + +22. We demand abolition of the mercenary troops and formation of a +national army. + +23. We demand legal opposition to known lies and their promulgation +through the press. In order to enable the provision of a German press, +we demand, that: a. All writers and employees of the newspapers +appearing in the German language be members of the race: b. Non-German +newspapers be required to have the express permission of the State +to be published. They may not be printed in the German language: c. +Non-Germans are forbidden by law any financial interest in German +publications, or any influence on them, and as punishment for +violations the closing of such a publication as well as the immediate +expulsion from the Reich of the non-German concerned. Publications +which are counter to the general good are to be forbidden. We +demand legal prosecution of artistic and literary forms which exert +a destructive influence on our national life, and the closure of +organizations opposing the above made demands. + +24. We demand freedom of religion for all religious denominations +within the state so long as they do not endanger its existence or +oppose the moral senses of the Germanic race. The Party as such +advocates the standpoint of a positive Christianity without binding +itself confessionally to any one denomination. It combats the +Jewish-materialistic spirit within and around us, and is convinced that +a lasting recovery of our nation can only succeed from within on the +framework: common utility precedes individual utility. + +25. For the execution of all of this we demand the formation of a +strong central power in the Reich. Unlimited authority of the central +parliament over the whole Reich and its organizations in general. The +forming of state and profession chambers for the execution of the laws +made by the Reich within the various states of the confederation. +The leaders of the Party promise, if necessary by sacrificing their +own lives, to support by the execution of the points set forth above +without consideration. + +Adolf Hitler proclaimed the following explanation for this program on +the 13 April 1928: + + + Explanation + +Regarding the false interpretations of Point 17 of the program of +the NSDAP on the part of our opponents, the following definition is +necessary: + +“Since the NSDAP stands on the platform of private ownership it happens +that the passage” gratuitous expropriation concerns only the creation +of legal opportunities to expropriate if necessary, land which has +been illegally acquired or is not administered from the viewpoint of +the national welfare. This is directed primarily against the Jewish +land-speculation companies. + + + PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1709-PS + + [Report of Special Delegate for Art Seizures, July 1943] + +[_Page 68 Par. 134_] + +The collection Lubomierski in Lemberg contained among others 31 +valuable hand drawings by Albrecht Duerer. An offer made in the spring +of 1940 by a special commissioner through the foreign office to the +Russian government, to exchange these drawings by Duerer for equally +valuable Russian works of arts and literary monument, was refused. +On the day of the capture of Lemberg, the special commissioner, Dr. +Muehlmann and the museum director Dr. Kudlich went there by order +of the Reichmarshal, to conduct a search for the hand drawings. The +investigation encountered considerable difficulties, because the +Russians had reorganized the system of museums in Lemberg and because +the collection Lubomierski did not exist any more. + +In the course of further investigations Prof. Gebarowicz of the +Bawarowski-museum, who had publicized the drawings in the past, was +thoroughly interrogated also. Finally he explained that he kept the +drawings carefully hidden from the Russians in the Bawarowski-museum. +On demand, he also brought them out from concealment. + +After thorough examination, the sequestration was announced, and a +regular receipt was issued. + +The special commissioner has turned over these hand drawings in July +1941 to the Reichmarshal in person, who brought them to the Fuehrer +into the headquarters, where they still are. By specific order of the +Fuehrer, they remain temporarily in his possession. + +The following single drawings are affected, which were entered in the +supplement of the catalogue (31 drawings on 23 cartons): + + Carton I 1. Self portrait + 2. 6 pillows + Carton II 3. The young steer + Carton III 4. Nude with mirror + 5. Partial sketch of the same figure + Carton IV 6. Nude woman with headscarf in a niche on a sphere + Carton V 7. Nude man with lion + 8. Nude man with mirror + 9. Attached weak reprint of the same figure + Carton VI 10. Corner ornament with eagle + 11. The holy family + Carton VII 12. Drapery study + 13. Nude man lying down + Carton VIII 14. Oarsman + Carton IX 15. Horse + Carton X 16. Europa on the steer + Carton XI 17. Corpus Christi + Carton XII 18. Nude woman with a staff + Carton XIII 19. Sampson with the city gates of Gaza + Carton XIV 20. Mary and child + 21. Childhead + Carton XV 22. Pictures of the emperors Charlemagne and + Sigismund + Carton XVI 23. The holy family in a hut + Carton XVII 24. Study for a Madonna and the head of an old man + 25. Two geometric drawings + Carton XVIII 26. Mary with a child in an indicated renaissance hall + Carton XIX 27. Christ as king of the universe + Carton XX 28. Man’s head with a cap + Carton XXI 29. Lamentations over Christ + Carton XXII 30. Head of a deer + Carton XXIII 31. Study for an adoration, left kneeling Mary, right + Holy Joseph + +[_Page 77, Par. 148_] + + + _Works of art for decorative purposes_ + +On the desire of the Governor General, a number of 2nd and 3rd class +art objects was made available to him for exhibition and decorative +purposes,--Reference Paragraph 141 and 142.--The architect Franz +Koettgen in Krakau was charged with the execution of this mission, +especially the furnishing of Castle Kressendorf and the castle in +Krakau. A list was made by the special commissioner, in which all +objects, put at the disposal of architect Koettgen, were exactly listed +in detail. + +During the conference with the architect Koettgen, on 30 July 1942, the +latter promised, to continue the inventory, already started by him, +more rapidly, and to conclude by the end of 1942 at the latest. He +furthermore said he was willing, to provide the special commissioner +after the completion of the inventories with a directory of the +location of the individual objects. The completeness of the transferred +art objects and their careful storing can only be examined after the +completion of the inventories. + +A copy of the above mentioned lists on the object, put at the disposal +of Koettgen is added to the report as enclosure Nr. 8. + +[_Page 80_] + +Of the objects, taken from the depot of the special commissioner in the +state library in Krakau as of 1 Aug 1942, the following were inspected: + + + I. In Berlin in the depot of the special Commissioner and in the safe + of the German Bank: + + _Catalogue No._ + East German Master 1430 “Picture of the Vesper” 4 + German Master 16th century “Picture of a bearded man” 17 + Master von Kappenberg “Mary with child” 27 + Dirk Bouts “Annunciation of Mary” 35 + Netherland Master “Lamentation over Christ” 42 + Berckheyde “Small Houtpoort in Haarlem” 45 + Breughel “Folksfestival” 47 + Gerrit Dou “Rembrandt’s mother” 51 + Pinturicchio “Madonna and child” 138 + Raffael “Picture of a young man” 141 + Venetian Master “Mary and child” 145 + de Largilliere “Portrait of a lady” 158 + Further two 2nd class pictures, namely “The lustful + old man” (unequal lovers), “Fugger’s Portrait”. + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1721-PS + + CONFIDENTIAL + + Supreme SA Command + FO No 82/277-38 n.f.D. Ha/Hbl. + + MUNICH, 29 November 1938 + For Use of the Services Only + Distributor I + +Subject: Measures against the Jews. + +The Stabsleiter of the Fuehrer’s deputy, in Order No. 189/38 (not to be +made public), makes the following announcement: + + “In connection with the actions against the Jews arising from the + public, valuable objects had to be safeguarded here and there by the + offices of the Party and its branches for the protection of German + public property. I order that such objects be turned over at once to + the nearest office of the Secret State Police, and receipts be given + therefor.” + + “If, in connection with these actions, the offices of the Party and + their branches should become aware or have been aware of thefts, + which unfortunately may have occurred, it is to be reported at once + to the nearest Police Station. The same is to be done upon the + appearance of suspicious objects.” + + “The offices of the police are to be aided to the fullest extent in + accomplishing their assignment.” + + Chief of the Fuehrungshauptamt: + Signed: JUETTNER + Obergruppenfuehrer + + Official + /s/ [Illegible] + Standartenfuehrer + STAMPED: SA Group Kurpfalz 1543 + /s/ [Illegible] + 30 November 1938 + + # # # # # + +CONFIDENTIAL + + SA der NSDAP + 50th Brigade (Starkenburg) + Division F Reference No 4309 + + DARMSTADT, 2 Moosbergstrasse 11 November 1938 + Tel. 7042 and 7043 Postal checking account: Frankfurt on + the Main 234-38 Bankaccount City Savings Bank 155 + To: SA Group Electoral Palatinate [Kurpfalz] _Mannheim_ + +The following order reached me at 3 o’clock on 10 November 1938. + +“On the order of the Gruppenfuehrer, all the Jewish synagogues within +the 50th Brigade are to be blown up or set on fire immediately.” + +“Neighboring houses occupied by Aryans are not to be damaged. The +action is to be carried out in civilian clothes. Rioting and plundering +are to be prevented. Report of execution of orders to reach Brigade +Fuehrer or office by 8:30.” + +I immediately alerted the Standartenfuehrer and gave them the most +exact instructions; the execution of the order began at once. + +I hereby report that the following were destroyed in the area of: + +Standarte 115 + + 1. Synagogue at Darmstadt, Bleichstrasse destroyed by fire. + + 2. Synagogue at Darmstadt, Fuchsstrasse destroyed by fire. + + 3. Synagogue at Ober/Ramstadt interior and furnishings wrecked. + + 4. Synagogue at Graefenhausen interior and furnishings wrecked. + + 5. Synagogue at Griesheim interior and furnishings wrecked. + + 6. Synagogue at Pfungstadt interior and furnishings wrecked. + + 7. Synagogue at Eberstadt destroyed by fire. + +Standarte 145 + + 1. Synagogue at Bensheim destroyed by fire. + + 2. Synagogue at Lorsch in Hessen destroyed by fire. + + 3. Synagogue at Heppenheim destroyed by fire and blown up. + + 4. Synagogue at Birkenau destroyed by fire. + + 5. Prayer House Alsbach destroyed by fire. + + 6. Meeting room Alsbach destroyed by fire. + + 7. Synagogue at Rimbach furnishings completely destroyed. + +Standarte 168 + + 1. Synagogue in Seligenstadt destroyed by fire. + + 2. Synagogue in Offenbach destroyed by fire. + + 3. Synagogue in Klein-Krotzenburg destroyed by fire. + + 4. Synagogue in Steinheim on the Main destroyed by fire. + + 5. Synagogue in Muehlheim on the Main destroyed by fire. + + 6. Synagogue in Sprendlingen destroyed by fire. + + 7. Synagogue in Langen destroyed by fire. + + 8. Synagogue in Egelsbach destroyed by fire. + +Standarte 186 + + 1. Synagogue in Beerfelden blown up. + + 2. Synagogue in Michelstadt furnishings wrecked. + + 3. Synagogue in Koenig furnishings wrecked. + + 4. Synagogue in Hoechst i/Odenwald furnishings wrecked. + + 5. Synagogue in Gross-Umstadt furnishings wrecked. + + 6. Synagogue in Dieburg furnishings wrecked. + + 7. Synagogue in Babenhausen furnishings wrecked. + + 8. Synagogue in Gross-Bieberau destroyed by fire. + + 9. Synagogue in Fraenk. Crumbach furnishings destroyed. + + 10. Synagogue in Reichelsheim furnishings destroyed. + +Standarte 221 + + 1. Synagogue and Chapel in Gross Gerau destroyed by fire. + + 2. Synagogue in Ruesselheim torn down and furnishings destroyed. + + 3. Synagogue in Dornheim furnishings destroyed. + + 4. Synagogue in Wolfskehlen furnishings destroyed. + + The Fuehrer of Brigade 50 (Starkenburg) + + /s/ [Illegible] + Brigadefuehrer + + Stamped: SA Group Electoral Palatinate (Kurpfalz) + 11 Nov 1938 + + /s/ [Illegible] + + # # # # # + + CONFIDENTIAL + + Notice! + +8.35 Oberfuehrer Durein [?] for the area of Brigade 51 reports +completion of the matter of the Synagogues. + +Everything has been carried out up to Roelsheim [?] near Germersheim. + + 10 Nov 38 (s) [Illegible] + + # # # # # + + CONFIDENTIAL + + Note for Files + + Telephone call by the Fuehrer of Brigade 50, Darmstadt. + Brigadefuehrer Lucke. + +Brigadefuehrer Lucke reports at 9 o’clock on 10 November 1938: +The Jewish church at Darmstadt, the Synagogue at Darmstadt, and +the Synagogue at Eberstadt were destroyed by fire. The Synagogue +in Darmstadt destroyed and burned out. The Synagogue in Eberstadt +destroyed and burned out. The Synagogues in Griesheim, in Graefenhausen +and Oberramstadt destroyed. The Synagogue in Bensheim destroyed by +fire. The Synagogue in Lorsch near Bensheim destroyed by fire. The +Synagogue in Heppenheim blown up. The Synagogues in Rimbach and +Birkenau destroyed. The Prayer Hall at Alsbach a.d.B. destroyed. +Meeting-room in the Jewish cemetery in Haehnlein destroyed. The +Synagogue and Church in Gross-Gerau destroyed by fire. The Synagogue in +Ruesselsheim wrecked. In addition, the Synagogue and wooden church in +Dornheim were demolished. In Offenbach the big Church and the Synagogue +were destroyed by fire. Synagogues that may still exist will also be +found and destroyed. + + Mannheim, 10 Nov 1938 /s/ LOHMANN + Sturmhauptfuehrer + Copied: + + # # # # # + + CONFIDENTIAL + + Note for Files + + Telephone call from Brigade 151, Saarbruecken, by Sturmhauptfuehrer + Rossel. + +Sturmhauptfuehrer Rossel reports at 9.15 on the morning of 10 November +1938. Tonight the Synagogue in Saarbruecken was set on fire, and the +Synagogues in Dillingen, Merzig, Saarlautern, Saarwillingen and +Broddorf were also destroyed. Jews were taken into protective custody. +The fire departments are occupied with extinguishing the fires. In the +area of Standarte 174 all Synagogues were destroyed. + + MANNHEIM, 10 November 1938 + Copied: + + /s/ ZIMMERMANN + Standartenfuehrer + + # # # # # + + CONFIDENTIAL + + Note for Files + + Telephone call from the Fuehrer of Standarte 250, Bruchsal, + Standartenfuehrer Ritter von Eberlein. + +Standartenfuehrer Ritter von Eberlein reports at 9.00 on the morning +of 10 November 1938. In the early morning of 10 November 1938, between +the hours of 4.30 and 6.00 o’clock, the Synagogue at Bruchsal burned +down to the foundations. The crowd broke all shop windows of the Jewish +stores in the city; the alerted SA put guards before the Jewish stores +to prevent plundering. The Rabbi and several prominent Jews had to be +taken into protective custody for their own safety. This was done by +the Gestapo. The Synagogue at Philippsburg also burned down at the same +time. The infamous Rabbi Neuburger, who is known because of his foreign +connections was taken into protective custody by instigation of the +SA. During the night the Synagogues at Wiesloch, Walldorf and Malsch +were also destroyed. The male Jews had to be taken into protective +custody for their personal safety. In the area of Sturmbann III/250 the +Synagogues at Sinsheim, Neidenstein, Neckar-Bischofsheim, Hoffenheim, +Wollenberg and Ittlingen were also destroyed. + + MANNHEIM, 10 November 1938 + Copied: + + /s/ ZIMMERMANN + Standartenfuehrer + + # # # # # + + CONFIDENTIAL + + Note for Files + +Standarte 17 reports by telephone call from Sturmbannfuehrer. Then at +10.13 o’clock in the morning of 10 November 1938: The Synagogues at +Ludwigshafen and Frankenthal were burned down completely this morning +between 7 and 8 o’clock. Several Jewish stores were demolished. + + MANNHEIM, 10 November 1938 + Copied: + + /s/ [Illegible] + Standartenfuehrer + + + PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1723-PS + + DECREES, REGULATIONS, ANNOUNCEMENTS [The German publication entitled + “Verfuegungen, Anordnungen, Bekanntgaben”] Pp. 430-39. + + _Security Police_ + +Cooperation of the Party offices with the Secret State Police [Gestapo]. + +In a summary of all the previously issued decrees on the cooperation +between the Party and the Gestapo I refer to the following and ordain: + +1. To the Gestapo has been entrusted the mission by the Fuehrer to +watch over and to eliminate all enemies of the Party and the National +Socialist State as well as all disintegrating forces of all kinds +directed against both. The successful solution of this mission +forms one of the most essential prerequisites for the unhampered +and frictionless work of the Party. The Gestapo, in their extremely +difficult task, is to be granted support and assistance in every +possible way by the NSDAP. The supervision of the Party itself does not +come under the jurisdiction of the Gestapo. + +I prohibit all offices of the Party, its organizations and associated +groups to conduct investigations and interrogations regarding +affairs which concern the Gestapo only. All occurrences of a +political-criminalistic nature are to be reported without prejudice +along Party channels and as ever brought to the knowledge of the +Gestapo immediately. + +2. The secret state police must report automatically all occurrences +of a criminal nature, even if it includes Party Members, to the +responsible public prosecutor according to the laws of the National +Socialist State, in force for all nationals. In such cases, the State +police offices will notify, as before, the county and Gauleiters +concerned, of the reports made to the public prosecutor. Reports will +include reasons for the incidents. In the interest of the movement the +functionaries [Hoheitstrager] are obliged to suspend, if necessary, +the party members, after contacting the responsible Party Court; +the latter will hold a public hearing, to decide on the temporary +suspension. + + + _Invitation of the leaders of offices in the Security Police and the + Security Service to attend Party meetings._ + +In order to establish closer connections between all the offices of the +Party and their organizations and the office leader of the Security +Police and SD, the leader of the Party Chancellor asks that they should +be invited in the future to all large official meetings of the Party. + + + _The taking over of political offices by officials of the Gestapo_ + +The Secret State police has the mission to safeguard the unhampered +development of all forces active in the party and released by it in the +National Socialistic State. + +Since it is still in a state of being organised and the available +officials and employees are very much in demand they are only to be +employed in order to take over positions in the Party in as much as it +is compatible with their official duties in the Secret State Police. + +I, therefore, ask to check in every single case and in close harmony +with the department of the Secret State Police concerned, whose leader +welcomes the taking over of political functions by officials and +employees of the Secret State Police, whether the transfer of political +missions into the Party can be justified in the interest of the +official obligations of the Secret State Police. + + + _Presentation to the State Police upon request by Party offices_ + +The Chief of the Security Police and SD has issued the annexed decrees +of 29 March 1940 and 4 November 1940. It is ordered herewith that +departments of the Secret State Police will be obliged to execute the +presentation request when the same emanates from the Reichsleiters +or the Gauleiters. If the request for presentation originates from +subordinate departments of the party it will only be granted if +particular interests of the State Police seem to warrant a presentation. + +In the future the county administration and local administrations are +to direct all requests through the district administration to the +responsible department of the Secret State police. + + # # # # # + + Berlin, 29 March 1940 + + The Chief of the Security Police and SD + I A 1 NR. 102/40-176 + To all State police departments + + By way of information to the Inspectors of the Security Police and SD. + + Subject: Presentation to the State Police upon request by Party + offices. + +Repeated requests by Party offices for presentation to the State Police +of Volksgenossen who did not heed the summons of the Party offices, +cause the following regulations to be decreed: + +1. If the district administration makes the request the same is to be +granted as long as no important interests of the State Police interfere. + +2. If a party office subordinate to the district administration +requests the presentation, the same has to be denied in as far as no +important interests of the State Police seem to warrant a presentation. + + Signed: HEYDRICH + +Verified: Schoenbrunn of the Chancellery + + # # # # # + + Berlin SW 11 4 November 1940 + + The Chief of the Security Police and SD + IB 1 NR 763/40-151 + + To All State Police Departments + + By way of information to the Inspectors of the Security Police and SD + + Subject: Presentation to State Police upon request of Party Offices + + Reference: Decree of 29 March 1940 IA 1 NR 102/40-176 + +In supplement to my decree of 29 March 1940 I order that presentation +requests by Reichsleiters be granted in so far as important interests +of the State Police do not interfere. + + Signed: HEYDRICH + + # # # # # + + _Protective Custody_ + +Protective custody must be viewed as the strongest measure in order to +impressively instruct the Volksgenossen, who maliciously neglect their +duties toward the community or endanger the security of the State, +that they have to conform themselves to the universal interests and to +adapt themselves to State discipline. Therefore it should only serve as +a means of combatting real enemies of the Reich, but should never be +used for the clarification or punishment of different or insignificant +offenses. + +An excessive use of protective custody, as well as its infliction +without previous indisputable clarification of the state of affairs and +the question of guilt, is neither justified with regard to the future +of the one involved nor with respect to the reduction of its moral +effect. + +Therefore it must be expected that protective custody is only to be +employed in really pressing and substantial cases. + +I request that the county leaders be instructed orally to avoid any +written communications; special emphasis on secrecy. + + + _Protective Custody_ (_Regulations_) + +Through the circular of the 25 January 1938, the Reich Minister of +the Interior has issued new regulations regarding the introduction of +protective custody. In the following, I announce the wording of this +decree for confidential information. + + # # # # # + + Berlin 25 Jan. 1938 + +The Reich Minister of the Interior + +The following regulations regarding protective custody go into effect +on the 1 February 1938. At the same time, the following are rescinded: + +a. My decree of 12 April 1934--I 3311 A/28.2 along with the supplement +of 26 April 1934 and 10 July 1934 (directed to governments of the +states and to the Reichstatthalters). + +b. My decree of 12 April 1935--VI B 757A/3014 along with the +supplementary decree of 1 June 1935 VI B 11568/3014 (directed to the +governments of the states, Reichstatthalter, Prussian presidents of +government districts). + +c. My decree of 17 June 1935--III P 3311/329 (directed to the state +government and the Reichstatthalter.) + +d. The decree of office of Secret State Police of 3 July 1934--B Nr. +19582 II I D (directed to the presidents of the Prussian government +districts). + +e. The decree of the Political Police Commander of the Lands of the 9 +Sept 1935--B. Nr. 37840/35 II I D (directed to the Political police of +the states and the Prussian State Police offices). + + + Article 1 Admissibility + +Protective custody can be decreed as a coercive measure of the +Secret State Police against persons who endanger the security of the +people and the state through their attitude, in order to counter all +aspirations of enemies of the people and state. + +Protective Custody shall not be decreed for penal purposes or as a +substitute for punitive arrest. Punishable offenses have to be decided +finally by the courts. + + + Article 2 Competence + +1. The Secret State Police exclusively is competent for the application +of protective custody. + +2. Motions in behalf of the application of protective custody have +to be directed to the Secret State police through the State police +offices. Every motion has to be substantiated in detail; the statements +of the arrested person have to be considered in it. A copy of the +hearing of the person temporarily apprehended has to be forwarded +immediately. + +3. Protective custody may only be inflicted if the accused has +previously had a hearing on offenses imputed to him. + + + Article 3 Temporary Arrest + +1. The Secret State police bureau, the offices of the State police +director and of the State Police are authorized under the provisions of +par. 1 to order the temporary arrest of persons: + +a. If it is feared that the freedom will be abused for activities +hostile to the state. + +b. If danger of under-cover activities exists. + +c. If there is suspicion of escape. + +2. The accused has to be notified at the latest within 24 hours after +the arrest. He is to be heard on the grounds for the infliction of the +temporary arrest according to protocol. + +3. A temporarily arrested person has to be released at the latest after +an elapse of 10 days from the day of apprehension if the Secret State +police bureau has in the meantime not decreed protective custody (5). + +* * * * * * * + + + Article 6 Execution + +The protective custody has to be executed generally in the State +Concentration Camps. + + + Article 7 Duration + +1. Protective custody shall only be upheld as long as it serves its +purpose. + +2. The Secret State police bureau authorizes release from protective +custody. For that reason the bureau investigates periodically but not +exceeding 3 months, whether the protective custody should be cancelled. +The release must have taken place, at the latest, on the third day +after the lifting of the protective custody. + + + Article 8 Foreigners + +As a matter of principle deportation procedure has to be carried out +against foreigners who have been taken into protective custody unless +particular reasons interfere. + + + Article 9 Executory Regulations + +The Chief of the Security Police issues the necessary regulations for +the execution. + + + PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1724-PS + + Press conference on August 4, 1938 headed by Regional Leader + [Gauamtsleiter] Schoeller + + Duration: 1 hour + + [Page 1, par. 4] + +The breaking up of the synagogue (information must still be secret). + +On August 10, 1938 at 10 o’clock A. M. the breakup of the synagogues +will commence. Gauleiter Julius Streicher will personally set the crane +into motion with which the Jewish symbols (Star of David etc.) will be +torn down. This should be arranged in a big way. Closer details are +still unknown. + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1725-PS + + 1935 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 502 + +Ordinance on Enforcement of the Law for Securing the Unity of Party and + State of 29 March 1935 + +By virtue of the law for securing the unity of Party and State of 1 +December 1933 (RGBl I, 1016) I order: + + + ARTICLE 1 + +1. The NSDAP and the Hitler Youth Movement, Inc. are to be expunged +in the corporation register. The property of these corporations has +without liquidation become the property of the NSDAP as a corporation +of public law. + +2. The land deeds and other public records are to be corrected free of +charge on request. + +3. Until the decree of the statute of the NSDAP (Article 1, Section +2 of the Law for Securing the Unity of Party and State of 1 December +1933), the previous statute of the National Socialist German Workers’ +Corporation, Inc., is applicable in this sense to the NSDAP as a +corporation of public law. + + + ARTICLE 2 + +The SA, + +The SS, + +The National Socialist Driver Corps [Kraftfahrkorps], + +The Hitler Youth (including the Jungfolk, the League of German Girls +and Jungmaedel), + +The National Socialist German Student League, + +The National Socialist German Women’s Auxiliary [Frauenschaft], are +components of the party. + + + ARTICLE 3 + +The National Socialist League of German Physicians, Inc., + +The League of National Socialist German Jurists, Inc., + +The National Socialist Teachers’ League, Inc., + +The National Socialist People’s Welfare, Inc., + +The National Socialist War Veterans’ Administration, Inc., + +The Reich League of German Officials, Inc., + +The National Socialist League of German Technologists, + +The German Labor Front (including the National Socialist foundation +“Kraft durch Freude”), + +are the organizations affiliated to the NSDAP. + + + ARTICLE 4 + +1. The components of the NSDAP possess no legal character of their own +and no property of their own. + +2. The NSDAP forms with its components as a corporation of public +law, a unit for the domain of the entire organization, with reference +to property rights. Therefore the entire corporation is exclusively +obligated and justified as to property rights. + +3. The Reich Treasurer of the NSDAP is the Plenipotentiary of the +Fuehrer in all legal matters relating to property of the NSDAP. The +Plenipotentiary rights include the right to assign sub-powers of +attorney generally or for individual matters. + + + ARTICLE 5 + +1. The affiliated organizations can possess their own legal character. + +2. The affiliated organizations are subject to the financial +supervision of the Reich Treasurer of the NSDAP. + +3. The other legally determined supervisory rights are not touched by +the financial supervision of the Reich Treasurer of the NSDAP. + + + ARTICLE 6 + +All authorities have to assist the Reich Treasurer of the NSDAP and his +agent in the fulfillment of his duties and to conform with the requests +of the Reich Treasurer of the NSDAP, which go to them on the basis of +this order. + + + ARTICLE 7 + +1. The first enforcement order of 23 March 1934 (Voelkischer +Beobachter, Munich edition No. 86 of 27 March 1934 and Berlin edition +No. 87 of 28 March 1934) on the law for securing unity of party and +state dated 1 December 1933 is abrogated. + +2. Likewise all previous orders and regulations contrary to the above +enforcement order on the law for securing unity of party and state of 1 +December 1933 are abrogated. + + + ARTICLE 8 + +1. The Deputy of the Fuehrer issues terms for enforcement and +supplementing Articles 2 and 3 of this order. The Reich Treasurer of +the NSDAP issues the remaining terms for execution of this order. + +2. This law takes effect on the day following its announcement. + +Berlin, 29 March 1935 + + The Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor + Adolf Hitler + + The Deputy of the Fuehrer + R. Hess + Reich Minister without Portfolio + + The Reich Minister of the Interior + Frick + + + COPY OF DOCUMENT 1726-PS + + STATEMENT OF THE NETHERLANDS GOVERNMENT IN VIEW OF THE PROSECUTION AND + PUNISHMENT OF THE GERMAN MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS + + Enclosure “h” entitled: _Central Bureau for Statistics_ + + THE DEPORTATION OF NETHERLANDS WORKMEN TO GERMANY [Pages 1-3]. + +The enlistment of working labourers took quite a different course. Many +big and reasonably large business concerns, especially in the metal +industry, were visited by German commissions who appointed workmen +for deportation. This combing out of the concerns was called the +“Sauckel-action”, so named after its leader, who was charged with the +appointment of foreign workmen in Germany. + +The employers had to cancel the contracts with the appointed workmen +temporarily, and the latter were forced to register at the labour +offices, which then took care of the deportation under supervision of +German “Fachberater”. + +Workmen who refused (relatively few) were prosecuted by the +“Sicherheitsdienst” (SD). If captured by this service, they were mostly +lodged for some time in one of the infamous prisoners camps in the +Netherlands and eventually put to work in Germany. + +In this prosecution the “Sicherheitsdienst” was supported by the German +Police Service, which was connected with the labour offices, and was +composed of members of the N.S.B. and the like. + +At the end of April 1942 the deportation of working labourers started +on a grand scale. Consequently in the months of May and June the number +of deportees amounted to not less than 22,000, resp. 24,000 of which +many were metal workers. + +After that the action slackened somewhat, but in October 1942 another +top was reached (2,600). After the big concerns, the smaller ones had, +in their turn, to give up their personnel. * * * + +This changed in November 1944. The Germans then started a ruthless +campaign for manpower, passing by the labour offices. Without warning, +they lined off whole quarters of the towns, seized people in the +streets or in the houses and deported them. + +In Rotterdam and Schiedam where these raids (razzia’s) took place on 10 +and 11 November, the amount of people thus deported was estimated at +50,000 and 5,000 respectively. + +In other places where the raids were held later, the numbers were much +lower, because one was forewarned by the events. The exact figures are +not known as they have never been published by the occupants. + +The people thus seized were put to work partly in the Netherlands, +partly in Germany. + +The events of the war then took such a turn that further deportations +did not take place. But still in the North and East of the country, +many men, up to 60 years, were seized and forced to build defence works +in the neighbourhood of their homes. + + + PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1741-PS + + PART 3 + + S BLN NR 51 7 AUG 8 AUG 0800-- + TO the Chairman of the German-French Economic Commission, + Ambassador HEMMEN, + Wiesbaden Hotel 4 Jahreszeiten. + + [Rubber Stamp] + + German Armistice Delegation for Economy + + Wiesbaden 8 AUGUST 1940 + NO. 30 Incl. 1. + + NO. 70-- + +Enclosed, I forward to you a copy of the draft of the note on +occupation costs, which corresponds to the decisions made in the +meeting of the H.P.A. on 31 July, and which in the meantime has the +consent of the Chief of the OKW. I request to forward the note now. + + By Order /S/ WIEHL. + + # # # # # + + NOTE: For the Chairman of French Delegation with the German Armistice + Commission General Huntziger + + My General: + +By order of my government, I have the honor to inform you of the +following: + +1 According to Article 18 of the German French Armistice Agreement of +22 June 1940, the costs for the maintenance of the German occupational +troops on French soil are to be borne by the French government. To +carry out this term, an early settlement is necessary. + +2 Considering the impossibility to calculate the costs accurately +at present, until further notice, daily installments of at least 20 +million marks are necessary. These installments may be paid in French +francs, Reichcredit checks [Reichskassen Scheinen] or other values, +to be agreed on. The conversion of French francs has been fixed on +a currency ratio at 1:30, subject to a later different settlement. +The billeting of the German occupation troops on French soil is not +included in the settlement of installments. The billet owners will be +compensated for the billeting costs by the French government outside of +the settlement of installments. + +3 The settlement is in force from the period beginning 25 June 1940. +The back payments are due with the settlement of installments. The +further amounts are to be paid every time for a period of ten days in +advance. + +4 Certificates of requisition for material in kind, issued by the +German occupation, exclusive of billeting, as far as they have been +issued after the coming into force of the settlement of installments, +will be registered as payment for the cost of the occupation by the +French government. However, the certificates of requisition, which were +issued by the German occupational troops before the coming into force +of the settlement of installments, are to be redeemed by the French +government without deducting it from the costs of occupation. I request +my General to confirm to me the receipt of this note, and to notify +me about the measures which the French government has made about the +execution of the above settlement. + +Permit me, My General, to express my utmost respect, + +* * * * * * * + + +PART 6 + + Wiesbaden No. 29 17.9.40 2010 Secret + Teletype + Foreign Berlin + Secret + + Del. No. 120. + +In your teletype No. 171 of 12 September, concerning occupation +expenses, it is stated in number 2 that it is the wish of the Reich +Finance Ministry to inform the French delegation explicitly “that +the installments did not constitute a settlement by a lump sum, but +that they would have to be adapted to the actual necessities arising +from the current war situation and the current requirements of the +occupation troops”. I hesitate considerably, to communicate this +request to the French delegation for the following two reasons: + +In my notes of 8 August 1940--Del. W. 280 of 15 August 1940--Del. W. +331--and of 20 August 1940--Del. W. 408, the idea of installments has +always been expressed clearly. The idea of a settlement by a lump +sum has never been discussed with the French. The French delegation +has therefore no reason, up to now, to assume that the installments +constituted a settlement by a lump sum. The instruction requested by +the Reich Finance Ministry would, on the contrary, only arouse the +idea of a settlement by a lump sum in the minds of the French, which I +consider as disastrous. + +General von Stuelpnagel informed me more officially, that numerous +German Divisions have been transferred to the East from France. This +fact cannot remain unknown to the French permanently. He draw my +attention to that fact because he thought that this decrease of the +armed forces in France would certainly influence the amount of the +occupation expenses. + +The transmission of the communication to the French delegation at +present in the wording “as necessitated by the current war situation +and the current requirements of the occupation troops” as desired by +the Reich Finance Ministry, contains the further danger, that the +French delegation would claim a reduction of the installments because +of the decrease in the number of troops. + +I ask you for your decision. + + Signed: HEMMEN + + 2015 NR 29 Received BO AUSW AMT (Foreign Office) Berlin. + + # # # # # + + PART 7 + + Wiesbaden 23 October 1940 + +Armistice Commission for Economic Affairs + +The President of the French Delegation for Economic Affairs French +Delegation + + To Monsieur Hemmen + Minister Plenipotentiary + President of the German Armistice + Delegation for Economic Affairs. + + No. 6318/DE + [Rubber Stamp] + German Armistice Delegation for Economic Affairs Wiesbaden + 24 October 1940 + No. 1532 + Enclosures + + Sir: + +By order of my government I have the honor to communicate the following +to you: + +In a note dated the 12th of October, the German government answered +a note of the 26th of August in which the French government had made +a formal protest against the payments demanded from her to cover +the expenses of the German occupation troops in France. The German +government refuses all discussion, both on the distinction between +“occupation troops” and “operational troops”, and on the rate of +exchange between Reichsmarks and francs. + +It further refuses or denies the French government the right to watch +and receive information about the way in which the sums paid for the +costs of occupation are used, as well as about the requisitioning of +lodgings and economic requisitions. + +The French government profoundly regrets this reply. It considers, in +fact, that events have fully justified the position it took up. + +After having recalled once more the essential distinction which it +makes between “occupation troops” and “operational troops”, the +French government pointed out to the government of the Reich the two +considerations which, in its opinion, make a fresh examination of the +problem necessary. + +1. Facts have shown that the rate of exchange fixed for the conversion +of the Reichsmark into francs was too high. This rate of exchange +did not take into account the respective levels of prices in France +and Germany at the time when it was fixed. It anticipated a very +considerable rise in French prices, which the German authorities +considered inevitable. Actually this rise did not take place and the +buying power of the franc remains much higher, than that implied by the +maintenance of the present parity. + +The French government is all the more surprised at its protest against +the rate of exchange between francs and Reichsmarks not having had any +results, as it had itself suggested, in case the rate were modified, a +formula allowing the pay and allowances received by the German troops +for their expenses in France to remain at the figures at present paid +in francs. + +An immediate consequence of the rate of exchange of 20 francs to the +mark is that the sum demanded on account, for the maintenance of the +occupation troops, which is reckoned in Reichsmarks, is out of all +proportion to the real expenses of these troops. As a matter of fact, +the credit balance of the account opened by the Bank of France for +the German military administration is enough to cover the costs of +occupation for a long time to come. + +2. It is obvious that the payments demanded by the government of the +Reich should be reduced in proportion to the number of German troops in +France. But it is clear that this number has diminished considerably +since the daily payment was fixed. + +The French government is all the more justified in arguing from the +above facts, as it is faced by an extremely serious economic problem, +owing to a lack of raw materials and insufficient means of transport, +which have led to considerable unemployment. The result is that, if the +level of the costs of occupation fixed in August is persisted in, the +burden will become more and more difficult to bear as time goes on. + +The French government therefore has to make a formal request for +a revision of the present daily payment. This reduction is amply +justified, both by the real needs of the occupation troops and by +France’s economic capacity. If it does not take place soon, the French +government will inevitably be unable to continue its payments. + +The French government, anxious to carry out the Armistice Convention +which it signed, wanted to give the government of the Reich this loyal +explanation of the position it is forced to take up. It appeals to the +feeling of great comprehension of the German government and hopes that +this sincere explanation will induce the latter to grant the revision +requested in this note. + + I am, sir, + + /S/ Yves de Boisanger. + + [Rubber Stamp] + THE PRESIDENT + French Armistice Delegation + For Economic Affairs. + + # # # # # + + PART 8 + + French Delegation for Economic Affairs + + Wiesbaden, 18 March 1941 + [Rubber Stamp] + German Armistice Delegation for Economic Affairs + 18 March 1941 + No. 5409 + Enclosures. + + No. 15447/DE + + The President of the French Delegation for Economic Affairs, to + Monsieur Hemmen Minister Plenipotentiary + + President of the German Armistice Delegation for Economic Affairs. + +Sir: + +I have the honor to communicate the following to you on the orders of +my government: + +Since the fixation of the daily indemnity by Germany, the French +government has paid over 108 million as occupation costs. + +The burden of this payment, aggravated as it is to this degree, can no +longer be borne by the economy of this country without serious danger. +There is a risk of its causing a disorganization of its social and +political structure from which German interests would be the first to +suffer. + +The representatives of the German government have several times +manifested their intention of dealing considerately with France’s +domestic order and her attempts at recovery. + +It is the purpose of safeguarding the economic forces necessary for +Franco-German collaboration that the government has the honor of +setting forth the motives and objects of its request for the revision +of the indemnity. + + + I. MOTIVES + + 1. _Monetary_ + +The total of the sums paid by France is so great that financing has to +be covered by repeated appeals to the Bank of France. + +As a result, the monetary circulation is increasing at an exceptionally +dangerous rate. + +In January 1939 it did not exceed 110 milliards. In January 1941 it +had already been doubled. At the present rate it will soon reach three +times its pre-war volume. + + + 2. _Economic_ + +This enormous mass of buying power weighs down an impoverished country, +whose reserves have been exhausted by war and whose production is +cramped by the lines of demarcation. It can not be reabsorbed by taxes, +since budgetary recoveries, which already represent a very heavy +burden on the taxpayer, do not exceed 60 milliard francs. It can not +be absorbed by loans, since subscriptions to treasury bonds only just +cover the expenses of the French state. + +The mass of currency thus exercises considerable pressure on prices, so +that it is difficult to prevent them rising. + + + 3. _Psychological_ + +This is particularly the case owing to the fact that, all holders of +francs are showing an increasing propensity to fly from money. The +rise in the rate of interest on shares, hoarding by merchants and +individuals and rise in real estate prices reveal the progressive +depreciation of the national currency. + +The fall of the franc was considerably accelerated when, the +State’s Fourth Convention with the Bank of France (20 January 1941) +became known. It is to be feared that the publication of the Fifth +Convention, dated the 20th of February, will be still more disastrous, +unless it is accompanied by the announcement of a revision of the +indemnity. + + + II. OBJECTS + + + 1. _Reduction of the indemnity_ + +The indemnity was fixed at 400 million francs per diem, as the result +of a decision by the German Armistice Commission for Economic Affairs +on the 8th of August 1940, to meet the expenses of the occupation +troops. + +But these troops have decreased in number since the armistice, and +one must reintroduce the distinction between operational troops and +occupation troops, the latter being the only ones who were to be +supported by France, according to the Armistice Convention. + +Furthermore, the debits actually entered on the account of the Reich +Credit Bank [Reichskreditkasse] with the Bank of France have been used +to cover other needs than that of supporting German troops. + +Finally, in spite of these non-military uses to which the indemnity +has been put, German expenses have not absorbed the credits which were +opened. + +Thus it came about, that on the 12th of March 1941 the payments made by +France amounted to 108 milliards, while the Germans had only drawn up +to half this figure. + +It would therefore only be fair, to reduce the daily payment of 400 +millions by a very considerable fraction. + + + 2. _Incorporation of all French obligations into the indemnity_ + +The present indemnity does not include all the obligations which France +has to meet. + +The French State meets the expenses of lodging and billeting separately. + +The fiscal exonerations which Germany recently decided her purchases +in France should enjoy, deprived the French Treasury of a considerable +income. + +It would only be fair that the new payment should cover all the +obligations falling on France as a result of the occupation. + + + 3. _Reduction of the rate of exchange of the mark_ + +The rate adopted for the mark, as a result of the decision of the 8th +August, is 20 francs to the Reichsmark, whereas the official parity +between the two currencies is 17 francs, and real parity, based on a +comparison of their buying power, is still lower than this figure. + +This over-valuation of German currency does not have as its only effect +a considerable aggravation of the burden of tribute. It also exerts an +upward pressure on French prices which tend to adjust themselves to +German prices, on the basis of the excessive rate of exchange of the +mark. + +The parity between the two currencies should therefore be brought back +to a level which stands in a closer relationship to economic realities. + + + 4. _Alteration of the method of payment_ + +The habit of making payments in currency in settlement of the +requisitions supplied to the occupation authorities is the principal +cause of the exaggerated monetary circulation. + +It is therefore essential that the needs of the German occupation +troops be met, in principle, only by requisitions in kind; + +that the methods used in the Rhineland from 1919 onwards be taken as an +example and the French authorities be made responsible for obtaining +these requisitions and debiting the occupation account with the value +of the products and services provided in France; + +that payments in currency be limited to a few purchases direct from +commerce and industry made by soldiers of the German army out of their +pay; + +that payment for purchases in Germany for the maintenance of the +occupation troops in France be met by the Reichsmarks which the French +Compensation Office holds in Berlin. The cost of these supplies would +be debited to the account opened to follow the use of the daily +indemnity. + +The French government strongly hopes, that the reasons for her +preoccupations will be understood. It urgently requests, that talks +be begun rapidly, so that the indemnity can be readjusted before +the currency has lost its value completely. It counts on the German +government agreeing to no new payments being made, until the necessary +negotiations have been completed, as the needs of the occupation troops +are covered for many months by the money at present credited to them in +the Bank of France. + + I am, Sir, etc. + /S/ Yves de Boisanger. + + [rubber stamp] + The President + French Armistice Delegation + for Economic Affairs. + +* * * * * * * + + + PART 20 + + Paris 11 Sep 1941 + + C 3 + Del. W. No. 9659 P + + 1. _Foreign BERLIN_ + Del W. No. 443 of 11 Sep 1941 + + _Teletype Secret_ + +After extensive examination of the situation, I would like to suggest +urgently, in reference to our dilatory treatment of the occupation +costs, ordered by the telegram from there of 2 Aug 1941--No. +3863--and strictly complied with up to now, to make a new appeal to +the Reichsminister for Foreign Affairs, to authorize me to sign the +agreement over the reorganization reached with the French delegation, +according to my telegram of 22 July 1941, Del. W. No. 372, and to put +it into force. + +In fact, it absolutely complies with Ambassador Abetz’s opinion, +forwarded there in his telegram of 15 Aug 1941, paragraph 1, that our +consent for a fundamental readiness to decrease the occupation costs +has been given to Admiral Darlan on 7 May 1941 for the concessions, +granted us in Syria. As it is reported to me, General Huntziger +has represented the opinion to De Boisanger, that there may be a +misapprehension or incomplete notification of German agencies, if now +the settlement of the occupation costs are brought up in connection +with the North African questions. + +I further point out, that the present arbitrary de facto settlement +of the payment of 15 instead of 20 million RM daily, already extends +over 4 months, and that this represents for France the practically most +favorable situation, and probably pleases more than the new regulation +for 10 million RM credit plus 3 million RM transfer daily. It is +still more important, that with a further delay of the settlement of +occupation cost, a series of important questions, which are regulated +with the reorganization simultaneously, remain further unsolved _at the +same time_, and disadvantages for us come about from this: + +1. The purchase of further French interests abroad is obligatory +in most cases because of war-economical reasons. However, the +reorganization, agreed to, cannot be taken up for that, as long as a +total solution is still uncompleted. The Reichsministry for Economy +reports that the negotiations are practically at a standstill at +present for this reason. Therefore, the disadvantage lies with us alone +in these subjects, while 60 million RM for the purchase of interests +with the coming into force of the reorganization. + +2. The execution of armament deliveries from France always presents +to our armed forces authorities difficulties, which result from the +payment. An immediate coming into force of the transfer of goods would +directly result in favor of our war potential. + +3. I can secure the final appointment of the German foreign trade +commissioner at the same time, for which especially the Four Years’ +Plan and the military commander show a lively interest. + +But the stoppage also has a disadvantageous effect on the other work +of the delegation. I am forced to approach the French government +every week with new demands, mostly war-economically important, among +them the construction of a German-French clay factory in France for +deliveries of additional 100,000 tons of clay per year, the renting of +several thousand trucks with French drivers, and the purchase of 15,000 +French trucks, converted to wood gas for transports to Russia. + +Everywhere the energetic cooperation of the French government and in +part serious pressure by the government on its own economic circles +are necessary for the execution of these problems. Because of the +well-known tendency of the French government to hide themselves in +case of such economic desires behind the general political situation, +my efforts now ran against continually increasing difficulties. It +is therefore desired to reinstitute the previous status as soon as +possible, and to keep the field of endeavor of my delegation free and +independent of the prevailing political constellations, as much as +possible. + +For these reasons, I recommend, that the present uncertain situation +of the occupation cost question, which can only have a disadvantageous +effect on us ourselves, be ended soon, and that the new settlement be +ordered by us now. + +[In ink] Ambassador Abetz has been informed of this telegram before it +was forwarded. + + /s/ Hemmen + +1735 No. 23 one received foreign office KR + +* * * * * * * + + + PART 22 + + FOREIGN OFFICE Ambassador Ritter C.3 + + “Westfalen”, 14 October 1941 + [STAMP] German Armistice Commission + Wiesbaden 18 October 1941 + Nr. 10628 + +Dear Mr. Hemmen, + +I have received your letter of 29 September 1941--Del. W. No. 10093 P. + +The Reich Foreign Minister does not consider it appropriate to approach +the Fuehrer with the regulation of the occupation expenses at the +present. + + With friendly greetings + + Heil Hitler + Yours + signed: Nitter + +To The Ambassador Hemmen German Embassy Paris + + # # # # # + + PART 23 + + Paris, 4th November 1941 + Place du Palais-Royal + + French Delegation to the German Armistice Delegation for Economic + Affairs + +German Armistice Delegation f. Economic Affairs + + Wiesbaden 5 November 1941 No. 11116 Enclosures + +The President of the French Delegation for Economic Affairs, + + To Monsieur Hemmen Minister Plenipotentiary President of the German + Armistice Delegation for Economic Affairs + +Sir, + +In execution of the decisions taken by the German government with +regard to the payment of the costs of occupation, the French government +has, since August 1940 made periodic payments which, on the 31st +October 1941, totalled 183,200,000 francs. It was also obliged +to defray certain expenses (particularly the lodging of troops) +directly--expenses which amounted at this same time, to nearly 8 +milliards and to cover the deficit in the Franco-German clearing +account, which is, at the moment, in the neighborhood of 11 milliard +francs. + +The French government protested several times against the size of this +imposition, drawing the attention of the German Government to the grave +dangers it entails, both from the financial and from the economic point +of view. + +Its fears on this point are unfortunately being shown to be better +founded every day. + +The expenses resulting to the French Treasury from the occupation alone +are as high as the expenses of the State itself. The sums paid towards +the costs of occupation are also often used to a large extent to defray +expenses which have nothing to do with the maintenance of troops. + +It is clear that such burdens are disappropriate to the present +resources of France and that they can be covered only by treasury +expedients. + +The national revenue is diminishing continually. If the efforts made in +the field of agriculture result in an increase in the productivity of +the soil, industrial activity slows down. An increase in taxation would +produce a hardly noticeable result, and one must, on the contrary, +expect the product of these taxes to diminish more or less rapidly. One +is therefore forced to borrow at short call, either from the Bank of +France or from individuals and credit establishments, up to 70% of the +needs. In this way the public debt and the advances from the fiduciary +swell at an alarming speed, whatever the effects may be of the measures +taken to manipulate certain elements of this debt and to make it less +onerous (conversion, consolidation, reduction of rates of interest). + +The mass of means of payment created to deal with the expenses +resulting from the occupation, seriously imperils economic equilibrium. +Inflation takes place in spite of the efforts of the government to +limit its volume and its consequences. + +The prices of foodstuffs of daily use and of industrial products are +maintained by rationing and taxation, but nevertheless tend more and +more irresistibly to rise, and each day it is harder to prevent too +rapid a rise in the cost of goods and property. + +The increasing abundance of money available is shown both by the +increased circulation of bank notes and by the increase in stocks held +in private and public institutions. + +The monetary circulation, which was about 160 milliard francs in June +1940, has today reached the figure of 250 milliards, in other words, +it has increased by over 56%. During the same period bank deposits +increased by about 50%. + +The smallness of the quantity of goods offered is at the same +time accentuated by supply difficulties and by the extent of the +requisitions carried out in the occupied zone. + +This development is leading to a catastrophy like that suffered by +Germany 20 years ago. + +When the French government signed the Armistice, it firmly intended +reestablishing the economic situation. All its efforts since then have +aimed particularly at keeping the monetary situation under control, in +spite of difficulties of all kinds and, particularly, in spite of the +enormous costs of occupation. + +The French government is resolved to persevere in this path, but it +cannot do so usefully if the payments imposed by the German government +continue to render all its efforts useless in advance. It wants to warn +it once more. + + I am, Sir, etc. + + sgd. Yves de Boisanger. + +[rubber stamp] The President French Armistice Delegation for Economic +Affairs + +* * * * * * * + + + PART 27 + + _Telegram (Secret Ch V)_ + + Berlin, 19 February 1942, 1343 o’clock + + Wako Paris + Nr. 50 of 19 Feb. Citissime. + Matter to be kept under lock C + + Att: Mr. Hemmen + + German Armistice Delegation for Economics + + Wiesbaden 20 February 1942 No. 1309 Enclosures + [Initials] + +In answer to report of 3 and 11 February No. 736 and No. 189 of 16 +February and telegram of the 18th No. 43. + +1. Reich Foreign Minister has ordered on 16 February that you orally +transmit to the Governor de Boisanger that the German Government +considers the letter of Finance Minister Bouthillier to the Reich +Minister of Finances only as a personal statement, not as an official +communication of the French Government. In case the French government +wishes to make a statement concerning the question of occupation costs +this should be directed by the authorized French chief of negotiations +to the authorized German chief of negotiations. In connection with this +communication you are to warn Mr. de Boisanger regarding the end of Mr. +Bouthillier’s letter emphatically against an arbitrary discontinuation +of the payments for occupation costs by the French Government and to +point out to him that such a discontinuation would create a serious +situation and result in corresponding German counter measures. + +2. The Reich Minister of Finance has on 17 February declared that he +approves these steps and that he is not going to answer the letter. +However, he has suggested an internal discussion of the question of +occupation costs to which the Reich Foreign Minister also agreed +regarding the report of the OKW on the actual daily expenditures. +The discussion will take place soon in agreement with the competent +department and your reports mentioned in the beginning will also be +discussed. + +3. Reich Foreign Minister, by the way, has issued for all your +negotiations the general directive, considered at an earlier date, +that you are to break off negotiations and depart for Berlin in case +the French assume an attitude which is not becoming to them as the +conquered ones. + + Wiehl. + +* * * * * * * + + + PART 29 + + French delegation to the German armistice delegation for economic + affairs + +Ref.: P 276/DE + + Paris, 4 March 1942 + Place du Palais-Royal + + From: The president of the French delegation to the German armistice + delegation for economic affairs. + + To: Monsieur Hemmen, Minister Plenipotentiary, president of the + German armistice delegation for economic affairs. + +Sir, + +I have the honour to inform you of the following by order of my +government. + +Ever since August 1940 the French government has continuously drawn the +attention of the German Government to the extremely grave consequence +which must necessarily accrue to French economics and finance from +payments towards the costs of the occupation. + +The French delegation to the German armistice delegation for economic +affairs has time and again made personal and written representations on +this point; the question has also been taken up regularly by members of +the French government and their representatives every time they had a +chance to discuss Franco-German problems with the German authorities; +lastly, the French finance minister considered it his duty, in view of +the seriousness of the situation, to make a direct appeal to the German +finance minister. + +The French government declared, as soon as it was informed of the +German Government’s demands, that it only agreed under duress to make +payments out of proportion to the obligations accruing to it out of +the armistice agreement; it has protested against the German refusal +to differentiate between occupation and operational troops and against +the rate of exchange imposed between the franc and the mark, which +enabled the German army, by reason of the very low level of French +prices, to effect enormous requisitions in the occupied territory. +Finally, it has proved again and again that the daily payments of 20 +million Reichsmarks exceeded the total requirements of occupation and +operational troops, since the sums placed at the disposal of the German +authorities were never sent in their entirety, although they were even +used otherwise than for the expenses of the German army in France +(purchases of goods by the Reich, purchases of stocks and shares, etc.). + +These representations remained without effect, and those protests +were never accepted. Only one series of discussions was opened in May +1941; it continued for over three months and had no other result than +the reduction of the daily payments to 15 million Reichsmark and an +admission by the German government that this amount could very well be +reduced a lot more. Even these concessions were made dependent by the +Germans on extremely heavy compensations in the form of transfers which +the French Government only accepted for a limited period and in order +to facilitate an agreement. + +More than seven months have gone by and this question is still +outstanding. It is now impossible to put off a decision any longer, +since the effects on French economics and finance of the payments +exacted under occupation costs are now fully visible. + +On February 28th, in other words after 20 months of occupation France +will have paid 219,200,000,000 francs and another 9,000,000,000 odd +under the heading of military accommodation costs. Payments for the +year 1942 based on present facts and exclusive of accommodation costs +will reach 110,000,000,000, which is considerably more than the total +fiscal receipts of the French state. + + # # # # # + + PART 30 + + Dir. Ha Pol Nr. Buero RAM with the request for further transmission. + + Berlin, 10 March 1942 + + Notes Concerning occupational cost regulation + +With the approval of the Reich minister for Foreign Affairs all the +departments took up again the question concerning the occupational +costs. + +According to the opinion of all the ministries expressed unanimously, +negotiations with France concerning the occupational costs have become +necessary, because a suspension or diminution of the payments on the +part of the French was to be feared on one hand (Bouthillier-letter) +and because the OKW on the other hand protested again with +determination against the, in July 1941, proposed reduction of the +installments to 10 million RM’s per day because of its current needs in +France. + +After careful deliberation of the question, all departments, the Armed +Forces included, took the point of view that the reduction to 10 +billion RM’s should not be conceded to the French as a final settlement +on the occasion of new negotiations, but that they should be granted a +breathing spell of about 6 months, from 1 April 1942--1 October 1942, +which should exclude any further discussion of that question until that +date. This is insofar of tactical importance as in that manner the old +amount of the installments of 15 to 20 million RM’s is being maintained +and thereby the important concession of a reduction to 10 million RM as +a political concession is left open. + +It has been agreed upon, that: + +1. A current transfer from the existing credit amounting to 2 million +RM per day in merchandize and 1 million RM in securities (stocks) and +participation must be insisted upon for the meeting of the so-called +external occupation costs. + +2. The French Government should see to it that the expenditures for the +occupational costs figure in the budget in a lawful manner. + +3. A general regulation of the absolutely necessary tax-, wage- and +price-reform and other measures for the prevention of the danger of an +inflation must be demanded simultaneously. + +The decision proved indisputably that we had no real efficacious +counter-measures at our disposal in the case of an arbitrary suspension +or diminution of the occupational costs by France. To make ourselves +paid by sequestering the bank-note reserve of the Bank of France or +by sequestering French State- or private property would only be of +temporary efficacy, not to mention the political effect of such a +measure of force. This would direct itself very soon against the proper +German interest, because the present efficacious French cooperation in +the execution of great armament orders and the distribution of orders +would suffer strongly by it. + +Considering these viewpoints, I ask for the authority to instruct +the German Armistice delegation for economy in Paris to conduct the +negotiations with the French delegation in that sense. + + Hereby submitted to the Foreign Minister of the Reich + through the State secretary. + + signed: Wiehl + +* * * * * * * + + + PART 32 + +Draft/KA + + Final Copy + + SR/17 Oct 1942 + Paris, 16 October 1942 + Del. W. No. 347 secret RS + +1) To the Foreign office Berlin + +(in ink) written in eight copies 3 copies of which to Berlin: + + 1 FRH v. Mahs + 1 Int Ley (2) + 1 Ambassador-Paris + 1 Capt. Brandt + 1 Qva + + To the decree of 18 September this year--Ha Pol Frie 839/secret and + in connection with the report of 24 August this year--Del. + +W. No. 307 secret RS + +_Subject_: Occupation costs in France + + 2 information copies + +I. In addition to the suggestions of the German armistice delegation +for economy in its above-mentioned report and for the preparation of +the execution of the decision of the HPA of the 7 September 1942 in the +question of occupation costs, the following suggestions are made: + +If one starts out, that because of political and financial reasons +the French government does not find itself ready for the continuous +advance of the occupation cost account above the daily installment of +15 million RM for the purpose of retention of a minimum amount of the +account, because it will mean an increase of the cost of occupation, +then it will depend during the coming negotiation with the French +government upon getting its agreement to the suggestion of the German +armistice delegation for economy, to settle the expenditures, unrelated +to the occupation, which have been paid thus (or from occupation cost +funds, via the clearing, to retain the occupation cost funds for their +proper purpose). + +1. In connection with this suggestion, it must be attempted to solve +two questions: + +a. One single transfer of a larger amount via clearing to the +occupation cost to equalize at least partly the expenditures, unrelated +to occupation costs, already paid in the first half year of 1942 from +occupation cost funds; + +b. Continuous monthly transfer via clearing of funds from Germany, +which are necessary for the settlement of expenditures, unrelated to +occupation costs. + +At first it will depend upon making it clear to the French that we +are forced to make a difference between expenditures for occupational +purposes, and expenditures, unrelated to occupation costs. It is yet +to be considered in detail, which instances are to be mentioned to the +French as examples of expenditures, unrelated to the occupation costs. +Without doubt, these will include in the past the funds out of which +the compensations were paid for the requisitioned horses, and in the +future the expenditures for food and fodder deliveries consigned for +Germany. However, there are strong doubts about mentioning the black +market purchases here also. At the end, the only thing to do will +be to justify the distribution to the French by generally military +reasons, which cannot be described in detail. Of course, such a basis +for negotiations makes the accomplishment of the new German demands for +the transfer via clearing of the continuously necessary funds of 150 +million RM monthly more difficult, because the French will recognize +that therewith additional purchases of goods outside the contingencies +agreed to are to be paid. + +Since the costs of the occupation have increased greatly especially +since the beginning of the year, there is a definite reason to demand +from the French that they also agree for the past to the settlement of +at least a part of the expenditures, unrelated to occupation costs, +in such a form that an amount as big as possible, is paid in via +clearing and transferred by France to the occupation cost account. In +that manner, it could be accomplished that the occupation cost account +will again be replenished by this amount. In the first half year of +1942, 280 million RM have been spent for the purchase of horses, and +600 million RM for the purchase of the Raw Material Trading Co. Ltd. +(Roges). Of course, it will not be possible to get from France the +consent for the transfer of an amount of that size. + +In case of the one single payment as well as in case of the future +continuous monthly payments for expenditures, unrelated to the +occupation costs, the French authorities will neither be informed about +the distribution of the accounts, the latter of which are to be paid as +lump sum payments at the end of each month, nor about the purpose. + +It is a prerequisite for the settlement, that the procurement of funds +in Reichsmarks is secured in the past as well as in the future. + +* * * * * * * + +3. This type of settlement of the question of occupation costs secures +the procurement of French funds in a simple practical form, and fits +into the frame of the German-French financial transaction. Naturally, +it amounts to a further considerable financial burden on French +economy; but it does not appear in the form of an increase of the +occupation costs. + +The idea to balance this internal account at the final settlement of +the occupations at the conclusion of the peace can be combined at the +same time with the special internal bookkeeping of these expenditures, +unrelated to the occupation costs, separate from other clearing +transfers. + +II. The fact that in the meeting of the HPA it was not finally given +up to increase the amount of francs of the installments by change of +the exchange rate, causes the German armistice delegation once more +conclusively to take a standpoint to this question. + +* * * * * * * + +However, a new evaluation of the Franc by 50% does not lie in the +German interest. The present economical situation of France can no +longer be compared with the one of 1940, where the interior purchasing +power of the Franc was about in the ratio of 1 RM=10 Francs. + +* * * * * * * + +The account has dropped since 1 July 1942 until 15 October 1942 from +2,476 billion RM to 1,532 RM. + +* * * * * * * + + /s/ Hemmen + + # # # # # + + PART 33 + + Received: 28 October 1942 at 9:40 o’clock from: A. A. Bln by: Buehler + +Initials + + Incoming stamp: + German Armistice Delegation for Economics + Wiesbaden 28 October 1942 no. 353 g. Rs. Enclosures + +From Foreign Office, Berlin + +To German Armistice-Delegation for Economics + + Paris + + Citissime! + +Telegram (secret code) No. 307 of 27 October. + +Matter to be kept under lock C. + +1. For your information: Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs has +ordered, as there might arise political objections against increased +demands from France, more exact explanation how in detail the increase +of daily expenditures for occupation has been brought about, in +particular, who is responsible for the fact that from the account of +occupation costs demands have been satisfied which do not represent +actual occupation costs. OKW, Department of Wehrmacht Budget and +Administration, declare themselves not to be in a position to explain +more fully the use of occupation cost amounts and expenditures +unrelated to occupation costs. + +II. Therefore I ask you to contact the bookkeeper of occupation cost +account, get the necessary documents and vouchers and wire back. +What matters is to get a survey of amount and purpose of the issue +of green checks to the various authorities entitled to make demands +[Bedarfstraeger] since the beginning of this year which should easily +appear from the books of the issuing office. Greatest speed is demanded +as these documents are needed for another submission to Reich Foreign +Minister. + + /s/ Wiehl + +decoded: Buehler + +Pencil notes: + +1. How large is the part administered by _v. Lenz_? How large is the +part administered by Berlin? Who gives to Roges. To whom else does +Berlin give allotments. + +2. How far does Lenz know for that purposes the amounts are used which +he allots to branches of the Wehrmacht, etc. + +3. What are green checks? + + # # # # # + + PART 34 + + OKW Berlin, 6 November 1942 + 2 f 32 Beih. 1A WV (XVI) + 3145/42 secret + + SECRET + +To the Foreign Office + +Subject: Occupation costs France + + Reference: a. Note of the DWFW Del. W. 347 g of 16 Oct 42 + b. Meeting of committee for trade policy of 22 Oct. 42 and + 30 Oct 42 + +The Chief Intendant with the military Commander in France has +reported that in the past deliveries have been made amounting to a +total of 90,000,000 RM monthly which could have been paid by way of +the German-French clearing system, because the procured goods were +exported from France. The following figures have been obtained from +the present monthly average of the year 1942 but they can only serve +as a conjecture because the elimination of those goods which were not +procured for the requirements of the units of the German Wehrmacht +stationed in France is very difficult on basis of the available +documents. The following items are involved: + + 1. Food supply and forage ca. 11 mill. RM + 2. Spirits, wine and champagne ” 4 ” ” + 3. Red wine for troops ” 0.6 ” ” + 4. Canteen goods of all kinds ” 1 ” ” + 5. Billeting utensils ” 16 ” ” + 6. Tools for vehicles ” 3 ” ” + 7. Procurements of ordnance staffs ” 0.4 ” ” + 8. Procurements of air force ” 23.5 ” ” + 9. Procurements of horses ” 15 ” ” + 10. Purchases by Wehrmacht procurement + office ” 4 ” ” + 11. Procurements by the departments + North and Pas de Calais ” 5.3 ” ” + 12. War risk premiums ” 2.5 ” ” + 13. Navy ” 5 ” ” + ----------------- + ca. 91 ” ” + +These procurements have been transacted at the prices resulting from +the general increase of prices in France. As the procurements were +made for service branches outside of France, payment by way of the +German-French clearing system is permissible as a matter of principle. +Funds of occupation costs have been claimed so far, because the +final customer of the goods in most cases is not known at the time +of procurement. The payment and final entry into the books of these +expenditures is the duty of the procurement office in France. + +The amount of 150 mill. RM provided so far for carrying out the flat +clearing process [Pauschalclearingverfahren] with France can be reached +only by including the purchases made by the Roges “Raw Material Trading +Company Ltd.” [Rohstoffhandelsgesellschaft m k H] on the black market. +Objections have been made hereto, because resale of the goods bought +on the black market [“S-Markt”] is practicable only with subsidies to +reduce the prices granted by the Reich Minister of Finances, and it +is irresponsible to incur a commercial debt in the amount of these +subsidies given by the Reich Minister of Finance, in order to procure +goods which bring a considerably lower price than that expended. +Payment of the procurements on the black market should be possible, +however, at least to the amounts _actually_ obtained by the Roges +through resale. The amount of 150 mill. RM would almost be reached +if the Roges were required to transfer by way of the German-French +clearing the proceeds obtained by resale of the goods with exception of +the Reich subsidies for price reduction. + +If this settlement should not be practicable carrying out of the flat +clearing process could be restricted to the amount of 90 mill. RM per +month. In this case, the French Government in accordance with the +suggestion of the Reich Minister of Finances of 27 October 1942 should +be obliged to provide in form of occupation costs the surplus amount +missing from the 150 mill. RM. + +The excess consumption of occupation cost funds in 1942, as already +thoroughly pointed out in the last meetings of the Committee for Trade +Policy, is primarily due to the decrease in purchasing power of the +franc, and it is to be assumed that this decrease compared with 1940 +is at least one third. In addition, payments to a considerable extent +had to be made from the occupation cost funds which were not allotted +to meet the demands of those units of the German Wehrmacht stationed +in France. On 15 January the B account of occupation costs was +approximately _3 bill. RM._ The reason for the decrease appears from +the following compilation: + + a for procurement of goods exported from + France during the period of 1 Jan.-31 Oct + 1942 an estimated 10 × 90 mill. RM 900 mill. RM + + b to Roges Raw Material Trading Company + Ltd. for purchases on black market 700 ” ” + + c for procurement of foreign bills by the Navy + (the purchase of foreign bills with French + francs was necessary to buy and repair merchant + ships in Spanish harbors. These merchant + ships are to serve for supplying Rommel’s + Panzer army in Africa) 40 ” ” + + d Reimbursement to Foreign Office (account + Syria) 4 ” ” + + e Allotments in favor of families of French + workers working in Germany 1.5 ” ” + + f Special commissioner Rumania 1.3 ” ” + + g Costs of building completions for directors + of French powder factories 0.2 ” ” + --------------- + 1647 ” ” + +Therefrom it appears that the decrease of reserves of occupation cost +funds amounting to 3000 mill. RM on 15 January 1942 is primarily +due to expenditures for purposes unrelated to the occupation. Also +in the above compilation are not included the bills issued by the +Reichskreditkasse imported into France. Of these probably a not +immaterial part has been imported by troop units transferred to +France, but to carry out procurement of goods destined for export +from France. Consequently, it may be assumed that the requirements +of the Wehrmacht units stationed in France up to now could have been +approximately satisfied from the installments of 450 mill. RM made +available every month by the French Government. It is further pointed +out that a considerable part of the above-listed expenditures unrelated +to occupation, in particular the expenditures for purchases on the +black market (S-Markt) and for French food deliveries not destined for +the occupation troops proper, have not been caused by the OKW. + + The Chief of the OKW + b. Dr. Kersten + Del. W. 7479 + + # # # # # + + PART 35 + + Received 4 December 1942 + at 16 - - o’clock + from AA Berlin + by Mk. + + [Rubber Stamp] + German Armistice Delegation for Economy + Wiesbaden 4 December 1942 + No. 399 top secret + + Telegram from Foreign Office, Berlin to German Armistice Delegation + for Economy Paris + +Citissime + +Telegram (Secret, coded, Verf) No. 352 of 4 Dec. + +Secret + +Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs has ordered the submission of a vote +with reasons, _whether_ the _French potential can bear_ the increase +of occupation cost payments, demanded by us. One must if possible gain +clarification before a decision, whether for instance as result of +black market purchasing actions, a development would be started, which +would lead to Greek conditions. + +Request _by return_ that _documents and standpoint, necessary_ for +vote, is wired, if _necessary_ in connection with _military commander_ +and _Embassy_. + + /s/ Wiehl. + +decoded: Buehler + + # # # # # + + PART 36 + + Dir. Ha Pol 379 Berlin, 8 December 1942 + + Note re French occupation costs + +Following the note dated 27 November--Dir. Ha Pol 371 + +According to instructions, I submit in the annex a note of delegate +Hemmen about the financial capacity of the French to pay the increased +expenditure rates of the occupation as well as about the dangers +threatening French finances arising from the payments of occupation +costs and about the methods to meet these dangers. Delegate Hemmen +comes to following conclusion. + +1. The increased payments of 25 million RM daily (yearly 182 billion +francs) are bearable and by no means dangerous for the French finances. +The yearly French national income amounted to 432 billion francs for +1942. The daily per capita war expenses are at present in Germany 2.90 +RM and thus 6 times as high as in France with 0.40 RM. + +2. The danger point for the French finances lies in the fact that +the French government has done nothing until now to counteract the +threatening inflation which is due to the war expenditures, so that +a price increase of 50-60 per cent and a devaluation of the franc of +about one third took place. + +3. Therefore it is necessary to raise simultaneously with the demand +for increased occupation costs the demand for effective French +financial, monetary and price regulations and to secure their strictest +execution under German guidance and control. + +This result on the whole corresponds to the decisions of the HPA +which were laid down in my former note. As suggested there, it can be +demanded from the French to increase the daily part-payments from 15 +to 25 million RM; however, as it has been also suggested there, it +is to be insisted that the measures which are needed against further +price increase should be carried out without delay and in an absolutely +effective way. The investigations which were conducted by the OKW and +by the Reich Ministry for Finance come to the same conclusion. + +In doing so, it is not sufficient to leave this to the French +government alone, but we ourselves have to intercede. The nomination of +a special commissioner with similar tasks as in Greece will at present +not be necessary and not even feasible in France, for the simple reason +that it would be unwise to entirely unburden the French government +of its own responsibilities to maintain the order of economics and +finances. But it seems necessary to persuade the French government to +accept a collaboration with one or more German advisors in order to +introduce and carry out the necessary measures. This function could +be assigned to the delegate Hemmen and to his delegation in such a +manner that the negotiations they have conducted until now would be +changed into a collaboration with the corresponding French governmental +agencies. The necessity for this could be presented to the French +government with the double motivation that, as an occupying power, our +interest is not only in that further inflation should be prevented +in France and that we can demand this in our capacity as receiver +of the occupation costs on the basis of the armistice contract, but +that we also have the same interests on account of the far-reaching +interweaving of the French and German industries which was achieved +through mutual free negotiations. + +Furthermore, the German side has to do its share that nothing should +happen in the further course which would enhance the inflationary +tendencies in France. I have agreed with State Secretary Koerner that +the Foreign Office and the Four Years’ Plan should most closely follow +further development in this respect and intervene as soon as necessary. +State Secretary Koerner has told me that the Reich Marshal announced +his decision to curb and, if necessary, to stop the black market action +if it should become apparent that it has undesirable consequences in +this respect. Also, further liaison will be maintained by the Foreign +Office with the OKW which has already taken provisions to reduce the +military expenditures to the absolutely necessary minimum in order to +observe permanently this point of view. + +In this way both on French as well as on German sides everything will +be done to prevent the possible dangers of the payment of increased +occupation costs. + +Herewith submitted via the State Secretary to the Reich Foreign +Minister with the request to approve the planned procedure. + + signed Wiehl + +Copies to: + + Buero Reich Foreign Ministry + St. S + U. St. S. Pol + Dir. Ha Pol + Dg. Ha Pol + Delegate Hemmen + Ha Pol Frie + Ha Pol II a + +* * * * * * * + + + PART 41 + + 12th February 1943 + +The Head of the Government + + [Rubber stamp] + German Armistice Delegation f. Economic Affairs + Wiesbaden, 13 January 1943 + No. Del. W. 165 + enclosures: + + To his Excellency, Monsieur Hemmen, Minister Plenipotentiary German + Armistice Delegation for Economic Affairs + +Sir, + +On the 15th December 1942 the German government asked me through you +to increase the payments towards the costs of occupation by 10 million +RM (200 million French francs), which would bring the daily total of +payments to 25 million RM, as against 15 millions, or 500 million +French francs as against 300 millions. + +During our conversation of the same day, the 15th December, at the +German Embassy, I pointed out to you: + +on one hand that these payments exceeded France’s ability to pay; +that they would oblige the French government to cover this increase +by advances from the Bank of France, and would in consequence risk +compromising the French currency irretrievably; + +on the other hand that the French payments exceeded the concept of +occupation costs and really constituted a French contribution to the +common defence of Europe; + +that, wishing to collaborate and to render effective aid to the German +war-effort under existing circumstances, I accepted these extra +payments. + +In formulating your request for an increase, you declared that close +cooperation should be instituted between our two countries, with the +purpose of seeking and applying common measures intended to ensure +the stability of the French currency and of French economy. You +mentioned, on this subject, that the German government would appoint +a plenipotentiary to the French government, whose mission would be to +advise the French government. + +I declared myself ready to cooperate closely in the financial field as +in all others, but I formally rejected the appointment of a financial +adviser, as this would undermine the authority of the French government +and risk ruining the confidence of investors. + +It is in fact necessary to point out that the daily payments which are +the object of your request of the 15th December for an increase, do not +represent the total of the financial burdens on my country. Besides +these payments, France bears the lodging and billeting expenses of the +German troops in the occupied zone, as well as the advances made for +the functioning of the Franco-German clearing agreement. + +I had also pointed out to you, in our conversation of the 15th +December, that a demand from the Italian Government could be expected. +Since then, although the Franco-Italian Armistice Convention does not +put part of the costs of maintenance of the Italian occupation troops +on France, the Italian government has requested advances. + +Finally, I consider that the daily payments should, from the day that +they are raised to 25 million RM, i.e., 500 million French francs, +include all obligations falling on France as a result both of the +occupation and of the Clearing agreement, and should take into account +any advances which may eventually be granted to the Italian government. + +It has not been possible to hold any conversations since December; I +consider that negotiations on these various points are essential and +should be pursued without delay. + +While waiting for these negotiations to end up the necessary agreement, +I inform you that I accept from now, under the conditions I have just +described, a provisional increase in the daily payments as from January +1943, to 25 million RM, i.e., 500 million French francs. + +The French government will immediately take steps to meet, on this +basis, the new payments which have been demanded from it, and +particularly to make up the difference in the payment made on the 11th +January 1943 at the old rate. + + I am, sir, etc. + + [signature illegible] + +* * * * * * * + + H. Hartlieb I propose a note 2/Nov + Received 2 November 1943 at 1630 o’clock from AA Berlin by Kn. + [Rubber Stamp] + German Armistice Delegation For Economy + Wiesbaden, 2 November 1943 + No. 4492 + Inclo. + +From S Berlin, Foreign Office No. 52 Nov 1617 Etat + +To Delegation Hemmen Paris + +No. 196=Secret Letter + + Reference: _written Decree HA POL FRIE 808 of 28 and 836 of 30 + October [penciled note: not yet received] and 838 of 2 November._ + +All departments concerned attach the _greatest importance_ to the +continued payment of the French occupation cost payment, previously +paid to Italy, because of the condition of the occupation cost and of +the increased demand, which has been caused by the occupation of the +Southern French area, which was up to now reserved for the Italian +armed forces. I therefore request, to demand from the French government +the transfer of all payments promised to Italy, to the Reich. If the +French government should raise any legal objections then I request to +point out without going into legal questions that the German Reich +has taken over the protection of the areas occupied by Italy up to +now. If necessary, certain concessions can be made, according to the +suggestion by the Four Years’ Plan, to which the Reich Minister of +Finance has also agreed, in the question of the additional payment of +2.8 billion Francs for the previous additional demands of the Italians +in the connection with war and occupation damages. The Reich Minister +of Finance requests to point out to the French government also that its +representatives themselves, during the negotiations of the delegate +of the Reich cabinet (Reichsregierung) for economic and Financial +questions, always have entered the Italian occupation costs as debit +items. Request report on the acceptance of your demarche. + + Dumont * * * + +No. 6 of 2 November 1943 1630 Rec’d Wako Paris Ka † † + +* * * * * * * + + + PART 44 + + Paris 23 June 1944 + +_Minister of Finance_ + +_Minister’s Office_ + + [rubber stamp] + German Armistice Delegation f. Economic Affairs. + Wiesbaden, 23 June 1944 + No. 2126 + Enclosures + + [rubber stamp] + Minister’s office + Ministry of National Economy + and Finance + +Sir, + +I have the honour to confirm the conclusions reached in our talk of the +21st June. + +The payments towards the costs of occupation, which have till now been +made every 10 days and in advance, will provisionally, to fit in with +present circumstances, be made monthly and in advance, on the 21st of +each month. + +On the 25th of June next a settlement will be made, which will cover +the monthly period from the 21st June to the 20th July, taking into +account the payment made on the 21st June. From the 21st July, monthly +payments will be made in advance at the rate previously agreed. + +These new regulations for the payments were adopted owing to the +exceptional circumstances which justify the request you addressed to +me in the note of the 19th June. They impose new burdens on the French +Treasury at a time when, as you know, the monetary situation fills me +with the liveliest apprehension. + +I therefore count on the system of making the payments every 10 days +being reintroduced as soon as possible. + + I am, sir, etc. + + [signature illegible] + +Monsieur Hemmen Minister Plenipotentiary + + President of the German Armistice Delegation for Economic Affairs + +* * * * * * * + + + PART 46 + + Konzept/Ss _No. 2318_ + +Paris, 11 July 1944 + + 1. To the Foreign Office Berlin Teletype-C7-(only from to in secret + cipher) + + [In handwriting] “Citissime” + No. 87 of 11 July 1944 + after cabled order of 8 July No. 71. + +I ask for the consent of the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs to +enter negotiations with the French government on the following basis: + +1. The OKW demands an increase of the French occupation cost payments +from 25 million RM a day or 750 million RM a month plus 50 million RM +for Italian occupational costs to 33.3 million RM a day or 1 billion RM +per month and proposed to the Foreign Office to instruct my delegation +to enter negotiations with the French Government to that effect. The +RFM (Reich Finance Ministry) and the Four Year Plan agreed to that +demand. + +The expenditures for occupational cost have since the beginning of +the year constantly exceeded the income because of the increasing +preparations on the Atlantic coast, made necessary by the war. Those +excess expenditures were covered by using the remaining credits on +the account of occupational costs and by a payment of one month of +occupational costs in advance which we demanded a short time ago. + +These expenses increased to an even larger extent during the last few +months, especially since the beginning of the invasion. While they +still amounted to 900 million RM in May, they increased to 950 million +RM in June and will reach 1100 millions in July. All reserves which +were available up to now will be exhausted by the middle of August at +the latest. New means for the conduct of war in France must therefore +be procured until then according to the demand of the OKW. + +2. The income of the French Government from Tax-Sources, and mainly the +raising of money through loans and short term bills of exchange has on +the other side decreased considerably since the extensive paralyzation +of the economic life, the industries and the transportation system in +France. The French Government consequently has been forced for the last +few months to use the _advances of money_ of the Bank of France at an +ever-increasing rate. Those advances increased from _about 10 billions_ +of F. Frs. to 18 billions of F. Frs. _in May_ and _25 billions_ F. +Frs. in June. The newly demanded payments will also have to be raised +through the use of the bank-note credit, that means, through the +printing of bank notes. + +The French Government can on the other hand hardly be surprised, +considering the actual circumstances, if we approach them with the +demand for increased payments. + +We know from confidential sources that Laval and Finance Minister +Cathala already expect such a demand. + +3. Considering, however, the political necessities and the already +mentioned difficult financial situation of France, and in appreciation +of the fact that the French Government has kept its financial +obligations for 4 years without interruption, I propose the following: + +1. to designate the new increase of payments which has now become +necessary, as _temporary_ and to leave open the possibility of our +readiness to reopen negotiations for an eventual re-diminution, as soon +as the military situation in France permits. + +2. _Not_ to designate that new demand as an increase of the +occupational costs in the spirit of the Armistice treaty, because +that demand, which was explicitly motivated by the OKW, as to cover +the increased expenses for our conduct of war in France, could +only with difficulty be reconciled with the obligation to pay the +“_cost for the maintenance of our occupation troops_”, as based on +the Armistice-treaty. I recommend rather to present it _as special +contribution of the French Government and the French people_ for the +repelling of Bolshevism (original version reads: “repelling of the +Anglo-Saxon invasion of Europe” but it has been changed in pencil to +read as above) and the defense of Europe. Such a formulation lies in +the political line of Laval and his repeated declarations. This does +not change the fact, that those payments, like the previous increase, +will also be made through the account of occupational costs and will +thus continue to be treated as such. + +3. In order to provide _also an exterior character_ to that idea, I +propose to negotiate about a single additional effort of _1 billion +RM_ to be paid in _monthly installments_ of 200 million RM each. At +the expiration of 4 months a further contribution by France could +eventually be negotiated again, according to the then prevailing +military situation. + + With the consent of the embassy. + signed: Hemmen. + + # # # # # + + PART 47 + + Copy as concept/Ss + + German Armistice Delegation for Economics + Paris, 31 July 1944 + +1. Note for the President of the French Delegation to the German +Armistice Delegation for Economics, Governor de Boisanger. + + Mr. President! + +Following a special order of the Reich Cabinet, I have the honor to +communicate the following to you: + +According to Article 18 of the Armistice treaty the French Government +has to defray the expenses for the support of the German occupation +troops on French soil. + +The daily occupation expenditures for the Wehrmacht in France are at +present more than 35 million RM. Since 11 November 1942 the French +Government has paid daily installments of 25 million RM to the +occupation costs. Due to the deficit thus resulting every month the +last reserves from the occupation cost account have been used up in the +meantime as you repeatedly had occasion to notice for yourself. By my +exchange of notes with Minister Cathala on the future monthly advance +payments of occupation costs of 19 and 23 June 1944 the necessarily +resulting insolvencies could be overcome, however, the existing deficit +could not be removed. I therefore request the French Government now to +increase the installments of occupation costs effective on 1 August of +this year to 35 million RM daily. + +In accordance with the said exchange of notes of 19 and 23 June +1944--No. 2076--the installments are to be paid monthly in advance on +the 21st of the preceding month. The additional amount of 200 million +RM for the period of 1 to 20 August has therefore become due and is to +be paid before 15 August 1944. + +I request you, Mr. Governor, to acknowledge receipt of this note and +to inform me of the orders given by the French Government in order to +carry out the above demand of the Reich Cabinet. + +Please accept, Mr. President, the expression of my deepest respect. + + s. Hemmen + President + +* * * * * * * + + + PART 49 + + _By special route via Altkirch_ + + Belfort, 20 August 1944 No. 2739 IV + + _Teletype_ + + Foreign + + _Berlin_ + + No. 111 of 20 August 1944 + In connection with No. 107 of 11 August. + +As I reported on 12 August the 8 billion-rate promised by President +Laval for 12 August has finally been paid on time after considerable +difficulties had been overcome (compare my report of 16 August). There +was an unmistakable tendency to put off this payment until after the +approaching bank-holidays to the 16th in the hope that by that time +the development of the military situation would prevent the payment +(American tanks had already been reported in Chartres). + +In addition to the increase of occupation cost payments I negotiated +since 7 August upon suggestion of our military agencies with the +Governor of the Bank of France, de Boisanger, about transport for +safeguarding of the large reserves in bills in Paris (60 billion F. +frs.) and Clermont Ferrand (80 billion F. frs.) to eastern France. + +Readiness of the Bank of France to do so was undoubtedly present, the +existing transport facilities and the requisite military protection +however extremely slight. A first transport of 25 billion from +Paris to Nancy was scheduled for 12 August; simultaneously also the +installment of 8 billion due on the 12th was to be sent off because +there would be no other transport opportunity for it. This transport +was carried out. For a second transport of 25 billion the military +could no more make available any trucks. Railroads are also out. +Therefore, the German Bank commissioner tried to transfer 10 billion F. +frs. on 2 trucks of the Bank of France in another transport about the +completion of which there is no report yet. + +Still greater were the difficulties of transport and protection for the +transfer of 80 billion reserves in bills from Clermont-Ferrand to Dijon +and Lyon, because there direct transport is being obstructed by Maquis +and transport therefore had to be directed via Paris. + +Ten billion of these did arrive. Further transports are improbable in +view of the development in the meantime. + +* * * * * * * + +However, on the morning of the following day, 17 August, I again +negotiated orally with Minister Cathala and Governor de Boisanger +about our demand for increase of occupation costs. Cathala at this +opportunity declared as per order of President Laval that the French +government now definitely refuses the demanded increase for reasons +already stated. I stated that therewith I had to consider our +negotiations as definitely frustrated and therefore reserve subsequent +decisions to my government. As I had learned in the meantime that the +convention in the Bank of France necessary for the installment of 8 +billion due on 21 August had not yet been applied for, i.e., that on +the due date new difficulties for the payment had to be expected, I +expressed the definite expectation of the Reich Cabinet that order to +pay the balance will be issued on time by the Ministry of Finances, +Cathala thereupon declared that the French Government for a period +of more than 4 years always fulfilled its obligations promptly. As +long as he functioned as Minister of Finances he always considered it +his special duty to fulfill the obligations contracted by the French +Government; he would act the same way now in case he should still be +in office on the 21 August. By saying so he distinctly alluded to +the pending plans for a change of government and the present serious +situation of President Laval. + +* * * * * * * + +[Note: The original shows numerous corrections in ink. Translation +followed the corrected version.] + +* * * * * * * + + + PART 51 + + Copy In the field 7 September 1944 + The Military Commander in France + To Distribution + +The French government has not yet paid the 2nd September installment +of the occupation costs which were due 21 August. For the securing of +the French for the armed forces, stationed on French soil, I order the +following. + +The administrative headquarters [Feldkommandanturen; FK] mentioned in +the distribution, will confiscate at once half of the cash amounts of +francs at the branch of the Bank of France, located at their official +station, and will cause the removal under military guard to the +following Reichskreditkassen: Belfort, Colmar, Muehausen, Strassburg, +Saargemund, and Saarlautern. According to the situation of end of +July, the following cash amounts were with the branches of the Bank of +France: Belfort 698 million francs, Besancon 642, Epinal 853, Luneville +93, Nancy 1,411, Nevers 1,016, Saint Die 181, Vesoul 227. + +Furthermore, 2 billion francs in thousand-franc notes are in the vault +of the Bank of France in Nancy or Epinal, which were brought via +transport in the middle of August from Paris to Nancy. Those 2 billion +francs are also to be confiscated and to be removed. + + /s/ Kitzinger + General of the Air Force + + _Distribution_ + + (in pencil) + FK Belfort 698 + Besancon 642 + Epinal 853 + Luneville 93 + Nancy 1,411 + Nevers 1,016 + Saint Die 181 + Vesoul 227 + ----- + 6,131 : 2 = 3 billion francs + + 2 billion francs + --------------------- + 5 billion francs were to be confiscated + +Order was forwarded by telephone + +* * * * * * * + + + PART 53 + + German Armistice Delegation for Economics + + Wiesbaden 16 November 1944 + No. 2971 Enclosures + Berlin C 111, + 7 November 1944 + +Chief Administration of the Reichskreditkassen + + Journal No. 10906/44 Re: Your letter of 12 October 1944 No. II 2846 + +The French moneys in the amount of frs. 2,931,000,000 deposited with us +by the military commander in France have been accounted for by us with +the Bank of France, Belfort branch, as per our letter of 25 October +1944, photocopy of which is enclosed. + + Chief Administration of the Reichskreditkassen + [initials illegible] + + To the + German Armistice + delegation for Economics + (12 b) _Salzburg_ + Hotel Osterreichischerhof + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1742-PS + + The Reichmarshal of the Greater German Reich. + V.P. 18727/6/3 + _Distribution_: + + Berlin, October 26, 1942 + W8 No. 3, Leipziger Street + + OKW W.F.St. + OKW Wi Amt, + OKH Gen.St.d.H. + OKW Gen. Qu. + Chef d. Gen.St.d. Luftw. + Reichsfuehrer SS, Ostmin. + Reichsernaehrungsmin. + Chef wi Srab Ost + Gen. Bev. f. d. Arb. Eins., + Org. Todt, + Reischsarbeitsdienst, Chefgr. Ernaehrung. + +Simultaneously with the intensified combating of gang activities, +[Bandentaetigkeit] ordered by the Fuehrer, and with the cleaning up +of the Hinterland in particular that behind the Army Group Middle, I +request that the following aspects are taken into consideration and +that the deductions drawn therefrom are put into practice. + +1. During combating of the underground and the combing through of the +areas contaminated by them, all the available _cattle stock_ there, +must simultaneously be driven off to safe areas. _Food supplies_ are +to be evacuated and protected similarly, so that they will no more be +accessible to the bands. + +2. All masculine and feminine labour which can be considered for some +kind of employment, must be seized by force and transported to the +plenipotentiary Chief of the Labour Exchange who will employ them in +the safe areas of the hinterland or at home. The accommodation of the +children in the hinterland camps is to be regulated separately. + +3. In the execution of the directives outlined under pars 1 and 2, +no regard is to be paid to whether the agricultural or any other +production in these areas will suffer or succumb owing to these +measures. Since up to now these band infested areas have nothing to +show in the way of production anyway, but were directly or indirectly +useful to the bands. + +I request all authorities concerned, in as far as it is necessary, in +mutual agreement, to effect the requisites within their spheres of +competence, in order to act according to the directives outlined by me. + +About the detailed delimitation of areas an Agreement must be reached +between the various head groups of agriculture of the Economy Offices +[Wirtschaftsdienststellen]. + + (signed) Goering + attested: + Schwimpe + Registrar of the Ministry. + + + PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1743-PS + +[Page 1] Economic Operations Staff East + + TOP SECRET + +Note: Up to mobilization day these instructions are to be treated as +“Top secret”, as of mobilization day open for “Restricted”. + + _Guiding Principles for the Economic operations in the newly occupied + Eastern territories_ + + (Green portfolio) + + Section I Assignments and organization of the Economy + + Berlin, June 1941 Printed at the Armed Forces High Command + +_Introductory remark._ [page 3] + +The “green portfolio”, Section I, serves the military leadership and +the Economic offices for orientation in the Economic assignments in +the Eastern territories to be newly occupied. It contains instructions +concerning the supplying of the troops from that land and provides the +guiding principles for the troops to assist the Economy. + +The instructions and guiding principles contained in the “green +portfolio” correspond to the military orders issued by the armed forces +high command and the branches of the armed forces. + + + The Major Economic Assignments + +The following executions are first of all intended for orientation +during the course of operations. But they contain simultaneously the +guiding principles, which serve for the duration of the occupation +as a fundamental principle. The Economic arrangements necessary in +the further progress of the occupation will be released as soon as +the great political aim is publicized, which will be determined in +connection with the necessary improvement of the German war Economy. + +I. In accordance with the commands given by the Fuehrer, all measures +are to be taken which are necessary, to bring about the immediate and +highest possible exploitation of the occupied territories in favor of +Germany. On the contrary all measures are to be refrained or to be held +back that could be harmful to this goal. + +II. The Exploitation of the territories to be newly occupied must be +executed first of all in the realm of food and mineral oil economy. +To gain for Germany as much food stuff and mineral oil as possible is +the main goal of this action. Aside of that order raw materials are +to be transported from the occupied territories for the German War +Economy, insofar as it is technically possible and with a view towards +the production to be maintained outside. As far as kind and amount of +the factory production to be maintained the occupied territory, to be +reconstructed or newly ordered is concerned, this likewise is also in +the very first line to be decided according to the needs, provided by +the exploitation of the agriculture and the mineral oil Economy for the +German War Economy. + +For the Economic leadership in the occupied territories the main points +are to be clearly outlined in accordance with this. This is valid with +regards to the main aim as well as for the individual assignments +and those that serve to aid their execution. From that it can be +further concluded, that these assignments, that cannot agree with the +given basic direction toward the goal, respectively those that may +make their retention difficult, must be left out of consideration, +no matter if their individual compilation does appear desirable. +The conception would be totally off the track, if it would come to +the point to uniformly pursue the idea in the occupied territories, +that it can be directly restored to order and reconstructed with the +greatest expediency. The treatment of the individual districts of +the country will have to be on the contrary, entirely varied. Only +those territories must be economically promoted and urgently kept in +order in which considerable food and mineral oils can be rendered +accessible for us. In other sections of the country, which cannot feed +themselves--therefore in big sections of north and middle Russia--the +economic operations must be limited to the available supplies. + +Which mobilization factories are to be maintained or reconstructed, is +reserved for later decision. + +III. The individual fields consist of the following [Page 4]: + +a. Food and agriculture: + +1. The main assignment to be accomplished as soon as possible, is the +uninterrupted supply of the German troops, in order thereby to relieve +the supply situation in Europe and to ease the burden on the means of +transport. The entire need of oats for the armed forces is to be taken +care of from middle Russia, the main section for the growth of oats, +insofar as it cannot be obtained from other occupied territories. In +South-Russia it is to be achieved to feed barley and corn instead of +oats. + +2. The main weight in procuring of food stuff for the domestic economy +has to be placed on grain and oil fruits. The surplus of the crop +that can be obtained and stocks in the southern territories are to +be secured by all means, the proper handling of the harvest is to be +watched, the removal into agricultural deficient Middle and North +Russia has to be stopped ruthlessly, insofar as exceptions are not +ordered or made necessary in order to feed the troops. + +b. The main weight as far as industrial raw materials are concerned, +is to be placed on mineral oil. Under these measures, which do not +serve the food management, all tasks connected with the production and +shipment of mineral oil, will have first priority, by all means. For +the execution of the decrees in the mineral oil field, especially to be +issued for the Caucasus, the Continental Oil Company will be appointed. +* * * + +c. The industries which provide for the functioning in the German +interest, of agricultural production in surplus territories, the +production of mineral oil and raw material production, are to be put +into operation immediately. + +d. In order to tackle the transportation problem in the German +interest, particular attention is to be paid to + + 1. Street buildings in South territories and the thoroughfares, + + 2. The extension of the railroad tracks, especially the building of + two track lines in the most important traffic districts, + + 3. The improvement of canals, unloading facilities in the inland + waterways, especially in the North and South traffic, + + 4. Rebuilding of harbor facilities. * * * + + + Organisation of the Economy [Page 5] + + A. General. + +The Reichsmarschall has formed the “Wirtschaftsfuehrungsstab Ost” +which is under his immediate jurisdiction and which will be run by +Staatssekretaer Koerner, as his representative, for the uniform +management of the Economy administration in the zone of operations +and in administration districts, to be established later. For the +representation of the military interests, for the preparation and for +the duration of the military operations, the Chief of the War Economy +and Armament Office, General of the Infantry Thomas, has the authority +which he exercises as a Member of the Wirtschaftsfuehrungsstabes Ost. + +The directives of the Reichsmarschall include all phases of the Economy +incl. food and agriculture. They will be carried out by the subordinate +economy agencies (see B). + +The orders of the “Wirtschaftsfuehrungsstabes Ost” will be transmitted +by the Chief of the Wi Rue office to the advanced “Wirtschaftsstab Ost” +in the occupied territory which will be located during the operations +in the vicinity of the OKH/Gen Qu. + +B. Organization of the Economy in the zone of operations. + +The subordinate Economy agencies of the “Wirtschaftsstab Ost” are, +as far as they are active in the zone of operation, assigned to the +Command agencies of the Army and militarily under their jurisdiction, +namely: + +a. In the rear area of the army: + + One each economy inspection team with the Commanders of the army rear + area, + + One each of several economy Commands with the security divisions, + + One group IV Wi each with the field administration headquarters. + +b. in the Army zone: + + One each group IV Wi [V.O. Wi Rue Office] with the AOK’s [Army high + commands] + + One each group IV Wi with the field administration headquarters, who + have advanced into the Army zone and who are under the jurisdiction + of the AOK’s, also in case of need, economy commands advanced into + the Army zone militarily under the jurisdiction of the AOK’s. * * * + + C. Organization of the Economy for the political Administration + districts. + +Regulation will follow later by the Reichsmarschall. + +The execution of the economic detailed tasks [Page 9]. + +1. Within the food economy, the procurement of grain and oil containing +plants is the foremost task. All measures for this will be taken with +a view of long duration (bringing in of the harvest, safe storage, +preparation and cultivation of the fields for autumn, to make available +manpower and machines, the seed, fertilizer, throttling of the +consumption of the domestic population. As much use as possible, is to +be made of the setting up of simple community kitchens.) + +The supplying of the troops from the land [Page 14]. + +As far as the troops have to be supplied from the land, attention is +called to the following: + +I. Food, Clothes, housing needs and consumer goods. + +* * * * * * * + +2. The food, housing, consumer goods and Clothes found in the zone of +combat and in the rear areas, are in the first place at the disposal of +IVa in order to satisfy the immediate needs of the troops (notice par. +3). + +3. In order to facilitate the possibility of transfer of food stocks +at a later date, the required supplies for the immediate needs of the +troops, are if possible not to be taken from stocks which are in a +general favorable locality for the shipment to Germany. (At railroad +stations and waterways, in harbor, especially baltic harbor, the border +states, in the vicinity of the German borders.) + +4. All food, housing, consumer goods and Clothes stocks which have not +been taken over in the zone of combat and the Army rear areas by IVa +and its agencies for the immediate use of the troops, will be put at +the disposal of IV Wi, who thereby will be responsible for the care and +Transfer to the economy agencies next in line. + +5. In the Army rear area the economy agencies who are taking over the +preliminary work done by IV Wi will be charged with reconnaissance, +security and care of the food, housing, consumer goods and Clothes +stocks. The assignment to the troops will be made through the Wi +agencies to the permanent local food supply agencies, who will +determine the requirements of all troops of the different branches +and report them to the local competent economy agencies. These will +regulate the supply demands. * * * + +II. Fuel and tires. + +a. The troops will resort to the stocks found by them. + +Only in an emergency can be used: + +a. stocks of the gas, water, electricity and mine facilities + +b. gasoline and lubricants for farm and vital Industries + +c. stocks of the motor tractor stations. + +* * * * * * * + +War-Booty, Services for pay, Army booty, prize [Page 19]. + +I. General. + +1. Although according to the Hague Convention the entire movable +property of the enemy country can be taken away without compensation, +however for the time being only the movable property of the enemy +army shall be treated as booty. Other movable property of the state +may however be used by the troops in case of need, it is however to +be treated as private property and to be paid for in case of use or +acquisition. + +2. The payment is to be made in case of values up to 1000 RM in +Reichskassennotes, amounts exceeding 1000 RM by issuance of receipts. + +Receipts may be issued by every agency in the rank of battalion or +higher, unless exceptions have to be made due to a situation of the +fighting or in case different directives have not been given by the OKH. + +3. When taking over property for which there is no owner a receipt will +be given to the Senior member of the community or a report will be made +to the field administration headquarters. + +4. With the establishment of the Field administration headquarters +[Feldkommandanturen] and the permanent local economy agencies, the +latter will be charged, in connection with the military agencies, with +the procurement and making available the requirements of the troops +from the Economy. In urgent cases the troops may even then secure their +immediate needs independently. If possible, the local competent Field +administration headquarters will be notified in such a case. + +Raw materials, Management of goods [Page 23]. + +An exact regulated production and distribution of goods by +interpolation of special merchandise pools will be out of question +as far as the new territories to be occupied are concerned, with the +exception perhaps of the Baltic states. + +* * * * * * * + +C. All raw materials, processed and half processed goods, useful to us +will be withdrawn from the market. This will be initiated by IV Wi’s +and the economy agencies through suitable measures such as appeals and +orders, through decrees for confiscation or through military guard or +both. + +Money and Credit system [Page 24]. + +* * * * * * * + +2. Gold reserves and foreign currency are to be secured. Further action +will be taken by the Economy command upon notification. + +* * * * * * * + +5. Reichskreditkassen will be established as soon as possible. +They are personally and in fact under the jurisdiction of the +Chief administration of the Reichskreditkassen in Berlin. The +Reichskreditkassen are charged with the regulation of the Money and +Credit system. They will discharge their duties with Reichskreditkassen +notes which will be issued in 50, 20, 5, 2, 1 and 0.50 RM +denominations. The Reichskreditkassen notes are legal tender along with +the currency of the country. The ratio of the Reichsmark in relation +to the currency of the Country will be fixed through decrees by the +authorities in charge. + +The Reichskreditkassen notes serve as well the purpose to keep the +economy of the occupied country intact, as far as this is important +for us in the interest of peace and order, as well as to satisfy and +balance the money requirements of the German troops. The first will +be achieved by granting credits to industrial and other enterprises +also to financial institutions or also to state and district +administrations, if the granting of credits is in the German interest +(compare 3). + +The financial institutions of the occupied countries are also to be +induced to open accounts with the Reichskreditkassen. + +The Army has been ordered to pay its troops, after they cross the +border, only with Reichskreditkassen notes or with the currency of the +country and to use German change only in the smallest denominations +of 10, 5, 2 and 1 Reichspfenning if the foreign change is not +available. The money in the hands of the soldiers at the time of the +invasion, in the amount of more than 0.50 RM, has to be exchanged +into Reichskreditkassen notes at the nearest Reichskreditkasse by the +Finance office of the troops. + +6. The Army has the order to see to it that the soldiers on their +part pay in the occupied territory only with Reichskreditkassen notes +or in the currency of the foreign country at the established rate of +exchange. A decree will be issued in due time to the effect that in the +occupied territory along with the currency of the foreign country, the +Reichsmark in the form of Reichskreditkassen notes will also be a legal +tender and what the rate of exchange will be. + +7. The maintenance of the rate of exchange of the Reichskreditkassen +notes is especially important. The way of their acceptance by +the population is therefore carefully to be observed. Should any +difficulties arise of the kind that the population refuses to accept +Reichskreditkassen notes at all or only to another than the fixed rate +of exchange, so if necessary it must be counteracted by punishment. The +Economy agencies will report about such incidents. + +To the maintenance of the rate of exchange pertains also that in case +of subscription to forced loans and also when selling merchandise +to the population not only the currency of the foreign country is +demanded, but also Reichskreditkassen notes will be accepted at the +rate of exchange by us. + +* * * * * * * + +9. The Reichskreditkassen will work in closest cooperation with +the Economy agencies. They have, notwithstanding the fact that +they are under the jurisdiction of the Chief administration of the +Reichskreditkassen, to bring in line their measures with the intentions +of the Economy inspector with regard to the Money and Credit system. + +Foreign Trade and Exchange [Page 25]. + +1. General. + +With regard to the question of Trade and Exchange between the occupied +territories and third countries is to be taken into account, that all +surplus of goods are in principle destined for German consumption. So +far as removal is not possible, the goods will be, for the time being, +stocked and secured, and be held ready for later removal. Therefore +trade between the occupied territories and third countries is for the +time being, fundamentally not possible. Directives for carrying on +trade at a later date, with third countries in the interest of Germany, +will be given as soon as the situation is clearer. + +* * * * * * * + +Price Control [Page 26]. + +A decree or announcement of a most simple character will prohibit +the raise of prices and other compensations (also wages) and make it +a punishable offense. This is only a temporary solution. A change +of prices which are subject to political conditions will have to be +considered. + +For agricultural products, the following rates are fixed, which may not +be exceeded in the occupied territories. + +The IV Wi and the economy agencies will take care of their publication. +Food purchases for the troops as well are to be made at the established +prices only. + + 1. Field products, prices for 1 dz: + Wheat 140 Ruble + Rye 120 ” + 100% Grain 145 ” + Barley 110 ” + Oats 120 ” + Corn 100 ” + Peas 160 ” + Millet 100 ” + Buckwheat 130 ” + Potatoes 50 ” + Hay 30 ” + Straw 15 ” + + 2. Processed Products, prices for 1 dz: + 80% Wheat flour 200 Ruble + 85% Rye flour 155 ” + Sugar 400 ” + + 3. Animals (living) + Cattle (for each dz.) 500 Ruble + Hogs (for each dz.) 600 ” + Calves (for each dz.) 250 ” + Sheep (for each dz.) 200 ” + + 4. Dairy products + Milk (each 1.) 1 Ruble + Butter (each kg.) 44 ” + + + PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1746-PS + + Conference between Field Marshal List and Representatives of the + Bulgarian General Staff + + (Agreement between Germany, Bulgaria and Rumania for attacking Greece + and eventually Turkey). dated February 8, 1941 + +[_Page 1, Line 5-14:_] + +_Minutes_ of questions discussed between the representatives of the +Royal Bulgarian General Staff and the German Supreme Command--General +Field Marshal List--in connection with the possible movement of German +troops through Bulgaria and their commitment against Greece and +possibly against Turkey, if she should involve herself in the war. + +[_Page 1, Line 19--Page 2, Line 24:_] + +1. During the operation of the German troops against Greece or Turkey, +the Bulgarian army will not be committed in an offensive way against +the two mentioned countries, according to an agreement between the two +governments. It will be reinforced, in order to safeguard the new order +on the Balkan. + +2. Up to the arrival of German troops on the Bulgarian South and +Southeast border, the Bulgarian army will alone defend its territory +with its own troops for the beginning, with about the following +deployment: + + at least 6 Bulgarian divisions on the Bulgarian-Turkish border + + sufficient forces for the protection of the border, on the Greek + border, + + reinforced border protection on the Yugoslavian border + +Later on, the Bulgarian army is also responsible for adequate +protection along those fronts where German forces will not become +offensive. + +The mobilization and the deployment of these forces may start +immediately in a camouflaged way. However, in order that these measures +will have the desired effect, the deliveries to Bulgaria must be +fulfilled immediately by Germany (enclosure I). + +The German supreme command will do everything in its power, so that its +troops will appear on the Bulgarian-Turkish and Bulgarian-Greek border +in sufficient numbers in the shortest time. + +For this purpose, from the beginning a sufficient amount of German +forces--mainly armored and motorized divisions--will be moved in the +shortest time behind the Bulgarian border protection troops. This move +will start with the deployment of the two armored divisions which +already are in the Dobrudscha as well as with the armored and motorized +divisions which are in Walachia. The other forces provided for the +operations, that means more infantry and armored divisions, will follow +behind, depending on weather, road, and bridge situation. + +[_Page 3, Line 3-12:_] + +3. The Bulgarian and the German general staff will take all measures in +order to camouflage the preparation of the operations and to assure in +this way the most favorable conditions for the execution of the German +operations as planned. + +The representatives of the two general staffs consider it to be +suitable to inform their governments that it will be good to take +the necessity of secrecy and surprise into consideration, when the +three-power treaty is signed by Bulgaria in order to assure the success +of the military operations. + +[_Page 3, Line 13--Page 4, Line 27:_] + +4. In order to protect Bulgaria from any possible enemy before and +after the beginning of the operations, the German supreme command will +take the following measures: + +a. _Against Turkey_: From the beginning, sufficient German forces, +mainly armored divisions, will be thrown against the Turkish border +behind the Bulgarian defensive front. At the same time, the German air +force will stand ready for active defense. + +If Turkey should attack Bulgaria, while the German operations against +Greece are being carried out, the Bulgarian army will defend itself, +supported by sufficient German forces. The German supreme command will +take all necessary measures immediately, in order to beat and throw +back the Turkish army with German troops, so that an extended defense +by Bulgarian troops will be avoided on the Turkish front. + +The same also goes for Greece, if the Greeks should attack Bulgaria +during the German operations against Turkey. + +b. _Against Greece_: Motorized advance units shall thrust immediately +against the Greek-Bulgarian border as fast as possible, in order to +stand there as support for the protection of the Bulgarian border. + +c. _Against Yugoslavia_: If Yugoslavia should attack, the columns of +the German infantry divisions would take over the protection against +the West, at first, which are deployed on the right flank to the rear. +Other German forces would get at Yugoslavia from another side, too. It +is assumed in this case, that a reinforced Bulgarian border protection +exists also along the Bulgarian-Yugoslav border. + +d. _Against Russia_: Sufficient German forces are ready on the German +Eastern border, to be used for any purpose. Moreover, German instructor +troops are available in Rumania, in addition to the Rumanian army. + +e. _Against landing attempts_: The German troops are in a position +to take a hand at any time in the defense against a possible landing +on the Black Sea coast, in cooperation with the air force. Besides, +the supreme command of the army List will make its suggestions at the +competent German navy office, in order to strengthen the protection of +the two ports Varna and Burgas, according to the already known wishes +of the Bulgarian supreme command. + +The Bulgarian army will also do its part to guarantee the protection of +the two ports by providing forces there. + +[_Page 4, Line 32--Page 5, Line 27:_] + +6. The supply of the German troops on their march through Bulgaria and +during their operations against Greece or Turkey will be provided from +their own German stocks. However, in order to relieve the railroad and +transportation system, especially with regard to feeding facilities, +assistance from the Bulgarian side is necessary. This assistance will +only be within the limits of the so-called “Contingents” [Kontingent]. +The details about the installation of the necessary dumps, about +purchases, payment of work, etc., as well as export and import control, +will be regulated by a special commission. + +[Remark in pencil] (L IV Is taken care of) + +7. It will be necessary to use the Bulgarian national installations +(railroad, postal system, etc.), for the purposes of the German armed +forces, as far as it will be bearable for the Bulgarian economy. The +details about it will be regulated by the special commissions which +are already in Sofia. It is presumed that especially the railroad +net and the rolling stock will be placed at the disposal of the +German army for its requirements. For that purpose it is necessary +that the Bulgarian railroad receives an extra allowance of about 100 +locomotives, 1500 freight cars and 30 km rail material, in order to +satisfy all requirements of the Bulgarian army, the Bulgarian economy +and the German army. Operation and management of the Bulgarian national +railroad, postal and telegraphic service are to remain in Bulgarian +hands. Transportation required by the German army will be organized +by the Bulgarian general staff. The details about the service of +the railroads, postal and telegraphic systems will be discussed and +regulated by a special commission. + +[_Page 6, Line 6-11:_] + +10. The activity of the counter intelligence service [Abwehr Dienst] +of the German and Bulgarian general staffs is already regulated by a +special commission. + +11. The question of command function in Bulgaria could not yet be +finally settled. The German high command will come back to this +question in the near future. + +[_Page 6, Line 15-26:_] + +13. Questions which might come up later will be taken care of by +further conferences. + +14. The conditions laid down above, as far as political questions are +concerned, will be in effect only after the approval by the German +supreme command of the armed forces. Nevertheless, the preparations +for the execution of the operations will be made with all energy, +regardless of the above fact. + +In order to enable the Bulgarians to carry out in time the last +preparations for the deployment, it is necessary that the Bulgarian +general staff should be informed of the crossing of the border by the +Germans 10 days ahead of time. + + Finis + + + PART II Conference of Hitler and the German High Command _on the + situation in Yugoslavia. Dated March 27, 1941_ + +[_Page 1--Page 4, Line 13:_] + +W F St + + Berlin, March 27, 1941 + + Top Secret + + 1st copy W F St + _2nd copy L_ + 3rd copy W Kr G + +Only for general officers + +To be transmitted by officers only. + + _Discussion about the situation in Yugoslavia_ + + [stamp] [several pencil + marks and initials] + OKW/W F St Dept L (I M I) 29 March 1941 + No 44391/41 top secret + +Present: + + Fuehrer + Reich Marshal + Chief OKW + Chief W F St + Major General Bodenschatz + Colonel Schmundt + Commander von Puttkamer + Lieutenant-Colonel Scherff + Major von Below + Major Christian + +Later on the following persons were added: + + Supreme commander of the army (Ob.d.H.) + Chief of the General staff of the army (Chef Gen St d H) + Colonel Hensinger + Lieutenant-Colonel Sieverth + Reich Foreign Minister + Ambassador Hewel + Brigadier General (Gen.Maj.) von Waldan + Colonel Schmidt + Brigadier General (Gen.Maj.) von Rintelen. + +_The Fuehrer_ describes Yugoslavia’s situation after the coup +d’etat. Statement that Yugoslavia was an uncertain factor in +regard to the coming Marita-action and even more in regard to the +Barbarossa-undertaking later on. Serbs and Slovenes were never +pro-German. These governments never sit securely in the saddle, because +of the nationality problem and the officers caste (Kamarilla), which +is always inclined to start a coup d’etat. In the present time, the +country had only one strong man, namely Stojodinowitsch, and Regent +Prince Paul had him thrown over, to his own disadvantage. + +The present moment is for political and military reasons favorable for +us to ascertain the actual situation in the country and the country’s +attitude toward us, for if the overthrow of the government would have +happened during the Barbarossa-action, the consequences for us probably +would have been considerably more serious. + +The Fuehrer is determined, without waiting for possible loyalty +declarations of the new government, to make all preparations in order +to destroy Yugoslavia militarily and as a national unit. No diplomatic +inquiries will be made nor ultimatums presented. Assurances of the +Yugoslav government which cannot be trusted any how in the future will +be taken note of. The attack will start as soon as the means and troops +suitable for it are ready. + +It is important that actions will be taken as fast as possible. An +attempt will be made to let the bordering states participate in a +suitable way. An actual military support against Yugoslavia is to be +requested of Italy, Hungary, and in certain respects of Bulgaria too. +Rumania’s main task is the protection against Russia. The Hungarian and +the Bulgarian ambassador have already been notified. During the day, a +message will still be addressed to the Duce. + +Politically, it is especially important that the blow against +Yugoslavia is carried out with unmerciful harshness and that the +military destruction is done in a lightning like undertaking. In this +way, Turkey would become sufficiently frightened and the campaign +against Greece later on would be influenced in a favorable way. It can +be assumed that the Croats will come to our side when we attack. A +corresponding political treatment (autonomy later on) will be assured +to them. The war against Yugoslavia should be very popular in Italy, +Hungary, and Bulgaria, as territorial acquisitions are to be promised +to these states; the Adria coast for Italy, the Banat for Hungary, and +Macedonia for Bulgaria. + +This plan assumes that we speed up the schedule of all preparations +and use such strong forces that the Yugoslav collapse will take place +within the shortest time. + +_In this connection, the beginning of the Barbarossa-operation will +have to be postponed up to 4 weeks._ + +The military operations are to be carried out in the following way: + +1. Begin the operation Marita as early as possible with the limited aim +to capture Greek-Thracia and the basin of Saoloniki and to win the high +terrain of Edessa; for that purpose march [Ausholen] across Yugoslav +territory. + +2. Push from neighborhood South of Sofia in direction Skoplje in order +to relieve the flank of the Italian front in Albania. + +3. Push with stronger forces from the area around Sofia in direction +towards Nis, then towards Belgrad, in cooperation with + +4. Stronger German forces penetrating from the area around Graz and +Klagenfurt in direction South-East with the aim to destroy the Yugoslav +army. + +[_Page 5, Line 3-9_:] + +5. The main task of the airforce is to start as early as possible with +the destruction of the Yugoslavian airforce ground installations and to +destroy the capital Belgrade in attacks by waves; besides the air force +has to support the advance of the army. + +For this purpose, it is possible to make use of the Hungarian ground +installations. + +[_Page 6, Line 7-12_] + +_The Fuehrer_ orders the immediate starting of all preparations. He +expects the plans of the different parts of the armed forces during the +evening of March 27th. General von Pintelen is ordered to receive the +message and verbal orders from the Fuehrer during the night of March 27. + + [illegible pencil initial] + +* * * * * * * + + + PART V + +Subject: Tentative plan for the coordination of the German and Italian +operations against Yugoslavia. Dated: March 28, 1941 + + The Chief of the operational staff of + the Armed Forces of the Supreme Command + of the Armed Forces. + + Berlin, March 28, 1941 + +[in pencil] Handed over to Gen. von Rintelen on March 28, 1941 at 4 P. +M. + +Only for general officers + +To be transmitted by officers only + + KW/W F St [Stamp] [several pencil marks] + + + Tentative Plan for the coordination of the German and Italian + operations against Yugoslavia. + +1. In the event that the political development requires an armed +intervention against Yugoslavia, it is the German intention to attack +Yugoslavia in a concentric way as soon as possible, to destroy her +armed forces, and to dissolve her national territory. + +2. For this purpose, the following units are being formed: + +a. One assault group South of Sofia for the advance in direction +Skoplje and South, in order to occupy the Southern part of Yugoslavia +as basis for the combined attack against Greece and to remove the +danger for the rear of the Italian front in Albania. + +b. One assault group which will be deployed around Graz and under +certain circumstances also in the Southwest Hungary, in order to +penetrate into Yugoslavia later in the direction Belgrad and Westward. + +c. Probably an Hungarian attack group reinforced by German forces which +will be committed in the general direction towards the Danube on both +sides of Belgrad. + +3. If the weather situation permits, the operation against Greece will +start on April 2nd or 3rd. In this operation, the right flank will +move across Yugoslavian territory. In the beginning, its aim will be +limited to the occupation of the basis of Saloniki and the high terrain +of Edessa. + +4. Therefore, the following tasks result for the participation of the +Italian armed forces: + +a. Flank protection for the German attack group Graz by advancing +towards the line Split-Yajele, with forces as strong as possible. + +b. Shifting to the defense on the Greek-Albanian front and deployment +of an attack group, in order to join with the German forces committed +around Skoplje and South. + +c. Elimination of the Yugoslav naval forces. + +d. Later on, resumption of the attacks against the Greek front in +Albania. + +For the inner-political integration of the Yugoslav national territory +it is especially desirable to favor the Croat independence movements +in every respect and to treat the Croats as friends of the Axis. It +will therefore be opportune to avoid any air attacks against Croat +territory, as long as it is not a question of commitment against enemy +troops fighting there. + +5. The following chronological schedule of the German operations may be +expected: + +a. Attack against Greece: April 2nd-3rd + +b. Attack from the area South of Sofia on April 3rd or April 4th + +c. Attack from the area around Graz and East of it: April 12th. + + [illegible initial] + + + PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1751-PS + + SECRET + + SS Main Office Economy Administration [SS Wirtschafts-Verwaltungs + Hauptamt] + +Department Chief [Amtsgruppenchef] + + Concentration Camps Dramenburg, 12 May 1944 + DI/Az,:14 h 2/Na/s- + Geheim Tgb-Nr. 605/44 + + Re: assignment of prisoners for experimental purposes + + To the Camp Commanders of Concentration camps Da, Sah, Bu, Mau, Flo, + Neu, Au.I III, br-Ro, Natz, Stu, Rav, Herz, Aufenth, Camp Bergen, + Belsen + + Group leader D Riga, one copy each for KL Riga, Kauen, Vaivara + + SS Wirtschafter Ost, Krakau with one copy each for KL Lublin, + Warschau and Plaszow. + +There is cause to call attention to the fact that in every case +permission for assignment has to be requested here _before_ assignment +of prisoners is made for experimental purposes. + +To be included in this request are number, kind of custody, and in +case of aryan prisoners, exact personal data, file number in the Main +Reich’s Security Office and reason for detainment in the concentration +camp. + +Herewith, I explicitly forbid assignment of prisoners for experimental +purposes without permission. + + [signature illegible] (Waffen) + SS Lt Gen and Lt Gen of the SS + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1752-PS + + SECRET + + _Preparations already made for the International Congress_ + +Reichsleader Alfred Rosenberg received the order from the Fuehrer to +stage an anti-Jewish congress. The date for this congress was fixed for +11.7. after a discussion, and after the corresponding preparations had +been made. + +The following preparations for the congress have been undertaken: + +1. In Germany. + +2. abroad. + +1. _Preparations in Germany._ + +a. The financing of the congress has been taken on by the Reich +Treasury of Chief, Schwarz. Further, after the Fuehrer had decided on +Cracow as the site of the congress, Reich Minister and General Governor +Frank has taken over all the costs that arise within his General +Government. + +b. _The site of the meeting._ + +All negotiations concerning billeting, feeding and welfare of the +guests, the lecture rooms etc. have been readily settled with the +offices of the General governor. (Instead of Cracow, a place that is +safe from air raids, for instance Zakopane, can be selected at any +time.) + +c. The program of lectures has been discussed with the appropriate +offices, + +1. Foreign Office + +2. Propaganda Ministry + +3. Head Office for internal security + +and has met with general approval. The Reich Foreign Minister as well +as Reich Minister Dr. Goebbels have given their assent to the program. + +d. German speakers and lecturers have been visualized, among others +three German Ministers. The promise of these three gentlemen to attend +seems certain. Some lectures are already on hand. + +The final preparations, those for the cultural extra items on the +programme, have been taken in hand. (See the letter from Reichsleader +Rosenberg to Reichsleader Bormann concerning the appearance of the +Berlin Philharmonic Orchestra, with Furtwaengler as conductor.) + +Even the formation of international organisations for investigating and +combatting Jewry, which have been provided for in connection with the +congress, have been brought about, and scientific presidents of the +organisations have been earmarked. Some individual personalities have +already been approached. Amongst others we already have the promise of +Geheimrat Professor Dr. Eugen Fischer to be president of the European +organisation for the “racial-biological questions of Jewry”. + +e. The following have been entered as honorary members: + + Reich Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop + + Reich Minister of the Interior and Reichsleader of the SS Heinrich + Himmler + + Reich Minister Dr. Goebbels + + Reich Minister and Governor Dr. Frank + +2. _Preparations abroad_ + +The Foreign Office has accepted the task of contacting the prominent +European people, with the exception of a few of the occupied +territories in Europe, via its representatives abroad. + +The German representatives abroad have received several official +instructions, according to which they are + +a. to propose delegates to be invited, + +b. nominate lecturers, + +c. approach the representatives of governments with a view to their +participating at the congress. + +In the course of these instructions being carried out, the +following have promised their participation, or membership of the +congress-committee and membership of the honorary committee: + + Italy: Minister for National Enlightenment Mezzasoma (honorary + committee) + + The former Minister of State Preziosi (congress-committee and + congress lecturer) + + France: Minister for Education Abel Bonnard (Honorary committee) + Secretary of State Paul Marion (congress-committee) + + Hungary: Minister for the Interior von Jarossh (honorary committee + and congress lecturer) + + Holland: The leader of the NSB, Mussert (Personally invited by + Reichsleader Rosenberg during the latter’s stay in Holland) + + Arabia: The Grand Mufti of Jerusalem (honorary committee and congress + lecturer) + + Iraq: Prime Minister Gailani (honorary committee) + + Norway: At the present moment a representative of Reichsleader + Rosenberg has arrived here, in order personally to convey + an invitation to Prime Minister Quisling to attend the + congress. + +Contacts have also been established with countless other countries. For +the time being the promises to attend of the prominent representatives +are not yet at hand. On the other hand promises have been received from +delegates from Sweden, Roumania, Slovakia and illegal delegates from +Switzerland, Spain and Portugal. Further the office of General in the +SS Berger has undertaken to invite renowned leaders of the Germanic +volunteers in the SS to take part in the congress. Amongst others, +Britons and Americans are visualised in this connection, who are also +willing to speak. + +The occupied eastern territory is included via the Ministry for the +East. A number of promises to attend have been received from renowned +personalities in this territory. Lectures have already been received +from foreign speakers, amongst others from the former Minister of State +Preziosi. + +3. Reason for the importance of the Congress at the present time. The +reports from outside Germany and the anti-German allied propaganda try +to make believe beyond all doubt that the whole war is being kindled by +the other side more and more as a crusade, because the German nation +plans to destroy the “Jewish People”. + +The Soviet Union: We refer to the pro-semitic Molotov-congress in +Moscow. + +U.S.A.: We refer to permanent session of the Jewish Congress. + +The _last new_ beginning 6. 5. 1944. + +England: We refer to the English failure to pay attention to their own +White Paper regarding Palestine problem. + +At the same time, we point out the slowly rising anti-Semitic feeling +in the countries of our opponents. It seems necessary that the feeling +caused by enemy propaganda that National Socialism is retreating on all +fronts, be refuted by this great anti-Jewish Congress. + +The invasion army is not fighting against the barbarian Germany of +annihilation of Jews but it is fighting for world Jewry! + +What kind of propaganda is being duly turned out on the German side? + +To give up this plan or to postpone this International Congress _to an +indefinite date_, after half of Europe has already been won for this +plan would support or strengthen the propaganda conducted against us. + +It must be borne in mind that not a German authority but an +international assembly is responsible for the Congress and issues +invitations to it. + +The preparations for the Congress have so far progressed with the +greatest possibilities of disguise. + +An arrangement, which has been made on general lines, mentions only an +International historic and scientific congress taking place in a Town +in the East of the Reich. + + Berlin, 15th June 1944. + Hg/We + + /s/ Hans Hagemeyer, + Head of the Department. + + + PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1757-PS + + _REPORT OF GOERING’S COMMISSION_ + + for the investigation of the Aryanisations carried out in the Gau of + Franconia between 9.11.38 and 9.2.39 and the irregularities connected + therewith which have been established + +[P.9] k. By an order of the Reich Chancellor of the Exchequer of +the 2nd September 1938, No. 57/38, issued with the agreement of the +Fuehrer’s deputy, all party offices, including organisations and +attached formations, are forbidden to accept administrative dues, +donations, gifts, bequests or material payments of any other kind +for the participation of the party in economic tasks, including the +transfer of Jewish firms to persons of German race, nor are they +allowed to make the fulfillment of such tasks dependent on the payment +of contributions, etc. The order was addressed to all Gau treasurers +and reached the Gauleaders as well, among others. + +[P.12] From the course of events one can only assume that the Reich +Chancellor of the Exchequer’s order of the 2nd September 1938 No. 57/38 +about the ban on financial payments for the cooperation of the Party +in Aryanisation and other economic tasks was considered in Franconia +to be superseded, and that they thought themselves entitled to obtain +considerable sums of money for the Gau of Franconia in connection with +Aryanisation. + +[P.13] l. Following upon the November demonstrations, the deputy +Gauleader, Holz, took up the Jewish questions. His * * * reasons can be +given here in detail on the basis of his statement of the 25th March +1939: + +“_The 9th and 10th November 1938._ In the night of the 9/10 November +and on the 10th November 1938 events took place throughout Germany +_which I considered to be the signal for a completely different +treatment of the Jewish question in Germany_. Synagogues and Jewish +schools were burnt down and Jewish property was smashed both in shops +and in private houses. Besides this, a large number of particular +Jews were taken to concentration camps by the police. Towards midday +we discussed these events in the Gauleiter’s house. All of us were of +the opinion _that we now faced a completely new state of affairs on +the Jewish question_. By the great action against the Jews, carried +out in the night and morning of the 10th November, _all guiding +principles and all laws on this subject had been made illusory_. We +were of the opinion (particularly myself) that we should now act on our +own initiative in this respect. I proposed to the Gauleiter that, in +view of the great existing lack of houses, the best thing would be to +put the Jews into a kind of _internment camp_. Then the houses would +become free in a twinkling and the housing shortage would be relieved, +at least in part. Besides that, we would have the Jews under control +and supervision. I added “The same thing happened to our prisoners of +war and war internees.” The Gauleiter said that this suggestion was, +for the time being, impossible to carry out. Thereupon I made a new +proposal to him: I said to him _that I considered it unthinkable that, +after the Jews had had their property smashed they should continue to +be able to own houses and land_. I proposed that these houses and this +land ought to be taken away from them, and declared myself ready to +carry through such an action. I declared that by the Aryanisation of +Jewish land and houses _a large sum could accrue to the Gau out of the +proceeds_. I named some millions of marks. I stated that in my opinion, +this Aryanisation could be carried out as legally as the Aryanisation +of shops. The Gauleiter’s answer was something to this effect: “_If you +think you can carry this out, do so. The sum gained will then be used +to build a Gau school._” The very same afternoon I began to organize +the Aryanization of land. I stated here as in my memorandum, too, _that +I considered this Aryanisation of Jewish land as a logical continuation +of the events of the 9th and 10th November_. I was of the opinion that +I was doing a service to the Party by trying to bring it money. I was +further of the opinion _that the transfer of the land and houses from +Jewish to German hands was a National-Socialist action_.” + +[P.16] Holz appointed commissioners for Nurnberg and Furth to carry out +the Aryanisation of Jewish landed property * * * + +[P.18] 2. The Aryanisation was accomplished by the alienation of +properties, the surrender of claims, especially mortgage claims, and +reductions in buying price. + +The payment allowed the Jews was basically 10% of the nominal value +or nominal sum of the claim. As a justification for these low prices, +Holz claimed at the Berlin meeting of the 6th February 1939 that the +Jews had mostly bought their property during the inflation period for a +tenth of its value. As has been shown by investigating a large number +of individual cases selected at random, this claim is not true. + +[P.70] Favoritism shown to third parties and irregularities during the +Aryanization of properties. + +[P.72] _Schoeller case._ c. Gauamtsleiter Fritz Schoeller bought +_Grimmstrasse 3, Nurnberg_ by a contract of the 15th November 1938. +The house has a nominal value of RM 43,300 and an exchange value of +RM 50,000. The buying price was fixed at RM 5,000. Holz admitted +(statement of the 27th March 1939) that he was in agreement with +the buying of the property. He based his agreement on the fact that +Schoeller was an old and deserving party member and deserved particular +consideration owing to his family circumstances. + + +Report of German Commission to Goering on Streicher. [Extract from Part + II] + +[P. 139] On the other hand, the minority of the shares of the +Mars-Werke, Nurnberg, with a face value of Reichsmark 112,500, were +acquired through publishing house manager Fink for the Gauleiter +according to the latter’s instructions at the instigation of the +deceased SA Brigadier General Koenig. These shares were in the +possession of the Jewish banking house Kohn, the proprietor of which +was at that time in protective custody. Verlagsdirektor Fink, as agent +for the Gauleiter, acquired the parcel of Mars-Werke shares from this +Jew at 5 per cent of the face value, i.e., the sum of Reichsmark 5,600. + +In the presence of Fink, Koenig informed the Gauleiter in detail of +the completed transaction. The Gauleiter gave his complete assent and, +in addition, gave the order to transfer the parcel of shares from the +account of the banking firm Kohn to the account of Fink at the Dresdner +Bank. He further ordered that his name should not be mentioned at all +in connection with the transaction. + +By order of the Gauleiter, Fink withdrew Reichsmark 5,600 from a +Stuermer account, and later, also acting for the Gauleiter, he bought +the remainder of the shares of the Mars-Dresdner Bank, at 60 per cent +for the Gauleiter with Stuermer funds. + +After Fink learned of the investigating commission he discussed the +matter with Gauleiter Streicher. Streicher told Fink that he would keep +the shares, because they had no connection with the Aryanization of +estates, and if the purchase of the Mars shares should be contested he +would simply pay over the required sum to the Reich. + +After the investigating commission had started to work Gauleiter +Streicher sent for Fink and told him the following: “The police have +found out about the Mars shares. We will simply say that the shares +were not bought for me but for the Fraenkische Tageszeitung!!” [P. 145] +Thanks to the efforts of the district economic adviser and president +of the chamber of commerce Strobl, it was possible to persuade the +Hungarian consul Pfaller to buy the estate of the Gauleiter on Lake +Constance without ever having seen it, for a price of Reichsmark +240,000. It is noteworthy that the Gauleiter and people close to him +had a very bad opinion of Consul Pfaller, but after the purchase of +the estate the Gauleiter sent him a picture. In order to avoid the +Gauleiter’s appearing personally as the seller, a sham contract was +made with publisher Willmy, so that the latter would appear to the +outside world as the seller of the estate. + +[P. 152] Gauleiter Streicher likes to beat people with a riding whip, +but only if he is in the company of several persons assisting him. +Usually the beatings are carried out with sadistic brutality. + +The best known case is that of Steinruck, whom he beat bloodily in +the prison cell, together with deputy Gauleiter Holz and SA Brigadier +General Koenig. After returning from this scene to the “Deutscher +Hof” he said: “Now I am relieved. I needed that again!” Later he also +stated several times that he needed another Steinruck case in order to +“relieve” [erloesen] himself. + +In August 1938 he beat editor Burker at the district house, together +with district office leader Schoeller and his adjutant Koenig. + +On 2 December 1938 he asked to have three youthful criminals (15 to 17 +years old) who had been arrested for robbery brought to the room of the +director of the criminal police office in Nurnberg-Fuerth. Streicher, +who was accompanied by his son Lothar, had the youths brought in singly +and questioned them about their sex life and in particular, through +clear and detailed questioning, he laid stress on determining whether +and since when they masturbated. One of the youths did not know the +word, whereupon Streicher gave him a vivid description. The last one of +these three boys he beat with his riding whip, with blows on the head +and the rest of the body. + +[P. 151] From 1934 to 1938 Gauleiter Streicher employed the Jew Jonas +Wolk as contributor to the Stuermer. Wolk wrote for the Stuermer under +the pseudonym of “Fritz Brandt”. In addition, Wolk did spy work for +the Gauleiter abroad. From February 1937 to August 1938 the Stuermer +paid the Jew Wolk a fee of Reichsmark 8,262.39. Wolk was previously +convicted six times, among other things with loss of civic rights. +It is especially significant that Streicher had the Jew Wolk paid +by the Fraenkische Tageszeitung from 1934 to 1937. The Fraenkische +Tageszeitung paid Wolk the sum of Reichmark 9,623.65. + +[P. 160] According to the statement of the district treasurer +[Gauschatzmeister], his financial adviser, and several other persons, +Streicher is regarded as extremely brutal. The statements made by +Verlagsdirektor Fink are especially significant. He declared that he +was convinced that the Gauleiter would have him bumped off one of these +days, as soon as he found out that Fink had told the truth to the +investigating commission. + +[P. 161] According to reports of reliable witnesses, Gauleiter +Streicher is in the habit of pointing out on the most varied occasions +that he alone gives orders in the district of Franconia. For instance, +at a meeting in the Collosseum in Nurnberg in 1935 he said that nobody +could remove him from office. In a meeting at Herkules Hall, where +he described how he had beaten Prof. Steinruck, he emphasized that +he would not let himself be beaten by anybody, _not even by an Adolf +Hitler_. + +[P. 166] For, this also must be stated here, in Franconia the Gau acts +first and then orders the absolutely powerless authorities to approve. + +[P. 172] In general it is to be said that Koenig was regarded as the +evil spirit in Franconia. In an unheard-of-manner he tyrannized the Gau +leader, the authorities and the population, and he knew how to make +the influence of his power felt everywhere. Koenig’s word carried the +weight of that of the Gauleiter. + +[P. 174] In favor of Strobl [pencil note: Director of the AEG, +Gau economic adviser, and president of the Chamber of Industry +and Commerce] it must be said that he, in contrast to almost all +other defendants, immediately told the truth on all points in his +interrogations. It is primarily thanks to him that clearness was +quickly reached in many cases which could be verified. + +As an excuse for his incorrect acts Strobl states that he like all +other persons in the Gau of Franconia was to such an extent under the +pressure of Gauleiter Streicher and his adjutant Koenig that he would +never have dared to do anything against the orders of the two men +mentioned. + +[P. 179] By the law of April 1938 it is decreed that all applications +for Aryanization shall be submitted to the competent Gauleiter. From +that time on Strobl submitted the applications, which he had up to +that time handled by himself, to the adjutant of the Gauleiter, SA +Brigadier General Koenig for approval. He makes the excuse that it had +been the practice in Franconia for the adjutant to take care of almost +all matters as agent for and deputy of the Gauleiter. Every order of +Brigadier General Koenig was equivalent to an order of the Gauleiter. + + + COPY OF DOCUMENT 1759-PS + + United Mexican States } + Mexico, Federal District } + Embassy of the United } ss + States of America } + } + + Mexico City, D. F. } + } ss + Mexico } + +Raymond H. Geist, being first duly sworn, deposes and says: + +I came to Berlin in December, 1929, as Consul and continued in that +capacity, exercising my official functions until the end of 1939. In +1938 I was appointed First Secretary of the Embassy and continued in +that office discharging at the same time my duties as consul. During +the entire period of ten years my work was of such character that +I frequently came into contact with many officials of the German +Government. After the Nazis came to power in 1933, these contacts +increased owing to the much more frequent occasions on which it was +necessary to intervene with German officials in order to protect the +rights of American citizens and their properties. During this period I +not only had many official contacts but also friends and acquaintances, +both in Berlin and elsewhere in Germany. My work permitted and +occasionally required travel in Germany. It was my custom to make +bicycle trips, as well as excursions by automobile to various points +particularly in the environs of Berlin, often to the extent of fifty +miles. Although I do not have the first-hand information with regard +to developments under the National Socialists for all of Germany that +I have regarding the neighborhood of Berlin, I saw enough during my +excursions, and was told enough by friends and acquaintances to know +that the activities hereafter described in and around Berlin were being +substantially duplicated all over Germany. + +There were indeed few military establishments in the neighborhood of +Berlin in 1929 and until 1933 there were the Casernas at Potsdam and +the military establishment at Doeberitz. After the Nazis came to power, +military establishments of all sorts grew up with enormous rapidity. +Before the end of 1933, during my frequent excursions, I discovered +outside of Berlin on nearly every road leaving from the city new large +military establishments, including training fields, airports, barracks, +proving grounds, anti-aircraft stations and the like. For these +establishments most of the ground was broken during the year 1933; +there were probably fifty within the immediate vicinity of Berlin. +Most of these establishments were being openly prepared, nevertheless +they were under guard. It was apparent with respect to others that an +attempt was made to preserve secrecy. I recall in particular that the +large anti-aircraft station near my house in the Gruenwald was built +under secrecy, likewise a munitions dump burrowed in the hills of +Wildpark near Potsdam was also built under secrecy. Being disguised as +a German and speaking the language, I was able on my bicycle trips to +penetrate certain of these establishments where at various times I saw +military exercises, including the use of tanks, in various maneuvers. +I recall from my travels beyond Berlin and the information and reports +which I had from friends and acquaintances that the same feverish +preparations were in progress throughout the length and breadth of +Germany, in fact, all establishments which could serve a military +purpose were converted to military uses. + +I also saw the preparations being made for building up the new army. I +visited the camps of the compulsory labor service, the _Arbeitsdienst_, +which was well under way by the end of 1933, with camps established +all over Germany. Though this was ostensibly a labor service, it was +essentially military in character, as is well known. I saw the men +working on reclamation projects and was informed that they worked two +hours in the morning and two hours in the afternoon, the balance of +the time being spent in military tactics and in instruction in Nazi +ideology. So that when conscription went into effect in 1935 through +the medium of these camps, it was possible for the Germans to put a +trained army of at least 3,500,000 men, which formed the nucleus of the +future army of aggression. + +Particularly through the years 1933 and 1934 the hordes of storm +troopers SA were much in evidence practicing military exercises. +They were being converted into a military organization. I frequently +encountered the storm troopers deployed in fields and in forests +engaged in military technical exercises. This was all the part of a +general plan to prepare Germany’s manpower for war. + +I witnessed, too, scores of times, the training of the Hitler Youth, +which included boys from 14 to 17, who dressed in their uniforms, were +likewise generally in evidence wherever I chose to travel. I frequently +saw them in the woods near Berlin, deployed in ravines, in fields, +woods and hillsides staging mock attacks, employing the technique of +actual maneuvers. Frequently they were under the direction of uniformed +leaders and at times under officers of the Reichswehr. This type of +training of the youth extended everywhere in Germany. Frequently my +route of travel had to be changed in order not to find myself in the +midst of some maneuvers which required the use of roads or paths along +which I was riding. It was not considered wise to get too close to +these operations, particularly if they were on an extensive scale. + +The _Deutsche Jungvolk_ (boys from the ages of 6 to 14) was also the +vehicle for military training. They were also in evidence throughout +the country. I frequently met them marching. I saw them engaged in +military exercises in the school yards during the school recesses, +particularly throwing hand grenades usually under expert adult +leadership. Often I have seen these children in large numbers engaged +in what were obviously military maneuvers, and under the direction of +adult uniformed officers. + +I had occasion, at times, to witness the organizations which were +created for the girls that were part of the Hitler Youth and were +also incorporated in the so-called _Arbeitsdienst_, usually located +somewhere near the camps for men. The resultant illegitimate children +were a definite planned result of the program; they were part of the +manpower and the army for the next generation. The shame and the grief +of parents over this program fostered and urged by the Nazis although +it existed, was seldom openly expressed on account of dangers to which +the parents might expose themselves. + +So far as the youth were concerned, the entire program was carried +on with lavish propaganda and enough benefits to the participants to +make it extremely popular. The Nazis provided the youth with special +trains, special trucks, special bathing beaches, food and other +privileges. At the same time, the semi-hysteria which was maintained +about the whole National Socialist program made it impossible for +parents or anyone else to speak against it even if they had wished to +do so. The German people were well acquainted with the goings on in +concentration camps and it was well known that the fate of anyone too +actively opposed to any part of the Nazi program was liable to be one +of great suffering. Indeed, before the Hitler regime was many months +old almost every family in Germany had had first-hand accounts of the +brutalities inflicted in the concentration camps from someone either in +the relationship or in the circle of friends who had served a sentence +there; consequently the fear of such camps was a very effective brake +on any possible opposition. + +In addition to what I saw during these many years with my own eyes +regarding the preparation and the building of a huge armed force, +I received reliable information from trustworthy sources as to its +scope and strength. One of my close friends in Berlin was one George +Graffenstein, who lived at 34 Altenauerstrasse, just across the street +from me. He was a German, formerly a member of Meile Printing Company +of Chicago and a man strongly opposed to the Nazis. He had been an +officer in the German army in the First World War; therefore he knew +a large number of the officers of Reichswehr. Occasionally he gave in +his house beer-evenings which a number of Reichswehr officers attended, +including certain generals. To these parties I was occasionally +invited. One of these generals was General Goettke, who was the head +of the artillery on the General Staff and a very close friend of +Graffenstein. In addition, Graffenstein’s nephew was on the General +Staff and was at the same time the liaison between the Reichswehr +and the S.A. Late in 1934, George Graffenstein told me that from the +information which he had received from his friends, the armament +program was already so complete, so far advanced, so gigantic and +all-inclusive, that there was no doubt of Germany’s winning the war +on sheer weight of arms alone. That same information was given to me +directly by certain of the high officers of the Reichswehr, whom I met +at Graffenstein’s house. + +By the middle of 1934 it had become obvious that the rearmament +program, though in its beginning, was being planned on a vast scale so +that it could not possibly be considered as defensive armament but only +as a weapon for offensive war. This was, however, not a conclusion of +my own; but it was openly stated as such to me. Graffenstein told me in +1934, during the conversations to which I have already referred, that +the purpose of the program was an aggressive war. He told me that he +had been so informed by General Goettke in particular. This statement +was borne out by other persons who were in the know in Germany at +that time. I confirmed his statements by my own conversations with the +generals who gathered in his house. They intimated to me, not only that +Germany was embarked upon an inevitable program toward war but even +gave me indications of the general plan, namely, the drive to the East +and the attack upon Russia, after Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Austria +had been eliminated. This was as early as 1934, and I had many similar +conversations along the same line at Graffenstein’s house during the +following years. + +Similar information was constantly being confirmed from other sources +at later dates. For instance, in December 1938, I had a conversation +with General Franz Halder, who was then Chief of Staff, at the house +of Dr. Etscheit, a prominent Berlin lawyer. Halder stated to me: “You +must take into account the National Socialist program in the East. +If you, the Western powers, oppose our program in the East, we shall +have to go to war with you.” During this conversation he made it +clear to me that the program of the Nazis for expansion in the East +was unalterably fixed and decided upon. It included the attack on +Poland, the annexation of Austria, territorial expansion in Yugoslavia, +Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Russia, particularly in the Ukraine. The +latter provinces would have to be German. When I replied to Halder +that I was positive the Western powers would never tolerate any such +aggressive program and that inevitably it would not only mean war with +England and France but with the United States as well Halder replied: +“That is a pity.” + +The same information as to the aggressive intention of the Nazis was +given to me by a friend, Count von Bismarck, formerly Counselor of the +German Embassy in London. He was violently anti-Nazi. In Germany, where +I knew him, he held no official position, deriving his income from +his estates in East Prussia; but he was a man with wide contacts in +officialdom, particularly in the Foreign Office. He said that the Nazis +were headed for war, for huge aggressive adventures, that conquest of +the East was a major part of the vast plan and that conquest of the +West would only follow, when complete victory in the East solidified +Germany’s strength and resources in those quarters. He made this +statement to me in 1936 and we discussed it often in 1937 and 1938. He +was extremely disturbed, not over the aggressive plans of the Nazis, +but over their manner of converting Germany into a slave State, which +he repudiated entirely. He considered that the course of the Nazis +militarily could not be hindered and furthermore, no country was +preparing to stop them. + +I also had the same information from another reliable source. After +Hitler came to power in 1933, General von Hammerstein withdrew from +public life. He had been head of the Reichswehr under Chancellor +Bruening. Although he was then retired, he knew and associated +intimately with the Generals of the German Army, as he was among them +_primus inter pares_. He told me of the German program for aggressive +war during a long conversation which we had during a musical recital +in 1938 at Dr. Paul Kempner’s home. The army, he said, was at a +highly mechanized strength, extremely mobile and ready for anything. +He was sure, in view of the preparations and the excellent character +of the German equipment that the German Army was then an instrument +of invincible striking power. He stated categorically that it was a +superb instrument which had been formed to wage war and that it would +not be much longer delayed. He did not know the plans and details but +he confirmed the information that I had from all sources, that Germany +intended to strike in the East and that the war in the West depended on +whether or not the Western powers would endeavor to intervene when the +German war machine started moving. + +Of these aggressive designs I learned also from other sources. A +personal friend, Dr. Hans Henniger, a veterinarian in Berlin, was an +intimate friend of an officer by the name of Schlessicher (I believe +that is the correct spelling), who was the responsible purveyor to the +German Army, therefore a high member of the Quartermaster Corps. I +do not remember his exact title. Dr. Henniger received from this man +information constantly with regard to the preparations being made by +the Germans in 1939. A month before March 15, 1939, I was informed of +the plans for marching into Prague on that date and that large stocks +of food and other equipment were being accumulated near the border of +Czechoslovakia. On March 15, 1939, the German Army rolled into Prague. + +I also had a good deal of personal experience with and first-hand +knowledge of the internal policies from 1935 to 1939. Indeed, from the +very outset of the regime, I had intimate and continuous contact with +various officers of the German Government in the course of my duties as +an American official protecting American citizens or protesting against +their mistreatment. The acts of violence against American citizens were +numerous, particularly during the early years of 1933 and 1934. In +addition, I was constantly receiving information as regards other Nazi +tactics and the nature and number of victims from a variety of sources; +the victims themselves on many occasions, both American and German, +told me their experiences and appealed for help; relatives and friends +of victims, both those who came back and those who did not; the foreign +newspaper correspondents and, to a very considerable degree, I received +information from the Gestapo itself. + +For a period I dealt directly with Herr Heinrich Himmler, then +subsequently with Herr Reinhard Heydrich and often with Dr. Werner Best. + +My vigorous relations with the Gestapo began in March, 1933. In fact +I knew the organization of the secret police and dealt with that +organization before the Nazis came to power. It was then the Politische +Abteilung des Politizeipraesident, i.e., the political division of +the Politizeipraesidium, which was charged with supervisory and +preventive functions with regard to political matters, then chiefly +investigating the terror of Communists. It was located in Berlin at +the Politizeipraesidium. On March 6, 1933, it was moved from the +Politizeipraesidium to No. 8 Prinzalbrechtstrasse and became the +famous Gestapo [Geheimstaatpolizei], its first chief was Rudolf Diels, +who was succeeded by Heinrich Himmler, in May, 1934. I knew well not +only Diels but also Himmler, his second in command, Reinhard Heydrich +and his administrative officer, Dr. Werner Best. The organization at +No. 8 was huge with over 1,000 persons employed there. Besides, as +rapidly as administrative measures permitted, Gestapo headquarters +were established throughout Germany, not only in the cities but in +provincial places to such an extent that the smallest hamlet and +village fell under direct Gestapo supervision. At the beginning of +the Hitler regime, the only organization which had meeting places +throughout the country was the S.A. (storm troopers). Until the Gestapo +could be organized on a national scale the thousands of local S.A. +meeting places became the “arrest points.” There were at least fifty +of these in Berlin. Communists, Jews, and other known enemies of the +Nazi party were taken to these points and, if they were enemies of +sufficient importance, they were immediately transferred to the Gestapo +headquarters. During 1933 and 1934, when the Gestapo became universally +organized, the S.A. were gradually eliminated as arresting agents +and the S.S. [Schutzstaffe] were incorporated as administrative and +executive officials into the Gestapo. By the end of 1934, the S.A. had +been fairly well eliminated and the S.S., the members of which wore +elegant black suits and were therefore called Elite Guards, became +almost identical as functionaries with the Gestapo. + +Immediately in 1933, the concentration camps, as soon as they were +established, were put under the immediate charge of the Gestapo and +they remained exclusively a Gestapo institution. Only “political” +prisoners were held in the concentration camps. Ordinary criminals +remained the responsibility of the regular police authorities and the +established courts. On being sentenced, they were confined in the +regular prisons. These confinements were always the result of duly +carried out legal procedure. Incarceration in concentration camps was +carried out without any legal procedure, neither indictment nor trial. +Prisoners were, occasionally, released from the concentration camps +and turned over to the prosecuting attorney for prosecution before +the legal courts of justice. A prisoner accused of high treason, for +example, whose offense might carry a death sentence, would be released +to the prosecuting attorney for trial in the people’s court. All +felonies were tried by the regular courts. + +As I have stated, my frequent contacts with this entire Gestapo +organization began with the first wave of terrorist acts in the week of +March 6-13, 1933. That wave was accompanied by universal mob violence. +Since 1925, one of the cries of the Nazi party had been “Jude Verrecke” +(Death to the Jews) and when the Nazi party won the elections in March, +1933, on the morning of the sixth, the accumulated passion blew off in +wholesale attacks on the Communists, Jews, and those who were suspected +of being either. Mobs of S.A. men roamed the streets, beating up, +looting, and even killing persons. + +No American citizen, so far as I am aware, was killed, but a number of +them were assaulted and injured and appealed to the Consulate General +for aid and protection. For example, Nathaniel Wolff, an American +citizen, who resided in Rochester, New York, made an affidavit which +stated: + + This morning, March 6, at 5 o’clock, there came into my room five or + six Nazis with drawn revolvers. They abused me, called me a dirty + Russian Jew and started going through my belongings. They asked me + what remarks I had made. I replied that I had made none that I knew + of and that I am not interested in politics. One of them shouted “Do + you call throwing bombs not being interested in politics?” Another + asked at the same time, “Are you the Wolff who lived in the Pension + Stephanie?” Having left the Stephanie on account of difficulties + with the Portier regarding the price of the room and his behavior, I + whistled very softly, intimating that I understood the source of the + denunciation. Thereupon one of the Nazis remarked: “Du Scheiss Jude, + warum pfeiffst du?” and hit me in the jaw. They said that they would + take me to the police station, whereupon I answered, “The quicker, + the better, because my conscience is absolutely clear.” One of them + said, “Do you call throwing bombs having a clear conscience?” The + intruders were not accompanied by an officer, nor did they carry + “Hilfspolizei” armbands. They took me in an automobile to an address + in the Knewbeck Strasse beyond the Kant Strasse (I believe No. 67 or + 76, Gartenhaus left, I think three or four flights up the stairs). + I was conducted to a bare room in which the shutters were closed + and the windows boarded, evidently to prevent sounds from getting + out, where, after my possessions were taken away including my keys, + I was left with two guards who spent the time abusing the Jews. At + five minutes before seven, the group who had arrested me returned + with two or three members including one who was apparently a leader, + when I was again abused, that is, they gave me to understand that + they imagined I was implicated in communistic activities. I remarked + that I should like to send a telegram to my cousin, Alan Steyne at + the Hamburg American Consulate, and asked if I had the right to + do so, whereupon the leader replied: “As a foreigner you have no + right, and especially not as a Jew.” One of the men then proceeded + to bind my hands and feet as closely and as painfully as possible. I + still bear the marks of the bruises on my wrists. I was questioned + about various English and French letters which had been found in + my room and taken along with them and then I was left about half + an hour alone because they evidently discussed my fate. After some + time one of the group returned and advised me that every one had a + right to his own political opinions as long as no attempt was made + to mix into politics. He remarked that nothing was to be gained by + brutality, undid the rope and freed my hands and feet and gave me + a cup of coffee and said, “Probably the thing isn’t so bad because + women chatter a great deal” and that I was denounced by a girl. After + a few minutes he elaborated the statement that the girl, Paula, of + the Pension, had denounced me as having the intention of throwing + bombs at the Nazi parade. I expressed my astonishment and told him + the facts of the case. He appeared to laugh it off and asked me if + I would be willing to sign a paper on the condition that they would + release me. I said “yes.” They then said I would have to go to the + police to have my signature attested to and one of the men who had + come in, in the meanwhile, went out to draft the paper I was to sign. + He returned with the paper which read: (1) “I am a Jew,” (2) “I will + leave tonight for Paris,” (3) “I promise never again to set my foot + on German soil.” “I attest that no physical violence was done to me + and that none of my property was stolen.” This paper I signed. They + told me to put on my coat and come to the police. Instead of taking + me to the police station they took me to Charlottenburg towards the + Gruenwald. When I asked to which police station they were taking me, + they replied “You’ll get there soon enough.” When we were near the + Heer Strasse they pretended that the automobile was broken down and + informed me that I would have to walk through the woods to get to the + police station. We proceeded into the woods where three members drew + their pistols and the other two brought straps out of their pockets + and informed me that they were going to teach me a lesson and made as + if they were about to tie me to a tree. They said that they intended + to beat the life out of me and “You can walk back afterwards.” I + replied that I hoped I would be able to walk. This was probably about + eight o’clock and we were entirely alone as nobody had followed us. + I took off my coat myself and remarked “If one can’t help oneself, + one may as well make the best of it.” One of them threw my coat + to the ground and said “Get ready” and after making a threatening + gesture, said “You can go home now!” pointing to the wrong direction, + whereupon they walked rapidly to the automobile and disappeared + yelling after me, “Keep your mouth shut.” I was also threatened that + if they ever caught me in Germany again, they would know how to get + me out of the way. * * * + +Another American, Herman I. Roseman, made an affidavit which stated: + + Yesterday, March 10, 1933, in the afternoon at about 4:30, I came + out of “KDW” with my fiancee, Fraulein Else Schwarzlose, residing in + Wilmersdorf, Kaiser-Allee 172, and proceeded to walk along Tauentzien + Strasse. A man in S. A. uniform stepped on my toe purposely, + obviously offended me and said “Pardon.” I said “bitte,” and walked + ahead. He followed me and kicked me saying: “Na und?” A policeman saw + this and walked ahead, paying no attention to attacks made on me. + Then I took my passport out of my pocket, showed it to the second + policeman, and said that I was an American citizen, but he walked + ahead, obviously not able to afford me protection, or at least being + unwilling. The S.A. man continued to attack me, struck me in the + face, wounded me over the eye, and continued to do me bodily harm. + During this attack, all the time my walking along, we reached another + policeman, and I applied to him, showing my passport and said: “I am + an American and am entitled to protection.” He shrugged his shoulder + and said “What can I do?” By this time the S.A. man had obviously + inflicted enough attack upon me and walked away. + + Upon my appeal the policeman brought my fiancee and me to the station + house at 13 Bayreuther Strasse. My fiancee and I reported to the + officer in charge. He heard the story and said that he was sorry, but + that there was nothing to do. My face was bleeding. The policeman + said that he had had orders not to interfere in any affair in which + an S.A. man took part. I then asked him what I could do to protect + myself. He said that there was nothing to do but to wait until the + situation was better. He added that the police were absolutely + powerless, and were under the direction of the S.A., and that there + were S.A. [Sturm-Abteilung] in the police itself. Thereupon I + departed * * * + +Another American, Mrs. Jean Klauber, made an affidavit which stated: + + That on the night of Friday, March 10, 1933, she and her husband + had retired for the night when they were awakened by a prolonged + ringing of their apartment bell. They heard pounding upon the street + door and a demand for immediate entry, and a concurrent threat to + break the door down. The street door was opened by the janitor’s + wife, and a party of four or five men entered and went at once to + the apartment of the deponent where they again rang and pounded on + the door. Mr. Klauber asked who was there, and was answered--“The + police.” He opened the door and a party of four or five men in brown + uniforms, one wearing a dark overcoat and carrying a rifle, pushed + in, jostling Mr. and Mrs. Klauber aside. One asked Mrs. Klauber where + the telephone was and she indicated the room where it was to be + found, and started to go there. Thereupon, she was knocked down by + one of them. They went on to the bedroom where Mr. and Mrs. Klauber + followed them, and there they demanded their passports. Mr. Klauber + went to the wardrobe to get his, and was stopped, being asked by the + intruders whether he was carrying any weapons. Being clothed only + in pajamas, his denial was accompanied by a gesture indicating his + garb. He then turned to the wardrobe, opened it, and reached for one + of his four suits hanging there in where he thought the passport + was, and was immediately attacked from behind by all but one of the + intruders, who beat him severely with police clubs, the one with + the overcoat and rifle standing by. Remarks were shouted such as + “Look. Four suits, while for fourteen years we have been starving.” + Mrs. Klauber tried to inquire the reason for their actions, and was + answered--“Jews. We hate you. For fourteen years we have been waiting + for this, and tonight we’ll hang many of you.” + + When the intruders stopped beating Mr. Klauber he was unconscious, + and they demanded the passports again of Mrs. Klauber. Mrs. Klauber + found her American passport and her German passport (required by + local authorities as the wife of a German citizen, and issued by the + Police at Munich after her arrival here), and the intruders took both + in spite of Mrs. Klauber’s protests that she was American. She then + searched for her husband’s passport, laid hold of his pocket-book, + and in her excitement offered it to them. Though full of money they + refused it, and again demanded the passport. Mrs. Klauber then found + it and handed it over. + + Then the intruders returned to the unconscious Mr. Klauber, saying + “He hasn’t had enough yet,” and beat him further. Then they left, + saying “We are not yet finished,” and just as they departed, one of + them said to Mrs. Klauber “Why did you marry a Jew? I hate them” and + struck her on the jaw with his police club * * * + +I personally can verify that the police had been instructed not +to interfere; that is that there was official sanction for these +activities. Affidavits taken from numerous victims attest this fact. +I had become acquainted with the two police officers stationed at +the corner of Bellevuestrasse and Tiergartenstrasse near where the +Consulate General was located; these officers told me that they and +all the other police officers had received definite instructions not to +interfere with the S.A., the S.S. or the Hitler Youth. + +For the Germans who were taken into custody by the Gestapo, chiefly +Communists at that time, there was, from my experience and from the +information that I had from all sources, a regular pattern of brutality +and terror. Upon arrest, the victims would be systematically subjected +to indignities and brutalities such as beatings, kicking, pushing +downstairs, deprivation of food and all comforts, and threats of much +worse. After the victims had been imprisoned--usually in cellars, since +both the headquarters at No. 8 Albrechtstrasse and the S.A. meeting +places usually had them--they would be beaten with various degrees +of severity. If the Gestapo believed that the victim--particularly +Communist leaders--had information as to other alleged accomplices they +would give systematic beatings, usually when stripped and tied on a +table. This would go on often for many days until they had extracted +the information they wanted or killed the victim. + +Based on all of the reports which I had from many sources, my judgment +is that the victims were numbered in the hundreds of thousands all +over Germany. Many of them were ultimately released. I can state with +certainty that the contemporaneous accounts in foreign newspapers, such +as the London Times and the American newspapers which I have seen, are +accurate. + +The second wave of terror was not so systematic nor so concentrated as +to point of time. It was directed chiefly against the Jews, and was +chiefly the result of the ruthless and occasionally violent enforcement +of numerous decrees and orders, such as the Nurnberg Decrees. After +the initial outbreak in March, 1933, and all through that year and the +next, the Jews still in Germany had, in many cases, come to believe +that things might become a little better and that they could live in +some sort of peaceable relationship with the Nazis, even though they +were reduced to the status of second or third class citizens. In 1935, +however, the pressure on them began to increase and they began to be +excluded completely from certain civil activities. The terrorism was +continued all the time to some degree; but the enforcement of the new +decrees in 1935 was characterized by such brutality and ruthlessness +that it warrants special attention. Inadvertent violators were dealt +with, for example, with great severity. + +The 1938 wave of terror was a very pronounced and definite one. Again +the object was the Jews, particularly the wealthy ones. The ostensible +occasion was the murder of the German diplomat, von Rieth, by a +French Jew, but the violence was in no sense spontaneous. Dr. Best, +the Administrative Officer of the Gestapo, told me that the terror +had been decided upon and ordered by Hitler himself, and that he, Dr. +Best, could, therefore, do nothing about it. Actually that statement +corroborated what everyone knew. Innumerable persons with whom I talked +and who witnessed the violence told me that at all of the synagogues, +which had been set on fire by the Nazis, the fire departments were +always present, but never acted except to prevent the fires from +spreading to neighboring non-Jewish properties. Nor did the police +interfere with any of these acts of vandalism and incendiarism. + +I personally did not see any of the violence nor the burning of +the synagogues while the acts were being perpetrated, as the mobs +throughout Germany commenced to work at midnight on November 8, 1938, +and carried through their activities during the early morning hours of +November 9. At that time I was on my way to the Wartburg Castle, and on +the day of November 9 I saw the burned synagogues and the looted and +smashed shops in Eisennach, and later in Berlin. I also know that at +this time many of the wealthy Jews, who had previously escaped attack, +were arrested, among whom were relatives of American citizens. Pursuant +to requests from the United States, some of which were transmitted +through the Department of State, I personally intervened with the +Gestapo through Dr. Best, and secured the return of nearly twenty +victims from the Saxonhausen Concentration Camp. Among these victims +were Fritz Warburg and Eugene Garbaty. I think that many, perhaps most +of these people, were released in the space of ten days or two weeks +with the warning that if they remained in Germany they would have +cause to regret it. In all cases the victims were subjected to rough +treatment. Those who returned from the concentration camp and whom I +saw in my office had their hair closely clipped, a common outward sign +that they had been at Saxonhausen. + +The Gestapo authorities with whom I spoke on my frequent, and often +daily visits to the Gestapo headquarters did not hesitate to state +that they regarded Communists in particular as subversive and as an +element dangerous to the State, and that it was necessary to wipe +them out. Diehls, the first chief of the Gestapo, in particular, whom +I saw nearly every day of the March wave of terror in 1933, made no +attempt to conceal the systematic character of the roundups of what he +called “subversive persons”; though he did attempt to justify it to +me as necessary to the safety of the State. While denying that any +violence against American citizens was contemplated, he admitted that +it was being undertaken against Germans. Terroristic tactics, however, +in all their various forms, were so completely and thoroughly the +actuating policy, that it would have been wholly redundant to discuss +it. They and I both understood that it was the mainspring of all +Gestapo activity--indeed of all Nazi activity--and that it was beyond +discussion. + +On one occasion I received a clear and definite admission of the Nazi +terroristic policy with respect to many of their victims. In 1938 I +was making strenuous efforts to free a young man from a concentration +camp. He had been arrested in March, 1933, for aiding certain of his +comrades to escape Germany, and had been sentenced by regular courts +to a sentence of 2½ years. When he was released from the Brandenburg +Prison at the end of that time, he was taken into custody by the +Gestapo and sent to Dachau, the notorious concentration camp, and from +there to Buchenwald. I had tried over a long period of time to secure +his release by appeals personally to Himmler, Heydrich and Best, and +had failed. In 1938, however, I was told by Ministerialraet Krohne, in +the Ministry of Justice, that if I could reach Gruppenfuehrer Eiche of +the Todtenkopfverbaende (Death’s Head Regiments) I might be successful. +Eiche was then the head of all German concentration camps. After having +first been told officially by the Gestapo that no such person existed, +I was finally able by a ruse to secure his telephone number whereupon, +through the recommendation of Krohne, I was able to make an appointment +with Eiche at the Saxonhausen Concentration Camp near Berlin. He told +me that with respect to Communists and any other persons who were +suspected of holding views contrary to the Nazi conception of the +State, such persons were “Asociale”, that is, impossible of social +assimilation and, therefore, they must be physically eliminated from +society or destined to perpetual confinement. Thaelman, the leader of +the Communists in the Reichstag, was, as is well known, kept during the +Hitler regime in perpetual confinement. His ultimate fate has never +been revealed. + +On another occasion I was given considerable information by a high +official of the Gestapo as to the policy of the Nazis with respect to +the Jews. I had had a considerable contact with the head of the Jewish +section of the Gestapo, known as the “Judische Abteilung der Gestapo”, +one Dr. Hasselbacher, in connection with making arrangements for +official representatives of the American Joint Distribution Committee +to visit certain Jewish centers throughout Germany, for which +visits, of course, the permission of the Gestapo was necessary. These +negotiations brought me frequently in touch with Dr. Hasselbacher, +whom I came to know very well. He told me that Germany will be made +“Judenrein”, that is, clean of Jews. He said that all the Jews who +failed to leave Germany would be exterminated. That statement was +made in 1938 before the extermination camps were established, but the +statement of Hasselbacher clearly indicated the eventual emergence +of extermination camps in accordance with the general Nazi plan; for +certainly the Jews were unable to leave Germany, even if they had been +permitted to do so by the Nazis, as no world-wide arrangement had been +made to receive them in other countries. + +I had a great deal of experience with the systematic measures which +were taken to confiscate property of non-Nazis, particularly Jews. +Force of circumstance and a settled governmental policy made this +campaign a more gradual one. Drastic and sudden action would have led +to the alienation of a great deal of ready assets owned by the Jews +and would have tended to destroy the economic value of Jewish-owned +property. It would also have resulted in the physical destruction or +hiding by Jews of things of value, as indeed did happen to a great +extent. Consequently, the Nazis permitted many Jews, particularly those +of wealth and position, to remain unmolested for many years, giving the +Jews the faithless and false assurance that they were exempted from the +general repressive program for various reasons. For example, I knew +well the leading German cigarette manufacturer, Eugene Garbaty. Until +September, 1938, he was in complete control of his fortune. During that +month, however, he was compelled to sell his factory, worth between +seven million and ten million marks for the sum of one million marks. +In October, 1938, his country estate near Dresden, valued probably over +two million marks, was simply confiscated with no payment at all. It +was to be used, as the authorities stated, for a welfare center for +German Youth. After his experience in the Pogrom of November 8, 1938, +Garbaty applied for a passport and received one only after paying a +bribe of 500,000 marks to the corrupt Count Heldorf, Chief of Police +in Berlin, and enough other fines to equal the million marks that he +had received for his factory. He left Germany with nothing, except +that earlier, by bribing the customs officials with approximately +250,000 marks, he had been able to get valuable art treasures out of +Germany. Garbaty is now a citizen of the United States and is living in +Connecticut. + +Another instance of the same nature occurred with respect to my +landlord, Mr. Franz Rinkel, who told me the entire story of his +persecution at the hands of the Nazis. He had a fine house at No. 2 +Bruckenalle in Berlin, in which I lived. Rinkel was one of the victims +sent to Saxonhausen and whom, after the space of a week, I was able +to rescue. One Dr. Lilienthal, a fanatical Nazi lawyer practicing in +Berlin, coveted Rinkel’s house. The general system of expropriating +the property of the Jews was illustrated in this particular case. +My landlord was approached by Dr. Lilienthal and told the price the +latter desired to pay, a mere fraction of the value of the estate. +He was given a few days to make up his mind to sell at that price. +He sold because he knew that if he did not, he would be accused of +some trumped-up crime and taken away to the concentration camp. Dr. +Lilienthal took possession of Rinkel’s house. I know that on many +occasions where it was thought necessary to increase the pressure, the +prospective purchaser or his agent would be accompanied by a uniformed +S.A. or S.S. man. I know because I lived in the immediate neighborhood +and know the individuals concerned, that Baron von Neurath, one time +Foreign Minister of Germany, got his house from a Jew in this manner. +Indeed, he was my next door neighbor in Dahlem. Von Neurath’s house was +worth approximately 250,000 dollars. I know too that Alfred Rosenburg, +who lived in the same street with me, purloined a house from a Jew in +similar fashion. There were, of course, innumerable instances in which +Nazis used their positions in the Party to void debts and the like. +An illustration of this were the cases of the persons who came to the +Consulate in Berlin and informed us of the circumstances. For example, +Max Schussler, an American citizen, made an affidavit which states: + + * * * I own several apartment houses in Berlin, one situated at + Ring Strasse 11, Berlin-Steglitz. On the property at Ring Strasse + 11 resides a tenant by the name of Hans Zink, who owns and operates + a restaurant in those premises. He has been in arrears in his rent + for about a year. Since the first of February of this year, that + is, since the new Government came into power, he has refused to + pay his rent. I gave instructions to the Sheriff to have him put + out. Yesterday two uniformed men came to my office and spoke to my + secretary and said that if I do not recall the order to the Sheriff + to have Zink evicted, something will happen to me. I did not see + these men. My secretary received them. She stated they wore black + trousers and brown shirts. She referred them to my attorney, Felix + Szkolny, Charlottenstrasse 17, Berlin S.W. 68. They went to the + attorney, but he refused to give the order. They came to my office + again and said to my secretary that if I did not give the order in + writing and hand it over to a certain address within an hour’s + time, something would happen. I then called the police station at + Alexandrinenstrasse 134, Revier No. 113, and a police officer came to + my office and accompanied me to a taxi, when I went home. + + About a week before, it may be noted, Zink had come to my office and + insisted on my rescinding the order of eviction, and said, “I care + nothing about law; we are now in power, remember that. Do anything + you please, I am not going out of the office until you cancel the + order”. I called the police, and an officer came. Zink said, “I do + not care what you say”. After about ten minutes the officer put him + out. + + At two o’clock Tuesday morning, March 7, I was awakened and faced by + two men with pistols, who had come into the house. They were allowed + to enter by the janitress, as they claimed to be “Hilfspolizei”, and + also by my maid. These two men were accompanied by two others in + civilian clothes, the former wearing the brown National Socialist + uniforms. They said, “Here, dress yourselves, quick too”. My wife + asked them to turn about while she dressed, but they refused. She + was compelled to remove her night gown at the point of a revolver + and stand naked before the intruders. When she protested they said, + “Don’t be theatrical”. My wife then wanted to telephone, but they + said, “No, sit down. Do not touch the telephone”, while they kept + their pistols pointed at us all the time. I sat down. One of them + said, “Have you got a fountain pen? You sign that”. I had to sign + the order to the Sheriff cancelling the order of eviction, and had + to sign another letter to the tenant Zink, stating that the order + of eviction was called off. I hesitated to sign and they drew their + revolvers on me, and my wife in terror fell to her knees, and then + I signed. I asked if they had credentials, and they pointed to the + “Hakenkreuz” on their sleeves and said that was their credentials. + They then said, “If you recall that order tomorrow, you will be + dead”. After I signed, they left * * * + +Actually, all Nazis used their positions in the Party as a means +of enriching themselves. I have already spoken of the bribe to the +customs officials and the Foreign Office officials, which Mr. Garbaty +was compelled to pay. Another instance of the venality of the Nazi +officials was illustrated in the case of Mendelssohn Bartholdy, who +owned a house near me and whom I knew well. He was told by Count +Heldorf, Chief of Police in Berlin, through his stooge, one Herr +Schmidt, that his passport would cost him 250,000 marks. Bartholdy told +me the facts and asked me if he should pay. Knowing the Nazi practices +and the danger which he ran as a Jew in Germany, I advised him to pay. +He did, got his passport and visa, and left Germany. This happened in +November, 1938. + +I was informed by a personal friend, a Jewish banker in Berlin, Herr +Kempner, whom I believed to be qualified to make an accurate estimate, +that the total confiscations from Jews in Germany was between seven and +eight billion marks. + +I had less experience with the manner in which the Nazis operated in +industrial firms. However, from the accounts of numerous American +businessmen with manufacturing plants in Germany, accounts which agreed +with the information which I had with respect to similar activities +in German factories, I know that the Nazis used their Party position +to obtain authority and power. Many American businessmen told me +that they had serious troubles operating their factories because +the Nazi officials in the establishment, usually recruited from the +workmen, attempted to take over the management themselves, and engaged +consistently and ruthlessly in acts of persecution against non-Nazi +workmen. Many German firms were actually dominated by fanatical Nazis, +usually persons who had had no previous position of importance, such +as janitors, timekeepers and the like. Their position in the Nazi +hierarchy gave them importance in the enterprise out of all proportion +to their standing and position. + + [Signed] Raymond H. Geist + +Subscribed and sworn to before me William L. Brewster Vice Consul of +the United States of America, duly commissioned and qualified, in +Mexico, D. F., Mexico, this 28th day of August 1945. + + [Signed] William L. Brewster + Vice Consul of the United States of America + Service No. 6684 + Tariff No. 38 + No fee prescribed. + + + COPY OF DOCUMENT 1760--PS + + United Mexican States } + Mexico Federal District } + Embassy of the United } SS + States of America } + +George S. Messersmith, being first duly sworn, deposes and says: + +During the period 1930 to the late spring of 1934, I was Consul General +of the United States of America in Berlin. During that period and +particularly during the years 1933 and until my departure for Austria +in the late spring of 1934, the nature of my work brought me into +frequent contact with German Government officials. As background for +this statement it is pertinent to state that this contact with German +Government officials in the highest categories was necessary by me as +Consul General, and some of my principal associates, because of the +circumstances of the period. + +In the period immediately preceding the coming into power of the +National Socialists it was necessary for me and some of my principal +associates in the Consulate General to have contact with high +officials of the German Government because of unsettled state of +affairs in Germany due to the uncertain political situation; this +involved difficulties for American firms of various kinds which made +the intervention of the Consulate General in the line of its regular +duty necessary. In addition to this contact with the officials of the +Government, as a matter of further duty I had contact with individuals +in all parties in Germany in order to keep myself and therefore our +Government currently informed with regard to developments in the +political picture in Germany. During that period, and before the +National Socialists came into power, I therefore had contact of an +informed character with persons in the National Socialist Party for +the purpose of securing information as to their aims and objectives, +but that contact was, before the access to power of that party, with +secondary rather than with the first ranking members thereof. + +Immediately after the access to power of the National Socialist +Government in the beginning of 1933, all sorts of steps of an arbitrary +character were taken by the new Government and by its various agencies +and dependencies which affected the rights of American citizens and +property and in the carrying through of my official duty as Consul +General I had the primary responsibility for the protection of American +citizens and property. In consequence of this responsibility I had to +see frequently almost all of the high ranking members of the German +Government with the exception of Hitler and a very large number of +officials below the rank of Minister. The nature of my duties was such +that a considerable portion of my days had to be spent in visits on +such officials to discuss the protection of American interests and +property. Some of these secondary officials I had known before the +Party came to power, for information purposes. + +It is difficult to explain adequately in a statement of this kind the +circumstances under which these officials of the Nazi German Government +frequently took occasion to talk to me most frankly about matters of +general Nazi policy and to discuss frankly and freely the aims and +purposes of the Nazi regime. Frequently our conversations were long +and difficult because of the matters which I had to present and on +which I had to take the firmest stand. Not infrequently at the end of +such official conversations they spoke freely and without any reserve +with regard to the aims of the regime. + +It is the more important to bring this out in this preliminary section +of my statement because I did not at any time conceal from any of these +Nazi officials my complete lack of sympathy with the course they were +pursuing nor did I hesitate to say to them what I considered was the +danger of the course which they were pursuing not only for Germany but +for Europe and the rest of the world. Their freedom of expression to me +was all the more interesting in view of the fact that I never hesitated +to assert in the strongest possible way the rights of the United States +and of its citizens when they were violated. It requires a knowledge +of the circumstances of the time, of the character and psychology of +these high Nazis and secondary Nazi officials to be able to appreciate +that the fact that I was forthright in my views and did not hesitate +to express them and particularly that we stood out so strongly for +the rights of our country and our citizens that led them to respect +me and my associates and to reveal to me more than they very probably +revealed to other foreign representatives. Whatever the reasons may +have been, however, the Nazi Government officials, almost without +exception from the highest to the lowest with whom I had contact, were +on most occasions amazingly frank in their conversation and without any +concealment of their aims. + +* * * * * * * + +[Omitted is a part of this affidavit in which Mr. Messersmith lists the +names, and states his impressions of, the following: + + 1. Hermann Goering + 2. General Milch + 3. Hjalmar Schacht + 4. Hans Frank + 5. Wilhelm Frick + 6. Count Schwerin von Krosigk + 7. Joseph Goebbels + 8. Richard Walther Darre + 9. Robert Ley + 10. Hans Heinrich Lammers + 11. Otto Meissner + 12. Franz von Papen + 13. Walther Funk + 14. General Wilhelm Keitel + 15. Admiral Eric von Raeder + 16. Admiral Karl Doenitz + 17. Dr. Bohle + 18. Dr. Stuckert + 19. Dr. Krupp von Bohlen + 20. Dr. Davidson] + +In the late spring or early summer of 1934, I cannot recall the exact +date, I left my post as Consul General at Berlin to go to Vienna +where I remained until the late spring of 1937. During my stay in +Austria, I had intimate official and personal contact with the highest +officials of the Austrian Government as well as with many of the +secondary and lower ranking officials. I had this intimate contact +with these officials of the Austrian Government from the very outset +due, undoubtedly, to the fact that when I came to Austria it was +already well known that I was an outspoken opponent of all that the +Nazi Government and leaders stood for. In consequence, even though +I was the Minister of a country which was considered in Austria as +having no immediate concern in Austria’s foreign relations, I received +much information from the many Austrian officials on developments in +Austro-German relations and in their relations with other countries +in Europe. Among those whom I saw frequently and from whom I obtained +information were the following: + + President Miklas + Chancellor Dollfuss + Chancellor Schuschnigg + Foreign Minister Berger-Waldenegg + Police President and Minister of Security, Hofrat Skubl. + +In addition, I should add that there were both in Berlin and in Vienna +a corps of correspondents, many of whom were of outstanding ability and +with whom I was in frequent contact. + +Finally, I should say that during my stay in Austria I made fairly +frequent trips to Berlin and on many of these saw and talked with +the same persons whom I had known during my residence there as +Consul-General. Thus I maintained my German sources of information as +well as acquiring new Austrian ones. + +I feel fully qualified, therefore, to speak with authority on the +matters which follow in this statement. The specific conversations and +events which I recite are, of course, specific facts which I set forth +here as facts. As to many of them, I have refreshed my recollection as +details from contemporaneous reports and letters which I wrote during +this period. The opinions which I offer are, I believe, fully warranted +by the sum total of information which I received from all sources. + +From the very beginnings of the Nazi Government, I was told by both +high and secondary Government officials in Germany that incorporation +of Austria into Germany was a political and economic necessity and that +this incorporation was going to be accomplished “by whatever means +were necessary”. Although I cannot assign definite times and places, +I am sure that at various times and places every one of the German +officials whom I have listed earlier in this statement told me this +with the exception of Schacht, von Krosigk and Krupp von Bohlen. I +can assert that it was fully understood by everyone in Germany who had +any knowledge whatever of what was going on that Hitler and the Nazi +Government were irrevocably committed to this end and the only doubt +which ever existed in conversations or statements to me was “how” and +“when”. + +At the beginnings of the Nazi regime in 1933, Germany was, of course, +far too weak to permit any open threats of force against any country, +such as the threat which the Nazis made in 1938. Instead it was the +avowed and declared policy of the Nazi Government to accomplish the +same results which they later accomplished through force through the +methods which had proved so successful for them in Germany--obtain a +foothold in the cabinet, particularly in the Ministry of the Interior +which controlled the police, and then quickly eliminate the opposition +elements. During my stay in Austria I was told on any number of +occasions by Chancellor Dollfuss, Chancellor Schuschnigg, President +Miklas and other high officials of the Austrian Government that the +German Government kept up constant and unceasing pressure upon the +Austrian Government to agree to the inclusion of a number of Ministers +with Nazi orientation. The English and French Ministers in Vienna with +whom I was in constant and close contact confirmed this information +through statements which they made to me of conversations which they +had with high Austrian officials. + +In order to compel the Austrian Government to accept their terms the +Nazis resorted to almost every conceivable measure, including economic +pressure, propaganda, and most important of all, terroristic acts. +My information concerning these terroristic outrages came partly +from official communiques of the Austrian Government, partly from +responsible news sources, and to a very considerable extent from Skubl, +the Police President and later Minister of Public Security, whom I +saw frequently and knew well. The Austrian secret police under the +direction of Skubl, it should be noted, was one of the most efficient +in all of Europe. + +The outrages were an almost constant occurrence, but there were +three distinct periods during which they rose to a peak. During the +first two of these periods--in mid-1933, and in early 1934--I was +still in Berlin. However, during that period I was told by high Nazi +officials in conversation with them that these waves of terror were +being instigated and directed by them. I found no concealment in my +conversations with high Nazi officials of the fact that they were +responsible for these activities in Austria. These admissions were +entirely consistent with the Nazi thesis that terror is necessary and +must be used to impose the will of the Party not only in Germany but +in other countries. I recall specifically that General Milch was one +of those who spoke frankly that these outrages in Austria were being +directed by the Nazi Party and expressed his concern with respect +thereto and his disagreement with this definite policy of the Party. + +During the wave of terroristic acts in May and June 1934, I had already +assumed my duties as American Minister in Vienna. The bomb outrages +during this period were directed primarily at railways, tourist +centers, and the Catholic Church, which latter, in the eyes of the +Nazis, were one of the strongest organizations opposing them. I recall, +however, that these outrages diminished markedly for a few days during +the meeting of Hitler and Mussolini in Venice in mid-June 1934. At that +time Mussolini was strongly supporting the Austrian Government and was +strongly and deeply interested in maintaining Austrian independence +and sovereignty and in keeping down Nazi influence and activity in +Austria. At that time also Hitler could not afford an open break with +Mussolini and undoubtedly agreed to the short cessation of these bomb +outrages on the insistence of Mussolini because he, Hitler, wished to +achieve as favorable an atmosphere for the meeting between him and +Mussolini as possible. The cessation of the bomb outrages during the +Hitler-Mussolini conversations was considered by me and by the Austrian +authorities and by all observers at that time as an open admission on +the part of Hitler and the German Government that the outrages were +systematically and completely instigated and controlled from Germany. + +While I cannot recall at this time the details of the terroristic +acts, they were fully reported in the Legation despatches of the +period. These reports were based upon intimate and frequent contact +with high Austrian officials and many of the details I received from +the then head of the Austrian Police, Dr. Skubl. While there was no +doubt whatever that these outrages had been conducted and directed by +Germany, there was ample evidence as to the origin of the outrages from +the fact that fragments of the bombs collected by the Austrian police +showed that they were of German manufacture and had been introduced +from Germany into Austria. While I do not recall having seen any of +these bomb fragments myself, I recall specifically having been told +by high Austrian authorities that they had seen them and that there +was no doubt as to the origin of the bombs. A further proof that these +outrages were directed from Germany, although in most cases the bombs +were actually planted by Austrian Nazis, is found in the fact that the +records of the Vienna Police and Courts at the time will show that when +some of these Nazis were arrested they declared proudly that they had +committed these acts. + +At various times I or A. W. Kliefoth, Counselor of the Legation, +reported on these outrages because of their significance. Quotations +from some of these despatches are as follows: + + Trunks containing inflammable material were placed in the + three leading railway stations of Vienna and timed to explode + simultaneously on the evening of May 6. The damage was very slight. + The police charged the Nazis with the Crime. + + An official communique, dated May 10, announced that on the previous + evening a bomb was exploded near the Philadelphia Bridge in Vienna, + wounding two persons. The same evening a bomb was exploded in one of + the local beer gardens, at which a picnic of the Heimwehr was being + held, slightly wounding a woman. + +Official despatch from Vienna dated May 15, 1934. + + During the past week the continuation of the Nazi terrorist + activities in bombing public places and railway lines, with the + object of damaging the Austrian tourist trade, some of which + are described below, was the source of serious concern to the + authorities. This terrorism was carried out according to a well + organized plan, undoubtedly conducted by Nazi agents in Germany. The + explosives used by the Nazis during the past week, according to the + Foreign Office, were all manufactured in Germany and smuggled into + Austria. + + In a communique dated May 24, the authorities also admitted a number + of other bomb outrages at Brannau, Bad Ischl and Dorf an der Pram. + While the damage to both life and property was small--no lives + were lost--the Government admitted its inability to cope with the + situation with the existing measures of security. + + The authorities further confirmed officially, on May 25, a bomb + explosion on May 23 in the residence of the Archbishop of Salzburg, + which caused considerable damage. At Monag, near Salzburg, on May 23, + a bomb explosion wrecked a flower-kiosk, causing damages amounting + to 10,000 schillings. A nine year old child was severely injured in + Anleiten, near Ried. + +Official Despatch from Vienna dated May 29, 1934. + + The Nazi terrorist outrages continued during the past week in spite + of the Government’s notification regarding the application throughout + Austria of martial law for crimes of public violence. These crimes, + now punishable by death, include malicious acts against public order, + and damage to the railway, telegraph, telephone and wireless services + of the State. + + The new development in the recent outrages was that many of the acts + were directed against the property of the Roman Catholic Church, + which in the eyes of the Nazis was the strongest organization + opposing the Nazi regime. + + In addition to the attempted bombing of the Archbishop’s palace in + Salzburg, a few days previously, a bomb was exploded on May 20 in an + annex to the Archbishop’s palace in Feldkirch, which caused minor + damages. The police charged Nazis with the outrages and arrested a + number of suspects. During the night of May 27, a bomb explosion + broke windows in the churches and vicarages of St. Paul in Carinthia. + + In Linz, on May 26, a bomb exploded before the entrance of one of the + schools, breaking 44 windows. The school was empty at the time the + outrage was committed. During the same night, an attempt was made to + blow up the electric works at Brannau, causing a temporary suspension + of the electric service. + + Other outrages, not reported by the press, included an attempt to + blow up one of the bridges over the Danube in Vienna on May 30, a + bomb explosion in one of the popular cafes, and numerous bombings of + telephone and newspaper kiosks. + +Official Despatch from Vienna dated June 4, 1934. + + The National Socialist terrorism in Austria, which started slowly + and cautiously several weeks ago, culminated in a heavy and rather + serious outbreak on June 8 to June 11, threatening not only the + peace and security of the country, but the foreign tourist trade, an + exceedingly important item in Austria’s economic life. The attempts + to wreck the railway lines near Vienna and in other parts of Austria, + as well as terrorist outrages in the principal tourist centers, + occupied the attention of the Government above all other matters. + After a number of important cabinet sessions, new measures were + adopted to counteract the terrorism, and the matter was also the + subject of diplomatic conversations between Austria and Germany. + +Official Despatch from Vienna dated June 13, 1934. + + The outrages in Austria during the week ending June 23, while almost + as numerous as in the week preceding, were less violent in character. + The attacks were directed, as heretofore, against the quarters of + anti-Nazi associations and persons, public utilities, but less + against the railway communications. Additional stores of explosive + materials were uncovered in Vienna and elsewhere. + + * * * * * * * + + A recent terrorist explosion in the Vienna School of Agronomy caused + damages amounting to about 40,000 schillings. As a result of the Nazi + outrages, the school has been closed for one week. + + In an attempted bomb attack on the post office in Bregenz, the + capital of the Province of Vorarlberg, the police seized a supply + of explosives bearing labels of “Sprengstoffwerke Kloster Lechfeld, + G.m.b.H.”, “Dynamit A.G. Hamburg, Alfred Nobel & Co.”, and “Fabrik + Wurzendorf”, explosive factories domiciled in Germany. + +Official Despatch from Vienna dated June 25, 1934. + + During the week ending June 30 there were less terrorist outrages of + major importance, but the number of small outrages, bomb explosions, + attacks on electric, water, and railway establishments had not + decreased. The principal attacks were directed against Catholic + institutions, ex-National Socialists, and the city of Salzburg. The + purpose in the latter case was to frighten foreign tourists away from + the Summer Music Festivals at Salzburg. + + A bomb which exploded in the Roman Catholic vicarage in Kapfenberg, + in the Province of Styria, on June 24, resulted in the death of the + Chaplain, Reverend Franz Eibel. Several other persons were slightly + injured. The death was one of terrorism, although there were several + cases of attacks. Likewise there were attacks on other Church + institutions in different parts of the country. + + A series of outrages were reported on June 28 from Salzburg and + adjoining tourist centers. Bombs were exploded in the market place + and elsewhere, and attempts were made to blow up the electric and + railway communications. The outrages were particularly directed at + Salzburg at this time in view of the forthcoming Summer Festivals, + which ordinarily attract thousands of non-German tourists. Similar + attacks were made the same day in the Provinces of Vorarlberg and + Tyrol. + +Official Despatch from Vienna dated July 3, 1934. + + A series of lesser outrages were reported from all parts of Austria + on Sunday, July 15. A large amount of explosives were stolen from + a shop in Gloggnitz; the director of the institution was fined 600 + schillings and sentenced to two weeks imprisonment for negligence in + guarding the supplies. In Unterkirchen, on July 17, a bomb explosion + damaged the local vicarage and the electric works. On July 18 a bomb + explosion in Innsbruck injured one person, whereas in St. Kathrein + a house was damaged. In Vienna on July 18 a public telephone was + damaged, and set on fire. The perpetrator, a National Socialist, was + immediately apprehended by the Police. At Edlach, a summer resort + about 100 kilometers from Vienna, an attempt was made to bomb the + railway. A similar attempt was made in a Tyrolian mountain railway + station. + +Official Despatch from Vienna dated July 26, 1934. + +In addition to these outrages, the Nazis attempted to bring pressure +upon Austria by means of the “Austrian Legion”. This organization, a +para-military force of several thousand men, was stationed near the +Austrian border in Germany as a constant and direct threat of violent +action against Austria. It was without any question sanctioned by the +Nazi Government of Germany as it could otherwise not have existed, +and it was armed by them. It was made up of Austrian Nazis who had +fled from Austria after committing various crimes in Austria and by +Austrians in Germany who were attracted by the idle life and pay given +by the German authorities. + +After the July Putsch, in August 1934, in Vienna I was told by the +British Military Attaché in Vienna of a conversation which he had +had with the German Military Attaché in Vienna, General Muff. It +may be observed here that to my knowledge General Muff was a rather +influential person in Germany and one who played a preponderant role in +the German Legation in Vienna. General Muff told the British Military +Attaché that he had just been in Germany and had spent three days with +Hitler at Berchtesgaden, during which time he had several conversations +with Hitler. He said then--in August 1934--that the Austrian Legion had +not yet been dissolved and that Hitler had talked at length with him +about the Legion. General Muff did not deem it worth while to conceal +to the British Military Attaché the fact that the Austrian Legion had +been armed and that the Nazis had armed it. I saw General Muff later +myself and received the same impression as to these facts although he +was not as frank and direct in his statements with me as he had been +with the British Military Attaché. + +The events of the Putsch of July 25, 1934, are too well known for me +to repeat them in this statement. I need say here only that there can +be no doubt that the Putsch was ordered and organized by the Nazi +officials from Germany through their organization in Austria made up +of German Nazis and Austrian Nazis. Dr. Rieth, the German Minister in +Vienna, was fully familiar with all that was going to happen and that +was being planned. The German Legation was located directly across the +street from the British Legation and the Austrian secret police kept +close watch on the persons who entered the German Legation. The British +had their own secret service in Vienna at the time and they also kept +a discreet surveillance over people entering the German Legation. +I was told by both British and Austrian officials that a number of +the men who were later found guilty by the Austrian Courts of having +been implicated in the Putsch had frequented the German Legation. In +addition, I personally followed very closely the activities of Dr. +Rieth and I never doubted on the basis of all my information that Dr. +Rieth was in close touch and constant touch with the Nazi agents in +Austria; these agents being both German and Austrian. Dr. Rieth could +not have been unfamiliar with the Putsch and the details in connection +therewith. I recall, too, very definitely from my conversations with +the highest officials of the Austrian Government after the Putsch, +their informing me that Dr. Rieth had been in touch with von Rintelen, +who it had been planned by the Nazis was to succeed Chancellor Dollfuss +had the Putsch been successful. + +It may be that Dr. Rieth was himself not personally sympathetic with +the plans for the Putsch but there is no question that he was fully +familiar with all these plans and must have given his assent thereto +and connived therein. + +As this Putsch was so important and was a definite attempt to overthrow +the Austrian Government and resulted in the murder of the Chancellor +of Austria, I took occasion to verify at the time for myself various +other items of evidence indicating that the Putsch was not only made +with the knowledge of the German Government but engineered by it. I +found and verified that almost a month before the Putsch, Goebbels told +Signor Cerruti, the Italian Ambassador in Berlin, that there would be a +Nazi Government in Vienna in a month. On the evening before the Putsch, +a pamphlet appeared in the streets of Berlin from which it appeared +that the Nazi Government had full knowledge of what was planned the +next day in Vienna. An attempt was made by the German authorities in +Berlin to suppress this pamphlet and this effort was partly successful +but copies of it were available at the time and I recall an officer +of our Embassy in Berlin, whose name I cannot specifically recall at +this time, informing me that he had seen a copy thereof. Articles also +appeared in some of the German papers of July 25, indicating that they +had information as to the time that the Putsch was to take place. I +will not go into detail as to the character of the evidence but there +is no question from the historical record and the facts as known to me +from direct knowledge at the time that the Putsch was engineered and +directed by the German Government from Berlin and Munich. + +For two years following the failure of the July 25 Putsch, the Nazis +remained relatively quiet in Austria. Very few terroristic acts +occurred during the remainder of 1934 and as I recall in 1935 and +most of 1936; this inactivity was in accordance with directives from +Berlin as direct evidence to that effect, which came to my knowledge +at that time, proved. Early in January, the Austrian Foreign Minister, +Berger-Waldenegg, furnished me a document which I considered accurate +in all respects and which stated: + + “The German Minister here, von Papen, on the occasion of his last + visit to Berlin, was received three times by Chancellor Hitler for + fairly long conversations, and he also took this opportunity to call + on Schacht and von Neurath. In these conversations the following + instructions were given to him: + + “During the next two years nothing can be undertaken which will + give Germany external political difficulties. On this ground, + everything must be avoided which could awaken the appearance of + Germany interfering in the internal affairs of Austria. Chancellor + Hitler will, therefore, also for this reason not endeavor to + intervene in the present prevailing difficult crisis in the National + Socialist Party in Austria, although he is convinced that order + could be brought into the Party at once through a word from him. + This word, however, he will, for foreign political reasons, give + all the less, as he is convinced that the for him desirable ends + may be reached also in another way. Naturally, Chancellor Hitler + declared to the German Minister here, this does not indicate any + disinterestedness in the idea of Austria’s independence. Also, before + everything, Germany cannot for the present withdraw Party members + in Austria, and must, therefore, in spite of the very real exchange + difficulties, make every effort to bring help to the persecuted + National Socialist sufferers in Austria. As a result, Minister of + Commerce Schacht finally gave the authorization that from then on + 200,000 marks a month were to be set aside for this end (support of + National Socialists in Austria). The control and the supervision of + this monthly sum was to be entrusted to Engineer Reinthaler, who, + through the fact that he alone had control over the money, would + have a definite influence on the Party followers. In this way it + would be possible to end most quickly and most easily the prevailing + difficulties and division in the Austrian National Socialist Party. + + “The hope was also expressed to Herr von Papen that the recently + authorized foundation of German ‘Ortsgruppen’ of the National + Socialist Party in Austria (made up of German citizens in Austria) + would be so arranged as not to give the appearance that Germany is + planning to interfere in Austrian internal affairs. + + “He was also informed that an effort would be made through the + easing of the Auslandesperre, particularly with reference to the + more westerly Austrian Alps sections, so that to the German-Austrian + Alpenverein (Alps Association) a particular role was to be given. The + easing of the Auslandesperre was naturally only to be accorded to + those who obligated themselves to visit the more westerly Austrian + Alps sections and to go to fixed towns and live in specified hotels + or inns.” + +This policy of the Nazis was dictated solely by considerations of +expediency. The basic aim of achieving Anschluss remained wholly +unchanged. The brutal murder of Dollfuss, the Austrian Chancellor, and +the unquestioned direct attack on Austrian sovereignty through the +Putsch, directed by the German Government from Germany, had so shocked +public opinion in Austria and in Europe that the Nazis could not afford +for the time being to take open action. + +That the policy of Anschluss remained wholly unchanged was confirmed to +me by Franz von Papen when he arrived in Vienna as German Minister. It +will be recalled that he accepted this assignment as German Minister +even though he knew that he had been marked for execution in the St. +Bartholomew’s massacre on June 30, 1934. When, in accordance with +protocol, he paid me a visit shortly after his arrival in Vienna, +I determined that during this call there would be no reference to +anything of importance and I limited the conversation strictly to +platitudes which I was able to do as he was calling on me in my office. +I deemed it expedient to delay my return call for several weeks in +order to make it clear to von Papen that I had no sympathy with and +on the other hand was familiar with the objectives of his mission +in Austria. When I did call on von Papen in the German Legation, he +greeted me with “Now you are in my legation and I can control the +conversation”. In the baldest and most cynical manner he then proceeded +to tell me that all of Southeastern Europe, to the borders of Turkey, +was Germany’s natural hinterland, and that he had been charged with +the mission of facilitating German economic and political control over +all this region for Germany. He blandly and directly said that getting +control of Austria was to be the first step. He definitely stated that +he was in Austria to undermine and weaken the Austrian Government and +from Vienna to work towards the weakening of the Governments in the +other states to the South and South East. He said that he intended to +use his reputation as a good Catholic to gain influence with certain +Austrians, such as Cardinal Innitzer, towards that end. He said that +he was telling me this because the German Government was bound on this +objective of getting this control of Southeastern Europe and there was +nothing which could stop it and that our own policy and that of France +and England was not realistic. + +The circumstances were such, as I was calling on him in the German +Legation, that I had to listen to what he had to say and of course I +was prepared to hear what he had to say although I already knew what +his instructions were. I was nevertheless shocked to have him speak so +baldly to me and when he finished I got up and told him how shocked +I was to hear the accredited representative of a supposedly friendly +state to Austria admit that he was proposing to engage in activities +to undermine and destroy that Government to which he was accredited. +He merely smiled and said, of course this conversation was between +us and that he would, of course, not be talking to others so clearly +about his objectives. I have gone into this detail with regard to this +conversation as it is characteristic of the absolute frankness and +directness with which high Nazi officials spoke of their objectives. + +Nazi activities, forced underground in this period, were by no means +neglected. The Party was greatly weakened for a time as a result of +the energetic measures taken against the Putsch and as a result of the +public indignation. Reorganization work was soon begun. In October +1934 the Austrian Foreign Minister, Berger-Waldenegg, furnished me +the following memorandum, which he told me had been supplied to the +Austrian Government by a person who participated in the meeting under +reference. + + “A meeting of the chiefs of the Austrian National Socialist Party + was held on the 29th and 30th of September, 1934, at Bad Aibling in + Bavaria. + + “The meeting occupied itself principally with the reorganization + of the Austrian National Socialist Party and particularly with the + measures to be taken to this end in the Tirol. + + “Measures were decided upon as to the means to be used to create + better contact between the party leadership and its members as well + as with respect to new propaganda measures. + + “One principal point on the agenda had reference to the preparatory + measures to be taken for taking over the power in Austria. It + was decided to give to all of the Party Headquarters in Austria + instructions preparatory to new Terroristic acts. The necessary + material, however, is nevertheless until new instructions are issued + not to be transported from the German border into Austria, but shall + be kept assembled at appropriate places on the German side of the + entire Austro-German frontier. + + “From a report received by the Party chiefs on the situation in + Vienna and upper Styria, it is established that agreements have been + concluded with the Communists and with the Socialists with respect to + a uniform and common procedure. + + “The agents of the Party Direction in Germany have received orders in + every Austrian district to prepare lists of all those persons who are + known to actively support the present Government and who are prepared + closely to cooperate with it. + + “When the next action against the Government takes place these + persons are to be proceeded against just as brutally as against all + those other persons, without distinction of party, who are known to + be adversaries of National Socialism. + + “In a report of the Party leaders for Austria the following + principles have been emphasized: + + “A. The taking over of the power in Austria remains the principal + duty of the Austrian National Socialist Party. Austria has for the + German Reich a much greater significance and value than the Saar. The + Austrian problem is the problem. All combat methods are consecrated + by the end which they are to serve. + + “B. We must on every occasion which presents itself appear to be + disposed to negotiate, but arm at the same time for the struggle. The + new phase of the struggle will be particularly serious and there will + be this time two centers of the terror, one along the German frontier + and the other along the Yugoslav frontier.” + +The Austrian Legion was kept in readiness in Germany. Although it +was taken back some miles further from the Austrian frontier, it +remained undissolved in spite of the engagement which had been taken +to dissolve it. The Austrian Government received positive information +to this effect from time to time which it passed on to me and I had +direct information to the same effect from reliable persons coming from +Germany to Vienna who actually saw the Legion. + +On the surface, however, German activities consisted principally of +efforts to win the support of prominent and influential men through +insidious efforts of all kinds, including the use of the German +Diplomatic Mission in Vienna and its facilities and personnel. Von +Papen as German Minister entertained frequently and on a lavish scale. +He approached almost every member of the Austrian Cabinet, telling +them, as several of them later informed me, that Germany was bound to +prevail in the long run and that they should join the winning side if +they wished to enjoy positions of power and influence under German +control. Of course, openly and outwardly he gave solemn assurance that +Germany would respect Austrian independence and that all that she +wished to do was to get rid of elements in the Austrian Government like +the Chancellor, Schuschnigg and Starhemberg as head of the Heimwehr and +others, and replace them by a few “nationally-minded” Austrians, which +of course meant Nazis. The whole basic effort of von Papen was to bring +about Anschluss. + +In early 1935, the Austrian Foreign Minister, Berger-Waldenegg, +informed me that in the course of a conversation with von Papen, the +latter had remarked “Yes, you have your French and English friends +now and you can have your independence a little longer”. The Foreign +Minister, of course, told me this remark in German but the foregoing +is an accurate translation. The Foreign Minister told me that he had +replied to von Papen “I am glad to have from your own lips your own +opinion which agrees with what your chief has just said in the Saar +and which you have taken such pains to deny.” Von Papen appeared to +be terribly upset when he realized just what he had said and tried +to cover his statements, but according to Berger-Waldenegg, kept +constantly getting into deeper water. + +Von Papen undoubtedly achieved some successes, particularly with +men like Glaise-Horstenau and others who had long favored the +“Grossdeutschtum” idea, but who nevertheless had been greatly disturbed +by the fate of the Catholic Church. Without conscience or scruple, +von Papen exploited his reputation and that of his wife as ardent and +devout Catholics to overcome the fears of these Austrians in this +respect. + +Developments in the fall of 1935 and the spring of 1936 gave Germany +an opportunity to take more positive steps in the direction of the +Nazification of Austria. Italy, which had given Austria assurance +of support of the most definite character against external German +aggression, and on one occasion by mobilizing her forces, had +undoubtedly stopped German aggressive action which had been planned +against Austria, embarked on her Abyssinian adventure. This and the +reoccupation of the Rhineland in 1936 completely upset the balance in +Europe. The French and the British Minister informed me that as early +as August 1935, they had informed their Governments, on the basis of +conversations with the Austrian Foreign Minister, that if there was +to be any Danubian Pact, it would have to come into being rapidly for +the Austrian Government would be forced to negotiate with Germany even +though it would have no confidence that any such agreement arrived at +would be respected. + +The result of all these forces was the Austro-German accord of July 11, +1936, the public text is as follows: + + “Convinced that they are thereby rendering a valuable contribution + toward the peaceful development of Europe, and believing that they + are thereby doing the best service to the various common interests + of the two German States, the Government of the German Reich and the + Government of the Austrian Federal State have decided to restore + normal and friendly mutual relations. + + “It is therefore declared: + + “1. In the sense of the statement made by the Fuehrer and Reich + Chancellor on May 21, 1935 the German Government recognizes the full + sovereignty of the Federal State of Austria.[2] + + + FOOTNOTES: + + [2] On May 1935, in a speech in the Reichstag, Hitler had stated + with respect to Austria (I quote from _Documents on International + Affairs_, Vol. I, 1935, published by the _Royal Institute of National + Affairs_, (London, 1936) p. 171): + + “Germany neither intends nor wishes to interfere in the internal + affairs of Austria, to annex Austria, or to conclude an + ”_Anschluss_“. The German people and the German Government have, + however, the very comprehensible desire, arising out of a simple + feeling of solidarity due to a common national descent--namely, + that the right to self-determination should be guaranteed, not only + for foreign nations but to the German people everywhere. I myself + believe that no regime which does not rest on public consent and is + not supported by the people can continue permanently.” + + + “2. Each of these two Governments shall regard the internal political + conditions of the other country, including the question of Austrian + National-Socialism, as a domestic concern of that country, upon which + it will exert neither direct nor indirect influence. + + “3. The Austrian Federal State Government’s general policy and its + policy toward Germany in particular shall be constantly guided by the + Principle that Austria recognizes herself to be a German State. The + Rome Protocol of 1934, together with its additional clauses of 1936, + and the relations of Austria to Italy and Hungary, as partners in the + said protocols are not hereby affected. + + “Recognizing that the relaxation of tension desired by both parties + can be brought about only if in addition certain preliminary + conditions are established by the Governments of both countries, + the Reich Government and the Austrian Federal Government shall in + a series of detailed measures create these required preliminary + conditions.” + +Even more important than the terms of the agreement published in the +official communique, was the contemporaneous informal understanding, +the most important provisions of which were, that Austria would (1) +appoint a number of individuals enjoying the Chancellor’s confidence +but friendly to Germany to positions in the Cabinet; (2) would devise +means to give the “national opposition” a role in the political life +of Austria and within the framework of the Patriotic Front, and (3) +would amnesty all Nazis save those convicted of the most serious +offenses. This amnesty was duly announced by the Austrian Government +and thousands of Nazis were released, and the first penetration of the +_Deutsche Nationaler_ into the Austrian Government was accomplished +by the appointment of Dr. Guido Schmidt as Secretary of State for +Foreign Affairs, and of Dr. Edmund Glaise-Horstenau as Minister without +portfolio. + +The significance of these arrangements can best be explained by quoting +from an official dispatch which I wrote in October 1934 when concern +was being expressed with regard to conversations which Chancellor +Schuschnigg was reported as having with the “moderate Nazis”, +Reinthaller and Riehl. I then reported as follows: + + “It is obvious, however, that in view of certain well known facts, + these conversations will be followed with interest. A major + consideration which will not be disregarded is the fact that + Chancellor Hitler himself has always been in favor of indirect rather + than direct action in bringing Austria into the German picture. It + is his belief that the way to be followed is to get representatives + of the National Socialist Party into the penetration. It is an + indication of political astuteness, for it is quite certain, in the + opinion of many objective observers, that if once a militant, even + though small, National Socialist minority gets representation in the + Cabinet, it will be the forerunner of absorption. To explain why + this is so is rather difficult, as it requires a full appreciation + of many factors at play in Germany and in Austria. Briefly, however, + it may be epitomized in the terroristic policy which is one of the + primary principles of National Socialism. Even before July 25, + when the National Socialist Party was legally prohibited, it was + very difficult to get proper police and judicial action against + National Socialists who committed terroristic acts or who were + plotting against the Government. This inaction came, not through + sympathy with the movement or through lack of definite knowledge + of overt acts, but through fear--through fear of reprisals when + a National Socialist regime might come, and that if it did come, + those who had proceeded, even though in the line of duty, against + National Socialists, would be dealt with with the barbarity and + intolerance with which National Socialism has treated its opponents + in Germany. The determined attitude of the Government after July + 25, strengthened the administration of justice and of the security + forces, and this changed attitude came about as a result not only + of the feeling within the country that National Socialism would not + come now, but also as a result of the action of the powers in support + of the independence of Austria. Should the conversations which the + Government is having with the National Socialist groups reawaken + this fear, or should there be any weakening of the attitude of the + Government towards National Socialist be admitted even to indirect + or subordinate participation in the Government, it would undoubtedly + bring back this fear in an even more acute form and bring into what + element of weakness. + + “The fact that these conversations are taking place need, therefore, + not be considered as being intrinsically a disturbing factor in the + internal and external situation of Austria, but should these National + Socialist elements in the Government, there is reason for the gravest + concern, not only so far as the internal situation in Austria is + concerned, but this might become the focal point of disturbance + without the country * * *” + +The sequel of the agreement was the only one which could have been +expected in view of all the facts and previous recorded happenings. +Active Nazi operations in Austria were resumed under the leadership of +a certain Captain Leopold, who it was known definitely was in frequent +touch with Hitler. The Nazi program was now to form an organization +through which the Nazi could carry on their operations openly and +with legal sanction in Austria. There were formed in Austria several +organizations which had a legal basis but which were simply a device +by which the Nazis in Austria could organize, and later seek inclusion +as a unit in the Patriotic Front. The most important of these was the +_Ostmarkischer Verein_, the sponsor of which was the Minister of the +Interior Glaise-Horstenau. Through the influence of Glaise-Horstenau +and the pro-Nazi Neustadter-Sturmer, this organization was declared +legal by the Courts. I made specific mention of the foregoing because +it shows the degree to which the situation in Austria had disintegrated +as a result of the underground and open Nazi activities directed from +Germany. + +Even more open recognition of the Nazis was demanded. In January 1937, +Captain Leopold submitted a memorandum of Nazi demands, which, though +not formally received, were known to and considered by the Austrian +Cabinet. + +The Leopold memorandum is as follows: + + + For the Internal Pacification of Austria. + +* * * * * * * + +[In Mr. Messersmith’s affidavit there appears at this point the body +of Captain Leopold’s lengthy memorandum. It includes Captain Leopold’s +statement of the existing situation in Austria. It includes the +following demands: (1) An amnesty for all punishments or privations +suffered for National Socialist or National activity or sympathy; +(2) equal treatment for National Socialists, including freedom of +political activity and cultural activity; abolition of laws and +sanctions used by the Government against Nazi activity. The memorandum +advocates cooperation on the basis of political principles including: A +broadening of the Patriotic Front; changes in the Cabinet; an alliance +with the Reich; common racial stock as a political aim, and the +application of anti-Semitic measures; an early plebiscite on Anschluss.] + +Later, a petition circulated by Leopold was submitted to the Austrian +Government, demanding authorization to form a “nationalistic party”, +which was to be incorporated as a group in the Political Front. It was +a Party which its sponsorship plainly marked as openly Nazi. Pressure +for the acceptance of these demands was exercised by staging frequent +demonstrations and circulating propaganda, all of which was financed +in and from Germany. Even as soon after July 11 as July 29, 1936, +when the Olympic Torch was carried through the streets of Vienna, +there were violent Nazi disorders. From then on, and until Austrian +sovereignty was destroyed, there were constant arrests and trials of +persons accused of distributing illegal literature or staging illegal +demonstrations, accompanied by numerous press comments of more or less +violence. + +The Austrian Government sought to counteract this pressure in some way +by allowing activity in favor of a restoration of the Hapsburgs. On his +visit to Vienna in late February 1937, von Neurath took occasion to +register Germany’s emphatic opposition to any such move. I remember von +Neurath’s visit very clearly. I had known him well and was on friendly +terms with him while I was stationed in Berlin. At that time and after +the Nazi came into power, he told both Ambassador Dodd and me that he +had remained as Foreign Minister when the Nazi came into power in order +that he might exercise “a restraining influence” and render service to +his country. This may have been the initial motive of von Neurath but +he rapidly became one of the most complete and in some ways effective +instruments of the Nazis. If he was not in accord with what they did, +he was a perfect instrument in helping to carry it through. + +Although I had known him well in Berlin and had on occasions been in +his house in small gatherings, when he came to Vienna in 1937, there +were a number of ceremonies and receptions given by the Austrian +Government to which the Diplomatic Corps was invited. When he met me +at these meetings he treated me with great coolness and even disdain, +knowing my complete lack of sympathy with the program to which he +had committed himself, and this manner of treating me with disdain +and open disregard was probably his way of protecting himself and +his own feelings of shame. Shortly after the visit of von Neurath, +Chancellor Schuschnigg in my conversations with him told me that in his +conversations with von Neurath, during the visit, von Neurath had been +just as bad as if Habicht or Frauenfeld had been talking when they had +discussed the German demands for the inclusion of Nazis in the Austrian +Cabinet. + +About the same time, Schuschnigg made some concessions to ease the +pressure from the Nazis. In February, he appointed a so-called +“Committee of Seven”, consisting among others of Dr. Jury and a man +named Tavs, to discuss “nationalistic ambitions” with him. In June, +following the visit of Glaise-Horstenau and General Kraus and Leopold +to Hitler in Berlin, and the increased Nazi activities following, +Schuschnigg appointed Seyss-Inquart and Dr. Pembauer to devise a means +whereby the “Nationalists” could be incorporated into the Patriotic +Front. + +Dr. Seyss-Inquart himself was a prominent Vienna Lawyer, who had +long been an intimate personal friend of Chancellor Schuschnigg. The +Chancellor himself told me on various occasions that Dr. Seyss-Inquart +had frequently attempted to convince him that the admission of the +Nazi into the Austrian Cabinet would be for the best interest of +Austria, in that it would relieve the pressure on Austria by Germany, +and that he (Seyss-Inquart) at all times professed a sincere desire to +maintain the independence of Austria. I had little personal contact +with Seyss-Inquart but I knew from various sources absolutely reliable +that while Seyss-Inquart was making these protestations to the +Chancellor with whom he had had this intimate friendship, and which +the Chancellor repaid by his confidence, Seyss-Inquart was in fact +completely insincere. He was known at the time, and I had knowledge +of this, to be in frequent contact with many high officials of the +German Government and that he had had contact with Hitler himself. My +information on this point was obtained not only from sources in Austria +but also from acquaintances in Germany. There is only one thing which +can be said in favor of Seyss-Inquart at the time and that is that he +perhaps did believe the German protestations made to him that Austria’s +independence would be respected. It is difficult, however, to conceive +that a man who was known to have the legal ability and intelligence +of Seyss-Inquart could have been completely taken in by these +protestations. The probabilities are that at least from the outset he +used his friendship with Chancellor Schuschnigg in order to help to +destroy the independence of his country in order to make a place for +himself. + +I left Vienna on July 11, 1937, in order to assume the post of +Assistant Secretary of State in Washington. I, therefore, left Vienna +before the final tragedy occurred. The final outcome, however, was +then already foreseeable. From the tenor of the Italian Minister’s +conversations with me it was clear that Italy would not or could not +any longer defend Austria militarily against German aggression. It was +also clear that Austria could not resist the German pressures alone. +Although France had given very definite assurances as to her interest +in maintaining Austria’s independence and England had expressed her +interest therein, the Austrian Government was less and less able to be +assured of real support. When the Austrian government could no longer +expect the full military support of Italy, it knew that its fate was +sealed. Hitler was, therefore, free to work his will in Austria. The +only question remaining was when he would do it and when he considered +it opportune. The work of disintegration, set forth in this statement, +had had its effect. Early in 1938, apparently satisfied that England +and France would not move and knowing that Italy could not and would +not oppose him, Hitler struck the final blow at Austria’s independence, +bringing to a climax what must be recorded in history as one of the +most insidious, dastardly, unjustified and altogether effective series +of measures to undermine and bring about the end of a sovereign state, +during the course of which machinations and operations the Nazi +Government nevertheless consistently openly proclaimed its friendliness +towards Austria and its intentions of maintaining its respect for its +sovereignty and independence. + + [Signed] G. Messersmith + +Subscribed and sworn to before me, William L. Brewster, a Vice Consul +of the United States of America, duly commissioned and qualified, in +Mexico, D.F., Mexico, this 28th day of August 1945. + + [Signed] William L. Brewster + Vice Consul of the United States of America + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1765-PS + + The commissioner for the four year plan + Plenipotentiary for special missions + + Berlin W8, Behrenstr. 43, 15 Jan 43 + SECRET + + To + +1. His excellency, the Reich marshal of the Greater German +Reich--commissioner for the four-year plan-- + + _a._ Attention the secretary of state Koerner or his representative + + _b._ Attention the ministerial dirigent Dr. Gramsch or his + representative + + _c._ Attention ministerial councillor Dr. Kadgien or his + representative + + _d._ Attention ministerial councillor Legler, or his representative + +2. the commissioner for the four-year-plan- central planning-Attention +state councillor Schieber or his representative. + +3. The high command of the armed forces + + _a._ Office of economics--attention General Thomas or his + representative + + _b._ Special staff HWK, attention Admiral Groos, or his representative + + _c._ Office of foreign intelligence, attention Admiral Canaris, or + his representative + + _d._ Army Administration Office, attention General Osterkamp, or his + representative + + _e._ Armed forces budget dept., attention Ministerial dirigent Dr. + Tischbein, or his representative + + _f._ Armed forces administrative dept., attention Intendant General + Dr. Biehler, or his representative. + +4. The High Command of the army--Quartermaster General, attention Maj. +Gen. Wagner or his representative. + +5. The Reich minister for Aviation and supreme commander of the +Airforce, attention Field Marshal Milch, or his representative + + _b._ Administrative office of the airforce, attention General Crosrav + or his representative + + _c._ Dept. GI--attention chief engineer Sellschopp, or his + representative + +6. The high command of the navy, attention Admiral-General Witzell, or +his representative. + +7. The Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police + + _a._ SS Main office of economic administration, attention SS + brigadier General Loerner, or his representative. + + _b._ SS-Office for raw materials--SS-Colonel Kloth, or his + representative. + +8. The Foreign Office + + _a._ Attention Ministerial Director Wiehl, or his representative + + _b._ Attention VLR. Bisse, or his representative + + _c._ Attention Minister Hemmen, or his representative + +9. The Ammunition Ministry + + _a._ Attention Reichsminister Speer, or his representative + + _b._ Attention Commercial Attaché Ruckenbrod, or his representative + +10. Reich Minister for Nutrition + + _a._ Attention Secretary of State Backe, or his representative + + _b._ Attention Ministerial Director Dr. Moritz, or his representative + +11. Reich Minister of Finance + + _a._ Attention Reichsminister Count Schwerin-Krosigk, or his + representative + + _b._ Attention Ministerial Councillor von Knorre, or his + representative + + _c._ Attention Government Councillor Nitschke, or his representative + +12. The Reichsminister of Economy + + _a._ Attention the secretary of State Dr. Landfried, or his + representative + + _b._ Attention to the under secretary of state von Jagwitz, or his + representative + + _c._ Attention for the President Kehrl, or his representative + + _d._ Attention to the Ministerial Councillor Dr. Drexl, or his + representative + + _e._ Attention of the Chief Councillor of government Dr. Goetze, or + his representative + +13. The Main Office for Reich Security [RSHA] + + _a._ Attention SS-Brigadier General Ohlendorf, or his representative + + _b._ Attention SS-Colonel Schellenberg, or his representative + +14. The Reich Commissioner for price control + + _a._ Attention Minister Fischboeck, or his representative + + _b._ Attention Government councillor Dr. Wurst, or his representative + +15. The Auditor-Generals Office of the German Reich + + _a._ Attention Ministerial Councillor Kuesel-Glogau, or his + representative + + _b._ Attention Office Councillor Rueger, or his representative + +16. The Military Commander in France + + _a._ Attention KVCh Dr. Michel, or his representative + + _b._ Attention KVACh Frhr. v. Mahs, or his representative + + _c._ Attention OKVR Bolck, or his representative + + _d._ Attention Intendant of General Staff Lenz, or his representative + +17. The Military Commander in Belgium and Northern France + + _a._ Attention KV Chief Reeder, or his representative + + _b._ Attention Ministerial dirigent Dr. Schlumprecht, or his + representative + + _c._ Intendant in charge, Intendant of General Staff Fritsch, or his + representative + +18. Commissar of the Reich for the occupied Dutch Territories + + _a._ Reichscommissar Dr. Seyss-Inquart, or his representative + + _b._ Dept. of industrial economy, attention Chief Councillor of + government Dr. Heinemann, or his representative + + _c._ Dept. of the four-year plan, attention Mr. Pluemer, or his + representative + +19. Commander of the Armed Forces in the Netherlands + + _a._ General Christiansen, or his representative + + _b._ Intendant in charge, intendant of General Staff Dr. Geyer, or + his representative + +20. The Plenipotentiary General for Economy in Serbia, Consul General +Neuhausen, or his representative + +21. The Supervisory Office in Paris, attention Lt. Col. Koch, or his +representative, two copies + +22. The Supervisory Office in Belgium, attention Lt. Col. V. Parish, or +his representative, two copies + +23. The Supervisory Office in Lille, attention Major Woehlke, or his +representative, two copies + +24. The Supervisory Office Netherlands, attention SS-Major Hanke, or +his representative, two copies + +25. The Supervisory Office Belgrade, attention Major Werner, or his +representative, two copies + +26. The Roges trading Company Ltd., attention Director Kraney, or his +representative + +Enclosed I send copy of my second report of findings with the request +for acknowledgement. + + Heil Hitler + signed: J. Veltjens + + Col AC + certified: + + Hillmann + office employee + + The commissioner for the four-year plan + plenipotentiary for special missions + + + SECRET + +2. Report of findings of the plenipotentiary for special missions + +A. _Obtaining of war important goods on the black market in the +occupied western territories_ and in Serbia. + + I. The black market up to the issue of the order to the + plenipotentiary for special missions. + + II. Development of the black market since the 1 July 1942. + + 1. General + + 2. The organization created by the plenipotentiary for special + missions. + + 3. Scope of the previous purchases (per 30 Nov. 1942). + + III. The further development + +B. Obtaining of harbor installations and machines from shut down plants. + + I. Harbor installations + + II. Machines + +C. Christmas action. + +D. Miscellaneous. + + # # # # # + +A. _Providing of war important goods on the black market in the +occupied western territories and in Serbia._ + + +I. The black market up to the issue of the order to the plenipotentiary +for special missions. + +The beginning of a black market in the occupied territories can already +be ascertained in the time before the German troops entered. It started +however, on a large scale after the German occupation and as matters +were, the occupation authorities could not prevent this.--The following +reasons have necessarily led to its rise: + +1. The scarcity of goods in consequence of the exploitation and +rationing as a result of hoarding as an escape into material values +(particularly in metals) and as a result of removal for the purpose of +sabotaging the German Military power. + +2. The impossibility of enforcing price limits completely and +consequently a constant enlargement of the divergence of price between +raw materials and finished products on one hand and between goods and +wages on the other. + +3. The impossibility of controlling the prices on the German +model because of the lack of personnel in the German supervisory +organizations. + +4. The lack of effective support of the counter-measures by the +individual administrative state authorities, primarily in France. + +5. The inefficient criminal justice of the individual state criminal +authorities. + +6. The lack of discipline in the civilian population. + +This development was accelerated--particularly since the year 1942--by +the attitude of numerous offices of the armed forces and other German +organizations. The raw materials and finished products needed by these +offices could often not be placed at disposal on the desired scale +by the home land within the framework of existing priority measures. +Consequently it became often actually the practice simply to use +the way of supply through the black market. The activity of German +agencies on the black market gradually reached an extent which led to +increasingly more unbearable conditions; it was daily routine for the +black marketeers to offer their goods simultaneously to several offices +for sale and that that office which offered the best price received the +merchandise so that the individual German formations in this manner not +only snatched the merchandise away from one another, but also, inflated +the prices. + +Finally the black market dealings took a course which gave impetus to +the most serious fears with respect to market- and currency policy. +The military commanders in France, Belgium and northern France and +the Reichscommissar for the occupied territories of the Netherlands +therefore took measures during the course of the year 1941 to bring +this development to a halt. However, in this respect the lever was +not--at any rate not primarily--inserted at the price side because this +promised only little success in the face of the internal conditions +prevailing in the occupied territories; just as little could a +stricter control of prices be considered at that time. The central +occupation authorities rather began to do business themselves on the +black market, with the aim of slowly gaining control of it and then to +kill it gradually. These actions can be viewed as the predecessors of +the organization of the Bfs, (Plenipotentiary for special missions) +here also the purchased goods were distributed centrally and because +the winding up was also executed through the Roges (in France) or +through the AWG (in Belgium) and the Bfs in Holland in conjunction +with the department “four year plan” of the Reich commissioner on the +one hand and the departments of the Reich on the other. The purchase +was at times made through a single purchasing agency. However, such a +procedure had to be denied the desired success as long as it was not +possible to hold off all the other offices from activity on the black +market; it would have been a prerequisite for this, that all central +authorities in the Reich had instructed the departments subordinated to +them accordingly, but this was only done in part. + +Finally, in June 1942 the plenipotentiary for special missions [Bfs] in +agreement with all central authorities was ordered to take charge of +the seizure and central control of the black markets. With that, the +prerequisite for an effective beginning regarding the problem of the +black market and with it the struggle against it existed for the first +time. + + +II. Development of the black market since 1 July 1942. + +1. General. + +The plenipotentiary for special missions has from the beginning on +viewed the purpose of the mission given to him less in presenting the +highest possible figures of purchases; the final aim was set rather to +combat the black market that is, to bring it to an end. + +The starting point had to be however, that as long as in the occupied +territories an essential part of the goods existing or produced at all, +disappears by reason of inefficient control or various other reasons +in the black market, in the interest of supplying the German war +economy with the most important raw materials and finished products, as +textiles and PX rations, seizure of these goods could not be avoided. +One fact is overlooked again and again: that the black market is not +a phenomenon evoked through the activity of the plenipotentiary for +special missions or other departments, but--as is shown under I--has +developed inevitably from the economic situation of the market and will +exist and have to be exploited in the German interest as long as no +way has been found to break it up completely or at least check it to +the extent that the amount of goods caught through it are meaningless +within the framework of the total supply. However, the figures given +later on in detail show that for the time being there cannot be any +question about it. + +But the figures given later on show also that the purchases made on the +black market could contribute essentially to the covering of many gaps +in the supply of the German war economy without impairing the quota of +deliveries in the occupied territories. Therefore the purchases can +already for this reason not be refrained from as long as it has not +been established that the goods can be secured in another way. The +objection that these goods could have been secured anyhow within the +frame work of the normal supply--and then much cheaper,--is incorrect. +A typical example is the result of the last negotiations with France +regarding leathergoods: Upon the desire of the Reichsminister of +economics, the chief plenipotentiary for special missions had agreed to +stopping the purchases on the leather and hide market, if the French +who had complained about the German buying activity on the black +market, would oblige themselves to deliver additionally in 1943 the +same amount which had been bought in 1942 on the black market; the +French declared that they did not feel in a position to do this. The +objection mentioned is overlooking the fact that merchandise which had +once been withdrawn from production or had been produced illegally, +will never again become “white”. What is done cannot be undone, the +black market is in existence and would also exist without any doubt +if not a single German department would work in this field. The black +market receives new impulse again and again and that on the one hand +from the supply side, and + + 1. from the large hidden stocks still in existence, + + 2. from the illegal production which is taking place continuously + (this subject will have to be investigated later on more in + detail), + + 3. in France--at any rate up to date--through continuous supply from + the unoccupied territory; + +on the other hand, at the always increasing scarcity of goods every +item finds a buyer, either from the civilian population or industry, +or through purchase on the part of the Italians, Swiss, Spaniards; +yes, numerous purchases could even be ascertained--in particular +in unoccupied France--by the English or--evidently through British +instigation--from neutral sources, as for instance the Portuguese which +do not serve any other purpose than that of depriving Germany of the +merchandise. + +The consequence of such sudden cessation of purchases through the +organization of the plenipotentiary for special missions would +therefore only be that a so far not inconsiderable source of raw +materials and war important finished products dries up without +achieving on this account the end of the black market. Besides, it has +to be doubted with good reason that it would be possible to keep up the +prohibition of purchases which was issued to the German departments +in the occupied territories, if the delivery by the organization of +the plenipotentiary for special missions would suddenly cease. This +applies particularly for the cases of the so-called immediate-need +[Sofort-Bedarf]. The conception that the black market will come to an +end if no more is bought on the part of the Germans, is incorrect. +[Marginal notation in handwriting is inserted here: “Yes, our work +has to begin _here_; with it we hit then the French black market +primarily”.] + +The central purchasing organization of the plenipotentiary for special +missions for instance does not buy agricultural products (only some +particularly reasonable items in price have been bought, which however +are not at all worth mentioning within the framework of the total +supply) and nevertheless the black market is the most significant just +on this sector. + +It has been explained that further activity on the black market at the +scale up to date will in the long run not be bearable any more for the +budget of the Reich. However, in this respect it has to be pointed +out that the greatest part of the purchases--that is the ones made in +France--have been financed from the French costs of occupation. Of RM +1,107,792,819----the total amount of purchases, RM 929,100,000 have +been financed from French occupational funds. Therefore a debit to the +budget of the Reich did not arise to this extent. + +The claim that the black market or the activity of German departments +on the black market would bring about an increasing decline of the +currency in the occupied territories, cannot be recognized as the +truth. The decline of the currency which has in part actually occurred +already, is not a consequence of the black market, but on the contrary, +the inflationary tendencies accompanying the increasing scarcity of +goods have evoked the rise of the black market. + +At this place it will not be necessary to elaborate on the advantages +of a centralized obtaining of the purchases on the black market; only +two points of view shall be emphasized: + +1. While in the time before the commissioning of the plenipotentiary +for special missions, the prices on the black markets rose always +further,--for the most part a consequence of the mutual competition of +the individual German buyers--it has since been possible, to stabilize +the prices of most goods, and this in spite of the fact that the +_general_ level of prices in the occupied territories has risen further. + +2. While until the commissioning of the plenipotentiary for special +missions, the individual German departments received and used the goods +purchased by themselves uncontrolled, without regard to the degree of +necessity, the distribution now takes place within the scope of total +planning by the Reich according to the degree of _urgency_. + +In summarizing, it has to be said that in the face of the supply +situation of the Reich, it cannot be refrained from skimming the black +market now as before as long as there are still concealed stocks of war +important goods. With regard to this higher interest all other points +of view have to remain in the background. + +2. The organization created by the plenipotentiary for special missions. + +In his report at the end of August 1942, the plenipotentiary for +special missions has presented in detail the organization created +by him for the getting hold of and centralized control of the black +market. Therefore here a short review only shall be given. + +The general control and supervision of the purchasing activity is the +task of the supervising offices newly created for this purpose. + +They are: + + _a._ the supervising office France with its seat in Paris + + _b._ the supervising office Belgium and Northern France with its seat + in Brussels + + _c._ the supervising office Belgium and Northern France, Lille + branch, with its seat in Lille + + _d._ the supervising office Netherlands with its seat in the Hague + + _e._ the supervising department Serbia with its seat in Belgrade. + +Principle and directives for the execution are on the one hand +“the instructions for the winding up of stocks of merchandise of +uncertain origin” issued by the plenipotentiary for special missions +in agreement with the military commanders of the Reich commissar for +the occupied Dutch territories and on the other hand the contracts +concluded by the Roges raw material trading company Ltd. with the +purchasing organizations. The purchases themselves are made by a +restricted number of authorized purchasing organizations, of which +there are in France 11, in Belgium 6, in the Netherlands 6 and in +Serbia 3. Thereby the total purchasing activity is subordinated to the +central supervision of the plenipotentiary for special missions. Each +purchasing organization is only authorized for a quite definite kind +of goods. The engagement of a number of purchasing organizations which +will on first sight appear comparatively high was necessary, because +the black marketeers by experience want to sell for the most part only +to certain departments, with which they have cooperated before and +because they refuse to cooperate with other buyers whom they did not +know previously; it had to be taken care, however, that none of the +existing sources dried up. Participation has been prohibited to all +other departments by corresponding orders of the central authorities in +the Reich and the military commanders of the Reich commissioner. + +The financing of purchases and the transportation of the goods will +be taken care of by the Reich-owned Roges Ltd.; the goods are then +distributed according to the urgency of the individual consumers in +agreement with the instructions of the centralized planning or the +departments charged by the centralized planning. It is the additional +task of the Roges Ltd., to level the purchasing prices down to the +German internal price; lower prices, however, will not be granted for +deliveries to the armed forces, authorized and--in case of investment +goods--to big plants. The adherence to the directives is guaranteed +by the fact that the purchasing organizations at each offer may only +then perform the transaction, if the supervising department has given +its permission through an expert. The experts for their part will make +their decision on the basis of the price and quality limits given by +the plenipotentiary for special missions or the Reich departments. + +3. Scope of the previously made purchases (up to 30/11/1942). + +_a._ Since the beginning of the action (that is since purchases have +been directly centralized by the military commander or the Reich +commissar with centralized distribution of goods in the Reich). + +Up till now since the beginning of the action purchases have been made +in the total amount of RM 1,107,792,818.64, of which + + in France RM 929,100,000.00 + in Belgium RM 103,881,929.00 + in Holland RM 73,685,162.64 + in Serbia RM 1,125,727.00 + +Payment takes place in France from the funds for occupation, in the +other countries through clearing. + +In the following is a statement of the quantities involved: + +1. _Metals_: + +66,202 tons to the value of RM 273,078,287.00 of which there are + + _a._ non-ferrous metals 58,742 tons, in particular copper and copper + containing material (34,000 tons), lead and lead alloys (14,500 + tons), furthermore (in the succession of their quantity) zinc, + aluminum, tin, nickel, magnesium, antimony, manganese ore; + + _b._ material containing iron (tools, junk, etc.) 7,460 tons. + +2. _Textiles_: + +To the total value of RM 439,040,000.00, of which there are 22,672,000 +pieces of linen, suits (particularly workers’ clothing), overcoats, +etc., 5,488,000 kg yarn and miscellaneous, 40,642,000 m cloth and +ribbons, 10,072,000 pairs of gloves, suspenders, etc. + +3. _Leather, skins, and hides_: + +To the total value of RM 120,754,000.00, of which there are 5,053,000 +kg raw hides, 3,390,000 square feet of finished leather, 1,783,000 +pieces of hides, chamois, etc., 801,000 pairs of shoes, and 694,000 kg +leather for soles and other shoe soling articles. + +Furthermore was bought: + + industrial oils and fats (1,330 tons) + food oils and fats (346 tons) + wool + household articles + PS goods including paper articles + wines and alcoholic drinks + equipment for engineers + sanitary necessities + sacks + +The factors leading to excessive raising of prices of essential goods +are at the present time the following: + + -----------+--------+---------+------------- + | | | The + | France | Belgium | Netherlands + -----------+--------+---------+------------- + Metals | 9 | 9 | 5-6½ + Textiles | 4 | 6½ | 5 + Hides | 6½ | 6 | 4 + Leather | 6½ | 6 | 6 + -----------+--------+---------+------------- + +Since beginning of the action the following items were bought in +_France_--against payment from occupation funds: + + Metals RM 248,000,000.00 + Textiles RM 340,000,000.00 + Hides, skins, leather RM 112,000,000.00 + Wool RM 3,000,000.00 + Oils & fats (for industrial and food purposes) RM 12,000,000.00 + Household goods RM 46,600,000.00 + PK goods RM 33,000,000.00 + Wines and alcoholic drinks RM 50,000,000.00 + Sacks RM 10,500,000.00 + Paper and packing material RM 5,000,000.00 + Food and pleasure items RM 33,000,000.00 + Chemical products RM 8,000,000.00 + Sanitary necessities RM 12,000,000.00 + Miscellaneous RM 16,000,000.00 + ------------------- + TOTAL SUM RM 929,100,000.00 + +Since beginning of the action the following items were bought in +_Belgium_--against payment by clearing: + + Metals RM 13,784,000.00 + Textiles RM 43,755,000.00 + Leather, skins & hides RM 4,030,880.00 + Wool RM 2,179,720.00 + Industrial oils & fats + Chemical products + Food-oils & fats RM 3,815,159.00 + Household goods RM 2,512,912.00 + Furniture RM 418,035.00 + Paper & packing material RM 5,561,268.00 + Food & pleasure items RM 3,393,955.00 + Engineer equipment RM 7,500,000.00 + Miscellaneous RM 16,931,000.00 + -------------------- + TOTAL SUM RM 103,881,929.00 + +Since beginning of the action the following items were bought in the +_Netherlands_--against payment through normal bank transactions: + + Non-ferrous metals RM 6,706,744.00 + Textiles RM 55,285,568.00 + Wool RM 753,878.00 + Leather, hides & skins RM 4,723,130.00 + Wooden barrels RM 254,982.00 + Furniture RM 272,990.00 + Food-and pleasure items RM 590,859.00 + Chemical-and cosmetic articles RM 152,191.00 + Various iron-and steel goods RM 3,792,166.00 + Rags RM 543,416.00 + Motor oil RM 52,284.00 + Raw diamonds RM 25,064.00 + Miscellaneous RM 531,890.00 + -------------------- + TOTAL SUM RM 73,685,162.00 + +In Serbia was bought against payment through clearing: + + Non-Ferrous metals in the amount of RM 1,125,727.00 + +The action began here only in the month of November. Up to date the +goods charged to the receivers amounted to a total of RM 86,084,910.06. + +The reasons why, at a total delivery of RM 1,107,792,819.00 no larger +quantities could be completely wound up, are various (aggravation of +the winding up through the procedure in fixing the prices, difficulties +in transportation, lack of personnel). The Plenipotentiary for special +missions has instigated measures, in order to accelerate the wind-up in +the future. + +_b._ Since the beginning of the activity by the plenipotentiary for +special missions, on the 1/7/1942, the following was bought (up to +30/11/1942): + + Altogether for RM 840,382,893.00 + of which + metals RM 174,982,697.00 + textiles RM 318,013,354.00 + leather, skins and hides RM 82,265,070.00 + +The figures mentioned above comprise roughly about the same period of +time (1/7/-30/11, i.e., five months) as the purchasing action of the +military commander or the Reichs Commissar before commissioning of the +plenipotentiary for special missions (in France 6 months, in Belgium 2 +months, in the Netherlands 7 months); the figures are however several +times higher (RM 840,382,893.00--in contrast to RM 267,409,926.00). +This proves more than anything else that and to what degree, the +concentration of purchases on the black market through the organization +of the plenipotentiary for special missions and the placing of the +purchased goods at the disposal of the total planning of the Reich +succeeded. + + +III. The further development. + +There is not any doubt that the black market as such from the viewpoint +of political economy is extremely undesirable and that therefore +everything has to be attempted to bring it to an end. In this respect +it is also necessary that the German purchasing activity be stopped +as soon as possible. But on the other hand, as has already been +explained above in detail, the delivery of war important raw materials +and finished products cannot be refrained from. The plenipotentiary +for special missions has therefore made his own suggestions to the +departments involved to the effect the purchasing activity be abandoned +by degrees if the black market is suppressed by corresponding measures; +in this respect it must be certain however, that the quantities of +goods which flowed up to date to the black market will now go into +the “white” production and into normal trade. Naturally, however, +repressive measures have to precede this; only then can the gradual +abandoning of the purchasing activity take place in order to impair the +total influx of goods as little as possible. + +In examining the measures to be taken for the fight against it, a +distinction must be made between the sources, from which the black +market is fed. First, there are the concealed stores established for +most varied reasons whose sale will bring a one time flow of goods. +Second, the black market is fed by continuous illegal production. It is +certain that with continued duration of the war the second mentioned +source will gain more and more in importance; therefore special +attention has to be paid to it. + +The illegal production has its cause--aside from the general lure +of higher prices--in the fact that the price divergence between raw +materials and finished products has partly become so great that it +cannot be bridged any more within the framework of normal production +without endangering the solvency of the enterprise. Often the +capacity of the enterprise is exploited only incompletely so that the +entrepreneur, even if it is only in order to avoid a shut-down, turns +to procurement of raw materials illegally in order to produce beyond +his quota, that is, illegally. Previously the purchases in unoccupied +France which were sent on special routes into the occupied territory, +formed a third and considerable source. It remains to be seen, whether +it is now possible to supervise production in the up to now unoccupied +part of France on a stricter basis so that, here also, the fight +against the black market can be initiated. + +According to the conception prevailing here, the following measures for +the removal of the black market would have to be effected: + +1. Enlargement of the price supervision.--As an increase in personnel +of the German departments entrusted with the supervision does not +or only at a restricted scale seem possible, the administrative +authorities of the individual state have to be constrained to show more +activity. + +2. The enactment of severer penalties for violations against measures +of economic management taken in accordance with the German example +because only then can the lack of discipline in the civilian population +resulting from their individualistic and liberalistic attitude be +removed. A supervision of the verdicts of the penal authorities of the +individual states seems to be recommendable. + +3. The announcement of awards for reporting violations against measures +of economic management amounting to a not too small percentage of the +value of the objects confiscated on the basis of the report. + +4. Engagement of spies and agents provocateurs. + + Besides for the prevention of illegal production: + +5. Shut down of all plants which are not manufacturing for war purposes. + +6. Stricter shut-downs or merger of plants whose capacity is exploited +immediately only. + +7. Stronger supervision of the production in factories. + +8. Stricter scrutiny in the allotment of raw materials for the +distribution of orders. + +9. A price policy which gives to the enterprises sufficient prices and +guarantees them the existence. + +In order to create for the purchasing organizations of the +plenipotentiary for special missions the basis for purchasing activity +on the black market in the face of the administrative authorities of +the individual state in the occupied territories, the plenipotentiary +for special missions has in Belgium and in the Netherlands effected +a “decree on the clarification of unexplained goods” or a “general +decree”. Hereby the supervising departments and their purchasing +organizations were given simultaneously the possibility of approaching +through purchases of goods the source of error in management and +control. In accordance with it a suggestion was made by the +plenipotentiary for special missions also to Ambassador Hemmen for +France, which will result in the issue of such a decree for France also +in cooperation with the military commander. + +Most important and promising of success for the beginning appears the +measure outlined in 2 whereby the initial effort should be made toward +commerce and there again first toward retail business. As soon as a +number of draconic penalties has occurred, the retail dealers will in +their own interest refrain from buying excessively priced merchandise +from the wholesalers and manufacturers. The latter face then only the +organization of the plenipotentiary for special missions; then it +could be started by degrees to let the illegal producers crack up. +The plenipotentiary for special missions has in this respect already +performed certain preliminary work by directing part of the purchasing +organizations to try to approach the manufacturers by eliminating of +the black market traders. + +The repressive measures mentioned above--particularly under 1 and +2--have to be performed in close cooperation with the individual state +authorities; it is recommendable that as soon as possible proper +measures be taken on the part of the German occupation authorities. The +measures have to be accompanied by purposeful propaganda of press and +radio (branding the black market as a crime against one’s own people); +in order to build psychologically foundation for the strict measures +with the population and to rouse it to cooperation. + +Further, French and Belgium government--and economic circles--among +others also the French chief of government--have lately found it +necessary to complain about the organized German purchasing activity. +In the face of such representations--aside from various other +arguments--it should be pointed out that also on the part of Germany +the greatest interest exists in the disappearance of the black market, +but its existence is, in the main, the fault of the government +authorities themselves, through their incapability in the supervision +of prices and their laxity in penal prosecution, whereby, lack of +discipline is bred within their own population. + + B. Providing of fort installations and machines from shut-down plants. + +I. Harbor installations. + +A large amount of harbor equipment exists in the occupied western +territories, which at the present time is not or is insufficiently +used. On the other hand, in the eastern territories as well as partly +in the Reich there exists an urgent need for such harbor installations. +The plenipotentiary for special missions has therefore received the +directive to seize these idle potentialities, in agreement with the +departments involved. The determination of the objects to be shipped +is up to the Reich commissar for navigation or those needing the +goods after confiscation by the responsible navy departments, the +plenipotentiary for special missions effects the financial settlement +and puts the objects for installation at the disposal of those needing +them. So far installations of that kind could already be provided for +Oslo and for Hamburg; further transactions are in the process of being +executed. + +II. Machines. + +Another task of the plenipotentiary for special missions is the +seizure of machines from closed down plants. It is certain that large +potentialities, particularly in machine-tools which are badly needed +at home for the armament productions, are at the present time still +idle. In agreement with the plenipotentiary for special missions, +the military commander and the plenipotentiary for the production of +machines a so-called “arbitration offices for machines” is anticipated +in Belgium and the Netherlands. One of the main difficulties in this +field lies in the overcoming of the resistance of both the owner of the +plants involved and the individual state authorities in the occupied +territories. Here the occupational authorities will have to employ all +their initiative in order to break this resistance. + + +C. Christmas-Action. + +At the end of August 1942 the plenipotentiary for special missions +received a further special task, i.e. the providing of Christmas +presents for the German people. Initially the action was calculated to +amount to RM 300,000,000 (internal price). This task was undertaken +immediately with all possible vigor, though it could be foreseen +that providing and transportation of such quantities of goods in the +comparatively short time available until Christmas could hardly be +achieved; as the providing should if possible take place in the normal +way--by payment through clearing also in France--and _not_ on the black +market, an organization had first to be created in order to master this +task. + +Actually it was possible to provide goods to the value of approximately +RM 244,000,000 (purchase price) up to the 20 December 1942. But on +account of the difficulties of transportation occurring in conjunction +with the political events in France as well as the procedure necessary +for fixing the prices and other reasons, it was impossible to bring all +of these goods to Germany and to make them available for sale on time. +2,306 box-cars with 11,138,229 kg and further by ship 6,335 bales of +goods with over 100,000 kg arrived in Germany. In the first place they +comprise cosmetics, toys and in general gift-articles. Distribution +was primarily made in the bomb-damaged regions as well as in the +big cities Berlin, Vienna, Hamburg, Breslau, Koenigsberg and in the +industrial region of Waldenburg and Upper Silesia. A conclusive report +in the Christmas-action will be presented in the course of the month of +February. If an identical action should be contemplated in the year of +1943 on the basis of experiences made it would have to be started in +the course of the month of March. + +D. Miscellaneous. + +Recently a report has been made to the commissioner for the four-year +plan on the other fields of activity of the plenipotentiary for special +missions insofar as the providing of additional shipping space for war +important purposes is concerned. + +A report on the special imports by way of blockade running is +anticipated. + +On the orders issued recently + + _a._ in the field of the so-called “commodity-arbitrage” + _b._ the economic use made of enemy property, + +a report shall be rendered at opportune time. + + Signed: J. Veltjens + Colonel of the Air-Force. + +Berlin, 15 Jan. 1943 + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1770-PS + + 1933 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 161 + + Law concerning Factory Representative Councils and Economic + Organizations of 4 April 1933 + +The Reich Cabinet has decided the following law which is hereby made +public: + + + Chapter I + + _Factory Representative Councils_ + + + Article 1 + +1. The Highest Authority of the Federal State can postpone the +elections for the Legal Factory Representative Council for the Federal +State, parts of the Federal State or for individual enterprises until +30 September of this year at the latest for reasons of public safety +and order. + +2. The Factory Representative Council existing up to date remains +in office in the case of postponement of the elections. Filling of +vacancies in Factory Representative Councils caused by dismissal of +members is only necessary if the number of its members has fallen below +half of the legal number of members or if they number less than three. +The new members of the Factory Representative Council required for its +minimum strength will be nominated from the eligible workers by the +highest authority of the Federal State or the authority appointed by it. + + + Article 2 + +The highest authority of the Federal State can cancel the membership +of members who have been appointed contrary to the spirit of State and +economy [die in Staats- oder Wirtschaftsfeindlichem Sinne eingestellt +sind.] It can appoint new members for the Factory Representative +Councils from the eligible workers to replace the eliminated members. + + + Article 3 + +The aforementioned regulations will be applied accordingly to the +“United Factory Councils”, created according to Article 50 of the +Factory Council Law and to the “Special Representations” formed +according to Articles 61 and 62. Article 93 of the Factory Council Law +will not be applicable in the case of disputes concerning the execution +of the above-mentioned regulations. + + + Article 4 + +The competent highest Reich authorities will be appointed to exercise +the powers for the highest authority of the Federal State contained in +Chapter I, in the case of the administrations and enterprises of the +Reich, including the German Railroad Company and the Reichsbank. + + + Article 5 + +The regulations contained in Article 1, para. 2 and Article 2, 2nd +sentence are also applicable to measures taken before the effectiveness +of this law. + + + Chapter II + + _Dismissal of Workers_ + +The right to oppose dismissal of a worker contained in Article 84 +of the Factory Council Law is not applicable if the dismissed is +suspected of an unfriendly attitude towards the State. The worker can +appeal within a week to the authority declared competent according to +Chapter I, Article 2. That authority decides, after hearing all those +concerned, whether the suspicions are justified or not. The dismissal +is cancelled if its findings are negative. + + + Chapter III + + _Representation of Economic Organizations within the Miners Insurance_ + + + Article 1 + +Article 184, Article 157, sentences 2 and 3 and Article 180, part 3 of +the Reich Mining Law are hereby revoked. + + + Article 2 + +The Reich Labor Minister can charge members of the insurance or mine +supervision authorities, as commissioners with the tasks of the +instances which are in office at the time; the commissioners are under +the authority of the Reich Labor Minister. + + + Chapter IV + + _Legal Representation before the Labor Court_ + +The following part 3 is added to Article 11 of the Labor Court Law: + +The Reich Labor Minister can, in agreement with the Reich Economy +Minister and the Reich Minister of Justice, put other organizations on +the same level for legal representation as the organizations named in +parts 1 and 2. + + +Chapter V + +_Directives of Execution_ + +The Reich Labor Minister has the power to issue legal decrees and +general administrative directives in order to insure the execution of +the Regulations of this Law; he is authorized to change regulations of +the Reich Mining Law in order to adapt them to the decrees of Chapter +III of this Law. + + Berlin, 4 April 1933 + + The Reich Chancellor + Adolf Hitler + + The Reich Labor Minister + Franz Seldte + + The Reich Minister of the Interior + Frick + + For the Reich Minister of Justice + The Reich Minister of Finance + Count Schwerin von Krosigk + + The Reich Minister of Economy + Hugenberg + + + PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1773-PS + + THE LAW OF THE GENERAL GOVERNMENT + + [Das Recht des Generalgouvernements] Krakau, 1941 + + + _E 8. Impounding of Valuables_ + + E 800. Decree on the Sequestration of Property of the Former Polish + State in the General Gouvernement.--15 November 1939 + +On the basis of Article 5, section 1 of the decree of the Fuehrer +and Reich Chancellor governing the administration of occupied Polish +territory dated 12 October 1939 (RGBl I, page 2077), I issue the +following order: + +Article 1--1. All movable and stationary property of the former +Polish State with accessories, including all demands, participation, +rights and other interests inside the General Gouvernement, will be +sequestered for the purpose of securing all manner of public valuables. + +2. The seizure, administration, and utilization of the sequestered +property is the duty of the department “Trusteeship for the General +Gouvernement” in the office of the Governor General. + +Article 2--The director of the department “Trusteeship for the General +Gouvernement” will in agreement with the director of the finance +department in the office of the Governor General issue the regulations +required to execute this decree, in particular on the duty to make a +declaration of the wealth belonging to the former Polish State as well +as the treatment of rights of third persons on the wealth of the former +Polish State and of claims against this wealth. + +Article 3--This regulation will be effective on the day of its +publication. + + The Governor General for the Occupied + Polish Territories + FRANK + + # # # # # + + E 810. Decree on the Right of Ownership of Wealth of the former + Polish Territories.--24 September 1940 + +On the basis of Article 5, section 1 of the decree of the Fuehrer and +chancellor of the Reich of 12 Oct 1939 (RGBl I, page 2077), I issue the +following order: + +Article 1--The property sequestered on the basis of Article 1, section +1 of the decree on the confiscation of the wealth of the former Polish +State within the General Gouvernement of 15 Nov 39 (Verordnungsblatt +GGP, page 37) will be transferred to the ownership of the General +Gouvernement. A legal right of the General Gouvernement will not be +established by this transaction. + +Article 2--1. Rights of third persons in the property mentioned in +Article 1 expire insofar as they existed before 20 November 1939. + +2. It will be determined later on whether and to what extent an +indemnification can be granted to persons, especially to rightful +foreign claimants, for legal losses suffered through the action. + +Article 3--The seizure and administration of the property mentioned in +Article 1 will be executed until further notice on the basis of the +regulation on the confiscation of the wealth of the former Polish State +within the General Gouvernement of 15 November 1939 (Verordnungsblatt, +GGP, page 37) and of the first executionary decree issued on 16 March +1940 (Verordnungsblatt GGP II, page 175). + +Article 4--The director of the department “Trusteeship for the General +Gouvernement” in agreement with the director of the finance department +in the office of the governor general will be in charge of the property +mentioned in Article 1. + +Article 5--This regulation will be effective on the day of its +publication. + + The Governor General + FRANK + + # # # # # + + E 845. Decree on the Confiscation of Art Objects in the General + Gouvernement.--16 December 1939 + +On the basis of Article 5, section 1 of the decree of the Fuehrer and +Chancellor of the Reich on the administration of the occupied Polish +territories of 12 Oct 1939 (RGBl I, page 2077), I order the following: + +Article 1--All art objects in public possession in the General +Gouvernement will be confiscated for the fulfillment of public tasks +of common interest insofar as it has not already been seized under the +decree on the confiscation of the wealth of the former Polish State in +the General Gouvernement of 15 November 1939 (Verordnungsblatt GGP, +page 37). + +Article 2--With the exception of art collections and art objects which +were the property of the former Polish State, art objects will be +considered as owned by the public: + +1. private art collections which have been taken under protection by +the special commissioner for the seizure and safekeeping of the art and +cultural treasures. + +2. all ecclesiastical art property with the exception of those objects +required for the daily performance of liturgic actions. + +Article 3--1. In order to determine whether art objects are public +property in the sense of this regulation, every private and +ecclesiastical art possession has to be registered with exact data on +the kind, nature and number of pieces. + +2. Everyone who possessed or at the present time is in possession of or +else is entitled to dispose of such objects of art since 15 March 39, +is obliged to register the same. + +3. Everyone is obliged to make upon request truthful and appropriate +statements. + +Article 4--The special commissioner appointed by me for the seizure and +safekeeping of the art and cultural treasures will determine in cases +of doubt what art collections and art objects in detail will have to +be regarded on the basis of Article 2 of this regulation as public art +property. He also will decide on the eventual necessary exceptions. + +Article 5--1. He will be punished with imprisonment + +1. Who undertakes to conceal, sell or remove objects of art from the +General Gouvernement. + +2. Who refuses or else gives incorrect or incomplete information +required from him on the basis of this decree. + +2. The special court is competent for the trial. + +Article 6--The special commissioner appointed for the seizure +and safekeeping of the art and cultural treasures will issue the +regulations necessary for the execution of this decree. + +Article 7--This regulation will be put into effect immediately. + + The Governor General for the Occupied + Polish Territories + + FRANK + + # # # # # + + E 846. First Enforcement Regulation for the Order of 16 December 1939 + on the Confiscation of Art Objects in the General Gouvernement. + +In order to execute the decree on the confiscation of art objects in +the General Gouvernement of 16 December 1939 (Verordnungsblatt GGP, +page 209), I order the following: + +Article 1--The registration decree in Article 3, section 1 of the +regulation must be carried out by 15 February 1940 with the office of +the special commissioner for the seizure and safekeeping of the art and +cultural objects, Cracow, Bergakademie. + +Article 2--1. Objects of artistic, cultural-historical and historical +value which originate from the time before 1850, have to be registered. + +2. The registration includes the following: + + _a._ paintings + + _b._ sculpture + + _c._ products of handicraft (for instance antique furniture, china + ware, glass, golden and silver objects, Gobelins, rugs, + embroideries, lace-work, paramente, etc.) + + _d._ drawings, engravings, woodcuts, etc. + + _e._ rare manuscripts, musical manuscripts, autographs, + book-paintings, miniatures, prints, covers, etc. + + _f._ weapons, armors, etc. + + _g._ coins, medals, seals, etc. + +3. Regarding the art objects mentioned in section 2, detailed +information has to be given, if possible, on the master, the time +of production, the contents of the representation, measurements and +material (for instance, wood, canvas, bronze, etc.) + +Article 3--The special commissioner will send in writing his decision +in doubtful cases or in the eventual necessary exceptions as provided +for in Article 4 of the decree. The decision will be final. + +Article 4--Scientific experts will be entrusted with the execution of +the decree. + + The Governor General for the Occupied + Polish Territories + + By order: + + Dr. MUEHLMANN + + + PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1774-PS + + ORGANIZATIONAL LAWS OF THE GREATER GERMAN REICH + + “Verfassungsrecht des Grossdeutschen Reiches” by Ernst Rudolf Huber. + + FUEHRER, AND REICH-CABINET [REICH REGIERUNG, Page 223] + +_a._ The Structure of the Reich-Cabinet + +The political direction of the Reich is the task of the Fuehrer. The +Fuehrer selects, in all fields of political developments the goals +which should be attained, determines the methods to be used and makes +all fundamental decisions when necessary. The authority of the Fuehrer +[Fuehrergewalt] is the “Political Authority” in the new Reich. The +term “Leadership” expresses better the mobilization of the collective +political force of the people towards the achievement of the common +goal, than the term “Government” which has been used heretofore for +the highest authority of the State. The Fuehrer has the only final +power to decide in all matters concerning movement [party], people, +and Reich. He possesses and bears the historical responsibility to his +people. Even in instances, where the law assigns certain tasks to the +“Reichsregierung”, it is the Fuehrer who is responsible for the final +decision. + +The Fuehrer avails himself, however, in his decisions of the counsel +and the constructive cooperation of his collaborators, especially the +Reich-Cabinet, which combines the Subordinate-Fuehrers [Unterfuehrer] +of the various departments of the State. The legal position of the +Reich-Minister was originally laid down by the Reich-Minister Law +of March 27 1930 (RGBl I 96). In its place Section XIII of the +German Civil Servant Law is now applicable, with the exception of +the regulations concerning the official salaries, service quarters, +moving--and travel expenses, where the old law remains valid. The +Reich-Ministers are appointed by the Fuehrer and maintain a public +service relationship towards him and the Reich. They take a special +oath before the Fuehrer when they assume their functions. They +cannot belong to any economic enterprise as chairmen or members +of administrative or supervisory councils while they hold office +(“economic incompatibility”). The Reich-Ministers can be dismissed +from their offices at any time by the Fuehrer. No disciplinary action +against them will be taken. Special treatment of the Reich-Ministers is +based on the fact that they are not “Civil Servants”. Civil Servants +are only the members of the Bureaus which are sub- and coordinated +to the hierarchic administrative structure, but not those who occupy +immediate state-directing positions to whom the Reich-Ministers belong +according to the present constitutional law. + +The Fuehrer and Reich-Chancellor is at the top of the Reich-Cabinet. He +hands down the directives for the over-all operation of the Government +and the basic principles for the various departments. A number of +Bureaus are subordinated to him for direct counsel and assistance, as +follows: + +1. The Reich-Chancellery (Chief: Reich-Minister, Dr. Lammers) + +2. The Supreme-Command of the Armed Forces (Chief: Generaloberst (Gen.) +Keitel) + +3. The Presidential Chancellery (Chief: State Minister Dr. Meissner) + +4. The Privy Cabinet Council (President: Reich-Minister Frh. von +Neurath) + +The Reich-Cabinet [Reich Regierung] comprises furthermore the +department ministries proper. It is constituted in the following manner +according to the official order of rank laid down in the year 1939: + +1. The Deputy Commander for the Fuehrer (Reich-Minister Hess) + +2. The Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (Generaloberst (Gen.) Keitel) + +3. General Field-Marshal Goering (Deputy for the 4 Year Plan) + +4. Foreign Office (v. Ribbentrop) + +5. Reich-Minister of the Interior (Dr. Frick) + +6. Reich-Minister for Enlightenment of the People and Propaganda (Dr. +Goebbels) + +7. Reich Air-Minister (Gen. Field-Marshal Goering) + +8. Reich Finance Minister (v. Schwerin-Krosigk) + +9. Reich-Minister of Justice (Dr. Guertner) + +10. Reich-Minister of Economy (Funk) + +11. Reich-Minister for Food and Agriculture (Darre) + +12. Reich-Minister of Labor (Seldte) + +13. Reich-Minister for Science, Education and National Culture (Dr. +Rust) + +14. Reich-Minister for Ecclesiastical Affairs (Kerrl) + +15. Reich-Minister of Transportation (Dr. Dorpmueller) + +16. Reich Postal Minister (Ohnesorge) + +17. Reich-Minister Frank (Legal Affairs Reich-Fuehrer) + +18. Reich-Minister Schacht + +19. Reich-Minister Seyss-Inquart + +20. Reich Forest-Office (Gen. Field-Marshal Goering) + +The Commanders-in-Chief of the Army (Generaloberst (Gen.) v. +Brauchitsch) and of the Navy (Great-Admiral Raeder) have also the rank +of Ministers. Furthermore, the following participate regularly in the +sessions of the Government, whenever matters of their department are +being discussed: + +1. The Prussian Finance Minister, Dr. Popitz. + +2. The Reich-Fuehrer SS and the Chief of the German Police, Himmler. + +3. The Reich Labor Leader in the Reich-Ministry of the Interior, Hierl. + +4. The Chief of the Organization in Foreign Countries in the Foreign +Office, Bohle. In addition, the following Supreme Reich-Bureaus are +immediately subordinate to the Fuehrer: + +1. Court of Accounts of the German Reich (State-Minister, retired, +Mueller). + +2. Inspector General for the German Road System (Dr. Todt). + +3. Reich Office for Area Control [Raumordnung] (Kerrl). + +4. Youth-Fuehrer of the German Reich (v. Schirach). + +Furthermore, the following are immediately subordinate to the Fuehrer: + +1. The German Reich-Bank (President Reich-Minister Funk). + +2. Inspector General of Constructions for the Reich Capital (Professor +Speer). + +3. Counsellor General of Constructions for the Capital of the (party) +movement (Professor Giesler). + +4. Reich Construction Counsellor for the town of Linz on the Danube. + +The directors of these Reich Bureaus act as direct advisers and +collaborators of the Fuehrer in their department without being members +of the Reich-Government by authority of their office. + +A privy cabinet council, to advise the Fuehrer in the basic problems +of foreign policy, has been created by the decree of 4 February 1938 +(RGBl I, 112). This privy cabinet council is under the direction of +Reich-Minister v. Neurath, and includes the Foreign Minister, the +Air Minister, the Deputy Commander for the Fuehrer, the Propaganda +Minister, the Chief of the Reich-Chancellery, the Commanders-in-Chief +of the Army and Navy and the Chief of the Supreme Command of the +Armed Forces. The privy cabinet council constitutes a select staff of +collaborators of the Fuehrer which consist exclusively of members of +the Government of the Reich; thus, it represents a select committee of +the Reich Government for the deliberation on foreign affairs. + +The law on the Supreme Leader of the State makes provision for +the nomination of a Deputy Commander for the Fuehrer and also a +Vice-Chancellor. Up to July 1934, von Papen, then Reich Minister, was +Vice-Chancellor. Since then, no such nomination has been promulgated. +The Deputy for the 4 Year Plan has a sort of representation in all +matters concerning the 4 Year Plan, “all competent instances of party +and state” being combined in his person, and he has been given the +power to “issue directives to all authorities, including the highest +Reich-Authorities and all offices of the party, its subdivisions +and its affiliated associations”. The deputy for the 4 Year Plan is +therefore within the limits of his authority superior to the other +Reich Ministers, particularly to the economic and military departments. +But he is not only superior to the offices of the State but also to +those of the party. He is (with the exception of the Fuehrer) the only +central authority which by virtue of an office (and not by virtue +of a personal union of a party and State office) can issue binding +directives to the offices of the party and the State. Considering the +tremendous importance of the 4 Year Plan, this position of the deputy +is an important means for securing unity between party and State. + +This same object is furthermore pursued by the Office of the Deputy +Commander for the Fuehrer. While the Deputy for the 4 Year Plan +constitutes an authority of the State with the power to issue +directives to the party, the Deputy Commander for the Fuehrer +represents a party instance with authority to cooperate in State +affairs to a large extent. The “Ministry Hess”, with its Liaison-Staff +is charged to assert the influence of the party in the legislation and +administration of the State. All projects of politically important laws +have to be submitted to the Deputy Commander for the Fuehrer for his +preliminary examination. He naturally has the power to propose laws +from his side. His influence on the administration affects particularly +the selection of personnel. All appointments to be made by the Fuehrer +have to be examined first by the Deputy Commander for the Fuehrer. +Besides these individual powers, it is the duty of the Deputy Commander +for the Fuehrer to assert the will of the (party) movement in the +organization of the State, to settle difficulties which develop, to +investigate complaints, and thus to guarantee unity of party and State. + +Unity of party and Reich-Cabinet is furthermore secured by the numerous +personal unions i.e. association of Central State Offices with +corresponding party offices. Such personal unions exist in the cases +of the Food Minister and the Propaganda Minister, the Chief of the +German Police and the Reich Labor Leader, the Chief of the Organization +in the foreign countries, and the Reich Youth Fuehrer. Furthermore, +the majority of the Reich-Ministries is occupied by leading old party +members. Finally, all Reich Ministers have been accepted by the party +on 30 January 1937 and have been decorated with golden party insignia. + + _b._ The Reich-Cabinet as the bearer of responsible collaboration. + +The relationship between the Fuehrer and the Reich-Cabinet differs +from the Weimar colleague-like system as well as from Bismarck’s +Chancellor System. The great political principles are determined by +the Fuehrer; the will of the government is not expressed by vote, as +under the colleague-like system; doubts and differences of opinion +are also settled by the Fuehrer (in contrast to the provisions of +Section 57 of the Weimar Constitution). The Reich-Ministers who act as +advisers to the Fuehrer owe him loyalty and obedience in accordance +with the oath they have to take by virtue of the law of 16 October +1934. The Fuehrer is therefore not “primus inter pares” (first among +equal ones), as it was featured in the colleague-like system, but he +is absolutely superior to the other Reich-Ministers. But, if therefore +the principle of authority prevails within the Reich-Cabinet it is not +permitted in this case in the least to become a formal bureaucratic +mechanism like the one that characterized the Chancellor System of +Bismarck. In the latter, the collaborators of the Reich-Chancellor, +the State-Secretaries, were not independent and responsible chiefs of +their departments, but they were the subordinates of the Chancellor and +administered in his name and by his orders the various Reich-Offices, +at the top of which stood the Chancellor. Even the law of 17 March +1878 concerning deputies did not change that state of affairs to any +extent. Such a bureaucratic system does not permit the collaborators +to develop a sense of enjoying responsible action and power of +resolution and prevents genuine deliberation, the prerequisite of +which is independence of the advisor. This is characteristic of an +administrative state, where everything depends on the authoritarian +technical functioning of the State apparatus. In the Reich of the +Fuehrer the decisive factors are that the collaborators are subordinate +leaders, that they are therefore possessed themselves with the desire +for creative leadership and responsibility. + +The Fuehrer does not avail himself of the Reich-Ministers as +subordinate executive organs. The Reich-Cabinet is not a technical +apparatus. It is therefore inadmissible to consider the Reich-Ministers +as mere “Chiefs of Reich Offices” who preside over bureaucratic +institutions, rather Reich-Ministers in particular must become genuine +sub-leaders if the entire Reich is to be imbued with the spirit of +the Fuehrer system. In the Reich Cabinet, the Fuehrer procures for +himself the independent and responsible collaborators who do not only +technically direct the various offices but who are also capable to +act in a constructive and creative manner, within the scope of their +assignments. The Reich-Ministers are therefore not only advisors but +at the same time responsible creative assistants of the Fuehrer, who +administer their offices independently under the direction of the +Fuehrer. The prerequisite for the Fuehrer Principle which has been +realized in the Reich-Cabinet, is independent cooperation based on +confidence and responsibility, of the Fuehrer’s closest followers. +Thus, the Fuehrer Principle presents far higher requirements than the +bureaucratic absolutism and its not too different Chancellor System of +Bismarck. + +In view of this structure of the Reich-Cabinet it is only natural +that the counter-signature, prescribed in Section 50 of the +Weimar Constitution for all decrees and regulations issued by the +Reich-President, becomes unnecessary for the decisions of the Fuehrer. +They do not require the counter-signature of the Minister of the +respective department. Compulsory counter-signature was an institution +of the constitutional and parliamentary system. The Minister who +counter-signed the orders of the Chief of State assumed thereby +responsibility before parliament. The counter-signature was thus +inseparably connected with the parliamentary responsibility of the +Ministers; it lost its political foundation with the revolutionary +elimination of parliamentarianism of any form. However, also in the New +Reich during the period of Reich President Hindenburg’s administration, +counter-signature of presidential acts by the Reich-Chancellor was +maintained. Of course, the counter-signing Reich-Chancellor or +Reich-Minister did not assume any more the “responsibility before +the Reichstag”, as was the case within the limits of the Weimar +parliamentary system. The counter-signature was used in this case +rather as a suitable technical form for safeguarding the unified +direction of the State as long as a dual Chief of State existed. +This technical reason for maintaining the counter-signature was +rendered unnecessary with the assumption of the presidential powers +by the Fuehrer. Today, it is not necessary any more according to +constitutional law. The decrees of the Fuehrer have legal force, +even if they are not counter-signed by a Reich-Minister. Such was +particularly the order of execution of the 4 Year Plan of 18 October +1936 (RGBl I, 887) which in fact contains a law issued by the Fuehrer +alone without any counter-signature. + +As a rule, the decrees of the Fuehrer, are on the other hand, even +today co-signed by the Minister of the department concerned. Authorized +to co-sign are the Reich-Ministers, within the limits of their +departments. Furthermore the Chiefs of the Presidential-Chancellery +and of the Reich-Chancellery for their departments (Decree of 22 +November 1934, not published), and also the State-Secretaries of a +Reich-Minister who is temporarily unavailable (Decree of 20 March +1935, RMinBl. 423). The decrees concerning the party are co-signed +by the Deputy Commander of the Fuehrer, decrees concerning the range +of problems of the 4 Year Plan by the Deputy of the 4 Year Plan and +the military decrees by the Chief of the Supreme Command of the +Armed Forces. The Chiefs of the Supreme Reich-Bureaus who are not +Reich-Ministers are not authorized to co-sign. + +Co-signature is being regularly maintained for two reasons. For +once, the co-signature brings out the fact that the Minister of the +department is more than a mere technical auxiliary tool of the Fuehrer, +that he performs rather independent and objective work which requires +of course the approval of the Fuehrer but which is nevertheless the +Minister’s own work and performance. Thus, the co-signature gives +prominence to the fact that the Minister is an independent collaborator +and not only an executive instrument. Also, the co-signature is +therefore documentary proof--and this is the second reason--for the +responsibility of the Minister of the department, naturally not +before the Parliament but before the Fuehrer himself. By co-signing +the Minister accepts the responsibility before the Fuehrer that the +decree is practical, has been carefully considered and thoroughly +worked out. Such a responsibility of the Minister before the Chief of +the State could not exist under the radical parliamentary Republic. +The independence of the Minister from the Chief of State and his +responsibility before the Parliament would have been weakened in that +way. Under the old constitutional system, on the other hand, (as well +as under the presidential system formed after the constitutional +system) this responsibility of the counter-signing Minister also +before the Chief of State was in existence. This type of “Minister +responsibility” is indispensable under the Fuehrer Constitution. In +view of the number and the importance of affairs, it is self-evident +that the Fuehrer needs the advice, the suggestions, and the proposals +of his collaborators; political leadership is impossible without +reliable collaborators. The Ministers are responsible to the Fuehrer +by their oath for competent and reliable counsel and preparation of +his decisions. This responsibility of the Ministers of the various +departments finds its public expression by their counter-signature. +This counter-signature is not necessary, nevertheless. The Fuehrer can +do without it and issue all decrees and decisions which have full legal +effect by his own accord. + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1775-PS + +The OKW is asking the Fuehrer’s decision, concerning the following +proposals: + +Orders will be given immediately, after the detailed numbers and +letters have been released by the Leader, for accomplishment. + +1. To take no real preparatory measures in the Army or Luftwaffe. No +troop movements or redeployments. + +2. Spread false, but quite credible news, which may lead to the +conclusion of military preparations against Austria, + + _a._ through V-men [V-Maenner] in Austria, + _b._ through our customs personnel at the frontier, + _c._ through traveling agents. + +3. Such news could be: + + _a._ Furloughs are supposed to have been barred in the Sector of the + VII A.K. + + _b._ Rolling stock is being assembled in Munich, Augsburg, and + Regensburg. + + _c._ Major General Muff, the Military Attaché in Vienna has been + called for a conference to Berlin. (As a matter of fact, this is + the case). + + _d._ The Police Stations located at the frontier of Austria, have + called up reinforcements. + + _e._ Custom officials report about the imminent maneuvers of the + Mountain Brigade in the region of Freilassing, Reichenhall and + Berchtesgaden. + +4. Order a very active make-believe-wireless exchange in Wehrkreis VII +and between Berlin and Munich. + +5. Real maneuvers, training flights, and winter maneuvers of the +Mountain Troops near the frontier. + +6. Admiral Canaris has to be ready beginning on February 14th in the +Service Command Headquarters in order to carry out measures given by +order of the Chief of the OKW. + +7. An answer is requested to Lt General Keitel through the +Reich-Chancery. + + Signed--Keitel. + + 14.2 7:30 Captain Eberhardt gives the information by phone, + that the Fuehrer has given his approval in all points. + Answer came only around 2 at night through Reich-Chancellery. + + 9:00 Telephone message transmitted to Admiral Canaris in + Munich. + + + PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1778-PS + + THE POISONOUS MUSHROOM [Der Giftpilz] + + A Stuermer book for young and old Fables by Ernst Hiemer + Pictures by Fips + Published by Der Stuermer--Nurnberg copyright 1938 + +* * * * * * * + +[P.6] “It is almost noon,” he said, “now we want to summarize what we +have learned in this lesson. What did we discuss?” + +All children raise their hands. The teacher calls on Karl Scholz, a +little boy on the first bench. “We talked about how to recognize a Jew.” + +“Good! Now tell us about it!” + +Little Karl takes the pointer, goes to the black board and points to +the sketches. + +“One usually recognizes a Jew by his nose. The Jewish nose is crooked +at the end. It looks like the figure 6. Therefore it is called the +“Jewish Six”. Many non-Jews have crooked noses, too. But their noses +are bent, not at the end but further up. Such a nose is called a hook +nose or eagle’s beak. It has nothing to do with a Jewish nose.” + +“Right!” says the teacher. “But the Jew is recognized not only by his +nose...” The boy continues. The Jew is also recognized by his lips. His +lips are usually thick. Often the lower lip hangs down. That is called +“sloppy”. And the Jew is also recognized by his eyes. His eyelids are +usually thicker and more fleshy than ours. The look of the Jew is +lurking and sharp. + +[P.9] Then the teacher goes to the desk and turns over the black board, +on its back is a verse. The children recite it in chorus: + + From a Jew’s countenance--the evil devil talks to us, + + The devil, who in every land--is known as evil plague. + + If we shall be free of the Jew--and again will be happy and glad, + + Then the youth must struggle with us--to subdue the Jew devil. + +[P.32] Inge sits in the reception room of the Jew doctor. She has to +wait a long time. She looks through the journals which are on the +table. But she is much too nervous to read even a few sentences. +Again and again she remembers the talk with her mother. And again +and again her mind reflects on the warnings of her leader of the BDM +[League of German Girls]: “A German must not consult a Jew doctor! And +particularly not a German girl! Many a girl that went to a Jew doctor +to be cured, found disease and disgrace!” + +When Inge had entered the waiting room, she experienced an +extraordinary incident. From the doctor’s consulting room she could +hear the sound of crying. She heard the voice of a young girl: “Doctor, +doctor leave me alone!” + +Then she heard the scornful laughing of a man. And then all of a sudden +it became absolutely silent. Inge had listened breathlessly. + +“What may be the meaning of all this?” she asked herself and her heart +was pounding. And again she thought of the warning of her leader in the +BDM. + +Inge was already waiting for an hour. Again she takes the journals +in an endeavor to read. Then the door opens. Inge looks up. The Jew +appears. She screams. In terror she drops the paper. Frightened she +jumps up. Her eyes stare into the face of the Jewish doctor. And this +face is the face of the devil. In the middle of this devil’s face is +a huge crooked nose. Behind the spectacles two criminal eyes. And the +thick lips are grinning. A grinning that expresses: “Now I got you at +last, you little German girl!” + +And then the Jew approaches her. His fleshy fingers stretch out after +her. But now Inge has her wits. Before the Jew can grab hold of her, +she hits the fat face of the Jew doctor with her hand. Then one jump +to the door. Breathlessly Inge runs down the stairs. Breathlessly she +escapes the Jew house. + +[P.61] + +The pimpf [Hitler boy between 10-14] so far has not said anything. +Suddenly he stops. Then he grasps his two friends by the arm and pulls +them away. They stop in front of a bill-board. They read a large +poster. It says Julius Streicher makes an address in the People’s Hall +about “The Jews are our misfortune”. + +“That is where we go!” shouts Konrad, “I wanted to hear him speak for a +long time.” “I have heard him once before at a meeting two years ago,” +says Erich. “Do tell us all about it!” the two pimpfs beg. + +The Hitler youth recounts: + +“The meeting was overcrowded. Many thousands of people attended. +To begin with, Streicher talked of his experiences in the years of +struggle, and of the tremendous achievements of the Hitler Reich. Then +he began to talk about the Jewish question. All he said was so clear +and simple that even we boys could follow it. Again and again he told +about examples taken from life. At one time he talked most amusingly +and cracked jokes, making all of us laugh. Then again he became most +serious, and it was so quiet in the hall that one could hear a needle +drop. He talked of the Jews and their horrible crimes. He talked of the +serious danger which Judaism is for the whole world. + + “Without a solution of the Jewish question there will be no salvation + of mankind.” + +That is what he shouted to us. All of us could understand him. And +when, at the end, he shouted the “Sieg-Heil” for the Fuehrer, we all +acclaimed him with tremendous enthusiasm. For two hours Streicher spoke +at that occasion. To us it appeared to have been but a few minutes. + + + PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1780-PS + + Excerpts from General Jodl’s Handwritten Diary, February 1937-August + 1939. + + + _1937_ + +_4 February_: + +Decisive conference about the scarcity of raw materials by the +Commissioner of four-year plan. + +Only 50% of steel and iron available, therefore rationing necessary. +Full allotment only for export. Armed forces and constructions for +four-year plan must be cut down by about 40%. Therefore, requests for +money have to be converted into requirements for raw materials. Three +branches of the Armed Forces and L. for R.V. special resources must +make up a priority sequence. Until further notice no more orders to be +placed with industry so they will have a chance to fill the many orders +previously placed with them. + +The sentence “Money is an unimportant factor” has come true, even in +another sense. The main part is the raw materials. + +Bad harvest and [illegible], especially bread grain [Brotgetreide], +demand considerable use of foreign currency for the feeding of the +people. + +_31 March_: + +Report to the Minister about the maneuvers of the Armed Forces. The +Field Marshal emphasized the necessity to bring some influence to bear +(on the maneuvers) in so far as a special Armed Forces problem has to +be dealt with daily. These exercises are to be designated as “Armed +Forces Maneuvers” (army, etc.). After two years, a two front war i.e., +two maneuvers, should be presented. + +_5 November_: + +Hitler develops his ideas of future development, intentions, and +conduct of policy to the Commanders-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, the +Army, the Navy and the Air Force. + +There is a divergence in the recording of his ideas as made by the +Chief of the Armed Forces Office (War Department) [des Chef WA (R Kr. +Min)] and by the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force (Directive to the +Chief of the General Staff of Air Force). (No minutes were kept). + +Intention of L to put ideas on paper and transmit them to the Services +(C-in-C Air Force); furthermore, to incorporate them into mobilization +instructions. + + + _1938_ + +_11 February_: + +In the evening and on 12 February General K., with General v. Reichenau +and Sperrle, at the Obersalzberg. Schuschnigg together with G. Schmidt +are again being put under heaviest political and military pressure. At +2300 hours Schuschnigg signs protocol. + +_13 February_: + +In the afternoon General K. asks Admiral C. and myself to come to his +apartment. He tells us that the Fuehrer’s order is to the effect that +military pressure by shamming military action should be kept up until +the 15th. Proposals for these deceptive maneuvers are drafted and +submitted to the Fuehrer by telephone for approval. + +_14 February_: + +At 2:40 o’clock the agreement of the Fuehrer arrives. Canaris went +to Munich to the Counter-Intelligence office VII and initiates the +different measures. + +The effect is quick and strong. In Austria the impression is created +that Germany is undertaking serious military preparations. + +_15 February_: + +In the evening an official communique about the positive results of the +conference at the Obersalzberg is issued. + +_16 February_: + +Changes in the Austrian government and general political amnesty. + +_22 February_: + +At 1300 hours General K. sees the Fuehrer in order to inform him about +the planned advances [Vorstoesse]. + +_3 March_: + +The Austrian question is becoming critical. 100 officers shall be +dispatched there. The Fuehrer wants to see them personally. They +should not see to it that the Austrian Armed Forces will fight better +against us, but rather that they do not fight at all. + +_10 March_: + +By surprise and without consulting his ministers, Schuschnigg ordered a +plebiscite for Sunday, 13 March, which would bring strong majority for +the Legitimists in the absence of plan or preparation. + +Fuehrer is determined not to tolerate it. The same night, March 9 to +10, he calls for Goering. General v. Reichenau is called back from +Cairo Olympic Committee. General v. Schebert is ordered to come, as +well as Minister Glaise-Horstenau, who is with the District leader +[Gauleiter] Burckel in the Palatinate. General Keitel communicates the +facts at 1:45. He drives to the Reichskanzlei at 10 o’clock. I follow +at 10:15, according to the wish of General v. Viebahn, to give him the +old draft. + +“Prepare case Otto.” + +1300 hours: General K informs Chief of Operational Staff (and) Admiral +Canaris. Ribbentrop is being detained in London. Neurath takes over the +Foreign Office. + +Fuehrer wants to transmit ultimatum to the Austrian Cabinet. A personal +letter is dispatched to Mussolini and the reasons are developed which +force the Fuehrer to take action. + +1830 hours: Mobilization order is given to the Command of the 8th Army +(Corps Area 3), 7th and 13th Army Corps; without reserve Army. + +Air puts 300 JU-52 in readiness for dropping of propaganda pamphlets. +In addition, one Pursuit Squadron [Jagdgruppe], 3 bomber groups +[Kampfgeschwader] and two companies as airborne troops with transport +planes are held ready at civilian airports [Friedensflugplatze] in +Bavaria. + +Subordinated to the Army are: one commander of the Air Force, 2F, 3H +Squadrons, courier squadron, 1 heavy AA Bn., Regt. General Goering. + +_11 March_: + +Instruction No. 1 of the Fuehrer is given on 11 March at 2:00 without +signature; at 1300 hours with his signature. + +The Army is joined by the SS Military Units (V. T.) by regiments, +40,000 men of the police and the Totenkopf Unit Upper-Bavaria as second +wave. + +1700 hours: The Navy has ordered all ships back home. + +1800 hours: Schuschnigg has resigned; Seyss-Inquart is chancellor. SA +and SS perform duty in uniform. Own movements have commenced. Frontier +will not be crossed at the moment. Air Force plans large scale +propaganda flights for tomorrow. The police force will be needed in any +case and will be mixed with the troops. + +1835 hours: Department L. has been informed. Colonel Winkler and +Oberfuehrer Petri have also been informed. The Air Force has its doubts +if it should initiate the movements that have not yet started. + +Decision: yes. + +2030 hours: Briefing received from Major General Viebahn that the +situation has changed once more. The occupation will take place. + +_Later undated entry._ + +After annexation of Austria, the Fuehrer mentions that there is no +hurry to solve the Czech question because Austria has to be digested +first. Nevertheless, preparations for Case Green will have to be +carried out energetically; they will have to be newly prepared on the +basis of the changed strategic position because of the annexation of +Austria. State of preparations (see memorandum L I a of 19 April) +reported to the Fuehrer on 21 April. + +The intention of the Fuehrer not to touch the Czech problem as yet is +changed because of the Czech strategic troop concentration of 21 May, +which occurs without any German threat and without the slightest cause +for it. + +Because of Germany’s self-restraint, its consequences lead to a loss +of prestige of the Fuehrer, which he is not willing to take once more. +Therefore, the new order is issued for “green” on 30 May. + +_22 May_: + +Fundamental conference between the Fuehrer and K. Henlein (see +enclosure). + +_23 May_: + +Major Schmundt reports ideas of the Fuehrer. Further conferences, which +gradually reveal the exact intentions of the Fuehrer, take place with +the Chief of the Armed Forces High Command (OKW) on 28 May, 3 and 9 +June, see enclosures. (War Diary L) + +_30 May_: + +The Fuehrer signs directive Green, where he states his final decision +to destroy Czechoslovakia soon and thereby initiates military +preparation all along the line. The previous intentions of the +Army must be changed considerably in the direction of an immediate +break-through into Czechoslovakia right on D-Day [X-Tag], combined with +aerial penetration by the Air Force. Further details are derived from +directive for strategic concentration of the army. The whole contrast +becomes acute once more between the Fuehrer’s intuition that we must do +it this year and the opinion of the army that we cannot do it as yet, +as most certainly the Western Powers will interfere and we are not as +yet equal to them. + +_10 August_: + +The Army chiefs and the chiefs of the Air Force groups, Lt. Col. +Jeschonnek and myself are ordered to the Berghof. After dinner the +Fuehrer makes a speech lasting for almost three hours, in which he +develops his political thoughts. The subsequent attempts to draw the +Fuehrer’s attention to the defects of our preparation, which are +undertaken by a few generals of the Army, are rather unfortunate. This +applies especially to the remark of General Wietersheim, in which to +top it off he claims to quote from General Adams [die er noch dazu dem +General Adams in den Mund legt] that the western fortifications can +only be held for three weeks. The Fuehrer becomes very indignant and +flames up, bursting into the remark that in such a case the whole Army +would not be good for anything. “I assure you, General, the position +will not only be held for three weeks, but for three years.” The cause +of this despondent opinion, which unfortunately enough is held very +widely within the Army General Staff, is based on various reasons. +First of all, it (the General Staff) is restrained by old memories; +political considerations play a part as well, instead of obeying and +executing its military mission. That is certainly done with traditional +devotion, but the vigor of the soul is lacking because in the end they +do not believe in the genius of the Fuehrer. And one does perhaps +compare him with Charles XII. And since water flows downhill, this +defeatism may not only possibly cause immense political damage, for +the opposition between the Generals’ opinion and that of the Fuehrer +is common talk, but may also constitute a danger for the morale of the +troops. But I have no doubt that [?] the Fuehrer will be able to boost +the morale of the people in an unexpected way when the right moment +comes. + +_21-26 August_: + +Visit to Germany of the Hungarian Regent [Reichsverweser]. Accompanied +by the Prime Minister, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Honved +Minister v. Raatz [?]. + +They arrive with the idea that in the course of a great war, after a +few years, and with the help of German troops, the old state of Hungary +can be reestablished. They leave with the understanding that we have +neither demands from, nor claims against them, but that Germany will +not stand for a second provocation by Czechoslovakia, even if it should +be tomorrow. If they want to participate at that moment, it is up to +them. + +Germany, however, will never play the role of arbitrator between them +and Poland. The Hungarians agree; but they believe that, when the issue +arises, a period of 48 hours would be indispensable to them to find out +Yugoslavia’s attitude. + +_6 September_: + +Chief of General Staff, General of Artillery Halder, has a conference +with the Hungarian Chief of General Staff Fischer. + +Before that he is briefed by me on the political attitude of the +Fuehrer--especially his order not to give any hint on the exact moment. +The same with OQI, General v. Stuelpnagel. + +_8 September_: + +General Stuelpnagel OQI asks for written assurance that the Army High +Command will be informed five days in advance if the plan is to take +place. I agree and add that the over-all meteorological situation can +be estimated to some extent only for two days in advance, and that +therefore, the plans may be changed up to this moment. (D-day-2) [X-2 +Tage]. + +General Stuelpnagel mentions that for the first time he wonders whether +the previous basis of the plan is not being abandoned. It presupposed +that the Western Powers would not interfere decisively. It gradually +seems as if the Fuehrer would stick to his decision even though he may +no longer be of this opinion. It must be added that Hungary is at least +moody and Italy reserved. + +I must admit that I am worrying too, when comparing the change of +opinion about political and military potentialities, according to +directives of 24 June, 5 Nov 37, 7 Dec 37, 30 May 38, with the last +statements. + +In spite of that one must be aware of the fact that the other nations +will do everything they can to apply pressure to us. We must pass +this test of nerves, but because only very few people know the art of +withstanding this pressure successfully, the only possible solution is +to inform only a very small circle of officers of news that causes us +anxiety, and not to have it circulated through anterooms as heretofore. + +1800 hours to 2100 hours: Conference with Chief of Army High Command +and Chief of General Staff of the Air Force (present were Jeschonnek, +Kammhuber, Sternburg and myself). + +We agree about the promulgation of the D-day order [X-Befehl] (X-1, 4 +o’clock) and preannouncement to the Air Force (D-Day-1, 7 o’clock). +The “Y time” has yet to be examined; some formations have an approach +flight of one hour. + +_10 September_: + +General Halder back from Nurnberg. He reports that the Fuehrer signed +decree subordinating the Reich Labor Service to the Army High Command, +as of 15 September. Furthermore it was decided that the 13th and 2nd +motorized divisions would join the Reichenau Army and their place would +be taken by two other divisions [3 words illegible]. + +_11 September_: + +In the afternoon conference with Secretary of State Jahnke from the +Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda on imminent common +tasks. + +The joint preparations for refutation [Wiederlegung] of our own +violations of international law, and the exploitation of its violations +by the enemy, were considered particularly important. + +_15 September_: + +In the morning conference with Chief of Army High Command and Chief of +General Staffs of Army and Air Forces; the question was discussed what +could be done if the Fuehrer insists on advancement of the date, due to +the rapid development of the situation. + +_16 September_: + +General Keitel returns from the Berghof at 1700 hours. He graphically +describes the results of the conference between Chamberlain and the +Fuehrer. The next conference will take place on the 21st or the 22nd in +Godesberg. + +With consent of the Fuehrer, the order is given in the evening by the +Armed Forces High Command to the Army High Command and to the Ministry +of Finance, to line up the V.G.A.D. along the Czech border. + +In the same way, an order is issued to the railways to have the empty +rolling stock kept in readiness clandestinely for the strategic +concentrations of the Army, so that it can be transported starting 28 +September. + +_17 September_: + +Contrary to the previous intention to transfer all Sudeten Germans with +previous military training to the Replacement Army, the Fuehrer issues +order to unite them into a Sudeten German Free Corps. The Armed Forces +High Command puts Lt. Col. Koechling (reporter on youth questions) at +the disposal of Konrad Henlein as advisor to Henlein. + +_19 September_: + +Order is given to the Army High Command to take care of the Sudeten +German Free Corps. + +_20 September_: + +England and France have handed over their demands in Prague, the +contents of which are still unknown. The activities of the Free Corps +start assuming such an extent that they may bring about, and already +have brought about, consequences harmful to the plans of the Army. +(Transferring rather strong units of the Czech Army to the proximity of +border). By checking with Lt. Col. Koechling, I attempt to lead these +activities into normal channels. + +Toward the evening the Fuehrer also takes a hand and gives permission +to act only with groups up to 12 men each, after the approval of the +Corps HQ. + +_21 September_: + +The motorized reinforcements by the L. take effect. + +1130 hours: Telephone call from the Adjutant of the Fuehrer, Captain +Engel, (it is submitted during the conference with the Chiefs by +Captain Eberhardt). “The Fuehrer has received news five minutes ago +that Prague is said to have accepted unconditionally.” + +1245 hours: Department heads are informed and directive is given to +continue preparation for “Green”, but nevertheless to get ready with +everything necessary for a peaceful penetration. Orders to the Ic and +Ib of Navy High Command and Chief of General Staff of the Air Force; +General Stumpf to be informed. + +_22 September_: + +1920 hours: Ia reports about a telephone call from Godesberg by General +von Stuelpnagel on behalf of Keitel. Subject: a) Date cannot yet be +ascertained (D-Day); continue preparations according to plan. In case +“Green” occurs, it will not be before 30 September. If it occurs +sooner, it will probably be improvised. + +_25 September_: + +By order of the Fuehrer, two Death Head [Totenkopf] SS battalions have +moved into the panhandle territory near Asch [Acher Zipfel] to the rear +of the Free Corps. + +_26 September_: + +Chief of the Armed Forces High Command, acting through the Army High +Command, has stopped the intended approach march of the advance units +to the Czech border, because it is not yet necessary and because the +Fuehrer does not intend to march in before the 30th in any case. Order +to approach towards the Czech frontier need be given on the 27th only. + +In the evening of the 26th, fixed radio stations of Breslau, Dresden +and Vienna are put at the disposal of the Reich. Ministry for Popular +Enlightenment and Propaganda for interference with possible Czech +propaganda transmissions. + +Question by department “Foreign Countries” whether Czechs are to be +allowed to leave and cross Germany. Decision from Chief of the Armed +Forces High Command: yes. + +1515 hours: The Chief of the Armed Forces High Command informs General +Stumpf about the result of the Godesberg conversations and about the +Fuehrer’s opinion. In no case will X day be before the 30th. + +It is important that we do not permit ourselves to be drawn into +military engagements because of false reports, before Prague replied. + +A question of Stumpf about Y hour results in the reply that on account +of the weather situation, a simultaneous intervention of the Air Force +and Army cannot be expected. The Army needs the dawn, the Air Force can +only start later on account of frequent fogs. + +The Fuehrer has to make a decision for the commanders in chief who is +to have priority. + +The opinion of Stumpf is also that the attack of the Army has to +proceed. The Fuehrer has not made any decision as yet about commitment +against Prague. + +2000 hours: The Fuehrer addresses the people and the world in an +important speech at the Sportspalast. + +_27 September_: + +1320 hours: The Fuehrer consents to the first wave of attack being +advanced to a line from where they can arrive in the assembly area by +30 September. + +_28 September_: + +Stapf (?) reports about a conference with Goering where the latter +states that a Great War can hardly be avoided any longer. It may last 7 +years, and we will win it. + +1700 hours: Tension relaxes. The Fuehrer has decided on a conference +with Chamberlain, the Duce, and Daladier in Munich. + +_29 September_: + +The pact of Munich is signed. Czechoslovakia as a power is out. Four +zones as set forth will be occupied between the 2nd and 7th of October. +The remaining part of mainly German character will be occupied by the +10th of October. The genius of the Fuehrer and his determination not +to shun even a World War have again won the victory without the use of +force. The hope remains that the incredulous, the weak and the doubtful +people have been converted and will remain that way. + + + _1939_ + +_23 August_: + +Received order from Armed Forces High Command to proceed to Berlin and +take over position of Chief of Armed Forces Executive Office. (WFA). + +1100 hours-1330 hours: Discussions with Chief of Armed Forces High +Command. X day has been announced for 26 August. Y time has been +announced for 0430 hours. + + + PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1786-PS + + WAR DIARY OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF THE ARMED FORCES OPERATIONS STAFF + + WF. St. KTB (1) 1943 + 14 Mar. 1943 + +The treatment of captured partisans has been laid down in the combat +directive for the combatting of partisans in the East [Kampfanweisung +fuer die Bandenbekaempfung] of 27.11.42 (cf. 27.11/11/1) and Hitler’s +order [Fuehrerbefehl] of 16.12 (cf. 16.12/1). On the basis of the +foregoing the Reichsfuehrer SS ordered on the 30.12 that persons +suspected of being partisans or their assistants, who are not to be +executed, are to be transferred to concentration camps in Germany. + +This order, which corresponds to the terms of reference already +decreed, differs from an order already given on the 30.10.42 by the +Commander in Chief [Oberbefehlshaber] of the 18th Army, which calls for +the shooting without discrimination of all members of partisan groups +and which is covered by the subsequent orders of the 15.11 and 16.12 +only on their strictest interpretation. The Reichsfuehrer SS therefore +sent to the Armed Forces Operations Staff [Wehrmachtfuehrungstab] +on the 21.1 a letter of the Chef der S.P. and S.D. in which it is +requested that, in the area of the 18th Army also, partisan helpers and +persons suspected of such activity, should be dealt with in accordance +with the terms of reference of 30.12. + +The Armed Forces Operations Staff handed the matter over on the 25.1 +to the Army General Staff [Generalstab des Heeres] competent for the +combatting of partisans, and thereby conforming with the ruling given +by the Reichsfuehrer SS. This decision was confirmed by the Chief +of the High Command of the Armed Forces [Chef des Oberkommandos der +Wehrmacht]. + +Since the ruling of the combat directive, figs. 85, 86 & 104, provides +for work in Germany as a punitive measure for partisan helpers and +suspects and has proved to be disadvantageous for the enlistment +of voluntary workers, the General Plenipotentiary for Labour +[Generalbevollmaechtigter fuer den Arbeitseinsatz], has requested that +no threat of forced labour in Germany as a punitive measure should be +made, or that at least, suspects should be described as such to the +labour authorities for the purpose of supervision. + +The General Quartermaster together with the Economic Staff (East) +[Wirtschaftsstab Ost] has proposed that the deportees should be sent +either to prison camps or to “training centers in their own area”, and +that deportation to Germany should take place only when the deportees +are on probation and in less serious cases. + +In view of the Armed Forces Operations Staff this proposal does not +take sufficient account of the severity required and leads to a +comparison with the treatment meted out to the “peaceful population” +which has been called upon to work. He recommends therefore +transportation to concentration camps in Germany which have already +been introduced by the Reichsfuehrer SS for his sphere and which he +is prepared to introduce for the Armed Forces [Wehrmacht] in the case +of an extension to the province of the latter. The High Command of +the Armed Forces [Oberkommando der Wehrmacht] therefore orders that +partisan helpers and suspects who are not to be executed should be +handed over to the competent Higher SS and Police Leader and orders +that the difference between “punitive work” and “work in Germany” is to +be made clear to the population. + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1796-PS + + 7 April 1941 + + W Kr Gesch. + + Copy + + 3 Copies, 3rd Copy + + Major of the General Staff Deyhle + + Berlin, 18 October 1940 + 2 Copies, 2nd Copy + + Notes to the War Diary + + 1st. End of March 1939: + +The Fuehrer decides to make military preparations for the gradual, +seemingly unavoidable conflict with _Poland_, in such manner that these +can be executed in late summer 1939. Thereby the Fuehrer hopes only to +have to wage war on one front (“Fall Weiss”). + + 2nd. The following months: _Minutes under the Fuehrer’s influence_: + +_a._ Attack by the forces from East Prussia;--OKH will first of all +deploy the forces from South West Part of East Prussia in order to +eliminate the Corridor as soon as possible. The Fuehrer considers +attack further East more suitable in order to reach a decisive solution +at the very beginning (causing the Vistula line to fall, thereby +preventing the Poles from making a new stand behind the Vistula). + +_b._ Forming of 14 divisions. Fourth wave (Welle) to consist of E units. + +_c._ All preparations to be camouflaged as defensive measures. + + +_Basis_ for 1st and 2nd: + +_a._ Directive for “Fall Weiss” OKW/L of April 1939. + +_b._ “Chronological table” for Weiss OKW/L of July 1939. + +_c._ Correspondence OKW/L with sections of the Armed Forces. + +_d._ Beginning of the War diary L. + +3rd. August 1939: + +_In spite of the English guarantee to Poland_, and thereby a war on 2 +fronts becoming almost unavoidable, the Fuehrer decides to settle the +account with Poland after having prevented encirclement by means of _an +agreement with Russia_. + + 4th. September 1939: _Polish Campaign mainly under the Influence of + the Fuehrer_: + +_a._ “Great Pincers” (strongly motorized forces to attack the Eastern +part of East Prussia towards South behind Vistula, moreover motorized +forces to push forward in plenty of time across lower Vistula towards +East Prussia). + +_b._ Capture of Warsaw. Must be carried out _before_ the Russians reach +the Vistula. + +_c._ Reinforcement of the Western Front. Extension northwards to the +Belgian/Dutch border, in order to incite the French/British Army to +march into Holland and Belgium; in addition to this also hasten the +construction of the Northern part of the West Wall. + +5th. End of September 1939: + +_Decision of the Fuehrer_, to attack _in the West_ and this as soon +as possible since the French/British Army is not yet ready. Intention +of attacking through Belgium and Holland (at least southern part) is +certain from the start. From the very beginning it is the Fuehrer’s +idea not to repeat the Schlieffen-plan but to attack in approximately +a west-north western direction through Belgium and Luxembourg under +strong protection of the Southern flank, and to gain the Channel coast. + +After conclusion of the Eastern campaign the restrictions hitherto +existing in regard to warfare in the West are progressively being +lifted. They served the purpose, while the Eastern campaign was in +Progress, of not inciting the enemy in the West to greater action, by +German measures. + +6th. October 1939: + +Attack to begin at the earliest about 10 Nov. OKH is of the opinion +that the preparations of the Army will not be absolutely complete by +this time. Frequently the opinion is advocated--by no means shared by +the Fuehrer--that an attack in the West is unnecessary, the war could +perhaps be won for us satisfactorily if we were to wait a little. + +Fuehrer is determined to attack in November only if the _weather_ will +permit operations by the mass of the Luftwaffe since only then can one +of our most important trumps become effective. + +How situation would turn out if _France/England_ march into +_Belgium/Holland_, is constantly the concern of the Fuehrer. Immediate +attack of the German Western Army [Sofortfall] must be prepared for +this event. + +7th. End of October 1939: _Influence of the Fuehrer_: + +_a._ Employment of _motorized_ forces in direction Sedan is suggested +by the Fuehrer. Preparations are under way for moving Army group B and +concentrating them at A after, in accordance with previous deployment +of troops, main concentration had been at Army Group B. + +_b._ Re-occupation of Holland, it has been decided that Holland is not +to be occupied for the time being, rapid occupation in case of English +landing should however be possible at any time. + +_c._ Question of using parachute and airborne troops is being taken up +by the Fuehrer. + +8th. Beginning of November 1939: Mainly under _Influence of the +Fuehrer_: + +_a._ Permanent reinforcement of the southern mot. group, which is to +advance against Sedan. + +_b._ Reinforcement of the Western Army to the utmost capacity. + +The weather conditions prevent the execution of the attack in the West. + +9th. 23 November 1939: _Speech by the Fuehrer_ to the Generals and +Admirals. + +10th. End of November 1939: _Influence of the Fuehrer_ above all + +_a._ Holland is to be occupied immediately. + +_b._ Shifting of the main concentration of Army Group B to A appears to +have even better prospects. + +_c._ Deployment of 7th FL. Div. (Deliberation of further possibilities). + +_d._ Important to maintain element of surprise, therefore motorized +units which are still all located at home will be moved up to the Rhine +in order not to betray to the enemy the imminent beginning of the +attack, by the moving up to the front. + +_e._ Capture of the bridges at Maastricht and of the Fort Eben Emael, +since destruction of the bridges would render impossible the fast +advance of the sixth Army. + +First directive for _warfare against England_ (no. 9) is issued. +Purpose: concentration of all combat weapons for important targets. + +At a conference in the map-room of the OKW (Supreme Command of the +Armed Forces) in the Reich Chancellery, the Fuehrer expresses anew his +opinion that _the attack planned in the West_ will lead to the greatest +victory in world history. + +11th. December 1939: + +In spite of the _severe winter_ the Fuehrer as always still continues +to consider it desirable to carry out the _attack in the West_ as soon +as possible and not to delay it until spring. Reasons: + +_a._ England/France must not be allowed under any circumstances to +steal a march on us by occupying Belgium and Holland since then--on +account of the danger to the Ruhrbasin--the war could hardly be won. + +_b._ Time is not on our side but on the enemy’s (see notes of Major +Deyhle). + +The Fuehrer is carefully watching the Russo-Finnish war (on account of +the possibility of the Western powers joining in to the advantage of +Finland). + +12th. Beginning of January 1940: + +The introductory movements in _preparation for the big attack_ are +ordered anew by the Fuehrer, soon however checked again on account of +the weather condition, although most important operational basis fall +into Belgian hands and thereby there is a possibility of our intentions +becoming known. + +For the deployment of the 7th FL. Division a new possibility becomes +more and more probable: Capture of the “Fortress Holland”. + +13th. Middle of January 1940: + +During the past weeks probable _dates_ for our attack in the West _have +become known_ in Belgium and Holland. The reason can not be determined, +the main fault lies possibly in the long waiting time just before the +attack (issue of order 7 days beforehand). + +In order better to maintain the _surprise_ element beyond the time of +attack, the Fuehrer orders therefore a _change in the alert procedure_. + +The idea that the decisive point of the attack will have to be reached +by breaking through Southern Belgium (thus the total attack to be +concentrated on the left) is being worked out by the Fuehrer in even +greater detail. + +The occupation of the whole of Holland is ordered. For this also the +7th FL. Division is to be employed. Extensive deceptive measures are +ordered. The “Sofortfall” remains in effect. + +The Fuehrer _makes up his mind_ to utilize the Danish and _Norwegian +space_ for the German warfare. + +The Fuehrer considers what possibilities exist for forming new units. +The setting up of the division’s 7th and 8th wave is then ordered. * * * + + + PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1799-PS + + War Diary; Armed Forces Operations Staff (L/K.T.B. WFSt, Volume 6A, 1 + Aug. 1940-26 Mar. 1941) + + ANNEX 1 + +Report to the Fuehrer on 5 December 1940 + +The Chief of the General Staff of the Army then reports about the +planned operation in the East. He expanded at first on the geographic +fundamentals. The main war industrial centers are in the Ukraine, in +Moscow and in Leningrad. + +* * * * * * * + +The Fuehrer declares that he is agreed with the discussed operational +plans and adds following: The most important goal is to prevent that +the Russians should withdraw on a closed front. The eastward advance +should be combined until the Russian air force will be unable to attack +the territory of the German Reich and, on the other hand, the German +air force will be enabled to conduct raids to destroy Russian war +industrial territories. In this way we should be able to achieve the +annihilation of the Russian army and to prevent its regeneration. + +The first commitment of the forces should take place in such a way to +make the annihilation of strong enemy units possible. + +* * * * * * * + +It is essential that the Russians should not take up positions in the +rear again. The number of 130-140 Divisions as planned for the entire +operation is sufficient. + +1 August 1940-March 26, 1941 + + + PARTIAL COPY OF DOCUMENT 1800-PS + + PRELIMINARY REPORT ON GERMANY’S CRIMES AGAINST NORWAY + + [Prepared by the Royal Norwegian Government.] + +[Page 17] + + Other Violations. + +In different places in Norway the Germans appeared in Norwegian +uniforms during battles. This was the case in the district of Bergen +according to a Communique of the 14th of April, 1940, during the +struggles in Valdres and in Narvik. Reports have been received that at +one place the Germans even put on women’s clothes, in order to reach a +favourable position. + +Where the Germans passed, the civilians found their homes in an +indescribable condition after the battle, even if the Germans had not +set fire to the houses. The so-called German “informal requisitions” +which actually meant plundering and destruction, were later compensated +for to the extent of about 9 million kroner in all, partly by Norwegian +authorities and partly by German authorities, that is, by money drawn +out of the Bank of Norway [Norges Bank] by the Germans. + +On 25th April, 1940, Ulvik in Hardanger was reduced to ruins, as a +reprisal measure, as the Germans claimed that civilians there had +fired on German troops. Damage was done to more than 400 buildings and +chattels amounting to a total of 2.3 million kroner. [Page 26] + + + B. CRIMES AGAINST NORWEGIAN PROPERTY + + a. Wanton ravaging and destruction. + +4. As a result of the advance of the Russian troops and the retreat +of the German Army in Finnmark, October-November 1944, the Germans +practised the “scorched earth” policy for the first time in Norway. +Orders were issued that the civilian population was to evacuate and +that all houses, transport and stores were to be destroyed. As a result +of this about 30,000 houses were damaged, apart from 12,000 items of +damage to chattels, amounting to a total of about 176 million kroner +(Appendices 31 and 32). + +[Page 62] + +Appendix 31. + + + TO THE POPULATION: + +The evacuation of a part of North Norway has been rendered a military +necessity as a result of the treachery of a Finnish Government clique. + +This evacuation necessitates the removal of the civilian population, +as the enemy has proved that, in those territories occupied by him, +he ruthlessly and brutally forces the civilian population to give him +active assistance in achieving his aims. + +This means that no shelter or means of existence of any kind can +be left to the Bolshevisk enemy in the fighting zone. All such +installations as housing accommodation, transport facilities and food +stocks must be destroyed or removed. + +The population in these districts will therefore be deprived of the +basis for their existence so that in order to be able to survive they +must evacuate to those Norwegian territories which are still protected +by the German Wehrmacht. + +For this reason, the German occupation authorities have declared +themselves prepared to support, by all means at their disposal, the +civil evacuation which the Norwegian authorities are carrying out. + +In the interests of the people themselves all means by which they can +effect their own evacuation are to be used to the greatest possible +extent. + +It is above all essential for a successful evacuation that all fishing +smacks and other craft which are available in this area shall be fully +employed. Owners of craft who try to evade evacuation must be prepared +for severe counter-measures such as the shooting and sinking of craft +and crew. + +He who does not comply with these unequivocal instructions exposes +himself and his family to possible death in the arctic winter without +house or food. + + (signed) Terboven. + Reichskommissar for the Occupied Norwegian Territories. + + (signed) Rendulic. + Colonel-General + Commander-in-Chief 20th Army. + + Proclamation by Terboven and General Rendulic on the evacuation + of Finnmark. + + + PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1807-PS + + [EXTRACT FROM JODL’S DIARY.] + +16.6.42. + +The operational staff of the Navy [Skl], applied on the 29th May, +for permission to attack the Brazilian sea and air forces. The Skl +considers that a sudden blow against the Brazilian naval and merchant +ships is expedient at this juncture (_a_) because defence measures are +still incomplete (_b_) because there is the possibility of achieving +surprise and (_c_) because Brazil is to all intents and purposes +fighting Germany at sea. + + + PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1808-PS + + Address by the Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff, Col. Gen. + Jodl to the Officers and Officials of the Armed Forces Operations + Staff. July 24, 1944: 19:30 hours, page 4. + +Those making the attempt may have thought also that the men around +Hitler were climbers and servile characters. But how did matters +really stand? I, for example, was drawn in, even though I knew the +movement before 1933 but little and could do nothing for it for the +very reason that I was a soldier. Rather, I was against any relaxing of +the discipline, bound as I was by my oath to the Reich President. Of +course, my aims were, by and large, the aims of the movement, since my +thinking was always nationalistic, social, and anti-Catholic, and since +loyalty and obedience were the bases of life for me. And thus this +train of thought is also disposed of. + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1809-PS + + General Jodl’s Diary (Armed Forces Operational Staff) from 1 February + to 26 May 1940 + +_1 February 1940_: + +The Fuehrer requests that Major Kieritz be sent from here in good time +with special mission. + +Col. Schmundt and Capt. Deyhle are back from the West. + +Conclusion: + + 1. Morale and discipline--excellent + + 2. Tactical mobility is impossible because of the weather. One cannot + withdraw more than 15 km. Army Group B, on the contrary, deems + weather excellent to overcome floods. + + 3. In all divisions, formerly committed in the East, the automotive + position is very bad. Up to 40% are missing--each of these 40 + divisions should be provided with up to 100 vehicles. + +1700 hours General Jeschonnek. + + 1. Attitude of parachute units. In front of the Hague, they have to + be strong enough to break in even forcibly. The 7th division + intends to drop units near the town. + + 2. Political mission contrasts to some extent with violent action + against the Dutch air force. + + 3. Walcheren Ioland will have to be occupied as soon as possible. + + 4. Immediate use requires some arrangements. + + To be eliminated: + + Commitment of K against Eben Emael + + against bridge C + + “Fieselor Stork” airplane in front of Army Group A. + + The ground Forces already will take up position at dusk, if + possible. + + 7th Fl. Division is to be in readiness, but will not take up + position without further orders. + + 5. Question about general intentions? Time. + + 6. Is it not possible to tackle H alone; that would already be a + tremendous improvement in conducting aerial warfare. + + 7. The Air Force wants permission to attack every kind of commercial + shipping in the 30-mile zone as well as everything anywhere making + use of arms: French vessels, cargo boats. + +_2 February_: + +Fuehrer is furious about presentation by Ordnance Bureau which needed +8 days to demonstrate to him--not by actual constructing but only +theoretically--that the Czech 4.7-cm anti-tank gun is not usable with +armored car 3. + +Fuehrer decides as to Jeschonnek’s questions of 1 February: + +_a._ one has to employ in the Hague [d.H.] forces of such strength that +they will be able to take over command there. In order to achieve that, +a landing can be made in the center of the Hague. + +Unlimited use of arms against airfields and anti-aircraft guns is +authorized. + +Relative to an attack against all ships, found between the English East +Coast and the English mine fields, as desired by air, the Foreign +Office is still to be consulted and Admiral Schuster, Chief Air Force, +1700 hours, states in that matter that he does not want any exception. + +Italian and Japanese ships to be considered, which were sailing to +Newcastle, until a short time ago. + +Important, that, though we signed an agreement about submarine warfare, +we never signed one about manner of air warfare. + +Reported to the Fuehrer on 3 February + +The Spanish have supplied a German submarine and convoyed a merchant +ship from Bilbao to Santander. + +Opinions of the newspapers: Spain is not ungrateful. Photos of Church +Services, does Fuehrer agree with them? + +The Foreign Office wants that within the 30 mile zone the Air Force +shall _not_ attack-- + + _a._ Japanese and Italian ships. + _b._ Danish Maltesian cross ships. + _c._ All passenger boats which do not fire. + +_3 February_: + +General Gerke: Railroads are unable to accomplish big tasks. No +reaction to our transports. It seems possible that he got news about +the reliefs. Opportune to keep movement going. Proposal to prepare +again an A-movement to deceive the enemy. Empty rolling stock for 6 +divisions available, organization transports are rolling. Will head of +transportation service be able to release state of readiness, so that +he can gather empty rolling stock during 4 days. + +To consult Fuehrer. _The chief of Transportation Corps West requires +one week’s time (225 trains)._ 70 trains are at the disposal of the +armies. + +315 trains are needed for second echelon. An order will be issued on +this matter on D-day. + +Afterwards remain 3rd, 4th, and 5th echelon. + +Total 660 trains, including 80 for tanks and 70 for armies (among them +10,000 army cars). + +Altogether 60 fewer trains ready than before. + +_Air raid protection._ + +_Ammunition train has no special protection. If machine gun car is +added, the enemy flier will be aware of the fact, that this is an +important train._ The wave before the trains should attack the enemy +plane with best results. Ammunition trains often remain for weeks, +personnel for its protection become demoralized. + +Ammunition trains, regulating stations and storage areas to be spread +out and protected. Assembly stations are enlarged to assembly areas. + +Maintenance units are kept in readiness in the most endangered areas +between the Rhine and the line Kassel-Hanover. + +Ruhr area has 15 different ways to give way. + +_Rumania_ wants to get supply of rail track material (from Poland.) + +_1340_ locomotives and _40000_ cars will be manufactured by the end of +1940 or maybe beginning of 1941. Stock _23000_ locomotives, 8000 of +which are heavy freight train locomotives for Armed Forces transports. +This will only replace the loss. + +_4 February_: + +Will the Court-Martial be re-activated? + +Bodenschatz: Army Group C should not get out of hand [Keinen zauber +machen] on minus-1 day. + +Fuehrer gives his agreement that 225 trains in position of readiness +may be used for other purposes by the chief of transportation corps +until 12 February. + +Proposal to the Fuehrer about continuation of aerial warfare within the +30 mile zone. Fuehrer agrees with proposal and talks with the Minister +for Foreign Affairs in the afternoon. + +_5 February_: + +Special staff “Weser Exercise” meets and is welcomed by Chief of Armed +Forces High Command, gets instructions. + +Representative of Air Force is still missing. + +_6 February_: + +Consumption of gasoline is not reduced. Stocks further diminished by +30000 tons. + +Deception even of Armed Forces High Command. + +Office Reinicke and Thomas, that is to say Chief of Armed Forces High +Command, + +W Pr that is to say Chief of Armed Forces Operational Office. + +Fuehrer leaves in the evening. + +15:30 hours conference with General Jeschonnek, Col. v. Waldau and Col. +Warlimont. + +Air Force submits following questions: + +Does X time remain unchanged? Yes. Deceptive action intolerable for +Army Group C on A-1 day. Navy is not interested in Walcheren. Does not +see any danger from the English side. New idea: carry out actions H and +Weser Exercise only and guarantee Belgium’s neutrality for the duration +of the war. + +Discussed once more affair Risberg with Chief of Armed Forces High +Command. + +_8 February_: + +Chief of Transportation Corps reports: Reich Railroads now admit that +they cannot handle any additional burden at this moment. They are not +ready for war. Although they hardly got any military requests, they +cannot supply the domestic economy right now. + +It is only a question of engines, now, there are enough cars available +everywhere. + + Transportation: 80% railroad. + 18% water transport. + 2% road transport. + +Transportation by water has to be brought to double of current capacity. + +Radio receivers can be transformed into transmitters without particular +difficulties. + +Paris probably only by Gen. F.... [Fermont?], rue de Louvre. + +_9 February_: + +Chief of Armed Forces High Command received by Field Marshal Goering at +10 o’clock. Newspaper correspondents from the Protectorate may be sent +to the West Wall (Fuehrer gave permission on 10 February). + +_10 February_: + +The difficult situation in Transportation is presented by me in written +form to the Chief of the Armed Forces High Command. + +13:00 hours: Conference of Fuehrer with General Halder. Before that, +inspection of 4.7 tank destroyer on tank I, chassis satisfying +[befriedigt]. + +Field Marshal has explained, that he is able to start at night anyhow. +Flying into the area of ... from the sea. + +During the World War, we have dropped 28,000 tons. Thus, the Air Forces +does not want to anticipate, but prefers start at night. Planes shall +not fly over Luettich and Eben Emael in order to avoid any alarm there. + + 113,000 trucks driving in the W * * * + + 45,000 of them are suited for Armed Forces. + + We are able to produce 4000 trucks. + + Fuehrer states, all the iron has been taken away from Todt, even that + put aside by him (he wanted to build 3000 additional ones). + +_For the first time, the problems of transportation, motor vehicles and +gasoline have been reported to the Fuehrer more impressively._ + +Fuehrer agrees that the 225 trains for the first wave of Army High +Command reserves may still be used further on by the Chief of the +Transportation Corps. + +_11 February_: + +First report from France about our troop movements and reinforcements +in the west, which were terminated on 1 February already. + +_12 February_: + +Fuehrer has a cold. No report. + +_13 February_: + +The Army requested survey about the strength of the armies and +reserves, divided into batteries, battalions and tanks [Btn. Btlen u. +Kampfwagen], induces the Fuehrer again to open the question of the +center of gravity. + +He says: Most of the armed tanks [Geschuetzkampfwagen] have been +directed to areas of secondary importance. Armored Divisions at 4th +Army can do little in barricaded and fortified area. + +They will be stopped at the latest on the Maas river and must be +withdrawn. The 16th or 12th Army will then miss them. One should lead +them together in direction of Sedan. The enemy does not expect our main +assault there. The documents of fliers, who landed, have convinced them +[the enemy] still further in their opinion that our intention is only +to take possession of the Dutch and Belgian channel coast. + +A great number of tanks with 8th Tank Division does not seem necessary, +a mechanized division in 3 or 4 parts with tanks assigned, should +suffice. (It may be that this is a wish of the SSV division.) + +I hand over to the Fuehrer a summarized report, from which the great +possibility for formation of a center of gravity south of the line +Luettich-Namur becomes obvious (at least 5 times the strength of the +forces committed north of that line). I bring to his attention that +the thrust against Sedan is a tactical secret path, where one can be +surprised by the God of War. If the French attack from the south flank, +we must veer to the south. + +Fuehrer still thinks it possible, that the enemy will not engage the +battle at all. Anyhow he will do it automatically. After half a day the +news from Holland and Belgium may be so threatening already that he +will decide to stand still. + +I don’t believe it. + +At 17:30 hours Col. v. Greifenberg and Lt. Col. Heusniger are summoned +to discuss these questions. + +The Fuehrer disapproves of the wearing of regular army uniforms by +persons who are not members of the army or the Fuehrer’s headquarters. + +Recommends taking care of motor vehicles and fuel. Higher speeds result +in doubled tire consumption. + +Chief of Armed Forces High Command has a cold and will remain at home +in the afternoon. + +Have learned from Admiral Canaris that the echelon Reivel is to be put +to use against the Caucasus with bulk from Bulgaria. The Air Force must +explain with whom this false idea originated. + +Inquiries made to the Chief of the Operational Division: whether there +is a sufficient quantity of cloth for flags on hand? Change of position +of the Army High Commands. + +Proper designation of own troops: + + (_a_) Front line: white. + (_b_) In line of company CPs: swastika flag. + (_c_) Rear echelons: yellow rectangle. + +Communicated Fuehrer’s ideas to Col. Warlimont, von Greifenberg and +to Lt. Col. Heusniger, at 17:30 hours. Instructions requested how we +should proceed in future. + +_14 February_: + +Ziegenberg plant cannot be completed before June due to technical +difficulties. Emergency installation can be made ready for operation by +the middle of March, but in that case the Air Force must be in Nauheim +or on the train. + +_Colonel Schmundt_ must make a report on the distribution of personnel +to WNV. + +Copper advance from Wifo stocks now to WNV, later back to Wifo. + +Political action against the increase in frontier road-blocks [?] in +Luxemburg. + +_Dr. Dorpmueller telegraphed to the chief of the Transportation Corps_: +The condition of the Reich Railroads requires that all nonessential +transportation of the Armed Forces be postponed until warmer weather +sets in. + +_15 February_: + +The Fuehrer approves my article on the Finnish-Russian conflict. Is +to be published in the Voelkischer-Beobachter. Backlog congestion of +railroads increased by 200 trains. + +Certainty that nothing will happen to W. + +Instructions to the 18th Army. + +_16 February_: + +Corps on left flank of 16th and not 6th Army. + +Landing at the Hague.... + +Capture Fort Hendrik. + +10 divisions of the 8th wave [must receive 3 batteries]. + +No off-standard types of vehicles must be permitted to be used at the +front, as long as standard army models are still being used in industry. + +_To the Chief of the Luftwaffe_ [taken care of]. + +Air raid protection.... + +Speakers for troops, danger if commanders order the speeches themselves. + +Chief of the Armed Forces High Command. + + WNV training of 300 to 400 men + land postal clerks at Verst. [?] + Not yet + from the Chief of the Air Force at present + +_6 new German consuls appointed in Scandinavia._ + +_C. has given orders for large-scale preparations for offensive._ + +Fortress [Fest] drill of “Grafemvoeln”. + +Special security by counterintelligence coordination of press. + +Brief reports in the provincial newspapers for enemy intelligence +service. Request authorization to land at Myden with a load of +machines. Alternative preparations at C. should work in the same +direction. Pr. Battleship “Repulse” in dock. Complete flop of this +news report. Altmark in Bergen, British submarines expected. Burgedeyk +submarine 48 Schulz unsuccessful [?] submarines. + + Chief of Armed Forces High Command. + Press Conference at Foreign Office. + +Chief of the Navy High Command wishes to talk the Halifax problem over +once more and then speak to the Fuehrer. Now applications of mines +only. Chief of Navy, High Command will take this matter up again with +the Fuehrer. L. ask what with report of General Staff Officers. + +_17 February_: + +Incident with tankship “Altmark”, 6 dead, 4 seriously injured. 1700 +hours: Newly promoted Commanding Generals and General Rommel at +Fuehrer’s table for dinner. (Geyr, Manstein, Schmidt, Reinhardt, +Glumne). Complaints that guns in armored cars IV only * * * have not to +2000 m. After dinner Manstein reports his ideas about the operations +of Army Group A. He says, the decisive blow will not fall west of the +Maas, but it must be overcome between Sedan-Charleville. If the enemy +crosses the river, we are able to beat him and cross the River Maas +together with him. In the south therefore, we must have strong armor or +none at all. What is in the rear cannot reach the battlefield in time. + +_18 February_: + +On the basis of my discussion with Greifenberg on 13 February Chief +of the Armed Forces High Command and General Halder reported to the +Fuehrer the following intention: + +1. To shift the demarcation line between Army Group A and B in line +Luettich-Namur. + +2. To employ stronger armored forces in front of the 12th and 16th +army, weakening by the measure Army Group B (1st and 5th armored) and +ground forces reserved (9th armored division). + +3. Intention to go to the front any way with a very small staff one +night preceding A Day. + +Fuehrer approves all three suggestions but insists that in distributing +the heavy tanks III, III t and IV due consideration should be given to +the tasks to be expected. That is to say not such a large number of +heavy tanks as it is the case now with the 8th Armored and 6th Armored +Division. + +_19.II_ + +Fuehrer displeased with behavior of Graf Spee crew on the Altmark. No +resistance, no British losses. + +Fuehrer presses energetically, preparations for the Weser Exercise +Equip steamships. Put units in readiness. Will talk to staff. + +In order to speed up preparations I advise to appoint one of newly +promoted commanding generals with his staff as leader. + +Fuehrer approves. + +Chief of Army reports about problems of organization. + +_20 February_: + +Discussion and consideration how case “Weser Exercise” is to be carried +through. Equipment is to be taken on board ships ahead of the troops. +Designation of units depends on equipment on hand. + +1500 hours discussion concerning that matter through Chief of Armed +Forces High Command with General Fromm. Intention, to take two +divisions with technical equipment as second wave. + +_21 February_: + +Fuehrer talks to General von Falkenhorst and charges him with +preparation of the Weser Exercise. Falkenhorst accepts gladly. +Instructions to each of the 3 branches of the armed forces. + +Proposal from Fromm to use only units with German material. Therefore +7th Fl. Div., 22nd Division, one regiment of the 1st mountain division. +Two divisions of the 7th wave, motorized brigade (rifle brigade. 11 +with armored car 1). + +Fuehrer wishes that western connections of the “Spicherer Hoehen” be +advanced and fortified with pillboxes. + +Colonel v. Greifenberg transmits. + +_22 February_: + +Fuehrer expresses his intention to go to Munich for Sunday. + +At the beginning of operations he does not want to go to Ziegenberg but +to the Eagle’s Nest [Felsen]. + +Colonel Juppe ordered: + + _a._ to have a drawing made of the chain of command. + + _b._ to consider, in what way the communications can be technically + improved at the Eagle’s Nest and vicinity. + +Commander Junge informed about proposed points in his report by the +Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. Important 3 points: + + _a._ Submarines into the Mediterranean. + + _b._ Esthonian submarines. + + _c._ Discordance Navy-Airforce about the moment for the beginning of + mine laying. Air force beginning 1 May with 3000, Navy with + Heinckel 115 now, already 1845 hours Chief of the Armed Forces + High Command informed. + +_Noon._ Todt reports to the Fuehrer concerning extension of railroad +gauges [?] [Schienenhoehen]. Fuehrer approves that extension will be +built according to schedule. + +_23 February_: + +Navy High Command reports that during last night 2 destroyers were sunk +by our own planes [Leberecht Maas and ...]. Navy High Command stresses +that this is the consequence of uncoordinated conduct of sea warfare, +regardless whether it is conducted under, on or above the sea. One +takes pains not to get excited; what would happen if there should be +heavy losses. Fuehrer is furious. He is right. He says: “I would not +say anything if the whole Navy were sunk in battle with the enemy, but +it is inexcusable if that happens on account of lack of coordination.” + +Gasoline reserve for motor vehicles. + +_24 February_: + +Clear up, whether Navy is authorized to start already now with mine +laying. Who will ask Duce, whether our own submarines have to enter the +Mediterranean? + +Engel informs about inquiry results Todt and Schmundt. The latter calls +long distance from Munich. Fuehrer has ordered completion of Eagle’s +Nest for Armed Forces Operational Staff and Air Force. [Zug] (air group +[?]) Heinrich will have to stay east of the Rhine. + +Army High Command as strongly as possible in forests. Officer from the +General Staff and an officer from Intelligence Service are to go to +Eagle’s Nest 26 February. There to reconnoiter together with Todt. + +1430 hours. Orally transmitted to Chief of Operational Department and +to Lieutenant Colonel Heusinger the matter. Chief of the High Command +is informed. Staff Falkenhorst arrives in Berlin and starts to function +XXIst Corps. + +_25.II._ + +Disturbing reports from Turkey. Communication apparently cut off. + +Chief of Armed Forces High Command inform General Halder about +Fuehrer’s intention to have an Operational Staff of the Army High +Command near the Eagle’s Nest also. + +_26.II._ + +Fuehrer raises the question, whether it is better to undertake the +Weser Exercise before or after case “Yellow”. + +Chief of the Air Force charged with examining this problem. Fuehrer +decides that Navy will have to wait with starting of mine laying by +means of planes, until situation will permit large-scale employment of +air force [transmitted to Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force]. + +Talked with Chief of Air Force and Chief of Staff about work on and +about housing of Air Force near Eagle’s Nest at the beginning. Air +Force to Rodert or Muenstereifel or train nearby. + +_27 February_: + +60 Tons of leaflets shall be dropped down in the near future. Fuehrer +approves the schedule but will not issue proclamation to Armed Forces +from here on A Day. + +_28 February_: + +I make the following proposition to the Chief of the Armed Forces +High Command and after that to Fuehrer: Case “Yellow” and Weser +Exercise have to be prepared in such a manner that they will become +quite independent from another regarding time and strength. Fuehrer +completely agrees with that proposition if there is any possibility for +it. + +1500 hours, staff Falkenhorst reports about preparations made so far. +In this connection I explain to him the new basis of preparations. + +Proposition for employment of forces + + N 4 airborne companies + 2 Mountain divisions + D 1 corps headquarters + 22 infantry divisions less + 2 division, 7th wave pol. division + 1 div. 3rd wave regional defense unit. + +It has yet to be decided, whether reinforcement 11th rifle brigade +is to be directed first to group D and then to group N or to group N +immediately. + +Proposition as regards combat planes too high. + +_29 February_: + +1500 hours, Report of staff Falkenhorst with Kranke, Buschenhagen, +Dnaus very satisfactory to Fuehrer. He approves the suggestions. + +Fuehrer wishes also to have a strong group at Copenhagen and detailed +elaboration in which way the individual coastal batteries are to be +overpowered. Commander-in-Chief of Air Forces is instructed to make out +immediately the order for Army, Navy, and Air Force, and Chief “WZ” +order concerning increasing of the staff. + +According to my proposal outfit transport ships immediately and with +them bring horses over here from East Prussia. + +1300 hours, Order to Juppe to speed up construction of Eagle’s Nest, 11 +March according to interim solution (operational staff of the Commander +in Chief of the Armed Forces in hunting lodge and at the same time +permanent solution). (Army High Command with operational department and +parts of O.A.IV.) + +The same evening order concerning personal requirements of the staff +and requisition to the branches of the armed forces. + +_1 March_: + +Fury at Army High Command because transfers. Consultation with Chief +of Armed Forces High Command. After my discussion with Jeschonnek +scaling-down of requisitions. + +_2 March_: + +Agreement with Army. Field Marshal rages and gets unfriendly towards +Chief of Armed Forces High Command, goes to see Fuehrer at 1300 hours. +During the afternoon new requisitions are put forward which are +somewhat reduced after consulting with Army and Air Force. + +1100 hours: Assistant Secretary of State Welles with the Fuehrer. The +appointment of a new Minister for Ordnance is to be expected because +Fuehrer is dissatisfied with production of equipment and munition. + +Letter from the Chief of the Armed Forces High Command to the Field +Marshal. + +_3 March_: + +Fuehrer expresses his opinion about the necessity of prompt and strong +action in Norway very sharply. No delay by branches of Armed Forces. +Rapid acceleration is necessary. + +Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force is against any proposition to +subordinate Air Force units to XXI Corps. + +Fuehrer decides to undertake Weser Exercise before case “Yellow”, with +several days interval. + +_4 March_: + +Discussion with General Jeschonnek. All units of the Air Force are +subordinated to X Fl. K. This receives its order through High Command +of the Air Forces, upon demand of the Staff of XXIst Corps. + +Fuehrer orders that the Air Force shall provide the anti-aircraft +battalion for the Weser exercise South. + +3rd mountain division to be in Berlin already on March 6th. + +_1000 hours_: Chief of the Air Force is informed. + +_1300 hours_: Chief WNV is charged with securing communications from +Falkenhorst to us. The former has to go to Luebeck to the X Fl. K. + +_1500 hours_: Chief WNV is instructed to set up * * * platoon company +only after X-day. After that time, use expedients and send some men +with the tactical troops. + +_1700 hours_: General Bodenschatz complains about exclusion of the +Field Marshal from Weser exercise. He said that 110 officers of the Air +Force had been consulted in advance. Such subordination is intolerable. + + Mad at General K + I certify this error. + +Chief of the Armed Forces High Command is informed that General +Rundstedt is supposed to feel sick. Intend to talk about it with +Commander-in-Chief of the Army. If it is true, v.R. would have to be +replaced by List in good time. + +Himmler or Canaris are to provide personnel who are familiar with the +Hague. These to Wenninger and are grabbed there by Kiertz. + +Proclamations: + + _a._ faked ones, + _b._ proclamations that everything is going well. + +Student wants separate proclamations for Holland. + +_5 March: 1500 hours_: + +Big conference with the 3 Supreme Commanders about Weser exercise. +Field Marshal vents his spleen, because he was not consulted +beforehand. He dominates the discussion and tries to prove that all +previous preparations are good for nothing. + +_Result_: + + _a._ Stronger forces to Narvik, + + _b._ Navy shall leave warships in the ports (Hipper or Luetzow in + Trondheim), + + _c._ Christian and may be excluded, for the beginning, + + _d._ 6 divisions should be calculated for Norway, + + _e._ To get a foothold immediately in Copenhagen, too. + +After this, the following make a report: General von Kesselring, +Student, Sp * * * Richthofen, Captain Koch, 1st lieutenant Witzig +about the case “Festung” [fortress] and actions by glider-borne troops +against the bridges of Vroenhofen and Veldvezelt, furthermore against +Fort Eben-Emael. Accusations are made that Army Group B is supposed to +have said that it would take 3-4 days until forces of the army could +attack the fort. + +_6 March_: + +_7 March_: + +Falkenhorst with Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force. The preparations +have now materialized. The Fuehrer signs a directive containing all +changes subsequent to the conference of March 5th. Nothing is to be +changed any more now. + +_8 March_: + +Fuehrer wishes to have issued special orders for the Weser exercise in +another form. They are to be divided into military orders which have +to be made known to the tactical troops and into general instructions +concerning actions of the Plenipotentiary of the Reich. + +Fuehrer is outraged about report of the Field Marshal that the Army +does not care for occupation of the area in front of the left wing of +the Army led by Busch by airborne troops dropped from “Stork” planes, +because divisions can get there only after several days. I object that +it will naturally be better to employ these troops there, where armored +divisions will arrive faster. + +_9 March_: + +Fuehrer is outraged when he learns that Prince Oskar is commanding +officer of a regiment. Schmidt was just about to suggest that he should +be given command of a division, but he managed not to mention it. + +Buschenhagen reports to me about the preparations for W and submits the +schedule. + +Fuehrer does not appear at table. + +In the evening of March 8th, I again bring seriousness of the gasoline +situation to the attention of the Chief of the Armed Forces High +Command. Nothing efficacious has been done to improve the situation. +Industry regularly uses up 80,000 tons a month. + +There is pressing need for the appointment of a Deputy-General for Fuel +Economy (General von Schell). + +_10 March_: + +Fuehrer makes his wonderful speech in the arsenal on the occasion of +Memorial day. + +The news about the Finnish-Russian negotiations are very favorable, +from a political point of view. + +The French press rages about it because they consider it necessary to +cut Germany off from the Swedish ore. In a military way, the situation +is disturbing for us, because, if peace should be concluded soon, the +motivation for the prepared action of the group Falkenhorst will be +difficult. + +_11 March_: + +Fuehrer has objections against the iron cross in gold (color effect +black-gold), as it means abandoning tradition. Rather create a new +decoration. + +On the other hand, he agrees with the Oak-Leaves for the Knight’s +Cross. The Chief of the Armed Forces High Command presents a list of +the tanks at hand in the armed forces. + +Fuehrer wants a basic ruling that only such people should be appointed +in the Armed Forces and in Civil Service who have no relatives abroad. +The danger is too great that they will get into conflict with their own +conscience. The schedule (for the Weser exercises) is presented to the +Fuehrer. Also the special orders which the Fuehrer takes along. + +_12 March_: + +Fuehrer is very much satisfied with Ribbentrop’s conference in Rome. +Duce remains steadfast, wants to talk with Fuehrer personally next +week on the Brenner. Conclusion of peace between Finland and Russia +deprives England, but us, too, of any political basis to occupy Norway. + +The preparations are ready to the extent that March 20th could be +W-day. However, unfavorable ice conditions compel postponement by 1-2 +days. + +_13 March_: + +Fuehrer does not yet give order for “W”. He is still looking for some +justification. + +_14 March_: + +English keep vigil in the North-Sea with 15-16 submarines; the reason +is doubtful, either to prevent a German action. Fuehrer has not yet +decided, how to justify the Weser exercise. Wrong news report in the +American newspapers. + +Commander-in-Chief of the Navy is in doubt, whether it is still +important to play at preventive war [?] in Norway. The question is, +if it wouldn’t be better to carry out case “Yellow” before the Weser +exercise. + +The danger in that case is that the English will immediately get a +foothold in Narvik, because we would have started with neutrality +violation. + +At noon, Colin Rosz visits the Fuehrer. Interesting explanations about +Japan-China and Russia. + +_15 March_: + +Fuehrer wants the following material for the conference with the Duce +on March 18th: + + 1. Large-scale map of the distribution of our own forces (207 + divisions). + + 2. Maps about the distribution of enemy and neutral forces. France, + England, Holland, Belgium, Switzerland, Norway, Denmark, Sweden, + Hungary. + + 3. Terminal map of the Finnish-Russian conflict. + + 4. Strength of our own Air Force. + +_1330 hours_: Lunch with Army Group A and with Chief of the General +Staff. + +_1500 hours_: Reports of Army Group Commander and Army Commanders, +including Group Kleist; very satisfactory. + +_16 March_: + +Worries that the English will proceed against Norway, as overhead radio +messages indicate. As the English have retired 7 submarines, such an +action does not seem probable any longer. + +Army Group B reports about its evaluation of the situation and its +intentions. + +Detailed preparations are done very well. Displeasure about +disconnection of the 4th army. Mutual assistance is eliminated. + +Lack of reinforcements, if the 6th army should be successful, after +all. 6th army shifts its center of gravity to 4th Corps, and also draws +3 armored divisions of the 2nd echelon there. 10th and 9th Corps have +no anti-aircraft protection. + +Jeschonnek transmits that Army Bush needs another 25 “stork” planes. + +_17 March_: + +Fuehrer leaves at noon for conference with Duce on the Brenner. + +News of the successful raid of the Air Force against Scapa Flow. +Fuehrer is in high spirits. + +_18 March_: + +Nothing important. Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force (Chef L) is +informed about the report of the commanders in the West. + +_19 March_: + +Fuehrer returns from the conference with the Duce beaming with joy +and very much satisfied. Complete harmony, Duce is resolute; but he +cannot fight a long war. Duce is highly impressed and agrees with the +opinion of the Fuehrer’s that the decision against France is being +made. Whatever happens at the periphery in the meantime is unimportant. +At the end, Duce told Ciano: “My decision is made. Did you hear, +Fuehrer?” Balkan should and must remain quiet. Complete understanding +for Fuehrer’s cooperation with Stalin. + +Fuehrer deeply moved by enthusiasm of the Tyrolian’s England song [“We +will sail against England...”--translator’s note]. + +Chief of Armed Forces High Command very much depressed because of +Todt’s appointment. I try to persuade him not to insist on the +“agreement”. It is much better, to separate the tasks clearly. The +quests of the Armed Forces are laid down by the Fuehrer and transmitted +to Dr. Todt by the Armed Forces High Command. Dr. Todt has full powers +to fulfill these requests. + +_20 March_: + +During the night, the English attack Sylt and Hoermann [?]. No success. + +At noon, the Fuehrer signs an order which appoints Todt as Minister for +Ordnance. + +Wedel is instructed by the Chief of the Armed Forces High Command to +celebrate the 40th anniversary of service by the Commander-in-Chief +of the Army in a modest way only. The achievements of individual +personalities can be appreciated only during or after the war. + +In the evening, annihilating blow against an English convoy; 42000 tons +of big boats (10-12000 tons) have been sunk. + +_21 March_: + +Objections of Group 21 [Grp. XXI] about the long interval between +taking up readiness positions at 05,30 hours and finishing of the +diplomatic action. Fuehrer rejects any earlier negotiations, because +otherwise calls for help will be offered, it has to be broken +ruthlessly. The political plenipotentiaries will have to strongly +emphasize the military measures taken, and will even have to exaggerate +them. + +_22 March_: + +Reported to Fuehrer, how we want to proceed at the proposed discussions +with the Italian General Staff. First, inquiry by attaché in Rome, how +they believe they can take some burden off us. Only then to proceed to +possibility of an operation across the Upper Rhine. Discussion with +General Staff only once our cards are on the table. + +American newspaper correspondents inspect the small damage on Sylt. + +_24-25 March_: + +Fuehrer at Obersalzberg. + +No special events. + +The English start to molest our merchantmen in the Danish and Norwegian +territorial waters, or even fire at them. + +_26 March_: + +The Fuehrer is back. + +Discussion about deadlines for operations. + +Fuehrer sticks to it: first Weser exercise, dark nights necessary for +it. Thus about 4-5 days later. Commander-in-Chief of the Navy reports, +urges to start laying mines with planes, as 1270 mines will already be +at hand by end of April. Fuehrer wants to think it over some more. + +_27 March_: + +Our own submarine stranded near Lindesnaes, one submarine and boat 37 +come to help. Are to ask for permission to stay in Norwegian waters, if +necessary, 2300 PM. Discussion of the Fuehrer with Commander-in-Chief +of the Army and of Army Group C. First and Seventh army. + +Fuehrer explains his intentions with the Italians about to strike. +Operational aim plateau Langres. + +Deceptive actions of First Army in case “Yellow” agreed to. Attacks +proposed in case of 95th, 93rd, 75th, 268th, 215th, and 246th +divisions. These have favorable effects, but deceptive measures of the +7th army will not take place, because of the preparation of case Brown +(Ital.). + +_28 March_: + +Duce attaches importance to General Staff talks, Graziani intends to +send General Roatta to B. in April. The Norwegians are interning U +21 seemingly because of awkward statements by the commander, who did +not claim engine trouble but mistaken navigation. But it may also be +a mistake made in translation. Individual naval officers seem to be +lukewarm concerning the Weser exercise and need stimulus. The three +chiefs von Falkenhorst are also pondering matters, which are none of +their business. Kranke sees more disadvantages than advantages. + +In the evening, the Fuehrer steps into the map room and explains +sharply that he will not be content with the Navy again quitting the +Norwegian ports right away. Narvik, Trondheim, and Oslo will have to +remain occupied by naval forces. Bad impression on ground forces. + +_29 March_: + +Talk with Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, 1200 hours. Wants decision +about commitment of air mines. + +Fuehrer talks to him alone about retaining of ships. Admiral of the +Fleet [Grossadmiral] rejects Narvik, but wants to examine, if Trondheim +cannot be set up as a base immediately. + +Commander-in-Chief of the Navy draws attention to the fact that they +want fuel from him, because the army will run out of it by the end of +May. This is the consequence of the wrong arrangements with Shell and +not to buy in Mexico, like the Navy did it. + +3 PM: Commander-in-Chief of the Force with the Fuehrer. + +_30 March_: + +U-21 not set free yet by the Norwegians. Negotiations under way. + +Fuehrer thinks about activation of another 10-12 new divisions. Where +are the mortars committed? + +L II ordered to present an outline of personnel and materiel, from +which it could be determined, if and when new activations are possible. + +_31 March_: + +Nothing of importance. + +_1 April_: + +German fighters shoot 7 enemy fighters down. 1300 hours: Falkenhorst +again gives general report about Weser exercise. 1300 hours: Breakfast, +then discussion with all commanding officers primarily concerned. + +Fuehrer has a very good impression about thoroughness of preparations. + +_2 April_: + +1530 hours: Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force, Commander-in-Chief of +the Navy, and General von Falkenhorst with the Fuehrer. All confirm end +of the preparations. Fuehrer orders carrying out of the Weser exercise +for April 9th. + +Protests of the commanding officer of the Air Force that some warships +leave ports again right away. Fuehrer, too, disapproves of that, but +does not want to intervene too much in an exclusive concern of naval +warfare. + +Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force agrees to plan to start aerial +torpedo war [LM-Krieg] now. + +Fuehrer wants that Luetzow shall be used for the transport of troops to +Trondheim, in spite of tasks later on. + +Find out, if it is not possible to land debarkation troops by fishing +boat, in order to capture the bridge strong point of Vordingborg. + +_3 April_: + +Movements of the first 3 ships of the leading echelon [Ausfuhrstaffel] +started at 0200 hours. Lt. Commdr. Junge reports at 1600 hours that the +3 ships have instructions how to act against Norwegians. I immediately +instruct Councillor of Legation Hewel in order to inform the Foreign +Minister what the situation is, in case one of the ships of the leading +echelon should be examined by Norwegians. The Chief of the Armed Forces +High Command also informs the Fuehrer at 1815 hours about it. + +1830 hours Reich Foreign Minister informed by Fuehrer. Chief of Armed +Forces High Command asked to join discussion. + +_4 April_: + +Slight alarm, as some news from Norway indicates increased +preparedness. Sweden has asked what preparations for troops shipments +in Stettin are supposed to mean (boats under Reich Naval Ensign) +[Reichsdienstflagge]. + +Fuehrer drafts the proclamations. Piepenbrock, Chief of +Counter-Intelligence service 1, returns with good results of the talk +with Quisling from Copenhagen. + +News that 2 armored coastal vessels [Kuestenpanzer] are in Narvik and +that 2 submarines are expected. + +_5 April_: + +Weser exercise runs according to plan. Some alarm report from the +source of a Belgian agent [V-Mann] appears unworthy of belief. The +Chief of the Armed Forces High Command instructs General von Rintelen +at 1930 hours. + +_6 April_: + +Weser exercise runs according to plan. The high-pressure weather area +over the Northern North-Sea, which was predicted yesterday, is not +taking place and that favors the action of the navy. Fuehrer puts great +emphasis on the fact that the families of all deserters will be checked +carefully. Navy records long English radio message, but is unable to +decipher it. + +_1500 hours_: General Gerke reports that his movements according to +plan. + +_1600 hours_: Talks in room of the Chief of the section for Foreign +Countries in presence of Chef L and Military Attaché in Rome with +General Marras. + +_1700 hours_: Report that Luetzow is dropping out and can go to Oslo +only, because auxiliary engines did not take part. Fuehrer agrees to +this decision. + +_7 April_: + +No disquieting news. Hipper with destroyers seems to have been reported +by an English submarine on Sunday morning, April 7th. + +Prince Axel of Denmark has the intention to visit Field Marshal Goering +on Monday. + +_8 April_: + +Day of highest tension. The English put 3 mine fields in the Norwegian +territorial waters and make that public. + +Leading echelon is far off with several ships because of lack of pilots. + +Only 1 ship near Narvik, everything else seems to be hardly beyond +Bergen. + +Boat Rio de Janeiro is torpedoed; since horses and men in uniform are +landed, the impending project becomes known to the Norwegians. + +Group Hipper gets into a battle with an English destroyer and +annihilates it. + +_9 April_: + +The surprise effect succeeds in Bergen, Trondheim, Narvik, and from the +air in Stavanger. Not at Christiansand and in Oslo. + +Bluecher sinks after heroic fight. Commanding Admiral and Commander 103 +(Kdr 103) of it, on deck up to the last moment, swim to land. + +Luetzow has to take over lead and lower boats. + +Heavy fighting for coastal fortifications. Fortress Christiansand +fought to surrender by planes and Karlsruhe. + +_10 April_: + +Chief of naval forces [Flottenchef] reports 2 turrets gone, only 25 +miles. + +First breaking through of British destroyers in Narvik. + +The Koenigsberg destroyed by enemy dive bombers. Bornholm occupied. + +_11 April_: + +Luetzow on voyage home. Oslo hit by torpedo. + +Norwegian warships are put into service. + +Denmark does not belong any longer to jurisdiction of XXIst Corps. +Railroads Oslo-Bergen and Oslo-Drontheim destroyed. + +_12 April_: + +Still 6 destroyers left ready for use in Narvik, Freighter +[Treckdampfer] Jon Wellom in N., otherwise no ship of the leading +echelon. Bulk of the submarines ordered outside the ports occupied by +us. + +Hundalen on the iron-ore railroad reached. Strong enemy air attack on +Bergen. + +_13 April_: + +* * * Mountain battery flown to lake near Narvik with Ju 52 planes. +Concentration of strong English naval forces near Harstadt in process. + + Much booty in Oslo. + 1650 hours naval battle in Narvik. + Battleships and Hipper arrived in home ports. + +_14 April_: + +Dietl is not being attacked, but is separated from Northern group. +Terrible excitement. All details are to be ordered from here. + +Steamship Baerenfelsis sunk in the course of attack on Bergen. + +Another 3 airforce anti-aircraft batteries on board ship torpedoed by +submarine. + +Fuehrer wants that Dietl tries to fight his way through to the South. I +argue against this impossible idea. + +_15 April_: + +_16 April_: + +Reproaches against the navy, especially because the battle was not +engaged by battleships and because she does not succeed in speeding up +the transports (Unjustified--I strongly argue against it). + +_17 April_: + +During the night from the 16th to 17th Staff Officer from Admiralty +arrives in Narvik and delivers written report by Dietl with call for +help from Stavanger, since English naval forces are firing there. +Air-Force notified. The Fuehrer again states in a temperamental way +that the Gr. Dietl will have to march South or will have to be picked +up. I advocate again in a very strong way that + + _a._ a march South is impossible, + + _b._ even a transport can evacuate only very small units, leads to + the loss of many planes and breaks the moral backbone of the + Dietl group. + +They will continue to fight on the Swedish border for a long time. A +thing should be considered lost only when it is actually lost. 1200 +hours: Field Marshal with Jeschonnek. Has to be regrouped. Draws combat +teams to Ralburg and transport groups back into Slesvig. 1530 hours: +Admiral of the Fleet [Grossadmiral] with Admiralty Staff Officer from +Narvik who reports verbally about his experiences in Narvik. Each piece +of bad news leads to the worst fears. Chief of Air-Force and of L IH +[Army Air-Forces?] presents an evaluation of the situation I fully +agree to. I present to the Fuehrer this and the proof that we do not +have enough long range planes to pick up troops from Narvik, anyhow. +Furthermore, an order which is delivered by courier and composed in our +sense. + +To fight and tie down forces and not to give up. + +Even a professor who knows Norway is fetched from Innsbruck and asked +whether mountain troops can get from Narvik to Fauske is impossible +judging from my mountain experience. + +In the evening, the Fuehrer signs the order to Dietl which I had +prepared, to hold out as long as possible. + +_18 April_: + +Fuehrer is again calm. He gives orders to Captain von Sternburg in +a way conforming entirely with our point of view. It might even be +possible to change last night’s order even more towards a sense of +holding out and tying down forces. + +The situation, too, looks better. The strong shipping losses of the +English give them something to think about. + +Quiet day which does our somewhat strained nerves good. + +Sternburg leaves by plane with additional verbal orders. + +_1600 hours_: General Jeschonnek shares the opinion we should go to +Bardufoss. I refuse that. The troops cannot hold out. + +Important is * * * of the forces on hand, most important the thorough +destruction of the railroad. + +2. He expresses doubts whether the landing of the 22nd division +which takes several days still runs satisfactorily in view of the +preparations in Holland. I emphasize that we have to open for ourselves +at least the entry into the Southern front of the fortress Holland and +that we have to keep it open. + +_19 April_: + +Renewed crisis. Political action has failed. Envoy Braner is recalled; +since Norway is at war with us, the task of the Foreign Offices is +finished. According to the Fuehrer’s opinion, force has to be used. +Gauleiter Terboven is supposed to be put in charge. + +Field Marshal works in the same direction; he criticizes that the +behavior against the civilian population is not energetic enough, that +it was possible to occupy the electrical plant, that not enough troops +are brought up by the navy. The Air-Force cannot do everything. + +Chief of the Armed Forces High Command leaves room, leadership chaos is +again threatening, because even details are being overruled from above, +and all orderly work of the competent military leadership (Navy High +Command and Gr. XXI) is in vain. + +In the evening, Terboven arrives; after supper, the Fuehrer instructs +him alone. It is doubtful, if it will be possible to limit him to the +activity of a Civilian Commissar [Zivilkommissar], as I suggest it; we +will have to talk to him personally. + +_20 April_: + +Fuehrer’s birthday. Chief of the Armed Forces High Command and the +Supreme Commanders congratulate. All the tempests have quieted down. + +The movements to Oslo and Narvik make progress. No English landings. +Fuehrer has a discussion with the Field-Marshal, with Himmler, +Terboven, Reichsleiter Bormann. + +Before that, the Chief of the Armed Forces High Command has told the +Fuehrer about all possible points of friction between an independent +head of the government and the Military Commander in Norway. It seems +that reports of the Air Force have induced the Fuehrer to form the +opinion that the Norwegians are already conducting guerilla warfare and +sabotage on a large scale. Already on the 19th, I contradicted such +an opinion. We must not lead the Norwegians to passive or even active +resistance, because that is precisely the aim of the English, after all. + +_21 April_: + +Reports about landings on a larger scale near Andalsnes and Namsos +become more tangible. + +On the evening of April 20th, the General [Generaloberst] leads a long +fight in order to word the text of the order to Terboven in such a way +that the military necessities are taken into account. + +Fuehrer would like to bring big vessel with personnel and materiel to +Trondheim. + +Commander-in-Chief of the Navy considers that to be impossible, +especially now. + +_22 April_: + +Fuehrer is increasingly worried about the English landings and +the consequent impossibility to set up ground communications with +Trondheim. Without success, I compare the difficult situation of the +English, who have no usable port and no airdrome at their disposal. + +The Field-Marshal somewhat quieter, in view of the good weather +forecasts for the Air Force today. + +_23 April_: + +The excitement grows, because the 163d and 196th divisions are making +small progress towards the North and new bridge demolitions are being +reported. Fuehrer orders that no more motorized units [11th rifle +brigade] are to be sent to _Stavanger_, but immediately 2 mountain +divisions instead. 3rd is to be brought up to full strength again. 4 +ships of the Iller class, in addition a 5000t steamer, later 2 larger +East Asia boats are to be brought to Bergen convoyed by capital ships, +in order to make the troops there mobile and ready for battle. + +Forces in Narvik to be reorganized right away, in order to make the 3d +mountain division again steadfast for battle. + +No heavy artillery is to go to Norway for ground combat. The heavy +battalion of the 2nd mountain division remains in the West, those +of the 3d mountain and 69th division are at the disposal of the +Commander-in-Chief of the Army. + +Fuehrer talks to Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force. + + _a._ Anti-aircraft reinforcements for Stavanger. + + _b._ Bombers for ground fighting in Oslo, Fighters for ground + fighting in Oslo. + +In the evening Lieutenant-Colonel von Lossberg returns from Oslo. He +reports the favorable situation in a somewhat schoolmasterly way, but +does not know any details. He brings along an English battalion order. + +_24 April_: + +The situation looks much more favorable, a fast advance on the right +flank is to be expected with mechanized Battalion Goering. + +Lieutenant-Colonel Boehme confirms that picture after his return from +the front. He brings collected orders of the captured English brigade +detachment along. Very great political success to be anticipated with +that. + +_1130 hours_: Field-Marshal reports, especially the situation in +Trondheim. Lieutenant-Colonel Boehme, back from the battle field, +reports favorably, rapid progress. Fuehrer regrets the halting of the +11th rifle brigade. I refuse to send them again now. + +_2300 hours_: Schmundt back, even more favorable news. Boehme brings +English orders for the entire project of Norway’s occupation by the +English. Complaint about lack of clear orders in the Air Force. + +_25 April_: + +Optimistic mood continues. Fuehrer very happy about Schmundt’s +report and about exact orientation. Talks adversely about Lossberg +to Bodenschatz; Lossberg’s somewhat braggard report has created +displeasure, although he did not know any details. Preparation of an +action on the basis of the orders found on captured Englishmen. + +Order to Kraatzer W Pr and Counter Intelligence Bureau for foreign +countries [Amt Abwehr/Ausland]. + +Report by Sternberg about his task in Narvik. + +Order by me to Chief L to give out a strong directive that nobody but +Armed Forces High Command will give orders to Gr. Narvik. All men there +are subordinated General Dietl exclusively. + +The Belgian government resigned. + +_26 April_: + +Suggestion to the Fuehrer to omit naval transport to Bergen with +battleships and to bring these mobile parts of the 69th Division back +to Oslo. Italian ambassador Atolico is recalled, because he does not +take a clear pro-German attitude. + +At 1500 hours the Commander-in-Chief of the navy reports. + +Fuehrer drops request for transporting troops to Bergen convoyed by +heavy naval forces. + +Commander-in-Chief of the Navy reports that everything which could be +possibly thought of has been done for the safeguarding of * * * the +Westwall will be extended * * * Sp * * * solidified. + +Major Soltman reports about the interrogation of the Englishmen, and +delivers additional important documents, among them the secret chain of +command [Rangliste]. At noon, the first prisoners arrived in Berlin. +They are being interrogated in the Alexander Barracks and confirm the +authenticity of the orders. All material is handed over to the Foreign +Office. + +Until 0330 in the Reich Chancellery, where Fuehrer formulates the +government statement together with Foreign Minister. It will be +published on the * * * + +_27 April_: + +Fuehrer voices intention to start with case “Yellow” between 1st and +7th May. I point out that the Air Force and the Transportation Chief +have to be initially notified 3 days ahead of time. + +Motor column [Mot.Kol.] Fischer gets stuck 100 miles [Km?] south of +Drontheim in front of many destroyed bridges. + +Group (Gr) XXI is crying for engineers and cross-Country motor +vehicles. They will have to get along with their own engineers. After +all, there are 19 engineer companies. Order to get all engineers up to +the front. + +_28 April_: + +Advance movement direction Drontheim is halting. Nevertheless the +English are retiring fast according to their communiques. + +_29 April_: + +Fuehrer decides: Air Force can commit another 2 groups (new) in Norway +on Tuesday and Wednesday, but must be ready for Yellow on Sunday. + +Commander-in-Chief of the Navy commits heaviest flat * * * for the +safeguarding of * * * [?] + +Emden still to be left in Baltic (O), Employ 2 East Asia steamboats for +Oslo-transport. + +Falkenhorst wants his motorized and mountain battalion with engineer +platoon and battalion brought to Drontheim by air. + +Commander-in-Chief of the Army has to be compelled first to set up the +missing regiment for the 3rd mountain division so rapidly than it can +roll immediately behind the 2nd mountain division. + +Fuehrer is worried about Drontheim and is not quite to be dissuaded yet +from readying heavy artillery and also the 1st mountain division for +Norway. + +_30 April_: + +At 13.35 hours I am able to report to the Fuehrer that line of +communication on land between Oslo and Drontheim has been established. +Fuehrer is happy with joy. At noon, I have to sit next to him. + +The special communique is released right away. It remains to be decided +now, whether to keep in readiness the 1st mountain division (no) and +heavy artillery (no). At 18.30 hours the report comes in that Dombaas +has been reached, too, and that the enemy is retiring. Opdal on the +railroad Drontheim-Dombaas has also been occupied. Fuehrer releases +order of the day to the soldiers in Norway. + +_1 May_: + +More big successes in Norway on land and in the air. + +Fuehrer orders that starting Saturday, May 4th, everything must be in +readiness to start operations for case Yellow the following day, when +ordered. + +_2 May_: + +Victory report from Norway. Pursuit direction Andalsnes. The English +flee to the boats. Norwegians give up the Commander of Moeren-Romsdal, +Gen. Hang offers capitulation. + +Field Marshall with Kesselring, Jeschonnek, Student, Sponek again +report about case “Festung” [fortress]. It will be carried out. Landing +on super-highway possible. + +Difficulty is the strong echelonment in depth [Tiefenstaffelung] of the +bridge position near Moerdyk and north of it. + +Air Force is to get order on the 3rd at noon, whether to guide in +[einweisen] or not to guide in, that whether means to use or not to use +parachutists and airborne units. + +_3 May_: + +After evaluation of weather, Fuehrer decides that X-day will not be +before Monday, 6 May. + +Air Force notified by code word “Do not guide in.” [“Nicht einweisen”] + +Field Marshal protests against draft of the comprehensive description +of operations in Norway, where Armed Forces High Command is mentioned +and where the name Pellengahr appears, but not Milch. + +Fuehrer rejects request of the Air Force to set up a listening post +[Horchstelle] in the Caucasus. + +Prepared White Book concerning unneutral actions of Holland and Belgium +does not seem to satisfy the Foreign Office completely. To my mind the +material is more than sufficient. + +A new order goes out to group XXI, especially as several foreign news +reports say that Namsos, too, will be evacuated. + +Dr. Todt transmits exact details. + +_4 May_: + +Reports about evacuation of Namsos by the English. Great successes of +the Air Force against the English fleet. Battleship, heavy cruiser and +destroyer, in addition to 12000 ton transport sunk. + +Fuehrer himself wants to make comprehensive report about the campaign +in Norway. He is furious about it that people other than himself meddle +with this reporting. He stated that the Armed Forces High Command is +his staff. Fuehrer designates Tuesday, May 7th as X-day. + +The flanks of Gr. Dietl are being pressed hard in Narvik. I am afraid +he remains too long in front. + +_5 May_: + +Field Marshal reports that an English 1500 ton submarine minelayer +was sighted on the Swedish coast. He makes an onslaught aimed at +subordinating all Naval Air units under the Commander-in-Chief of the +Air Force. + +Fuehrer has finished justification [Begruendung] for case “Yellow”. +Wednesday, May 8th, is designated as A-day. + +_6 May_: + +Detailed orders for May 8th for A-day are issued, and for transmission +of the code words Augsburg and Danzig. + +_7 May_: + +Fuehrer railroad train was scheduled to leave Finkenkrug at 16.38 hours. + +But weather remains uncertain and therefore, the order valid up to this +time is rescinded. Next decision May 8th until 1200 hours. + +1100 hours: The Field Marshal with Bodenschatz and Jeschonnek at the +Fuehrer’s. + +1500 hours: Admiral of the Fleet [Grossadmiral] Raeder. + +Mine damage of the Gneisenau only very insignificant. One destroyer may +be recalled from Drontheim, as a second one is still ready for sailing. + +Fuehrer very much agitated about new postponement, as there is danger +of treachery particularly in brown leaflets [in braunen Blaettern]. +Talk of the Belgian Envoy to the Vatican to Brussels permits the +deduction that treason has been committed by a German personality who +left Berlin for Rome on April 29th. + +Fuehrer again emphasizes that the greatest achievement of endurance +[Dauerleistung] is that of the foot-slogging combat-soldier. + +_8 May_: + +Alarming news from Holland, canceling of furloughs, evacuations, +road-blocks, other mobilization measures; according to reports of the +counterintelligence service the British have asked for permission to +march in but the Dutch have refused. + +According to reports the measures of the Dutch are partly directed +against the coast and partly against us. It is not possible to obtain +a clear picture, whether the Dutch don’t work hand in hand with the +English or whether they actually want to defend their neutrality +against the first attacker. Evaluation of the weather shows slow +improvement of the whole situation, but development fog in the next +days still have to be taken into consideration. + +Fuehrer does not want to wait any longer. + +Field Marshal wants postponement until the 10th, at least. + +Chief of the Armed Forces High Command presses for early action. +Fuehrer is very agitated; then he consents to postponement until May +10th, which is against his intuition, as he says. But not one day +longer. Departure of Envoy Kieritz, who was scheduled to leave at 12.57 +hours is stopped at the last minute. Is not supposed to leave until May +9th. + +In the evening, I arrange the different telegrams with him. + +_9 May_: + +Fuehrer decides to fall in on May 10th for sure. Departure with Fuehrer +train at 17.00 hours from Finkenkrug. + +After report Jeschonnek that weather situation will be favourable on +the 10th, the code word Danzig is given at 2100 hours. + +The same to Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force. + +_10 May_: + +Morning arrival in Emskirchen still during darkness. At 0530 hours in +the Eagle’s nest. + +_11-13 May_: + +The operations take a course favorable beyond expectation. The Dutch +offer desperate resistance. Bridges at Maastricht, and all bridges +north of it, are blown up. Only the railroad bridge at Gemrep falls +into our hands undamaged. Fort Eben Emael is taken and the bridges +in Mordeyk south of Dortrecht as well as the important ones over the +Albert Canal west of Maastricht are taken over by parachutists and +glider-borne personnel and are held by them. Airborne operation of the +Sponek Division is met by heaviest resistance and is badly mauled. +However, the different units hold out. On the R., the junction of the +9th armored division with them is effected. The citadel of Luettich is +being broken into. + +_14 May_: + +Order number 11 issued, which orders the concentration of all armored +and mechanized units in front of the 4th army. + +Holland capitulates. + +_16 May_: + +Fuehrer insists very much on transfer of all armored and mechanized +units from Army Group B to A, and on speediest bringing up of strong +reserves behind the 4th and 12th army. OKH gives orders to pull these +units out from B and to add them via F ... to the fifteenth corps +as new Armored Group Hoeppner. According to report Reichau, there +are indications that the enemy is giving up the Dyle position or its +Southern part, at least. Therefore, Army High Command receives the +option to carry out the junction of Armored Group Hoeppner also in +front of Nanner, which the enemy seems to be evacuating. + +Engle reports after visit at 4th army that that army has reached the +French-Belgian border near Beauchmont, after a heavy tank battle. + +_1600-1830 hours_: Field Marshal Goering with the Fuehrer, talk with +Jeschonnek about forthcoming tasks of the Air Force and intentions +concerning Narvik, utilizing the new airdrome near * * * + +_17 May_: + +_18 May_: + +Day of great tension. The commander-in-chief of the Army has not +carried out the intention of building up, as quickly as possible, a +new flanking position to the South. Instead of turning march to the +west. For this reason the 10th Armored Division and the 2nd and 29th +Motorized Divisions are still entrenched in the defensive flanking +positions. + +The commander-in-chief of the Army and General Holdes are called +immediately and ordered to adopt the necessary measures immediately +(see note in the files). + +Chief of the Armed Forces High Command is flying immediately by plane +to General Rundstedt at Bastogne. + +I further give an order supplementing the previous directive. It veers +the 1st Mountain Division and the rear echelons of the 4th Army, to the +South and South-West for an attack. + +_19 May_: + +_20 May_: + +Break-through becomes more and more clearly outlined. True, Army Group +“B”, respectively Chief are very vexed because their Armored Corps was +taken away from them, but it was the right thing to do. On the 20th, we +already have all armored and mechanized divisions, except the 9th one, +in the middle of the break-through wedge. While we were still afraid on +the 19th that the bulk of the French-English army might have escaped to +the South, it becomes increasingly evident on the 20th that more than +20 divisions are still north of the Somme. + +Now everything depends on sealing off the Abbeville gap and the Army +Corps Kleist reaches it in the evening of the 28th. In the forenoon of +the 20th, at the Army High Commands conference, the Fuehrer declares +the new directive for continuation of operations against the French +Army. + +1. Annihilation of the enemy north of the Somme and gaining of the sea +coast. + +2. Sudden thrust forward between Oise and sea, until Seine river is +reached. + +3. Principal Attack on both sides of Reims in south-westerly direction, +accompanied on the right flank east of Paris by heavy forces. + +4. For secondary reasons penetration of the Maginot line by +lighter forces between St. Avold and Sarreguemines in direction of +Nancy-Luneville. + +General von Stuelpnagel is ordered, not to follow up any more former +intention, to attack the Plateau of Langres with 20 Italian Divisions +crossing the Upper Rhine. The Italians rather should attack the French +Alpine Front and pin down French forces on the Upper Rhine. This they +can prepare already now, without having commenced hostilities. + +Fuehrer is beside himself with joy. Talks in words of highest +appreciation of the German Army and its leadership. Is working on the +peace treaty, which shall express the tenor only: Return of territory +robbed over the past 400 years from the German people, and other values. + +First negotiations in the forest of Compiegne like in 1918. + +British can get a separate peace any time after restitution of the +colonies. + +A special memorandum of the Chief of the Armed Forces High Command +containing the emotion-chocked words of the Fuehrer when receiving +the telephone report of the Commander-in-Chief of the Army about the +capture of Abbeville, is in the files. + +_21 May_: + +Commander in Chief of the Army together with Halder reports at 09.45 +about situations and later intentions. The Commander-in-Chief of the +Army wants to operate by-passing Paris on the West with the entire +Armored and mechanized units under Reichman’s command, and in addition +to this to attack with he wants to attack the Upper Rhine with 18 +divisions. This would change the intentions of the Fuehrer, expressed +by him on the 20th. Fuehrer declares his agreement for the time being. + +* * * * * * * + +In the afternoon the Fuehrer explains to Chief of the Armed Forces High +Command and to me, that he had changed his mind. He believes, that it +is wrong to employ all Armed and Mechanized Divisions West of Paris, +that it would be better to direct the main thrust, also with the bulk +of Armored Forces, to by-pass Paris in the east (transmitted by me to +Greifenberg in the evening). + +Report of Commander-in-Chief of the Navy to Fuehrer at 1200 hours. In +the afternoon Field Marshal and Jeschonnek. + +The Fuehrer is a little nervous in the evening about the fact, that +infantry divisions are not pushed forward fast enough. Possibly they +are being held back in order to obtain improvements of position of the +VIth and VIIth Corps. If possible, one must employ transport groups. + +Fuehrer stays in map room until 0130 hours. + +_22 May_: + +Chief of the Armed Forces High Command decides after that to fly to +Army Group A in Charleville early on the 22nd. Brings back a report +much more pleasant than the situation map indicates. It becomes +apparent that Headquarters of 4th Army has ordered General Kluge to +commit the 1st Army Corps south of Sombre, so that it will be in front +rather than in the rear of the French border fortifications. + +The Fuehrer approves at 1300 hours directive, submitted by me, +concerning sparing of human lives of the 10th Army by disengagement +from the Maginot line, cessation of unnecessary attacks, bringing up of +all Divisions and mobile GHQ troops to the rear of 4th Army. + +Sharp pressure of Army Group B towards the West. The Fuehrer +furthermore approves commitment of an airborne Battalion already in +readiness and of 2 companies Mountain troops, with short training, in +Narvik. + +Army High Command draws a very optimistic picture of the situation at +1700 hours and intends to continue at 1200 hours on left wing West of +Arras towards North. + +But Jeschonnek reports at 1900 hours, that French tanks reached point +3 kilometer in front of Arras and were stopped only there by dive +bombers, pursuit planes and Anti Aircraft Artillery. + +_24 May_: + +The Fuehrer flies together with me and Schmundt to Army Group A to +Charleville. + +He is very happy about the measures of the Army Group, which correspond +entirely with his ideas. He learns to his surprise that the Army High +Command, without informing the Fuehrer and the High Command of the +Armed Forces, has subordinated the 4th Army and a number of Divisions +to its rear, to Army Group B. Fuehrer is very much displeased and +thinks this regulation is a mistake not only in military respect but +also psychologically wrong. Commander-in-Chief of the Army is ordered +to report, and shifting of dividing-line is rescinded. New crisis +of confidence, especially since Field Marshal reports earlier that +an order of the Army High Command in no way pushes the Army Group B +onward, but even invites it to make available reserves that can be +spared. + +For that reason a new order is issued in the evening (a) not to advance +beyond the line Sandez-St.Omer-Graveline towards the East. Besides that +each change regarding the Chain of command among the Armies is subject +to approval of the Fuehrer. + +The Fuehrer signs Order #13 regarding continuation of operations. + +He prohibits the proposed talk by General von Melsch in the Foreign +Office to foreign journalists about the war situation, if necessary +this shall be done by W PR [Armed Forces Propaganda?] + +Very favorable report of the Commander in Chief of the Air Force and +the Commander in Chief of the Army about the situation. + +It becomes obvious, that the surrounded enemy is no longer capable of +concerted action. + +Situation in the East becomes threatening because of Russian +concentration of forces against Bessarabia. + +_25 May_: + +In the morning the Commander-in-Chief of the Army arrived and asks +permission armored mechanized division to push forward from the High +terrain Vimy-St.Omer-Graveline towards in the West into the level +terrain. Fuehrer is against it, leaves decision to Army Group A. They +decline for the time being because tank, shall rest a while, to be +ready for tasks in the South. + +At noon, Commander of 22 Divisions (Parachute Divisions) Count Sponek, +reports about his experiences between the Hague and Rotterdam. He had +heavy losses, but accomplished the incredible. + +Air Force reports great successes near Narvik. + +The unlimited expansion plan of the SS causes general apprehension. +Lutz protests in a letter to the General [Generaloberst] against +mentioning of the Armed-SS [Waffen-SS] in Armed forces High Command +communiques. But this came from the Fuehrer in a proclamation to the +troops in the Dutch theater of operations. General Dietl has received +parachuted mountain troops in Narvik after a course of training lasting +only 10 days, no losses. + +_26 May_: + +In the morning the Fuehrer sends for Commander-in-Chief of the Army +and agrees because 18th and 6th army advance slowly and because, +resistance in the South in front of the 2nd Army Corps has stiffened, +that tank units and infantry divisions push forward in direction of +Tournai, Cassel and Dunkerque from the West, especially because the +enemy on their part do not advance against the mountain positions but +dig themselves in defensive positions and improve them. In conjunction +therewith the Commander-in-Chief of the Army reports about his +intentions for further conduct of the operations (All sketch). Of the +12 Divisions, committed for the first push northwest of Paris, 6 shall +join Army Group B (9th and 4th Army). First push possible around 31 +May. 2nd push 6 to 8 days later (Main attack A and B), 3rd push at C +will be in readiness starting 15 June. + +The problem Paris is to be considered, not only from a military, but +also from a political point of view. + +* * * * * * * + +If Paris is surrendered or if revolutionary features come to the fore, +then Paris must be occupied at once. If Paris is defended, we will +strongly disengage ourselves for the time being. + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1814-PS + + ORGANIZATION BOOK OF THE NSDAP + + Editions of 1936, 1938 and 1940. + + Editor, the Reich Organization Leader of the NSDAP (Dr. Robert Ley). + Published by the Central Publishing House of the NSDAP, Franz Eher + Successor, Munich. Pages 86-88. + + THE ORGANIZATION OF THE NSDAP AND ITS AFFILIATED ASSOCIATIONS + +The Party was created by the Fuehrer out of the realization that if +our people were to live and advance towards an era of prosperity they +had to be led according to an ideology suitable for our race. They +must have as supporters men above average, that means, men who surpass +others in self-control, discipline, efficiency, and greater judgment. +The party will therefore always constitute a minority, the order of the +National Socialist ideology which comprises the leading elements of our +people. + +Therefore the party comprises only fighters, at all times prepared +to assume and to give everything for the furtherance of the National +Socialist ideology. Men and women whose primary and most sacred duty is +to serve the people. + +The NSDAP as the leading element of the German people control the +entire public life, from an organizational point of view, as well as +from that of affiliates, the organizations of the State administration, +and so forth. + +In the long run it will be impossible to let leaders retain responsible +offices if they have not been recognized by the Party. + +Furthermore, the party shall create the prerequisites for a systematic +selection of potential “Fuehrers”. + +The reconstruction of the National Socialist organizational structure +itself is demonstrated by the observation of the following principles: + + The Fuehrer Principle. + + The subordination and coordination within the structure of the entire + organization. + + The regional unity. + + The expression of the practical community thought. + + +I. FUEHRER PRINCIPLE [Fuehrerprinzip] + +The Fuehrer Principle requires a pyramidal organization structure in +its details as well as in its entirety. + +The Fuehrer is at the top. + +He nominates the necessary leaders for the various spheres of work of +the Reich’s direction, the Party apparatus and the State administration. + +Thus a clear picture of the tasks of the party is given. + +The Party is the order of “Fuehrers”. It is furthermore responsible for +the spiritual-ideological National Socialist direction of the German +people. The right to organize people for their own sake emanates from +these reasons. + +This also justifies the subordination to the party of the organizations +concerned with the welfare of the people, besides the inclusion of +people in the affiliates of the party, the SA, SS, NSKK, the Hitler +Youth, the NS Womanhood, the NS German Student Association and the NS +German “Dozentenbund” [University teachers association]. + +This is where the National Socialist Fuehrer structure becomes more +strongly apparent. + +Every single affiliate is cared for by an office of the NSDAP. + +The leadership of the individual affiliates is appointed by the Party. + +The Reich Organization Leader [Reichsorganisationsleiter] of the NSDAP +is simultaneously leader of the DAF. The NSBO is the organization +bearer of the DAF. + +The Leader of the Head-Office for Public Welfare also handles within +the “Personalunion” the National Socialist Welfare and the Winter +Relief. + +The same applies to: + + The Reich Justice Office [Reichsrechtsamt] for the NS + “Rechtswahrerbund”, + + The head office for public health for the NS. German Medical + Association, + + The head office for educators for the NS Teachers Association, + + The head office for civil servants for the Reich Association of Civil + Servants, + + The head office for war victims for the NS. War Victim Relief, + + The head office for technology for the NS. Association of German + Technology. + +The Racial Political Office handles the Reich Association of families +with many children, the NS Womanhood [Frauenschaft] and the “Deutches +Frauenwerk”. + +The Reich Office for agrarian politics of the NSDAP remains furthermore +in closest touch with the “Reichnaehrstand” [Reich Nutrition Office] +which is anchored in the State. Direct handling and personal contact of +the leaders is also provided in this manner. + +All attached affiliates, as well as the offices of the Party, have +their foundation, in the same manner as in the Reich direction, in the +sovereign territories, in the “Gaue” and furthermore in the districts +(Kreise) and if required in the local groups of the NSDAP. This applies +also to cells and blocks in the case of the NS Womanhood, the DAF, +and the NSV. The members of the attached affiliates will be included +in local administrations, respectively district sectors or district +comradeships which correspond geographically to local groups of the +Party. + + +II. FUEHRER PRINCIPLE. SUBORDINATION AND COORDINATION WITHIN THE TOTAL +ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE + +The Fuehrer structure would be split, though, if all subdivisions, +including attached affiliates were completely independent in their +structure from the smallest unit up to the “Reichsfuehrung” and were +they to come only at the top directly under the Fuehrer. + +Like a four-story building, if we consider the four Sovereign +territories [Reich, Gau, etc.] whose pillars and walls go up to the +roof without having supporting joists (wooden stays) or connections +on the various floors. Furthermore, it would not be reconcilable with +the Fuehrer principle, which assumes complete responsibility, to +assume that the Leader of a subdivision, as well as of an affiliated +organization, would be in the position to guarantee beyond a +professional and factual responsibility the political and ideological +attitude of _all_ the sub-leaders down to the smallest unit on the +basis of his Reich leadership. The total independence of individual +organizations would necessitate furthermore, the creation of an +organizational, personal and educational apparatus for each one of +them. This, in turn, would create eventually, in spite of the best will +of the responsible “Reichsleiters” [Reich Leaders], central offices and +office leaders in the Reich Leadership [Reichsfuehrung] of the party, +differences in the various organizations. Those differences would +later on of necessity take the shape of completely different systems +in regional, vertical, and personal respects, etc. within the National +Socialist regime. + +The Subdivisions NS German Student Association, NS Womanhood +Association, NSD [Dozentenbund] and the affiliates and their leaders +come therefore under the authority of the competent sovereign leaders +of the NSDAP. At the same time their structure is professionally +effectuated from the bottom up and they are subordinated to their +immediately superior organization in the sovereign divisions of the +Party, from a disciplinary point of view, that is to say insofar as +organization, ideology, politics, supervision and personal questions +are concerned. + +Thus a solid anchorage for all the organizations within the party +structure is provided and a firm connection with the sovereign leaders +of the NSDAP is created in accordance with the Fuehrer Principle. + +[In the 1943 edition the text remains the same, but the topical +sentences “I. Fuehrer Principle” and “II. Fuehrer Principle. +Subordination and Coordination within the Total Organizational +Structure” are changed to “I. Construction of the Organization” and +“II. Subordination and Coordination within the Total Organizational +Structure”.] + + + PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1815-PS + + Berlin 12 May 1941 + + R.S.H.A. + IV B I + To all Staatspolizei-leit-stellen + + _For information_: + The SD-Leit-Abschnitten + The Inspekteuren der Sipo/SD + + Concerning: The Study and Treatment of Church Politics + +The Chief of the R.S.H.A. has issued an order, which is to come into +immediate operation, in which the Sipo and SD Study and Treatment +of Church Politics, which has hitherto been divided between the +SD-Abschnitte and Stapostellen, shall now be taken over entirely by +the Stapostellen. (See the plan for the division of work issued by +the R.S.H.A. on 1.3.41. In addition to combatting opposition, the +Stapostellen thus take over the entire ‘Gegnernachrichtendienst’ in +this sphere.) + +In order that the Stapostellen should be in a position to take +over this work, the Chief of the Sipo/SD has ordered that ‘Church +Specialists’ hitherto employed in the SD-Abschnitten, should be +temporarily transferred to the same posts at Stapostellen, and operate +the Nachrichtendienst (Intelligence Service in the Church Political +Sphere) there. + +On the orders of the Chief of the R.S.H.A., and after reaching +agreement with the heads of Amts III, II, and I, these ‘Church +Specialists’ specified in the attached lists will thus be transferred +from the SD-Abschnitten to the Stapostellen, quoted. Further +instructions for transference or removal will be issued by Amt. I. +Those Stapostellen which are unable to obtain any SD-‘Specialists’ must +immediately train those of their specialists who appear most suitable +for Nachrichtendienst work. + +The Chief of the R.S.H.A. has furthermore ordered that +‘Nachrichtendienst’ files concerning Church Political Opposition, +hitherto the property of the SD-Abschnitte should be handed over to +the Stapostellen. However, material concerning Confessional influence +on the lives of the people is to remain with the SD-Abschnitten. In +doubtful cases the Stapostellen are to be given an opportunity of +making copies or photostats of these reports. + +Since it is essential that in this particular sphere the opposition +should be kept under constant observation, with no possibility +of loopholes, I am endeavoring to ensure that the change-over in +organization should take place immediately. + +On I.VI.1941 all Stapostellen are to send in reports on the completion +of the actual change-over of organization, and, at the same time, draw +up a list of personnel, giving the names of those ‘Specialists’ who, +after the reorganization, are doing executive work in the Stapostellen, +and of those who are conducting the intelligence proper of the +Nachrichtendienst. + +I then intend, at the end of June, to summon all these specialists to +a conference [Arbeitstagung] in Berlin, at which they will receive +important instructions for the carrying-out of their work. + + Signed Mueller + Beglaubigt: Kanzleiangestellte + + # # # # # + + Berlin 14.8.1941 + + R.S.H.A. + IV B + To all Stapo-leit-stellen + + _Information_: From the Inspectors of the Sipo/SD + + _Concerning_: Conference of the Specialists in Church Affairs + [Kirchenbearbeiter] attached to the Stapostellen. + +On 22d and 23d of September 1941 a Conference for Church Specialists +attached to Stapo-leit-stellen will take place in the Lecture-Hall of +the Stapoamt, Prinz-Albrechtstrasse 8, Berlin SW II. Date of arrival: +21.9.41. Uniform: Brownshirt and trousers worn with jackboots. + +I leave it to the heads of the Stapo-leit-stellen as to whether they +send those officials responsible for the entire ‘Kirchenbearbeitung’ +(Treatment and Study of Church Politics) to this conference, or +officials in charge of both the executive and intelligence branches +(SD-members). In each case those taking part in the conference must +have their names sent in before 10.9.1941, in order that accommodation +may be found for them. Billeting forms will be issued on arrival in +Berlin on the 21st at the Stapoamt Watchroom, Room I. Passes are to +be given up at the entrance of the lecture-hall at the opening of the +conference at 9 hrs.--22.9.41. + + Heydrich + Beglaubigt: Kanzleiangestellte + + # # # # # + + Aachen, 8 October 1941 + + Report of Hammes on Conference dated 8 October 1941 at Aachen + + _Notes on the Conference of Church Specialists attached to + Stapo-leit-stellen_ + +On the 22d and 23d September 1941 a Conference of Church Specialists +attached to Stapo-leit-stellen was held in the Lecture-Hall of the +R.S.H.A. in Berlin, in which 141 Specialists took part. + +I. _On 22.9.1941_ + +1. The latest developments in the Church Political situation, and our +outstanding tasks at this moment--SS-Stubaf. Hartl. + +2. Sipo measures for combating the Political Church and +Sects--Regierungsrat Rotu & Reg. Ass. Harnensbruch. + +3. Nachrichtendienst tasks in the conflict with Political Catholicism +in the Reich--SS-Ostuf. Kunze. + +4. Vatican world-politics, and our Nachrichtendienst +tasks--SS-Untersturmfuehrer Jakobs. + +II. _On 23.9.1941_ + +5. Present conditions within the German Protestant +Church--SS-Obersturmfuehrer Stiller. + +6. Treatment of the Sect problem, and the combating of +Sects--SS-Hauptscharfuehrer Ehrhardt. + +7. World-Protestantism and the Oxford Movement--Nachrichtendienst work +evolving from these subjects--SS-Obersturmfuehrer Stiller. + +8. The problem of the Church in the Eastern regions, and +Nachrichtendienst measures--SS-Untersturmfuehrer Wandesleben. + +9. The present Nachrichtendienst problem of +Freemasonry--SS-Hauptsturmfuehrer Kolrep. + +10. Summary of the most important points in the treatment of Church +Political opposition--SS-Sturmbannfuehrer Hartl. + +In the absence of SS-Obergruppenfuehrer Heydrich, the Conference was +opened by SS-Brigadefuehrer Mueller, who, after a short speech of +welcome, and introduction handed over to the first lecturer. The most +important lectures--those under I, items 2 and 3, have been noted down +and filed. + +The main aim and object of the conference has been to familiarize the +specialists as thoroughly as possible with their material, and, by +stimulating their interest, enable them to fulfill their duties to the +best of their ability. + +Nothing of great moment came to light in the discussions. Finally +SS-Stub. Hartl, also deputizing for the absent Heydrich, summed up the +most important points in the treatment of Church Political affairs. He +summarized the culminating points as follows: + +1. Avoidance of all sweeping measures and actions against the Church +and its establishments. + +2. Suspension of measures taken against monasteries/convents, including +“camouflaged” measures of this type. + +3. Action is still to be taken as before in individual cases, but the +R.S.H.A. is to be informed in each case. In particularly serious cases +the decision of the Fuehrer will be sought. + +4. Above all it must be ensured that the Church does not win back any +lost ground. We must see to it that we retain any position won. + +5. The greatest importance is to be attached to Church Political +activity. Any material that is of the slightest significance, or could +become of significance, is to be carefully examined. On the Fuehrer’s +instructions photostats are to be made of all documents seized, and +other material of this type, as in such cases duplicate copies are in +no way sufficient for the introduction of decisive measures. + +The “Nachrichtennetz” is to be fostered with the greatest of care, and +enlarged through the recruitment of new V-Personen. Particular value is +attached to contacts between Church circles and “Staatsstellen.” + +The lecturer closed with the following words: + +Each one of you must go to work with your whole heart and a true +fanaticism. Should a mistake or two be made in the execution of this +work, this should in no way discourage you, since mistakes are made +everywhere. The main thing is that the enemy should be constantly +tackled with determination, will, and effective initiative. + + Signed: HEINZE + Kriminal-Secretaer + + Signed: HAMMES + Kriminal-Kommissar z. Pr. + + # # # # # + + Aachen, 26 September 1941 + + Report of Regierungsrat Roth’s speech before Conference dated 26 + September 1941 + + _Sicherheitspolizei measures for combating Church Politics and Sects_ + +While describing the aim and methods of the Political Church in its +oppositional activities, the executive measures which, in accordance +with the Concordat, are at the disposal of the Stapo, were discussed. + +a. Punishable offences and infringements of the law by members +of the Church are to be submitted to the Kripo for processing. +Nachrichtendienst evaluation, and the compiling of evidence for a final +breakdown is the responsibility of the Stapo. + +b. It has been demonstrated that it is impracticable to deal with +political offences (malicious) under normal legal procedure. Owing to +the lack of political perception which still prevails among the legal +authorities, suspension of this procedure must be reckoned with. The +so-called “Agitator-Priests” must therefore be dealt with in future +by Stapo measures, and, if the occasion arises, be removed to a +Concentration Camp, if agreed upon by the RSHA. + +c. Offences and crimes against the “Sammlungsgesetz” [Order to +contribute to Party Funds] and the “Flaggenerlass” [Order to beflag +Churches etc.,] come under normal procedure. [A penciled note states +that this is not always so, and that it depends on the case in +question.] + +d. The necessary executive measures are to be decided upon according to +local conditions, the status of the person accused, and the seriousness +of the case--as follows: + +1. Warnung (Warning) + +2. Sicherungsgeld (Fine) + +3. Redeverbot (Forbidden to preach) + +4. Aufenthaltsverbot (Forbidden to remain in parish) + +5. Betaetigungsverbot (Forbidden all activity as a Priest) + +6. Kurzfristige Festnahme (Short-term arrest) + +7. Schutzhaft (Protective custody) + +The instructions for the application of individual measures are known. +The following points must be remembered: + +_The Aufenthaltsverbot_ (Forbidden to remain in parish) is very much +feared by all the clergy. In one case a Vicar-General appealed to the +RSHA for the lifting of the ban, and begged that they would rather +place the priest under short-term arrest. The “Aufenthaltsverbot” is +to be enforced in any case where the continued stay of the priest in +his former parish is likely to bring about dissension and disquiet +among the population. It should be applied, for instance, in the event +of a priest returning from arrest, in order to prevent him from being +feted as a martyr. Care must be taken that the measure is only enforced +where really expedient (encumbering of another Stapostelle). + +_Redeverbot_ (Forbidden to preach) is intended chiefly as a measure +against itinerant preachers, and will only be brought against +residential ones when they exceed their normal offices as priests, and +preach much injurious matter. + +_Betaetigungsverbot_ (Forbidden all activities as a priest) has not yet +been applied, but is possible. + +_Schutzhaft_ (Protective custody). As already stated, in accordance +with the Order issued by the RSHA on 24.8.36 the “Agitator Priest” is +to be taken into long-term imprisonment. The technical execution of +this lies in the hands of the Referat IV C 2, while it is IV B I’s +responsibility to present the charges. + +Actions against societies are not at the moment possible as a +widespread State measure. However, in cases where the Society has +been involved in anti-state activity, or appears superfluous or +undesirable, local measures may be applied. Small funds/properties +may be liquidated. Funds may also be handed over to the NSV. In cases +of activities against the State the only method is confiscation of +funds. Proposals for “Declaration of Enmity to People and State” with +the object of confiscation of property, are principally to be directed +to the RSHA, which works nonexecutively, and directs the necessary +negotiations with the MdI. + +_Monasteries/Convents._ It is not expected at the present that +they will be declared as hostile to the State. During the process +of “Dissolution” it should be remembered that the Law of 10.2.36 +suffices as a legal basis for the disposal. It is not essential that +the Order of 28.2.33 should be quoted, and it will only be brought +up if the Stapo measures are to come under “legal justification” +(Betaetigungsverbot 4). + +_Actions against Monasteries/Convents._ About 100 monasteries in the +Reich have been dissolved. Various incidents which may be traced back +to bad tactical procedure by Stapo officials, have led to disagreeable +consequences. Should the inmates of the monasteries put questions +to the appointed officials, those officials must refer them to the +Aktionsleiter [officer in charge of the proceedings]. + +Churches are to be seized at the same time, but, if possible, should +not be closed. As long as the confiscation is not absolute, any +action which interferes with property, or causes any alteration to it +should be avoided. The principle to be followed during the period of +“Sicherstellung” is that life should go on within the framework of an +ordered administration. + +Further points made were: + +Retreats, recreational organizations, etc., may now be forbidden on +grounds of industrial war-needs, whereas formerly only a worldly +activity could be given as a basis. + +Youth camps, recreational camps are to be forbidden on principle. +Church organizations in the evening may be prevented on grounds of the +black-out regulations. + +Processions, pilgrimages abroad are to be forbidden by reason of the +overburdened transport conditions. For local events too technical +traffic troubles and the danger of air attack may serve as grounds for +their prohibition (one Referent forbade a procession, on the grounds of +it wearing out shoe leather). + +There are no new regulations regarding the despatch of Confessional +literature to the troops, and the restrictions on Confessional +publications. + +Visas are always to be denied where the applicant cannot offer the +excuse that he will dedicate himself unreservedly to working for the +Fatherland while abroad. There are, however, possible exceptions. In +principle the intention still holds good, that no foreign priest should +enter the Reich, and that no German priest should travel abroad, above +all, not to the “Aufbaugebiet.” + +In the meantime the Church Ministry has adopted the view of the +RSHA, in which it was decided that Polish civilian workers and +prisoners-of-war must definitely be separated at Services. + +The RSHA requests that questions of policy should be submitted to +them, but that, on the other hand, they should not be bothered with +unnecessary inquiries. Above all, definite proposals on how to handle +the case in question should always be given, and not just requests for +direction or decision. + +The immediate aim: The Church must not regain one inch of the ground it +has lost. + +The ultimate aim. Destruction of the Confessional Churches to be +brought about by the collection of all material obtained through +Nachrichtendienst activities, which will, at a given time, be produced +as evidence for the charge of treasonable activities during the German +fight for existence. + + Signed: HAMMES + Kriminal-Kommissar z.Pr. + + # # # # # + + SECRET + +Excerpt from Note 16 concerning the Conference held by the Inspector in + Dusseldorf on 23.9.41. (Pp. 26, 27, 28.) + +14. _Cooperation between Stapo/and SD in the sphere of Church Politics_ + +The study and treatment of the efforts of the Catholic Church in its +opposition to the present State is, from both a communication and +executive angle, the responsibility of the Stapo (‘Gegnerbekampfung’). +The treatment of the efforts of the Church, and their repercussions in +the sphere of ‘religious life’ is, however, the task of the SD. + +From this it can be seen that a close cooperation in the future within +the sphere of the “Catholic Church” is especially necessary. It is the +duty of the Stapostellen to inform the SD-Abschnitte of any general +points to be observed during the course of ‘Gegnerbekampfung,’ in order +that the SD-Abschnitte can evaluate these facts from a religious angle. +The SD-Abschnitte are to inform the Stapostellen of any observations +which might be of assistance to them in their fight against the church +as an opponent of the State. Gegnerbekampfung and research in the +religious sphere must go hand in hand. The SD-Abschnitte must hand +over to the Stapostellen those V-Maenner who are working entirely, +or for the greater part, in ‘Gegnerbekampfung.’ However, if mutually +agreed upon, the SD-Abschnitte, who may still have a certain claim on +these V-Maenner by virtue of their work in the religious sphere, may +retain one or another of them to contribute work in this sphere. It +is desirable, however, that the appropriate official attached to the +Stapostelle should start taking over the direction of the V-Maenner by +stages as soon as possible. + +The Inspector has asked for a general ruling from RSHA concerning the +direction of the ‘Kirchenreferat’ by the Stapo offices, and at the same +time expressed the opinion that it was not absolutely essential that +the responsibility of this should rest principally on the executive +officials. The RSHA has made a corresponding decision in which it +shall be left to the Stapoleiter in every individual case to choose +who should be entrusted with the general direction and control of the +‘Kirchenreferat.’ It is therefore up to the Stapo leader [leiter] to +decide, by the efficiency of his work, who is the more capable, and to +appoint him head of the Referat. (Order of the Chief of Sipo/SD 18.9.41 +IV B.) The Inspector is to be informed as soon as possible of the +subsequent decision. + + # # # # # + + Berlin, 22 October 1941 + + Reichssicherheitshauptamt IV B 1--2744/41 g + _To all Stapostellen_ + _For information to_: + + a. The Fuehrers of all SD-(Leit) Abschnitte + + b. To all Inspectors of the Sipo/SD + + c. To the “Befehlshaber der Sipo/SD in Generalgouvernement KRAKAU” + + d. To the “Kommandeure der Sipo/SD--KRAKAU, LUBLIN, RADOM, WARSCHAU.” + + _Concerning_: Present Conditions within the Organization of the + Catholic Church. + +_Enclosure_: 1 Report. + +_Minute_ + +I am inclosing a report on the present position of the Organization of +the Catholic Church. This report is designed to serve as a basis for: + +a. The education of the appropriate Specialist. + +b. To aid “Nachrichtendienst” activity. + +The following directions must be followed concerning Nachrichtendienst +activity: + +1. If at all possible to verify that Bishops are using the papal +nunciate courier to deliver their report to Rome, and vice versa, we +should be informed. + +2. It should be found out which priests, members of Holy Orders, and +Laymen are used by the Bishops to bring their reports to and from Rome. +Wherever possible, attempts should be made to intercept this method of +reporting through V-Maenner. + +3. If possible, the reports submitted to Rome every 5 years should be +intercepted, especially when an opportunity arises in connection with +Stapo action. + +4. Where tension is known to exist between Bishops, the Bishop and +Nuncio, or the Bishops and the “Instanzen” subordinate to them, this is +to be utilized for Nachrichten purposes. + +5. Since there are at the moment 13 Arch- and Bishoprics vacant in +Greater Germany, efforts must be made to obtain the lists of Bishop +candidates. + +6. If not already known, it must be found out with what particular +department the individual Bishops are concerned, under the aegis of +the Bishops Fulda Conference. Those Stapostellen in whose area there +is a Bishop entrusted with special duties--(The Bishop of Berlin with +Press work, the Bishop of Mainz with “Jugendseelsorge,” the Archbishop +of Freiburg with charity work, the Bishop of Passau with work +connected with the Church in the Eastern regions ... etc. ...) have +Nachrichtendienst tasks of especial Reich importance. + +7. Points discussed during the Diocesan Synodes are to be obtained +wherever possible, and should be immediately submitted to IV B 1 at the +R.S.H.A. + +8. The following directive is given for local Nachrichtendienst +activity-- + +a. In every case where a Sachbearbeiter attached to a Stapostelle has +an Archbishopric in his area, he must have a thorough knowledge of the +particular sphere of work in which the individual Referenten of the +appropriate Ordinarists are engaged. + +b. The Episcopal Chancery is of particular importance within the +Episcopal Ordinariat. Similarly, and especially in the case of an +“Action,” the diocesan archives and the Episcopal secret archives are +of especial significance. + +c. The Deans are of particular importance to Aussenstellen, since +they are described as the eyes and ears of the Bishop. Should the +opportunity arise, the yearly reports which they have to submit to the +Bishop, should be obtained and evaluated locally. + +d. In order to ensure that the Nachrichtendienst organization is as +comprehensive as possible, an all-embracing Nachrichtennetz should be +spread among the more insignificant members of the clergy. + +9. It must be discovered which of those members of Orders, and priests +of German origin are employed in important posts at the Vatican--other +than those named in the report; we must be immediately informed of this. + +10. The Specialists of the individual Stapo(leit)stellen have to +extract the names of those Papal “Protonotare,” Chamberlains, Prelates, +and Chaplains who are officiating in their districts, and devote extra +attention to them in the course of their Nachrichtendienst duties. +Especial watch must be kept in order to discover to what extent they +are employed as “agents” to and from the Vatican. + +11. Reports are also to be submitted on those theological students +destined for Papal Institutes, and Priests returning from such +institutes to Germany. Should the opportunity arise of placing someone +for Nachrichtendienst purposes in one of these institutes, in the guise +of a theological student, we should receive immediate notification. + + Signed: Heydrich + Attested: KLANN [?] + Chancellery Clerk + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1816-PS + + STENOGRAPHIC REPORT OF THE MEETING ON “THE JEWISH QUESTION” UNDER THE + CHAIRMANSHIP OF FIELD MARSHALL GOERING IN THE REICHS AIR FORCE + + (12 November 1938--11 o’clock) + + + Part I + +_Goering_: Gentlemen! Today’s meeting is of a decisive nature. I have +received a letter written on the Fuehrer’s orders by the Stabsleiter of +the Fuehrer’s deputy Bormann, requesting that the Jewish question be +now, once and for all, coordinated and solved one way or another. And +yesterday once again did the Fuehrer request by phone for me to take +coordinated action in the matter. + +Since the problem is mainly an economic one, it is from the economic +angle that it shall have to be tackled. Naturally a number of legal +measures shall have to be taken which fall into the sphere of the +Minister for Justice and into that of the Minister of the Interior; +and certain propaganda measures shall be taken care of by the Minister +for Propaganda. The Minister for Finance and the Minister for Economic +Affairs shall take care of problems falling in their respective resorts. + +In the meeting, in which we first talked about this question and came +to the decision to aryanize German economy, to take the Jew out of it, +and put him into our debit ledger, was one in which, to our shame, we +only made pretty plans, which were executed very slowly. We then had a +demonstration, right here in Berlin, we told the people that something +decisive would be done, but again nothing happened. We have had this +affair in Paris now, more demonstrations followed and this time +something decisive must be done! + +Because, gentlemen, I have enough of these demonstrations! They don’t +harm the Jew but me, who is the last authority for coordinating the +German economy. + +If today, a Jewish shop is destroyed, if goods are thrown into +the street, the insurance company will pay for the damages, which +the Jew does not even have; and furthermore goods of the consumer +goods belonging to the people, are destroyed. If in the future, +demonstrations which are necessary, occur, then, I pray, that they be +directed, so as not to hurt us. + +Because it’s insane to clean out and burn a Jewish warehouse then have +a German insurance company make good the loss. And the goods which +I need desperately, whole bales of clothing and what-not, are being +burned; and I miss them everywhere. + +I may as well burn the raw materials before they arrive. The people of +course, do not understand that; therefore we must make laws which will +show the people once and for all, that something is being done. + +I should appreciate it very much if for once, our propaganda would make +it clear that it is unfortunately not the Jew who has to suffer in all +this, but the German insurance companies. + +I am not going to tolerate a situation in which the insurance companies +are the ones who suffer. Under the authority invested in me, I shall +issue a decree, and I am, of course, requesting the support of the +competent Government agencies, so that everything shall be processed +through the right channels and the insurance companies will not be the +ones who suffer. + +It may be, though, that these insurance companies may have insurance +in foreign countries. If that is the case, foreign bills of exchange +would be available which I would not want to lose. That shall have to +be checked. For that reason, I have asked Mr. Hilgard of the insurance +company, to attend, since he is best qualified to tell us to what +extent the insurance companies are protected against damage, by having +taken out insurance with other companies. I would not want to miss +this, under any circumstances. + +I should not want to leave any doubt, gentlemen, as to the aim of +today’s meeting. We have not come together merely to talk again, but +to make decisions, and I implore the competent agencies to take all +measures for the elimination of the Jew from German economy and to +submit them to me, as far as it is necessary. + +The fundamental idea in this program of elimination of the Jew from +German economy is first, the Jew being ejected from the Economy +transfers his property to the State. He will be compensated. The +compensation is to be listed in the debit ledger and shall bring a +certain percentage of interest. The Jew shall have to live out of this +interest. It is a foregone conclusion, that this aryanizing, if it +is to be done quickly, cannot be made in the Ministry for Economy in +Berlin. That way, we would never finish. + +On the other hand, it is very necessary to have safety precautions so +that the lower echelons, Statthalter, and Gauleiter will not do things +unreasonably. One must issue correction directives, immediately. + +The aryanizing of all the larger establishments, naturally, is to be my +lot--the Ministry for Economy will designate, which and how many there +are--it must not be done by a Statthalter or his lower echelons, since +these things reach into the export trade, and cause great problems, +which the Statthalter can neither observe, nor solve from his place. + +It is my lot, so that the damage will not be greater than the profit, +which we are striving for. + +It is obvious gentlemen, that the Jewish stores are for the people, and +not the stores. Therefore, we must begin here, according to the rules +previously laid down. + +The Minister for Economic Affairs shall announce which stores he’ll +want to close altogether. These stores are excluded from aryanizing at +once. Their stocks are to be made available for sale in other stores; +what cannot be sold, shall be processed through the “Winterhilfe” or +taken care of otherwise. However, the sales values of these articles +shall always be considered, since the State is not to suffer but should +profit through this transformation. For the chain and department +stores--I speak now only of that, what can be seen, certain categories +have to be established, according to the importance of the various +branches. + +The trustee of the State will estimate the value of the property and +decide what amount the Jew shall receive. Naturally, this amount is to +be set as low as possible. The representative of the State shall then +turn the establishment over to the “Aryan” proprietor, that is, the +property shall be sold according to its real value. + +There begins the difficulties. It is easily understood that strong +attempts will be made to get all these stores to party-members and to +let them have some kind of compensations. I have witnessed terrible +things in the past; little chauffeurs of Gauleiters have profited so +much by these transactions that they have now about half a million. +You, gentlemen, know it. Is that correct? + + (Assent) + +Of course, things like that are impossible. I shall not hesitate to act +ruthlessly in any case where such a trick is played. If the individual +involved is prominent, I shall see the Fuehrer within two hours and +report to him. + +We shall have to insist upon it, that the Aryan taking over the +establishment is of the branch and knows his job. Generally speaking +he is the one who must pay for the store with his own money. In other +words, an ordinary business transaction is to be sought--one merchant +selling, the other one buying a business. If there are party members +among the contenders, they are to be preferred, that is if they have +the same qualifications: first shall come the one who had the most +damage, and secondly, selection should be according to length of Party +membership. + +Of course, there may be exceptions. There are party-members who, as +may be proven, lost their business concessions by action of the +Schuschnigg or Prague Government, and so went bankrupt. Such a man has +naturally first option on a store for sale, and he shall receive help +if he does not have the means to help himself. The trustee of the State +can justify this help, if he is more business like in the transfer. +This party-member should have the chance to buy the store for as cheap +a price as possible. In such a case the State will not receive the full +price, but only the amount the Jew received. Such a buyer may even +receive a loan besides, so that he will get off to a good start. + +I wish to make it clear that such a proceeding shall only be legal +if the party-member has once owned such a store. For example, a +party-member was the owner of a stationery store, and Schuschnigg took +away the concession to operate it so that the man lost the store and +went bankrupt. Now, if a Jewish stationery store is being aryanized, +this party-member should get the store on conditions which he’ll be +able to fulfill. Such a case shall be the only exception though, in +all other cases the procedure shall be of a strictly businesslike +nature whereby the party-member, like I said before, shall have the +preference, if he has the same qualifications as any other candidate, +who is not a member of the party. + +When selling for the actual value we shall find only about 60 Aryans +ready to take over 100 Jewish stores. I don’t think that we have a +German for every Jewish store. You must not forget that the Jew sees +his main activity in the field of trade, and that he owns 90% of it. I +doubt that we’d have a demand big enough. I even doubt that we’d have +enough people, particularly now since everybody has found his field of +work. + +Therefore, I ask the Minister for Economy to go beyond what we think +ought to be done for the sake of the principle, in liquidating the +establishments. I ask him to go further, even though there won’t be any +candidates. That’ll be perfectly alright. + +The transfer of stores and establishments shall have to be executed +by the lower echelons, not through Berlin but through the Gaue and +through the Reichstatthalterschaft. Therein shall be the seat of the +members of the Board of Trustees, even if it consists of a few people +only. The Statthalter and his people cannot do this job; the trustees +will have to tackle it. But the Statthalter shall be the authority +which supervises, according to the regulations given him, the trustees, +particularly in dealings such as the transfer to party-members. + +Naturally, these establishments cannot disappear all at once but we’ll +have to start by Monday, in a manner that shall make it obvious that a +change has begun to materialize. Besides that, certain stores could be +closed which will make things here easier. + +Another point! I have noticed that Aryans took over a Jewish store and +were then so clever to keep the name of the Jewish store as “formerly,” +or kept it altogether. That must not be; I cannot permit it. Because it +may happen--what has just happened--stores were looted because their +signboards bore Jewish names--because they had once been Jewish, but +had been “aryanized” a long time ago. Names of former Jewish firms +shall have to disappear completely, and the German shall have to come +forward with his or his firm’s name. I ask you to carry this out quite +definitely. That much then regarding aryanizing of stores and wholesale +establishments, particularly in regard to signboards and of all that is +obvious! + +Of the consequences resulting from this for the Jew, I shall speak +later, because this is connected with other things. + +Now for the factories. As for the smaller and medium ones, two things +shall have to be made clear. + +1. Which factories do I not need at all--which are the ones where +productions could be suspended? Could they not be put to another use? +If not, the factories will be razed immediately. + +2. In case the factory should be needed, it will be turned over to +Aryans in the same manner as the stores. All these measures have to +be taken quickly, since Aryan employees are concerned everywhere. I’d +like to say right now that Aryan employees shall have to be given +employment immediately after the Jewish factory is closed. Considering +the amount of labor we need these days, it should be a trifle to keep +these people, even in their own branches. As I have just said; if the +factory is necessary, it will be aryanized. If there is no need for +it, it being abandoned shall be part of the procedure of transforming +establishments not essential, for our national welfare into one that +is essential for it--a procedure that shall take place within the next +few weeks. For it, I shall still need very much space and very many +factories. + +If such a factory is to be transformed or razed, the first thing +to be done is check the equipment. The questions arising will be: +Where can this equipment be used? Could it be used after the place +is transformed? Where else might it be needed badly? Where could the +machinery be set up again? It follows that aryanizing factories will be +an even more difficult task than the aryanizing of stores. + +Take now the larger factories which are run solely by a Jewish owner, +without control by a Board of Directors; or take corporations where the +Jews might be in the Supervisory Council or Board of Directors. There +the solution is very simple: the factory can be compensated in the same +manner as in the sale of stores and factories; that is, at a rate which +we shall determine, and the trustee shall take over the Jew’s interest +as well as his shares, which he in turn may sell or transfer to the +State, which will then dispose of them. So, if I have a big factory, +which belonged to a Jew or a Jewish corporation, and the Jew leaves, +perhaps with his sons who were employed there, the factory will still +continue to operate. Maybe a director will have to be appointed because +the Jew has run the factory himself. But otherwise, particularly if the +maintenance of the establishment is very essential everything will run +smoothly. + +Everything is very simple. I now have his shares. I may give them to +some Aryan or to another group or I may keep them. The State takes them +over and offers them at the stock market, if they are acceptable there +and if it so desires, or it makes use of them in some other way. + +Now, I shall talk of the very big establishments, those in which the +Jew is in the Board of Directors, in which he holds shares etc., and +so is either the owner or one of the coowners; in any case in which he +is greatly interested. There too, things are comparatively simple; he +delivers all of his shares which shall be bought at a price fixed by +the trustee. So the Jew gets into the account book. The shares shall +be handled like I’ve just explained. These cases cannot be taken care +of by the Gaue and Reichsstatthalter, but only by us here on top; +because we are the only ones to decide where these factories are to be +transferred to, how they may be affiliated with other establishments +or to what an extent the State shall keep them or hand them over to +another establishment belonging to the State. All this can only be +decided here. Of course, the Gauleiter and Statthalter will be glad to +get hold of the shares, and they’ll make great promises to beautify our +capital cities, etc. I know it all! It won’t go! We must agree on a +clear action that shall be profitable to the Reich. + +The same procedure shall be applied where the Jew has a share in, or +owns property of German economy. I am not competent enough to tell +off hand in what forms that might be the case, and to what an extent +he’ll have to lose it. Anyway, the Jew must be evicted pretty fast from +German economy. + +Now, the foreign Jews. There we’ll have to make distinctions between +the Jews who have always been foreigners--and who shall have to be +treated according to the laws we arranged with their respective +countries. But regarding those Jews who were Germans, have always lived +in Germany and have acquired foreign citizenship during the last year, +only because they wanted to play safe. I ask you not to give them any +consideration. We’ll finish with these. Or have you any misgivings? +We shall try to induce them through slight, and then through stronger +pressure, and through clever maneuvering--to let themselves be pushed +out voluntarily. + +_Woermann_: I’d like the Foreign Office to be included, since a +generally valid decision could hardly be made. + +_Goering_: We cannot consult you in every case, but on the whole we +will. + +_Woermann_: Anyway, I’d like to make known the claim of the Foreign +Office to participate. One never knows what steps may become necessary. + +_Goering_: Only for important cases! I do not like to take this +category under special consideration. I have learned only now to what +extent that has been done, particularly in Austria and Czechoslovakia. +If somebody was a Czech in Sudetenland, we do not have to consider +him at all, and the Foreign Office doesn’t have to be consulted +because that person now belongs to us. And in Austria and also in +Sudetenland, too many become all of a sudden Englishmen or Americans or +what-not--and generally speaking we cannot consider that a great deal. + + + [Part II is missing] + + + Part III + +_Funk_: That is quite a decisive question for us: should the Jewish +stores be reopened? + +_Goebbels_: If they will be reopened is another question. The question +is will they be restored? I have set the deadline for Monday. + +_Goering_: You don’t have to ask whether they’ll be reopened. That is +up to us to decide. + +_Goebbels: Number 2._ In almost all German cities synagogues are +burned. New, various possibilities exist to utilize the space where +the synagogues stood. Some cities want to build parks in their place, +others want to put up new buildings. + +_Goering_: How many synagogues were actually burned? + +_Heydrich_: Altogether there are 101 synagogues destroyed by fire; 76 +synagogues demolished; and 7,500 stores ruined in the Reich. + +_Goering_: What do you mean “destroyed by fire?” + +_Heydrich_: Partly, they are razed, and partly gutted. + +_Goebbels_: I am of the opinion that this is our chance to dissolve +the synagogues. All those not completely intact, shall be razed by the +Jews. The Jews shall pay for it. There in Berlin, the Jews are ready +to do that. The synagogues which burned in Berlin are being leveled by +the Jews themselves. We shall build parking lots in their places or new +buildings. That ought to be the criterion for the whole country, the +Jews shall have to remove the damaged or burned synagogues, and shall +have to provide us with ready free space. + +_Number 3_: I deem it necessary to issue a decree forbidding the Jews +to enter German theaters, moving houses, and circuses. I have already +issued such a decree under the authority of the law of the chamber for +culture. Considering the present situation of the theaters, I believe +we can afford that. Our theaters are overcrowded, we have hardly any +room. I am of the opinion that it is not possible to have Jews sitting +next to Germans in movies and theaters. One might consider, later on, +to let the Jews have one or two movie houses here in Berlin, where they +may see Jewish movies. But in German theaters they have no business +anymore. + +Furthermore, I advocate that the Jews be eliminated from all positions +in public life in which they may prove to be provocative. It is still +possible today that a Jew shares a compartment in a sleeping car +with a German. Therefore, we need a decree by the Reich Ministry for +Communications stating that separate compartments for Jews shall be +available; in case where compartments are filled up, Jews cannot claim +a seat. They shall be given a separate compartment only after all +Germans have secured seats. They shall not mix with Germans, and if +there is no more room, they shall have to stand in the corridor. + +_Goering_: In that case, I think it would make more sense to give them +separate compartments. + +_Goebbels_: Not if the train is overcrowded! + +_Goering_: Just a moment. There’ll be only one Jewish coach. If that is +filled up, the other Jews will have to stay at home. + +_Goebbels_: Suppose, though, there won’t be many Jews going on the +express train to Munich, suppose there would be two Jews in the train +and the other compartments would be overcrowded. These two Jews would +then have a compartment all to themselves. Therefore, Jews may claim a +seat only after all Germans have secured a seat. + +_Goering_: I’d give the Jews one coach or one compartment. And should a +case like you mention arise and the train be overcrowded, believe me, +we won’t need a law. We’ll kick him out and he’ll have to sit all alone +in the toilet all the way! + +_Goebbels_: I don’t agree. I don’t believe in this. There ought to be a +law. Furthermore, there ought to be a decree barring Jews from German +beaches and resorts. Last summer * * * + +_Goering_: Particularly here in the Admiralspalast very disgusting +things have happened lately. + +_Goebbels_: Also at the Wannsee beach. A law which definitely forbids +the Jews to visit German resorts! + +_Goering_: We could give them their own. + +_Goebbels_: It would have to be considered whether we’d give them +their own or whether we should turn a few German resorts over to them, +but not the finest and best, so we cannot say the Jews go there for +recreation. + +It’ll also have to be considered if it might not become necessary to +forbid the Jews to enter the German forests. In the Grunewald, whole +herds of them are running around. It is a constant provocation and +we are having incidents all the time. The behavior of the Jews is so +inciting and provocative that brawls are a daily routine. + +_Goering_: We shall give the Jews a certain part of the forest, and the +Alpers shall take care of it that various animals that look damned much +like Jews,--the Elk has such a crooked nose,--get there also and become +acclimated. + +_Goebbels_: I think this behavior is provocative. Furthermore, Jews +should not be allowed to sit around in German parks. I am thinking +of the whispering campaign on the part of Jewish women in the public +gardens at Fehrbelliner Platz. They go and sit with German mothers and +their children and begin to gossip and incite. + +_Goebbels_: I see in this a particularly grave danger. I think it +is imperative to give the Jews certain public parks, not the best +ones--and tell them: “You may sit on these benches” these benches +shall be marked “For Jews only.” Besides that they have no business +in German parks. Furthermore, Jewish children are still allowed in +German schools. That’s impossible. It is out of the question that any +boy should sit beside a Jewish boy in a German gymnasium and receive +lessons in German history. Jews ought to be eliminated completely from +German schools; they may take care of their own education in their own +communities. + +_Goering_: I suggest that Mr. Hilgard from the insurance company be +called in; he is waiting outside. As soon as he’ll be finished with his +report, he may go, and we can continue to talk. At the time Gustloff +died, a compensation for the damage Germany had suffered, was prepared. +But I believe that at present we should not work it through raised +taxes but with a contribution paid only once. That serves my purpose, +better. + + (Hilgard appears) + +Mr. Hilgard, the following is our case. Because of the justified anger +of the people against the Jew, the Reich has suffered a certain amount +of damage. Windows were broken, goods were damaged and people hurt, +synagogues burned, etc. I suppose that the Jews, many of them are also +insured against damage committed by public disorder, etc. + + (Hilgard: “Yes”) + +If that is so, the following situation arises; the people, in their +justified anger, meant to harm the Jew; but it is the German insurance +companies that will compensate the Jew for damage. This situation is +simple enough; I’d only have to issue a decree to that effect that +damage, resulting from these risks, shall not have to be paid by the +insurance companies. But the question that interests me primarily, and +because of which I have asked you to come here, is this one: In case of +reinsurance policies in foreign countries, I should not like to lose +these, and that is why I’d like to discuss with you ways and means by +which profit from reinsurance, possibly in foreign currency will go to +the German economy, instead of the Jew. I’d like to hear from you, and +that is the first question I want to ask: In your opinion, are the Jews +insured against such damage to a large extent? + +_Hilgard_: Permit me to answer right away. We are concerned with three +kinds of insurances. Not with the insurance against damage resulting +from revolt or from risks. But with the ordinary fire insurance, the +ordinary glass insurance, and the ordinary insurance against theft. +The people, because of their contracts, who have a right to claim +compensation are partly Jews, partly Aryans. As for the fire insurance, +they are practically all Jewish, I suppose. As for the department +stores, the victim is identical with the Jew, the owner and that +applies more to the synagogues, except for neighbors to whose places +the fire may have spread. Although the damage done to the latter’s +property seems to be rather slight, according to the inquiries I made +late last night. + +As for the glass insurance which plays a very important part in this, +the situation is completely different. The majority of the victims, +mostly the owners of the buildings are Aryans. The Jew has usually +rented the store, a procedure which you may observe all over, for +example on Kurfuerstendamm. + +_Goering_: That is what we’ve said. + +_Goebbels_: In these cases, the Jew will have to pay. + +_Goering_: It doesn’t make sense, we have no raw materials. It is all +glass imported from foreign countries and has to be paid for in foreign +currency! One could go nuts. + +_Hilgard_: May I draw your attention to the following facts: the +glass for the shop windows is not being manufactured by the Bohemian, +but by the Belgian glass industry. In my estimation, the approximate +money-value to which these damages amount is $6,000,000--that includes +the broken glass, glass which we shall have to replace, mainly to +Aryans because they have the insurance policies. Of course I have to +reserve final judgment in all this, Your Excellency, because I have had +only one day to make my inquiries. Even counting on about half of the +$6,000,000 being spent in transacting the business-specialists from the +industry itself are more confident in this matter than I am, we might +well have to import glass for approximately $3,000,000. Incidentally, +the amount of the damage equals about half a whole year’s production +of the Belgian glass industry. We believe that half a year will be +necessary for the manufacturers to deliver the glass. + +_Goering_: The people will have to be enlightened on this. + +_Goebbels_: We cannot do this right now. + +_Goering_: This cannot continue! We won’t be able to last with all +this. Impossible! Go on then! You suggest that the Aryan is the one who +suffers the damage; is that right? + +_Hilgard_: Yes, to a large extent, as far as the glass insurance goes. + +_Goering_: Which would have to replace the glass. + +_Hilgard_: Yes. Of course there are cases in which the Aryan, the owner +of the store is identical with the owner of the building. That is so +with all department stores. In the case of the department store Israel, +the owner is the Jew. + +_Goering_: And now the third category. + +_Hilgard_: Under this fall the victims of thievery. + +_Goering_: I have to ask you a question. When all kinds of goods were +taken from the stores and burned in the streets, would that also be +thievery? + +_Hilgard_: I don’t think so. + +_Goering_: Could that be termed as “Riot”? + +_Hilgard_: That is just the question which we are unable to decide +at this moment. Is it ordinary theft if entry into a dwelling or a +container of any kind is forced and something is taken away? + +_Goering_: That is a case of “Riot.” + +_Hilgard_: Riot does not mean much since we have very little insurance +against damage caused by riots--these were discarded by us long ago. + +_Goering_: But this here is “Rioting.” That is the legal term. There +was no theft, and no individual broke into any place. But a mob rushes +in and knocks everything to pieces, or “Public Disturbances.” + +_Hilgard_: Public disturbance. It is no riot. + +_Goering_: Are they insured against damages caused by public +disturbances? + +_Hilgard_: No, no more. May I show this by an example. The most +remarkable of these cases is the case Margraf Unter Den Linden. The +Jewelry store of Margraf, is insured with us through a so-called +combined policy. That covers practically any damage that may occur. +This damage was reported to us as amounting to $1,700,000 because the +store was completely stripped. + +_Goering_: Daluege and Heydrich, you’ll have to get me this jewelry +through raids, staged on a tremendous scale! + +_Daluege_: The order has already been given. The people are being +controlled all the time. According to reports, 150 were arrested by +yesterday afternoon. + +_Goering_: These things will otherwise be hidden. If somebody comes +to a store with jewels and claims that he has bought them, they’ll be +confiscated at once. He has stolen them or traded them in all right. + +_Heydrich_: Besides that, looting was going on in the Reich in more +than 800 cases, contrary to what we supposed; but we have already +several hundred people who were plundering, and we are trying to get +the loot back. + +_Goering_: And the jewels? + +_Heydrich_: That is very difficult to say. They were partly thrown +into the street and picked up there. Similar things happened with +furriers, for example, in Friedrichstrasse, district C, there the +crowd was naturally rushing to pick up minks, skunks, etc. It’ll +be very difficult to recover that. Even children have filled their +pockets, just for fun. It is suggested that the Hitler Youth is not +to be employed and to participate in such actions without the Party’s +consent. Such things are very easily destroyed. + +_Daluege_: The Party should issue an order to the effect that the +police will immediately receive a report in case the neighbor’s wife, +(everybody knows his neighbor) has a fur coat altered or in case +somebody appears wearing new rings or bracelets. We’d like the Party to +support us here. + +_Hilgard_: These damages are not covered by the policy, I believe. May +I say a word in general about our liabilities and a “Petidum” of the +Versicherungswirkschaft report. We’d like to make it our point, Mr. +General Field Marshall, that we shall not be hindered in fulfilling the +obligations for which our contracts call. + +_Goering_: But I have to. That is important for me. + +_Hilgard_: If I may give reasons for this request, I’d like to say +that it simply has to do with the fact that we carry out, to a large +extent, quite a number of international transactions. We have a very +good international basis for our business transactions, and in the +interest of the equilibrium of the Foreign exchange in Germany, we have +to make sure that the confidence in the German insurance shall not be +ruined. If we now refuse to honor clear-cut obligations, imposed upon +us through lawful contract, it would be a black spot on the shield of +honor of the German insurance. + +_Goering_: It wouldn’t the minute I issue a decree--a law sanctioned by +the State. + +_Hilgard_: I was leading up to that. + +_Heydrich_: The insurance may be granted, but as soon as it is to be +paid, it’ll be confiscated. That way we’ll have saved face. + +_Hilgard_: I am inclined to agree with what General Heydrich has just +said. First of all, use the mechanism of the insurance company to check +on the damage, to regulate it and even pay, but give the insurance +company the chance to * * * + +_Goering_: One moment! You’ll have to pay in any case because it is +the Germans who suffered the damage. But there’ll be a lawful order +forbidding you to make any direct payments to the Jews. You shall also +have to make payment for the damage the Jews have suffered, but not to +the Jews, but to the Minister of Finance. + + (Hilgard: Aha!) + +What he does with the money is his business. + +_Schmer_: Your Excellency, I should like to make a proposal. A certain +rate should be fixed, say 15% or maybe a little higher, of all the +registered wealth, I understand one billion is to be confiscated so +that all Jews shall pay equally, and from the money raised this way, +the insurance companies shall be refunded. + +_Goering_: No. I don’t even dream of refunding the insurance companies +the money. The companies are liable. No, the money belongs to the +State. That’s quite clear. That would indeed be a present for the +insurance companies. You make a wonderful Petidum there. You’ll fulfill +your obligations, you may count on that. + +_Kerl_: It seems that in one respect, we’ll have to arrange this +somewhat differently. As far as the glass insurance goes, the fact of +the matter is that the owners of the buildings will definitely have to +be paid for the damage, as stipulated. The majority of these companies, +with the exception of one Joint Stock Company in Cologne, are all very +small reciprocity companies [Gegenseitsvereine]. They won’t be able to +make up for the damage. We’ll have to find out how far they are covered +by reinsurance which I cannot tell at the moment. + +_Hilgard_: In this connection, the reinsurance plays a relatively +small role, except for the large fire-insurance policies taken out by +department stores. There is not reinsurance in the glass insurances, +for the simple reason that, under normal conditions glass insurance is +one of our best branches in the insurance business; and therefore does +not need reinsurance. I have to add, though, that the amount of this +damage is approximately twice as high as the amount of damage for an +average year. It makes all our calculations wrong and completely wipes +out our chance for profit. + + (Interrupted by Kerl) + +No, sir, that is the way it is. The whole premium of the German glass +insurance amounts to $14,000,000, if I am not wrong. Under normal +conditions it amounted to 4 or 5 million. The glass insurance is our +greatest asset. So far, the greatest profits were made in it. But now, +the amount of this damage is alone twice as high as the amount for +one ordinary year. With the various special glass insurances, it is +altogether different. + +_Goering_: One moment! 4 to 5 millions normally. Twice as much would be +about 10 million. You suggested 14 million. There are still 4 million +left. + +_Hilgard_: We’ll also have to pay for the expenses. No, it is a very +great catastrophe for us. Let me point out that the damage in the whole +of Germany, in my estimation, shall amount to approximately 25 million +mark. I wanted to be careful. + +_Heydrich_: We estimate that the damage to property, to furniture and +to consumer-goods amounts to several hundred million; although that +includes the damage the Reich shall suffer from loss of taxes--sales +taxes, taxes on property, and on income. I assume that the Minister for +Finance too, has been informed of all this. + +_V. Krosigk_: I have no idea about the extent. + +_Heydrich_: 7,500 destroyed stores in the Reich. + +_Daluege_: One more question ought to be cleared up. Most of the goods +in the stores were not the property of the owner but were kept on the +books of other firms, which had delivered them. Then there are the +unpaid for deliveries by other firms, which definitely are not all +Jewish but Aryan, those goods that were delivered on the basis of +commission. + +_Hilgard_: We’ll have to pay for them, too. + +_Goering_: I wished you had killed 200 Jews, and not destroyed such +values. + +_Heydrich_: There were 35 killed. + +_Kerl_: I think we could do the following: Jews we don’t pay anyhow. +As for Aryans, payment shall have to be made. The insurance company +may contact us through the “Reichsgruppe” and we shall investigate +each case. I am thinking of the small reciprocity companies; it +should be easy to find out whether they are capable of paying or not. +In their cases, the amounts involved are not too large. We may find +an arrangement for this later on; I am thinking of one in which the +insurance companies arrange for recompensation exclusively to Aryan, +and once they know the results of their inquiries, contact us. We shall +then find a way out for these small companies. Of course only in cases +where it is absolutely necessary. + +_Funk_: That is not necessary. I’d like to refer to what I’ve said +before about the decree. That seems to be the easiest solution. + +_Goering_: We cannot do that. These people make a point of their +ability to pay. + +_Funk_: If the Jews pay for it, the insurance companies don’t have to +pay. + +_Goering_: Right, well, gentlemen, this is all very clear. We’ll stick +to it. At this moment every insurance company, except Mr. Hilgard +who is here, counts on having to pay for the damage. They want to +pay too, and I understand this very well. They’ll have to want that, +so they cannot be reproached for not being secure enough to pay. The +glass insurance, and a point was made of that, has brought the highest +profits so far. That means they’d have enough surplus money, and if +they haven’t divided it all up in dividends, they’ll have savings +enough for the compensation. Such an insurance company will have to be +in a position to pay for a damage of 10, 12, 15 million, that is three +times the amount paid in the normal year. If they are unable to do +that, then we’ll have to wonder whether we should let small companies +live at all. It would be insane to keep insurance companies which would +be unable to pay for such a damage. To permit an insurance company like +that to exist would simply mean to cheat the people. I suggest now the +following. The damage shall be determined in each case. And for the +time being, the insurance companies shall have to honor their contract +in every respect and shall have to pay. + + + [Part IV is missing] + + + Part V + +_Goering_: Now for the damage the Jew has had. At Margraf’s the jewels +disappeared, etc. Well, they are gone, and he won’t get them refunded. +He is the one who has to suffer the damage. As far as the jewels may +be returned again by the police, they belong to the State. Now for the +consumer foods which were thrown into the street, stolen, or burned. +There too, the Jew will be the one who has the damage. + +As for the goods that were kept on the basis of commissions, the Jew +shall have to make good for the damage. + +_Goebbels_: That doesn’t have to be put in the decree, though. This +decree is quite sufficient the way it is. + +_Hilgard_: I wonder to what an extent insurance companies in foreign +countries might be involved in this. + +_Goering_: Well, they’ll have to pay. And we’ll confiscate that. + +_Hilgard_: As for this merchandise sold on the basis of commissions, I +can imagine that the American supplier of fur coats, shipping them from +England or from America would in many cases insure it with English or +American insurance companies! + +_Goering_: Then they’ll pay him for the damage. The question merely is +the following: do you think there are reinsurances for all this damage +in foreign countries? + +_Hilgard_: Very few, amounting to very little. + +_Goering_: Of course, the Aryan cannot report any damage because he +hasn’t had any. The Jew will make good. + +The Jew shall have to report the damage. He’ll get the refund from +the insurance company but the refund will be confiscated. After it’s +all said and done, there will remain some profit for the insurance +companies since they can’t have to make good for all the damage. Mr. +Hilgard, you may enjoy yourself. + +_Hilgard_: I have no reason for that--the fact that we won’t have to +pay for all the damage is called profit! + +_Goering_: Just a moment! If you are compelled under the law to pay +5 million and all of a sudden there appears an angel in my somewhat +corpulent form before you, and tells you: you may keep 1 million--why, +cannot that be called making a profit? I should actually split with +you, or whatever you’d call it. I can see it, looking at you. Your +whole body grins. You made a big profit. + + (Remark: Let’s initiate a tax for damages, resulting from public + disturbance, to be paid by the insurance companies) + +_Hilgard_: For me it goes without saying that the honorable German +merchant cannot be the one who suffers. I have discussed this matter +with the enterprises and I have spoken for it that the Aryan must not +be the one who has the damage. But it is decidedly he who has it, +because all the insurance companies, not one insurance company, are the +ones that shall have to pay higher rates and at the same time shall +receive lower dividends. Therefore, all the insurance companies are +the losers. That is so, and that’ll remain so, and nobody can tell me +differently. + +_Goering_: Then why don’t you take care of it that a few windows +less are being smashed! You belong to the people too! Send your +representatives out. Let them instruct the people. If there should be +any more questions speak to Mr. Lange. + + (Reichsgruppenleiter Hilgard leaves the meeting) + +Gentlemen, let us continue. + +_Woermann_: I think that the foreign Jews are left out completely in +Article 1. They are covered only by Article 2. But they should also be +taken care of in Article 1. Otherwise they can be dealt with only if +they are insured, and not if they are not insured. + +_Goering_: Well, they’ll have to insure themselves--or what else do you +mean? + +_Woermann_: As for insurance, the foreign Jews are, to my +understanding, mentioned only in Article 2 and 3, and not in Article 1. +If I remember correctly, you were going to say in Article + +1: “Jews inside the country.” Well, we’ll have plenty of complaints +then. + +_Goering_: Pardon me. According to Article 2, they’ll receive their +compensation. + + (Woermann: If they are insured!) + +The number of those who are not insured is negligible. + +_Heydrich_: I’d like to say one more thing of primary importance. In +the decree we should not mention the confiscation. We can do that +easily. + +_Goering_: No, you cannot do that tacitly. A clear legal procedure will +have to be employed there. But that is not what Mr. Woermann means, he +is talking about these foreign Jews who are not insured. As far as they +are insured, they are covered. This here concerns those who are not +insured. That may be the case here and there. + +_Woermann_: We shall then have plenty of complaints. + +_Goering_: I’d like to avoid paying too much attention to the foreign +Jews. + +_Woermann_: But if Article 2 contains that provision, Article 1 may as +well have it. The first draft by the Minister for Justice covered it +all very nicely. + +_Guertner_: Now, if I don’t misunderstand, Mr. Woermann, he is +primarily concerned with the obligation for restoration which shall +be valid generally while only Jews who have German citizenship are +mentioned regarding the insurance. + +I’d like to know whether there are any objections against compelling +also the foreign Jews to restore the damage, and to inform him that he +shall not be paid the money from the insurance. + +_Goering_: He is quite able to do that. + +_Woermann_: Even if he is not insured? + +_Guertner_: Oh! + +_Goering_: There should hardly be such instances. Let’s take a chance +on it. + +_Stuckart_: If he is not insured, he’ll have to have the damage +restored anyway. How can he then make claims against anybody? + +_Goering_: He cannot. + +_Woermann_: He can file claims against the State. + +_Stuckart_: According to which law? Damage caused by riots? We won’t +recognize riots. + +_Goering_: Perfectly right. + +_Woermann_: Generally speaking, may I say: regarding foreign Jews, the +reservation that the contract is to be taken into consideration was +made only for the organization. That is valid for all branches which we +have discussed today, and also for the expropriation. + +_Goering_: Like the Fuehrer says, we’ll have to find a way to talk this +over with the countries which also do something against their Jews. +That every dirty Polish Jew has a legal position here and we have to +stand him--that ought to cease. The Fuehrer was not very happy about +the agreement that was made with the Poles. He thinks we should take a +few chances and just tell the Poles: all right, we are not going to do +that; let’s talk over what we may be able to accomplish together; you +are doing something against your own Jews in Poland; but the minute the +Itzig has left Poland, he should suddenly be treated like a Pole! I’d +like to disregard these stories from foreign countries a little. + +_Woermann_: It ought to be considered whether or not, the U S might +take measures against German property. This question cannot be handled +equally for all countries. I have to make a formal and general +reservation. + +_Goering_: I have always said and I’d like to repeat it that our +steamship companies and German companies in general should finally +catch on and liquidate their investments in the U S, sell them, etc. +That country of scoundrels does not do business with us according to +any legal rules. Once before they stole everything from us, that is why +I don’t understand how we could do it again, just for some temporary +profit. It is dangerous. You can do it with a regular country but not +with one that cares for the Right as little as the U S. The other day I +had the American ambassador with me, we talked about the zeppelin and +I told him: “We don’t need any helium, I fly without helium but the +prerequisite will have to be that this ship will be flying to civilized +countries where the Right prevails. It goes without saying that one +cannot fly to such gangster-states.” He had a rather silly look on +his face. One ought to tell these Americans. But you are right, Mr. +Woermann, it ought to be considered. + +_Woermann_: In other words, the foreign office is granted the right to +be consulted. + +_Goering_: Granted, but I’d like to avoid mentioning the foreign Jews +as long as we can help it. We’d rather have the foreign office take +part in these cases where that question becomes acute, so that some +compromise can be reached. + +_Woermann_: Generally, and in particular cases. + +_Funk_: The decisive question is: Are the Jewish stores to be reopened +or not? + +_Goering_: That depends on how big a turn-over these Jewish stores +have. If it is big, it is an indication that the German people are +compelled to buy there, in spite of its being a Jewish store, because a +need exists. If we’d close all Jewish stores which are not open right +now, altogether before Christmas, we’d be in a nice mess. + +_Fischboeck_: Your Excellency, in this matter we have already a very +complete plan for Austria. There are 12,000 Jewish artisan and 5,000 +Jewish retail shops in Vienna. Before the National Revolution, we had +already a definite plan for tradesmen, regarding this total of 17,000 +stores. Of the shops of the 12,000 artisans, about 10,000 were to be +closed definitely and 2,000 were to be kept open. 4,000 of the 5,000 +retail stores should be closed and 1,000 should be kept open, that is, +were to be aryanized. According to this plan, between 3,000 and 3,500 +of the total of 17,000 stores would be kept open, all others closed. +This was decided following investigations in every single branch and +according to local needs, in agreement with all competent authorities, +and is ready for publication as soon as we shall receive the law which +we requested in September; this law shall empower us to withdraw +licenses from artisans, quite independently from the Jewish question. + +_Goering_: I shall have this decree issued today. + +_Fischboeck_: It was granted us in connection with the economic plan +for Austria. I believe the only reason why it was not yet published +was that negotiations between the Reich Ministry for Economic Affairs +and the National Food Corporation were going on. A basic agreement had +already been reached. We’ll be able to close these 10,000 stores as a +matter of mere routine as soon as the decree will be issued. As for the +actual execution of the matter, somebody will have to take care of the +merchandise in these stores. Until last week we had intended to more or +less leave it up to the Jews themselves to liquidate the warehouses. +We cannot do that anymore. We intend to create a central agency which +shall take care of the merchandise to be used. Generally, the best +procedure might be to turn the merchandise over to the particular +branch which in turn shall divide it up among the Aryan stores. These, +in turn, shall resell it on the basis of commissions or for a fixed +price. + +If this is carried out as planned, it’ll concern only the approximately +3,000 remaining stores which shall be aryanized, according to the +investigations made in the various branches. Actual buyers for about +half of these stores are waiting: their contracts have been checked +and are ready to be approved. If many of these cases were not approved +sooner, it is only because the decision on the planning had not yet +been made. As for the remaining 15,000 stores, negotiations have +also gone rather far in many cases. We think that a deadline should +be set, say until the end of the year. If, by the end of the year, +definite buyers for the stores designated for Aryans, cannot be found, +it’ll have to be examined once more whether the stores should not be +liquidated. In most cases that will be possible; an artisan’s shop is +of a rather individual character. As for retail stores, it would never +be urgent enough, so as to say that the economic worth was too big. The +very few stores which would still remain and found to be necessary but +for which no buyer was available, could be taken over by trustees. This +way, I believe that fewer than 100 stores would be left, and by the end +of the year we would have liquidated all the Jewish-owned businesses +which so far have been obvious as such in the eyes of the public. + +_Goering_: That would be excellent. + +_Fischboeck_: Out of 17,000 stores 12,000 or 14,000 would be shut down +and the remainder aryanized or handed over to the bureau of trustees +which is operated by the State. + +_Goering_: I have to say that this proposal is grand. This way, the +whole affair would be wound up in Vienna, one of the Jewish capitals, +so to speak, by Christmas or by the end of the year. + +_Funk_: We can do the same thing over here. I have prepared a law +elaborating that, effective 1 January 1939, Jews shall be prohibited +to operate retail stores and wholesale establishments as well as +independent artisan shops. They shall be further prohibited from +keeping employees or offer any ready products on the market. Wherever a +Jewish shop is operated, the police shall shut it down. From 1 January +1939, a Jew can no longer be employed as an enterpriser as stipulated +in the law for the Organization of National Labor from 20 January 1934. +If a Jew holds a leading position in an establishment without being +the enterpriser, his contract may be declared void within 6 weeks by +the enterpriser. With the expiration of the contract all claims of the +employee, including all claims to maintenance, become obliterated. +That is always very disagreeable and a great danger. A Jew cannot be a +member of a corporation; Jewish members of corporations shall have to +be retired by 31 December 1938. A special authorization is unnecessary. +The competent Ministers of the Reich are being authorized to issue the +provision necessary for the execution of this law. + +_Goering_: I believe that we can agree with this law. + + (Remark: Yes) + +Of course there remain a few things to be straightened out even after +1 January. We shall be able to handle them with these general methods +which we shall have to employ for handling all other Jewish property. +As for the Jewish stores, we may proceed vigorously; we believe that by +Christmas enough buyers shall be found to take over the stores which +from now on shall be entirely under pressure. Also the merchandise may +be taken the way you have proposed it. To me, all this seems to be +prepared in an excellent manner. + +_Funk_: In every single store everything is there. + +_Schmer_: Everything is there, except that we have no control, anymore, +over this business with the trustees. I personally am of the opinion +that we don’t need it at all; so far we have managed quite well with +the aryanization. For those few stores that are to be kept open, we +shall easily find buyers. All other rooms shall be rented without much +ado. There is a great need for this right here in Berlin. + +_Goering_: But my dear friend, that way the Jew will receive the full +amount. + +_Schmer_: He will receive the amount that is far below the value, and +the aryanizing shall have to be authorized, as before. + +_Goering_: The Jew will receive the amount which won’t be put into the +account book. + +_Schmer_: No. We can arrange that later. He cannot swallow the money. +The amount is fixed, and under the law the Jew is compelled to +report every change in his financial status, so that it can easily +be controlled. He won’t run away; we’ll keep it in the Reich. The +only thing you’d have to do is to issue a decree, or to transfer the +provisions of Article 7 on to the Ministry for Economic Affairs in +order to confiscate the Jewish property. He cannot run away from us. + +_Goering_: Mr. Schmer, could not the following be done: Somebody will +become aryanized and get 300,000 marks into his hands. He runs into the +next-best jewelry store around the corner and buys one piece of jewelry +after another, and on the same day disappears across the border. + +_Schmer_: In that case, we’ll have to report this change in his +property. + +_Goering_: But if he wants to scram! + +_Fischboeck_: The OK on the aryanizing is not being given the minute +the price for the purchase is being paid. We do that the following way. +The aryanizing is being authorized only under the condition that the +price for the purchase is to be paid in installments lasting over a +long period of time, in case the buyer is unable to pay; or, in case +payment is being made, that the amount is to be put in the bank of a +frozen account. + +_Goering_: We could do the same thing here. + +_Schmer_: In the provisions for the execution of the law we may +stipulate that from a certain level on, payment shall have to be made +in bonds of the Reich or something similar. That would have to be a +decree made by the authorities which OK the aryanizing. + +_Daluege_: The number of Jewish stores is unknown. Until yesterday, +7,500 were reported to us and the number does not increase. + +_Fischboeck_: Because of what has happened the day before yesterday in +Vienna, 5,000 were shut down there. There were 40,000 altogether. + +_Schmer_: Shall the arrangement made in Austria remain? + +_Goering_: Nothing will be changed there. + +_Fischboeck_: Everything can be shut down at any time. + +_Heydrich_: I know that a very high limit has been set for registering, +3,000 I believe. + +_Fischboeck_: More than 5,000. + +_Goering_: Is that the same in the Reich? + +_Fischboeck_: Yes, in the Reich too. In this connection, I’d like to +make a few more remarks. What we are very much concerned with, is the +situation regarding the Jewish apartment houses which contribute a +large percentage of Jewish wealth. Surprisingly enough, the Jewish +national wealth in Austria is reported to amount to 320 million marks +only; the value of the apartment houses alone amounts to 500 million. +We should appreciate it very much if the regulation which makes it +possible to requisition Jewish property would be made to be valid also +for the apartment buildings; thus we would be enabled to have these +houses administered by a board of trustees and to give the Jews the +right to have a claim on the debit ledger of the Reich. That could +also be an occasion to cash the contribution, which might be deducted +this way in advance. The administration of these blocks of apartment +buildings wouldn’t be a problem at all. The only thing we’d need for +it would be managers, and there’d be plenty of them. We’d like to +requisition the apartment buildings and also any bonds that way. This +question of the bonds has been left open so far. In Austria, a very +large part of Jewish wealth, 266 billion Reichsmarks, is invested in +bonds of all kinds, in shares or simply in bonds bringing a fixed rate +of interest. In my opinion, a danger for the market does not exist +because the Ministry for Economic Affairs would have control over +these bonds. We’ll pay by handling out claims, on the debit-ledger of +the Reich. Therefore, the finances of the Reich won’t be affected, +the Minister for Finance shall only pay 3% for the claims on the +debit-ledger of the Reich. He in turn receives internal loans, that +means saves money. And if the bonds are not being sold, one might keep +them 30 years until those claims on the debit-ledger of the Reich shall +be expired. + +_Funk_: Why should Jews not be allowed to keep bonds? + +_Goering_: Because that way he would actually be given a share. + +_Funk_: That is entirely new. + +_Goering_: No. I said very clearly before; bonds and shares. + +_Funk_: Shares yes, but not internal loans. + +_Fischboeck_: It is certainly better to pay the Jew 3% instead of 4%. +We’d have no possibility to control Jewish wealth the minute we’d let +him have shares. + +_Goering_: Gentlemen, no arguments. It is out of the question that he’d +keep the shares. He’ll have to turn them in. + +_Fischboeck_: In that case I’d like you to arrange this by calling +the shares in so that the stock market won’t be ruined. That can very +easily be done. They’ll be turned in. Administering the shares is +also much simpler. The trustee turns the shares over to the depot and +receives claims on the debit-ledger of the Reich in their place. With +this, the whole affair is settled. The only question is whether you +want to recall the shares or not. + +_Funk_: This way, the Reich will become possessor of half a billion +shares. + +_Goering_: Yes, yes. + +_Goebbels_: He’ll be able to get rid of them according to its needs. + +_Fischboeck_: But it is a business based on profits. + +_V. Krosigk_: I am wondering, first whether it will bring us profits. I +grant you that, though. But secondly, an entirely new point of view has +to be entered here. I can very well see the point in what the Minister, +Mr. Fischboeck, says. As for the values that otherwise bring fixed +rates of interest, it is an entirely new idea to expropriate the Jew +also in this, though the intention had been to refrain his status as +the owner of the shares. + +_Fischboeck_: The reason why this is so very important is that our +whole action shall remain without success as long as the Jews shall be +in the possession of values, which they may realize quickly and employ +for any other undertaking. + +_Goering_: That’s it. We want to prevent the Jews from again secretly +manipulating against us. + +_Fischboeck_: For example, if we don’t want the Jews to possess jewelry +we can prevent them from having it by allowing them to possess only +Internal Loan bonds, that means that they could acquire the jewelry +only by paying with bonds. + +_Goering_: Nobody would pay them claims on the debit-ledger. + +_Fischboeck_: They are not transferable. + +_Goering_: Only if authorized. + +_Heydrich_: Is it not possible to issue an order forbidding the Jew to +invest his money in certain values, such as art treasures? + +_Goering_: The arrangement with the registration in the debit-ledger +is much simpler. Claims on the debit-ledger are not transferable. He +cannot do anything with them, and he cannot do much with those 3½%. + +_Heydrich_: But we’ll also have to find an arrangement for confiscation +of valuable objects in Jewish possession. + +_Goering_: What he has now in his possession, that’ll come. + +_Schmer_: Article 7 of the decree states that the use of Jewish wealth +in German economy shall be regulated through the Four Year Plan. + +_Goering_: I think Fischboeck’s proposal is very good. We should give +it the form of a draft now, find the apartment buildings, the shares, +etc. + +_Fischboeck_: I should also like to have a decision made on the +following question. In Austria, individuals, not institutions, owe the +Jews 184 billion Reichsmarks. This way the Jews certainly have invested +money in a way we don’t like. That is money which they have loaned +out to other Jews, oftener enough to an Aryan. This way, a dependency +of the Aryan artisan from the Jewish creditor is created which we do +not want. Now the question arises, and I would answer yes. Should +trustees not be created to administer these debts and then pay with +claims on the debit-ledger, according to demand coming in. The goal of +this procedure would be to make the debtor independent from the Jewish +creditor, to insert Aryan trusteeship and pay the Jew, as far as his +demands could actually be met. Therefore it does not have to be paid. +So we should have to insert trusteeship in this case also, but the +difference to that in the case of the bonds would be that we won’t +simply pay but leave the decision for payment up to the trusteeship. + +_Funk_: If word of this debate should reach the public, we’d have a run +on the capital market tomorrow. + +_Fischboeck_: That’s why we have postponed these ideas all the time. We +have examples for it that the Jews have sold, head over heel, bonds of +internal loans, shares and everything they had. + +_Goering_: I could stop that with a single decree, ordering the +immediate stoppage of traffic of Jewish capital. He is punishable who +buys from Jews, and his purchase shall be confiscated. I would not do +it any other way. + + + [Part VI is missing] + + + Part VII + +_Frick_: The Ministry of the Interior shall have to take part in it. + +_Goering_: I have said so before. + + (Shout by Goebbels) + +* * * that is a misunderstanding. That is now the committee which is +elaborating on nothing but on this problem which is being tackled. How +are the shares, how are the claims on the debit-ledger to be handled? +Therefore, I shouldn’t like to have anybody else in the Committee, in +order to keep it as small as possible. + +_Buerkel_: Is the plan for the aryanizing to be discussed also? + +_Goering_: Mr. Fischboeck shall bring that up. This place is the crux +of the matter. I hope you have listened properly so that you know +exactly what is to be valid for the Sudetengau! Of course, I too am of +the opinion that these economic measures ought to be strengthened by a +number of Police-action-Propaganda-measures and cultural displays so +that everything shall be fixed now and the Jewry will be slapped this +week right and left. + +_Heydrich_: In spite of the elimination of the Jew from the economic +life, the main problem, namely to kick the Jew out of Germany, remains. +May I make a few proposals to that effect? + +Following a suggestion by the Commissioner of the Reich, we have +set up a center for the Emigration of Jews in Vienna, and that way +we have eliminated 50,000 Jews from Austria while from the Reich +only 19,000 Jews were eliminated during the same period of time; we +were so successful because of the cooperation on the part of the +competent Ministry for Economic Affairs and of the foreign charitable +organizations. + +_Goering_: The main thing is, you cooperated with the local leaders of +the “Green Frontier.” + +_Heydrich_: That amounted to a very small number, your excellency. +Illegal * * * + +_Goering_: This story has gone through the whole world press. During +the first night the Jews were expulsed into Czechoslovakia. The +next morning, the Czechs grabbed them and pushed them into Hungary. +From Hungary, they were returned to Germany and from there into +Czechoslovakia. They traveled around and around that way. They landed +finally on an old Barge in the Danube. There they lived, and wherever +they tried to go ashore, they were barred. + +_Heydrich_: That was the report. There weren’t even 100 Jews. + +_Goering_: For practically two weeks, a number of Jews left every +midnight. That was in the Burgenland. + +_Heydrich_: At least 45,000 Jews were made to leave the country by +legal measures. + +_Goering_: How was that possible? + +_Heydrich_: Through the Jewish Kulturgemeinde, we extracted a certain +amount of money from the rich Jews who wanted to emigrate. By paying +this amount, and an additional sum in foreign currency, they made it +possible for a number of poor Jews to leave. The problem was not to +make the rich Jew leave but to get rid of the Jewish mob. + +_Goering_: But children, did you ever think this through? It doesn’t +help us to extract hundreds of thousands from the Jewish mob. Have you +ever thought of it that this procedure may cost us so much foreign +currency that in the end we won’t be able to hold out. + +_Heydrich_: Only what the Jew has had in foreign currency. + + (Goering: agreed) + +This way. May I propose that we set up a similar procedure for the +Reich, with the cooperation of the competent government agencies, and +that we then find a solution for the Reich, based on our experiences, +after having corrected the mistakes, the General Field Marshall has so +rightly pointed out to us. + + (Goering: agreed) + +As another means of getting the Jews out, measures for Emigration ought +to be taken in the rest of the Reich for the next 8 to 10 years. The +highest number of Jews we can possibly get out during one year is 8,000 +to 10,000. Therefore, a great number of Jews will remain. Because of +the aryanizing and other restrictions, Jewry will become unemployed. +The remaining Jews gradually become proletarians. Therefore, I shall +have to take steps; to isolate the Jew so he won’t enter into the +German normal routine of life. On the other hand, I shall have to +restrict the Jew to a small circle of consumers, but I shall have +to permit certain activities within professions; lawyers, doctors, +barbers, etc. This question shall also have to be examined. + +As for the isolation, I’d like to make a few proposals regarding police +measures which are important also because of their psychological effect +on public opinion. For example, who is Jewish according to the Nurnberg +laws shall have to wear a certain insignia. That is a possibility which +shall facilitate many other things. I don’t see any danger of excuses, +and it shall make our relationship with the foreign Jew easier. + +_Goering_: A uniform? + +_Heydrich_: An insignia. This way we could also put an end to it that +the foreign Jews who don’t look different from ours, are being molested. + +_Goering_: But, my dear Heydrich, you won’t be able to avoid the +creation of ghettos on a very large scale, in all the cities. They +shall have to be created. + +_Heydrich_: As for the question of ghettos, I’d like to make my +position clear right away. From the point of view of the police, I +don’t think a ghetto in the form of completely segregated districts +where only Jews would live, can be put up. We could not control a +ghetto where the Jews congregate amidst the whole Jewish people. It +would remain the permanent hideout for criminals and also for epidemics +and the like. We don’t want to let the Jew live in the same house with +the German population; but today the German population, their blocks or +houses, force the Jew to behave himself. The control of the Jew through +the watchful eye of the whole population is better than having him by +the thousands in a district where I cannot properly establish a control +over his daily life through uniformed agents. + +_Goering_: We’d only have to forbid long-distance calls. + +_Heydrich_: Still I could not completely stop the Jews from +communicating out of their districts. + +_Goering_: And in towns all of their own? + +_Heydrich_: If I could put them into towns entirely their own, yes. But +then these towns would be such a heaven for criminals of all sorts that +they would be a terrific danger. I’d take different steps. I’d restrict +the movement of the Jews and would say; in Munich, the governmental +district and the district + +* * * + +_Goering_: Wait a minute! I don’t care so much for it that the Jews +don’t appear in spots where I don’t want them. My point is this one: +if one Jew won’t have any more work, he’ll have to live modestly. He +won’t be able to go far on his 3½%--to restaurants, etc. He’ll have to +work more. That’ll bring about a concentration of Jewry which may even +facilitate control. You will know that in a particular house only Jews +are living. We shall also have concentrated Jewish butchers, barbers, +grocers, etc., in certain streets. The question is of course whether we +want to go on tolerating that. If not, the Jew shall have to buy from +the Aryan. + +_Heydrich_: No, I’d say that for the necessities in daily life, the +German won’t serve the Jew anymore. + +_Goering_: One moment. You cannot let him starve. But there’ll be the +following difficulty. If you say that the Jews will be able to have +so and so many retail stores, then they’ll again be in business, and +they’ll continually have to sell for the wholesaler. + +_Schmer_: In a small town that wouldn’t work at all. + +_Goering_: It could only be worked out if you’d reserve in advance +whole districts or whole towns for the Jews. Otherwise, you’ll have to +have only Germans do business, and the Jew shall have to buy from them. +You cannot set up a Jewish barbershop. The Jew will have to buy food +and stockings. + +_Heydrich_: We’ll have to decide whether we want that or not. + +_Goering_: I’d like to make a decision on that right now. We cannot +make another subdivision here. We cannot argue: so and so many stores +will remain for the Jew because then again no control will be possible +since these stores in turn would have to work with wholesale stores. +I’d say, all stores should be Aryan stores, and the Jew may buy there. +One may go one step further and say that these and these stores +will probably be frequented mostly by Jews. You may set up certain +barbershops operated by Jews. You may make concessions in order to +channel certain professions into certain streets for certain tasks. But +not stores. + +_Heydrich_: What about the ghetto? Would the Jew have to go to an Aryan +district to buy? + +_Goering_: No. I’d say that enough German storekeepers would love to +dwell in the ghetto if they could do some business there. I wouldn’t +alter the principle that the Jew shall have no more say in German +economy. + +_Heydrich_: I shouldn’t like to comment on that. Now a few things which +are important also from a psychological angle. + +_Goering_: Once we’d have a ghetto, we’d find out what stores ought to +be in there, and we’d be able to say: you, the Jew so and so, together +with so and so, shall take care of the delivery of goods. And a German +wholesale firm will be ordered to deliver the goods for this Jewish +store. This store would then not be a retail shop but a cooperative +store, a cooperative one for Jews. + +_Heydrich_: All these measures would eventually lead to the institution +of the ghetto. I’d say one shouldn’t want to build a ghetto. But these +measures, if carried through as outlined here, shall automatically +drive the Jews into a ghetto. + +_Funk_: The Jews will have to move quite close together. What are +3 million? Everyone will have to stand up for the next fellow. The +individual alone will starve. + +_Goering_: Now, as to what Minister Goebbels has said before, namely +compulsory renting. Now, the Jewish tenants will be together. + +_Heydrich_: As an additional measure, I’d propose to withdraw from +the Jews all personal papers such as permits and driver’s licenses. +No Jew should be allowed to own a car, neither should he be permitted +to drive because that way he’d endanger German life. By not being +permitted to live in certain districts, he should be furthermore +restricted to move about so freely. I’d say the Royal Square in Munich, +the Reichsweihestatte, is not to be entered any more within a certain +radius by Jews. The same would go for establishments of culture, border +fences, military installations. Furthermore, like Minister Dr. Goebbels +has said before, exclusion of the Jews from public theaters, movie +houses, etc. As for cultural activities, I’d like to say this: cultural +activities in holiday resorts may be considered an additional feature, +not absolutely necessary for the individual. Many German Volksgenossen +are unable to improve their health through a stay at a resort town. I +don’t see why the Jew should go to these places at all. + +_Goering_: To health spas, no. + +_Heydrich_: Well, then I’d like to propose the same thing for +hospitals. A Jew shall not lie in a hospital together with Aryan +Volkgenossen. + +_Goering_: We’ll have to manage that gradually. + +_Heydrich_: The same applies to public conveyances. + +_Goering_: Are there no Jewish Sanatoriums and Jewish hospitals? + + (Remarks--Yes!) + +We’ll have to finagle all this. These things will have to be +straightened out one right after another. + +_Heydrich_: I only meant to secure your approval in principle so that +we may start out on all this. + +_Goering_: One more question, gentlemen: What would you think the +situation would be if I’d announce today that Jewry should have to +contribute this 1 billion as a punishment? + +_Buerckel_: The Viennese would agree to this whole-heartedly. + +_Goebbels_: I wonder if the Jews would have a chance to pull out of +this, and to put something on the side. + +_Brinkmann_: They’d be subject to punishment. + +_V. Krosigk_: Mr. Fischboeck, one question: Could this authorization be +ordered without their closing out their securities? + +_Funk_: They are all registered. They’ll also have to register the +money. + +_V. Krosigk_: But for the time being they may dispose of it. + +_Goering_: It won’t help them to cash them all. They can’t get rid of +the money. + +_Funk_: They’ll be the ones to have the damage if they sell their +stocks and bonds. + +_Fischboeck_: There is a certain danger, but I don’t think it is very +great. But only then, when all the other measures shall definitely be +carried out during next week. + +_V. Krosigk_: They have to be taken during the next week at the latest. + +_Goering_: I would make that a condition. + +_Fischboeck_: Maybe it is good that we put ourselves under pressure +this way. + +_Goering_: I shall close the wording this way; that German Jewry shall, +as punishment for their abominable crimes etc., etc., have to make a +contribution of 1 billion. That’ll work. The pigs won’t commit another +murder. Incidentally, I’d like to say again that I would not like to be +a Jew in Germany. + +_V. Krosigk_: Therefore, I’d like to emphasize what Mr. Heydrich has +said in the beginning; that we’ll have to try everything possible, by +way of additional exports, to shove the Jews into foreign countries. +The decisive factor is that we don’t want the society-proletariat here. +They’ll always be a terrific liability for us. + + (Frick: “and a danger!”) + +I don’t imagine the prospect of the ghetto is very nice. The idea of +the ghetto is not a very agreeable one. Therefore, the goal must be, +like Heydrich said, to move out whatever we can! + +_Goering_: The second point is this. If, in the near future, the German +Reich should come into conflict with foreign powers, it goes without +saying that we in Germany should first of all let it come to a showdown +with the Jews. Besides that, the Fuehrer shall now make an attempt with +those foreign powers which have brought the Jewish question up, in +order to solve the Madagascar project. He has explained it all to me +on 9 November. There is no other way. He’ll tell the other countries. +“What are you talking about the Jew for?--Take him!” Another proposal +may be made. The Jews, gotten rid of may buy territory for their +“coreligionists” in North America, Canada, or elsewhere. + +I wish to summarize: The Minister of Economic Affairs shall direct the +committee and he shall in one form or another, take all steps necessary +within the next few days. + +_Blerning_: I fear that during the next few days, beginning Monday, +the Jews will start to sell bonds on internal loans for hundreds of +thousands, in order to provide themselves with means. Since we control +the course of the internal loan in order to sell more bonds, the +Reich-Treasury, Loan-Committee or the Reich Minister for Finance should +have to back this internal loan. + +_Goering_: In what way could the Jew bring his bonds on the market? + + (Remark: “Sell them”) + +To whom? + +(Remark: “on the stock market--he orders a bank to do it.”) + +Well, I’ll prohibit selling internal loan bonds for three days. + +_Blerning_: That could be done only through a decree. + +_Goering_: I can’t see any advantage for the Jew. He won’t know himself +how and he’ll have to pay. On the contrary, I believe he won’t move. + +_Goebbels_: For the time being he is small and ugly and stays at home. + +_Goering_: I don’t think it would be logical. Otherwise we’ll have to +do it. The reason why I want this decree in a hurry is that for the +time being we have peace but who can guarantee that there won’t be new +trouble by Saturday or Sunday. Once and for all I want to eliminate +individual acts. The Reich has taken the affairs in its own hand. The +Jew can only sell. He can’t do a thing. He’ll have to pay. At this +moment, the individual Jew won’t think of throwing anything on the +market. There’ll be some chatter first, and then they will begin to run +to us. They’ll look for those great Aryans with whom, they’ll think +they may have some luck, the so-called various mailboxes of the Reich +with whom they can lodge their protests. These people will run my door +in. All that takes some time, and by then we’ll be ready. + +_Daluege_: May we issue the order for confiscating the cars? + +_Goering_: Also the Ministry of the Interior and the Police will have +to think over, what measures will have to be taken. I thank you. + + [Conference closed at 2.40 PM] + + + PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1817-PS + + ORGANIZATION BOOK OF THE NSDAP, 1936 EDITION + + The Reich Organization Leader of the NSDAP, published by the Central + Publishing House of the NSDAP, Franz Eher Successor, Munich. Page 211. + + + BUREAU FOR FACTORY TROOPS [AMT WERKSCHAREN] + +I. _TASK_: + +The factory troops in the National Socialist Community “Strength +through Joy” [NS--Gemeinschaft “Kraft durch Freude”] carry out the +following tasks: + +1. To help and come to the rescue, in their capacity as a young factory +guard, whenever there is a question of bringing the German working man +strength through joy. + +2. Shaping of factory celebrations and festivals in order to permeate +the factories with National Socialist ideology and philosophy, with +special regard to the creation of a new ritual. + +3. To be an ideological shock squad [Weltanschaulicher Stosstrupp] +within the factory. + + + PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1818-PS + + ORGANIZATION BOOK OF THE NSDAP, 1940 EDITION + + The Reich Organization Leader of the NSDAP [Dr. Robert Ley] published + by the Central Publishing House of the NSDAP, Franz Eher Successor, + Munich. Pages 195-196b. + + + BUREAU FOR FACTORY TROOPS AND TRAINING + +The Bureau of Factory Troops and Training [Werkschar und Schulung] +is simultaneously a Bureau under the jurisdiction of the Reich +Organization Leader of the NSDAP--Main Training Bureau. + +* * * * * * * + +The education and training of the Bureau of Factory Troops and Training +has in mind the totality of the tasks of the NSDAP and of the German +labor front. It comprises political shaping of the will, and conveying +trade knowledge, and includes the whole labor policy on an ideological +basis, character education, and creation of a soldierly attitude +[Soldatisch-haltungsmaessige Ausrichtung]. + +It is the aim of the German labor front training to enable the factory +troops and the German labor front functionaries to lead the workers of +the German people, and thereby to render real the National Socialist +community of factory, accomplishment and people. + +* * * * * * * + + + THE FACTORY TROOPS OF THE GERMAN LABOR FRONT IN THE FACTORY + +Regulations for its building: + +The Factory Troop as an organization exists only in the factory. It is +the nucleus of the factory community. + +The Factory Troops Leader: + +The confirmed factory chairman [Betriebsobmann] of the German Labor +Front leads, under the same title, the Factory Troops of the factory. +For training and commitment of the shock squad [Stosstrupp] the factory +chairman deputizes a shock squad leader [Stosstruppfuehrer]. + +Membership in the Factory Troops: + +Membership in the Factory Troops is voluntary and it presupposes +readiness to fight for a National Socialist conception of work and for +a German worker’s community. + +* * * * * * * + + + TASK OF THE FACTORY TROOPS + +Under the leadership of the factory chairman, it is the task of the +Factory Troops to guarantee, under all circumstances and by all means, +the political security and readiness of the factory to commit itself. + +Not through words and speeches alone, but primarily through their +example, the Factory Troops shall convince the community of their +fellow-workers of the justice of the National Socialist will, and +educate them to utmost effort, to highest accomplishments, and to most +extreme devotion. + +It must remain the aim of the Factory Troops to fuse the factory into +a closely-meshed, single-willed community capable of the highest +accomplishments for the people and the Reich. Commitment: + +Directives and regulations for physical coordination, commitment +and utilization of the Factory Troops are issued by the Reich +Organizational Leader, or on his behalf by the head of the Central +bureau, or the German Labor Front chairmen of district [Gau] county +[Kreis] and locality [Ort], so far as it is not a question of Factory +Troops tasks falling within the professional sphere of activity of the +factory. + +The competent regional chairmen (district, county and locality) are +solely responsible for the over-all commitment of the Factory Troops. + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1822-PS + + +[Item 1] + +1. Letter of the Fuehrer with wording of 25 August 1939 transmitted to +me by telephone from the Reich Labor Ministry. + +2. Telegram No. 370 of 25 August 1939 concerning transmittal of +Fuehrer’s letter to Duce. + +3. Second letter of Fuehrer to Duce, dated 25 August 1939 transmitted +by telephone by the Reich Labor Ministry to the Ambassador. + +4. Tel. No. 371 of 25 August 1939 concerning transmission of second +letter of Fuehrer. + +5. Note of Envoy von Plessen concerning telephone call from Berlin, +dealing with alleged contradiction between telegram 370 and a letter +transmitted by Ambassador Attolico in Berlin. + +6. Note of 26 August 1939 on same subject. + +7. Letter of Duce to Fuehrer of 26 August, transmitted at 1210 hours by +telephone in Berlin by Count Ciano to Attolico. + + # # # # # + +[Item 2] + + Rome, August 25, 1939. + + Embassy Courier (Btsch./Kr.) + + Telegram in code (Secret Ch. V.) + + (Valid) + + Foreign Affairs + _Berlin_ + + Citissime + + No. 370 of 25 August Top Secret + To: The Minister of Foreign Affairs. + Subject: Today’s Telephonic Instructions. + V. 1. Encoding: Fink/Grade/Haupmann. + 2. Dispatched: Krueger/Limberg/Zimmerm. + 3. To me dispatched in sections (last one at 11 p. m.) + [Illegible notations] + +I have personally handed on to the Duce in the Palazzo Venezia at 1520 +o’clock in the presence of Ciano the contents of today’s letter of +the Fuehrer conveyed here by telephone. The Duce, who was possessed +of great calmness, at first, read the letter through entirely, and +then went over it, with me sentence for sentence, at which time, +he translated the sentences into Italian for Ciano, who is not +conversant with German, and, in fact, as I was able to convince myself, +completely, correctly, and true to the meanings. + +Among this comments upon the individual themes, I shall single out the +following: + +He was entirely satisfied with the non-aggression pact with Moscow. +He, himself, already in the Spring had offered such a suggestion to +Field Marshal Goering, pointing out, indeed, at this juncture, the need +of adopting a moderate attitude, since our two nations, who for ten +years on account of ideological reasons have been oriented for a fight +against Moscow, must have the time needed for a readjustment. In spite +of the suggestion made at that time, he, himself, is and remains an +implacable anticommunist. + +(Here I interrupted with the view that the German position against +communism self-evidently remains entirely unchanged and that in regard +to this fact Moscow has never been left in doubt.) + +The comment in the letter concerning the attitude of the Japanese +Cabinet he regarded as being correct. The fault lies with the Japanese +Ministry of the Navy, which is opposed to adopting an unambiguous +position against England. + +The reaction he also expects the pact with Moscow to have upon Rumania +appeared to be of most lively interest to him. Consideration for +Bessarabia would paralyze Rumania’s freedom of movement in favor of +Poland in the case of conflict. Thus Rumania would be left to the +Hungarians. + +With an approving nod of the head he agreed that Turkey would now have +to revise its attitude. + +He described the worsening of German-Polish relations as so acute that +an armed conflict can no longer be avoided. The moment to consider +possibilities of preventing the conflict has now passed, because +the Polish mentality--supported by England’s attitude--is no longer +responsive to reasonable suggestions, no matter from which side they +might come. Otherwise he might have imagined that the Poles would have +sought, for example, immediate reapproachment with Germany, if they +correctly appreciated the danger threatening their existence; and, to +prove clearly their willingness to negotiate, they would first of all +have given Danzig to Hitler, without reservations and without any talks +on negotiations. Then one might have considered the removal of further +reasons for discord--he cited the Polish Corridor and Silesia--by means +of direct German-Polish talks; in his opinion that would have been +possible. Finally, a general conference might have followed in order +to solve the other big controversial questions--points of differences +between Italy and France, German colonies, distribution of raw +materials, armament questions. This would have assured European peace +for 15-20 years, as is desired by all. Such considerations, however, +are outdated by the precipitous course of events. He had now adjusted +himself to the fact that the outbreak of a general conflagration is +not only unavoidable but immediately imminent. The question of the +exact date interested him most, and he wanted to know whether I could +tell him more about that. I answered the question by pointing out the +corresponding places in the letter. He seemed to realize that nothing +more could be said at the moment by anybody. But he emphasized that +he attached much value, for obvious reasons, to the fact that he +should be informed as fast as possible. But in view of the speed of +the developments he understood the difficulties of such notification. +Finally, he stated again that he would have preferred open conflict +2 to 3 years hence and gave his reasons. And he believed the reasons +also applied to us, especially in view of the condition of our fleet. +However, developments are now forcing us in another direction. In any +case, he expressly emphasized, he is with us, unconditionally and with +everything. + +At the end of the talk he made comments about the prospects of an armed +German-Polish conflict which should be decided in our favor by our army +in a very short time. + +Ciano, who led me out after I took leave of the Duce, summarized +his impressions of the situation by saying that any discussion over +possibilities to keep the peace was outdistanced by the course of +events. No longer the word “peace,” but “victory” would govern his +action. + + Mackensen + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1823-PS + + Telegram in Cipher (Good) + Sent Berlin 27 Aug 1939 00-32 hours + Rec Rome same day 02-25 + Rec Embassy 27 Aug 1939 03-40 + + Deciphering Nr. 403 of 26 Aug 1939 + + [illegible pencil mark] For Chief of Agency personally. Sealed + matter. Decipher personally. Strictly secret. To Ambassador v. + Mackensen personally. + +The Reich Minister requests that the following reply of the Fuehrer be +forwarded to the Duce immediately. + + Duce! + +I have received the information concerning your final attitude. I +respect the motives and influences determining your resolution. Perhaps +it will nevertheless be for the best. Of course, in my opinion, +this will be true only if the world does not receive any inkling of +the intended attitude of Italy, at least not till actual fighting +starts. For this reason I beg you heartily to support my struggle +psychologically in your press and any other means. I also beg of you, +Duce, if it is possible for you to force at least England and France to +immobilize certain parts of their strength, by demonstrative military +actions, or to keep them in any case, in a state of uncertainty. But +the most important thing is this, Duce: should, as mentioned, the big +war start, the situation in the East will be solved, before the two +Western powers can achieve any success. This winter or at the latest by +spring I intend to deploy in the West forces at least equal to those of +France and England. The blockade will be of little effect, especially +under the altered circumstances in the East and as a result of my +autarchic preparations. Its danger during the progress of war will not +increase but decrease. Now I have a big favor to ask you, Duce. You and +your people could help me most in this hard struggle by supporting me +with Italian manpower, manpower for industrial as well as agricultural +purposes. Should you later on in the course of developments be forced +or be in a position to intervene, the intensified autarchic basis of +the Reich would be of the utmost importance to you. In reiterating my +entreaty for the granting of this special favor, I wish to thank you +for all the efforts you have made in our common cause. + + Adolf Hitler + +End of Letter: Schmidt. + + # # # # # + + COPY + +Letter of the Fuehrer transmitted telegraphically to his Excellency +Ambassador v. Mackensen, received at 3:40 o’clock, 27 August 1939, for +immediate delivery to Il Duce. + + DUCE! + + [Text of message the same as above]. + + + PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1828-PS + + Extract from Memorandum Handed to German Foreign Office by Count + Magistrati, forwarded by von Weizacker to Ambassador von Mackensen in + Rome 7 August 1939. + +2. * * * Above all it must be most _clearly_ and _unmistakably_ stated +that when the Fuehrer decides that the opportune time to start a war +has come, Italy is ready to agree a _hundred percent_. If Germany has +to mobilize, Italy will also do so _at the same time_, since it intends +to meet its obligations fully and with all its forces. As said already +before, this should be _clearly_ understood. * * * + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1831-PS + +BTSCH/KR + + NOTE + +On behalf of the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs, VLR Kordt calls +at 11:15 with the information that two telegrams, numbered 439 and 440 +are on the way to me. The Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs requests +that I should get in touch with the postal authorities to have these +telegrams delivered to me with the greatest possible speed. They +contained the text of two letters by the Fuehrer to the Duce, but I +was to keep this information to myself. I was to hand these to the +Duce personally as quickly as possible. When I asked when were the +telegrams sent off and how long they were which I had to know in order +to estimate for when to make an appointment with the Duce, Mr. Kordt +stated that until then only No. 439 had been sent off at 10:30, whereas +No. 440 was still being in the process of coding. One of the telegrams +was about half a page long, the other, two. I told Mr. Kordt that I +would take the necessary steps, but that I had to point out already now +that one should not entertain any false hopes as to the time that would +elapse. + +At 11:50 the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs calls me up from the +Reich Chancellery personally and requests me to have the Fuehrer’s +two letters to the Duce received immediately by telephone, as their +transmission by telegraph would presumably take too long and then +to deliver the letters to the Duce with greatest speed. Then the +telephonic transmission of the text of the two telegrams followed +immediately. + +Immediately afterwards VLR Kordt called me and told me that he had just +transmitted to us the Fuehrer’s two letters to the Duce by telephone. +Referring to our previous telephone conversation he asked me to take +the further steps. I answered that meanwhile the Minister for Foreign +Affairs has called me personally and that I had already received +the text of the letters over the telephone through another line. We +ascertained together that thus the text of these letters has arrived +here over three routes. + +At 12:15, I informed the office RM by telephone that the Duce would +receive me at 1 o’clock. + +After the audience with the Duce, I informed by telephone the Office RM +at 1:50 about the delivery of the letters, adding that a telegram about +my conversation with the Duce would be sent immediately. + +ROME, 1 September 1939 + + (Signed) Mackensen + + # # # # # + + Coded Telegram (Copy) + + From Berlin: 3 September 1939, 2:50 hours + Arr. Rome: 3 September 1939, 3:00 hours. + Arr. Embassy: 3 September 1939, 6:30 hours + + DECODING + + No. 450 dated 2 September 1939. + For High Officials or their representatives in person. + Top Secret. To be decoded in person. + Top Secret. + For the Chief of the Mission for personal and confidential + information. + +The Italian Ambassador handed to the State Secretary at the Duce’s +order following copy for the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor and for The +Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs: + +Italy sends the information, leaving, of course, every decision to the +Fuehrer, that it still has a chance to call a conference with France, +England and Poland on following basis: 1. Armistice which would leave +the Army Corps where they are at present. 2. Calling the conference +within 2-3 days. 3. Solution of the Polish-German controversy which +would be certainly favorable for Germany as matters stand today. + +This idea which originated from the Duce has its foremost exponent in +France. + +Danzig is already German and Germany is holding already securities +which guarantee most of her demands. Besides, Germany has had already +its “moral satisfaction.” If it would accept the plan for a conference, +it will achieve all her aims and at the same time prevent a war which +already today has the aspect of being universal and of extremely long +duration. + +Duce does not insist on it, but he lays particular emphasis that above +should be brought to the immediate attention of von Ribbentrop and of +the Fuehrer. + +End of Copy + +The answer to the Italian Ambassador was promised by 3 September. + + Woermann + + # # # # # + + Telegram Heading in Italian + 773 S Berlin AW1/2 977 630/626 3/9 2051 Etat--459 + + For the Ambassador + +I request that the following message from the Fuehrer be forwarded to +the Duce personally: + +Duce + +I first want to thank you for your last attempt at a mediation. I would +have been ready to accept, but only under condition, that there would +be a possibility to give me certain guarantees that the conference +would be successful. Because, for the last two days the German troops +are engaged in an extraordinarily rapid advance in Poland. It would +have been impossible to devaluate the bloody sacrifices made thereby +by diplomatic intrigues. Nevertheless, I believe that a way could have +been found, if England would not have been determined to wage war +under all circumstances. I have not given in to the English, because, +Duce, I do not believe that peace could have been maintained for more +than ½ year or 1 year. Under these circumstances, I thought that, in +spite of everything, the present moment was better for resistance. At +present, the superiority of the German armed forces in Poland is too +overwhelming in all fields that the Polish Army will collapse in a very +short time. I doubt whether this fast success could be achieved in one +or two years. England and France would have armed their allies to +such an extent that the crushing technical superiority of the German +armed forces could not have become so apparent anymore. I am aware, +Duce, that the fight which I enter, is one for life and death. My own +fate does not play any role in it at all. But I am also aware that one +cannot avoid such a struggle permanently and that one has to choose +after cold deliberation the moment for resistance in such a way that +the probability of the success is guaranteed and I believe in this +success, Duce, with the firmness of a vouch. Recently you have given +me the kind assurance that you think you will be able to help me in a +few fields. I acknowledge this in advance with sincere thanks. But I +believe also--even if we march now over different roads--that fate will +finally join us. If the National Socialistic Germany were destroyed by +the Western democracies, the Fascist Italy would also have to face a +grave future. I was personally always aware of this community of the +future of our two governments and I know that you, Duce, think the same +way. To the situation in Poland, I would like to make the brief remark +that we lay aside, of course, all unimportant things, that we do not +waste any man in unimportant tasks, but direct all on acts in the light +of great operational considerations. The Northern Polish Army which is +the Corridor, has already been completely encircled by our action. It +will be either wiped out or will surrender. Otherwise, all operations +proceed according to plan. The daily achievements of the troops are far +beyond all expectations. The superiority of our air force is complete, +although scarcely one third of it is in Poland. In the West I will +be on the defensive. France can here sacrifice its blood first. Then +the moment will come when we can confront the enemy also there with +the full power of the nation. Accept my thanks, Duce, for all your +assistance which you have given to me in the past and I ask you not to +deny it to me in the future. + + (Signed) Adolf Hitler + +End of message. Cable report is requested + + Ribbentrop + + # # # # # + + Rome, 4 September 1939 + Foreign Berlin + No. 418 of 4 September 1939 + Telegram, secret code procedure (good) + + CITISSIME to telegram No. 495 of 3rd of this month and in connection + with telegram No. 414 of 3 September. + + + TOP SECRET + +Duce remarked during the presentation of the Fuehrer’s message, which +took place in Ciano’s presence at 0940, that he would forward his view +point by letter. He explained somewhat as follows, during the ensuing +conversation of a half an hour: they never had considered in the +least to let himself be used in an action of arbitration, which had +as prerequisite the withdrawal of German troops. No man on earth can +seriously consider the thought as worthy of discussion, to make such +an offer to troops, which, furthermore, are advancing successfully. +He refused such ideas with actual indignation, also he would not +consider the “symbolic withdrawal” suggested by Paris. In view of the +strong appeal by France to make one last attempt, he had forwarded the +suggestion under the self-evidence supposition, that the remaining of +the army corps, where it should be a prerequisite. In this case, if we +had considered the agreement of the Fuehrer to the suggestion possible, +he would perhaps even have advised it. However, England, which is +guilty for the entire development of the German-Polish conflict, did +apparently not want to let it come to a compromise. He seemed to know, +that the Polish Ambassador in London still exercised in the last +minutes a decisive influence on the position at the British Cabinet. +The declaration by England, which brought about the stage of war, and +which France followed up the last, only hesitantly, is absolutely +“diotic,” brought about by people who apparently have never even +studied a map. For what form should such a war take? It can only be +waged on water, on land or in the air. Breaking out of the Maginot Line +on land, over-running of the West Wall would be a hopeless undertaking, +which will hardly be attempted by the French. Even if our fleet is +modest, in any case the Navy cannot undertake anything decisive. The +air force would attempt to drop a few bombs, maybe it would destroy +this and that installation, but even that has nothing to do with the +decision, especially if we limit ourselves in the air as well to the +defensive. In brief, the declaration of war is an absolutely absurd +undertaking, because the only thing actually left would be the war of +attrition and that would also be harmful to the one who declares it. + +If the Fuehrer’s message says that the Fuehrer and the Duce “would +now go separate ways”, he is of an entirely different opinion. On +the contrary, the most complete agreement in respect to methods and +goal prevails, and especially militarily, he has done everything to +the last, what the Fuehrer desired of him, and he continues his +preparation most intensively. In Lybya, the critical month for him is +September, after which even there, he will be armed for a successful +defense. Already today, he ties down 400,000 men of the opponent by +his measures on the Alpine frontier and in Africa. He will send to +the Fuehrer, via the military attaché (who is invited this evening to +the home of Gen. Pariani) all the details of his military measures +with appropriate carbo-graphic material, which he also showed me and +explained most thoroughly. I can leave the reporting on this to the +military attaché. I only wish to emphasize the Duce’s remark, that the +mobilization measures did not only pass without any friction, but also +that the spirit of those conscripted and of their families, thanks to +the generous subsidy allotted to them, is excellent. + +At the end, the Duce repeated his assurance of every assistance desired +by us, particularly, in the question of workers and (on a suggestion of +mine) by the press. + +Duce was in a confidential mood. + + /s/ MACKENSEN. + + + PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1832-PS + +The Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs called me on the telephone at +2200 hours from the Reich Chancellery and reported as follows: + +According to authentic information, the rumors spreading in Rome, +by way of the Italian embassy in Berlin, that a relaxation of the +situation is to be noted and that conferences are being held. We wanted +to state on the contrary, that just the opposite is true and that +the situation is getting more serious from hour to hour. “The Armies +are marching”. It would be good if I would see to it that the rumor +mentioned above should not be believed by the Duce and Ciano. + + Rome, 27 August 1939. + + to the notice of: Mackensen + + 1. B. R. [initialed] + 2. Military attaché [initialed] + 3. Naval attaché [initialed] + 4. Air attaché [initialed] + 5. to be returned to me. + Rome, 27 August 1939. + [initialed] + + + PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1834-PS + + FOREIGN OFFICE + RAM NO. 56/R + + Berlin, 2 March 1941 + + STRICTLY SECRET + + Personal + +In the inclosure is forwarded, for strictly confidential and purely +personal information, an extract of a report on my conference with the +new Japanese Ambassador Oshima in Fuschl on 23 February 1941. These +statements are of fundamental significance for orientation on the +general political situation facing Germany in early Spring 1941. + + Signed: Ribbentrop + + To: The German Embassy in + Ankara + Madrid + Moscow + Rome (_Quir._) + Rome (Vat.) + + The German Legation in + Athens + Belgrade + Bern + Budapest + Bukarest + Helsinki + Lisbon + Pressburg (Bratislava) + Sofia + Stockholm + one each + + # # # # # + + 65215 + + Enclosure + To RAM No. 56/R + +STRICTLY SECRET + +Extract from the report of the conference of the Reich Foreign Minister + with Ambassador Oshima in Fuschl on 13 February 1941 + +After particularly cordial mutual greetings, the RAM (Reich Foreign +Minister) declared that Ambassador Oshima had been proved right in +the policy he had pursued regarding Germany in the face of the many +doubters in Japan. By Germany’s victory in the west these policies had +been fully vindicated. He (the RAM) regretted that the alliance between +Germany and Japan, for which he had been working with the Ambassador +for many years already, had come into being only after various detours, +but public opinion in Japan had not been ripe for it earlier. The main +thing was, however, that they are together now. + +Expanding upon the general political situation the Reich Foreign +Minister declared: The Fuehrer had always looked for an understanding +with England and he (RAM) had himself been sent to England as an +ambassador in his time to undertake a last attempt in this direction. +A certain possibility had existed in the person of King Edward, even +though it had been doubtful from the beginning whether the king would +prevail. He (the RAM) had been more than skeptical already at his +arrival in London, and had considered the chances for an understanding +as 100 to 1. Thus the war-inciter clique in England had then won the +upper hand. When he (the RAM) left England, _war was unavoidable_. Then +when it came to war the Fuehrer decided on a _treaty with Russia_--a +necessity for _avoiding a two-front war_. Perhaps this moment was +difficult for Japan. The treaty was, however, in the interest of Japan, +for the Japanese empire was interested in as rapid a German victory +as possible, which was assured by the treaty with Russia. Furthermore +he (the RAM) had made it clear to Stalin as well as to the public +that the treaty between the Reich and Russia in no way affected the +German-Japanese relationship. Now the _German-Japanese alliance_ has +been concluded. Ambassador Oshima is the man who gets credit for it +from the Japanese side. After conclusion of the alliance the question +of its further _development_ now stands in the foreground. How is the +situation in this respect? + +* * * * * * * + +As for the war against _England_, we had poor weather for our bombers +during the Fall and Winter to be sure, but in spite of this, heavy +damage has been done which has had a strongly retarding effect on +English war production, etc. The bombings would continue in increasing +measure so that we hope to destroy very much more than America was able +to replace. We now had air supremacy over the whole continent. The time +when we should win air supremacy over England would depend on further +developments. + +At sea the commitment of U-boat weapon had thus far been comparatively +slight; after the end of March the commitment of the U-boat weapon +would multiply in a short time. Then with the combination Air +Force-U-Boat weapon we would deal terrible blows to England. The loss +of tonnage already was making considerable difficulties for the +English food supply. Meat and fats were already scarce. It was now a +matter of reducing imports by sinking to a definite level below the +absolute minimum for English existence. Thereby England’s situation +would take catastrophic shape overnight. The landing in England is +prepared; its execution, however, depends on various factors, above all +on weather conditions. + +Concerning _America_, the Reich Foreign Minister went on, it must be +noted that Roosevelt is the most bitter enemy of Germany and Japan. As +far as he was concerned he would like to enter the war. However we have +an interest in keeping America out of the war. Should America enter +the war in spite of this it could not wage the war militarily at all. +The vast spaces of the oceans lying between us and America made this +impossible. In East Asia, America would hardly dare to send its fleet +beyond Hawaii, as it would then be threatened with destruction by the +Japanese fleet. In the Atlantic Ocean there is a lack of commitment +possibilities with the exception of England. Landing in Europe is +impossible, and Africa also is too far removed. Supply points for the +fleet and land troops are lacking. This points to the creation of +American air bases in England for practical purposes. But in an air war +we are located in a strategically advantageous position with respect to +England. We could bomb England concentrically from the broad basis of +the European coast while England had to spread out in fanlike fashion +in its attacks on Europe and must thereby split up its forces. In an +air duel--Europe vs. England--Germany would always be superior. We +believed, however, that it should be possible to keep America out of +the war by skillfully coordinated politics of the allied powers. + +The Fuehrer would beat England wherever he would encounter her. +Besides our strength is not only equal, but superior to a combined +English-American air force at any time. The number of pilots at our +disposal was unlimited. The same was true for our airplane production +capacity. As far as quality is concerned ours was always superior to +the English (to say nothing about the American) and we were on the way +even to enlarge this lead. By order of the Fuehrer the anti-aircraft +defense too would be greatly reinforced. Since the army had been +supplied far beyond its requirements, and enormous reserves had been +piled up (the ammunitions plants have been slowed down because of the +immense stock of material), production would now be concentrated on +submarines, airplanes and anti-aircraft guns. + +Every eventuality had been provided for; the war has been won today +militarily, economically and politically. We had the desire to end the +war quickly and to force England to sue for peace soon. The Fuehrer +was vigorous and healthy, fully convinced of victory and determined +to bring the war to a quick and victorious end. To this end the +cooperation with Japan was of importance. However, Japan, in its own +interest, should come in as soon as possible. This would destroy +England’s key position in the Far East. Japan, on the other hand, would +thus secure its position in the Far East, a position which it could +acquire only through war. There were three reasons for quick action: + +1. Intervention by Japan would mean a decisive blow against the center +of the British Empire (threat to India, cruiser-warfare, etc.). The +effect upon the morale of the British people would be very serious and +this would contribute toward a quick ending of the war. + +2. A surprising intervention by Japan was bound to keep America out +of the war. America, which at present is not armed as yet and would +hesitate greatly to expose her Navy to any risks West of Hawaii, could +do this even less so in such a case. If Japan would otherwise respect +the American interests, there would not even be the possibility for +Roosevelt to use the argument of lost prestige to make war plausible +to the Americans. It was very unlikely that America would declare war +if it then would have to stand by helplessly while Japan takes the +Philippines without America being able to do anything about it. + +3. In view of the coming new world order it seems to be in the +interest of Japan also, to secure for herself already during the war +the position she wants to hold in the Far East at the time of a peace +treaty. Ambassador Oshima agreed with me entirely and said that he +would do everything to carry through this policy. + +The Reich Foreign Minister mentioned further that, if America should +declare war because of Japan’s entry into the war, this would mean that +America had had the intention to enter the war sooner or later anyway. +Even though it would be preferable to avoid this, the entry into the +war would, as explained above, be by no means decisive and would not +endanger the final victory of the countries of the Three-Power Pact. +The Foreign Minister further expressed his belief that a temporary lift +of the British morale caused by America’s entry into the war would be +cancelled by Japan’s entry into the war. If, however, contrary to all +expectations, the Americans should be careless enough to send their +Navy in spite of all, beyond Hawaii and to the Far East, this would +represent the biggest chance for the countries of the Three-Power +Pact to bring the war rapidly to an end. He, the Foreign Minister, +is convinced that the Japanese fleet would then do a complete job. +Ambassador Oshima replied to this, that, unfortunately he does not +think the Americans would do it, but he is convinced of a victory of +his fleet in Japanese waters. + +The Minister for Foreign Affairs further explained that closest +cooperation was required for the common waging of the war, particularly +as far as intelligence service and press were concerned. The +cooperation with the Italians is already exemplary; the same is true +for the cooperation with Rumania, Hungary and Slovakia. The press, +radio, etc. of these countries were already so synchronized with each +other that they form one single weapon. The same kind of close contact +must be established with Japan. The Ambassador welcomed this and +intends to set up a program with our men determining how our Japanese +propaganda can be most effectively intensified in all fields. + +Ambassador Oshima explained that when the Three-Power Pact was +concluded, various opinions were still present in Japan. It was then +that the Emperor intervened with an edict. It must be stated, however, +that, impressed by the German victory in the West, the Japanese people +are now entirely for the Three-Power Pact. + +Ambassador Oshima remarked further that in Japan, under the +influence of the events, the hard feelings against America had risen +considerably. The Reich Foreign Minister referred to the recent +statement of Nomura, the Japanese Ambassador in the U.S.A., concerning +Japan’s attitude in case of America’s entry into the war, and mentioned +that he considered it appropriate to talk plain language with the +U.S.A. Ambassador Oshima remarked hereto that the Japanese Ministry of +Foreign Affairs had given instructions to that effect. The Minister for +Foreign Affairs pointed out that particularly in view of the desire +to keep America out of the war, plain language must be used. Only if +the U. S. realized that they were confronting firm determination, +would they hold back. The people in the U. S. did not like National +Socialism. However, they were not willing to sacrifice their sons and +therefore were against an entry into the war. The American people felt +instinctively that they were drawn into the war for no reason, by +Roosevelt and the Jewish wire-pullers. Therefore, our politics with +the U. S. should be plain and firm, but, of course, not aggressive. In +the U. S. they must realize that Germany, Italy and Japan had no hard +feelings for the American people, but that should the U.S.A. have any +aggressive desires, they would confront an iron front of determined +people, a front, at that, which includes practically the whole world. +One would therefore have to work in close cooperation against the +attempts of misrepresentation by the British propaganda. As far as +speeches and addresses of a principle nature are concerned it would be +necessary to keep up a continuous exchange of ideas. In this connection +the Minister for Foreign Affairs referred to a recent remark by +Matsuoka concerning Japanese willingness to act as mediator for peace +negotiations. This remark had been extensively exploited by the enemy +propaganda. + +The Reich Foreign Minister continued by saying that it was Japan’s +friendship which had enabled Germany to arm after the Anti-Comintern +Pact was concluded. On the other hand, Japan had been able to penetrate +deeply into the English sphere of interest in China. Germany’s victory +on the continent has brought now, after the conclusion of the Three +Power Pact, great advantages for Japan. France, as a power, was +eliminated in the Far East (Indochina). England too was considerably +weakened, Japan had been able to close in steadily on Singapore. Thus, +Germany had already contributed enormously to the shaping of the future +fate of the two nations. Due to our geographical situation we should +have to carry the main burden of the final battle in the future, too. +If an unwanted conflict with Russia should arise we should have to +carry the main burden also in this case. If Germany should ever weaken, +Japan would find itself confronted by a world-coalition within a short +time. We were all in the same boat. The fate of both nations was being +determined now for centuries to come. The same was true for Italy. The +interests of the three countries would never intersect. A defeat of +Germany would also mean the end of the Japanese imperialistic idea. + +Ambassador Oshima definitely agreed with these statements and +emphasized the fact that Japan was determined to keep its imperial +position. The Reich Foreign Minister then discussed the great problems +which would arise after the war for the parties of the Three Power +Pact from the shaping of a new order in Europe and East Asia. The +problems arising then would require a bold solution. Thereby no +overcentralization should take place, but a solution should be found +on a basis of parity, particularly in the economic realm. In regard +to this the Reich Foreign Minister advanced the principle that a +free exchange of trade should take place between the two spheres of +interest on a liberal basis. The European-African hemisphere under the +leadership of Germany and Italy, and the East-Asian sphere of interest +under the leadership of Japan. As he conceived it, for example, Japan +would conduct trade and make trade agreements directly with the +independent states in the European hemisphere, as heretofore, while +Germany and Italy would trade directly and make trade agreements with +the independent countries within the Japanese orbit of power, such +as China, Thailand, Indochina, etc. Furthermore, as between the two +economic spheres, each should fundamentally grant the other preferences +with regard to third parties. The Ambassador expressed agreement with +this thought. + +The Reich Foreign Minister then touched upon the question, explicitly +pointed out as theoretical, that the contracting powers might be +required, on the basis of new affronts by the U.S.A., to break off +diplomatic relations. Germany and Italy were fundamentally determined +on this; after signing of the Three-Power Pact we should proceed if +the occasion arises, but also jointly in this matter. Such a lesson +should open the eyes of the people in the U.S.A. to the situation +and under certain conditions bring about a swing toward isolation in +public opinion. Naturally a situation had to be chosen in which America +found herself entirely in the wrong. The common step of the signatory +powers should be exploited correspondingly in propaganda. The question, +however, was in no way acute at the time. + +* * * * * * * + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1835-PS + +Urgent. To Ambassador: + + Fuehrer and RAM request you immediately to transmit the following + letter by Fuehrer to Duce. + +Report execution. + +Berlin, 28.3.41. 0,5 - + +Duce, events force me to give you, Duce, by this quickest means, my +estimation of the situation and the consequences which may result from +it. + +1. From the beginning, I have regarded Yugoslavia as a dangerous factor +in the controversy with Greece. Considered from the purely military +point of view, German intervention in the war in Thrace would not be at +all justified, as long as the attitude of Yugoslavia remains ambiguous +and she could threaten the left flank of the advancing columns, on our +enormous front. + +2. For this reason, I’ve done everything and honestly have endeavored +to bring Yugoslavia into our community bound together by mutual +interests. Unfortunately these endeavors did not meet with success, +or they were begun too late to produce any definite result. Today’s +reports leave no doubt as to the imminent turn in the foreign policy of +Yugoslavia. + +3. I don’t consider this situation as being catastrophic but +nevertheless a difficult one, and we, on our part, must avoid any +mistake if we do not want, in the end, to endanger our whole position. + +4. Therefore, I have already arranged for all necessary measures in +order to meet a critical development with necessary military means. +The change in the deployment of our troops has been ordered also in +Bulgaria. Now I would cordially request you, Duce, not to undertake +any further operations in Albania in the course of the next few days. +I consider it necessary that you should cover and screen the most +important passes from Yugoslavia into Albania with all available force. + +These measures should not be considered as designed for a long period +of time but as auxiliary measures designed to prevent for at least +fourteen days to three weeks a crisis arising. + +I also consider it necessary, Duce, that you should reinforce your +forces on the Italian-Yugoslav front with all available means and with +utmost speed. + +5. I also consider it necessary, Duce, that everything which we do and +order be shrouded in absolute secrecy and that only personalities who +necessarily must be notified, know anything about them. These measures +will completely lose their value should they become known. + +6. Today I called in the Bulgarian and the Hungarian ministers and +outlined to them my thoughts on the situation and, with view to +military developments, to arouse their interest by explaining to both +of them, the negative and positive effects which would arise for +them in this case. Since without the aid of Hungary and Bulgaria, +operations, Duce, cannot develop with the swiftness which might be +necessary under the circumstances. + +If possibly in the course of tomorrow, I will inform you, Duce, more +thoroughly about all this. + +7. Therefore, General von Rintelen will report to you, Duce, tomorrow +if the weather is suitable for flying and will tell you the military +dispositions which are being prepared, and which we shall carry out. + +Duce, should secrecy be observed as to these measures, then in case +action on our part should become necessary, I have no doubt that we +will both achieve a success no less than the success in Norway a year +ago. This is my unshaken conviction. + +Accept my heartfelt and friendly greetings. Yours. + + (Signed) Adolf Hitler + +End of letter, Bureau of Minister. + +With the directive that Ambassador Mackensen transmit this letter +tonight to Duce. + + Howel 27.3.41 2400 + + + PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1842-PS + + Notes on the discussion of the Reich Foreign Minister Von Ribbentrop +with the Duce in the presence of Count Ciano as well as the ambassadors + von Mackensen and Alfieri, in Rome on the 19th September 1940. + +* * * * * * * + +All the same, Germany had won air superiority, and was bombing England, +and particularly London, by day and by night, whilst the British +were at most sending a few planes over Germany at night, in order to +drop bombs there at random. During the day no British plane dared to +fly over German territory. Germany, however, was carrying out strong +reprisal attacks by day as well as by night. On one occasion the German +Luftwaffe had been ready for a large scale attack as early as August. +But this attack had to be called off because of bad weather. A really +large scale attack had not taken place since, because the Fuehrer +wanted to accept the responsibility for this only when it was certain, +that such an attack would mean the beginning of England’s destruction. +Although Germany had merely carried out reprisal bombings from the air, +their results for England had already been extraordinarily serious. +With a continuation of these attacks London would be in ruins within a +short time. The British armament factories had been seriously affected, +and important ports, such as Portland, had been entirely crippled. +Moreover, all aerodromes from the South Coast to London had been made +unusable. + +* * * * * * * + +With regard to Greece and Yugoslavia, the Foreign Minister stressed, +that it was exclusively a question of Italian interests, the settling +of which was a matter for Italy alone, and in which Italy could be +certain of Germany’s sympathetic assistance. But it seemed to us to +be better not to touch on these problems for the time being, but to +concentrate on the destruction of England with all our forces instead. +Where Germany was concerned, she was interested in the northern German +districts (Norway etc.), and this was acknowledged by the Duce. + +* * * * * * * + +The Reich Foreign Minister further announced a statement by the Fuehrer +regarding the military part of the Spanish problem, i.e., the conquest +of Gibraltar. The Spaniards wanted to conquer Gibraltar by themselves. +But so as to prevent any failure, Germany would provide Spain with +special troops equipped with special weapons, and a few squadrons of +planes. The Fuehrer had carefully examined the Gibraltar problem from +the military point of view, and had come to the conclusion, that the +conquest of the rock was absolutely possible, but only then, if the +Spaniards were to be given assistance. + +The Reich Foreign Minister then showed the Duce the German map +regarding the Spanish territorial demands, and this was duly noted by +the Italian gentlemen. A question which was put to the Duce by the +Reich Foreign Minister, showed, that the Spanish ambitions did not +clash with Italy’s in any way. In this connection the Reich Foreign +Minister announced Serrano Suner’s intention, also to make a visit to +Rome. + +On his return to Berlin, he (the Reich Foreign Minister) intended to +sign a secret protocol with Serrano Suner, dealing with Spain’s entry +into the war, as well as the supplying of Spain with the aforementioned +materials, recognizing the Spanish ambitions, and providing an attack +against Gibraltar as a declaration of war. The protocol would also +state, that Spain’s entry into the war would be left to the judgment +of that country. It had been verbally provided, that Spain would come +into the war as soon as Franco had completed his preparations, and +particularly after the German special weapons and troops as well as +planes had arrived at their destinations in Spain. + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1850-PS + +_Filing reference_ 11 C-2 [in ink] + + _Subject_: Negotiation between Obergruppenfuehrer Krueger, Oberst + Karmann, Oberst Lorenz, in the Chambers of the Reich Board of + Trustees on 8 July 1933. + +Oberst Karmann stated that the Armed Forces had so far maintained no +contact whatsoever with the ex-service men. The only contact which +the ex-service men have, is the vote of their maintenance at the +Reich Ministry of Labor. Oberst Karmann intends to establish an +Ex-service men’s Association for which membership of the SA is laid +down as a condition. Ex-service men wait for about 3 years from the +time their active service ends until they obtain a Civil Service +post. Roughly estimated, they number about 20,000 men. In addition, +approximately 8,000 non-commissioned officers and men are released +yearly. The demand for these ex-service men is so great that, for +example, Oberst Karmann has difficulty in obtaining personnel for his +establishment. Oberst Karmann, however, wishes to send ex-service men +compulsorily to the S.A., as soon as this is required by the Chief +of Training. As a rule, the ex-service men go where they receive the +best pay. Furthermore, Oberst Karmann explained his ideas on the +recruitment of non-commissioned officers of the reserve. Forestry +and customs officials should, for example, do several years military +service with the Reichswehr. A similar provision should be made for +officials of other categories. The settling of the question regarding +the disadvantages of ex-service men in the SA, compared to those +in the Labor Service has been postponed until a later date. Oberst +Karmann mentioned that ex-service men, who were not appointed to good, +regularly paid positions in the S.A. would, when they claimed their +right to maintenance, be at a great practical disadvantage as regards +their financial circumstances by reason of their S.A. service. He would +see that there was official compensation for this. + +Berlin, 8 July 1933. + + 131 Fl [ink] + C002167 + + # # # # # + + Confidential 5 July 33 + filing reference [in ink] [ink] + +_Discussion with Oberst v. Vietinghoff, Chief of Armed Forces Division, + on Wednesday the 5th July 33._ + +1. _Leadership of Reich Youth_ [Reichsjugendfuehrung]. The question +of the powers of the Head of the Reich Youth in connection with +pre-military training. + +I state that, by a decision of the Fuehrer, the spheres of duty of the +Head of the Reich Youth, the Reich Commissar for Sport and the Chief of +Training are sharply defined. I sent a draft to Munich to that effect. + +2. _Students._ A discussion is taking place today between Oberst v. +Vietinghoff and Gerullis regarding the question of military sports for +students. Oberst v. Vietinghoff is of the opinion that these matters +also should be placed under the control of the Chief of Training. + +I mentioned my preliminary negotiations with Herr Schwab, formerly with +the General Armed Forces Office [AWA-Allgemeines Wehrmachtsamt] who, as +liaison official on the Staff, was arranging this matter of military +sports for students on the right lines. + +Oberst v. Vietinghoff believes that the Prussian Ministry of Education +and Public Worship, will make certain difficulties and would very much +like to take a service-officer into the ministry as technical advisor. +He suggested Hauptmann von Bernuth for this purpose. + +3. I then gave an extensive outline of Bernuth’s duties; he was working +out the guiding principles for the training of men and the leaders +for the military camps and schools for leaders in accordance with the +wishes of the Reich Minister for Defense [Reichswehrministerium] with +regard to pre-military training, in addition, however, he should make +the technical preparations for weapon-training. Oberst v. Vietinghoff +declared himself in agreement. + +Hauptmann v. Bernuth is being given a long-term appointment to my +staff. 002168 131 F2 [ink] + +4. _Labor Service._ Military sports in Labor service camps are +suspended for considerations of foreign policy. Dr. Stellbrecht has +been to Oberst v. Vietinghoff to inform him that the Labor Service is +being organized on the wrong lines. + +5. _The Office for Defence Policy_ [Wehrpolitisches Amt]. My answer to +Oberst v. Vietinghoff’s question was that of the “Wehrpolitisches Amt” +must not interfere with my sphere of duties and that I considered it +advisable to dissolve it. + +Oberst v. Vietinghoff is of the opinion that the “Wehrpolitisches Amt” +has become superfluous and that all questions relating to military +sports should again be decided by the Chief of Training. + +6. _The budget._ I drew Oberst von Vietinghoff’s attention to the fact +that the budget question must find its solution through the S.A., that +it was not advisable for the Reich Ministry for Defence to put the care +for the budget on behalf of the Chief of Training, for that might cause +difficulties. I drew attention to Oberst v. Reichenau’s suggestion and +how it would work out. + +Oberst v. Reichenau recommends that the budget adviser to the Chief +of Training should contact Major Osterkamp, the expert of the Reich +Ministry for Defense, who is very experienced in these matters. It +would then be easier to get the budget passed by the Reich Ministry for +Finance. + +I declared myself ready to examine the budget, in conjunction with +the Reich Ministry for Defense, as soon as it was decided upon. +Furthermore, the Fuehrer’s demand in Reichenhall that I should train +250,000 SA men and leaders within a year so that they would be at the +disposal of the Reichswehr in case of emergency, is the basis on which +I shall act. + +In accordance with this demand of Hitler’s I should have to examine +the possibilities of instructional training and draw up my budget +accordingly. Deductions from the budget made by the Reich Ministry +would not be allowed. + +7. The _Reich Trusteeship_. Oberst v. Vietinghoff asked when I was +taking over the Trusteeship of the Reich, to which I answered that I +had had a talk with Neuville today and that he had requested me in the +course of this discussion to go with him the next morning to Minister +Seldte to obtain information regarding the winding-up of affairs. + +Oberst v. Vietinghoff considers this step superfluous, and only +calculated to cause further delay. I assured him that I was of the same +opinion. + +8. _Branch Leaders_ [Zweigstellenleiter]. I referred to my order to +the main groups; it is to be left to them to employ Branch Leaders as +Training Inspectors as they are required. If they were not needed, the +former Branch Leaders would have to leave their posts. + +Berlin, 5 July 1933. + + 131 F4 C002170 + + # # # # # + + SECRET + + Filing Reference 11 C-3 [Ink] Bauen + + Discussion with Reich Defense Minister v. Blomberg on 15 July, 0930 + hours. + +1. My note of 13.7 to General v. Blomberg showed both parties that, in +fact, there had been a misunderstanding in the way the budget question +was viewed. General v. Blomberg had not been informed that Oberst v. +Reichenau had tried to have the budget for the Chief of Training of the +S.A. introduced by the Reich Ministry for Defense. + +The Fuehrer’s statement of 12.7 regarding the basic regulations for +pre-military fitness training for youth, which had been shown to him +today, had cleared all doubts. + +At the last discussion he had merely intended to grant to the Chief of +Training from his own special Fund for Training purposes, money which +might possibly be refused by the Reich Minister for Finance. He had +only wished to offer his services for this purpose, and today agreed +with me that the Reich Ministry of the Interior should decide upon the +budget for the Chief of Training and put the case before the cabinet. + +2. With a view to a practical solution of the budget problems he +suggests that a discussion should take place between the Chiefs at the +beginning of August, in which the Ministers Frick, Schwerin-Krosigk, +and v. Blomberg should take part; he recommended also that I should +first have a word with State Secretary Reinhard in the Reich Ministry +for Finance to smooth the way. + +3. General v. Blomberg had me explain to him the forms of training in +the military camps and requested that the very necessary camouflage +measures be taken. + +4. Relationship of the higher S. A.--Fuehrerkorps to the Reich Ministry +for Defense. Berlin, 15.7.33. + + C002171. + + # # # # # + + Ki/Eg Berlin, 1 Sept. 1933. + + Filing Reference + + Subject: Enrollment in the SA of members of the Reichswehr who are + due for release. + + for the archives [in ink] + +Discussion (1.9. 1933/0936 hours) between _Oberst Hinria_ and Hauptmann +von Wolf (general section and Armed Forces Section of Reich Ministry of +Defense) on the one hand and Stabsfuehrer Waehmann and Adjutant Kiefer +on the other. + +_Oberst Hinria_ expressed the wishes of the members of the Reichswehr. +The latter wish, on entering the SA after their demobilization to +receive a rank corresponding to their last appointment. They consider +it inadvisable that, _for example_ a non-commissioned officer on +entering the SA should have, as his superior in rank, a man who was +formerly under him. + +As opposed to this, Stabsfuehrer Waehmann holds that this idea is +contrary to the spirit and the service instructions of the SA, for it +is a demand which is particularly stressed in the SA that one should +place oneself voluntarily under the orders of another. + +With regard to the Unions [Treubuende] the commonly held opinion is +voiced that their main purpose was to prevent the members of the +Reichswehr due for release from going over to the left. After the +assumption of power, since this danger was averted, this purpose will +no longer be held good in future. Nevertheless, Oberst Hinria advocates +their continued existence, for the reasons stated below. + +_Suggestions for a temporary solution_: In future the Reichswehr will +presumably only be recruited from members of the S.A. Thus the men +being demobilized, will automatically return to the S.A. Therefore, the +solution for this period is simple. + + Filing reference [in ink] 131 Gi [in ink] + + # # # # # + + SECRET + + Filing reference + + 11 C-5 [in ink] + + _Discussion with State Secretary Reinhard, Reich Ministry for Finance + on the morning of 18.7_ + +1. I reported to State Secretary Reinhard on the whole question of the +budget for the new sphere of duties assigned to Chief of Training; I +also asked that the further payment of the budget funds granted by the +Reich Ministry for Finance and belonging to the Reich Trusteeship, +since dissolved, should be cleared up for the current financial year. + +2. Preliminary examination of the supplementary budget drafted by me +for the financial year 33/34 and an additional demand of approximately +25 millions. + +State Secretary Reinhard considers it very difficult under the +circumstances to carry through the supplementary budget for the current +financial year. He was informed that the Reich Ministry for Finance +wishes to dispose of the funds granted from the Reich Trusteeship, +but on the other hand considers it necessary that the discussion of +Chiefs mentioned by General v. Blomberg should take place between the +Ministries. Taking the long view, State Secretary Reinhard believes +that the estimated budget could still be approved if the unemployment +problem were solved in the autumn. This is in his opinion a preliminary +condition. + +In addition, however, Finance Minister Krosigk had the matter of +the budget in his own hands, for he [Reinhard] has to solve all the +problems relating to unemployment. + + Berlin, 18 July 1933. + +[illegible initials] R. [ink] + + 131 E (1) [in ink] + + # # # # # + + SECRET + + 11 C-4 [in ink] Bauen + + Filing Reference + + _Discussion with Ministerial Director Gerullis, Prussian Ministry for + Public Worship and Instruction, on 17 and 18.7.33_ + +1. Gerullis is fundamentally of the opinion that all military sports in +the colleges and universities should be in the hands of the Chief of +Training. He declared himself to be in agreement with my suggestion to +take onto my staff as liaison officer a Student Leader who is still to +be nominated, (Schwab or Krueger) and who, according to my suggestion, +is to be responsible for all training in military sports. + +In addition it is necessary for carrying this out further, that the +S.A. Leaders etc., at present appointed as instructors in military +sport in the Colleges and universities, should once again be summoned +to a special course in order to do their training on the new lines. +Gerullis suggests Councillor Ministerialrat Haupt, present at today’s +discussion, as representative for Prussia. [3 illegible words in ink +and illegible initials follow] + +2. From 1 October, five officers of the General Staff are to be +appointed for 3 years to the Universities of Koenigsberg, Breslau, +Berlin, Cologne, and Frankfurt-on-Main to teach military tactics, leave +of absence being granted for that period. + + + (Regulars, 5 senior Staff officers for this) [marginal note in pencil] + +They will give lectures on military tactics in those universities. +On 1 September these gentlemen will be brought to Berlin and will +make contact with the Chief of Training. Questions regarding Military +Training are to be cleared up with me by these gentlemen. This ruling +is the joint decision as mentioned by Oberstleutnant Weissenberger, who +also took part in the discussion of the Reich Ministry for Defense and +the Prussian Ministry for Public Worship and Education. + +3. With regard to the former soldiers of the Reichswehr _now_ united +in the Unions it was said: The SA has no interest in incorporating the +Unions, for all elements who do not believe firmly in the principles of +the new idealogy, are unwanted. (There is also no power of authority +over these unions). _The troop commanders should, however, be +guaranteed authoritative influence over the unions in their commands._ +They should then see to it that: + +1. All those who have hitherto been members of the Unions, who are +suitable by reason of their ideology, are incorporated into the S.A. + +2. That the members of the Reichswehr due for release in the future +continue to join the unions which are under the supervision of the +Commanders, but are without exception incorporated into the SA. The +necessary foundations for this enrollment are to be laid immediately +upon entry into the Reichswehr and also constantly during military +service. + +Oberst Hinria has also set up for future use the following organization +and order of service: + +1. SA with preparation for the Reichswehr. + +2. Period of service with the Reichswehr. + +3. Re-entry into SA after release. + +4. Transfer to the S.A. Reserve [SA--Handwehr] after the age of 45. + +(Expansion of the Kyffhaeuser Union to form the SA Reserve.) + + [illegible pencilled initials] + 131 G 2 [in ink] + + # # # # # + +Personal [in pencil] + +Ch 25/4/33 [in ink] [Illegible initials] + + 11C- 7 [in ink] + 5 September 1933. + + To the Chief of Naval Command for the attention of Konteradmiral Dr. + N. C. Gross. + + _Berlin W. 10_ + Koenigin Augustastrasse 38-42. + +K/Kl. + +Sir: + +I am very much obliged for the dates of the Fleet Maneuvers sent to me +at the request of the Chief of Naval Staff [Chf der Marineleitung]. + +On the 17th inst. I shall go on board in Pillan punctually at 1200 and +will take the liberty of reporting in good time when and where, I shall +be arriving in Pillan, for before that I shall probably be on a duty +visit in East Prussia. + +I take this opportunity of expressing a personal wish. + +The Chief of Staff, Oberstleutnant Roehm, informed me that he will +also be present at the Fleet Maneuvers. I should be very grateful if +I could go on board the same cruiser, for I think that particularly +with regard to the whole question of the training of Naval-SA units, my +presence might be of value. Since the problems relating to this are my +responsibility, it would be a great advantage to me, if the opportunity +were offered me, to discuss the question and all its complications with +the Chief of Staff. In Nurnberg I took the opportunity of discussing +the matter with Korvettenkapitaen Kieseritzky, who is assigned to +my staff. Korvettenkapitaen Kieseritzky believes, however, that it +is unlikely that my request will be fulfilled on account of the +distribution already on hand. + +For this reason, Sir, I am again applying directly to you. + +Perhaps Korvettenkapitaen Kieseritzky could inform me briefly whether +my request can be granted. + +Your very faithfully, + + Heil Hitler + K. [Krueger] + Obergruppenfuehrer. + C--2177 131 D2 (in ink) + + # # # # # + +_For filing_ 11C-8 + + received 31.10.33 Initials [ink] + + SECRET + + Filing reference + +1. The speech delivered by the Fuehrer to the SA leaders on the evening +of Tuesday the 17.10, has induced me to bring up for decision by the +Chief of Staff, the question, as to whether it is right that the SA +training in the Army of the Reich should be continued. In the clearly +expressed declaration of the Fuehrer there might be lost a suggestion +of apprehension, if we trained the SA in the Reichswehr; informers and +spies might have the opportunity of passing information regarding that +training to our foreign political opponents. + +The Chief of Staff intends to decide this question before the +Gruppenfuehrer at the Gruppenfuehrer discussion on 23.10, while I am +commissioned to discuss the decision intended at the Reich Ministry +for Defense. If the Reich Minister for Defense assumes complete +responsibility for the resulting consequences, the Chief of Staff +agrees to the training of the SA in the army. + +I informed Hauptmann von Dernuth on 18.10 of this wish of the Chief of +Staff, with the request that he would inform Oberst von Reichenau to +that effect, and obtain the decision of the Reich Minister for Defense. + +On 19.10, 1100 hours, Oberst von Reichenau asked me to attend a +discussion during which this question was approached again. Oberst +von Reichenau drew attention to the fact that, to reject the training +of the SA in the Army of the Reich, by this decision of the Chief of +Staff, would mean that the training by special courses would also be +a thing of the past and also the entire training in frontier-guard +duties would be rendered impossible. I replied that, with regard to +the questions of frontier protection, no conversation had taken place +between the Chief of Staff and myself. This point would therefore need +special consideration. + + # # # # # + + C002177/1 P.T.O. + +Filing reference [in ink] + +The Chief of Staff is placing the decision with the Reich Minister for +Defense, who, for his part, bears the responsibility for the training +of the SA in the Army of the Reich. + +The clearly-expressed speech of the Fuehrer on 17.10 caused the Chief +of Staff to clear up the question of responsibility in such a way as to +leave no room for doubt; for this reason it was absolutely necessary +that the Reich Minister for Defense should make inquiries of the +Chancellor. + +If the Reich Minister for Defense assumed full and complete +responsibility for the training in the Army of the Reich, the Chief of +Staff saw no reason to cease training the SA in the Army. + +II. Oberst von Reichenau showed me the letter written by +Obergruppenfuehrer von Jagow to the Reich Minister for Defense by +way of reply to the complaint made by the Reich Minister for Defense +regarding Obergruppenfuehrer von Jagow. + +Since it was possible to misinterpret the wording of von Jagow’s +letter, I repeated to Oberst von Reichenau the remarks I had made to +Jagow, which the Reich Minister for Defense made in my presence. It +appeared that Obergruppenfuehrer von Jagow had had the opportunity +on the occasion of his visit to Berlin on 17.10, to speak to +Korvettenkapitaen von Langsdorff at the Reich Defense Ministry on the +suspension of weapon training in the SA camps. A remark made by Jagow +on this subject, which was quite unimportant and only reached Minister +von Blomberg in the course of a report, was the reason for Minister von +Blomberg’s complaint regarding Obergruppenfuehrer von Jagow. + +Oberst von Reichenau remarked that there had been a misunderstanding +on the part of the Reich Minister for Defense and, after examining +the facts, he was of the opinion that the complaint made by the Reich +Minister for Defense about Obergruppenfuehrer von Jagow, which was +reported by word of mouth to Obergruppenfuehrer Krueger had been +unnecessary. + + C002178/1 + +Reich Minister for Defense von Blomberg would now feel induced to write +to Jagow. + +III. Discussion regarding the appointment of personnel to the Reich +Ministry for Defense. + +IV. Discussion about the case of von Reichenau, von Obernity, and +Gruppenfuehrer Franken. It so happened that, through Hauptmann +Fenchtlinger, Nurnberg, a conversation between himself and +Gruppenfuehrer von Obernity has come to the knowledge of the ministry. + +Oberst von Reichenau is very anxious that this misunderstanding should +be removed. He will therefore write a personal letter to Gruppenfuehrer +von Obernity. + +Berlin, 19 October 1933. + + /s/ Ringen. + C002179/1 + + + PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1851-PS + + THE NEW GERMANY SPEAKS HERE + + Book 11, Reichsfuehrer SS HEINRICH HIMMLER. + + The Security Squadron as an Anti-Bolshevist Battle Organization. 1936. + + Central Publishing House of the NSDAP., Franz Eher, Succ. Munich + + + OBEDIENCE. + +* * * * * * * + +[Page 23, line 31 to page 24, line 27] + +The fourth directive and virtue, which applies to us, is that of +obedience; of obedience, which arises unconditionally through +the highest spontaneity, through the service to our ideology +[Weltanschauung], which is ready to make every necessary sacrifice of +pride, superficial honors and of everything, which is dear and valuable +to us; of obedience, not hesitating once, but following every order, +which is given by the Fuehrer, or has lawfully been given by one of +the superiors; the virtue of obedience, which keeps silent even during +the time of the political fight, when the will of freedom believes +to have to rise indignantly, which, with wide-awake senses and with +strict attention toward the enemy, does not raise a finger, which also +obeys unconditionally, and goes over to the attack, even if it should +believe, in its heart, that it cannot conquer. + +We are so honest, that we do not claim about ourselves, that all these +laws are understood by the very last man, and in their last deepest +sense. But we believe to be able to claim, that now for six years, the +SS has generally assembled according to these directives, was organized +and lives according to them. We know, that year for year, we will +accept more of these virtues, and that they will more and more become +the natural property of every SS man. We are convinced, when fate +determines sooner or later, that as the first generation of the SS, we +are no more, then we can hand down these virtues as a full heritage, as +the best tradition to those, who are SS men after us. + +* * * * * * * + +[Page 28, line 17 to page 29, line 9] + + + BLOOD and SOIL + +I, as Reichsfuehrer SS, who am myself a peasant according to ancestry, +blood and being, would like to state this second fact in front of +you, German peasants: The idea of blood, advocated by the SS from +the beginning would be condemned, if it were not tied eternally +with the conviction about the value and holiness of the soil. From +the beginning, the Race and Settlement Main Office [Rasse- und +Siedlungs-Hauptamt], has incorporated the term “Blood and Soil” in its +name, although with different words, but in the same meaning. I can +assure you, that it is not a coincidence, that the Reich Leader of +Peasants [Reichsbauernfuehrer des Deutschen Reiches] has belonged to +the SS as a leader for years, and that he, as a SS Lt. Gen. is Chief of +its Race and Settlement Main Office, as much as it is no coincidence, +that I am a peasant, and belong to the Reich Council of Peasants +[Reichsbauernrat]. Peasants and SS men both do not belong to those +kind of men, who speak superfluously many kind and friendly words. But +let it be said here clearly and plainly, as it was until now, so it +should be according to our will in the future. Wherever Adolf Hitler’s +peasants stand, they shall always have the SS at their side as their +most faithful friend, just as we know, that wherever Adolf Hitler’s +SS stands, it will have at its side the German peasant as its best +friend and comrade. That is how it is today, and that is how it will be +forever. + +[Page 29] + +I know that there are some people in Germany who become sick when they +see these black coats; we understand the reason for this and do not +expect that we shall be loved by too many. All those who love Germany +close at heart will and shall respect us; those who shall fear us, in +any way or at any time, must have a bad conscience toward the Fuehrer +and the nation. For these persons we have established an organization +called Security Service, and likewise, we the SS, place the men for the +service in the Secret State Police. We shall unremittingly fulfill our +task, the guaranty of the security of Germany from the interior, just +as the Wehrmacht guarantees the safety of the honor, the greatness, and +the peace of the Reich from the exterior. We shall take care that never +again in Germany, the heart of Europe, will the Jewish-Bolshevistic +revolution of sub-humans be able to be kindled either from within or +through emissaries from without. Without pity we shall be a merciless +sword of justice for all those forces whose existence and activity we +know on the day of the slightest attempt, may it be today, may it be in +decades or may it be in centuries. + +* * * * * * * + +[Page 31] + +Every one of us knows, that he does not stand alone, but that this +tremendous force of two hundred thousand men, who are bound together by +oath, gives him unmeasurable strength, and he knows as well, that he, +as a representative of the black corps, must do honor to this community +by his best performance at his place. Thus we assemble and march +according to unalterable laws as a national socialist, soldierly order +of distinctly Nordic men, and as a sworn community, of its clans, on +our way into a far future, and we wish and believe, that we do not only +want to be the descendants who fought it out better, but above that the +ancestors of later generations, necessary for the eternal life of the +German, Germanic people. + + + PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1852-PS + + “THE GERMAN POLICE” by Dr. Werner Best, Pp. 14-20 1940 edition. + +_III. LAW._ The conception and formation of “police” law, which governs +the duties and activities of the “police” in detail, is based on the +conception of the law and its formation in general. + +1. Law. a. The personal-human (individual-human) conception of law. + +For the personal-human (individual-human) conception, “law” is only +that law laid down by those who are concerned with the validity of +the law or those commissioned by them, in accordance with the rules +of the fundamental law--the “constitution”--or a legal decree based +on law, whereas the administrative decree which governs the actions +of the authorities is not regarded as law. Every action which is not +based upon the law and does not come within its framework, is wrong and +illegal, insofar as it concerns individual men, because their agreement +to such action cannot be stated or supposed. + +b. The people’s conception of “Law”. + +According to the people’s conception, law is every rule which fulfills +the unity of the people’s “organs”--organizations and individuals--and +which is sanctioned or approved by the leaders. There is, therefore, no +difference between stronger and weaker “rules”, between “constitutional +Law” and “common law”, between “law”, “orders” and “decrees”, between +“public” and “private” law. The will of the leaders, in whatever form +it is expressed whether through law, order, decree, single order or +collective order, regulation of an organization or regulation of +competence, etc., administers law and alters all theretofore valid law. + +2. “Police” law. There is no written “Police” law of the German Reich, +which rules the duties and activities of the Police (actual “Police” +law). + +The only government ruling, in which the “police duties” are mentioned, +without any more detailed specification, is in the Fuehrer’s and Reich +Chancellor’s decree concerning the appointment of the Chief of the +German Police and Reich Ministry of the Interior, dated 17th June 1936 +(Reichsgesetzblatt I, p. 487): + + For the unification of the police duties in the Reich, a chief of + German Police of the Reichs Ministry of the Interior is appointed + who will be commissioned with the leadership and organization of + all police matters in the administrative sphere of the Imperial and + Prussian Ministry of the Interior. + +The contents of the “police duties”, which in this are specifically +recognized by the leader as special State duties, must be gathered from +the written and unwritten “law”, through which the action of the police +is at present determined. + +a. The written “police” law. + +Written “police” law, which governs the duties and activities of the +“police” exists at present only as common law of the individual German +states. As an example, the Prussian Police Administration Law of +1.6.1931 (Prussian Law Manual, p. 77) is referred to. + +The extent to which this written law can still be regarded as valid, +evolves upon two points of view, insofar as differences of common law +definitions can be established, firstly, to exercise duties uniformly +in the German Reich, different rules in different districts cannot be +recognized; secondly, in differences of common law, the laws drawn +up by the national socialist regime take precedence over the laws of +earlier times which are still valid. + +The most important national socialist ruling on duties for a part of +the “police” is contained in the Prussian Law of 10.2.1936 (Prussian +Law Manual, p. 21) about the Secret State Police. Clause 1 of this law +reads: + + The Secret State Police has the task of investigating and combatting + all activity dangerous to the state within the whole territory + of the state, of collecting and evaluating the results of the + investigations, of giving information to the government of the state, + of keeping other authorities posted as to facts important for them, + and of supplying them with suggestions. The Chief of the Secret State + Police in agreement with the Minister of the Interior decides what + individual matters come within the sphere of the Secret State Police. + + The sphere of competence of the organs of the ordinary administration + of justice remains unaffected. + +Thus the “police” task for a branch of the “police” has been defined +according to the law of the land, in such a way that it conforms to the +task which forms the basis of the people’s conception of “police”: the +safeguarding of national order against disturbance and destruction. + +The decree for the protection of people and state of 28.2.1933 (Reich +Law Publication I p. 83) is to be regarded not as “police” law, i.e. +as the direction of police duties and activity, but as the expression +of the changed conception of “state” after the national socialist +revolution, out of which arose the new conception of “police”. +Paragraph 1 of this decree reads: + + The articles 114, 115, 117, 118, 123, 124 and 153 of the constitution + of the German Reich are annulled until further notice. Therefore + restrictions as regards personal freedom, the right of free + expression of opinion including freedom of the Press, the right of + forming unions and holding meetings, infringements on the secrecy + of letter, post, telegraph and telephone communications, orders for + house-searches and confiscation of property, as well as restrictions + on property, even beyond the limits already fixed by law, are + admissible. + +By means of this legal statement it was formally made clear at the +very moment of the revolution, that individual decisions of the law +valid until then, even of constitutional law, are no longer to be +used, as they are incompatible with the new conception of “state”; +since that time countless other legal decisions of the past--even +those of constitutional law--have been regarded as being no longer +applicable without formal repeal or annulment, because they are no +longer compatible with the new constitution of the state. The decree +of 28.2.1933 for the protection of people and state was not a “legal +foundation”, i.e. a statement of their duties and their activity, +but only the confirmation of the fact that the duties which they had +already begun to undertake were in accordance with the will of the +highest governing body to set things right. + +Both the second clause of the law of 18.3.1938 (Reich Law Publication +I p. 262) dealing with the reunification of Austria and the German +Reich and the third clause of the decree of the Fuehrer and Reich +Chancellor of 22.10.1938 (Reich Law Publication I p. 1453) dealing with +the administration of the Sudeten-German territories, served as the +desired formal clarification, in the territories newly acquired by the +Reich, that the restrictive legal decisions of the past must not stand +in the way of the fulfilling by the “police” of their duties in Reich +territory. The first paragraph of both these clauses is practically +identical and reads: + + The Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police in the Reich + Ministry of the Interior can take the necessary measures for the + maintenance of security and order (in the decree of 22.10.1938: + administrative measures) even beyond the legal limits otherwise laid + down for this purpose. + +b. The unwritten “Police” law. + +Not only the legal regulations drawn up by the national socialist +regime, but also the whole activity of the German police since the year +1933 sanctioned by the highest governing body of the Reich--and partly +on its sole instructions--as well as the rearrangement of the “police” +regulations, show that the duty of the “police” is conceived by the +government in the sense represented here, and that any other conception +of the duty of the “police” can no longer be valid. + +Thus all legal definitions which are at odds with this must be +considered as altered in the sense of this new conception, without +formal cancellation or alteration of the individual earlier laws. For +the making of laws as a result of popular “voices” working together, +of actively operating organizations and of “actively” or “passively” +cooperating individuals, for the fulfilling of a definite task--here +the task of the “police”--must not be contradictory in itself, or +only because an individual law drawn up at an earlier date has not +been formally altered, and to which laws at variance with the will of +the government remain tied. At an early date this conception became +evident in the administration of justice of individual German High +Administrative Courts. The High Administrative Court of Saxony has +already explained in a decision of 18.1.1935 (published in the Reich +Administrative Publication of 1935, p. 117 ff.): + + According to it (the national socialist conception of state and law), + law is not the sum total of the single regulations expressly laid + down by the legislator. Legislation is rather only the expression of + the ideas of right which are rooted in the people. Not legislation + but these ideas of law (“conceptions of right”), according to which + laws are formed in steady development, represent “law” * * * In this + sense, “law” as common law, i.e. as the orderly way in which the + people lives as a community, is recognized as taking precedence over + the statutes themselves. + +This means that the orderly or regular way in which the people +fulfills the “police” task through its “voices”--organizations and +individuals--is “police” law, which takes precedence over statutory +law, insofar as this does not reproduce the contents of the “police” +law which is valid at the time but which belongs to an earlier date and +has meanwhile been altered. + +The unwritten “police” law, i.e. law which is not laid down in +statutory form, by means of which all “police” action is determined, +does not however consist of mere “ideas of law” which are “rooted +in the people”, but of many sorts of regulations which in different +forms--law, order, decree, single command, general command, +organizational and competence regulations, etc.--were laid down by the +highest governing body of the Reich or with its sanction. The “police” +never acts in a lawless or illegal manner so long as it acts according +to the rules laid down by its superiors--up to the highest governing +body. The High Administrative Court of Hamburg rightly states in its +judgment of 19.11.1937 (published in the Juristischen Wochenschrift +1937, p. 3335 f.): + + According to its nature, the police must only deal with what the + government wants to know is being dealt with. + +What the “government” wants to know is being “dealt with” by the police +is the essence of “police” law, and is that which guides and restricts +the actions of the police. As long as the “police” carries out the will +of the government, it is acting legally; should it overstep the will of +the government, then it is no longer a matter of “police” action, but +it is a case of a breach of duty by a member of the police. + +Whether the will of the government lays down the “right” rules, i.e. +those possible and necessary for police action--thus the “police” +law suitable for and beneficial to the people--is no longer a +question of law, but a question of fate. For actual misuse of the +“right-to-put-right” on the part of a people’s government, whether it +consist of harmful severity or of harmful weakness, will be punished +more surely before history by fate itself with misfortune and overthrow +and ruin, because of the violation of the “laws of life”, than by a +State Court of Justice. + +[Pages 38-39]: + +As the intelligence service of the German National Socialist Labor +Party, the Security Service has first of all the task of investigating +and keeping a watch over all forces, events and facts which are of +importance for the domination of the National Socialist idea and +movement in German territory. With this task follows that duty laid +down by the Reich Minister of the Interior--the duty of supporting the +Security Police--which is fulfilled, so far as it goes, under State +orders. In support of the task of the Security Police in securing the +ranks of the German people against interference and destruction of any +kind, the Security Service has to watch over every sphere of life of +the German people with regard to the activities of inimical forces and +the result of state and political measures, and to inform continually +the competent State authorities and offices about the facts which have +come to light. Finally, it has to investigate politically and explore +fundamentally the activities and connections of the great ideological +arch-enemy of National Socialism and the German people, in order +thereby to render possible a purposeful and effective fight against it. + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1855-PS + + ORGANIZATION BOOK OF NSDAP, Page 418. + +Bravery is valued by the SS man as the highest virtue of men in a +struggle for his ideology. + +He openly and unrelentingly fights the most dangerous enemies of the +State: Jews, Free Masons, Jesuits, and political clergymen. + +However, by his example, he recruits and convinces the weak and +inconstant, who have not been able to bring themselves to the National +Socialistic ideology. + + + PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1856-PS + + HERMANN GOERING, SPEECHES AND ESSAYS. + + Edited by Dr. Erich Gritzbach, Third Edition. Published by Central + Publishing House of the NSDAP Franz Eher Successor, Muenchen. (1939) + +* * * * * * * + +Excerpt from speech entitled: “We Bear the Responsibility”, delivered +at an NSDAP demonstration on 3 March 1933, at Frankfurt am Main [page +27]: + + Fellow Germans, my measures will not be crippled by any judicial + thinking. My measures will not be crippled by any bureaucracy. Here + I don’t have to give Justice, my mission is only to destroy and + exterminate, nothing more! This struggle, fellow Germans, will be + a struggle against chaos and such a struggle I shall not conduct + with the power of any police. A bourgeoise state might have done + that. Certainly, I shall use the power of the state and the police + to the utmost my dear Communists, so that you won’t draw any false + conclusions but the struggle to the death, in which my fist will + grasp your necks, I shall lead with those down there,--those are the + brown shirts. + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1857-PS + + _VOELKISCHER BEOBACHTER_, 26 July 1934 p.I. + + The Fuehrer elevates the SS to a standing of an Independent + Organization. + + Munich, 25 July + +The Reich Press Office announces the following order of the Fuehrer: + +In consideration of the very meritorious service of the SS, especially +in connection with the events of 30 June 1934, I elevate it to +the standing of an independent organization within the NSDAP. The +Reichsfuehrer SS, like the Chief of Staff, is therefore directly +subordinate to the highest SS fuehrer. The Chief of Staff and the +Reichsfuehrer SS are both invested with the party rank of Reichsleiter. + +Munich, 20 July 1934. + + /s/ Adolf Hitler. + + + PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1861-PS + + 1934 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 45 + + Law Regulating National Labor of 20 January 1934 + +The Government of the Reich has decided to enact the following law +which is hereby made public: + + + _SECTION I_ + +The Leader of the enterprise and the board of employee representatives. + + + _Paragraph 1_ + +The entrepreneur works in the factory as leader of the enterprise +together with the employees and the workers who constitute his +followers for the furtherance of the aims of the enterprise and for the +common benefit of people and state. + + + _Paragraph 2_ + +1. The leader of the enterprise makes the decisions for the employees +and laborers in all matters concerning the enterprise, as far as they +are regulated by this law. + +2. He is responsible for the well-being of the employees and laborers. +The employees and laborers owe him faithfulness according to the +principles of the factory community. + + + _Paragraph 3_ + +1. In the case of legal persons and personal groups the legal +representatives will be the leaders of the enterprises. + +2. The entrepreneur or in the case of legal persons or personal groups, +the legal representatives can appoint a person who participates in the +management of the enterprise in a responsible capacity as their deputy. +This must be done if they do not direct the enterprise themselves. In +matters of lesser importance they can also appoint another person. + +3. Should the court of honor legally deprive the leader of the +enterprise of his qualifications to be a leader, then a new +entrepreneur must be appointed. + + + _Paragraph 4_ + +1. Administrations are also considered as enterprises in the sense of +this law. + +2. Subordinate enterprises and parts of the enterprise which are +connected with the main enterprise through common direction will only +be considered as independent enterprises if they are situated far away +from the main enterprise. + +3. The regulations of this law, with the exception of paragraphs 32 +and 33, do not apply to Ships, Inland navigation and Air-transport and +their crews. + + + _Paragraph 5_ + +1. Representatives recruited from the employees and laborers act in an +advisory capacity to the leader of an enterprise with, in the rule, +at least 20 employees. They constitute with the leader and under his +direction the board of representatives of the enterprise. + +2. To the employees and laborers in the sense of the regulations +concerning the board of representatives belong also the persons who +do piece work at home, who work mainly for the same enterprise either +alone or with their families. + + + _Paragraph 6_ + +1. It is the duty of the board of representatives to increase the +mutual confidence within the enterprise-community. + +2. It is the task of the board of representatives to discuss +all measures concerning the improvement of the output, the form +and execution of the general labor conditions, especially the +enterprise regulations, the execution and the improvement of +enterprise-protection, the strengthening of the ties between the +members of the enterprise among themselves and toward the enterprise +as well as the welfare of all the members of the community. +It is furthermore their task to liquidate all quarrels within +the enterprise-community. They must also be heard prior to the +determination of punishment for violation of the plant-rules. + +3. The board of representatives can charge certain representatives with +the execution of certain of its tasks. + + + _Paragraph 7_ + +(1) The number of representatives is as follows: + + in enterprises with 20- 49 employees 2 + in enterprises with 50- 99 employees 3 + in enterprises with 100-199 employees 4 + in enterprises with 200-399 employees 5 + +(2) These numbers are increased by one representative for each +300 supplementary employees until they reach the maximum of ten +representatives. + +(3) An equal number of deputies shall be designated. + +(4) Employees, workers and those who do piece work at home are to be +considered in the choice of trustees. + + The Chancellor of the Reich + Adolf Hitler + + The Reich Minister of Labor + Franz Seldte + + The Reich Minister of Economic Affairs + Dr. Schmitt + + The Reich Minister of Justice + Dr. Guertner + + The Reich Minister of Finance + Graf Schwerin von Krosigk + + The Reich Minister of Interior + Frick + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1862-PS + + 1936 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 887 + + Ordinance for the Execution of the Four Year Plan of 18 October 1936. + +The realization of the new Four Year Plan--announced by me at the Party +Congress of Honor--requires homogeneous leadership of all forces in the +German nation and the strict coordination of all competent authorities +in Party and State. + +The execution of the Four Year Plan, I intrust to Minister-President +General Goering. + +Minister-President General Goering shall take all steps necessary for +the execution of the task put before him; he is authorized to issue +decrees of ordinances and general administrative directives. He is +empowered to receive reports from all governmental agencies, including +the highest agencies of the Reich and from all Party offices, their +departments and attached organizations--and issue orders to them. + +Berchtesgaden, 18 Oct 36 + + The Fuehrer and Chancellor of the Reich + Adolf Hitler + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1866-PS + + Record of the conversation between the Reich Foreign Minister and the + Duce in the Palazzo Venezia on the 13th May 1941, in the presence of + Count Ciano. + +To begin with the Reich Foreign Minister conveyed the Fuehrer’s +greetings to the Duce. + +He would shortly propose to the Duce a date for the planned meeting, +which he would like to take place as soon as possible. As the place for +the meeting he would probably prefer the Brenner. At the present moment +he was, as the Duce well understood, still busy with the Hess affair +and with a few military matters, but could be at his disposal after +that for a meeting. + +The Duce replied that he would agree with all the Fuehrer’s proposals +concerning the place and date of this meeting. That he was prepared +to go to Germany, to meet him at the Brenner, or to arrange for the +conversation to take place anywhere else in Italy. + +The Reich Foreign Minister then said that the Fuehrer had sent him +to the Duce, in order to inform him about the Hess affair and the +conversation with Admiral Darlan about the Hess affair. He remarked +that the Fuehrer had been completely taken aback by Hess’ action, and +that it had been the action of a lunatic. + +Hess had been suffering for a long time from a bilious complaint and +had fallen into the hands of magnetists and nature cure doctors who +allowed his state of health to become worse. + +All these matters were being investigated at the moment as well as the +responsibility of the aides-de-camp who had known about Hess’ forbidden +flights. Hess had for weeks carried out secret practice flights in a +M.E. 110. Naturally he had acted only from idealistic motives. His +being unfaithful to the Fuehrer was utterly out of the question. His +conduct had to be explained by a kind of mysticism and a state of mind +caused by his illness. + +The Reich Minister went on to say that Hess was undoubtedly convinced +that England was facing imminent defeat, but that the English could not +take the step of drawing the necessary conclusions. + +Being sympathetically inclined towards England Hess had conceived the +crazy idea of using Great Britain’s Fascist circles to persuade the +British to give in. He had explained all this in a long and confused +letter to the Fuehrer. When this letter reached the Fuehrer, Hess was +already in England. It was hoped in Germany that he would perhaps +have an accident on the way, but he was now really in England and had +tried to contact the former Marquis of Clydesdale, the present Duke +of Hamilton. Hess quite wrongly considered him as a great friend of +Germany and had flown to the neighbourhood of his castle in Scotland. +He had thus carried out his plan at the risk of his life. The Fuehrer +who was naturally and personally deeply stricken by these events, +took up a very severe attitude under the circumstances, demoted Hess +immediately and stated that he would have Hess shot immediately if he +returned to Germany. The investigation of the event was continuing, but +it was quite clear that Hess had not acted out of lack of faithfulness +towards the Fuehrer. + +The Duce replied that he was also of the opinion that Hess was no +traitor. From the political point of view he did not consider the +results of his action serious. He was wondering what Hess intended to +say in England. It was said that his first words after being found were +to the effect that he had always had a great sympathy for England. + +Without failing to see that the psychological results of Hess’ flight +were not slight, one could nevertheless say that the prosecution of the +war and public opinion in the Axis countries remained untouched by it. +In 3 or 4 days the whole affair would gradually subside. The question +arose as to whether anyone in Germany knew about Hess’ attitude to +England, and whether Hess had perhaps wanted to save England. + +The Reich Foreign Minister remarked here that in Germany Hess had had +supporters mainly among the * * * [illegible] party members, but that +now every German was wondering how it was possible that Hess could have +done such a thing. The Fuehrer would want first to see in what way +enemy propaganda would make use of this affair. Considering England’s +morale and its situation, Churchill could naturally not use Hess’ peace +idea as propaganda material; this would immediately cause trouble +among his own people. The British would probably rather direct their +propaganda tactics towards making out that they regarded the whole +event as a sign of discord and internal division and as an outcome of +an allegedly difficult position of the Reich, and would also maintain +that Germany would now no doubt have to make peace soon. If it should +be necessary, the Fuehrer would carry out an energetic counter-attack +against this propaganda and would, if necessary, summon the Reichstag, +in order to clarify the whole situation there. + +The Duce repeated his unworried view of the affair and remarked that to +him also it seemed best that the whole truth should be told about the +whole affair. + +Going on to the matter of the talks with Admiral Darlan, the Reich +Foreign Minister explained to the Duce that two subjects especially had +been discussed: + + 1. the assistance which France could give in Syria for the support of + Iraq, and + + 2. the facilities she could provide for German-Italian supplies to + North Africa. + +Darlan had agreed to deliver to Iraq certain quantities of arms and +war materials out of the stocks stored in Syria under Italian control. +Part of these arms would, no doubt, already be on their way to Iraq. +Ambassador Rahn and a French official had flown to Syria and had +submitted a directive of the Vichy Government to the local Government +Commissioner, General Deuz, according to which he was to provide all +the deliveries and other facilities recommended by the two delegates. +Darlan had, furthermore, put landing places for German aircraft and +stocks of petrol at their disposal. + +At the same time, Ambassador von Papen had been recalled to Germany and +been instructed, as he, the Reich Foreign Minister, could inform the +Duce confidentially, to endeavour to obtain from the Turks permission +for the secret passage of arms for Iraq through Turkish territory. + +According to the impression he left, Darlan would certainly do all that +was possible to help the Axis. Although, of course, one could not +look into his heart, he yet definitely appeared to be an enemy of the +English. + +Should a large-scale transport of arms reach Iraq it would be possible +to move airborne troops into the regions, who could then advance +against the British with the material found there and who could, under +certain circumstances, attack Egypt from the East from Iraq. + +The Duce stated his point of view on the Iraq question: + +1. One must definitely help Iraq, as a new front against the British +would be created in this way and the indignation, not only of the +Arabs, but also of the great number of Moslems would be aroused. +Already the Grand Mufti had summoned the Arabs of the world to a +holy war against England. In answer to an interpellation by the +German Foreign Minister, the Duce declared that he ascribed a certain +importance to these events in any case. + +2. It would be necessary to get possession of Crete and Cyprus (the +“anteroom” of Syria). If one could then obtain, from the French, +permission to land troops and planes in Syria, the Axis powers help +to Iraq could be very substantial. The Italians had already prepared +five planes, which would proceed to Baghdad via Rhodes, in order to +transport their 400 machine-guns, as well as 20 anti-tank guns. In +addition, 12 fighter planes were ready for action. + +Should the passage of arms through Turkey prove impossible, one would +have to march against England from Syria. The great advantage here lay +in the 100 km stretch of desert which had to be overcome in the event +of an attack on Egypt from Syria, as compared with the 500 km stretch +of desert in the case of an attack on Egypt from the West. + +In answer to an interpolation by the Reich Foreign Minister as to how +long Iraq would be able to hold out against the British, the Duce +replied that the Head of the Iraq Government had declared that he could +hold his own against the British, provided only he received some war +material. If, however, he received no aid, opposition would, in the +Duce’s opinion, be overcome by the British in 3 or 4 weeks. He was also +wondering whether the de Gaullist movement in Syria would not perhaps +put difficulties in the way of French assistance. The Reich Foreign +Minister replied to that that Darlan appeared convinced that he could +carry out the business in Syria as planned. + +With regard to Tunis, the Reich Foreign Minister, reported on the +purchase of lorries and the recent concession that these lorries could +be sent to Tripolitania with freight. Darlan had agreed to place an +Algerian harbour, Baume, at their disposal for the unloading of the +materials transported by sea, (as these things could be carried out +more easily in Algeria than in Tunis). The Reich Foreign Minister also +mentioned, in this connection, that Darlan had told him that he would +like it, for personal reasons, if lorries were sold to Germany only. +Should Italy wish to obtain such vehicles from the French, he proposed +that the sale should first take place to Germany, and that the trucks +should then be given by the Reich to Italy. The Duce and Count Ciano +agreed to this procedure. + +In reply to the Duce’s question as to what Germany had conceded to +France in exchange for these concessions, the Reich Foreign Minister +pointed to the lowering of the occupation costs from 20 to 15 millions +which, although it had not yet been definitely fixed, was expected, +as well as to certain facilities with the regard to the Line of +Demarcation. Further the rearming of some torpedo boats. + +The Fuehrer had laid down as a principle that France could be granted +facilities to the extent to which she on her part made the war against +England for the Axis easier. + +The Reich Foreign Minister answered the Duce’s question as to whether +concessions had been made regarding French prisoners of war in the +negative and mentioned that the Fuehrer had first of all reminded +Darlan of how the German prisoners of war had only been released in the +year 1920, when the World War had already been over a long time. + +The Reich Foreign Minister further pointed out that he had suggested to +Darlan that if France should now grant facilities for the continuation +of the war against England, such an attitude would be taken into +account when the peace was signed. Furthermore he had stressed to +Darlan the necessity that France choose now, and place herself +unambiguously on the side of the Axis. Germany had certain wishes +concerning naval bases in Morocco for the maintenance of her submarines +and surface vessels. If France agreed to that, she (Germany) would +allow her some destroyers to arm, as she had long requested to do. +Beyond this, Germany did not, for one moment, anticipate assistance +from France on a larger scale, just as she did not expect the possible +assistance of the French Fleet against England. + +It had been made clear to Darlan that in future the Axis powers would +be the decisive centre of power in Europe and that France would have to +toe the line in this respect. + +It was also pointed out that France must, of course, count on having +to make concessions in the Mediterranean in the peace treaty; the +Italian demands were indeed known to them. She might, however, receive +compensation for the concessions elsewhere, e.g. in Africa, at the +expense of England. + +In a private tete-a-tete conversation, Darlan declared to the Reich +Foreign Minister that he wished to assist the Axis powers against +England under all circumstances, after the Reich Foreign Minister had +analysed to him the three possibilities which offered themselves to +France, namely, that France could either work against Germany, in which +event she would be destroyed, or she could adopt a waiting attitude, +which, however, would also be to her detriment. Finally she could give +clear evidence of her will to cooperate with the Axis, and would then +receive an honourable position amongst the peoples of Europe. + +The Duce replied that there were two camps in France, those who +wanted to wait, and those who were in favour of collaboration. When +the Yugoslav campaign began, people in France had hoped that it would +end unfavourably for the Axis. The opinion of French politicians was +beginning to waver. Typical of the trend of public opinion was the +fact, that in those days the monument of King Alexander of Yugoslavia +in France had been decked with flowers by the population. But when the +French saw how quickly Germany was victorious in the Balkans, they +immediately turned round towards collaboration again. In Vichy the +majority belonged to the camp that wanted to await events. Count Ciano +here added that the only difference between Vichy and Paris was that +in Paris people were saying: “Let us hope the British win,” whilst +in Vichy people were saying, “Let us hope those British swine win”. +To this the Reich Foreign Minister added, that of course chauvinists +continued to exist in France and would have to be weeded out according +to a plan yet to be laid down. In his opinion Pétain was an old fox, +whose memory deserted him just at the moments when it best suited him. +A few days before, and in connection with the invitation to Admiral +Darlan to come to the Berghof [Hitler’s residence in Berchtesgaden], he +had written a letter to the Fuehrer, which factually contained nothing +of importance, but which nevertheless indicated that in France people +were gradually becoming more and more certain that the war was finally +lost. It was the Fuehrer’s opinion that final victory against England +must under all circumstances be achieved. For this purpose he wanted to +obtain from France a maximum of facilities, without in any way binding +himself. The French questions would be dealt with on this basis, and it +would now have to be seen how far Darlan was prepared to go along this +road. But, as already stated, France would only be granted concessions +in proportion to facilities for the battle against England. When the +French would participate on a large scale in the battle against England +was still undecided. + +To this the Duce remarked that France could give many small, but very +important bases to the Axis. In this connection he stressed the fact +that France always drew closer to the Axis when the Axis gained a +victory. But as soon as things were not making any proper headway, she +made eyes at England and the United States. The latter, particularly, +would have to be watched closely in this connection. The Reich Foreign +Minister agreed with this and remarked that if France was to attach +herself in any way to the Axis organization, this fact would make a +deep impression on the United States. + +The Duce agreed with this conception, and referred in this connection +to the policy, expressed by the Fuehrer, of the unity of all Europe +against England. Russia and Spain were alone absent from this united +front. Serrano Suner had actually stated that Spain would march after +this year’s harvest. But this seemed to him to be extremely doubtful. +To this the Reich Foreign Minister remarked that at the beginning of +this year Franco had unfortunately left the Axis completely in the +lurch. This he had to note with regret again and again. If he had +cooperated at that time, Gibraltar would today not be in the hands of +the British, and the Spanish people would probably have far more to eat +than now, when alms from England and America could not save them either. + +The Duce returned to his remark concerning the united front of Europe +against England and the two countries, Spain and Russia, that were +absent from it, with the remark that, to him, it seemed that it would +be advantageous if a policy of collaboration with Russia could be +carried out. He asked the Reich Foreign Minister whether Germany +excluded such a possibility, i.e. collaboration with Russia. The Reich +Foreign Minister replied that Germany had treaties with Russia, and +that the relations between the two countries were in other respects +correct. He personally did not believe that Stalin would undertake +anything against Germany. But should he do so, or should he carry out +a policy that was intolerable to Germany, then he would be destroyed +within 3 months.--The Duce agreed to this.--The Fuehrer would certainly +not look for any quarrel, but he had nevertheless taken precautions +for all eventualities. He had in no way come to any decision, but as a +result of certain occurrences and want of clearness on the part of the +Russians, he had become suspicious. Thus, for example, the Russians +had strengthened their forces along their western Frontier, which of +course caused Germany to reinforce her troops too, but only after the +Russians started it. + +But Russia would never be a problem that could have any influence on +the final victory against England. She would never be able to interfere +with Germany, for Germany had such a large number of troops available +that she could easily deal with any eventuality. + +The Duce then enquired whether Germany was not receiving deliveries +of raw materials from Russia, whereupon the Reich Foreign minister +mentioned the figures 1 million tons of oil and 1½ million tons of +corn, and added that these deliveries were coming in relatively well. + +During the further course of the conversation, the subject of Japan, +and in particular the Japanese-American exchange of opinions, was +touched upon. In this connection the Reich Foreign Minister stressed +the fact that the principle that Japan shared a common destiny with +Germany and Italy had been so clearly understood by the Japanese that +he (the Reich Foreign Minister), did not think Japan would pursue a +policy which would not in the end align itself once more with the +policy pursued by Germany and Italy. In this connection the Reich +Foreign Minister referred to Matsuoka’s remarks that he was forced into +frequent manoeuvres for reasons of home politics, and that on occasion +he might be forced to do things that would not be easily understood in +Germany. At any rate he (the Reich Foreign Minister) trusted Matsuoka, +although of course he could not know what was going on inside his +heart. It was unfavourable that the discussions with Roosevelt were +being conducted via Admiral Nomura, for at heart Nomura inclined rather +towards the Anglo-Saxons. Matsuoka had, for the time being, made the +following further enquiries: + +1. Whether the United States were willing to enter into an undertaking +not to enter into the European conflict, and + +2. What was the attitude of the United States on the problem of the +Philippines. + +If against all expectations, Japanese policy should follow a course +which does not correspond with the spirit of the Tripartite agreement, +great opposition would certainly arise all over Japan and Ambassador +Oshima would probably become the soul of such a real revolution. But +these affairs should be handled carefully, and we should avoid creating +unnecessary difficulties for Matsuoka. + +The whole affair shows that Roosevelt is beginning to get alarmed, +probably because he is gradually realizing that, in case of warlike +complications, he can accomplish nothing, because of America’s bad +armament position, and therefore wishes to keep his back free. + +The Duce remarked, in this connection, that it would without doubt be +favourable to Germany, and Italy if Matsuoka were in this manner to +prevent the United States entering the war. On the other hand, the +motive of his actions could, of course, also be Japan’s desire to keep +out of the war herself. + +To that, the German Foreign Minister remarked that, if a forcing +hand were played and it were laid down that the American system of +protecting convoys meant war, the Americans would most probably +hesitate, because American rearmament was the biggest bluff in the +world’s history. + +In this connection the Duce referred to the split which had appeared +in the United States and quoted speeches by Hoover and Lindbergh as +the most prominent opponents of Roosevelt’s policy. As against this, +the Jews and their propaganda were so strong that they had brought the +whole of America under their influence. But if in a country a War party +fights against a Peace party the War party usually wins, because war is +much nearer the soul of man than peace. + +The German Foreign Minister replied that the same naturally went for +Japan as well, and that it was his conviction that sooner or later +Japan would enter the war on the side of the Axis to exploit the +opportunities offered. Anyhow he was absolutely certain that Japan +would meet her treaty obligations. + +The Duce went on to speak about Turkey, which he called Germany’s and +Italy’s trump card. He asked the German Foreign Minister whether he +believed that Turkey would go with Germany and Italy. + +The German Foreign Minister replied that Germany was in the act of +trying to influence Turkey in this sense. The preliminary conditions +were favourable, in so much as it was not in Turkey’s interests to let +great masses of English troops assemble in Iraq, so that Germany hoped +to be able to draw the Turks over to her side. A certain improvement in +the attitude of the Turkish press could already be noted. + +Later on in the discussion the German Foreign Minister spoke about a +great intended propaganda drive in the British Empire, with the motto +that the Axis would support the liberation of all peoples oppressed by +the British. In this connection he mentioned the presence in Germany of +the Indian Nationalist leader--Bose--news which the Duce received with +surprise and great interest. The Duce agreed to this kind of propaganda. + +In conclusion, the German Foreign Minister explained the plans +according to which he intended to employ Bose for Indian propaganda +and he emphasized that the development of any antagonism between Bose +and Ghandi should be avoided. Besides, Ghandi had written a very good +article against the British a short while before. + +In conclusion, the Duce mentioned in this connection that Italy was +in contact with the Fakir of Ipi and was attempting by means of large +sums of money to get him, as well as the Grand Mufti, to carry on some +activity in the interests of the Axis. Even if these actions were +not very extensive, they would nevertheless create some unpleasant +difficulties for the English. + +When parting, the possibility of having another discussion next morning +shortly before the return flight of the German Foreign Minister, was +left open. + +This discussion took place in a very cordial spirit. + +Fuschl, the 14th May 1941. + + SCHMIDT. + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1871-PS + +Minutes of the conference between the Fuehrer and the Italian Minister +for Foreign Affairs, Count Ciano, in the presence of the Reich Foreign +Minister of Obersalzberg on 12 August 1939. + +At the beginning of the conference the Fuehrer with the aid of maps +explained to Count Ciano the present situation of Germany from the +military standpoint. He emphasized particularly the strength of the +German fortifications in the west. There are three break-through points +in the west at which the French had in former times always attempted +to break through for geographical and strategic reasons, which have +now been protected with particular care, so that a break-through +seems impossible here as well. Moreover, fortifications have also +been built along the Luxemburg and Belgian borders up to the Dutch +border, so that a violation of Belgian neutrality would no longer give +France any military advantages, but would only involve the danger that +Belgium would join the German side in order to defend her neutrality +and under pressure from the Flemish part of the population. The only +remaining possibility of attack is therefore theoretically through the +Netherlands. But they too would, in the opinion of the Fuehrer, defend +their neutrality energetically because they would know that if they +should participate in a general conflict they would lose their East +Asiatic colonies, which are almost undefended, to Japan. Moreover, the +Netherlands are completely unsuitable as an assembly area for a large +army because of the numerous rivers and the possibility of flooding +large parts of the land which lies below sea level. In case of a breach +of Dutch neutrality Germany would of course move into the country +immediately and would have the possibility of reaching the Meuse in a +few hours because of its proximity to the German border. Besides, the +Rhine which is 1 to 1½ km wide in Holland offers natural protection +against attacks from this direction. + +The third possibility of attacking Germany is a blockade by the British +Navy. But it must be kept in mind the ships used for the blockade would +be attacked from the air from Germany, since all of England is within +the radius of attack of the German air force, because of the long range +of the latest German bombers. There are no further possibilities of +attack on Germany. The Nordic countries would no doubt remain neutral +and are safe from air attack from any side, since there is hardly any +question of occupying such large areas as Norway and Sweden. In the +same way Switzerland would certainly defend her neutrality to the last +against any invader. + +Germany has likewise built strong fortifications in the East. The +Fuehrer showed Count Ciano the various fortification systems of East +Prussia (Koenigsberg, Heilsberg triangle, border fortifications). +On the rest of the German frontier (Grenzmark, Silesia) strong +fortifications are also being built, which have been developed, +particularly on the Polish border opposite Berlin, into an impregnable +system of lines lying one behind the other. Of course the capital is +exposed to air attacks, since it lies only 150 km from the Polish +border, particularly since because of its size (28 km north to south +and 45 km east to west) the city could be bombed from a very great +altitude (8 to 9,000 meters) without the possibility of attacking +certain targets but with the certainty that the bombs would hit +somewhere within the city. + +Proceeding to the military situation of the western powers and Poland +the Fuehrer again pointed out England’s vulnerability from the air. +Although some progress has been made in air craft production, the +anti-aircraft defense is still quite backward. It is known that England +decided on a certain type of anti-aircraft gun only last fall, and we +have enough experience on the basis of our own 7 years of rearmament +to know that mass production is possible only a long time after the +choice of a prototype, so that effective anti-aircraft defense can be +expected in England only after 1 to 2 years. Moreover, London and other +great cities and industrial centers have the same disadvantage which +characterizes Berlin’s position in regard to Polish air attacks: from +high altitude, out of range of the present English AA guns which are +left from the war, bombing can be carried out in absolute safety, which +would be successful in any case in the general target area. + +At the present time England has no increase in sea power to record. The +first units of the ships under construction cannot be put in service +for some time. As for the land army, 60,000 men have been called up +since the introduction of compulsory military service. If England +keeps the necessary troops at home, she will be in a position to put +at the disposal of France only two infantry divisions and one armored +division. Furthermore she can transfer a few groups of bombers to +France but hardly any groups of fighters, since the German air fleet +would attack England immediately upon the outbreak of war, and the +English fighter planes would be urgently needed for the protection of +their own country. + +In regard to France’s situation--the Fuehrer said that in a general +conflict after the expected conquest, within a short time, of Poland, +Germany would be in a position to assemble 100 divisions at the +Westwall, which would force France to assemble all available forces +from the colonies, from the Italian border, and elsewhere at the +Maginot line for the life and death struggle which would then begin. +Moreover, it is his opinion that the French cannot overrun the Italian +fortifications any more than the Westwall. + +At this point Count Ciano showed signs of extreme doubt. + +The Polish Army varies greatly in its value. Besides several crack +divisions there are a number of inferior units. Poland is very weak +in AA and anti-tank defense. At present France and England cannot +supply her. If, however, Poland is supported economically for a +considerable period of time by the West, she could acquire these +weapons, and Germany’s superiority would be reduced. The fanatics of +Warsaw and Cracow are opposed by the indifferent peasant population +of other districts. Besides, the composition of the population of +the Polish state must be considered: out of 34 million inhabitants +1½ million are German, about 4 million are Jews, and an estimated 9 +million Ukrainians, so that there are considerably fewer real Poles +than the total population, and even these, as mentioned before, have +to be differently evaluated in regard to fighting power. Under these +circumstances, Poland would be conquered by Germany in a very short +time. + +As Poland makes it clear by her whole attitude that in case of conflict +she will in any event be on the side of the enemies of Germany and +Italy, quick liquidation at this moment would only be of advantages for +the unavoidable conflict with the western democracies. If a hostile +Poland should remain on Germany’s Eastern frontier, not only the 11 +East Prussian Divisions, but also further contingents would be tied up +in Pomerania and Silesia, which would not be the case in the event of +previous liquidation. Generally speaking, it would be best to liquidate +the pseudo-neutrals one after the other. This is fairly easily done, if +one Axis partner protects the rear of the other, who is just finishing +off one of the uncertain neutrals, and vice versa. Italy may consider +Yugoslavia such an uncertain neutral. At the visit of Prince Regent +Paul he (the Fuehrer) suggested, particularly in consideration of +Italy that Prince Paul clarify his political attitude toward the Axis +by a gesture. He had thought of a closer connection with the Axis and +Yugoslavia’s leaving the League of Nations. Prince Paul agreed to the +matter. Recently the Prince Regent was in London and sought reinsurance +from the western powers. The same thing was repeated that happened in +the case of Gafencu, who was also very reasonable during his visit +to Germany and who denied any interest in the aims of the western +democracies. Afterwards it was learned that he had later assumed a +contrary standpoint in England. Among the Balkan countries the Axis +can completely rely on Bulgaria, which is in a sense a natural ally +of Italy and Germany. That is why Germany has supported Bulgaria as +much as possible with supplies of weapons and will continue to do so. +Yugoslavia would stay neutral only as long as it would be dangerous to +take the side of the western democracies openly. At the moment when +there would be a turn to the worse for Germany and Italy, however, +Yugoslavia would join the other side openly, hoping thereby to give +matters a final turn to the disadvantage of the Axis. Rumania is afraid +of Hungary and is militarily very weak and internally corrupt. King +Carol would doubtless not give up his neutrality unless absolutely +necessary. + +Hungary is friendly and Slovakia is under German influence and even has +German garrisons in some parts. + +Returning to the question of Danzig, the Fuehrer explained to Count +Ciano that it is impossible to yield on this point. He has agreed +with Italy to withdraw the Germans from South Tyrol, but for that +very reason he must carefully avoid everything that could give the +impression that a precedent has been created by the withdrawal of +the Germans from South Tyrol, which could be applied to other +regions, too. Besides, his justification to the German people of the +withdrawal of these Germans from Italy is the German policy, which is +in general, directed toward the east and the north-east. The east and +the north-east--i.e., the Baltic countries--have always been Germany’s +uncontested sphere of interest, just as the Mediterranean is Italy’s +own sphere. Germany needs the grain and wood-producing countries of +these eastern regions for economic reasons as well. Danzig is not +only a case of material interests, however, although this city is the +biggest Baltic port. The turn-over amounts to 40% of the tonnage of +Hamburg. + +Danzig, the Nordic Nurnberg, is an old German city, which awakens +sentimental feelings in every German, and just this psychological +element forces the Fuehrer to respect public opinion. To make the +situation easier to understand for an Italian, Count Ciano should +imagine that Trieste is in the hands of Yugoslavia and a strong Italian +minority on Yugoslavian territory is being treated with brutal force. +It can hardly be supposed that Italy would look on calmly for very long. + +_Count Ciano_ replied to the Fuehrer’s explanations by first pointing +out the great surprise among the Italians at the absolutely unexpected +seriousness of the situation. Neither in the Milan conversations nor +in the talks on the occasion of his visit to Berlin was any indication +given by the Germans that the situation with regard to Poland was so +serious. On the contrary, the Reich foreign minister had declared that +in his opinion the question of Danzig will be settled in the course of +time. On the basis of this state of affairs, the Duce decided, true +to his conviction that a conflict with the western democracies is +unavoidable, to make his preparations for that eventuality and made +his plans for a certain period of time of 2 to 3 years. If a conflict +is unavoidable now, Italy would of course be on Germany’s side, as the +Duce re-emphasized just before Count Ciano’s departure, but for various +reasons, enumerated in detail, Italy would welcome a postponement of +the general conflict. + +_Count Ciano_ then explained, with the aid of a map, the Italian +position at the outbreak of a general conflict. Italy believes, he +said, that a conflict with Poland would not be restricted to that +country, but would grow into a general European war. + +_The Fuehrer_ remarked that opinions differ on that point. He +personally is firmly convinced that the western democracies will in the +end shy away from precipitating a general war. + +_Count Ciano_ replied that he hoped the Fuehrer was right, but he did +not believe it. In any case, one should adapt one’s reflections to +the worst possibility, i.e., to general conflict. Since the Abyssinian +conflict Italy has actually been constantly living in a state of war +and therefore urgently needs a breathing spell. Count Ciano proved +with the aid of figures how great Italy’s material effort had been, +especially in the Spanish conflict. Italy’s stock of raw materials is +now exhausted. She needs time to restock her warehouses. + +She must also transfer her war industries, all of which are in an +exposed location, to the south, in order to be better able to defend +them. In the same way the Italian artillery, particularly the AA +defense, is greatly in need of modernization. The long coast line and +other exposed points are not sufficiently defended. + +The strength of the fleet is also extremely unfavorable. At the +moment Italy can put against the combined English and French 11 to +12 battleships only 2 of its own, while in a few years a total of 8 +battleships will be available. + +At this point the Fuehrer remarked that of course England and France +will have additional battleships of 35,000 and 40,000 tons. + +_Count Ciano_ pointed out the long Italian coastline, which is hard to +defend and the numerous bases at the disposal of the English and French +fleets, giving particular attention to the Greek ports. + +The Italian colonies are especially vulnerable at present. Lybya is +hard to attack from Egypt, it is true, while from Lybya there is the +possibility of advancing to Marsah Matru. The situation in regard to +Tunisia is quite different. The proportion of the Italian and French +Arab population is 1 to 20, while the strength of white troops is 1 to +5 to Italy’s disadvantage. Besides, the Italian fortifications on the +French frontier are quite inadequate. Only recently new armored bunkers +were delivered. + +Though Abyssinia is almost pacified, with the exception of certain +regions along the border of the English territory, where the English +create difficulties among the population with their money and +propaganda, this pacification is only on the surface. It would be +sufficient, in a general conflict for a few English airplanes to drop +leaflets over Abyssinia, saying that the world had risen against Italy +and that the Negus would return, to make the revolt of the Abyssinians +flare up again. Besides, Abyssinia would be cut off completely from the +motherland in case of a conflict, and the fate of the 200,000 Italians +in Abyssinia would be very uncertain. In a few years there would be an +army of 4 to 500,000 men in Abyssinia, and if a conflict should break +out then it would be possible to attack the Sudan, Kenya, and French +Somaliland successfully. + +The islands of the Dodecanese would be in difficulties because of the +attitude of Turkey. Of course Leros and Rhodes could defend themselves +for years. + +Albania is a completely undeveloped country and would make an effective +base for operations against the Balkans only after several years. +First roads have to be built and the natural resources (iron, copper, +chromium, and petroleum) have to be exploited, and then one could +consider, as the Fuehrer had indicated, advancing successfully on +Saloniki and in other directions of the Balkans, as along the five +fingers of an outstretched hand. + +Italy has plans of economic autarchy which cannot be realized for +several years and which would then put Italy in a position to withstand +even a prolonged war without difficulties. Another reason for the +Duce’s desire to postpone the conflict is the Italians abroad, who were +to be brought back to Italy according to plan. One million Italians +live in France, of whom about 700,000 are definitely lost for Italy. +The other 300,000, however, would be used by France as hostages in case +of a conflict, as could be seen from some measures taken by France in +September of last year. + +Besides, the Duce personally attaches great importance to the orderly +execution of the world’s fair in 1942, for which Italy made big +preparations and from which she hopes for good results in the economic +field, especially as regards the inflow of foreign currency. + +Besides these considerations, which are based on Italy’s position, +there are others of a general political nature which recommend +postponement of a general conflict. The Duce is convinced that the +encirclement system of the western democracies would doubtless work +at the present time. But after a certain length of time the points +of friction and the seeds of disunity would come to the fore among +the partners of the encirclement front, and the front would gradually +disintegrate. + +Moreover, the Duce is convinced that the present enthusiasm in England +and France will not last very long. Soon, particularly in France, the +union sacree will once more be replaced by party discord, on condition +that the Axis keeps quiet for a time. At the present time it is only +due to the Axis that internal differences have been buried in the +respective countries. + +Japan’s position would also be much stronger after the termination +of the China conflict, which is to be expected in two years, while +Roosevelt’s position in America would be seriously weakened after a +period of calm in the field of foreign politics, so that he could not +be elected president for a third time, which would certainly be the +case if a conflict should break out soon. + +Spain, which has just acquired government friendly to the Axis (Serano +Suner, Beigbeder), needs peace after the civil war, but would stand at +the side of the Axis in 2 to 3 years as a power not to be neglected. +Thus, for example, within 2 years Spain would build 4 battleships of +35,000 tons each, the plans for which have just been taken to Spain by +an Italian General. The construction is to take place in El Ferrol. + +For these reasons the Duce wishes strongly (le Duce insiste) that the +Axis powers should make a gesture which would emphasize anew the will +of peace of Italy and Germany. This could be done by the publication of +a communique which Count Ciano had given to the Reich foreign minister +on the previous day and which he now presented again in the following +English (and French version): * * * + +Count Ciano said in connection with this tentative communique that +the Duce had at first contemplated a proposal for a conference, but +conscious of the Fuehrer’s misgivings, he now makes another suggestion +in a milder form and is very much interested in its acceptance. + +_The Fuehrer_ declared concerning the conference plan that in future +meetings of the powers it will not be possible to exclude Russia. In +the German-Russian conversations the Russians made it plain, with +reference to Munich and other occasions from which they had been +excluded, that they would not tolerate this any more. Besides the 4 +main powers, Poland and Spain would also have to be included in such a +conference, besides Russia. This means, however, that Italy, Germany, +and Spain would oppose England, France, Russia, and Poland, which +certainly is an unfavorable position. + +_Count Ciano_ replied that the Duce is of the opinion that the one who +wins at a conference is the one who is ready to let the conference fail +if necessary and to accept war as a possible result. Moreover, the +Duce took the Fuehrer’s misgivings into consideration and modified his +proposal. He sees in an Italian and German peace gesture, as suggested +in this proposal, the advantage that the western powers, which are +internally not at all ready for war--but would surely start it at the +present moment, if they were, so to speak, forced to the wall by the +Axis and saw no other way out, according to the conviction of the Duce, +based on very reliable information from the democracies. [Translator’s +note: This sentence is incomplete--possibly something was omitted +in copying]. The suggested gesture of Germany and Italy represents a +face-saving way out for the western powers, which they will certainly +use, for there are wide circles which warn against war and which would +be backed up by a peace gesture. This means, however, that Poland, +which would doubtless be abandoned by the western powers, would be +isolated after a time and would have to agree to reasonable solutions +of the existing difficulties. + +_The Fuehrer_ replied that there is no time to be lost in the solution +of the Polish problem. The further we get into fall the harder military +operations in the east of Europe will be. The air force could hardly be +employed at all after the middle of September in those regions because +of the weather conditions, while the motorized forces would also be +unusable because of the condition of the roads, which are rapidly +turned to mud by the rains which set in in the fall. From September to +May Poland is one big swamp and absolutely unsuitable for any military +operations. Thus Poland could simply occupy Danzig in October--and she +probably intends to do so--without Germany’s being able to do anything +against it; for it is out of the question to shell and destroy Danzig. + +_Count Ciano_ asked by what time the question of Danzig will have +to be settled, in the Fuehrer’s opinion. _The Fuehrer_ replied that +this question will have to be settled one way or the other by the +end of August. The Fuehrer replied to Ciano’s question as to how +the Fuehrer imagined the solution, that Poland will have to give up +Danzig politically, whereby her economic interests will of course be +preserved, and that she will have to contribute by her general attitude +to a release of the tension. It is doubtful whether Poland will be +willing to do so; for hitherto she had rejected the German proposals. +The Fuehrer personally made these proposals to Beck on the occasion +of his visit to Obersalzberg. They were very favorable for Poland. In +exchange for the political return of Danzig to Germany, with complete +preservation of Polish economic interests and the establishment of +a connection between East Prussia and the Reich, Germany conceded a +border guarantee, a 25-year friendship pact, and Polish participation +in influence on Slovakia. At that time Beck acknowledged the proposal +with the remark that he wanted to examine it. The sharp refusal was +only the consequence of English intervention. Poland’s aims can, +moreover, be seen clearly in her press. All of East Prussia should be +occupied, they want to advance to Berlin, etc. In the long run it is +unbearable for a big power to tolerate such a hostile neighbor at a +distance of only 150 km from its capital. The Fuehrer is therefore +determined to use the opportunity of the next political provocation, in +the form of an ultimatum, brutal mistreatment of Germans, an attempt +to starve out Danzig, or something similar, to attack Poland within +48 hours and to solve the problem in this way. This would mean a +considerable strengthening of the Axis, just as an Italian liquidation +of Yugoslavia would mean a considerable increase of power for the Axis. + +_Count Ciano_ asked when such an undertaking against Poland is to be +expected, since Italy must of course prepare for all eventualities. The +Fuehrer replied that under the prevailing circumstances an attack on +Poland is to be expected at any moment. + +A telegram from Moscow and one from Tokyo were handed to the Fuehrer +during this exchange of opinions. The conference was interrupted for +a short time, and then Count Ciano was informed of the contents of +the Moscow telegram. The Russians agreed to the sending of a German +political mediator to Moscow. The Reich foreign minister added that the +Russians were completely informed about Germany’s intentions against +Poland. He himself had informed the Russian charge d’affaires, by order +of the Fuehrer. + +_The Fuehrer_ remarked that in his opinion Russia would not be willing +to pull chestnuts out of the fire for the western powers. Stalin’s +position is endangered as much by a victorious Russian army as by a +defeated Russian army. Russia is, at the most, interested in enlarging +her access to the Baltic a little. Germany has no objection to that. +Besides, Russia would hardly take the part of Poland, whom she hates +from the bottom of her heart. The sending of the English-French +military mission to Moscow has only the purpose of averting the +catastrophic state of political negotiations. + +After further discussion of the communique proposed by Count Ciano, +the Fuehrer said that he wanted to think over for a day, this proposal +as well as Count Ciano’s explanation of the general situation, and he +therefore suggested that the discussion be resumed the next day. + + Salzburg 12 August 1939 + + signed Schmidt. + + + PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1874-PS + + Notes on the Conference Between General Field Marshal GOERING and the + DUCE in the Presence of Count CIANO + + 15 April 1939 + +[_Page 4, par. 2_] + +However, the heavy armament of Czechoslovakia shows, in any case, how +dangerous this country could have been, even after Munich, in the event +of a serious conflict. Because of Germany’s action the situation of +both axis countries was ameliorated, among other reasons because of the +economic possibilities which result from the transfer to Germany of the +great production capacity (armament potential) of Czechoslovakia. That +contributes toward a considerable strengthening of the axis against +the Western powers. Furthermore, Germany now need not keep ready a +single division for protection against that country in case of a bigger +conflict. This, too, is an advantage by which both axis countries will, +in the last analysis, benefit. + +[_Page 5, par. 2_] + +* * * the action taken by Germany in Czechoslovakia is to be viewed +as an advantage for the axis in case Poland should finally join the +enemies of the axis powers. Germany could then attack this country +from 2 flanks and would be within only 25 minutes flying distance from +the new Polish industrial center which had been moved further into +the interior of the country, nearer to the other Polish industrial +districts, because of its proximity to the border. Now by the turn of +events it is located again in the proximity of the border. + +[_Page 6, par. 2_] + +Furthermore the Fieldmarshal happened to talk about the date at +which Germany would be prepared best for a greater test of strength. +In this connection he pointed out that Germany at the moment was +comparatively weak on the sea because both the new battleships which +had been launched recently would be ready for commissioning only next +year and two additional battleships would be launched only next year. +In the airforce also, regrouping and adaptation of a new bomber type +“JU 88”, the production of which had yet to begin, was taking place. +This new German bomber had such a range that it would be possible to +attack not only England herself, but moreover that would push forward +into a western direction, in order to bomb the ships which come from +the Atlantic to England. Of course, Germany was ready for action, if +suddenly some conflict should come up. But if one was considering at +what period of time the armament situation was most favorable, both +the facts mentioned above--the insufficient armament at sea and the +reconversion of the airforce to the new type of bomber--should not be +disregarded. Besides in the fall already a monthly production of 280 +planes of the “JU 88” and at the end of the year of 350 planes, could +be counted upon. On the basis of these calculations he came to the +conclusion that in 9 months or one year the situation for the axis, +from a military point of view, would be more favorable. On the other +hand it was true that the rearmament in England and France had not made +very much progress. In many cases, the factories for the production of +war material were only in a state of construction. England would most +likely not be able to show any results worth mentioning before 1942 for +her new beginning high pressure rearmament in the air. + +Furthermore, the Fuehrer considered it almost out of the question +that England and France would not stand together. According to the +German point of view, both countries would in any conflict eventually +support each other to the utmost. Only if England should execute a +complete reversal of her policy, and the costs and risks of her present +political line should become too high, she would perhaps adapt herself +to confining her efforts to the preservation of the empire and give +the authoritarian countries a free hand for the securing of their +vital necessities. At the present time England had a weak government +which had yielded to the pressure of the leftist circles. England had +deviated from her old line in a way that it offers assistance only on +the basis of her own judgment of the situation in question from case +to case and she had, in completely turning away from her traditional +policy of giving support from time to time only on the basis of her own +judgment of the situation at the time, now obliged herself in advance +to render support, and that under conditions which could be determined +by the other partner. It was another question, of course, how England +could fulfill her guarantee obligation in fact. How was she going to +help Poland or Rumania, for instance? She did not have the possibility +of sending troops and could actually fulfill her obligations only by +setting ablaze a general war. + +All in all, however, it had to be stressed, that the situation of the +axis was very strong and that it could defeat all possible opponents in +a general conflict. + + + PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1877-PS + + Report RAM 19/41 + + REPORT ON THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE REICH MINISTER FOR FOREIGN + AFFAIRS [RAM] AND THE JAPANESE FOREIGN MINISTER MATSUOKA IN BERLIN ON + 29 MARCH 1941. + +The RAM resumed the preceding conversation with Matsuoka about the +latter’s impending talks with the Russians in Moscow, where they had +left off. He expressed the opinion, that it would probably be best, +in view of the whole situation, not to carry the discussions with the +Russians too far. He did not know how the situation would develop. +One thing, however, was certain, namely that Germany would strike +immediately, should Russia ever attack Japan. He was ready to give +Matsuoka this positive assurance, so that Japan could push forward +to the South on Singapore, without fear of possible complications +with Russia. The largest part of the German army was anyway on the +Eastern frontiers of the Reich, and fully prepared to open the attack +at any time. He (the RAM) however believed, that Russia would try to +avoid developments leading to war. Should Germany however enter into +a conflict with Russia, the USSR would be finished off within a few +months. In this case, Japan had of course even less reason to be afraid +than ever, if it wants to advance on Singapore. Consequently, it need +not refrain from such an undertaking because of possible fears of +Russia. + +He could not know of course, just how things with Russia would develop. +It was uncertain, whether or not Stalin would intensify his present +unfriendly policy against Germany. He (the RAM) wanted to point out to +Matsuoka in any case, that a conflict with Russia was anyhow within +the realm of possibility. In any case, Matsuoka could not report to +the Japanese Emperor upon his return, that a conflict between Russia +and Germany was impossible. On the contrary, the situation was such, +that such a conflict, even if it were not probable, would have to be +considered possible. * * * + +Next, the RAM turned again to the Singapore question. In view of the +fears, expressed by the Japanese, of possible attacks by submarines, +based on the Philippines and of the intervention of the British +Mediterranean and Home fleets, he had again discussed the situation +with General-Admiral Raeder. The latter had stated, that the British +Navy during this year would have its hands so full in the English home +waters and in the Mediterranean, that it would not be able to send even +a single ship to the Far East. General-Admiral Raeder had described the +U.S. submarines as so bad, that Japan need not bother about them at +all. + +Matsuoka replied immediately, that the Japanese Navy had a very low +estimate of the threat from the British Navy; it also held the view, +that in case of a clash with the American Navy, it would be able to +smash the latter without trouble. However it was afraid, that the +Americans would not take up the battle with their fleet; thus the +conflict with the United States might perhaps be dragged out to five +years. This possibility caused considerable worry in Japan. + +The RAM replied, that America could not do anything against Japan in +the case of the capture of Singapore. Perhaps for this reason alone, +Roosevelt would think twice before deciding on active measures against +Japan. For while on one hand he could not achieve anything against +Japan, on the other hand there was the probability of losing the +Philippines to Japan; for the American President, of course, this would +mean a considerable loss of prestige, and because of the inadequate +rearmament, he would have nothing with which to offset such a loss. + +In this connection, Matsuoka pointed out, that he was doing everything +to reassure the English about Singapore. He acted as if Japan had +no intention at all regarding this key position of England in the +East. Therefore it might be possible, that his attitude toward the +British would appear to be friendly in words and in acts. However, +Germany should not be deceived by that. He assumed this attitude not +only in order to reassure the British, but also in order to fool the +pro-British and pro-American elements so long, until one day he would +suddenly open the attack on Singapore. + +In this connection, Matsuoka stated, that his tactics were based on +the certain assumption, that the sudden attack against Singapore would +unite the entire Japanese nation with one blow. (“Nothing succeeds like +success,” the RAM remarked.) He followed here the example of the words +of a famous Japanese statesman, addressed to the Japanese Navy at the +outbreak of the Russo-Japanese war: “You open fire, then the nation +will be united”. The Japanese need to be shaken up to awaken. After +all, as an oriental, he believed in the fate, which would come, whether +you wanted it or not. * * * + +Matsuoka then introduced the subject of German assistance in the blow +against Singapore, a subject which had been broached to him frequently, +and mentioned the proposal of a German written promise of assistance. + +The RAM replied, that he had already discussed these questions with +Ambassador Oshima. He had asked him to procure maps of Singapore in +order that the Fuehrer--who probably must be considered the greatest +expert on military questions at the present time--could advise Japan on +the best method of attack against Singapore. German experts on aerial +warfare, too, would be at their disposal; they could draw up a report, +based on their European experiences, for the Japanese on the use of +dive-bombers from airfields in the vicinity against the British fleet +in Singapore. Thus the British fleet would be forced to disappear from +Singapore immediately. + +Matsuoka remarked, that Japan was less concerned with the British +fleet, than with the capture of the fortifications. + +The RAM replied, that here too, the Fuehrer had developed new methods +for the German attacks on strongly fortified positions, such as the +Maginot Line and Fort Eben Emael, which he could make available to the +Japanese. + +Matsuoka replied in this connection, that some of the younger expert +Japanese naval officers, who were close friends of his, were of the +opinion, that the Japanese naval forces would need three months until +they could capture Singapore. As a cautious foreign minister, he had +doubled this estimate. He believed, he could stave off any danger which +threatened from America, for six months. If, however, the capture of +Singapore required still more time and if the operations would perhaps +even drag out for a year, the situation with America would become +extremely critical and he did not know as yet how to meet it. + +If at all avoidable, he would not touch the Netherlands East Indies, +since he was afraid that in case of a Japanese attack on this area, +the oilfields would be set afire. They could be brought into operation +again only after 1 or 2 years. + +The RAM added, that Japan would gain decisive influence over the +Netherlands East Indies simultaneously with the capture of Singapore. * +* * + +Berlin, the 31st of March 1941. + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1881-PS + + Notes Fueh 20/41 + + NOTES + + regarding the discussion between the FUEHRER and the Japanese Foreign + Minister MATSUOKA in the presence of the Reich Foreign Minister and of + the Minister of State MEISSNER in Berlin on the 4th of April 1941. + +Matsuoka further mentioned, that he was induced to make those endeavors +for peace particularly in view of the personality of Cardinal Caspari. + +Furthermore he had endeavored to convince the Pope, that the United +States and particularly the American President prolonged the war in +Europe and in China. It was not the question to determine, if America +or its President were right or wrong. They certainly had their definite +reasons for their policy. Notwithstanding the question of right or +wrong, one had to state the fact that they prolonged the war in Europe +and in China. In regard to China, he tried to convince the Pope that +Japan was not fighting the Chinese or China herself, but merely the +Bolshevism which threatened to spread in China and in the entire Far +East. It is regretful that America and England sided with Bolshevism. + +The Fuehrer interrupted that both countries also sided in Spain with +Bolshevism. + +Matsuoka then also expressed the request, that the Fuehrer should +instruct the proper authorities in Germany to meet as broad-mindedly as +possible the wishes of the Japanese Military Commission. Japan was in +need of German help particularly concerning the U-boat warfare, which +could be given by making available to them the latest experiences of +the war as well as the latest technical improvements and inventions. +Japan would do her utmost to avoid a war with the United States. In +case that country should decide to attack Singapore, the Japanese navy, +of course, had to be prepared for a fight with the United States, +because in that case America probably would side with Great Britain. +He (Matsuoka) personally believed, that the United States could be +restrained by diplomatic exertions from entering the war at the side of +Great Britain. The Army and Navy had, however, to count on the worst +situation, that is with war against America. They were of the opinion +that such a war would extend for five years or longer and would take +the form of guerilla warfare in the Pacific and would be fought out in +the South Sea. For this reason, the German experiences in her guerilla +warfare are of the greatest value to Japan. It was a question how such +a war would best be conducted and how all the technical improvements of +submarines, in all details such as periscopes and such like, could best +be exploited by Japan. + +To sum up, Matsuoka requested that the Fuehrer should see to it that +the proper German authorities should place those developments and +inventions concerning navy and army which were needed by the Japanese +at their disposal. + +The Fuehrer promised this and pointed out that Germany too considered +a conflict with the United States undesirable, but that it had already +made allowances for such a contingency. In Germany one was of the +opinion that America’s contributions depended upon the possibilities +of transportation, and that this again is conditioned by the available +tonnage. Germany’s war against tonnage, however, means a decisive +weakening not merely against England, but also against America. Germany +has made her preparations so that no American could land in Europe. She +would conduct a most energetic fight against America with her U-boats +and her Luftwaffe, and due to her superior experience, which would +still have to be acquired by the United States, she would be vastly +superior, and that quite apart from the fact that the German soldiers +naturally rank high above the American. + +In the further course of the discussion the Fuehrer pointed out that +Germany on her part would immediately take the consequences, if Japan +would get involved with the United States. It did not matter with whom +the United States would first get involved if with Germany or with +Japan. They would always try to eliminate one country at a time, not +to come to an understanding with the other country subsequently, but +to liquidate this one just the same. Therefore, Germany would strike, +as already mentioned, without delay in case of a conflict between +Japan and America, because the strength of the tripartite powers lies +in their joint action, their weakness would be if they would let +themselves be beaten individually. + +Matsuoka once more repeated his request, that the Fuehrer might give +the necessary instructions, in order that the proper German authorities +would place at the disposal of the Japanese the latest improvements and +inventions, which are of interest to them, because the Japanese navy +had to prepare immediately for a conflict with the United States. + +As regards Japanese-American relationship, Matsuoka explained further +that he has always declared in his country, that sooner or later a war +with the United States would be unavoidable, if Japan continued to +drift along as at present. In his opinion this conflict would happen +rather sooner than later. His argument went on, why should Japan, +therefore, not decisively strike at the right moment and take the risk +upon herself of a fight against America? Just thus would she perhaps +avoid a war for generations, particularly if she gained predominance +in the South Seas. There are, to be sure, in Japan many who hesitate +to follow those trends of thought. Matsuoka was considered in those +circles a dangerous man with dangerous thoughts. He, however, stated +that, if Japan continued to walk along her present path, one day she +would have to fight anyway and that this would then be under less +favorable circumstances than at present. + +The Fuehrer replied that he could well understand the situation of +Matsuoka, because he himself was in similar situations (the clearing of +the Rhineland, declaration of sovereignty of armed forces). He too was +of the opinion that he had to exploit favorable conditions and accept +the risk of an anyhow unavoidable fight at a time when he himself was +still young and full of vigor. How right he was in his attitude was +proven by events. Europe now was free. He would not hesitate a moment +to reply instantly to any widening of the war, be it by Russia, be it +by America. Providence favored those who will not let dangers come to +them, but who will bravely face them. + +Matsuoka replied, that the United States or rather their ruling +politicians had recently still attempted a last maneuver towards +Japan, by declaring that America would not fight Japan on account +of China or the South Seas provided that Japan gave free passage +to the consignments of rubber and tin to America to their place of +destination. However, America would war against Japan the moment she +felt that Japan entered the war with the intention to assist in the +destruction of Great Britain. Such an argument naturally did not miss +its effect upon the Japanese, because of the education oriented on +English lines which many had received. + +The Fuehrer commented on this, that this attitude of America did not +mean anything but that the United States had the hope that, as long as +the British World Empire existed, one day they could advance against +Japan together with Great Britain, whereas, in case of the collapse +of the World Empire, they would be totally isolated and could not do +anything against Japan. + +The Reich Foreign Minister interjected that the Americans precisely +under all circumstances wanted to maintain the powerful position of +England in East Asia, but that, on the other hand, it is proved by this +attitude to what extent she fears a joint action of Japan and Germany. + +Matsuoka continued that it seemed to him of importance to give to the +Fuehrer an absolutely clear picture of the real attitude inside Japan. +For this reason he also had to inform him regretfully of the fact +that he (Matsuoka) in his capacity as Japanese Minister for Foreign +Affairs could not utter in Japan itself a single word of all that +he had expounded before the Fuehrer and the Reich Foreign Minister +regarding his plans. This would cause him serious damage in political +and financial circles. Once before he had committed the mistake, before +he became Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, to tell a close +friend something about his intentions. It seems that the latter had +spread these things and thus brought about all sorts of rumors, which +he as Foreign Minister had to oppose energetically, though as a rule +he always tells the truth. Under these circumstances he also could not +indicate, how soon he could report on the questions discussed to the +Japanese Premier or to the Emperor. He would have to study exactly +and carefully in the first place the development in Japan, so as to +make his decision at a favorable moment, to make a clear breast of +his proper plans towards the Prince Konoye and the Emperor. Then the +decision would have to be made within a few days, because the plans +would otherwise be spoiled by talk. + +Should he, Matsuoka, fail to carry out his intentions, that would be +proof that he is lacking in influence, in power of conviction, and in +tactical capabilities. However, should he succeed it would prove that +he had great influence in Japan. He himself felt confident that he +would succeed. + +On his return, being questioned, he would indeed admit to the Emperor, +the Premier and the Ministers for the Navy and the Army, that Singapore +had been discussed; he would, however, state that it was only on a +hypothetical basis. + +Besides this, Matsuoka made the express request not to cable in the +matter of Singapore because he had reason to fear that, by cabling, +something might leak out. If necessary he would send a courier. + +The Fuehrer agreed and assured him, after all, that he could rest +entirely assured of German reticence. + +Matsuoka replied he believed indeed in German reticence, but +unfortunately could not say the same of Japan. + +The discussion was terminated after the exchange of some personal +parting words. + +Berlin, the 4th of April 1941. + + Signed: SCHMIDT + + + PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1882-PS + + Aufz RAM 21/41 + +Notes on the talk between the Reich Foreign Minister and the Japanese +Foreign Minister Matsuoka in Berlin on 5 April 1941. + +[Pages 2 to 3] + +Matsuoka then spoke of the general high morale in Germany referring +to the happy faces he had seen everywhere among the workers during +his recent visit to the Borsig Works. He expressed his regret that +developments in Japan had not as yet advanced as far as in Germany and +that in his country the intellectuals still exercised considerable +influence. + +The Reich Foreign Minister replied that at best a nation which had +realized its every ambition could afford the luxury of intellectuals, +most of whom are parasites, anyway. A nation, however, which has to +fight for a place in the sun must give them up. The intellectuals +ruined France; in Germany they had already started their pernicious +activities when National Socialism put a stop to these doings; they +will surely be the cause of the downfall of Britain, which is to be +expected with certainty. + +In answer to a remark by Matsuoka, that Japan was now awakening and, +according to the Japanese temperament, would take action quickly after +the previous lengthy deliberation, the Reich Foreign Minister replied +that it was necessary, of course, to accept a certain risk in this +connection, just as the Fuehrer had done so successfully with the +occupation of the Rhineland, with the proclamation of sovereignty of +armament, and with the designation from the League of Nations. * * * + +[Pages 9 to 11] + +The Reich Foreign Minister replied that the new German Reich would +actually be built up on the basis of the ancient traditions of the +Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation, which in its time was the only +dominant power on the European Continent. + +In conclusion, the Reich Foreign Minister once again summarized the +points he wanted Matsuoka to take back to Japan with him from his trip: + +1. Germany had already won the war. With the end of this year the +world would realize this. Even England would have to concede it, if it +had not collapsed before then, and America would also have to resign +herself to this fact. + +2. There were no conflicting interests between Japan and Germany. The +future of both countries could be regulated for the long run on the +basis that Japan should predominate in the Far East, Italy and Germany +in Europe and Africa. + +3. Whatever might happen, Germany would win the war. But it would +hasten victory if Japan would enter the war. Such an entry into the war +was undoubtedly more in the interest of Japan than in that of Germany, +for it offered a unique opportunity which would hardly ever return, for +the fulfillment of the national objectives of Japan, a chance which +would make it possible for her to play a really leading role in East +Asia. + +Matsuoka replied that he himself could only repeat that he had long +been of the opinion that every nation would be offered an opportunity +only once in a thousand years. Japan was confronting such an +opportunity, and she would have to assume the risk connected with it. +She would have to act decisively at the right moment in order to take +advantage of this unique opportunity. + + Berlin, the 7th of April 1941 + Sig. Schmidt + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1889-PS + + _Account_ Concerning the conference of the Fuehrer with the Italian + Ambassador Attolico on August 31, 1939 at 1900 hours. + +The Fuehrer handed the Italian Ambassador a copy of the German +proposals and a press notice, pointing out that because of the Polish +Government the proposals are now void. The mediation attempt of England +must, therefore, be considered as having failed. + +Ambassador Attolico recalled that the Fuehrer on the occasion of a +mediation offer made a few days ago by Mussolini had declared that +England had just made a proposal and that one would wait for its +result. Since the Fuehrer had stated himself now, that the English +proposal must be considered as having failed, the question arises now +if the Duce on his part could not take over a mediation. He asks, +therefore, the Fuehrer if it were all right if the Duce would mediate +from now on. + +The Fuehrer replied, one had to wait first of all for future +developments. He is not in the mood to be slapped in the face time +and again by Poland, and does not want to bring the Duce into an +uncomfortable position through acceptance of his mediation. He is +certain that because of the spiritual conception of the Poles, they +wouldn’t listen to the Duce either. + +To the question of Attolico whether herewith everything is at an end, +the Fuehrer answered yes. + +Herewith submitted to the Foreign Minister as per instructions. Berlin, +1 September 1939 + + (signed) Dr. Schmidt + Ambassador + + + PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1893-PS + + Organization Book of the NSDAP 1943 edition, Editor the Reich + Organization Leader of the NSDAP (Dr. Robert Ley), Published by the + Central Publishing House of the NSDAP, Franz Eher Successor, Munich. + +[Page 6 e.] + +3. Resignations. + +* * * * * * * + +Authorized to decree dismissal on the basis of a lawful decision of a +party court are: + + (_a_) The Local Chapter Directors [Ortsgruppenleiter]. + (_b_) The County Directors [Kreisleiter]. + (_c_) The District Directors [Gauleiter]. + (_d_) The Fuehrer. + +[Page 7] + +6. Duties of the Party Members. + +The commandments of the National Socialists: + + The Fuehrer is always right. + +* * * * * * * + + The program be your dogma: + + It demands your utter devotion to the movement: + +* * * * * * * + + Right is, what serves the movement and thus Germany which means the + Nation. + +* * * * * * * + +[Page 13] + +The aims of the Party are Only Ideological Ones. + +It must be attempted to transfer all professional duties which, during +the reconstruction in connection with the rebuilding of the Reich, are +still being executed by the Party, to the affiliated organizations or, +if possible, to the State administration in due time. If necessary, and +if possible, directives to this effect will be issued by the competent +officers of the Reich Directorate [Reichsleitung]. + +The party as an instrument of ideological education, must grow to be +the Leader Corps [Fuehrerkorps] of the German nation. + +This Leader Corps is responsible for the complete penetration of the +German Nation with the National Socialist spirit and to overcome the +dependence on the international influences in which the nation is still +partly rooted. + +It will further be the duty of this Fuehrerkorps to see that the +professional and general duties within the affiliated organizations and +within the State administration will be handled according to National +Socialist directives. + +[Page 14] + +The Political Director [Der Politische Leiter]. + +The basis of the Party organization is the Fuehrer thought. The public +is unable to rule itself either directly or indirectly. The man best +suited for the job will be a Fuehrer. He will be carried by the +confidence of the people. All Political Directors stand as appointed +by the Fuehrer and are responsible to him. They possess full authority +towards the lower echelons. In choosing the Political Director the +main consideration will be to put the right man in the right place * +* * . In principle this is to be noted: Only a man who has absorbed +the school of subordinate functions within the Party has a claim to +the higher Fuehrer offices if he should be otherwise suited. We can +only use Fuehrers who have served from the ground up. Any Political +Director who does not conform to these principles is to be dismissed or +to be sent back to the lower offices, as Blockleiter, Zellenleiter, for +further training. + +Each Political Director must be conscious always, as a Political +Fuehrer, that leadership does not only confer greater powers, but first +and foremost higher duties * * * . + +[Page 15] + +The Type of the Political Director. + +All this shows the character of the Political Director. The Political +Director is not an office worker but the Political Deputy of the +Fuehrer * * * . With the Political Director we are building the +political leadership of the State * * * . The type of the Political +Director is not characterized by the office which he represents. There +is no such thing as a Political Director of the NSBO, etc., but there +is only the Political Director of the NSDAP. + +[Page 16] + +The Oath of the Political Director. + +The Political Director is sworn in yearly. The oath is worded as +follows: + + “I pledge eternal allegiance to Adolf Hitler. I pledge unconditioned + obedience to him and the Fuehrers appointed by him.” + +The Political Director is inseparably tied to the ideology and the +organization of the NSDAP. His oath only ends with his death or with +his expulsion from the National Socialist community. + +[Page 17] + +The Protection of the Honor of the Political Director. + +The leading personalities of State and Party are protected against +vicious attacks upon State and Party. (See Section 6). + +This law primarily protects leading Party members from District +Directors on up. + +Should, however, a situation exist which is liable to degrade the Party +and its institutions (for instance an allegation of embezzlement by a +Kreisleiter in which matter nothing was being done which would mean, in +other words, that bad conditions were tolerated) the prosecution may be +directed by authority of paragraph 1 of the law. + +In case of attacks which are liable to degrade the Party and its +officers prosecution may be requested through the competent State +prosecutor after consultation with the proper law office of the Party. + +[Page 19] + +The Appointment of Political Directors. + +1. The Fuehrer appoints the following Political Directors: + +(_a_) Reichsleiter and all Political Directors to include the Directors +of the Women’s Leagues within the Reich Directorate [Reichsleitung]. + +(_b_) Gauleiters to include the Directors of an office of the Gau +Directorate, as well as the Directors of the Women’s League’s of the +Gau. + +(_c_) Kreisleiters. + +Their appointment will be published in the official paper +[Verordnungsblatt]. + +2. The Gauleiter appoints: + +(_a_) The Political Directors and the Directors of the Women’s Leagues +within the Gau Directorate, and the Directors of the Main Offices up to +Associate Directors [Mitarbeiter]. + +(_b_) The Political Directors and the Directors of the Women’s Leagues +in the Kreis Directorate. + +(_c_) The Local Chapter Directors [Ortsgruppenleiter]. + +3. The Kreisleiter appoints: The Political Directors and the Directors +of the Women’s Leagues of the Local Chapter [Ortsgruppen] to include +Block and Cell Directors and Block Helpers, as well as the Political +Directors in the factories (inasmuch as they are Party members). All +Political Directors and Directors of the Women’s Leagues will be issued +an identity card. + +[Page 24] + +All political directors irrespective of the local chapter, the county, +or the district in which they may be in office will wear a uniform +office suit. + +All political directors irrespective in what party offices they execute +their duties, be it in the political directorate, the administration, +the party courts, the affiliated associations or in the factories, will +wear a uniform office suit. + +[Page 49] + + + _MEETINGS OF MEMBERS AND PUBLIC MEETINGS_ + +The bearers of sovereignty of the party are responsible for the +membership meetings planned by all party offices and affiliated +associations. They will be approved: + +1. By the local chapter director if they do not go beyond the local +chapter in their importance. + +2. By the county directors if they do not go beyond the county in their +importance. + +3. The district directors if they have a general political significance +for the district. + +The meetings will be conducted along the lines laid down by the local +organization and propaganda offices. + +[Page 50] + + + _CELL EVENINGS OF THE NSDAP_ + +1. Time of meetings: + +Cell evenings of the NSDAP will be held once a month. + +2. Conduct of the Cell Evenings: + +The cell evenings of the Party will be conducted by the cell director +of the NSDAP. If no suitable cell director is on hand--either because +of his short time in office or insufficient indoctrination--the meeting +will be in the hands of the local Chapter Director of the NSDAP. + +3. Participants: + + (_a_) Participation at a cell evening is compulsory for: + + All political directors of the cell: + + Block leaders and block helpers, cell foremen and block foremen + living within the cell zone. + + Factory cell and factory block foremen of the German Labor Front + [DAF] and their co-workers. + + NSV cell and block managers: + + Cell and block leaders of the Women’s League and the co-workers + of the NSV and NSF whose domicile is within the Cell Zone. + + All Party members within the cell; + + All members of organizations of the NSDAP. * * * + +5. Program of the Cell Evenings. (During War Time): + +Following are the rules for the program of a cell evening: + +* * * * * * * + +(_b_) Lecture (not over 30 minutes) based on the directives issued by +the Reich Directorate for Propaganda of the NSDAP. + +[Page 50A-51] + + + _LEADER CONFERENCES--TIME OF MEETINGS_ + +1. Leader conferences in the local chapter zone. + +(_a_) Local chapter directors and office chiefs, cell directors and +block directors possibly in the presence of cell and block foremen, as +well as cell and block managers and cell and block directors of the +Women’s League, as well as the local leaders of the organizations and +possibly the deputies of the Kreis offices (health, education, civil +servants, county policy, etc.). + + Once a month. + +(_b_) Cell directors with block directors and cell foremen, cell +managers and cell directors of the Women’s League. + + Once a month. + +(_c_) Block directors with block foremen, block managers, block leaders +of the Women’s League and block helpers. + + Once a month. + +(_d_) All officers of the local chapter are also to participate in: + + 1. The official formation within the region of the local chapter (may + be combined with leader conference (_a_)). + + 2. Official formations of the county. + + Every three months. + + 3. The District Day. [Gautag]. + + One every three years. + + 4. The County Day. [Kreistag]. + + If coinciding with District Day, County Day will be cancelled. + + Once a year. + +(_e_) Participation in schooling: + + 1. Participants: The political directors, foremen, managers, + advisers, directors of the Women’s League, etc. + + * * * * * * * + + Once a month. + +(_f_) Participation in education. + + The political directors of the local chapter; in the evenings or + Sunday mornings, sport to be conducted concurrently. (For further + details see AVM). + + Twice a month. + +* * * * * * * + +2. Leader conferences in the county [Kreis]: + +(_a_) County director and his staff every 8 to 14 days. + +(_b_) If possible the county director is to arrange for a week end +course of 1½ to 2 days duration. (Possibly at a county school +[Kreisschule], with the participation of the directors of the county +offices and local chapter directors.) + + One every 3 months. + +Purpose: To hear fundamental lectures, to gather socially in the +presence of the bearer of sovereignty, to get to know each other, to +overcome difficulties of personal and professional nature by a mutual +exchange of thought. + +In counties having a large number of local chapters, these courses +can be divided. Participation in these conventions is compulsory and +official duties are not constituted an excuse under any circumstances. + +* * * * * * * + +(_d_) The bearers of sovereignty will meet at least once a month with +the leaders of the SA, SS, NSKK, HJ, as well as the RAD, and NSFK, in +so far as they are located within their sector for mutual orientation. + +3. Leader conferences in the District: + +(_a_) District leaders [Gauleiter] with his staff every 8 to 14 days. + +(_b_) It is further absolutely necessary that the directors of the +GAU offices will meet with the county directors of their district +once every three months for a three day convention (possibly at a +district schooling castle) where they will have an opportunity to +overcome difficulties of personal and professional nature, apart from +hearing fundamental lectures, by social gatherings in the presence +of the bearer of the sovereignty, by getting to know each other and +by a mutual exchange of ideas. Participation in these conferences +is compulsory and duty would not constitute an excuse under any +circumstances. + +(_c_) The arrangement of social meeting in the presence of leaders +of the organizations of RAD and NSFK of the respective zone of +sovereignty. In the course of these meetings differences of opinions +may be straightened out in discussions. + +(_d_) The bearer of sovereignty will meet at least once a month with +the leaders of the SA, SS, NSKK, HJ, as well as the RAD and the NSFK +who are within the zone for the purpose of mutual orientation. + +[Page 98] + +Bearers of Sovereignty--[Hoheitstraeger]. + +Sectors of Sovereignty--[Hoheitsgebiete]. + +Among the Political Directors [Politische Leiter] the Bearers of +Sovereignty assume a special position. Contrary to the other Political +Directors who have departmental missions and serve as advisers to the +Bearers of Sovereignty, the Bearers of Sovereignty themselves are in +charge of a geographical sector known as the Sector of Sovereignty +[Hoheitsgebiete]. + +Bearers of Sovereignty are: + + The Fuehrer. + The District Directors [Gauleiter]. + The County Directors [Kreisleiter]. + The Local Chapter Directors [Ortsgruppenleiter]. + The Cell Directors [Zellenleiter]. + The Block Directors [Blockleiter]. + The Sectors of Sovereignty are: + The Reich. + The District. + The County. + The Local Chapter. + The Cell. + The Block. + +Within their Sector of Sovereignty the Bearers of Sovereignty have +sovereign political rights. They represent the Party within their +Sector, internally and externally, and they are responsible for +the entire political situation within their Sector. The Bearers of +Sovereignty supervise all Party officers within their jurisdiction and +they are responsible for the maintenance of discipline within their +sector. On the other hand, the Directors of the Offices, etc., and +of the affiliated organizations are responsible to their respective +Bearers of Sovereignty as regards their specific missions apart from +their responsibility towards their departmental superiors. The Bearers +of Sovereignty are superior to all Political Directors, Managers, +etc., within their sector. As regards personal considerations Bearers +of Sovereignty, from a Local Chapter Director on up are endowed with +special rights. They may, within the provisions of their general +directives regarding personnel authorizations, appointments, leaves and +dismissal of Political Directors, execute the judgments of the Party +law courts which have jurisdiction within their Sector of Sovereignty. + +The Bearers of Sovereignty of the Party are not to be administrative +officials for a certain sector but are to move in a continuous vital +contact with the Political Directors and the population within their +sector. The Bearers of Sovereignty are responsible for the proper and +good supervision of all members of the nation within their sector. The +supervision within a Local Chapter of the NSDAP should, if possible, +not be conducted through its business office but through the Blocks +and Cells and by the Directors of those units. Through the arrangement +of regular interview hours everyone should be given the opportunity to +contact his Bearer of Sovereignty. + +* * * The Party intends to achieve a state of affairs in which the +individual German will find his way to the Party not only in cases of +emergency but where the Party, upon its own initiative, as desired by +the Fuehrer, will currently supervise and care for all members of the +nation. + +[Page 70] + + + _POLITICAL LEADERS AND THE SA_ + +The political leaders conduct the practical political work and care for +the German nation. + +The SA is the instrument of training and education through the Party. +The parallel organizations, SS and NSKK, are charged with maintaining +physical fitness and soldierly spirit within their organizations and +with the possibility of commitment as an inner political troop. + +* * * * * * * + +Smooth cooperation in the service of the Movement and the avoidance of +all petty jealousies is the absolute duty of both parties. + +* * * * * * * + +Mutual Leader Conferences. + +To emphasize unity and to promote it, the following principles will +apply: + +Hoheitstrager [bearers of sovereignty], gauleiters, kreisleiters, etc., +will meet at least once a month with the leaders of the SA, SS, NSKK, +and HJ, as well as RAD and NSFK, as found within their zone for the +purpose of mutual orientation. + +More than that, it is desirable to invite the SA leader to other +political Fuehrer talks and the political leader to the SA Fuehrer +talks. + +* * * * * * * + +[Page 71] + +The Hoheitstrager is responsible for the entire political appearance of +the Movement within his zone. The SA leader of that zone is tied to the +directives of the Hoheitstrager in that respect. + +Requisitioning the SA. + +The Hoheitstrager is the ranking representative of the Party to include +all organizations within his zone. He may requisition the SA located +within his zone from the respective SA leader if they are needed for +the execution of a political mission. The Hoheitstrager will then +assign the mission to the SA. + +* * * * * * * + +Should the Hoheitstrager need more SA for the execution of a political +mission than is locally available, he then applies to the next higher +office of sovereignty which, in turn, requests the SA from the SA +office in his sector. + +* * * * * * * + +[Page 75] + + + _POLITICAL LEADERS AND THE SS_ + +The directives laid down with regard to the relationship to the SA are +similarly applicable to the SS. + +* * * * * * * + + + _POLITICAL LEADERS AND THE NSKK_ + +The directives laid down with regard to the relationship to the SA are +similarly applicable to the NSKK. + +[Page 76] + + + _POLITICAL LEADERS AND THE HJ_ + +The directives laid down with regard to the relationship to the SA are +similarly applicable to the HJ. + +In appointing leaders of the HJ and the DJ, the office of the HJ must +procure the approval of the Hoheitstrager of his zone. This means that +the Hoheitstrager can prevent the appointment of leaders unsuited for +the leadership of youth. If his approval has not been procured, an +appointment may be cancelled if he so requests. + +* * * * * * * + +The political leader has the right to requisition the HJ, in the same +manner as the SA, for the execution of a political action. + +* * * * * * * + +[Page 76a] + + + _THE POLITICAL LEADERS AND THE NS AVIATION CORPS (NSFK)_ + +General Collaboration. + +The ranking unit leader of the NSFK within the zone will be consulted +during the general leader conferences by the Hoheitstrager of the +NSDAP. Similarly, the Hoheitstrager or his deputy will be invited to +general leader conferences and other meetings of the NSFK. + +* * * * * * * + +[Page 76b] + + + _THE POLITICAL LEADER AND THE REICH LABOR SERVICE_ + +General Collaboration. + +Although the Reich Labor Service is no longer an organization within +the NSDAP--on the basis of the Labor Duty Law of 26 June 1935--the +connection of this service with the Party is demonstrated by the +appointment of the Reich Labor Leader to be Reichsleiter of the NSDAP. + +To emphasize this union, the leaders of the Reich Labor Service within +the zone will participate in the monthly leader conferences of the +Hoheitstrager. More than that, it is desirable that the Reich Labor +Leader will be invited to other political Fuehrer talks and, vice +versa, the political leader to meetings of the Reich Labor Service. + +[Page 77] + + + _THE POLITICAL LEADER AND THE STATE_ + +To achieve unity of Party and State, the Chief of the Party Chancellery +has been given the powers of a Reich Minister. In fundamental +questions, the official channels of all Party offices and organizations +of the NSDAP with the ministries and other State authorities and, in +the opposite direction, of all State offices with organizations of the +Party go through the Party Chancellery. This method will assure unified +procedure of the Party towards the State. + +The Chief of the Party Chancellery must be heard prior to the +appointment of any higher civil servant; he will indicate the judgment +of the Party towards the person of the proposed civil servant. To +make sure of agreement between the municipal administration and the +Party, the deputy of the NSDAP will have a decisive voice in the +appointment and dismissal of the mayor, the alderman, and the municipal +councillors, and furthermore, in the following decisions of the mayor: + +1. The decree of principal directives. + +2. The bestowal of honorary citizen rights and honorary titles. + +The Chief of the Party Chancellery appoints the deputy of the NSDAP. +On the basis of his directives, the gauleiter appoints the deputies +as follows: for town and country districts, the kreisleiter. If +this official happens to be an employee of a municipality or of an +inspectorate, a gau inspector will be appointed. In special cases, the +gauleiter may appoint himself as deputy. + +[Page 92] + +Membership in Affiliated Organizations. + +The tasks of the affiliated organizations are laid down by the chief +offices of the Party which have jurisdiction in the zone of those +organizations. + +* * * * * * * + +Only those organizations may claim to uphold the Fuehrer principle and +the form of National Socialist organization and thus be recognized +as promoting the continuation of State and people in the National +Socialist sense who have found, and will find in the future, structure, +supervision, and general character through the Party. + +All others, living an existence of their own, are to be turned away as +outsiders and must either change or disappear from public life. + +[Page 99] + + + _BLOCK OF THE NSDAP_ + + + A. BLOCKLEITER + +1. Regional Sector. + +The household: The household is the basic community upon which the +block and cell system is built. The household is the organizational +focal point of all the Germans united in an apartment and including +roomers, domestic help, etc. + +* * * * * * * + +The block of the NSDAP consists of 40 to 60 households (if possible no +more than 50). + +* * * * * * * + +2. Personnel Questions. + +_a._ The blockleiter is Hoheitstrager of the NSDAP. + +* * * * * * * + +_c._ Subordination: Within the local chapter the blockleiter is +subordinate to the cell leader in disciplinary matters. + +_d._ Appointment: The blockleiter will be appointed by the +Ortsgruppenleiter (local chapter director). + +* * * * * * * + +3. Tasks and Jurisdiction. + +The blockleiter has jurisdiction over all matters within his zone +relating to the Movement, and he is fully responsible to the cell +leader. + +* * * * * * * + +[Page 101] + +It is his duty to find people disseminating damaging rumors and to +report them to the Ortsgruppe so that they may be reported to the +respective State authorities. + +The blockleiter must not only be preacher and defender of the National +Socialist ideology towards the members of nation and Party entrusted +to his political care, but he must also strive to achieve practical +collaboration of the Party members within his block zone and he must +make those of special talents and ability known to the Hoheitstrager. + +[Page 102] + +The blockleiter shall continuously remind the Party members of their +particular duties towards the people and the State. + +* * * * * * * + +Furthermore, the blockleiter completes a list (card file) about the +households. + +* * * * * * * + +[Page 103] + +It is the blockleiter’s aim to achieve to the greatest extent possible +that the sons and daughters of families within his zone become members +of the various formations of the HJ, SA, SS, NSKK, as well as the +corresponding affiliated organizations of the Party, and the German +Labor Front, that they visit the National Socialist meetings, rallies, +celebrations, etc. In short, the blockleiter must be an untiring +activist and propagandist of the Movement. + +* * * * * * * + +In principle, the blockleiter will settle his official business +verbally, and he will receive messages verbally and pass them on in +the same way. Correspondence will only be used in cases of absolute +necessity and practicability. + +[Page 104] + +5. Attitude Towards Members of the Nation. + +* * * * * * * + +_a._ The blockleiter conducts National Socialist propaganda from mouth +to mouth. He will eventually awaken the understanding of the eternally +dissatisfied as regards the frequently misunderstood or wrongly +interpreted measures and laws of the National Socialist government. +He is to encourage the members of the nation to ask questions and he +is to point out that they may go ahead and talk to him without having +to expect difficulties. He will admonish them, however, to exercise +discretion towards other members of the nation as regards loose talk. +It is not necessary for him to fall in with complaints and gripes about +possibly obvious shortcomings of any kind in order to demonstrate this +solidarity, but he must always be eager to think in a positive manner +and to influence those under his care by his attitude of confidence. * +* * + +_b._ A condition to gain the confidence of all people is to maintain +absolute secrecy in all matters. * * * + +[Page 110] + + + _THE CELL OF THE NSDAP_ + + +A. CELL LEADER + +1. Regional Sector. + +The cell consists of four to eight blocks. + +* * * * * * * + +2. Personnel Questions. + +_a._ The cell leader is the Hoheitstrager of the NSDAP immediately +superior to the block leader. + +* * * * * * * + +[Page 112] + +3. Mission and Jurisdiction. + +The missions of the cell leader correspond to the missions of the block +leader. + +* * * * * * * + +[Page 116] + + + _THE LOCAL CHAPTER [ORTSGRUPPE] OF THE NSDAP_ + +1. Regional Sector. + +The zone of sovereignty includes one or more communities; if necessary, +towns may be subdivided into several zones of sovereignty. + +* * * * * * * + +[Page 119] + +3. The Local Chapter Director. + +I. Personnel Questions. + +_a._ The Ortsgruppenleiter of the NSDAP in his capacity as +Hoheitstrager is endowed with special rights. + +* * * * * * * + +[Page 119a] + +_c._ Place of Rank: The Ortsgruppenleiter is directly subordinate to +the respective (County Director) [Kreisleiter]. + +_d._ Appointment: The Ortsgruppenleiter is appointed by the Kreisleiter. + +* * * * * * * + +[Page 120] + +II. Mission and Jurisdiction. + +(1) General Responsibility. + +Contrary to the time before the assumption of power, the actions of the +NSDAP are not limited to the care of its members but now include the +care of the entire German nation. This results in the following basic +conditions for the Ortsgruppenleiter and his office chiefs: + +The Ortsgruppenleiter and his office chiefs must manage their Party +duties in addition to the fulfillment of their professional and family +duties. + +Therefore, the proper conduct of Party tasks is only possible if the +tasks of the individual and, in particular, the honorary co-workers of +the Party are as limited as possible. + +As Hoheitstrager, all expressions of the Party will emanate from him; +he is responsible for the political and ideological leadership and +organization within his zone of sovereignty. + +The Ortsgruppenleiter carries the over-all responsibility for +the political results of all measures initiated by the offices, +organizations and affiliated associations of the Party. The Party +office directors (office chiefs, etc.) within the staff of the +Ortsgruppenleiter are the deputies of the Hoheitstrager in their +respective offices. + +The Ortsgruppenleiter has the right to protest to the Kreisleiter +against any measures contrary to the interests of the Party with +regards to a unified political appearance in public. + +* * * * * * * + +[Page 121] + +(2) Special Tasks and Duties. + +* * * * * * * + +_c._ Leader Conferences: The Ortsgruppenleiter has the duty to issue +directives in regular conferences. + +* * * * * * * + +[Page 130] + + + _THE KREISLEITUNG OF THE NSDAP_ + +[Page 131] + +4. The County Director [Kreisleiter] + +I. Personnel Questions. + +_a._ Place of Rank: The Kreisleiter is directly subordinate to the +Gauleiter. + +* * * * * * * + +_c._ Appointment: The Kreisleiter is appointed by the Fuehrer upon +suggestion of the Gauleiter. + +[Pages 132-133-134] + +II. Mission and Jurisdiction of the Kreisleiter. + +The Kreisleiter carries the over-all responsibility towards the +Gauleiter within his zone of sovereignty for the political and +ideological training and organization of the political leaders, the +Party members, as well as the population. + +* * * * * * * + +[Page 136] + + + _GAULEITUNG OF THE NSDAP_ + +The Gauleitung--Gauleiter and Gau staff--have the political leadership +of a designated sector of the Reich and there they perform creative +work. + +1. Regional Sector. + +The Gau represents the concentration of a number of Party counties +[Parteikreis]. + +* * * * * * * + +4. The Gauleiter. + +The Gauleiter is directly subordinate to the Fuehrer. He is appointed +by the Fuehrer. + +The Gauleiter bears the over-all responsibility to the Fuehrer for +the sector of sovereignty entrusted to him. The rights, duties, and +jurisdiction of the Gauleiter result primarily from the mission +assigned by the Fuehrer and, apart from that, from detailed directives. + +* * * * * * * + +[Page 140b] + +7 B. Functions. + +(1) The edition of the official gazette of the Gauleitung. + +* * * * * * * + +(3) The central coordination office of the Gau directorate with +the State authorities (Reich deputies, police, Gestapo, etc.). The +arrangement of conferences between the Gauleiter and offices outside +the Party (State, economy, and others) inasmuch as several Gau +main offices or Gau offices are interested, in the presence of the +respective professional Gau office directors. + +(4) The installation of the M Section into the Gau staff office and, +thus, the connection to the Armed Forces. + +* * * * * * * + +(7) Preparation of matters of pardon and commutation of sentence. + +* * * * * * * + +[Page 141a] + +C. Structure. + +To be able to handle all these tasks the staff office director of the +Gau is assigned the necessary number of co-workers. The above-mentioned +tasks of the staff office director of the Gau are combined in the +following main offices. + +(1) Referee for questions of the Armed Forces (mobilization matters). + +(2) Information and report matters. + +(3) Pardon matters. + +(4) Matters of interior conduct of business in as far as these are not +a concern of the Gau treasurer. + +(5) Chancellery for personal-official concerns of the Gauleiter and the +Deputy Gauleiter. + +(6) Law consultant of the Gau. + +(7) Complaints and reception of visitors. + +[Page 146] + + + _THE FUEHRER_ + +The recognition of the sociological mismanagement in pre-war Germany +which prevented the growth of a genuine people’s community, the +front line experiences of the World War filled with the spirit of +comradeship, and the disgust with the traitorous pacifist postwar +Germany, matured the Fuehrer’s decision to become a politician and to +give the German people a state form which would assume its justified +life interests for centuries. + +To achieve this aim the Fuehrer created the National Socialist German +Workers’ Party. He filled it with his spirit and his will, and with it +he conquered the power of the State on 30 January 1933. The Fuehrer’s +will is supreme in the Party. As supreme bearer of sovereignty in the +Movement, he possesses the right of pardon in Party court matters. + +By authority of the law about the Chief of State of the German Reich, +dated 1 August 1934, the office of the Reich President has been +combined with that of the Reich Chancellery. Consequently, the powers +heretofore possessed by the Reich President were transferred to the +Fuehrer, Adolf Hitler. Through this law, the conduct of Party and State +has been combined in one hand. By desire of the Fuehrer, a plebiscite +was conducted on this law on 19 August 1934. On this day, the German +people chose Adolf Hitler to be their sole leader. He is responsible +only to his own conscience and to the German nation. + +To assist him, particularly in party-political questions, the Fuehrer +uses the _Party Chancellery_. + +The Chief of the Party Chancellery, to guarantee closest collaboration +between the offices of the Party and the State authorities, has the +powers of a Reich Minister and is a member of the Reich Cabinet. + +With the execution of tasks particular to the Party, the Fuehrer has +entrusted the _Reichsleiter_ within the Reich Directorate of the NSDAP. + +[Pages 148-149] + + + _THE REICH DIRECTORATE OF THE NSDAP_ + +The NSDAP represents the political conception, the political +conscience, and the political will of the German nation. Political +conception, political conscience, and political will are embodied in +the person of the Fuehrer. Based on his directives and in accordance +with the program of the NSDAP, the organs of the Reich Directorate +directionally determine the political aims of the German people. It +is in the Reich Directorate where the strings of the organization of +the German people and the State meet. By endowment of the Chief of the +Party Chancellery with the powers of a Reich Minister, and by special +administrative directives, the penetration of the State apparatus with +the political will of the Party is guaranteed. It is the task of the +separate organs of the Reich Directorate to maintain as close a contact +as possible with the life of the nation through their sub-offices in +the Gaus. Observations at the front are to be collected and exploited +by the offices of the Reich Directorate. + +The structure of the Reich Directorate is thus that the channel from +the lowest Party office upwards shows the most minute weaknesses and +changes in the mood of the people, and that the directives thereby +produced in the Reich Directorate will reach the outer command posts of +the Party quickly and clearly. + +The Reich Directorate, then, sees to it that the reports of the +mood of the people will move from the lower to the higher echelons +uninterruptedly and quickly, and that the will of the Fuehrer will +reach the most distant branches quickly and accurately, even as in the +healthy organism of a tree, where the roots receive the food from the +soil and lead it into the leaves while the juices formed in the leaves +are being sent to the most distant roots. This coordination guarantees +an ever-renewed reception of power and an ever-strengthening anchorage +of the roots, and it permits the crown to spread further and further, +to reach higher and higher, and yet to withstand wind and weather. + +Since the National Socialist Movement has originated from the people, +it is the most noble task of the Reich Directorate to watch that the +strong roots of the Party--namely its ties within the nation--will not +die off. + +Another essential task of the Reich Directorate is to assure a good +selection of leaders. It is the duty of the Reich Directorate to see +that there is leadership in all phases of life, a leadership which +is firmly tied to National Socialist ideology and which promotes its +dissemination with all its energy. + +Apart from the general great political tasks which are the +responsibility of the Reich Directorate, it will also see that the +Party is well organized in all its offices. For that purpose, the +Reich Organization Leader exercises a continuous supervision of the +organizations of the entire Party apparatus, and he prevents the birth +of a bureaucracy which would paralyze the striking power of the Party. +It is the supreme task of the Reich Organization Leader to preserve the +Party as a well-sharpened sword for the Fuehrer. + +The inner organization of the Reich Directorate serves for the +execution of the above-named tasks. The number of its offices is so +arranged that there will be a representation of all phases of national +life within the Reich Directorate. The offices will have subordinate +organizations in the other zones of sovereignty as may become +necessary. The tasks, jurisdiction, etc., of the offices are further +defined in detail in the following chapters. + + + PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1903-PS + + Decrees, Regulations, Announcements [Verfuegungen, Anordnungen, + Bekanntgaben], Vol. II. Edited by the Party-Chancellery. Published by: + Zentralverlag der NSDAP, Frz. Eher Nachf. GmbH., Muenchen. Page 510. + + Decree of the Fuehrer on the execution of the decree concerning the + Deputy General for the mobilization of labor [Arbeitseinsatz]. + + +In the following the Fuehrer’s decree on the extension of the authority +of the Deputy General for the Arbeitseinsatz is made public: + +“Decree of the Fuehrer on the execution of the decree concerning the +Deputy General for the Arbeitsdienst of 30 September 1942. + +I herewith authorize the Deputy General for the Arbeitseinsatz, +Reich-governor and district-leader [Gauleiter] Fritz Sauckel to +take all necessary measures for the enforcement of my decree +referring to a Deputy General for the Arbeitseinsatz of 21 March +1942 (Reichsgesetzblatt I, Page 179) according to his own judgment +in the Greater German Reich, in the Protectorate, and in the +Government General [Generalgouvernement] as well as in the occupied +territories, measures which will safeguard under all circumstances +the regulated deployment of labor [geordneter Arbeitseinsatz] for the +German war-economy. For this purpose he may appoint commissioners +[Beauftragte] to the bureaus of the military and civilian +administration. These are subordinated directly to Deputy General +for the Arbeitseinsatz, in order to carry out their tasks. They are +entitled to issue directives to the competent military and civilian +authorities in charge of the Arbeitseinsatz and of wage-policy. + +More detailed directives will be issued by the Deputy General for the +Arbeitseinsatz. + +Fuehrer-Headquarters 30 Sept 1942 + + The Fuehrer + Sign. Adolf Hitler + + The Reichminister and Chief of the Reich-Chancery + Sign. Dr. Lammers + + The chief of the German High Command + Sign. Keitel.” + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1913-PS + +1943 REICHSARBEITSBLATT, PART I, PAGE 588 + + Agreement between the Plenipotentiary General for the Arbeitseinsatz + and the German Labor Front concerning the care of non-German workers + +The Commissioner for the Four Year Plan + +The Plenipotentiary General for the Arbeitseinsatz VIc 5783/291 + + Berlin, 20 Sept. 1943 + + To the presidents of the Gau employment offices and + to the Reich Trustees of Labor + as well as to the directors of the employment offices. + + + AGREEMENT + +The following agreement has been concluded between the Plenipotentiary +General for the Arbeitseinsatz, Gauleiter and Reich Governor +[Reichstatthalter] Sauckel and the Reichsleiter of the German Labor +Front, Reichsorganisation leader Dr. Ley. + +1. The German Labor Front, on the basis of decree Nr 4 of the +Plenipotentiary General for the Arbeitseinsatz of 7 May 1942--GBA +405/42 (Nr 2b) has the sole and exclusive mission of caring for all +foreign workers employed within the Reich. Excluded are the farm +workers employed in the Reich food administration. + +2. The Reichsleiter of the German Labor Front, Reichsorganisationleiter +Dr. Ley, in collaboration with the Plenipotentiary General for +the Arbeitseinsatz, Gauleiter Sauckel, will establish a “central +inspection” for the continuous supervision of all measures concerning +the care of the foreign workers mentioned under 1. This will have the +designation: + + “Central inspection for the care of foreign workers.” + +The central inspection for the care of foreign workers exercises its +functions upon directives and in the name of the Plenipotentiary +General for the Arbeitseinsatz and of the Reichsleiter of the German +Labor Front. In order to avoid all duplication of work, it will be its +sole responsibility, to scrutinize all measures taken for the care of +foreign workers employed in the factories and camps, also to remove +immediately all defects discovered--as far as possible--on the spot and +to issue the necessary instructions for this. + +The authority of the Plenipotentiary General for the Arbeitseinsatz +to empower the members of his staff and the presidents of the state +employment offices to get direct information on the conditions +regarding the employment of foreigners in the factories and camps, will +remain untouched. + +3. The central inspection for the care of foreign workers will be +continuously in touch with the main office VI of the Plenipotentiary +General for the Arbeitseinsatz. It will instruct the office on the +general observations made and will make suggestions for changes, if +that should become necessary. + +4. The offices of the administration of the Arbeitseinsatz will be +constantly informed by the “central inspection for the care of foreign +workers” of its observations, in particular immediately in each case in +which action of State organizations seems to be necessary. + +This agreement becomes effective on the day of its signing. + +Berlin, 2 June 1943 + + Dr. Robert LEY Fritz SAUCKEL + + # # # # # + +For the carrying out of this agreement I order the following: + +1. The supervision of all welfare measures in the realm of the +employment of foreign workers is the sole responsibility of the +central inspection for the care of foreign workers. Complaints about +bad quarters, food, deficient provision of free time activities and +cultural and propagandistic care will in the future be directed by me +to the central inspection for investigation and elimination of possible +deficiencies. The labor offices and Gau labor offices must direct +complaints and protests coming to them to the locally competent office +of the German Labor Front. + +The central inspection will inform the Plenipotentiary General for +Arbeitseinsatz regarding its decisions and the measures instituted by +it and their completion. + +2. The employment of foreign workers, their identification, +equalization between the plants, transfers, supervision of practical +and vocationally correct employment in the plant, the promotion of +instructional measures to increase production, as well as drafting of +the labor-contract regulations, the carrying out of pay regulation +measures, and the supervision of the orderly paying of foreign +workers, remain as formerly the task of the competent offices of the +administration of the Arbeitseinsatz and Reich trusteeship. + +3. The directives for the employment of eastern and western laborers +given in Va 5780.28/90 of 9 January and Va 5780/196 of 4 February 1943 +remain in force with the provision that the labor offices and Gau labor +offices and the specialists employed with them for the inspection of +camps for eastern laborers need only undertake the tasks mentioned +under No. 2. + +4. The close interrelationship of the tasks of the Arbeitseinsatz +and the care of foreign labor demands, independently of the measures +to be effected, for the execution of the above agreement, a constant +and close cooperation between the offices of the administration of +the Arbeitseinsatz and the offices of the German labor front. If, for +example, it is determined in the execution of Arbeitseinsatz measures, +that an insufficient labor performance on the part of foreign labor +results from absence of welfare work, then the competent agencies of +the German Labor Front are to be informed of this without delay so +that the latter may effect the correction of existing deficiencies. +On the other hand the offices of the German Labor Front will bring +to the attention of the competent agencies of the Arbeitseinsatz +administrative findings made in the course of their welfare work which +require an evaluation from the point of view of the Arbeitseinsatz. + +For the adjustment of individual questions of cooperation between the +offices concerned and the erection of a permanent exchange of findings +the Gau labor offices will enter into negotiations with the appropriate +administration [Gauwaltungen] of the German Labor Front and will inform +the labor offices on the rulings effected for the districts. + +By order + + Dr BEISIEGEL + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1914-PS + +Decrees, Regulations, Announcements [Verfuegungen, Anordnungen, +Bekanntgaben], 1st part, 1943 Edition--Editor: The Party Chancellery. +Published by the Central Publishing House of the NSDAP, Franz Eher, +successor, Muenchen. Pages 318-320. + + # # # # # + + AGREEMENT + +The following agreement between the Reich Minister for the Occupied +Eastern Territories, Reichsleiter Alfred Rosenberg and the director +of the German Labor Front, Reichsorganisationsleiter Dr. R. Ley, was +reached today: + +I. On the basis of the agreement reached on June 2, 1943, between +the Deputy General for the Arbeitseinsatz, Gauleiter Fritz Sauckel +and the leader of the German Arbeitsfront, Reich Organisationsleiter +Dr. R. Ley, concerning a “Central inspection for the care of foreign +laborers”, in order to avoid in the future duplication of work and +overlapping in plants and camps in which foreign workers are employed +or housed, special inspections of the plants and community camps +will be effected only by the central inspection. In order to secure +cooperation between the Reich Ministry for the occupied Eastern +territories and the Central Inspection, a liaison agency will be +created in the Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories. + +II. The Central Inspection for the care of foreign laborers is directed +to give upon request the liaison office of the Reich Minister for the +Occupied Eastern Territories, all information in questions related to +the care of foreigners. + +III. If, in special cases, the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern +Territories considers that a committee should be dispatched in order +to inspect camps and plants, this will be done with the consent and +cooperation of a representative of the central inspection for the care +of foreign workers. + +IV. However, the leader of the liaison agency will have at any time +access to the community camps and plants in which workers from the +Occupied Eastern Territories are housed or employed. Nevertheless, in +these cases too the central inspection will have to be given advance +notice of the intended inspections. + +V. This agreement comes into force on the day of signing. + + + AGREEMENT + +1. A liaison office of the Propaganda Ministry to the German Labor +Front is established in the office of the Arbeitseinsatz between the +Reichminister for Enlightenment and Propaganda, Dr. Goebbels and the +Director of the German Labor Front, Reichsorganisationsleiter Dr. Ley +as the result of the agreement reached on 2 June 1943, between the +Deputy General for the Arbeitseinsatz, Gauleiter Fritz Sauckel and the +Director of the German Labor Front, Dr. Ley about the establishment of +a “Central inspection for the care of foreign laborers”. + +2. A similar agency will be created in the Gau administrations between +the Reich Propaganda Office and/or the Gau Propaganda Office and the +main section of the Arbeitseinsatz of the German Arbeitsfront. + +3. The liaison agencies have to see that all the measures for +caretaking should be carried out in closest cooperation. + +4. In order to secure this cooperation, it will be ascertained that +all reports, especially those of the central inspection, should be +currently maintained to liaison agents. + +5. The liaison agents will be currently notified of the visits to camps +and plants effected by the German Arbeitsfront and by the delegates of +the Central Inspection; it will be at their discretion to take part in +these visits in person or by a representative. In special cases the +liaison agent or his representative can also visit camps and plants +after notifying the DAF. + +6. This agreement comes into force on the day of signing. + + # # # # # + +Chief of Security Police and SD. + +IV D--626/43 (ausl Arb.) + + Berlin + June 21, 1943 + Night Letter! + +To the inspectors of the Security Police and of the SD. + +Subject: Central inspection for the care of foreign laborers. + +For the permanent control of all measures for the care of foreign +workers employed in the Reich--except in agriculture--the leader of the +DAF has created: + + “Central Inspection for the care of foreign labor”, in + cooperation with the Deputy General for Arbeitseinsatz. + +This Central inspection has the task of supervising all the measures +for the care of foreign labor in plants and camps, of correcting the +detected flaws right on the spot, as far as possible and to issue the +directives which are necessary for this purpose. + +The leader of Central Inspection for the care of foreign labor is the +Hauptdienstleiter of the NSDAP. + + Party member Otto Gohdes. + +The erection and tasks of this central inspection will not interfere +with the measures for which the Security Police and SD are responsible. +The preventive tasks of the police which aims at an orderly treatment +and care of foreign laborers to avoid incidents undesirable from the +standpoint of the Security Police, will be considerably supported and +secured by the central inspection and its delegates. The delegates of +the central inspection for the care of foreign laborers are instructed +to carry out their activities in close cooperation with the agencies of +the Security Police and of the SD, particularly with the State Police +(directive) agencies. I request, therefore, that close cooperation be +afforded the delegates of the central inspection, that they be strongly +assisted and taken everywhere committed, even where the care of foreign +laborers does not forward the interests of the Security Police and the +SD. + +Care of laborers of a German blood. + +In order to do justice to the particular position of people of German +blood [Volksdeutschen], the DAF--Office of the Arbeitseinsatz--has +confidentially instructed its agencies to carry out the care of +Volksdeutschen in cooperation with the agencies of the Volksdeutschen +information office and to avoid that foreign liaison agencies should +take care of the Volksdeutschen workers. In the future, the DAF and the +State Labor Office will not submit to the foreign liaison agencies such +plants which employ only Volksdeutschen from the country in question. + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1915-PS + + 1938 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 111 + + Decree concerning the leadership of the Armed Forces, 4 February 1938 + +From now on, I take over directly the command of the whole Armed Forces. + +The former Armed Forces department in the Reichs War Ministry will come +directly under my command with all its tasks which it fulfilled under +the jurisdiction of the “supreme command of the Army” and my military +staff. + +At the head of the staff of the supreme command of the Armed Forces +is the former Chief of the Armed Forces department as “Chief of the +supreme command of the Armed Forces”. He is equal in rank to a Reichs +Minister. + +At the same time, the supreme command takes the responsibility for +the affairs of the Reichs Ministry of War, and by my order, the chief +of the supreme command of the Armed Forces exercises the authority +formerly belonging to the Reichs Minister. + +It is the supreme command of the Armed Forces’ duty to carry out in +peace time in accordance with my instructions, the preparation of the +defense system of the Reich. + +Berlin 4 February 1938 + + The Fuehrer and Reichs Chancellor + Adolph Hitler + + The Reichs Minister and Chief + of the Reichs Chancellery + Dr. Lammers + + The Chief of the Supreme Command + of the Armed Forces + Keitel + + + PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1918-PS + +HIMMLER’S ADDRESS TO OFFICERS OF THE SS-LEIBSTANDARTE “ADOLF HITLER” ON + THE “DAY OF METZ” (PRESENTATION OF HISTORICAL NAZI FLAG). + +Now I would like to bring another matter to your attention. Very +frequently the member of the Waffen-SS thinks about the deportation +of this people here. These thoughts came to me today when watching +the very difficult work out there performed by the Security Police, +supported by your men, who help them a great deal. Exactly the same +thing happened in Poland in weather 40 degrees below zero, where we +had to haul away thousands, ten thousands, hundred thousands; where +we had to have the toughness--you should hear this but also forget it +again immediately--to shoot thousands of leading Poles, where we had to +have the toughness, otherwise it would have taken revenge on us later. +We also had to bring in, in this winter of 40 degrees below zero, ten +thousands of Germans, and had to take care of their needs--that the +women were warm; that, when they bore children, these children did +not experience want and destitution; where we had to take care of +their horses; where we had to take care of the baggage of these poor +Germans from Volkynia; all duties where the proud soldier says: “My +God, why do I have to do that, this ridiculous job here...!” Gentlemen, +it is much easier in many cases--and that I would like to tell you +this once, or would like to recall to you, you will gladly admit: in +many cases it is much easier to go into combat with a company than to +suppress an obstructive population of low cultural level in some area +with a company, or to carry out executions, or to haul away people, or +to evict crying and hysterical women, or to return our German racial +brethren across the border from Russia and to take care of them. I want +to tell you: In the entire Waffen-SS we must begin to view the other +great activity of the entire SS [Gesamt-SS] and entire police. We must +see to it that you consider the activity of the man in green uniform as +just as valuable as the activity you yourself are engaged in. You have +to consider the work of the SD man or of the man of the Security Police +as a vital part of our whole work just like the fact that you can carry +arms. You are the ones to be envied, because if you do something, if a +unit achieves fame, then one can talk of fame, and it can be decorated. +It is much more difficult in many other positions--and with that I do +not want to underestimate your achievements; I would be the last one +to do that--but, believe me, in many places it is much more difficult, +this silent work-compulsion, this silent activity, this standing +guard over our ideology, this necessity of remaining steadfast, this +necessity of not compromising is very much more difficult in places. +Now I want to tell you something else; I mentioned before that we +absolutely were in danger of suffocating within ourselves, within the +leadership corps [Fuehrerkorps]. There did not seem to be a way out. +Either we would have become senile or we had to kick the people out too +soon. Today, in the future, in time of peace, the possibility does not +exist that a man, or a leader, provided he is worth his salt, does not +perform valuable work in some position or that satisfactory work is not +assigned to him. Of course we will do it in such a way--let there be no +doubt about it--that we put the most capable ones into each position. +In other words, if there are four company commanders, the most capable +one will be promoted to battalion commander, the one who is best fitted +for that activity. The other three, or the other 2, will be utilized +in some activity which is just as valuable, but for which he is better +adapted. In general, everyone should understand that the course of the +past two years, which were pure war years with preparation for war, +are of course not completed, education for Political Officers will +become much more strongly emphasized. I would like to use this word +for once, Political Leader, Political Officer. A period will commence +where someone will be platoon leader in the Waffen SS for 3 or 4 years. +During that time he will attend this training course or that, and +already as a young leader he will come to know the sphere of activity +of all other branches in the SS, in courses lasting 6 to 8 weeks. From +the beginning it will then happen that mutual understanding sets in, +mutual esteem and the absolute conviction that the duties of the other +guy are very, very difficult, and are very, very valuable. On the +other hand, I will not allow any branch to grow where the leading men, +the members of the Fuehrercorps, are not at least reserve leaders of +the Armed SS and did not get at least far enough to be able to lead a +company as reserve leader. This way coherence will be achieved which +is necessary. I believe that you can get an idea from what I said to +the men today--and you as leaders can add to it by drawing your own +conclusions--what the entire SS will have to do in order to secure +our Reich, I mean in the first place with respect to ideology and +safeguarding of the race [Blut] by settlements and extending of our +Lebensraum, with respect to the work in colonies, and we shall have +garrisons far away in South-Africa, and we shall have garrisons in the +Arctic winter, as we have not in Kirkenes, that is up there on the +North cape we are also going to have a garrison of a few battalions, +we shall have garrisons on the Bug, and we shall now have garrisons in +the West, where certainly Metz will not be the most distant western +frontier. If we think the right way, some things will be of decisive +importance. You would be surprised if I wanted to carry out immediately +after the war when peace begins with an iron hand what I indicated +today in my class with the men, that we must win the peace and be hard +against ourselves. The first two years of peace will be decisive for +our future. After victory we must nowhere become megalomaniacs, we must +not relax in any respect but we must start an unheard-of education of +ourselves. It is necessary, that obedience be granite-like, or else it +would be impossible to have distant garrisons like Kirkenes which at +times cannot be reached even by modern means, or colonial garrisons, if +the officers there, the leader there, does not act strictly [eisern] in +accordance with his orders and would take any consequences rather than +disregard in any way an order, a basic order, given. + +We shall have to do one thing: After the war we shall apply an +unheard-of discipline against ourselves as far as external values are +concerned they also are important. Whether it concerns our clothes +or anything else, because you see, it is a great plus and a great +danger at the same time, that what we are doing after the war, during +Adolf Hitler’s life, will live on for centuries to come, and if we +make a mistake, the mistake will live on for centuries, because silly +descendants will say: “Yes this is what they did in Adolf Hitler’s +time, consequently we must act likewise!” If we strike up a wrong +tune, this wrong tune will resound through centuries. And mistakes +unfortunately do grow in dimension the longer they are continued. +Therefore, it is necessary that we train ourselves in the future in an +unheard-of way. I believe it is not the right thing for us to do to +discuss these worries which I have with each one of you separately. The +one or the other among you who talks here and there like a fool and +believes he must talk wildly in the Cassino might say: “For Heaven’s +sake, those people up there don’t know, they have not the slightest +idea!” Our idea goes very far and I know exactly what is going on +within the troop, know exactly what they think and how they feel. You +must also consider the following: I cannot concentrate my mind solely +on--now, please don’t become conceited--the most splendid part of the +SS because it is the most positive part and because the trade you are +following is the most positive and most manly, I cannot do that, I must +always have the entire SS in my mind. + +If I did not see this part, I would deny life to this most positive +and most manly part of our activity; i.e., the Armed SS. I would deny +your life. Because this armed SS will live only if the entire SS is +alive. If the entire corps is actually an order which lives according +to these laws and realizes that one part cannot exist without the +other--you are unimaginable without the general SS, and the latter is +not imaginable without you. The police is not imaginable without the +SS, nor are we imaginable without this executive branch of the state +which is in our hands. The Fuehrercorps is not imaginable without the +national-political institutions of education which we are building +up now, and vice versa we cannot fill up our ranks without contact +with the youth, we cannot exist without the business enterprises. A +field which probably is unknown to most of you because nothing has +ever been said about it. I want to tell you just a little bit of +it: The apartment-building program which is the prerequisite for a +healthy and social basis of the entire SS as well as of the entire +Fuehrercorps can be carried out only when I get the money for it from +somewhere; nobody is going to give me the money, it must be earned, +and it will be earned by forcing the scum of mankind, the prisoners, +the professional criminals to do positive work. The man, guarding +these prisoners, serves just as hard as the one on close-order drill. +The one who does this and stands near these utterly negative people +will learn within 3 to 4 months * * * and we shall see: In peacetime +I shall form guard-battalions and put them on duty for 3 months +only--to fight the inferior being [Untermenschentum], and this will +not be a boring guard duty, but if the officers handle it right, it +will be the best indoctrination on inferior beings and the inferior +races. This activity is necessary, as I said, 1. to eliminate these +negative people from the German people, 2. to exploit them once more +for the great folk community by having them break stones and bake +bricks so that the Fuehrer can again erect his grand buildings and 3. +to in turn invest the money, earned soberly this way, in houses, in +ground, in settlements so that our men can have houses in which to +raise large families and lots of children. This in turn is necessary +because we stand or die with this leading blood of Germany and if the +good blood is not reproduced we will not be able to rule the world. +Please understand: We would not be able to hold the great Germanic +Reich which is about to take shape. I am convinced, that we can hold +it, but we have to prepare for that. If we once had not enough sons +those who will come after us will have to become cowards. A nation +which has an average of 4 sons per family can venture a war: if 2 of +them die, 2 transplant the name. The leadership of a nation having +one son or two sons per family will have to be faint-hearted at any +decision on account of their own experience because they will have to +tell themselves: We cannot afford it. Look at France, which is the best +example. France had to accept from us a dictate. It could no longer +dictate to us because they could not continue. All the things which +sometimes seem strange to you because other things were more urgent +during the last 2 years, because I could not explain them sufficiently +to you, the leaders, because sometimes I did not explain them to you in +order not to make too public what was just starting life, so that the +tender nursling would not be pulled out by people who don’t like us. I +preferred that very often not even my own troops knew anything about +it and let the small nursling secretly grow into a small tree. Then +when it is big, nowadays everything is big, now the trees are not being +uprooted. Everything that seemed strange to you: “Why do we have to +contribute to the spring of life [Lebensborn]?” “Why do we have to join +the saving’s cooperative?” “Why do we have to do this and to do that?” +If anything like that turns up, I demand from you in future: + +In the first place be SS men who have the creed that everything +being done is all right. One piece fits the other, even if you don’t +recognize it beforehand, even if it does not appear at first sight +that they fit each other. In the end, everything will be all right. +The ultimate aim for those 11 years during which I have been the +Reichsfuehrer SS has been invariably the same: To create an order +of good blood which is able to serve Germany. Which unfailingly and +without sparing itself can be made use of because the greatest losses +can do no harm to the vitality of this order, the vitality of these +men, because they will always be replaced. To create an order which +will spread the idea of nordic blood so far that we will attract all +nordic blood in the world, take away the blood from our adversaries, +absorb it so that never again, looking at it from the viewpoint of +grand policy, nordic blood in great quantities and to an extent worth +mentioning will fight against us. We must get it and the others cannot +have it. We never gave up the ideas and the aim conceived so many +years ago. Everything we did has taken us some distance further on the +way. Everything we are going to do will lead us further on the way. It +can only be carried out, if everyone of us looks beyond the things he +likes in his activity, his company, his regiment--and you are supposed +to love it you may be proud of it--looks beyond it towards the great +common goal, here the SS, and the SS also is only a means to an end, +always the Reich, the ideology, created by the Fuehrer, the Reich, +created by him, the Reich of all teutons. + + + PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1919-PS + + Speech of the Reichsfuehrer-SS at the meeting of SS Major-Generals at + Posen October 4th, 1943 + + The 1941 attack + +In 1941 the Fuehrer attacked Russia. That was, as we can well see now, +shortly,--perhaps 3 to 6 months--before Stalin prepared to embark on +his great penetration into Central and Western Europe. I can give a +picture of this first year in a few words. The attacking forces cut +their way through. The Russian Army was herded together in great +pockets, ground down, taken prisoner. At that time we did not value the +mass of humanity as we value it today, as raw material, as labour. What +after all, thinking in terms of generations, is not to be regretted, +but is now deplorable by reason of the loss of labour, is that the +prisoners died in tens and hundreds of thousands of exhaustion and +hunger [p. 3]. + +It is basically wrong for us to infuse all our inoffensive soul and +spirit, our good-nature, and our idealism into foreign peoples [p. 22]. +This is true since the time of Herder who clearly wrote “Voices of +the Nations” [Stimmen der Voelker], in a state of drunkenness, thereby +bringing [p. 23] on us, who come after him, such immeasurable sorrow +and misery. This is true for instance, of the Czechs and the Slovenes +to whom we gave their consciousness of nationality. They were just not +capable of it themselves; we had to discover it for them. + +One basic principle must be the absolute rule for the SS man: we must +be honest, decent, loyal, and comradely to members of our own blood +and to nobody else. What happens to a Russian, to a Czech does not +interest me in the slightest. What the nations can offer in the way +of good blood of our type, we will take, if necessary by kidnapping +their children and raising them here with us. Whether nations live +in prosperity or starve to death [verrecken--to die--used of cattle] +interests me only in so far as we need them as slaves for our Kultur; +otherwise, it is of no interest to me. Whether 10,000 Russian females +fall down from exhaustion while digging an anti-tank ditch interests +me only in so far as the anti-tank ditch for Germany is finished. We +shall never be rough and heartless when it is not necessary, that is +clear. We Germans, who [p. 24] are the only people in the world who +have a decent attitude towards animals, will also assume a decent +attitude towards these human animals. But it is a crime against our own +blood to worry about them and give them ideals, thus causing our sons +and grandsons to have a more difficult time with them. When somebody +comes to me and says, “I cannot dig the anti-tank ditch with women and +children, it is inhuman, for it would kill them,” then I have to say, +“You are a murderer of your own blood because if the anti-tank ditch is +not dug, German soldiers will die, and they are sons of German mothers. +They are our own blood.” That is what I want to instil into the SS +and what I believe have instilled into them as one of the most sacred +laws of the future. Our concern, our duty is our people and our blood. +It is for them that we must provide and plan, work and fight, nothing +else. We can be indifferent to everything else. I wish the SS to adopt +this attitude to the problem of all foreign, non-Germanic peoples, +especially Russians. All else is vain, fraud against our own nation and +an obstacle to the early winning of the war. + + +Foreigners in the Reich + +We must also realize that we have 6 to 7 million foreigners in Germany. +Perhaps it is even 8 million now [p. 43]. We have prisoners in Germany. +They are none of them dangerous so long as we take severe measures +at the merest trifle. It is a mere nothing today to shoot 10 Poles, +compared with the fact that we might later have to shoot tens of +thousands in their place, and compared to the fact that the shooting +of these tens of thousands would then be carried out even at the cost +of German blood. Every little fire will immediately be stamped out +and quenched, and extinguished,--otherwise--as in the case of a real +fire--a political and psychological surface-fire may spring up among +the people. + + + The Communists in the Reich + +I don’t believe the Communists could attempt any action, for their +leading elements, like most criminals, are in our concentration camps. +And here I must say this--that we shall be able to see after the war +what a blessing it was for Germany that, in spite of all the silly talk +about humanitarianism, we imprisoned all this criminal sub-stratum of +the German people in concentration camps: I’ll answer for that. If they +were going about free, we should be worse off. For then the sub-humans +would have [p. 44] their NCOs and Commanding Officers, then they would +have their councils of workers and military. As it is, however, they +are locked up, and are making shells or projectile cases or other +important things, and are very useful members of human society. + + + The SS in wartime + +Now I come to our own development, to that of the SS in the past +months. Looking back on the whole war, this development was fantastic +[p. 51]. It took place at an absolutely terrific speed. Let us look +back a little to 1939. At that time we were a few regiments, guard +units [Wachverbaende] 8 to 9,000 strong,--that is, not even a division, +all in all 25 to 28,000 men at the outside. True, we were armed, but +really only got our artillery regiment as our heavy arm two months +before the war began. We will recapitulate which tasks, which duties, +and which assignments we have been given in the last 4½ years. But +first I would like to enumerate and make known once more some outward +changes. + + + Changes in Personnel + +The following changes have taken place at the Main Offices: + +Our comrade, SS Lieutenant General Kaltenbrunner has succeeded +our fallen friend Heydrich. Unfortunately he is ill today. He has +phlebitis, but it is, I am glad to say, not dangerous. That [p. 52] is +why he could not come. + +Our old friend Daluege has such severe heart trouble that he has to +undergo courses of treatment and now has to retire from active service +for 1½ to 2 years.--I would like this evening to send our two friends, +Daluege especially, and Kaltenbrunner too, a teleprint or a telegram in +the name of all of us. As I have said, we may hope that Daluege will +have recovered in about two years, and can then return to the front and +get into harness. + +SS Lieutenant General Wuennenberg is in charge as his deputy. He +has been in charge of the police division up till now, and was then +appointed to be Officer Commanding IVth SS armored corps. He is General +of the Waffen-SS and the police, and is in charge of the uniformed +regular police [ordnungspolizei] as their Head. + +SS-Gruppenfuehrer Breithaupt has succeeded our old comrade and friend +Scharfe as Chief of the SS-court of justice. + +SS-Obergruppenfuehrer Hofmann has made a change. He has given up the +Main office for race and settlement [Rasse--u. Siedlungshauptamt] and +has become Senior Executive SS and Police Officer [Hoehre SS--und +Polizeifuehrer] for the South-West. + +SS-Obergruppenfuehrer Hildebrandt has left Oberabschnitt Weichsel, and +has become Chief of the Main Office for race and settlement [p. 53]. + +SS-Obergruppenfuehrer Schmidt has left the Head Office for Personnel at +his own request and has joined my personal staff for special duties. He +is succeeded by SS-Gruppenfuehrer von Herff. + +One of my closest and most long-standing colleagues, +SS-Obergruppenfuehrer Wolff, has now, I am glad to say, recovered +completely from a severe illness which greatly endangered his +life--(it was an operation for removing stones from the kidney)--and +is now,--this is a new appointment--Supreme Executive SS and Police +Officer for the whole of occupied Italy. He therefore has charge of 25 +to 30 million people. Under him he has SS-Gruppenfuehrer Globocnik as +Senior Executive SS and Police Officer for the coastal area. He too +could not come today. + +Senior Executive SS and Police Officers have since been appointed as +follows: for Croatia--Kammerhofer, who on account of the Croatians is +not called Senior Executive SS and Police Officer, but Commissioner of +the Reichsfuehrer SS; for Serbia, Meyszner was appointed earlier, for +Greece--[p. 54] Stroob at the moment but--I would like to tell you this +now--I am transferring him from there to Schimana. Officials in Greece +will become Senior Executive SS and Police Officers, and thus not +command the Galician SS--Volunteer Division. SS-Gruppenfuehrer Pancke +is to become Senior Executive SS- and Police Officer for Denmark. + + +Chief of the Anti-partisan Units [Bandenkampf-Verbaende] + +In the meantime I have also set up the department of Chief of the +anti-partisan units [p. 57]. Our comrade SS-Obergruppenfuehrer von dem +Bach is Chief of the anti-partisan units. I considered it necessary +for the Reichsfuehrer SS to be in authoritative command in all these +battles, for I am convinced that we are best in a position to take +action against this enemy struggle, which is a decidedly political one. +Except where the units which had been supplied and which we had formed +for this purpose were taken from us to fill in gaps at the front, we +have been very successful. + +It is notable that, by setting up this department we have gained [p. +58] for the SS in turn a division, a corps, an army, and the next step, +which is the High Command of an army or even of a group--if you wish to +call it that. + + + Regular uniformed Police and the Sipo + +Now to deal briefly with the tasks of the regular uniformed police and +the Sipo. They still cover the same field. I can see that great things +have been achieved. We have formed roughly 30 police regiments from +police reservists and former members of the police--police officials +as they used to be called. The average age in our police battalions is +not lower than that of the Security battalions of the Armed Forces. +Their achievements are beyond all praise. In addition, we have formed +Police Rifle Regiments by merging the police battalions of the “savage +peoples”. Thus we did not leave these police battalions untouched but +blended them in the ratio of about 1:3. That is why we have, at the +present moment of crisis, a far greater stability than could be seen +among the other units made up of natives or local inhabitants. + + + SS-industrial concerns + +I now come to other individual great spheres of activity, of which it +is important for you all to know [p. 63]. We have huge armament works +in the concentration camps. This is the sphere of activity of our +friend SS-Obergruppenfuehrer Pohl. Every month we put in many millions +of hours of work for armaments. We tackle the most thankless tasks +and--I must give this its [p. 64] due--whether in the concentration +camps, in Pohl’s industrial works, or outside at the offices of the +Senior Executive SS and Police Officers or in the workshops of the +Head Office of SS administration, one thing is obvious: wherever we +are, we are SS-men. Where things are in a bad way, we act. I want +every subordinate trained to this end. We want to help, unhampered +by quibbles regarding authority, for we want to win the war. What +we are doing, we are doing for Germany. Whether it is a question of +building a road, if a tunnel is not going ahead somewhere, or if it +is an invention which for sheer red-tape does not come to fruition, +or anything else; where we can get to work, we get to work. What we +are doing in our armament works will be a remarkable and noteworthy +achievement, even if we can only assess it and prove it when the war is +ended. + + + The Clearing out of the Jews + +I also want to talk to you, quite frankly, on a very grave matter. +Among ourselves it should be mentioned quite frankly, and yet we will +never speak of it publicly. Just as we did not hesitate on June 30th, +1934 to do the duty we were bidden, and stand comrades who had lapsed, +up against the wall and shoot them, so we have never spoken about it +and will never [p. 65] speak of it. It was that tact which is a matter +of course and which I am glad to say, is inherent in us, that made us +never discuss it among ourselves, never to speak of it. It appalled +everyone, and yet everyone was certain that he would do it the next +time if such orders are issued and if it is necessary. + +I mean the clearing out of the Jews, the extermination of the Jewish +race. It’s one of those things it is easy to talk about--“The Jewish +race is being exterminated”, says one party member, “that’s quite +clear, it’s in our program--elimination of the Jews, and we’re doing +it, exterminating them.” And then they come, 80 million worthy Germans, +and each one has his decent Jew. Of course the others are vermin, but +this one is an A-1 Jew. Not one of all those who talk this way has +witnessed it, not one of them has been through it. Most of _you_ must +know what it means when 100 corpses are lying side by side, or 500 or +1000. To have stuck it out and at the same time--apart from exceptions +caused by human weakness--to have remained decent fellows, that is what +has made us hard. This is a page of glory in our history which has +never been written and is never to be [p. 66] written, for we know how +difficult we should have made it for ourselves, if--with the bombing +raids, the burdens and the deprivations of war--we still had Jews today +in every town as secret saboteurs, agitators and trouble-mongers. We +would now probably have reached the 1916/17 stage when the Jews were +still in the German national body. + +We have taken from them what wealth they had. I have issued a strict +order, which SS-Obergruppenfuehrer Pohl has carried out, that this +wealth should, as a matter of course, be handed over to the Reich +without reserve. We have taken none of it for ourselves. Individual men +who have lapsed will be punished in accordance with an order I issued +at the beginning, which gave this warning: Whoever takes so much as +a mark of it, is a dead man. A number of SS men--there are not very +many of them--have fallen short, and they will die, without mercy. We +had the moral right, we had the duty to our people, to destroy this +people which wanted to destroy us. But we have not the right to enrich +ourselves with so much as a fur, a watch, a mark, or a cigarette or +anything else. Because we have exterminated a bacterium we do not want, +in the end, to be infected by the bacterium and die of it. I will not +see so much as a small area of sepsis appear here or gain a [p. 67] +hold. Wherever it may form, we will cauterize it. Altogether however, +we can say, that we have fulfilled this most difficult duty for the +love of our people. And our spirit, our soul, our character has not +suffered injury from it. + + + The bearing of the SS-man + +If I make a statement for us all and in the presence of all of us of +all that we have done this year in the form of--I would almost say--a +statement of accounts, then there is one thing that I must not overlook +and pass over: the significance of the bearing of the SS-man. + + + The Principle of Selection + +We are a product of the law of selection [p. 70]. We have made our +choice from a cross-section of our people. This people came into being +aeons ago, through generations and centuries, by the throw of the dice +of fate and of history. Alien peoples have swept over this people and +left their heritage behind them. Alien blood-streams have flowed into +this people, but it has, nevertheless in spite of terrible hardships +and terrible blows of fate, still had strength in the very essence of +its blood to win through. Thus this whole people is saturated with, +and held together by Nordic-Phalian-Germanic blood, so that after all +one could, and can, still speak of a German people. From this people, +of such varied hereditary tendencies, as it emerged from the collapse +after the years of the battle of liberation, we have now consciously +tried to select the Nordic-Germanic blood, for we could best expect +this section of our blood to contain the creative, heroic and +life-preserving qualities of our people. We have gone partly by outward +appearances, and for the rest have kept these outward appearances in +review by making constantly new demands, and by repeated tests both +physical and mental, both of the character and the soul. Again and +again we have sifted out and cast aside what was [p. 71] worthless, +what did not suit us. Just as long as we have strength to do this will +this organization remain healthy. The moment we forget the law which +is the foundation of our race, and the law of selection and austerity +towards ourselves, we shall have the germ of death in us, and will +perish just as every human organization, every blossom in this world +does some time perish. It must be our endeavour, our inner law, to +make this blossoming and fructifying last for our people as long as +possible, bringing as much prosperity as possible, and--don’t be +alarmed--if possible for thousands of years. That is why, whenever we +meet and whatever we do, we must be mindful of our principle: blood, +selection, and austerity. The law of nature is just this: What is +hard is good; what is vigourous is good; whatever wins through in the +battle of life, physically, purposefully and spiritually, that is what +is good--always taking the long view. Of [p. 72] course sometime--and +this has happened often in history--someone can get to the top by +deceit and cheating. That makes no difference to nature, to the fate of +the earth, to the fate of the world. Reality, that is, Nature, Fate, +removes the impostor after a time--time not reckoned in generations +of man but in historical periods. It must be our endeavour never to +deceive ourselves, but always to remain genuine, that is what we must +continually preach and instill into ourselves, and into every boy and +each one of our subordinates. + + + The SS after the war + +One thing must be clear, one thing I would like to say to you today: +the moment the war is over, we will really begin to weld together +our organization, this organization which we have built up for 10 +years, which we imbued and indoctrinated with the first most important +principles during the 10 years before the war. We must continue to do +this--we,--if I may say so, we older men--for twenty years full of +toil and work, so that a tradition 30, 35, 40 years, a generation, may +be created. Then this organization will march forward into the future +young and strong, revolutionary and efficient to fulfill the task of +giving the German people, the Germanic people the super-stratum of +society which will combine and hold together this Germanic people +and this Europe, and from which the brains which the people needs +for industry, farming, politics, and as soldiers, statesmen and +technicians, will emerge. In addition this super-stratum must be so +strong and vital that every generation can unreservedly sacrifice +two or three sons from every family on the battlefield, and that +nevertheless the continued flowing of the bloodstream is assured. + + + The Virtues of the SS-Man + +I will speak now of the most important virtues which I began years ago +to preach and to impress on this organization, on this whole General-SS +[Allgemeine-SS]--for that is the basis of this organization--and which +are just now in the 5th year of war of such decisive significance and +importance. + +1. Loyalty + +We have, I am glad to say, not had a single case among our ranks so +far, of an SS-Man being disloyal. Let this one thing be our guiding +principle: If within the sphere of your knowledge there is ever +anyone who is disloyal to the Fuehrer or to the Reich, even if it +is only in thought, you must see to it that this man is thrown out +of the organization and we will see to it that he departs this life +[p. 74]. For everything,--I have said this one already and repeat +it today,--everything can be forgiven in this world, but one thing +cannot be forgiven among us Teutons: that is disloyalty. It would be +unforgivable and is unforgivable. Downfalls, like the downfall of +Badoglio in Italy must not and will not happen in Germany. The name +Badoglio will in future be the name for bad dogs, the name of abuse for +four-legged mongrel curs, just as in the olden days the name Thersites +was the name of abuse for traitors.--We can only say one thing and +preach it constantly: Let the German people show, by unparalleled and +wholehearted loyalty on the part of each one of its men and each one of +its women that is worthy of being permitted to live at the time of an +Adolf Hitler, and worthy of this leader having arisen for it, who has +dedicated his life full of care, full of responsibility, full of work, +to our German Teutonic people. + +2. Obedience + +Obedience is demanded and given in the soldier’s life morning, noon, +and night. And the little man always obeys or usually does. If he does +not, he is put in prison. The question of obedience in [p. 75] the case +of senior officials in the state, party and the army, and even here +and there in the SS, is more difficult. I would like here to state +something clearly and unequivocally: It is a matter of course that the +little man must obey. It is even more a matter of course that all the +senior leaders of the SS, that is, the whole corps of Gruppenfuehrer, +are a model of blind obedience. If anyone thinks that an order is based +on a misunderstanding on the part of the superior or on a false basis +it goes without saying that it is his duty and responsibility--that +is, the duty and responsibility of every one of you--to say so, and +also to state his reasons truthfully like a man if he is convinced +that they deprecate the order. But the moment the superior concerned +or the Reichfuehrer-SS--that applies to the Corps of Gruppenfuehrer +in most cases--or even the Fuehrer has made the decision and given +the order, it must be carried out, not only in word and letter, but +also in spirit. Whoever carries out the order must do so as a good +steward, as a true representative of the authority giving the command. +If you thought at first that this would be right and that that would +not be right or even wrong, then there are two alternatives. Thus if +a man thinks that he cannot be answerable for obeying an order, then +he should say quite honestly: [p. 76] I cannot be answerable for it. I +beg you to excuse me from it. Then the order will usually be: You must +still carry it out. Or you think: his nerve has gone he’s weak. Then +you can say: Good, retire on a pension. But orders must be sacred. If +the Generals obey, then the armies obey automatically. The more our +territory grows, the more does this sacredness of orders apply. It was +not all difficult to enforce an order in our little Germany. But to +enforce an order once we--and I am convinced of this--have garrisons +in the Urals,--that _is_ more difficult. Here it will not always be +possible to make sure that the order is carried out. Our controlling +authority may not, may never be,--as in Russia--the Commissar. The +only Commissar we have must be our own conscience, devotion to duty, +loyalty, obedience. If you lead the way with this example, gentlemen, +every subordinate will follow this example. But you will never be able +to demand obedience of your men if you do not give the same obedience +to authority over you, and give it blindly and without reserve. + +3. Bravery + +To bravery, I think we need least to exhort ourselves, for our leaders +and men are brave [p. 77]. + +4. Truthfulness + +I now come to a fourth virtue, which is very rare in Germany, to +truthfulness. One of the greatest evils which has spread during the war +is the lack of truthfulness in messages, reports, and statements which +subordinate departments in civil life, in the state, the party and the +Services send in to the departments over them. The message, the report +is the basis of every decision. It is actually the fact that one can +now in many spheres assume in wartime that 95 out of 100 messages are +untrue or only half true or semi-correct [p. 80]. + +While on the subject of truthfulness I now come to another matter [p. +83]. It must so come about in war and in peace--in peace this will be +above all a training task--that we SS-men no longer conclude written +agreements, but that among us, as used to be the case formerly, the +giving of one’s word and the hand-shake signify the contract, and that +the hand-shake of one SS-man is--if necessary--certainly for 1 million +or more. It must so happen that the hand-shake or the promise of an +SS-man is more proverbially reliable than mortgage upon the greatest +value of anybody else’s. It must be so! + +If we conclude agreements, we must keep them. If I make a contract +with an agent, even with a blackguard, I keep the contract. I take +my stand unreservedly on this point of view. If I announce in the +Generalgouvernement, that anyone who informs against a Jew who has +sought shelter and gone into hiding, shall have a third of the Jew’s +property, then it often happens that Secretary Huber or Second Lt. +(SA) Huber who--when he can--makes illegal trips, or does not hesitate +[p. 84] to order a new telephone or new pencils, who, that is, never +saves,--suddenly begins to save for the German Reich. He says for +instance: This Jew has 1200 RM. What, that means I would have to pay +out to the Pole who denounced him 4000 RM. No, I’ll save that for +Germany. The Pole shall only get 400 RM. So a little man goes and +breaks the promise of a whole organization. That sort of thing should +be impossible. + +If we make a promise, it must be kept. If one Reichsfuehrer-SS pledges +to anyone support for his organization--as may very often be the case +now in the Balkans--this pledge must be kept. We must acquire such +a reputation for the keeping of contracts in the whole world, we in +the SS, that we thereby gain for Germany advantages of the greatest +value, namely faith through confidence. Many will come to us, who +will not approach official departments. The Balkans are always in a +state of confusion. That is a blessing. If they were united it would +be terrible. Things are chaotic in the Caucasus and in Russia. We can +only see to it--this is also a [p. 85] precept,--that the territories +we have occupied and the peoples we rule over never become united, that +they always remain disunited. For they would only be united against us. +If therefore we pledge our protection to a party [Splittergruppe] who +approaches us, it must be quite out of the question for any member of +the SS or the police, any member of the whole organization to go and +break the promise. This promise must be sacred. + + + Practical Tasks + +In the way of practical duties for the Senior SS executive and [p. +103] Police Officers I see above all one task, which applies at +the same time to the Heads of the Main Offices as well. For me the +Senior SS Executive and Police Officer is the representative of the +Reichsfuehrer-SS in his area. It would be an evil day if the SS +and police fell out. It would be an evil day if the Main Offices, +performing their tasks well meaningly but mistakenly made themselves +independent by each having a downward chain of command. I really think +that the day of my overthrow would be the end of the SS. It must be, +and so come about, that this SS organization with all its branches--the +General-SS which is the common basis of all of them, the Waffen-SS, the +regular uniformed police [Ordnungspolizei], the SIPO, (with the whole +economic administration, schooling, ideological training, the whole +question of kindred), is, even under the tenth Reichsfuehrer-SS _one_ +bloc, _one_ body, _one_ organization. Alas if we do not bring them +together. Alas if the individual main offices, the individual chiefs +had a false conception of their duty here, if they believed they were +doing a good thing, whereas in fact they were taking the first step +toward the end. We have come a long way on the road to amalgamation. In +the hard battles of this year the Waffen-SS has been welded together +in the bitterest hours from the most varied divisions and sections, +and from these it formed: body-guard units [Leibstandart], military +SS [Verfuegungstruppe], Death’s head units, and then the Germanic SS. +Now when our “Reich”, Death’s Head Cavalry Divisions and “Viking” +Divisions were there, everyone knew in these last weeks: “Viking” is at +my side, “Reich” is at my side, “Death’s Head” is at my side,--“Thank +God”, now nothing can happen to us.--The regular uniformed police and +Sipo, General-SS and Waffen-SS must now gradually amalgamate too, just +as this is and [p. 105] must be the case within the Waffen-SS. This +applies to matters concerning filling of posts, recruiting, schooling, +economic organization, and medical services. I am always doing +something towards this end, a bond is constantly being cast around +these sections of the whole to cause them to grow together. Alas, if +these bonds should ever be loosened,--then everything--you may be sure +of this--would sink back into its old insignificance in one generation, +and in a short space of time. It could then be said that that would be +no pity; if it wasn’t worth keeping alive, it should come to an end. +That is right. I would not hear of anything being kept, even if it is +my, our SS which is so dear to us, if it was not worth keeping alive. + +Only I think that we could not be answerable for it to Germany, and +to Germania, for this Germanic Reich needs the SS organization. She +needs it at least for the next few centuries. Then, in a hundred, a +thousand, or two thousand years another form will surely be found. When +we are dead and gone, some remnant of us with a few of our fundamental +ideas will pull through and carry on. Out of this will grow something +new again, just as here and there we took over, and now bear, a torch +from the time of the Teutons, from the age of chivalry, from the +Vehmic organization, and from the [p. 106] Prussian army, in order to +light a great light from it. It will be just like that later on. I +believe that today we could not afford to let anything happen to this +SS. That is why I urge one thing on all of you, on you, my heads of +the main offices, my Senior Executive SS and Police Officers, and on +this whole corps of Gruppenfuehrers, the highest gradation in this +hierarchy of the SS organization: Always see the whole, always look at +the whole organization, never at your branch of it only, or only your +Oberabschnitt but always see the SS, and above it the Germanic Reich, +and above that our Fuehrer who has created and is still creating this +Reich. + + + The Future + +When the war is won,--then, as I have already told you, our [p. 112] +work will start. We do not know when the war will end. It may be +sudden, or it may be long delayed. We shall see. But I say to you +_now_, if an armistice and peace comes suddenly, let no-one think that +he can then sleep the sleep of the just. Get all your Commanders, +Chiefs and SS-Fuehrers attuned to this; only then, gentlemen, shall +we be awake, for then, so many others will fall into this sleep. I am +going so to rouse the whole SS, and keep it so wide awake that we can +tackle reconstruction in Germany immediately. Then Germanic work will +be begun immediately in the General-SS, for then the harvest will be +ripe to be taken into the granary. We shall then call up age-groups +thereby law. We shall then immediately put all our Waffen-SS units +into excellent form, both as regards equipment and training. We shall +go on working in this first 6 months after the war, as though the +big offensive were starting on the next day. It will make all the +difference, [p. 113] if Germany has an operative reserve, an operative +backing, at the peace or armistice negotiations, of 20, 25 or 30 +SS-divisions intact. + +If the peace is a final one, we shall be able to tackle our great work +of the future. We shall colonize. We shall indoctrinate our boys +with the laws of the SS-organization. I consider it to be absolutely +necessary to the life of our peoples, that we should not only impart +the meaning of ancestry, grandchildren and future, but feel these to +be a part of our being. Without there being any talk about it, without +our needing to make use of rewards and similar material things, it +must be a matter of course that we have children. It must be a matter +of course that the most copious breeding should be from this racial +super-stratum of the Germanic people. In 20 to 30 years we must really +be able to present the whole of Europe with its leading class. If the +SS, together with the farmers,--we together with our friend Backe, then +run the colony in the East on a grand scale, without any restraint, +without any question about any kind of tradition but with nerve and +revolutionary impetus, we shall in 20 years push the national boundary +[Volkstumsgrenze] 500 kilometers Eastwards. + +I requested of the Fuehrer today, that the SS--if we have fulfilled +our task and our duty by the end of the war--should have the privilege +of holding Germany’s most Easterly frontier as a defence frontier +[p. 114]. I believe this is the only privilege for which we have no +competitors. I believe not one person will dispute our claim to this +privilege. We shall be in a position there to exercise every young +age-group in the use of arms. We shall impose our laws on the East. +We will charge ahead and push our way forward little by little to the +Urals. I hope that our generation will successfully bring it about +that every age-group has fought in the East, and that every one of our +divisions spends a winter in the East every second or third year. Then +we shall never grow soft, then we shall never get SS members who only +come to us because it is distinguished or because the black coat will +naturally be very attractive in peacetime. Everyone will know that: “if +I join the SS, there is the possibility that I might be killed.” He +has contracted in writing that every second year he will not dance in +Berlin or attend the carnival in Munich, but that he will be posted to +the Eastern frontier in an ice-cold winter. Then we will have a healthy +elite for all time. Thus we will create the necessary conditions for +the whole Germanic people and [p. 115] the whole of Europe, controlled, +ordered and led by us, the Germanic people, to be able, in generations, +to stand the test in her battles of destiny against Asia, who will +certainly break out again. We do not know when that will be. Then, when +the mass of humanity of 1 to 1½ milliards lines up against us, the +Germanic people, numbering, I hope, 250 to 300 millions, and the other +European peoples, making a total of 600 to 700 millions--(and with +an outpost area stretching as far as the Urals, or, a hundred years, +beyond the Urals)--must stand the test in its vital struggle against +Asia. It would be an evil day if the Germanic people did not survive +it. It would be the end of beauty and “Kultur”, of the creative power +of this earth. That is the distant future. It is for that that we are +fighting, pledged to hand down the heritage of our ancestors. + +We see into the distant future, because we know what it will be. That +is why we are doing our duty more fanatically than ever, more devoutly +than ever, more bravely, more obediently and more thoroughly than ever. +We want to be worthy of being permitted to be the first SS-men of the +Fuehrer, Adolf Hitler, in the long history of the Germanic people, +which stretches before us. + +Now let us remember the Fuehrer, Adolf Hitler, who will create the +Germanic Reich and will lead us into the Germanic future [p. 116]. + + Our Fuehrer Adolf Hitler + Sieg Heil! + Sieg Heil! + Sieg Heil! + + # # # # # + + Speech of the Reichsfuehrer-SS Heinrich Himmler at Kharkow April 1943 + + My SS-Fuehrer, + +It is perhaps very strange, that we should meet in a university of the +Russian State, here at Kharkow,--at this Kharkow, which has played so +great a part, and really will play a still bigger part in the history +of the war. Until last year it was of no very great significance. This +year it has become, like Stalingrad, but in the reverse sense, a city +of destiny in German war history, in German history. I have asked you, +the Commanding Officers of the three SS-Divisions, who took part in +this campaign from the Dnieper to Kharkow and carried out this campaign +practically alone and forced a decision, to come together here in +order, as has been the custom for many many years, as long as there +has been an SS, to meet each other again, and in order once more to +establish a few facts about the past and the future. + +I would like, in a few words, to outline the whole position and +situation with regard to the war. + +Today, Germany is on the borders of Europe everywhere. These European +frontiers stretch up as far as the North Cape, down the Norwegian +coast, through Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium and France and jump +over to Africa, continue to Tunis to form a bridgehead, run across as +far as the frontiers formed by the sea, then from Greece and Crete up +to the borders of the neutral states of Turkey and Bulgaria, to join +hands again here in the East. I would like to give it a name: it is the +great fortress of Europe. + +It will undoubtedly happen, that the enemy will make the attempt, +today, tomorrow or the next day, at some time, to break into this +fortress of Europe at one point or another. That will undoubtedly be +the case. Possibly he will be able to force an entry for a shorter or +longer period at one point or another in places which we do not have +in our personal and responsible control, or which we are not defending +with our arms [p. 2]. One thing is certain: wherever the enemy lands, +if once we can get to grips with him on the Continent, where we are +not dependent on supplies from overseas, that ought to be, and will +be, all right with us. On the whole, however, it is here in the East +that the decision lies. The fortress of Europe with its frontiers must +be held and will be held too, as long as is necessary. The decision, +therefore, lies here in the East; here must the Russian enemy, this +people numbering two hundred million Russians, be destroyed on the +battle field and person by person, and made to bleed to death ... + +It is my opinion--and here, I believe, I am speaking to men [p. 3] who +already understand this--that we must conduct the war and our campaign +on these lines:--how can we take the most men from the Russians--dead +or alive? We shall do it by killing them or taking them prisoner and +[p. 4] really putting them to work, by endeavoring to gain as much +control as possible over any territory we occupy, and by leaving +empty of people any territory we dispose of, any areas we make over +to the enemy. Either they must be deported and will be used as labour +in Germany for Germany, or they will just die in battle. To hand +people back again, giving the enemy workers once more and enabling +him to recruit again,--that I think, taking the broad view, would be +absolutely wrong. That could not be advocated * * * + +On the other side, one thing goes on the same as ever, the U-boat +war, this dreadful stranglehold on the throat of the enemy. [p. 5] I +have good reason to be convinced that this stranglehold will never +be relaxed, but will tighten. I cannot help feeling that things are +beginning to go worse with England these last few months in matters +of supply. That by no means indicates that England will collapse +today, tomorrow or the next day, but it does mean that we will just be +approaching the time when one or other of our opponents, once Russia is +conquered and eliminated as a factor, will come to the conclusion that +it is not worth carrying on the war. The result--and I am convinced +of this, I believe it and I know it--the result, the end of this war, +regardless of however many months or even years it lasts, will be this: +that the Reich, the German Reich or the Germanic Reich of the German +nation, will with just title find confirmation of its evolution, that +we have an outlet and a way open to us in the East, and that then +centuries later, a politically Germany--a Germanic World Empire will +be formed. That will be the result, that will be the fruit of all the +many, many sacrifices, which have been made and which must still be +made. + +We have,--I would say, as very consistent National Socialists, [p. 7] +taken the question of blood as our starting point. We were the first +really to solve the problem of blood by action, and in this connection, +by problem of blood, we of course do not mean anti-semitism. +Anti-semitism is exactly the same as delousing. Getting rid of lice is +not a question of ideology. It is a matter of cleanliness. In just the +same way, anti-semitism, for us, has not been a question of ideology, +but a matter of cleanliness, which now will soon have been dealt with. +We shall soon be deloused. We have only 20,000 lice left, and then +the matter is finished within the whole of Germany. But for us the +question of blood was a reminder of our own worth, a reminder of what +is actually the basis holding this German people together. Just as is +the case in the years between 1938 and 1943, in exactly the same way +as now, the same ill-founded reproaches were made then: well, if you +bring the Nordic man so much to the fore, you’re creating a new split, +a new class-distinction,--it’s a new class hatred. We’re overcoming +the social barriers, so I’ve been told by important party members, and +now you’re setting up racial ones. My reply to these people has always +been: If you want to look at things in a negative way, there is nothing +in the world which you cannot see in a negative way. From the negative +angle, of course, you can argue that way. I see it differently, for I +see it on this plane: What is the binding factor which holds the man +in East Prussia and the man in the Black Forest together, the man in +Schleswig-Holstein and in Hamburg and the man in Munich, in Graz, in +Pomerania, in Berlin [p. 8] and in the Rhineland? What is then the +factor or the element which contains all that is dear and precious and +valuable to us? It is in fact what we Germans call inherent Kultur, it +is this Germanic, this Nordic component of our blood. + +In one operation those peoples must and will be incorporated in the +Germanic Reich which, at one time, were part of Germany, part of the +German Empire (the Roman Empire and the German nation) and belonged +to us up to 1806 or only till 1648,--that is Flanders, Wallonia, and +the Netherlands. They were a part of the Reich [p. 10]. Over and above +this, we must have the power to bring into the fold, and make a part of +our community in a second operation, those Germanic peoples and states +too, which have never been part and parcel of the German Reich,--I mean +Denmark and Norway, the Danish and Norwegian people. + +I very soon formed a Germanic SS in the various countries. We very soon +got Germanic volunteers from them [p. 11]. It has not always been liked +and is still not liked today by many of the political leaders in these +countries. From the beginning, I have said to them, “You can do what +you like and leave what you like. I leave everything entirely to you, +but you may be sure, that an SS will be set up in your country, and +there is but one SS in Europe, and that is the Germanic SS, led by the +Reichsfuehrer-SS. You can resist, or you can offer no resistance, it’s +all the same to me. We shall do it in any case!” We have told them that +curtly and plainly and clearly from the beginning. + +I have said to the SS-men from the beginning too: We do not expect +you to renounce your nation, or do anything which a proud and +self-respecting fellow who loves his nation cannot do. We do not expect +you to become German out of opportunism. But we do expect you to +subordinate your national ideal to the greater racial and historical +ideal, to the Germanic Reich. + +In addition, one thing is quite obvious. All of us, who are members of +the Germanic peoples, can be happy and thankful that once in thousands +of years fate has given us, from among the Germanic peoples, such a +genius, a leader, our Fuehrer Adolf Hitler, and you should be happy to +be allowed to work with us. + +Although I do not wish to discuss any individual official matters +here, I would still like to mention in a slightly official way, in my +capacity as a military man, what I said before about racial Germans. I +beg you never to commit the psychological error of speaking of Germans +who came from Roumania or Hungary or Croatia, as Croats, Roumanians +or Hungarians. I also beg you never to make the mistake of letting a +man who speaks [p. 12] German badly or cannot speak and read German, +sense this, or let him sense the thought: “You are a second-rate +German, for you can’t read or write German properly.” I beg you +rather, (and here too I am stating a very sober opinion), to think in +this case of these Germans in the whole of the Balkans, still more of +those overseas, in America, when one day we must fetch over here in +millions,--and we shall succeed in doing so--who have held out for +centuries. I am certainly of the opinion that if a mighty German Reich +with an incredible upward urge in its very being and a great German +Fuehrer had not now come into being at this time and in the last few +decades, it would have been the end of these Germans. A person with a +very strong character can personally rise above his surroundings for +years and perhaps for decades. A race, if it is in small groups, cannot +in the long run hold out against its surroundings. And we must never +forget this: these Germans do not usually live together in hundreds +of thousands, but a thousand here in a few villages, and two thousand +there, and 20 thousand at the most somewhere else. But they do not +live together in large numbers. So they are always encircled by a +foreign nation [Volkstum], and surrounded by its influence, but are +above all surrounded by the influence of the people of the country. +_They_ are not the people of the country, those are the others. They +are subjects of a state of foreign nationality, which, in any moment +of doubt, is their enemy, or at the very best, as, shall we say, +Roumania, a tolerably neutral and impartial observer. But on the whole +these Germans have lived, throughout the centuries of German weakness, +from the Thirty Years’ War up till now, in surroundings calculated not +to strengthen their consciousness of German race [Deutschtum] but to +destroy it. + +There was something else besides this. If one of these Germans wanted +to get anywhere he could only do so by entering the state system of the +foreign people as an official or an officer. It is no mere chance--[p. +13]. I am not making spiteful assertions now but merely stating the +facts--that, for instance, among Hungarian generals there is such a +considerable percentage of men of German origin, who of course had, +in most cases, to alter their names if they wanted to get anywhere. +In many cases, if they did not do so, and remained obdurate about +it, they were subsequently removed from office. I quote here as an +example the present Chief of the Hungarian General Staff, General +Sombacke, who in his youth at the Austrian Military Academy still +had the thoroughly good German name of Knaus. May I remind you of +Feldmarschall or Feldmarschall-Lieutnant Raab, who as we all know, has +now retired. Both are of German descent, and one could name countless +hundreds of leading men in these South-Eastern States who are all of +German origin, had to become part of the alien nation, and were then +drained [eine Auslaugung bildeten] of their own most valuable national +characteristics. + +If, then, we get sons of these racial Germans [Volksdeutschtum] who +have still survived there--(some are genuine volunteers, and others +come as a result of a levy, for we have organized the racial groups +from within the Reich through the SS, so that without possessing +political power we have in fact, morally such strength and power among +these people that we can compel a man, compel him morally, to serve +with us in Germany, due entirely to the power of the whole German +national community)--if we therefore get these men, you must not make +it difficult for them to enter our community by calling him by the +name which you judge he will not wish to hear. A Saxon from Siebenburg +will never let it be said that he is a Roumanian. It’s just against +that that he and his fathers have fought for 700 years. And a German +from Hungary will never let it be said that he is a Hungarian. If you +know how he has been thrashed by many a Hungarian gendarme, before +he came to us, how his mother was thrashed, and his parents driven +from hearth and home, you can imagine how bitter it is for him if he +now joins German service-men and they say: here comes a Hungarian. Or +you can imagine how bitter it is for him when he is reproached for +something which he cannot help. If we had not been to a German school +we should not be able to read and write German either. If we had been +forced, shall we say, to go to a Polish school, we should write Polish +too, although we profess to be Germans. And that is often the case +with these men. I must therefore expect of you understanding and human +sympathy in this matter, and must expect that the leaders, in addition +to their many other duties, will undertake to see that additional +German instruction in reading, speaking and writing, be given to these +men at every opportunity that is offered. I lay special emphasis on +this matter, because by negotiations, we have now managed to make an +arrangement enabling us in future to enlist even those Germans who up +to now have been serving in the Roumanian army. So we can expect a +great influx from the Germans of the South-East. + +We know that these clashes with Asia and Jewry are necessary [p. 16] +for evolution. They give the cue [Auftakt] for the European Continent +to unite. These clashes are the only evolutionary possibility which +will enable us one day, now that Fate has given us the Fuehrer Adolf +Hitler, to create the Germanic Reich. They are the necessary condition, +for our race, and our blood to create for itself and put under +cultivation, in the years of peace, (during which we must live and work +austerely, frugally and like Spartans), that settlement area in which +new blood can breed, as in a botanical garden so to speak. Only by this +means can the Continent become a Germanic Continent, capable of daring +to embark, in one or [p. 17] two or three or five or ten generations, +on the conflict with this Continent of Asia which spews out hordes of +humanity. Perhaps we shall also have to hold in check other coloured +peoples who will soon be in their certain prime, and thus preserve +the world, which is the world of our blood, of our children and of +our grandchildren. Now it is just this world we like the best, the +Germanic world, the world of Nordic life. We know that this conflict +with the advancing pressure from Asia, with the 200 million Russians, +is necessary. And we shall win as sure as I am speaking here in the +University of Kharkow. We shall have to pass through many a valley, +many a narrow defile. Many will grow tired on the way. Of course they +will mostly be those who have no reason to do so. To put it vulgarly, +many will do something in their trousers. Many people will get shaky +at the knees. The only thing that matters is that we stand firm. This +is what is important for us as SS-men, for our province of duty and +our mission (it is a task additional to those of the whole German +Armed Forces and the whole German people): That is what I would like +to impress upon you, this is what I beg you, as Commanding Officers, +as Chiefs, and as leaders to teach the young men again and again in +their ideological instruction. That is what I demand and exact of +you,--that you really concern yourselves with the man, the young fellow +of 17 to 18 who comes to us, and with many who are in our ranks not as +volunteers but as conscripts. I ask you to look after them, and guide +them, and not let them go before they are really saturated with our +spirit and are fighting as the old guard fought before us--that is what +I request and demand of you. + +We have only one task, to stand firm and carry on the racial struggle +without mercy. I will now say again something which I have already +today said to the men elsewhere: we will never let that excellent +weapon, the dread and terrible reputation which preceded us in the +battles [p. 18] for Kharkow fade, but will constantly add new meaning +to it. They can call us what they like in the world, the main thing is +that we are the eternally loyal, obedient, steadfast and unconquerable +fighting men of the Germanic people and of the Fuehrer, the SS of the +Germanic Reich. + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1932-PS + +SS Main Economic Administrative office + +[SS-Wirtschafts-Verwaltungshauptamt] + + Oranienburg 7 June 1943 + +Office group D, Concentrations Camps + +D I/ 1 Az: 14 c 2 / Ot / S.--Secret diary No. 743/43 + + Subject: Treatment of prisoners who fall under the night and fog + decree. [NN-Erlass]. + + Reference: Reich Security Main Office [Reichs-Sicherheitshauptamt] IV + c 2 General No. 103/42 g - issued 5 May, 1943 + + Annexes: None + + + SECRET + +To the Camp commanders of the Concentrations Camps + + Dachau, Sachsenhausen, Buchenwald, Mauthausen, Flossenburg, Neumarkt, + Auschwitz, Gross-Rosen, Natzweiler, Stu., Ravensbruck, Herz., Riga, + Lublin and the Civilian Camp Bergen-Belsen. + + [Da., Sah., Bu., Mau., Flo., Neu., Au., Gr.-Ro., Natz., Stu., Rav., + Herz., Ri., Lub., und Zil Bergen-Belsen.] + +I send the following decree of the Reich Security Main Office +[Reichssicherheitshauptamt] regarding treatment of Night and Fog [NN] +prisoners for acknowledgement and strictest observation. + +The purpose of the NN decree is the elimination of all anti-German +forces in the occupied territories and their being brought into the +Reich. + +The relatives and the population are to be kept in uncertainty about +the fate of these persons. In order to achieve this, the NN decree +further provides that prisoners of this kind should be placed under +prohibitions to write, to receive mail and parcels, to talk, or that +information should be given about them. In this regard it is irrelevant +whether it is the question of a NN-prisoner of the old or new type. By +NN-prisoners of the old type are understood those whom the military +courts have handed over to the disposing agencies for shipment to the +Reich, while the so-called New-Type NN-prisoners have been brought +directly by the arresting agencies of the Security-Police and of the SD +to the concentration camps (KL) in the Reich without the participation +of military courts. + +The Agencies of the security police and of the SD in question are +instructed to submit to the Reich security Main Office and to the +concentration camp in charge questionnaires on all prisoners who +fall under the NN-decree. This questionnaire should contain detailed +personal data, data on racial origin, the reason for arrest, the former +place of custody and other incriminating elements. These questionnaires +are to be marked by a seal “Night and Fog” [Nacht und Nebel]. + +Upon the reports of the agencies of the Security Police and of the SD +a collective order for protective custody will be issued here with the +questionnaires attached and the agencies will be further instructed to +transfer the arrestees to a concentration camp. + +Insofar as Germanic NN-prisoners are concerned, they will be +transferred from here to the concentration camp of Natzweiler +exclusively; in all other cases the NN-prisoners will be shipped to a +concentration camp depending on the location of the transferring agency +of the Security Police and of the SD with consideration of the echelon +division and of capacity of the concentration camp. + +The camp commanders of concentration camps in which there are already +NN-prisoners have to order immediately that the prisoners should +be investigated according to racial points of view and that the +_Germanic_ NN-prisoners should be transferred to the concentration +camp of Natzweiler. Compliance with this order is to be reported on +individual questionnaires for each prisoner. The camp commander of the +concentration camp of Natzweiler has to take care that the NN-prisoners +are to be kept separated from the other prisoners. + +In other respects the directives of the RSHA-Referat ND 4--which have +been sent together with the secret letter No. 551/42, dated 18 Aug. +1942, are referred to. + +Furthermore it is pointed out again as has been ordered already in the +circular decree, issued 2 Feb. 1943, secret diary No. 111/43--that +death notices of NN-prisoners are to be submitted _exclusively_ to the +agency particular transferring agency of the Security Police and of the +SD, to the RSHA and to this agency, in order to exclude divulgence of +the place of custody of an NN-prisoner. Hereby the decrees regulating +the procedure in cases of death, particularly any notification of +the relatives are cancelled. The effects of deceased Night and Fog +prisoners are to be sent in their entirety to the transferring agency +in charge which will guard it until further notice. + + The chief of the central office + [signature illegible] + SS Lt. Colonel + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1933-PS + +Main Bureau for SS Economic Administration + + Bureau Group Chief D--Concentration Camp-- DI/l/Az: 14 f 13/L/S + +Secret order of the day--No. 612/43 + +_Subject_: Action 14 f 13 in the concentration camps. + +_Reference_: Local directive DI/1/Az: 14 f 13/OT/S--Secret order of + the day No. 34/43 of S.1.43 + + STATE SECRET + +To the Camp Commanders of the Concentration Camps + + Da., Sah., Bu., Mau., Flo., Neu., Au., Gr.-Ro., Natz., Stu., Rav., + Ri., Herz., Lubl., and Bergen-Belsen. + +Copy to: Chief of Bureau D II, III in the house + +The Reich Fuehrer-SS and Chief of German Police has decided, after +consultation, that in the future only mentally sick [geisteskranke] +prisoners may be selected for action 14 F 13 by the medical commissions +appointed for this purpose. + +All other prisoners incapable of working (tubercular cases, bed-ridden +cripples, etc.) are to be basically excepted from this action. +Bedridden prisoners are to be drafted for suitable work which they can +perform in bed. + +The order of the Reich Fuehrer SS is to be obeyed strictly in the +future. + +Requests for fuel for this purpose therefore do not take place. + + [signature illegible] + SS-Brigadefuehrer and Major General of the Waffen-SS + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1939-PS + +A “Proclamation to Workers” addressed to employees and employers by Dr. +Robert Ley on 5 September 1939. Quoted from the chapter “The German +Worker Has Recognized * * *” pp. 14-17, of “Forge of the Sword”, a +collection in book form of speeches by, and articles about, Dr. Robert +Ley, published in 1942 by the Central Publishing House of the NSDAP, +Franz Eher Successor, Munich, with a foreword by Reichs Marshal Goering. + +The German people in its over-all attitude is what the Fuehrer has +made of that people after the collapse. The poised and self-assured +attitude of the German people in the current world crisis contrasts so +enormously with the insecurity of the so-called democratic nations, +that each thinking human being must ask himself about the cause of this +state of affairs, which is so full of hope for us Germans. + +The achievement of the Fuehrer in the entire political sphere is +a LARGE SCALE AND UNIQUE ACHIEVEMENT OF EDUCATION. The following +principles have been taught by the Fuehrer and are decisive for the +present strong attitude of Germany. + +The Fuehrer has taught the German people that its existence and its +being is dependent upon the unqualified perception of all Germans that +the battle for life of the German people cannot be fought in limited +areas, but that this battle for life means wrestling and battling in +all spheres of life. It is the teaching of the totality for the battle +for life. + +We National Socialists say: social policy and economy are one +and belong together. Progress and development are socialism. A +socialist can never be a pacifist; on the contrary, he must ALWAYS +STAND PREPARED AT THE HIGHEST PITCH OF MILITARY READINESS to attain +the socialist objective. Peace and war are not separate, mutually +exclusive conditions, but in each case they are only a different guise +[Erscheinungsform] for one and the same struggle of the people to +secure its living potentialities. We National Socialists do not hope +for gifts and miracles, but we recognize that every thing must be +fought and worked for honestly. We do not believe in chance, and we +leave nothing to arbitrariness either. To us Fight is Life, and to us +Life means Fight. We have no inclination to rest and restrict ourselves +to watching, but we know that Life would simply pass us by were we to +withhold ourselves from the Fight. We could never make up for what we +neglect today. + +BECAUSE OF THAT THE FUEHRER HAS FURTHERMORE TAUGHT US THAT OUR GERMAN +PEOPLE MUST COMMIT ALL THE STRENGTH AND ENERGY IT POSSESSES TO FIGHT +THROUGH THE STRUGGLE OF LIFE AND DESTINY, SO AS TO ATTAIN VICTORY. We +National Socialists REJECT HALF MEASURES AND COMPROMISES. They never +lead to the goal, but lull people to sleep until they wake up one day +in horror and dread. COWARDS PERISH! + +Because of that we National Socialists have mobilized all resources +and all our energies during the past seven years, so as to be equipped +for the supreme effort of battle. WE DO NOT THROW OURSELVES INTO +ADVENTURES, AND WE ARE NOT SO UNSCRUPULOUS AS TO LEAVE ANYTHING TO +ACCIDENT. + +True,--when according to human judgment and according to the state of +our knowledge all preparations have been made, then we have never as +yet hesitated to venture the ultimate. + +OBSERVE THE FUEHRER! Is he not the living model! His own career, +his leadership of the NSDAP, the seizure of power, the conduct of +the state, the regaining of Austria, the Sudeten area, Bohemia and +Moravia and finally the Memel territory,--all great events demonstrate +ever anew the fortunate fact that the Fuehrer prepares anything and +everything to the last detail. He calculates, ponders, elucidates,--he +acts. But when a decision has been arrived at, then there is no more +going back. He holds fast. He is tenacious. + +Thus did the Fuehrer’s great successes come about, and thus new +successes will be added. + +In conclusion the Fuehrer has taught a third principle: THE +PREREQUISITE for any battle and THE PREREQUISITE for the mobilization +of all our strength and energy is the _folk and fate community of +all Germans_. [Volks und Schicksalsgemeinschaft]. Even though our +professions may differ, even though our interests may clash, even +though the individuality of the various tribes and provinces may reveal +itself, one thing encompasses us, whether we are workers or soldiers: +THE RECOGNITION, THAT WE GERMANS BELONG TOGETHER IN AN INDISSOLUBLE +COMMUNITY OF FATE. + +For example, what a splendid example was the building of the West Wall, +which revealed convincingly and unforgettably the cohesion of worker +and soldier! + +THE COMMUNITY OF THE FACTORY IS NOT A MATTER OF PAPER VERBIAGE, BUT IT +IS AN UNEQUIVOCAL FACT. + +The Great War 1914/1918 was not lost because the German soldier had +become a coward, but because dissension and discord tore the people +asunder. + +Destiny will test us anew. This time we will demonstrate what the +National Socialist community can accomplish. This community is not a +matter of paper verbiage, it is not a phrase! The first precautionary +measure, the introduction of rationing certificates has proven how +seriously the National Socialist state believes in the total people’s +community. + +Thus you, German man and German woman workers, will understand that +in this gigantic fight of Germany for justice and freedom, for living +space and bread, THERE IS NO PLACE WHATEVER FOR EVERYDAY QUARRELS. YOU, +working German, will learn to understand THAT THE LONG-RANGE PLANS OF +THE FUEHRER AUTOMATICALLY PRECLUDE ALL DISSENSION. + +It will be impossible in future, too, to play the Home Front against +the Fighting Front and Fighting Front against the Home Front. Not a +front sector at some border is alone involved in battle, but the entire +German people. The worker at his drill press, the merchant at his +counter, the inventor in his laboratory, the soldier in the trenches, +they are all equally determined to fight for Germany’s freedom. + +No one will be able to evade the question: “Do you believe in +Germany?”, and no one will want to evade that question. And the answer +to this question will resound audibly for the whole world: “Yes, +indeed, we believe in Germany because we believe in the work of the +Fuehrer.” + + + PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1940-PS + + VOELKISCHER BEOBACHTER, Southern German Edition (Publisher Franz Eher, + Successor), issue 136, of 11 May 1933, Page 1, column 5. + + THE GERMAN LEADERS OF LABOR AN EDICT BY ADOLF HITLER + + Berlin, 10 May + +The Fuehrer Adolf Hitler has issued the following edict: + +I appoint the Chief of Staff of the Political Organization [P.O.] of +the NSDAP, Dr. Robert Ley, as leader of the German Labor Front. + +I appoint District Leader [Gauleiter] Forster Danzig, as leader of the +Employees’ Associations [Angestelltenverbaende]. + +I appoint the leader of the National Socialist Factory Cell +Organization [N.S.B.O.], Schuhmann, as leader of the Workers’ +Associations [Arbeiterverbaende]. + + Berlin, 10 May + Adolf Hitler. + + + PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1942-PS + + LEGAL REGULATIONS AND LEGAL PROBLEMS OF THE MOVEMENT + + [Rechtseinrichtungen und Rechtsaufgaben der Bewegung] by Dr. Otto + Gauweiler (Munich 1939), page 20. + +_a. Amendments in Reich Legislation_: + +By an order of the Fuehrer, dated 25 July 1934, his Deputy, as well as +appointed reviewers, were given the power to take part in the editing +of bills dealing with all the departments of the Reich. On the basis +of this decree, the Deputy of the Fuehrer was to be invited to all +discussions of the department heads, to which he could also send his +representatives. Drafts of the laws had to be presented to the Deputy +of the Fuehrer in the form of reviewer’s drafts [Referentenentwuerfe] +and not as Cabinet bills. From a special order from the Fuehrer, 6 +April 35, this privilege of participation in government affairs by +the Fuehrer’s Deputy was expanded to include all executive decisions +and orders insofar as they were published in the Reichsgesetzblatt. +The Deputy of the Fuehrer can on his own initiative introduce bills, +etc. regardless in what field; insofar as the good of the party is +concerned, he is the man in charge. + +Thus, the direct influence of the movement on the legislation and the +executive branch was assured at a point where up to now the laws were +an internal affair of the individual ministries. From now on, technical +considerations or considerations of time cannot interfere with the +requests and plans of the party. + + + PARTIAL COPY OF DOCUMENT 1947-PS + +From: Freiherr v. Fritsch. + +To: Baronin Margot v. Schutzbar. + + Achterberg, 11 Dec 38. + +My dear Baroness: + +Many thanks for your two letters. * * * It is really peculiar that so +many people should look to the future with increasing fears, in spite +of the Fuehrer’s indisputable successes during the past years. Herr +von Wiegand’s letter interested me very much and I am returning it +herewith. Unfortunately, I am afraid he is right when he speaks of the +profound hate which is directed to us by a large part of the world. + +Soon after the war I came to the conclusion that we should have to be +victorious in three battles, if Germany were to become powerful again: + +1. The battle against the working class--Hitler has won this. + +2. Against the Catholic Church, perhaps better expressed against +Ultramontanism, and + +3. Against the Jews. + +We are in the midst of these battles and the one against the Jews is +the most difficult. I hope everyone realizes the intricacies of this +campaign. + +* * * * * * * + + (signed): FRITSCH + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1948-PS + +The Reichsstatthalter in Vienna + +I a Pol.--VIII--136/40 Vienna 7 November 1940 + +Subject: Compulsory Labor of Able-bodied Jews. + +1. Notice: + +On 5 November 1940 telephone conversation with Colonel +[Standartenfuehrer] Huber of the Gestapo. The Gestapo has received +directions from the Reich Security Main Office [RSHA], as to how +able-bodied Jews should be drafted for compulsory labor service. +Investigations are being made at present by the Gestapo, to find out +how many able-bodied Jews are still available in order to make plans +for the contemplated mass projects. It is assumed that there are not +many more Jews available. If some should still be available, however, +the Gestapo has no scruples to use the Jews even for the removal of the +destroyed synagogues. + +SS Colonel Huber will report personally to the “Regierungspraesident” +in this matter. + +I have reported to the “Regierungspraesident” accordingly. The matter +should further be kept in mind. + +2. Presented anew: 25 November 1940 + +Presented anew: 20.12.40 + + [Initialed] + +By order: + + [Signed] Dr. Fischer. + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1949-PS + +State Administration of Reich Gau Vienna + +Statistical Office for Reich Gau Ostmark + +Zl. 3305/I 39 + + Vienna, 15 December 1939 + 1. Heldenplatz, Neue Burg + Tel. R 27-5-65 + + To the Reich Commissar for the Reunion of the Austrian Nation with + the German Reich + + through channels via the Governor [Regierungspraesident] of Vienna + +The Statistical Office for Reich Gau Ostmark has the honor to submit +herewith, in the enclosure, an initial compilation of early results +of this year’s census relative to the number and reduction in number +of Jews and part Jews in Reich Gau Ostmark, especially in the Vienna +districts, together with a brief commentary. + + [Signature illegible] + +1 file of the Statistical Office for the Reich Districts (Gaue) of the +Ostmark, together with a summary of 15 December 1939. Zl. 3305/I 39 + + # # # # # + + _Jews and Part Jews in the Reich Districts [Gaue] of the Ostmark_ + +In the census of 17 May 1939, the question was put for the first time +whether one of an individual’s grandparents was full Jew by race. +The declarations were to be made by the people on the “Supplementary +Card for Data on Descent and Education” in full and to the best of +their ability; this supplementary card was to be given to the honorary +census taker in a sealed, opaque envelope, which was opened only +when the statistical count was made. No check has yet been made as +to the correctness of the information submitted. In the compiling +of the statistics, everyone who reported that three or four of his +grandparents were full Jews was counted as a full Jew himself, +everyone with two Jewish grandparents as a part Jew, Grade I, and +correspondingly everyone with only one Jewish grandparent as a part +Jew, Grade II. The resulting slight deviation from the pertinent legal +definitions of full Jew and part Jew was occasioned by formulation of +the question in the simplest possible way. + +According to the initial results of this year’s census, there were +91,480 full Jews and 22,344 part Jews of Grades I and II in Vienna as +of 17 May 1939. In the remaining Reich Districts of the Ostmark there +were 3,073 full Jews and 4,241 part Jews. According to this, there were +altogether 121,138 Jews in the Ostmark, of whom 113,824, i.e. 94%, +lived in Vienna, 3% in Niederdonau, 1% in the Steiermark, and less than +1% in each of the remaining Gaus. + +While 80% of all the Jews in Vienna were full Jews and only 14% were +part Jews, Grade I, and 6% part Jews, Grade II, in the other Reich Gaus +the part Jews predominated, totaling 58%, as against 42% who were full +Jews. Only in Niederdonau were the full Jews, with a total of almost +2,000, approximately as numerous as the part Jews. + +These varying proportions of full Jews and part Jews are explained +primarily by the emigration of Jews following the political change +over. This emigration had reduced the number of _full Jews_ in the +Reich Gaus of the Ostmark, excluding Vienna and Niederdonau, to a small +remainder of 1,103 by the time of the census. + +The extent of the emigration of full Jews can be estimated +approximately by comparison with the number of persons of Jewish faith +reported in the census of 1934. It must be remembered, however, that in +1934 the number of those of Jewish faith did not include all full Jews +and that, on the other hand, a small number of those of Jewish faith +were part Jews, Grades I and II. + +With this reservation, it can be stated that the number of Jews in +the Ostmark (not including the annexed Sudeten-German regions) has +diminished from 191,528 Jews by faith to 94,384 full Jews. At the +same time the number of Jews in the Reich Districts (Gaus), excluding +Vienna, decreased by 13,000 i.e. approximately 82% to 3,000. In Vienna +alone, the decrease amounted to 84,000 persons, i.e. 48%. + +The ratio of the sexes among full Jews has become so greatly dislocated +that there are 100 male full Jews to every 136 female full Jews in +Vienna, which can probably be ascribed to the earlier emigration of +the Jewish males. The ratio among the part Jews, comparatively few of +whom are thought to have emigrated, is 100:112, more nearly the average +surplus of women in the population of Vienna. + +According to data furnished by the Central Office for Jewish +emigration, Vienna IV., about 100,000 Jews emigrated from the Ostmark +in the period between the change over [Umbruch] and the census. This +number is very close to the figure of 97,000 given above as the +reduction in Jews since the census of 1934. Some 26,000 persons of +Jewish faith emigrated from the Ostmark in the months succeeding the +census. + +While the problem of full Jews is almost completely solved, therefore, +in the Reich Districts of the Ostmark, with the exception of Vienna, +from a numerical standpoint the problem of part Jews still plays a +relatively large role. For example, almost half of the approximately +1,000 Jews in Oberdonau are part Jews, Grade I, and more than one +quarter are part Jews, Grade II. Similar conditions prevail in the +remaining Reich Gaus, particularly in Salzburg, in Carinthia, and in +the Tyrol. + +Nevertheless the problem of part Jews in the Ostmark is first and +foremost a problem for the Reich District of Vienna, where there are +86% of the part Jews Grade I and 80% of the part Jews Grade II. Gau +Niederdonau takes second place, with a large interval, but has only 6% +of the part Jews Grade I and 8% of the part Jews Grade II. + +Out of all the part Jews in the Ostmark, 68% had two Jewish +grandparents and 32% had one Jewish grandparent. It is worth noting +that 70% of all Jews in Vienna were half-Jews, whereas less than 60% +were half-Jews in the remaining Gaus of the Ostmark. + +At the present time the problem of part Jews in Vienna is still +numerically overshadowed by the large number of full Jews, of whom +there are estimated in round figures to be 70,000, since approximately +4,000 persons of Jewish faith have emigrated from the Ostmark every +month since the census--with the exception of September. + + [Signature illegible] + 15.12.39. + + +JEWS AND PART JEWS IN THE DISTRICT OF VIENNA + +Preliminary Results of 1939 Census * JEWS + +---------------------+--------------------------+-------------------------- + | GRAND TOTAL | FULL JEWS + DISTRICTS +--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+-------- + | total | male | female | total | male | female +---------------------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+-------- +I. Innere Stadt | 6,825 | 3,001 | 3,824 | 5,947 | 2,596 | 3,351 +II. Leopoldstadt | 33,889 | 14,483 | 19,406 | 31,564 | 13,370 | 18,194 +III. Landstrasse | 7,623 | 3,290 | 4,333 | 5,890 | 2,530 | 3,360 +IV. Wieden | 3,166 | 1,365 | 1,801 | 2,121 | 901 | 1,220 +V. Margareten | 2,712 | 1,229 | 1,483 | 1,769 | 788 | 981 +VI. Mariahilf | 4,634 | 2,016 | 2,618 | 3,826 | 1,653 | 2,173 +VII. Neubau | 5,187 | 2,263 | 2,924 | 4,181 | 1,786 | 2,395 +VIII. Josefstadt | 3,699 | 1,668 | 2,031 | 2,958 | 1,314 | 1,644 +IX. Alsergrund | 12,784 | 5,179 | 7,525 | 11,281 | 4,527 | 6,754 +X. Favoriten | 2,307 | 1,057 | 1,250 | 1,393 | 609 | 784 +XI. Aimmering | 447 | 218 | 229 | 265 | 134 | 131 +XII. Meidling | 1,986 | 900 | 1,086 | 1,045 | 444 | 601 +XIII. Hietzing | 2,008 | 851 | 1,157 | 1,310 | 524 | 786 +XIV. Penzing | 1,729 | 759 | 970 | 933 | 403 | 530 +XV. Fanfhaus | 3,667 | 1,572 | 2,095 | 2,573 | 1,051 | 1,522 +XVI. Ottakring | 3,123 | 1,440 | 1,683 | 1,874 | 831 | 1,043 +XVII. Hernals | 1,690 | 760 | 930 | 934 | 394 | 540 +XVIII. Wahlring | 3,246 | 1,411 | 1,835 | 2,155 | 922 | 1,233 +XIX. Dobling | 2,961 | 1,325 | 1,636 | 2,030 | 845 | 1,185 +XX. Brigittenau | 7,082 | 3,020 | 4,063 | 6,025 | 2,519 | 3,506 +XXI. Floridsdorf | 1,391 | 671 | 720 | 524 | 224 | 300 +XXII. Grossenzerdorf | 171 | 82 | 89 | 45 | 21 | 24 +XXIII. Schwechat | 364 | 215 | 149 | 286 | 175 | 112 +XXIV. Modling | 365 | 176 | 189 | 113 | 56 | 57 +XXV. Liesing | 507 | 205 | 302 | 240 | 89 | 151 +XXVI. Klosternauburg | 340 | 161 | 179 | 198 | 93 | 105 +---------------------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+-------- + Total |113,824 | 49,317 | 64,507 | 91,480 | 38,798 | 52,682 + +Table continued ... + +---------------------+-------------------------+------------------------- + | PART JEWS, GRADE I | PART JEWS, GRADE II + DISTRICTS +--------+-------+--------+-------+--------+-------- + | total | male | female | total | male | female +---------------------+--------+-------+--------+-------+--------+-------- +I. Innere Stadt | 650 | 293 | 357 | 228 | 112 | 116 +II. Leopoldstadt | 1,862 | 885 | 977 | 463 | 228 | 235 +III. Landstrasse | 1,180 | 520 | 660 | 553 | 240 | 313 +IV. Wieden | 698 | 31 | 388 | 348 | 154 | 193 +V. Margareten | 632 | 293 | 339 | 311 | 148 | 163 +VI. Mariahilf | 608 | 263 | 345 | 200 | 100 | 100 +VII. Neubau | 740 | 356 | 384 | 266 | 121 | 145 +VIII. Josefstadt | 534 | 256 | 278 | 207 | 98 | 109 +IX. Alsergrund | 1,076 | 498 | 578 | 347 | 154 | 193 +X. Favoriten | 609 | 292 | 317 | 305 | 156 | 149 +XI. Aimmering | 127 | 57 | 70 | 55 | 27 | 28 +XII. Meidling | 610 | 298 | 312 | 331 | 158 | 173 +XIII. Hietzing | 457 | 210 | 247 | 241 | 117 | 124 +XIV. Penzing | 506 | 230 | 278 | 290 | 126 | 164 +XV. Fanfhaus | 758 | 368 | 390 | 336 | 153 | 383 +XVI. Ottakring | 833 | 410 | 423 | 416 | 199 | 217 +XVII. Hernals | 508 | 249 | 259 | 248 | 117 | 131 +XVIII. Wahlring | 744 | 329 | 415 | 347 | 160 | 187 +XIX. Dobling | 633 | 315 | 318 | 298 | 165 | 133 +XX. Brigittenau | 754 | 339 | 415 | 304 | 162 | 142 +XXI. Floridsdorf | 540 | 279 | 261 | 327 | 168 | 159 +XXII. Grossenzerdorf | 69 | 35 | 34 | 57 | 26 | 31 +XXIII. Schwechat | 44 | 23 | 21 | 34 | 18 | 16 +XXIV. Modling | 146 | 67 | 79 | 106 | 53 | 53 +XXV. Liesing | 185 | 80 | 105 | 82 | 36 | 46 +XXVI. Klosternauburg | 88 | 41 | 47 | 54 | 27 | 27 +---------------------+--------+-------+--------+-------+--------+-------- + Total | 15,591 | 7,296 | 8,295 | 6,753 | 3,223 |3,530 + + +Decrease of Jews in the Reich Districts [Gaue] of the Ostmark[3] (Based +on preliminary results of 1939 census) + + -----------+----------+--------+-------------------+-------- + | | | Numbers less | + | | | in 1939 than | + Reich | Jews by | Full | in 1934 | + Gau | religion |Jews by +--------+----------+ Jews + | as of | race, | | | by + | 22 Mar | as of | | |religion + | 1934 | 17 May |Absolute|In percent| 1934 + | | 1939 | | | + -----------+----------+--------+--------+----------+-------- + Vienna | 175,099 | 91,480 | 83,619 | 47.8 | 91.4 + Niederdonau| 11,439 | 1,836 | 9,603 | 83.9 | 6.0 + Oberdonau | 1,257 | 216 | 1,041 | 82.8 | 0.7 + Steiermark | 2,818 | 563 | 2,255 | 80.0 | 1.5 + Karnten | 273 | 60 | 213 | 78.0 | 0.1 + Salzburg | 239 | 67 | 172 | 72.0 | 0.1 + Tirol | 361 | 119 | 242 | 67.0 | 0.2 + Vorarlbg. | 42 | 43 | 1 | ... | 0.0 + -----------+----------+--------+--------+----------+-------- + OSTMARK | 191,528 | 94,384 | 97,144 | 50.7 | 100.0 + -----------+----------+--------+--------+----------+-------- + +Table continued ... + + -----------+------------------- + |Local distribution + +------------------- + Reich | 1939 + Gau +------------------- + | | Part Jews + + Full +-----+------ + | Jews |Grade|Grade + | | I | II + -----------+------+-----+------ + Vienna | 96.9 | 86.8| 80.3 + Niederdonau| 2.0 | 5.6| 7.1 + Oberdonau | 0.2 | 2.4| 3.4 + Steiermark | 0.6 | 2.9| 5.2 + Karnten | 0.1 | 0.7| 1.5 + Salzburg | 0.1 | 0.7| 1.0 + Tirol | 0.1 | 0.8| 1.1 + Vorarlbg. | 0.0 | 0.1| 0.4 + -----------+------+-----+------ + OSTMARK |100.0 |100.0|100.0 + -----------+----- +-----+------ + + +FOOTNOTES: + +[3] Regional status as of Oct. 15, 1938, without the annexed +Sudeten-German districts. + + # # # # # + +Jews and Part Jews in the Reich Districts (Gaus) of the Ostmark +(Preliminary results of the census of 17 May 1939) + + -----------+----------+--------+-----------------+------------------- + | | | These include | In percentages + | +--------+-----------------+-------+----------- + | | | Part Jews | |Part Jews + Reich | Jews and | +--------+--------+ Full +-----+----- + Gau |part Jews | Full | Grade | Grade | Jews |Grade|Grade + | together | Jews | I | II | | I | II + -----------+----------+--------+--------+--------+-------+-----+----- + Niederdonau| 3,737 | 1,970| 1,117| 650| 52.7| 29.9| 17.4 + Oberdonau | 1,015 | 251| 468| 296| 24.7| 46.1| 29.2 + Steiermark | 1,512 | 563| 508| 441| 37.2| 33.6| 29.2 + Karnten | 313 | 60| 129| 124| 19.2| 41.2| 39.6 + Salzburg | 273 | 67| 123| 83| 24.5| 45.1| 30.4 + Tirol | 360 | 119| 147| 94| 33.1| 46.8| 26.1 + Vorarlberg | 104 | 43| 23| 38| 41.4| 22.1| 36.5 + -----------+----------+--------+--------+--------+-------+-----+----- + Total | 7,314 | 3,073| 2,515| 1,726| 42.0 | 34.4| 23.6 + -----------+----------+--------+--------+--------+-------+-----+----- + Vienna | 113,824 | 91,480| 15,591| 6,753| 80.4 | 13.7| 5.9 + Ostmark | 121,138 | 94,553| 18,106| 8,479| 78.1 | 14.9| 7.0 + -----------+----------+--------+--------+--------+-------+-----+----- + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1950-PS + + COPY + +The Reichminister and Chief of the Reich Chancellory + +_RK. 789 B secret_ + + Berlin, W8 3 Dec. 40 + Voss Str. 6 + + SECRET + +To the Reich Governor in Vienna Gauleiter von Schirach + +VIENNA + +Dear Mr. von Schirach, + +As Reichleiter Bormann informs me, the Fuehrer has decided after +receipt of one of the reports made by you, that the 60,000 Jews, still +residing in the Reichsgau Vienna, will be deported most rapidly, that +is still during the war, to the General Gouvernement because of the +housing shortage prevalent in Vienna. I have informed the Governor +General in Cracow as well as the Reichsfuehrer-SS about this decision +of the Fuehrer, and I request you also to take cognizance of it. + + HEIL HITLER! + Yours Obedient + /s/ Dr. LAMMERS. + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1954-PS + + Deposition of Field-Marshal Wilhelm Keitel + + Investigating Officer: Dr. Bohuslav Ecer, Colonel of the Czechoslovak + Judge-Advocate’s Department. + +Secretary: Elizabeth Radziejewska, WCB, USFET. + +Present: Dr. Schwartz, L. of Judge-Advocate’s Department + +Place: Ashcan--Time: 3rd August 1945, afternoon. + +On being interrogated Keitel deposes: + +I am Wilhelm Keitel, born 22 September 1882 at Helmscherode, district +of Gandersheim, Brunswick. Married to Liza, born Fontaine, I have 5 +children. I have 3 sons, 30, 28, and 26 years old, the last one killed +in action in the East in 1941, and 2 daughters; one of them 35 years +old, married. The other one died at the age of 30. I saw my wife for +the last time in middle of April 1945. + +_My functions._ + +On 4 February 1938 I was appointed Chief of the Supreme Command of +the Armed Forces by Adolf Hitler. Before I was appointed there was a +Reich-Minister for War, who was at the same time Supreme Commander of +the Armed Forces. It was von Blomberg. On 4 February 1938 Adolf Hitler +ordered a change. He abolished the functions of the Minister for War, +and himself took over the functions of Supreme Commander of the Armed +Forces. + +At that time I became entrusted with certain functions of the Minister +for War, and that from case to case. The three Supreme Commanders of +the three formations of the Armed Forces--Air Force, Army, Navy--were +under direct orders of the Fuehrer, and contrary to Blomberg, I had no +command authority with respect to them. Therefore I was not entitled to +give orders independently, but only by order of Adolf Hitler and after +reporting to him. I had no authority of command, my role was really +that of a Chief of Staff. I was, however, able to submit proposals in +military matters to the Fuehrer in his capacity as Supreme Commander of +the Armed Forces on my own initiative, if the three Supreme Commanders +of the formations of the Armed Forces had not done so themselves; and +generally the Fuehrer asked for my opinion in military matters. The +decision was made by the Fuehrer alone. + +On 1 September 1939 a Ministerial Council for the Defense of the Reich +was created under the chairmanship of Hermann Goering. I was a member +of this board only in so far as it dealt with military matters. I was +never made a member of the Reich Government and I never had seat or +vote in the Cabinet. For seat and vote in the Cabinet was never granted +to me. + +_Relations to the Party._ + +In spring 1939 I was awarded the Golden Badge of Honor of the Party as +a decoration. I never applied formally for admission to the Party. The +Party considered me a member after the alteration of the law concerning +the Armed Forces as from autumn 1944, because I held the Golden Party +Badge; they asked me to pay a voluntary contribution to the Party. +To begin with I sent them 1000 marks at that time. Personally I was +a faithful follower of Adolf Hitler and my political conviction was +National-Socialist. But when the Fuehrer granted me his confidence, I +developed into National-Socialist under the influence of this personal +contact. Even today I am a convinced adherent of Adolf Hitler; this +does not exclude that I do not identify myself with some items of the +Party programme and of the Party policy. + +_The German rearmament._ + +The German rearmament began approximately in the year 1935; at first to +a modest extent, after we had withdrawn from the League of Nations and +had reestablished the German sovereignty of arms. + +Question: How much was the total expenditure for the German Armament up +to 1 September 1939? + +Answer: For the Armed Forces about 30 and not more than 40,000,000,000. + +Q. Do you know about the speech of Adolf Hitler, delivered at the +Sport Palace on 1 September 1939, in which he admitted to have spent +90,000,000,000 marks for German rearmament? + +A. Yes. I know of his speech and also of the figure mentioned. I was +utterly surprised by this figure and I nearly fainted when I heard this +figure. As far as my knowledge went, this figure was exaggerated by +about two thirds. + +Q. Was it the purpose of German rearmament to prepare for a war of +aggression? + +A. Even during the years 1938 and 1939 none of us soldiers gave thought +to a war of aggression. I knew that we were not at all prepared for a +war of aggression, and even less for a world war. + +Q. Did you ever advocate a German war of aggression in your official +capacity? + +A. I was in favor of a war of aggression under certain conditions, +e.g. if by such a war of aggression a certainly impending attack of an +adversary was to be prevented. + +Q. What were the reasons for the German attack on the Soviet Union? + +A. Because we had sure knowledge of the preparations of the Soviet +Union for an attack and wished to prevent it. + +Q. Did you know that some individuals in Germany, both military and +civilian, advocated a total war? + +A. No. + +Q. Did you yourself favor total war, i.e. a war disregarding +international law of warfare? + +A. No. + +Q. Was Germany prepared for a world war at the time of the Munich +crisis? + +A. No, for at that time no preparations had been made on our side, +neither strategically nor operationally. + +Q. Would Germany have begun the military attack if France and Gt. +Britain had not agreed to the Munich Treaty? + +A. Hardly, in my opinion, because as I said before, we were not +prepared for a war at that time, especially if France had fulfilled her +obligation to help Czechoslovakia. + +Q. Had Adolf Hitler made up his mind firmly to get his political aims, +even at the price of war of aggression waged by Germany or even of a +world war? + +A. I do not know that, but I am firmly convinced that he did not want a +world war. + +Q. Did you, in your capacity as Chief of the Supreme Command of the +Armed Forces, never sign an ordinance which might have implied a +violation of the International Law of Warfare? + +A. Not that I know of. + +The investigating officer submits at this instance an ordinance of the +Fuehrer concerning a General Trustee for the Employment of Labor to +Wilhelm Keitel, an ordinance dated 21 March 1941. + +Q. Were you one of the signatories of this ordinance? + +A. Yes. + +Q. Were you aware of the fact that a rule of International Law is +violated by the employment of prisoners of war and the civilian +population of the occupied countries in the German armament industry? + +A. No, as long as the ordinance is applied in accordance with +International Law. I am not responsible for further ordinances issued +later on the basis of this ordinance in order to carry it into effect. +I add, that the Fuehrer would have issued the ordinance also without my +counter-signature; or to put it better that he would not have made the +ordinance of 21 March 1942 dependent on my counter-signature. + +_The Czechoslovakian Problem._ + +Q. Who conceived the idea to solve the problem of the Sudeten-Germans +by means of an occupation by German forces, and to solve the whole +problem of Czechoslovakia forcibly by means of an occupation of the +remainder of the Republic? + +A. That was exclusively the idea of the Fuehrer, although possibly +political advisers cooperated; about this I know nothing, though. + +Q. Was there a part-mobilization or were there movements of German +forces against Czechoslovakia during the second half of May 1938 with +the purpose of solving the Sudeten-German problem by the use of force? + +A. No. The idea of military action was not yet discussed at that time, +so far as I know. + +Q. Do you remember an order of Adolf Hitler’s of 28 May 1938, ordering +the preparation of military action against Czechoslovakia for the 2 +October? + +A. I do not remember such an order, although I should have known about +it. + +The investigating officer now reads to Wilhelm Keitel the following +passage from the Reichstag speech of Adolf Hitler’s of 30 January 1939, +page 453 of the book “Dokumente der deutschen Politik” (Documents of +German Policy), vol. 7, part 2: + + As Germany had not mobilized, let alone any intentions to attack + Czechoslovakia, the situation was bound--there is no doubt about + it--to lead to a grave loss of prestige of the Reich. This unbearable + provocation, made still worse by a really infamous prosecution and + terrorization of our Germans living there, has led me to the decision + to solve the Sudeten-German problem now finally and radically. On 28 + May + + (1) I ordered to prepare military interference against this state for + the 2 October. + + (2) I ordered the enormous and speedy completion of our defensive + front in the West. + +Keitel declares thereto: + + Such orders may have been given, although from my memory I do not + know anything about it; for according to my memory the respective + preparatory measures were ordered only later, during the summer. I + believe, though, that the declarations of Hitler’s are correct, but I + do not know where they come from. + + I stress the fact that Germany was not prepared for military action + against Czechoslovakia in May 1938. I know, it is true, that the + Fuehrer had made up his mind to solve the Sudeten-German problem in + any case and within a reasonable space of time. + +Q. Was the danger of a Czechoslovakian mobilization discussed at the +time of the invasion of Austria by German forces? + +A. I myself have drawn the attention of the Fuehrer to the fact that we +were not prepared and could not occupy Austria if Czechoslovakia would +mobilize. This indication was rejected by the Fuehrer. + +Q. Do you know that at the time of the Austrian crisis Goering and +Neurath gave guarantees, both in their own names and that of the +Fuehrer, to Czechoslovakia that Germany felt bound by the Treaty of +Arbitration concluded with Czechoslovakia in 1925 and that Germany had +no intentions of attacking Czechoslovakia? + +A. I do not know anything about such a guarantee. + +_Munich._ + +I was present, I admit, in Berchtesgaden, Godesberg, and Munich when +Neville Chamberlain visited the Fuehrer. But I did not participate in +any of the discussions and was but passively present, ready for any +military information required. + +Q. Did the Fuehrer consult you with regard to the military +possibilities of Germany before the meetings with Chamberlain? + +A. No. He was well informed about the military possibilities proper, +and he knew that we were not at all prepared for war at the time of the +Munich crisis. + +Q. Was then Adolf Hitler in favor of war at that time? + +A. No, because Germany was not prepared for war, as I have to stress +again. + +Q. What would have happened militarily, if Gt. Britain, France and +the Soviet Union had taken the side of Czechoslovakia, and if they +had declined the discussions with Germany and Italy, which led to the +Munich Treaty? + +A. The military means of the German Reich were by no means sufficient +against such a constellation. An action at such a time would have been +madness. + +Q. Was it the political purpose of the Munich Treaty to eliminate the +Soviet Union from the European affairs? + +A. That is correct, for Czechoslovakia was considered to be a virtual +field of deployment of the Soviet Union which might have dangerous +consequences for military operations. + +Q. Did the Armed Forces as a whole make their influence felt by means +of an official representative with regard to the designation of the +borderline in consequence of the so-called Munich Treaty? + +A. I personally did not, neither did an officer of my Staff to my +knowledge; but it may be that a representative of the Army was given +the duty to point out strategical points of view, when the borderline +was discussed. + + signed: Wilhelm KEITEL + +Wilhelm Keitel has signed this protocol consisting of 9 (nine) pages, +on all copies and on every page in my presence. + + signed: Guy A. Weill O-513470 + Capt, AUS. + +Signed Col. Dr. B. Ecer + +Signed Lt. Dr. P. Schwarz + +Signed Elisabeth Radziejewska. + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1956-PS + + Das Archiv, Vol. 22-24, Page 1342 January 1936. + + Meaning and tasks of the Secret State Police. + +In order to refute the malicious rumours spread abroad, the “Voelkische +Beobachter” (V.B. of 22.1.36) published an article on the origin, +meaning and tasks of the Secret State Police; extracts from this read +as follows: + +The Secret State Police was created simultaneously in all German +Provinces after the National Socialist Revolution owing to cogent +political necessity. In Prussia its creator was Prime Minister Goering +who is still the Chief of the Secret State Police today. In Bavaria the +Bavarian Political Police was created by the Reichs Leader of the S.S. +Himmler, who at the same time directed the building of the political +police forces in the other provinces outside Prussia. The Political +Police Forces became uniformly coordinated when, in the spring of +1934, Prime Minister Goering appointed the Reichs Leader of the S.S. +as deputy Chief of the Prussian Secret State Police--cf. Si P.38 (Vol. +1). Thereby a unified leadership and a proportionate extension of the +Political Police Forces of all provinces was assured. + +The Secret State Police is an official machinery on the lines of the +criminal police, whose special task is the prosecution of crimes and +offences against the State, above all the prosecution of high treason +and treason. The task of the Secret State Police is to detect these +crimes and offences, to ascertain the perpetrators and to bring them +to judicial punishment. The number of criminal proceedings continually +pending in the People’s Court on account of high treasonable actions +and of treason is the result of this work. The next most important +field of operations for the Secret State Police is the preventive +combatting of all dangers threatening the State and the leadership +of the State. As, since the National Socialist Revolution, all open +struggle and all open opposition to the State and to the leadership of +the State is forbidden, a State Police as a preventive instrument in +the struggle against all dangers threatening the State, is indissolubly +bound up with the National Socialist Leader State. The opponents +of National Socialism were not removed by the prohibition of their +organizations and their newspapers, but have withdrawn to other forms +of struggle against the State. Therefore, the National Socialist State +has to trace out, to watch over and to render harmless the underground +opponents fighting against it in illegal organizations, in camouflaged +associations, in the coalitions of well meaning fellow Germans and even +in the organizations of party and state before they have succeeded +in actually executing an action directed against the interest of the +state. This task of fighting with all means the secret enemies of the +state will be spared no Leader State, because powers hostile to the +state, from their foreign headquarters, always make use of some persons +in such a state and employ them in underground activity against the +state. + +The preventive activity of the Secret State Police consists primarily +in the thorough observation of all enemies of the state in the Reichs +territory. As the Secret State Police can not carry out, in addition +to its primary executive tasks, this observation of the enemies of the +state, to the extent necessary, there steps alongside to supplement it +the Security Service of the Reichs Leader of the S.S., set up by the +Deputy Fuehrer as the political intelligence service of the movement, +which puts a large part of the forces of the movement mobilized by +it into the service of the security of the state. The Secret State +Police takes the necessary police preventive measures against the +enemies of the state on the basis of the results of the observation. +The most effective preventive measure is without doubt the withdrawal +of freedom, which is covered in the form of “protective custody”, if +it is to be feared that the free activity of the persons in question +might endanger the security of the state in any way. The employment +of protective custody is so organized by directions of the Reichs and +Prussian Minister of the Interior and by a special arrest examination +procedure of the Secret State Police, that--as far as the preventive +fight against the enemies of the state permits--copious guarantees +against a misuse of protective custody are provided. While protective +arrest of short duration is carried out in police and court prisons, +the concentration camps under the Secret State Police admit those taken +into protective custody, who have to be withdrawn from public life for +a longer time. The majority of the inmates of the concentration camps +is formed by those communist and other Marxist functionaries, who, by +previous experiences, would if free immediately resume their struggle +against the state. Further police preventive measures against efforts +hostile to the state consist in the dissolution of associations, in +the prohibition and dissolution of assemblies and congregations, in +the prohibition of publications of all kinds and so on. As the NSDAP +and its leaders are also provided with special protection by legal +regulations, the prosecution of crimes against these laws and the +protection of the party and its leaders are also incumbent upon the +Secret State Police. + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1961-PS + + 1942 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 247 + + Decision of the Greater German Reichstag of 26 April 1942 + +At the proposal of the president of the Reichstag, on its session of +26 April 1942, the Greater German Reichstag has approved of the rights +which the Fuehrer has postulated in his speech, with the following +decision: + + There can be no doubt, that in the present war, in which the German + people is faced with a struggle for its existence or annihilation, + the Fuehrer must have all the rights postulated by him which serve + to further or achieve victory. Therefore--without being bound + by existing legal regulations--in his capacity as leader of the + nation, Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, governmental chief + and supreme executive chief, as supreme justice and leader of the + party--the Fuehrer must be in a position to force with all means at + his disposal every German, if necessary, whether he be common soldier + or officer, low or high official or judge, leading or subordinate + official of the party, worker or employee--to fulfill his duties. + In case of violation of these duties, the Fuehrer is entitled after + conscientious examination, regardless of so-called well-deserved + rights, to mete out due punishment and to remove the offender from + his post, rank and position without introducing prescribed procedures. + +At the order of the Fuehrer this decision is hereby made public. + + Berlin, 26 April 1942 + + The Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery + Dr Lammers + + + PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1962-PS + + 1935 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PAGE 839 + + Law to change the Penal Code 28 June 1935 + +The Reich government has ratified the following law which is herewith +announced: + + + Article 1 + +Creation of Law by suitable application of the penal law. + +The sect. 2 and 2a of the penal code contain the following wording: + + + sect. 2 + +Any person who commits an act which the law declares to be punishable +or which is deserving of penalty according to the fundamental +conceptions of the penal law and sound popular feeling, shall be +punished. If there is no penal law directly covering an act it shall +be punished under that law which most closely fits, in regards to +fundamental conception. + + + sect. 2a + +The culpability of the act and the punishment are determined according +to the law which is in force at the time of the act. + +Should a milder law be in force at the time of judgment than at the +time of the act, then the milder law can be applied; should the act +no longer be subjected to punishment at the time of judgment, then +punishment may not take place. + +A law which is only valid for a designated time is also to be applied +upon the acts which have been committed during its validity even if it +has been rescinded. + +Decisions on disciplinary measures of security and improvement are to +be made according to the law which is in force at the time of judgment. + +Berlin 28 June 1935 + + The Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor + ADOLF HITLER + + The Reich Minister of Justice + DR. GUERTNER. + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1964-PS + + 1942 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PAGE 535 + + Decree of the Fuehrer regarding special jurisdiction of Reich Minister + of Justice 20 Aug 1942. + +A strong administration of Justice is necessary for the fulfillment +of the tasks of the great German Reich. Therefore, I commission and +empower the Reich Minister of Justice to establish a National Socialist +Administration of Justice and to take all necessary measures in +accordance with my directives and instructions made in agreement with +the Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery and the Leader of +the Party-Chancellery. He can hereby deviate from any existing law. + + Fuehrer Supreme Headquarters 20 August 1942 + + The Fuehrer + ADOLF HITLER + + Reich Minister and Chief of Reich Chancellery + Dr. Lammers + + + PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1965-PS + + EXTRACT FROM “DER STURMER”, 4 November 1943 + +“It is really the truth that the Jews ‘so to speak’ have disappeared +from Europe and that the Jewish ‘reservoir’ of the East, from which +the Jewish plague has for centuries beset the peoples of Europe, has +ceased to exist * * * However, the Fuehrer of the German people at the +beginning of the war prophesied what has now come to pass * * *” + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1969-PS + + NOTE + +To the file. + +_Subject_: Ottilienheim Absberg. + +Dr. Hefelmann, Berlin, informed me by telephone that the transfer of +the sick from the Ottilienheim was not carried out by the directive of +Berlin, but by the directive from the Bavarian State Ministry, Munich, +Regierungsrat Gaum. + +Furthermore, he told me, that the bearer of sovereignty +[Hoheitstraeger] could not be included, since the regulation does not +call for that. + +Nurnberg, 5 March 1941. + + /s/ Sellmer + /t/ Sellmer + 297/12 + +[_Seal_] + + # # # # # + + Gau Staff Office Sel/Pf. 5 March 1941 + +To the Kreisleiter Party Member Michael Gerstner + + _Weissenburg/Bavaria_ + + Subject: Your letter of 24 Feb 1941 + + Alarm of the population of Absberg. + +The Reich Office [Reichsstelle], Berlin, informs me that the transfer +of the sick from the Ottilienheim was not carried out by Berlin, but by +Munich. Therefore, I have now turned to Munich. In the meantime, I have +found from the Regierungspraesident that we also raised a complaint +against the ways and means of the treatment of the sick. I therefore +hope, that such cross mistakes will not occur in the future. + + Heil Hitler + S 297/11 + [Initial: Semmler] + Gaustabsamtsleiter + +NB: The specialist [Sachbearbeiter] for Bavaria is Regierungsrat +Gaum in the Bavarian State Ministry in Munich. If possible we should +get in touch with him. Regierungsrat Gaum will see to it, that the +institutions will be cleared out as soon as possible. + + # # # # # + + Berlin, 31 Dec 1940 NW 7, Unter den Linden 72 + Telephone: Local 120034 + Long Distance 120037 + Teletype: Local 517 + Long Distance K 1517 + Cable Address: Reichsinnenminister + [Rubber Stamp] Kreisleiter Informed + +Reichministry of the Interior Ministerial Dr. Linden. + +Iog 7633/40/5100. + +It is requested, to mention this official designation and subject in +any further correspondence. + +[Red pencil] S.6.I.41 + + To the Gaustabsamtsleiter, Heinrich Sellmer in Nurnberg, Gauleitung + +My dear party member Sellmer! + +I forward in the enclosure an incident, which deals with the affair +about which you have been informed by party member Blanicenburg from +the Fuehrer’s chancellery. As you can see in the application of Mrs. +Marie Kehr, the latter would like to have information whether it is +possible by a law of the Reich, to relieve people from their incurable +sufferings. I request that you investigate, whether Kehr is politically +reliable, especially whether she does not have church connections. In +case this should not be so, from my side, there are no misgivings, if +you give Kehr the desired information orally. + + Heil Hitler! + /s/ Linden + +In Ink + + _Ortsgruppenleiter Party member Popp_ is of the opinion, that one can + inform Mrs. Kehr. She is calm and circumspect. + + S 7 Jan 1941 + 297/21 2 DM + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1972-PS + + SECRET + +SS Fuehrungshauptamt [SS Main directorate office] + +Kommandoamt of the Waffen SS + +[Command Office] + + Berlin--Wilmersdorf, 14 October 1941 + Kaiserallee 188 + +Sect. Ia NR. 4116/41 geh. + +_SUBJ_: Intermediate report on the civilian state of emergency. + +_TO_: Reichsfuehrer SS + +I deliver the following report regarding the commitment of the Waffen +SS in the Protectorate Bohemia and Moravia during the civilian state of +emergency: + +In the mutual changes, all Battalions of the Waffen SS in the +Protectorate Bohemia and Moravia will be brought forth for shootings, +and relatively for the supervision of hangings. + +Up until now there occurred: + + _in Prague_: + 99 shootings + 21 hangings + + _in Bruenn_: + 54 shootings + 17 hangings + ---- + Total 191 executions (including 16 Jews) + +A complete report regarding other measures and on the conduct of the +officers, non-coms and men will be made following the termination of +the civilian state of emergency. + + Signed: JUETTNER + + SS Gruppenfuehrer [Maj. Gen.] and + Generalleutnant of the Waffen SS + +Official stamp of Personal Staff of Reichsfuehrer SS + +15 Oct 1941 + + + PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1991-PS + + 6th Report on activities and final report of the German Armistice + Delegation for Economy and of the Delegate of the Reich Government for + Economic and Financial Questions with the French Government for the + period from 1 July 1943 to 17 August 1944. + +Salzburg. 15 December 1944. + +No. 000101. + +[Page 63, last paragraph]. + +During the four years of the occupation of France the Armistice +Delegation transferred approximately 121 Million Rmk. worth of +investments from French into German possession, among them shares of +war vital enterprises in third countries, in France and in Germany. +For details see the former activity reports of the Delegation. About +half of these transfers have been paid for by Germany with economic +compensations by delivery of French foreign bonds, which were acquired +in Holland or Belgium, whereas the balance was paid through Clearing +and from occupation costs. From the difference in the value of the +French foreign bonds, between the German purchasing price and the +French rate of purchase, there have been realized profits amounting to +Rmk. 7 Million which could be paid to the Reich. + + + PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1992-PS + + Lecture by General [Obergebietsfuehrer] + + Dr. Hellmuth Stellrecht: + + “The Military Education of the German Youth” + + From: National Political Course for the Armed Force, from 15-23 + January 1937 + +[National-Politischer Lehrgang der Wehrmacht, vom 15.-23. January 1937] + + Restricted for the Armed Forces + +[Pages 163-166] + +All of you know already the words: Pre-military training, youth’s +physical training or military education [Wehrerziehung]. + +The first term “pre-military training” means, that the young person +prior to his induction into the Army should acquire a certain amount +of knowledge; the second term “youth’s physical training” means +conditioning of the body to a certain degree of physical fitness will +be reached. However, we are choosing of the three terms the last one +which is “military education”. Because not only does it mean acquiring +a certain amount of knowledge and reaching a certain degree of +physical fitness, but what is more important, it will have a decisive +influence on the soldier. + +One will ask: Why is it that there is such an endless debate going on +in Germany today about the term “military education”? Why are attempts +being made just at present to define clearly the term “military +education” to carry out what is recognized as correct? Is it done for +the sole purpose of trying to get the lead over foreign countries? Is +it because of reasoning that we did this, or does it go much deeper +than is noticeable on the surface? + +Gentlemen, I believe that it was not only because of the reasoning of +individuals who inspired us that a change in our thinking unnoticeable +for many is taking place and becomes visible to all in its effects. + +The term “military education” cannot be realized in a vacuum but it is +closely connected with the symbol of the German soldier. Just like this +symbol changes, the term “military education” also changes. Military +education of the youth makes sense only under certain historical +conditions. These in turn are closely connected with the ideology of +state and society current at the time. + +* * * * * * * + +The young Germany found herself again in a soldierly way of life. +The great historic development which lasted over hundred years had +finally reached its conclusion and consequently the German people had +gained new possibilities. Under Frederic the Great the military and +the bourgeoisie (middle class) as different estates [Staende] opposed +each other without understanding as hopeless strangers; the reforms, +the wars of independence brought about, had united again both terms. +However, they could not overcome the bourgeois way of life permanently. + +Only within our time was this development concluded since life was +again molded into one unit. No more the citizen of the sovereign ruler +but each citizen of the New Reich is being born to bear arms. It is +not a “cursed obligation” which puts him under military law but his +own free will urges him to do it and makes him recognize the necessity +of military service not only for one or two years but for a life-time, +under a new unified system which begins in the earliest childhood and +ends only when he is also unable to do service at home for the well +being of all. + +Considering all this, it goes without saying that we are talking about +the military education of the German youth and carrying it out. It is +just as clear before our eyes that Friederich Ludwig Jahn with all +his knowledge and the great effort put forward by him did not succeed +in carrying it out. But now the time is ripe because the newly gained +philosophy of life may be realized. It would only be self deception to +believe that this task could be solved from the top only. German youth +has been a movement since a generation. + +This movement started long before the war as a first proof of its +coming great renovation protesting against the bourgeoise. + +The Youth Movement before the war was not yet soldierly but it was hard +against itself and on long hiking tours it helped to lay the foundation +for a real great Germany. The volunteer-spirit of the great war would +be unthinkable without this youth movement--that volunteer-spirit which +is the prerequisite of military duty! Of course, those who only came +in order to fulfill their own duty did not spare themselves anything +either in the great war. They were no less brave than the volunteers. +The only difference was that the volunteer was willing to take +responsibility for his fate, injury and death, while the other one felt +more secure if the State and the Law were responsible for himself and +the family when the misfortune arose. + +The voluntary service was contained in the free corps [Freikorps], in +the military organizations [Wehrverbaenden], in the organizations of +the NSDAP and in the Hitler Youth Movement. + +The German youth has formed its own Reich within this youth-movement +in which it has the right and privilege of its own way of life. In a +decree issued by the Fuehrer on 1 December 1936, pertaining to the +Hitler Youth Movement this own Reich was approved by him. It might be +said that its own way of life gives its own character to German youth +but we are lucky in that the philosophy of life of National Socialism +has become the philosophy of life of youth and that there are no +political differences between the different generations of present +day Germany. Only the way of life of German youth has its individual +emphasis. This has hardly penetrated the older generations. The way +of life could also not be changed by an order from above because it +did not grow by order or by accident but through a movement that has +grown through the decades. We have to observe the fact that in the +youth organization and in other organizations different ways of life +confront each other. For instance, the way of life of the Army which +is based on the probably oldest tradition which we have. There is no +doubt that a boy who changes from one organization to another feels +that the different ways of life are different and that he tries to +decide for himself if one or the other is the right one. He probably +tries to compare youth hostel and barracks, comradeship leader +[Kameradschaftsfuehrer] and sergeant, an evening in a youth hostel +and military instruction, the comradely “thou” which bound him to all +leaders up to the Reichs Youth Leader and the pronounced separation +from his superior even the corporal, also, abstinence from nicotine and +alcohol and the sudden abolition of this abstinence. + +It would, of course, be completely senseless for the individual to +start to investigate if this or that way seems right to him. It goes +without saying that an army which is to be trained for battle must be +handled entirely different from a unit of boys. I believe that there +is no organization in Germany which has gathered so much experience +through its century old tradition in leading men as the army. Only +at a later age one comes to see those things as a result of a deep +psychological knowledge which, as a private, as a young sergeant or +lieutenant, seemed obscure, or which one carried out without thinking, +as and how it has always been done. + +It would be just as senseless to argue that the army, as the oldest +organization, should demand that the way of life in the youth +organization should be patterned after the army’s way and that this +should be done at once by a system of orders and regulations. That +would be completely wrong because the present youth movement is of a +natural growth which cannot suddenly be sent by coercion but needs a +certain amount of freedom to be able to grow further. And nothing would +be more harmful than to substitute a system of orders, which developed +under totally different conditions, for the free will of the present +young generation. The forty years of German youth history cannot +and shall not be erased because what has developed alive out of an +idealistic motive shall never be extinguished. + +But, from a long range point of view, it is necessary that we do +not allow the life of a German boy who has to pass through all the +organizations, to go through as many breaking experiences as there are +organizations. On the contrary, it is necessary to give to his life +and his development actual stability. We do not only want to train our +boys and through the difference of the organizations give them the +opportunity to compare and to criticize but we want to lead them in +an unbroken line of development from boy to man, a development which +must be natural to them, which does not give them cause to investigate +why they have been dealt with in this or that manner. The political +education of the boy stops when he enters the service of the Armed +Forces. + +We have to admit that the way of life in the youth organization is +different from that in the Armed Forces. But our time gives us an +opportunity to draw one line of development from the tenth year to +the time of discharge from the Armed Forces; that is the line of +development of military training and military education. Therefore, +it is in general of tremendous educational value and not only for the +training of a soldier. The boy should feel that he is part of a natural +course of events and react to it by feeling a constant uninhibited +enhancement of life. + +The young scout grows into the armour-bearer of the nation. Thus +the natural course of events is again completed which has been +characteristic of every natural warriordom. It always let the boy +become a scout first, then gave him practice weapons and only then let +him earn the deathly weapon of the man. + +All military training must thus be regarded a building of life without +friction, following only the laws of life and supported by the one as +well as the other organization and nothing to block it. Life itself +knows no abrupt fundamental changes from one day to another. One is +not a boy one day and a man the next one but every age period has +educational and formative significance, which needs to be recognized +and utilized. + +In case these laws are observed one will, a few decades from now, be +incredulous before the achievements which will be made by development +of physical potentialities and by technical knowledge and also before +the high degree of ideological readiness which is inherent in the +German soldier. The recognition of the laws of development will and +must give us an incredible advantage over the achievements of other +nations, especially in the present which is carried along by the +impulse of national uprising. There is no question that even with +several years of military training another nation cannot ever make +up for that which was neglected in regard to development which we +recognized and utilized in time. + +But that which will happen in the future in regard to this will not +only mean the training to be a German soldier but training to be a +German man, the decisive final finish of whom takes place in the +service of the Armed Forces. In addition, an extensive exchange of +experiences will come about on the broadest possible basis between the +Armed Forces in the Youth Organization on all things so decisive for +all future development in order to continue the one education in every +respect at the exact point where the other one stopped. + +In regard to work with pure military education, this has already +been done in years of collaboration and very extensively. The +result has been put down in a book written by me which regulates +future military education up to the last detail of training +and which, on mutual consent, includes a preface by the Reichs +minister of war [Reichskriegsminister] and the Reichs Youth Leader +[Reichsjugendfuehrer]. + +The basic idea of this work is to present to the boy what fits into the +particular stage of his development. In doing this one quite naturally +avoids to bring up something beforehand that belongs into the future +training of the Armed Forces and does not fit the boy but only the +man. For that reason no boy is given a military weapon, simply because +it does not make sense from the point of view of development. But, on +the other hand, it makes sense to give him practice guns of smaller +caliber. Just as there are military exercises which fit only adult men +there are exercises which are better tackled at the age of a boy. Among +others, for instance, outdoor training. + +The young man of twenty who has become estranged to nature in +the city--and two-thirds of the German population today live in +cities--will find it very difficult to reestablish contact. Everything +has become too foreign to him and he will never again be able to become +a bush or woods runner [Busch- und Waldlaeufer] whose best friends are +nature and terrain. + +It is different for the boy. At the age of 12 to 16 or 17 a boy is +actually ideal for the terrain. It is exactly the age of wild west +romanticism when he thinks only in terms of secret paths, ambush and +surprise raids. If at that time nothing brings the boy into the terrain +if he only continues the dull way of going to school something ingrown +and crooked develops in him which can never again be straightened out. +The right time to put him into the terrain has been missed. + +The same is true of the training of the senses. I am of the opinion +that to the training for seeing even the most insignificant things +in nature, for noticing the slightest change in the normal world +around us, a very systematic training of the ear should be added. +One has to learn again to distinguish from entire noise pictures the +single important sound which has something to say. One has to learn +direction hearing and distance hearing and one has to train the ear +to be constantly on the alert and immediately register the slightest +noise which shows danger. This kind of training belongs entirely to a +youthful age. If the right time has been missed it can hardly be made +up in later years. + +The boy starts to learn while he plays and in more and more systematic +training becomes a young scout. He again acquires the incredible +agility of primitive men to find cover and camouflage in the terrain, +to use every indentation in the ground, every bit of vegetation to +close in, to cover long distances without any noise also at night and, +at the same time, to see everything, to hear everything and finally to +appear out of nowhere before the baffled enemy; thus growing into the +future battle technique through his full life of a boy. + +I ask you, gentlemen, to think back for a moment and remember +Langemarck, the volunteers who, for the idea, offered their lives to +the bullets while singing “Deutschland, Deutschland ueber alles”. And +then think of the youth with the same ideological readiness of a few +decades later which does not waste one drop of blood, which in defense +and attack evades the enemy, against whom the best weapon becomes +useless because it hardly any longer can find its aim. This is a +picture of the goal of great education which starts with the playful +training of the boy in the terrain and completes itself in the training +in the Armed Forces. + +If we in Germany use only a fraction of the effort which is used in the +school to prepare the boy for _that_ we will certainly get results. +Because this service has one advantage: It meets the desires of the boy +halfway while, thank heavens, sitting on a school bench never does. +Because the fate of nations will also in the future not be determined +by academicians but by politicians and finally by the soldier. Why +shouldn’t it be possible to give back to German youth what is natural +to primitive men? Our nation is healthy. The natural tendency for it +still exists. They have not been lost, they are only obscured. First, +they have to be forced so that they may grow again. + +What a boy between 10 and 14 does in his games, the older boy practices +in systematic training. But nowhere is there a place for unnatural +drilling, everything shall and must be part of the life of youth. But +the effort made by the individual must be increased as he grows older. + +We Germans were given a great gift by providence. That is, that we are +the only nation who knows how to hike. We are bound to nature not only +by the necessity to exploit it but by the talent to understand nature +emotionally. We experience nature when we hike because we add our own +effort. + +We do not wish our youth to goose step in a column, but travel in a +small group which must find its own way. The group learns, after it +has been taught essentials, to orient itself, to read maps and to +judge the terrain. It increases the joy of hiking if the leader gives +definite problems, for instance, to find a certain point visible in the +terrain on the map, or, to look up a road on the map and lead the group +to it, etc., etc. + +The trip offers the great opportunity to fit in all that which belongs +to the system: description and judgment of terrain; recognition and +description of the aim; use of terrain, scouting; reporting; securing; +and to end up in a terrain game which requires all the boy; initiative. + +The trip does not alone train the boy in the terrain but, as I like +to call it, to self-help. During the war we found that the truly +useful soldiers were not those who had completed their training but +those guys who knew what to do in any situation and could take care +of themselves when it came to the smallest details. Only the mastery +of these thousands of skills makes a completely useful soldier. The +idealist reaching for the stars is of little use if he cannot deal +with all the unpleasant things which must be overcome. Of what use is +the most enthusiastic man if he neglects his footwear and has to stay +behind with bad feet. It is a useless comrade who does not know how to +set up a tent, to dig a hole for cooking, to make a fire, to dress a +wound. The many repulsive tasks in the world of war will soon cause him +to stay behind as unfit, or he will remain a constant source of trouble +to the sergeant, who will be unable to grasp how anybody could be born +with so little common sense. + +We have no use for helpless professors but need agile, quick youths who +can deal with every situation in life and have learned all that at a +time when it was easiest to learn it. This is, to a large extent the +purpose of the hiking trip and the camp. + +But the hiking trip has still another purpose. It is one of the best +means of education at our disposal; because it is the only way in which +the boy can get acquainted with his fatherland for which he will have +to fight one day. From the perspective of the back alley he can never +win it. But he who has not been completely satisfied will still find in +sun and rain and in his own effort the meaning of trees and soil, of +villages and old towns. He can carry it with him as his true possession +and with this possession he ceases to be a proletarian. It is even a +prerequisite for the possibility that the new state once again may +give him a piece of land. Then again it would have a meaning to the +individual. + +The systematic development of physical ability for all of us today +has become something self-understood. We can hardly grasp the fact +that the old state did so little for it with a few hours of gymnastic +exercises up to the end of compulsory school and nothing up to the time +of military service. And that at a time when the number of men fit for +military service in the large cities decreased from year to year. It +does not make sense to us to provide physical training only for those +who desire it and, therefore, join sports clubs. Because he who does +not do that is certainly much more in need of physical training. A +definite program for physical training simultaneous with the physical +development of the young person is a demand already made by the Fuehrer +in his book “Mein Kampf” and which was therefore also demanded and +carried out by the new state. The gap between school, labor and army +service must finally be closed. + +What shall and must be done in particular is clear today and +established. The natural is the best. General physical training is +the beginning. Then follows athletics. Track comes first, followed by +jumping, throwing and pushing. But not everything belongs to athletics +but only the simplest: short and long distance running, high and broad +jumping, shot put and instead of javelin, club-throwing. For building +the body those are the most beneficial exercises which require a +minimum of tools and at the same time not too much technique. Among +those swimming is one of the exercises which develop the body in +general. Why should a boy wait till he is 20 years old to learn how to +swim? In the question itself lies the contradiction. Why should the +army occupy itself by teaching 70 percent of the recruits how to swim. +The boy of ten can learn to swim and should master it long before he +becomes a soldier. + +* * * * * * * + +Of special value for the development of the body is any fighting +sport, especially boxing. Every boy first learns free wrestling and +then boxing. There is no sport which educates better to hardiness and +fighting spirit. + +One could not start it too early but only after the body has almost +stopped growing, under no circumstances during the grooming periods. +After that it shall be the main part of body training. + +* * * * * * * + +[Pages 174-176] + +Every boy endures within the proper limits of his strength and +resistance. It is the art of the educator not to go further and to +go so far that through a new test new hardiness follows and in such +a manner that the new test can be on a higher level and increase +resistance by not giving beyond its limits. + +* * * * * * * + +All that has been learned serves, from a military point of view, +nothing but to get close to the enemy and to bring arms into effect. +The entire education and training remains without value if it does not +lead to the full effect of the weapon against the enemy. All training, +therefore culminates in training in shooting. It cannot be emphasized +enough and because shooting is a matter of practice one cannot start +too early. In the course of years we want to achieve that a gun feels +just as natural in the hands of a German boy as a pen. It is a strange +state of mind in a nation if, through years many hours every day are +spent in practicing penmanship and grammatical writing but not a single +hour in practice-shooting. Liberalism put the following slogan above +school doors “Knowledge is power”. We, on the other hand, have found +out during the war and postwar period that the power of a nation, in +the last analysis, always rests on its arms and on those who know how +to handle them. + +Shooting meets with the desire of a boy. There is hardly ever a boy +who does not experiment with it, if only with a bow and arrow he made +himself. Let us put into his hand that which suits him that gives him +real pleasure. First a new air rifle with which he can really learn +how to shoot and let us teach him how to do it correctly. Later, the +older boy gets a small caliber rifle with which all the fine points of +shooting can be taught and in the service of the army finally, as the +last stage, a weapon. + +In such a training course the art of shooting can be developed to a +degree which, up to now, seemed not attainable. + +* * * * * * * + +In addition to general training there is special training for the new +replacement generation in the Air Force, Navy and motorized troops. +The training course for this has been established with the competent +authorities in the Armed Forces. In addition, there is training in +communications on a broad basis and, in the country, cavalry training. + +* * * * * * * + +With the law of 1 December 1936 on the Hitler-Youth, the Fuehrer +made it possible to extend the principles which, so far, have been +applied to the education of the Hitler-Youth to all German Youth. +Military education is one of the most important tasks to be fulfilled +by the future Hitler-Youth. Besides it, there are the other tasks +which are inseparably connected with it. In our opinion it is not +possible to divide the thinking of a human being into various sections +which then are cultivated by various organizations. But man is an +indivisible whole also in regard to education. Military education and +philosophical education belong together. The latter is not to exhaust +itself in lectures but always through ideological attitude has to draw +the conclusion through action. + +During the years the boy lives in the youth organization we want to +give him the knowledge of that for which he has to fight and be a +soldier. The army of the new Reich is not only a community of men +who know how to fight according to the laws of military honor, but a +community of faith in the mission of the German people and in their own +great task. The education of youth has to take care that the knowledge +and the principles, according to which the state and the Armed Forces +of our time have been organized and which support them, enters so +thoroughly into the thoughts of the individual that they never again +can be taken away and remain direction-giving principles all through +life. + +But if faith should be shattered and the idea itself should no longer +be firm enough then the German man must have been educated in such a +manner that the laws of honor, which alone enable him to live in his +community, still hold. And if even those should be shattered, there +remains as the last resort the manly discipline, the iron habit to obey +silently and to carry out, without a word that service by order of +another for which the individual will does not suffice. He who cannot +give orders to himself, must get used to obeying the orders of others +and to feel the obligation so to do so strongly that even at the most +dangerous moment it does not fail. It is a fine thing when a man of 20 +learns to obey unconditionally but it is much better when the boy of +ten starts to put his own wishes aside, to renounce, to give in, and to +serve the will of the community. + +Gentlemen, you can see for yourself that the tasks of present German +youth education have gone far beyond the “playful”. Within the great +order of the new Reich they have taken on a new and tremendous +significance. In order to be able to solve these problems apart from +everything old and inhibiting the Fuehrer has given its own realm to +youth. But this problem can only be solved if the large educational +organizations of the German people are coordinated in such a way that +the life of the German boy constantly increases in physical skill as +well as in ideological will. It would be a pleasure to know that I +succeeded in showing you the great possibilities and in arousing your +interest in the fact that the Armed Forces and the youth together, have +to follow _one_ road. + + + PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1992-A-PS + + National Political Course for the Armed Forces, from 15 to 23 Jan. + 1937. + + [National-Politischer Lehrgang der Wehrmacht, vom 15.-23. Januar 1937] + + Restricted for the Armed Forces. + + HIMMLER: Organization and Obligations of the SS and the Police. + +[Pages 141-161] + +I shall speak first of all about the origin, organization, and the +spheres of activity of the SS; secondly, about the organization and +obligations of the Police; and thirdly, about the combined efforts of +the SS and the Police, and about the important and vitally necessary +question on the internal security of the Reich. + +The SS originated in 1923, very early in the history of the movement, +as shock troop [Stosstrupp] Hitler, was prohibited and disbanded on +November 9, 1923. When the party was reestablished in 1925, the SA as a +protective organization for the meetings was at first prohibited. The +Fuehrer was also denied the right of speech and assembly in Prussia as +well as in Bavaria. Assembly was permitted only in Saxony and Thuringia +which at that time were entirely red. + +In order to insure the success of these meetings, it was necessary to +protect them from dispersal. Therefore in 1925 the Fuehrer ordered a +small organization to be formed in order to protect these meetings, +namely the SS [Schutzstaffeln, protective squadrons]--literally +Staffeln at that time, namely small formations with the effective +strength of one leader and 10 men in each location. Even as large a +city as Berlin had a squadron of only 2 leaders and 20 men at that +time. Throughout 1925 and 1926 we succeeded in carrying out and +carrying through the meetings of the Fuehrer and also of other party +speakers in Saxony and Thuringia with these squadrons. + +In 1926 the SA was again permitted to exist, and for a few years the SS +withdrew more into the background. + +In the year 1929, eight years ago, I was ordered by the Fuehrer to take +over the leadership of all SS units in the entire Reich, then totaling +280 men, and to change them according to the order, into a reliable +elite organization of the Party. + +I decided to tackle this problem--which I should like to discuss here +to some extent--because I was a National Socialist, of course. I want +to tell you also how this is to be interpreted. I am a strong believer +in the doctrine that, in the end, only good blood can achieve the +greatest, enduring things in the world. Strengthened by this conviction +of mine, I began to work on this problem. + +Accordingly only good blood, blood which history has proved to be +leading and creative and the foundation of every state and all military +activities, only Nordic blood, can be considered. I said to myself +that should I succeed to select from the German people for this +organization as many people as possible a majority of whom possess +this desired blood, to teach them military discipline and, in time, +the understanding of the value of blood and the entire ideology which +results from it, then it will be possible actually to create such an +elite organization which would successfully hold its own in all cases +of emergency. + +This form of selection of good blood has been very often theoretically +recognized. Many books have been written on it from Chamberlain +to Guenther of the years 1926/27, and many others which I shall +not mention here. Now came the difficult question of the method of +selecting these people. There are two kinds of selection procedures: +first, the most severe selection procedure brought about by war, the +struggle for life and death. In this procedure the value of blood is +shown through achievement. In the year 1929, a great number of former +soldiers still existed whose worth could be determined by their record +during the war. Wars however, are exceptional circumstances, and a way +had to be found to make selections in peace time as well, when courage +could not be given this test. Thus, I could only draw conclusions from +the appearance of the people in question. Of course, many will argue +immediately: that is all very well but if you judge by height, blond +hair and blue eyes and the dimensions of the skull then the matter is +very problematical. That is known to me very well, too. One could never +judge by that alone. + +I then went on to require a certain height. I did not accept people +under 1,7 m--and here I ask you to understand the exact meaning to +my words--because I know that people who have reached a certain +height must possess the desired blood to some degree. Of course it is +impossible to be too discriminating here as it cannot be said that +people who are smaller should not possess the same blood. That is +natural but by choosing from this pool of people having the desired +height there exists a greater probability of obtaining satisfactory +results. + +But we went further. It was not enough to go by height, but we began +to obtain photographs at that time. That amounted to a hundred to +two hundred people annually who were eligible for admission. I have +personally seen each photograph and asked myself: Does the face of this +man have distinct traits of foreign blood, excessive cheek bones, or as +is the common way of asking: Does this one appear Mongolic or that one +Slavic? Slavic, incidentally, is a faulty expression. It is merely a +popular expression. + +Why have I done all this? I should like to call to your attention here +the types of soldier councils of the years 1918 and 1919. Everyone of +you who was an officer at that time knows a number of such people by +personal experience. You will have to admit that on the whole they were +people whose appearance affected our German eye as rather peculiar, +whose features looked strange and who had some foreign blood in them. +They were the type of people who could be disciplined, who are orderly +in normal times, who would even be brave, bold and daring in time of +war but who, because of their blood, would fail to pass the final great +test of character and nerves. + +Since I knew these things I said to myself: I shall not accept people +whom I expect to quit, to complain, to become disloyal and traitors, +to have bad soldierly manners and the like at the moment of political +tests, because of the nature of the composition of their blood. We had +to be all the more careful because we had only voluntary discipline in +the SS during the years of struggle, and therefore we were unable to +compel a man to do something. + +It was only possible to deprive the man of his arm band for a period +of three or four weeks or impose on him penal drills, and that only if +he voluntarily accepted the punishment. If he was unwilling he could +always say: “I resign, I don’t like it any longer.” We therefore have +followed the above-mentioned principle of selection and been able to +remove the principal causes of defect. + +With this outward screening however, no final selection had been +attained, since it was always the performance of the person during the +following months and years which was of importance. It was my point of +view that we should always require difficult tasks and more than any +other organization. Valuable personnel is never trained by means of +easy service and conveniences, but by difficulties and added burdens. +We therefore began by exacting from our men higher dues in spite of the +widespread poverty of the times. At a time when no uniforms were issued +to party organizations, we asked our people to acquire black trousers +and boots from their own means--a tremendous expense for an unemployed +person who had to pay the 40 marks of his own purse. If he failed to +do so and declared: I cannot do that, then we explained to him: please +go away, for you somehow failed to understand the matter for you do not +possess the instinctive willingness to a sacrifice of your own accord, +for we cannot use you. Thus we gradually arrived at our intended and +desired picture. + +This briefly-mentioned theory of selection of people may be criticised, +today after eight years I believe I can say with sincerity that its +practical application has justified its existence, and that it has +really been possible to effect a certain selection of people in the SS +already during the time of fighting. + +I shall skip the next few periods and shall now occupy myself with +the year 1933. This year was for the SS the hardest trial; for it was +a time when all organizations flourished, a time of great assault +and tidal waves of those who desired membership in the party and its +organizations. A very difficult question confronted us at that time. +It was a question of deciding whether to close the party and its +organizations to further membership and thus remaining pure in quality +but small in volume, or of opening them to further membership to +increase their volume. This resulted in a dangerous situation, as was +shown as a number of people poured in who were not entirely loyal and +idealists, so that to a certain degree it became a menace of numbers, +of the masses. + +The SS too was endangered by this menace. Therefore I closed it in +April 1933 while some of the other organizations still accepted as +great a number of people as possible. This way I had the SS again under +my control in April and said: We shall accept no more people. From +the end of 1933 to the end of 1935 we expelled all those of the newly +accepted members who proved unsuitable. In these years I have expelled +approximately 60,000 men. Today the strength of the SS consists of +approximately 210,000 men. This has been of great benefit to the SS and +all of its units as its quality has greatly improved whereas it would +have suffered considerably through quantity. + +I shall close the question of selection by stating that today we accept +young men of 18 years of age. We know them already from the Hitler +Youth, have studied them already a few years, so that we are sure to +get only the best. With 18 years they come to us as candidates. + +They are extremely thoroughly examined and checked. Of 100 men we +can use on the average 10 or 15, no more. We ask for the political +reputation record of his parents, brothers and sisters, the record +of his ancestry as far back as 1750 and naturally the physical +examination and his records of the Hitler youth. Further we ask for a +record of hereditary health showing that no hereditary diseases exist +in his parents and in his family. Last, but perhaps most important, is +a certification of the race commission. This examining commission is +composed of SS leaders, anthropologists and physicians. + +The behavior of this young man in front of this commission is now what +is decisive: Not only the way he stands at attention but also his manly +disciplined bearing, the ease and composition with which he answers the +questions posed to him in the course of conversation, his gait, his +hands, in fact all that which we have come to regard in the course of +our eight years of experience as ideal. This is the way we determine +whether to accept the man or not. The first years the company has been +very unhappy in many cases. It asked: Why is this man refused us? +We have just located in this or that village a man who has in every +respect an orderly appearance and now when this man confronts the race +commission he is being refused at a time when it is so difficult to +obtain people. In such cases we have always remained and still remain +severe and that is the right thing. That is the proper way to conduct a +veritable selection. + +I now come to the organization of the SS. It is necessary to +distinguish among the following organizations of the SS. First the +General SS which consists of about 190,000 men. This General SS is +entirely civilian in nature except for the higher officer corps, which +performs its duties on the higher levels, that is from Sturmbannfuehrer +up. I am very proud of the fact that only 0.4 percent of the General +SS are unemployed. These 0.4 percent come from Upper Silesia where +it is really very difficult to obtain work. We have almost only +professionals, and it is my opinion that it should be so. For a really +capable man is of little value to me if he only excels in arts, he +must also be otherwise honest and of good character, and accomplish +something in his field, in his profession. A man who changes his +position three times without satisfactory reason is expelled as we +have no further interest in him. People who stand around idle are of +no use to us. The General SS, therefore, is entirely professional +in its nature and character and performs its duties nights and +Sundays just like in war time. Besides the General SS there is the +Verfuegungstruppe; also the Death Head Units, the SD, and the race and +population system. I shall now discuss individual units in some detail. + +The General SS is divided into 13 subdivisions which on the whole are +exactly adapted to the present corps districts and one corps district +being planned. Under these subdivisions headed by Oberabschnittsfuehrer +who are Gruppenfuehrer or Obergruppenfuehrer, there are those which +are headed by an Oberfuehrer or Brigadefuehrer. These subdivisions, in +their turn, are subdivided into SS regiments [Standarten]. A regiment, +if in its entire force, is made up of 1600 men. Under the regiments we +have the battalions [Sturmbanne] and companies [Stuerme], and under the +companies the platoons. + +A great many SS men live very far apart. Of course, it would be much +more convenient to set up a Sturmbanne in some town and in this way +have all the people always together. That would facilitate considerably +the exercises which always take place in the evening hours, instruction +and sport, and require much less effort. However, that would inevitably +result in a decreasing quality because not enough people possessing the +desired qualities could be obtained in a town of approximately 20 to +25 thousand inhabitants. We have, therefore, extended our organization +considerably and have many platoons in the country side. These platoons +are then divided up between the villages, so that in a typical village +only the two best young men are SS members. We have meetings over the +week ends when the farmer is not too occupied, or one entire afternoon +in the winter, while in summer we only have monthly roll calls. That is +the outline of the organization of the General SS. + +The age groups in the SS are as follows: With 18 years the young man +enters the SS. He is first an applicant, after three months he takes +the oath on the Fuehrer and thus becomes a candidate [Anwaerter]. +As a candidate during the first year he takes examinations for his +SA sport insignia and his bronze sport insignia. At the age of 19 +or 19½, according to the time of his acceptance, he is conscripted +for the labor service and subsequently for the Wehrmacht. After +two more years he comes back from the Wehrmacht unless he remains +there as a prospective non-commissioned officer or reenlists. If he +returns to us he is still candidate. In these weeks he is especially +thoroughly instructed in ideology. The first year is for him a period +of elementary ideological indoctrination. In these weeks following +his return from the Wehrmacht he receives special instruction about +the marriage law and all other laws pertaining to the family, and the +honor laws. On the 9th of November, following his return from the +Wehrmacht, he becomes an SS man in the true sense. The Reichsfuehrer of +the SS is just as much an SS man in the sense of the SS organization +as the common man at the front. On this 9th of November he is being +awarded the dagger, and at this occasion he promises to abide by the +marriage law and the disciplinary laws of the SS, since the family is +also subject to these laws. From this day on he has the right and the +duty to defend his honor with a weapon as laid down by the honor laws +of the SS. The applicants and candidates do not yet have this right. +The SS man remains in the so called active general SS until his 35th +year. From his 35th to his 45th year he is in the SS reserve, and after +his 45th year in the Stammabteilung of the SS, identified by the grey +color patch. Between the ages of 21 and 35 the SS man has to perform +a great many duties, especially up to his 25th year. In these first +four years there are a lot of marches, tournaments, i.e., sports of +all kinds which take the form of contests that take place each year +between Easter and Summer solstice so that we are able to select the +best men of every company by these demonstrations of physical ability. +Every SS man is being asked to pass some kind of annual test until his +50th year. And the reason for that? These men are for the most part +professionals. In the SS perhaps anywhere from ½ to ⅗ live in cities. +The workman in the cities is often engaged in occupations requiring him +to stand or the intellectual worker to sit for a considerable amount of +time. To that is added the misery of big cities which in my opinion is +also a very serious military question. + +People of the 20th Century no longer walk but travel in the subway, +railroad or cars. Nobody is accustomed to marching in all the years +of his civilian life. Or take those who hold leading positions as an +example, all the professional State and Ministry leaders. These people +are condemned to sit. Everybody is so pressed for time he has to take +an automobile because there is no other way to keep up with the rush. +The result of this is that people grow pale and fat and in some cases +phlegmatic which is never good for the State. If we desire to remain +young we have to be sportsmen. But all that would remain on paper if I +did not hold annual checkups or arouse to a certain degree the ambition +of the men so that they really become sportsmen and pass their annual +tests. * * * + +The performance insignia of the SA have the following meaning: every +form of sport which requires the use of arms is being executed with +both arms. Shot put is done with both arms; the same holds true for +stone putting. Pistols and rifles are fired left and right. That +appears terribly awkward and unaccustomed in the beginning, but it +is an excellent form of exercise and very successful. Hand grenades +and clubs are hurled left and right. In the beginning no record +performances can be expected of course of people past their twentieth +year, since the left arm or in the case of a left-handed person the +right arm, are completely untrained, so that at a distance of 10 m the +target is often missed by three or five meters. It will be, however, a +very good development and application of all physical strength if we +require such performances of youths in the ages of 13 to 14 from the +very beginning. I believe that in this way we shall be very successful. +Every year the performance insignia differ. Of course, I do not expect +the conditions and time from a 40 year old for a 100 meter race as I do +expect them from a man of 21, but I do require of the man of 40 greater +endurance in marching than I do of the man of 21. I expect a 30 year +old man to shoot calmer and better than a 19 or 20 year old with few +examples. They are also graded to the extent that a wounded war veteran +who e.g. cannot swim need not, for that reason, refuse every sport. +But I want to help him by grading the conditions so that one who lost +an arm can perform the exercise with the other arm. Such are the sport +activities of the SS from the ages of 18 to 50. Aside from the sport +activity, those between the ages of 21 and 35 receive complete training +in street patrolling and barricading for cases of internal security. + +Hand in hand with physical exercise is mental and ideological training. +Weekly periods of instruction are held during which pages from Hitler’s +“Mein Kampf” are read. The older a person, the more steadfast must he +be in his ideology and the more training must he get in ideology. + +I now come to the Verfuegungstruppe [Forerunner of Armed Forces SS]. +The Verfuegungstruppe is divided into the following units: SS Regiment +“Adolf Hitler,” with three battalions, which is motorized and at the +same time contains infantrymen and additional companies; SS Regiment +“Deutschland” with 4 battalions with the usual motorcycle riflemen and +infantry howitzer companies; SS Regiment “Germania” with 3 battalions +also with motorcycle riflemen and infantry howitzer companies; the SS +battalion “Nurnberg,” an infantry battalion; the SS engineer battalion +today in Leisnig; later in Dresden; and the SS signal battalion today +in Berlin, later in Unna, upon completion of the barracks. The Regiment +“Adolf Hitler” is in Berlin. The Regiment “Deutschland” has three +battalions in Munich and one battalion in Ellwangen, the Regiment +“Germania” has now one battalion and two companies in Hamburg, and one +battalion in Arolsen and up to now one other battalion in Soltau. The +final garrison is not yet stationary. The time of service is 4 years. +No other form of conscription exists. The annual need for replacement +will be approximately 2200 men, not a great number. + +I now come to the Death Head Units. The employment and obligations of +the Verfuegungstruppe I shall discuss later in connection with the +police. The Death Head Units originated from the guard units of the +concentration camps. In connection with these concentration camps, I +should like to give a few data. We have in Germany today the following +concentration camps which, in my opinion, should not decrease but +increase in number for certain reasons: + +(1) Dachau near Munich; (2) Sachsenhausen near Berlin, which is the +former camp Esterwege in Emsland. I have dissolved this camp in +Emsland upon the suggestion of Reich Labor Leader, Hierl, and the +judiciary, who declared it was wrong to tell one person that the +service in the swamps to make land arable is an honor, and another, +by sending him there as a prisoner: “I’ll teach you people what it +means to get sent to the swamps.” This indeed is illogical, and after +half or three quarters of a year, I dissolved the camp in Esterwege +and transferred it to Sachsenhausen near Oranienburg. Then there is a +camp in Lichtenburg near Torgau, one in Sachsenburg near Chemnitz and +besides a few smaller ones. The number of prisoners is about 8000. I +shall explain to you why we must have so many and still more. We once +had a very efficiently organized German Communist Party [KPD]. This +KPD has been crushed in the year 1933. A part of the functionaries +went to foreign countries. Another part was comprised in the very high +number of protective custody prisoners in the year 1933. Because of my +extensive knowledge of Bolshevism, I have always opposed the release +of these people from the camps. It must be clear to us that the great +mass of workmen are absolutely susceptible to National Socialism and +the contemporary form of state as long as their way of thought has not +been changed by the specifically indoctrinated, trained and financially +backed functionaries. * * * + +It would be extremely instructive for everyone--some members of the +Wehrmacht were already able to do so--to inspect such a concentration +camp. Once they have seen it, they are convinced of the fact that no +one had been sent there unjustly; that it is the offal of criminals +and freaks. No better demonstration of the laws of inheritance and +race, as set forth by Doctor Guett, exists than such a concentration +camp. There you can find people with hydrocephalus, people who are +cross-eyed, deformed, half-Jewish, and a number of racially inferior +products. All that is assembled there. Of course we distinguish +between those inmates who are only there for a few months for the +purpose of education, and those who are to stay for a very long time. +On the whole, education consists of discipline, never of any kind of +instruction on an ideological basis, for the prisoners have, for the +most part, slave-like souls; and only very few people of real character +can be found there. They would pretend to do all that would be asked +of them, repeat all that is said in the “Voelkischer Beobachter” but +in reality, stay the same. The discipline thus preens order. The order +begins with these people living in clean barracks. Such a thing can +really only be accomplished by us Germans, hardly another nation would +be as humane as we are. The laundry is frequently changed. The people +are taught to wash themselves twice daily, and the use of a toothbrush +with which most of them have been unfamiliar. * * * + +The concentration camps are guarded by these Death Head Units. It +is impossible to use exclusively married people for guard duty as +has been suggested once, for no state can afford to do so. It is +further necessary to keep the number of such guards for concentration +camps--there are 3,500 men in Germany--at a relatively high level, +for no form of service is as exacting and strenuous for troops as the +guarding of crooks and criminals. * * * + +In case of war, it must become clear to us that a considerable number +of unreliable persons will have to be put here if we are to assure +ourselves of the absence of highly disagreeable developments in case of +war. + +The prisoner guards were formerly members of the general SS. We +gradually collected them into the so-called Death Head Units. They +are not arranged in companies, but in centuries (groups of 100) and +have naturally also machine guns. In such camps there are two or three +control towers, manned day and night with fully loaded machine guns, so +that any attempt of a general uprising--a possibility for which we must +always be prepared--can be immediately suppressed. The entire camp can +be strafed from three towers. + +The time of service in these Death Head Units is also four years. +They consist today mainly of people who have served their time in +the Wehrmacht and then enlisted with us for a period of four years. +The Death Head Units have the additional purpose of being the cadre +centuries for approximately 30 Death Head special battalions of the SS +in case of war, for 25,000 men with whom we shall guarantee the safety +in the interior. I shall come back to this subject later. + +I now come to the Security Service [SD]; it is the great ideological +intelligence service of the party and, in the long run, also that +of the state. During the time of struggle for power it was only the +intelligence service of the SS. At that time we had, for quite natural +reasons, an intelligence service with the regiments, battalions and +companies. We had to know what was going on on the opponent’s side, +whether the Communists intended to hold a meeting today or not, whether +our people were to be suddenly attacked or not and similar things. +I separated this service already in 1931 from the troops, from the +units of the general SS, because I considered it to be wrong. For one +thing, the secrecy is endangered, then the individual men or even the +companies are too likely to discuss every day problems. + +That was indeed the principle of the SS from the beginning. Every day +problems do not interest us; every leader appointed by the Fuehrer will +be backed by us, every leader dismissed by the Fuehrer will be removed +by us, if necessary by force, because only the command of the Fuehrer +counts. Besides that we are only interested in ideological questions of +importance for decades or centuries, so that the man is really above +the concern of every day and knows that he is working for a great task, +which occurs but once in 2000 years. The SS man is not interested in +daily problems of the kind whether perhaps the local group is correctly +manned, whether everything is done properly in the labor front, no +matter what it is, he is not interested. + +The Security Service was already separated from the troops in 1931 and +separately organized. Its higher headquarters coincide today with the +Oberabschnitte and Abschnitte (sectors), and it has also field offices, +an own organization of officials with a great many Command Posts, +approximately 3-4000 men strong, at least when it is built up. The +spheres which it handles are above all Communism, Judaism, Freemasonry, +ultra-mundane activities, the activity of political religion, and +reaction. Here, too, the details of the work are not of interest. You +will perhaps see that during your visit; I can, therefore, be short. +The security service is only interested in the great ideological +problems. + +For example: Let us say that it is attempted on the part of +ultra-mundane people to effect gradually for the territory of Austria +a change into a Swiss like state by means of scientific exploitation +of the theory of the Austrian man. Just as it happened to us in our +history 700 or 800 years ago with Switzerland which, although it +still speaks the German language today, does not consider itself +inwardly as belonging to Germany; or as we had to suffer the loss +of Holland with its entire lower German territory a few centuries +ago; the attempt is now being made to point at this problem of the +South-East German people, of the Austrian people, with propaganda, by +scientific underrunning and scientific work at the universities, until +spiritual separation is also possible. We are furthermore interested: +Which German professors support this theory or are connected with any +wire-pulling abroad or elsewhere? + +These are spheres which interest us. To us as a security service it +is of no interest whether, for instance, the cell organization of the +German Communist party at Berlin-Wedding has been broken up or not. +This is a question for the executive power. One day it will be broken +up, or it is broken up already, and if it is reorganized, it will be +broken up again. Therefore, this is of no interest to us, on account +of that Germany will not perish. We are interested: What are the +Communists’ large-scale plans for the next years, in which country do +they intend to begin, which influences of Bolshevism are noticeable in +foreign Freemasonry circles, what are their plans, where do the big +emissaries go now? Recently, e.g. 800 emissaries went to Austria. They +arrived there 3 or 4 months ago, and now we are extremely interested +to know: How is this going to affect Austria? Or what plans do they +have, what great organizational plans for Germany, from which angle do +they start, how does Bolshevism make common cause, for instance, with +the religious coalition [Bekenntnisfront], and suddenly supports as an +atheist movement these religious parsons, how is that possible all of a +sudden? Or we are furthermore interested in this: + +What economic influence do the Jews exercise--again considered on a +large scale--to suffocate business, to commit sabotage and to transfer +foreign currency illegally? These are things which are being studied +there scientifically and--in this case the word really fits--by a +general staff, which may sometimes last for years, tasks which in many +or in most cases are only in the beginning stage. + +After the Security Service follows the last pillar, the race- and +settlement organization. We thus have the general SS, which represents +the majority of the SS, of the order, the Verfuegungs troops with +a certain task in the country for the protection of the interior, +the Death Head Units, also for the protection of the interior, the +Security Service, the intelligence service of the party and the +state, and finally the race--and settlement organization whose task +of ideological training is of a positive nature, as contrasted with +the Security Service which has the negative task to seek information +about the opponent. In this race- and settlement office the marriage +applications are being handled. In the last 4 or 5 years we have the +order concerning marriages: No SS men can get married without the +approval of the SS Reich leader. A physical examination of the bride +and guarantees for the bride’s ideological and human character are +required. We are not interested whether the woman has a fortune or not. +We request only a statement whether or not she has defects. We prefer +it if the rich girls take along only what they have earned themselves, +or their dowry. In addition, the genealogical table up to 1750 is +required, the hereditary physical report of both, and several police +and other reports. This results in tremendous work, especially now that +people are getting married in an unusually great number; because it is +our concern, that our men get married. We desire that they get married +at 26 years, if possible, so that there will be really young marriages +which are also able to have children. * * * + +I now turn to the Police and its structure. Today the Police is divided +into two branches, namely civil and security police; the civil police +wears a uniform. The security police is composed of the criminal police +and of the Secret State Police [Gestapo]. We can certainly state +without exaggeration that in 1933 we took over a wild confusion, a +Police the decent elements of which were humiliated; for the sword had +been taken away from the officers and a rubber truncheon had been given +to the men. The police was permeated by persons with criminal records +and by absolute Marxists; it did not care to actually take a stand +against any crime because at once the League for Human Rights, the +Peace Society and similar societies intervened, and because absolute +glorification of crime was in vogue. This was the method of planned +intellectual Bolshevization. + +In Prussia, Goering took over the Police, put the uniformed police in +order, and created a Landespolizei (gendarmerie) which in 1935-1936 +was absorbed by the army; the same occurred in Bavaria. From my SS +position, I first of all concerned myself only with the Secret State +Police, with the political Police of the countries and with the Secret +State Police in Prussia. Through the fact that I personally was +political police commander of all German countries, and at the same +time deputy of the Gestapo in Prussia, the Gestapo gradually came +under the control of one person. + +I may skip the whole further development. On the 17th of June of the +previous year I became head of the German police, that is, of all the +German Police together with its auxiliary organizations. I shall review +for you my conception of my task as I have seen and still see it. + +First:--I shall ultimately form one true Reich police out of these 16 +different gendarmeries, for the Reich police is one of the strongest +binding elements that a state can have. We now have for the first +time in German history a Reich Police. Outwardly, I am eliminating +the various uniforms, the laws and regulations which were still in +force until six or nine months ago. When a Hamburg police official was +pursuing a criminal who was bold enough to go into Prussian territory, +he could not pursue him farther without the consent of the Prussian +Police. This naturally was to the great advantage of the criminal, for +he could very easily escape. The same was the case between the other +states of the federation. These things were still on such a firm legal +basis that one could not do away with them without legal revision. + +For the creation of the Reich police, not only outwardly but also +inwardly, I have already made a beginning in the officers’ corps and +with the officials, by shifting the people somewhat, through transfers, +etc., in this way showing Germany to them; thus my dear Bavarians may +come North for a change, and the people from the North go South. If +that is not done they all groan a little about it at first, as was the +case with the SS a few years ago. Now a telegram arrives suddenly, +the man is to be at his new post in two days. Transfers are effected +on principle only by telegram, that keeps people young and fresh. As +stated, this is only the beginning of our work with the Reich police. + +The effective strength of officers and men is very low. That is quite +understandable, for the police has given up much of its good or even +best personnel for setting up the Landespolizei. The Landespolizei +was absorbed by the Wehrmacht, and what is left in many places is the +poorest not only of equipment, trucks, autos and other things, but +sometimes the poorest of officers and men. All of this must now be +painfully built up and brought into order. * * * + +As far as I can, I am now bringing the police up to full strength +with men leaving the Verfuegungstruppe (reserve unit) and the Death +Head Units; I am bringing the police officers’ corps up to full +strength with SS leaders who come into the police from the Toelz +and Brunswick Fuehrerschulen [Leader Training schools] by way of +the Verfuegungstruppe. This brings me to an important problem; I am +fighting to prevent the police officers’ corps from becoming a second +class officers’ corps. This happens very easily just as it did in the +past. + +In connection with this whole matter, I now come to the main problem: +internal security and obligations of the police during war. In a future +war we shall have not only an army front on land, a navy front at sea, +and an air force front in the air over Germany, but we shall also have +a fourth theater of war, namely internal Germany. This is the basis +which must be kept sound, at all costs, lest the three combat branches +of Germany be stabbed in the back again. + +We must clearly recognize that an opponent in war is an opponent not +only in a military but also in an ideological sense. When I speak here +of opponents, I obviously mean our natural opponent, international +Bolshevism, under Jewish-Masonic leadership. This Bolshevism, of +course, has its supreme citadel in Russia. But this does not mean +that there is danger of Bolshevist attack from Russia only. One must +always reckon with this danger from wherever this Jewish Bolshevism +has gained decisive influence for itself. The states or people under +Jewish-Masonic-Bolshevist leadership, or at least strong influence, +will of necessity be unfriendly toward Germany and will constitute a +danger. + +Thus we must constantly ask ourselves, “Who is, or would be an opponent +in case of war? Who is an ideological opponent, that is, who is under +Jewish-Masonic-Bolshevist influence”? We must clearly realize, that +Bolshevism is the organization of the sub-humans, it is the absolute +foundation of Jewish sovereignty, it is the exact contrary of all that +is dear to an Aryan people. It is a diabolical teaching, for it appeals +to the meanest and lowest instincts of mankind and makes a religion of +this. Do not be deceived: Bolshevism, with its Lenin entombed in the +Kremlin, will take only a few decades to become the diabolical religion +of destruction, a religion native to Asia for the destruction of the +whole world. Furthermore, remember that this Bolshevism is working +according to plan for the Bolshevization of other peoples, and the +destruction is aimed at the white race. One of the first institutions +founded under Jewish leadership, as early as 1918, was an Asiatic +university as I shall call it. It has a kind of department for each +Asiatic population, whether numerous or not. The functionaries for +these populations are instructed not only in their language, but also +as to the customs, as to the religious and class quarrels, and the +economic circumstances, etc. They are instructed whether these people +are mostly rich or poor, whether the poorer class is particularly +oppressed, etc. All of this is studied down to the smallest sects. +The people who have finished their education there, then go out in a +constant stream to all of these people and exploit their wishes and +longings as their religious differences and their fanaticism, taking +advantage of social misery, to draw them into a whirlpool and thus +gradually convince them that the only ones who can really help them are +the people in Moscow. + +This general movement is also directed against the white race, and +is today directed primarily against resurrected Germany, which was +generally considered to have been ruined, because of having been +subdued. If we wish to be immune to the poison of destruction in our +people, our lives must again be founded on social well-being, order +and cleanliness. We are in the process of creating both. The first +four years have passed; unemployment has almost vanished, much has +been accomplished, much more remains to be done by us. But the most +important thing is the thorough ideological permeation of all our +people with the profound realization that our people, a minority of +70 million in the heart of Europe, could stand only because we are +qualitatively more valuable than the others. + +And this brings me back to what I said about the race question at the +beginning. + +We are more valuable than the others who do now and always will surpass +us in numbers. We are more valuable because our blood enables us to +invent more than others, to lead our people better than the others; +because it enables us to have better soldiers, better statesmen, higher +culture, better characters. We also have better quality, speaking of +your profession, because the German soldier is more devoted to duty, +more decent, and more intelligent than the soldiers of other countries. +And we shall maintain this quality as long as we keep our blood and +people healthy, so long as this people recognizes and obeys the ancient +laws for preservation of a people which National Socialism, thanks +to Adolf Hitler, restored to it. We shall remain healthy and immune +as long as we do not slide back into democracy, into a hereditary or +legitimate imperialism which did not develop from the people. Let us +realize clearly that we shall weather the next decades only if we are +a people that has a profound conviction of itself, believes in its own +strength, and proves this strength. + +I spoke of the ideological permeation of the whole people in case of +war. If this war should come sooner than any of us believe or wish, +that is, if war will come at all, we must clearly realize that there +will always be a residue among the German people who will form a +nucleus for the Comintern. The Comintern have an easy time of it, for +they have a political agitator and at the same time a military spy who +sells. Every communist is also a military spy who reveals any military +and industrial secret out of loyalty to his imaginary fatherland, +Moscow, the native land of the proletarians. Because of his conviction, +he engages in political agitation and sedition in exactly the same +way in order to start the revolution. The sooner war would come, the +greater would be the danger. The later it comes, the more generations +of youth have grown up, year after year, the less is the danger. The +danger would arise again only if the German people would deviate from +today’s path. In any case, we must prepare for this danger, for this +internal theater of war, and always realize clearly that any war +brought about by neglect of this internal theater of war would lead to +damage. + +I picture the scope of obligations in case of war as follows: The +police of course would, according to their duty as I see it, be able to +give up a maximum of 15,000 to 20,000 men (not more) to the Wehrmacht +as soldiers. I have a total of 80,000 to 90,000 uniformed police. It +must be taken into consideration that a large part of this uniformed +police is over or at least over 40, so that if I should give up 15,000 +to 20,000, I really would give up the backbone of this police. I can +substitute men over 55 or 60 whom I may reactivate. That could be done +if unavoidable. However, it is possible only if I assure myself of an +attack unit [Eingreiftruppe] which I can use for large scale projects. +These are the Death Head Units. By and large, I can get along with +this old Police force. I can carry out all the former tasks of the +Landsturm, i.e. guarding munition factories, railroad crossings, etc., +with civilians over 45, who would be drafted as auxiliary police as +planned provided I have as a backbone a troop that is young. For this +the Death Head Units are provided, ranging in age from 25 to 35, not +older and not younger. + +I do not wish to have any very young nor any old persons, for the +sabotage and terror troops consist of young, very lively persons with +the most modern equipment. This opponent cannot be fought with old +Landsturm personnel. + +The Death Head Units will enter every government district of Germany. +The following measures have been provided: firstly, no unit is to go +to its native province, thus a Pomeranian troop would never serve +in Pomerania. Secondly, each unit will change after three months. +Thirdly, the unit will never be assigned to street duty singly. An +individual with the death head insignia will never be used as a +policeman for street service, that must not be. Fourth, if such use +is made relentless measures are to be taken. Anything else is out of +the question. Otherwise we would have to reckon in Germany with such +possibilities as parachute jumps, use of saboteurs, use of bold groups +of 16 or 20 men who might, with the support of Communist personnel, +entrench themselves in a munitions factory. If these measures are not +provided for one could not get along with such a limited personnel. * * +* + +In closing, I may say one thing: I can manage with the officers’ corps +of the civil police and with the men of the Security Service, whom I +naturally cannot release even in war, and with the men and leaders of +the Death Head Units, only if I have valuable and decent people in +them. I must make it possible by way of the Verfuegungstruppe which +will be in combat, to have a constant exchange of wounded or those who +have been at the front a long time, in return for officers and men of +the police and the Death Head Units. Otherwise, I either would get no +decent characters for these home formations, and then obviously could +not fulfill the obligations; or else there would appear in the home +formations manifestations of disturbances as happened with the fleet +during the war, because it didn’t get out. This must be avoided, and +for this reason rotation is planned within the organization. Every SS +leader of the Verfuegungstruppe--we have about 300 SS leaders yearly +coming from the Toelz and Brunswick SS schools--is placed with the +civil police once every half year, in order to become a reserve officer +of the police. I can make good use of these people. If, for instance, +one of them is wounded and has only one arm, he can still render +excellent service at home. + +An appreciation of this completely new kind of organization must +penetrate everywhere, as well as an understanding of this internal +theater of war which will mean the difference between the existence or +nonexistence of our people if we ever would have to stand a trial. It +is the obligation of the SS and of the police to solve positively the +problem of internal security. That is the assignment given to us by the +Fuehrer. We are tackling it in all seriousness and are really convinced +that it is no second-rate task, and we are further convinced that only +the best ideological training of our men and a racial selection will +enable us to solve this problem some day. + +In this short outline I have depicted for you the task of the SS and +police. Just as I do in every address to Wehrmacht officers, I ask you +in your circle to think yourselves into these somewhat novel channels +of thought, and create understanding for it wherever you can. + +Let us all clearly realize, the next decades do not signify any foreign +political argument which Germany either can or cannot overcome, but +they signify a fight of extermination of the above-mentioned subhuman +opponents in the whole world who fight Germany, as the nuclear people +of the Northern race, Germany as nucleus of the German people, Germany +as bearer of the culture of mankind; they signify the existence or +nonexistence of the white race of which we are the leading people. We +have, of course, one conviction: we are lucky enough to be alive just +at the time when once in 2,000 years an Adolf Hitler has been born, and +we are convinced that we shall survive every danger in both good and +bad times because we all hold together and because each one approaches +his work with his conviction. + + + PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1997-PS + +_Copy of RK. 10714 B._ + + Decree of the Fuehrer concerning the administration of the + newly-occupied Eastern territories, dated the 17 July 1941. + +In order to restore and maintain public order and public life in the +newly-occupied Eastern territories I decree that: + + + Article 1 + +As soon as the military operations in the newly-occupied territories +are over, the administration of these territories shall be transferred +from the military establishments to the civil-administration +establishments. I shall from time to time determine by special decree, +the territories which according to this are to be transferred to the +civil administration, and the time when this is to take place. + + + Article 2 + +The Civil Administration in the newly-occupied Eastern territories, +where these territories are not included in the administration of +the territories bordering on the Reich or the General government, is +subject to the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern territories. + + + Article 3 + +Military sovereign rights and powers are exercised by the commanders +of the Armed Forces in the newly-occupied Eastern territories in +accordance with my decree of 25 June 1941. + +The powers of the Commissioner for the 4-year plan in the +newly-occupied Eastern territories, according to my decree of 29 June +1941, and those of the Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police +according to my decree of 17 July 1941, are subject to special ruling, +and are not effected by the following regulations. + + + Article 4 + +I appoint Reichsleiter Alfred Rosenberg as Reich Minister for the +Occupied Eastern Territories. He will hold office in Berlin. + + + Article 5 + +The parts of the newly-occupied Eastern territories which are subject +to the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories are to +be divided into Reich Commissariats, which are to be divided into +General Regions [Generalbezirke] and these again into District Areas +[Kreisgebiete]. Several “Kreisgebiete” can be joined into a Main Region +[Hauptbezirk]. The Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories +will issue more detailed instructions on this subject. + + + Article 6 + +At the head of each Reich Commissariat will be a Reich Commissar; at +the head of each General Region a Commissar-General and at the head of +every District Area an Area Commissar [Gebietskommissar]. Where a Main +Region is formed, there will be a Head-Commissar [Hauptkommissar] in +charge. + +The Reich Commissars and the Commissar-Generals will be appointed +by me, the heads of the main sections in the bureaux of the Reich +Commissars, as well as the Head Commissars and District Commissars will +be appointed by the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories. + + + Article 7 + +In cases where Article 3 is not applicable, the Reich Commissars will +be responsible to the Reich Minister for Occupied Eastern Territories, +and will receive instructions exclusively from him. + + + Article 8 + +It is the responsibility of the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern +Territories to legislate for the newly occupied territories under +his jurisdiction. He can delegate the legislative power to the Reich +Commissars. + + + Article 9 + +As regards civil affairs, the Reich Commissars are responsible for the +whole administration of their territory. + +As long as military operations are in progress, it is the duty of the +highest competent authorities of the Reich to guarantee railway and +postal services in accordance with the instructions of the Chief of +Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. Further ruling will remain pending +until the time the military operations cease. + + + Article 10 + +In order that the measures taken by the Reich Minister for the Occupied +Eastern Territories or by the Reich Commissars in their areas may +be brought into harmony with the over-all [uebergeordnete] aspects +of the interests of the Reich, the Reich Minister for the Occupied +Eastern Territories will maintain close liaison with the highest Reich +authorities. In differences of opinion which cannot be settled by +direct negotiations, my decision is to be obtained through the Reich +Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellory. + + + Article 11 + +The necessary regulations for carrying out and supplementing this +decree will be issued by the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern +Territories in agreement with the Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich +Chancellory. + + Fuehrer’s Headquarters, 17 July 1941 + + The Fuehrer + Signed: Adolf Hitler + + Chief of Supreme Command + of the Armed Forces + Signed: Keitel + + Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancery + Signed: Dr. Lammers. + +[L.S.] + + + PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2000-PS + + 1935 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, NO. 100, PAGE 1146. + +Law for the Protection of German Blood and German Honor of 15 September + 1935 + +Thoroughly convinced by the knowledge that the purity of German blood +is essential for the further existence of the German people and +animated by the inflexible will to safeguard the German nation for +the entire future, the Reichstag has resolved upon the following law +unanimously, which is promulgated herewith: + + + Section 1 + +1. Marriages between Jews and nationals of German or kindred blood are +forbidden. Marriages concluded in defiance of this law are void, even +if, for the purpose of evading this law, they are concluded abroad. + +2. Proceedings for annulment may be initiated only by the Public +Prosecutor. + + + Section 2 + +Relations outside marriage between Jews and nationals of German or +kindred blood are forbidden. + + + Section 3 + +Jews will not be permitted to employ female nationals of German or +kindred blood in their household. + + + Section 4 + +1. Jews are forbidden to hoist the Reichs and national flag and to +present the colors of the Reich. + +2. On the other hand they are permitted to present the Jewish colors. +The exercise of this authority is protected by the State. + + + Section 5 + +1. A person who acts contrary to the prohibition of section 1 will be +punished with hard labor. + +2. A person who acts contrary to the prohibition of section 2 will be +punished with imprisonment or with hard labor. + +3. A person who acts contrary to the provisions of sections 3 or 4 will +be punished with imprisonment up to a year and with a fine or with one +of these penalties. + + + Section 6 + +The Reich Minister of the Interior in agreement with the Deputy of the +Fuehrer and the Reich Minister of Justice will issue the legal and +administrative regulations which are required for the implementation +and supplementation of this law. + + + Section 7 + +The law will become effective on the day after the promulgation, +section 3 however only on 1 January 1936. + +Nurnberg, the 15 September 1935 at the Reich Party Rally of freedom. + + The Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor + Adolf Hitler + + The Reich Minister of Interior + Frick + + The Reich Minister of Justice + Dr. Guertner + + The Deputy of the Fuehrer + R. Hess + Reich Minister without portfolio + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2001-PS + + 1933 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 141 + + Law to remove the distress of people and State of 24 March 1933 + +The Reichstag has resolved upon the following law which is promulgated +herewith with approval of the Reichsrat after it has been established +that all the requirements of legislation for changing the constitution +have been complied with. + + + _Section 1_ + +Laws for the Reich can be resolved upon also by the Reich Cabinet +besides the procedure provided by the constitution of the Reich. This +also applies to the laws pursuant to sections 85 subsection 2 and 87 of +the Reich-Constitution. + + + _Section 2_ + +The laws for the Reich resolved upon by the Reich Cabinet may deviate +from the Reich-Constitution so far as they do not deal with the +institution of the Reichstag or the Reichsrat as such. The powers of +the Reich-President will remain intact. + + + _Section 3_ + +The laws for the Reich resolved upon by the Reich-Cabinet are issued +by the Reich-Chancellor and promulgated in the Reichsgesetzblatt. +They will become effective, so far as they do not determine otherwise +on the day following their promulgation. Section 68 to 77 of the +Reich-Constitution are not applicable to the laws resolved upon by the +Reich-Cabinet. + + + _Section 4_ + +Treaties of the Reich with foreign countries relating to matters of +the legislation of the Reich do not require the approval of the bodies +participating in the legislation. The Reich-Cabinet issues the rules +necessary for the execution of such treaties. + + + _Section 5_ + +This law will become effective on the day of its promulgation. It +becomes ineffective on 1 April 1937. Moreover it becomes ineffective if +the present Reich-Cabinet should be replaced by another. + +Berlin, 24 March 1933 + + The Reich-President + von Hindenburg + + The Reich-Chancellor + Adolf Hitler + + The Reich-Minister for the Interior + Frick + + The Reich-Minister for Foreign Affairs + Freiherr von Neurath + + The Reich-Minister for Finances + Count Schwerin von Krosigk + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2003-PS + + 1934 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 747 + + Law re the Sovereign Head of the German Reich 1 August 1934 + +The Reich Government has enacted the following law which is hereby +promulgated: + + + Section 1 + +The office of the Reichspraesident will be consolidated with that of +the Reich Chancellor. The existing authority of the Reichspraesident +shall consequently be transferred to the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor, +Adolph Hitler. He shall select his representative. + + + Section 2 + +This law is effective as of the time of the death of Reichspraesident +von Hindenburg. + + The Reich Chancellor + Adolf Hitler + + The Reich Deputy Chancellor + von Papen + + The Reich Minister of Foreign Affairs + Freiherr von Neurath + + The Reich Minister of Interior + Frick + + The Reich Minister of Finance + Graf Schwerin von Krosigk + + The Reich Minister of Labor + Franz Seldte + + The Reich Minister of Justice + Dr. Guertner + + The Reich Minister for Defense + von Blomberg + + The Reich Postal Minister and Transportation Minister + Freiherr von Eltz + + The Reich Minister for Nutrition and Agriculture + R. Walther Darre + + The Reich Minister for Enlightenment and Propaganda + Dr. Goebbels + + The Reich Minister for Air Travel + Hermann Goering + + The Reich Minister for Science, Training and Education + Bernhard Rust + + The Reich Minister without Portfolio + Rudolf Hess + + The Reich Minister without Portfolio + Hanns Kerrl + + + PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2004-PS + + 1933 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 153 + + Preliminary Law for the Coordination of the Federal States under the + Reich, 31 March 1933. + + + Article 4 + +(1) The popular representation of the federal states (diets [Landtage], +citizens’ assemblies [Burgerschuften]) is hereby dissolved with the +exception of the Prussian diet [Preussischer Landtag] elected 5 March +1933, so far as this has not already happened according to the law of +the state. + +(2) They will be newly constituted according to the number of votes +which in the election to the German Reichstag were given to the +electoral lists within each federal state. In this connection, seats +falling to the Communist Party will not be given out. The same will be +true for electoral lists of electoral groups which are to be regarded +as a substitute for the electoral lists of the Communist Party. + +* * * * * * * + +Berlin, 31 March 1933. + + The Reich Chancellor + ADOLF HITLER + + The Reich Minister of Interior + FRICK + + + PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2005-PS + + 1933 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 173 + + Second Law Integrating the Laender with the Reich 7 April 1933 + +The Reich Government has enacted the following law which is hereby +promulgated: + + + 1 + +(1) In the German “Laender”, with the exception of Prussia, the Reich +President, upon the proposal of the Reich Chancellor, shall appoint the +Reich governor, the Reich governor shall require the observance of the +general policy laid down by the Reich Chancellor. The following powers +of “Land” authority belong to him: + + 1. Appointment and removal of the head of the “Land” Government, and + upon his proposal, the other members of the “Land” Government. + + 2. Dissolution of the legislature and designation of the new election + subject to the rule of section 8 of the Provisional Law of March + 31, 1933, Integrating the German “Laender” with the Reich. + + 3. Preparations and publication of “Land” laws, including the laws + which are determined upon by the “Land” Government according to + section I of the Provisional Law of March 31, 1933, Integrating the + German “Laender” with the Reich. Article 70 of the Constitution of + August 11, 1919, applies accordingly. + + 4. Upon the proposal of the “Land” Government, appointment and + dismissal of the higher “Land” officials and judges, so far as this + formerly was accomplished by the highest “Land” officials. + + 5. The power of pardon. + +(2) The Reich governor may preside over the meetings of the “Land” +Government. + +(3) Article 63 of the German Constitution of August 11, 1919 remains +unaltered. + + + 2 + +(1) A Reich governor may not simultaneously be a member of a “Land” +Government. He shall belong to the “Land” whose sovereign powers +he exercises. His official residence is at the seat of the “Land” +Government. + +(2) For several “Lands” in each of which there are less than 2 million +inhabitants, a common “Lands” governor who must be a resident of one of +these “Lands”, may be appointed. The Reich President shall designate +the governor’s official residence. + + + 3 + +(1) The Reich governor is appointed for the duration of a “Land” +Legislative period. He can be recalled at any time by the Reich +President on the proposal of the Reich Chancellor. + +(2) The provisions of the Reich Ministry Law of March 27, 1930, +find appropriate application to the office of Reich governor. His +remuneration is borne by the Reich; the establishment of its size +remains unsettled. + + + 4 + +Votes of no confidence of the “Land” legislature against the head and +the members of the “Land” Government are not permissible. * * * + + The Reich Chancellor + Adolf Hitler + + The Reich Minister of the Interior + Frick + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2006-PS + + 1934 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 75 + + Law for the Reconstruction of the Reich 30 January 1934 + +The popular referendum and the Reichstag election of November 12, 1933 +have proven that the German people have attained an indestructible +internal unity superior to all internal subdivisions of political +character. + +Consequently, the Reichstag has enacted the following law which is +hereby promulgated with the unanimous vote of the Reichstag after +ascertaining that the requirements of the Reich Constitution have been +met: + + + ARTICLE I + +Popular assemblies [Volksvertretungen] of the “Laender” shall be +abolished. + + + ARTICLE II + +(1) The sovereign powers [Hoheitsrechte] of the “Laender” are +transferred to the Reich. + +(2) The “Laender” governments are placed under the Reich government. + + + ARTICLE III + +The Reich governors are placed under the administrative supervision of +the Reich Minister of Interior. + + + ARTICLE IV + +The Reich Government may issue new constitutional laws. + + + ARTICLE V + +The Reich Minister of Interior may administer the necessary legal and +administrative regulations for the execution of the law. + + + ARTICLE VI + +This law shall be effective on the day of its promulgation. + +Berlin, 30 January 1934. + + The Reich President + von Hindenburg + + The Reich Chancellor + Adolf Hitler + + The Reich Minister of the Interior + Frick + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2008-PS + + 1935 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 49 + + German Communal Ordinance 30 January 1935 + +The German Communal Ordinance [Deutsche Gemeindeordnung] aims at +qualifying the communes for the highest achievements in close +cooperation with Party and State, affording them full opportunities +for helping to accomplish--in the true spirit of Baron von Stein, the +creator of communal home rule--the purpose of the State: to restore +the priority of the common weal over the individual in a united people +permeated by one national will; to place the public interest before +selfish ends and to bring about the true national community under +the leadership of the best of the people, in which every willing +fellow-citizen finds the feeling of mutual solidarity. + +The German Communal Ordinance is a basic law of the National Socialist +State. The reconstruction of the Reich will be completed on the +foundations laid by the act. + +The Reich Government has therefore enacted the following law which is +hereby promulgated. * * * + + + Section 6 + +(1) The mayor [Burgermeister] is the head of the commune. He is +represented by the executive officers [Beigeordnete]. + +(2) The mayor and the executive officers receive their appointments +through the confidence of Party and State. In order to insure harmony +between the communal administration and the Party, the delegate of the +National Socialist Workers’ Party participates in certain matters. +Continuous contacts between the communal administration and the +citizens is guaranteed by the councillors [Gemeinderaete], who as +meritorious and experienced men assist the mayor through their advice. +* * * + + + Section 33 + +(1) In order to insure harmony between the communal administration and +the Party, the delegates of the National Socialist German Workers’ +Party participate, apart from the appointment and recall of the mayor, +the executive officers, and the councillors (Secs. 41, 45, 51, 54), in +the following decisions of the mayor: + + 1. The issuance of the basic ordinance requires the approval of the + Party delegate; + + 2. Honorary citizenship and honorary titles may be granted or revoked + only with his consent. + +(2) When the Party delegate [NSDAP] refuses to concur with the mayor +he must give his reasons in writing within two weeks after the +mayor has requested his decision. If the matter concerns the basic +ordinance, the Party delegate must state the provisions disapproved +by him, otherwise his approval is considered granted. Should further +conferences or correspondence between the Party delegate and the mayor +fail to bring about an agreement, the mayor must request the decision +of the supervisory authority, in urban counties that of the Reich +governor. In the case of the basic ordinance, the Reich governor must +have the approval of the Reich Minister of the Interior for any final +decision overruling the recommendation of the supervisory authority. +The decision of the Reich governor is binding upon the supervisory +authority. * * * + + + Section 41 + +(1) Vacant full-time positions of mayor and executive officer must be +advertised before they are filled by the commune. All applications +received are to be sent to the Party delegate, who after secretly +conferring with the councillors, nominates up to three candidates. In +the case of an executive officer, he must give the mayor an opportunity +to express his opinion of the candidate. + +(2) In submitting his nominations together with all the applications, +the Party delegate proceeds as follows: + + 1. If the vacancy concerns the position of mayor, senior executive + officer or chamberlain in cities of more than 100,000 + inhabitants, the folder is sent through the supervisory authority + to the Reich Minister of the Interior. + + 2. In the case of the position of another executive officer in cities + of the above class and in the case of the position of mayor and + executive officer in other urban counties, the folder is sent + through the supervisory authority to the Reich governor; + + 3. In the case of the position of mayor and executive officer in + cities belonging to a rural county, the folder is sent through + the supervisory authority to the higher supervisory authority, + and for all remaining communes to the supervisory authority. + +(3) If the proper authority concerned with the matter approves of +a nomination, the commune appoints the candidate. Otherwise new +nominations must be submitted. If no new nomination finds the approval +of the proper authority, the latter selects a candidate, whom the +commune must appoint. The same applies if nominations are not made +within the period of time specified by the proper authority. + +(4) Vacancies in the position of unpaid mayor or executive officer need +not be advertised. The proper authority may permit a commune to proceed +without advertising a vacancy in a position mentioned under (2). +Otherwise the regulations given in (1) to (3) apply accordingly. + +(5) Nominations are to be kept confidential until the proper authority +according to (2) has made its decision. * * * + + + Section 45 + +(1) The proper authority according to Sec. 41 (2) may revoke the +appointment of a mayor or executive officer until the close of their +first year of office. For positions of the first category under +Sec. 41(2) the Reich governor must be invited to express himself on +the matter. The same applies to the Party delegate for position of +the third category under Sec. 41(2); cases of disagreement require a +decision of the Reich governor. * * * + + + Title 2 + + Communal Councillors + + Section 48 + +(1) It is the duty of the councillors to keep the communal +administration in close touch with all groups of the citizenry. They +must advise the mayor on their own responsibility and uphold his +measures among the population. In their activities they are to be +guided solely by the thought of preserving and promoting the common +weal. + +(2) In cities the councillors have the title of “Ratsherr.” + +* * * * * * * + + + Section 51 + +(1) The Party delegate selects the councillors in agreement with +the mayor. In making the appointment, he is to take into account +national reliability, qualifications, and reputation, and must +consider personalities whose activities give the commune its special +significance or who exert an important influence upon the life of the +community. + +(2) Civil servants, employees and workers of the commune and civil +servants of the supervisory authority may not be appointed councillors. +The supervisory authority may grant exceptions from this rule. + +* * * * * * * + + + PART VII + + SUPERVISION + + Section 106 + +The State supervises the communes in order to insure that their +activities conform with the laws and the aims of national leadership. +The supervision shall be exercised in such a way that the initiative +and the sense of responsibility of the communal administration are +strengthened and not diminished. + +* * * * * * * + + + Section 123 + +The provisions of this act take effect on April 1, 1935. + +Berlin, 30 January 1935. + + The Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor + Adolf Hitler + + The Reich Minister of the Interior + Frick + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2012-PS + + 1933 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 195 + + First Regulation for Administration of the Law for the Restoration of + the Professional Civil Service of 11 April 1933 + +On the basis of Article 17 of the Law for the Restoration of the +Professional Civil Service of 7 April 1933 (RGBl I, 175), the following +regulation is issued: + + + 1 + +_To Article 2_: + +Unfit, are all civil servants who belong to the communist party or +communist aid- or supplementary organization. They are, therefore, to +be discharged. + + + 2 + +_To Article 3_: + +1. A person is to be regarded as non-Aryan, who is descended from +non-Aryans, especially Jewish parents or grandparents. This holds true +even if only one parent or grandparent is of non-Aryan descent. This +premise especially obtains if one parent or grandparent was of Jewish +faith. + +2. If a civil servant was not already a civil servant on 1 August +1914, he must prove that he is of Aryan descent, or that he fought at +the front, or that he is the son or the father of a man killed during +the World War. Proof must be given by submitting documents (birth +certificate and marriage certificate of the parents, military papers). + +3. If Aryan descent is doubtful, an opinion must be obtained from the +expert on racial research commissioned by the Reich Minister of the +Interior (Sachverstaendiger fuer Rasseforschung). + + + 3 + +_To Article 4_: + +1. In determining whether the suppositions of Article 4, sentence +(1) are given, the whole political career of the official is to be +considered, particularly from 9 November 1918 on. + +2. Every official is required on request to attest to the highest Reich +or country authority (Article 7) as to what political party he has been +a member of until the present. As political parties in the sense of +this definition reference is made to the Reichsbanner, Black-Red-Gold, +the Republican Judges’ Union and the League for the Rights of Man. + + + 4 + +All negotiations, documents and official certificates which are +requisite for the fulfillment of this law, are free of duty and +stamping (gebuehren- und stempelfrei). + +Berlin, 11 April 1933 + + The Reich Minister of the Interior + Frick + + The Reich Minister of Finance + Count Schwerin von Krosigk + + + PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2014-PS + + 1934 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 341 + + Law About Changing the Rules of Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure of + 24 April 1934 + + + CHAPTER III + + + Article 1 + +(1) A People’s Court is formed as a trial court in cases of high +treason and treason. + +(2) When the People’s Court sits for trial, the decisions are made by +five members; otherwise by three members, including the President. The +President and one other member must have the qualifications of judges. +Several Senates may be formed. + +(3) The Supreme Reich Prosecutor [Oberreichsanwalt] is the prosecuting +authority. + + + Article 2 + +On the suggestion of the Reich Minister of Justice, the Reich +Chancellor appoints the members of the People’s Court and their +deputies for a period of five years. + + + Article 3 + +(1) The People’s Court has jurisdiction over the investigations and +has the power to make the sole and final decision in cases of high +treason according to Articles 80-84--, treason according to Articles +89-92--, attacks against the Reich President according to Article 94, +paragraph 1 of the Reich Criminal Code: and crimes according to Article +5, paragraph 2, No. 1 of the Decree of the Reich President for the +Protection of People and State of February 28, 1933 (Reichsgesetzblatt +I, p. 83). In these cases the People’s Court also makes the decisions +enumerated in Article 73, paragraph 1 of the Law of the Organization of +the German Courts. + +* * * * * * * + + + Article 5 + +* * * * * * * + +(2) There is no appeal from the decisions of the People’s Court. + + + CHAPTER IV + +* * * * * * * + + + Article 3 + +The appointment of a Council of Defense must be approved by the +President of the People’s Court. + +* * * * * * * + +Berlin, April 24, 1934 + + The Reich Chancellor + Adolf Hitler + + The Reich Minister of Justice also for + the Reich Minister of the Interior + Dr. Guertner + + The Reich Minister of Defense + von Blomberg + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2016-PS + + 1942 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 475 + + Order concerning the Jurisdiction of SS Courts and Police Courts in the + Protectorate Bohemia and Moravia. July 15, 1942 + +In pursuance of the decree of the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor +concerning the Protectorate Bohemia and Moravia, dated March 16, 1939 +(RGBl I, p. 485) and in agreement with the Reich Protector of Bohemia +and Moravia, the following order is issued: + + + Section 1 + +In case of direct attack by a non-German citizen against the SS or the +German Police or against any of their members, the Reich Leader of the +SS and Chief of the German Police in the Reich Ministry of the Interior +may establish the jurisdiction of a combined SS Court and Police Court, +by declaring that special interests of parts of the SS or of the Police +require that judgment be given by an SS and Police Court. + +This declaration shall be sent to the Reich Protector of Bohemia and +Moravia. The SS and Police Court, which shall have jurisdiction in +individual cases, shall be specified by the Reich Leader of the SS and +Chief of the German Police in the Reich Ministry of the Interior. + + + Section 2 + +If the offense directly injures the interests of the Armed Forces, the +Reich Leader of the SS and Chief of the German Police in the Reich +Ministry of the Interior, and the Chief of the Supreme Command of the +Armed Forces shall reach an agreement as to whether the case shall be +prosecuted by an SS and Police Court or by a Military Court. + + + Section 3 + +This order shall become effective one week after its publication. + +Berlin, July 15, 1942. + + The Reich Minister of the Interior + By deputy: Dr. Stuckart. + + The Chief of the Supreme Command + of the Armed Forces + Keitel. + + The Reich Minister of Justice + Dr. Schlegelberger (in charge) + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2018-PS + + 1939 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 1539 + +Fuehrer Decree Establishing a Ministerial Council For Reich Defense, 30 + August 1939 + +For the period of the present foreign political tension, I decree the +following for the uniform leadership of administration and economy: + + + I + +(1) A Ministerial Council for Reich Defense shall be established as a +standing committee out of the Reich Defense Council. + +(2) The standing members of the Ministerial Council for Reich Defense +shall include: General Field Marshall Goering as chairman, Fuehrer’s +Deputy, Commissioner General for Reich Administration, Commissioner +General for the Economy, Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich +Chancellory, Chief of the High Command for the Armed Forces. + +(3) The chairman may draw on other members of the Reich Defense Council +including further personalities for advice. + + + II + +The Ministerial Council for Reich Defense may issue decrees with +statutory effect, in so far as I have not provided for the passing of a +law by the Reich Government or the Reichstag. + + + III + +The authority of General Field Marshall Goering under the Decree for +the Administration of the Four-Year Plan of October 13, 1936 (RGBl I, +887) including his power to issue instructions shall remain unaffected. + + + IV + +The Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellory shall supervise +the business of the Ministerial Council for Reich Defense. + + + V + +I shall determine the period for the expiration date of this decree. + +Berlin, 30 August 1939. + + The Fuehrer + Adolf Hitler + + General Field Marshall + Goering + + The Reichs Minister and Chief of the Reichs + Chancellory + Dr. Lammers + + + PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2022-PS + + 1933 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 225 + + Law against overcrowding of German Schools and Higher Institutions of + 25 April 1933 + +The Reich Government has enacted the following law that is promulgated +herewith: + +* * * * * * * + + + Article 3 + +In those special schools and faculties where the number of pupils and +students is greatly disproportionate to professional demand, the number +of registered students must be reduced during the school year 1933 +as far as it is, without excessive rigor, consistent with a proper +proportion. + + + Article 4 + +The number of non-Aryan Germans, within the meaning of the Law for the +Restoration of the Professional Civil Service, of 7 April 1933 (RGBl I, +p 175), who may be admitted to schools, colleges and universities, must +not exceed a number proportionate to the Aryan students in each school, +college or university compared to the percentage of non-Aryans within +the entire German population. This proportion is fixed uniformly for +the whole Reich. + +If, in accordance with Article 3, the number of pupils and students is +to be reduced, there is likewise a proper proportion to be established +between the total number of students and the number of non-Aryans. In +doing so a somewhat higher proportion may be fixed. + +Clauses 1 and 2 do not apply in the case of non-Aryans, whose fathers +have fought at the front during the World War for Germany or her +allies, or to children whose parents were married before the enactment +of this law, if the father or mother or two of the grandparents are of +Aryan origin. The number of these students is not to be included when +calculating the quota of non-Aryans. + +* * * * * * * + + + Article 7 + +The decree is valid upon promulgation. + +Berlin, 25 April 1933 + + The Reich Chancellor + Adolf Hitler + + The Reich Minister of the Interior + Frick + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2029-PS + +1933 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 104 + + Decree Establishing The Reich Minister of Public Enlightenment and + Propaganda of 13 March 1933 + +A Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda is herewith +established for the purpose of enlightening and propagandizing the +population with regard to the policies of the Reich Cabinet and the +national reconstruction of the German fatherland. + +The chief of this agency has the title “Reichsminister of Public +Enlightenment and Propaganda.” + +The Reichschancellor defines in detail the duties of the Reich Minister +for Public Enlightenment and Propaganda. + +In agreement with the other Reich Ministers concerned, he defines the +duties which are transferred from their jurisdiction to that of the new +Ministry. This will be done even in cases where the jurisdiction of the +Ministries concerned is affected fundamentally. + + Berlin, March 13, 1933 + The Reich President VON HINDENBURG + The Reich Chancellor ADOLF HITLER + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2030-PS + + 1933 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 449 + + Decree Concerning the Duties of the Reich Ministry for Public + Enlightenment and Propaganda of 30 June 1933 + +Based upon the order of the Reich President of 13 March 1933 +(Reichsgesetzblatt I, Page 104), I decree in agreement with the Reich +Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Reich Minister of the Interior, +the Reich Minister of Economics, the Reich Minister of Nutrition +and Agriculture, the Reich Post Minister, the Reich Minister of +Transportation, and the Reich Minister of Public Enlightenment and +Propaganda, as follows: + +The Reich Minister of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda has +jurisdiction over the whole field of spiritual indoctrination of +the nation, of propagandizing the State, of cultural and economic +propaganda, of enlightenment of the public at home and abroad; +furthermore, he is in charge of the administration of all institutions +serving these purposes. + +Therefore, the Reich Minister of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda +takes over the following jurisdictions: + + 1. From the jurisdiction of the Foreign Office: + + News services and enlightenment in foreign countries; art; art + exhibitions; moving pictures and sport abroad. + + + 2. From the jurisdiction of the Reich Ministry of the Interior: + + General domestic enlightenment; + + Academy of Politics; + + Establishment and celebration of national holidays and of state + celebrations in conjunction with the Reich Minister of Interior; + + Press, (including the Institute for Journalism); + + Radio; + + National anthem; + + German Library in Leipzig; + + Art (however, with the exclusion of: the Institute for the History + of Art in Florence; of protection of rights in literature and + art; the catalogue of works of art of national value; + German-Austrian agreement on export of art; protection of art + and monuments; protection and care of landscape and natural + monuments; national parks, maintenance of buildings of + historical importance; for the Science of Folkdom; Reich Honor + Monument). + + Music, including the Philharmonic Orchestra; + + Theater; + + Moving Pictures; + + Campaign against dirty and obscene literature. + +3. From the jurisdiction of the Reich Minister of Economics and of the +Reich Ministry for Nutrition and Agriculture; Propaganda in the field +of business, exhibitions, fairs, and commercial publicity. + +4. From the jurisdiction of the Reich Post Ministry and of the Reich +Ministry of Transportation: + + Propaganda for tourism. + +Furthermore, there are transferred from the Reich Post Ministry all +radio matters with the exclusion of the technical administration; the +administration of the buildings of the Reich Radio Corporation and the +Radio Corporation is not included in that exception. However, the Reich +Minister of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda must participate in the +technical administration to the extent necessary for the execution of +his own duties, especially in fixing the conditions for renting radio +installations and the regulation of fees. + +The representation of the Reich in the Reich Radio Corporation and the +Radio Corporation is entirely transferred to the Reich Ministry of +Public Enlightenment and Propaganda. + +In the areas designated, the Reich Minister for Public Enlightenment +and Propaganda has the predominant jurisdiction, including legislation. +The general regulations are valid so far as the other Ministers of the +Reich have to participate. + +Berlin, 30 June 1933 + + The Reich Chancellor + ADOLF HITLER + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2031-PS + + 1938 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 112 + +Decree Concerning the Establishment of a Secret Cabinet Council dated 4 + Feb. 1938 + +To advise me in conducting the foreign policy I am setting up a secret +cabinet council. + + As president of the secret cabinet council, I nominate: + Reichsminister Freiherr von Neurath + + As members of the secret cabinet council I nominate: Reichsminister + of the Exterior Joachim von Ribbentrop + + Prussian Prime Minister, Reichsminister of the Air, Supreme Commander + of the Air Forces, General Field Marshall Hermann Goering + + The Fuehrer’s Deputy, Reichsminister Rudolf Hess + + Reichsminister for the enlightenment of the people and of propaganda, + Dr. Joseph Goebbels + + Reichsminister and Chief of the Reichs Chancellory, Dr. Hans-Heinrich + Lammers + + The Supreme Commander of the Army, General Walther von Brauchitsch + + The Supreme Commander of the Navy, Grand Admiral Dr. (honorary) Erich + Raeder + + The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, Lt. Gen. + Wilhelm Keitel + +The current affairs of the secret cabinet council are handled by the +Reichsminister and Chief of the Reichs Chancellery. + +Berlin, 4 February 1938 + + The Fuehrer and Reichs Chancellor + Adolf Hitler + + The Reichsminister and Chief of + the Reichs Chancellery + Dr. Lammers + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2039-PS + + 1942 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 419 + +Decree concerning the conditions of Employment of Eastern Workers of 30 + June 1942 + +The Ministerial Council for Defense of the Reich orders with force of +law: + + + Chapter I + + _Definition of Eastern Worker_ + + + Article 1 + +Eastern workers are those laborers of non-German national origin +who inhabited the Reich Commissariat for the Ukraine, the General +Commissariat for White Russia, or territories bordering on these +territories to the east or on the former free states of Lithuania and +Estonia, and who were brought into the German Reich, including the +Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, and employed there after the +occupation by the German armed forces. + + + Chapter II + + _Conditions of Employment_ + + + Article 2 + + General Conditions + +The eastern workers employed in the Reich have an employment +relationship of a special type. German labor code and labor protection +provisions shall be applicable to them only insofar as specifically +stated. + + + Article 3 + + Compensation + +1. The eastern workers employed in the Reich shall receive compensation +graded according to their work. + +2. The amount of this compensation shall be determined from the tables +which are attached as an appendix to this decree. + +3. In determining the compensation which is to be paid individual +eastern workers under the appended tables, the point of departure shall +be the wage-rate (hourly, piece and premium wage-rates) of comparable +German workers. + +If a part of the reference wage consists of payment in goods, such +payment shall be considered equivalent, in determining this wage, to +the rate calculated for it for German workers in the enterprise in +event of payment in cash. + +Social security deductions and payments of all kinds to which the +German workers are subject shall not be included in the determination +of the reference wage. + +With respect to incentive payments, these shall be computed, in +determining the reference wage, at the same rate at which they are made +to German workers in the enterprise for the same work. If the eastern +worker’s production falls behind the average production of a German +worker, a correspondingly reduced reference wage will be the point of +departure in determining the compensation to be paid him. + +Extra pay for difficult work, dirty work, etc. shall be included in +determining the proper reference wage for calculating the individual +eastern worker’s compensation. + +4. The eastern worker shall receive compensation only for work actually +performed; but the regulations on idleness resulting from bad weather +may be applied in his case. + +5. Higher compensation than that determined under those provisions may +not be paid to eastern workers. + + + Article 4 + + Extra Rates and other Payments + +Except as otherwise provided by the General Manpower Authority, eastern +workers shall have no claim to extra compensation for overtime or +Sunday, holiday, and night work. Per diem and maintenance payments, as +well as travel and board expense payments, may not be made. + + + Article 5 + + Payment in Goods + +1. The compensation due the individual eastern worker according to the +tables appended to this decree shall be paid in cash at the end of the +regular pay period for the enterprise after deduction of the equivalent +of payments made in goods. The board and room furnished by the employer +shall be computed according to the rates specified by the tables +appended to this decree. Other payment in goods, such as clothing, +shoes, etc., shall be computed at proportionate prices. + +2. Employers may cover the commutation cost of eastern workers to and +from the place of work for the entirety of eastern workers employed by +them and make deductions for this expense from the amounts to be paid +in cash according to the tables. + + + Article 6 + + Compensation in Case of Illness + +For days on which the eastern worker is unable to work on account of +sickness or accident, free board and room only shall be furnished by +the employer, unless hospital care is given. In other respects the sick +care of these workers shall be regulated by prescriptions issued by the +Reich Minister of Labor. + + + Article 7 + + Leave and Family Visits + +Leave and family visits will not be granted for the present. Detailed +regulations concerning the institution of leave and family visits will +be issued by the General Manpower Authority. + + + Article 8 + + Pay Invoices + +Pay invoices shall not be issued to eastern workers. + + + Article 9 + + Exceptions + +The Reich Trustee or Special Trustee of Labor may permit exceptions +from the provisions of this decree in regard to the calculation of +compensations. + + + Chapter III + + _Eastern Workers Tax_ + + + Article 10 + + Tax Obligation + +1. Employers who use eastern workers within the German Reich, including +the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, are subject to a tax in +amounts specified by the tables appended to this decree (Eastern +Workers Tax). + +2. Agricultural employers must pay only one half of this tax. + + + Article 11 + + Accruement of the Tax + +The Eastern Workers Tax accrues exclusively to the German Reich. + + + Article 12 + + Tax Exemption of Eastern Workers + +Eastern workers must pay no wage tax nor citizen tax during their +employment in the German Reich. + + + Chapter IV + + _Savings_ + + + Article 13 + +Eastern workers may lay up their compensation in whole or in part as +savings with interest: the sum saved is transferred to the saver’s +homeland, and is there available to him or to members of his family +according to detailed regulations issued by the Reich Minister for the +Occupied Eastern Territories or by the Commander in Chief of the Armed +Forces. + + + Chapter V + + _Grant of Powers_ + + + Article 14 + +1. The General Manpower Authority shall be empowered to issue, in +consultation with the interested Reich Ministers, regulations for the +execution, implementation, and revision of Chapters I and II of this +decree. + +2. The Reich Minister of Finance shall be empowered to issue, in +consultation with the General Manpower Authority, the Reich Minister +of the Interior, the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern +Territories and, so far as eastern workers employed in agriculture +are in question, with the Reich Minister for Food and Agriculture, +regulations for the execution, implementation and revision of Chapter +III of this decree. + +3. The Reich Minister of Finance, in consultation with the General +Manpower Authority, may change by executive order the amounts of the +Eastern Workers Tax as specified in the appended tables. + +4. The Reich Minister of Economic Affairs, the Reich Minister for the +Occupied Eastern Territories, and the Commander in Chief of the Armed +Forces shall be empowered to issue, in consultation with the General +Manpower Authority, regulations for the execution and implementation of +Chapter IV of this decree. + + + Chapter VI + + _Effective Date, Sphere of Validity_ + + + Article 15 + +1. This decree shall become effective 15 June 1942. The provisions of +Chapters II and III shall be first applicable to compensation paid +after 15 June 1942. + +2. Articles 1 to 5 and Article 7, subsection 1, of the decree +concerning taxing and treatment under the labor code for workers form +the newly occupied eastern territories [StVAOst] of 20 January 1942 +(RGBl I, p. 41), as well as the regulation of the Reich Minister of +Labor concerning treatment under the labor code for workers from the +newly occupied eastern territories of 9 February 1942 (Deutscher +Reichsanz. No. 37 of 13 February 1942), shall become invalid on the +effective date of this decree. + +3. This decree shall be valid also in the Protectorate of Bohemia and +Moravia and in the incorporated Eastern Territories. + +Berlin, 30 June 1942 + + The Chairman of the Ministerial Council for Defense + of the Reich and Commissioner for the Four Year Plan + Goering, Reich Marshal + + The General Manpower Authority + By Deputy: Dr. Stuckart + + The Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellory + Dr. Lammers + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2047-PS + + 1937 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 105 + + Law for the Extension of the Law Concerning the Removal of the Misery + of the People and the Reich of 30 January 1937 + +The Reichstag has decided unanimously to enact the following law which +is hereby published: + +(1) The validity of the law for the removal of the misery of the people +and the Reich of 24 March 1933 (RGBl I, p. 141) is being extended to 1 +April 1941. + +(2) The law on the reconstruction of the Reich of 30 January 1934 (RGBl +p. 75) remains unchanged. + +Berlin, 30 January 1937 + + The Fuehrer and Chancellor of the Reich + Adolf Hitler + + The Reichs Minister of the Interior + Frick + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2048-PS + + 1939 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 95 + + Law for the Extension of the Law Concerning the Removal of the Misery + of the People and the Reich of 30 January 1939 + +In completion of the law of 30 January 1937 (RGBl I, p. 105), the +Reichstag has decided unanimously to enact the following law which is +hereby published: + +1. The validity of the law on the removal of the misery of the people +and the Reich of 24 March 1933 (RGBl I, p. 141) is being extended to 10 +May 1943. + +2. The law on the reconstruction of the Reich of 30 January 1934 (RGBl +I, p. 75) remains unchanged. + +Berlin, 30 January 1939. + + The Fuehrer and Chancellor of the Reich + Adolf Hitler + + The Reichs Minister of the Interior + Frick + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2049-PS + + 1934 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 1189 + +Second Edict concerning the Reconstruction of the Reich of November 27, + 1934. + +On the basis of Article 5 of the law concerning the reconstruction +of the Reich of January 30, 1934 (Reichsgesetzblatt I page 75) it is +ordered in agreement with the Prussian Minister-President: + + + Article 1 + +Up to the execution of the reorganization of the Reich, the Prussian +Provincial governors [Oberpraesidenten] are, in the Provinces over +which they have jurisdiction, simultaneously representatives of the +Reich government. + + + Article 2 + +The provincial governors [Oberpraesidenten] are empowered to receive +instructions from all Reich and federal state authorities as well +as from offices supervised by permanent Reich or State public-legal +corporations, within the Province, and to call their attention to the +authoritative viewpoints and the consequently necessary measures as +well as effect temporary regulations in case of danger in delay. These +rights they may not transfer to their supplementary officials; their +representatives may only practice those rights, when the provincial +governors are hindered not merely for a short time in the observation +of their business. + + + Article 3 + +The Reich ministers may in the execution of Reich missions furnish +directly with instructions the Prussian provincial governors and +council heads without prejudice to the supervision of the Civil Service +of the Reich and Prussian Ministers of the Interior. + +Berlin, November 27, 1934. + + The Minister of Interior for + the Reich and Prussia. + Frick + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2050-PS + + 1919 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 1383 + + THE CONSTITUTION OF THE GERMAN REICH + + _August 11, 1919_ + +The German people, united in their racial elements and impelled by the +will to renew and strengthen their Reich in freedom and justice, to +serve the ends of peace at home and abroad and further social progress, +have established this Constitution. + + + FIRST PART + + STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION OF THE REICH + + + _First Chapter_ + + Reich and Lands + + + _Article 1_ + +The German Reich is a Republic. The state power is derived from the +people. + + + _Article 2_ + +The territory of the Reich consists of the territories of the German +Member States [Lands]. Other territories may be incorporated in the +Reich by Reich statute if the inhabitants of such territory, in +exercises of the right of self-determination, so desire. + + + _Article 3_ + +The Reich colors are black, red and gold. The merchant flag is black, +white and red, with the Reich colors in the upper inside corner. + + + _Article 4_ + +The generally accepted rules of international law are to be considered +as binding integral parts of the law of the German Reich. + + + _Article 5_ + +The state power in respect to matters within the competence of the +Reich shall be exercised by the authorities of the Reich on the basis +of the Constitution of the Reich; in respect to matters within the +competence of the Member States by the authorities of the Lands, on the +basis of their respective constitutions. + + + _Article 6_ + +The Reich shall have exclusive legislative competence for: + +1. Foreign affairs. + +2. colonial matters. + +3. questions relating to nationality, freedom of travel and residence, +immigration, emigration and extradition. + +4. the organization of defense forces. + +5. coinage. + +6. customs, as well as the unity of customs and trading areas and +freedom of commerce. + +7. post and telegraph, including the telephone. + + + _Article 7_ + +1. civil law. + +2. penal law. + +3. judicial procedure, including the execution of penalties and legal +aid between authorities. + +4. matters relating to passports and police supervision of aliens. + +5. poor relief and the care of vagrants. + +6. matters relating to the press, associations and assemblies. + +7. policies relating to population, maternity relief, welfare of +infants, children and youth. + +8. public health, veterinary matters and the protection of plants +against disease and pests. + +9. labor laws, insurance, and the protection of laborers and employees, +and employment bureaus. + +10. the establishment of Reich organs of vocational representation. + +11. provision for war veterans and the surviving dependents of deceased +soldiers. + +12. laws relating to expropriation. + +13. the socialization of natural resources and economic undertakings, +and also the production, manufacture, distribution and price regulation +of economic wares for the benefit of the general economy. + +14. trade and commerce, weights and measures, the issue of paper money, +banks and banking and the stock exchanges. + +15. traffic in foodstuffs, articles for consumption and luxury, and +necessaries of daily life. + +16. industries and mining. + +17. matters relating to insurance. + +18. ocean navigation, deep-sea fishing and coastal fishing. + +19. railways, inland navigation, automatic traffic on land, water, +and in the air; the construction of highways, insofar as general +communication and national defense are concerned. + +20. theaters and cinemas. + + + _Article 8_ + +The Reich shall further legislate in regard to taxation and other +revenues, insofar as they are partially or wholly utilized for its own +purposes. If the Reich claims such taxes or other revenues for its own +purposes as have hitherto been available for the Member States (Lands), +the Reich shall take into consideration the preservation of the life of +the Member States. + + + _Article 9_ + +Insofar as it is necessary to issue uniform rules, the Reich shall +legislate for: + +1. public welfare. + +2. the protection of public order and safety. + + + _Article 10_ + +The Reich may by legislation, establish fundamental principles for: + +1. the rights and duties of religious associations. + +2. educational matters including high schools and scientific libraries. + +3. laws relating to officers of all public corporations. + +4. matters relating to the real-estate laws, distribution of the soil, +settlements and homesteads, restrictions attached to landed property, +housing and the distribution of the population. + +5. matters relating to burial. + + + _Article 11_ + +The Reich may by means of legislation establish fundamental principles +concerning the admissibility and mode of: + +1. injury to the revenues or commercial relations of the Reich. + +2. double taxation. + +3. excessive or obstructional fees for the use of public means of +communication, highways, and other facilities. + +4. tax discrimination against imported goods in favor of domestic +products in interstate or inter-district commerce, or + +5. export premiums, + +or in order to preserve important social interests. + + + _Article 12_ + +So long as and so far as the Reich refrains from exercising the right +of legislation, the Lands shall retain the right of legislation. This +does not apply to matters for which the Reich has exclusive competence +of legislation. + +The government of the Reich has the right of veto in regard to Lands +laws relating to matters within the scope of Article 7, Number 13, so +far as the general welfare of the Reich is thereby affected. + + + _Article 13_ + +Reich law takes precedence over Lands law. + +Where there are doubts or differences of opinion as to whether a legal +provision of a Land is compatible with Reich law, the competent Reich +or central authorities of a Land may, in accordance with particulars +prescribed by the Reich law, appeal for decision to a Supreme Court of +the Reich. + + + _Article 14_ + +The laws enacted by the Lands shall be executed by the authorities of +the States, unless the laws of the Reich determine otherwise. + + + _Article 15_ + +The government of the Reich exercises supervision in such matters as +are within the legislative competence of the Reich. + +So far as the laws of the Reich are to be executed by the authorities +of the Lands, the government of the Reich may issue general +instructions. The government is empowered to send commissioners to the +central authorities of the Lands, and with their permission, to the +lower state authorities, to supervise the execution of the laws of the +Reich. + +It is the duty of the government of the Lands, at the request of the +government of the Reich, to rectify defects which have become manifest +in the execution of Reich laws. Where differences of opinion arise both +the government of the Reich and the government of the Land may appeal +for decision to the Constitutional Court, unless a different court is +prescribed by Reich law. + + + _Article 16_ + +The officers entrusted with direct Reich administration in any Land +shall, as a rule, be citizens of that Land. The officers, employees +and laborers of the Reich administration shall be employed in their +home districts if they so desire, whenever this is possible and not +inconsistent with the requirements of their training or the service. + + + _Article 17_ + +Each Land must have a republican constitution. The people’s +representatives must be elected by universal, equal, direct and secret +ballot by all German men and women in conformity with the principles of +proportional representation. The government of the Land must enjoy the +confidence of the people’s representatives. + +The principles for the elections of the people’s representatives apply +equally to communal elections. A Land law, however, may make the right +to vote dependent on residence in the communal district for a period +not exceeding one year. + + + _Article 18_ + +The division of the Reich into Lands shall be such as to serve the +people to the highest possible economic and cultural attainment, +whereby the will of the population affected shall be taken into +consideration as far as possible. The alteration of territory of the +Lands and the creation of new Lands within the Reich may be effected by +means of a Reich law amending the Constitution. + +If the Lands directly affected give their consent, an ordinary Reich +law is sufficient. + +An ordinary Reich law is also sufficient, if one of the Lands affected +refuses consent, but the territorial alteration or the creation of a +new Land is demanded by the will of the population and the paramount +interests of the Reich. + +The will of the population shall be ascertained by plebiscite. The +Government of the Reich orders the plebiscite if, in the territory to +be separated, one-third of the inhabitants qualified to vote for the +Reichstag so demand. + +Three-fifths of the votes taken, but at least a majority of the +enfranchised voters, are necessary for a resolution to alter a +boundary or create a new Land. Even if it is only a question of the +disconnection of a part of a Prussian administrative district, a +Bavarian “county” or a corresponding administrative division in other +Lands, the will of the population in the whole district affected must +be ascertained. If the territory to be disconnected nowhere adjoins the +rest of the district, a specific Reich law may declare that the will of +the population in the said district is sufficient. + +The consent of the population having been ascertained, the government +of the Reich shall introduce an appropriate bill for enactment in the +Reichstag. + +If the unification or disconnection should give rise to a dispute +concerning the distribution of property, the Constitutional Court of +the German Reich shall decide the same on the application of one party. + + + _Article 19_ + +Constitutional disputes arising within any Land in which there is no +court competent to settle the same, of disputes not governed by private +law, arising between different Lands or between the Reich and any Land +shall be decided by the Constitutional Court of the German Reich on +the application of one party, unless some other court of the Reich is +competent to decide such dispute. + +The President of the Reich executes the judgment of the Constitutional +Court of the Reich. + + + _Second Chapter_ + + The Reichstag + + + _Article 20_ + +The Reichstag is composed of the delegates of the German people. + + + _Article 21_ + +The delegates represent the whole people. They are subject only to +their own conscience and are not bound by instructions. + + + _Article 22_ + +The delegates are elected by universal, equal, direct and secret ballot +by men and women over twenty years of age, according to the principles +of proportional representation. The election day must be a Sunday, or a +public holiday. + +The Reich Election Law will regulate details. + + + _Article 23_ + +The Reichstag is elected for four years. New elections must take place +at the latest on the sixtieth day after this term has run its course. + +The Reichstag assembles for the first time at the latest on the +thirtieth day following the election. + + + _Article 24_ + +The Reichstag meets every year on the first Wednesday in November at +the seat of the government of the Reich. The President of the Reichstag +must summon it earlier if the President of the Reich or at least +one-third of the members of the Reichstag so demand. + +The Reichstag determines the close of its session and the date of +reassembly. + + + _Article 25_ + +The President of the Reich may dissolve the Reichstag, but not more +than once for the same cause. + +The new election takes place not later than the sixtieth day after +dissolution. + + + _Article 26_ + +The Reichstag chooses its president, his substitutes and its +secretaries. It sets up its own rules of procedure. + + + _Article 27_ + +Between two sessions or terms the President and his substitutes of the +preceding session continue in their duties. + + + _Article 28_ + +The President has domiciliary and police authority within the Reichstag +building. He controls the house administration; he manages the revenues +and expenditure of the house in accordance with the budget of the +Reich, and represents the Reich in all legal transactions and disputes +arising within his administration. + + + _Article 29_ + +The Reichstag proceedings are public. They may be held in camera, if, +on the motion of fifty members, a two-thirds majority so decides. + + + _Article 30_ + +Accurate reports of the proceedings of the public meetings of the +Reichstag, the State Diets, and of their committees remain free from +all responsibility. + + + _Article 31_ + +An Election Investigation Court shall be established in connection with +the Reichstag. It shall also be competent to decide whether a delegate +has forfeited his seat. + +The Election Investigation Court consists of members of the Reichstag, +elected by the latter for the election period and of members of the +Reich Court of Administration, appointed by the President of the Reich +on the proposal of the presidency of the said court. + +The decisions of the Election Investigation Court shall be taken +after a public oral hearing by three members of the Reichstag and two +judicial members. + +Outside of the oral proceedings before the Election Investigation Court +such affairs shall be managed by a commission of the Reich, nominated +by the President of the Reich. In other respects the procedure is +regulated by the Election Investigation Court. + + + _Article 32_ + +A simple majority vote is necessary for decisions of the Reichstag, +unless the Constitution prescribes a different proportion of votes. The +rules of procedure may make exceptions in the case of elections by the +Reichstag. + +The rules of procedure regulate the question of a quorum. + + + _Article 33_ + +The Reichstag and its committees may demand the presence of the +Chancellor of the Reich and of any Minister of the Reich. + +The Chancellor and Ministers of the Reich and the commissioners +appointed by them have access to the sittings of the Reichstag and its +committees. The Lands are entitled to send delegates to these meetings +to state the views of their governments on the subject under discussion. + +At their request the governmental delegates must be heard during the +deliberations, in the case of the representatives of the government of +the Reich, even irrespective of the agenda. + +They are subject to the authority of the chairman as regards questions +of orders. + + + _Article 34_ + +The Reichstag has the right and--on the application of one-fifth of +its members--the duty, of appointing investigation committees. These +committees hear such evidence in public sittings as they or the +applicants consider necessary. The public may be excluded from the +proceedings by a two-thirds majority of the investigation committee. +The rules of procedure determine the proceedings of the committee and +determine the number of its members. + +It is the duty of the judicial and administrative authorities to +accede to the requests of the said committees in regard to the taking +of evidence; the files of the authorities must be submitted to the +committees on request. + +The provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure are applicable as +far as is appropriate to the investigations of the committees and the +authorities approached by them; nevertheless, the secrecy of letters, +post, telegraph and telephone remains inviolate. + + + _Article 35_ + +The Reichstag appoints a standing committee for foreign affairs, +which may also act when the Reichstag is in recess, and after the +parliamentary term has expired, or after the dissolution of the +Reichstag, until the new Reichstag meets. The meetings of this +committee are not public, unless the committee decides otherwise by a +two-thirds vote. + +The Reichstag also appoints a standing committee for the maintenance of +the right of the people’s representation towards the government of the +Reich during the periods of recess, and after the term has expired or +the Reichstag is dissolved, until the new Reichstag meets. + +These committees have the rights of investigation committees. + + + _Article 36_ + +No member of the Reichstag or of a Land’s Diet may at any time be +subjected to criminal or disciplinary prosecution or otherwise held +responsible outside the house on account of his vote or of remarks made +by him in the execution of his functions. + + + _Article 37_ + +During a session no member of the Reichstag or of a Land’s Diet may be +subjected to investigation or arrested on account of any punishable +offense, without the consent of the house to which such a delegate +belongs, unless he is arrested in the act of committal or at the latest +in the course of the following day. + +Similar consent must be obtained for every other curtailment of +personal freedom which hinders a delegate in the execution of his +functions as representative. + +Any criminal proceeding against a member of the Reichstag or a Land’s +Diet, any detention or other curtailment of his personal liberty must +be suspended for the duration of the session at the request of the +house to which the delegate belongs. + + + _Article 38_ + +Members of the Reichstag and the Land’s Diets are entitled to refuse +to give evidence in respect to persons who have confided matters to +them in their capacity as delegates or to whom they have given such +confidences in the execution of their functions as delegates, as +well as in respect to such facts. In respect also to the seizure of +documents they have the same status as persons who are entitled by law +to refuse to give evidence. + +Any search or seizure may only be carried out within the precincts of +the Reichstag or a Land’s Diet with the consent of their President. + + + _Article 39_ + +Public officials and members of the defense forces need no leave for +the performance of their functions as members of the Reichstag or a +Land’s Diet. + +If they are candidates for a seat in one of these bodies, the necessary +leave must be extended to them to enable them to prepare for their +election. + + + _Article 40_ + +Members of the Reichstag shall have free passes for all German railways +and receive a compensation for expenses to be fixed by Reich law. + + + _Third Chapter_ + + The Reich President and the Reich Government + + + _Article 41_ + +The Reich President is elected by the whole German people. + +Every German who has completed his thirty-fifth year is eligible for +election. + +Details will be regulated by a Reich law. + + + _Article 42_ + +The Reich President shall, on assuming office, take the following oath +before the Reichstag. + +I swear to devote my energies to the well-being of the German people, +to further their interests, to protect them from injury, to keep +the Constitution and the laws of the Reich, to fulfill my duties +conscientiously and to administer justice to all. + +It is permissible to add a religious asseveration. + + + _Article 43_ + +The Reich President’s term of office shall last seven years. +Re-election is permissible. + +At the request of the Reichstag the President may be deposed from +office by plebiscite before his term has expired. A two-thirds majority +vote is necessary for such a resolution by the Reichstag. + +The resolution has the effect of suspending the Reich President from +the further exercise of his office. If the deposition is rejected by +the plebiscite, this is regarded as a new election and entails the +dissolution of the Reichstag. + +The Reich President cannot be prosecuted criminally without the consent +of the Reichstag. + + + _Article 44_ + +The Reich President may not at the same time be a member of the +Reichstag. + + + _Article 45_ + +The Reich President represents the Reich in the sphere of international +law. He concludes alliances and other treaties with foreign powers in +the name of the Reich. He accredits and receives Ministers. + +War is declared and peace concluded by Reich law. + +Alliances and treaties with foreign States which relate to matters +within the legislative competence of the Reich, require the consent of +the Reichstag. + + + _Article 46_ + +The Reich President appoints and dismisses the public officials of the +Reich and officers of the defense forces, unless otherwise provided +by law. He may allow the right of appointment and dismissal to be +exercised by other authorities. + + + _Article 47_ + +The Reich President has supreme command over all the defense forces of +the Reich. + + + _Article 48_ + +If a Land fails to fulfill the duties incumbent upon it according to +the Constitution or the laws of the Reich, the Reich President can +force it to do so with the help of the armed forces. + +The Reich President may, if the public safety and order in the German +Reich are considerably disturbed or endangered, take such measures as +are necessary to restore public safety and order. If necessary he may +intervene with the help of the armed forces. For this purpose he may +temporarily suspend, either partially or wholly, the Fundamental Rights +established in Articles 114, 115, 117, 118, 123, 124 and 153. + +The Reich President shall inform the Reichstag without delay of all +measures taken under Paragraph 1 or Paragraph 2 of this Article. On +demand by the Reichstag the measures shall be repealed. + +In case of imminent danger, the government of any Land may take +preliminary measures of the nature described in Paragraph 2 for its own +territory. The measures are to be revoked upon the demand of the Reich +President or the Reichstag. + +Details will be regulated by a Reich law. + + + _Article 49_ + +The Reich President exercises the right of pardon for the Reich. + +Reich amnesties require a Reich law. + + + _Article 50_ + +All orders and decrees of the Reich President, including those +concerning the defense forces, require for their validity the +counter-signature of the Chancellor of the Reich or the competent +Minister of the Reich. By counter-signature responsibility is assumed. + + + _Article 51_ + +The Reich President shall, when prevented from functioning, be +represented in the first place by the Reich Chancellor. When such +disability is likely to be of long duration, a Reich law shall regulate +the question of representation. + +The same applies in the case of a premature termination of the +Presidency until the new election takes place. + + + _Article 52_ + +The government of the Reich shall consist of the Chancellor and the +Reich Ministers. + + + _Article 53_ + +The Reich Chancellor and at his proposal the Reich Ministers shall be +appointed and dismissed by the Reich President. + + + _Article 54_ + +The Chancellor and the Reich Ministers require for the exercise of +their office the confidence of the Reichstag. Any of them must retire +if the Reichstag by express resolution withdraws its confidence. + + + _Article 55_ + +The Reich Chancellor presides over the government of the Reich and +conducts its affairs according to rules of procedure laid down by the +government of the Reich and approved by the Reich President. + + + _Article 56_ + +The Reich Chancellor determines the outlines of the policy of the State +and is responsible to the Reichstag for the same. Within these outlines +each Reich Minister conducts the office entrusted to him independently +and on his own responsibility towards the Reichstag. + + + _Article 57_ + +The Reich Ministers shall lay before the Reichstag for deliberation +and enactment all bills and all matters for which such a course is +prescribed in the Constitution or by law, as well as all differences of +opinion in regard to questions within the competence of more than one +Minister. + + + _Article 58_ + +The government of the Reich passes its resolutions by majority vote. In +the case of tie votes the chairman has a casting vote. + + + _Article 59_ + +The Reichstag is entitled to impeach the Reich President, the +Chancellor and Reich Ministers for having culpably violated the +Constitution or a statute of the Reich before the Constitutional Court. +The motion for impeachment must be signed by at least one hundred +members of the Reichstag and be approved by the majority prescribed for +amending the Constitution. + +Details will be regulated by the Reich statute concerning the +Constitutional Court. + + + _Fourth Chapter_ + + The Reich Council + + + _Article 60_ + +A Reich Council shall be constituted to represent the German Lands in +the legislature and administration of the Reich. + + + _Article 61_ + +Each Land has at least one vote in the Reich Council. In the case of +larger Lands there shall be one vote for every 1,000,000 inhabitants. +A surplus, which is equal to at least the population of the smallest +Land, will be reckoned equal to 1,000,000. No Land may be represented +by more than two-fifths of the total number of votes. + +German-Austria, after its union with the German Reich, shall be +entitled to participate in the Reich Council with the number of votes +proportionate to its population. Until then the representatives of +German-Austria may take part in the deliberations. + +The number of votes shall be fixed anew by the Reich Council after +every general census. + + + _Article 62_ + +No Land shall have more than one vote on the committees formed by the +Reich Council from its own members. + + + _Article 63_ + +The Lands shall be represented on the Reich Council by members of their +governments. But half the Prussian votes shall belong to the Prussian +provincial administrations in accordance with a Land law. + +The Lands are entitled to send as many representatives to the Reich +Council as they have votes. + + + _Article 64_ + +The government of the Reich must convene the Reich Council on the +demand of one-third of its members. + + + _Article 65_ + +A member of the government of the Reich shall preside over the Reich +Council and its committees. The members of the government of the +Reich have the right and--if so demanded--the duty of attending the +deliberations of the Reich Council and its committees. On their own +request they must be heard at any time during the proceedings. + + + _Article 66_ + +The government of the Reich and each member of the Reich Council are +entitled to lay proposals before the Reich Council. + +The Reich Council regulates its procedure by rules of procedure. + +The plenary sittings of the Reich Council are public. In compliance +with the rules of procedure the public may be excluded for specific +subjects of deliberation. + +Decisions are taken by a simple majority of those voting. + + + _Article 67_ + +The Reich Council shall be kept informed by the Reich ministries of the +conduct of affairs of the Reich. The competent committees of the Reich +Council shall be consulted by the ministries of the Reich with regard +to important affairs. + + + _Fifth Chapter_ + + Reich Legislation + + + _Article 68_ + +Bills are introduced by the government of the Reich or by members of +the Reichstag. + +Reich laws shall be enacted by the Reichstag. + + + _Article 69_ + +The introduction of bills by the government of the Reich requires +the consent of the Reich Council. If no agreement is reached between +the Reich government and the Reich Council, the Reich government may +introduce the bill notwithstanding, but must state the contrary opinion +of the Reich Council. + +If the Reich Council resolves on a bill not assented to by the +government of the Reich, the latter must introduce the bill to the +Reichstag, stating its own point of view. + + + _Article 70_ + +The Reich President shall promulgate all constitutionally enacted laws +and proclaim them in the Reich’s Legal Gazette within one month. + + + _Article 71_ + +Reich laws, unless they provide otherwise, come into force on the +fourteenth day after the date on which the Reich’s Legal Gazette is +published in the capital of the Reich. + + + _Article 72_ + +The proclamation of a Reich law shall be postponed for two months on +the demand of one-third of the Reichstag. Laws stated to be urgent by +the Reichstag and the Reich Council may be proclaimed by the Reich +President notwithstanding such demand. + + + _Article 73_ + +A law enacted by the Reichstag shall be made the subject of a +referendum, if the Reich President so determines within a month. + +A law, the proclamation of which has been postponed on the application +of at least one-third of the members of the Reichstag, shall be +subjected to a referendum, if one-twentieth of the persons qualified to +vote so submit. + +A referendum shall further be instituted if one-tenth of the persons +qualified to vote initiate by petition the introduction of a bill. +An elaborated bill must underlie such people’s initiative. The bill +shall be submitted to the Reichstag by the government together with a +statement of its own point of view. No referendum shall take place if +the petitional bill is passed unaltered by the Reichstag. + +In regard to the budget, taxation laws and laws relating to pay and +salaries, only the Reich President may inaugurate a referendum. + +A Reich law shall regulate the procedure for referendum and initiative. + + + _Article 74_ + +The Reich Council is entitled to raise an objection to laws passed by +the Reichstag. + +The objection must be submitted to the Reich government within two +weeks following the final vote in the Reichstag and sustained by +reasons at the latest within two further weeks. + +When such objection has been raised, the law is again submitted to the +Reichstag for redecision. If by this means no agreement is reached +between the Reichstag and the Reich Council, the President may, +within three months, order that a referendum be taken on the matter +in dispute. If the President does not exercise this right, the law is +considered not to have been passed. If the Reichstag has passed the +law in spite of the objection by the Reich Council by a two-thirds +majority, then the President must either proclaim the same within three +months in the form approved by the Reichstag or order a referendum to +be taken. + + + _Article 75_ + +A referendum can nullify an enactment of the Reichstag only if a +majority of those qualified to vote take part in the vote. + + + _Article 76_ + +The Constitution may be amended by law. But acts of the Reichstag +amending the Constitution can only take effect if two-thirds of the +legal number of members are present and at least two-thirds of those +present consent. Resolutions of the Reich Council also require a +two-thirds majority of the votes taken, when an amendment to the +Constitution is in question. If on a popular initiative an amendment +to the Constitution is to be decided by referendum the consent of a +majority of those qualified to vote is required. + +If the Reichstag has passed an amendment to the Constitution in spite +of an objection on the part of the Reich Council, the President may +not proclaim such law, if within two weeks the Reich Council demands a +referendum. + + + _Article 77_ + +Unless otherwise provided by law the Reich government shall issue the +general administrative provisions necessary for putting into execution +the laws of the Reich. The approval of the Reich Council is required +when the execution of the Reich laws is within the competence of the +authorities of the Lands. + + + _Sixth Chapter_ + + Reich Administration + + + _Article 78_ + +The cultivation of the relations with foreign States is exclusively a +function of the Reich. + +With regard to matters the regulation of which is within the competence +of the Lands’ legislatures, the Lands may conclude treaties with +foreign States; such treaties require the approval of the Reich. + +Agreements with foreign States relating to any alteration of the +boundaries of the Reich are concluded by the Reich, after the consent +of the Lands concerned has been obtained. Such boundary alterations may +only be undertaken on the basis of a Reich law, unless it is simply a +case of adjusting the boundaries of uninhabited districts. + +All arrangements and measures necessary for safeguarding the interests +of individual Lands arising out of their particular economic relations +with or their proximity to foreign States shall be undertaken by the +Reich in agreement with the Lands concerned. + + + _Article 79_ + +The defense of the Reich is a function of the Reich. The defense +organization of the German people shall be uniformly regulated by Reich +law with due regard to special peculiarities of the inhabitants of the +different Lands. + + + _Article 80_ + +Colonial matters belong exclusively to the competence of the Reich. + + + _Article 81_ + +All German commercial vessels constitute one single merchant marine. + + + _Article 82_ + +Germany constitutes one single customs and trading area surrounded by a +customs frontier. + +The customs frontier coincides with Germany’s foreign frontier line. +At the sea the shore of the mainland and of the islands belonging to +the territory of the Reich form the customs boundary. Deviations may +be ordered for the course of the boundary line along the sea and other +waters. + +Foreign territories or parts of territories may be joined to the +customs area by means of international treaties or agreements. + +Portions may be excluded from the customs area to meet particular +necessities. In the case of free ports such exclusion can only be +repealed by a law amending the Constitution. + +Districts excluded from the customs area may be joined to a foreign +customs area by means of international treaties or agreements. + +All products of nature and industry and art which are freely traded +within the Reich may be transported over the boundaries of the Lands +and Communes into, out of, and through them. Exceptions may be allowed +by Reich law. + + + _Article 83_ + +Customs duties and consumption taxes are administered by the +authorities of the Reich. + +The authorities of the Reich, when administering taxes of the Reich, +shall take steps to enable the individual Lands to safeguard their own +particular interests in regard to agriculture, trade, commerce and +industry. + + + _Article 84_ + +The Reich shall provide by law for: + +1. the institution of a tax administration of the Lands, so far as is +necessary for the uniform and equal execution of the Reich taxation laws + +2. the institution and powers of the authorities entrusted with the +supervision of the execution of the Reich taxation laws + +3. the accounting with the Lands + +4. the reimbursement of the costs of administration in executing the +Reich taxation laws. + + + _Article 85_ + +All revenues and expenditures of the Reich must be estimated for every +fiscal year and entered in the budget. + +The budget shall be passed by law before the beginning of the fiscal +year. + +Appropriations are as a rule made for one year; in special cases they +may be granted for a longer period. Other provisions in the budget law +which legislate for a period beyond the fiscal year, or which have no +reference to the revenues or expenditures of the Reich, may not be +incorporated in the budget law. + +The Reichstag may not increase existing or incorporate new +appropriations in the budget bill without the consent of the Reich +Council. + +The consent of the Reich Council may be replaced as provided in Article +74. + + + _Article 86_ + +The Reich Minister of Finance shall, in the course of the year, account +to the Reich Council and the Reichstag for the expenditure of all the +revenues of the Reich for the preceding year in order to release the +government of the Reich from its responsibility. The auditing of this +account shall be regulated by Reich law. + + + _Article 87_ + +Funds may only be obtained by loans in the case of extraordinary +requirements and, as a rule, only for the purpose of productive outlay. +A Reich law is required for this method of procuring funds as well as +for the creation of a charge on the Reich by way of security. + + + _Article 88_ + +The post and telegraph as well as the whole telephone system are +exclusive functions of the Reich. + +Postage stamps are uniform for the whole Reich. + +Treaties relating to communications with foreign countries may only be +concluded by the Reich. + + + _Article 89_ + +It is a function of the Reich to take over the ownership of railways +serving as means of general traffic and to operate them as a uniform +system of communications. + +The rights of the Lands to acquire private railways shall be +transferred to the Reich on demand. + + + _Article 90_ + +With the transfer of the railways the Reich acquires the right of +expropriation and the sovereign state rights of the Lands over the +railway systems. The extent of these rights shall be decided in the +case of conflict by the Constitutional Court. + + + _Article 91_ + +With the approval of the Reich Council, the government of the Reich +shall issue all decrees relating to the construction of railways, their +operation and traffic. With the consent of the Reich Council, the +government may transfer this right to the competent Reich Minister. + + + _Article 92_ + +The railways of the Reich, although their budget and accounts are +incorporated in the general budget and accounts of the Reich, shall +be operated as an independent economic enterprise, with the duty of +defraying its own expenditure including interest on and amortization +of the railway reserve fund. The amount of the amortization and the +reserve fund, and the purposes for which the latter is to be utilized +shall be regulated by special law. + + + _Article 93_ + +The government of the Reich with the consent of the Reich Council shall +establish advisory councils for the railways of the Reich to assist in +an advisory capacity in matters relating to railway traffic and rates. + + + _Article 94_ + +Once the Reich has taken over the administration of the railroads +serving the general traffic of a particular district, new railroads +serving general traffic may not be constructed within such district +except by or with the consent of the Reich. When new railroad systems +or alterations in those already existing are so projected as to +fall within the police competence of any Land, the Reich railroad +administration shall consult the Land authorities before the decision +is taken. + +Whenever the Reich has not yet taken over the administration of the +railroads, it may construct such railroads on its own account as are +deemed necessary for general traffic or for national defense by virtue +of a Reich law, even against the protest of the Lands whose territory +is to be traversed, but without prejudice to the sovereign rights of +the Lands; or the Reich may entrust another with the execution of such +construction, together with the right of expropriation, if necessary. + +All railroad administrations must permit the junction of other lines at +the latter’s expense. + + + _Article 95_ + +Railways of general traffic not administered by the Reich shall be +supervised by the Reich. + +Railways under the supervision of the Reich shall be constructed and +equipped according to uniform principles determined by the Reich. +They must be kept in safe working order and developed as traffic +requirements dictate. Service and equipment for passenger and freight +traffic shall be maintained in accordance with their requirements. + +The supervision of railway rates shall be directed to securing +nondiscriminatory and moderate charges. + + + _Article 96_ + +All railways, including those not serving as means of general traffic, +must comply with any demands of the Reich for their utilization for the +purpose of national defense. + + + _Article 97_ + +It is the duty of the Reich to take over the ownership and +administration of waterways serving the general traffic. + +After they have been taken over, waterways serving the general traffic +may only be constructed or developed by the Reich or with its consent. + +In the administration, development or construction of waterways, +the requirements of land and water economy must be safeguarded in +agreement with the Lands. Their improvement shall also be taken into +consideration. + +Every administration of waterways must permit the connection of their +own with other inland waterways at the expense of the promoter. The +same obligation holds for the construction of a connection between +inland waterways and railways. + +With the transfer of waterways the Reich acquires the right of +expropriation, the control of rates and the police survey over the +waterways and navigation. + +The duties of the river conservancies in respect to the development of +the natural waterways in the Rhine, Weser, and Elbe districts shall be +taken over by the Reich. + + + _Article 98_ + +Advisory councils to cooperate in matters concerning Reich waterways +shall be formed in compliance with detailed provisions to be issued by +the Reich government with the approval of the Reich Council. + + + _Article 99_ + +On natural waterways charges may only be collected for such works, +plants and other institutions as are designed to facilitate traffic. +In the case of Lands and communal institutions they may not exceed +the necessary costs, for construction and upkeep. The construction +and maintenance costs of institutions not exclusively devoted to the +facilitation of traffic but also destined for the furtherance of other +purposes, may only be raised in a proportionate degree by shipping +charges. Interest and sinking funds on the invested capital are +included as costs of construction. + +The provisions of the foregoing paragraph apply also to charges +collected for artificial waterways and to works erected thereon and in +harbors. + +Within the sphere of inland navigation the entire cost of a waterway, +a river basin or a system of waterways may be utilized for calculating +the shipping charges. + +These provisions apply equally to the floating of timber on navigable +waterways. + +It is within the exclusive competence of the Reich to exact from +foreign ships and their cargoes other or higher charges than from +German ships and their cargoes. + + + _Article 100_ + +In order to cover the cost of the maintenance and construction of +inland navigation routes, contributions may also be levied by virtue +of a Reich law from persons enjoying benefits from the construction +of dams in other ways than by navigation, if more than one Land is +involved, or the Reich bears the costs of construction. + + + _Article 101_ + +It is the duty of the Reich to take over the ownership and +administration of all marine signal stations, particularly lighthouses, +lightships, buoys, floats, and beacons. After the Reich has taken them +over, marine signal stations may only be constructed or developed by +the Reich or with its consent. + + + _Seventh Chapter_ + + The Judiciary + + + _Article 102_ + +Judges are independent and subject only to the law. + + + _Article 103_ + +The ordinary judiciary consists of the Reich Supreme Court and the +courts of the Lands. + + + _Article 104_ + +The judges of the ordinary judiciary are appointed for life. Against +their will they may only be permanently or temporarily suspended from +office or transferred to another position or retired by virtue of a +judicial decision and only for the reasons and in the form prescribed +by law. The legislature may fix an age limit, on reaching which judges +shall retire. + +A temporary suspension from office as provided by law is not affected +hereby. + +If a change is effected in the organization of the courts or their +districts the judicial administrative authorities of the Lands may +order involuntary transfers to another court or removal from office, +but only on full pay. + +These provisions do not apply to commercial judges, lay judges, and +jurors. + + + _Article 105_ + +Exceptional courts are prohibited. No one may be deprived of the right +to be heard by his legally prescribed judge. The legal provisions +concerning military courts and courts martial are not affected hereby. +Military courts of honor are abolished. + + + _Article 106_ + +Military jurisdiction shall be abolished except in time of war and on +men-of-war. Details shall be regulated by a Reich law. + + + _Article 107_ + +Both in the Reich and in the Lands, administrative courts shall be +established under the laws for the protection of individuals against +decrees and orders of the administrative authorities. + + + _Article 108_ + +A Constitutional Court shall be established for the German Reich in +accordance with a Reich law. + + + SECOND PART + + FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF THE GERMANS + + + _First Chapter_ + + The Individual Person + + + _Article 109_ + +All Germans are equal before the law. + +In principle men and women have the same civil rights and duties. + +Public-legal privileges or disadvantages of birth or of rank are to be +abolished. + +Titles of nobility shall be regarded merely as part of the name, and +may no longer be bestowed. + +Titles may only be bestowed when they indicate an office or profession; +academic degrees are not affected hereby. + +Orders and decorations may not be conferred by the State. + +No German may accept titles or orders from a foreign government. + + + _Article 110_ + +Citizenship of the Reich and the Lands is acquired and lost in +accordance with the provisions of a Reich law. Every citizen of a Land +is at the same time a citizen of the Reich. + +Every German has in every Land of the Reich the same rights and duties +as the citizens of that Land. + + + _Article 111_ + +All Germans enjoy liberty of travel and residence throughout the whole +Reich. Everyone has the right to sojourn and settle in any place +within the Reich, to acquire real estate and to pursue any means of +livelihood. Restrictions require a Reich law. + + + _Article 112_ + +Every German is permitted to emigrate to a foreign country. Emigration +may only be restricted by a Reich law. + +All citizens of the Reich within and without the territory of the Reich +are entitled to the protection of the Reich in relation to foreign +countries. + +No German may be surrendered to a foreign government for prosecution or +punishment. + + + _Article 113_ + +No laws or administrative orders may prejudice in their free and +characteristic development the elements of the population of the +Reich whose mother tongue is other than German, especially in regard +to the use of their mother tongue in schools, in matters of internal +administration, and the administration of justice. + + + _Article 114_ + +The freedom of the person is inviolable. Curtailment or deprivation of +personal freedom by a public authority is only permissible on a legal +basis. + +Persons who have been deprived of their freedom must be informed at the +latest on the following day by whose authority and for what reasons the +deprivation of freedom was ordered; opportunity shall be afforded them +without delay of submitting objections to their deprivation of freedom. + + + _Article 115_ + +Every German’s home is his sanctuary and is inviolable. Exceptions may +only be made as provided by law. + + + _Article 116_ + +An act can only be punishable if its penalty was fixed by law before +the act was committed. + + + _Article 117_ + +The secrecy of letters and all postal, telegraphic and telephone +communications is inviolable. Exceptions are inadmissible except by +Reich law. + + + _Article 118_ + +Every German has the right, within the limits of the general laws, to +express his opinions freely in speech, in writing, in print, in picture +form or in any other way. No conditions of work or employment may +detract from this right and no disadvantage may accrue to him from any +person for making use of this right. + +Censorship is forbidden, but in the case of moving pictures deviations +from this rule may be established by law. Legal provisions are also +admissible for combatting pornography and obscene publications and for +the protection of young persons at public plays and entertainment. + + + _Second Chapter_ + + The General Welfare + + + _Article 119_ + +Marriage as the cornerstone of family life and the preservation and +increase of the nation is placed under the special protection of the +Constitution. It is based on the equal rights of both sexes. + +It is the duty of the State and the Communes to foster the purity, +health, and social advancement of the family. Families with numerous +children have a claim to proportionate assistance. + +Motherhood has a claim to the protection and care of the State. + + + _Article 120_ + +To provide their children with a thorough physical, spiritual, and +social education is the supreme duty and natural right of parents, +whose activities shall be supervised by the State. + + + _Article 121_ + +The same conditions shall be created by law for the physical, spiritual +and social development of illegitimate as for legitimate children. + + + _Article 122_ + +Youth shall be protected against exploitation and also against neglect +of their moral, mental or physical well-being. The States and Communes +shall make the necessary arrangements. + +Compulsory measures for their welfare may only be ordered on the basis +of law. + + + _Article 123_ + +All Germans have the right to assemble peacefully and unarmed without +giving notice and without special permission. + +A Reich law may make previous notification obligatory for assemblies in +the open air, and may prohibit them in the case of immediate danger to +the public safety. + + + _Article 124_ + +All the Germans have the right to form associations or societies for +purposes not contrary to criminal law. This right may not be curtailed +by preventive measures. The same provisions apply to religious +associations and societies. + +Every association may become incorporated according to the provisions +of the civil law. The right may not be refused to any association on +the grounds that its aims are political, social-political or religious. + + + _Article 125_ + +The liberty and secrecy of the vote is guaranteed. Details shall be +regulated by election laws. + + + _Article 126_ + +Every German has the right to address requests or complaints in writing +to the competent authorities or to the people’s representatives. This +right may be exercised individually or by several persons collectively. + + + _Article 127_ + +Communes and communal unions have the right of self-administration +within the limits of the law. + + + _Article 128_ + +All citizens without distinction shall be eligible for public office +in accordance with the laws and according to their capabilities and +achievements. + +All provisions discriminating against women are abolished. + +The principles governing the legal status of the public officials shall +be regulated by Reich law. + + + _Article 129_ + +Public officials shall be appointed for life, unless otherwise provided +by law. Pensions for retired officials or the surviving dependents of +deceased officials shall be regulated by law. The vested rights of +public officials are inviolable. Legal steps may be taken by public +officials for pecuniary claims. + +Public officials may be only temporarily suspended from office, +temporarily or permanently relieved or transferred to a different +office with a lower salary on the conditions and in the form provided +by law. + +In every case where a disciplinary sentence is pronounced, the way must +be open for appeal and a new trial. Entries unfavorable to a public +official may not be made in his official record until opportunity has +been afforded him of expressing his own view of the facts. Public +officials shall be permitted to inspect their official records. + +The inviolability of vested rights and the competence of the civil +courts to adjudicate pecuniary claims are also assured particularly +to the regular soldiers. In other respects their position shall be +regulated by Reich law. + + + _Article 130_ + +Public officials are servants of the whole community, and not of a +party. + +Liberty of political opinion and freedom to form associations is +guaranteed to all public officials. + +A Reich law shall provide in detail for the special representation of +public officials. + + + _Article 131_ + +If a public official in the execution of the official authority vested +in him transgresses his official duty towards a third person, the State +or the public body in whose service the officer is, is in principle +held responsible. The right of recovery from the officer is reserved. +Recourse to the ordinary civil courts may not be excluded. + +Details shall be regulated by the competent legislature. + + + _Article 132_ + +It is the duty of every German to accept honorary offices in accordance +with the laws. + + + _Article 133_ + +It is the duty of all citizens to render personal services to the State +and the Commune in accordance with the laws. + +The duty of military service is determined by the provisions of the +Reich Defense Law. This shall also stipulate how far single Fundamental +Rights of the Constitution shall be restricted in respect to members of +the defense forces, in the interest of the fulfillment of their tasks +and the maintenance of discipline. + + + _Article 134_ + +All citizens without distinction contribute to all public burdens in +proportion to their means and in accordance with the laws. + + + _Third Chapter_ + + Religion and Religious Associations + + + _Article 135_ + +All inhabitants of the Reich enjoy full religious and conscientious +freedom. The undisturbed exercise of religion is guaranteed by the +Constitution and is under state protection. The general state laws are +unaffected hereby. + + + _Article 136_ + +Civil and civic rights and duties are neither contingent upon nor +limited by the exercise of religious freedom. + +The enjoyment of civil and civic rights and the eligibility for public +office are independent of religious belief. + +Nobody is obliged to reveal his religious conviction. The authorities +are only entitled to ask questions concerning adherence to a religious +body so far as rights and duties are dependent thereon or in pursuance +of statistical inquiries prescribed by law. + +No one may be compelled to attend any church service or ceremony or to +participate in religious exercises, or to take oath in religious form. + + + _Article 137_ + +There is no State Church. + +Freedom to form religious societies is guaranteed. The combination of +religious societies within the territory of the Reich is subject to no +restrictions. + +Every religious society regulates and administers its affairs +independently within the limits of the law, applicable to all. It +appoints its officers without the cooperation of the State or the civil +community. + +Religious societies become incorporated in accordance with the general +provisions of civil law. + +Religious societies remain bodies of public law if this has been their +status hitherto. Similar rights shall be granted to other religious +societies on their application, if their constitution and the number +of their members offer a guarantee of permanency. If several such +religious societies are united as public bodies, this union is also a +public body. + +Such religious societies as are public bodies are entitled to levy +taxes on the basis of the civil tax-roll in accordance with the laws of +the respective Lands. + +Associations devoted to the common cultivation of a philosophy of life +are placed on the same footing as religious societies. + +So far as the execution of these provisions requires more detailed +regulation, this is within the competence of the Lands’ legislatures. + + + _Article 138_ + +State contributions to religious societies based on laws, contract or +special legal titles shall be commuted by Lands legislation. The Reich +shall establish the principles therefor. + +Property and other rights of religious societies and associations in +their institutions, foundations, and other properties for cultural, +educational, and charitable purposes are guaranteed. + + + _Article 139_ + +Sundays and public holidays recognized by the State remain under legal +protection as days of rest and spiritual edification. + + + _Article 140_ + +Members of the defense forces shall be allowed the necessary free time +for performing their religious duties. + + + _Article 141_ + +So far as there is need for divine service and spiritual consolation +in the army, in hospitals, prisons or other public institutions, +the religious societies shall be permitted to perform the religious +offices, but all compulsion shall be avoided. + + + _Fourth Chapter_ + + Education and the Schools + + + _Article 142_ + +Art and science and the teaching thereof are free. The State guarantees +them protection and takes part in their cultivation. + + + _Article 143_ + +The education of young persons shall be provided for by means of public +institutions. The Reich, Lands and Communes shall cooperate in their +establishment. + +The training of teachers shall be regulated uniformly for the whole +Reich according to the generally recognized principles of higher +education. + +Teachers in public schools have the rights and duties of state +officials. + + + _Article 144_ + +The whole school system is under the supervision of the State, which +may cause the Communes to participate therein. The supervision +of schools is exercised by trained expert officials as their +occupation-in-chief. + + + _Article 145_ + +Attendance at school is universally obligatory. + +In principle this duty is fulfilled by attending an elementary school +for at least eight school years and a connected continuation school +until the completion of the eighteenth year. Instruction and school +supplies are supplied free of charge in the elementary and continuation +schools. + + + _Article 146_ + +The system of public schools shall be organically developed. The +intermediate and secondary school system shall be built upon the basis +of common elementary schools. This system shall be determined by the +needs of all kinds of vocations, and for the reception of a child +into a particular school, his abilities and inclination shall be the +deciding factor, not the economic and social status or the religious +confession of his parents. + +Within the Communes, however, on the petition of parents and guardians, +popular schools professing their own faith or philosophy of life shall +be established, so far as this does not interfere with an organized +school system in the sense, also, of Paragraph 1, supra. As far +as possible the will of parents and guardians shall be taken into +consideration. Details shall be regulated by Lands legislation based on +principles prescribed by a Reich law. + +Public funds shall be provided by the Reich, Lands and Communes to make +the intermediate and secondary schools available for those possessed +of restricted means; in particular shall there be educational grants +for the parents of children looked upon as suitable subjects for +instruction in intermediate and secondary schools until their schooling +is completed. + + + _Article 147_ + +Private schools as substitutes for public schools require the approval +of the State and are subject to the laws of the Lands. Approval shall +be granted when the private schools are not inferior to the public +schools as regards their instructional aims and equipment and the +scientific training of the teachers, and a separation of the pupils +according to the wealth of their parents is not encouraged. The +approval shall be refused if the economic and legal position of the +teachers is not sufficiently assured. + +Private elementary schools shall only be admitted when for those +parents or guardians whose wishes are to be regarded under Article +146, Paragraph 2, no public elementary school of their faith or +philosophical persuasion exists in their Commune, or if the educational +administrative authorities recognize the existence of a particular +educational need. + +Private preparatory schools shall be abolished. + +The existing law shall continue to apply to private schools not serving +as substitutes for public schools. + + + _Article 148_ + +In all schools moral training, a sense of civic responsibility, +personal and vocational efficiency in a spirit of national German +feeling and international conciliation shall be aimed at. + +Care shall be taken that instruction in public schools shall not hurt +the feelings of those who differ in opinion. + +Civics and manual training form part of the school curriculum. On +completing his obligatory schooling every pupil shall receive a copy of +the Constitution. + +Popular education including popular universities shall be developed by +the Reich, Lands and Communes. + + + _Article 149_ + +Religious instruction forms part of the ordinary school curriculum +except in the nonconfessional (secular) schools; its form will be +regulated by the laws relating to schools. Religious instruction shall +be given in conformity with the principles of the religious society +concerned, without prejudice to the State’s right of supervision. + +The imparting of religious instruction and the performance of religious +acts is left to the decision of the teacher, while the participation in +religious lessons, acts, and ceremonies is a matter for the decision of +those who have the right to determine the religious education of the +child. + +The theological faculties in the universities shall be maintained. + + + _Article 150_ + +Artistic, historical, and natural monuments and scenery enjoy the +protection and care of the State. + +It is a function of the Reich to prevent German art treasures from +passing to foreign countries. + + + _Fifth Chapter_ + + The Economic Life + + + _Article 151_ + +The regulation of economic life must be compatible with the principles +of justice, aiming at the attainment of humane conditions of existence +for all. Within these limits the economic liberty of the individual +shall be assured. + +Legal compulsion is only admissible for the realization of threatened +rights or in the service of preponderant requirements of the common +welfare. + +Freedom of trade and commerce is guaranteed on the basis of the Reich +laws. + + + _Article 152_ + +As far as the laws allow, there shall be freedom of contract in +business intercourse. Usury is prohibited. Legal transactions contra +bonos mores are invalid. + + + _Article 153_ + +Property is guaranteed by the Constitution. Its content and limits are +defined by the laws. + +Expropriation can only take place for the public benefit and on a +legal basis. Adequate compensation shall be granted, unless a Reich +law orders otherwise. In the case of dispute concerning the amount of +compensation, it shall be possible to submit the matter to the ordinary +civil courts, unless Reich laws determine otherwise. Compensation must +be paid if the Reich expropriates property belonging to the Lands, +Communes, or public utility associations. + +Property carries obligations. Its use shall also serve the common good. + + + _Article 154_ + +The right of inheritance is guaranteed according to the civil code. + +The share of the State in inherited property is determined by the laws. + + + _Article 155_ + +The distribution and utilization of the land shall be supervised by +state authorities in a manner to prevent abuse and with the object of +ensuring a healthy dwelling to every German and to all German families, +especially those with numerous children, living and working quarters +in accordance with their needs. War veterans shall be particularly +considered in the enactment of homestead laws. + +Real estate, the acquisition of which is necessary for housing +purposes, for the promotion of settlements and land cultivation or +to improve agriculture, may be expropriated. All entails shall be +dissolved. + +The cultivation and utilization of the soil is a duty owed by the +landowner to the community. An increase in the value of land, which +arises without the expenditure of work or capital on the property, +shall be utilized for the common benefit. + +All treasures of the soil and all natural forces of economic utility +are under the supervision of the State. Private mining rights shall be +transferred to the State by legislation. + + + _Article 156_ + +The Reich may, without prejudice to the right of compensation, by law +transfer to public ownership private economic enterprises suitable for +socialization, applying thereby analogously the regulations relating to +expropriation. The Reich may allot to itself, the Lands or the Communes +a share in the administration of economic enterprises and associations +or secure to itself a controlling influence therein in some other way. + +The Reich may also in case of urgent necessity for socioeconomic +interests, by law effect a combination of economic enterprises and +associations on the basis of self-administration with the object of +securing the cooperation of all working elements of the population, +of allowing employers and employees a share in the management and +regulating the production, fabrication, distribution, utilization, +price fixing, and the importation and exportation of economic goods +according to the principles of national economy. + +The cooperative industrial and economic associations and their unions +shall at their request be incorporated in the socialized economic +system, their constitution and peculiarities being thereby taken into +consideration. + + + _Article 157_ + +The ability to work is under the special protection of the Reich. The +Reich shall create a uniform labor law. + + + _Article 158_ + +Intellectual labor, the rights of the author, the inventor, and the +artist enjoy the protection and care of the Reich. + +Recognition and protection in foreign countries also shall be secured +to German science, art and technic by means of international agreements. + + + _Article 159_ + +Freedom of association for the preservation and promotion of labor +and economic conditions is assured to everyone and to all vocations. +All agreements and measures attempting to restrict or restrain such +freedom, are unlawful. + + + _Article 160_ + +Persons working as employees or laborers are entitled to the leave +necessary for the exercise of their civic rights and, so far as the +enterprise is not materially damaged thereby, for performing the duties +attached to public honorary offices entrusted to them. The law shall +determine to what extent they retain their right to remuneration. + + + _Article 161_ + +For the maintenance of health and capacity to work, for the protection +of maternity, and for provision against the economic consequences of +age, infirmity, and the vicissitudes of life, the Reich shall organize +a comprehensive system of insurance, in which the insured persons shall +cooperate to a considerable extent. + + + _Article 162_ + +The Reich shall endeavor to obtain an interstate regulation of +the legal status of laborers which shall have as its object the +establishment of a general minimum standard of social rights for all +working classes of mankind. + + + _Article 163_ + +Every German has, without prejudice to his personal liberty, the moral +duty to utilize his intellectual and physical powers in the interest of +the general welfare. + +The opportunity of earning his living by economic work shall be +afforded to every German. So far as suitable work cannot be found for +him, he shall be provided with the necessary support. Details shall be +regulated by special Reich laws. + + + _Article 164_ + +The interests of the independent middle classes in agriculture, +industry and commerce shall be promoted by legislation and +administration and protected from oppression and absorption. + + + _Article 165_ + +Laborers and employees are called upon to take part on equal terms and +together with the employers in regulating conditions of work and wages +and also in the general economic development of productive forces. +The organizations on both sides and agreements between them shall be +recognized. + +Laborers and employees shall be legally represented on the Workmen’s +Councils of the Enterprise, as well as in the District Workmen’s +Councils organized for each economic area and on a Reich Workmen’s +Council. + +The District Workmen’s Councils and the Reich Workmen’s Council shall +combine with the representatives of the employees and other interested +elements of the population to form District Economic Councils and a +Reich Economic Council for the purpose of performing all economic +tasks and of cooperating in carrying out the socialization laws. The +District Economic Councils and the Reich Economic Council shall be +so constituted that all important vocational groups are represented +thereon in accordance with their economic and social importance. + +Social-political and political-economic bills of basic importance +shall be submitted to the opinion of the Reich Economic Council by the +government of the Reich before being introduced. The Reich Economic +Council has itself the right to propose the introduction of such +bills. If the government of the Reich does not approve them, it must +nevertheless introduce such bills to the Reichstag, stating its own +point of view. The Reich Economic Council may have the bill supported +in the Reichstag by one of its own members. + +Supervision and administrative powers may be conferred on the Workmen’s +and the Economic Councils within their own spheres of work. + +The regulation of the organization and tasks of the Workmen’s and +the Economic Councils as well as their relation to other social +self-governing bodies is exclusively a function of the Reich. + + + _Transitional and Concluding Provisions_ + + + _Article 166_ + +Until the establishment of the Reich Administrative Court the Reich +Supreme Court shall take its place in the formation of the Election +Investigation Court. + + + _Article 167_ + +Article 18, sect. 3 to 6 are valid 2 years after announcement of the +Reichs Constitution. + + + _Article 168_ + +Until--but only for a year--the Landlaw, considered in Article 63 is +issued, all Prussian votes in the Reichsrat can be given by the members +of the Cabinet. + + + _Article 169_ + +The Reichs Cabinet, will set the date, when Article 83, sect. 1, +becomes valid. + + + _Article 170_ + +The postal--and telegraph agencies of Bavaria and Wuertenberg, will be +taken over by the Reich on 1 April 1921 the latest. + +If, on 1 Oct 1920, no agreement on the points of the taking over has +been reached, the supreme constitutional court will decide. + +Until the taking over, the present rights and duties of Bavaria and +Wuertenberg are in force. The postal and telegraph traffic with +neighboring states of foreign countries, will be regulated by the Reich. + + + _Article 171_ + +The State Railroads, Waterways and sea-marks will be taken over by the +Reich on April 1, 1921, the latest. + +If on 1 Oct 1920 no agreement on the points of the taking over, has +been reached, the Supreme Constitutional Court will decide. + + + _Article 172_ + +Until the Reich law concerning the Supreme Constitutional Court comes +into force, a Senate shall exercise its powers; this Senate shall +consist of seven members of which four are chosen by the Reichstag from +its own members and three by the Supreme Court of the Reich from its +own members. The Senate shall regulate its own procedure. + + + _Article 173_ + +Until the enactment of a Reich law according to Article 138 the present +state contributions to religious societies based on laws, contracts or +special legal claims shall be continued. + + + _Article 174_ + +Until the enactment of the Reich law provided in Article 146, Paragraph +2, the present legal situation shall continue. The law shall take into +particular consideration those districts of the Reich in which a school +where no distinction of creeds is made is established by law. + + + _Article 175_ + +The provision of Article 109 does not apply to orders and decorations +to be conferred for merit in the war years 1914-1919. + + + _Article 176_ + +All public officers and members of the defense forces shall take the +oath upon the Constitution. Details shall be regulated by an order of +the Reich President. + + + _Article 177_ + +Where in the existing laws the oath is prescribed in religious form, +the oath shall be legally binding if the person taking the same, +leaving out the religious formula, declares: “I swear.” The content of +the oath as prescribed in the laws remains otherwise unaltered. + + + _Article 178_ + +The Constitution of the German Reich of April 16, 1871, and the laws of +February 10, 1918, concerning the provisional government of the Reich, +are repealed. + +All other laws and orders of the Reich remain in force, so far as this +Constitution is not incompatible with them. The provisions of the +Peace Treaty signed at Versailles on June 28, 1919, are not affected +by the Constitution. With respect to the negotiations concerning the +acquisition of the island of Heligoland a regulation in favor of its +inhabitants may be made differing from that of Article 117, Paragraph 2. + +Orders by the authorities which have been legally issued in conformity +with the present laws, retain their validity until they are repealed by +new orders of legislation. + + + _Article 179_ + +So far as laws or orders refer to provisions and institutions which +are repealed by this Constitution, the appropriate provisions +and institutions of this Constitution shall take their place. In +particular, the Reichstag shall take the place of the National +Assembly, the Reich Council that of the State Committee, the Reich +President elected on the basis of this Constitution that of the Reich +President elected on the basis of the law concerning the provisional +government of the Reich. + +The power, hitherto pertaining to the State Committee, of issuing +executive orders is transferred to the government of the Reich, which +requires therefor the approbation of the Reich Council in accordance +with this Constitution. + + + _Article 180_ + +Until the meeting of the first Reichstag, the National Assembly shall +function as Reichstag. The President of the Reich chosen by the +National Assembly shall retain his office till 30 June 1925. + + + _Article 181_ + +The German people have passed and adopted this Constitution by means +of their National Assembly. It comes into force with the date of its +proclamation. + +Schwarzburg, 11 August 1919. + + _The Reich President_ + + EBERT + + _The Reich Cabinet_ + + BAUER + + ERZBERGER HERMAN MUELLER DR. DAVID NOSKE + SCHMIDT SCHLICKE GIESBERTS + DR. MAYER DR. BELL + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2056-PS + + 1938 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 1632 + + Decree concerning the Extension of the Jurisdiction of the Special + Courts of 20 November 1938 + +On authority of Chapter II of the Sixth Section of the decree of 6 +October 1931 (RGBl I, page 537), Article II of the law regarding +the reunification of Austria with the German Reich of 13 March 1938 +(RGBl I, page 237) and Article 7 of the decree of the Fuehrer and +Reich Chancellor regarding the administration of the Sudeten German +territories of 1 October 1938 (RGBl I, page 1331), the following order +is promulgated: + + + Article I + +In cases of criminal acts which belong to the jurisdiction of the +Assizes or of a lower court, the prosecuting authorities can bring the +charge before the Special Court, if they believe that in consideration +of the gravity or the wickedness of the deed, or the possible arousing +of popular excitement, an immediate verdict by the Special Court is +advisable. + + + Article II + +(1) Under the same supposition in the state of Austria and in the +Sudeten German territories the prosecuting authorities can bring the +charge before the Court of Appeal in cases of criminal acts which, +according to the existing legal procedure in those areas, belongs to +the jurisdiction of the Jury Court or of a lower court. This is decided +by the appointment of three professional judges. + +(2) For the legal procedure the decree of 21 March 1933 (RGBl I, page +136) is applicable. The Reich Minister for Justice is to be consulted +for more precise definitions. + + + Article III + +In the proceedings before the Special Court (Court of Appeals) the +period of time for summons is limited to 24 hours. + + + Article IV + +As long as the main deliberation has not yet begun in cases of Articles +I and II, proceedings which are pending in the Assizes (Jury Court) +or a lower court at the time this decree enters into effect, are to +be referred to the Special Court of the prosecuting authorities so +proposed. + + + Article V + +This decree becomes effective on the date of publication. + +Berlin, 20 November 1938 + + The Reich Minister for Justice + Dr. Guertner + + The Reich Minister of the Interior + Frick + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2057-PS + + 1934 REICHSGESETZBLATT PART I, PAGE 529 + + Law Relating to National Emergency Defense Measures of 3 July 1934 + +The Reich Government has enacted the following law, which is hereby +promulgated: + + + ONLY ARTICLE + +The measures taken on 30 June and 1 and 2 July 1934 to counteract +attempt at treason and high treason shall be considered as national +emergency defense. + +Berlin, 3 July 1934. + + The Reich Chancellor + Adolf Hitler + + The Reich Minister of the Interior + Frick + + The Reich Minister of Justice + Dr. Guertner + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2058-PS + + 1933 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 462 + + Decree for the securing of the State Leadership of 7 July 1933 + +Based on paragraph 18 of the provisional law about the coordination of +the states [Laender] with the Reich of 31 March 1933 (Reichsgesetzblatt +I, page 183), I decree: + + + _The Reichstag and houses of delegates of the states_ + + Article 1 + +The distribution of seats, according to the electoral suggestion of the +Social Democratic Party, for the Reichstag and the provincial diets +(citizens’ committee), based on the election results of 5 March 1933 +or on the results of the coordination action, according to Article 4, +Section 2 of the provisional law for the coordination of the states +with the Reich of 31 July 1933, is void. An alternate distribution will +not take place. + + + _Community self-administrative bodies_ + + Article 2 + +The distribution of seats, according to the elective suggestion of +the Social Democratic Party, for the community self-administrative +bodies (county diets, district diets, district councils, council of +officials, city councils, city councils of representatives, community +councils, etc.) in Prussia based on the results of the election of +12 March 1933, in the other German states based on the results of +the coordination action according to article 12, Section 2 of the +provisional law for the coordination of the states with the Reich of 31 +March 1933 is void. + + + Article 3 + +In as much as it may be necessary for the maintenance of a +self-administration of the community to fill the seats whose +distribution has been nullified, the state supervisory authority can +fill these seats again according to the will of the people after the +conquering of the republic [Parteienstaat]. + + + Article 4 + +The members of the community self-administrative bodies will be +appointed by the state supervisory authority according to the will +of the people after the conquering of the republic in the following +additional cases. + +1. if a community body of representatives is dissolved, by the state +supervisory authority, or if their election or coordination has been +declared void in the examination of the election, + +2. if a community or an association of communities is newly formed by +way of organization, + +3. if a regular filling of the community body of representatives is not +possible, because, according to the elections, a sufficient number of +acceptable alternates is no longer available, + +4. if in Prussia, a new election of the community body of +representatives has not taken place on 12 March 1933. + + + _Civic honorary positions_ + + Article 5 + +(1) The elections of honorary members of national administrative +resolution authorities, committees and of bearers of national, +individual honorary positions, who themselves belong to the Social +Democratic Party, or who were elected because of the electoral +suggestion of representatives of the Social Democratic Party, are void. + +(2) The same applies to the election of honorary chairmen or members +of boards of direction of communities and association of communities, +deputations, commissions, community councils, as well as bearers of +honorary individual positions, who are themselves members of the Social +Democratic Party, or who have been elected by bodies of representatives +or other organs, entitled to vote, of the community or of the community +associations based on electoral suggestion, which have been submitted +by the representatives of the Social Democratic Party. + +(3) In as much as it is necessary for the maintenance of the national +administration or of the community self-administration to fill civic +honorary positions, the election of which are void (Section 1 and 2), +the alternates will be appointed by the state supervisory authority or +by its deputized officials according to the will of the people after +the conquering of the republic. + +Berlin, 7 July 1933. + + The Reich Minister of the Interior + Frick + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2059-PS + + 1933 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 134 + +Decree of the Reich-President relating to the granting of amnesty of 21 + March 1933 + +Pursuant to Section 48, subsection 2 of the Constitution of the Reich +the following is ordered: + + + Section 1 + +Amnesty is granted for penal acts committed in the national revolution +of the German People, in its preparation or in the fight for the German +soil pursuant to the following provisions: + + + Section 2 + +Penalties imposed by final judgment at the time this law becomes +effective and which have not yet been served, are annulled. + +The amnesty applies to additional fines and security measures as long +as they have not been executed, to subsidiary legal consequences as +well as outstanding fines payable to the Treasury of the Reich or the +Landes and to outstanding expenses. + +If a sentence has been passed to the effect that something should be +confiscated or made unusable it will remain as such. + + + Section 3 + +Pending proceedings will be discontinued if the offense has been +committed before the 21 March 1933 and further proceedings are not to +be instituted. + + + Section 4 + +Should a penalty which has not yet been served at the time when this +decree becomes effective, include one or several penalties for offences +for which amnesty is granted, such part of the entire penalty which is +proportionally meted out for the offences mentioned has to be deducted. + +If a penalty constituting imprisonment has been transformed into one +of penal servitude only on account of simultaneous offences for one +of which amnesty is granted, the entire penalty which will be reduced +pursuant to subsection 1, has to be commuted into imprisonment of the +same length of time. + +Judicial findings (Section 458 of Code of Criminal Procedure) relating +to whether and to what extent a penalty is to be extenuated pursuant +to the provisions of subsections 1 and 2 will be decided upon by the +court which has the jurisdiction to impose penalties for the offence +mentioned in subsection 1. + + + Section 5 + +The Court decides upon the discontinuance of pending proceedings upon +application of the parties. + +If the proceedings have been instituted upon a private complaint +the costs of such proceedings are quashed. The Court may divide +the necessary expense of the private complaint and the accused +appropriately or may impose the expenses on any one of them. + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2061-PS + + 1934 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 785 + + _Oath of Reich Officials and of German Soldiers, of 20 August 1934._ + +Law on attestation of officials and of soldiers of the Armed Forces, of +20 August 1934. + +The Reich’s government has enacted the following law which is hereby +proclaimed: + + + Art. 1 + +The Public officials and the soldiers of the armed forces have to take +an oath of service on entering service. + + + Art. 2 + +1. The oath of service of public officials will be: + + “I swear: I shall be loyal and obedient to Adolf Hitler, the Fuehrer + of the German Reich and people; respect the laws, and fulfill my + official duties conscientiously, so help me God.” + +2. The oath of service of the soldiers of the armed forces will be: + + “I swear by God this sacred oath, that I will render unconditional + obedience to Adolf Hitler, the Fuehrer of the German Reich and + people, supreme commander of the armed forces, and will be ready as + a brave soldier to risk my life at any time for this oath.” + + + Art. 3 + +Officials already in service are to be given the oath without delay +according to Art. 2, number 1. + + + Art. 4 + +The law on attestation of officials and of soldiers of the armed forces +of 1 Dec. 1933 (RGBl I. P. 1016) and the decree of the second of the +same month (RGBl I. P. 1017) are rescinded. + + Berlin, 20 August 1934. + + The Fuehrer and Reichschancellor + Adolf Hitler + + The Reichsminister of the Interior + Frick + + The Reichsminister of Defense + von Blomberg. + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2073-PS + +1936 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 487 + +Decree concerning the Appointment of a Chief of German Police in the +Reich Ministry of the Interior of 17 June 1936 + + + I + +For the unification of police duties in the Reich, a Chief of German +Police is instituted for the German Ministry of the Interior, to whom +is assigned the direction and conduct of all police affairs within +the jurisdiction of the Reich and of the Prussian Ministries of the +Interior. + + + II + +(1) For the Chief of German Police in the Reich Ministry of the +Interior, the Deputy Chief of the Secret State Police of Prussia is +declared to be Reichsfuehrer SS Heinrich HIMMLER. + +(2) He is subordinated individually and directly to the Reich and the +Prussian Ministries of the Interior. + +(3) In their absence he represents for his jurisdiction the Reich and +the Prussian Ministries of the Interior. + +(4) He bears the service title: Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the +German Police in the Reich Ministry of the Interior. + + + III + +The Chief of the German Police in the Reich Ministry of the Interior +shares in the sessions of the Reich Cabinet, so far as his jurisdiction +is concerned. + + + IV + +I commission the Reich and the Prussian Ministries of the Interior with +the conduct of this decree. + +Berlin, 17 June 1936 + + The Fuehrer and Chancellor of the Reich + Adolf Hitler + + The Reich Minister of the Interior + Frick + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2075-PS + + 1937 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 187 + + Decree + +for appointment of a chief of the organization of Germans abroad within + the Foreign Office. + + 30 January 1937. + + + I + +For uniform care for German Nationals abroad a Chief of the +Organization of Germans abroad is appointed within the Foreign Office +and to whom, at the same time, the leadership and processing of all +affairs of German Nationals abroad within the jurisdiction of the +Foreign Office will be given over. + + + II + +(1) As chief of the Organization for Germans abroad within the Foreign +Office Gauleiter Ernst Wilhelm Bohle, director of the Organization for +Germans abroad of the Nazi Party is appointed. + +(2) His is a personal appointment and immediately subordinate to the +Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs. His field of activity, as chief of +the organization of German nationals abroad of the Nazi Party and his +subordination to the deputy of the Fuehrer are not affected. + +(3) His official title is: Chief of Organization of Germans abroad +within the Foreign Office. + + + III + +The Chief of Organization of Germans abroad of the Foreign Office +participates in the sessions of the Reich Cabinet so far as his field +is concerned. + + + IV + +The Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs in agreement with the deputy of +the Fuehrer will issue the implementative regulations of this decree. + +Berlin, 30 January 1937. + + The Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor + Adolf Hitler + + The Reich Foreign Minister + Freiherr von Neurath + + + PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2076-PS + + 1933 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGES 136-137 + +Decree of the Reich Cabinet relating to the formation of special courts + of March 21, 1933 + +On the basis of Chapter II, Part 6 of the third decree of the Reich +President to safeguard economy and finances and to combat political +excesses, of 6 October 1931 (Reichsgesetzblatt I pp. 537, 565) the +following is decreed. + + + Section 1 + +(1) A special court will be created for the district of each court of +appeals. + +(2) The special courts are courts of the State [Land]. + +(3) The legal administration of the State [Land] determines the seats +of the special courts. + + + Section 2 + +The special courts have jurisdiction over crimes and felonies +enumerated in the decree of the President of the Reich for the defense +of people and state, of 28 February 1933 (Reichsgesetzblatt I, p. 83) +and in the decree relating to the defense against insidious attacks +against the government of the national revolution provided that such +offenses are not within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court or court +of appeals. + + + Section 3 + +(1) The special courts also have jurisdiction when a crime or felony +which is under their jurisdiction fulfills at the same time the +specifications of another offense. + +(2) If another offense is directly connected with the crime or felony +which comes under the jurisdiction of the Special Courts, then the +proceedings against the offenders and accessories of the other offense +may be instituted in the Special Courts. + +(3) The extended jurisdiction pursuant to Paragraphs 1 and 2 does not +apply to offenses for which the Supreme Court or Courts of Appeals have +jurisdiction. + +* * * * * * * + + + Section 7 + +Proceedings may be instituted also before the Special Court in the +district of which the defendant was caught or where he is in custody. +The release of the defendant does not affect this jurisdiction once it +has been established. + +* * * * * * * + + + Section 9 + +(1) No hearings relating to the warrant of arrest shall be held. + +* * * * * * * + + + Section 11 + +A preliminary court investigation will not take place. If a preliminary +investigation is pending at the time this decree becomes effective, the +records are to be transferred at once to the prosecuting official with +the Special Court. + +* * * * * * * + + + Section 16 + +(1) No legal remedy is admissible against the decisions of the Special +Courts. + +* * * * * * * + +Berlin, March 24, 1933 + + The Reich Chancellor + Adolph Hitler + + For the Reich Minister of Justice + The Deputy of the Reich Chancellor + von Papen. + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2078-PS + + 1934 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 365 + + Decree concerning the establishment of the Reichs Ministry of Science, + Education, and Popular Culture of 1 May 1934 + +(1) For the entire system of education, training, and instruction of +the Reich, as well as for the tasks of science, a Reich Ministry for +Science, education, and popular culture is established. + +(2) The director of this office bears the title “Reich Minister for +Science, Education and Popular Culture.” + +(3) The Chancellor of the Reich will determine the various duties of +the Reich Ministry for Science, Education, and Popular Culture. He +will also determine the duties which are transferred from the sphere +of activity of the Reich Ministries affected to the new Ministry and +also even if the sphere of activity of the ministries concerned is +fundamentally affected hereby. + +Berlin, 1 May 1934 + + The President of the Reich + von Hindenburg + + The Chancellor of the Reich + Adolf Hitler + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2079-PS + + 1935 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 1145 + + Reich Flag Law 15 September 1935 + +The Reichstag has unanimously ratified the following law which is +hereby announced: + + + Article 1 + +The colors of the Reich are black, white, and red. + + + Article 2 + +The Reich and national flag is the swastika flag. It is also the +merchant flag. + + + Article 3 + +The Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor designates the design of the Reich War +Flag and the Reich Service Flag. + + + Article 4 + +The Reich Minister of the Interior releases the necessary legal and +administrative regulations for the execution and completion of this law +as long as it does not interfere with the jurisdiction of the Reich +Minister of War. + + + Article 5 + +This law becomes valid on the day of announcement. + + Nurnberg 15 September 1935 + on the Reichparteitag of Freedom + + The Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor + ADOLF HITLER + + The Reich Minister of the Interior + FRICK + + The Reich Minister of War and + Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht + VON BLOMBERG + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2082-PS + + 1933 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 661 + + Law relating to the Reich Chamber of Culture of September 22nd, 1933. + +The Reich Government has decreed the following law which is hereby +promulgated: + + + Section 1 + +The Reich Minister for Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda is ordered +and authorized to organize the functions under his jurisdiction into +public corporations. + + + Section 2 + +Pursuant to section 1, the following chambers are established: + + 1. a Reich Chamber of Archives, + 2. a Reich Press Chamber, + 3. a Reich Radio Chamber, + 4. a Reich Theater Chamber, + 5. a Reich Music Chamber, + 6. a Reich Chamber of Creative Arts. + + + Section 3 + +In establishing the Chambers mentioned in section 2, the provisions +relating to the film industry contained in the Law relating to +the Establishment of a Provisional Film Chamber of 14 July 1933 +(Reichsgesetzblatt, page 483) and supplementary executive provisions +thereunder are to receive corresponding application. + + + Section 4 + +The organization of these Chambers must be kept within the framework +of the policies laid down by the Reich Government in connection with +professional advancement. + + + Section 5 + +The corporate bodies listed in Section 2, together with the provisional +film Chamber, referred to as the Reich Film Chamber, are united into +a Reich Chamber of Culture. The Reich Chamber of Culture is under +the supervision of the Reich Minister for Popular Enlightenment and +Propaganda. It has its seat in Berlin. + + + Section 6 + +The Reich Minister for Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda and the +Reich Minister of Economics are authorized to coordinate the provisions +of the Trade Laws with the provisions of this law by means of a +combined decree. + + + Section 7 + +The Reich Minister for Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda is +authorized to decree laws and general administrative regulations as +well as amendments for the purpose of implementing this law. The +laws and general administrative regulations affecting financial or +trade interests of the Reich require consent of the Reich Minister of +Finance, in agreement with the Reich Minister of Economics. + +Berlin, 22 September 1933. + + The Reich Chancellor + Adolf Hitler + + The Reich Minister for + Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda Dr. Goebbels + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2083-PS + + 1933 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 713 + + Editorial Law + 4 October 1933 + +The Reich Government has resolved upon the following law, which is +hereby published: + + + Part One + + The Editorial Profession + + + Section 1 + +The cooperative work carried on as main employment or based upon +appointment to the position of chief editor in the shaping of the +intellectual contents by written word, dissemination of news or +pictures of the newspapers or political periodicals, which are +published within the area of the Reich, is a public task, which is +regulated as to its professional duties and rights by the state through +this law. Its bearers are called editors. Nobody may call himself an +editor who is not entitled to do so, according to this law. + + + Section 2 + +(1) Newspapers and periodicals are printed matters which appear in +regular sequence at intervals of at most 3 months, without limiting +their circulation to a certain group of persons. + +(2) All reproductions of writings or illustrations, destined for +dissemination, which are produced by means of a mass reproduction +process are to be considered as printed matter. + + + Section 3 + +(1) The provisions of this law relating to newspapers are valid also +for political periodicals. + +(2) This law does not apply to newspapers and periodicals which are +published by official order. + +(3) The Reich Minister of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda will +determine which periodicals are to be considered as political within +the meaning of the law. In case the periodical affects a certain +vocational field, he will make the decision in agreement with the +highest Reich or State agency concerned. + + + Section 4 + +Cooperation in the shaping of the intellectual contents of the German +newspapers is also considered as such, if it does not take place in +the management of a newspaper, but in an establishment, which is to +supply newspapers with intellectual contents, (written word, news, or +pictures). + + + Part Two + + Admission to the Profession of Editor + + + Section 5 + +Persons who can be editors are only those who: + +1. possess the German citizenship, + +2. have not lost the civic rights [buergerliche Ehrenrechte] and the +qualification for the tenure of public offices, + +3. are of Aryan descent, and are not married to a person of non-Aryan +descent, + +4. have completed the 21st year of age, + +5. are capable of handling business, + +6. have been trained in the profession, + +7. have the qualities which the task of exerting intellectual influence +upon the public requires. + + + Section 6 + +For the requirement of the Aryan descent and the Aryan marriage, +section 1a of the Reich Law for Officials [Reichsbeamtengesetz] and the +provisions issued for its implementation will be applied. + + + Section 7 + +(1) Whoever has acquired the knowledge of an editor by training for at +least one year (editor in apprenticeship) with the editorial staff of a +German newspaper or an establishment of the kind mentioned in Section +4 and can prove this by certificate to the editorial staff will be +considered as professionally trained. The apprenticeship served with a +foreign newspaper may be made equivalent to the apprenticeship served +with a German paper by means of the implementation order. + +(2) The provisions of this law also pertain to the editors in +apprenticeship with the exception of Section 5, Subsections 4, 5, and 6. + + + Section 8 + +The admission to the editorial profession will be affected by entry +upon request in the professional editors’ list. The professional +rosters are kept by the offices of the regional associations +[Landesverbaende] of the German press (Section 24, Subsection 2). The +registration will be passed upon by the head of Regional association. +He must decree the registration, if the requirements which are +set forth in Section 5 are fulfilled. He has to reject it if the +Reichsminister for Public Enlightenment and Propaganda protests. + + + Section 9 + +(1) Upon application by the head of the regional association the head +of the Reich Association of the German Press (Section 23) with the +approval of Reich Minister of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda may +permit exceptions from the requirements set forth (Section 5, Nos. +1, 3, and 6). This exception can be limited to certain branches of +the activity of an editor. In this case the Reich Minister of Public +Enlightenment and Propaganda grants the permission in accordance with +the highest competent Reich or State authority. + +(2) Exemption from the requirement of German [Reich] citizenship is to +be granted to those of German origin if no special objections exist. + + + Section 10 + +The nominator must be notified in writing together with a statement +of reasons of a decision by the head of the Land Association +[Landesverband] rejecting an entry into the professional roster. The +nominator may call for a decision by the professional court within +four weeks after the notice. The appeal is not permitted if the +circumstances fall within the purview of Section 8, 5th sentence. + + + Section 11 + +The head of the Land Association is required to decree the deletion +of an entry in the professional roster if the requirements set forth +in Section 5, Nos. 1, 2, 5, are not present, or the data furnished +under Nos. 1-6 has been found incorrect, or the editor has given up +his profession. Section 10, sentences 1 and 2 are correspondingly +applicable. + + + Part Three + + Exercise of the Profession of an Editor + + + Section 12 + +By registration in the professional roster, the editor becomes entitled +to execute his profession with German newspapers or with German +enterprises of the kind described in Section 4. If he moves into the +district of a different Land Association, he will be transferred to the +respective professional roster without further examination. + + + Section 13 + +Editors are charged to treat their subjects truthfully and to judge +them according to the best of their knowledge. + + + Section 14 + +Editors are especially bound to keep out of the newspapers anything +which: + +1. in any manner is misleading to the public, mixes selfish aims with +community aims, + +2. tends to weaken the strength of the German Reich, outwardly or +inwardly, the common will of the German people, the German defense +ability, culture or economy, or offends the religious sentiments of +others, + +3. offends the honor and dignity of Germany, + +4. illegally offends the honor or the welfare of another, hurts his +reputation, makes him ridiculous or contemptible, + +5. is immoral for other reasons. + + + Section 15 + +Editors are bound to exercise their profession conscientiously and by +their behavior inside or outside their professional activities prove +themselves worthy of the respect which this profession demands. + + + Section 16 + +The publisher of a newspaper may compel an editor by means of a +contract to observe the fundamental policies of a newspaper. The public +duties and rights of the editor which derive from Sections 13 to 15, +cannot be affected by policies. + + + Section 17 + +Contracts for the hiring of an editor must be in writing. + + + Section 18 + +The publisher of a newspaper must appoint an editor-in-chief and +is required to report his name in writing to the Land Association +concerned. + + + Section 19 + +The editor-in-chief is required to draw up in writing a plan for +distribution of work, from which must be evident what part of the tasks +of editing are to be taken by each editor and to what extent he has the +authority to issue directions to other editors, in accordance with the +terms of the contracts of employment and the supplementary directives +of the publisher. + + + Section 20 + +(1) Editors of a newspaper are responsible under professional, criminal +and civil law, for its intellectual content so far as they themselves +wrote or selected it. The responsibility under criminal or civil law of +other persons is not thereby excluded. + +(2) The chief editor is responsible for the over-all editorial policy +of the newspaper. + +(3) The editor-in-chief is required: + +(_a_) to take care that only such contributions are accepted as have +been written or selected for acceptance by an editor. + +(_b_) to take care that the first and last names as well as the +residence of the editor-in-chief and his deputies, as well as that of +each editor to whom a specific part of the direction of a newspaper is +delegated, is reported. + +(_c_) upon request to give information to anyone establishing a legal +interest therein, as to which editor bears the responsibility for +a contribution, so far as this is not evident from the data under +subdivision b. + + + Section 21 + +Editors who cooperate in the shaping of the intellectual contents of a +newspaper by their activity with an enterprise of the kind mentioned +in Section 4, are responsible for the contents to the extent of their +cooperation. + + + Part Four + +Protection of the Editorial Profession Afforded by the Laws Relating to + Association. + + + Section 22 + +The editorial group as a whole will watch over the fulfillment of duty +on the part of individual professional colleagues and will look after +their rights and their welfare. + + + Section 23 + +Editors are legally united to the Reich Association of the German Press +[Reichsverband der Deutschen Presse]. By virtue of his registration on +the professional roster every editor belongs to it. By virtue of this +law the Reich Association becomes a public corporation. It has its seat +in Berlin. + + + Section 24 + +(1) The Reich Minister for Public Enlightenment and Propaganda will +appoint the head of the Reich Association who will issue a charter for +the Reich Association, which will require the approval of the Minister. +The head of the Reich Association will appoint an advisory councilor. + +(2) The Reich Association is organized in Land Associations. Further +details are regulated by the charter. Editors who live abroad must +belong to a Land Association in whose district there is a newspaper or +an establishment of the kind outlined in Section 4, by which they are +employed. + + + Section 25 + +(1) The Reich Association is required: + + 1. to establish educational, advanced training and welfare + institutions for the editors, + + 2. to give expert advice to Reich and Land authorities, + + 3. to cooperate in the making of stipulations for employment of + editors, + + 4. upon request of one party, to negotiate among editors, and to + settle differences in case both parties agree. + + 5. to maintain professional courts for the press. + +(2) The Reich Association may assume additional duties for the +achievement of the purposes provided for in Section 22. + +(3) The Reich Association is authorized to impose dues on its members +in order to meet its expenses. The regulations governing this must have +the approval of Reich Minister for Public Enlightenment and Propaganda. +The dues are to be collected like public taxes. + + + Section 26 + +The Reich Minister for Public Enlightenment and Propaganda will +exercise supervision to ensure that the Reich Association fulfills +tasks which have been assigned to it. + + + Section 27 + +(1) Professional Courts [Berufsgerichte] will be established for the +protection of the editorial profession. + +(2) Professional Courts of the first instance are the District Courts +[Bezirksgerichte] of the Press. Professional Courts of the second +instance is the Press Court [Pressegerichtshof] in Berlin. + + + Section 28 + +The Professional Courts have jurisdiction: + +1. to try and to decide whether the registration in the professional +roster for cases set forth in Section 10 is to be decreed. + +2. to try and to decide upon removals under Section 11. + +3. to interpret termination clauses in editors’ contracts of employment +[Anstellungsverhaeltnisses] under Section 30. + +4. to try and to decide offenses of a professional nature on the part +of editors (proceedings of an honor court). + + + Section 29 + +The termination of employment must be in writing and must contain a +statement of reasons. + + + Section 30 + +A publisher may dismiss an editor because of the views expressed by +him in the newspaper only if they are in conflict with the public +professional duties of an editor or if they contravene the agreed +policies. The Professional Court will, at the request of the editor, +state whether the dismissal, in its opinion, has been contrary to +the provisions of the preceding sentence or amounts to an evasion of +them. Legal proceedings before the regular courts, if any have been +initiated, are to be deferred until the requested opinion has been +obtained. + + + Section 31 + +(1) An editor who fails in his public professional duties, as set forth +in Sections 13 to 15, 19, 20, subsection 3, commits a professional +misdemeanor. In such case the Professional Court may: + +1. warn the editor, + +2. punish him with a fine not exceeding the sum of one month’s +professional earning, + +3. decree the removal of his name from the professional roster. + +(2) His license to exercise the editorial profession and to call +himself an editor is terminated with such removal. + +(3) The Professional Court may temporarily deny an editor, against whom +proceedings in an honorary court have been instituted, the right to +exercise his profession. + + + Section 32 + +Professional Courts shall consist of the President and the lay judges +[Beisitzer]. Alternates are to be appointed for the President and the +lay judges. The President and the lay judges must be eligible for +the office of judge or for higher administrative offices. They must +possess judicial independence. The lay judges and their alternates +have to be editors and publishers in equal numbers. All members of the +Professional Courts are appointed by the Reich Minister for Public +Enlightenment and Propaganda. The head of the Reich Association will +nominate the editors, while the head of the Organization of Publishers +in the Reich Press Chamber will nominate the publishers. + + + Section 33 + +The District Press Courts with five members, the Press Court +[Pressegerichtshof] with 7 members, the President being included in +both cases. + + + Section 34 + +The procedure before the Professional Courts will be regulated by a +code of procedure which is decreed by the Reich Minister for Public +Enlightenment and Propaganda in agreement with the Reich Minister +for Justice after obtaining the opinion of the head of the Reich +Association. + + + Section 35 + +The Reich Minister for Public Enlightenment and Propaganda may decree +the removal of an editor from the professional list independent of the +proceedings of the Professional Court, if he deems it necessary for +pressing reasons of public welfare. + + + Part Five + + Protection of the Editorial Profession Afforded by the Penal Laws + + + Section 36 + +Whosoever works as an editor despite the fact he is not registered in +the professional rosters, or despite the fact that the exercise of +his profession has been prohibited temporarily, will be punished with +imprisonment up to one year, or fined. + + + Section 37 + +A publisher who entrusts a person who is not registered in the +professional rosters or an editor who has been temporarily suspended +from the exercise of his profession with the work of an editor as +a main profession, or who maintains a newspaper without having +appointed a chief editor, according to Section 18, will be punished by +imprisonment of up to 3 months or by a fine. + + + Section 38 + +An editor who demands, accepts a promise of, or accepts a remuneration +or any other advantage for an action which violates Sections 13 or 14, +will be punished with imprisonment or fined. + + + Section 39 + +Whosoever attempts to induce an editor or a publisher or his deputy, by +an office, promise or granting an advantage, to undertake, bring about +or tolerate the shaping of the intellectual content of a newspaper, in +violation of Sections 13 or 14, will be punished with imprisonment or +fined for bribery of the press. + + + Section 40 + +(1) Whosoever attempts to induce an editor or a publisher or his deputy +by means of threats to undertake, bring about or tolerate the shaping +of the intellectual content of a newspaper in violation of Sections +13 or 14 will be punished with imprisonment or fined for unlawful +interference with the press. + +(2) If the unlawful interference with the press is exerted by misuse of +the dependent employee-status of the editor, then the punishment must +be not less than 3 months imprisonment. + + + Section 41 + +In cases under Sections 38 to 40 the judgment may include less of civil +rights in addition to imprisonment. + + + Section 42 + +Whosoever assumes the title of an editor, despite the fact he is not +registered in the professional roster, will be punished by fine of up +to 150 Reichsmark or by imprisonment [haeft]. + + + Section 43 + +The license of a publisher against whom there is a final judgment for +violation of provisions contained in Sections 37, 39 and 40, may be +revoked by the administrative authority having jurisdiction in such +matters under the laws of the State. + + + Part Six + + Concluding Provisions + + + Section 44 + +Regulations enabling delegates of a law-making body to limit +prosecutions are not applicable to cases under sections 31 to 35 of +this law. + + + Section 45 + +(1) Sections 7, 8, of the Reich Law relating to the Press of 7 May +1874 (RGBl I page 65) are not applicable to newspapers and political +periodicals. + +(2) Otherwise the provisions of the Reich Press Law relating to +the responsible Editor in charge [Redakteur] are applicable to the +responsible editor [Schriftleiter or Hauptschriftleiter] of newspapers +and political periodicals, insofar as Section 20, subsection 1 and +Section 21 of this law are concerned. + + + Section 46 + +The Reich Minister for Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda in +agreement with the other Reich Ministers concerned may issue directives +for the execution of these laws and for conversion from the old legal +basis to the new one. + + + Section 47 + +The Reich Minister for Public Enlightenment and Propaganda will set the +date on which this law becomes valid. + +Berlin, 4 October 1933 + + The Reich Chancellor + Adolf Hitler + + The Reich Minister for Public + Enlightenment and Propaganda + Dr. Goebbels + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2084-PS + + 1933 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 215 + +Law on the Formation of Student Organizations at Scientific Universities + + 22 April 1933. + +The Government of the Reich has decreed the following law which is +promulgated herewith: + + + _Section 1_ + +Students of German descent and mother tongue, fully registered with +a scientific University shall constitute the Student-body of such +University, regardless of their citizenship. + + + _Section 2_ + +The Student-body is a part of the University and represents the +students as a whole. It shall be instrumental in ensuring that students +fulfill their duties towards the people, the State, and the University. + + + _Section 3_ + +Details relating to organization and work of the student-bodies will be +determined by Land governments’ Student Regulations and by the by-laws +of the Universities and the Student-bodies. + + Berlin, 22 April 1933. + + The Reich Chancellor + ADOLF HITLER + + The Reich Minister of the Interior + FRICK + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2088-PS + + 1934 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 375 + + Decree Relating to Tasks of the Reich Ministry for Education of 11 May + 1934 + +Pursuant to the decree of the Reich President of 1 May 1934 (RGBl I, p. +365) I determine that the following affairs are transferred from the +jurisdiction of the Reich Ministry of Interior to the Reich Ministry of +Education: + +1. Science + + German scientific matters, also in their relation to foreign + countries, + + Physical-Technical Institute, + + Chemical-Technical Institute, + + Seismographical Institute, + + Important Scientific Institutes inside and outside Germany, + + Scientific Libraries, + + Folklore, + + Archeological Institute. + +2. Education and Instruction: + + High School-matters, + + Support of students, “Reichsschaft” leaders of the students in German + High Schools and + + Craft Schools, + + General School matters, + + Elementary schools, + + Private schools, + + Craft and Technical Schools, + + German school affairs in foreign countries, + + Schools in foreign countries. + +3. Youth Organizations. + +4. Education of Adults. + +The Reich Minister for Education is the authority in the outlined +fields for the tasks including legislation. The participation of other +Reich-Ministers is governed by general principles. + +Berlin, 11 May 1934. + + The Reich Chancellor + ADOLF HITLER + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2089-PS + + 1933 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 241 + + Decree relating to the Reich Air Ministry of 5 May 1933. + +A Reich Air Ministry is established as the highest Reich authority for +Aviation. The Chief of this office shall have the title “Reich Air +Minister.” + +Jurisdiction will include the functions of the Reich in Aviation; the +functions and authority of the now abolished Reichskommissar [Reich +Commissioner] for Aviation are transferred to the “Reich Air Minister.” + +This decree is effective from 1 May 1933. + +Berlin, 5 May 1933. + + The Reichpresident + von Hindenburg + + The Reich Chancellor + Adolf Hitler + + The Reich Commissioner for Aviation + Goering + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2090-PS + + 1935 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 1029 + + Decree relating to the Coordination of the Jurisdiction of the Reich + and Prussia in relation to Church Affairs of 16 July 1935 + +Those church affairs, which have hitherto come within the jurisdiction +of the Reich and Prussian Ministry of the Interior as well as by +the Reich and Prussian Ministry for Science, Education and National +Culture, are transferred to the Reich Minister without Portfolio KERRL. + +The Reich and Prussian Ministers concerned will issue more specific +regulations for the execution of this decree. + +Berlin, 16 July 1935. + + The Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor + Adolf Hitler + + The Reich Minister of the Interior + Frick + + The Reich Minister for Science, Education and National Culture + Rust + + The Prussian Minister President + By order + Koerner + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2091-PS + + 1940 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 513 + + Decree of the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor Appointing a Reich Minister + for Armaments and Munitions + + 17 April 1940 + +In order to consolidate the highest leadership of all offices engaged +in the production of armaments and munitions in the Greater German +Reich including the German Government for occupied Polish territories, +I am appointing a Reich Minister for Armaments and Munitions. I appoint +as Reich Minister for Armaments and Munitions the General Inspector of +the German Highways Dr. Engineer Todt. The issuance of administrative +regulations are reserved by me. + +Berlin, 17 March 1940. + + The Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor + Adolf Hitler + + The President + for the Council of the Ministry for the Defense of the Reich + + Goering + General Field Marshal + + The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces + Keitel + + The Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery + Dr. Lammers + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2092-PS + + 1943 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 529 + + Decree of the Fuehrer for the Concentration of the War Economy 2 + September 1943 + +Considering the closer coordination and the unified employment of all +economic forces, demanded by the necessities of war, I order for the +duration of the war: + + + Article 1 + +The Reich Minister of Economy is competent for the basic +economic-political questions of German economy. + + + Article 2 + +The competence of the Reich Minister for Economy in the realm of raw +materials and production in industry and the trades are transferred +to the Reich Minister for Armament and Munitions. The Reich Minister +for Armament and Munitions will carry the designation, because of his +enlarged realm of activity, of + + “Reich Minister for Armament and War Production.” + + + Article 3 + +(1) The Reich Minister for Economy remains competent for the supply of +civilian population with consumer goods and for their rationing. + +(2) The Reich Minister for Economy is competent in the realm of raw +materials and of the production in industry and trades and in the +realm of commerce for the treatment of foreign commerce questions +within the frame of the foreign trade policy of the Reich. + +(3) Furthermore, he is responsible within the realm of the entire +foreign trade, for the maintenance of the general economic viewpoints +in the framework of the active German economic planning, and to direct +German economy accordingly. + +(4) The competence of the Reich Minister of Foreign Affairs in regard +to the foreign trade policy of the Reich, and in regard to the +preparation and execution of foreign trade policy conferences, remains +untouched. + + + Article 4 + +(1) The Reich Minister for Economy is charged with the topmost +supervision over the credit institutes, the supervisory and +administrative rights, which belong, according to law or constitution, +to the subordinated Reich or state authorities, are transferred to +him. He delegates the supervisory or administrative rights to the +subordinated officials, so far as he is not required to take care of +them himself for special reasons. + +(2) He is competent for the financial questions of the German economy. + + + Article 5 + +The authorities of the Reichsmarshal of the greater German Reich as +Commissioner for the Four-Year Plan, remain untouched. + + + Article 6 + +This proclamation applies to the area of the greater German Reich +including the incorporated Eastern territories and the Protectorate. +In the protectorate also, the Reich Minister for Armament and War +Production is competent in the realm of raw materials and the +production in industry and the trades. + + + Article 7 + +The legal and administrative regulations, necessary for the execution +and completion of articles 2, 3, and 4, will be issued: For Article 2 +by the Reich Minister for Armament and War Production together with the +Reich Minister for economy. For Articles 3 and 4 by the Reich Minister +for Economy in agreement with the Reich Ministers concerned. + +Fuehrer Headquarters, 2 September 1943. + + The Fuehrer + Adolf Hitler + + The Reich Minister and Chief of Reich Chancellery + Dr. Lammers + + + PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2093-PS + + 1934 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 617 + + First Executive Order relating to the transfer of Forestry and Hunting + Matters to the Reich of 12 July 1934 + + + Article 1 + + Section (2) + +The Reich Conservator of Forests [Reichsforestmeister] has as Chief of +the Reich Board of Woods and Forests the position and the authority of +a Reichminister. + +* * * * * * * + +Berlin, 12 July 1934. + + The Reichminister of the Interior + Frick + + The Reich Forester + Goering + + The Reich Minister for Food and Agriculture + R. Walther Darre + + + PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2094-PS + + 1937 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 95 + + Decree of the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor Concerning the Reich Labor + Leader in the Reich Ministry of the Interior of 30 January 1937 + +* * * * * * * + + + ARTICLE 3 + +The Reich Labor leader in the Reich Ministry of the Interior will +participate in sessions of the Reich Cabinet, in so far as matters +under his jurisdiction are concerned. + +Berlin, 30 Jan 1934. + + The Fuehrer and Reichs Chancellor + Adolf Hitler + + The Reich Minister of the Interior + Frick + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2095-PS + + 1943 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 495 + + Decree of the Fuehrer on the Establishment of a Supreme Reich + Authority-- “The Reich Labor Leader” of 20 August 1943. + +In Amendment of the Reich Labor Service Law, in the form of the +proclamation of 9 September 1939 (RGBl I, p. 1747), and of my decree of +30 January 1937 (RGBl I, p. 95), I ordain: + + + I + +Under the title “The Reich Labor Leader,” a Supreme Reich Authority +will be established, with a seat in Berlin. + + + II + +(1) The Reich Labor Service is under the jurisdiction of the Reich +Labor Leader. + +(2) The powers of the Reichminister of the Interior derived from +laws, decrees and orders concerning the Reich Labor Service will be +transferred to the Reich Labor Leader. The processing of matters +concerning the Reich Labor Service will no longer fall under the +competence of the Reichminister of the Interior. + +(3) The Reich Labor Leader is under my immediate jurisdiction. + +Fuehrer Headquarters, 20 August 1943. + + The Fuehrer + Adolf Hitler + + The Reichminister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery + Dr. Lammers + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2097-PS + + 1937 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 1317 + + Decree of the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor relating to Designation of + the Chief of the Praesidialkanzlei of 1 December 1937 + +The State secretary and chief of the Praesidialkanzlei will carry in +the future the official designation “State Minister and chief of the +Praesidialkanzlei of the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor.” He will be +equal in rank to a Reich Minister. + +Berlin, 1 Dec 1937 + + The Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor + Adolf Hitler + + The State Secretary and Chief of the + Praesidialkanzlei + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2098-PS + + 1938 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 215 + +Decree relating to the Status of the Supreme Commanders of the Army and + Navy of 25 Feb 1938 + +The Supreme Commander of the Army, General von Brauchitsch, carries the +equivalent rank of a Minister of the Reich--as has already been the +case with the Supreme Commander of the Navy, Admiral Dr. h.c. Raeder. + +Following my orders, the Supreme Commanders of the Army and Navy shall +participate in the meetings of the Reich Cabinet. + +Order No. 461 of April 20, 1936 (Heeresverordnungsblatt page 163) is +rescinded. + +Munich, 25 Feb 1938 + + The Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor + Adolf Hitler + + The Reich Minister and Chief of the + Reich Chancellery + Dr. Lammers + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2099-PS + + 1941 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 295 + +Fuehrer Decree Relating to the Chief of the Party Chancellery of 29 May + 1941 + +By order of May 12, 1941, I decree for the National Socialist German +Labor Party that the hitherto existing office of Deputy Fuehrer should +be designated from then on as Party Chancellery under my personal +jurisdiction. In order to guarantee closest collaboration of the +Party Chancellery with the Supreme Reich Authorities, I order in this +connection: + +The Chief of the Party Chancellery, Reich Leader Martin Bormann, has +the powers of a Reich Minister; he is member of the Reich Government +and the Ministerial Council for Reich Defense. Wherever in connection +with laws, orders, decrees, ordinances, and other regulations the +term “Deputy Fuehrer” is used, it will be replaced by “Chief of the +Party Chancellery.” The instructions necessary for the execution and +supplementing of this decree will be given by the Reich Minister and +Chief of the Reich Chancellery in agreement with the Chief of the Party +Chancellery. + + Headquarters of the Fuehrer, 29 May 1941 + The Fuehrer + Adolf Hitler + + The Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery + Dr. Lammers + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2100-PS + + 1942 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 35 + + Directive + + About the application of the Fuehrer decree regarding the position of + the chief of the Party Chancellery, dated 16 January 1942. + +Based on the Fuehrer decree about the position of the chief of the +Party Chancellery, dated 29 May 1941, (RGBl I, page 295) the following +is decreed: + + + Par. 1 + +(1) The participation of the Party in legislation is handled +exclusively through the chief of the Party Chancellery unless otherwise +directed by the Fuehrer. Proposals and suggestions for legislation +coming from the Party, its organizations and affiliated associations, +may be submitted to the competent supreme Reich authorities only +through the chief of the Party Chancellery. + +(2) The same procedure regarding collaboration of the Party in +personnel questions of civil servants will be used exclusively through +the chief of the Party Chancellery. + + + Par. 2 + +In legislative functions the position of the chief of the Party +Chancellery will be that of a participating Reich Minister in all +cases. The supreme Reich authority will therefore include him in +the preparations for Reich laws, for decrees and directives of the +Fuehrer, for directives of the Counsels of Ministers for the Defense +of the Reich, as well as directives of the supreme Reich authorities +to include executive directives and general directives. The same +applies to his concurrence with laws and directives of the states and +directives of the Reich deputies [Reichsstadthalter]. + + + Par. 3 + +In fundamental and political questions, in particular those which serve +to prepare, change or put into effect laws, decrees and directives, +the channels between the supreme Reich authorities and the supreme +authorities of the states which include several Gaue on the one +hand, and the offices of the Party, its organizations and affiliated +associates on the other hand, go through the chief of the Party +Chancellery. Direct communication between the supreme Reich authorities +and the supreme State authorities with other offices of the Party is +not permissible in these cases. This applies to personnel matters +regarding civil servants in as far as there are no special regulations. + + Fuehrer Headquarters, 16 January 1942. + + The Reichs Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery + Dr. Lammers + + The Chief of the Party Chancellery + M. Bormann + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2101-PS + + 1941 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 192 + + Decree of the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor concerning the Inspector +General of the German Highways Administration of the 3rd of April 1941. + +The Inspector General of the German Highways Administration has the +power of a Reich Minister. + +Berlin, April 3, 1941 + + The Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor + Adolf Hitler + + The Reichminister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery + Dr. Lammers + + + PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2102-PS + + 1941 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 467 + + Decree of the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor concerning the Inspector + General for Water and Power of 29 July 1941 + +In consideration of the special needs of the war and the necessity +of unified planning in the Greater German Territory I appoint for +the administration and reconstitution of the power development and +the Power and Water administration an Inspector General for Water +and Power. He has within the field for his activity the position and +authority of a Reichminister and a Prussian Minister. His office is the +highest Reich authority and the highest Provincial authority in Prussia. + +To the office of Inspector General for Water and Power I nominate the +Inspector General for the German Highways, Reichsminister Dr. Todt. + + + I. Power Administration + +(1) The responsibilities of the Reichsminister for Economics in the +realm of power administration especially according to the law for the +advancement of the power administration (Power administration law) of +December 13, 1935 (Reichsgesetzblatt I, Page 1451) are transferred to +the Inspector General for Water and Power. + +(2) Art. 1 Sect. 2 of the power administration law receives the +following interpretation: + +“(2) The supervision is done by the Inspector General for Water and +Power.” + +(3) The Reichsminister for Economics remains responsible for + +_a._ the determination of the electrical current demands of the +industry and the requesting of the necessary amounts of power; + +_b._ the preparation of the materials and coal required by the power +industry; + +_c._ the approval for the use of the stock market for the purpose of +the power industry in accordance with the generally valid regulations +and the adjustment of the claims of the power industry on the money and +stock market with regards to the requirements of the entire industrial +economy; + +_d._ the approval for the rearrangement of the legal constitution +of enterprises of the power industry especially for registered +corporations, and for the introduction of new legal constitution in the +field of the registered trade corporation. + + + II. Water Administration + +(1) The responsibilities of the Reichminister and Prussian Minister for +Food and Agriculture and of the Reichminister and Prussian Minister for +Transportation in the field of Water Administration and the waterways +are transferred to the Inspector General for Water and Power. + +(2) The Reich--and Prussian Minister for Food and Agriculture remains +responsible for the Agricultural matters in the Water Administration, +namely for the carrying out of the agricultural accommodations +[Folgoeinrichtungen]. The Inspector General for Water and Power +decides, in agreement with the Reichminister for Food and Agriculture, +concerning the carrying out of improvements in Agriculture and in the +Fisheries as well as concerning the bearable burdens of the land owners. + +(3) The Reich--and Prussian Minister for Transportation remains +responsible for the traffic on the waterways. + +(4) The Inspector General for Water and Power may transfer the +technical supervision concerning the planning and the carrying out of +Water Administrative measures and harbor constructions, to the water +construction agencies, in so far as the execution does not lie in the +hands of official agencies. + + + III. Mutual Regulations + +(1) The Inspector General for Water and Power takes over at the very +latest by April 1, 1942 the personnel of the Reich and of Prussia, +which are occupied with the assignments now transferred to him. The +Reichminister for Economics, the Reichminister for Food and Agriculture +and the Reichminister for Transportation will immediately make +available to him the pertinent business groups. Also included in this +transfer are the furnishings and office material belonging thereto. +The details of the transfer will be agreed upon by the participating +Reichministers. + +(2) For the execution of his missions the Inspector General for Water +and Power may create corporations, institutions of a public legal +nature or commercial legal companies, or other institutions in using +new legal procedures. + +(3) The Reichminister for the Interior and the Inspector for the field +of responsibility transferred to them under inclusion of the road +administration to prepare the development of a uniform administration +within the framework of the general administration + + The Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor + Adolf Hitler + + The Reichminister and Chief + of the Party Chancellory + Dr. Lammers + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2103-PS + + 1943 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 295 + + Decree of the Fuehrer on the Cabinet Legislation of 10 May 1943 + +Considering that the law of 24 March 1933 (RGBl I, p. 141) expires +formally on 10 May 1943, I ordain: + +The Reich Cabinet has to continue to exercise the powers entrusted to +it by the law of 24 March 1933. + +I reserve it to myself, to bring about the confirmation of these powers +of the Reich Cabinet by the Greater German Reichstag. + +Headquarters of the Fuehrer, 10 May 1943. + + The Fuehrer + Adolf Hitler + + The Reich Minister and Chief of + the Reich Chancellory. + Dr. Lammers. + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2104-PS + + 1933 PREUSSISCHE GESETZSAMMLUNG, PAGE 122 + + Law on the organization of a Secret State Police Office + +The State Ministry has resolved on the following law: + + + Article 1 + +(1) The Secret State Police, with headquarters in Berlin, is organized +in order to carry out the duties of political police with or in place +of the ordinary police authorities (Article 2, paragraph 1 of the Code +of Police Administration of June 1, 1931, Gesetzsammlung p. 77). The +Secret State Police Office has the rank of a higher police authority +and is subordinate only to the Minister of the Interior. + +(2) The Minister of the Interior determines the functional and +territorial jurisdiction of the Secret State Police Office. + +(3) The regulations of the Code of Police Administration of June 1, +1931 concerning appeals against orders of the higher police authorities +are applicable in so far as the Administrative Court in Berlin has +exclusive jurisdiction over court appeals against orders of the Secret +State Police Office. + + + Article 2 + +Within its jurisdiction, the Secret State Police Office can make +requests for police action to all police authorities. + + + Article 3 + +The Minister of the Interior is entitled to issue administrative orders +for the execution of this law. He acts in agreement with the Minister +of Finance in regard to the number and type of officials and employees +who should be employed by the Secret State Police Office. + + + Article 4 + +The law goes into effect on the day of its promulgation. + +Berlin 24 April, 1933 + + The Prussian Ministry of State + /ss/ Goering and by Popitz + and for the Minister of the Interior + +The above law, resolved by the Prussian State Ministry, is herewith +promulgated. + + Berlin 26 April 1933 + /ss/ For the Reich Chancellor: + The Prussian Prime Minister + Goering + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2105-PS + + 1933 PREUSSISCHE GESETZSAMMLUNG, PAGE 413 + + Law on the Secret State Police of November 30, 1933 + +The State Ministry has resolved the following law: + + + Article 1 + +(1) The Secret State Police is an independent branch of the +Administration of the Interior. The Prime Minister is its chief. He +appoints an Inspector of the Secret State Police as acting manager of +the affairs. + +(2) In case of absence, the State Secretary of the State Ministry acts +as deputy of the Prime Minister in his capacity as Chief of the Secret +State Police. + +(3) The Inspector of the Secret State Police is also chief of the +Secret State Office. + + + Article 2 + +The jurisdiction of the Secret State Police covers all political police +matters of the general and interior administration. The Prime Minister +as Chief of the Secret State Police, will issue the regulations +regarding the matters which must be transferred to the Secret State +Police. + + + Article 3 + +(1) With the enactment of this law the Secret State Police Office takes +over matters of a political nature which were previously handled by the +Ministry of the Interior. + +(2) The district, county and local police authorities [Landes Kreis und +Ortspolizeibehoerden] are subject to the directives of the Secret State +Police Office. + + + Article 4 + +The Minister of Finance is empowered to make changes in the budget of +the State in order to carry out this law. + + + Article 5 + +Provisions of the law of April 26, 1933 (Gesetzsammlung 1933, p. 122) +which conflict with this law are superseded by this law. + + + Article 6 + +This law goes into effect with its promulgation. + +Berlin, November 30, 1933 + + The Prussian State Ministry, + /ss/ Goering Popitz + and as Minister of Interior + +The above law, as resolved by the Prussian State Ministry, is herewith +promulgated. + + For the Reich Chancellor: + For the Prussian Prime Minister + Goering + + + PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2107-PS + + 1936 PREUSSISCHE GESETZSAMMLUNG, PAGES 21-22. + + (No. 14308) Law on the Secret State Police of 10 February 1936 + + + Section VII + +Orders in matters of the Secret State Police are not subject to the +review of the Administrative Courts. + +* * * * * * * + +Berlin, 10 February 1936 + + THE PRUSSIAN STATE MINISTRY + GOERING FRICK + + + PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2108-PS + +1936 PREUSSISCHE GESETZSAMMLUNG, PAGES 22-24 + + Issue No. 5 distributed in Berlin, 12 Feb 1936. No. 14309 + + Decree for execution of the Law on the Secret State Police of 10 + February 1936 + +On the basis of Articles 1 and 8 of the Law on the Secret State Police +of the 10 February 1936 (Prussian Legal Gazette, page 21) is decreed: + + + Art. 1 + +The Gestapo is authorized to carry out the police investigations in +high treason, treason and explosive cases, as well as other punishable +aggressive actions against Party and State. + + + Art. 2 + +(1) In the proper competence of the Secret State Police, the Secret +State Police Bureau is authorized to undertake measures in the entire +territory of Prussia and measures effective for the entire territory. + +(2) The Secret State Police Bureau assumes the competence of the +Supreme Federal State Authorities in cases of the Law on guns and +munitions of the 13 July 1928 (Reichs Legal Gazette I, page 198). + +(3) The Secret State Police Bureau is a central collecting agency for +political police information. + +(4) The Secret State Police Bureau administers the state concentration +camps. + +(5) In Berlin the Secret State Police Bureau assumes the competence of +the Secret State Police for the Federal-State-County and local police +affairs. Whether, and to what extent these tasks will be transferred to +the State Police office in Berlin--will be determined by the Chief of +the Secret State Police. + + + Art. 3 + +The State Police offices may, within the framework of the competence +of the Secret State Police, take all the measures incumbent upon +the Secret State Police with the exception of the prohibition of +periodicals in their district. + + + Art. 4 + +(1) Insofar as it is necessary for the detection and fighting of +aspirations which are directed against the State, the authorities of +the county and local police in towns of more than 5000 inhabitants may +decree the confiscation of printed material and restrictions regarding +the rights of association and assembly for the support of the Secret +State Police. The county and local police authorities have to obey +within this realm the instructions of the responsible office of the +State Police. + +(2) The State Police office at its location executes also the functions +of the local police within the framework of responsibility of the +Secret State Police. + + + Art. 5 + +The Secret State Police is an independent branch of the interior +administration. Its officials, employees and paid personnel belong to +the interior administration. Its highest superior is the Chief of the +Secret State Police. + + + Art. 6 + +The head of the Secret State Police office will represent the Deputy +Chief of the Secret State Police in all official business functions. + + + Art. 7 + +The Secret State Police office may, within the framework of +responsibility resting upon the Secret State Police, make requests +to the heads of provincial and county governments [Ober--und +Regierungspraesidenten], as well as to all police agencies. The heads +of the provincial and county governments have to obey the instructions +of the Secret State Police office with respect to affairs concerning +the Secret State Police. + + + Art. 8 + +(1) The State Police offices are located at the seat of the government. +The chief of the Secret State Police can, in agreement with the +Minister of Interior, make exceptions from this principle. + +(2) An index of the State Police offices is added in the appendix. + + + Art. 9 + +(1) The heads of the State Police offices and political specialists +[Sachbearbeiter] of the provincial governors will be determined by the +Chief of the Secret State Police in agreement with the Minister of the +Interior. + +(2) In case the head of the State Police Office is prevented from +doing so, the functions of the political specialist of the provincial +governor will be taken care of by the official who is destined as +permanent deputy of the head of the State Police Office. He will be +designated by the Chief of the Secret State Police in agreement with +the Minister of Interior. + + + Art. 10 + +The State Police offices may make their requests to all police +authorities of their district. In counties, the request has, as a +matter of principle to be directed to the County Governor [Landrat]; +in the urgent cases it will suffice to inform the County Council. The +reports of the authorities subordinated to the County Governor have +to be sent to the State Police offices through the County Council; in +urgent cases it will suffice to inform the County Council at the same +time. + + + Art. 11 + +The authorities of the County Police have to report directly to the +responsible state police office on all important political occurrences +and observations. + + + Art. 12 + +Insofar as officials of the Secret State Police within the framework of +the authority of the Secret State Police, take over the tasks incumbent +upon the authorities and officials of the police--and security services +according to the regulations of the code for criminal proceedings, they +are acting as auxiliary officials of the Chief Prosecutor of the Reich +[Oberreichsanwalt] or of the State Prosecutor for the District Court +[Oberstaatsanwalt] who is locally responsible. + + + Art. 13 + +The Chief of the Secret State Police disposes of the funds set +aside for the Secret State Police in the budget of the interior +administration. + + + Art. 14 + +The Ministerialblatt of the Reich--and Prussian Ministry of the +Interior is the official gazette for the Chief and Deputy Chief of the +Secret State Police. + + + Art. 15 + +This decree will be effective on the day after its publication. + +Berlin, 10 February 1936 + + The Prussian Prime Minister + GOERING + + The Reich--and Prussian Minister of the Interior + FRICK + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2111-PS + + 1941 VERORDNUNGSBLATT, PAGE 190 + + Order of the Reich Commissioner for the Occupied Netherlands + Territories concerning the Establishment of Administrative Courts + Martial + +Pursuant to Section 5 of the decree of the Fuehrer concerning the +exercise of governmental authority in the Netherlands, of May 18, 1940 +(RGBl I, p. 778) I hereby order as follows: + + + Section 1 + +(1) The Reich Commissioner for the occupied Netherlands territories +may, if he shall deem it necessary for the maintenance or restoration +of public order and security, establish administrative courts martial +for these territories or for certain areas within these territories. + +(2) The establishment of administrative courts martial shall become +effective as soon as it is announced. Such announcement shall be made +by posters along public roads, streets and squares, by radio, by the +press, or according to local custom. The abolition of administrative +courts martial shall be made public the same manner. + +(3) Simultaneously with the establishment of administrative courts +martial, shall be decreed that everyone shall refrain from all +activities which might disturb or endanger public order and security, +and that everyone must comply with special orders issued by the +Reich Commissioner, in which he shall make particular reference to +the strictness of the administrative courts martial. Any person +acting contrary hereto shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the +administrative courts martial. + + + Section 2 + +Unless the Reich Commissioner shall order otherwise, the provisions +of Sections 3 to 8 shall be effective for the areas in which +administrative courts martial have been established, so long as these +courts are maintained. + + + Section 3 + +(1) The Higher S.S. and the Police Leader shall take all measures +deemed necessary by him for the maintenance or restoration of public +order and security. + +(2) He may promulgate rules and regulations, having the force and +effect of laws, which are necessary for the fulfillment of his +functions. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 7, such rules and +regulations may contain penal clauses subjecting a defendant to fines +of unlimited amount, imprisonment or jail. They shall be published in +accordance with the provisions of Section 1, paragraph 2, sentence 2. + +(3) In the fulfillment of his duties, the Higher S.S. and the Police +Leader may deviate from existing law. + + + Section 4 + +(1) The Reich Commissioner shall appoint a Special Agent for the entire +area for which an administrative court martial has been decreed. + +(2) The Special Agent shall be the head of the entire public +administration, excluding the police administration, unless the Higher +S.S. and the Police Leader assumes administrative tasks in accordance +with Section 3, paragraph 1. + +(3) The Special Agent shall promulgate rules and regulations necessary +for the fulfillment of his functions. Notwithstanding the provisions +contained in Section 7, they may contain penal clauses subjecting a +defendant to fines of unlimited amount, imprisonment, or jail. They +shall be published in accordance with the provisions of Section 1, +paragraph 2, sentence 2. + +(4) In the fulfillment of his duties, the Special Agent may deviate +from existing law. + +(5) The Reich Commissioner shall have the right to appoint Special +Agents, even for certain parts of the area in which administrative +courts martial have been established. + + + Section 5 + +The activities of all public representative committees which made +decisions as a body, shall be suspended. Their powers and duties shall +be transferred to the chief administrative authority concerned with +the subject matter (for example, commissioner of the province, major, +overseer of dikes, etc.). + + + Section 6 + +The validity of regulations issued by the Secretaries General in the +Netherlands Ministries in accordance with Section 3, paragraph 2, +sentence 2, of Order No. 3/1940, or by virtue of Order No. 23/1940, +shall be dependent upon prior consent by the Special Agent (Section 4). + + + Section 7 + +Any person shall be subject to court martial who, after the +establishment of an administrative court martial, shall intentionally +participate in activities likely to disturb or to endanger public order +and security, or who intentionally violates special orders of the Reich +Commissioner issued in accordance with Section 1, paragraph 3. Such +person shall be punishable by death or, in less serious cases, by hard +labor either for life or for a period of not less than ten years. + + + Section 8 + +(1) The German Superior Court shall operate as a court martial in +accordance with the procedure established in the Old Reich for +proceedings before Special Courts. + +(2) The provisions regarding judicial procedure for the German Armed +Forces and the jurisdiction of Special Courts in criminal cases +concerning members of the S.S. and of the police forces assigned to +special duty, shall not be affected by this order; Section 11 of Order +No. 52/1940, regarding the possibility of referring certain criminal +cases to the jurisdiction of Special Courts, shall likewise remain +unaffected. + +(3) The judges of the court martial shall be appointed by the +Reich Commissioner. The Court Martial shall be considered lawfully +constituted even if only one judge has the educational qualifications +required for judicial tenure. + +(4) Death sentences shall be executed by shooting. + + + Section 9 + +This order becomes effective on the day of publication. + + + The Hague, March 19, 1941 SEYSS-INQUART + + Reich Commissioner for the Occupied Netherlands Territories. 2 7 2 + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2112-PS + + 1941 VERORDNUNGSBLATT, PAGE 655 + + Order of the Reich Commissioner for the Occupied Netherlands + Territories concerning Jewish Real Estate--11 August 1941 + +By virtue of article 5 of the decree of the Fuehrer concerning the +exercise of Governmental authority in the Netherlands, of May 18, 1940 +(RGBl I, p. 778) I order as follows: + + + Part I + + DEFINITION + + + Section 1 + +(1) Jewish real estate, as defined in this order is any real estate +which belongs in whole or in part: + + 1. To a Jew, as defined in Section 4 of Order No. 189/1940, + concerning the registration of enterprises; + + 2. To an enterprise which is required to register by virtue of Order + No. 189/1940; + + 3. To a private corporation, an association, an institution, + a foundation or any other endowment, if one of the conditions + of Section 2 of Order No. 189/1940 is fulfilled, although the + organization in question is not an enterprise within the meaning of + that order. + +(2) Jewish real estate for the purpose of this order is, further, any +right in real estate, as well as any mortgage, to which a person, an +enterprise, an association, an institution, a foundation or any other +endowment, as defined in paragraph (1), is entitled in its entirety or +in part. + +(3) The owner or beneficiary, for the purpose of this order, is the +holder of title to the property, the possessor of a right in the real +estate, or the mortgage creditor. + + + Section 2 + +The provisions of this order shall not apply to real estate covered by +the provisions of Order No. 102/1941, concerning the registration and +treatment of agricultural real estate in Jewish hands (Order for the +Exclusion of Jews from Agriculture). + + + Part II + + REQUIREMENT OF REGISTRATION + + + Section 3 + +(1) Jewish real estate must be registered in writing with the +Netherlands Real Estate Administration, The Hague, Juliana van +Stolberglaan 45, by the use of a form which may be obtained from the +Chambers of Industry and Commerce. + +(2) Registration must be made before September 15, 1941. Any real +estate acquired only after this order has become effective, must be +registered within one month after such acquisition. + +(3) The owner or beneficiary of real estate must register it. Any +person who is entitled to represent the owner or beneficiary, or who is +entitled to administrate such real estate, must also register it. + + + Section 4 + +(1) A person required to register must fill out the registration form +completely and truthfully. + +(2) Copies of the following documents must be filed with registration +form, if they are in the possession of the person registering: + + 1. Excerpts from the Land-Register and the Mortgage-Register; + + 2. Contracts of sale and other documents concerning the acquisition + of the real estate; + + 3. Contracts of lease or tenancy, or other documents showing an + existing use. + +(3) The Netherlands Real Estate Administration is empowered to require +further information and the production of books, vouchers, and any +other documents. + + + Section 5 + +(1) Every parcel of real estate, every right in real estate and +every mortgage which on or before May 9, 1940, belonged to a person, +an enterprise, an association, an institution, a foundation or any +other endowment, as defined in Section 1, paragraph 1, or to which +such person, enterprise, association, institution, foundation or +other endowment was entitled, and which, before this order has become +effective, has been transferred to any other person, must likewise be +registered. + +(2) The owner or beneficiary as defined in paragraph 1, and his +representative, as well as his immediate successor in title and the +representative of the latter, are required to perform this registration. + +(3) Registration must be filed in writing before September 15, 1941, +with the Netherlands Real Estate Administration. The registration +must be accompanied by excerpts from the Land-Register and the +Mortgage-Register, as well as by the contracts of sale and other +documents concerning the legal transfer to which reference was made in +paragraph 1. Section 4, paragraph 3, shall not be applicable. + + + Section 6 + +The registration requirements shall not apply to real estate: + + 1. Which has been registered pursuant to Order No. 26/1940, + concerning the handling of enemy property; + + 2. Which belongs or did belong to an association or foundation which + has been registered by virtue of Order No. 145/1940, concerning the + registration of non-commercial associations and endowments; + + 3. Which has been reported in the registration of an enterprise, + pursuant to Section 6 of Order No. 189/1940. + + + Part III + + ADMINISTRATION + + + Section 7 + +(1) The Netherlands Real Estate Administration shall be empowered to +take over Jewish real estate for administration. + +(2) It shall be empowered to appoint third persons for such +administration. + + + Section 8 + +(1) As soon as real estate has been taken over for administration, the +Netherlands Real Estate Administration shall be empowered to execute +all transactions, by court procedure or otherwise, which are necessary +in the regular course of administration; it may alienate real estate in +its entirety or in part, and may also mortgage it. The Netherlands Real +Estate Administration shall be empowered to transfer these powers in +their entirety or in part to the persons whom it has appointed for the +administration of the real estate. + +(2) Dispositions by the owner or beneficiary of the real estate +shall be void during the period in which such real estate is being +administered by the Netherlands Real Estate Administration. During such +period payments by a mortgage debtor to the owner or beneficiary shall +have no releasing effect. + + + Section 9 + +(1) The taking over of administration by the Netherlands Real Estate +Administration shall be recorded in the public register without payment +of a fee. + +(2) It shall become legally effective on the date on which the request +for recording was received by the agency competent to keep the register. + + + Part IV + + PERMISSIONS + + + Section 10 + +(1) Persons, enterprises, associations, institutions, foundations or +other endowments, as defined in Section 1, paragraph 1, may acquire +real estate by legal transfer, only with the permission of the Reich +Commissioner for the occupied Netherlands Territories (Commissioner +General for Finance and Economic Affairs). + +(2) Acquisition at an execution sale shall also be considered +acquisition by legal transfer. + + + Section 11 + +(1) Jewish real estate can be alienated, mortgaged, leased, or made +subject to other changes in ownership or possession, in part or in its +entirety, only with the permission of the Reich Commissioner for the +Occupied Netherlands Territories (Commissioner General for Finance and +Economic Affairs); mortgages in particular can be paid off entirely or +in part only with such permission. + +(2) Paragraph 1 shall not apply, if real estate: + + 1. Is being administered by the Netherlands Real Estate + Administration; + + 2. Is being administered by an administrator appointed pursuant to + Order No. 26/1940; + + 3. Is being administered by a trustee appointed pursuant to Order + No. 48/1941 (Order concerning the Exclusion of Jews from Economic + Affairs); + + 4. Belongs to an association or foundation registered pursuant to + Order No. 145/1940. + +(3) The incurring of an obligation to execute any of the legal acts +mentioned in paragraph 1, sentence 1, is also subject to the granting +of permission. If permission is granted to incur such obligation, +said permission shall also extend to legal acts in performance of the +obligation. + + + Section 12 + +The request for permission shall be made by the person who intends to +conclude a contract subject to permission, or to carry out any legal +act subject to such permission. + + + Section 13 + +The permission may be made dependent upon the fulfillment of certain +conditions or may be connected with certain requirements. + + + Part V + + COSTS + + + Section 14 + +(1) The procedure pursuant to this order may be subject to costs. + +(2) Action on applications may be made dependent on advance payment of +such costs in part or in their entirety. + + + Part VI + + PROVISIONS + + + Section 15 + +(1) Any person who maliciously violates or circumvents the provisions +of this order, or of any order, condition or requirement issued or made +by virtue of this order, shall be subject to imprisonment or fine, +unlimited as to the amount, or to both of these penalties. + +(2) If the act has been committed negligently, the punishment shall be +imprisonment not exceeding one year, or a fine not exceeding 100,000 +guilders. + + + Section 16 + +(1) In addition to such penalty, the confiscation of the property to +which the criminal act referred may be ordered. + +(2) If no particular person can be prosecuted or convicted, +confiscation may be ordered independently. + + + Section 17 + +(1) Prosecution shall be initiated only upon request of the Reich +Commissioner for the Occupied Netherlands Territories (Commissioner +General of Finance and Economic Affairs). + +(2) The request for prosecution can be withdrawn until sentence has +been pronounced in the court of last resort. + + + Section 18 + +Acts punishable pursuant to Section 15 shall be considered criminal +acts as defined in Section II, paragraph 2, of Order No. 52/1940, +concerning German jurisdiction in Criminal Cases, as revised in Order +No. 123/1941. + + + Section 19 + +(1) Property involved in the punishable act pursuant to Section 15 may +also be confiscated by administrative procedure. + +(2) In this case, confiscation takes place upon order of the Reich +Commissioner for the Occupied Netherlands Territories (Commissioner +General for Security); it becomes effective upon general publication +or upon notice to the person concerned. If such confiscation involves +property or rights which by virtue of a legal provision have been +recorded in a public register, such confiscation shall be immediately +recorded free of cost in such register, upon request of the Reich +Commissioner (Commissioner General for Security). + +(3) The Reich Commissioner for the Occupied Netherlands Territories +(Commissioner General for Finances and Economic Affairs) shall decide +as to the disposition of confiscated property. + + + Part VII + + FINAL PROVISIONS + + + Section 20 + +(1) The Reich Commissioner for the Occupied Netherlands Territories +(Commissioner General for Finance and Economic Affairs) shall carry +out all measures necessary for the enforcement of this order. He is +authorized to delegate his powers. + +(2) The Reich Commissioner for the Occupied Netherlands Territories +(Commissioner General for Finance and Economic Affairs) shall have +general power to make legally binding final decisions, in doubtful +cases arising from the application of the provisions of this order. + + + Section 21 + +This order shall become effective on the day of publication. + + THE HAGUE + August 11, 1941 + + Reich Commissioner for the Occupied + Netherlands Territories + SEYSS-INQUART + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2113-PS + + 1934 PREUSSISCHE GESETZSAMMLUNG, PAGE 143 + + Secret State Police Department Decree for Application of the Law of 30 + November 1933, Concerning the Secret State Police of 8 March 1934 + + + ARTICLE 1 + +(1) The tasks of the Secret State Police will be effected + + _a._ by the Secret State Police Department in Berlin (Art. 1 of + the law of the 26th April 1933--L.R. p. 122) for the entire State + territory, + + _b._ by the State Police Offices for the Provincial Police Districts + [Landes Polizei Bezirke]. + +(2) The “Inspecteur” (Head of the Police) conducts the general +supervision of the State Police Offices, on the order and according to +the instructions of the “Ministerpraesident” (Chief of the Secret State +Police). + +(3) In so far as the Minister President does not otherwise order, the +State Police Offices are subordinate to the Regional President and in +Berlin to the Police President with whom they are in immediate working +connection. The control of the State Police Offices will be effected by +officials to be designated by the Minister President. + +(4) In places where there is no State Police Office, subsidiary offices +can be established on the proposal of the “Inspecteur”. + +(5) The competence of the State Police Offices will cover + + _a._ matters limited in their inferences to the Provincial Police + Districts, + + _b._ matters assigned to them by the “Inspecteur” of the Secret State + Police without regard to the limitations of the Provincial Police + District. + +(6) The local or district police matters within the sphere of the +Secret State Police will be conducted at the seat of the State Police +Office by the latter, in places where there are subsidiary offices of +the State Police by these, and for the rest by the Local and District +Police authorities as auxiliaries to the Secret State Police. + + + ARTICLE 2 + +The receipts and expenditure of the Secret State Police will be treated +separately in the Budget of the Ministry of the Interior. The task of +the preparation of the Budget and the disposition of these funds belong +to the Minister President. + + + ARTICLE 3 + +(1) The officers of the Secret State Police are officials of the +general internal Administration. On the request of the Minister +President, they will be placed at the disposal of the Secret State +Police by the Minister of the Interior. The appointments of the higher +administrative officials of the Secret State Police and of the Superior +officials of the Criminal Police, from the Criminal Commissar upwards, +will be made by the Minister President and the appointments of the +other officials will be made by the “Inspecteur”. + +(2) The “Inspecteur” has disciplinary powers over the officials of the +Secret State Police in accordance with Art. 16, Art. 17, para. 1, No. +2 of the Officers’ Disciplinary Code of the 27th January 1932 (L.R. p. +59). + + + ARTICLE 4 + +(1) Art. 2 of the Second Decree of Application of the 26th April 1933, +by the Minister of the Interior (L.R. p. 126), to the Decree of the +President of the Reich concerning the protection of the German People, +dated 4th February 1933, is hereby abolished. + +(2) Art. 1, of the Decree of the Minister of the Interior of the 26th +April 1933 (L.R. p. 127) reads as follows: + + + “Article 1 + + Besides the Police President in Berlin, in his capacity as Provincial + and District Police Authority (Art. 1 and 2 of the Decree of the + 2nd March 1933--L.R. p. 33), the Secret State Police Department in + Berlin is also competent for the prohibition of periodicals, for the + imposition of restrictions on property, on personal liberty, and on + the right of union and assembly, as well as limitations on letter, + post, telegraph and telephone secrecy, in accordance with Art. 1 of + the Decree of the Reich President for the Protection of the People + and State of 28th February 1935 (Reichs Law Register p. 83).” + + + ARTICLE 5 + +Art. 2 of the Decree of the Minister of the Interior of the 2nd March +1933 (L.R. p. 33), concerning the supplement to the Decree of 1st +October 1931 (L.R. p. 213), for the regulation of the competence of the +Provincial and District Police Authorities, will be altered in such +wise that, for the ordering of restrictions on personal freedom and the +rights of union and assembly, as well as on limitations on letter, post +and telegraph secrecy, the authorities of the Secret State Police (Art. +1, para. 1) shall also be competent, in so far as concerns their sphere +of office, but that, for the regulation of restrictions on telephone +secrecy, only the latter shall be competent. + + + ARTICLE 6 + +This Decree comes into force on the day of its proclamation. + + THE PRUSSIAN MINISTER PRESIDENT. + Berlin, 8 March 1934 Goering. + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2115-PS + + 1939 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 710 + + Second Execution Order to the Law of the Hitler Youth (Youth Service + Regulation) of 25 March 1939 + +On the basis of Article 4 of the law for the Hitler Youth of 1 December +1936 (RGBl I, page 993), I order: + + + Article 1 + + _Length of Service_ + +(1) Service in the Hitler Youth is honorary service to the German +people. + +(2) All juveniles from the 10th to the end of the 18th year of age are +obliged to serve in the Hitler Youth, and namely: + + 1. Boys between the ages of 10 and 14 in the Junior Hitler Youth (DJ), + + 2. Boys between the ages of 14 and 18 in the Hitler Youth (HJ), + + 3. Girls between the ages of 10 and 14 in the Junior Hitler Youth + (JM), + + 4. Girls between the ages of 14 and 18 in the German Girls League + (BDM). + +(3) Pupils of elementary schools, who have already completed their 10th +year of age, are deferred from the service in the Hitler Youth until +they leave the classes of the elementary schools. + +(4) Pupils of elementary schools, who have already completed their 14th +year of age, remain, until their discharge from school, members of the +Junior Hitler Youth (DJ and JM). + + + Article 2 + + _Educational Authority_ + +All boys and girls of the Hitler Youth are subject to a public-legal +educational authority according to the provisions of regulations, +decreed by the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor. + + + Article 3 + + _Unworthiness_ + +(1) Those juveniles are unworthy of membership in the Hitler Youth, and +thus are excluded from the community of the Hitler Youth, who + + 1. Commit dishonorable acts, + + 2. Were dismissed from the Hitler Youth, before this law came into + effect, because of dishonorable acts, + + 3. Who cause offense by their moral behavior in the Hitler Youth or + in public, and thus injure the Hitler Youth. + +(2) Furthermore, juveniles are excluded from membership in the Hitler +Youth, as long as they are in official custody. + +(3) The youth leader of the German Reich can permit exceptions. + + + Article 4 + + _Unfitness_ + +(1) Juveniles, who have been found, in the opinion of a medical officer +of the HJ or of a physician, commissioned by the HJ, to be unfit or +only partially fit for service in the Hitler Youth, must be relieved +altogether or partially from service in the Hitler Youth according to +the medical decision. + +(2) The cooperation between health offices and the execution of other +hygienic measures will be regulated by the youth leaders of the German +Reich in agreement with the Fuehrer’s Deputy and the Reich Minister of +the Interior. + + + Article 5 + + _Deferment and Exemption_ + +(1) On request of the legal guardian or the HJ leader concerned, +juveniles can in each case be deferred or exempted from service in the +Hitler Youth up to the duration of one year, if they: + + 1. Are retarded considerably in their physical development, + + 2. In the judgment of the school principal cannot fulfill the demands + of school without the exemption. + +(2) In individual cases, a request for deferment or exemption from +service in the Hitler Youth can also be granted, when the conditions +of Part 1 do not exist, but if there are other urgent reasons, which +justify the temporary or permanent absence of a juvenile from service +in the Hitler Youth. + +(3) The youth leader of the German Reich will issue further regulations. + + + Article 6 + + _German Subjects of non-German National Origin_ + +(1) Juveniles of German citizenship, whose both parents or father +belong according to their own statement to the Danish or Polish ethnic +groups, are to be exempted from membership in the Hitler Youth on +request of those who are charged with their care. If several persons +have the right and duty to care for the juvenile person, and not +everyone of them makes the request, the juvenile may be exempted. +Illegitimate juveniles may be exempted from membership in the Hitler +Youth on request of those who are charged with their care, if the +mother belongs according to her own statement to the Danish or Polish +racial groups; they are to be exempted if the guardian agrees to the +request. + +(2) The request is to be made to the lower administrative authorities. +The higher administrative authority will investigate whether there is +an acknowledgment of membership in the Danish or Polish ethnic group. +More specific administrative rules will be issued by the Reich Minister +of the Interior in agreement with the youth leader of the German Reich. + +(3) The Reich Minister of the Interior exercises the supervision +over youth organizations of the Danish or Polish ethnic groups. New +foundations need his permission. + +(4) No compulsion may be exercised by anyone toward the joining of a +youth organization of the Danish or Polish ethnic groups. + + + Article 7 + + _Racial Requirements_ + +Jews (Article 5 of the 1st proclamation to the law of Reich citizenship +of 14 November 1935, RGBl I, page 1333) are excluded from the +membership of the Hitler Youth. + + + Article 8 + + _German Subjects residing Abroad_ + +Juveniles of German citizenship, who reside abroad, and who are only +temporarily in the German Reich, are not obliged to serve in the Hitler +Youth. + + + Article 9 + + _Registration and Induction_ + +(1) All juveniles are to be registered with the respective Hitler +Youth, leader for induction into the Hitler Youth before 15 March +of the calendar year during which they complete their 10th year of +age. If a juvenile fulfills the conditions for acceptance into the +Hitler Youth (for instance release from official custody, receipt of +citizenship, permanent residence in the German Reich) after this time, +the juvenile is to be registered within one month after fulfillment of +the conditions named. + +(2) The legal representative of the juvenile is liable for the +registration. + +(3) Induction into the Hitler Youth takes place on 20 April of every +year. + +(4) The youth leader of the German Reich will issue more specific +regulations about registration and induction into the Hitler Youth. + + + Article 10 + + _Discharge_ + +(1) The following will be discharged from the Hitler Youth: + + 1. Juveniles after the expiration of the period, fixed in Article 1, + and girls who marry, + + 2. Juveniles concerning whom it is established that they are excluded + from membership in the community of the Hitler Youth according to the + regulations of this law. + +(2) Article 3, part 3 apply accordingly to No. 2 and 3. + +(3) Male and female leaders remain members of the Hitler Youth after +the period fixed in Article 1 has expired. Their discharge will take +place by special regulations. They are to be discharged on their +request. + + + Article 11 + + _Leaves during Membership in the Hitler Youth_ + +(1) The membership in the Hitler Youth becomes inactive for the +duration of active military service. + +(2) Members of the Reich labor service may not be active in the service +of the Hitler Youth. + + + Article 12 + + _Punitive Regulation_ + +(1) A legal guardian will be punished with a fine up to 150 marks or +with confinement if he intentionally acts against the provisions of +Article 9 of this law. + +(2) Whoever malevolently prevents or attempts to prevent a juvenile +from serving in the Hitler Youth, will be punished with prison and +fine, or with one of these punishments. + +(3) Legal punitive action will only be taken on request of the youth +leader of the German Reich. The request can be withdrawn. + +(4) Juveniles can be forced by the respective local authorities, to +fulfill the duties with which they are charged on the basis of this +law, and of the implementative regulations issued for it. + + + Article 13 + + _Final Regulations_ + +For juveniles of the age classes 1921 to 1929, who have not belonged to +the Hitler Youth up to now, the youth leader of the German Reich will +fix the time of their registration and induction into the Hitler Youth. + +Berlin, 25 March 1939 + + The Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor + Adolf Hitler + + The Deputy of the Fuehrer + R. Hess + + The Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery + Dr. Lammers + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2118-PS + + 1941 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 547 + + Police Decree on Identification of Jews 1 September 1941 + +In agreement with the Reichs-Protector for Bohemia and Moravia the +following law based on the regulations regarding the Police-decrees of +the Ministers of the Reich from 14 November 1938 (Reichsgesetzblatt I, +page 1582) and on the decree regarding the right of establishing of law +[Rechtsetzungsrecht] in the protectorate Bohemia and Moravia from 7 +June 1939 (Reichsgesetzblatt I, page 1039) is herewith published: + + + Article 1 + +(1) Jews (article 5 of the first decree regarding the law on German +citizenship of 14 November 1935--Reichsgesetzblatt I, page 1333) who +have completed their sixth year of life shall be prohibited to appear +in public without wearing a Jewish star. + +(2) The Jewish star is a yellow piece of cloth with a black border, +in the form of a six pointed star of the size of a hand with the +inscription “Jew”. It shall be worn visible, sewed on the left side of +the chest of the garment. + + + Article 2 + +Jews are prohibited to: + +_a._ leave the area of the community in which they live without written +permission of the local police; + +_b._ to wear medals, ribbons and other insignia. + + + Article 3 + +Article 1 & 2 shall not apply to: + +_a._ a husband living in a Jewish mixed marriage if children, born from +this marriage who are not considered as Jews exist. This also applies +if the marriage is dissolved or if the only son was killed in the +present war. + +_b._ to a Jewish wife in a childless mixed marriage, for the duration +of the marriage. + + + Article 4 + +(1) He who violates articles 1 & 2 willingly or carelessly shall be +punished with a fine up to 150 Reichsmark or with imprisonment not to +exceed 6 weeks. + +(2) Further protective measures on the part of the police as well as +rules according to which a more severe punishment is permitted remain +unaffected. + + + Article 5 + +This decree shall also be valid within the borders of the +protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia with the specifications that the +Reichs-Protector in Bohemia and Moravia shall adopt the rules of +article 2 _a_, to the local situation in the protectorate of Bohemia +and Moravia. + + + Article 6 + +This Police-law shall be valid two weeks after publication. + +Berlin, 1 September 1941. + + For the Reich Minister of the Interior. + Heydrich + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2119-PS + + 1939 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 485 + + Decree of the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor concerning the Protectorate + of Bohemia and Moravia, March 16, 1939 + +The Bohemian-Moravian countries belonged for a millennium to the +living space of the German people. Violence and want of judgment +have torn them arbitrarily from their old, historic environment and +finally created, through their inclusion in the artificial structure +of Czechoslovakia, a center of continuous unrest. Year after year +the danger increased that out of this area--as once before in the +past--would arise a new, stupendous menace to European peace. For the +Czechoslovak State and its rulers had not succeeded in organizing in a +reasonable manner the coexistence of the national groups arbitrarily +comprised within it, and thus they failed to awaken and to preserve +the interest of all concerned in the maintenance of the state common +to them. Thereby this state has demonstrated its inherent inability to +exist and therefore now has fallen into actual dissolution. + +The German Reich cannot tolerate everlasting disturbances in these +areas, areas so decisively essential not only to its own peace and +security but also to the general welfare and the general peace. +Sooner or later the German Reich would have had to suffer the most +serious consequences because it is the power which is the most vitally +interested and concerned by history as well as by geographical +position. It is therefore only an act of compliance with the law of +self-preservation if the German Reich is resolved to take decisive +action for the reestablishment of the foundations of a Central European +Order based on reason and to resort to measures impelled by this aim. +For the millennial this historic past of the German Reich has proven +that it alone is chosen by virtue of its greatness and the qualities of +the German people to solve this problem. + +Imbued with the earnest desire to serve the true interests of the +nations settled in this living space, to safeguard the national life +of the German and Czech nations, to promote peace and the social +welfare of all, I therefore order, in the name of the German Reich, the +following as foundations on which the inhabitants of these areas can +live side by side in the future: + +Article 1. (1) The territories of the erstwhile Czechoslovak Republic, +occupied by the German Armies in March, 1939, are hereby incorporated +into the territory of the Greater German Reich and are placed under its +protection as the “Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia.” + +(2) In so far as the defense of the Reich requires it, the Fuehrer and +Reich Chancellor may issue, for specified areas of these territories, +orders at variance with these articles. + +Article 2. (1) The residents of the Protectorate of German origin +are hereby declared to be German nationals and German citizens, +in accordance with the provisions of the Reich Nationality Code +[Reichsburgergesetz] of September 15, 1935 (RGBl I, p. 1146). +Therefore, the provisions for the protection of German blood and German +honor shall apply to them. They shall be subject to the jurisdiction of +German courts. + +(2) The other residents of Bohemia and Moravia are hereby declared to +be citizens of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia. + +Article 3. (1) The Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia is declared to +be autonomous and shall govern itself. + +(2) It shall exercise the sovereign rights to which it is entitled +within the framework of the Protectorate in conformity with the +political, military, and economic interests of the Reich. + +(3) The Protectorate shall exercise these sovereign rights through its +own political agencies, authorities, and officials. + +Article 4. The head of the autonomous administration of the +Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia shall be entitled to the protection +and the full honors of the head of a sovereign government. The head of +the Protectorate must enjoy, in the exercise of his high office, the +confidence of the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor. + +Article 5. (1) The Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor will appoint as a +guardian of the interests of the Reich a “Reich Protector of Bohemia +and Moravia.” His official residence shall be in Prague. + +(2) It shall be the duty of the Reich Protector, as representative of +the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor and as the agent of the Government of +the Reich, to assure compliance with the political instructions issued +by the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor. + +(3) The members of the government of the Protectorate shall hold office +subject to confirmation of the Reich Protector. A confirmation may be +later revoked. + +(4) The Reich Protector may demand information concerning all acts of +the government of the Protectorate and may offer his counsel to the +government. He may protest against measures which may be harmful to the +Reich, and, in cases of emergency, may take all steps necessary to the +common welfare. + +(5) The publication of statutes, orders, and other general rules +and regulations, and the enforcement of administrative measures and +execution of judicial decisions which have become final, shall be +suspended upon notice of protest given by the Reich Protector. + +Article 6. (1) The foreign affairs of the Protectorate, especially the +protection of its citizens abroad, shall be entrusted to the Reich. +The Reich shall take charge of the foreign affairs in such a manner as +shall conform with the common interest of both countries. + +(2) The Protectorate shall have a representative with the Government of +the Reich officially designated as Minister. + +Article 7. (1) The Reich shall extend military protection to the +Protectorate. + +(2) For the purpose of extending such protection the Reich shall +maintain garrisons and military establishments in the Protectorate. + +(3) The Protectorate may establish its own units for the maintenance +of home security and protection. The Government of the Reich shall +determine the form of organization, the number of the forces, and the +armament to be employed. + +Article 8. The Reich shall directly supervise all traffic, posts, and +telegraphs. + +Article 9. The Protectorate shall form part of the German customs area +and shall be subject to its customs authority. + +Article 10. (1) In addition to the Reichsmark the Krone shall +constitute legal tender until further notice. + +(2) The rate of exchange for the two currencies shall be determined by +the government of the Reich. + +Article 11. (1) The Reich may issue orders having the force of statutes +for the Protectorate, in so far as required by the common welfare of +both of them. + +(2) In so far as there is a common need, the Reich may take over +branches of the administrative services and may establish the necessary +Reich agencies in their stead. + +(3) The Government of the Reich may take all measures necessary for the +maintenance of security and order. + +Article 12. The laws and statutes presently in effect in Bohemia and +Moravia shall remain in effect unless incompatible with the purposes of +protection by the German Reich. + +Article 13. The Reich Minister of the Interior shall, in agreement with +the Reich ministers concerned, issue all rules and regulations, general +and administrative, required for the enforcement and implementation of +this decree. + +Prague, March 16, 1939. + + Adolf Hitler, Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor + Frick, Reich Minister of the Interior + + von Ribbentrop, Reich Minister of Foreign Affairs + Dr. Lammers, Reich Minister and Chief + of the Reich Chancellery + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2120-PS + + 1938 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 1342 + + Law on Passports of Jews on 5 October 1938 + +Based on the law on passport, alien police and registration affairs as +well as on identification affairs of 11 May 1934 (Reichsgesetzblatt I, +Page 589) the following is ordered in agreement with the Reich Minister +of Justice: + + + Article 1 + +(1) All German passports of Jews (Article 5 of the first law to the +Reich citizenship of 14 November 1935--Reichsgesetzblatt I Page 1333), +who reside in the Reich area, become invalid. + +(2) The holders of the passports, mentioned in Section (1), are obliged +to hand in these passports to the passport authority within Germany, in +whose district the holder of the passport has his permanent residence +or in lieu of such sojourns temporarily, within 2 weeks after this +law becomes effective. For Jews who are staying abroad at the time of +publication of this law, this period of two weeks begins with the day +of their re-entry into the Reich area. + +(3) The passports, made out to be valid abroad, will become valid again +if they are marked with a sign designated by the Reich Minister of the +Interior, which will mark the holder as a Jew. + + + Article 2 + +Whoever carelessly or willfully does not comply with the obligation +described in article 1, section 2 will be punished with prison and +fined up to 150 marks or with either one of them. + + + Article 3 + +The law becomes effective with its promulgation. + +Berlin, 5 October 1938. + + The Reich Minister of the Interior + By order + Dr. Best. + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2124-PS + + 1938 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 594 + +Decree Introducing the Nurnberg Racial Laws into the Land of Austria 20 + May 1938 + +Pursuant to Article II of the law relating to the reunion of Austria +with the German Reich, 13 March 1938 (Reichsgesetz Bl. I, p. 237), the +following is ordered: + + + ARTICLE I + + LAW RELATING TO CITIZENSHIP OF THE REICH + + + Section 1 + +The following are applicable to the Land of Austria: + +1. The Law Relating to Citizenship of the Reich of 15 September 1935 +(Reichsgesetz Bl. I, p. 1146). + +2. Section 2, Sub-Section 2, Section 4, Sub-Sections 1, 3 and 4, +Sections 5 and 6, Sub-Section 1, and Section 7 of the First Decree +under the Law Relating to Citizenship of the Reich of 14 November 1935 +(Reichsgesetz Bl. I, p. 1333). + + + Section 2 + +The effective date of Section 1, Sub-Section 2, of the Reich +Citizenship Law will be determined by the Reich Minister of the +Interior. + + + Section 3 + +The elimination of Jews from public offices which they hold on the +effective date of this decree will be specially regulated. + + + Section 4 + +For the application of Section 5, Sub-Section 2, of the First Decree +under the Reich Citizenship Law, 16 September 1935 will be considered +the effective date of the Reich Citizenship Law in Austria also, and +17 September 1935 will be considered the day on which the law for the +Protection of German Blood and Honor came into effect. + + + ARTICLE II + + THE LAW FOR THE PROTECTION OF THE BLOOD + + + Section 5 + +The Law for the Protection of German Blood and Honor of 15 September +1935 (Reichsgesetz Bl. I, p. 1146) and the First Decree for the +implementation of this Law of 14 November 1935 (Reichsgesetz Bl. I, p. +1334) are applicable to the Land of Austria. + + + Section 6 + +Section 3 of the Law for the Protection of the Blood will become +effective on 1 August 1938. + + + Section 7 + +For the application of Section 12, paragraph 3, of the First Decree for +the implementation of the Law for the Protection of the Blood, the 16 +September 1935 is also to be considered the effective date of the Law +for the Protection of the Blood in Austria. + + + Section 8 + +1. A marriage cannot be entered into unless it is proved by the +testimony of the local Burgermeister of the bride’s permanent residence +that there is no obstacle to the marriage according to the provisions +of the Law for the Protection of the Blood and of the First Decree for +the implementation of this law. If the bride has no permanent residence +in Austria, the competence of the Burgermeister is determined by the +further Provisions of Section 3 of the General Administrative Procedure +Law (Austrian BG. BL. #274/1925). + +2. If the Burgermeister has any doubt about the existence of a +marriage obstacle in the sense of Section 6 of the First Decree for +the implementation of the Law for the Protection of the Blood, he must +demand a Marriage Fitness Certificate from the bride and groom of the +official physician. + + + Section 9 + +In the application of Section 15, sentence 2, of the First Decree for +the implementation of the Law for the Protection of the Blood, the +former possession of Austrian citizenship is equivalent to the former +possession of German citizenship. + + + ARTICLE III + + PROCEDURE REGULATIONS + + + Section 10 + +In annulment proceedings, the provisions of the Austrian Law relating +to the jurisdiction and the procedure of the courts in lawsuits +relating to the annulment of marriages are applicable, subject to the +following limitations: + +1. The suit is to be made against both spouses. If the public +prosecutor or one of the spouses files an appeal, then in the first +case both spouses and in the second case the public prosecutor and the +other spouse are to be considered as adverse parties. + +2. The regulations relating to compulsory representation by counsel are +not applicable to the public prosecutor. + +3. If the public prosecutor is defeated, the Treasury is obliged to +refund the expenses incurred by the spouses, according to Sections 40 +et seq., of the Austrian Civil Law. + +4. No counsel for the defense of the marriage bond will be appointed. + +5. The suit can only be filed, if both spouses are alive. If one of the +spouses should die before the sentence is executed, the case is to be +considered in the main as closed. + + + Section 11 + +The court of first instance has jurisdiction over violations of Section +5, Sub-Sections 1 and 2, of the Law for the Protection of the Blood. + + + ARTICLE IV + + CONCLUDING PROVISIONS + + + Section 12 + +If regulations introduced into Austria by this decree cannot be applied +according to the letter, they are to be applied according to the spirit. + + + Section 13 + +This decree comes into effect on the day after its promulgation. + +Berlin, 20 May 1938. + + The Reichsminister of the Interior + Frick + + The Deputy of the Fuehrer + Hess + + The Reich Minister for Justice + per Dr. Schlegelberger. + + + PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2149-PS + + SECRET + + [STAMP:] + German Armistice Delegation + 14 December 1942 + Del. W. 7903 + Berlin, 11 December 1942 + + Foreign Office, + No. Ha Pol 7563 g + +The enclosed statement of the Reichsbank, Department for National +Economy [Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung], of the capability of France +is submitted for your information. + + To this the Reichsbank remarks as follows: + + “The statement deals solely with the effect of an increase of the + occupation expenses through levying on the French budget in regard to + economy and currency. + + “It is an entirely different question, however, how to act in + practice in the face of the imperative military necessities. + + * * * * * * * + + “The Armed Forces’ money requirements must be supplied in any + case--either through the budget of the French Government or in the + form of an advance from the issuing bank or in any other form of + financing; otherwise it would be necessary to issue Reich Credit + Bills [Reichskredit Kassenscheine], which is undesirable.” + + To: + The German Armistice Delegation for Economy in Paris + + per + (signed:) DUMONT + [pencil notation:] + +The German Embassy _in Paris_ + + Occup. SECRET + +--each separate-- + + # # # # # + +Copy to be attached to Ha Pol. 7563/42 g + + Berlin, 7, December 1942 + + SECRET: + +German Reichsbank + +Department for National Economy + + Concerning the question of an increase of French contributions to the + Occupation expenses. + +Altogether the burden for France hitherto as an effect of the Armistice +is nearly 18.5 billion marks or 370 billion francs. + +* * * * * * * + +France therefore has transferred the greatest part of her payments +(17.6 billion marks) in the form of goods and labor. + +* * * * * * * + +Anyhow the conclusion is obvious that the French National Economy has +been taxed more heavily since the Armistice in June 1940 than Germany +was after the World War. + +* * * * * * * + +Since the French contributions for the occupation expenses could not be +covered by taxes, they had to be financed in part from the proceeds of +the issuing of treasury bills, but mostly by credit from the bank of +issue. + +* * * * * * * + +Whether the economic exploitation of France could be intensified by +raising the daily contributions to the occupation expenses from 15 to +25 million marks for the rest of the War seems to us--as far as we can +judge from here--rather doubtful for the following reasons: + +* * * * * * * + +Under these circumstances the French Government would be obliged to +utilize the credit of the bank of issue to still greater extent than +hitherto in order to finance the demands for increased occupation +expenses. + +* * * * * * * + +Inflationary rises in prices and wages in France would cause very grave +disadvantages for Germany. + +* * * * * * * + +Such a measure also seems very problematical in regard to the goods +[gueterseite] in French national economy. + +* * * * * * * + +With the loss of a large part of French imports, industrial production +as well as the capacity of France to supply us with food will have to +be further reduced in the future. Such a great weakening of French +economic power is to be reckoned with that it does not seem to make +much sense to raise the expenses of the occupation. + +* * * * * * * + +An increase in French contributions to the occupation expenses could +be advocated, however, only if there were a corresponding chance of +raising her production ability [Sachleistungen]. + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2153-PS + + NATIONAL SOCIALIST PARTY CORRESPONDENCE + +NSK No. 358 + + 30 March 1933 + + Defeat the Enemy of the World! + + By Julius Streicher, head of the Central Committee for defense against + Jewish horror and boycott agitation. + +All Judah wanted the battle, it shall have it! It shall have it until +it realizes that the Germany of the Brown Battalions is not the Germany +of cowardice and of surrender: All Judah shall have the battle until +victory is ours. + + + National Socialists! + +Defeat the enemy of the World! And if the World were full of devils, we +must still succeed! + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2154-PS + + NATIONAL SOCIALIST PARTY CORRESPONDENCE + + NSK No. 359 31 March 1933 + + Additional orders of the Central Committee for defense against Jewish + horror and boycott agitation. + +NSK. The following additional orders are issued by the Central +Committee for defense against Jewish horror and boycott agitation: + + + Order No. 3 + +In enforcing the defensive boycott, the closing of Jewish business or +the use of violence against their customers is to be avoided under all +circumstances. + +If such an establishment closes its doors voluntarily, no higher power +is involved, and the proprietors have no excuse for discharges without +notice or for the refusal to pay wages and salaries or for reductions. + + + Order No. 4 + +Numerous reports are received by the Central Committee saying that +Jewish proprietors are transferring their establishments to German +figureheads in order to avoid the effects of the defensive propaganda. + +Therefore it is decreed that: Establishments transferred to German +figureheads by the Jewish proprietors after 28 March 1933 will be +considered as Jewish establishments for the duration of the defensive +boycott. + + Signed: Streicher + + + Order No. 5 + +Concerning the defensive action against the Jewish horror and boycott +agitation beginning Saturday, 1 April at 10 AM, the local action +committees are again reminded to see to it most strictly: + +1. That any use of force is to be avoided, establishments cannot be +closed by the committee or by its agents. On the other hand, closing by +the proprietor himself is not to be prevented. + +Entering of Jewish establishments is strictly forbidden to SA or SS +members or other agents of the action committee. + +The only duty of the defensive guards is to inform the public that the +proprietor of the establishment is a Jew. + +2. That boycotting of establishments is refrained from if it has not +been definitely proved that the proprietor is a Jew. + +3. That provocateurs cause no property damage which is counter to the +purpose of the defensive action. + +4. That the action committee be kept informed of all details of the +course of the defensive action by the SA and SS controllers so as to be +constantly well posted. + +5. Posters with provocative contents are forbidden. + + Central Committee for defense against + the Jewish horror and boycott agitation. + Streicher. + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2156-PS + + NATIONAL SOCIALIST PARTY CORRESPONDENCE + + NSK No. 357 29 March 1933 + + The central committee for defense against Jewish horror and boycott + agitation + +NSK. The central committee for defense against Jewish horror and +boycott agitation announces: + +Julius Streicher, member of the Reichstag, commissioned with the task +of creating and directing the central committee for defense against +Jewish horror and boycott agitation, began his work on Wednesday, 29 +March. As presiding deputy of the central committee he appointed Karl +HOLZ (Nurnberg), the editor of the anti-Semitic weekly “Der Stuermer”. +The other members of the central committee are: + + Robert Ley, Reichstag member, staff leader of the Fuehrer, in the + supreme leadership of the party organization. + + Adolf Huehnlein, Major, Reichstag member, deputy chief of staff of + the S. A. + + Heinrich Himmler, Reichstag member, Reich Fuehrer of the S. S. + + Reinhold Muchow, deputy head of the National Socialist factory cell + leadership [Nationalsozialistische Betriebszellenleitung]. + + Hans Oberlindober, Reichstag member, head of the National Socialist + list organization for the care of war victims. + + Jakob Sprenger, Reichstag member, head of the National Socialist + league of public officials. + + Walter Darre, Reichstag member, head of the agrarian-political Dept. + of the N. S. D. A. P. + + Dr. von Renteln, Reichstag Fuehrer of the fighting league [Kampfbund] + of the trade middle class. + + Dr. Hans Frank II, Reichstag member, head of the National Socialist + jurist’s league. + + Dr. Gerhard Wagner, head of the National Socialist league of + physicians. + + Willy Koerber, deputy of the Reich youth leader. + + Dr. Achim Gercke, head of the National Socialist information + department of the Nazi party executive board [Reichsleitung]. + +The office of the central committee for defense against Jewish horror +and boycott agitation is located in Munich, Hotel “Reichsadler”, 32 +Herzog Wilhelm Street, Room 56. (Telephone Munich 90-0-12.) + + + PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2163-PS + + NATIONAL SOCIALIST YEARBOOK 1941 + + [Nationalsozialistisches Jahrbuch 1941] + + Editor: Party Director for Organization of the NSDAP Dr. Robert Ley + + The SS During the War-Year 1939/40. + +In the foreground of the work and the battle of the SS during the war +year 1939/40 stands the fight of the Waffen-SS in the Poland-Campaign +and in the West, the matter-of-fact-employment of the leaders and men +of the General-SS in all sections of the Armed Forces and the enormous +performances of SS-Leaders and SS-men in the course of the work, which +the Fuehrer imposed on the Reichsfuehrer-SS in his capacity as “Reich +Commissioner for the Consolidation of German Nationality” by order of +7th October 1939. + +As the Reichsfuehrer-SS said: “Everyone of us knows that he is +a representative of the Black Corps and has to do honor to this +community by the best possible performance of his station, whether he +is employed on the field of battle in the divisions of the Armed-SS, +or whether he fights as an officer or soldier of the Army, whether he +has been detailed as unit or part of the police, and serves the inner +order of the Reich, or whether he fights against the enemies of the +State as a member of the Security Service, or whether he labors in +the framework of the historic mission, which has been carried over +to the Reichsfuehrer as Reich-Commissioner for the Consolidation +of German Nationality, or whether he is professionally with the +home-front. The revolutionary spirit of fighting and sacrifice of this +National-Socialist formation, its daily employment and hereby the +best and most severe selection have determined its direction and its +constant unique way. + +The firm believing tie to the great blood stream of the people, the +knowledge of the fulfillment of the deepest German longing by service +to the people, this welding for a firm inner unity of solidarity which +the SS could accomplish in the course of hard and fully filled years +were the suppositions for the now following, largely increased missions +of the Black Corps.” [Gunter d’Alquen]. + +The Armed-SS-divisions, a garrisoned organization, which have been +constructed in accordance with the experiences of the SS and with the +National-Socialist principles of selection, education, and formation of +the will and leadership have been fully materialized during the winter +1938/39. They are at the exclusive disposal of the Fuehrer. + +Already in March 1939 the SS-Emergency Force was required in this new +form for the pacification of the Protectorate Bohemia-Moravia. + +By decree of the Fuehrer they were committed in the framework of the +Army. + +Parts of the SS-Emergency Force crossed the German-Czech border +together with units of the Army Groups 3 and 5, in the early hours +of 15th March 1939. During the preceding night Army-units and the +Leibstandarte “Adolf Hitler” had occupied Maehrisch-Ostrau and +Wirkowitz. The German population in these localities was seriously +threatened by Chauvinist Czechs. In the early morning of the same day 3 +trucks with SS-leaders arrived at the Police Head Office in Prague and +contacted the local security-officials. + +The commitment of the SS-Emergency-Force in restoring order within +collapsing Czechoslovakia, was their trial of efficiency in the new +motorized form. After their return from this action a new order +of the Fuehrer requested the immediate enlargement of the present +SS-Emergency-Force into a motorized division. At once, new units +were formed. As speedily as possible the SS-Artillery Regiments, the +SS-Anti-Tank Battalions, the SS-Anti-Aircraft Machinegun Battalion and +the SS-Reconnaissance Squadrons were formed. + +The training of future leaders was undertaken by the Junker schools at +Tolz and Braunschweig in which the selected SS men were trained for +a soldierly and politically perfect Fuehrer Corps under the harshest +conditions. + +The aim of the summer training 1939 was the training of the new groups +to make a troop which had grown to cope with any situation. + +On 22nd March 1939 the Memel-land returned to the Reich, on the basis +of an agreement with Lithuania. Also the SS had taken part in the +liberation of the old German province, especially the Eastern-Prussian +SS. + +In the liberation of Danzig in August 1939 the SS-Home-Guard especially +excelled. + +When in August 1939 the Polish despotism grew and acts of violence +increased day by day, the quickly formed SS-Home-Guard entered the +scene. + +The SS-Home-Guard formed for the first time in Danzig on 18th August +1939, at which time they received their colors from District Leader +[Gauleiter] Forester. The commitment of the SS-Home-Guard made +Danzig ready for defense and it became possible to proclaim the +District-Leader of Danzig to become Head of the State of the Free +City of Danzig in opposition to the Polish threats. This was done in +accordance with the “Law for the Lifting of Distress from the People +and State” to be effective as of 23rd August 1939. The political +department of the Danzig President of the Police was at the same time +placed under the Senate under the title “Secret State Police Danzig”, +as an independent department. A further ordinance created the authority +to appoint State-Commissioners for essential concerns. + +When the Fuehrer gave the order that on 1st September the German sword +should be wielded against Polish despotism, in order to break force by +force, the SS-Home-Guard was employed in this battle. + +They have proved their courage especially in the fighting for Dirschau +and Gdynia and in defeating the Polish Army of the Corridor. + +During the Polish Campaign, formations of the SS-Emergency-Force +attached to the Army often fought shoulder to shoulder with units of +the Army at decisive places. The report which the High Command of the +Wehrmacht made public on the 23rd September 1939 regarding the Polish +Campaign pays special tribute to this fact. + +How much courage and daring commitment the leaders and men have shown +during the Polish Campaign, is proven by the great number of Iron +Crosses awarded to officers and men of the Waffen-SS in the Polish +Campaign for gallantry in action. + +Iron Crosses First Class were awarded to 26 officers and 1 +non-commissioned officer, the Iron Cross Second Class to 241 officers, +227 non-coms, and 203 men. + +Numerous reports contain the heroic actions of the Waffen-SS in the war +against the Allied Western Powers, especially the most daring advance +of the SS-Regiment “Der Fuehrer”. Reports about the actions of the +Waffen-SS in this war shall be rendered when final victory has been won. + +By decree of 1st August 1939 (RGBl I. p. 1335) the Fuehrer amplified +the provisions of the Law concerning the Care and Welfare of +former Members of the Armed Forces, dated 26th August 1938, making +them applicable to former members of the SS-Junker schools, the +SS-Death-Head-Units and the strengthening of the SS-Death-Head-Units +and their bereaved. + +The provisions of the Law concerning the Care and Welfare of Members of +the Armed Forces are therefore applicable to all armed units of the SS. + +The Reich-Minister for the Interior issued, in agreement with the +Reich-Finance-Minister and the Chief of the High Command Armed Forces, +an executionary decree to the decree of the Fuehrer, dated 3rd August +1939 (RGBl I. p. 1342). By this decree the Care and Welfare Office of +the SS, created originally for the SS-Emergency-Force, was commissioned +to carry out the care and welfare of all remaining armed units of +the SS. A further Care-and-Welfare-Office-SS was created, which is +subordinate to the Main-Welfare-Office-SS. + +On the basis of an agreement between the Reichs-Fuehrer-SS and +Chief of the German Police and the Chief of the High Command of the +Wehrmacht--the Reich-Finance-Minister consenting--the whole care and +welfare of former members of the Sudeten-German Free Corps and their +bereaved has been designated to the Care and Welfare authorities of the +SS to become effective immediately. + +On 7th October 1939 the Reichsfuehrer-SS and Chief of the German Police +was, by decree of the Fuehrer, appointed “Reich-Commissioner for the +Consolidation of German Nationality” with the duty to evacuate the +persons of German race from the Baltic countries and from the former +Polish territories of the Western Ukraine and White Russia. This is +to be done in accordance with the National-Socialist ideology stating +that common blood and race should have a common home as living space. +It was to be his further duty to begin the racial consolidation and +resettlement of the reclaimed German Eastern territories. + +The SS takes a decisive part in this historic task and its solution. + +The persons of German race from Galizia, Wolhynia, and the Narew area +have been settled without loss or friction in full agreement with the +Russian authorities. + +For some time now the Reichsfuehrer-SS has had at his disposal an +office under the management of SS-Obergruppenfuehrer Lorenz, the +“National German Central Office” [Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle-VM]. This +office has the task of dealing with National German questions and the +raising of required support. + +In addition to the VM the Immigration Center Offices +[Einwanderungszentralen, EWZ.] with the Chief of the Security +Police and the Security Service of the SS (under the management of +SS-Obersturmbannfuehrer Dr. Sandberger) and the Settlement Staff of +the Reich-Commissioner were created, which, in cooperation with the +NSV [National Socialist Welfare Organization] and the Reich-Railroad +Agency, took charge of the Migration of National Germans. + +Numerous SS-leaders and SS-men helped with untiring effort in bringing +about this systematic migration of peoples, which has no parallel in +history. + +There were many authoritative and administrative difficulties which, +however, were immediately overcome due to the unbureaucratic working +procedure. This was especially guaranteed above all by the employment +of SS leaders. + +The procedure called “Durchschluesung” [literally passing through the +lock] takes 3 to 4 hours as a rule. The resettler is being passed +through 8 to 9 offices, following each other in organic order: +registration office, card-index office, certificate and photo-office, +property office, and biological hereditary and sanitary test office. +The latter was entrusted to doctors and medical personnel of the SS +and of the Armed Forces. The SS-Corps Areas [Oberabschnitte] Alpenland, +North-West, Baltic Sea, Fulda-Werra, South and South-East, the +SS-Main Office [SS-Hauptamt], the NPEA [National Political Education +Institution] Vienna, and the SS-Cavalry-School in Hamburg provided +most of the SS-Officer and SS-Non-Coms who worked at this job of +resettlement. + +Up to 30th April 1940, the Immigration Center dealt with 149,513 +persons. Of these 56,777 were Germans from the Baltic countries, 92,736 +Germans from Galizia, Wolhynia and the Narew-provinces. + +While the resettlement of the Germans from Galizia and Wolhynia is now +in full swing, the resettlement of the Germans from Esthonia and Latvia +has nearly been finished. Of these resettling Baltic Germans, 37,134 +persons have been resettled in the Warthe-district, a small number in +the district Danzig-Western Prussia, and in the Reich proper. + +The statistics office of the Immigration Center dealt with 107,882 +migraters from Galizia, Wolhynia and the Narew-area up to 23rd March +1940. + +The settlement, establishment and care of the newly-won peasantry in +the liberated Eastern territory will be one of the most cherished tasks +of the SS in the whole future. + +The Security Service [SD] of the SS is a thorough political +intelligence service, created in accordance with the principles of +racial and ideological selection as required by the SS; it became the +real security service for the SS, the Party and the Reich. It has +proved its significance during the war year of 1939/40. + +The Security Service is organized in Corps Areas and division areas +in close similarity to the General-SS; its Chief is SS-Gruppenfuehrer +Heydrich, who is at the same time Chief of the Security Police. Part +of the duties of the Security Service is to watch for any changes in +the manner of working and the tactics of the enemy and to protect the +people against any kind of sedition. Leaders and men of the Security +Service work in close cooperation with the German Security Police, +whose members have the duty also to investigate and to fight against +any nationally hostile intentions in the provinces of the Protectorate +and the newly won Eastern territory, to evaluate and to gather the +results of the uprisings. + +The Fuehrer also assigned missions of police nature during the war +year to the SS aside from those on military matters. Because of its +ideological and political education the spirit of the SS is alive in +the German Police. + +Thus a front has been created in which the State and the Party, the +official and the soldier not only cooperate in the defense against +political and criminal enemies of the Nation, but also as protectors +of the people. The Police, whose new members are recruited out of the +ranks of the SS, has become friend and helper of the community of the +people. + +The Chief of the SS-Main Office SS-Obergruppenfuehrer Heissmeyer, was +appointed Inspector of the National-Political Education Office. Thereby +it has been ensured that the selected men of the SS-NPEA (National +Political Education Office) are being educated exactly in the spirit +of the SS. The educators and teachers of the NPEA are exclusively SS +officers and non-coms. + +The SS takes its share in the work in every sphere of racial life, +according to the motto given to us by the Fuehrer as our obligation: +“Our Honor means Faithfulness”. + +Our work and fight continues in the spirit of the proclamation of the +Reichsfuehrer SS: “Thus we have fallen in and are marching forward, in +accordance with unchangeable laws, as a National Socialist soldierly +order of men of Nordic designation and as a sworn community of their +tribes, towards a far future. We wish and believe that we are not only +the grandchildren fighting better to the end, but that we shall be, +further, the ancestors of yet unborn generations, which are necessary +for the eternal life of the German and Germanic People.” + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2164-PS + +NATIONAL SOCIALIST YEARBOOK 1940 [Nationalsozialistisches Jahrbuch 1940] + + Editor: Dr. Robert Ley, Pp. 365-371 + + The SS (The Schutzstaffeln of the NSDAP) + + The SS since the Reichparteitag 1938 + +Between today and the Reichsparteitag 1938 there is a span of time +which, saturated with important political events, was rich in missions +and commitments for the SS as a whole. Only three of those occurrences +of special significance are mentioned: + + the incorporation of the Sudetenland into the Reich, + the founding of the Protectorate Bohemia-Moravia, + the return of Memel to the greater Germany. + +When the march into the liberated provinces of the Sudetenland began on +that memorable 1 October 1938, the Emergency Force [Verfuegungstruppen] +as well as the Death Head units [Totenkopfverbaende] were along with +those in the lead. Already previously they have proven themselves in +the fulfillment of their assigned missions in every respect and thereby +contributed to the results. However, not only the garrisoned parts of +the SS were employed. Also the General SS [Allgemeine SS] were brought +forth for special missions. Thousands of younger and older SS comrades +were employed for the strengthening of the Police and for the guarding +of Concentration Camps and have faithfully fulfilled their duty +throughout the weeks. + +The 15th of March 1939 brought a similar utilization of the SS when it +served to establish order in the collapsing Czechoslovakia. This action +ended with the founding of the protectorate Bohemia-Moravia. + +Only a week later, on the 29th March 1939, Memel also returned to the +Reich upon basis of an agreement with Lithuania. Again it was the SS, +here above all, the East Prussian SS, which played a prominent part in +the liberation of this province. + +Aside from these illustrated commitments, the cordon-service +[Absperrdienst], which is included among the well known missions of the +SS, goes on. It placed increased requirements on the Berlin SS as a +result of visits by the Italian Foreign Minister, Count Ciano, (21 to +23 May 1939), the Prince regent Paul of Yugoslavia (1 to 5 June 1939), +and the return of the Condar Legion (6 June 1939). Also these missions +were readily fulfilled in cooperation with other formations of the +movement. + +It is here especially emphasized that the SS did justice to the demand +required of it in all cases and have proven themselves worthy of the +confidence of the Fuehrer. + +Naturally the territorial expansion of the Reich also brought along a +further expansion of the SS. + +The return of Austria already resulted in the creation of the +SS-Regiment “Der Fuehrer” in the SS-V.T. [Verfuegungstruppen] and the +creation of the SS-Regiment “Austria” in the SS-T. [Totenkopfverbaende] +and the formation of the SS Corps area “Donau” in the General +[Allgemeine] SS. Likewise, the incorporation of the Sudeten-German +provinces necessitates the organization of new units by the Allgemeinen +SS. + +The founding of the protectorate Bohemia-Moravia also brought the +possibility to construct an SS here which consists out of the +independent SS division XXXIX in Prague with the 107th SS Regiment in +Iglau and 108th in Prague, which are under the command of the higher SS +and Police-fuehrer Bohemia-Moravia, SS-Brigadier General Frank. + +Upon the return of Memel, the whole Memel Ordnungsdienst was taken over +in the SS by the Reichsfuehrer SS. The members of the new Regiment +retained the right to wear the native insignia of Memel, the elk +antlers, as collar insignia. + + + The SS-Emergency Force [Verfuegungstruppen] + +The SS-Emergency Force [Verfuegungstruppen]. The SS-Verfuegungstruppe +is a standing armed force although it belongs to the SS in its +entirety. It is neither a part of the Police nor a part of the +Wehrmacht and stands at the exclusive disposal of the Fuehrer. + +The construction of the individual groups of the SS-Verfuegungstruppe +is similar to the corresponding units of the Army for organizational +reasons. The Truppe was recruited out of volunteers from the number who +are conscripted [Wehrpflichtigen]; these however are still subjected +to special selective laws of the SS in addition to their usefulness +determined by the Wehrmacht. + +In the SS-Verfuegungstruppe, in which they must obligate themselves to +four years service, they fulfill the first two years of their active +lawful Army conscription. + +In the year 1938 after the reincorporation of Austria into the Reich, +new SS-Regiment “Der Fuehrer” was formed in Austria by Fuehrer +decree. It appeared for the first time in public as a group on the +Reichsparteitag 1938. + +During the September crisis of the year 1938, the SS-Verfuegungstruppe +was placed under the Army by special decree of the Fuehrer in order to +solve the mission of the liberation of the Sudeten provinces with this +combination. + +In all parts of the newly returned German Sudeten provinces, units +of the SS-Verfuegungstruppen marched over the border, along with the +first formations of the Army. All the tasks assigned to the Truppe were +entirely fulfilled in every case. Hereby, the Truppe showed excellent +accomplishments. + +Following the completion of this employment the order came to +completely motorize the Truppe during the course of the winter. +This brought a huge amount of work for all officers and men of the +SS-Verfuegungstruppe for the winter. + +In addition to the organizational measures which were required by +this rearrangement, the training of a large number of drivers for +the various types of vehicles had to take place in this short time. +Specialists had to be schooled. Aside from that, the leadership +principles of offices and men had to be retaught. While everyone still +worked with all their might in the fulfillment of this task, already +the March of 1939 saw the new employment for the pacification of the +protectorate Bohemia-Moravia. + +By decree of the Fuehrer the SS-Verfuegungstruppe again was committed +into the framework of the Army. This commitment offered an excellent +test of efficiency for the employability of the SS Verfuegungstruppe. +Hardly was the work of motorization completed when a new employment +in this new form had to follow without any apparent large preparatory +practices. + +The return from this commitment however in no way signified the +continuation of the uninterrupted training period. A new decree by +the Fuehrer demanded the immediate conversion of the existing units +of the SS-Verfuegungstruppen into a motorized division. And so the +organizational preparations for the construction of new groups already +began on the military training grounds following their commitment +in the protectorate. The SS Artillery Regiment, the SS Anti-tank +Battalion, the SS Anti-aircraft machine gun Battalion and the SS +Reconnaissance Squadrons were created. + +The training of these new formations to a battle-ready, employable unit +was the goal of the so short summer training of the year 1939. + + + The SS-Death Head Units [Totenkopfverbaende] + +Once a year the SS-Totenkopfverbaende step forth into the open on a +large scale: on the Reichparteitag. The participation on this day is +a reward for the officers and men for the heavy services accomplished +during the preceding year. At the same time it should bear testimony of +the exclusiveness and of the soldierly discipline of this Armed part of +the SS. + +If the work of construction and the commitment during the preceding +years should be quickly summarized then it must be said beforehand that +hardly a young German goes through a tougher school of self-training +and self-discipline as the men of the SS-Totenkopf regiments. The +service in the concentration camps, the guarding of State enemies and +of criminal sub-humanity requires unheard of demands of the man in +physical as well as in psychological respects; the man who fulfills +his duty day by day for the community in his unselfish commitment and +in his exemplary trustworthiness. Here it does not only mean to be +a soldier, but also beyond that, to be a character who remains hard +despite all enmities and who remains hard toward any temptations which +may approach him. Only the best human material, selected according to +character and heredity, grew in this organization for service. + +During the last year, as in all of the years of its existence, the +spiritual tools for their daily employment were given by schooling +and instruction in the quiet work of the troop while the military +training provided for the increased striking power of the troop. This +systematic training made it possible for the SS Totenkopf regiments +[Standarte] to do justice to all their missions which were assigned +to them outside of the sphere of their daily service. Was it the +employment during the reincorporation of the Sudeten district into the +Reich in which especially the men of the SS Totenkopf regiments were +placed in the front lines and where it served to execute the quickest +and most reliable commitment capabilities under orders; or was it +the reception of foreign State officials which required the troop to +serve as parade troops in public--always the SS Totenkopf regiments +immaculately fulfilled their duties. Therefore, they can look back +with justifiable pride upon all their achievements, in which they were +employed and where they served to represent the SS. This also goes for +their employment on district and county days [Kreistag] of the Party or +on other occasions, as the Reich Warriors day in Kassel for example. +Everywhere the men happily and unselfishly served according to their +motto: “Be more than appears.” + +One of the main missions in the past year was the continued +construction of Special Units [Sondereinheiten], for example, all +matters concerning transportation, communication and medical affairs. +In addition, there also was the establishment of E-Battalions +(Educational), the task of which is the training, in courses of 3 +months each, of those comrades of the General [Allgemeinen] SS who are +not inducted for service in the Wehrmacht. They were trained in weapons +and terrain. + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2168-PS + + Writings of the Hochschule for Politics Edited by Paul + Meier-Beneckenstein + + II The organizational structure of the Third Reich + + Number 21 + +“The German laborer of brain and fist, who marches in the SA, has long +ago grown out of the bourgeoise notion of duty behind which stands +‘I must’ and has grown into the sublime feeling of the soldierly +conception of duty which culminates in the absolute voluntariness of ‘I +want to’. + +We SA men want to live as men, to fight as men, and to die as men with +the consciousness that we have done our utmost for and devoted our +utmost to Fuehrer and Folk.” + + /s/ VICTOR LUTZE + + + CONTENTS + +I. History of the SA. The Path of the Struggle--The SA in the Third +Reich. + +II. Organization. The Branches of the SA--The Operational Staff of +the Supreme SA Headquarters--The Operational Main Office--The Main +Office for Education--The Main Office for Health--The Main Office for +Personal Affairs--The Main Administrative Office--The Main Office +for NS Tournaments--The Adjutant’s Office of the Chief of Staff--The +Special Units of the SA--Engineer and Signal SA--The Mounted SA--The +Naval SA--The SA Sanitation Men--The “Feldherrnhalle” Regiment--The +Reichfuehrer School. + +III. PROSPECTUS. The Law of Willingness to Volunteer. + + + THE SA + +History, Work, Aim, and Organization of the Storm Troops of the Fuehrer + and the Supreme SA Headquarters. + + Compiled on order of the Supreme SA Headquarters. + + By SA--Sturmfuehrer + + Dr. Ernst Bayer + + 1938 + +Junker and Luennhaupt Publishing House, Berlin + + + I. HISTORY OF THE SA + + The Path of the Struggle + +Germany experienced in the year 1918 a revolution whose spiritual +bearers were people to whom morals, honor, and love of the Fatherland +were unknown conceptions, who ridiculed soldierly virtues and fighting +behavior and laughed at the performance of the German Army. Their +example and their propaganda found followers because the man of that +time had not learned to think clear politically, because he was tossed +here and there between political, economic, and religious directions +and interests, and because he did not have the power, to decide for +himself, out of a deep anchorage and belief, in a great ideological +idea, and to hold himself firm against a breakdown. That which the +Reich of the Kaiser had failed to do, which was the internal shaping of +the human being into a knowing and convinced fighter for the nation, +avenged itself in 1918 bitterly. + +At this time of the complete breakdown of Germany, the Fuehrer with his +Idea began the march among the people. And beside and with him marched +men, embodiment of soldierly spirit, who perceived their highest +mission in life to be in service for a new greater Germany, ready to +enter upon and to sacrifice everything for the victory of National +Socialism. They are the first political soldiers of the Fuehrer, the +original cell of the SA. + +Are we able today to write a history of the SA? Scarcely, for this +history is still too much the present and we stand too close yet to +the experiences of a great period in order to be able to measure and +evaluate correctly the immense performance of the fighting period and +of the upheaval in its forcible measures. + +Numbers are distinctive of the picture of history. And, indeed, if we +would give an historical presentation of the fight and the performance +of the SA, we must not only name the dates of great events, which +are apparent to all the world, but also we must go out into everyday +affairs and experience there the path, spirit, and struggle of the SA +as an historical performance of the unfolding power of a nation. Dates +and numbers, however, win meaning and become valuable only if they come +alive as the expression of a great deed, of an offered sacrifice or +of an historical performance for the nation. And the SA has produced +innumerable of such dates and figures which distinguish the path of +the SA as the sacrificial way of the best of a nation. Along this +path stand the eternal monuments of over 400 blood witnesses of the +Movement, who gave their lives for the resurrection of Germany. + +The SA was not founded as one forms just any sort of club. It was born +in midst of strife and received from the Fuehrer himself the name +“Storm Troops” after that memorable hall battle in the Hofbrauhaus +at Munich on the 4th of November 1921. Forty-six National Socialist +regulars stood against a thousand Marxists on this memorable day. The +Fuehrer had spoken to his men before the meeting: “Today for the first +time you will have to preserve the faith of the Movement come what may. +Not one of us leaves the hall unless they bear us out as dead men. +He who cowardly yields, from him I will personally tear off his arm +band and take away his badge. Think about the fact that attack at the +slightest attempt to make an explosion is the best defense.” + +In a bitter struggle 46 German men, who were determined to carry +through to the end even at the sacrifice of their lives, beat out +of the hall and put to flight a thousand Marxists. It was a baptism +of fire and a test of the willingness to bear a burden which this +young shocktroop of the Movement had masterfully undergone and which +secured for the Party peaceful meetings up to 9 November 1925, for no +Marxist dared to raise his fist again in National Socialist meetings. +Outside, however, on the streets the dissembling strife continued in +strengthened extent. + +Blood and sacrifice were the most faithful companions of the young SA +on its hard path to power. The Storm Troops were and still are today +the fist and propaganda arm of the Movement. The SA was not only +messenger, but also pattern for the Idea, the spiritual and physical +armament of the Party and the assembly basin for the fanatical fighters +of the National Socialist ideology. So the SA became the school for +practical National Socialism for all German men; it has so remained up +to the present day and it will be so forever in the future. + +It is one of the greatest historical services of the SA that at the +time when the German People’s Army had to undergo a dissolution, it +held high those virtues which marked the German soldier: personal +courage, idealism, willingness to sacrifice, consciousness of +responsibility, power to decide, and leadership. Thus, the SA became +among the people the messenger and bearer of German armed strength and +German armed spirit. + +The 4th of November 1921 was not only the birth hour of the SA by +itself, but was the day from which the young fighting troop of the +Movement took its stand at the focal point of political events. With +the clear recognition that now the unity of a troop led to victory, +the SA was systematically reorganized and so-called “Centuries” were +established. The year 1922 saw the SA variously in action. On the 16th +of August the first marching columns demonstrated along with patriotic +associations against the protective law of the Republic. The Marxists +appeared but the SA struck destructively and by fighting gained for +itself the liberty and right of the streets. The flow into the SA grew +so, that in September 1922 eight Hundertschaften could be raised in +Munich. These quickly grew further. On the 23rd of November the 11th +Hundertschaft was formed, which was composed almost exclusively of +students. The present deputy of the Fuehrer, Rudolf Hess, took over the +leadership of this Century. + +“We have to teach the Marxists that the master of the streets in the +future is National Socialism, exactly as it will once be the master of +the State”; thus, Adolf Hitler sketched the outlines of the task of +the SA. And sooner perhaps than one supposed, the opportunity came to +let deeds speak. The march in Coburg on the 14th and 15th of October +1922 became a beacon of the Germany which was awakening. It was to be +a “German Day” set up by the citizens and it became a break-through +battle for National Socialism. It became the day of the SA on which +800 SA men under the leadership of Adolf Hitler and Naval Lieutenant +retired, Klintzsch, broke completely the Red Terror. + +This mighty success and its linking danger for the system of government +led to a step by the Berlin government which was often repeated in +the following years: prohibition of the NSDAP for Prussia and other +states. The more lively the activity became in Bavaria. For the first +time, on 28 January 1923, the Reich Party Day of the NSDAP was held +in Munich, where the four standards designed by Adolf Hitler himself +were handed over to the SA as campaign symbols. And here, too, the +11th Hundertschaft appeared for the first time in uniform: grey cap, +wind-breaker, swastika band, and knotted stick. + +The Ruhr invasion by the French caused the conversion of the SA, which +up to then had been only a political fighting troop, into an armed +association for the purpose of employing these battle-tested men in +a desired active resistance against foreign domination. All pressed +for a decision. And in the matter the Storm Troops of the Fuehrer did +not want to be inactive. They joined themselves with other fighting +Bavarian bands and formed the “Labor group of patriotic fighting +associations” under the leadership of retired First Lieutenant Kriebel. +In March 1923 the last commandant of the Richthofen Squadron, Hermann +Goering, took command of the entire SA. Activity and readiness is +the password. Out at Forstenrieder Park and on the Froettmaninger +heath near Munich the Labor group held great exercises, at which on +May 1st an armed parade of the whole Bavarian SA and other fighting +associations ensues on the Oberwiesen field. This day was supposed to +bring the final reckoning with the Marxists. Only the employment of the +Reichswehr and police prevented this intention. + +The decision is pressing; the collapse of the Ruhr resistance and +its consequences threaten the unity of the Reich and seem to bring +about chaos. The 8th of November comes around. That evening, full of +hope and certainty of success; the betrayal of that night, base and +unbelievable. No one believes yet that men in the fateful and difficult +hour have betrayed the struggle for Germany. On the morning of November +9th, Adolf Hitler casts his young Movement, his faithful and upright +fighters, onto the scales of decision; the march to the Hall of the +Field Generals through jubilant Munich. Betrayal causes this March of +Triumph to become a Death March for the best of the nation. + +The Fuehrer is in custody. The Head of the Movement is missing in +the most difficult hours after the miscarriage of the revolution. +Everything appears beaten and lost. But one thing is not: that spirit +of the Storm Troops which has fought for the new Reich and which has +become, under the concept “Spirit of the SA”, the pattern for voluntary +and ceaseless preparedness for sacrifice and initiative for German men. +And it was victorious over betrayal. + +The faithful collaborators and comrades of the Fuehrer rescue what +is to be rescued. The Illegal SA continues and waits for the return +of the Fuehrer from the prison in Landsberg. He returns in 1925, and +the men of the Storm Troops, with the same spirit of readiness for +sacrifice and use, come to him and are strongest support to him at +the Party refounding, which occurs on February 27, 1925. In his basic +directions for the reestablishment of the National Socialist German +Labor Party, Adolf Hitler ordered the refounding of the SA as a pure +Party organization for meeting hall protection and propaganda, without +having the character of an armed association. + +And now a fight for Germany began of such a sort as was never before +fought. What are names, what are words or figures which are not indeed +able to express the magnitude of belief and of idealism on one side and +the magnitude of hate on the other side. + +1925: The Party lives again, and its iron spearhead is the SA. With it +the power and meaning of the National Socialist movement grows. Around +the central events of the whole Movement, the Reich Party Days, dates, +decisions, fights, and victory roll themselves into a long list of +German men of undenying willingness to sacrifice. + +One cannot count up all of this at one time. However, we wish to +present the sense and meaning as we tell what the SA was: the political +strong arm, the visible representation of the idealism and daily +initiative of the Party. Generally, it stopped the breaches. As an +example of a seemingly impossible deed, the 11th of February 1927 +should be firmly preserved. It is the day on which the SA broke the Red +Terror, with heavy sacrifice, in the hall battle at the Pharaoh’s Hall +in Berlin, the stronghold of the Communists, and thereby established +itself decisively in the capital city of the Reich. In considering the +badly wounded SA men, Dr. Goebbels coined the phrase “Unknown SA man”, +who silently fights and bleeds, obeying only his duty. + +Possession of the streets is the key to power in the state--for this +reason the SA marched and fought. The public would have never received +knowledge from the agitative speeches of the little Reichstag faction +and its propaganda or from the desires and aims of the Party, if the +martial tread and battle song of the SA companies had not beat the +measure for the truth of a relentless criticism of the state of +affairs in the governmental system. They wanted the young Movement to +keep silent. Nothing was to be read in the press about the labor of the +National Socialists, not to mention the basic aims of its platform. +They simply did not want to awake any interest in it. However, the +martial tread of SA took care that even the drowsiest citizens had to +see at least the existence of a fighting troop. + +The SA conquered for itself a place in public opinion and the +leadership of the National Socialist Movement dictated to its opponents +the law for quarrels. The SA was already a state within a state; a part +of the future in a sad present. + +In this period there was only one thing: discretionless use of the +person and genuine spirit of offensive. This became more essential from +year to year for sudden attacks on individual National Socialists and +whole columns piled up in frightful quantity. The death roster of the +Movement grew. However, the greater the losses became, the more tightly +the SA men closed themselves into a sworn fighting partnership. Its +exemplary employment did not remain without effect. The best from the +ranks of the Reds came to the “Nazis”, because they were convinced by +their deeds. When at the very end of 1926 the volunteer-corps fighters +of the various Rossbach groups joined themselves to the SA, the SA +received not only strengthening alone through that but also strong +buoyancy. + +With the end of 1926 there begins a new phase of development in the +history of the SA. The Storm Troops until now had stood in loose +connection with the political organization. A Reich branch or central +command office was not yet in existence. Both were created with the +ensuing founding of the Supreme SA Leadership Headquarters, on November +1st, 1926. With that a central control originated to which the SA, as +well as the SS and the HJ, were subordinate. Adolf Hitler appointed the +Gau leader and SA Fuehrer of the Gau of the Ruhr, Franz von Pfeffer as +the highest SA Leader. In the course of the years 1926 and 1927 the +SA was uniformly reorganized and divided into divisions [Gruppen], +Gau areas [Gaustuerme], brigades [Brigaden], regiments [Standarten], +battalions [Sturme], and platoons [Trupps] and at the same time a sharp +separation from the political organization was achieved. That which had +been established in practice became now the clear internal orientation +for the SA: the Storm Troop men should be educated into political +soldiers, politically dependable, spiritually motivated, physically +steeled, disciplined and devoted to the Fuehrer in unconditioned +fidelity and obedience. Thus the SA became the mightiest instrument in +the hands of the Fuehrer. + +1927: The first huge demonstration in Nurnberg of National Socialism +which can no longer be dead silent. 30,000 SA men march a bloc of will +and strength. The System becomes nervous. Up to then the Executive has +looked on inactively for the most part. From then on it directed all +measures against National Socialism and allowed thereby more and more +liberty to Communism and Marxism. The word “Forbidden” was all too +well known to SA men. The Berlin SA, which had been forbidden with the +Party in May 1927, coined the password: In spite of prohibition, not +dead. And this slogan, to the discomfort of the System, became an all +too living reality when it issued like hail prohibitions of all shades +and shapes in the following years. One of the old veterans coined the +phrase once: the history of the SA and of the NSDAP generally has been +a single, almost uninterrupted succession of prohibitions. Something +was always prohibited. There was never a period in which the SA was +granted nearly the same liberty in all Germany as was granted to the +Reichbanner or certain patriotic associations. + +Brown trousers and boots in themselves were dangerous for the State. +The white shirt had to substitute for the brown shirt for a long time. +Often the SA men came to meetings and parades with naked upper parts of +the body and with bare feet, and many in their underwear, because along +the way the pieces of clothes which were dangerous to the State were +taken off of them. Chicanery after Chicanery. But all of this had to be +borne. However, murder and terror governed this year of the strife. And +always it was National Socialists who were stamped as the attackers. + +Emergency orders and measures for the protection of the Republic +aided the waves of prohibition. They promised themselves results from +this because they believed they dealt with factionists and did not +recognize that these National Socialists were bearers and heralds of an +ideology. They themselves were conscious that they were the last levy +of the German Folk. Thus the SA grew to be the troop which fought most +strongly against the decaying Republic. It was spared no sacrifice but +also no prohibition, no trickery, and no item could stem its march. + +Almost 300 dead comrades marched with the ranks of the SA, foremost +among them the songster of the Movement, Horst Wessel. His sacrificial +death became a new beacon of the struggle for Germany. The labor and +the struggle of the SA was not in vain. They stood at the foremost +front of election fights. Adolf Hitler himself on the 2nd of September +1930 took over the leadership of the SA as the Supreme SA Fuehrer. He +himself guided his SA in the fateful election fight of the year 1930. +On the evening of the 14th of September the first battle was won. 107 +representatives of the NSDAP took their seats in the German Reichstag. +A huge victory was earned through the fight, but, the System took no +reckoning of it. + +1931: It was to be the year of decision. The Movement grew steadily; +everywhere the election results were great. The burden which tested the +SA was enormous, and only an iron discipline and internal union helped +it to bear all the difficulties. + +SA, SS and HJ were newly articulated. On April the 1st the National +Socialist Automobile Corps as an auxiliary organization of the SA, +which performed valuable service at election time, was founded. The +17th and 18th of October brought the SA meeting in Brunswick at which +104,000 SA and SS men passed in review before Adolf Hitler. Here before +these faithful fighters the Fuehrer raised before all the world claim +to the total state leadership by National Socialism. The men returned +to every day affairs with enormous enthusiasm and new courage which +could not be dampened by the announcement on December 8 prohibiting the +uniform in all regions of the Reich. + +The fateful year 1932 brings a heavy blow to the Movement. On April +13 the SA and SS are prohibited within the entire regions of the +Reich, even after the vote of unprecedented activity in the second +election for Reich president on April 10, 1932, had been 13,400,000 +for the National Socialists. They wanted to beat an organization by +the most brutal means. The wearers of the brown shirt were treated +like criminals. Everything attainable was confiscated. SA homes and +SA kitchens which gave protection and meals to needy and jobless SA +men were pitilessly closed. Nevertheless, with exemplary discipline +the SA and SS carries on and does not allow themselves to be enticed +into rashness. As simple party partners the SA men fulfill their duty +now. Finally on June 14th the uniform and demonstration prohibition is +raised. Communism and Marxism raise themselves and want to stop the +victory parade with bloody force. Not less than 32 National Socialists +among whom were SA and SS men and Hitler Youths, fall as sacrifices to +the Red Terror in a short six weeks. The Bloody Sunday of Altona was +a terrible indictment against the governmental system. Eighteen Folk +comrades are killed and 50 badly hurt. Nevertheless, the SA remains +disciplined and unshaken. It is not the least of its meritorious +services that the Reichstag election of 31 July 1932 brings the NSDAP +a huge victory and makes the Movement the strongest Party in the +Reichstag. And in spite of all, the SA men are still unprotected game, +having nothing for their protection but their own strength and the +fidelity of their comrades. It is difficult to clothe in words what +lies and slanders were poured out over the SA during this period; it is +also difficult to tell with what incomparable discipline and devotion +these men have fought. “Bullies and beaters” they were called by the +satiated citizenry, and yet it was they who protected the security of +the citizenry from Bolshevism. “There can be no thanks for anyone when +considering this greatest success of our Movement, but there is only +the duty of all of us to take up and continue the fight again with +renewed and increased strength”--thus Adolf Hitler recalled to mind on +the night of the victory of his Movement, and that was a command for +the SA. + +The time of the most difficult trials arrives. The SA knows it is for +the ultimate. Victory, already within grasp, must be finally gained +by fighting. Comrades fall but unswervingly the columns march. The +Fuehrer told them: “Victory belongs to him who in this fight brings the +last levy and the last battalion onto the battlefield.” And the SA was +prepared to enter its last battalion. + +On the 22nd of January 1933 the decision, morally, comes. At the +Bulowplatz before the Karl-Liebknecht House in Berlin, the Moscow +Center in Germany, the Berlin SA parades. Before this collected +strength of the Party the hirelings of Moscow crept cowardly into their +lurking holes. Hour after hour the SA men passed in review before the +bulwark of Communism and none of the Moscow disciples dared to raise a +fist. It was a victory for the SA, the significance of which could only +be measured later. + +Then the day dawns which meant victory and fulfillment of the struggle +of the SA: the 30th of January 1933. No command was given on this day, +and yet ten thousands of SA men and National Socialists stood ready +in the evening, in their old tattered brown shirts in which they had +marched through murder and terror, to greet the Fuehrer, their Highest +SA-Fuehrer, as Chancellor of the German Reich. In these SA men the +young Germany marched through the Brandenburg Gate into a Reich which +they had fought for at the foremost front and which to form and to +carry today is the highest commandment of their lives. + + + THE SA IN THE THIRD REICH + +Just as there was no celebration of victory by Adolf Hitler and his +fighting comrades after the seizure of power, so was there no moment +of rest for the SA men. What was worth cleaning up, was cleaned up. +Whether as auxiliary police or with special orders, whether as a +propagandist or as helper, the SA man in general was there and labored +silently as the shining example of the Idea in the structure of the +new State. Even after victory the SA had heavy losses to lament. It +was generally employed where elements of the government foreign to the +people had not yet understood the signs of the time or where Communism +and elements hostile to the State still insolently dared to rebel. And +not the last the fight against disguised opponents was a difficult +labor of the SA. But it is proud, then and now, to be the tool for +strengthening the structure of the new State and of the Community of +Folk. + +For the first time, on April 8, 1933, the entire SA in the regions of +the Reich and of Austria, stands drawn up at the same hour to avow +their immutable fidelity and willingness to follow to the Fuehrer, who +addressed his men over the radio from the Berlin Sports Palace. The +young Steel Helmets and the Steel Helmets during the year 1933 placed +themselves under the SA and became members of it. The SA during the +year experiences several changes which finally result in the present +form of the organization as will be described in the following chapter. + +With the consolidation of inner political perceptions within Germany +the type of strife of the SA changed. Just as the SA man during the +fighting period was not a companion along the way to great decisions, +but was the one who prepared the way, so the SA retained in the +Third Reich its original task, namely: to be the Shock Troops for +Ideology and as the practical school of National Socialism. The SA +trained no specialists in any form for its area of labor was among the +entire German Folk. To carry to the Folk, through things previously +experienced and by acts, the revolutionary spirit of the fighting +period, the initiative and willingness to sacrifice and to keep +awake among them those virtues which are the fundamentals for the +preparedness of National Socialists, is one of the huge tasks of the +SA. “All that you are, you are through me; and all that I am, I am +through you alone”. These words of the Fuehrer, spoken to his SA on the +30th of January 1936, are a recognition as well as an obligation. It is +a short formula of the platform of the SA: Germany. + +The deeds and achievements of the SA are not carried upon huge rosters +but are every day undertakings which will continue to live in the +hearts of the people. And that is more valuable than the written word. + +Several things out of the manifold labor sphere of the SA should be +named in collective concepts: use at times of catastrophe, prevention +of damage, thanksgiving of the Nation, cultural work, colonization, +educational encampments, officer training schools, scholarships and +many more. Over all of this is the eternal charge: shaping of human +beings. The guiding motif of this labor to educate the German people in +this powerful entity: strong soul, sound spirit, steel-like body. + +National Socialism has never demanded a new state form but has always +demanded the reformation of the individual German into a fighter who +has intelligence, who has conviction, who is politically dependable, +who is spiritually motivated, and physically hardened. Thus it was +only the consistent continuation of a labor already begun to win the +individual German when the Fuehrer handed over to the SA the execution +of protective and aggressive training and education of the individual +German. SA sports and SA sports badges, the latter established by +the Fuehrer himself on the 15th of February, 1933, “in order to lend +a conscious expression in all sections of the German people to the +cultivation of a warlike spirit”, are essentially the new shape of +the physical and spiritual training of the individual German within +the meaning of the National Socialist Ideology. Therewith, the SA was +commissioned to obtain an increase of and preservation of a warlike +power and a warlike spirit as the expression of an aggressive attitude. +The creation of the NS Contest Games on November 27, 1936, as a yearly +spectacle of accomplishments of physical prowess and of a warlike +spirit, and the order of March 18, 1937, that possession of the SA +sports badge is made dependent upon yearly repetitive performance of +the tests in order to maintain the warlike fitness of its bearers up to +old age, are milestones along the way to attainment of the great goal +of the SA. + +The SA is aware of the magnitude of its task. But it is able to master +the tasks given by the Fuehrer only because it emanates from the Folk +and is a part of the Folk. + + + II. ORGANIZATION + + The Branches of the SA + +The Fuehrer himself has designated the SA as the guarantor of the +National Socialist Movement and the National Socialist Revolution. The +SA is the political soldiery. In this concept “political soldiery”, +which was coined and found its animated shape during the fighting +period, are contained all these tasks of the SA whose affairs represent +still today the educational work of the Storm Troops. Tasks of this +proportion are only completed by voluntary performance of service; +however, they require, too, an organization which branches out +widely and yet guarantees as much as possible, by a concentration of +individual supervisory offices and their work sphere, a central, clear +and united management. + +The Supreme SA Fuehrer is Adolf Hitler, who gives his oldest fighting +formation its tasks, determines its direction of work, and commands its +uses. By order of the Fuehrer the Chief of Staff represents the SA in +its totality. A high measure of recognition and trust of the Fuehrer +lies in this charge, for to the Chief of Staff of the SA is entrusted, +for ideological and physical education and for further development, the +best and most valuable young strength of the German people. + +The Supreme SA Headquarters in Munich and the Office of the Adjutant in +Berlin are both bureaus of the Chief of Staff; the SA Fuehrers who head +these are directly responsible to the Chief of Staff for their work. + +The Supreme SA Headquarters is subdivided into the operational staff, +main offices, offices, and divisions. The Stabsfuehrer of the Supreme +SA Headquarters determines its employment as representative of the +Chief of Staff. + +The Storm Troops of the Fuehrer himself, which exist in all the regions +of the Reich and in the free city of Danzig, are divided according to +political and territorial considerations. + +The entire SA is composed of 24 groups which are subordinate to the +Chief of Staff. These are: SA Group Alpenland, Bavarian Eastern March, +Berlin-Brandenburg, Danube, Franken, Hanseatic, Hessian, Hochland, +Kurpfalz, Middle, Lower Rhine, Lower Saxony, North March, North Sea, +Eastland, Eastern March, Pomerania, Saxony, Silesia, Southern March, +Southwest, Thuringia, Westfalia, and Western March. + +The next subordinate branch is the SA Brigade, which is composed of +several regiments. A regiment consists of three to five battalions, +which is formed from three to five companies. The SA Company is +organized generally into three platoons, each of which is further +subdivided into three squads. + +The multilateral demands which are made of the SA formations +require, above all, in the use of the SA for preparations, parades, +catastrophes, accidents and all other acts of assistance, the +incorporation of special or technical units. Therefore, the following +special branches were established: signal, engineer, mounted, naval, +bicycle, and sanitary units. Local considerations and geographical +situations determine their incorporation into companies and battalions +and govern the consideration of subordinate positions. + + + THE OPERATIONAL STAFF OF THE SUPREME SA HEADQUARTERS + +The Stabsfuehrer is the permanent deputy of the Chief of Staff. As such +he is the highest authority for the collective main offices of the +Supreme SA Headquarters and of the SA groups. All decisions of a basic +nature for the SA, as long as they are not reserved for the Chief of +Staff himself, are made by the Stabsfuehrer. Immediately subordinate to +him are the liaison office of the Supreme SA Headquarters, the central +division, the staff for military affairs, the press and propaganda +division, the legal division, and the architectural division. The +liaison office keeps in continuous touch with all important bureaus of +the Party and State in order to handle all the questions which are of +importance to the SA. + +The treatment of occurrences of a fundamental sort, which require rapid +settlement and touch on the spheres of the various main offices so +that the closest cooperation with these main offices becomes a matter +of course, is the function of the central division with its two main +departments. The Staff commandant’s office bears the responsibility for +the total, internal operational service of the Supreme SA Headquarters. + +The entire press and propaganda preparations or exploitations of all +important events within the SA emanate from the press and propaganda +division to which is also joined publication of the fighting sheet of +the Supreme SA Headquarters, the SA-Man. Following the directions given +by this division, the group press departments, whose function is the +trusteeship of the local press, work through the individual SA groups. +The activity is above all of an informative nature; for the SA lays no +value on the quantitative nature of the things written about it, but is +only concerned with the fact that the German editor may be trusted with +the character and task of the SA. + +The legal division is still in process of being formed. On the other +hand the architectural division, which likewise was newly formed, is +working on plans and projects for new building designs in which the +creative genius of the SA will be expressed. + + + THE OPERATIONAL MAIN OFFICE + +The chief of the operational main office is responsible for the entire +organization and branches of the SA, for the education and suitable +equipment of units, and, not last, for the employment of the SA. + +The operational main office is subdivided into the office for +organization and employment and the office for physical fitness. +The latter, on the basis of the SA sports badges must prepare the +fighting training of the bodies of all Germans capable of bearing arms +and as preparation therefor must organize the execution of corporal +exercises (basic physical training) and sports performances, so that +the widest stratum of the population is laid hold upon and will be kept +in condition to bear arms, both physically and spiritual, as well as +ideologically in character up to the greatest old age. + +The tasks of the organization and employment office are given in its +title. Besides this it is entrusted with the special units of the SA: +signal, engineer, naval, and mounted units; it treats with the air and +gas protection of the SA; it carries on the education of the SA in the +sphere of catastrophe protection and prevention of damage; and as well +as keeping liaison with all Party and public offices which come into +consideration for these questions. + +In addition there arises the treatment of details of clothing and +equipping the SA and the regulations for office plans for SA offices as +well as the perfection of suggestions for investing certain SA units +with standards and names of heroic champions of the Movement. + + + THE MAIN OFFICE FOR EDUCATION + +The office of education is responsible for the entire education and +orientation of the SA Officers’ Corps. Upon this office devolves one of +the tasks of greatest significance for the people, the Reichsfuehrer +School, which consists of the Reichsfuehrer School in Munich and +the Officers’ School of the Supreme SA Headquarters in Dresden. The +curricula and community of work at these officers’ schools, as well +as at the 21 group schools and special schools, serves the purpose of +creating an SA officers’ corps which bears the highest responsibility +and great capability. + +The comparatively young officers’ school of the Supreme SA headquarters +in Dresden, above all, serves for the education of the intermediate +SA officers’ corps which has earned its qualification to attend at +one of the group schools. In this school the training for those who +want to try out for the SA sports badge stands in the foreground. The +spiritual and physical training on the fundamentals of the National +Socialist’s ideology pursues the purpose of making the SA Fuehrer into +a real educator of his troop. The threefold harmony: Soul, Spirit, and +Body, which sets in unison for the common group capability, knowledge, +and accomplishment, is an essential prerequisite here. Military sport, +as an SA expression of sports activity, is just as much a means to +accomplish our purpose as is instruction about the history of the +Party and the Folk, about racial teaching, or training as speakers. +The directions for this training hold good for the group schools, too, +which are subordinate to the same office. The work is performed in +close understanding with the leader of the group in whose territory +the school lies, because he himself possesses the best possibility +of choosing his future officers. This division, which is immediately +subordinate to the main office, maintains liaison with the offices of +Party and State, for which the experience won in the educational labor +of the SA are significant. Thereby it is achieved that the educational +labor of the SA stands in full and complete unison with the labor of +the Party and all its branches. + +The third office, ideology and culture, counts as its assigned sphere +cultural forms of service, the cultivation of SA and Folk songs, and +music. Directly and strictly avoided is publication of any sort of +service plan for festive formations, for form is not the deciding +factor, but the spirit with which that form is accomplished. + +The division for scientific exploitation, finally, contains a +voluminous library. It has the task of giving to every SA Fuehrer who +desires to train himself further, information about the most important +literature at hand on the subject. + + + THE MAIN OFFICE FOR HEALTH + +The main health office is responsible for all questions of health +and sanitary service of the SA. Since health forms the basis and +prerequisite for physical fitness, the main health office inserts +itself quite particularly into this branch of the SA service. Not +only care of and looking after the sick and injured belong to the +accomplishments of health service but, above all, preventive health +care. + +In the fighting period only the sanitation service existed. It is being +organized and changed in some particulars at present. Ten thousand +sanitation officers are trained and perfected in the best manner to be +able to perform first aid at any time. The Reich Sanitation School of +the SA in Tuebingen represents the ground floor for entire training +activity in the essentials of sanitation. In all regiments in the +whole Reich there are sanitation units ready for immediate employment +in catastrophe and great accidents. The sanitation man accompanies +his comrades everywhere in the SA service, whether it be employment +in preparations, construction of barriers, parades, marches with full +pack, or in the fields of sports contest. + +Training, equipment, and organization of the sanitation service are +gathered together in one office, the main office for health. Next to +it is a second office with the task of health operations and fostering +of race. The men of the SA have recognized the value of the health +of a Folk, and bear the conviction that only a sound Folk can be an +eternal Folk. With this conviction they fight for accomplishment of +the directions and orders which emanate from the main office for Folk +health and from the Reich Surgeon. In the foremost place are the +sanitation men of the SA who use themselves for that great goal: Purity +of blood and Purity of Race. + + + THE MAIN OFFICE FOR PERSONAL AFFAIRS + +The trusteeship of the SA Officers’ Corps, just as the care for future +SA officers, is a problem not only for the members themselves but, far +and above, is also of the greatest significance for the Party and for +the entire Nation. + +The personal affairs main office, which is divided into three offices: +personnel, social welfare courts and justice office, works in +permanent, animated touch with the SA front, where the capabilities and +suitabilities of the SA officers show themselves in daily employment. +A continuous exchange between this front of staff work and application +to educational spheres marks the future path of the SA officers. +His evaluation results from consideration of the suitability of the +character, of his ability and knowledge, and, above all, of his service +to the Movement. The oldest veterans and champions of the SA also +receive leading positions within the branches in so far as they prove +their capability to do the job. + +If there exists in one way a reward for the old tested fighters in +the assignment to fulfill a great obligation and a more responsible +mission, then the office for social welfare takes care that those SA +comrades who were wounded in the fight for the new Germany or who +find themselves in need, are looked out for. If it was imperative in +the first years after the seizure of power to provide a job generally +for these men, then, the problem of retraining stepped into the +foreground. In the camps of Lockstedt and Falkenstein the SA gives +unskilled manpower the possibility of earning, in about 40 weeks, the +journeyman’s certificate, and, thereby, the prerequisites for an +appointment as a skilled laborer in industry, or, in fact, in any of +those places which suffer because of lack of such laborers. In addition +to that men are retrained for mercantile professions and for work in +administrative offices. + +The same is true for the choice of settlers for those home sites which +arise everywhere in the Reich by way of thanks offerings. Also here are +old veterans who find a new home in the thanks-offering settlements +alongside of the war victims. + +To this office come officially the personal welfare matters of the men +and their families. Comrades who have suffered injury at sports or in +the service receive a cure or recuperation stay in the SA homes at Wyk +in Foehr, Hohenlychen, or Trillup bei Hamburg. The needy are permitted +support, and, in fact, in an understanding with the Reich treasurer, +the means of the Adolf Hitler Thanks and the Adolf Hitler Foundation +are placed at this office’s disposal. Above all, however, this office +interests itself in those who were injured in the fighting period by +political adversaries, so that a permanent personal touch gives to +these men the certainty that one will never forget their sacrifice. + +As third within the main personal affairs office the courts and justice +office is mentioned. One task of this office lies in the fostering +of honor and of clean behavior of the SA and the SA Officer’s Corps. +For the clean behavior of the leadership two chambers of discipline +serve. The personal rights of SA men are taken care of in a particular +division. + +Incumbent upon the justice division, composed of professional lawyers, +is legal counsel to the main offices of the Supreme SA Headquarters and +groups, cooperation with the remaining justice offices of the Movement, +and, thirdly, official traffic with the Chancellory of the Fuehrer and +treatment of pardon petitions of criminally convicted SA men as well as +former SA members. This proceeds from the viewpoint that the SA man, it +is true, on the one side has an enhanced duty to the Community of the +Folk; on the other side, however, there comes into discussion manifold +economics and mental after-effects of the period of the wrestling for +power in the case of old tested veterans of the SA in which their +significance can be fully adjudicated only by the SA. + + + THE MAIN ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE + +The administration of the SA, in its present standard organization and +proper economic operations, represents the tool which the Chief of +Staff uses for the solution of great tasks given to him by the Fuehrer. +Clarity is the distinguishing feature of SA administration in all its +many spheres. + +The matters pertaining to the property right of the NSDAP and, +therefore, of concern to the SA, are placed under the Reich treasurer +as Plenipotentiary of the Fuehrer. The deputy of the Reich treasurer +for the entire SA administration is the Reich cashier administrator +of the SA, who, without prejudice to his responsibility to the Reich +treasurer, is at the same time in his quality as Chief of the main +administrative office, the specialist of the Chief of Staff for all +matters which touch upon the administration of the entire SA. + +The large sphere of the tasks of the main administrative office is +divided into three offices: _a._ money economy, budget bookkeeping, +control of finances, and economics; _b._ things of value, procurement, +insurance and contracts; _c._ construction and settlement office. + +The salary of SA officers and men who are on the staffs which are +essential to the main offices is regulated uniformly on the basis of +an office plan. It is composed of base pay, quarters allowance, and +increase for marriage and children. Considering it from the political +standpoint of population, the increase for children in this ideal +echelon of society was settled upon. + +Great frugality which is pointed to particularly at every opportunity, +is understood as a matter of course in the SA. A splendidly working +accounting and control system makes possible an exact review of the +economic operation of all units and makes easier the immediate remedy +of a shortage of any kind. The examination reports, which are requested +by the Deputy of the Reich treasurer of the units are treated and made +use of in one special division of the Main Administrative Office. + +The great property values of the SA, which is a consistent part +of the total fortune of the NSDAP, is laid hold upon according to +number and value and carefully administered. Many millions flow into +economy through the settlement work called into being by the Supreme +SA Headquarters with the aid of the thanks-offering of the Nation. +The settlement work should offer to many thousands of needy people +and to families, sound in heredity and rich in children, their own +homes. Aside from settlements on the edge of town the construction +and settlement office in the neighborhood of Aurich erected farm +settlements with 60 to 80 acres of land, which, above all, are managed +by former farm laborers. Here, too, they put cattle and even crops at +their disposal gratuitously. + +The many sided tasks of SA Administration are united closely with +those of the headquarters. Parades and other arrangements, training, +equipping, procurement, etc., cannot be accomplished without standard +cooperation of the administration. + + + THE MAIN OFFICE FOR NS-TOURNAMENTS + +On the 27th of November 1936 the Fuehrer decreed the following order: +In pursuance of my proclamation at the Reich Party Day of Honor I +hereby create for future Reich Party Days the NS-Tournament. The SA is +charged with the preparation and execution of this tournament. I decree +that the determinations necessary for execution be left up to the +suggestions of the Chief of Staff of the SA. The Reich Sports Fuehrer +is directed to cooperate with the sports department of the Supreme SA +Headquarters. The Chief of Staff will keep me continually informed +about the measures planned. + +In order to solve organizationally the tasks sketched in this order +of the Fuehrer, the main tournament office was created in February +1937. As the chief of this main tournament office, the Chief of Staff +appointed the Reich Sports Fuehrer von Tschammer und Osten. By this +appointment the guarantee is given that, in comradely cooperation with +the Reichsbund for physical training, the tasks set by the Fuehrer in +respect to the military fitness of the entire nation and the formation +of a Folk will be solved by physical training. + +Therewith, SA Obergruppenfuehrer von Tschammer und Osten holds in his +hand responsibility for the organization and accomplishment of the NS +Tournaments, which are to be held each year in Nurnberg during the +Reich Party Day as an exhibition of the achievement of the whole German +people. + +Incumbent upon the office simultaneously is direction of the NS +Winter Tournaments and Reich Contests of the SA which also experience +continuous enlargement. + +The main office for the NS Tournaments is divided into three offices: +organization, military sports, and sports which from their titles alone +indicate the limits of their spheres of work. + + + THE ADJUTANT’S OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF + +In the Adjutant’s Office of the Chief of Staff are treated all +questions which are proposed directly to the Chief of Staff by the +offices of the Party and of the State, as well as by others. Next to +the very voluminous labor of dealing with those questions and lectures +of the Chief of Staff on important matters, the Adjutant’s Office, as +the personal office of the Chief of Staff, has to take care of the +preparation for and smooth execution of travel of the Chief of Staff. +Continuously the Chief of Staff visits the individual Groups, using +in the first place airplane, then rail transportation and automobile. +All of the troublesome details, which these official trips demand, +require thorough discharge so that appointments shall be kept and the +entire program developed as foreseen. As a matter of course many SA +Fuehrers, spending a while in the Reich capital, come in person to the +Adjutant’s Office to speak with the Chief of Staff. Various wishes are +attended to here and many worthwhile suggestions come from the ranks of +the visitors. The men in the Adjutant’s Office whose task it is to do +their duties in the personal service of the Chief of Staff endeavor, +in order to facilitate for him his difficult and responsible task, +take care of at least the pressing questions or help their fellows +with professional advice. Next to that this office has value in that +it fixes appointments for various official conferences of the Chief of +Staff with leading men of the Party and State and in that it divides up +the daily program according to current demands, so that all work can be +executed smoothly. It is not easy work which the men in the Adjutant’s +Office have to perform; only the consciousness of helping their fellows +in the broad Front everywhere in the Reich and of supporting their +fight gives to their work a valuable substance. + + + SPECIAL UNITS OF THE SA + +Engineers and Signal SA + +In the same measure that the little Shocktroop of the National +Socialist Idea grew up into an organization in whose hands the Fuehrer +has laid the whole physical and ideological education of our people, +so in the same measure the sphere of the tasks of the brown Army of +Adolf Hitler grew and received a multiformity which made necessary the +special training of units which were capable of continuous employment +and highest performance within their special areas. + +First it was engineer companies, then further, it was signal companies. +Since the time they were established, both units, when put to the test +have proved that the men with “Pi” and “Na” on the lapels of their +service uniform are found where German humanity needs their help. If +storms whip the waves of the seas, and masses of water threaten the +coasts of the Reich; if downpours and melting snows swell the mountain +streams so that fields, plains, and farms are in danger; if fire is on +the point of destroying the property of German people; or if anywhere +a natural catastrophe happens, one finds, in all the Gaus of the Reich +and at all times, the engineers and signal men among the first helpers +who strike with cheer and with readiness to sacrifice. Very few have a +suspicion of what takes place in the hour of bitterest wrestle with the +might of Nature, but they scarcely think about the fact that these very +same men, who perhaps gave their utmost during the entire night, are a +few hours later going about their callings; and only the least number +have a clear understanding of what basic and careful training and what +untiring practice was necessary in order to achieve a complete success +in time of serious accident. And in these practices we see how a bridge +is made at the turn of a hand, how blasting is executed, and can +alongside the performances of the engineers, who work hand in hand with +the signal units, see with amazement how the latter lay their field +cables, set up their telephones, let the blinker apparatus speak, and +relay reports by bicycle riders, messenger dogs or carrier pigeons, in +short, how they establish connection between the front and the staffs +and thereby secure smooth cooperation. The status of training of the +men of the signal units is kept under constant control by the signal +certificate. This certificate is proof for its holder that his status +of training is complete and excellent. It must be won by examinations +for three consecutive years before it is finally the possession of the +signal man. + +Thus there originates in these technical units of the SA a trained +crew whose capabilities and knowledge are not the last things of +extraordinary value in the service for defense of the country. On one +side the young SA man, who enters the Army from his branch, comes +prepared with a multitude of prerequisites which facilitate and speed +up his training in technical respects; while on the other side those +very soldiers, having served, who return out of the Army into the +SA, keep themselves, by constant practice, in a trained condition +physically and spiritually and impart their knowledge to their fellows. + +Thus they contribute a considerable portion to the enhancement of +military strength and military spirit of the German people. As +everywhere, the soldier of the army finds here, too, his closest +confederates in political soldiers. + +The Mounted SA + +If today in Germany the sport of riding is not as it was in past +decades, the prerogative and affair of a propertied class, but a thing +for all of those who from enthusiasm and love of horses profess to +ride, then it is just something else for which to thank the SA which +has interested itself in the sport of riding as a means of fitting +the people physically. The Fuehrer himself by his order about the +establishment of the NS cavalry Corps on March 17, 1936, created the +basis upon which first the SA Cavalry itself and then the German youth +and above all the compulsory military duty classes could be led to the +sport of riding. This order soon created the necessary organizational +prerequisites, so that at present the SA each year is able to furnish +many thousands of young trained cavalrymen to our Wehrmacht. All those +who are 18 to 20 years of age must join the NSKK and even those in +younger and older year groups, may join it, who come up for cavalry +and motor training and want to earn a cavalry certificate before their +period of service in order to be able to serve with a mounted or +motorized troop. + +The organization of the NSKK has its apex in the Reich Inspectorate +for mounted and mobile units who is directly subordinate to the +Chief of Staff and who at the same time presides over the recently +created main office for mounted and mobile training within the Supreme +SA Headquarters. In this way a conceivably close liaison has been +established between both organizations, and in it at the same time +lies the foundation for fruitful exchange between the SA cavalry and +the NSKK. In each S.A. group was created the office of Group Cavalry +Fuehrer, who is responsible to the Reich Inspectorate as his deputy +for training and organization. At present the S.A. cavalry has at its +disposition 101 cavalry regiments in whose schools, year in and year +out, young Germans who are obligated for service receive the training +which fits them for entrance into a section of troops which is of their +own choosing. + +The NSKK has discovered, by creation of the cavalry certificate, +a means of fostering and requiring cavalry fitness. The cavalry +certificate is granted only after careful testing and fulfilling +essential conditions successfully; it requires an all-embracing +quantity of riding ability. Thus the cavalry certificate is a way to +select and require real talent. The NSKK is still young, but two years +of serious labor have already proven the correctness of its objective. + +The Naval S.A. + +The men of the water’s edge, the navigators and fishermen, for the most +part do their duty in the naval SA, since they are concerned in their +daily professions with all sorts of things having to do with navigation +and water. Nevertheless, there are not only naval S.A. regiments +along the ocean but also in the interior. If there is no big ship at +their disposal for training, a ship built on land often suffices for +the accomplishment of the careful training of the men about masts, +shrouds, and deck structure. The service of the naval S.A. operates as +preparation and development for the Navy. Semaphore, radio, Morse Code, +and flags as signal service, navigation, cutter operation, astronomy, +professional use of sailing craft, rescue service--to mention only a +few spheres of its tasks--complete its curriculum. + +For the seafaring S.A. men however, who pass the greater portion of +their lives on the seas of the world, there is, in the first place, +ideological use as a border troop who make their appearance in foreign +countries at celebrations, parades, and similar events. The naval S.A. +furnishes yearly to the German merchant marine and navy splendidly +prepared material and is, therefore, practically and theoretically, a +valuable support of German seafaring and German navigating. + +The SA Sanitation Men + +The “Sani” men, the sanitation men of the S.A., were already at hand +in the fighting period if it was necessary to bring help to injured +comrades. Endless numbers thanked the S.A. for these S.A. sanitation +men of the fighting period. And from these simple men came physicians +for body and soul, who continuously struck the correct note and whom +one knew could be depended upon in every situation of life. If security +and peace rule internally at present, the S.A. sanitation men have not +indeed become superfluous. The Service in the S.A. which is continually +prepared for use, brings with it physical danger, and many injuries +can be avoided or lessened by speedy aid. Be it hot weather or frost, +mischance or sudden sickness, the “sani-men” are at their post. Highest +demands, however, are placed on them if, at time of catastrophe medical +assistance is not sufficient and the life of many depends upon the +success of appropriate initial treatment. Then the S.A. sanitation men +fall to the task and give their utmost. Unnamed and unknown they do +their duty in the spirit and tradition demanded by the organization to +which they belong. + +The “Feldherrnhalle” Regiment + +Under the symbol, which for us National Socialists is the embodiment of +supreme preparedness to sacrifice, the sacrificial runic symbol, the +S.A. has created a troop which is set up to symbolize the political +soldiery of our time: The Feldherrnhalle Regiment. The fact that the +Supreme S.A. Fuehrer, Adolf Hitler, has appointed his tested comrade, +S.A. Obergruppenfuehrer Hermann Goering, as its chief, proves the high +calling which falls to the lot of this regiment today and tomorrow. +As the elite troop of the S.A. it seeks to be the shining example in +service and in obedience. + +The measures are very strict which have been laid upon this young body +of men who have assigned their lives to this regiment. Yearly young men +from all callings and skills of the people thrust themselves into this +original body. Differences of heredity or property are unknown. Here it +is only the man, his performance and his obligation to obey as an ever +ready S.A. man the commands of his leader, which has worth. + +Every possibility stands open to him who proves himself true in this +regiment. He who has performed his year of service may decide to +remain or return to his calling. Likewise it is possible to work his +way up into the main offices of the S.A. headquarters or to enter the +administrative service; the decisive factors for that, frankly, are the +capabilities of the candidate and the possibilities for their use in +the political life of the people. + +In six great camps, which lie scattered in the whole Reich, a valuable +work of education is consummated for many hundreds of apt persons. +The political value of this work cannot be grasped by bare numbers +and dry statistics. These are not decisive factors; it seems to us to +be much more essential and for the justification of this information +of political soldiery, that out of the training of the Feldherrnhalle +Regiment, National Socialists go forth who shall do their part to +assure the continuation of that work begun by Adolf Hitler. For this +reason there belongs in the Feldherrnhalle regiment the concepts of +discipline, voluntary subordination, and leading a soldierly life as +first prerequisites and basic conditions for the acceptance of future +members. + +Out of the apparent forms of political life developed by the present +emulating in their behavior the proven example of the old S.A., the +Feldherrnhalle regiment professes itself to the concept of a soldierly +life. It unites in its ranks young, consciously political individuals +who voluntarily wish to live their lives in hardiness and soldierly +strictness. + +The Reichsfuehrer School + +Selection of officers and planned education of officers was the +innovation drawn into the circle of political work of the Party after +the seizure of power. An effective instrument for such officer training +is the Reichsfuehrer School in Munich created in 1931 by the Fuehrer. +Many thousands of S.A. officers are oriented here in accordance with +the perceptions of the fighting period in their new form and have been +trained and then, supplied with knowledge and ideological learning, +have gone out into their units where they impart to those whom they +have to lead, the Front of the political struggle of the present and +their experiences and recently gained insights. + +The work of the Reichsfuehrer School today is set aside to bring the +synthesis of body and mind very near to the ideal form. All technical +means are employed to do that. In a nine months course of study the +future S.A. officers are introduced into all spheres of political +life. The Reichsfuehrer School desires to stimulate self-created +labor, to teach meditation, and to shape the young S.A. officer +into a consciously strong charactered, political personality. Body, +mind, soul--one cannot be thought of without the other. A hardy +physical training, strict measures about health and racial values and +continued supervision of the life being led are valuable, but are also +indispensable expedients for strict and serious work. + +A second task has been given to the Reichsfuehrer School with the +comprehensive two weeks labor conference which takes place yearly in +the time after the Reich Party Day, and is for the older unit officers +from regimental commanders up to, and including, staff divisions. At +these labor conferences the political balance sheet of the year is +reckoned. Consequently, the Reichsfuehrer School has an outstanding +part in the political training work of the Party. The success of the +education of future officers will perhaps become apparent only in later +decades, but even today the goal stands out in a clearly recognizable +fashion: the individual German trained in National Socialism, hardened +in mind and strength, and firm in character. + +The Reichsfuehrer School of the S.A. in Dresden is guided according to +similar directions. For special training of particular units there is +at the disposal of the S.A. the Reich Sanitation School in Tuebingen +and the Reich Cavalry School in Zehlendorf. + + + III. PROSPECTUS + + The Law of Willingness to Volunteer. + +In the beginning of the fight there was the Party and the S.A. The +goal, tasks and changing requirements of the fight have led to the +establishment of the branches of the Party out of the great collecting +basin of the S.A. The strong impulses which emanated from the S.A. have +been carried over into the labor of all branches of the Party. All +branches fulfill their work at present according to their own laws and +responsibilities. Most of their officers, however, and many of the men +have marched in the ranks of the Storm Troops, and, thus at present +there lives and works in these branches the further quality which we +call the S.A. spirit. + +“The fight continues”--that was from the start the password of the S.A. +and will continue to be for all time. Never has the S.A. man fought +just to be fighting, and never to be destructive, but he has fought +only to be constructive. And only for that reason can the Fuehrer +extend tasks to the S.A. in the new State, which have a decisive +significance. + +Our comrades in the past years in Austria have demonstrated with +what spirit the S.A. is blessed. They were unshaken in avowal to +the Fuehrer, in belief in the strength of blood, and in fidelity to +their native place. They have fixed for themselves a monument to the +S.A. spirit which will always renew itself. Their sacrifice was a +cornerstone of liberty. They were proud to be permitted to suffer for +Germany. Fate has let these men and their families go along a path +whose milestones were need, hate, suffering, terror, and pursuit. Many +have sacrificed their lives, and for many, who sat behind dungeon and +prison walls, the hope of liberty had sunk away to nothing, and, yet +not one word of bitterness came past their lips. He who fought thus is +worthy of being called a German and an S.A. man. + +A few months ago the S.A. men of Austria still stood in the midst of +bloody fighting, and yet now they work in peaceful construction. Thus +the S.A. in German Austria became the peace army of the people in the +National Socialist State. The S.A. was only able to master this task +because the goal always remained the same and they marched along all +paths which the Fuehrer commanded, and because the voluntary will to +serve is the supreme law of National Socialism. + +Today the S.A. stands before the great task of being guardian and +fashioner of the armed desire and armed strength of the German people. +Its devotion, its preparedness to sacrifice, its belief in the idea, +and its soldierly, combatant attitude will create and preserve in the +German people that physical fitness and armed preparedness which the +Fuehrer and the Reich need and without which a people cannot live. + +Great achievements are only produced with unheard of personal +application based upon voluntary will. And this law of voluntary +service is the key to preparedness and successful labor of the S.A. Not +spectator, but active participant is the password of the S.A. in all +things it takes hold of. + +The Storm Troops have made their way through most difficult trials. +They have withstood them because this nucleus troop bears in it +unshakeably the spirit of unconditional fidelity and unconditional +obedience to the Fuehrer. The S.A. exists today stronger and firmer +now and forever. It knows that the Fuehrer will also assign to it in +the future new work spheres. The Storm Troops are ready to fulfil the +commands of the Fuehrer and his charges with complete application +because they desire in all things to be nothing other than the bearers +of the Idea, the strong arm of the Movement, the secure support of the +people and the German people’s infantry, prepared to sacrifice and +happy to attack. + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2169-PS + + Copy + + SS Garrison-doctor Hmb. Neuengamme + Kl. Hmb.-Neuengamme 29 March 1945 + _Az.: 14 h (Kl) 3.45/Tr./Um._-- + + Subject: Quarterly Sickreport on Internees of Concentration Camp + Hmb.-Neuengamme + + Re: Circular from there dated 27-12-1944 No. 242/Az.:14 h + (Kl.) + Attachments: 2 Diagrams + Date: 1-4-1945 + +To the Head of the Medical-Service at SS Chief office of Economic +Administration [Wirtschafts-Verwaltungshauptamt] and Chief of Bureau D +III + +Oranienburg + + + I. Concentration Camp + +1. The average number of internees in the Concentration Camp +Hmb.-Neuengamme during the quarter of the year reported on amounted to +_40,393_ (including the affiliated working camps). + +In addition there is an average of 11,768 female internees. + +2. There were _6,224_ death cases during the quarter of the year +reported on (from 26-12-1944 to 25-3-1945), among them _95_ female +internees. Of this number the following deaths have occurred in the +affiliated camps: + + Base-Camp Hamburg 944 deaths + ” Bremen 515 ” + ” Druette 102 ” + ” Watenstedt 298 ” + ” Reimstedt 9 ” + ” Porta 89 ” + ” Hannover 453 ” + ” Braunschweig 198 ” + Affiliated Camp Meppen-Versen 379 ” + ” Woebbelin 53 ” + ------------ + Total 3,040 deaths + at concentration camp + Hmb.-Neuengamme 3,089 ” + ------------ + Total deaths 6,129 + In addition of the female internees: 95 deaths + ------------ + +3. The average number of internees in the hospital buildings I, II, +III, IV, and V during the quarter of the year reported on amounted to +_1711_ daily. + +4. During the period of time reported on _815_ internees daily were +treated without being hospitalized. + + SS Garrison doctor Kl. Hmb.-Neuengamme + SS Captain + + + COPY OF DOCUMENT 2171-PS + + Report B-2833 + +THE NUMERICAL EXPANSION OF THE CONCENTRATION CAMP BUCHENWALD DURING THE + YEARS 1937-1945 + + (Based on the complete records of the competent service units) + + + PREFACE + +The following figures are compiled from authentic material that the +SS in their flight from the camp were unable to destroy. Particular +attention is called to the fact that every number can be substantiated +by the personal records of the prisoners in question. + + + I + +In July 1937 the first advance headquarters of the so-called +professional criminals arrived on the completely unimproved, untouched +wooded terrain of the Ettersberg near Weimar for the construction of +a new large concentration camp. At the time the SS had not yet named +the future camp and called it KL Ettersberg. The first roll call was +made on 19 July 1937 and recorded 149 prisoners. On the following +day 70 prophylactic prisoners, that is to say so-called professional +criminals from the KL Sachsenburg, arrived. On the 27th of July the +first 91 political prisoners, among them 7 Bible research students +also arrived from the KL Sachsenburg. On the 29 July 1937 the name “KL +Buchenwald” appeared for the first time in the official correspondence. +At that time the number in the camp had increased to 327 persons. On 30 +July 1937 600 prisoners from the KL Lichtenburg were added and another +convoy from the Lichte [Lichtenburg] arrived on 6 August 1937. + +On the lists of the Reich’s German nationals the name of Hermann +Kempek appears as the first deceased, who died on 13 August 1937 in +Buchenwald. The two next dead persons are already reported on 15 August +1937. + +Additional convoys followed from Sachsenburg and the Lichte individual +arrivals were also recorded. The total number of arrivals in the year +1937 amounted to 2,912 persons. By 1 January 1938 already 48 or 1.65% +of them had died. + +The last roll call made by the SS took place on 3 April 1945. At the +time the number of prisoners in the camp amounted to 80,011 persons. On +11 April 1945 the victorious Allied troops liberated the concentration +camp. + +The expansion of the concentration camp is shown in Table 1, which +gives the total number of arrivals and the deceased for each year. + + + _Table 1_ + + ---------------+--------------+---------------- + Year | Arrivals | Deceased + ---------------+--------------+---------------- + 1937 | 2,912 | 48 + 1938 | 20,122 | 771 + 1939 | 9,553 | 1,235 + 1940 | 2,525 | 1,772 + 1941 | 5,890 | 1,522 + 1942 | 14,111 | 2,898 + 1943 | 42,177 | 3,516 + 1944 | 97,866 | 8,644 + 1945 (3 month) | 43,823 | 13,056 + +--------------+---------------- + Total | 238,980 | 33,462 + ---------------+--------------+---------------- + +It is self-evident that under normal living conditions only a minor +fraction of these 33,462 persons would have died. Most of them had +reached the best years of their manhood. The living and working +conditions in Buchenwald were such that every one could easily contract +a serious illness, especially during the first months, owing to the +sudden and violent change in their daily habits of life. In Buchenwald +a serious illness resulted nearly always in death, because during the +first years no medical help was dispensed or was so inefficient that +the hope of a recovery was perforce without any prospects. + +The number of unnatural deaths also reached a shocking figure. In +desperation many chose voluntary death by hanging themselves or +touching the electrically charged wire fence. In addition in the +KL Buchenwald, like everywhere else where the SS and the Gestapo +were in charge, numerous prisoners were shot “in flight”. This +“shooting-in-flight” was often conducted after a certain pattern by +forcing the prisoners in the labor units to cross the line of guards. +This happened especially in the stone quarries, where they were +maltreated to such a degree that in desperation they could find no +other way of escape. The nearest SS guard would shoot them down only a +few yards beyond the line. In the following Table 2 are not included +those who were wounded by rifle fire or those who died in the camp area +from the results of the maltreatment they received. + + + _Table 2_ + + ----------+--------------------+------------------ + | Number shot while | Number who chose + Year | in flight | voluntary death + ----------+--------------------+------------------ + 1937 | 7 | -- + 1938 | 34 | 11 + 1939 | 9 | 3 + 1940 | 89 | 11 + 1941 | 16 | 17 + 1942 | 48 | 3 + 1943 | 46 | 2 + 1944 | no accurate record | 46 + 1945 | no accurate record | 16 + ----------+--------------------+------------------ + +A satanical asphyxiation installation equal to the one in the KL +Auschwitz was not erected in the KL Buchenwald. The SS probably feared +that they would not be able to keep the secret in the most densely +settled part of Germany. But this does not mean that we were spared +such installation in Buchenwald. Already on 13 July 1941 a convoy was +formed consisting of 94 “invalide”, German Reich nationals and Poles, +for the greater part but not exclusively Jews, and taken to Hohenstein +near Dresden, guarded by heavily armed SS troopers. On the following +day 93 more were dispatched. Several days later their clothes, +including their personal effects, false teeth, etc., were returned to +Buchenwald. In so far it became known at that time these persons were +poisoned by gas at the place of their destination. It is probable that +the SS had already at that time perfected its asphyxiation chambers +and tested them. On 2, 11 and 12 March 1942 further convoys followed +containing 285 prisoners, exclusively Jews. + +Beginning Fall 1942 increasingly larger mass transports and individual +transports of Jews, who had already been a long time in the camp, to KL +Auschwitz took place, where unquestionably they were murdered. For this +reason these prisoners were probably not entered on the records of the +KL Auschwitz. In detail it concerns the following transports: + + 27 July 1942 163 prisoners, among them 119 Soviet PWs. + 26 Sept. 1942 200 gypsies. + 6 Oct. 1944 1,183 Jews. + +It can no longer be determined today how high the number of the +individual transports ran, but it is definite that these individual +transports were carried out on special instructions from Berlin. + +Since the beginning of the war a continually rising number of +executions were carried out in the KL Buchenwald. The shooting or +hanging of individual persons or of certain categories of prisoners +took place on the basis of the orders issued by the SS Reich Management +without any judicial verdict. Three executions in the KL Buchenwald by +hanging were performed in public, that is to say, before the entire +assembled camp inmates on the roll call grounds. The first prisoner +was hung on 4 June 1938, the second on 21 December 1938, both of +whom had beaten down their SS guards in their flight from an advance +headquarters on 8 May 1938. The victim of the third execution on 13 +September 1944 was a recaptured fugitive. + +When other prisoners in the camp were to be executed they were called +to the entrance and taken away. Exact figures can only be given +with certainty for the years 1944 and 1945, because until then such +prisoners were recorded as being turned over to the Gestapo and it is +no longer possible to determine now which were actually turned over +and which only allegedly. In the year 1944 at least 177 and in 1945 at +least 54 prisoners of the camp were executed. + +The mass executions of Soviet prisoners of war, officers, political +officers and troops were introduced. However, Polish officers, German +officials and higher ranking officers as well as German and foreign +women were executed in Buchenwald. At that time the execution places +were installed in the DAW terrain and in the horse stable and the +crematory was considerably enlarged. Upon arrival, those destined to be +executed were not entered on the camp records, but were separated from +those arriving simultaneously in the normal course of procedure and +handed over to the Court of Justice Division for “special treatment”, +which in official language meant, for execution. Unfortunately the SS +had already destroyed on 1 and 2 April 1945 all the relating documents +therefore no figures of any kind can be quoted. + +Based on the observations of the prisoners it would seem that +approximately 7,000 persons were executed. + +Furthermore to the total number of those who died in the concentration +camp Buchenwald must be added the others who were killed in April 1945 +during the retransport from the advance headquarters to the camp, +in the advance headquarters itself and on the march. In addition +innumerable others must be added, who during the evacuation of the camp +died in other camps en route. + +If on the whole the number of the victims of death is set at 50,000 +this frightful figure will not be estimated too high. + + + II + +The development of the camp shall now be followed in all its details. + +The camp strength rose gradually after 1 January 1938 until it reached +the figure of 3,000 on 1 May 1938. Then the phase “Arbeitsscheu Reich” +(shirking to work for the Reich) set in. The first “asocials” 5 May +1938. Larger transports of a total of 1,000 “asocial” Jews arrived +on 14 and 15 June 1938. With this event the camp strength jumped and +reached its first high point of 7,968 on 7 August 1938. The number of +the dead also jumped. Whereas the number of dead prisoners amounted to +4 in April 1938 it amounted to 16 in May, 62 in June and 105 in July. + +In the following months the camp strength slowly decreased through +deaths and discharges and only amounted to 7,791 persons on 1 September +1938. The first foreigners arrived in September 1938, namely, in round +figures, 2,200 Austrian Jews from the KL Dachau. This influx increased +the camp strength to 10,471 on 1 October 1938. + +In November 1938 the notorious great movement against the Jews in the +Third Reich was carried through, which Hitler tried to justify by +referring to the attempt on the life of the official of the German +Embassy in Paris, von Rath. In a very short time the camp strength +doubled itself. Whereas on 9 November 1938 it still amounted to 9,842, +it had grown to 19,676 on 13 November 1938. No lodging facilities +were available for such an increase. Temporarily the new arrivals +were camped on the roll call ground and in the half completed sheep +stable, until very primitive wooden barracks without any sanitary +installations were erected alongside the roll call grounds, which later +became famous as the Blocks 1a-5a. During the first few days the SS +had no clear survey that the keeper of the records would announce over +the loudspeaker, “If another Jew hangs himself, will he kindly stick a +piece of paper with his name on it in his pocket, so that one knows who +he is.” + +Where the Jews came from is given in the survey in Table 3. + + + _Table 3_ + + -----------------------------------+-------- + Place of Origin | Number + -----------------------------------+-------- + Giessen | 138 + Mainz | 97 + Kassel | 693 + Breslau | 2,471 + Dresden | 151 + Magdeburg | 375 + Chemnitz | 171 + Leipzig | 270 + Oppeln | 703 + Bielefeld | 406 + Meiningen | 91 + Dessau | 85 + Darmstadt | 169 + Frankfurt a/M | 2,621 + Friedberg | 99 + Erfurt | 197 + Halle/Saale | 124 + Hannover | 316 + Nordhausen | 89 + Aachen | 135 + Wuerzburg | 103 + Eisenach-Gotha | 112 + Offenbach | 82 + Worms | 87 + Various small places in Thueringen | 689 + +This increase in the camp strength not only resulted in a definite but +also in a greater percentage number of death cases, as indicated in +Table 4. + + + _Table 4_ + + ---------------------+------------+---------------+--------------- + | Number of | Average | Deaths in % + Period | deaths | Camp Strength | Camp Strength + ---------------------+------------+---------------+--------------- + Oct. 10-Nov. 9, ’38 | 53 | 10 156 | 0.52% + Nov. 10-Dec. 12, ’38 | 244[4] | 17 262 | 1.41% + ---------------------+------------+---------------+--------------- + + FOOTNOTES: + + [4] Among them 3 unknown dead and 3 suicides. + +At that time the first construction work of the concentration camp +and the necessary troop billets were finished in the rough. The SS +sent their prophylactic prisoners to new places for the erection of +other camps and SS barracks. The first professional criminals were +sent to Camps Mauthausen and Flossenburg on 3 November 1938. Other +Transports followed shortly. The “Actions-Juden” (Jews arrested during +the movement or campaign against them) were also discharged after a +comparatively short time, that is to say, after plundering them and +requisitioning their property, they were for the greater part expelled +from the Third Reich and upon leaving the camp had to immediately +board a ship or cross the frontier. Through these proceedings and the +inclusion of death cases the camp strength went down to 8,650 in round +figures by the end of February 1939 and stayed at this level, for the +time being. + + + III + +Immediately after the beginning of the war the camp strength rose +anew. At that time the “Aktions” prisoners, Reich nationals and +Austrians unfit to carry arms, arrived. Also the Czech hostages from +the Protectorate were delivered as the next batch of foreigners in +September 1939 amounting to a total number of 756, some of them +coming from the KL Dachau. At the start of the war the KL Dachau was +completely evacuated and on 26 September 1939 no less than 2,200 +prisoners were transferred to Buchenwald. + +On 5 October 1939 members of the Polish minority in Germany numbering +181 persons followed. + +After the conclusion of the Polish campaign Buchenwald experienced +a grim and tragic sequel in the action taken against the so-called +Polish snipers and other Poles coming from those parts of Poland which +belonged to Germany before 1918. + +On 15 October 1939 and 16 October no less than 1,000 and 1,098 Poles +arrived and were put in tents under the most primitive and barbaric +conditions on the half-finished roll call grounds, where they received +only half of the amount of the food furnished to the other prisoners. +The terrible results of this annihilation process is reflected in the +comparison of the death cases. In the period 16 September to 15 October +1939--44 prisoners died in the KL Buchenwald, and from 16 October to 15 +November 1939, therefore in the same space of time, 6.4 times as many, +or 283 prisoners. + +After the attempt on Hitler’s life in the Buergerbraeu in Munich on +9 November 1939 a new terror deed by the SS filled the camp with a +shuddering and paralyzing fright. The 9 November was a holiday and +no work was being done. In the morning under the command of the SS +Staff Sergeant Blanck heavily armed SS soldiers appeared and without +any list or records selected at random 7 men from each block of Jews, +mostly young ones. Thereupon, without any further explanation, they +were marched to the stone quarry and shot down. The particulars of the +records of these 21 victims are known. + +The unbelievable bad conditions, especially the sanitary ones, in +the special camp of the Poles, spread to the rest of the camp. The +epidemics in the camp and the fear of contagion on the part of the +troops forced the SS to quarantine the camp. Individual additions +arrived only in exceptional cases. From 1 November 1939 to 30 June +1940, i.e. in 8 months, only a total of 131 additions arrived. +Correspondingly the discharges from the camp were almost completely +discontinued. Therefore, it was in the main the death cases which in +this first winter of the war, owing to the miserable nourishment, +hunger and dysentery, caused a decrease in the number of prisoners +from 12,841 on 24 October 1939 to 7,986 on 1 May 1940. Death took an +especially high toll among the Burgenland gypsies confined in the camp. +In the aforementioned figures showing the decrease, a transport of +1,000 prisoners on 6 March 1940 and one of 3,000 on 14 April 1940 sent +to the KL Mauthausen, is included. Who ever knows the reputation of +this newly erected camp in Mauthausen must also know that not many of +these prisoners remained alive. + +A larger number of additions to the camp only began to arrive again in +August 1940, namely again 1,100 Poles in two transports from Posen. +In the following winter the camp strength remained about the same and +averaged in round numbers about 7,500 prisoners. + +(Hitler had promised a very generous pardon decree for his 50th +birthday. It consisted in discharging in round figures 2,300 mostly +“asocial” prisoners. Later delayed pardon act reduced the camp strength +from 6,363 on 1 May 1939 to a low figure of 5,376 on 21 August 1939.) + + + IV + +The first results of the Western Campaign soon manifested themselves +in Buchenwald. Already on 2 July 1940 delivery of 216 Hollanders was +made to the KL Buchenwald, mostly high-ranking officials and officers +as hostages, and was followed by an additional 111 on 8 and 9 October +1940. The last Dutch hostages arrived on 23 August 1941. They were +isolated in a block from the other camp inmates like the preceding +ones, and were conceded certain modest facilities. A selected few of +them were discharged during the year. The main body, however, remained +in Buchenwald until 15 November 1941 and were then transported to the +vicinity of Herzogenbusch. + +In the beginning of 1941 the German security police raided the +Amsterdam Jewish quarter after a strike and abducted for transfer to +Buchenwald 389 Dutch Jews on 28 February 1941. They were immediately +employed in the hardest physical work and in this manner destroyed. The +balance of them, 341, with 350 other prisoners were transferred to the +KL Mauthausen on 22 May 1941. + +Finally it should be mentioned, that a large transport of 2,000 +prisoners arrived from the KL Dachau at the beginning of the Summer of +1941. In contrast to Buchenwald the construction regarded as a sort of +recreation camp to which invalids and sick prisoners were sent. When +they had recuperated they were again sent to other camps for heavy +enforced labor. More will be told later about these “transfers”, as +they were officially termed, from one camp to another. + +The aforementioned addition and transports, augmented by the regular +additions which were delivered two or three a week from the police +prisons, caused the camp strength to rise from the low figure of 6,705 +on 1 June 1941 to 8,370 prisoners on 1 October 1941. + + + V + +On June 22 1941 Hitler invaded the Soviet Union. The delivery of 2,000 +Soviet prisoners of war was the first direct effect on the camp on 18 +October 1941. The SS troopers could not prevent the joyful reception +of these prisoners of war by the camp inmates who provided them +with additional bread, food, tobacco and other articles. The whole +camp was punished and especially certain individuals who attracted +most attention. The prisoners were also strictly isolated from the +others and their barracks provided with a sign having the inscription +“prisoners of war”. + +Probably Soviet reprisals were feared and they did not want to give +the impression that the prisoners of war had been turned over to a +concentration camp. Nevertheless they were subjected to the same +strict camp discipline as the other prisoners and in the first months +especially the quality of their food was considerably inferior. They +were compelled to do the hardest physical work. Details of the future +fate of the prisoners of war will be reported later. A transfer of +1,000 of them to the KL Mauthausen was made on 19 May 1942. In the +following months and years more Soviet prisoners of war were delivered. +At the end there were 821 prisoners of war in the camp which were +evacuated in one group, when during the last days before the liberation +the SS began to clean out the camp. + +The camp strength rose to 10,342 persons with the arrival of the +prisoners of war on 16 October 1941. During the winter of 1941/42 +the figure slowly decreased and on 12 March 1942 amounted to 9,770 +prisoners. On that day and the following one two large transports +departed from the camp one on 12 March 1942 of 400 to the KL Natzweiler +and one of 800 to the KL Ravensbrueck. The SS apparently tried to +break the anti-fascist character of the camp by these transfers, which +had manifested itself especially in its attitude toward the Soviet +prisoners of war. Many long term political prisoners were sent away +without any consideration. Undernourished and badly billeted they were +forced to the hardest kind of physical labor in the new camps, so +that the majority of them died and only a few were able to return to +Buchenwald after a long time with other transports. After the departure +of the transports the camp was again strictly searched for German +political prisoners and a number of them isolated in a special company +for hard physical labor. This matter will also be treated by another +source in a special report, therefore, it will not be necessary to go +into details at this time. These transports and the aforementioned +transport of 1,000 Soviet prisoners of war to the KL Mauthausen reduced +the camp strength on 1 June 1942 to the figure of 7,601, due to the +relatively minor additions. + +About this time, Sauckel, the Gauleiter of Thuringia and Hitler’s +General Deputy for labor Employment, began to abduct on a large scale +the population of the occupied eastern territories for forced labor +in Germany. Partly voluntary, with a naive belief in the promises of +the Nazis, and partly concerned they came in large mass transports +to Germany for employment. Already at the beginning the Germans must +have recognized that many undisciplined and politically undesirable +“elements” were to be found among them, which threatened to endanger +peace and order. + +They were harshly treated and locked up for minor infraction in the +punishment and concentration camps for “commitment to labor”, which in +other words meant life-long slavery. No trouble was taken to determine +in the individual cases the question of guilt. No one felt responsible +for the fate of the abducted. The SS demanded and received their share +of the booty derived from this unpaid labor and exploited it without +any consideration and brutally for their own selfish purposes. + +Beginning 1 June rapidly increasing numbers of Ukrainian, Russian, +Tartar civilian workers and former prisoners of war arrived in the +camp. In addition the normal collecting transports abducted people of +all the various nations and of every age to the Ettersberg. Within a +very short space of time the camp was inhabited by persons from 25 +countries from all over Europe and overseas, one might say, shortly +from nearly all the countries in the world. At the end for 1944 +nationals from 36 different countries were imprisoned in the camp. If +the influx let up, the Reich leader of the SS would issue new decrees +on the basis of which new raids and actions were carried out causing +the inflow to increase again by leaps and bounds. + +The SS also understood how to procure slave labor from inside Germany. +Beginning December 1942 the judicial authorities had to turn over in +part their cheap labor employees to the concentration camps. A decree +was issued which ordered the transfer of the prisoners of the courts +of justice to the concentration camps for labor commitment. Committees +visited the penal prisons and shortly thereafter pronounced criminals +(murderers, persons guilty of manslaughter, persons guilty of moral +turpitude) sentenced to long and life-long penal imprisonment were sent +from the penal prisons Saxony, Thuringia, Hessen, the Rhineland and +Westphalia, as well as from the Province of Brandenburg, (were sent) +to the KL Buchenwald. Many of them were used as “guinea pigs” in the +spotted fever barracks, while many others, accustomed to living for +years in confined quarters, died, because they could not endure the +sudden transition to a life in the open during the winter and in the +spring. + +If some of the concentration camps were overcrowded or workmen were +needed at certain points, whether for the construction of airdromes, +defense fortifications or barracks, or even for the completion +of castles, country houses and homes of individual high-ranking +SS officials and their staffs, the private slaves of the SS were +dragged, without any consideration from one camp to another. Further +developments are shown in Table 5, in which the camp strength and the +number of the addition for the 12 months from 1 June 1942 to 31 May +1943 are given. + + + _Table 5_ + + -----------+---------------+--------------+------------------------------ + | Camp Strength | Additions | + Month | beg. of month | during month | Special Transport + -----------+---------------+--------------+------------------------------ + June ’42 | 7,601 | 1,019 | On 5 July--300 invalids + July ’42 | 8,000 | 1,996 | and 51 clergymen to Dachau. + Aug. ’42 | 8,849 | 1,715 | + Sept. ’42 | 9,886 | 1,709 | 500 from KL Dachau + Oct. ’42 | 10,075 | 984 | 13 Oct.--619 to KL + | | | Sachsenhausen. + | | | 17 Oct.--405 to KL Auschwitz. + Nov. ’42 | 8,831 | 794 | + Dec. ’42 | 9,092 | 1,044 | + Jan. ’43 | 9,517 | 2,500 | On 23 Jan. 43--843 foreign + | | | workers from Duesseldorf. + Feb. ’43 | 11,275 | 1,291 | + Mar. ’43 | 11,920 | 2,474 | The first in the small camp. + Apr. ’43 | 12,461 | 2,773 | On 5 Mar.--500 to KL Dachau. + May ’43 | 13,326 | 2,939 | On 23 Mar. to Riga. + 31 May ’43 | 14,441 | | On 3 Apr.--933 Poles from + | | | Lublin. + | | | On 12 Apr.--339 from KL + | | | Wewelsberg. + -----------+---------------+--------------+------------------------------ + +In what manner the terrible conditions in the overcrowded German +concentration camps and the pitiless exploitation of the prisoners +crossed the plans of the higher authorities of an increased production, +is revealed in a communication of the SS Main Office of the Economic +Administration. According to this letter, the total number of additions +in all the German concentration camps in the 6 months from June to +November 1942 amounted to 136,780, whereas 70,610 died in the same +period. (See copy of the document in Annex IV.) + + + VI + +The Germans had to leave the Soviet Union after the decisive defeat +at Stalingrad. During the retreat all the still available manpower +reserves were combed out everywhere. Men and women, children and old +men were dragged off to Germany. A great number of them were not even +employed as foreign workers, but instead immediately delivered to the +concentration camps. In the Fall of 1943 the following transports from +the still occupied parts of the Soviet Union arrived in Buchenwald. + + + _Table 6_ + + -------------+-----------------+--------- + Date | Origin | Number + -------------+-----------------+--------- + 26 Aug. ’43 | Dnjepropetrowsk | 998 + 29 Aug. ’43 | Dnjepropetrowsk | 781 + 19 Sept. ’43 | Dnjepropetrowsk | 1,362 + 5 Oct. ’43 | Nikolajew | 604 + 10 Oct. ’43 | Kiriwograd | 529 + 31 Oct. ’43 | Kiew | 233 + 1 Nov. ’43 | Kiriwograd | 318 + 28 Nov. ’43 | Nikolajew | 192 + 24 Mar. ’44 | Nikolajew | 377 + | +-------- + | | 5,394 + -------------+-----------------+--------- + +Women and children also arrived with these men here. They were not +allowed to enter the camp, but were passed on directly to the women’s +concentration camp, or an exception was made, and they were temporarily +billeted for one or two days until they were transported to other +places. + +At the same time conditions in France also took an unfavorable turn +for the Third Reich. After the defeat on the East Front the lack and +in correlation the want of manpower rose in Germany. Sauckel went to +Paris and negotiated with Laval for the delivery of forced labor. +This development reflected itself in the KL Buchenwald by deliveries +of French prisoners of war from the German concentration camp in +Compiegne. The poetical talents of the German Security Service and +its sneering attitude toward these victims expressed themselves in +designating this action as the “Meerschaum Operation”, which was +followed in 1944 by another operation termed the “Spring Zephyr”. The +large mass transports which arrived in KL Buchenwald from the West are +compiled in Table 7. + + + _Table 7_ + + --------------+---------+----------------------------- + Date | Number | Origin + --------------+---------+----------------------------- + 21 May ’43 | 50 | Compiegne via KL Mauthausen + 27 June ’43 | 962 | Compiegne + 4 Sept. ’43 | 896 | Compiegne + 18 Sept. ’43 | 926 | Compiegne + 30 Oct. ’43 | 911 | Compiegne + 16 Dec. ’43 | 921 | Compiegne + 19 Jan. ’44 | 1,940 | Compiegne + 24 Jan. ’44 | 1,991 | Compiegne + 29 Jan. ’44 | 1,580 | Compiegne + 8 May ’44 | 967 | Brussels + 14 May ’44 | 2,052 | Compiegne + 14 May ’44 | 1,667 | Compiegne via KL Auschwitz + 22 May ’44 | 891 | Brussels + 19 June ’44 | 574 | Brussels + 3 July ’44 | 435 | Compiegne + 6 Aug. ’44 | 1,080 | Compiegne + 10 Aug. ’44 | 827 | Compiegne + 20 Aug. ’44 | 1,650 | Compiegne + 21 Aug. ’44 | 1,246 | Compiegne + 5 Febr. ’45 | 285 | Penal Prison Gross-Strehlitz + --------------+---------+----------------------------- + Total | 21,851 | + --------------+---------+----------------------------- + +Frenchmen and Belgians formed the bulk of these transports. However, +all these transports also contained nationals of other countries, +who were living temporarily or permanently in France, and were also +delivered to Buchenwald. + +The stream of mass transports stopped after the Red Army had +reconquered the greater part of the Ukraine. However, many “normal” +additions continued to arrive, i.e. prisoners from the Germany +prisons, but also 90% foreigners, who were sent to the concentration +camps on the orders of Himmler. Nevertheless, these additions could +not have covered the disastrously increased demand, brought about by +the inconsiderate waste of manpower, if the SS had not uncovered new +sources. + +Beginning in the early summer of 1944 Hungarian Jews were dragged into +German slavery in undiscernible masses. They were followed in August by +the civilian Polish population evacuated from Warsaw. + +It is characteristic of the continually increasing catastrophic shaping +of the conditions in the Third Reich, that the services conducting +the arrests were no longer in a position to properly register the +prisoners. Whereas the transport directing services sent lists along +containing the records of the prisoners in the first mass transports +from the Soviet Union, France and Belgium, such lists did not accompany +the Hungarians and Poles coming from Warsaw. + +Most of these transports passed through the KL Auschwitz where the +prisoners probably were subjected to a first examination. Whoever +appeared fit for work was provided with some scant clothing and after +a few days sent on. In Auschwitz they were designated as “Transport +Jews”, and no one took the trouble anymore to review their records. +That work was left to the concentration camps to which the individuals +were finally committed. The SS regarded the labor commitment as their +first duty, and the prisoners engaged with the reception of the +additions were faced with the greatest to determine the records of +the additions so that the SS would not simply use them up as numbers. +Only the fact that we insisted on carrying out the still existing +order regarding the reception of the additions and did not ignore the +regulations, which would have greatly pleased the SS it is now possible +to report--who passed through the camp, who died in the camp--and in +the near future it will be possible to give information to the brutally +torn apart family members, relatives and acquaintances on the fate of +their relatives. + +The same applies to the Hungarian Jews, the Poles evacuated from +Warsaw, the Polish Jews, Poles, Estonians and the Lithuanians, who had +been interned in the labor camps in the East. They had been committed +as foreign workers and in part had lived together with their families. +When the demand for labor arose and with the approach of the Red Army +in spite of the fact that they were not guilty of any transgressions, +they were dragged off to the German concentration camps. In many cases +these separations only took place here upon their arrival at the +railroad station; where the families were ruthlessly torn asunder, +parents from their children, husbands from their wives, brothers from +brothers and sisters from sisters. + +During the Summer and the Fall of 1944 the following transports from +the East arrived in the KL Buchenwald. + + + _Table 8_ + + -----------+------+-----------------+-------------------- + Date |Number|Type of Prisoners| Origin + -----------+------+-----------------+-------------------- + 24 May ’44| 1,000| Hungarian Jews |Auschwitz + 2 June ’44| 1,000| Hungarian Jews |Budapest + 18 June ’44| 1,000| Hungarian Jews |Auschwitz + 16 July ’44| 2,500| Hungarian Jews |Auschwitz + 5 Aug. ’44| 1,459| Polish Jews | + 13 Aug. ’44| 2,651| Evacuated Poles |Warsaw + 15 Aug. ’44| 1,999| Evacuated Poles |Warsaw via Auschwitz + 9 Nov. ’44| 615| Hungarian Jews |Graz + 18 Jan. ’45| 2,840| Polish Jews | + 20 Jan. ’45| 1,446| Polish Jews | + -----------+------+-----------------+-------------------- + +Also other domestic political events reflected themselves in new +additions for the KL Buchenwald. After the disturbances at the +University of Oslo 349 Norwegian students arrived at Buchenwald on 13 +January 1944. Due to the intervention of the Swedish government they +were better treated than the other prisoners. They were housed apart +from the others, kept their civilian clothes, received the same food +as the troops and for several months were given instruction courses +and political education by SS instructors. Evidently they were to be +converted to Nazism. The efforts of the SS, however, were in vain. Not +one volunteered for the SS. Therefore 117 of them were first sent to a +SS camp on 7 July 1944 and the rest of them on 23 October 1944, where +they had to do heavy work on the field fortifications. When the Front +moved closer they were evacuated from the SS camp and on 12 December +1944, with other Norwegian students who had not yet been in Buchenwald, +making a total of 492 men, they were again delivered to Buchenwald. On +1 March 1945 they were evacuated to the KL Neuengamme. + +In 1942 a change swept over the German concentration camps--instead +of being detention camps for political opponents they became labor +camps for the German war industries. Early in 1942 the high-ranking +SS leaders organized the DAW [Deutsche Ausruestungs-Werke-German +Equipment Works]. The DAW paid the camp administration a modest sum for +the services of a prisoner with the result that the camps soon became +self-supporting and the stockholders, having friendly relations with +the military authorities and cheap labor at their disposal, were soon +counted amongst the greatest war profiteers. Thusly, they had found +a new means for garnering profits for the SS and its leaders out of +state monies. For example, the Camp Commander Pister of Buchenwald was +elected a director of the DAW-Buchenwald at a considerable monthly +salary. + +A further development plants were constructed and installed with +machinery in the concentration camps. A railroad between Buchenwald +and Weimar was built in record time, and the so-called Gustloff Works, +consisting of 13 immense workshops were erected in the immediate +vicinity of the camp. In addition increasing numbers of prisoners +were employed in existing equipment plants. Sauckel himself obtained +the first prisoners for the Sauckel Works in Weimar. At first they +were only employed there and transported back and forth daily in +automobiles. At a later date an equipment headquarters with shelters +for the prisoners was installed close to the factory. Further outside +headquarters soon followed in pronounced Nazi plants such as the +Hasag-Leipzig, and at other points. + +The largest and the most terrible of the outside headquarters was +soon provided with the cover name of “_Dora_” and mentioned only +with fear and fright by the prisoners. What at first had been only +an assumption very soon became a certainty. The senseless and cruel +V-weapons were a specialty of the SS. Their satanical plan provided for +the construction of these weapons by those foreigners whose countries +were to be totally destroyed by them. Possibly they also thought that +the employment of prisoners isolated from the rest of the world would +help to better guard their secret coupled with the hope that the Allied +air power would not bomb the plants out of consideration for their +countrymen. Everything in connection with the production was treated as +a top-secret. Prisoners who were in the respective headquarters were +designated as “secret carriers.” In so far as it concerned the Reich +nationals and the Czechs, they had to be reported specially to the Main +Office of the Reich Security, the Central Office of the Gestapo, to +prevent the possibility of a premature discharge. + +The most important centers of production were the outside headquarters +“Dora” near Nordhausen/Harz, and “Laura” near Saalfeld/Thuringia. In +the workshops Nos. 4-7 of the tremendous Gustloff Works separate parts +for the V-weapons were also manufactured. At the “Dora” and “Laura” +plants underground, bomb safe factories were constructed without any +regard for the waste of manpower or the living requirements of the +prisoners as regards air, sleep or nourishment. One transport after +another of unfortunates went to these outside headquarters from +Buchenwald--never to return. The number of the victims of death soon +reached record heights and was increased by the victims of explosions +and plant accidents. Those who became unfit for work were sent to such +isolated camps as Lublin and Bergen-Belsen, where they were for the +greater part liquidated by gas poisoning or injections. + +The civilian additions were not in sufficient numbers to fill the +gaps, therefore new transports arrived continuously from other camps +which after a few days in Buchenwald for the necessary recording +photographing and physical examination, were passed to the notorious +outside headquarters. + +The Service Group Command D of the Economic Administration Main Office +in Berlin-Oranienburg was the Central Office for the distribution +of the labor forces to the German concentration camps. Orders were +issued from there as to how many and what type of prisoners were to +be transported to other camps, that is, how many prisoners were to be +committed to labor by the various outside headquarters. At first this +Service Command issued a strict order that no political Reich nationals +were to be shipped in these mass transports. The administrations of +the various concentration camps strictly observed this rule in their +own interests, not because they wanted to spare these Germans but +because they were needed to perform the administration and disciplinary +duties which the SS really should have handled had it not been for +their lack of capability and ambition. We prisoners, therefore, had +the great advantage of regulating many things ourselves, which by +direct intervention of the SS would have aggravated considerably the +already insupportable living conditions of all the inmates of the camp. +Furthermore it is evident that every SS commander endeavored to keep +his trained people because the new prisoners would only have meant +trouble and work. In addition, regulations from the Reich Security +Main Office forbade sending certain prisoners with the transports +to assure a degree of isolation. Except for a few individual cases, +this regulation applied in particular to the half-jews. On orders +of the Reich Security Main Office all these as in Germany arrested +“half-breeds”, Grade 1, as they were officially designated, were sent +to Buchenwald and were not allowed to be transferred to another camp. +Thusly it came about, that when larger transports were assembled, +especially for the notorious outside headquarters or camps, the least +capable and the latest additions were selected from the blocks and +commands and sent away again. At the new places these persons were just +as unfit for labor as at the previous ones, in other words, they were +undesirable. After their arrival they very often had to be quarantined +for some time. The attempted regulation of the distribution from +one central office and the increasing impossibility to control this +manpower, resulted in thousands of prisoners being continually on the +move. They therefore, could not be committed to labor as the paper +records seem to indicate. + +From the Fall of 1943 to the Fall of 1944 the transports compiled in +Table 9 arrived in Buchenwald from other concentration camps, which for +the greater part had already been destined for shipment to “Dora” and +other outside headquarters. + + + _Table 9_ + + -------------+--------+----------------------------+---------------- + Date | Number | Type of Prisoner | From KL + -------------+--------+----------------------------+---------------- + 22 Sept. ’43 | 300 | Mostly Russians | Gross Rosen + 22 Sept. ’43 | 210 | 149 Russians and oth. | Natzweiler + 14 Oct. ’43 | 650 | 373 Frenchmen | Ravensbrueck + | | 144 Russians and oth. | + 17 Oct. ’43 | 849 | Mostly Russians | Mauthausen + 19 Oct. ’43 | 311 | Mostly Russians and Poles | Stutthof + 21 Oct. ’43 | 300 | Mostly Russians and Poles | Auschwitz + 21 Oct. ’43 | 200 | Mostly Russians and Poles | Natzweiler + 21 Oct. ’43 | 506 | Mostly Jugoslavs | Flossenburg + 23 Oct. ’43 | 1,539 | Mostly Poles | Auschwitz + 30 Oct. ’43 | 1,025 | Mostly Jugoslavs and | + | | Russians | Dachau + 20 Nov. ’43 | 375 | Mostly French and Poles | Mauthausen + 21 Nov. ’43 | 417 | Mostly French and Russians | Dachau + 12 Dec. ’43 | 200 | Russians and Poles | Auschwitz + 25 Jan. ’44 | 400 | Germans and Russians | Sachsenhausen + 3 Mar. ’44 | 421 | Mostly Czechs | Auschwitz + 11 Mar. ’44 | 413 | Mostly Poles | Gross Rosen + 2 Apr. ’44 | 202 | Czechs | Auschwitz + 7 Apr. ’44 | 883 | Gypsies | Auschwitz + 28 May ’44 | 350 | Mostly Poles and Russians | Stutthof + 24 June ’44 | 2,000 | Mostly Poles and Russians | Auschwitz + 29 July ’44 | 200 | Russians and Poles | Bergen-Belsen + 3 Aug. ’44 | 510 | Gypsies | Auschwitz + 3 Aug. ’44 | 400 | Russians and Poles | Neuengamme + 16 Aug. ’44 | 1,350 | Jews various nations | Stutthof + 27 Sept. ’44 | 1,085 | | Natzweiler near + | | | Dora + 1 Oct. ’44 | 1,500 | Poles and Russians | Auschwitz + -------------+--------+----------------------------+---------------- + +In this table transports of less 200 prisoners from other camps and +transports which went directly to the outside headquarters without +passing through the main camp, are not listed. + +The greater number of these additions, as well as the afore mentioned +additions from the East and West proceeded quickly and intact to the +outside headquarters of the equipment industry and only the completely +emaciated in the camps until they died of old age or decrepitude. After +months of the severest physical labor in those headquarters under the +worst living conditions (bad food, no rest even during their free +time, with out any sanitary installations, during months no thorough +bodily cleansing and no change of underwear) they either perished +[or were sent to] miserable concentration camps Lublin, Auschwitz or +Belsen-Bergen not for recreation--but for final liquidation. This +exploitation of the work potential of their slaves to the last gasp was +termed by the SS “shredding”. In this manner they reduced every one +they could lay their hands on to shreds--Russians, Poles, Hungarians, +Jugoslavs, Frenchmen, Jews and Christians--they would have annihilated +the population of a whole continent, if the Allied armies had not put a +stop to matters by their victorious advance. + +By reason of all these transports from the West and the East and from +the other concentration camps the number of the additions, the camp +strength and the number of death cases rose as shown in Table 10. + + + _Table 10_ + + ----------+-----------+----------+--------------- + | | | Camp Strength + Month | Additions | Deaths | end of month + ----------+-----------+----------+--------------- + July ’43 | 1,725 | 191 | 15,796 + Aug. ’43 | 4,537 | 118 | 19,641 + Sept. ’43 | 5,444 | 123 | 24,688 + Oct. ’43 | 9,048 | 109 | 33,377 + Nov. ’43 | 4,454 | 314 | 35,112 + Dec. ’43 | 3,734 | 967 | 37,319 + Jan. ’44 | 8,017 | 1,000 | 42,833 + Feb. ’44 | 1,979 | 880 | 41,240 + Mar. ’44 | 5,065 | 1,311 | 43,371 + April ’44 | 4,788 | 560 | 45,830 + May ’44 | 9,655 | 390 | 54,287 + June ’44 | 9,986 | 460 | 61,156 + July ’44 | 7,398 | 347 | 66,609 + Aug. ’44 | 17,170 | 742 | 82,391 + Sept. ’44 | 4,251 | 497 | 84,505 + Oct. ’44 | 6,728 | 770 | 55,473 + ----------+-----------+----------+--------------- + +On the 6 October 1944 the camp strength reached its highest figure +amounting to 89,134 prisoners. On 29 October 1944 the auxiliary +headquarters “Dora” became an independent concentration camp with the +name of KL Mittelbau containing 32,532 prisoners who were at that +time attached to the various auxiliary headquarters. The names of +these prisoners were removed from the Buchenwald records and the camp +strength reduced accordingly. + +On 24 August 1944 at noon the equipment plants belonging to the +concentration camp were bombarded and completely destroyed. Not a +single high-explosive bomb fell into the prisoners camp but a few +incendiary bombs, diverted by the wind, set fire to the prisoners +tailor shop, shoemaker shop, laundry and the disinfection station +without injuring a single prisoner. The SS had not provided air raid +shelters for the prisoners, in fact they did not even allow the +prisoners to go into the camp during an air raid alarm. The prisoners +were compelled to remain in the workshops or in their immediate +vicinity. Bomb proof shelters or trenches for protection against +bomb fragment had not been constructed for the prisoners. During an +attack the water supply was shut off in the entire camp. Prisoners who +attempted to escape from the high-explosive and the incendiary bombs by +running into the open were shot down by the SS guards without mercy. +Consequently, the air bombardment caused the death of 364 prisoners. +It is not possible to determine now how many were shot down by the SS +troopers. It is a fact however that Thaelmann, who allegedly was killed +during the attack was an inmate of the Buchenwald camp. The prisoners +had reason to be grateful that the pinpoint bombing of the Allied Air +Force greatly reduced the number of victims. + +The bombardment not only destroyed the factory buildings but also the +important administration offices of the SS in Buchenwald, especially +the so-called “Political Section,” in which the personal records of +the prisoners were kept. Therefore no new prisoners were allowed to be +shipped to the camp for a while. Those additions which were recorded in +September 1944 were sent directly to the auxiliary headquarters, and in +particular to “Dora”. + +After the failure of the attempt on the life of Hitler on 20 July 1944 +Himmler took over command of the Home Front Army. The concentration +camp Buchenwald soon reflected the results of this event. On 22 August +1944 the operation, given by the code name of “Gitter” [trellis], was +conducted throughout the entire territory of the Reich, by which the +remainder of the former functionaries of the Anti-Fascist Parties, who +were still at liberty, were arrested and sent directly to the nearest +concentration camp. On the 22 or 23 August 1944 about 750 “trellis” +prisoners arrived from the immediate surroundings of Weimar within +a few hours. Further transport from Saxony, the Rhineland and from +Westphalia were anticipated. However, after the attack of the Allied +Air Forces on the 24 August 1944 these transports could no longer be +made. In other Fascist circles this “trellis” action must also have met +with some opposition. The details and the reasons were not known at +that time. In any case, the Weimar Gestapo arrived in the camp a few +days later briefly examined the arrested persons and then set most of +them free. + +If this was merely a police measure to use the camp temporarily as a +lodging place for arrested persons, Himmler soon found other ways and +means to increase the number of the slaves of the SS by new additions. + +In November 1944 the first prisoners of a new category arrived which +was termed “Zwischenhaft II” (intermediate custody II). This category +included members of the Wehrmacht who had been condemned by the +military courts to severe penal prison sentences for desertion and +absence without official leave from their units. These soldiers were +sent to the concentration camp for “intermediate custody” and to be +set to work. It was Himmler’s plan to have these soldiers finish the +balance of their penal prison sentence after the end of the war. +According to orders from the highest authorities in Berlin they all +had to be sent to the KL “_Mittelbau_” or in other words to “Dora.” At +“Dora” they were probably put to work on the dangerous manufacture of +the secret weapons, because being long term prisoners they were not +to be spared. Furthermore, no difficulties could arise in the future +because they could not be given a discharge on account of the secret +nature of their work. + +These intermediate prisoners were by no means only German Reich +nationals, but among them were also members of all the European nations +who had joined the German Wehrmacht as volunteers. In these months, +even Himmler delivered members of his own SS units who were guilty of +misdemeanors, to the concentration camps. In December 1944, January and +February 1945 several small transports of Croatians, Turka (members of +a Mohammedan SS formation) and Frenchmen, at the time in SS uniforms +arrived in the camp as prisoners. + +Other political events in occupied Europe brought new additions to +the concentration camps. In September 1944 a large raid was carried +out in Denmark, against the Danish police, especially in Copenhagen. +On 30 September 1944, 1,480 Danish police functionaries arrived in +the KL “Buchenwald,” after having been detained a few days in the KL +“Neuengamme.” They were followed by 473 men on 5 October 1944. They +were soon put to work and long columns of them had to carry building +materials. However, they did not stay very long in the camp. The first +200, mostly high-ranking police officers, were removed by the Danish +Red Cross on 8 December 1944, and as far as it was known here, taken to +an internment camp in Schleswig Holstein. The next transport of 1,604 +Danes left on 17 December 1944 and the balance followed during January +and February 1945. The unaccustomed severe climate of Buchenwald, +to which they had been transported at the beginning of the winter, +demanded a relatively high total of victims. In the few months of their +sojourn, approximately 90 Danes died. + + + X. + +When the Auxiliary Headquarters “Dora” was declared an independent +concentration camp in October 1944, the construction work had been +completed and the production of V-weapons was running at full speed. In +connection therewith the demand for unskilled labor had diminished a +little. + +The establishment of a new and even more notorious auxiliary +headquarters near Ohrdruf in Thuringia with the designation “S III”, +soon caused Buchenwald to experience a new increase in mass transports. +In all haste an underground factory was to be built there, without any +regard for any wastage of manpower. Again mass transports from all +concentration camps either passed through Buchenwald or went directly +to their point of destination. Again mass transports left Buchenwald +itself for the new auxiliary headquarters. The SS found the SS ordered +all the prisoners to fall in on the roll-call grounds, the latter were +then closed off and the SS selected 1,000 prisoners for “S III”, who +were shipped off that same night. The first large transport of 1,000 +men arrived in the new headquarters on 20 November 1944. Already within +a month the strength of the headquarters rose to 7,500 men and reached +a maximum figure of 13,726 prisoners on 27 March 1945. + +The increasing inefficiency of the administrative machine in the higher +offices soon manifested itself very clearly. The new headquarters were +put under the command of the Wehrmacht. The prisoners were struck +off the records of the camp strength of the various concentration +camps and were to be incorporated into the new headquarters. This soon +proved itself impossible on account of the enormous inflow and the +lack of experienced help. Therefore the whole headquarters had to be +taken over again into the camp strength of the KL Buchenwald. It was +absolutely unknown which prisoners were in “S III” and the SS had it +compiled with the help of prisoners, a complete record of all the camp +inmates. At that time the rolls disclosed a strength of 7,648 men of +which about 2,000 were in the so-called North Camp and approximately +5,500 in the South Camp. Before the lists sent to the KL Buchenwald +could be checked, 1,400 completely exhausted prisoners arrived at +Buchenwald from “S III” on 12 December 1944. They gave the camp its +first shocking impression of the horrible conditions in Ohrdruf. On +their arrival at the Buchenwald railroad station more than 200 of the +1,400 prisoners had already died or were well spent and exhausted that +they were unable to give their names or numbers. The transport lists, +sloppily compiled by the SS, did not check. Prisoners were listed that +did not come with the transport and vice-versa, consequently it was +impossible to accurately identify later the dead. The SS management did +not send the next transport of “shredded” workers to Buchenwald but to +the concentration camp Bergen-Belsen, where their final liquidation in +the remoteness of the Lueneburger Heide, presumably, could be carried +out less openly and more expeditiously. + +The tragic end of the exterior headquarters is probably known by this +time. At the approach of the victorious Allied troops the headquarters +set out on foot in the direction of Buchenwald. Anyone who could not +keep up with the marching column was shot. From 4 to 7 April 1945 about +9,300 prisoners (in view of the chaotic conditions which also existed +here, an accurate count could not be made) arrived in Buchenwald. On +the 9 and 10 April 1945 the SS evacuated the majority of them from +Buchenwald. From all that has been learned so far about them it is +probable that this transport was annihilated completely. At the end of +March, according to the local reports, about 12,000 prisoners were in +“S III”. The prisoners who did not arrive in Buchenwald, by the SS in +the “S III” camp or on the road. + + + _Table 11_ + + --------------+--------+------------------------------+---------------- + Date | Number | Type | From KL--All + | | | to S III + --------------+--------+------------------------------+---------------- + 19 Nov. ’44 | 778 | Hung. Jews | Sachsenhausen + 24 Nov. ’44 | 500 | Hung. Jews | Sachsenhausen + 26 Nov. ’44 | 1,000 | Jews | Stutthof + 27 Nov. ’44 | 500 | Jews | Sachsenhausen + 29 Nov. ’44 | 500 | Lithuanians, Poles, Russians | Stutthof + 2 Dec. ’44 | 353 | Polish jews | Camp Plaszow + 5 Dec. ’44 | 1,997 | Various | Dachau + 7 Dec. ’44 | 500 | Poles | Auschwitz + 13 Dec. ’44 | 2,496 | Various | Dachau + 18 Dec. ’44 | 425 | Mostly Poles | Auschwitz + 26 Dec. ’44 | 394 | Mostly Poles | Natzweiler + --------------+--------+------------------------------+---------------- + +In the following Table 12 transports are listed, consisting of +prisoners from “S III” no longer capable of working, which were +transferred to other camps. It is to be assumed, that at least a +portion of these prisoners were not recorded as additions in the camps +of their destination, because they were condemned to be liquidated and +therefore, not booked on the rolls of the camp strength. + + + _Table 12_ + + -------------+--------+---------+-------------- + Date | Number | Type | Destination + -------------+--------+---------+-------------- + 14 Febr. ’45 | 500 | Various | Bergen-Belsen + 24 Febr. ’45 | 1,884 | Various | Bergen-Belsen + 25 Febr. ’45 | 500 | Various | Bergen-Belsen + -------------+--------+---------+-------------- + +In addition to the above there was one transport of 1,002 “invalids”, +the greater number of which had also been in “S III”, or had keen +destined for “S III”, but were sent directly from Buchenwald to the KL +Bergen-Belsen. + +Of the new arrivals booked by “S III” in the period of 24 December 1944 +to 26 February 1945, the records indicate that 1,460 prisoners died in +Ohrdruf. + + + XI. + +The advance of the Red Army compelled the evacuation of the large +concentration camps in the East. The result was a maddening increase in +arrivals and a horrible, almost inconceivable increase of unnecessary +suffering and senseless sacrifices. The offensive on the Vistula River +began 13 January 1945. Within a short time the Red Army reached a +menacing position close to the concentration camp Auschwitz, where +there must have been about 80,000 prisoners. Auschwitz had to be +evacuated. Shortly thereafter, the concentration camp Gross Rosen near +Breslau had to be cleared. The first transports of evacuated Jews from +the KL Auschwitz on open railroad cars arrived here on 22 January 1945, +which were soon followed by others. In those days it was bitterly +cold. These human beings had been traveling for days, insufficiently +clad and underfed. In the overcrowded railroad cars their comrades had +died from weakness and exhaustion, and to save themselves the living +had to throw the dead bodies from the moving train. The commandant of +the camp received complaints from the regions through which the trains +had passed, that corpses had been found on the railway embankments. +The arrivals very often dragged themselves from the railroad station +to the camp with their last ounce of strength. Prisoners, the camp +guards and the fire department had to proceed with two-wheeled carts +and handcarts, usually, and for transporting building materials to the +station to load up the collapsed persons and the dead bodies. The camp +streets were littered with lost blankets, caps, overcoats, mess kits +and collapsed human beings, who had not been able to drag themselves +any further. + +An accurate count of the additions was no longer possible. A check +on the number of those leaving the point of departure and on how +many had died on the way, escaped, or had simply remained behind +also was no longer possible. Likewise the administrations of the +dissolved camps did not know which prisoners had been transported to +Buchenwald. The Reich Security Service sent a teletype letter to all +the concentration camps, who had received additions from Auschwitz and +Gross-Rosen, requesting that lists of the newly arrived prisoners with +their old prisoner’s number be forwarded as soon as possible to the +administration of the Auschwitz concentration camp, which latter in the +meantime had been transferred to the KL Mittelbau. The concentration +camps Auschwitz and Gross-Rosen, as well as other camps and prisons in +the East and the West had to be evacuated in great haste and many of +the inmates came to Buchenwald. + +The transport which came here will be listed in detail in Table 13 and +Table 14 will show the increases in the camp strength in the additions +and the death cases. + + + _Table 13_ + + -------------+----------+--------------------+--------------------------- + Date | Number | Type of Prisoner | Origin + -------------+----------+--------------------+--------------------------- + 24 Dec. ’44 | 916 | Polish Jews | Budapest via Vienna + 25 Dec. ’44 | 1,913 | Hungarian Jews | + 17 Jan. ’45 | 263 | Various | Cologne and + | | | Aix-la-Chapelle. + 17 Jan. ’45 | 2,740 | Polish Jews | Tschenstochau. + 20 Jan. ’45 | 1,446 | Polish Jews | Tschenstochau. + 22 Jan. ’45 | 2,224 | Jews diff. nations | Auschwitz. + 23 Jan. ’45 | 917 | Jews diff. nations | Auschwitz. + 26 Jan. ’45 | 3,987 | Various | Auschwitz. + 3 Febr. ’45 | 291 | Various | Kuestrin. + 5 Febr. ’45 | 285 | French a. Belgians | Prison Gr. Strehlitz. + 7 Febr. ’45 | 250 | Various | Kuestrin. + 10 Febr. ’45 | 6,805 | Various | Gross-Rosen. + 24 Febr. ’45 | 464 | Russians | Gross-Rosen. + 26 Febr. ’45 | 290 | Various | Exterior Hdg. Gross-Rosen. + | | Various | { Gross-Rosen to Exterior. + 5 Mar. ’45 | 580 | | { Hdqtrs. Leipzig. + 7 Mar. ’45 | 905 | Mostly Jews | Gross-Rosen. + 12 Mar. ’45 | 399 | Mostly Poles | Gross-Rosen. + 30 Mar. ’45 | 280 | Various | Natzweiler. + -------------+----------+--------------------+--------------------------- + + + _Table 14_ + + ----------+-----------+-----------+------------------- + Date | Additions | Deaths | Camp Strength End + | | | of month + ----------+-----------+-----------+------------------- + Nov. ’44 | 10,305 | 612 | 59,261 + Dec. ’44 | 12,555 | 1,113 | 63,048 + Jan. ’45 | 24,197 | 2,002 | 80,297 + Febr. ’45 | 13,066 | 5,523 | 86,232 + March ’45 | 6,560 | 5,531 | 80,436 + ----------+-----------+-----------+------------------- + +The further expansion in the last 11 days of the existence of the +National Socialistic concentration camp Buchenwald was influenced by +the ever closer approaching Allied Armies. The last of the exterior +headquarters located in the West returned to the camp of origin +Buchenwald. On 6 April the number of the prisoners amounted to about +47,700 men. The balance of 31,598, mostly employed in exterior +headquarters east of Buchenwald, did not return to the camp. At this +time nothing is known of their fate. + +The SS began to evacuate the camp on April 6, 1945. It succeeded in +transferring 28,285 prisoners to other camps. The transports in detail +are given in Table 15. + + + _Table 15_ + + -------------+----------+-------------------+---------------- + Date | Number | Type of Prisoners | Destination + -------------+----------+-------------------+---------------- + 6 Apr. ’45 | 3,105 | Jews | KL Flossenbuerg + 7 Apr. ’45 | 1,500 | Various | Leitmeritz + 7 Apr. ’45 | 4,800 | Mostly Jews | KL Flossenbuerg + 9 Apr. ’45 | 9,600 | Various | Dachau + 10 Apr. ’45 | 9,280 | Various | Unknown + | ------ | | + Total | 28,285 | | + -------------+----------+-------------------+---------------- + +When the KL Buchenwald was liberated by the Allied Armies on 11 April +1945 there were still about 21,000 prisoners on the Ettersberg. + + # # # # # + + _Annex I_ + +Tabular Survey of the Numerical Expansion at the Buchenwald +Concentration Camp + + ----------+----------+----------------------------------+--------- + | | Decrease | Camp + | +---------+--------+------+--------+ strength + Month | Increase | Disch. | Trans. | Died | Total | end of + | | | | | | month + ----------+----------+---------+--------+------+--------+--------- + July ’37 | 930 | | | | 1 | 929 + Aug. ’37 | 1,414 | | | 8 | 48 | 2,295 + Sept. ’37 | 180 | | | 7 | 55 | 2,420 + Oct. ’37 | 109 | | | 2 | 60 | 2,469 + Nov. ’37 | 133 | | | 9 | 75 | 2,527 + Dec. ’37 | 146 | | | 22 | 112 | 2,561 + +----------+---------+--------+------+--------+--------- + Total | 2,912 | | | 48 | 351 | + ----------+----------+---------+--------+------+--------+--------- + + ----------+----------+---------+--------+------+--------+--------- + Jan. ’38 | 139 | | | | 67 | 2,633 + Febr. ’38 | 140 | | | | 45 | 2,728 + Mar. ’38 | 138 | | | | 60 | 2,806 + April ’38 | 236 | | | | 42 | 3,000 + May ’38 | 1,785 | | | | 54 | 4,731 + June ’38 | 3,103 | | | | 111 | 7,723 + July ’38 | 463 | | | | 258 | 7,928 + Aug. ’38 | 348 | | | | 485 | 7,791 + Sept. ’38 | 3,059 | | | | 379 | 10,471 + Oct. ’38 | 428 | | | | 711 | 10,188 + Nov. ’38 | 10,098 | | | | 2,181 | 18,105 + Dec. ’38 | 185 | | | | 7,262 | 11,028 + +----------+---------+--------+------+--------+--------- + Total | 20,122 | | | 771 |11,655 | + ----------+----------+---------+--------+------+--------+--------- + + ----------+----------+---------+--------+------+--------+--------- + Jan. ’39 | 184 | | | | 1,727 | 9,485 + Febr. ’39 | 113 | | | | 949 | 8,649 + Mar. ’39 | 45 | | | | 30 | 8,664 + Apr. ’39 | 13 | | | | 2,314 | 6,363 + May ’39 | 20 | | | | 713 | 5,670 + June ’39 | 103 | | | | 250 | 5,523 + July ’39 | 166 | | | | 297 | 5,392 + Aug. ’39 | 155 | | | | 165 | 5,392 + Sept. ’39 | 3,314 | | | | 62 | 8,634 + Oct. ’39 | 5,373 | | | | 1,232 | 12,775 + Nov. ’39 | 50 | | | | 448 | 12,377 + Dec. ’39 | 17 | | | | 587 | 11,807 + +----------+---------+--------+------+--------+--------- + Total | 9,553 | | | 1,235| 8,774 | + ----------+----------+---------+--------+------+--------+--------- + + ----------+----------+---------+--------+------+--------+--------- + Jan. ’40 | 24 | | | | 875 | 10,956 + Feb. ’40 | 21 | | | | 654 | 10,323 + Mar. ’40 | 14 | | | | 1,518 | 8,819 + Apr. ’40 | 67 | | | | 900 | 7,986 + May ’40 | 19 | | | | 372 | 7,633 + June ’40 | 26 | | | | 321 | 7,338 + July ’40 | 250 | | | | 318 | 7,270 + Aug. ’40 | 1,168 | | | | 239 | 8,199 + Sept. ’40 | 52 | | | | 144 | 8,107 + Oct. ’40 | 196 | | | | 502 | 7,801 + Nov. ’40 | 96 | | | | 286 | 7,611 + Dec. ’40 | 592 | | | | 763 | 7,440 + +----------+---------+--------+------+--------+--------- + Total | 2,525 | | 1,772 | | 6,892 | + ----------+----------+---------+--------+------+--------+--------- + + ----------+----------+---------+--------+------+--------+--------- + Jan. ’41 | 50 | | | | 128 | 7,362 + Feb. ’41 | 452 | | | | 217 | 7,597 + Mar. ’41 | 236 | | | | 513 | 7,320 + Apr. ’41 | 505 | | | | 336 | 7,489 + May ’41 | 288 | | | | 992 | 6,785 + June ’41 | 231 | | | | 209 | 6,807 + July ’41 | 2,695 | | | | 920 | 8,582 + Aug. ’41 | 396 | | | | 496 | 8,482 + Sept. ’41 | 251 | | | | 363 | 8,370 + Oct. ’41 | 251 | | | | 468 | 8,153 + Nov. ’41 | 277 | | | | 520 | 7,910 + Dec. ’41 | 258 | | | | 257 | 7,911 + +----------+---------+--------+------+--------+--------- + Total | 5,890 | | 1,522 | | 5,419 | + ----------+----------+---------+--------+------+--------+--------- + + ----------+----------+---------+--------+------+--------+--------- + Jan. ’42 | 554 | | | | 479 | 7,986 + Febr. ’42 | 480 | | | | 349 | 8,117 + Mar. ’42 | 2,843 | | | | 2,154 | 8,806 + Apr. ’42 | 521 | | | | 673 | 8,654 + May ’42 | 452 | | | | 1,505 | 7,601 + June ’42 | 1,019 | | | | 620 | 8,000 + July ’42 | 1,996 | | | | 1,147 | 8,849 + Aug. ’42 | 1,715 | | | | 678 | 9,886 + Sept. ’42 | 1,709 | | | | 1,520 | 10,075 + Oct. ’42 | 984 | | | | 2,228 | 8,831 + Nov. ’42 | 794 | | | | 533 | 9,092 + Dec. ’42 | 1,044 | | | | 619 | 9,517 + +----------+---------+--------+------+--------+--------- + Total | 14,111 | | 2,898 | | 12,505 | + ----------+----------+---------+--------+------+--------+--------- + + ----------+----------+---------+--------+------+--------+--------- + Jan. ’43 | 2,500 | | | 111 | 742 | 11,275 + Febr. ’43 | 1,291 | 94 | 377 | 175 | 646 | 11,920 + Mar. ’43 | 2,474 | 40 | 1,582 | 311 | 1,933 | 12,461 + Apr. ’43 | 2,773 | 1,102 | 299 | 507 | 1,908 | 13,326 + May ’43 | 2,339 | 38 | 807 | 379 | 1,224 | 14,441 + June ’43 | 1,858 | 122 | 348 | 211 | 681 | 15,618 + July ’43 | 1,727 | 39 | 1,317 | 191 | 1,547 | 15,796 + Aug. ’43 | 4,537 | 57 | 517 | 118 | 692 | 19,641 + Sept. ’43 | 5,444 | 41 | 233 | 123 | 397 | 24,688 + Oct. ’43 | 9,048 | 41 | 209 | 109 | 359 | 33,377 + Nov. ’43 | 4,454 | 27 | 2,378 | 314 | 2,719 | 35,112 + Dec. ’43 | 3,734 | 35 | 525 | 967 | 1,527 | 37,319 + +----------+---------+--------+------+--------+--------- + Total | 42,177 | 1,636 | 8,592 |3,516 | 14,375 | + ----------+----------+---------+--------+------+--------+--------- + + ----------+----------+---------+--------+------+--------+--------- + Jan. ’44 | 8,017 | 49 | 1,454 |1,000 | 2,503 | 42,833 + Febr. ’44 | 1,979 | 44 | 2,648 | 880 | 3,572 | 41,240 + Mar. ’44 | 5,065 | 96 | 1,527 |1,311 | 2,934 | 43,371 + Apr. ’44 | 4,788 | 120 | 1,649 | 560 | 2,329 | 45,830 + May ’44 | 9,655 | 133 | 675 | 390 | 1,198 | 54,287 + June ’44 | 9,986 | 464 | 2,193 | 460 | 3,117 | 61,156 + July ’44 | 7,398 | 311 | 1,287 | 347 | 1,945 | 66,609 + Aug. ’44 | 17,170 | 217 | 429 | 742 | 1,388 | 82,391 + Sept. ’44 | 4,221 | 1,139 | 471 | 497 | 2,107 | 84,505 + Oct. ’44 | 6,728 | 981 | 34,047| 732 | 35,760 | 55,473 + Nov. ’44 | 10,305 | 698 | 5,207 | 612 | 6,517 | 59,261 + Dec. ’44 | 12,555 | 2,076 | 5,579 |1,113 | 8,768 | 63,048 + +----------+---------+--------+------+--------+--------- + Total | 97,867 | 6,328 | 57,166 |8,644 | 72,138 | + ----------+----------+---------+--------+------+--------+--------- + + ----------+----------+---------+--------+------+--------+--------- + Jan. ’45 | 24,197 | 190 | 4,756 | 2,002| 6,948 | 80,297 + Febr. ’45 | 13,066 | 257 | 1,351 | 5,523| 7,131 | 86,232 + Mar. ’45 | 6,560 | 488 | 6,337 | 5,531| 12,356 | 80,436 + +----------+---------+--------+------+--------+--------- + Total | 43,823 | 935 |12,444 |13,056| 26,435 | + ==========+==========+=========+========+======+========+========= + TOTAL 1937| | | | | | + to 31 | | | | | | + MARCH | | | | | | + 1945: | 238,980 | | |33,462|158,544 | + ----------+----------+---------+--------+------+--------+--------- + + + _Annex II_ + +Copy of a letter from the SS Main Office of Economic Administration to +all concentration camps. + + SS Main Office of Economic Administration + Service Group D Concentration Camp + D III/Az.: 14 h (KL) 12.42 Lg/Wy + + Oranienburg + 28 December 1942 + + Regarding: Medical Activities in the Concentration Camps + Reference: without + Enclosure: 1 + + SECRET + +TO the 1. Camp Doctors of the Concentration Camps Da., Sh., Bu., Neu., +Au., Rav., Flo., Lu., Stu., Gr-Ro., Nied., Natz., Hinz., Mor., Herzog., +Mau., + +Copy to the Camp Commandants. + +In the inclosed a compilation of the current arrivals and departures +in all the concentration camps is sent to you for your information. It +discloses that out of 136,000 arrivals about 70,000 died. With such a +high rate of death the number of the prisoners can never be brought +up to the figure as has been ordered by the Reichsfuehrer of the SS. +The 1. camp doctors must use all means at their disposal to reduce +essentially this death rate in the various camps. The best doctor in a +concentration camp is not the one, who believes that he must stand out +for uncalled severity, but the one who by his supervision and exchange +keeps the working capacity at the various labor commands at the highest +possible level. The camp doctors must supervise more often than in +the past the food of the prisoners and, with the approval of the +administration, submit improvement proposals to the camp commandants. +These, however, must not only appear on paper, but must be controlled +regularly by the camp doctors. Furthermore, the camp doctors are to +see to it that the working conditions at the various labor places are +improved as much as possible. To this purpose it will be necessary that +the camp doctors inspect the labor places on the ground and convince +themselves about the conditions of work. + +The SS Reichsfuehrer has ordered that the death rate absolutely must +be reduced. For this reason the aforementioned has been ordered and a +monthly report on this matter is to be submitted to the Chief of the +Department D III. The first report to be submitted on 1 February 1943. + + [Signature illegible] + + Klueder[?] + + SS Brigadefuehrer and Major General of the Arms + + + _Survey_ + + For the month of June-November 1942 + + ------+------------------------------------ + Month | Arrivals + ------+------------------------------------ + | Deliveries Uberst [?] Total + ------+---------+--------+---------+------- + June | 10,322 | 1,575 | 11,897 | 873 + July | 25,716 | 6,254 | 31,970 | 907 + Aug. | 25,407 | 2,742 | 28,149 | 581 + Sept. | 16,763 | 6,438 | 23,201 | 652 + Oct. | 13,873 | 5,345 | 19,218 | 1,089 + Nov. | 17,780 | 4,565 | 22,345 | 809 + +---------+--------+---------+------- + Total| 109,861 | 26,919 | 136,870 | 4,711 + ------+---------+--------+---------+------- + +Table continued ... + + ------+-------------------------------------- + Month | Departures + ------+-------------------------------------- + | Dischrg, Uberst [?] Dead Exek. Total + ------+---------+--------+-------+----------- + June | 1,903 | 4,080 | 243 | 6,899 + July | 4,340 | 8,536 | 477 | 12,260 + Aug. | 2,950 | 12,733 | 99 | 16,363 + Sept. | 6,805 | 22,598 | 144 | 30,199 + Oct. | 6,334 | 11,858 | 5,945 | 25,235 + Nov. | 5,514 | 10,805 | 2,350 | 19,478 + +---------+--------+-------+----------- + Total| 27,846 | 70,610 | 9,267 | 112,434 + ------+---------+--------+-------+----------- + + + COPY OF DOCUMENT 2176-PS + + CONFIDENTIAL + + REPORT OF INVESTIGATING OFFICER HEADQUARTERS THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY + + Office of the Judge Advocate + + APO 403 + AG 092 (3 JA-132) GNMCJ 17 June 1945 + + SUBJECT: Report of Investigation of Alleged War Crimes. + + TO: Commanding General, Twelfth Army Group, APO + 655, U. S. Army. + + +I. _AUTHORITY_ + +1. This investigation was conducted in conformity with Letter, European +Theater of Operations, 24 February 1945, by Eugene S. Cohen, ASN +O-1573121, Major, 514th Quartermaster Group, APO 403, United States +Army, Investigator-Examiner, during the period 6 May 1945 to 15 June +1945, and pursuant to directive of Commanding General, Third United +States Army, a copy of which is attached as Exhibit 1. + + +II. _MATTERS INVESTIGATED_ + +2. Murder by shooting, beating, use of poison gas, drowning, starving, +injections, stoning, exposure, burning, and choking of nationals of +twenty-three (23) nations, including members of the United States armed +forces, of the German civilian population working under the German +armed forces and of other nationals under the orders of said German +armed forces, in violation of Article 2 of the Geneva Prisoner of War +Convention (Par 73, Rules of Land Warfare, Article 2 of same, Par 25, +26, 30, and 31, Rules of Land Warfare). + + +III. _PROCEEDINGS_ + +3. _a._ The testimony of all witnesses examined in the course of this +investigation and which is attached and made a part hereof was secured +through the use of interpreters where requisite, after the witness +had been sworn by me, through the interpreter, under the authority of +Article of War 114, in the following form: “You swear (or affirm) that +the evidence you shall give in this investigation now being conducted +by me shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the +truth. So help you God.” Where practicable, the witness was given an +opportunity to sign his testimony in my presence and, in all cases, it +was signed after such testimony had been read back to the witness in +his own language by the interpreter. The use of a stenographic reporter +was impracticable under existing conditions. + +The interpreter was sworn in the following form: “You swear (or affirm) +that you will truly interpret this investigation now being conducted by +me. So help you God.” + +_b._ The transcribed testimony of each such witness whose name is +below listed is hereto attached as an Exhibit--the number of which +is indicated immediately following the witness’ name. As a further +aid, the name of each camp in the chain at which the said Exhibit was +prepared is listed alongside the name of the witness: + +* * * * * * * + + _c._ Other Exhibits: + _Description_ + +(_a_) (Exhibit 4 is a report by an International Committee set up +by this Investigation, and same is sworn to in due form by the two +witnesses named. The report is further documented with the names of +others who helped compile the facts and figures). + +(_b_) Journal Record of victims between certain dates, including +information as to name, nationality, residence, date of birth, date of +death, manner of death, and the names of guards performing the actual +execution. (Ex. #214) + +(_c_) “Totenbuch,” or Book of the Dead, representing names of victims, +nationality, residence, date of birth, date of death, and manner of +death, between certain dates. This is a sample of small journals which +were later incorporated in the permanent records which number sixteen +(16) volumes and which will be submitted in a supplemental report. (Ex. +#215) + +(_d_) Specimen of poisonous gas used in gas chamber at Mauthausen and +Gusen No. 1 and No. 2. (Ex. #216) + +(_e_) Rubber hose used by SS Guards to beat prisoners in the Mauthausen +Chain of Camps. (Ex. #217) + +(_f_) Heavy whip used by SS Guards to beat prisoners in the Mauthausen +Chain of Camps. (Ex. #218) + +(_g_) Cat of Nine Tails Whip used by SS guards. (Ex. #219) + + +IV. SUMMARY OF FACTS + +4. A certificate by the Investigator-Examiner is attached hereto in +separate form, summarizing the camp and methods of working them in the +present investigation. + +_a._ Between 1,500,000 and 2,000,000 political prisoners are known to +have been incarcerated and labeled for extermination at the Mauthausen +system of concentration camps from available records. The Chain +consisted of between 23 and 30 individual camps between the years 1941 +and 1945, the number varying as the smaller of these were occasionally +evacuated when certain jobs had been finished (see Exhibits 4, 81, and +213). + +_b._ Of the camps affiliated with Mauthausen, the present investigation +covered 13 of them of which the largest were Mauthausen, Gusen, Number +1 and Number 2, Ebensee, Steyr, and Gunskirchen. Others in the list +situated in Third Army Territory were Linz, Numbers 1, 2 and 3, Wells, +Lenzing, Schlier, and Enns. The victims of this Chain of camps were +murdered by the SS Guards working in these camps under the command of +Franz Ziereis, Commandant and George Bachmayer, Assistant Commandant, +both now deceased, whose headquarters were at the fortress in +Mauthausen (see Exhibits 209, 210, and 212). + +_c._ Evidence reveals that the orders for the systemic decimation of +these prisoners originated in Berlin under the direct orders of SS +Fuehrer Heinrich Himmler (see Exhibit 4). + +_d._ American Forces liberated this camp on 5 May 1945 and this +Investigator-Examiner and his team commenced this investigation on 6 +May 1945. + +_e._ The victims of the Mauthausen Chain of concentration camps are in +the process of compilation and will be submitted in a supplementary +report. + +5. It may be added that one of the functions of the International +Committee formed by this investigator to assist in the investigation of +these camps was to arrange for each nation to copy the names of each +of its dead from the available records in order to notify the next +of kin. Therefore, it is confidently concluded that each such nation +already has a list of its own dead with all information regarding +their manner of death and the statistics thereupon. This International +Committee was selected from the inmates by the team and consisted of +the most distinguished members selected by the prisoners themselves. +The Committee numbered six men as principals and many assistants have +greatly helped the investigation in securing the best witnesses and +covering all phases in the preparation of this case for trial (see +Exhibit 4). + +6. _Enemy Individuals_ + +_a._ See Exhibit 2. + +_b._ Wanted notices for all perpetrators are in the process of +preparation. + + +V. _CONCLUSIONS_ + +The evidence collected in this case shows very clearly that the +whole purpose of the Mauthausen Chain of concentration camps was +extermination of human beings for no other reason than their opposition +to the Nazi way of thinking. There is no doubt that Mauthausen was the +basis for long term planning. It was constructed as a gigantic stone +fortress on top of a mountain flanked by small barracks. + +Mauthausen, in addition to its permanency of construction, had +facilities for a large garrison of officers and men, and had large +dining rooms and toilet facilities for the staff. It was conducted with +the sole purpose in mind of exterminating any so-called prisoner who +entered within its walls. + +The so-called branches of Mauthausen were under direct command of the +SS officials located there. All records, orders, and administrative +facilities were handled for these branches through Mauthausen. The +other camps, including Gusen and Ebensee, its two most notorious and +largest branches, were not exclusively used for extermination but +prisoners were used as tools in construction and production until +they were beaten or starved into uselessness, whereupon they were +customarily sent to Mauthausen for final disposal. + +The responsibility for the deaths of these victims lies definitely +with the Nazi Party and with the SS men who executed its commands. +Men like Himmler, Ziereis, Bachmayer, Schulz, Giesler, Pelzer, and +other names in Exhibit 2 are but the arch criminals. However, although +direct evidence is not established against all the members of the SS +Guards in this disreputable Chain, the inescapable presumption is +that all of them are prima facie guilty of these mass murders and the +burden of proof is upon them individually to prove his innocence. In +this connection the SS organization was purely a voluntary one and its +purposes were obviously criminal, in violation of the Hague and Geneva +Conventions, and the rights of humanity. + +It is the belief of the Investigator-Examiner that the theory of +“Association des Malfaiteurs” should be employed most stringently in +a case as virulent and as atrocious as the Mauthausen set-up (see +Certificate attached hereto). + + /s/Eugene S. Cohen + EUGENE S. COHEN, Major, QMC, + JA Section, Third US Army, Investigator-Examiner. + 3 JA-132 + + # # # # # + + CERTIFICATE OF OFFICER INVESTIGATING MAUTHAUSEN CONCENTRATION CAMP. + +I hereby certify as follows: + +1. The Mauthausen Chain of Concentration Camps varied in number from +twenty to thirty or more, depending on the needs of any specific work +assignment. + +2. As shown in Exhibits 21, 22, and 201, the captured records indicated +the names of most of these camps, which varied in size from the huge +fortress of Mauthausen itself, to a small detached lager similar to +Steyr or Lenzing. Lenzing for example, like Steyr (See Exhibits 86, 194 +and 195) were detachments from Mauthausen sent and billeted in barracks +to run two large factories. + +3. The map herein included as Exhibit 201 shows the locations of these +named camps with most important route number leading to them. It is +thus seen that the majority of these camps were located East of the +River Enns (which flows into the Danube and passes through Steyr and +Enns-Township, Austria), and, therefore, are of Russian concern, since +this river is the present International Occupation Boundary between +ourselves and the Soviet Union. + +4. However, the remainder of the camps (as shown in Exhibit 201), +amounting roughly to about 13, have been accounted for in this present +investigation. (See list of Exhibits.) The so-called most notorious of +these camps are, of course, first Mauthausen (ranked with Auschwitz +as by far the largest and worst of all Concentration Camps); Ebensee +(ranked by many as worse than Dachau yet only an inferior Aussenlager +(Branch to Mauthausen)); Gusen, divided into two large branches named +Numbers one and two and of large size in themselves; Gunskirchen and +Steyr, (see Exhibit 84), numbering at capacity five-thousand people. +(See Exhibit 195.) + +5. Many of these camps were evacuated almost immediately upon +liberation, even so large a one as Gunskirchen. (See Exhibit 84.) This +camp was said to have numbered as many as 20,000 prisoners at one time, +but however, Gunskirchen, like Steyr and Lenzing and the Linz Group +(Exhibit 22), and even Ebensee, were not equipped for Mass Murder +(Extermination), like Mauthausen and the Gusens, and when deaths were +“required” other than through starving, beatings, exposure, or lack of +hygienic treatment, the prisoners were dispatched either to Mauthausen +or the Gusens where _all_ were labelled for eventual annihilation. (See +Exhibit 4 as a conclusive Exhibit which in itself, makes a complete +case against the perpetrators involved.) + +6. The total count of victims is impossible to estimate, but with +Hartheim Castle (a building used for mysterious disposal of people), +(see Exhibit 213) almost 2,000,000 are counted from the German Records +themselves. (Also see again Exhibit 4). + +7. As to the perpetrators or murderers, a complete list of leaders +and some 10,000 (approximately) other SS names are included in this +investigation. Descriptions are included whenever possible and at all +events, Name, Rank, Date of Birth, Last Residence, and Residence of +Next of Kin (to whom they might return) are given. (See Exhibit 2, and +valuable Exhibit 213 which lists the victims between certain dates, +giving their names, nationalities, Dates of Birth, Day of Death, Method +of Death, and Names of Guards doing the killing). + +8. All Camps presently investigated are as follows: + +Mauthausen, Gusen (Nos. 1 and 2), Linz (Nos. 1, 2, and 3), and Ebensee. +Wels, Gunskirchen, Lenzing, Steyr, and Schlier are also taken care +of as part of the chain and as indicated heretofore. All others were +either in Russian or British areas. All these camps have been treated +as one case. However, a Supplemental Report is now being prepared to +follow the present one in a short time. It should be noted that Franz +Ziereis, Commandant of the Mauthausen Chain and Georg Bachmayer, +Assistant Commandant, are now dead. (See Exhibits 181, 182, 183, 184, +185, 209 and 210.) + +9. Besides the books made Exhibits in this present report, sixteen +Totenbucher (Books of the dead, as described in Exhibit 4) have been +photographed in micro-film and although ready cannot be received in +time to submit in this present report. + +Additional still photographs and more than 1000 feet of motion pictures +have been taken by an official Signal Corps Team and will also be +submitted in the Supplemental Report. + + /s/ Eugene S. Cohen + EUGENE S. COHEN, + Major, QMCorps, Investigating Officer. + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2187-PS + +Main SS economic administration office Office group chief D + +--concentration camps--D I/Az : 14 e 3/Ot/S;-- + + Oranienburg, 14 July 1943 + +Re: Beating of female prisoners + + Ref: Reichsfuehrer-SS B. Nz. I/1891/41 Ads.Sk/Fe.--of 7 July 1943 + +Enclosures / none + + + REGISTERED + + To the camp commandants of concentration camps, Au., Rav., Herz., + Lub. and Stutthof. + +The Reichsfuehrer-SS and Chief of the German Police has ordered that +the execution of sentence on Russian women has to be done by Polish +women and on Polish and Ukrainian women by Russian women. + +As a reward the prisoners inflicting the punishment may be given a few +cigarettes. + +Under no circumstances may German prisoners be employed to inflict +punishment. Also other prisoners due for punishment themselves are not +to be employed for this purpose. + + per sig. Liebehenschel + SS-Obersturmbannfuehrer + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2189-PS + + SS Economic Administrative Main Office + Office Group Chief D + Concentration Camps, D 1/Az: 14e 3/L/Ot. + + Oranienburg, 11 Aug. 1942. + + _Re_: Punishment by Beating. + _Ref_: none + _Encl_: none + +To the camp commandants of concentration camps. Da, Sah, Bu, Mau, Flo, +Neu, Au, Gr-Ro, Natz, _Nie_, _Stu_, _Arb_, _Rav_, _and prisoner of war +camp Lublin_. + +The Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police has ordered that +punishment by beating will be executed in concentration camps for women +by _prisoners_--under the ordered supervision. + +In order to coordinate this order the main office chief of the main SS +Economic Administration Office, SS-Obergruppenfuehrer and General of +the Waffen-SS Pohl, has ordered, effective immediately, that punishment +by beating will also be executed by prisoners in concentration camps +for men. + +It is forbidden to have foreign prisoners execute the punishment on +German prisoners. + +The order for punishment will read on page 2 under “executors”. + +The following prisoners have executed physical punishment on the-- + + 1. __________________________________ prison number + 2. __________________________________ prison number + [signature illegible] + SS-Brigadefuehrer and Major General of the Waffen-SS + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2194-PS + + REICH DEFENSE LAW + + G-300 + Top Secret + + The Ministry for Economy and Labor Saxony + Dresden and 6 for September 1939 + Tel: 52151/Long Distance 52051 + + Ref: Wbv:407g + + To The Reich Protector in Bohemia and Moravia, Transportation Section, + + Attention of Construction Chief, Counselor Hirches or Representative + in the Office. + +_Prag_ + + [STAMP] + The Reich Protector in Bohemia and Moravia + received, Prag, 5 Sept. 1939. No. 274. + +Enclosed please find a copy of the Reich Defense Law of 4 Sept. 1938 +and a copy each of the decrees of the Reichsminister of Transportation +dated 7 October 1938--RL/W10.2212/38, Top Secret--and of 17 July +1939--RL/LV 1.2173/39, Top Secret, for your information and observance. + + By order-- + 3 Encl.: SIGNED: Kretzschmar. + Completed at Dresden 4 September 1939 + 3 Enclosures. SIGNED: Schneider. + +Receipt for the letter of 4 September 1939, wbv:407g with 3 enclosures +signed 5 September 1939 and returned to Construction Counselor +Kretzschmar. + + File: Wbv Signed: HI. + + # # # # # + +Top Secret + + Enclosure 2. RL/LV 1.2861/39G + The Reichsminister for Transportation. + RL/V 1.2173/39 + + Berlin 17 July 1939 + 44 plus 2 copies. + No. 45. + +To the Subordinate Authority of the Reich and the States as well as the + General Authority of the States to whom are attached: + + (_a_) Waterways Deputies (Wbv). + (_b_) Deputies for Local Transportation (Nbv). + (_c_) Deputies for ocean traffic. (Sbv). + + To each one individually: + + Subject: Protection of the secrecy of the law for the Reich + Defense. (RV--Gesetz). + Ref: Decree of 7 October 1938 RL/W 10.2212/38, + Top Secret. + +The leader has agreed to the tacit omission of the secrecy protection +of the Reich defense law of 4 September 1938 transmitted with the +corresponding decree. In spite of the greater ease in business +correspondence thus created, the following limitations, which are +herewith brought to your attention for compliance, have been ordered by +the competent office. + +1. _It remains prohibited_ to cite the Reich Defense law in public or +in connection with laws to be promulgated, as well as publication of +the contents of the law in its entirety. + +2. _It is permitted_ + + _a._ the mention of all installations founded on the Reich Defense + Law and their functions in public without referring to the law; + + _b._ the co-signature of laws which are prepared and announced in + peace time for war. + + Deputy + Signed: Baur. + + # # # # # + + SECRET STATE MATTER! + + To GRS Nr. 10/39 + Enclosure for RL/LV. I.2861/39 g. + The Reich Traffic Minister + RL/W 10. 2212/38 secret state matter + + Berlin, W8, Wilhelmstrasse 80, the 7th October 1938 + 47 and 3 copies + Examination Nr. 49 + + To the following Reich and State authorities from whom have been + ordered + + (_a_) deputies for water ways, + (_b_) deputies for the local traffic, + (_c_) deputies for ocean traffic + + --but especially-- + +Subject: Reich Defense Law [Reichsverteidigungsgesetz]. + +Enclosed is transmitted copy of the Reich Defense Law signed by the +leader and Reich chancellor on 4 September 1938. The promulgation +remains suspended. + + Deputy + Signed: Baur. + +To wbv.: 407 g. + + # # # # # + + TOP MILITARY SECRET + + To GRS Nr. 10/39 1432 + + Reich Defense Law of 4 September 1938. + +The Reich cabinet has decided on the following law which is announced +herewith. + + + I. _State of Defense_ + + par. 1 + +(1) As possessor of the complete power of state, the leader and Reich +chancellor can decree for the Reich territory or its parts a “State of +Defense”. + +(2) If the political situation demands it, the leader and Reich +chancellor decrees the “Mobilization”. The mobilization can be limited +to a part of the Reich or of the armed forces. + + + par. 2 + +(1) Once the territory of operation is determined the chief of the army +and the commanders of the armies have upon declaration of the state of +defense without further order the authority to exercise executive power +in this operational territory. + +(2) The commanders exercising executive powers can, effective for the +territory of operations, promulgate laws, institute special courts, +and issue directives to the officials and offices competent in the +territory of operations, with the exception of the supreme Reich +officials, the supreme Prussian country officials, and the Reich +leaders of the NSDAP. The lawfulness of directives precedes directives +from otherwise superior offices. + +(3) The boundaries of the territory of operations are determined by the +supreme commander of the armed forces. + +(4) Special directives for the case of a surprise threat to the Reich +territory. + +If a part of the Reich territory is surprised by a military threat, +and if special decrees for defense against this danger cannot be +awaited, then the commanders of the imperiled service commands have +the right to issue the directives which cannot be delayed and which +are necessary for the protection of the imperiled territory to all +non-military offices within their sphere of command. The same rights +apply to the commanding admirals of the Navy in case of surprise +threats against the coastal territory, and to the commanders of air +districts in case of surprise attacks from the air within the framework +of their war tasks. The execution of these directives has precedence +over the other commitments and the directives of superior offices. The +named commanders can transmit their right of issuing directives to +subordinate officers down to the village counselor. + + + par. 3 + +(1) With the declaration of the state of defense the plenipotentiaries +for the Reich administration (GBV) named by the leader and Reich +chancellor takes over the uniform leadership of the non-military +administration with exception of the economic administration. + +To him are subordinate-- + + the Reich minister of the Interior + the Reich minister of Law + the Reich minister for science, education and popular education, + the Reich minister for religious matters, + the Reich office for regional order. + +(2) The GBV must comply with the demands of the supreme command of the +armed forces (OKW) which are of considerable importance for the armed +forces. If the demands cannot be brought in accord with the affairs +of the Reich administration the leader and Reich chancellor makes the +decision. + +(3) The GBV has the right within his sphere to issue laws with the +accord of the OKW and GBW which differ from the existing laws. + + + par. 4 + +(1) With the declaration of the state of defense the chief deputy for +economics (GBW), appointed by the leader and Reich chancellor, takes +over the direction of the economy except for the armament industry. + +(2) It is the task of the GBW to put all economic forces into the +service of the Reich defense, and to safeguard economically the life of +the German nation. To him are subordinate-- + + the Reich minister of economics, + the Reich minister of nutrition and agriculture, + the Reich minister of work, + the Reich chief of forestry, + the Reich commissar for price control. + +He is furthermore responsible for directing the financing of the Reich +defense within the realm of the Reich finance ministry and the Reich +bank. + +(3) The GBW must carry out the demands of the OKW which are of +considerable importance for the armed forces; and he must insure +the economic conditions for the production of the armament industry +directed immediately by the OKW according to its demands. If the +demands of the armed forces cannot be brought into accord with the +affairs of economy, then the leader and Reich chancellor decides. + +(4) The GBW has the right within his sphere to issue laws with the +consent of the OKW and GBV which differ from the existing laws. + + + par. 5 + +(1) The Reich postal minister, the Reich transportation minister, and +the general inspector for the German road net are, with the declaration +of the state of defense, bound to the demands of the OKW for the +immediate affairs of the armed forces. + +(2) The following will get orders from the OKW: + +(_a_) the _Reich transportation minister_ for the use of means of +transportation, + +(_b_) the _Reich postal minister_ for the use and distribution of the +complete communication connections to the armed forces and the other +agencies. + +(3) The Reich transportation minister must comply, with the declaration +of the state of defense, with the demands of the GBW according to +the directions given to him by the OKW for the use of the means of +transportation. + +(4) In the sphere of the Reich postal minister, of the Reich +transportation minister, and of the general inspector for the German +road net, the chief of the OKW has the right to promulgate laws in +accord with the GBV and GBW which differ from the existing laws. + + + par. 6 + +The Reich ministers and chief Reich offices carry out the tasks within +their spheres on their own responsibility, regardless of the special +competence of the chief of the OKW, of the GBV, and of the GBW, +according to paragraphs 3, 4 and 5. + + + par. 7 + +For the shaping of the political mill of the people the deputy of the +leader of the NSDAP is responsible. He uses for that the NSDAP, its +formations and coordinated units. + + + II. _State of War_ + + + par. 8 + +(1) If the fight with an external enemy is forced upon the German +people, the leader and Reich chancellor declares the state of war. + +(2) With declaration of the state of war, the war laws and war decrees +come into force without further order. The legal consequences provided +in other laws for the state of war become effective. + + + par. 9 + +If the state of defense is not already declared beforehand, the decrees +about the state of defense go into effect with declaration of the state +of war. + + + III. _Preparatory Measures_ + + + par. 10 + +The Reich Defense Council (RVR). + +(1) The task of the Reich Defense Council consists in peace time in the +decision on all measures for the preparation of the Reich defense and +the gathering together of all forces and means of the nation according +to the directions of the leader and Reich chancellor. The tasks of the +RVR in war time will be specially determined by the leader and Reich +chancellor. + +(2) The leader and Reich chancellor is chairman in the RVR. His +permanent deputy is general field marshal Goering. He has the right to +call conferences of the RVR. Permanent members of the RVR are-- + + the Reich minister of air and supreme commander of the air force, + + the supreme commander of the army, + + the supreme commander of the navy, + + the chief of the OKW, + + the deputy of the leader, + + the Reich minister and chief of the Reich chancellery, + + the president of the secret cabinet council, + + the chief plenipotentiary for the Reich administration, + + the chief plenipotentiary for economics, + + the Reich minister of foreign affairs, + + the Reich minister of the interior, + + the Reich finance minister, + + the Reich minister for popular enlightenment and propaganda, + + the president of the Reich bank directory. + +The other Reich ministers and the Reich offices directly subordinate +to the leader and Reich chancellor are consulted if necessary. Further +personalities can be called as the case demands. + + + par. 11 + +The Reich Defense Committee (RVA). + +(1) The Reich defense committee is the working committee of the RVR. It +prepares the decisions of the RVR, sees to their execution, and secures +collaboration between armed forces, chief Reich offices, and party. + +(2) Presiding is the chief of the OKW. He regulates the activity of the +committee and gives the directions to the GBV and GBW and to the Reich +ministries not subordinated to them and to the chief Reich offices +according to the decisions of the RVR, which directions are necessary +for securing their uniform execution. + +(3) The RVA is composed of the OKW, deputy of the commissioner for the +four year plan, the leader staffs of the GBV and GBW, and the Reich +Defense officials. + +(4) Chief office officials for the Reich defense (RV-Referenten) and +their deputies are commissioned by the deputy of the leader, by the +Reich chancellery by each Reich Ministry, by the Reich leader of the +SS and chief of the German police, by the Reich work leader, by the +Reich forest master, by the chief inspector for the German road net, +by the Reich office for regional order, by the Reich bank directory, +and in the Prussian state ministry. The RV-Referent and his deputy are +immediately subordinate to the minister or the state secretary, and to +the chief of the Reich office, resp. + + + par. 12 + +The uniformity of the preparations for the start and the course of the +mobilization is secured by the OKW. + +As regards the actual formulation of the preparations, the GBV and GBW +make the arrangements for their sphere. + + + par. 13 + +The Chief Plenipotentiary for the Reich Administration (GBV): + +The GBV conducts the preparations for the Reich defense in the sphere +of the ministries and Reich offices subordinate to him according to +paragraph 3. They are bound by his directions already in peace time. + + + par. 14 + +The Chief Plenipotentiary for Economics (GBW): + +(1) The GBW conducts the economic preparations for the Reich defense +as far as they do not come in the sphere of the OKW as regards the +armament industry. + +(2) The GBW must secure the economic conditions for the production of +the armament industry immediately directed by the OKW according to its +demands. + +(3) The ministries and Reich offices named in paragraph 4 (2) are, +within the framework of these directives, already bound for the +preparation of the Reich defense to the directions of the GBW, the +Reich transportation minister to his demands according to paragraph 5 +(3). + + + IV. _Final Directions_ + + + par. 15 + +Penal Directions. + +Whoever acts against the orders of a decree promulgated on the basis +of this law, on purpose or negligently, will be punished with a jail +sentence and money fine or with one of these punishments, if the act is +not punishable with a heavier sentence according to other decrees. + + + par. 16 + +Execution and Completion Directives. + +The OKW promulgates in agreement with the GBV and GBW the law and +administrative directives necessary for the execution and completion of +this law. + + + par. 17 + +The law takes effect immediately. + +Berchtesgaden, the 4th September 1938. + + The leader and Reich chancellor + signed Adolf Hitler + signed Goering + + General Field Marshal + The deputy of the leader + signed R. Hess + + The Reich Minister of the Interior + signed Frick + + The Chief Plenipotentiary for Economics + signed Walther Funk + + The Reich Foreign Minister + signed Ribbentrop + + The Chief of the OKW + signed Keitel + + The Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery + signed Dr. Lammers + + # # # # # + + Berchtesgaden, the 4 September 1938 + + _Note to the Reich Defense Law_ + +1. The Publication of the Reich Defense Law of 4 Sept. 1938, remains +suspended. + +2. The following laws and cabinet decisions are reputed effective +immediately. + +A. Reich Defense Law of 21 May 1935. + +B. Decision of the Reich Cabinet of 4 April 1933 to form a Reich +Defense Council. + +C. Rectification and completion of 13 Dec. 1934 of the decision of the +Reich Cabinet of 4 Apr. 1933. + +D. Decision of the Reich Cabinet of 21 May 1935 on activity of the CB +in peace times. + + The Fuehrer and Reich Chancellery, + (signed) Adolf Hitler + + The Reich Minister and Chief of Reich Chancellery + (signed) Dr. Lammers + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2195-PS + +_File Memorandum_ + +Today I visited General Oshima. The conversation ranged over the +following subjects: + +1. The Fuehrer speech, which pleased him very much, especially because +it had been spiritually warranted in all its features. + +2. We discussed conclusion of a treaty to consolidate the triangle +Germany/Italy/Japan into an even firmer mold. He also told me that, +together with German counter-espionage [Abwehr], he was undertaking +long-range projects aimed at the disintegration of Russia and emanating +from the Caucasus and the Ukraine. However, this organization was to +become effective only in case of war. + +3. Furthermore he had succeeded up to now to send 10 Russians with +bombs across the Caucasian frontier. These Russians had the mission to +kill Stalin. A number of additional Russians, whom he had also sent +across, had been shot at the frontier. + +4. We then discussed the Mohammedan movement. He told me that a +Japanese officer had worked in Afghanistan, but he had been expelled +later because of suspicion that he had attempted to overthrow the +Afghan government. I told him that I had a police officer there and +that the two could very well collaborate once he again had someone +there. + +5. He told me confidentially that he had bought a piece of real estate +in Falkensee under the name of a middleman. Six Russians were employed +there, writing and printing leaflets, which were flown into Russia +from Poland in small balloons, when the wind was favorable. He had +reports and proofs from Russia that they had arrived in good condition +and that they were obviously being passed around among the people very +diligently. + +6. Also he had bought a motor boat in order to bring leaflets from +Roumania to the Crimea via the Black Sea. However, this had miscarried +in the fall, but he would repeat it once more in summer. + +Berlin, 31 January 1939 + + The Reichsfuehrer-SS: + + (signed) H. Himmler + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2199-PS + + + SECRET + + Copy + + SS Economic-Administrative Main Office + District Group D--Concentration Camps--DI/1 Az.: 14 f 5/L/Ot. + Secret diary Nr. 645/42 + + Oranienburg, 12 Sept 42 + + Concerns: Return of urns of inmates deceased in concentration camps. + + Reference: Chief of Security Police [Sipo] and the SD-ND1a-838/42--of + 7.9.42 + + Encl: None + + To the Commanders of Concentration Camps, Da., Sa., Bu., Mau., Flo., + Neu., Au., Gro.-Ro., Natz., Nie., Stu., Arb., Rav., and Prisoners of + War, Camp Lublin. + +According to a communication of the Chief of the Security Police and +the SD and conforming to a report of the Chief of Security Police and +SD in Prague, urns of deceased Czechs and Jews were sent for burial to +the home-cemeteries within the Protectorate. + +Based on different events (demonstrations, erecting of posters inimical +to the Reich on urns of deceased inmates in halls of cemeteries in the +home-communities, pilgrimages to the graves of deceased inmates etc.) +within the Protectorate, the delivery of urns with the ash remnants +of deceased Nationals of the Protectorate and of Jews is henceforth +prohibited. The urns shall be preserved within the Concentration Camps. +In case of doubt about the preservation of the urns oral instructions +shall be available at this agency. + + The Chief of the Central Office + sig: Liebehenschel, + SS-Obersturmbannfuehrer. + + Correctness of Copy is certified: + Natzweiler, 16 September 1942 + sig: [illegible signature] + SS Oscha. und Stabsscharf. + + # # # # # + + SECRET + + Copy + + SS Economic-Administrative Main Office + District Group D + Concentration Camps--D I/1/Az.: 14 e 3/Ot./U. + + III + Oranienburg, 4 April 1942 + +_Concerns_: Lashing [Pruegelstrafen] + + to the Concentration Camp Commanders of Da., Sah., Bu., Mau., Flo., + Au., Gr. Ro., Natzw., Nie., Stu., Arb., Rav., and Commander of + Prisoner of War Camp Lublin. + +The Reich Fuehrer-SS and Chief of the German Police has decreed that +when the word “more severe” [verschaerft] is added in his orders for +lashings, the execution of the sentence must be undergone with bare +seat [unbekleidetes Gesaess]. (This includes male as well as female +prisoners in protective or preventative custody.) + +In all other cases the previously decreed punishment by Reichfuehrer-SS +remains the same. + + The Chief of the Central Office + sig: Liebehenschel + SS-Obersturmbannfuehrer + + FdRda + sig: [illegible] + SS Oberscharfuehrer und Stabsscharfuehrer + + + PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2219-PS + +To the General Field Marshal + + At Present in Vienna, 14 July 1939 + +Sir: + +If I may add something about myself, it is the following: I know that +I am not of an active fighting nature, unless final decisions are at +stake. At this time of pronounced activism [aktivismus] this will +certainly be regarded as a fault in my personality. Yet, I know that +I cling with unconquerable tenacity to the goal in which I believe. +That is Greater Germany [Grossdeutschland] and the Fuehrer. And if +some people are already tired out from the struggle and some have been +killed in the fight, I am still around somewhere and ready to go into +action. This, after all, was also the development until the year 1938. +Until July 1934 I conducted myself as a regular member of the party. +And if I had quietly, in whatever form, paid my membership dues--the +first one, according to a receipt, I paid in December 1931--I probably +would have been an undisputed, comparatively old fighter and party +member of Austria, but I would not have done any more for the union. +I told myself in July 1934 that we must fight this clerical regime on +its own ground in order to give the Fuehrer a chance to use whatever +method he desires. I told myself that this Austria was worth a mass. I +have stuck to this attitude with an iron determination because I and my +friends had to fight against the whole political church, Freemasonry, +Jewry, in short, against everything in Austria. The slightest weakness +which we might have displayed would undoubtedly have led to our +political annihilation; it would have deprived the Fuehrer of the means +and tools to carry out his ingenious political solution for Austria, as +became evident in the days of March 1938. I have been fully conscious +of the fact that I am following a path which is not comprehensible to +the masses and also not to my party comrades. I followed it calmly and +would without hesitation follow it again because I am satisfied that +at one point I could serve the Fuehrer as a tool in his work, even +though my former attitude even now gives occasion to very worthy and +honorable party comrades to doubt my trustworthiness. I have never paid +attention to such things because I am satisfied with the opinion which +the Fuehrer and the men close to him have of me. + + [Seyss-Inquart] + + + PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2220-PS + + SECRET + + Letterhead + +THE REICH Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery + +RK.318D g III + + Berlin W8, April 17th, 1943. + Vosstrasse 6, at present: FIELD-quarters. + Mail must exclusively be directed to Berlin address. + + To the Reichsfuehrer-SS and Chief of the German Police. Herr Himmler + + Ref: The situation in the Government General. + +Dear Mr. Reichleader, + +We had agreed at our conference on March 27th of this year that written +texts should be worked out about the situation in the Government +General, on which our intended, mutual report to the Fuehrer, could be +based. + +The material gathered for this purpose by Lieutenant General Krueger +was submitted to you immediately. Based on this material, I have had +a sketch prepared, which sums up the most important points of this +material, sub-divides them in a way quickly to grasp, and finally +points out the kind of measurements to be taken. + +The memorandum was checked, together with SS Lieutenant General Krueger +who agrees with it in full. Part of it I herewith submit to you. + + (signed) Dr. Lammers. + + # # # # # + + Copy to RK. 318 D g III. F.Q. April 12th, 1943 + + SECRET! + +Ref: The situation in the Government General. + +A. _The task of the German Administration in the Government General._ +The German Administration in the Government General has to fulfill the +following tasks: + +1. For the purpose of securing food for the German people, to increase +agricultural production and utilize it to the fullest extent, to +allot sufficient rations to the native population occupied with work +essential for the war effort and to deliver the rest to the armed +forces and the homeland. + +2. To employ the manpower of the native population in the Government +General itself only for war important purposes, and to put at the +homeland’s disposal such manpower which is not needed for the purpose +mentioned above. + +3. To consolidate German folkdom in the Government General and by means +of inland settlement in particular to create a stronghold of German +folkdom in the eastern border districts, also by means of colonization +with racial Germans, transferred from other places, thus safeguarding +these very border districts. + +4. To safeguard the Government General as a transit zone for +replacements and supplies to the East front. + +5. To obtain troops as far as possible from the native population for +the fight against Bolshevism. + +B. _Wrong ways chosen for the fulfillment of these tasks._ The German +administration in the Government General has failed by a wide margin +in achieving the tasks listed under A. Although, in the year of 1942, +one succeeded in meeting the delivery quota of agrarian products for +the armed forces and the homeland at a relatively high percentage, +namely over 90% and also met the demands of the homeland concerning +the conscription of labor in general, one has to consider two things +on the other hand: First, these accomplishments in the year of 1942 +were achieved for the first time, prior, f. i. only 40,000 German tons +[Translator’s remark: 2206 lbs. avoir p. makes a ton] bread grain +had been delivered to the Armed Forces. Secondly, and above all, one +had failed to create for the bringing about of such achievements the +necessary organizational, economic, and political basis, which is +absolutely required, if such achievements shall not strongly affect +the entire situation, may eventually cause chaotic conditions in the +future. This failure of the German administration can for one thing be +explained by the system of the German administrative and governmental +activity in the Government General, personally represented by the +Governor General, and secondly, by the wrong basic principles of policy +in all those questions, which were decisive for conditions in the +Government General. + + +II. _The failure in basic principles of policy._ + +1. The realization of the task, listed in A 1, necessitates in the +first place a strict and clear-cut structure of economics, as well +as a disciplined and clear-cut official economic policy, accompanied +by an elimination as totally as possible of clandestine trading and +black markets. This stipulates above all the fullest utilization of +the harvest and its public management, the stopping of all trade +enterprises, which are not essential to the war and the care to be +taken for a clear-cut management in war essential enterprises. + +The German administration was in no respect capable of living up to +these requirements. In the matter of raising food it took a request of +a delivery contingent for the Reich and the Armed Forces amounting to +750,000 metric tons of bread grain in the summer of 1942, in order to +have the attempt made, of drawing up an inventory of food products. +For this purpose a census was taken. The result however turned out to +be unreliable. The utilization of the harvest [Ernte-erfassung] did +not even permit the full delivery of the contingent for the Reich and +the Armed Forces (instead of 750,000 metric tons only 690,000 tons) +let alone the ample feeding of the native population working for +German interests. While 1.4 million metric tons were demanded, only +1.2 million metric tons of bread grain could be taken hold of, of +which 690,000 m.t. were delivered to the Reich and the Armed Forces, +so that for roughly 16 million natives only 510,000 m.t. were left. +Accordingly, the weekly bread rations for the normal consumer had to +be cut down to only 1050 g, compared with 1675 g in the Protectorate +and 2600 g in the annexed Eastern territories. To make supplies +available for the native population, black markets and clandestine +trading were tolerated to the greatest extent, resulting in prices +entirely unattainable for the population, working for German interests. +A married Polish official, without children, with High school education +f.i. has a net income of 234.27 Zloty per month. Compared with this, +the prices in the clandestine trade are: + + 1 kg. rye bread 11.00 Zloty + 1 ” potatoes 2.40 Zloty + 1 ” pork 80.00 Zloty + 1 ” bacon 160.00 Zloty + 1 ” butter 170.00 Zloty + +Under such conditions the foreign worker remains at his place of work +for about 4 to 5 days per week only in order to purchase the missing +provisions for himself and his family on the remaining other days. +Daily ransackings, robberies, murders and other crimes are further +consequences of these conditions. + +The farmer received, as an incitement for delivery of his +agrar-products, premium certificates for the obtaining of commodities +(articles needed for farming, household necessities, salt, cigarettes, +brandy, etc.). These commodities very often could not be had, however, +despite the fact that they were obtainable in any desired quantity in +the clandestine trade, but at exorbitant prices. + + (1 bricklayer’s brush = 1 cow + 1 dz. (Drusch) coal = 30.00 Zloty + 1 pair of boots = 1500.00 ” + 1 horse shoe nail = 3.00 ” + 1 pair of wooden slippers = 2 calves + 1 dress = 1 cow) + +The consequences of this situation naturally lead to a severe curbing +of the farmer’s willingness to produce. Instead of reducing prices in +the trade section by means of taking the necessary measures in regard +to the management, a decree of the Governor General recommended, to +adjust the prices of agrar-products to the prices of commodities, which +were as much as 300 to 4000% higher. + +The trade economics are entirely built up according to capitalistic +viewpoints, with the aim of earning quickly and much and any planned +leadership, which might take war requirements into consideration, is +lacking. There is a lack of state supervision and of guidance in the +line of production and in the line of trade. The German individual +business man as a “trustee” on his own, of enterprises personally +directed by him, is given a free hand to do what he wants, in the +unrestricted play of forces. These trustees very often make use of +former Polish and Jewish owners of enterprises as agents empowered +to sign in their names. These trustees make tremendous profits in +clandestine trading, tolerated by the Government, and make them +within the shortest time. Prohibition of production and control of +individual management, as requested by the Armament Inspection (Lt. +Gen. Schindler), were not carried out. Part of the trade production +is directed only at putting at the disposal of the native population +objects for the trade-in of food; metals, materials for spinning, +leather, etc., are thus being drained off from the war economy. + +2. _The Utilization of Manpower._ The most important presupposition for +a proper and relatively frictionless regulation to utilize manpower +taken from the native population within the Government General itself, +as well as within the Reich, are normal conditions in the sphere of +economics. Lack of this coordination influences the steering of labor +employments unfavorably in many respects. If it would be possible +to provide the population, working in the interest of Germany, with +the minimum of food needed, and everyday objects, and to render +impossible the access to other items by way of black market channels +and clandestine trade, then the reserves of manpower at hand would +volunteer for employment as planned, of their own volition. This +would mean a basis for a sensible shaping of agrarian property-units. +It is necessary in this respect that parts of the population thus +available may then be employed in such work which will guarantee them +a satisfactory standard of living. After failing to have created the +necessary supposition for a well-planned and well-steered employment +of manpower, the utilization of manpower is confronted with the +greatest difficulties. It is clear that these difficulties have been +increased by the elimination of Jewish manpower. But it is incorrect +to consider this elimination as the cause of difficulties. If the +necessary basis for proper management of manpower had been given, the +elimination of Jewish manpower would not have caused any difficulties +worth mentioning. As things were, the utilization of manpower had to +be enforced by means of more or less forceful methods, such as the +instances when certain groups appointed by the Labor Offices, caught +Church and Movie-goers here and there and transported them into the +Reich. That such methods not only undermine the people’s willingness +to work and the people’s confidence to such a degree that it cannot be +checked even with terror, is just as clear as the consequences brought +about by a strengthening of the political resistance movement. + +3. _The Treatment of the Native Populations._ Can only be led into the +right channels based on a foundation of a clear-cut and well-organized +administration and management. Only such a foundation permits that the +native population may be handled strictly if necessary, even severely. +On the other hand, it can be dealt with in a big-hearted manner and +may be granted certain liberties, especially in cultural respect, +causing a certain amount of contentment. Without such a foundation, +severity would only strengthen the resistance movement and meeting the +native population half way would only undermine the German reputation. +That this foundation is missing can be concluded from the facts +mentioned above. Instead of trying to create this basis, the Governor +General inaugurates a promotion of cultural life on the part of the +Polish population, which knows no bounds in itself. Under prevailing +circumstances however and last, but not least, in connection with our +military situation last winter, this could only be explained as a +weakness and thus had to bring about exactly the opposite results of +the aspired aim. + + + PARTIAL COPY OF DOCUMENT 2222-PS + + HEADQUARTERS 12TH ARMY GROUP OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE APO 655 + + REPORT OF INVESTIGATION of ALLEGED WAR CRIME + + _Summary_ + + Nature of violation: Mistreatment, torture and Murder of Allied + nationals. + + Place and Date: 31 concentration camps all in vicinity of Nordhausen, + Germany from 23 August 1943 to 10 April 1945. + + Victims: Approximately 52,000 nationals of 18 Allied countries. + + Perpetrators: German SS troops and civilians. + + # # # # # + + CONFIDENTIAL + + Information to Establish Prima Facie Case Required by SHAEF Court of + Inquiry + + 25 May 1945 + + SUBJECT: Murder and maltreatment of Political Prisoners and Prisoners + of War in Mittelbau (Dora) Concentration Camps, near Nordhausen, + Germany. + + TO: Commanding General, Ninth United States Army, APO 339, U. S. Army. + + FROM: War Crimes Investigating Team 6822, U. S. Army. + + Date and Time: 11 April 1945 to 14 May 1945. Own File Ref: 315. + +1. _Nature of violations._ Murder and maltreatment of political +prisoners and prisoners of war in Mittelbau (Dora) concentration camps +near Nordhausen, Germany. (Map Ref: GSGS 4346, M-52:D-12.) + +2. _Place, date, time._ 23 August 1943 to 10 April 1945. + +3. Brief resume of incident. Nordhausen, Germany, a city of +approximately 39,000 peacetime population, is located eighteen +miles east of the Harz Mountains. In August 1943 (Exhibit A), the +construction of a V-bomb factory was undertaken in tunnels dug into the +foothills of the Harz Mountains about two miles north of Nordhausen. +The area was operated by a combination of commercial firms known as +Mittelwark which was charged with the construction of V-bombs. The +operating personnel was made up of forced laborers who were used in +both the construction of the tunnels and manufacture of the V-bombs. +These laborers were, with the exception of the German overseers, +composed of a number of nationalities the majority of which were +Russians, Poles, French, Belgians, and Czechs, in that order. There +were also Norwegians, Danes, Hollanders, Spanish, Italians, Hungarians, +Bulgarians, Latvians, Yugoslavians, Greeks, Albanians, Rumanians, +Estonians, and the records also show (Exhibit 81) one American as +having been in the camp (Exhibit A-1). There were thirty-one (31) camps +which were utilized for housing the forced laborers and which were, in +most cases, located in the vicinity of the area in which the laborers +were utilized. These camps were known as: + + Artern + Ballenstedt + Blankenburg + Bleicherode + Dora + Ellrich + Gross Werther + Harzungen + Hohlstedt + Ilfeld + Ilsenburg + Kelbra + Klein Bodungen + Kleissingen + Mackenrode + Nixei + Nordhausen (Boelcke-Kaserne) + Osterhagen + Osterode + Quedlinburg + Regenstein + Rossla + Rottleberode + Sollstedt + Sonderhausen + Tettenborn + Trautenstein + Walkenried + Wickerode + Wieda + Wolffleben + +The camps were guarded by SS troops (Exhibit A-1), and SS troop +headquarters were located at Dora (Exhibit 86). The SS personnel were +assisted in their guard duties by block leaders who, for the most +part, were Kapos (Capos), which was the name given to German Civilian +Criminals who had been released from imprisonment for the specific +assignment as block leaders in the aforementioned camps. + +Between 75,000 and 80,000 forced laborers (Exhibit A-1) were shuttled +into, and a few out of, these installations. A complete indifference +to the welfare of the prisoners was exhibited by their guards and +custodians. Drinking water and water for washing, in the first stages +of the operation of Dora proper, was found only wherever the forced +laborers could find a leak in the pipes (Exhibit EEE). At the time +of the liberation hundreds of bodies to which death had come from +starvation and bombings were strewn about Bolke Kaserne. These bodies +were emaciated, and bony prominences of the skeletons were conspicuous +under the skin. These bodies were laid in rows in various conditions +of decomposition. A pile of naked bodies, the result of one day’s +deaths, was found under the stairway at the Bolke Kaserne camp (Exhibit +87). Small piles of bodies were about the building (Exhibits 89, 90, +91, & 92). In their weakened condition the living were compelled to +relieve themselves in their beds from which they were too weak to move. +Deposits of human feces were frequent throughout. Both living and dead, +in many cases, were in the same beds (Exhibits CC, DD, EE, & FF). The +mental condition of the prisoners had degenerated with their physical +condition, and due to a lack of water some were drinking their own +urine (Exhibits A-1 & DD). Some effort had been made to burn some of +the bodies, and the partially burned, blackened bodies of 100 children +lay about the premises. No organized effort was made to bury the dead +(Exhibits EE & FF). + +The diet at the camps varied. At Dora the daily diet consisted of one +litre of very thin soup, 400 grams of bread, 50 grams of margarine, and +three times a week one slice of horse (hard) sausage or beef jelly, +the equivalent of 70 grams of meat. One spoonful of marmalade and one +spoonful of cream cheese once a week, and irregularly one canteen cup +of black, ersatz coffee (Exhibits GG, HH, RR, SS, TT, UU, & EEE). This +diet contained 1100 calories per day per man (Exhibit O). Deaths from +starvation were numerous (Exhibits MM, UU, & JJJ). + +During the period of construction of the camp at Dora no housing +facilities were present. Prisoners for three months were required to +sleep in the tunnels in which they worked. Many of them died from +respiratory diseases contracted in the damp tunnels, and others died of +heart ailments due to the under ground pressure (Exhibits A, A-1, TT, +UU, CCC, & EEE). They were permitted to leave the tunnels during this +period but once a week, and then only for roll call which lasted from +one to three hours. + +Transport was the name given to movements, whether they were made by +vehicle or on foot, to the transfer of prisoners from one installation +to another. When travel was by rail, groups numbering as high as +130 were placed in cattle and freight cars and during the inclement +weather were given no extra clothing (Exhibits A, Q, GG, HH, and EEE). +Of one group of 4,500 men and 500 women who were moved from Monowitz +to Nordhausen in January 1945, a trip lasting approximately eight +days, only twice were the passengers given food, at which times each +was given one-half loaf of bread and 106 grams of meat. Upon arrival +at Mittelbeau in the Nordhausen area, between 1,000 and 1,300 of the +travelers were dead (Exhibits A-1, & Q). On the 8th, 9th, 10th, and +11th of March 1945, 2,000 prisoners were taken from Nordhausen to a +so-called Red Cross Camp near Bolkenberg. They travelled by wagon and +on foot, and were given three days food for the ten day trip. 1,000 of +the 2,000 died within three days (Exhibit A). Of 1,600 prisoners who +came to Bolke Kaserene from Ellrich 250 died within three days (Exhibit +A). Approximately 100 prisoners a day, suffering from malnutrition, +tuberculosis, etc., were shipped from Dora to Bolke Kaserene to be +“hospitalized” (Exhibit A-1). As the Allied troops neared the vicinity +of the camps, evacuation of the prisoners was attempted by the use +of the so-called transports, and as transportation by rail became +impossible due to tactical operations, prisoners were in some instances +released and in other instances removed from their transports and taken +to areas, there to be murdered by their overseers (Exhibits DDD, FFF, +GGG, HHH, & III). + +The SS guards shot laborers upon the slightest pretext. Six prisoners +were shot one day because they had left their place of work to go +to the water closet (Exhibits A, N, O, LL, QQ, & SS). Beatings were +frequently administered upon the slightest provocation by SS guards +and Kapos (Exhibits A, F, G, H, I, J, L, M, O, R, S, T, U, V, AA, PP, +QQ, RR & TT). One instance of a prisoner’s failure to tip his hat to an +SS man was sufficient justification for his being beaten (Exhibit V). + +Executions were often performed without apparent trial under the +shallow guise of the condemned man having been a saboteur. 75 +prisoners were hanged on 10 March 1945 at Dora (Exhibit K). On 13 +March 1945 twelve others, including a Yugoslavian Doctor, who was +accused of administering too carefully to the prisoner’s ailments +and as being a saboteur were hanged (Exhibit K). 35 were hanged in +one day (Exhibit JJ). 80 were hanged in February 1945 for having +built a radio transmitter (Exhibits OO & SS). An engineer who was +accused of tampering with a voltmeter was hanged (Exhibit TT). On many +occasions the entire personnel of the camp were forced to witness the +hangings (Exhibits O, JJ, & VV). This area was visited by many high +Nazi officials, including Goebbels and Himmler. Himmler spoke to the +personnel at Dora on one of his visits there (Exhibits A-1 & TT). + +10,000 (Exhibit A-1) forced laborers who died or were killed at Dora +and auxiliary camps were cremated at Buchenwald and Dora. Medical +attention was of the most meager type (Exhibit HH). Deaths at Dora and +the Mittelbeau camps varied, and were caused by starvation and diseases +contributed to thereby (Exhibit EEE). At Dora estimated deaths were as +high as eighty (80) per day (Exhibit N). + + /s/ Fulton C. Vowell + FULTON C. VOWELL + Signature P. 13 of Document Major, JAGD, + Commanding Officer, WCIT 6822, U. S. Army + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2224-PS + + THE END OF THE MARXIST CLASS STRUGGLE + + Pages 1 and 2, Issue 381, 2 May 1933, of “NSK”. National Socialist + Party Press Agency [NSK, Pressedienst der NSDAP--the official news + agency of the NSDAP]. Edited by Wilhelm Weiss. Responsible for + communications of the Reich Press Office. Dr. Otto Dietrich, Reich + Press Chief. Published by Franz Eher’s Successor, Munich. + + NSK. The Action Committee for the protection of German labor reports: + +On 1 May 1933 the entire German people has made a mighty profession +of confidence to the new governmental leadership and to the German +folk community. The greatest event of the day was the unanimous stand +which the entire German working class in all its strata, in all levels +and trades, has taken up, behind the government of Adolf Hitler. The +flags of the new Reich, the symbols of the National Socialist uprising +and of German socialism fluttered in the workers’ districts of the +cities just as on the farms, on factory smokestacks and on trade union +headquarters, on state buildings and on homes in all German cities. + +1 May 1933 was the death hour of the Marxist class struggle. Workers +from the factories, manual and intellectual workers, clerical +employees--they all marched behind the swastika banner. The folk +community is here--the most splendid and exalted dream has become +reality. The working masses have testified to their faith in National +Socialism. + +But as yet the trade associations of the German working class, the +representative bodies of workers and employees, were in the hands +of Marxist leaders, who did not guide the German labor movement for +the benefit of the working German people, but only considered it as +the shock troop of their crazy international Marxist class-struggle +ideology. + +National Socialism, which today has assumed leadership of the German +working class, can no longer bear the responsibility for leaving +the men and women of the German working class, the members of the +largest trade organization in the world, the German Trade Union +movement, in the hands of people who do not know a fatherland that is +called Germany. Because of that, the National Socialist Factory Cell +Organization [NSBO] has taken over the leadership of the trade unions. +The NSBO has eliminated the old leadership of the Trade Unions of +the AGDB [General German Trade Union League] and of the AFA [General +Independent Employees’ Federation]. + +New German labor leaders have replaced senile ward-heelers [verkalkte +Bonzen]. The proven pioneers of the National Socialist Factory Cell +Organization [NSBO], who have fought to the limit for the rights of +German labor from the beginning, have taken over the leadership of the +trade union associations. That proves that the struggle of National +Socialism is not directed against the trade union idea as such, but +only against the bureaucratized leaderships, because they are the foes +of the German labor movement. The old, painstakingly attained rights of +the workers’ and employees’ associations will not be touched. On the +contrary, the new National Socialist trade union leadership will make +good the harm inflicted on the German working class by class struggle +and internationalism. + +On 2 May 1933 the National Socialist Factory Cell Organization took +over the leadership of all trade unions, all trade union buildings were +occupied and most stringent control has been organized over financial +and personnel matters of the organizations. + +The leadership of the Action Committee for the Protection of German +Labor has been assumed by Party Member Dr. Ley, Deputy: Schmeer. + +The leadership of the General German Trade Union League has been +taken over by Party Member Schumann. Party Member Muchow takes care +of the fundamental questions of organization. Party Member Biallas is +responsible for press and propaganda. + +Party Member Peppler assumes leadership of the General Independent +Employees’ Federation [AFA]. + +Party Member Mueller assumes leadership of the “Bank for Workers, +Employees and Civil Servants”. + +Auditing has been taken over by Party Member Brinkmann. + +German workers and employees! Help us to build a new Germany of +national liberty and socialist justice. Help to transform the trade +unions to the media of fruitful work. Maintain discipline, then your +work will be accompanied by success, to the benefit of the entire +German people, but primarily of German workers and employees. + +The new National Socialist trade union leadership will attempt to make +good the damage done to the German working class by class struggle and +internationalism. We appeal to the entire German people, to trade union +members of all shades and associations. + +Have confidence in the proven fighters of the National Socialist +Factory Cell Organization! + +Attempts at sabotage by unscrupulous mischief-makers will be avenged +with the whole severity of the law. Comply with all future directives, +it is a matter of your and your children’s future! + + Now to work! + Long live Socialism! + Long live Germany! + + # # # # # + + WORKERS’ CONGRESS IN BERLIN + + NSK, Berlin, 2 May + +The “National Socialist Party Press Agency” is informed that a great +Workers’ Congress will take place on Wednesday, 10 May, in the +Prussian House of Lords in Berlin. The united front of German workers +will be formed there. Adolf Hitler will be asked to assume the position +of Honorary Patron. + + # # # # # + + THE ACTION COMMITTEE WITH ADOLF HITLER + +NSK. On Tuesday noon, at about two o’clock, the gentlemen of the +Action Committee for the Protection of German Labor visited the Reich +Chancellery under the leadership of Dr. R. Ley, in order to inform the +Reich Chancellor of the accomplished coordination [Gleichschaltung] +of the Free Trade Unions in line with the general political situation +in Germany. Dr. Ley informed the Chancellor of the smooth course +encountered by the project, the necessity of which was based on the +attitude of the German working class itself, which had demanded an end +to Marxist activity in the trade unions. The Action Committee then +asked Adolf Hitler to become Honorary Patron of the Great Workers’ +Congress to take place within the next few weeks. + +The Fuehrer declared his readiness to assume this position of Honorary +Patron and emphasized especially that he expected smooth execution +of the various measures, so that especially from a financial point +of view, the Purge Project [Reinigungsaktion] would result not only +in harm to the German worker, but exclusively in benefit. The Action +Committee asserted that the settlement was taking place in complete +peace and order, and could promise that as of tomorrow the payments of +the institutions concerned would be resumed to their full extent. + + # # # # # + + “ARBEITERTUM” + + OFFICIAL ORGAN OF THE ADGB + + [General German Trade Union League] + + NSK, Berlin, 2 May + +In consequence of the coordination [Gleichschaltung] of the Free Trade +Unions, the organ of the National Socialist Factory Cell Organizations +[Nationalsozialistische Betriebszellenorganisation], “Das Deutsche +Arbeitertum”, has been designated as official organ of the ADGB. In +future “Arbeitertum” will appear weekly (instead of bi-weekly, as up to +now) with a total circulation of about 4 million copies. + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2225-PS + + THE FRONT OF GERMAN WORKERS HAS BEEN ERECTED! + + Page 1, Issue 382, 3 May 1933, of “NSK”. National Socialist Party + Press Agency, [NSK, Pressedienst der NSDAP--the official news + agency of the NSDAP]. Edited by Wilhelm Weiss. Responsible for + communications of the Reich Press Office. Dr. Otto Dietrich, Reich + Press Chief. Published by Franz Eher Successor, Munich. + +NSK. We have been informed by the leader of the Action Committee +for the Protection of German Labor, Dr. Ley, that the following +organizations have unconditionally subordinated themselves to the +leadership of Adolf Hitler and the directives of the Action Committee +for the Protection of German Labor: Central League of Christian +Trade Unions [Gesamtverband der Christlichen Gewerkschaften]; Trade +Union Circle of Associations of German Employees, Workers and Civil +Servants [Gewerkschaftsring deutscher Angestellten, Arbeiter und +Beamtenverbaende] [Hirsch-Duncker]; Trade Union League of Employees +[GDA], the RDA; and other associations. Tomorrow negotiations will +begin with the German National Clerks’ League [DHV] as the last +association. It is to be hoped that this organization, too, will +discern the spirit of the times and integrate itself into the great +undertaking. + +For the first time in the German labor movement a concentration of all +workers’ and employees’ associations would thus be reached and one of +the greatest undertakings recorded in the history of the German working +class brought to fruition. + +We have been further informed by the leader of the Action Committee +for the Protection of German Labor, Dr. Ley, that he intends now, +after these associations have unconditionally and without reservation +submitted to the NSDAP, to draft the positive and expert forces from +these organizations for cooperation. This intention will already find +expression at the great Workers’ Congress, which will take place in +Berlin next week. + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2226-PS + + THE LABOR FRONT STANDS! + + From Page 2, Issue 383, 4 May 1933 of “NSK”. National Socialist + Party Press Agency, [NSK, Pressedienst der NSDAP--the official news + agency of the NSDAP]. Edited by Wilhelm Weiss. Responsible for + communications of the Reich Press Office. Dr. Otto Dietrich, Reich + Press Chief. Published by Franz Eher Successor, Munich. + + THE GERMAN NATIONALIST CLERKS’ LEAGUE [DHV], TOO HAS JOINED + +NSK, Berlin, 4 May + +_All German trade union associations of all shades having +recognized the leadership of the NSDAP in German trade union +affairs, the German Nationalist Clerks’ League_ [_Deutschnationaler +Handlungsgehilfenverband_] has now too joined Adolf Hitler; the last +big association to do so. + +After a detailed conversation between the leader of the Action +Committee for the Protection of German Labor, Dr. Ley, and the +leadership of the German Nationalist Clerks’ League [DHV], integration +of the DHV into the German Labor Front was decided upon. + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2228-PS + + ORDER ISSUED BY THE GERMAN LABOR FRONT + + From Page 5, Issue 426, 26 June 1933, of “NSK”. National Socialist + Party Press Agency, [NSK, Pressedienst der NSDAP--the official news + agency of the NSDAP]. Edited by Wilhelm Weiss. Responsible for + communications of the Reich Press Office. Dr. Otto Dietrich, Reich + Press Chief. Published by Franz Eher Successor, Munich. + +NSK. The leader of the Organizational Office of the German Labor Front, +Party Member Muchow, has issued the following proclamation: + +All associations and societies of workers and employees, which have +not yet been concentrated [zusammengefasst] in the two big collective +associations of workers and employees within the German Labor Front +must report to the Organizational Office of the German Labor Front, +Berlin SW 19, 34, Maerkisches Ufer, within 8 days. The requisite +documents about membership figures and other pertinent data must be +enclosed. They will then be notified by the Organizational Office, +which Association they will have to join [eingliedern]. + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2229-PS + + THE REICH YOUTH LEADER AT WORK + + Issue 423, 22 June 1933, of “NSK”. National Socialist Party Press + Agency, [NSK, Pressedienst der NSDAP--the official news agency of + the NSDAP]. Edited by Wilhelm Weiss. Responsible for communications + of the Reich Press Office. Dr. Otto Dietrich, Reich Press Chief. + Published by Franz Eher Successor, Munich. + + IMPORTANT ORDER OF BALDUR VON SCHIRACH + +NSK Berlin, 22 June + +The Youth Leader of the German Reich, Baldur von Schirach, has +published the following order: + +* * * * * * * + + + _ORDER 2_ + +1. The Greater German League [Grossdeutscher Bund], together with its +sub- and member organizations, is dissolved as of 17 June 1933. The +property of the Greater German League and of the affiliated sub- and +member organizations is to be secured. Thus, along with the Greater +German League the following have been dissolved: + + 1. Free Band of the Young Nation [Freischar Junger Nation]. + + 2. German Free Band [Deutsche Freischar]. + + 3. German Boy Scout League [Deutscher Pfadfinderbund]. + + 4. The Geuses [Die Geusen]. + + 5. Community Circle of German Boy Scouts [Ringgemeinschaft deutscher + Pfadfinder]. + + 6. Circle of German Boy Scout Districts [Ring deutscher + Pfadfindergaue]. + + 7. German Boy Scout Corps [Deutsches Pfadfinderkorps]. + + 8. Free Band of Protestant Boy Scouts [Freischar evangelischer + Pfadfinder]. + +2. The Reich Committee of German Youth Associations [Reichsausschuss +der deutschen Jugendverbaende] is dissolved herewith. Previous tasks +of the Reich Committee will be taken over into the expanded sphere of +tasks of the Youth Leadership of the German Reich. + +3. All Youth Organizations in Germany are to be reported to the +Youth Leader of the German Reich (Berlin NW 40, 10, Kronprinzenufer, +Department for Organizations). Youth Organizations which have not +reported, or reported only incompletely, by 15 July 1933, are to be +considered as dissolved. It is expressly emphasized that the term +“Youth Organizations” also comprises such organizations which are +groups within adult organizations. The reports are to be submitted by +the top leadership of individual youth organizations for the entire +organization. Insofar as the youth groups of adult organizations do +not have centralized youth leadership, the leadership of the adult +organization is obligated to submit the report. + +It is mandatory that the report contain: + + 1. name of the society (with accurate information about the legal + status of the society); + + 2. board of directors of the society (accurate information about + name, residence, and telephone number (if applicable)); + + 3. information relative to person authorized to represent the society; + + 4. office of the society (telephone); + + 5. banking and postal checking accounts of the society, with + indication who is authorized to sign for the society there; + + 6. accurate membership figures with indication when the figures were + ascertained; + + 7. statutes of the society; + + 8. information about the organizational structure of the society, + insofar as they are not contained in the statutes; + + 9. information about chairmen of districts, regions, states, or + similar subdivisions; + +4. The tasks of the Youth Leader of the German Reich must be +accomplished partially with the help of contributions of affiliated +organizations. The amount of contributions will be fixed in the very +near future. + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2230-PS + + AGREEMENT ENTERED INTO BETWEEN THE REICH LEADER OF THE GERMAN LABOR +FRONT, PARTY MEMBER DR. LEY, AND THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE STORM TROOPS + [SA], VIKTOR LUTZE, WITH REGARD TO THE FACTORY TROOPS [WERKSCHAREN]. + + THE ORGANIZATION BOOK OF THE NSDAP + + [Organisations Buch der NSDAP] Edition of 1938, editor: The Reichs + Organization Leader of the NSDAP [Dr. Robert Ley]. Published by + the Central Publishing House of the NSDAP, Franz EHER, Successor, + Muenchen. [Pages 484, 485b, 486c]. + +1. The Factory Troop [Werkschar] is the National Socialist backbone +of the factory. Its task is to permeate the factory with the National +Socialist philosophy. The factory troop is the carrier of the factory +community and incarnates community life within the factory; it bears +witness to these facts by its factory celebrations and festivals. It +is in the forefront in carrying through the tasks of the German Labor +Front. It is the living incarnation of these tasks. + +2. The Storm Troops [SA] will promote the building-up of the factory +troops with all means. Storm Troops [SA] units will maintain closest +comradeship and connection with the factory troops, frequently visiting +their meetings, and inviting the factory troops to their own meetings. + +3. Factory troops are formed on a voluntary basis by Storm Troopers +[SA-Maenner] in a factory and by other workers in the factory. The +latter simultaneously become Storm Troop candidates (insofar as they +are not already members of another formation of the Party). + +4. Officers and men of the Storm Troops, who are working in the factory +and are members of the German Labor Front, are to be made leaders +of the Factory Troops. On the basis of previous agreements, the +appointments take place in accordance with the ordinance of 10 January +1936--Ch. Nr. 11150, as follows: + +_a._ in the case of the Reich Directorate of the German Labor Front, +upon recommendation of the Supreme Storm Troop Command [Oberste +SA-Fuehrung] + +_b._ in the case of Districts, upon recommendation of the SA-Group + +_c._ in the counties, [Kreisen] upon recommendation of the SA-Standards +[Standarten] + +_d._ within the factory, the factory troop leader is appointed by +the County Factory Troop Leader, after consultation with the factory +representative of the German Labor Front. + +5. Special sections [Referate] for factory troops will be established +at the headquarters of Storm Troop Groups, respectively Brigades, and +of Standards. They are to be merged with the previous Special Sections +for Social Work at Storm Troop Bureaus. The District respectively +County Factory Troop Leaders are in charge of this Special Section. +Simultaneously these Storm Troop leaders are to be charged by the +regional commissioners with the leadership of the Department factory +troops in the German Labor Front. For disciplinary and personnel +purposes they remain subordinate to their unit commanders. + +The requisite financial means for the Special Sections are to be made +available by the German Labor Front in accordance with agreements still +to be reached. + +6. Directives and regulations for commitment, and for the tasks to be +accomplished within the factory, will be issued by the Reich Leader of +the German Labor Front through factory troop channels (Reich factory +troop leader; District factory troop leader; County factory troop +leader; Factory factory troop leader). + +7. 4 to 5 week days a month are available to the factory troop for +carrying through their tasks. + +In the case of urgent tasks within the factory, and in the case of +protective measures against natural catastrophes and preparatory +service for large-scale political utilization of the German Labor +Front, factory troop service has priority over Storm Troop [SA] service. + +8. Physical training will take place with Storm Troop [SA] cadre units. + +9. The service Uniform for factory troops remains customary factory +troop uniform for meetings within the factory as well as in parades of +the German Labor Front. + +Berlin, October 1936 + + The Chief of Staff of Storm Troops [SA] + (signed) Lutze + + The Reich Leader of the + German Labor Front + (signed) Dr. Ley + + + PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2231-PS + + “Die Reichskanzlei” by Hermann von Stutterheim + + [Pages 19-34] + +Nevertheless, there is still a “people’s legislation” even in the Third +Reich, but this does not restrict the legislative power of the Reich +Cabinet [Reichsregierung] in any way. According to the law on the +plebiscite of 14th July 1933, the Reich Cabinet, which is, de facto and +also, as we shall see later, de jure, nothing more nor less than the +Fuehrer, can apply to the people for its approval or disapproval of a +measure which is envisaged by the Reich Cabinet, whereby it is also a +matter of an approval or disapproval of a planned law. It is therefore +impossible for a people’s law to be passed without or even contrary to +the will of the Fuehrer. Neither can drafts of laws put up for approval +be passed if the content has been altered in any way. It must be either +accepted or rejected just as it stands. Even should it be rejected, +such a result of the vote does not oppose the will of the Fuehrer. +For, in as much as the Fuehrer puts a law to the people’s vote, an +action which he takes of his own free will, he shows that he is quite +prepared for the law to be rejected. + +Within the Reich Cabinet, the Reich Chancellor was de jure at first +also the president of the Reich Cabinet which was a body of people +who made the decisions, in which the Reich Chancellor had only a +seat and a vote. He could therefore be overruled. In practice, since +the day of the assumption of power, this was no longer the case. The +dominating personality of the Fuehrer and the actual power possessed +by him made it obvious from the start that the Reich Cabinet could +not make any decisions which did not coincide with the will of the +Fuehrer. The Reich Cabinet accordingly was from the outset, nothing +more than an advisory body to the Fuehrer which was to advise the head +of the cabinet [Regierungschef]. Even if the result of this advice +was still called “the decision of the Reich Cabinet” the decision in +reality was that of the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor, which, after a +previous conference, was passed by the Reich Cabinet. The same applied +to administrative measures, political resolutions and legal decisions. +Later, this situation also gained its legal semblance by the duty of +obedience of the Reich Ministerate to the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor. +This occurred at the time of the Reich Law of 16th October 1934, on the +oath taken by Reich Ministers and members of the provincial governments +[Landesregierungen], by which the Reich Ministers had to swear loyalty +and obedience to the leader of the German Reich and people, Adolf +Hitler. Thereby, the whole administrative power was concentrated in +the person of the Fuehrer. From then on, he was also de jure head of +the Reich, supreme legislator, Supreme Chief of all administration and +supreme commander of the armed forces, without being restricted by any +other factors or authorities when exercising the power with which he +was endowed by virtue of the legal position. The cooperation of the +members of the Cabinet [Regierungsmitglieder] in an advisory capacity +in particular, is therefore no essential condition of the legality +of the Cabinet Laws [Regierungsgesetze]. Even without the advisory +cooperation of the Cabinet, the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor can issue +decrees which are of course always in the form of a “Fuehrer Edict” +or that of a Decree to differentiate between them and the designation +“Reich Law” used for those laws issued with the formal cooperation of +the Reich Cabinet. + +It is neither an essential of the Fuehrer State, nor does it conform to +the personal characteristics of the Fuehrer, that all the difficulties +described above must be submitted to the supreme Fuehrer for his +decision. On the contrary: although the Reich Ministers are today +basically subject to the unlimited authoritative power of the Fuehrer +when making their decisions even in unimportant individual cases, +they actually have an independence in carrying out their official +functions such as was never enjoyed by Reich Ministers during the +republic [Systemzeit]. Responsibility, powers of decision, a driving +energy and real authority, these are the qualities required, first +and foremost by the Fuehrer of his ministers. Therefore he allows +them great freedom in carrying out their official functions. But, +if the evolutionary New Order is not to give way to revolutionary +conditions, it is essential that the legal order be respected by the +Reich Ministers, and by all their subordinate departments. And so it is +necessary, in the middle of the gigantic process of reorganization that +we are now experiencing, that the Fuehrer himself should continually be +taking steps to abolish obstacles of a legal or any other kind which +could not be eliminated in any other way by apportioning certain full +powers and issuing other orders which might not be legally binding or +might lack the required authority if they were not issued as laws or +Fuehrer Edicts. Anyone who has a certain amount of experience in the +sphere of administration knows how extraordinarily difficult it is to +gauge what retrospective effects interference with the traditional and +established administrative system will have. Should such interference +be unavoidable, if higher ends are to be gained, it is necessary to +direct and restrict them so that unwanted repercussions are eliminated. +Even with practical experience and a knowledgeable survey of the whole +sphere of administration and legislation, it is however also necessary +to give thorough consideration to the problem to be solved before it is +submitted to the Fuehrer. Of course, the final decision can be made, to +a certain extent, by the competent departmental Minister himself. Too +often, however, he is unable to come to an agreement with those other +ministers whose departments are affected by the measure intended, and +he sometimes lacks any definite knowledge of the Fuehrer’s possible +plans to which such measures must conform. + +Considered theoretically, the Reich Cabinet would be a suitable special +committee to settle opposing points of view and make them fit in with +the Fuehrer’s aims. In practice, however, this would mean that the +cabinet would be in almost continuous session, a quite impossible +demand on the Fuehrer. He has not the time to take part in long cabinet +meetings [Kabinetsitzungen] to listen to detailed descriptions, +justifications and counter-arguments which it is the duty of all +ministers to make from the particular standpoint of their departments. +The Fuehrer must be free and have the necessary time for those great +decisions, which must be made in the field of state-leadership in +interior-policy and also especially in foreign policy and which +he alone must make. For he is not called to be the arbitrator in +differences both of opinion and of other things, but purely a leader, +an inspiration, a commander-in-chief--in short a creator. That causes +the necessity of reducing cabinet meetings to the minimum and therefore +only to those all-important questions, so that even drafts of laws, +before they are handed to the Fuehrer are to be dealt with, not during +cabinet deliberations, but by the so-called process of circulation, +i.e. by obtaining the written statement of agreement from the +individual members of the cabinet. + +Under these conditions, it is the duty, first and foremost of the +Chief of the Reich Chancellery to submit the matters to the Fuehrer, +for his decisions and orders, in a concentrated manner and a suitable +chronological order. This saddles him with the necessity of keeping +conversant the whole time with the most important matters in the +sphere of administration, economy and politics and, at the same time, +of concerning himself in the preliminary work of legislation. It +falls to him in particular to see whether and in what form any direct +interference is to be recommended to the Fuehrer in as much as he must +in any case be informed of occurrences in public life. + +As they are so numerous, it is almost impossible to give an accurate +individual picture of the extent and type of all the questions and +concerns which, in this way, make up the substance of the reports made +by the Chief of the Reich Chancellery to the Fuehrer. These questions +and concerns are extremely numerous and affect all spheres of public +life. Fundamentally, only those concerns can be separated which are the +responsibility of the President’s Chancellery and of the Office of the +head of the NSDAP and are laid before the Fuehrer by the heads of these +departments, as well, particularly, as all military matters, which +the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces has to report. +Naturally even these matters could encroach on the sphere of activity +of the Reich Chancellery on account of their connection with political +and administrative questions and therefore require a special report by +the Chief of the Reich Chancellery alone or together with the proper +competent departmental heads. + +Taken as a whole, it may be said that the severe limitation in +frequency of the cabinet deliberations has resulted in a corresponding +increase of the duties and heightening of the responsibility of the +Chief of the Reich Chancellery. + +However, the fact that cabinet meetings, under the pressure of +circumstances, could take place only seldom, led to the necessity of +setting up a special advisory body to the Fuehrer in the form of a +Secret cabinet council [Kabinettsrat] to advise the Fuehrer on the +direction of Foreign Policy. However, this fact meant a small reduction +of the duties of the Reich Chancellery just as did the establishment of +a cabinet council [Ministerrat] for the defence of the Reich later on. +This subject will be dealt with anon. The “Secret Cabinet Council” was +established by the Fuehrer Edict of 4th February 1938. The following +persons are members: Reich Minister Baron von Neurath as president, as +members, Reich Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop, General Field Marshall +Goering, the deputy-Fuehrer, Reich Minister Hess, Reich Minister of +Enlightenment and Propaganda, Dr. Goebbels, Reich Minister and Chief +of the Reich Chancellery, Dr. Lammers, C-in-C of the Army, General von +Brauchitsch, C-in-C of the Navy, Dr. H. C. Raeder and Chief of the +Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, General Keitel. The Reich Minister +and Chief of the Reich Chancellery is in charge of any affairs with +which the Secret Cabinet Council has to deal. + +This is purely a deliberating body which is not called on or empowered +to make orders or measures by itself. The special conditions of the +war, especially the need to change the legal position and to meet +the fast-arising wartime requirements however, made it vital to +disembarrass the Fuehrer even in the sphere of legislation. This was +accomplished by the Fuehrer Edict of 30th August 1939. Under this, a +“Cabinet Council for the defence of the Reich” was formed with the +power to issue decrees with a legal authority should the Fuehrer +decide that a certain law was not to be issued by the Reich Cabinet +or by the Reichstag. The following persons are members of the Cabinet +council for the defence of the Reich: General Field Marshall Goering as +president, the deputy-Fuehrer, the Plenipotentiary-General for Reich +Administration, the Plenipotentiary-General for Economy, also the +Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery and the Chief of the +Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. The president can invite other +persons to attend the deliberations of the Cabinet Council. The Reich +Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery is in charge of the affairs +of the Cabinet Council. Another legislative body, therefore, came +into existence but here again, in accordance with the authoritarian +principle of leadership, it was an organization of leadership in the +hand of the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor, a legislative organization, +whose authority to issue decrees is based on the supreme legislative +power of the Fuehrer and which can be used in specific cases only if +the Fuehrer has not decided on some other procedure. Actually, the +cabinet council’s authority to issue decrees has been made use of to a +great extent since the beginning of the war. + +The most important decrees issued by the Cabinet Council for the +defence of the Reich are the following: + + Decree on the appointment of Reich Defence Commissars dated + 1st September 1939 (Reich Law Gazette I p 1565), Decree on the + compensation for personal damage (Personal damage decree) dated 1st + September 1939 (Reich Law Gazette I p 1623), Decree on measures + concerning civic disputes, compulsory execution, bankruptcy and civic + right dated 1st September 1939 (Reich Law Gazette I p 1656), Decree + on special radio measures dated 1st September 1939 (Reich Law Gazette + I p 1683), Decree on the restriction on changing the place of work + dated 1st September 1939 (Reich Law Gazette I p 1685), War-economy + decree dated 4th September 1939 (Reich Law Gazette I p 1609), Decree + against elements of the population, dated 5th September 1939 (Reich + Law Gazette I p 1679), Decree on the assessment of damage to property + (damage to property assessment decree) dated 8th September 1939 + (Reich Law Gazette I p 1754), Decree on the concession of delayed + payment in legal disputes dated 7th October 1939 (Reich Law Gazette I + p 2004), Decree on the treatment of enemy capital dated 15th January + 1940 (Reich Law Gazette I p 191). + +This short list of the most important Cabinet Council Decrees should +suffice to make clear the extent and significance of the Cabinet +Council legislation. It is obvious that this has lifted a quite +exceptionally heavy burden from the Fuehrer’s shoulders. The Reich +Chancellery, however, participates fully in the work of the Cabinet +Council since the Chief of the Reich Chancellery is not only a member +but also directs its affairs. The Chief of the Reich Chancellery was +given the task of directing these affairs because it put him in a +position to keep the Fuehrer conversant all the time with the work +of the Cabinet Council. In this connection, the Chief of the Reich +Chancellery, in cases where there is any doubt on the point, has to +make sure that the Fuehrer has the opportunity in good time to make +clear whether he is in favour at all of a measure planned by the +Cabinet Council, or whether he would not prefer the form of a Cabinet +or Reichstag law instead of a cabinet Council decree. Basically the +right possessed by the Cabinet Council for the defence of the Reich to +issue decrees is limited to legal matters directly connected with the +defence of the Reich. However, in special cases and at times when the +Fuehrer is on a visit to the front, this rule cannot always be kept. +Should there be any doubt, whether and to what extent deviations from +this rule can be made, it usually falls to the Reich Minister and Chief +of Reich Chancellery to take steps to obtain the Fuehrer’s decision +should the occasion arise. + +According to the assignment of duties in the Reich Cabinet the Chief +of the Reich Chancellery is in charge of the affairs of the Reich +Cabinet as well. In this capacity he has to arrange the meetings of +the Reich Cabinet on the direct instructions of the Fuehrer and to +issue summonses to these meetings together with the agenda and the +subjects up for discussion. He must also see that the Reich Ministries +concerned are in agreement beforehand on the subjects to be discussed, +or if they are not unanimous, that a clear position has been reached +about the incompatibility of the various opinions and about the +reasons for the opposed points of view. Ministerial conferences among +the Ministers concerned may be held prior to the cabinet meeting to +clear up these differences of opinion. These Ministerial Conferences +under the chairmanship of the Reich Chancellor, took place before the +assumption of power. Apart from exceptional occasions, this no longer +occurs. Summonses to Ministerial Conferences are sent out by the Chief +of the Reich Chancellery at the request of one or more of the ministers +concerned; he then as a rule presides at these conferences. Naturally, +this does not apply to the numerous ministerial conferences arranged +by the authoritative Reich Ministers of the day, in which the matters +dealt with are such that it is not, or not yet, necessary that the +Fuehrer be informed; therefore the Reich Minister and Chief of the +Reich Chancellery need not be present at the conferences. + +The drafts of Cabinet laws [Regierungsgesetze] are first prepared by +the authoritative ministry, that is the ministry most concerned, in +agreement with any other ministry concerned, in the matter. There is +sometimes a preliminary discussion of these in conferences between +departmental heads [Chefbesprechungen] and then they are handed to the +Chief of the Reich Chancellery who determines whether they are to be +included in the agenda of a cabinet meeting or whether the agreement +of all the members of the cabinet is to be obtained in writing by the +so called process of circulation. Should there still be differences of +opinion remaining unsolved when the cabinet deliberates on the drafts +of the laws, the Fuehrer makes the final decision on the content of +the law and its passing. This procedure is also followed when any +opposition remains during the process of circulation and deliberation +on the draft in a cabinet meeting seems impracticable for some reason +or other. + +Cabinet laws [Regierungsgesetze] decided on are drawn up and issued by +the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor. The finished law, the actual legal +document, is signed first by the Fuehrer and then by the ministers +concerned, who are thereby responsible to the Fuehrer for the law. +Apart from the Reich Ministers concerned, the Reich Minister and +Chief of the Reich Chancellery also appends his signature and, by +this action, makes himself responsible that all Reich Ministers had +the opportunity of stating their opinions. Furthermore, the president +of the Cabinet Council for the defense of the Reich must append his +signature to all Reich Laws and that under the signature of the Fuehrer +and Reich Chancellor. Fuehrer Edicts with a legislative content are +always signed also by the Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich +Chancellery. This rule of signatures is based mainly on an internal +regulation of the Fuehrer or on usage. It applies also to the Cabinet +laws [Regierungsgesetze] which are issued as Reichstag laws or People’s +laws. + +The Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery who, as we know, +directs the affairs of the Cabinet Council plays a similar part in the +work of the Cabinet Council for the defence of the Reich in issuing +decrees which, as mentioned above, have the authority of laws, as he +does with the Cabinet laws. It must be noted, that the peculiarity +in this case is that the subjects dealt with by the Cabinet Council +are distributed not merely among the members of the Cabinet Council, +but also among all the members of the Cabinet who are thereby given +the opportunity of guarding the interests of their spheres of office +by adding their appropriate standpoints in the Cabinet Council +legislation, even if they do not participate in making the decree. + + + PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2232-PS + + GERMAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW [Deutsches Verwaltungsrecht] + + by Dr. Hans Frank. + + Published by: Central Publishing House of the NSDAP + + Franz Eher Successor, Munich. + + [Pages 420, 421, 424, 425, 430] + +Task and Means of a Political Police. + + +A. The Task + +The task of a political police in the sense of the National Socialist +conception of this institution has been formulated best so far in +Section 1 of the Prussian law concerning the Secret State Police of +10 February 1936 (Prussian law collection, 1936, p. 21): “The Secret +State Police has the task of investigating and fighting all attempts +dangerous to the State, of collecting and evaluating the result of +the inquiries, of informing the State Government and of keeping the +other authorities currently informed on important facts pertaining to +them and of supplying them with suggestions.” This formulation also +outlines the task of Political Police Systems in other German countries +for which this task assignment is to be concluded from the National +Socialist conception of a Political Police, since a legal formulation +is mostly missing. + +* * * * * * * + +_b._ All attempts dangerous to the State are subject to the activity of +the Political Police. “Dangerous to the State” is more than “hostile +to the State” and includes not only undertakings with programs hostile +to the State but also all attempts--no matter what their aim--which in +their effects endanger the State. + +Not the State in its outward organic appearance but the tasks of the +leadership in the sense of the National-Socialist idea is the object +of protection. It is the task of the National Socialist leadership to +preserve and to develop all national values. These being endangered, +the Political Police is called upon for protection against the +endangering attempts, e.g. if there is any danger: + + to the State leadership and structure of the State by intentions of + terror and revolutionary plans, + + to the Armed Forces and the forces of defense by espionage and + (intellectual and technical) sabotage, + + to the people’s community and the state principles by disintegration + and instigation, + + to the people’s health and blood purity by moral corruption (e.g. + offenses according to Section 175 of the Reich penal code) and racial + disgrace, + + to the ideological unity of the people by intellectual poisoning and + distortion (e.g. by “Jehovah’s Witnesses” and other sects). + +A complete catalogue of “attempts dangerous to the State” can never be +drawn up because it can never be foreseen what may endanger leadership +and people sometime in the future. National Socialist recognition of +threatening danger and National Socialist knowledge of responsibility +will understand and fulfill the duties of the Political Police +according to the real necessities in any political situation. + +* * * * * * * + +_b._ The lawful means for _preventive police measures_ of the Political +Police have not been regulated legally. They cannot be regulated, for +the preventive police duties of the Political Police--and the means +necessary for their performance--cannot be described and standardized +for all time. + +The duties of the Political Police and the necessary means for their +performance are not chosen freely but are prescribed by the foe. Just +as the operations of an army against the outward enemy and the means +to fight this enemy cannot be prescribed, so the Political Police also +must have free hand in the choice of the means necessary at times to +fight attempts dangerous to the State. + +Since the National Socialist revolution, the powers of the Political +Police in a legally positive respect are derived immediately from +the new conception of the State and the resulting conception of the +duties of a police force. According to this conception the duty of +the Political Police, due to its nature, is to fight all attempts +dangerous to the State. And it thus has the right to take all necessary +measures for this fight as long as there are not any expressly contrary +regulations. This conception is confirmed by the decree of the +Reichspresident for the Protection of People and State of 28 February +1933 (RGBl I, p. 83) by which the so-called basic rights of the Weimar +Constitution have been abrogated. This means that ever since, every +State institution--particularly the Political Police--may take measures +in the performance of its duties which were barred before by those +basic rights. + +“The decree for the Protection of People and State of 28 February +1933 has eliminated the negative law barriers of the State power. The +positive competence of the police to restrict liberty of any kind, +especially to order protective custody, results already from the +character of the function which the Police in the National-Socialist +State has to perform.” (Dr. Walter Hamel: “The Police in the +National-Socialist State,” German lawyers’ newspaper of 15 March 1935, +col. 326.) + +According to kind and purpose the measures taken by the Political +Police can logically be subject to a check only by their own channels +of administrative supervision. This is recognized for instance in +Section 7 of the Prussian law concerning the Secret State Police of +10 February 1936 by the stipulation: “Orders in matters of the Secret +State Police are not subject to the check of the administrative +courts.” In its decision of 2 May 1935 (III C 43/35) the Prussian +High Court of Administration had already come to the same conclusion, +before the decree of 10 February 1936 was issued, by reason of the +legal situation in Prussia. Also for the other German countries--if not +expressly settled to the contrary--and for a future Reich regulation +the principle has to be maintained that measures of the Political +Police can be checked only by their own channels of administrative +supervision. In view of the tasks and means of the Political Police +which cannot be standardized individually, there can be no legal +backing for a court decision. Any agency outside of the Political +Police must lack the necessary expert knowledge for a decision by way +of administrative supervision. + +* * * * * * * + +_f._ The Secret State Police administers the State Concentration Camps +through the Inspector of the Concentration Camps who is affiliated with +the Office of the Secret State Police. + + + PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2233-A-PS + + FRANK DIARY, Meetings of Departmental Chiefs in 1939/40 + [Abteilungsleitersitzungen 1939/40] + + Minutes of the 1st conference of the Departmental Chiefs on the 2nd + December 1939. + +[Page 3, line 4-13] + +The condemning to death of an archbishop and bishop gives cause to the +fundamental observation that a total war against any kind of resistance +is being waged in the Government General. The two bishops have been +condemned quite rightly, because arms were found in their possession. +If, despite that, they were pardoned to hard labor, then certain other +considerations were the cause for that. Reports by the press concerning +the shooting of Jews are not desirable because such reports would +intimidate the Jews. + + +Minutes of the 2nd conference of the Departmental Chiefs on the 8th +December 1939. + +[Page 4, par. 1 and 2] + +The question of forced labor for the Jews could not be solved +satisfactorily from one day to the other. Prerequisite for this would +be the card indexing of the male Jews from 14 to 50 years of age. In +this it had to be ascertained which trade the Jews had so far carried +on, because just in those territories the Jews had had various skilled +trades, and it would be a loss if this manpower would not be usefully +exploited. To do this, sweeping planning is necessary. For the time +being the Jews had to be gathered in columns and had to be employed +wherever there was a pressing need. It is the task of the chief of the +district to determine these needs. + +The police was being reenforced by 4 police battalions. The commitment +would be such that each government section was to receive one +battalion. Moreover, it was ordered that the police battalions in the +Government General would be relieved and interchanged from time to +time with battalions from home. Already before Xmas the relief of 4 +battalions would take place. No insecurity would result. + +[Page 7, 2 last paragraphs] + +_Governor Dr. Lasch_ called attention to the fact that the order of the +Governor General regarding the institution of compulsory work provided, +that Poles from their 18th year upward were to be conscripted for +compulsory labor. A regulation of the age groups from 14 to 18 would +also be desirable. One should not neglect the danger that particularly +the youth of this age group in high schools could become a source of +national resistance. + +_Governor General Reich Minister Dr. Frank_ orders the preparation of a +supplementary decree, according to which the compulsory labor was to be +extended to the age groups from 14 to 18. + + +Meeting of Departmental Chiefs at the Bergakademie (Academy for mines). + + Friday, 10th May 1940 + + [Page 23, par. 1] + +Then the Governor General deals with the problem of the _Compulsory +Labor Service_ of the Poles. Upon the demands from the Reich it has now +been decreed that compulsion may be exercised in view of the fact that +sufficient manpower was not voluntarily available for service inside +the German Reich. This compulsion means the possibility of arrest of +male and female Poles. Because of these measures a certain disquietude +had developed which according to individual reports, was spreading +very much, and which might produce difficulties everywhere. General +Fieldmarshal Goering some time ago pointed out in his long speech the +necessity to deport into the Reich a million workers. The supply so far +was 160,000. However, great difficulties had to be overcome. Therefore +it would be advisable to consult the district and town chiefs in the +execution of the compulsion, so that one could be sure from the start +that this action would be reasonably successful. The arrest of young +Poles when leaving church service or the cinema would bring about +an ever-increasing nervousness of the Poles. Generally speaking, he +had no objections at all if the rubbish, capable of work yet often +loitering about, would be snatched from the streets. The best method +for this, however, would be the organization of a raid, and it would be +absolutely justifiable to stop a Pole in the street and to question him +what he was doing, where he was working, etc. + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2233-B-PS + + FRANK DIARY, 1940 1st Vol., January-March. + +[Page 18, 3rd paragraph] + +Thursday, January 11th + +1520 Section Chief Dr. Frauendorfer reports to the Governor General +on the possibilities and the extent of the transport of workers into +the Reich. The German State Railway sends daily 10 transports, each +carrying 1000 workers. Beginning with January 15, these transports, +which were stopped temporarily--will be taken up again. + +In regard to the project of resettlement, it should be avoided, that +it be carried out further in the brutal manner which has prevailed up +till now, because otherwise it is to be feared that people will not +volunteer any more to go into the Reich, and also because of the way in +which the resettlement is carried out, the possibility of using these +people in the Reich will be impaired. As an extra allowance for the +unemployment pay the Reich Ministry for labor has held out the prospect +of an additional sum of 3 million Reichmarks a month. + +* * * * * * * + +[Pages 183-184] + +March 7th, 1940 + + Citadel of Cracow + + 1645 Conference with SS Brigadier General Schreckenbach + + 1650 Attaché Dr. Albers is introduced by Councillor of Legation v. + Grolinan to the Governor General + + 1700 Conference with Brigadier General Buehrmann, Stabsleiter + Reichert, Reichhauptamtsleiter Dr. Frauendorfer, and 2 special + advisors. + +Subject of the discussion is the question of the shipment of Polish +agricultural workers into the Reich. + +Brigadier General Buehrmann started by saying that Stabsleiter Reichert +has been appointed by the Reich Food Ministry, to make sure, that +Polish workers would be sent into the Reich under all circumstances, +and--if necessary--a compulsory service should be enforced upon +them. Brigadier General Buehrmann would like to recommend, that the +Governor General--for the time being does not make any decision for the +introduction of a compulsory service or employment of force against the +Polish agricultural workers. + +Stabsleiter Reichert emphasizes that Berlin insists that the one +million agricultural workers be sent into the Reich. + +Reichshauptamtsleiter Dr. Frauendorfer replies to a question of the +Governor General, that so far 81,477 Polish agricultural workers were +sent into the Reich--of which 56,721 were men, and 24,756 women. + +Since 12 February, 154 special trains have been sent off, that was +the utmost that could have been accomplished in this time. To these +figures--just mentioned--are to be added 42,000 workers, who had been +already in the Reich so that the amount is increased to 130,000. + +The Governor General has the opinion, that the 480,000 prisoners of +war should also be included in the sum of one million. On account +of the railroad and the highway conditions, it is not at present +possible to do anything by force, also there were not sufficient police +forces there at disposal, to carry such measures out. If any force +were exercised, then it would affect workers who were employed as +specialized workers for the plants. + +Stabsleiter Reichert asks--if the occasion arises--that superior +offices should make the decision in this question. + + Cracow + + + Wednesday, March 6th 1940 + + 10:00 Conference with Ministerial-Director Dr. Buehler. + 10:50 Conference with bank-director Dr. Paerscl. + 11:00 Conference with Reichshauptamtsleiter Dr. Frauendorfer. + +Reichshauptamtsleiter Dr. Frauendorfer reports, that 73,000 Polish +workers have been sent now into the Reich. At present 4,000 men +are transferred daily. Further, Dr. Frauendorfer reports on the +organization in the plants. It is as simple as possible. On Monday, +he visited a few plants in Warsaw, and he could only say that they +all were running excellently, this applies also to the machinery. +Kitchens were also installed everywhere now and furthermore, the +necessary quantities of soap had been provided. 5,000 sets of underwear +and linen, 32,000 Kg. flour, 4,000 Kg. of beef and of pork and other +merchandise had been distributed. The Governor-General ordered that +the exact figures should be published in the press. Now, as before, he +thinks that the soup given out daily was one of the best solutions, for +the problem of the welfare for the working men. + +Reichshauptamtsleiter Dr. Frauendorfer remarks that this soup is being +served daily now with one pound of bread. + +The Governor-General will not out of basic considerations give his +consent to the proposal that an introductory note should be added to +the 2nd decree for the regulation of social insurance, but he thinks +it better to point out in a suitable way, that the chief of the labor +section has given an explanation about it to the press chief. + +In this conference the question of the sending of Polish agricultural +workers into the Reich was then discussed. Here, Dr. Frauendorfer +points out that workmen from the Lublin area had never gone to the +Reich before, from which naturally certain difficulties arise. Besides +numerous letters from the agricultural workers to their families had +already come from the Reich, in which the Polish agricultural workers +expressed themselves very gratefully concerning their treatment in +Germany. The Governor-General orders that some of these letters should +be published in the press. + + +[Page 216] + +15 March 1940 + +Conference with ambassador v. Wuehlisch. + +18:30: Ambassador v. Wuehlisch reports that the preparations for the +transport of the _Vert Stoss Altar_ to Nurnberg have been completed. +The church really looked better, due to the space gained by the removal +of the altar. Ambassador v. Wuehlisch reported furthermore, that the +former ambassador Wysoski had asked again for an audience with the +Governor-General. The Ambassador v. Ruemelin had been asked to make a +request that he be taken into the service of the Government-General. + +[Page 216, last 12 lines.] + +The question of the Polish relief committee: the Security service wrote +to Mr. Arlt, and pointed out, that the head of this organization Count +Radziwill, participated in Silesian revolt, that he supported Korfanty +and that he also was supposed to have disloyal remarks about the Reich. +The ambassador v. Wuehlisch asked Arlt, to proceed very carefully in +this matter, before expelling Count Radziwill from the relief committee +because such a procedure might have disagreeable consequences. + +Under any circumstances, the consent of the Governor-General would be +necessary for this. + +The so-called Polish Government in anger has completed a “White Book” +which deals with the arch-diocese of Posen and Suesen. The Governor +General said that he discussed this question with the Papal Nuncio in +Berlin. He gathered from this conversation that a great deal was said +about the treatment of the churches and apparently it was attempted to +push many things off into the government general, for which it was not +at all responsible. + +Ambassador v. Wuehlisch thinks it worth while that those and similar +questions be discussed in Berlin. Such negotiations would have to be +handled through the foreign office. + +The Governor General said that he had long conferences with the +Ministry of Finance and with the representatives of the Reich Food +Ministry. It was requested there very urgently, that the Polish +agricultural workers be sent in greater quantities to the Reich. In +Berlin he explained that if he were asked to do so, he could naturally +exercise some compulsion in perhaps such a way, that he might have +the police surround a village and bring out the men and women in +question by force, and then send them to Germany. But besides these +police measures one also could proceed by withholding unemployment +relief for the workers in question. Ambassador v. Wuehlisch discussed +then certain violations of the border which occurred at the Soviet +frontier. By request of the Reich Minister of Finance and by request of +the Armed Forces High Command representation had been made in Moscow +evidently for the reason that the Soviet border guards always employed +their firearms immediately. It was suggested that such incidents be +straightened out right away on the spot. + +The deputy foreign commissar Potemkin suggested that liaison officers +should be appointed by both sides for this purpose. The liaison staff +Russia should serve as central office. + +The Governor General does not consider this method practicable and he +feels that here also the Government General should be unhindered, he +requested that the ambassador v. Wuehlisch confer on this question with +the Secretary of state Dr. v. Wuehlisch. This question did not only +concern the Wehrmacht but also for example the customs administration, +for this reason representatives of the Ministry of Finance must also +cooperate in this matter. + +Ambassador v. Wuehlisch draws attention to the fact that the customs +officials are subordinated to the Wehrmacht. + +The Governor General points out, that a superior office would not make +any decision. In this matter the decision would be up to him. For the +time being one must try to reach the goal by employing different means. +For instance letters might be published, that were sent from the Reich, +written by Polish workers to their families. If the occasion arises, +such compulsory decree should not be announced publicly. + +Reichshauptamtsleiter Dr. Frauendorfer confirms, on the basis of his +experiences, that in many cases there was no possibility of employing +recruiters from the Reich. On account of the snowfall, the passenger +cars could not be used, and by using field sleighs, the recruiters +could have travelled not more than 60 km. daily. Also, the Warsaw +district was never really an emigration-area for Polish agricultural +workers. + +It has to be observed, that unfortunately the agricultural workers have +medical certificates or statements made out by the words, which purport +to say that they are not fit for service. Other workers took refuge +into the woods. Often complaints were expressed, that the words did not +support the action sufficiently, and cases have been observed, where +official labor measures, had been intentionally violated. Besides, the +activity of the recruiter can not be without danger; just some time +ago, one of these German officers was fired upon. Also the fact should +be noted, that of 800 workers, which were already assigned, only 69 +reported to the station. + +All that could be traced back to the fact that the rural population is +affected by a psychosis of anxiety, without mentioning the fact that +the Poles might have organized themselves well in the meantime. + +The Governor General is not at all disinclined to take the most extreme +measures. But then, the authority of the Reich would have to be fully +utilized, but as long as there is snow on the ground, any change in +this situation can not be contemplated. * * * + +[Page 198, lines 15-22] + + 12 March 1940 + +Governor General Dr. Frank: + +In view of the propaganda in the U.S.A. any use of force should if +possible be avoided, but a light pressure could be exerted by stopping +the payment of unemployment relief, for those categories which are +concerned at all, at any rate agriculture should not send back young, +strong workers, just because they were unskilled. + +Reichsobmann Behrendt: The Agriculture needs skilled as well as +unskilled workers. One unskilled worker could be employed for each two +skilled workers. + + + PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2233-C-PS + + FRANK DIARY, 1940. + + Vol. IV, October-December + +[Page 943, 4th-6th lines] + +10/7/40 + +The Governor-General then addresses the assembly with the following +words: + +My dear Comrades! + +* * * * * * * + +[Page 946, lines 1-3, 21-30] + +10/7/40 + +* * * There are so few of us here that no one can actually really +conceal himself. Everybody has to fear that the spotlight will now and +then rest on him * * * + +* * * It is clear that education will perhaps still be necessary here +and there; furthermore, it is clear that this open-minded comradeship, +this common spirit of close contact finds its counter-part in the +unstinted observation of authority in inner office relations. We cannot +permit the offices to become 5 o’clock tea rooms. But, of course, our +position as Germans here must be such that the lowest of us is still +far above the highest Pole in this room * * * + +[Page 1158, 2nd par. to p. 1159 4th line] + +* * * And another thing was told me by the Fuehrer in all seriousness, +a few days ago: that the old Japanese proverb:--after the war tighten +your helmet strap--should retain its validity. Comrades, never again +shall we be a weak Reich. The Armed Forces will represent the crown +of community education. Just as the NSDAP is the crown of social, +political and ideological leadership, so the Armed Forces will be the +essence of military training, of the proud and immaculate bearing of +our people. And you can say: you took part in it as soldiers. I am +very happy about this hour of the Armed Forces, for it joins us all +together. Some of you left your mothers, your parents at home, others +their wives, their brides, their brothers, their children. In all +these weeks, they will be thinking of you, saying to themselves: my +God, there he sits in Poland where there are so many lice and Jews, +perhaps he is hungry and cold, perhaps he is afraid to write. It would +not be a bad idea then to send our dear ones back home a picture, and +tell them: well now, there are not so many lice and Jews any more, and +conditions here in the Government General have changed and improved +somewhat already. Of course, I could not eliminate all lice and Jews in +only one year’s time (public amused). But in the course of time, and +above all, if you help me, this end will be attained. After all, it is +not necessary for us to accomplish everything within a year and right +away, for what would otherwise be left for those who follow us to do? + + + PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2233-D-PS + + FRANK DIARY, 1941 Oct-Dec. + + CABINET SESSION + + Tuesday 16 December 1941 in the Government Building at Krakow + + Speech of the Governor General Closing the Session + +[Page 76, line 10 to page 77 line 33] + +As far as the Jews are concerned, I want to tell you quite frankly, +that they must be done away with in one way or another. The Fuehrer +said once: should united Jewry again succeed in provoking a world-war, +the blood of not only the nations, which have been forced into the +war by them, will be shed, but the Jew will have found his end in +Europe. I know, that many of the measures carried out against the Jews +in the Reich, at present, are being criticized. It is being tried +intentionally, as is obvious from the reports on the morale, to talk +about cruelty, harshness, etc. Before I continue, I want to beg you +to agree with me on the following formula: We will principally have +pity on the German people only, and nobody else in the whole world. +The others, too had no pity on us. As an old National-Socialist, I +must say: This war would only be a partial success, if the whole lot +of Jewry would survive it, while we would have shed our best blood in +order to save Europe. My attitude towards the Jews will, therefore, +be based only on the expectation that they must disappear. They must +be done away with. I have entered negotiations to have them deported +to the East. A great discussion concerning that question will take +place in Berlin in January, to which I am going to delegate the +State-Secretary Dr. Buehler. That discussion is to take place in the +Reich-Security Main-Office with SS-Lt. General Heydrich. A great Jewish +migration will begin, in any case. + +But what should be done with the Jews? Do you think they will be +settled down in the “Ostland”, in villages [Siedlungdoerfer]? This is +what we were told in Berlin: Why all this bother? We can do nothing +with them either in the “Ostland” nor in the “Reichkommissariat”. So, +liquidate them yourself. + +Gentlemen, I must ask you to rid yourself of all feeling of pity. We +must annihilate the Jews, wherever we find them and wherever it is +possible, in order to maintain there the structure of the Reich as a +whole. This will, naturally, be achieved by other methods, than those +pointed out by Bureau Chief Dr. Hummel. Nor can the judges of the +Special Courts be made responsible for it, because of the limitations +of the frame work of the legal procedure. Such outdated views cannot be +applied to such gigantic and unique events. We must find at any rate, +a way which leads to the goal, and my thoughts are working in that +direction. + +The Jews represent for us also extraordinarily malignant gluttons. We +have now approximately 2,500,000 of them in the general government, +perhaps with the Jewish mixtures and everything that goes with it, +3,500,000 Jews. We cannot shoot or poison those 3,500,000 Jews, but we +shall nevertheless be able to take measures, which will lead, somehow, +to their annihilation, and this in connection with the gigantic +measures to be determined in discussions from the Reich. The general +government must become free of Jews, the same as the Reich. Where and +how this is to be achieved is a matter for the offices which we must +appoint and create here. Their activities will be brought to your +attention in due course. + + + PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2233-E-PS + + FRANK DIARY, Conference Volume, + + Cabinet session in Cracow on 24 August 1942 + + Cabinet session in the Great Conference Room of the + Government Building in Cracow + + Monday, 24 August 1942 + + Subject: A new Plan for seizure and for food [Ernaehrung] of the + General Gouvernement + + written in 3 Copies: + + 1. Office of the Governor General + 2. State Secretary Dr. Boepple + 3. District Court Judge [Oberlandesgerichtsrat] Dr. Weh + +_List of those present at the session of 24 August 1942_ + + The Governor General + State Secretary Krueger + State Secretary Dr. Boepple + General Becker + Schoengarth + Kobusch + Dr. Wendler + Dr. Siebert + Dr. Radtke + Plodeck + Tetzner + Naumann + Dr. Eissfeldt + Dr. Gschliesser + Ohlenbusch + Watzke + Bauder + Gerteis + Dr. Breithaupt + Dr. Paersch + Dr. Weh + Dr. Schulte-Wissermann + Dr. Wohlrab + Neumann + Dr. Behr + Bette + Rauber + Eden + Neumann + Dr. Zeisner + Winkler + Grafmann + Gareis + Dr. Odenthal + Pietschmann + Krahmer + Schubert + Colonel Fischer + Reitz + Major Dr. Herrmann + Capt. Behringer + Verwaltungsrat Korff + Von Dazur + Vogel + Dr. Ness + Topf + Blauer + + + Beginning of the Session at 4 p.m. + + The _Governor General_ opens the meeting with the following words: + +Gentlemen, + +I have called you together today with special speed and emphasis in +order to acquaint you with a measure which is unusually important and +decisive for all the work in the General Government in the year to +come. What I tell you, I tell you in strictest confidence. I call your +attention to the fact that every word which leaks out of this meeting, +unofficially, might mean a tremendous damage to our country. + +A few days ago a meeting with the Reich Marshal took place in Berlin. +The Reich Marshal had the reports concerning the almost catastrophic +developments in the _food situation in Germany_. According to all +confidential reports of the police, as well as of the Gauleiter, which, +as he expressed himself, also confirmed by his own experiences, the +situation is as follows: unless a considerable improvement in the +food situation in Germany can be achieved in a short time, serious +consequences as to the health of the people, especially the German +working people, would result. In hundreds of thousands of sick cases, +one can already see the tragic consequences not only of this food +shortage but also a deterioration of foodstuffs which endangers +health. That is especially true of the quality of bread which has been +distributed to the German people within the last few weeks: this leads +to the most serious health disorders. + +A serious situation, therefore, has arisen since Germany not only has +to feed herself but also a large proportion of other European people. +We must also take care that in the months to come and during the coming +winter sufficient food will be distributed to the German people that +they will be able to withstand the great nervous strain of the coming +months in every case. + +Under these circumstances you probably will not be surprised that the +saying now has become true: Before the German people are to experience +starvation, the occupied territories and their people shall be exposed +to starvation. In this movement, therefore, we here in the General +Government must also have the iron determination to help the Great +German people, our fatherland. + +Germany had almost sufficient rye to tide them over until the new +harvest, but not sufficient wheat. In large parts of Germany, +therefore, no more wheat can be distributed in the near future. We +therefore must aid the fatherland until the beginning of the new wheat +harvest. + +The General Government therefore must do the following: The General +Government has taken on the obligation to send 500,000 tons bread +grains to the fatherland in addition to the foodstuffs already being +delivered for the relief of Germany or consumed here by troops of the +armed forces, Police or SS. If you compare this with our contributions +of last year you can see that this means a six-fold increase over that +of last year’s contribution of the General Government. + +The new demand will be fulfilled exclusively at _the expense of the +foreign population_. It must be done cold-bloodedly and without +pity; for this contribution of the General Government is still more +important this year since the occupied Eastern territories--Ukraine and +Ostland--will not yet be able to make an important contribution toward +the relief of Germany’s food problem. Even if a million tons of bread +grains could be delivered from Ostland and Ukraine, it would in the +face of Germany’s food situation be only a “drop in the bucket”. + +For this reason I wanted to acquaint you, Gentlemen, here in this +governmental session with the decisions which I have made known today +to Party member Naumann. You will essentially find an additional +_increase_ of the _quota_ of foodstuffs to be shipped to Germany +and _new regulations for the feeding of the population_; especially +of the Jews and of the Polish population, whereby, if possible, the +provisioning of the working people, especially of those working for +German interests, shall be maintained. + +The step which we are taking together today, is one of the most +decisive ones, because it will surely have certain consequences as +to the internal order of this country in January or February of next +year. These consequences have to be accepted, because before the German +people be starved, others, as a matter of course, must undergo the same. + +I first of all give the word to Party member Naumann, who will give you +a general report about this problem. + +_Naumann_, President of the Main Department for Food and Agriculture: + +Governor General, Gentlemen! + +At the beginning of July during the last session of the government, +I acquainted you with the _food budget_ of the year 42/43. I +hoped that this budget would be adequate. The Governor General, +in order to increase the high goal that was originally set in the +General Government, had decreed martial law for the harvest time +[Ernteausnahmezustand] in order to drain even the last possibilities +for the execution of the seizure (of the harvest). + +Previously we concluded conferences with the Reich Food Ministry. We +had included the shipments which, according to the then prevailing +interpretation, were to be delivered by the General Government, in +the food budget, and could hope to reach the harvest of 1943 without +friction. Meanwhile a message from State Secretary Backe as well as +a message from Reich Marshal Goering has arrived, and the Governor +General has ordered that all requirements of the Reich are from now on +to be fulfilled under all circumstances. + +Out of this situation the following needs arise: + + + _1. Grain_ + +After exact considerations the grain quota is raised 25%, that is, +from 960,000 tons to 1.2 million tons. The dry measure [Metze] of +_self-feeders_, which was 30 kg per head per year, will be raised to 50 +kg per head per year. This means: Self-feeder--there total 8.8 million +persons in the General Government who heretofore could eat two bushels +and 20 kg of bread grain per year--will in the future eat two bushels +per year. By this means it will be possible to cause an increase in +the dry measure from 160,000 tons to 264,000 tons. This is the burden +which we shall place upon and must place upon Polish and Ukrainian +agriculture. + +On the other hand, I gave an estimated total requirement of 670,000 +tons of _bread grain_ for the General Government in the food budget +of early July. The requirements of the Reich make it necessary that +exceptional savings be carried out in the interest of absolute +fulfillment of Reich deliveries. + +The feeding of a _Jewish population_, estimated heretofore at 1.5 +million, drops off to an estimated total of 300,000 Jews, who still +work for German interests as craftsmen or otherwise. For these the +Jewish rations, including certain special allotments which have proved +necessary for the maintenance of working capacity, will be retained. +The other Jews, a total of 1.2 million, will no longer be provided with +foodstuffs. + +_Non-German normal consumers_ will receive, from 1 January 1943 to 1 +March 1943, instead of 4.2 kg bread per month, 2.8 kg; from 1 March +1943 to 30 July 1943 the total bread ration for these non-German normal +consumers will be cancelled. + +Those _entitled to be supplied_ [Versorgungsberechtigten] are composed +as follows. We estimate that 3 million persons come into consideration +as war workers, the A- and B-card holders and their kin, and that +somewhat more than 3 million persons are non-German normal consumers, +who do not work directly or indirectly in the interests of Germany. The +war workers, A- and B-card holders and their families, about 3 million +persons, will however continue to be supplied, up to the harvest of +1943, at the prevailing rates. + +Furthermore, savings will be brought about in the sphere of _seed +grain_ in such a way that seed grain will be issued for general seed +grain needs only when the farm [Betrieb] delivers for it, in excess of +its quota, an equal amount of food grain. + +_Rations of oats for feed_ to those who own horses in their professions +must be reduced to a great extent. Unfortunately a certain portion of +oats will also fall away which heretofore was placed at the disposal +of the main forestry department for the horses with which the urgent +transport of wood was carried out. Extensive restrictions will be +carried out in _Manufacturing and finishing plants_, which will take +effect in the food sphere. Also special allotments, as we carried them +out last year during the winter months in Warsaw, Radom, Cracow, etc. +cannot be carried out this winter. By this measure a saving of 115,000 +tons of bread grain will be attained. + +When the above mentioned increased quota will be brought in 100%, it +will be possible to maintain a new food balance in the grain sector. +Every amount which is missing from a 100% achievement of the total +quota takes the form of a further reduction, first of all for the 3 +million non-German normal consumers who do not work in the interest of +Germany. In case the seizure and collection of the dry measure should +even then create certain difficulties, this will have an effect on the +family members of war workers working in the interests of Germany and +on A- and B-card holders. The Main Department for Food and Agriculture +will try, however, not to take these last measures if the acquisition +to some extent brings about the result we all hope from it. + + + _2. Potatoes_ + +Also here the changed _potato quota_ must be raised 25 percent, that +is, from 1.2 million to 1.5 million tons. It is planned that war +workers and A- and B-card holders will again receive, as during last +year, 3.5 double-bushels of potatoes which they can use for themselves +and the members of their families. For Germans 2 double-bushels per +head per year are planned, for the 7 main cities of the General +Government, 1 double-bushel per person. Before supplying the main +cities with potatoes, the requirements and quotas of factory potatoes +must be primarily secured. Only then, when this securing has been made, +will potatoes be issued to the main city population at the rate of a +double-bushel per head. This precautionary measure has the purpose +above all of seeing to it that enough alcohol can be produced, first of +all to maintain equal quality amounts [Praemienmengen] and secondly to +have enough alcohol available for other important purposes. + + + _3. Meat_ + +Also in the domain of meat a 25% _quota increase_ takes place, so that +the new Reich contributions can be fulfilled. The now almost completely +accomplished registry of cattle aids the seizure. We hope to be able to +achieve, with what are considerable encroachments in themselves, that +the 400 grams per month for non-German normal consumers can be issued. +Nevertheless the situation can arise that at certain times here and +there the 400 grams per month may for once not be issued, but less must +be given, since here also the deliveries to the armed forces and the +Reich contributions have priority. + +These drastic measures can only succeed when the following +prerequisites can be created and/or maintained. Every _ration increase_ +for war workers, A- and B-card holders or members of their families +must be refused. Just a short time ago the armament inspection +requested from me an increase of rations. Furthermore requests have +come in to raise the insufficient rations of the Drohobycz oil region. +In the face of the serious food situation in which the General +Government finds itself, ration quota increases for these groups of +workers, and the members of their families as well, cannot be carried +out. + +New _ration applicants_ can under no circumstances be accepted any +more. This means: New industries, new construction projects or major +enterprises cannot be satisfied with supplementary, insofar as a +need is created by new masses of workers, unless the Reich makes +available and allows an amount to be deflected which corresponds to the +requirements of the additional masses of workers, from those supplies +which we have to deliver to the Reich. + +The _Bonus amounts_ approved by the Main Department of Economies +and Monopoly must be delivered without fail. Beyond that new bonus +goods must be made available due to the raising of quotas of the main +Department of Food and Agriculture. If it is not possible to secure +cigarettes, liquor, textiles, and earlier bonus goods, I request that +_salt_ be also fully counted into the bonus drive now, this means that, +starting immediately, the total salt ration is to be provided in the +cities through food cards and on farms through bonus certificates. + +Proposed _resettlement projects_, such as are planned, according to +reports from the Department Leaders of Lemberg and Lublin, must in my +opinion be postponed, for the sake of a frictionless procurement and +effecting of the harvest for the coming year. + +The _securing of all depots and food processing plants_ as well as +their transport facilities must be assured, as otherwise irreplaceable +losses result which mean a further burdening of the food budget. I +have had maps made of all districts [Kreise] on which the depots have +all been drawn in. I request that the necessary measures be taken on +the part of the police that these depots, which are in the eyes of the +hungering masses above all at times when the restrictions are carried +out, should be strictly guarded, so that the meager supplies which we +have until the new harvest should not be destroyed by sabotage or arson. + +The still outstanding _price adjustment_ of various products in the +district of Galicia to the price level of the old General Government +must be carried out at once. Furthermore the strong inroads upon the +substance of farm establishments caused by the raising of quotas +undoubtedly involves damage which will have unfavorable results on the +procurement of the 1943 harvest. + +Finally it must be determined at the beginning of November whether the +_martial law for the harvest period_, which has been proclaimed up +to 30 November, must be extended to 30 December. Martial law for the +harvest period has been extended to all products which are to be reaped. + +The planned quota increase and reduction of ration quantities must +be kept secret under all circumstances and may be published only at +that time which the Main Department for Food and Agriculture considers +proper. Should the reduction of ration quantities and the increase +of quotas become known earlier, extremely noticeable disturbances in +the seizure would take place. The mass of the Polish population would +then go to the land and would become a supplementary competitor of +our requisitioning agencies. Should the quota increase become known +prematurely, the winter sowing and work of procurement would suffer +noticeable damage. We have therefore decided first to have the winter +planting in the ground and then to announce the quota increase. + +In the realm of food the General Government has lived through serious +and difficult times during the last 3 years. However, I believe that +the coming year 1942-43 will be the hardest in the food sector. My +co-workers and I will do everything to master the situation under the +given circumstances. + +The _Governor General_. + +Gentlemen! You have heard the very serious presentation of President +Neumann. You will also derive therefrom that every debate about the +figures or measures announced by him would be completely superfluous +and actually entirely harmful to the matter. For every debate would +give rise to the illusion that perhaps some other method would be +possible. + +I must point out that some sectors of the administration will feel +this very keenly. In the first place the _police_ will feel this, for +it will have to deal, if I may say so, with an increased activity +of the black market and a neglect of food customs. I will gladly +give the police extraordinary powers so that they can overcome these +difficulties. + +The _economy_ will feel it. The decrease of work rendered will become +felt in all sectors, branches and regions. I also assume that our +_transport system_ will feel it too. In view of the worsening living +conditions an extraordinary hardship will set in for railroad workers +and other categories; as the previous quantities of food were already +not enough. The monopolies will feel it through a decrease of their +incomes, as the amounts of potatoes available for the production of +vodka will be less. + +The _Germans_ in this area shall not feel it. We wish in spite of this +new plan to see to it that the supplies for Germans will be maintained. +Also the Wehrmacht and other encamped units in this area shall not feel +it. We hope that it will be possible for us to keep up the whole quotas +here. + +To help in this necessity there is a corresponding measure, namely +that the supervision of persons travelling from the General Government +to the Reich, above all of military personnel, in order to see +whether they are _taking food out_ of the General Government, should +be suspended. This means that in addition to all that which we must +now extract from the land economically, there must take place a +complete removal of control over that which is dragged out of the +land by thousands upon thousands--doubtless illegally and against our +government measures. + +From this you realize how seriously the situation will develop. In this +connection do not forget, however, that the food situation in the Reich +is less favorable. In whatever difficulties you observe some place +here, in the form of the sicknesses of your workers, the breakdown of +your associations, etc., you must always think of the fact that it is +still much better when a Pole breaks down than that a German succumb. +That we sentence 1.2 million Jews to die of hunger should be noted only +marginally. It is a matter, of course, that should the Jews not starve +to death it would, we hope, result in a speeding up of anti-Jewish +measures. [Page 15.] + +However, that on the other hand it is expected of all that they will +show an understanding of these government measures is also to be noted +only marginally. The original demand of the Reich from the General +Government amounted to 1 million tons. However it was fortunately +possible to reduce this demand by half. + +When you consider that a land like the Protectorate with a size of +barely 50,000 square kilometers and a large industrial population was +required to deliver over 200,000 tons of bread grain, that countries +like France and Holland are forced to deliver up to the last remnant to +the Reich, then you can estimate how the food situation of the Reich is +regarded. + +I did not wish to fail to inform you of this decree, which I now put +into effect. + +To a question by president _Gerteis_, the _Governor General_ explained +that according to the coming new regulation the maintenance of members +of the Eastern Railway [Ostbahn] will come under the categories of war +workers, A- and B-card holders. + +The _Governor General_ then requested the representatives of the +Wehrmacht, in view of the food situation in the General Government, +to help the government more intensively to prevent a _buying up of +foodstuffs_ for the other eastern territories. He directed the same +request to State Secretary Krueger for the SS and police. It would be +out of the question entirely that purchasers from some other regions +should be active in the General Government. Army and police should take +care, in their own representing a supply--or purchasing territory for +other regions or troop units, unless it were within the compass of the +quota obligations of the General Government of the Reich. + +Ministerialrat _Reis_ indicated that the Oberquartiermeister would +introduce a command to that effect with the Generalquartiermeister. + +The _Governor General_ then declared that it was left to a coming +conference of the authoritative factors of the government of the +General Government to take measures against the results of the present +decision. The results would, to be sure, first take effect at the +beginning of next year, since the old rations were valid until the end +of this year. + +In this connection the _Governor General_ declares the new +decree in force and empowers Main Departmental President +[Hauptabteilungspraesident] Naumann, in line with his proposal, to lead +the nutritional policy of the General Government. + +State Secretary _Dr. Boepple_ points out that by reason of the +attendance list the names of all who took part in the meeting were +known. Should rumors about the measures decided on today eventually +seep through to the public, he would, as representative of the +government, have them traced to their source, and bring the responsible +parties to account. + + End of the meeting: 1640 hrs + +* * * * * * * + +Not unimportant manpower has been taken from us in form of our old +proven Jewish communities. It is clear that the working program +is made difficult when in the middle of this program, during the +war, the order for complete annihilation of the Jews is given. The +responsibility for this cannot be placed upon the government of the +General Government. The directive for the annihilation of the Jews +comes from higher quarters. We have to be content with the consequences +and can only report that the Jew has caused tremendous difficulties +with regard to the work-program. I was able to prove, the other day, to +Staatssekretaer Ganzenmueller, who was complaining that a big building +project in the General Government came to a halt, that this would not +have happened if the many thousands of Jews working at it had not been +deported. Now the order is given that the Jews will have to be removed +from the armament projects. I hope that this order, if not already +cancelled, will soon be cancelled, for then the situation will be still +worse. + + + PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2233-F-PS + + FRANK DIARY, 1944. + + Loose Leaf Volume covering period from 1 January 1944 to 28 February + 1944--speech delivered by Hans Frank in Berlin 25 January 1944 before + the Representatives of the German Press + +[Page 5] + +At the present time we still have in the General Government perhaps +100,000 Jews. + +* * * * * * * + + + PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2233-G-PS + + FRANK DIARY, 1939, from 25 October to 15 December + +[Pages 6-7] + +1230 hours. The governor general received Captain Benninghoff. The +latter reported about the extensive _reconstruction works_ on the +_bridges blown up_ by the Poles and pointed out that _special engineer +troops_ are occupied on rebuilding these bridges (at the present time +still 25 units). + +The governor general received the president of the police of Lodsch, +SS-Lieut. General Beckerle. + +Questions pertaining to the commitment of _Police_ and _civil service +employees_ were discussed. Lieutenant General Beckerle pointed out that +the former _fear psychology_ present among the people _had passed_ and +that there were more _Jews_ in Lodsch than before. This is one of the +reasons for the continued deterioration of the food situation. + +The Governor General received the district chief in Warsaw +[Reichshauptamtsleiter] Dr. Fischer. + +He discussed with him current questions, especially on the subject +of _finance_ and _monopoly_. Dr. Fischer was instructed to clear up +the question of mayoralty in Warsaw, and to determine what amounts +of _copper_ and _scrap metal_ are available. Dr. Fischer promises +to secure 300 _fur coats_ for the main office. The Governor General +requested information concerning the _diplomatic representation_, who +were still _in Warsaw_, and concerning the shooting of Jews and other +matters. Dr. Fischer reported also that there is a _cable connection_ +from Warsaw to _Krakau_ and moreover there is a large cable supply at +hand. Dr. Fischer was requested to set up _border signs_ at the border +of the general government * * * + +[Page 44]. + +* * * By spring 1,000,000 Poles and Jews from East and West Posen, +Danzig, Poland and Upper Silesia must be received by the general +government. The resettlement of the ethnic Germans and the taking on of +Poles and Jews (10,000 daily) must be accomplished according to plan. +Especially urgent is the instituting of _forced labor for the Jews_. +The Jewish population if possible must be extracted from the Jewish +cities and be put to _work on roads_. The critical questions of housing +and feeding are still to be cleared up * * * + +[Page 19]. 11:00 o’clock. + +* * * The Governor General received SS Lieutenant General Krueger, +General Becker, SS Brigadier General Streckenbach, and Lieutenant +Colonel Gudewill. + +Brigadier General Streckenbach reported: + +The Reichsfuehrer SS wishes that all _Jews_ be evacuated from the +newly gained Reich territories. Up to February approximately 1,000,000 +people are to be brought in this way in to the general government. +The families of good racial extraction present in the occupied Polish +territory (approximately 4,000,000 people) should be transferred +into the Reich and individually housed and thereby be uprooted as a +people. The deadline provided for the migration transport is the 15th +of November. The Governor General points out that better and greater +transport ways be made ready for both the West-East as well as the +East-West movements. SS Lieutenant General Krueger explained that, +starting 15 November, the entire railroad net of the general government +will be at the disposal of the resettlement transports. The general +governor gave SS Lieutenant General Krueger the assignments to organize +these refugee transports * * * + + + PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2233-H-PS + + FRANK DIARY, 1941, Vol. II, 19 April. + +[Page 313] + +8 PM Demonstration of the department of operations (Arbeitsbereich) +“Generalgouvernement” of the NSDAP in the _Uraniol_ in Cracow. + +After a short welcome speech by the Chief Department leader +(Oberbereichsleiter) _Schalk_, the _Governor General_ +(_Generalgouverneur_), Reichsleiter _Dr. Frank_ begins to deliver the +following address: + +* * * * * * * + +[Pages 316-317] + +We are absolutely optimistic (Lively applause). I have the impression +that the German Reich will always become greater and will keep growing +ever more in the final fight against England. The Greater German Reich +is by far not the greatest German Reich. The task we have here must +move us to think always in terms of the greatest connections. Let us +be on guard not to let enter here the petty currents and tendencies +which are not yet completely overcome at times here and there in the +Reich, in spite of all consciousness of unity. It would be senseless, +if one would start to feel superior and arrogantly assume to be higher +than the other one, in our Government General. There the value of the +German as such is the yardstick. And here the NSDAP, the department of +operations [Arbeitsbereich] in the Government General can set up a +model. The revolution of National Socialism can gain the original power +of its fighting energy again and again only from territories like the +one which we organize here. I have to watch myself like a hawk that the +finger of egoism do not get hold of me in a more or less hidden form. I +have to watch like a hunter that those individual cases of departmental +competence craze and self-styled glory do not develop here which we +often felt were the most vicious evil in the Reich. (lively applause) + +It is therefore clear that I sit in my castle like an old rapacious +knight and sometimes step out, in order to strike with my hammer all +around the country. After all, it would be a nice state of affairs if I +would not do that. + + (public amused) + +And, therefore, I believe it is always in order for us that we find the +great line of direction remembering the personality of the Fuehrer, +his own philosophy, and his conduct of life. We have all possibilities +in the Government General, we have received full powers from the +Fuehrer and can accomplish, by planning on a large scale, that has been +assigned to us. Thanks to the heroic courage of our soldiers, this +territory has become German, and the time will come when the valley of +the Vistula, from its source to its mouth at the sea, will be as German +as the valley of the Rhine. + + + PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2233-K-PS + + FRANK DIARY, Department Heads Meetings, 1939-1940 + +_Protocol re the Conference of Department Heads_, 2 December 1939. + +[Page 1, lines 14-25] + +Dr. Frank: * * * That which is stated in the Reichsgesetzblatt is not +applicable in the General Government, except when applied on the basis +of the Fuehrer Decree of 12.10.1939. This means that the authority +rests with the Chairman of the Ministerial Council for the Defense of +the Reich and he will only use this authority with the consent of the +Governor General. The final structure of the General Government is not +yet known, even less does one know whether it will remain permanently +as the General Government. Decisive in the administrative activities of +the General Government is the will of the Fuehrer that this area shall +be the first colonial territory of the German nation. + +[Page 2, last 4 lines and page 3, lines 1-3] + +Dr. Frank: * * * Principally it can be said regarding the +administration of the General Government: This territory in its +entirety is booty of the German Reich, and it thus cannot be permitted +that this territory shall be exploited in its individual parts, but +that the territory in its entirety shall be economically used, and its +entire economic worth redound to the benefit of the German people. + + + PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2233-L-PS + + FRANK DIARY, Department Heads Meetings 1939-1940 Conference of + Department Heads, 19 January 1940 + +[Page 11, last line; page 12, lines 1-6 and 16-19] + +Dr. Frank: * * * My relationship with the Poles is like the +relationship between ant and plant louse. When I treat the Poles in a +helpful way, so to speak tickle them in a friendly manner, then I do it +in the expectation that their work performance redounds to my benefit. +This is not a political but a purely tactical-technical problem * * * +In cases where in spite of all these measures the performance does not +increase, or where the slightest act gives me occasion to step in, I +would not even hesitate to take the most draconic action. + + + PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2233-M-PS + +FRANK DIARY, Department Head Meetings 1939-1940 + + Meeting of Department Heads in the Bergakademie, Friday 8 March 1940. + +[Page 5, lines 25-26; page 6, lines 1-8] + +Frank: One thing is certain. The authority of General Government as +the representative of the Fuehrer and the will of the Reich in this +territory is certainly strong, and I have always emphasized that I +would not tolerate the misuse of this authority. I have allowed this +to be known anew at every office in Berlin, especially after Herr +Field Marshal Goering on 12.2.1940 from Karin Hall had forbidden all +Administrative Offices of the Reich, including the Police and even +the Wehrmacht, to interfere in administrative matters of the General +Government * * * + +[Page 7, lines 22-28; page 8, lines 1-5]. + +There is no authority here in General Government which is higher as +to rank, influence, and authority than that of the Governor General. +Even the Wehrmacht has no governmental or official functions of any +kind in this connection; it has only security functions and general +military duties--it has no political power whatsoever. The same applies +here to the Police and SS. There is here no state within a state, +but we are the representatives of the Fuehrer and of the Reich. In +final conclusion, this applies also to the Party, which has here no +far-reaching influence, except for the fact that very old members of +the National Socialist Party and loyal veterans of the Fuehrer take +care of the general matters * * * + +[Page 13, lines 28-30; page 14, lines 1-8]. + +Wherever there is the least attempt by the Poles to start anything, +an enormous campaign of destruction directed against the Poles will +follow. Then I would not hesitate to set up a regime of terror with all +its consequences. I have issued the order to place under arrest for +three months several hundred members of such secret organizations, so +that nothing can happen in the immediate future. The last word of the +Fuehrer at my departure was: See to it that there is absolute peace +over there, I cannot allow anything to disturb peace in the East. I +will see to it. + + + PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2233-N-PS + + FRANK DIARY, 1940, Second Volume, April to June + +* * * * * * * + +1245 Discussion with State Secretary _Dr. Buehler_, SS Lieutenant +general _Krueger_ and Reichshauptamtsleiter _Dr. Frauendorfer_ in +presence of Reich Minister _Dr. Seyss-Inquart_. + +Subject of the discussion is _the sending of workers, particularly +agricultural workers into the Reich_. + +Reichshauptamtsleiter _Dr. Frauendorfer_ reports, that so far about +160,000 agricultural workers and about 50,000 industrial workers have +been sent to the Reich, however, in total there should be 500,000. It +is to be hoped that there would yet be enough voluntary enlistments. + +The governor-general stated that the fact that all means in form of +proclamations etc. did not bring success, leads to the conclusion that +the Poles out of malevolence, and guided by the intention of harming +Germany by not putting themselves at its disposal, refuse to enlist +for working-duty. Therefore, he asks Dr. Frauendorfer if there are any +other measures, not as yet employed, to win the Poles on a voluntary +basis. + +Reichshauptamtsleiter _Dr. Frauendorfer_ answered this question +negatively. + +The General Governor emphasized the fact that he now will be asked to +take a definite attitude toward this question. Therefore the question +will arise whether any form of _coercive measures_ should now be +employed. + +The question put by the general governor to SS lieutenant general +Krueger: does he see possibilities of calling Polish workers by +coercive means, is answered in the affirmative by SS lieutenant general +_Krueger_. + +So far as he knows another 300,000 Polish workers should be sent into +the Reich, and it will be possible to fill this request once the +working-duty decree has gone into effect. + +Reichshauptamtsleiter _Dr. Frauendorfer_ suggests to begin by issuing +_orders to report for certain age_ groups and to wait for the result +of this measure. However, some difficulties will be encountered as it +is not known where to send these orders to report. There might be the +possibility of getting the cooperation of the Woids. It is important, +however, that the workers of large cities be recruited and there the +difficulties will naturally be particularly great. + +The general governor is willing to agree to any practical measure, +however, he wishes to be informed personally about the measures to be +taken. One measure, which no doubt would be successful, would be the +_discontinuance of unemployment compensation_ for unemployed workers +and their _transfer to public welfare_. Therefore, he decrees that, +beginning _1 May_, claim for unemployment compensation will cease to +exist and only public welfare may be granted. For the time being only +men are to report and above those men living in cities. There might be +a possibility of combining the moving of the 120,000 Poles from the +Warthe district with this measure. + +Reich Minister _Dr. Seyss-Inquart_ mentions that not many of the Polish +workers are left in the Warthe district who would be qualified to be +sent to the Reich. All those who are fit for work are already being +sent to the Reich. Those capable of assimilation are going to the Reich +with their families anyway. Of those not capable of assimilation only +useful men are being chosen. + +The general governor closes the discussion by saying that guiding +directions are now given. The officials involved must work out the +details by themselves. Wherever the labor section does not succeed, the +police must act. + + + PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2233-O-PS + + FRANK DIARY, Department Heads Meetings 1939-1940 + +Warsaw, 19 December 1940 + +Present: Dr. Hans FRANK and others + +[Page 12, last 7 lines, and page 13, first 2 lines]. + +Dr. Frank: * * * In this country the force of a determined leadership +must rule. The Pole must feel here that we are not building him a legal +state, but that for him there is only one duty, namely, to work and to +behave himself. It is clear that this leads sometimes to difficulties, +but you must in your own interest see, that all measures are ruthlessly +carried out in order to become master of the situation. You can rely on +me absolutely in this. + + + PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2233-P-PS + + FRANK DIARY 1941--Part III + +9th September 1941 + +[Page 830, par. 1] + +Obermedizinalrat Dr. _Walbaum_ expresses his opinion of the _health +condition_ of the Polish population. Investigations which were carried +out by his department proved that the majority of Poles eat only about +600 calories, whereas the normal requirement for a human being is 2,200 +calories. The Polish population was enfeebled to such an extent that +it would fall an easy prey to _spotted fever_. The number of diseased +Poles amounted today already to 40%. During the last week alone 1,000 +new spotted fever cases have been officially recorded. That represented +so far the maximum number. This health situation represented a serious +danger for the Reich and for the soldiers who were coming into the +Government General. A spreading of the pestilence into the Reich is +absolutely feasible. The increase in tuberculosis, too, was causing +anxiety. If the food rations were to be diminished again, an enormous +increase of the number of illnesses could be predicted. + + + PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2233-Q-PS + + FRANK DIARY, Government Meetings, Oct.-Dec., 1941 + +Meeting of the Government of General Government + +Cracow, in the Government Building, 16 December 1941 + +[Page 35, lines 22-29] + +Dr. Frank: Severe measures must and will be adopted against Jews +leaving the ghettos. Death sentences pending against Jews for this +reason must be executed as quickly as possible. This order according +to which every Jew found outside the ghetto is to be executed, must be +carried out without fail. * * * + +[Page 66, lines 13-22]. + +Chief of Office in Warsaw, Dr. Hummel: * * * In Warsaw, in spite of the +setting up of a third court chamber, we have been able to decree only +45 death sentences, only 8 of which have been carried out since in each +individual case, the Pardon Commission [Gnadenkommission] in Cracow has +to make the final decision. A further 600 sentences were demanded and +are under consideration. An effective isolation of the ghetto is not +possible by way of the Special Court Procedure. The procedure to be +followed up to liquidation takes too much time. It is burdened with too +many formalities and must be simplified. + + + PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2233-R-PS + +FRANK DIARY, 1942, Part I + + Conference of the District Standartenfuehrer of the NSDAP in Cracow, + 18 March 1942. + +[Pages 185-186] + +Dr. Frank: As you know, I am a fanatic as to unity in administration +* * * It is therefore clear that the Higher SS and Police Leader is +subordinated to me, that the Police is a component of the Government, +that the SS and Police Leader in the district is subordinated to the +Governor, and that the Kreis chief has the authority of command over +the gendarmerie in his Kreis. This the Reichsfuehrer SS has recognized; +in the written agreement all these points are mentioned word for word +and signed. It is also self-evident that we cannot set up a closed shop +here which can be treated in the traditional manner of small states. It +would, for instance, be ridiculous if we would build up here a security +policy of our own against our Poles in the country, while knowing that +the Polacks in West Prussia, in Posen, in Wartheland and in Silesia +have one and the same movement of resistance. The Reichsfuehrer SS and +Chief of the German Police thus must be able to carry out with the aid +of his agencies his police measures concerning the interests of the +Reich as a whole. This, however, will be done in such a way that the +measures to be adopted will first be submitted to me and carried out +only when I give my consent. In the General Government, the Police is +the armed forces. As a result of this, the Leader of this Police system +will be called by me into the Government of the General Government; +he is subordinate to me, or to my deputy, as a State Secretary for the +Security System. + +[Pages 195-196] + +Incidentally, the struggle for the achievement of our aims will be +pursued cold bloodedly. You see how the state agencies work. You see +that we do not hesitate before anything, and stand whole dozens of +people up against the wall. This is necessary because here simple +consideration says that it cannot be our task at this period when the +best German blood is being sacrificed to show regard for the blood +of another race. For out of this one of the greatest dangers may +arise. One already hears today in Germany that prisoners-of-war for +instance with us in Bavaria or in Thuringia are administering large +estates entirely independently, while all the men in a village fit for +service are at the front. If this state of affairs continues then a +gradual retrogression of Germanism will show itself. One should not +underestimate this danger. Therefore, everything revealing itself as +a Polish power of leadership must be destroyed again and again with +ruthless energy. This does not have to be shouted abroad, it will +happen silently. + + + PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2233-S-PS + + FRANK DIARY, 1942, Part III + +[Page 798, lines 26-28] + + Mass Meeting of the NSDAP District Standartsfuehrung Galicia in + Lemberg. 1 August 1942. + +Dr. Frank: We have to understand that the purpose of this whole war is +to expand the living space for our people in a natural manner. + + + PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2233-T-PS + + FRANK DIARY, 1942, Part III + + Meeting to discuss Special Problems of the District Lublin Cracow, 4 + August 1942. + +[Page 830, lines 23-32 and page 831, line 1] + +State Secretary Krueger then continues, saying that the Reichsfuehrer’s +next immediate plan until the end of the following year would be to +settle the following German racial groups in the two districts (Zamosc +and Lublin): 1000 peasant settlements (1 settlement per family of +about 6) for Bosnian Germans; 1200 other kinds of settlements; 1000 +settlements for Bessarabian Germans; 200 for Serbian Germans; 2000 for +Leningrad Germans; 4000 for Baltic Germans; 500 for Wolhynia Germans +and 200 settlements for Flemish, Danish and Dutch Germans, in all +10,000 settlements for 50,000 to 60,000 persons. + +[Page 832, lines 15-23] + +The Governor General directs that the resettlement plan is to be +discussed cooperatively by the competent authorities and declares his +willingness to approve the final plan by the end of September after +satisfactory arrangements had been made concerning all the questions +appertaining thereto (in particular the guaranteeing of peace and +order), so that by the middle of November, as the most favorable time, +the resettlement can begin. + + + PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2233-V-PS + + FRANK DIARY, 1942, Part III + + Official Meeting of Political Leaders of the NSDAP, Cracow, 5 August + 1942 + +[Page 866, lines 14-23] + +Dr. Frank: The situation in regard to Poland is unique insofar as on +the one hand--I speak quite openly--we must expand Germanism in such +a manner that the area of the General Government becomes pure German +colonized land at some decades to come; and, on the other hand, under +the present war conditions we have to allow foreign racial groups to +perform here the work which must be carried out in the service of +greater Germany * * *. + +[Page 896, lines 24-28] + +What a dirty people made up of Jews swaggered around here before 1939! +And where are the Jews today? You scarcely see them. If you see them +then they are working. + + + PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2233-W-PS + + FRANK DIARY, 1942, Part III + + Discussion with Gauleiter Sauckel, Cracow, 18 August 1942 + +[Page 918, lines 18-21] + +Dr. Frank: I am pleased to report to you officially, Party Comrade +Sauckel, that we have up to now supplied 800,000 workers for the Reich. + +[Page 918, lines 28-34] + +Dr. Frank: Recently, they have requested us to supply them with a +further 140,000. I have pleasure in informing you officially that in +accordance with our agreement of yesterday 60% of the newly requested +workers will be supplied to the Reich by the end of October, and the +balance of 40% by the end of the year. + +[Page 920, lines 6-10] + +Dr. Frank: Beyond the present figure of 140,000 you can, however, +next year reckon upon a higher number of workers from the General +Government. For we shall employ the Police to conscript them. + + + PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2233-X-PS + + FRANK DIARY, 1942, Part III + + Kressendorf, 28 August 1942 + +Present: Dr. Hans FRANK and others + +[Page 968, 969, 983] + +Dr. Frank: I have since 1920 continually dedicated my work to the +NSDAP. * * * As National Socialist I was a participant in the +events of November 1923 for which I received the Bluorden. After +the resurrection of the movement in the year 1925, my real greater +activity in the movement began, which made me, first gradually, later +almost exclusively, the legal adviser of the Fuehrer and of the Reich +leadership of the NSDAP. I thus was the representative of legal +interests of the growing Third Reich in a legal ideological as well as +practical legal way * * * The culmination of this work I see in the big +Leipzig Army Trial in which I succeeded in having the Fuehrer admitted +to the famous oath of legality, a circumstance which gave the Movement +the legal grounds to expand generously. The Fuehrer indeed recognized +this achievement and in 1926 made me leader of the National Socialist +Lawyer’s League; in 1929 Reich Leader of the Reich Legal office of the +NSDAP; in 1933 Bavarian Minister of Justice; in the same year Reich +Commissioner of Justice; in 1934 President of the Academy of German Law +founded by me; in December 1934 Reich Minister without portfolio; and +in 1939 I was finally appointed to Governor General for the occupied +Polish territories. + +So I was, am and will remain the representative jurist of the struggle +period of National Socialism * * * + +I profess myself now, and always, as a National Socialist and a +faithful follower of the Fuehrer Adolf Hitler, whom I have now served +since 1919. + + + PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2233-Y-PS + + FRANK DIARY, 1942 Vol. IV [Pages 1212-1213] + +_Friday, 20 November 1942_: + +Of the total 180,000 head of cattle to be delivered, 159,000 have been +delivered to the Reich up to now. + +360,000,000 eggs have been collected. 92,000,000 of those eggs were +delivered for the Reich, and 85,000,000 are already in possession of +the Reich; the remaining 7,000,000 eggs would be delivered within the +next few days. + +The other deliveries were also being executed without friction on the +whole, and it was hoped that the necessary achievements, for example in +honey, poultry and sugar, would be completely fulfilled. + +The _Governor General_ expresses his satisfaction over those results +and points out in that connection, that two thirds of the increase +in the rations, carried out in the Reich were to be credited to the +General Government, according to a statement of Ministerialdirektor +Riche. + +President _Naumann_ then takes a position to the question concerning +the distribution of the remaining stocks of food in the General +Government. It was stated in the decree of 25 August 1942 that a +decrease in the rations should occur, respectively that rations should +be denied completely to the Polish population not working for the +German interest. + +The following plan has now been taken into consideration: + +Starting 1 February 1942 the food ration cards should not be +issued to the individual Pole or Ukrainian by the Nutrition Office +[Ernaehrungsamt], but to the establishments working for the German +interest. 2,000,000 people would thus be eliminated from the +non-German, normal ration-consuming contingent. Now, if those ration +cards are only distributed by the factories, part of those people will +naturally rush into the factories. Labor could then be either procured +for Germany from them or they could be used for the most important +work in the factories of the General Government. This would also +constitute a help for the main department of labor to a certain extent, +enabling it to get a better control over the available labor potential +within the Polish population. In the case of the eventual exclusion of +2,000,000 Poles from the rationing system, the family members of the +non-German, working population could be granted higher rations under +circumstances, as for instance in the form of an increase of the bread +ration to 1400 gr., the allotment of flour and larger meat rations. + +The Plant-manager [Betriebsfuehrer] must, of course, realize the +responsibility conferred upon him by the distribution of those food +ration cards, and statements about the number of workers employed by +the establishment must be absolutely correct. + +Very harsh directives must, therefore, be issued in order to avoid +eventual frauds; the plant-manager is personally responsible for the +correctness of the number, which he must report every month. + +It is planned furthermore to put a certain amount of foodstuff at the +disposal of the _Polish Central Committee_, for the purpose of taking +adequate care of old and infirm people, who cannot work any longer. + +After having reached into the existing stocks, the main attention will +have to be directed towards the greatest effort to _secure the harvest +1943_. + +He has, therefore, already in September instructed his Department II to +draft the necessary plans for it. + + + PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2233-Z-PS + + FRANK DIARY, 1942, Part IV. + +Official Meeting of Political Leaders of the NSDAP Area of Operation in + the General Government. + + Cracow. 14 Dec. 1942 + +[Page 1329, lines 11-15] + +Dr. Frank: You know that we have delivered over 940,000 Polish workers +to the Reich. Thereby the General Government absolutely and relatively +stands at the head of all the European countries. This achievement is +enormous: it has also been recognized as such by Gauleiter Sauckel. + +[Page 1331, lines 5-7, 18-34] + +Dr. Frank: I will endeavor to get out of the reservoir of this +territory everything that is yet to be got out of it. + +When you consider that it was possible for me to deliver to the Reich +600,000 tons of bread grain, and in addition 180,000 tons to the Armed +Forces stationed here; further an abundance amounting to many thousands +of tons of other commodities such as seed, fats, vegetables, besides +the delivery to the Reich of 300 million eggs, etc--you can estimate +the significance this territory possesses for the Reich. In order to +make clear to you the significance of the consignment from the General +Government of 600,000 tons of bread grain, you are referred to the +fact that the General Government by this achievement alone covers the +raising of the bread ration in the Greater German Reich by two-thirds +during the present rationing period. This enormous achievement can +rightfully be claimed by us. + + + PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2233-AA-PS + + FRANK DIARY, Official Meetings, 1943 + + Warsaw, 25 January 1943 + +Present: Dr. Hans FRANK and others + +[Page 16] + +State Secretary Krueger: When we settled about the first 4,000 in Kreis +Zamosc shortly before Christmas I had an opportunity to speak to these +people. + +* * * * * * * + +(State Secretary Krueger) It is understandable that in resettling this +area * * * we did not make friends of the Poles. + +* * * * * * * + +[Page 17] + +(State Secretary Krueger) In colonizing this territory with racial +Germans, we are forced to chase out the Poles. + +* * * * * * * + +(State Secretary Krueger) We are removing those who constitute a burden +in this new colonization territory. Actually, they are the asocial +and inferior elements. They are being deported, first brought to a +concentration camp, and then sent as labor to the Reich. From a Polish +propaganda standpoint this entire first action has had an unfavorable +effect. For the Poles say: After the Jews have been destroyed then they +will employ the same methods to get the Poles out of this territory and +liquidate them just like the Jews. + +* * * * * * * + +[Page 19] + +(State Secretary Krueger) As I have mentioned a great deal of unrest in +Polish territory has resulted because of this resettlement. + +* * * * * * * + +Dr. Frank: We will discuss each individual case of resettlement in the +future exactly in the same manner as in the case of Zamosc, so that you +will, Mr. State Secretary, appear before me and render a report. + +* * * * * * * + +[Page 53] + +Dr. Frank: Gentlemen, be assured that this composite structure of +General Government, on which all who are gathered around this table +have worked so splendidly, really has the power to endure over this +period. The great task which is given us will grow more difficult. No +one will help us; we are fully and entirely dependent on ourselves. +The Fuehrer can only help us as a kind of administrative island or +administrative pill-box. We must defend ourselves from all sides. +To all criticism of methods which we have heard--you know my basic +principle, I don’t need to say it in this circle--I would like to +stress one thing: we must not be squeamish when we learn that a total +of 17,000 people have been shot. These persons who were shot were +nothing more than war victims. If we compare this number against the +irreplaceable blood sacrifices which the German people uninterruptedly +day by day and every hour are making, then it weighs as nothing in the +balance. We are now duty bound to hold together. Each must bring with +him understanding for the other, he must be convinced that he is doing +his best. The main thing is that we do not allow any personal slackness +to arise. We must remember that we, who are gathered together here, +figure on Mr. Roosevelt’s list of war criminals. I have the honour of +being Number One. We have, so to speak, become accomplices in the world +historic sense. Just because of this we must hold together, and be in +agreement with one another, and it would be ridiculous if we were to +let ourselves get involved in any squabbles over methods. + + + PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2233-BB-PS + + FRANK DIARY + + Loose Leaf Bound File, 1 Jan. 1944--28 Feb. 1944. + + Speech to Members of District Standortfuehrung to Political Leaders, + Conference Room of District Standortfuehrung Cracow. + + 14 January 1944. + +[Page 24, lines 10-14] + +Frank: Once we have won the war, then, for all I care, mincemeat can be +made of the Poles and the Ukrainians and all the others who run around +here--it doesn’t matter what happens. * * * + + # # # # # + +Meeting of the Political Leaders of the NSDAP in General Government +Area, on 15 January 1944 in NSDAP House Cracow. + +[Page 13, lines 9-11] + +Frank: I have not been hesitant in declaring that when a German is +shot, up to 100 Poles shall be shot too * * * + + # # # # # + +Conference with Ambassador Counselor Dr. Schumburg, 8 February 1944, at +the Castle, Cracow. + +[Page 7, lines 19-28] + +* * * Ambassador Counselor Dr. Schumburg then brought up the question +of a possible amnesty of Poles who, because of trivial offences or +trespass of the law, had been taken to the concentration camp Auschwitz +and kept there for months. + +The Governor General will take under consideration an amnesty, probably +for 1 May of this year. Nevertheless, one must not lose sight of the +fact that the German leadership of the General Government must not show +any kind of weakness. + + + PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2233-CC-PS + + FRANK DIARY, 1939, Page 99. + + 14 December 1939 + +The General Governor announces the following order of rank: + + 1. General Governor + 2. Reich Minister Seyss-Inquart + 3A. Ministerial Director Dr. Buehler + 3B. The first SS and police leaders + 4. The district chiefs + 5. The department leaders of the Office of the General Governor + 6. Office Chief and first police leaders of the District Chief + + + PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2237-PS + + SECRET + + File on actions against the Jews in November 1938 + +1120 + + Action against the Jews on 9 and 10 November 1938 + + Legal Regulations + + Reich Commissioner for the Re-Union of Austria with the German Reich + + Vienna I, 18 November 1938 + Parliament + phone R, 50-5-60 + + To the Minister President, + Generalfieldmarshal Goering + _Berlin_ + + Sir! + +The action in Vienna which took place during the night from 9 to 10 +November was finished up completely by Tuesday. + +The following is what happened substantially: + +A decree of Dr. Goebbels, the Reichsminister for Propaganda, but +above all his speech which he delivered in Berlin on the evening of +9 Oct 1938 as well as the contents of the speech he made in Munich +were preludes for this so-called action. Though the hint was somehow +indefinite, no different conclusion could be drawn since it said: +“The fire-department has to be notified”. This order was not given +in the first place to the district leaders, but the lower echelons +[Gliederungen] were notified first so that the district-leader had no +chance to possibly take counter-measures. Besides there existed a few +orders which were farther reaching than the hint by Dr. Goebbels. Here +in Vienna in many cases even the schools were closed in the morning +so that the youth could participate--“according to the order” in +the demonstrations. As always happens in such cases, the disorderly +elements soon were leading and 40 different places were on fire. Around +noontime the Major reported that the fire-department was no more in the +position to control the situation. Simultaneously, the tumult against +the Jewish stores began. That, one may say was the signal for the +day and the night of the long fingers. How did the Party act in this +situation, and especially the political leaders? + +Fieldmarshal, I assure you, that after thorough investigation I am able +to state today that the political leaders, and that is the district +leaders and their Kreis-leaders, are the ones who have prevented chaos +in Vienna. Enormous quantities of stolen merchandise, above all jewelry +and valuables were safeguarded immediately by the Kreis-leaders, and +at this moment an inventory is being made. Gold, silver and valuables +will be brought to a safe in a bank today. There is no question of +returning the goods which were taken away from the Jews because one +does not know their original owners and also because the Jews make the +most outrageous and untruthful statements. Therefore I am forced, my +Fieldmarshal, to safeguard an extremely high quantity of valuables. The +rest of the goods will be checked, and shall be sold to retail-shops +for the purchase-value, since we have to expect a scarcity of goods on +account of the protective measures for our territory which we had to +take [Gebietsschutzmassnahmen]. + +Especially the enclosed orders will be necessary, for the restoration +of normal conditions and of a legal status. + +Fieldmarshal, please do examine the enclosures. In case you have no +objections, I would like to enforce them immediately. + +I may refer again to my request for support as for the introduction +of the laws on organization and also for the execution of the +Fuehrer-order. + + Heil Hitler! + sign.: [illegible] + + # # # # # + + Telephone-message of the Kripo D.D. + +State Police Vienna, Reg. Rat Dr. Pifrader gives the following +information via phone at 07,30: + +Since the Kripo-agencies [Kripostellen] of the “POl.-Aemter” are +constantly making inquiries at the state police (Stapo), they will have +to be informed by phone of the following: + +Influential and rich male Jews of German nationality of not too high an +age and who are healthy have to be arrested. + +The owners of the firearms are to be treated especially severely and a +special notation has to be made about them. + +The police agencies [Po. Amtsdienststellen] have to be informed (as top +secret) that the property of all native Jews has to be razed entirely. +Therefore the police is not supposed to come to the aid of Jews in such +cases. + +Fires may be started only where there is no danger that the fire may +spread. Therefore, as a rule, not in narrowly built parts of the city. + +On a whole about 3,000 Jews are to be arrested. + + Dr. Bayer D.D. of the Kripo + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2239-PS + + Secret State Police / State Police Precinct WEIMAR. + Received March 12, 1945 + [red stamp] + FS.-NR. 2470 + [blue stamp] + + PRAG NR. 8005 2.3.45 1730--KIL-- + To State Police DARMSTADT + + Subject: Protective prisoner ALEX MUUL, born Nov. 1, 1899 in KRIUSCH, + Russia Estonia. + + Reference: Report of January 26, 1945--ROEM. 4-6 Kl. + B--2181/44--SCHM.-- + + Protective custody until further notice + + Examination date May 19, 1945 + + Reason: Anti-German remarks + + As prisoner of grade--11--to be left in concentration camp Buchenwald. + + RSHA-ROEM. 4A 6 Kl. B--Nr. M 34 591-- + + DR. KALTENBRUNNER + + # # # # # + + File of Orders for Commitment to Concentration Camps + +All issued by RSHA, Amt IV A 6, Prague to Stapo Darmstadt signed by Dr. + KALTENBRUNNER. + +---------+--------------------+--------------+-----+-----------+----------- +Date | Grounds | KL |Class| Name |Nationality +---------+--------------------+--------------+-----+-----------+----------- +6.10.44 |Vagrancy, suspected |Lachrenhausen | I | Vaculik |Czech + | subversive | | | | + | activity | | | | + | | | | | +20.9.44 |Sex relations with |Ravensbrueck | -- | Hartmann |German + | Pole | | | | + | | | | | +30.9.44 |Refusal to work |Ravensbrueck | -- | Hilbert |German + | | | | | +19.10.44 |Religious |Dachau | I | Bruecher |German + | propaganda | | | | + | | | | | +2.11.44 |Association with |Ravensbrueck | -- | Wetzel |German + | Frenchmen and | | | | + | suggesting breach | | | | + | of labor contract | | | | + | | | | | +22.11.44 |Sex relations with |Ravensbrueck | -- | Merz |German + | PW’s. | | | | + | | | | | +2.12.44 |Work sabotage and |Dachau | I | Meriadec |French PW + | obstinacy | | | | + | | | | | +2.12.44 |Work sabotage |Dachau | I | Selderyk |Dutch + | | | | | +20.12.44 |Sexual intercourse |Ravensbrueck | -- | Dillmann |German + | with Pole | | | | + | | | | | +20.12.44 |Work sabotage |Ravensbrueck | -- | Francurchi|[French?] + | | | | | Corsican + | | | | | +27.12.44 |Vagrancy; escape |Dachau | I | Garco |Italian + | from transport; | | | | + | illegal use of RB. | | | | + | | | | | +31.12.44 |Escape from |Dachau | I | Dellominut|Italian + | transport, | | | | + | vagrancy | | | | + | | | | | +31.12.44 |Work sabotage and |Ravensbrueck | -- |Buettner |German + | association with | | | | + | foreigners | | | | + | | | | | +12.1.45 |Molestation and |Hossenburg | II |Nomkin |Lithuanian + | threatening of | | | | + | German woman; | | | | + | Communist | | | | + | statements | | | | + | | | | | +20.1.45 |Loafing on job |Bergen-Belsen | -- |Filber |German + | repeatedly | | | | + | | | | | +1.2.45 |Conduct inimical to |Hossenburg | II |Leclair |French + | Germany; spreading | | | | + | of enemy | | | | + | propaganda; | | | | + | suspected | | | | + | membership in | | | | + | resistance | | | | + | movement | | | | + | | | | | +9. 2.45 |Working against |Buchenwald | I |Etie |French + | Reich | | | | + | | | | | +9. 2.45 |Spreading of rumors |Buchenwald | I |Farichon |French + | detrimental to | | | | + | morale | | | | + | | | | | +9. 2.45 |Spreading of rumors |KL transfer | |Farichon |French + | detrimental to | later | | | + | morale | | | | + | | | | | +2. 3.45 |“Aktion Gitter” |Dachau | I |Laux |German + | | | | | +2. 3.45 |“Aktion Gitter” |Dachau | I |Appel |German + | | | | | +2. 3.45 |Creating public |(KL transfer | |Rauxloh |German + | nuisance | later) | | | + | | | | | +2. 3.45 |Black market |Buchenwald | I |Cau |French + | | | | | +2. 3.45 |Breach of work |Buchenwald | I |Coudoning |French + | contract | | | | + | | | | | +2. 3.45 |Sex relations with |(Investigation| |Meyer |German + | French PW. | cont’d) | | | + | | | | | +2. 3.45 |Black market |Flossenburg | II |Biache |French + | operator | | | | + | | | | | +2. 3.45 |Black marketing of |Dachau | I |Fruche |French + | stolen goods | | | | + | | | | | +2. 3.45 |“Aktion Gitter” |Dachau | I |Rueffer |German + | | | | | +2. 3.45 |Work sabotage; |Buchenwald | I |Revenranius|Greek + | suspected activity | | | | + | | | | | +2. 3.45 |Loafing on job; |(KL transfer | |Oberle |German + | creating public | later) | | | + | nuisance | | | | + | | | | | +2. 3.45 |Statements against |Buchenwald | I |Agurini |Italian + | Germany | | | | + | | | | | +2. 3.45 |Statements against |Buchenwald | II |Muul |[USSR?] + | Germany | | | | + | | | | | +2. 3.45 |Loafing on job |Thurenanstadt | |Lang |Jew + | | | | | +2. 3.45 |{“Aktion Gitter” |Ravensbrueck | |Maurer |Jew + | Man and wife? | | | | + | | | | | +2. 3.45 |{“Aktion Gitter” |Dachau | I |Maurer |German + | | | | | +2. 3.45 |Assault on foreman |Buchenwald | I |Toorn |Dutch + | | | | | +2. 3.45 |Theft of foodstuffs;|Dachau | IA |Rouanet |French + | resale at excess | | | | + | prices; or | | | | + | bartering | | | | + | | | | | +2. 3.45 |Defeatist statements|(KL transfer | |Ezrenlaub |German + | | later) | | | + | | | | | +2. 3.45 |Working against |Buchenwald | II |Bougoen | ? + | Reich | | | | + | | | | | +2. 3.45 |Attempted looting |Buchenwald | II |Borge | ? + | after air raid | | | | + | | | | | +2. 3.45 |Theft and escape |Buchenwald | I |Top |Dutch + | from jail | | | | + | | | | | +2. 3.45 |Work sabotage |(KL later) | |Eberhardt |German +---------+---------------------+--------------+-----+-----------+---------- + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2241-PS + + The employment of foreign labor forces in Germany. + +Decree of the Plenipotentiary General for Manpower on the execution of +the transportation of workers, in this case: damage to and soiling of +passenger coaches of the German Railways and their fittings. + + 20 July 1942. + +In his letter of 10 August 1940--21 Bauer 106--the Reich Minister +of Transport laid down that the management of the German Railway be +directed that the costs of the repair of damage caused to railway +coaches and their fittings by the careless or malicious behaviour of +foreign workers in special labour trains be charged to the guilty +persons, and where these are not determined, to the authorities +responsible for the transportation. After the German Railway claimed +again last winter considerable damage to and extraordinary soiling of +railway coaches, it proposed to the management of the German Railway +the demand of the costs of the repair of the damage and soiling +from the Manpower Authorities. In this respect I direct, that it +must definitely be left to the German Railway to pull up the guilty +transport users. The writing off of the costs on the budget of the +Reich stocks [Reichstocks] can only be considered exceptionally in +the event of special circumstances. All cases are particularly to be +refused in which the workers used normal trains or in which the damage +was caused by deficiencies in the special trains provided. + +According to reports of transportation commanders [Transportleiters] +presented to me, the special trains provided by the German Railway have +frequently been in a really deficient condition. Numerous windowpanes +have been missing in the coaches. Old French coaches without lavatories +have been partly employed, so that the workers had to fit up an emptied +compartment as a lavatory. In other cases the coaches were not heated +in winter so that the lavatories quickly became unusable because the +water system was frozen and the flushing apparatus was therefore +without water. + +In order to obtain reliable records of the condition of special trains +at the time of provision, in agreement with the Reich Minister of +Transport, I beg to direct the transportation commanders, together with +a representative of the station of departure, to determine in writing +before the departure of a special train the deficiencies existing in +the interior fittings of the railway coaches. The records are to be +given up after completion of the transport operation to the labour +reception office which has to present them to the competent state +labour office. The transportation commanders will have to contact +the office director of the station at least 1 to 2 hours before the +departure of the train. + +Simultaneously, I beg to direct the transportation commanders to give +particular attention during the journey to the exclusion of damage and +soiling of the railway carriages. + +In view of the further tasks, involved in the winding up of the +transport operation, incumbent on the transportation commander he +will have to be relieved of the further mutual determination of the +condition of railway carriages at the end of the journey. + +I transfer the discharge of claims of the German Railway in respect of +repairs to the state labour offices in whose area the special train was +dispersed. + + + PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2243-PS + + 1937 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 325 + + Law relating to Finance Measures in connection with the Police + + 19 March 1937 + +The government of the Reich has resolved upon the following law, which +is hereby proclaimed: + + + 1 + +(1) The following are to become direct officials of the Reich: + +1. Officials in organizing posts of the establishment “Reichfuehrer +of SS and Chief of the German Police in the Reich Ministry of the +Interior.” + +2. Officials of the Security Police [Gestapo and Criminal Police], but +not police officials serving in the State Police Administrations for +the Criminal Police. + +3. Officials of the Civil Police, the Gendarmerie and the police +medical and veterinary officers serving therein, professional police +instructors and technical officials. + +(2) The employees and workers who: + + serve in the establishment mentioned in paragraph 1. No. 1, + + serve in the Security Police, the Civil Police, the Gendarmerie and + the auxiliary establishments belonging to them, such as schools, + hospitals, convalescent homes, supply offices and equipment offices + and persons who + + serve in the State Police Administrations + + enter into the service of the Reich. + +(3) The number of appointments of police administrative officials +henceforth remaining dependent on the finances of the districts can +be determined by the Reich Minister for Finance in agreement with the +Reich Minister of the Interior. + + + 2 + +The Reich pays the personal allowances and bears the maintenance +expenses of the officials, employees and workers of the Reich mentioned +in (1) paragraphs 1 and 2 and the material expenditure of the whole of +the State Police but not the personal allowances, maintenance expenses +and costs of removal of the Police Administrative officials mentioned +in (1) paragraph 3. + + + 3 + +(1) The revenues of the State Police are revenues of the Reich. + +(2) The only revenues to remain in the districts are those which are +still to be booked for the Financial Year 1936, and all revenues from +taxes and fines. + + + 4 + +(1) The Reich will assume all property dues and rights which are +connected with the State Police of the districts, in so far as they +are not left to the districts according to 2 and 3. When the law comes +into force, the liability of the Reich is also extended to taking +over maintenance allowances falling due to persons who were formerly +entitled to them. + +(2) The Reich also assumes the responsibility, which, according to +the instructions regarding the liability of officials, rests with +the districts, for damage caused by police administrative officials, +who according to (1) remain under the districts. The districts owe +compensation to the Reich; their right to make claims against officials +is untouched. + + + 5 + +The authorities who hitherto represented the districts (exchequer) +in matters relating to the police, will now represent the Reich +(exchequer) in these matters. The Reich Minister of the Interior can +arrange the representation otherwise. + + + 6 + +(1) Premises and movable property belonging to the districts will +become the property of the Reich if at the time of the proclamation of +the law they are being used exclusively or mainly by the State Police +or the establishments mentioned in (1) paragraph 2 or are intended for +future use by these establishments. + +(2) The premises of the Reich and Prussian Ministry of the Interior in +Berlin, Unter den Linden 70/72/74, and the premises of the Chief of +Police in Berlin which are to be specially indicated in the executive +orders, will remain exempt from transference to the Reich. + +(3) Due to the transference of property to the Reich, taxes, duties and +other fees will not be levied. Cash payments remain out of account. + +(4) When this law comes into force, if any premises transferred to the +Reich become dispensable or unfit to be employed for the purposes of +the Reich police, without replacement being necessary, they are to be +offered for use to the district without recompense, in their present +state, before further use is made of them. + + + 7 + +(1) Where the Reich, the districts or the municipalities (municipal +unions) have placed officials, employees and workers or property at +the disposal of the State Police or of the establishments mentioned in +(1) paragraph 2, or have carried out service transactions, no change +will occur until a further ruling is made by the Reich Minister of +the Interior. The same applies in cases where the State Police or the +establishments mentioned in (1) paragraph 2 have placed their official +employees and workers or property at the disposal of other authorities +or have carried out service transactions, which have no connection with +police duties. + +(2) No further compensations than hitherto may be claimed for the +services mentioned in paragraph 1. + + + 8 + +The municipalities will pay their contributions to the Reich for the +State Police according to the regulations hitherto in existence. The +total contribution paid by the municipalities of a district during the +Financial Year 1936 may not be exceeded. A special ruling may occur +in cases of state control or regional change. The contributions of +the municipalities can be reckoned on the shares in the Reich revenue +remittances of the district. + + + 9 + +The shares of a district in the Reich revenue remittances are for each +Financial Year, first of all for the Financial Year 1937, reduced by +the balance between the expenditure and the revenues (deficit) of +its police, who, by this law are taken over on the Reich budget. The +deficit is calculated on the basis of the budget of the district for +the Financial Year 1936. If a greater deficit should be evident in +the average of the Financial Years 1925 to 1934, this deficit is the +standard. The Reich Minister for Finance fixes the sum to be reduced. + + + 10 + +The districts must place at the disposal of the Reich the remaining +expenses carried over into the Financial Year 1936 and not yet paid out +at the end of that year. The districts must also place at the disposal +of the Reich the additional sums not yet paid out at the end of the +Financial Year 1936, which are made over by the Reich, and which are +extra subsidies towards the material expenditure of the State Police. + + + 11 + +The Reich Ministers for Finance and for the Interior will determine +whether and how financial compensation is to be carried out if, in +the municipalities (municipal unions) municipal, uniformed police +officials are replaced by State Police or if, in the state police +administrations, the relative authorities of the State Police and the +municipal (remaining) police are ruled otherwise. + + + 12 + +For the officials, employees and workers of the State Police or of the +establishments mentioned in (1) paragraph 2, who are entering into the +direct service of the Reich, the legal and administrative orders of the +districts are to be applied temporarily. The Reich Minister for the +Interior can make a further ruling in agreement with the Prussian Prime +Minister. + + + 13 + +In so far as State contracts or other agreements between districts for +matters concerning their police are not rendered inapplicable by this +law, they will remain in force as Reich legal orders. + + + 14 + +The Reich Ministers of the Interior and for Finance will issue the +necessary legal and administrative orders for the execution and the +completion of this law and will decide upon all questions of doubt +arising from the application of this law. If the functions of other +ministers are thereby affected their approval is necessary. + + + 15 + +This law comes into force on 1st April 1937. + +Berlin, 19th March 1937. + + The Fuehrer and Chancellor of the Reich + Adolf Hitler + + The Reich Minister of the Interior + Frick + + The Reich Minister for Finance + Graf Schwerin von Krosigk + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2245-PS + + 1936 MINISTERIAL GAZETTE OF THE REICH AND PRUSSIAN MINISTER OF THE + INTERIOR + + [Reichsministerialblatt] + + The Employment of Security Police Inspectors + + [Pages 1343, 1344] + + Circular Decree by the Reich and Prussian Minister of the Interior + dated 20.9.1936. + + Police Special Order 1. 7/36 g + + (already promulgated) + +1. With effect from 1.10.1936 I am appointing Security Police +Inspectors to the Prussian Provinces and the States of Baden, Bavaria, +Wuerttemberg and Saxony. Detailed decrees to follow. + +2. The duties to be undertaken by these Inspectors and entailed by +their appointment are laid down in the appended Service Directives for +Security Police Inspectors. + +3. A special decree will be promulgated regarding the appointment of +Security Police Inspectors to the remaining States. + +To the State Governments (for Prussia: to the Prussian +Ministerpraesident), the Ober- & Regierungs-Praesidente, to the Gestapo +Office in Berlin, to the State Political Head Offices, to the State +Political Offices. + + # # # # # + +Police Special Order 1. + + Circular Decree of 20.9.1936 + + 272/36 + + +_Appendix_ + + Service Directive for Security Police Inspectors + +1. The special duties of the Security Police necessitate the closest +and most sympathetic cooperation with the Central Offices of the +General and Interior Administrations of the Provinces and States +as well as with the Gauleiters of the NSDAP and the Armed Forces +Authorities. + +2. The Security Police Inspectors are to foster this cooperation. +Especially are they to keep in the closest contact with the +Oberpraesident and/or the Ministry of the Interior of their area and to +keep them informed of all important occurrences, all essential reports +and observations of the Security Police and where necessary stimulate +the authorities of the Interior Administration and eliminate any +difficulties which may arise. + +3. The Security Police Inspectors are personally and immediately +subordinate to the Oberpraesident and/or Staatsminister of the Interior +and are to follow his directives. Should these directives not be in +accordance with the general and special Orders and Directions of the +Chief of Security Police and should it be impossible to reach an +agreement, then the Chief of Security Police is to be referred to for a +decision. + +4. The inspectors are furthermore charged with the task of supervising +the execution in their area of any Decrees issued by the Chief of +Security Police. They are to ensure that the Gestapo and the Civil +Police are organized on the same basis. Any difficulties arising are to +be reported to the Chief of Security Police together with suggestions +as to how they may be overcome. + + + PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2246-PS + +The Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Ambassador of the German Reich on +Special Mission + + Vienna, 1 September 1936 + +To: The Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor, Berlin (by courier) + +Subject: Report on Danube situation. + +* * * * * * * + +The progress of normalizing relations with Germany at the present time +is obstructed by the continued persistence of the Ministry of Security, +occupied by the old anti-National Socialist officials. Changes in +personnel are therefore of utmost importance. But they are definitely +not to be expected prior to the conference on the abolishing of the +Control of Finances [Finanzkontrolle] at Geneva. The Chancellor of the +League has informed Minister de Glaise-Horstenau, of his intention, to +offer him the portfolio of the Ministry of the Interior. + +As a guiding principle [Marschroute], I recommend on the tactical side, +continued, patient psychological treatment, with slowly intensified +pressure directed at changing the regime. The proposed conference on +economic relations, taking place at the end of October, will be a very +useful tool for the realization of some of our projects. In discussion +with government officials as well as with leaders of the illegal party +(Leopold and Schattenfroh) who conform completely with the agreement +of July 11, I am trying to direct the next developments in such a +manner to aim at corporative representation of the movement in the +fatherland front [Vaterlaendischen Front] but nevertheless refraining +from putting National-socialists in important positions for the time +being. However such positions are to be occupied only by personalities, +having the support and the confidence of the movement. I have a willing +collaborator in this respect in Minister Glaise-Horstenau. + + (Signature) Papen + + + PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2247-PS + +The Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary on Special Mission + + At present Berlin W.9, Lennestr. 9, 17 May 1935 + +Mein Fuehrer: + +* * * * * * * + +The news, which I communicated to you the day before yesterday, that +the Austrian Government would proclaim its intention to arm through +an autonomous act and simultaneously on 2 June would announce a +Starhemberg regency becomes more and more likely. + +* * * * * * * + +I suggest that we take an active part in this game. The fundamental +idea should be to pit Schuschnig and his Christian-social Forces, +who are opposed to a home front dictatorship, against Starhemberg. +The possibility of thwarting the measures arranged between Mussolini +and Starhemberg should be afforded to him, in such way that he would +submit the offer to the government of a definitive German-Austrian +compromise of interests. According to the convincing opinion of the +leader of the NSDAP in Austria, Capt. Leopold, the totalitarian +principle of the NSDAP in Austria must be replaced in the beginning by +a combination of that part of the Christian-elements which favors the +Greater Germany idea and the NSDAP. If Germany recognizes the national +independence of Austria and guarantees full freedom to the Austrian +national opposition, then as a result of such a compromise the Austrian +government would be formed in the beginning by a coalition of these +forces. + +There should follow a gradual disintegration of the barriers erected +between the two countries. The rearmament of the army would have to be +effected in close cooperation with the German army even if material aid +from Germany would be limited. + +A further consequence of this step would be the possibility of the +participation of Germany in the Danube pact, which would take the sting +out of its acuteness due to the settlement of relations between Germany +and Austria. Such a measure would have a most beneficial influence on +the European situation and especially on our relationship with England. + +One may object, that Mr. Schuschnig will hardly be determined to follow +such a pattern, that he will rather in all probability immediately +communicate our offer to our opponents. + +Of course, one should first of all explore the possibility of setting +Schuschnig against Starhemberg through the use of “Go-betweens”. The +possibility exists. If Mr. Schuschnig will finally say “no” and makes +our offer known in Rome, then the situation would not be any worse by +that; but, on the contrary, the efforts of the Reich government to +make peace with Austria would be revealed--without prejudice to other +interests. Therefore even in the case of refusal this last attempt +would be an asset. I consider it completely possible, that in view +of the far spread dislike of the Alpine countries of the pro-Italian +course and in view of the sharp tensions within the federal government +[Bundesregierung], Mr. Schuschnig will grasp this last straw--always +under the supposition that the offer could not be interpreted as a +trap by the opponents, but that it bears all the mark of an actually +honest compromise with Austria. + +Assuming success of this step, we would again establish our active +intervention in Central European politics, which, as opposed to the +French-Czech and Russian political maneuvers, would be a tremendous +success, both morally and practically. + +Since there are 2 weeks left to accomplish very much work in the way of +explorations and Conferences, an immediate decision is necessary. + +The Reich Army Minister shares the opinion presented above and the +Reich Foreign Minister wanted to discuss it with you, my Fuehrer. + + (signed) Papen. + + + PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2248-PS + + The Extraordinary Emissary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the German + Reich in Special Mission. + + Vienna, July 27, 1935. + + To the Fuehrer and Chancellor + _BERLIN_ + by courier. + + Contents: + One year after the death of the Bundeskanzler Dollfuss. + Review and Outlook. + +* * * * * * * + +It seems to me to be expedient to use this incident ourselves also to +draw the balance. + +* * * * * * * + +National Socialism must and will overpower the new Austrian ideology. +If today it is contended in Austria that the NSDAP is only a +centralized Reich German party and therefore unable to transfer the +spirit of thought of National Socialism to groups of people of a +different political make-up, the answer must rightly be that the +national revolution in Germany could not have been brought about in a +different way. But when the creation of the people’s community in the +Reich will be completed, National socialism could, in a much wider +sense than this is possible through the present party organization--at +least apparently--certainly become the rallying point for all racially +German units beyond the borders. Spiritual progress in regard to +Austria cannot be achieved today with any centralized tendency. +If this recognition would once and for all be stated clearly from +within the Reich, then it would easily become possible to effect a +break-through into the front of the New Austria. A Nurnberg Party Day +designated as “The German Day” as in old times and the proclamation of +a national socialistic people’s front, would be a stirring event for +all beyond the borders of the Reich. Such attacks would win us also the +particularistic Austrian circles, whose spokesman, the legitimistic +Count Dubsky wrote in his pamphlet about the “Anschluss”: The Third +Reich will be with Austria, or it will not be at all. National +Socialism must win it or it will perish, if it is unable to solve this +task; * * * + + (signed) Papen. + + + PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2260-PS + + SETTLEMENT OF RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NSDAP AND STAHLHELM (STEEL HELMETS) + + From Page 1, Issue 422, 21 June 1933, of “NSK” National Socialist + Party Press Agency [NSK, Pressedienst der NSDAP, the official news + agency of the NSDAP]. Edited by Wilhelm Weiss. Responsible for + communications of the Reich Press Office Dr. Otto Dietrich, Reich + Press Chief. Published by Franz Eher Successor, Munich. + +NSK The Reich Press Office of the NSDAP informs us: + +The following agreement was reached in a conference that took place +today between the Reich Chancellor, the Reich Labor Minister Seldte, +the Reich War Minister and the Vice-Chancellor: + +To ensure the striking power of the National Socialist revolution the +Stahlhelm, League of front-line Soldiers [Bund der Frontsoldaten], +integrates itself into the National Socialist movement in the following +manner: + +_a._ The Old-Guard Nucleus of the Stahlhelm [Kernstahlhelm] remains, as +heretofore, under the leadership of the League Leader. + +_b._ The League Leader prohibits, as of now, any party membership +except that in the NSDAP to members of the Old-Guard Nucleus of the +Stahlhelm. + +_c._ The leader of the NSDAP, Adolf Hitler, thus permits membership in +the Stahlhelm for the NSDAP. + +_d._ The Stahlhelm Youth [Jungstahlhelm] takes its place side by +side with the SA and SS, and is subordinate to the Supreme SA Leader +[Obersten SA-Fuehrer]. The “Scharnhorst” will be integrated into the +Hitler Youth. + +_e._ The leader of the Stahlhelm Youth [Jungstahlhelm] von Morozowicz, +joins the staff of the Supreme SA Leader. + +Berlin, 21 June 1933. + + Adolf Hitler + Franz Seldte + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2261-PS + + TOP SECRET + + Copy + + The Reich Minister of War and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces + +No. 1820/35 Top Secret L. II a + + Berlin, 24 June 1935 + +To + + The Supreme Commander of the Army + The Supreme Commander of the Navy + The Supreme Commander of the Air Forces + +In the appendix I transmit one copy each of the law for the defense of +the Reich of the 21 May 1935 and of a decision of the Reichs Cabinet +of 21 May 1935 concerning the Reich’s defense council. The publication +of the Reich’s defense law is temporarily suspended by order of the +Fuehrer and Reichschancellor. + +The Fuehrer and Reichschancellor has nominated the President +of the directorate of the Reichsbank Dr. Schacht to be +“plenipotentiary-general for war economy”. + +I request that the copies of the Reich defense law needed within the +units of the armed forces be ordered before 1 July 1935 at armed forces +office (L) where it is to be established with the request that the law +should only be distributed down to Corps Headquarters outside of the +Reichministry of war. + +I point out the necessity of strictest secrecy once more. + + (signed) von Blomberg. + + # # # # # + + No. 1820/35 L Top Secret II a Berlin, 3 Sept 1935 + To _Defense--Economic Group G-3_ + transmitted (copy) + (signed) Jodl + + # # # # # + + Copy + + Reich Defense Law of 21 May 1935 + +The Reich Cabinet has enacted the following law that is hereby made +public: + + + Part I State of Defense + + + ARTICLE 1 + +The Fuehrer and Reichschancellor can declare a state of defense for the +area of the Reich in case danger of war threatens. + + + ARTICLE 2 + +(1) With the declaration of a state of defense the entire power +of execution devolves upon the Fuehrer and Reichschancellor. The +Reichsminister of war exercises it by his orders. + +(2) The Reichsminister is empowered in the carrying out of the power of +execution to issue legal regulations which may deviate from existing +laws. He can, in order to enforce his regulation, threaten punishments +and set up special courts. + + + ARTICLE 3 + +(1) The Reichsministers are to observe the instructions of the +Reichsminister of war. They remain the highest Reich authorities within +their realm of activity. + +(2) The Reichsministers will in case of a state of defense effect the +necessary measures and are empowered to issue legal regulations which +may deviate from existing laws. + + + Part II Mobilization + + + ARTICLE 4 + +(1) If conflict with an external enemy becomes unavoidable, the Fuehrer +and Reichschancellor can order mobilization. + +(2) The ordering of mobilization includes in itself the declaration +of a state of defense according to Part I, in case the latter is not +already proclaimed, without prejudice to the directive of Article Six. + +(3) With the ordering of mobilization a state of war in the definition +of this law begins. + + + ARTICLE 5 + +The Reichsministers will effect the necessary measures in case of +mobilization and are empowered to issue legal regulations which may +deviate from existing laws. + + + ARTICLE 6 + +(1) The Fuehrer and Reichschancellor will appoint a +plenipotentiary-general for war economy to direct the entire war +economy. + +(2) It is the task of the plenipotentiary-general for war-economy to +put all economic forces in the service of carrying on the war and to +secure the life of the German people economically. + +(3) Subordinate to him are: + + The Reichsminister for economy + + The Reichsminister for food and agriculture + + The Reichs labor minister + + The Reichs forest master and all Reichs’ agents immediately + subordinate to the Fuehrer and Reichschancellor. + +Furthermore the financing of the war effort (in the province of the +Reichs finance ministry and of the Reichsbank) will be carried on under +his responsibility. + +(4) The plenipotentiary-general for war economy is authorized, within +his realm of responsibility, to issue legal regulations, which may +deviate from the existing laws. + + + Part III Setting of penalties and Conclusion + + + ARTICLE 7 + +Whoever purposely or carelessly acts in violation of a decree issued by +authority of this law will be, insofar as a more severe punishment is +not stipulated according to other directives, punished with jail and +with fine or with one of these penalties. + + + ARTICLE 8 + +The Fuehrer and Reichschancellor will issue the necessary legal and +administrative directives for carrying out of this law. + +Berlin, 21 May 1935 + + The Fuehrer and Reichschancellor + (signed) ADOLF HITLER + + The Reichsminister of war + (signed) VON BLOMBERG + + The Reichsminister of the Interior + (signed) FRICK + + # # # # # + +Note on the law for the defense of the Reich of 21 May 1935 + +The publication of the law for the defense of the Reich of 21 May 1935 +will be suspended. The law became effective 21 May 1935. + + The Fuehrer and Reichschancellor + (signed) ADOLF HITLER + + # # # # # + + Copy + + Decision of the Reichscabinet of 21 May 1935 on the Council for the + defense of the Reich + +Supplementing the decision of the Reichscabinet of 4 April 1933 and +13 Dec 34 on formation of a council for defense of the Reich, the +Reichscabinet has made the following decision: + +1. The plenipotentiary-general for war economy appointed by the Fuehrer +and Reichschancellor will begin his work already in peacetime. At the +suggestion of the chairman of the Council for the defense of the Reich, +he will direct the economic preparations for war, insofar as they do +not, in reference to the armament industry fall into the province of +the Reichs’ Ministry of war. In case of mobilization the following are +subordinate to him: + + Reichministry of economic affairs + + Reichministry for food and agriculture + + Reichministry of Labor + + Reich’s forest-master and all Reichoffices immediately subordinate to + the Fuehrer. + +In case of mobilization he will direct and be responsible for the +financing of the war effort (in the province of the finance-ministry +and the Reichsbank). + +Those ministries and the Reich’s authorities are bound already in time +of peace to observe his recommendations for the preparation of a war +economy and the financing of the war-effort. + +2. The Reichsminister of War and the plenipotentiary for war economy +will effect the preparations for mobilization in closest cooperation on +both sides. + +3. The plenipotentiary-general for war-economy will be a permanent +working committee he represents through his leadership staff the +interests of war economy. The department heads [Referenten] for the +defense of the Reich of the Ministries mentioned in Point I are bound +by the recommendations of this leadership staff. + +Foundation: + +The State of War, an institution of the old law, as it was established +in the old Reichsconstitution of 1871, the Prussian law on the state +of siege of 4 June 1861 and the Bavarian law on the state of war of +5 Nov 1912, has been only incompletely replaced by Article 48 of the +Reichsconstitution of 11 August 1919. Moreover, the provisions of +Article 48 no longer correspond to the actual legal conditions. + +The new law for the defense of the Reich should create clear legal +bases for the transfer of the whole machinery of state from a state of +peace to one of war. In this connection it was to be noted that a state +of war can begin unexpectedly or from a state of foreign political +tension. Since the time of such tension must be utilized as far as +foreign political relations will bear, in order to create a readiness +for war in time, the law for the defense of the Reich provides two +steps for the transfer from state of peace to state of war: + + 1. The state of defense + 2. The mobilization + +For both steps of war preparation, the law gives the legal basis, upon +which the individual measures of the Reichsdepartments can be built up +as the council for the defense of the Reich instructs. + +It is to be mentioned in regard to the provisions of the law in detail: + +_To Article 2_ + +The exercise of the power of execution by the Reichsminister of war +under the Fuehrer and Reichschancellor should emphasize the pressing +necessity of all demands of the immediate conduct of the war and should +guarantee their fulfillment. + +_To Article 4, Section 3_ + +In numerous laws special provisions for war are contained. It is +therefore necessary, to establish the beginning of a state of war, +in respect to times in order to create clear conditions for the +administration of justice etc. Since, however, in a future war official +declarations of war are not to be expected, as a result of which +Article 42 Section 2 of the Reichsconstitution also is obsolete, the +beginning of a state of war is to be considered as being at the same +time as the beginning of the mobilization. + +_To Article 6_ + +The experiences of the great war have demonstrated the necessity +of including during a war the entire economy and the financing +of the conduct of the war under unified leadership. The +plenipotentiary-general for war-economy should according to the will of +the Fuehrer and Reichschancellor take over the responsible leadership +and stands thereby independently along side the Reichsminister of war, +the possessor of the power of execution, and responsible for his realm +of activity under the Fuehrer and Reichschancellor. + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2270-PS + + COORDINATION [GLEICHSCHALTUNG] OF COOPERATIVES + + Issue 393, 16 May 1933, of “NSK” National Socialist Party Press + Agency, [NSK, Pressedienst der NSDAP, the official news agency of the + NSDAP]. Edited by Wilhelm Weiss. Responsible for communications of + the Reich Press Office Dr Otto Dietrich, Reich Press Chief. Published + by Franz Eher, Successor, Munich. [Pages 1-2]. + +NSK. The Executive Secretaries of the Reich League of German +Cooperatives [Reichsverband Deutscher Konsumvereine] have issued the +following statement: + +The undersigned, legally competent executive secretaries of the Reich +League of German Cooperatives, Cologne, and of the Gepag hereby submit +themselves and all cooperatives affiliated to their League irrevocably +and unconditionally to the command and administrative authority of the +leader of the German Labor Front, Dr. Robert Ley, and of Party Member +Karl Mueller, the Commissioner for Cooperatives appointed by him. + + Signed: Peter SCHLACK + Signed: Rob. SCHLOESSER + Signed: Fritz KLEIN + + # # # # # + +The Executive Secretaries of the Wholesale Purchasing League of German +Cooperatives have issued the following statement: + +The undersigned, legally competent executive secretaries of the +Wholesale Purchasing League of German Cooperatives, Inc., Hamburg, +hereby submit themselves and all cooperatives affiliated to +their League irrevocably and unconditionally to the command and +administrative authority of the leader of the German Labor Front, Dr. +Robert Ley, and of Party Member Karl Mueller, the Commissioner for +Cooperatives appointed by him. + + Signed: H. EVERLING + Signed: A. GRAHL + + # # # # # + +Pursuant to these statements the leader of the German Labor Front has +issued the following order: + +_As previously announced by Party Member Bank Director Mueller on my +behalf, the German Labor Front has today taken over the leadership of +the cooperatives. The legally competent executive secretaries of the +Wholesale Purchasing League of German Cooperatives, Inc., Hamburg, and +of the Reich League of German Cooperatives, Cologne, have submitted +unconditionally and unreservedly._ + +The Chief of the economic enterprises of the German Labor Front, Party +Member Bank Director Mueller, also assumes the management of the +cooperatives. This action is being taken for the benefit of the German +worker, in order to safeguard the savings of the masses here also, and +in order not to permit the decay of the assets which the cooperatives +hold for the benefit of the people. + +The action in itself is a winding-up action, which means that their +further extension will not be tolerated, that everything that is rotten +and burdensome must be gotten rid of now in the shortest possible +time, that in agreement with the representative organizations of the +middle class an equitable settlement is being initiated now already. +Offices of the NSDAP are requested to shed their hostile attitude +towards cooperatives, because they can rest assured that everything is +being done by the leadership which profits the benefit of the people +and the benefit of Germany. + +Future organization of the cooperatives is as follows: + +_The two great Reich Leagues of cooperatives will become members +of, and be merged into one Reich League. Great savings will thus be +effected in administration._ + +_As a matter of principle there will be no more voting in any +organization, but the leader, Party Member Mueller, is appointed by me +and he is authorized to appoint additional leaders of the individual +regions and localities._ + +_The Administrative Council, which is to help Party Member Mueller, +will constitute the Executive Chamber_ [_Kleine Kammer_], _in addition +a Plenary Chamber will be formed, so as to definitely clarify the +relationship between the new corporate structure and the cooperatives, +and to shape the winding-up more decisively and organically._ + + The leader of the German Labor Front + Dr. R. Ley + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2271-PS + + ORGANIZATION BOOK OF THE NSDAP + + [Organisationsbuch der NSDAP] + + Editions of 1936, 1938, 1940, & 1943 + + Editor the Reich Organization Leader of the NSDAP (Dr. Robert Ley). + + Published by the Central Publishing House of the NSDAP, Franz Eher + Successor, Munich. [Pages 185-187]. + + + The NSBO + + The National Socialistic Factory Cells Organization. + + [Die Nationalsozialistische Betriebszellen-Organisation] + +The NSBO is a union of the political leaders of the NSDAP in the DAF +[German Labor Front]. + +The NSBO is the carrier of the organization [Organisationstraeger] of +the DAF. + +The duties and responsibilities of the NSBO have passed over to the DAF. + +The political leaders who have been transferred from the NSBO to the +DAF guarantee the ideological education of the DAF in the spirit of the +National Socialistic idea. + + + The German Labor Front + + Including + the NS Community Strength through Joy [Kraft Durch Freude] + + Decree of the Fuehrer on the Nature and Goal of the German + Labor Front, dated 24 October 1934 + + + Nature and Goal + + + Article 1 + +The German Labor Front is the organization of creative Germans of brain +and fist. + +In the main, the members of the former unions, the former employee +unions and the former employer unions are united in it as members with +equal rights. + +Membership in the German Labor Front _cannot_ be substituted by +memberships in professional, social, political, industrial or +ideological organizations. + +The Chancellor of the Reich can decree that class-organizations which +have been recognized by the law should belong corporatively to the +German Labor Front. + + + Article 2 + +The aim of the German Labor Front is to create a true social and +productive community of all Germans [Volks- und Leistungsgemeinschaft]. + +Its task is to see that every single individual should be able to take +his place in the industrial life of the nation in that intellectual or +physical capacity which enables him to perform maximum work and thus +guarantees a maximum of benefit for the community of the nation. + + + Article 3 + +The German Labor Front is a branch of the NSDAP according to the Law +for Securing the Unity of Party and State, issued on 1 December 1933. +(According to the law, issued 29 March 1935, the DAF will be designated +as an affiliated organization [Verband] of the NSDAP. The editor.) + + + Leadership and Organization + + + Article 4 + +The NSDAP has the leadership of the German Labor Front. + +The Staff leader of the Political Organization [PO] is the leader +of the German Labor Front. He is assigned by the Fuehrer and Reich +Chancellor. + +He assigns and dismisses the other leaders of the German Labor Front. + +These posts should be given in the first place to members of the +existing branches of the NSBO and of the NS-Hago [NS Handelsund +Gewerkbetreibenden Organization, or the National Socialist Organization +of Tradesmen and Commercial Men] who are in the NSDAP, and further to +members of the SA and SS. + + + Article 5 + +The regional organization of the German Labor Front corresponds to that +of the NSDAP. + +The aim toward an organic order as laid down in the program of the +NSDAP determines the professional organization of the German Labor +Front. + +The staff leader of the Political Organization determines the regional +and professional organization of the German Labor Front; they will be +published in the service book of the German Labor Front. [In the 1943 +edition the following is added: “Organization Book of the NSDAP”]. + + + Article 6 + +The accounts [Kassenfuehrung] of the German Labor Front are under +the control of the treasurer of the NSDAP on the basis of the first +executive decree to the law securing the unity of Party and State, +issued 23 March 1934. + + + Tasks + + + Article 7 + +The German Labor Front has to secure the peace of labor by creating +understanding among the enterprise leaders for the justified claims of +their following [Gefolgschaft] understanding among the following for +the situation and possibilities of their enterprise. + +The German Labor Front has the task of finding the common basis between +the justified interests of all participants which is in accordance with +the national socialistic basic principles and which reduces the number +of the cases which are to be referred to the State agencies alone in +charge on the basis of the law of 20 January 1934. + +It is the exclusive task of the German Labor Front to represent all the +parties which are required for the conciliation. It is prohibited to +create other organizations in this domain or to permit their activities +in this field. + + + Article 8 + +The German Labor Front is the carrier of the National Socialist +Organization “Strength Through Joy.” + +The German Labor Front has to provide for professional training. + +Furthermore, it has to fulfill the tasks which have been assigned to it +by the law of 20 January 1934. + + + Article 9 + +The property of the former organizations as mentioned in Article 1 +of this decree, including their help and compensation organizations, +property managements and industrial enterprises, constitutes the +property of the German Labor Front. This property is the original +capital for the self-help organization of the German Labor Front. + +The German Labor Front, through its self-help organization, should +guarantee the existence of each of its members in emergency cases +in order to facilitate the progress of the most qualified Germans +[Volksgenossen] or to help them to secure an independent life, if +possible, on their own ground and soil. + + + Article 10 + +This order becomes valid on the day of its publication. + +Berlin, 24 October 1934. + + Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor + Adolf Hitler + + +My decree, issued 24 October 1934 about the German Labor Front will be +changed so that Article 4 will read as follows: + + + Leadership and Organization + + + Article 4 + +The NSDAP has the leadership of the German Labor Front. The Reich +Organization Leader of the NSDAP is the leader of the German Labor +Front. He is designated by the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor. + +He designates and dismisses the other leaders of the German Labor Front. + +These posts should be given in the first place to members of the +branches NSBO and NS Hago who are in the NSDAP and further to members +of the SA and SS. + +_Furthermore_: In Article 5, Par. 3, the word “Staff Leader of the PO” +will be substituted by _“Reich Organization Leader” of the NSDAP_. + +Berlin, November 12, 1934. + + Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor + Adolf Hitler + + + PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2273-PS + + Draft + + TOP SECRET + + [Geheime Reichssache] + + SPECIAL PURPOSE GROUP “A” + + [Einsatzgruppe A] + +* * * * * * * + + + III + + Jews + +The systematic mopping up of the Eastern Territories embraced, in +accordance with the basic orders, the complete removal if possible, of +Jewry. This goal has been substantially attained--with the exception +of White Russia--as a result of the execution up to the present time +of 229,052 Jews (see Appendix). The remainder still left in the Baltic +Provinces is urgently required as labour and housed in Ghettos. + +To attain this object various kinds of measures were necessary in the +different areas of the [Ostland]. + +In the three Baltic States of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, Jewry did +not make itself decisively felt until the Bolsheviks had come into +power there. But even before that the Jewish influence on the one hand +and the anti-Jewish feeling of the population on the other hand, were +very strong. + +In the following the various areas of the Eastern Territories will be +dealt with separately: + +1. _Estonia_ + +As Estonia, until the middle of the last century, was part of a +closed zone of the Russian Empire, into which it was forbidden for +Jews to immigrate, the number of Jews in the country has always been +insignificant. + +At the beginning of 1940 there were living in Estonia about 4,500 +Jews out of a total population of 1.2 millions. Their influence on +the economic life of the country was considerably stronger than the +proportion of Jews to the whole population. For instance 11% of +Estonian industry was in Jewish hands. During the Bolshevik time it +is true Jewish private property was nationalized, but nevertheless +the Jews themselves were almost everywhere left as Directors of their +former enterprises. By means of connections with the NKWD the Jews got +themselves into a very strong position. They controlled the Press, +cultural institutions, forced their way into the open professions, +and were the only minority besides the Germans to have the right to +cultural autonomy. + +With the advance of the German troops the majority of the Jews, +together with the Soviet-Russian authorities, left the country. Approx. +2,000 Jews remained behind in the country. Out of these almost 1,000 +lived in Reval alone. + +The Estonian Self Protection Movement [Selbstschutz], formed as +the Germans advanced, did begin to arrest Jews, but there were no +spontaneous pogroms. Only by the Security Police and the SD were the +Jews gradually executed as they became no longer required for work. + +Today there are no longer any Jews in Estonia. + +2. _Latvia_ + +The total number of Jews in Latvia amounted in June 1935 to 93,479 or +4.79% of the total population. + +When the Bolsheviks came into power in Latvia in June 1940, their +Soviet-Russian racial comrades succeeded in obtaining authoritative +influence for the Latvian Jews, who previously had been predominantly +Zionist. Whereas before 1940 there were no Jews as State officials in +Latvia, in fact were no Jews in the State Administration at all, in +the Soviet Russian Republic all the influential State positions were +quickly in the hands of the Jews. Half of the total number of Judges +were Jewish. The number was up to 80% in the Higher Courts and in +particular on the Tribunal. Equally strong was the influence of the +Jews on the economy and cultural life. + +When the German troops marched in there were still 70,000 Jews in +Latvia. The remainder had fled with the Bolsheviks. The Jews left +behind were actively engaged in sabotage and setting fire to places. In +Duenaburg so many fires of this kind were started by the Jews that a +large part of the Town was destroyed. + +After the terror of the Jewish-Bolshevik rule--altogether 33,038 Letts +were transported, imprisoned or murdered--an extensive pogrom carried +out by the population might have been expected. In fact, however, +only a few thousand Jews were eliminated by local forces on their +own initiative. In Latvia it was necessary to carry out extensive +mopping-up operations by means of Sonderkommandos with the help of +forces picked from the Latvian Auxiliary Police (mostly relations of +the Letts who had been carried off or murdered). + +Up to October 1941 approximately 30,000 Jews had been executed by +these Sonderkommandos. The remaining Jews who were still indispensable +from the economic point of view were collected in Ghettos, which were +established in Riga, Duenaburg and Libau. + +As a result of punishments instituted for not wearing the Jewish +star, black market, thieving, fraud, but also to prevent the danger +of epidemics in the Ghettos, further executions were subsequently +carried out. In this way 11,034 Jews were executed in Duenaburg on +9.11.41, and, as the result of an action ordered and carried out by +high authorities and Police chiefs, 27,800 were executed in Riga at the +beginning of December 1941, and, in the middle of December 1941, 2,350 +were executed in Libau. At the moment there are in the Ghettos (other +than Jews from the Reich) Latvian Jews in + + Riga approximately 2,500 + Duenaburg approximately 950 + Libau approximately 300. + +These are indispensable at the moment as they are specialized workers +necessary for maintaining the country’s economy. + +3. _Lithuania_ + +Until the Bolsheviks marched in, according to a census taken in 1923 +there were 153,743 Jews living in Lithuania, forming 7.58% of the total +population. Whereas their influence had previously for the greater +part been restricted to the business world, the Lithuanian Jews, who +had already been working illegally for Bolshevism, now quickly became +a dominating influence in public life. In particular Jews of both +sexes supported the activities of the NKWD. The transporting of 40,000 +Lithuanians to Siberia is traceable to the preliminary work done by the +Jews. + +When the German troops marched in the Lithuanians expressed their +hatred of the Jews in active pogroms, at the same time Jewish communist +youths set fire to many towns, through which the German armoured units +had passed leaving them little damaged, by means of tins of petrol +which they had previously put ready. + +As a result of the pogroms carried out by the Lithuanians, who were +nevertheless substantially assisted by Sipo and SD, 3,800 Jews in Kauen +and 1,200 in the smaller towns were eliminated. + +Where Jews were able to escape they were not infrequently handed over +to the authorities by the farmers. + +These spontaneous mopping-up actions were, however, insufficient to +stabilize this rear section of the Front, and at the same time the +enthusiasm of the local inhabitants waned. + +Therefore by means of selected units--mostly in the proportion of +1:8--first of all the prisons, and then systematically district by +district the Lithuanian sector was cleansed of Jews of both sexes. +Altogether 136,421 people were liquidated in a great number of single +actions. It is worthy of note that many of the Jews used force against +the officials and Lithuanian auxiliaries who were carrying this out, +and before their execution still expressed their Bolshevik convictions +by cheering Stalin and abusing Germany. + +As the complete liquidation of the Jews was not feasible as they were +needed for labour, Ghettos were formed which at the moment are occupied +as follows: + + Kauen approximately 15,000 Jews. + Wilna approximately 15,000 Jews. + Schaulen approximately 4,500 Jews. + +These Jews are used primarily for work of military importance. For +example up to 5,000 Jews are employed in 3 shifts on the aerodrome near +Kauen on earth-works and work of that sort. + +4. _White Russia_ + +The White Russian Sector is more thickly populated by Jews than all the +other States in the Ostland. In the year 1926, far more than 400,000 +Jews were counted in the then BSSR. The last Polish census showed more +than 500,000 Jews in the provinces [Wojwodschaften] of Bialystock, Nowo +Grodlek, Polesien and Wilna. These figures are however approximate and +most certainly too low, which is further apparent from the fact that +far more people have given “Yiddish” as their mother tongue than there +were supposed to be Jews counted in the same area. Quite half of the +Jews in the White Russian Settlement Area lived at the beginning of +the war in the larger towns. Minsk was occupied to a very particular +extent by Jews, in 1939 there were approximately 100,000 out of a total +population of 238,000. + +The social structure of the Jews shows a broad lower stratum of very +poor Jews, both in the area formerly Polish, and in the White Russian +Sector which was Bolshevik before the Russo-Polish war. + +The proportionately thin upper stratum dominated simply every sphere +of life in the former Polish sector, mainly as a result of its strong +economic position, and in the former Soviet-Russian sector as a result +of their influence in the leading party positions. The Jew in the area +formerly Polish is a particularly dangerous element, because of his +intelligence and activity. But even the Soviet-Russian Jew has during +the 25 years of Bolshevik domination assumed a very self-sufficient and +arrogant air, which he has even retained after the entry of the German +troops. + +The final and fundamental elimination of the Jews remaining in the +White Russian sector after the entry of the Germans is fraught with +certain difficulties. Just in this place the Jews form an extremely +high percentage of the specialized workers, who are indispensable +because of the shortage in other reserves in this area. + +Furthermore Einsatzgruppe A did not take over this area until after the +heavy frost had set in, which made mass executions much more difficult. +A further difficulty is that the Jews live widely scattered over the +whole country. In view of the enormous distances, the bad conditions +of the roads, the shortage of vehicles and petrol and the small forces +of Security Police and SD, it needs the utmost effort in order to be +able to carry out shootings in the country. Nevertheless 41,000 Jews +have been shot up to now. This number does not include those shot in +operations by the former Einsatzkommandos. From estimated figures +about 19,000 partisans and criminals, that is in the majority Jews, +were shot by the Armed Forces [Wehrmacht] up to December 1941. At the +moment approximately 128,000 Jews must still be reckoned with in the +area of the Commissariat-General. In Minsk itself--exclusive of Reich +Germans--there are about 1,800 Jews living, whose shooting must be +postponed in consideration of their being used as labour. + +The Commander in White Russia is instructed to liquidate the Jewish +question as soon as possible, despite the difficult situation. However +a period of about 2 months is still required--according to the weather. + +The shutting up of all the remaining Jews in special Ghettos is also +almost completed in the towns in White Russia too. They will be used +for work to the fullest extent by the authorities of the Armed Forces, +the Civil Administration and German Authorities. + +The feeding of the Jews in the Ghettos causes considerable difficulty, +especially in White Russia but also in Lithuania. Together with the +general decrease in working capacity, there is increased susceptibility +to all contagious diseases. + +5. _Jews from the Reich._ + +Since December 1940 transports containing Jews have arrived at short +intervals from the Reich. Of these 20,000 Jews were directed to Riga +and 7,000 Jews to Minsk. The first 10,000 Jews evacuated to Riga were +housed partly in a provisionally erected reception camp and partly in +a newly established hut encampment near Riga. The remaining transports +have for the time being been directed into a separate part of the Riga +Ghetto. + +The building of the hut encampment, as a result of the employment of +all Jews fit for work, is so advanced that all evacuated Jews who +survive the winter can be put into this camp in the spring. + +Only a small section of the Jews from the Reich is capable of +working. About 70-80% are women and children or old people unfit for +work. The death rate is rising continually, also as a result of the +extraordinarily hard winter. + +The amount done by those few Jews from the Reich who are fit for work +is satisfactory. They are preferred as labour to the Russian Jews, +because they are German speaking and because of their _comparatively_ +greater cleanliness. Worthy of note is the adaptability of the Jews, +with which they attempt to form their life in accordance with the +circumstances. + +The crowding together of the Jews into the smallest space, which occurs +in all the Ghettos, naturally causes greater danger of epidemics, which +is being combatted as much as possible by the employment of Jewish +doctors. In isolated instances sick Jews with contagious diseases were +selected under the pretext of putting them into a home for the aged or +a hospital and executed. + + # # # # # + +CHART [See Chart _Number 4_ in the last volume of this publication.] + + Judenfrei--free of Jews + + Jewish Executions carried out by Special Purpose Group A. + + Estimated number of Jews still remaining--128,000. + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2275-PS + + THE GERMAN LABOR FRONT. NATURE--AIM--MEANS + +[Die deutsche Arbeitsfront. Wesen--Ziel--Wege] Issued by the Scientific +Labor Institute of the German Labor Front. Published by the Publishing +House of the German Labor Front, 1943 + +[Footnote, page 11]. + +More than nine-tenths of all working Germans are members of the German +Labor Front. Shortly before the outbreak of war the German Labor Front +had 23 million individual members in the then Reich territory. In +addition there were corporate members [Korporative Mitglieder], the +number of which can be estimated at 10 millions after eliminating all +multiple memberships. + +The members of such organizations are “corporatively” affiliated to +the German Labor Front which have collectively joined the German Labor +Front on the basis of special agreements. But the members of such +organizations can nevertheless become individual members of the German +Labor Front. + +Among others the members of the following organizations are +“corporative” members of the German Labor Front: Reich Chamber +of Culture; Reich Food Estate; Reich League of Graduate Farmers; +Organization of Trade Economy; Experts’ Council on Public Health; +Attorneys’ League; Reich League of German Civil Servants; National +Socialist Teachers’ League; Reich Labor Service; Armed Forces; Nurses’ +Association. In other words, practically all important professional or +economic organizations have led their members into the German Labor +Front. + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2276-PS + + THE GERMAN LABOR FRONT. NATURE--AIM--MEANS + +[Die deutsche Arbeitsfront. Wesen--Ziel--Wege] Issued by the Scientific +Labor Institute of the German Labor Front. Published by the Publishing +House of the German Labor Front, 1943 + +[Page 55]. + +During the years from 1933 to 1939 everything necessary had been done +in secrecy [in aller Stille] that seemed necessary to the conservation +of the nation in the anticipated clash with an envious surrounding +world. As always, when taking precautionary defense measures in a +newly-won field, it was not possible here either to plan in a way that +would be satisfactory. It was necessary to check what was on hand, and +build with that the most essential and the momentarily most useful. It +could not be obviated that the result, measured with the yardstick of +what had been planned for the future, would appear modest and perhaps +even inadequate. + +It has not always been simple for those charged with practical social +work to master satisfactorily the juxtaposition of old, scantily mended +institutions and new ones. But certainly it was even more difficult +for the biggest part of the people to see how the effort supported by +it was, year after year, applied to tasks which initially necessitated +renunciation after renunciation. After all, it seemed like a small +matter to apply the energies released by the National Socialist +revolution to the improvement of social conditions desired for so long. +Instead the leadership chosen by the people and over again confirmed +by it, channeled all its strength into armaments [Wehrhaftigkeit]. +And--won the consent especially of those sections of the people who had +had to suffer most from social conditions prevailing up to then. + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2277-PS + + STATEMENT + +of Gustav Schiefer, born 17 July 1876, residence: Munich 9, No. 3 +Armanspergstrasse, about what happened to him when the Nazis came on 9 +March 1933. + +I was employed as part time worker [Hilfsarbeiter] by the former Trade +Union Society, Munich, beginning 11 November 1911. During the years +1914-1918, I was in the World War. + +After the revolution in November 1918 I was elected Executive Chairman +of the General German Trade Union Association [Allgemeiner Deutcher +Gewerkschaftsbund], Local Committee, Munich. I held this position +without interruption until 9 March 1933. + +On that day the Nazis stormed the Munich Trade Union Headquarters +Building, 40/42 Pestalozzistrasse. The offices remained closed until +15 March. On 13 March my late colleague Erhard Kupfer, former District +Secretary of the General German Trade Union Association [ADGB] and I +had to report to the, then, State Commissar Wagner, and were ordered +to reopen the Munich Trade Union Headquarters Building, and with it +the offices, by 15 March, and to resume normal activity within the +framework of the trade unions. + +Since I was at the same time chairman of the Munich Trade Union +Headquarters Building, Inc., it became my task to take over the house +in its entirety, and with it the individual offices of the trade unions. + +Because safes and strong-boxes, in fact everything that was locked, +had been smashed open, and because safes and tills, in the main, were +empty, I refused to take over the house and offices in their present +condition. I stated that I would take over the house only in the +condition in which it was when it was taken away from us on 9 March. + +The house had been taken over on 9 March 1933 by Herr Kurt Frey, and +returned to us on 15 March by the former executive secretary of the +Hotel, Restaurant, etc. Employees’ Association, Herr Reichart. This +Nazi, with whom I did not get along too well because of his equivocal +attitude, believed that the opportunity had arrived to wreak his +vengeance on me. + +I was dragged to the great hall, paper and pencil put before me with +the challenge to designate these Nazis who had committed thefts during +the period of 9 to 15 March 1933. I could not do that, since I did +not know the individuals. As I refused my signature about 10 Nazis +beat me promiscuously and indiscriminately until I collapsed. Upon +that they seized me and threw me into the bottom of the light shaft +of the Trade Union Headquarters Building. After lying there for +some time I summoned up my strength and tried to rouse myself. When +the Nazis noted that, they again dragged me into the hall and beat +me until I collapsed and fainted. My colleagues Josef Gessl, former +executive secretary of the Cobblers’ Association, and Richard Moses, +employee of the General Mutual Benefit Local Pay Office [Allgemeine +Ortskrankenkasse], Munich, grabbed me and brought me in this condition +to the Munich-Schwabing hospital. In addition to many other injuries, +Professor Dr. Kerschensteiner, director of this institution, diagnosed +serious concussion of the brain with hemorrhage into the brain. I +remained from 15 March to 5 May 1933. On 5 May the Precinct Physician, +at that time already a Nazi, certified that I was sufficiently fit for +arrest. On 5 May I was transported to the Ettstrasse Police Prison, and +from there to Stadelheim. I remained in Stadelheim until 25 August 1933. + +It is due to an extraordinarily fortunate circumstance that I was +saved from Dachau in 1933. Medical Privy Councillor Dr. Geisendoerfer, +who was chief physician in Stadelheim, knew me from the Cooperative +Sickness Benefit movement (I had been on the Committee of the General +Mutual Insurance Local Pay Office [Allgemeine Ortskrankenkasse], +Munich, for 25 years). Through the many negotiations with the physician +I had been in close touch with the above-named gentleman. During my +stay in Stadelheim the Gestapo had me examined five times by the chief +physician, who always held a protective hand over me, and to whom +I am also indebted for my early release, due to a serious illness +(intestinal gap of 15 cm depth and 7-8 cm length). + +I was then sick and unable to work until 24 December 1933. On that day +I was sent away by the Trustee Physician of the General Mutual Benefit +Local Pay Office, Munich (city), in spite of my request to allow me +to draw sickness benefits until the eve of the New Year. He said that +there was no reason to grant the request. As far as I know this Trustee +Physician was Medical Councillor Dr. Plate. + +I was then unemployed until May/June 1934 and then accepted various +jobs as representative. After my release from Stadelheim I had to +report to the police every third day for almost 2 years. Constant +police supervision was one of the simplest cases of chicanery. + +Upon the initiative of my colleague Wilhelm Leuschner, Berlin, I +joined the movement against the Nazi system in good time; and it was +exclusively due to the steadfastness of my colleague Leuschner that I, +like many other friends, am still alive. + +After the assassination attempt on Hitler on 20 July 1944, I was again +arrested and shipped to Dachau Concentration Camp. As is well known, +that project was called “Gitter.” + +On 6 October 1944 I was released without any interrogation. I was +extraordinarily fortunate. Since 2 May 1945 I am again active, in the +trade union as well as the political movement and also in social work +and life. + +As witnesses for the correctness of my statements I name the persons +already mentioned above, who brought me to the Schwabing hospital +(Josef Gessl and Richard Moses). + +And how decent were we once more in the year 1945. Not a hair on the +head of any of these swine was harmed on behalf of the trade unions. +We bore witness, and still bear witness today, for human dignity and +justice. + +Other liberated colleagues of the Free Trade Unions got away with +beatings in the cellar of the Trade Union Headquarters Building in the +beginning. Among others my colleague, Anton Friebl, now living at 4 +Gabrielenstrasse, 2nd floor. Many deceased colleagues, such as Georg +Kandlbinder, Josef Ertl, Heinrich Gassner and many others. + + Munich, 17 October 1945 + [signed] G. SCHIEFER + +Today on the 19th of November 1945, I have reread and signed every +single page of the statement given by me on 17 October 1945. I declare +hereby under oath that this statement is true. + + [signed] _Gustav Schiefer_ + Gustav Schiefer + + SWORN TO BEFORE ME this 19th day of November 1945, Munich, Germany. + + [signed] Kurt A. Baer, 0-1041959 + Captain, CAC + + 3rd Military Government Regiment + APO 403, U. S. Army + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2278-PS + + Official tour of Reich Minister Dr. Seyss-Inquart to the districts of + Warsaw, Lublin, and Radom from 17th November to 22nd November 1939 + +Those taking part were: + +1. Reich Minister Dr. Seyss-Inquart. + +2. Dr. Sild. + +3. Dr. Rahn, department of food and agriculture in the office of the +General Governor. + +4. Legation Councillor [LGR] Dr. Goetze, economic department. 17.11. +Departure at 7.0 a.m. from Burg Cracow in a car. To Warsaw via +Mislowitz, Sosnowitz, Czestochau, Radomsko, Petrikau, Lodz, Tomaszow +and Rawa. Arrival 1.0 p.m. Received by the governor, Dr. Fischer and +the gentlemen of his staff, followed by a small luncheon party. + +At 3.0 p.m., Reich Minister Dr. Seyss-Inquart addressed the department +heads of the District Chief and stated, among other things, that the +chief guiding rule for carrying out the German administration in the +General Government must be solely the interests of the German Reich. A +stern and inflexible administration must make the area of use to German +economy and so that excessive clemency may be guarded against, the +results of the intrusion of the Polish race into German territory must +be brought to mind. + +Following that the Reich Minister held conferences with the governor, +Dr. Fischer, and Section Head, Dr. Barth, on administrative and +economic questions; later on, experts and heads of departments were +called into the conferences to make reports. + +Among other specifications, Dr. Fischer submitted to the Reich Minister +the specification attached to the plan for the preliminary arrangement +of the departments in the office of the District Chief and of the +authorities in Warsaw. + +Dr. Fischer reported that, in particular, the number of personnel was +still considerably too small. Three out of 14 Sub-Prefects [Landraete] +were also missing. Of the departments in the District Office, only +a few had their full complement; that was also the case with the +department of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda and the Labour +department. Of important experts, there were still none for taxes and +monopolies. In the Health Service, one medical advisor was, at the +same time, head of the Health Department and district physician. The +accommodation of the authorities also left much still to be desired. + +Reich Minister Seyss-Inquart then stated that a large sum for the +productive support of unemployed would be made available. This sum +could be used for erecting or repairing any buildings required by the +administration. + +The governor, Dr. F., reported that further German administrative +and municipal officials were also required for the administration of +the city of Warsaw. Then a discussion took place on the organization +of the district authorities, the occupation of the rural districts +[Landkreise] and on the question of transferring the remaining 5 +communities of the Gtojec district from the district of Radom, and a +further 5 communities of the Garwolin district from the district of +Lublin, to the district of Warsaw. Reich Minister S. I. promised to +look into this affair. After that, general questions on the division +and personnel to occupy the districts were discussed. Reich Minister +S. I. agreed that should the District captain [Kreishauptmann] +not be a lawyer the best arrangement for a district captaincy +[Kreishauptmannschaft] was to assign to him a representative who was +trained in legal matters. Dr. Fischer reported that, up to now, the +German administration had been set up as essentially a supervising +authority over a Polish administration. Questions arose from this as +to what range of subjects should be included in the functions of the +District chief. It was superfluous to draw up any building regulations, +for should accommodation be had, it concerned only the Poles +themselves. Then the question of using Polish employees at the German +administrative courts was touched upon. There were some 300 Polish +employees working at the office of the District Chief of Warsaw. The +administration by the German authorities would have especially to serve +for the utilization of the Government’s sphere for German economy, so +the administration of agriculture, Labour, and Roads especially would +have to be well-ordered, on the other hand, trade, settlements, or even +the accountancy of the Polish communities are of less importance. + +Dr. Fischer then raised the question of prices. Price commissars were +to be sent from the Reich and they would equalize the standard of +prices with that in the Reich. Wages would then, however, have to be +adapted to his standard and this might have unforeseen consequences. +Reich Minister S. I., on the other hand, stated that Generaloberst v. +Brauchitsch wished to place army orders for textiles cheaply in Lodz +and suitable industrial centres. Dr. F. thought that higher prices had +their good points as at Warsaw, for instance which had only been fed +because of higher prices which gave the farmers an incentive to bring +their goods into the city. Thereupon, Reich Minister S. I. put the +question of how a definite influence could be obtained on the price +system and on the system of distributing goods by setting up monopolies +for essential goods such as salt, sugar, coal, petrol, and tobacco. +If these goods are in one’s hands and if it be possible to make them +available to the farmer for a definite price, he would also be prepared +to sell his products for a corresponding price in order to obtain +the goods he requires. Moreover for the time being it could not be +a question of furnishing better living conditions for the Poles, but +merely of securing the minimum of existence for them. However, it could +not be regarded in that light when a forced laborer was paid nine Zloty +per week. + +Hereupon Reichsminister Dr. S.I. received the report of the City +President [Stadtpraesidenten] of Warsaw, Dr. Dengel. He declared the +problem of the unemployed to be the most urgent one. Until now taxes +to the amount of 150,000 RM had been received, but this would not be +nearly sufficient, not even for the reconstruction of the most urgently +needed public buildings. The city budget was now in preparation, but +already it became apparent, that a loan to the amount of 50,000,000 +Zloty from the Reich Credit Bank [Reichskreditkasse], was needed. +Sufficient city property was available as security, of which an +inventory was being prepared. Later on the tax revenue would probably +be sufficient for regular interest on the loan. Regarding the tax +system, the City President reported that the cities received shares and +additional payments over and above the remittances [Ueberweisungen] of +State taxes, about the same as in the old Austria. The administration +of property taxes would be partially difficult, since during this +mix-up no status of persons or assets could be established. + +On the question being put by Reichsminister Dr. S.I. the City President +reported that in Warsaw about 40% of the buildings would be again +habitable, after part of them had been repaired. Dr. F. thought, +one would leave one quarter of the destroyed city for inspection, +but otherwise lay out grass plots in place of the debris. The City +President then mentioned the question of the Polish City officials. +For their necessities they have been receiving so far up to 250 Zlotys +a month and those with higher salaries half of the surplus up to 1200 +Zloty. Dr. F. pointed to the decree of the Governor General, whereby +100% of the basic salaries and not over 1,000 Zloty could be paid. The +activity of the banks was then mentioned. Stocks in gold, precious +metals, and foreign currencies had been delivered by them to the +Reichsbank. The inhabitants were obliged to deposit all their money at +the bank, withdrawals depending on the approval of the City President. +Dr. F. explained that the banking system was now attached to the +Department of Economic Affairs at the office of the District Chief. + +The City President now reported on welfare questions. Specific +difficulties had arisen from the sudden departure, on higher authority, +of the relief train Bavaria. Workers who could buy no food for +themselves, were frequently unable to continue working. The welfare +service of the NSV confined itself to the racial Germans, whereby +certain difficulties were caused by the question of determining who +were racial Germans, of which about nine to ten thousand were now +living in Warsaw. Jews were not aided, even out of municipal funds. + +For the care of the Poles, the Polish social Self-Help was to be +called into activity again, and was to be continued by the men who +had formerly directed it. The supervisor was to be supplied, against +payment, with motor cars and trucks with fuel, and permission was to be +granted to the organization to accept voluntary contributions in the +country. The confiscated bank accounts of about 9,000,000 Zloty are to +be at the disposal of the organization. + +The City President then pointed to the absolute necessity of the +speediest establishment of criminal justice officials as well as a +civil court. An orderly continuation of economic life depended on the +latter. He then also reported on the Court of Corporal Punishment +[Pruegelstrafengericht], which had been established for the punishment +of crimes amongst the Poles. + +Dr. F. pointed out that possibly greater treasures might be hidden in +the Jewish quarter. + +Reichsminister S.I. commented then that the building up of the +administration to be effected in Poland, was a good school for those +participating in it. + +The ideal arrangement would be that a Party man with strong initiative +should stand at the head of the administration, at whose side would be +experts and an experienced administrator, in order to include the work +in the general system. + +The head of the department, Labour Oberregierungsrat Dr. Espe then +spoke. He expressed the hope that it would later on be possible to +exchange forced labor by normal labor. There was a definite lack of +tools; he had therefore started a small factory for the manufacture of +tools, and now construction of the most primitive sort was going on at +the airport and on the highways. The question of transport was the most +important and would have to be tackled ahead of the clearing-up work. +At present a survey was being made of all undertakings which were at +all capable of production, and, after the Reich had decided what was to +be manufactured, they were to begin operations. Possibly three shifts +were to work in these factories to equalize the destruction. + +A difficult problem was the multitude of the new unemployed Polish +intellectuals. The students could still be trained in handicraft, but +for the 80,000 to 90,000 Polish officials, one must, if occasion +arises, revert to reconstruction of the Polish Administration +Departments. + +Reichminister S.I. then stated clearly that a second Polish +subadministration would be considered by the German authorities solely +in the form of a welfare organization. + +Oberregierungsrat Dr. Espe remarked that the activity of the sick fund +and of social welfare would largely be dependent on the functionaries +of the railroad and postal systems. Both welfare branches were +controlled by a head institution for social security which was already +again showing a certain profit. The administrative office could also be +rebuilt with available materials. The property of the head institution +is said to have been largely transferred to Russia in the form of +securities. Fortunately, it was largely a question of mortgages, which +could be declared invalid. + +As an added difficulty, Oberregierungsrat Dr. Espe then also mentioned +that wages had been brought down below the former level, due to surplus +labour. + +Reichsminister Dr. S.I. asked if the proclaimed tariffs were really +to be enforced. In any case no official Polish State should be set +up. Oberregierungsrat Dr. Espe thought that, on the basis of tax +collection, this decree was advantageous, and one could naturally not +suffer the obvious ignoring of regulations which we had promulgated. +Reichsminister Dr. S.I. thought that this was no further problem east +of the Reich border. One could, at an opportune moment, seize upon a +case of border violation for corresponding exemplary and also otherwise +useful action. + +Then the representative of the Reich Railways at the office of +the District Chief, Oberreichs Bahnrat Prasch, appeared to give a +report. He said now that military transport had come to an end, +traffic from the west was going on well. Also trains to Cracow went +through Kattowitz. The number of locomotives taken over was fairly +satisfactory, the major part, however, had gone to Russia where they +possibly would not even be needed because of the change in the railway +gauge, which had already been started to great extent. Trains were +already going to Lublin, also. Today, two railroad bridges were in +operation. Reichsminister S.I. pointed out that, above all, the tracks +to Cracow which do not go through Kattowitz, had to be restored in +order that the necessary gasoline and petroleum could be brought +from the oil field region to Warsaw. Admittedly, an increased amount +of suitable freight cars was still necessary, but that could be +accomplished by repairing the existing damaged tank cars. + +The director of the “Trade Economy” Department, Regierungsrat Dr. +von Coelln now came forward to give a report. He stated that, in the +district of Warsaw, almost all branches of industry were represented. +French and Dutch capital was invested in the oil field enterprises. Dr. +von Coelln then said that in the district of Warsaw still considerable +supplies of raw materials were stored in soap factories. These soap +factories should again be put into operation. The produced soap was +made of a higher solution of fat acid than was at present stipulated +in the Reich. Reichminister Dr. S. I. said the Order of the Governor +General according to which the factories were permitted to produce +one-third of their pre-war production, must be amended and the soap +should be confiscated. Furthermore, it was agreed that war economic +works, car factories, the chemical and optical industries, etc., +should be put quickly into operation. Dr. von Coelln then also raised +the question of how the import and export between the Reich and the +“Government” should be arranged, if the coal region with Sosnowic, +Dabrowa, and Trzebinia also becomes German territory and, after the +20th the control of foreign currencies and customs will be carried out. +He then reported that the electrical plants in Warsaw were in working +order. In spite of an order to the contrary, there were about 30 night +clubs in Warsaw. + +Of primary importance was the question of safeguarding the still +existing supplies of soap, tea, etc. The control of such goods as +petroleum, light, salt, fertilizers, etc., by some method of monopoly, +could best be accomplished through consumer cooperatives. + +Now appeared State Farmer Leader Koerner. He reported that the +supplying of Warsaw with food from Lublin and Radom must be made to +operate better. Up to now, Warsaw had been supplied in that respect by +Posen. Five thousand tons of grain were now going to be supplied to +Warsaw, 15,000 of which were already on the way. 20% of the grain in +the “Government” was destroyed through military action. There was also +a shortage of meat and similar commodities. In this case, however, as +a matter of principle, nothing should be sent in from the Reich. Until +the next harvest, the Polish population should be principally provided +with sufficient amounts of grain and potatoes only. It would take about +from 3 to 4 years to build up the stock of cattle again. The prices +of grain should be kept on a level of from 25 to 30% above those of 1 +September 1939. Such prices were sufficient for the farmers. + +At 8.00 P. M. supper with the commanding officer of the city garrison. + +18. 11. 8 o’clock departure from Hotel Europejski in Warsaw for a drive +of inspection within the Warsaw district accompanied by the Governor +Dr. Fischer. Survey of the destroyed bridges over the Bug at Wyszkow, +and then on via Lochow to Ostrow. + +At Ostrow visit to the Sub-Prefect [Landrat] von Boehnau, who reports +on his work to Reichsminister Dr. Seyss-Inquart. Boehnau sees a +special difficulty in the fact that the administrative services of the +Wehrmacht will be recalled in the very near future. The Sub-Prefects +[Landraete] have relied mainly on these units. After they have gone +away they will be very short of labor. + +In the Ostrow district there are also special food difficulties to be +noted, since the district on whose agricultural authorities Ostrow’s +supplies depended was said to have come under the Russians. There was +some talk that the Russians here would withdraw 5 kilometers. + +A particular nuisance also was the badly guarded frontier, due to the +shortage of police, which made possible a continuous uncontrolled +running backwards and forwards, and a considerable removal of property, +particularly by the Jews. + +After Ostrow the refugee camp at Malkinia was visited in which there +were no refugees at the time. It was reported that up to now about +10,000 German nationals had crossed over the frontier there. Frequently +displaced Germans from Posen and West Prussia were concerned. Near +the frontier we saw the countless Jews and similar rabble that were +on the 200 meters or so of no man’s land between the German and the +Russian frontier posts waiting to cross over into Russian Territory +in the darkness. Frequently it is said the Russians themselves bring +such refugees back again after a few days. Recently 150 Tax collectors +have arrived who will be installed in this section. Above all it is +essential that when the administrative services of the Wehrmacht leave, +replacements should be put in in good time. + +The police officer reported that when settling the frontier zone of +interests the Russian officers made an excellent impression and were +distinctly better informed than the Germans were. + +After lunch at the Landrat von Boehnau’s in Ostrow we set out at 1400 +hours on the drive via Siedlce, Sokolow to Biala-Podlaska, where we +spent the night at the operations command of the Security Service there. + +On 19.11. At 7.30 A. M. departure in the direction of Brest-Litovsk to +the Bug frontier. We drove past the airdrome of Terespol where we could +see numbers of airplanes destroyed by German bombers. The land there is +partly marshy, the villages produce a distinctly Russian impression. In +the afternoon we drove on from Biala via Radzyn, Lubartow to Lublin. On +the way, lunch at Major General von Courbiere’s the commander of the +213th Division. + +1900 hours, arrival in Lublin, received by the Governor, SS. +Brigadefuehrer Schmidt, at the town council building where the +Sub-Prefects, the divisional leaders and the police leaders attached to +the District chief were gathered together. + +SS. Brigadefuehrer Schmidt welcomed the Reich Minister “in the +easternmost corner of the territory of German interests.” Dr. +Seyss-Inquart, after having had the collaborators of the Governor’s +introduced, conveyed the good wishes of the Governor General whose +forthcoming visit to Lublin he announced. He then expounded the +Principles in accordance with which the administration in the +“Government” must be conducted. This administration would require above +all the ability to pull through on its own strength without being a +burden to the Reich. This could be attained especially by the firm +comradeship of the men stationed there. The resources and inhabitants +of this country would have to be made of service to the Reich, and only +within these Limits could they prosper. Independent political thought +should no longer be allowed to develop. The Vistula area might perhaps +be still more important to German destiny than the Rhine. The Minister +then gave us a guiding theme to the District Leaders: We will further +everything which is of service to the Reich and will put an end to +everything which may harm the Reich. Dr. Seyss-Inquart then added, that +the General Governor wished that those men who were fulfilling a task +for the Reich here should receive a material post in keeping with their +responsibility and achievements. + +Reichsminister Seyss-Inquart then touched on the question of +Ukrainians, who could be allowed a certain cultural life of their own, +which must never, however, be allowed to lead to a national movement. +In conclusion Dr. Seyss-Inquart invited the District Leaders to bring +their troubles and questions at any time to the Governor, so that he +can find the best solution in cooperation with them. + +District Chef Schmidt replied that these political directives +should also be worked out in the course of the present conference. +Personality was more necessary for the tasks before them than the +knowledge required for a usual administration. The area embracing the +district of Lublin required special consideration, for on account of +the resettlement it was a collecting point for Germans, who were no +longer allowed to live in Germany, and for other destructive elements. +Here iron firmness must be brought to bear. It would be a good idea +if the General Governor were personally to gain an insight into the +particular conditions existing in this region. Here also, a guard of +collaborators was being trained, who would carry out the most valuable +work in German Eastern Politics. + +We had dinner with SS. Sturmbannfuehrer Hasselberger where we also +spent the night (until the arrival of Brigadefuehrer Globocznik, police +Assistant to the District Chief). + +Hasselberger is of the opinion, in answering to questions by Minister +Dr. Seyss-Inquart, that the (racial German) individual protection is an +encumbrance. He did not dream it possible to organize the Ukrainians as +an auxiliary Police Force. + +Nov. 20, 1939. 08.30 Sight-seeing tour of Lublin, University, Cracow +Gate and the part of the city, built by the Germans--Old Lublin--as +well as the prison. Then a conference with the District Chief. At first +questions were discussed concerning the division into districts and +the supplying with personnel of the offices of the District Leaders. +Here also the lack of staff again stood first. Especially after the +withdrawal of the construction battalion the Sub-Prefects be left +without police and without any office help. Here also Dr. Seyss-Inquart +raised the question, as to what tasks should belong to the sphere +of the German administration. On the question of the setting up of +the councils of the District leaders, many District Leaders thought +it necessary, to have a legal representative. Furthermore clerical +staff and interpreters would be required. In the administrative +services of the Wehrmacht were some people who, in case of need, were +willing to remain on there as employees. Also the Wehrmacht might +be willing to transfer certain people, for instance as trustees for +agricultural estates, and so on. Also individual teachers badly needed +for schools could be obtained in this way. After the departure of the +administrative troops, there might also be a lack of motor vehicles, as +they had very often brought their own vehicles with them. + +Governor Schmidt had learned that the petrol of the Government was +to be included in the Reich Syndicate. Petrol here costs 8 Pfg. more +than in the Reich. Therefore 8 Pfg. more will have to be paid to +the German Petrol accounts for which the Government will be charged. +Then questions were discussed concerning the general construction of +the office of the District Chief in Lublin. As to taxes, it was to be +confirmed, that the revenue offices had re-employed 80% of the Polish +revenue officials, many of whom were to be in sole charge of the tax +administration out in the country. Now inspectors are to be appointed +for the supervision of these posts. The District Chief should handle +the supervision of the revenue offices. + +The office work of the District Chief is much delayed by the lack of +expert workers. Partly also there was no control over the work of the +people who had already arrived. Thus Mr. Ziere, the veterinary surgeon, +had gone to Cracow, and said he had to look after the wolhynian cattle +there. + +Reich Minister Seyss-Inquart suggested that Junkers from Ordensburgen +should be asked for as assistants for the administration of the General +Government. This would be excellent training for them. Besides higher +officials, the District Chief is still in need of a magistrate, four +inspectors, and a larger number of clerical staff and typewriters. + +Of petrol the office of the District Chief would need 10,000 litres per +month, and each Sub-Prefect’s Office would need 2,000 litres. But one +of the greatest nuisances was the poor communications. One hardly could +get any connection with Cracow by telephone, also the mail service was +very poor. Till now no replies have been received to letters or orders +sent to Cracow. The installation of a teleprinter was urgently needed. +But above all, the telephone or police communication from Lublin to the +frontier district should function. + +With regard to the necessary force of the police, that should be at the +disposal of the Sub-Prefects. Governor Schmidt said, that 25 for each +District Chief did not seem sufficient. + +In the afternoon, a sight-seeing tour was made to Wlodawa, Cycow. Cycow +is a German village. About 300,000 German nationals, who made a very +poor impression were gathered in the streets, and they sang national +songs conducted by the German Travelling Teacher [Wanderlehrer] Lindner +who is leader of the German nationals there. Reich Minister Dr. +Seyss-Inquart made a speech, on which he pointed out that the fidelity +of these Germans to their nationality now found its justification +and reward through strength of Adolf Hitler. This district with its +very marshy character could, according to District Governor Schmidt’s +deliberations, serve as a reservation for the Jews, a measure which +might possibly lead to heavy mortality among the Jews. + +35,000 German nationals are said to be living in the Lublin government +district. As to the problem which concerns schools, the Landrat Kalmus +in Oyew said he held the view that no salaries should be paid to the +Polish teachers at all, as the Poles in his district represented a +minority in comparison with the Jews. + +In the evening dinner with the Commissar of the city, Mr. Hagerer, in +Cholm, where we spent the night. + +21.11.1939. 8 A.M. Sight-seeing tour of the city and visit to the +camp for German refugees. For this purpose a big, newly-built house +belonging to the Polish railways was reserved, which however is not +ready yet to be occupied, as the heating especially cannot be brought +into working order on account of the lack of parts, which cannot be +procured in Lublin. + +Then followed a drive to the famous cathedral of Cholm that used to +have a golden dome. After that, we drove off to Hrubieszow, where we +found Ukrainian settlements, which are fine compared to the poor Polish +huts. The soil also is better. Here also we visited the frontier of +the Bug at Uszilug. The Jews are said to have removed much property +here, also owing to the poor guarding of the frontier. In this vicinity +too is the best soil for wheat in Poland. From this section, some +time ago 4,000 refugees were taken over from the Russian side. But +still thousands are beyond on the border, and many of them are dying, +as they cannot be housed or fed. Dr. Seyss-Inquart pointed out the +refugees could be allowed to enter if they, themselves, took measures +to guarantee that only German nationals entered the district of the +Government. + +According to the report of the District Chief the Ukrainians +attempted to form a self-administration against or without the +German administration. Further the District Chief criticized the +Reich-Credit-Bank for not granting a credit, which is necessary for the +starting of a sugar refinery, to make use of the harvested sugar beets. +Then we continued our journey via Zamost, Tomaszow to the border near +Belzek. Then there is a refugee camp with Jews. The staff-Surgeon there +fears that an epidemic may break out in the camp, which then would +endanger the whole neighborhood. + +These Jewish refugees who have crossed the frontier secretly, are often +sent back again by the Russians days after. + +Also there is much concern in this district at the mustering of horses +by the Wehrmacht. This mustering would affect the cultivation of the +fields. + +Governor Schmidt also reported that, in his district, collaboration +with the Wehrmacht was poor. Lieutenant General Buechs, Lublin, was +giving the “Government”--administration and police all possible trouble. + +In the evening, supper, and night spent at Sturmbannfuehrer +Hasselberger’s house. + +22.11.1939. + + + Departure for Radom + +In Radom, reception by District Chief Dr. Lasch. The latter reported, +that on his arrival in Radom, he had found a very unpleasant situation +there. His predecessor, Regierungspraesident Ruediger, had _put himself +into_ strongly opposed the Wehrmacht, and Dr. Lasch had first to bring +about a better understanding. Dr. Lasch introduced SS-Oberfuehrer +Katzmann to the Reichsminister as Senior SS and Police Chief attached +to the District Chief of Radom. Brigadefuehrer Globocznik who had been +nominated to that position in Lublin and was just travelling through, +also reported to Dr. Seyss-Inquart. + +Dr. Seyss-Inquart and Dr. Lasch now discussed the plan to establish +a messenger center in Radom in order to remedy the bad communication +system between Cracow and Lublin and between Cracow and Warsaw. +According to this plan, mail for all the three northern districts of +Cracow should be taken in 5 hours to Radom by train and from there, +according to the weather, to the respective places of destination +either by NSKK [Nationalsozialistisches Kraftfahrer (Motorists) Korps] +messenger or otherwise. The same procedure should be used for the +return journey. The agency should be called, perhaps: “Messenger agency +of the Governor General in Radom”. + +Next, Dr. Lasch gave a report on the work which had already been +done and on that which should still have to be done in the work +of reconstruction and improvement. Here also, lack of personnel +and difficulties in transportation were particularly prominent. +Furthermore, in the district of Radom, the Polish Squadron was said to +be still roving about. The people in question were said to be men who, +during the day, attend to their occupations in civilian clothes and, +at night, commit excesses in uniform. An encounter with the Wehrmacht +was said to have had no success. With the help of a map given the +Reichsminister, Dr. Lasch then explained the consolidation of the +existing 16 districts into 10. Dr. Lasch will not comply with Governor +Dr. Fischer’s expressed wishes to hand over a few communities on the +border of the northern district, as those were the most fertile ones of +the district which, as a whole, was a shortage area. + +Regarding the economic question, it was reported that the gun and +iron works in Stachachowitsche had already been taken over by the +“Hermann-Goering-Werke”. Provision should also be made for the +restarting of the whole economy, not only the war economy. In order to +do that, it was particularly necessary that unemployment pay should +no longer be at the rate of 7 Zloty per day or wages at the rate of +3 Zloty. Such a margin offered insufficient incentive to earn one’s +livelihood through work. + +The Governor urgently needed experts and other personnel. A medical +officer was especially urgently needed. There was no German physician +in the entire district. Individual cases of epidemics such as typhus +and dysentery had occurred. + +Furthermore, a man for the press and propaganda was necessary. There +were eight Polish newspapers in the district who were being attended to +by the District Leaders, but with such a procedure a thorough check was +not possible. The District Chief then stated his intention to submit to +Cracow in the near future a detailed list of the personnel required. + +After that, the Governor reported on the set-up of his office which had +several Departments: + +1. the Department of Internal Affairs: Supervision over the District +Leaders, Supreme Supervision over the Polish Administration, Justice, +School Affairs, Veterinary Affairs, Medical Affairs, and General +Matters. + +2. Department of Forestry and Game Preservation: Preservation of +Forests and Game, Control of the Entire Timber Industry which was here +of particular importance. + +3. Department of Economic Affairs: Industry, Commerce, Handicrafts, +Price Control, industrial Market Regulations, Collaboration with +the Agencies of the Four-Year-Plan and the War Economy Inspection +[Wehrwirtschaftsinspektion]. + +4. Traffic Department: Highway System, Railroad System, Postal System, +Waterways (shall the river Vistula be controlled), Control of the +Biliecza, the boundary between the districts of Radom and Warsaw, which +could have a favorable result upon agricultural productiveness. + +5. Department of Food and Agriculture: The district is an agricultural +shortage area. Cultivation must therefore be intensified. For this +purpose a good agricultural organization is necessary. The avoidance +of difficulties in the food supply this winter is mainly a question of +transport. In some areas there is still corn but it must be threshed. +There is no coal for the working of the threshing machines. The salt +mine at Wiliczka delivers salt only in compensation against natural +products. + +6. Finance Department: Revenue and expenditure. Concerning “justice” +the governor remarked that too many are being condemned to gaol and +penal servitude, which hereby burdens the district with costs. The +criminals found in the convict prisons were shot. The shootings, +however, were no longer carried out in public but in isolated wooded +regions. + +The majority of the intelligentsia have been imprisoned, one must be +careful, however, because the cooperation of these people cannot be +dispensed with, especially the doctors, as they are needed for the +health of the people and as they also must treat the Germans in many +instances. He asks that the governor general issue an order that +caution and reserve be exercised when arresting doctors. Concerning the +Polish jurisdiction the District Chief suggested an “organisation” in +three legal administrative branches: + + 1. Baronial court [Burggericht] + 2. District court [Bezirksgericht] + 3. Court of appeals [Kassationsgericht] + +The question was then discussed as to in whose name sentences were to +be pronounced and if the Polish authorities were to have some kind of +official seal. + +In regard to the communal administration the appointment of Polish +governors (Staros) to administer parts of the district as deputies of +the District Chief with headquarters at his office was discussed. There +are Polish majors in Radom and Czenstochau, and they would also be +appointed to the towns subordinate to the districts. Reichsminister Dr. +Seyss-Inquart pointed out that delegates of the District Chief must be +associated with them. Dr. Lasch added, furthermore, that he intended +to make the communities pay something towards the repair of roads and +other work, executed by means of compulsory labour service or of forced +labour, as expense was caused to districts by such work. The wages +also for free work must be established uniformly for the whole General +Government, as otherwise undesirable movement of workers seeking the +highest salaries would result. + +At this point the question of the monopoly of important exchange goods +for the acquiring of agricultural products was discussed. Dr. Lasch +then declared that it was not possible to transport all scrap metal to +the Reich. In the Government there was also a need of scrap metal for +the existing foundries. + +Dr. Lasch stated furthermore that he had received a petition to send +5,000 specialists to the Reich. + +Regarding the Polish police the opinion was expressed that arming in a +modest way could be carried out and was necessary. The foresters needed +at least a fowling piece to defend themselves against wood thieves and +peasants. + +In the case of the founding of an “individual protection” +(Selbstschutz) unit of racial Germans a careful selection and military +training of those selected must take place. According to information +given by Dr. Lasch the Ukrainians are said to be specially qualified to +be policemen. + +Dr. Lasch brought up the question as to what should be done with the +destroyed villages. + +The tax system could consist mainly of indirect taxes and +contributions, which were to be borne by the communities. A +contribution of 6 Million Zloty must be borne by the Jews in the +district of Radom. In the district of Radom a cooperative buying and +selling society will be founded in order to eliminate the entire Jewish +Commission business. + +Reichsminister Dr. Seyss-Inquart then spoke of the regulation provided, +according to which the government should not receive any more motor +fuel from the Reich, but must be dependent on the production of Jaslo +and Kresno the utilization of which, however, was to be determined in +accordance with the principles of the Reich. In this connection the +formation of a trading organization was also discussed. + +Dr. Lasch and Brigade-Leader Schmidt then spoke of the intention of +the Wehrmacht to confiscate 54,000 horses. Two studs in the district +he declared district studs. Dr. Seyss-Inquart pointed out that the +possessions of the Polish government were confiscated by decree +and therefore are out of the reach of the Wehrmacht. Finally Dr. +Seyss-Inquart spoke of the plan to publish a general administration +decree for the General Government after a period of development and +elucidation. + +Cracow, 22nd November 1939. + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2280-PS + + The Reich Commissioner for the Ostland [Baltic countries and White + Russia] + +Dept. III Labor policy and social Administration + + Riga, 3 May 1943 + +Labor Group Labor Mobilization 2 F 1/4 b. 1 (O) Kue Ty + +To the Commissioner General in Riga + + [stamp] Commissioner General Dept. Social Administration 8 May 1943 + in Riga 2 + + _Re_: Recruiting of Manpower in the Baltic Countries for the Reich + territories; here: New quotas agreed upon with GBA Gauleiter Sauckel + on 21 April 1943. + +In reference to the basic statements of the Plenipotentiary General for +manpower, Gauleiter Sauckel, on the occasion of his visit to Riga on +21 April 1943, and in view of the critical situation and in disregard +of all contrary considerations, it was decided that a total of 183,000 +workers have to be supplied from the Ostland for the Reich territory. +This task must absolutely be accomplished within the next four months +and at the latest must be completed by the end of August. The following +sub-quotas have been established: + + _White Ruthenia_: 30,000 youthful workers and 100,000 workers + including families. + +Of the families only members capable of productive work will be +counted. All persons 10 years old and up are considered as productive +manpower. + + _Lithuania_: 15,000 female workers. + 15,000 male workers. + 10,000 productive workers from about 2 to 3,000 + families + _Latvia_: 10,000 female workers, no male workers + _Estonia_: 3,000 female workers, no male workers + +For the benefit of volunteers [Hilfswilligen] no male manpower will +be recruited in Latvia and Estonia. For Estonia also in favor of the +Legion. + +All permissible means shall be used to obtain the manpower from _White +Ruthenia_. Do not hesitate to apply unusual measures. + +In Lithuania the 15,000 men shall be taken from the current recruitment +of the year groups 19 to 24. The placement of the manpower for +the Reich, excluding volunteers should be one half for the Baltic +countries’ own requirements and one half for Reich requirements. In +case the number of 15,000 workers cannot be thus obtained, the year +groups 12 to 18 shall be recruited until this number has been reached. + +The 15,000 female workers shall be obtained from the year groups of 20 +to 25. For this purpose the release of 10% of the women from factories +suitable for this purpose, even outside of the age limits set, has been +contemplated. The recruitment of females of the year groups 20 to 25 +will follow the examination of males of the year groups 19 to 24. + +Furthermore, the recruitment of about 2 to 3,000 families from +Lithuania is contemplated, which should contain a total of 10,000 +productive workers. + +In consideration of local requirements and the already accomplished +recruiting for the Legion and volunteers and of those volunteers still +to be provided by means of re-examining the year groups 19 to 24, the +recruitment of male manpower in Latvia has been dispensed with. + +The 10,000 female workers will be recruited from the year groups 20 to +25. Here also a release of 10% from factories is provided for, should +the age limits fail to provide sufficient workers. + +Estonia will provide 3,000 women, also to be recruited from the year +groups 20 to 25, or by release from factories. Otherwise the same +applies as for Latvia. + +To these workers I have promised the following special social +advantages: + +1. Limited engagement, generally 2 years’ duration. + +2. Granting of furloughs and return of families according to the +general regulations for foreigners in the Reich. + +3. Appointment of special trustees of the same nationality for the +female workers. + +4. Granting of special diplomas for services rendered in war work in +the Reich. + +In order to accomplish these measures I have sent a decree, of which +a copy is enclosed, to the President of the employment offices. +Furthermore, I have asked the Labor Mobilization Office of the German +Labor Front, in a letter of which a copy is also enclosed, to arrange +for the appointment of special trustees of the same nationality. + +Please take notice of this, inform my special purpose staffs +(Einsatzstaebe) accordingly, and take care of the immediate placing of +the manpower. + +On this occasion I shall like to point out that in the past year the +enclosed leaflet was used in hiring Lithuanian manpower. Since this +pamphlet contains inaccuracies, please see to it that it is no longer +used for recruiting purposes. In view of the explanations in my +enclosed decree to the Presidents of provincial labor offices, I do not +believe it necessary to provide a special leaflet for Plant-Managers. +I refer to your report of 25 March 1943 and to my letter of 14 +April 1943--5783. 28/148--about which I should like to have your +opinion soon. By reason of a suggestion of the German Labor Front, I +should furthermore like to know whether you consider it necessary to +conclude individual work--contracts for the workers from the districts +(Generalbezirke) of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. + +Copy sent to take notice with reference to the oral consultations in +Riga. + + Signed: Sauckel + [seal] Certified: Mueller + Clerk + +Certified: + +(sig:) Reinkmann + +19 June 1943 + + + PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2283-PS + + VOELKISCHER BEOBACHTER + + The Munich (Southern German) Edition Nr. 258, 14 September 1936, page + 11. + +THE 5TH DAY OF THE PARTY CONGRESS ADOLF HITLER HAS CARRIED OUT THE TRUE + SOCIALISM REICH ORGANIZATION LEADER DR. LEY RENDERS AN ACCOUNT OF THE + ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE GERMAN LABOR FRONT + + Nurnberg, 13 September. + +_Again 20,000 stirred people filled the big hall in the Luitpold Park +on Saturday for the penultimate session of the Party Congress._ + +_At this session, too, the Fuehrer was present from the beginning. +Again enthusiastic shouts of exultation lasting for minutes roared +around the Fuehrer when he strode through the long-stretched hall with +his deputy, his constant retinue and several Reich Leaders and District +Leaders._ + +_On this evening Congress participants listened to grandly-conceived +accounts by Reich Organization Leader Dr. Ley about the accomplishments +of the German Labor Front, by Reich Leader Hierl about the Labor +Service, and by Plenary Inspector for German Highways, Dr. Todt, about +progress in building the highways of Adolf Hitler._ + +After the parade of the Blood Banner and of the Party Standards the +solemn prelude was the overture to “Oberon”, played by the Reich +Symphony Orchestra. The Congress was opened by the Fuehrer’s Deputy, +Rudolf _Hess_, who immediately introduced Reich Agency Leader +[Reichsamtsleiter] _Dressler-Andress_ for reading of the account of +Reich Organization Leader Dr. Ley. + +My Fuehrer! + +When you, my Fuehrer, ordered me in mid-April 1933 to take over the +trade unions I could not understand why you gave this order to me, +since I could not see any connection between my task as Organizational +Leader of the Party and my new task. Very soon, however, your decision, +my Fuehrer, became clear to me and I recognized that the organizational +measures of the Party could only come to full fruition when +supplemented by the organization of the people, that is to say by the +mobilization of the energies of the people and by their concentration +and alignment. If the _Party_ represents the _concentration of the +political leaders_ of the people--as you, my Fuehrer, have taught us +again and again--then the _people_ in the _retinue_ [Gefolgschaft] must +be organized and trained according to the same principles. _Leader and +retinue_, _elite and community at large_ [Fuehrer und Gefolgschaft, +Orden und Gemeinde]--those words the clear directives for my work. +These were the consequences: + +1. _My tasks as Organizational Leader of the Party and as Leader of the +German Labor Front were a completely homogeneous task, in other words, +in everything I did I acted as Reich Organization Leader of the NSDAP._ + +2. _The German Labor Front was an institution of the Party and was led +by it._ + +3. _The German Labor Front had to be organized regionally and +professionally according to the same principles as the Party._ + +That is why trade union and employer associations had to be smashed +unrelentingly, and the _basis of construction_ was formed, as in the +Party, by the _cell_ and the _local section_. + +* * * + +The idea of the _Factory Troops_ [Werkschar] is making good progress +in the plants, and I am able to report to you, my Fuehrer, that +security and peace in the factories has been guaranteed, not only +in normal times, but that also in times of the most serious crises, +disturbances, such as the munition strikes of the traitors Ebert +and his confederates, are out of the question. _National Socialism +has conquered the factories. Factory troops [Die Werkschar] are the +Nationalist Socialist shock troops within the factory, and their motto +is_: + + THE FUEHRER IS ALWAYS RIGHT! + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2284-PS + + WRITINGS OF THE HOCHSCHULE FOR POLITICS + + Edited by Paul Meier-Benneckenstein + + II. The Organizational structure of the Third Reich + + Brochure 33 + + The SS + + History, Mission, and Organization of the Schutzstaffeln of the NSDAP + + Compiled on the Commission of the Reichsfuehrer-SS by + SS-Standartenfuehrer Gunter d’Alquen + + 1939 + + Junker and Duennhaupt Press, Berlin + + # # # # # + + 1. History and Structure of the SS + + Path of Proof + +The great National Socialist Movement, as a party, did not step into +German or even world history as a complete framework at the time of its +formal founding. + +Originating from the rebellion against the downfall, from a fervent +belief in the German people, which was born in the trenches of the +battle-fields in the whole world, Adolf Hitler began to conquer the new +Reich, both in thought and through deeds, with a few comrades, upon the +simple, strong fundamentals of his firm belief and to form it anew, +stone upon stone. + +Decisive actions, like the outbreak of 9 November 1923 for which we +today, in all its great tragedy and in all its pain, nevertheless have +to thank a forcible fate, impressed the inner and external features +into the power and into the structure of the Third Reich. Parts and +powers of this living marching growing movement, components and men +in it, acquired in proof faith, and reliability which was daily the +positions, missions and powers which then determined in the powerful +structural branch their course toward victory over external power. + +Therefore, he who wants to understand the growing mission and living +essence of the SS must first glance over its history and pursue therein +how it quite consequentially grew out of the smallest beginnings +through tough, clear work into an ever-enlarging mission. Therefore +the growth of the SS, as a firmly rooted member of the great Movement +is in many respects symbolic of the development of National Socialism, +as well as of a spiritual position and of the consequent practical +application of this unmistakably clear position in the life of the folk +and of its state. + +Not the chance incidents of the fighting years and also not the +tactical eventualities rounded out the form and brought about the +individual developments of this Black Corps, but from the beginning +on, the National Socialist of this organization, man upon man, was +quite consciously raised again and again above every day affairs which +are often petty and full of compromise; thereby raised above his own +weaknesses into the consciousness which is always new and living, that +he serves a powerful mission which is quite unique in the lengthy +annals of German history. + +The SS originated in the quite early time of the National Socialist +Movement in the year 1923. Then later, as the “Stosstrupp Hitler +[Shock Troop Hitler]” on the 8th of November 1923 it was forbidden and +dissolved automatically along with the entire movement. + +When the Party was again set up in the year 1925, the SA, as the +protective organization of the Movement, still remained forbidden. +Furthermore, besides these limiting coercive measures, there still +existed a prohibition against speeches as well as assemblies for +the Fuehrer in Prussia and also in Bavaria. The National Socialist +assemblies were at that time only allowed in Saxony and Thuringia which +were at that time fully Red. And now in order at least here to hold +the necessary assemblies with success, in order to gain a foothold, it +was necessary to protect them under all circumstances from explosive +missiles and premature disbandment. + + + The Protective Echelons + + [Die Schutzstaffeln] + +For this reason, the Fuehrer ordered in January 1925 that a small +mobile organization be constructed for the protection of these +meetings: The Protective Echelons. They were in the best sense of +the word at this time, therefore, echelons, which means, quite small +formations, most of them only in strength of one leader and ten men, +which had been set up in single places which at that time already were +important for the first forward march of the Movement. Even such a +large city as Berlin had only one “Schutzstaffel” of two leaders and +twenty men in those days. With these Schutzstaffeln then in the years +1925 and 1926, the Movement had held the assemblies of the Fuehrer +and also of other champions of the Party in Saxony and Thuringia, and +always held fast against each oppositional attempt in every case. + +The year 1926 brought the renewed permission to organize the SA and for +this reason, the Schutzstaffeln stepped more into the background in the +following years. + +This year 1926, however, is of great significance for the SS which +at that time consisted of about 200 men in its entire strength, when +namely Adolf Hitler gave the most sacred symbol of the Movement, the +Blood Banner [Blutfahne] of 9 November 1923 into faithful hands at the +Party Congress [Parteitag] in Weimar, the second Reichsparteitag of the +NSDAP. + +On the 6th of January 1929, Adolf Hitler appointed his tested comrade +of long standing, Heinrich Himmler, as Reichsfuehrer-SS. Heinrich +Himmler assumed charge therewith, of the entire Schutzstaffeln, +totaling at the time 280 men, with the express and particular +commission of the Fuehrer to form of this organization an elite troop +of the Party, a troop dependable in every circumstance. + + + The New Division + +With this day, the real history of the SS begins as it stands before +us today in all its deeper essential features, firmly anchored into +the National Socialistic Movement. For the SS and its Reichsfuehrer, +Heinrich Himmler, its first SS man, have both become inseparable in +the course of these battle-filled years. When the command of the +Fuehrer had been given for the organization on a greater scale of this +component of the movement, it had to be clear from the beginning that +this mission could only then be solved in the real significance of its +occasion if, in pursuit of the last essentials, the directives given by +Adolf Hitler to the movement were grasped and carried out. + + + The Selection + +We National Socialists are firmly convinced of the ideology that in +the final over-all objective only good blood, as seen in the long run, +produces the best accomplishments. Sustained by this conviction, the +Reichsfuehrer SS went at that time, beginning with this basic criterion +of the National Socialist, into the execution of the command of the +Fuehrer of the 6th of January 1929. + +One of the last soldiers of the old army and, at the same time, also +one of the oldest co-champions of the Fuehrer began, as a tough and +energetic organizer, to collect a troop, a troop of the best, not +only the best physically, but also most dependable, most faithful, +in the last analysis the most characteristically worthwhile men from +all parts of the movement, in order in the first place to satisfy the +fundamental demand made of this formation, namely: the greatest good of +the movement, to protect the Fuehrer himself. + +It remains as one of the greatest and decisive services of the +Reichsfuehrer SS that he inserted the theoretical concepts of the +National Socialist ideology, courageously and consequentially +especially in this field, into this, his own organizational mission of +the construction of the SS and then clearly carried them out even at a +time when the racial question was a negative concept deriving from a +self-evident anti-semitism. + + + The Marriage Law [Heiratsbefehl] + +It would naturally be meaningless and also, after a short time be +worthless, to undertake the experiment to assemble a male racial +elite and while so doing to by-pass present or, indeed, the future +families of the men. Corresponding to this quite simple and clear +perception, for which, moreover, German history affords sufficient +menacing lessons in all of its periods, the SS has given itself its +own appropriate fundamental laws. As the first and most important of +these basic requirements, the Reichsfuehrer-SS in the year 1931 gave to +the Schutzstaffeln the law which prescribes an engagement and marriage +certificate for SS men. + +This order has the following wording: + + Munich, 31 December 1931 + +“Reichsfuehrer-SS + + SS Command-A-No. 65 + +1. The SS is a band of definitely Nordic German men chosen according to +certain viewpoints. + +2. Corresponding to the National Socialist ideology and to the +perception that the future of our folk rests in the selectiveness and +preservation of the race and of the healthy inheritance of good blood, +I install with effectiveness from the 1st of January 1932 the ‘Marriage +Certificate’ for all unmarried members of the SS. + +3. The aim striven for is the hereditarily healthy clan of a definitely +Nordic German sort. + +4. The marriage certificate will be distributed or denied solely and +alone from a racial and hereditarily healthy viewpoint. + +5. Every SS man who has the object of getting married has to procure +for this purpose the marriage certificate of the Reichsfuehrer-SS. + +6. SS members who though denied marriage certificates marry in spite +of it, will be stricken from the SS; they will be given the choice of +withdrawing. + +7. The working out of the details of marriage petitions is the task of +the ‘Race Office’ of the SS. + +8. The Race Office of the SS directs the ‘Clan Book of the SS’ in which +the families of SS members will be entered after distribution of the +marriage certificate or acquiescence to the petition to enter into +marriage. + +9. The Reichsfuehrer-SS, the manager of the Race Office, and the +specialists (Referenten) of this office are duty bound on their word of +honor to secrecy. + +10. It is clear to the SS that with this command it has taken a step of +great significance. Derision, scorn, and failure to understand do not +move us; the future belongs to us! + + The Reichsfuehrer-SS + H. Himmler” + +This incisive command and the self-evidence of its execution +demonstrate, even in the difficult years before the first victory, +the self-confidence of this voluntary partnership for a determination +which even at the time in which it was ordered must mean an eternal, +inconceivable, encroachment on the so-called personal freedom of the +individual. + + + The Instrument of the Fuehrer + +Inside and outside of the movement, in these years, the SS had to +intervene, repeatedly called upon for the protection of the National +Socialist fundamental principles. From disunity over the attempt at +a schism to the betrayal of the Fuehrer himself, under immeasurable +difficulties and grave human sacrifices, the SS fulfilled its various +missions as the instrument for unconditional preparedness for +intervention for the Fuehrer. It earned for itself at this time the +slogan of Adolf Hitler: “SS-man, your honor is faithfulness”. + +In the whole broad Reich, in village and city, the SS, in good and +self-evident comradeship with the SA in the fighting years, broke the +Red and Black Terror. Long and stirring is the list of all those brave +soldiers of the Black Corps who gave their lives as a pledge of their +faithfulness. + +They did not die in open battle, eye to eye with the opponent; they +fell singly and deserted, pursued, hunted; harrassed, beaten, trampled +to death, in dark alleys and courtyards, shot in the back, murdered +by hostile superior forces; they gave their mortal life, and their +names shine forth today, from banners and standards, their earthly +immortality as a symbol of a great example which they fulfilled, +completely and purely, everywhere, including those unforgettable heroes +who fought against the choking gallows of an inhuman system, until even +Austria returned home into the greater Reich through their sacrifice. + + + Responsibility for the Future + +But not only the revolutionary fighting and sacrificial spirit of this +National Socialist formation, its daily application and by this means +the best and clear cut selectiveness, determined its existence and +its ever clearer course. Far and beyond this, it was the penetrating +feeling of responsibility of its leadership for a distant future which +decisively determined its course. + +Here, in that difficult moment, those solutions were found for all +necessary questions which, indeed in the first place must be justified +for the day, far and above that, however, without compromise, bore +complete responsibility at the same time in itself for the way of +future development. + +Apart from the green table, not for the sake of momentary results, +distinct from all dogma, a great eternal view of German history and a +chaste consciousness of the inheritance of ancestry and the genesis of +the future at the decisive point of the fighting period, and of the +selectiveness of this partnership, have the peculiar and deep meaning +for all missions and their execution. + +When the day of the grasping of power had finally come, there were +52,000 SS men who in this spirit, bore the revolution in the van, +marched into the new State which they began to help form, everywhere: +in their stations and positions, in profession and in service, and in +all their essential tasks. + +The firm, devout ties to this great blood stream of the nation [Volk], +the perception of the fulfillment of the deepest German longing for +service to the nation, this welding to the firm internal unity of the +exclusiveness which the SS was able to achieve, in the course of hard +and full years, was the presupposition for the succeeding further +greater task of the Black Corps. Only the absolute understanding of +the emptiness of all personnel objectives and the final recognition of +this valuelessness of smaller interests gave this formation the right +to be the protective corps in State and Party as the strong arm of the +Fuehrer for the internal security of the Reich in all good and evil +times. + + + Protective Corps of Party and State + +The prerequisites for this mighty mission were severe discipline +and the highest sort of self-confidence as the result of continuous +selection within its own ranks, but were, as well, a fanatical and +convinced consciousness of duty to coming generations. Here, the +hardiness of the best soldierly traditions met a new and harmonious +formation with the keenness of a crystal-clear political consciousness +as well as the pure, devout heart of a revolutionary of the living +German Movement. + +The missions which were given to the SS in the present day National +Socialist State can be understood only in the knowledge of this +evolution. + +The protective organization of the Movement became the internal +protective organization of the State after the seizure of power and +after the Schutzstaffel, by renewed proof of its essentiality and the +testing of its dependability on the 20th of July 1934, was elevated to +be an independent component of the Party directly subordinate to the +Fuehrer. + +Out of the above evolution, all the latter events could fashion +themselves in apparent self-evidence along these principles. With the +acquisition of power within the Reich, the protective organization +of the Party became, feature by feature, as a consequence of the +broadening of its mission, the protective organization of the National +Socialist State. In this capacity, it took over step by step the +remaining usable and valuable parts of the old police. Out of the +16 state police forces, a large and strong Reich police came into +existence; and, that which even the old National Socialists themselves +had hardly thought to expect: out of the jailer of the rubber cudgel +regime there came in existence in the new police, an active friend +of the people; and even more than that, in this slow and qualitative +evolution the police itself has become, in the completion of National +Socialism and in the leadership of National Socialism, through this +Black Corps, a part of the proud formations of the Movement. + + + Reichsfuehrer-SS and Chief of the German Police + +The Reichsfuehrer-SS became Chief of the German Police and united +its mission, as elastic as operative, with its formations into a +comprehensive line of defense for fighting political as well as +criminal enemies of the Nation; a line of defense in which State and +Party, civil servant and political soldier labor in a complete and, +therefore, for the first time in a positive manner hand in hand. + +For the first time the newly attained meaning of the Police, as +representative, protector, and helper of the community of the people, +and thereby as real soldiers of that community of the people and of the +National Socialist ideology, impressed the new features of this clear, +sober countenance. For out of this original police, employed with a +negative aim, an active friend and helper of the people has come into +being, a rejuvenated people’s troop, whose successors are provided +from the SS, so that the civil servant, both within and outside of his +service, is and remains an SS-man, a champion and protector of the new +State, of the community of the people and of the movement. + + + The Troops in Barracks + +The conceivable danger, that an organization destined only for internal +employment sees itself hampered in the fulfilling of the large, +all-embracing missions in difficult times which demand the employment +of the whole nation toward the outside. The Fuehrer met this by the +creation of an active troop of the SS lodged in barracks and chosen +from the SS members of long military service and politically of the +best training. + +Early in the year 1933 the Body Guard Regiment [Leibstandarte] of the +SS, “Adolf Hitler”, arose and in the further enlargement of this SS +Military Service Troop [SS-Verfuegungstruppe] there were added the +active SS regiments: SS 1, “Deutschland”, in Munich; SS 2, “Germania”, +in Hamburg; Aroken, Radolfszell. As well as these, there were the +Technical Storm Unit [Sturmbanne], the SS Pioneer Storm Unit in Dresden +and the SS Signal Corps Unit [Nachrichtensturmbanne] in Unna. The SS +Junker schools in Toelz and Braunschweig provided for the training of +those to become leaders of these SS Military Service Troops. + +In March 1938, after the return of Austria home into the Reich, the +Fuehrer gave the order to establish a fourth active SS regiment of +SS General Service Troops, SS 3, “The Fuehrer”, with its stations in +Vienna, Graz, and Klagenfurt. All these troops have received the finest +reward for their labor: they are allowed to cooperate prominently in +the creation and protection of the Greater Germany. + +This chosen SS-Troop, trained during four years service under the +severest conditions, offers, equally, the best rising generation for +future leaders and subordinate leaders of the General SS, the Police, +and the Security Service. + + + II. Organization + +In addition to the General SS, so to speak the mother of all the other +SS formations, there are the SS-militarized forces, the SS-Death +Head regiments, and further, the Security Service and the Race and +Settlement organizations. + +The supreme headquarters of the Reichsfuehrer SS for the General SS is +the SS Main Office in Berlin. + +The supreme headquarters for the Security Service is the SS-Main +Security Office in Berlin. + +The supreme headquarters for the Race and Settlement organization is +the Main Race and Settlement agency SS in Berlin. + +Aside from these main offices there are the following offices which +likewise are directly under the Reichsfuehrer SS and which have the +same characteristics of a main office: + + Personal Staff of the Reichsfuehrer SS. + + Administration Chief of the SS. + + Personnel Chief of the SS (these three in Berlin). + + Head of the SS courts, Munich. + + Chief of the Constabulary, SS-Lt. Gen. of the police Daluege, with + the rank of a Chief of a Main Office [Hauptamtschef]. + + + The SS Main Office + +The SS Main Office consists of the following 13 offices which have to +fulfill the following missions: + +The central chancellery [ZK] is the headquarters of the Chief of the +SS Main Office. It provides for the cooperation among all of its +subordinate offices and examines the whole direction of management +within the SS Main Office. + +The management office [Fuehrungsamt] (I) deals with all affairs which +pertain to the training, organization, and deployment of units of the +General SS. + +The personnel office (II) deals with the personnel affairs for all SS +fuehrers of the General SS from SS-Second Lieutenants to SS-Captains +inclusive. + +The SS Administrative Office (IV) handles all the administrative +affairs of the SS Main Office. It is of the same level as the +Administrative Office Security Service (SD) and the Administrative +Office Race and Settlement (R and S) and just as these, it +is subordinate to the SS Administrative Chief as the highest +administrative court of the SS. + +The medical office (V) deals with all things concerned with hygienic +conditions and accommodations for the SS. + +The SS-Recruiting Office (VI) handles the preliminary and final +acceptance of SS applicants and SS candidates into the SS. Here also, +the conviction and discharge of men and non-commissioned officers is +regulated as well as re-enlistment measures among other things. Its +missions further include the planning and execution of all recruiting +methods, the systematic comprehension and compiling of personal data of +all SS members as well as the compilation of the total strength of the +SS and of corresponding statistics. + +The office for Security Missions (VII) handles the employment of SS +units in special instances for example, at Fuehrer appearances and +for visits of leading foreign government officials. In addition it +is responsible for the mobilization preparations for the SS which it +completes in collaboration with the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht. +Among these also come the taking in of reserves of the SS Death Head +regiments for special practices in peace and the liability of military +service of SS members. + +The Reserve Office (VIII) is, as the name implies, responsible for the +Reserve of all the SS units. + +The Procurement Office (IX) provides for the procurement of articles of +equipment for the whole SS. + +The Office for Recreation (X) directs all measures for sport +participation of the SS in all forms of sports and supervises the +athletic training of the SS. + +The Office of Communication (XI), the Supply Office and the Public +Welfare Office (XII) and also the Educational Office (XIII) fulfill +their missions which are expressed by their title. + +Aside from the above named 13 offices, the following are also placed +under the Chief of the SS Main Office. + + The Inspector of the SS Militarized force. + The Fuehrer of the SS Death Head regiment. + The Inspector of the SS Border and Patrol units. + The Inspector of the SS Cavalry. + The Inspector of the SS Cavalry schools. + +In addition, the following are under the appropriate inspectors. + + The Auxiliary Work Camp Schleissheim. + The SS-VT professional school St. George. + The SS-Training Camp Dachau. + The SS-Rest Home, Sasbachwalden. + The SS-Motor School Berne. + The SS-Main Cavalry school Munich. + The SS-Cavalry supply institution Hamburg. + + + Formation structure of the General SS + +The strength of the General SS, 240,000 men, is subdivided today into +14 corps, 38 divisions, 104 infantry regiments, 19 mounted regiments, +14 communication battalions, and 9 Engineer battalions as well as +motorized and medical units. This General SS stands fully and wholly +on call as in the fighting years except for one small part of chief +Fuehrers and men. + +The Corps which are presently lead by a Lt. Gen. or Maj. Gen. are +subdivided into Divisions, Regiments, Battalions and Companies. + + + The steps in becoming an SS-man + +The steps in becoming an SS man are the following: + +After confirming his SS suitability and SS worthiness, the Hitler +Youth upon reaching 18 becomes an SS applicant. Then he is taken over +into the SS as an SS candidate on the Reichsparteitag of the same year +upon presentation of the SS certificate. Then after a short period of +probation he is administered the Fuehrer oath on the 9th November. + +As SS candidate he earns his Army sport badge and the bronze Reich +sport badge. Then he goes into the Labor service [Arbeitsdienst] and +finally to the Wehrmacht either at the age of 19 or 19½--according to +whichever way his age group is absorbed. + +After two years, he returns from the Wehrmacht in as far as he does not +want to remain as non-commissioned candidate or reenlistee. Whoever +returns to the SS is still, however, a candidate. In the following +period up until his coming final acceptance he will be schooled again +specially and ideologically at which time he will be thoroughly taught +and instructed in the fundamentals of the SS, especially regarding the +marriage law and the honor laws of the SS. The SS candidate will be +recognized as SS man upon fulfillment of other requirements on the 9th +of November following his return from the armed forces and thereby will +be finally taken into the SS. + +At the same time, on this 9th of November, he has the right to wear +the SS dagger and solemnly promises upon this occasion that he and his +pin will always hold to the basic laws of the SS. From this day on he +assumes the right and duty to defend his honor according to the honor +laws of the Black Corps as is specified in the SS code. + +He then remains in the active General SS as SS man until he is 35. Upon +request, he then will enter the SS Reserve and upon reaching 45 he will +transfer into the SS inactive Corps. + + + The SS Militarized forces [Verfuegungstruppen, VT] + +Out of the General SS, the foundation of all SS, after the seizing of +power the SS militarized forces appeared, on account of considerations +which are indicated in another reference, in a slow and organizational +development. + +Its garrison and construction are also described in another place. + +The militarized forces are constructed after the experiences of the +SS upon the fundamental basis of National Socialist perception of +selection, direction and education. + +The SS militarized forces, in their present day form which is clearly +delineated, are an active garrisoned and armed part of the SS. Those +men selected and tested according to the standards of the SS have +obligated themselves to a period of service of at least four years. In +addition to the indoctrination for the SS man, these troops receive a +full military education. The service in the militarized force counts +toward the fulfillment of military service. + +After termination of their obligations in the militarized forces, the +SS men naturally go back into the General SS from which they came. + + + The SS Death Head Units + +The SS Death Head units form one part of the garrisoned SS. They arose +from volunteers of the General SS who were recruited for the guarding +of concentration camps in 1933. + +Their mission, aside from the indoctrination of the armed political +soldier, is the guarding of enemies of the State who are held in +concentration camps. + +The SS Death Head units obligate their members to 12 years (service). +It is composed mainly of men who already have fulfilled their duty to +serve in the Wehrmacht. This time of service is counted completely. + +The Death Head units are fundamentally similar to the SS militarized +forces in construction and equipment. They consist of four regiments. + + + Personnel Chief of the SS + +The Office of the personnel Chief of the SS is the SS-Personnel +Chancellery. It handles all personnel affairs of the Fuehrer Corps of +the whole SS. + +Further, the Personnel Chief is Inspector of the SS Junker schools +in Braunschweig and Toelz. He is responsible for the continuation of +education of the forthcoming young Fuehrers from these schools. + +The Fuehrer school of the General SS Munich-Dachau is also placed under +the Personnel Chief. + + + Chief of the SS Courts + +The SS-Courts, directly under the Reichsfuehrer SS, is the highest +office of the SS in all cases of disciplinary or honorary jurisdiction. +Its activity therefore consists, above all, in the handling of +disciplinary actions; in cases of less severe nature it acts as court +of appeal. + +Further, the SS-Court is solely competent for the handling of cases of +clemency as well as of disciplinary and also of punitive nature. + +As the highest office of disciplinary penal affairs of the SS, at +the same time the SS-Court is the liaison office for all offices of +the Party and Reich which are essentially connected with its area of +jurisdiction. + +A penal jurisdiction will be introduced for the members of the SS +militarized forces, the SS Death Head units, the main offices of the +Security Service of the SS and for these main official members of +the General SS who are placed over these units. Its construction is +undertaken at present. + + + The Security Service + +During the fighting years, the scope of jurisdiction of the SS had +experienced an expansion in the course of time to such an extent that +more and more the necessity for discovering and knowing of opposing +tendencies developed as an absolute requirement for their operational +campaign. Originally, the SS served as the personal protection for +the Fuehrer and for leading personalities of the National Socialistic +Movement. + +Beyond the steady growth of the Party, the original relatively simple +mission of the protection of persons has further developed to a problem +of the Security of the Party and its manifold functions. For this +purpose, intelligence services were installed in the Party and all of +its components with the mission: to counter the significance of the +opposing aggressive and destructive intentions through exploration and +judging of the threatening menaces. + +However, there was no uniform planning, and a central collaboration of +intelligence services was hardly attempted. + +The SS had also acquired an intelligence service at this time +for the fulfillment of its missions. Contrary to the rest of the +intelligence services of the Party, a far-reaching systematic political +intelligence service grew out of the so-called I.C. Service, the later +P.I. Service [Press and Information] of the Reichsfuehrer SS. + +This intelligence service developed upon the fundamentals of racial +selection and ideological rearing in conformity with the general +fundamentals of the SS in deviation from all limitations of scope, +of momentary or personal nature in connection with an all embracing +positive setting of a goal, toward a true Security Service at first for +the SS and the Party and later thereby, for the people and the Reich. + +This became clear after the taking over of power, as the “Security +Service of the Reichsfuehrer SS” proved that it had seized all +opponents and living provinces which were or could become significant +for the new National Socialist State. This was done by a planned +construction of the organization, which kept itself free from personal +dependency. + +From this development, in the field of Party intelligence service, the +Deputy of the Fuehrer drew the deduction which he made in his decree of +9 June 1934 that “no intelligence or counterintelligence service of the +Party may exist outside of the Security Service of the Reichsfuehrer +SS.” From the promulgation of this decree on, the Security Service of +the Reichsfuehrer SS is the only political intelligence service of the +National Socialist German Workers’ Party. + +Since the Security Service of the Reichsfuehrer SS delivered +information on the situation and its connection through constant +observation of the open and secret enemies of the National Socialistic +ideology, it more and more became an organ for protection of the State +and of the people which stood in closest cooperation with the Secret +State Police. + +The head of the organization of the Security Service Reichsfuehrer +SS is the Main Security Office which stands next to the main offices +of the Reichsfuehrer SS. The Chief of the Main Security Office is +the present SS-Maj. Gen. Heydrich, who is at the same time Chief of +the Security Police, and who was entrusted at that time with the +construction of the I.C., as well as, the P.I. Service. + +The regional construction of the Security Service Reichsfuehrer SS +is close to that of the General SS in its subdivision into Corps and +sectors. + +The constant observation of the course of working methods of the +opponent, and his technique in the alternate forms of appearance, his +ideologies and methods of work compulsorily lead thereto, that the +work of the Security Service Reichsfuehrer SS cannot only be intended +for the hour but must be expansive and far-reaching. + + + The Race and Settlement Affairs + +After the Main Security Office comes the Main Race and Settlement +Agency as the next pillar of the Reichsfuehrer SS. + +In this Race and Settlement Agency the marriage applications of the +SS men are handled in the Relations Office, because no SS man can +openly marry without the permission of the Reichsfuehrer SS under +the stipulations of the marriage law of 1931. For this, a medical +examination is required for man and wife. Guarantees for ideological +and personal rearing are to be brought for the bride. Further, the +family tree is now required of man and wife--by officers [Fuehrers] +back to 1750 and by non-coms [Unterfuehrer] back to 1800. A copy of the +hereditary health certificate is likewise required. + +In order to make possible a rapid gathering of the necessary +requirements, Relation Officers are established and provided in the +infantry battalions of the General SS. They, like the Main Race and +Settlement Agency, are to help the SS man in the gathering of all +required papers. + +This naturally entails a gigantic work and extensive organizational +preparations in order to meet quickly the requests which today are very +pressing since people are being married in greater numbers. + +The Settlements Office within the Main Race and Settlement Agency +handles and brings about the idea of blood and earth [Blut und Boden] +by settling valuable SS families in connection with the new creation of +German peasantry and homestead settlement. + +Further, the Race office in the Main Race and Settlement Agency watches +over the uniformity of the racial acceptance examinations and over +the schooling of these specialists who are to be employed for these +acceptance examinations within SS units. + + + Personal Staff Reichsfuehrer SS + +The “Personal Staff Reichsfuehrer SS” was formed as a central +headquarters for the Reichsfuehrer SS and at the same time, as an +essential main office. + +This office developed out of the Adjutants Office of the Reichsfuehrer +SS in the course of increased missions. Today it is placed under +the Chief Adjutants’ Office and the Police Adjutant’s Office of the +Reichsfuehrer SS. The Personal Staff, through its business experts, +handles the normal traffic, it administers the press section of the +Reichsfuehrer SS as well as the cultural section. Among others, it also +has the porcelain manufacture in Allach under its jurisdiction. + +In addition, the SS barracks, that is the summation of all SS men in +the higher institutes of learning, are placed under the Personal Staff +Reichsfuehrer SS. + +In addition, the following working areas are combined in the following +divisions in the Personal Staff. + +The section of Economic Aid (it handles encumbrance problems which +developed out of the fighting years). + +The section for cultural Research (prehistoric works, expeditions +with the support of the Reichsfuehrer SS, excavations as well as +foundations). + +The society “The Ancestral heritage” [Das Ahnenerbe]. + +The society “The Well of Life” [Lebensborn]. This consists mainly of +members of the SS. It makes possible to women with many children the +best possible care in ideal homes before, during and after child birth. +Furthermore, it makes possible the painless delivery for good racial, +unmarried, and about-to-be married mothers. + +At present, several homes in Steinhoering Polzen, Klosterheide (Mark), +Hoheharst bei Bremen and in Wiener Wald belong to the society “Well of +Life.” + +The office “Four Year Plan” fulfills the mission of regulation of the +labor employment which was assigned by the Director of the Four Year +Plan. + +Finally, the liaison officers to the Ministries and Offices of the +Party are assembled under the Personal Staff. + + + The Motto [Kernsatz] of the SS + +There is no mission for its own sake. How can there, therefore, be +missions for the sake of an organization. There is only one mission +which everything in Germany serves and that is the life of this people +through Adolf Hitler. + +“So we fell in and are marching, according to unchangeable laws as a +national socialistic, soldierly order of men designated as Nordic and +as an avowed association of their kindred, along the way into a distant +future. We wish and believe that we should not only be the descendants, +who have fought it out better, but especially the ancestors of those +later generations necessary for the perpetual life of the German +Teutonic people.” + +This motto of the SS which was given to it by the Reichsfuehrer SS +Heinrich Himmler, is the direction for this troop within the framework +of the movement. This is the sense by which everything which concerns +the SS consequent, steadfast, and thrifty, today, maintains a happy and +positive appearance. + +If the individual tasks in the framework of this great Protective +Corps--often limited in nature by the tasks themselves--may +occasionally be heavy and represent the harshest human requirements +then the filling of all necessities with this consciousness of a great +duty and a clean and concrete association of this concept gives every +duty the gleam and happiness which the National Socialist heart needs +and is continuously needing. + + + III. The Inner Security + +After the outward conclusion of the revolution of our ideology, +in possession of power and thereby in the continuous, unlimited +responsibility for the fundamentals of the idea, there began the +greater, although externally less heroic, phase of the penetration. + +All divisional fields in inner or outer positions of the State concept +or of State presentation had now to be convincingly and continually +filled with our new philosophy or newly indoctrinated by it. We had +to carry the revolution, the vivaciousness of an extensive movement, +into the stark hardened institutions and concepts with all means, with +and against the law. We had to overthrow that which did not seem fit +to live according to this process; we had to fill anew with a living +spirit that which seemed to be useful and employable. + +Few divisional fields of the conquered State had to face from the +beginning so much opposition in relation to the life and expression of +the new Power as the Police. + +All our hate and all our rebellion had opposed it as the most outspoken +symbol of the night of the system for us. + +Rubber hoses, house searchings, imprisonment, terror, persecutions, all +the counter concepts of the harshness and gruesomeness of the period +behind us seem to crystallize and assemble themselves under the term +“Police.” Entirely necessarily the term “Police” was already at that +time a term of the things hated and cursed. Therefore, at the beginning +it seemed almost impossible to actuate the thought of reaching the +identical presentation of National Socialist law, of National Socialist +community authority with the term and institution “Police.” Also within +the movement itself, it naturally necessitated considerable authority +in order to allow the forceful wish to become an act. + +The SS as formation, the association made up of leader, men, and +kindred of consequent National Socialists, possessed this authority in +the course of the history and development of the Party. Out of its +original mission within the Party it now obtained the same broadened +mission within the whole people and State: the inner security, the +inner protection of the National Socialist people, the consequent +repulsion of its inner enemies in all phases of public life. + +Viewed from this standpoint, it seemed as if unsurmountable obstacles +arose as the Reichsfuehrer SS, upon command of the Fuehrer, obtained +the task, in addition to the SS, of concentrating the whole German +Police into his hand and thereby into the real special meaning of the +SS. + +This transfer proceeded under the sole valid law, the living right of +the German Volk, not only against old ideas but often enough against +still existing regulations. + +In few fields of State and People the solution of the big problem of +Party and State has been so revolutionary and extensively thoroughly +undertaken, and scarcely anywhere except for just this difficult ground +was it demonstrated so successfully that, according to the Fuehrer’s +will, it is the idea which must determine the State. + +The personal authority of the Reichsfuehrer SS and that of his men, who +were of a single mind, carried the beginning of this new construction, +while the success of the National Socialist measures taken guaranteed +the further course. + +From the traditional concept of Police has arisen the new concept of +a protective Corps of the German people. And just as the old idea was +typically personified in the bailiff, the new idea also demands a new +man. + +We do not need a mere official, just as we do not consider the +unpolitical soldier suitable here. The new type shall be representative +of the SS man, who grows out of the Principle of the indoctrination and +out of the way of the SS and who already today has clearly developed +himself before the people. Just in this post the people want and must +possess a political soldier in the best meaning of this National +Socialist conception. + +Instead of the duplicity of a liberal Police law the man of the Police +was given the powerful living authority of clear fundamentals and +removed from the hatred and mistrust of the best part of our people +by means of the National Socialist authority of the SS. Thereby, the +Police again was carried into the midst of the people as an important +member for the protection and defense of the community. + +It is clear and naturally necessary that completely new judgment of +the concept of enemy of the State would come from the new type of its +(Police) man and its youthful clear idea. Out of the limitation in +the general defense, a far-reaching prevention had to ensue from the +clear grasping of the State concepts, a clarification of the concept +of State enemies, a setting up of tasks which thereby assigns to the +National Socialist Protective Corps a historical mission of unheard of +proportions in the sound development of the people. + +The spirit of discipline and of companionship, the knowledge of the +source of our being and its single teaching, this vast train of thought +of the SS as expression of the developing factors of an inner National +Socialist securing and safeguarding of all possibilities of coming +events--all this is more and more the meaning and spirit of all great +new formations in this section of inner security. + +To guarantee the intensive security of this new Reich, that is the +great duty of the SS and with it, and within its scope, also of the +Police in all its categories. That is the comprehensive mission +the Fuehrer gave to the SS. It will attack this job anew every +day, with the utmost seriousness, fully conscious that this is an +immense National Socialist task and firmly convinced that only the +ideologically best education of its men and its selection of members +will enable it to solve this task completely. + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2285-PS + +Before me, Lieutenant Colonel Henry H. Mize, JAGD, personally appeared +Lieutenant Colonel Guivante de Saint Gast and Lieutenant Jean Veith, +both of the French army, who were made known to me, and who, being by +me first duly sworn, made the following statement in the handwriting of +Lieutenant Veith under oath: + + The undersigned: + +Guivante de Saint Gast, Lt. Colonel, Chef de Mission de 1^{ere} Classe, +Carte d’identite militaire BCRA MCPA Promontain No. 510, Immatricule +FFC Londres RUl. Carte de Repatrie No. 72352 delivered in Annercy +(France). Order of Mission of the Provisional Government of the French +Republic, Ministry of Prisoners and Deportees dated May 4th, 1945, No. +16772. Detained in the Concentration Camp of Mauthausen from March +18th, 1944, till April 22nd, 1945, No. 57876, having been employed at +the offices of distribution of work [Arbeitseinsatz] from August 16th, +1944, till April 22nd, 1945, as auxiliary and as titulary. + +Veith, Jean, Lieutenant, Charge de Mission de 2^e Classe, Carte +d’identite Repatrie No. 403927 delivered at Annercy. Order of Mission +of the provisional government of the French Republic, Ministry of +Prisoners and Deportees, dated May 4th, No. 16774. Detained in +Mauthausen from April 22nd, 1943, till April 22nd, 1945, No. 28645, +having been employed at the Politische Abteilung from June 2nd, 1943, +to June 25th, 1943; at the Arbeitseinsatz from June 26th, 1943, to +August 15th, 1944; as foreman of the cartography and mecausgraphy +Hollerith services till their dissolution in February 1945; and +from then on until his liberation at the Lagerschreibstube (night +shift)--both residing in Paris (17a) 20, Rue de Sanssuse, relate and +certify under oath the following facts: + +In Mauthausen existed several treatments of prisoners, among them the +“Action K or Kugel” (Bullet Action). Upon the arrival of transports, +prisoners marked “K” were not registered, got no numbers, and their +names remained unknown except to the officials of the Politische +Abteilung. (Lt. Veith had the opportunity of hearing, upon the +arrival of a transport, the following conversation between the +Untersturmfuehrer Streitwieser and the chief of the convoy: “How many +prisoners?” “15, but two K.” “Well, that makes 13.”) + +The prisoners were taken directly to the prison where they were +undressed and taken to the “Bathrooms.” This bathroom in the cellars +of the prison building near the crematory was specially designed for +execution (shooting and gassing). + +The shooting took place by means of a measuring apparatus. The +prisoners were backed against a metric scale with an automatic +contraption releasing a bullet in their neck as soon as the moving +board determining their height touched the top of their heads. + +If a transport consisted of too many “K” prisoners, instead of wasting +time on the measurements they were exterminated by gas which was sent +into the bathrooms instead of water. + +During his time as foreman at the Hollerith section, Dr. Veith +frequently received transfer sheets from other camps mentioning +prisoners who did not appear on the entry list of Mauthausen. In such +cases the Politische Abteilung very reluctantly used to give the +information that the camp services had not to take into consideration +such missing prisoners because they had been transferred “In geheimer +Reichssache” (Secret affair of the Reich) and insisted upon the +complete disappearance of all traces of the names. In many cases due +to transmission errors, the fatal “K” indication was not immediately +given with the transfer and followed several days or several weeks +later. Lt. Col. de Saint Gast certifies having received in this service +cancellation orders from the Politische Abteilung concerning such +prisoners. As upon their arrival such “K” prisoners had, by mistake, +received a camp number, they had to disappear in the numbers register +of the camp, and from this unification order was made in the following +hypocritical form: prisoner X Nr..... birth place, birth date is +actually called [heisst richtig] prisoner Y, Nr...., different birth +place and date. + +Such identification orders should be found in the documents of the +Arbeitseinsatz as far as they have not been destroyed. + +This statement has been made voluntarily in the handwriting of Lt. +Veith, who understands English and who has truly translated the same to +Lt. Col. de Saint Gast prior to his signing the same. + + /s/ Pf. de Saint Gast /s/ Jean Veith + +Subscribed and sworn to before me this 13th day of May 1945. + + /s/ Henry H. MIZE + HENRY H. MIZE + Lt. Col. JAGD + + + PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2288-PS + + ADOLF HITLER’S GREAT SPEECH BEFORE THE REICHSTAG. + + Berlin, 21 May 1935 + + Voelkischer Beobachter, Southern Germany Special Edition No. 142 a. of + 22 May 1935. [Pages 1, 3, 4] + +Deputies! Members of the German Reichstag! + +* * * * * * * + +Leaving these general conclusions now and arriving at a precise +fixation of the present current problems for me the + +Position of the German Reich Government results as follows: + +1. The German Reich Government refuses to adhere to the Geneva +Resolutions of 17 March. + +The treaty of Versailles was not broken by Germany unilaterally, but +the well known paragraphs of the dictate of Versailles were violated +and consequently invalidated by those Powers who could not make up +their mind to follow the disarmament requested of Germany with their +own disarmament as agreed upon by the treaty. + +2. Because the other powers did not live up to their obligations +under the disarmament program, the Government of the German Reich no +longer considers itself bound to those articles which are nothing but +a discrimination against the German Nation for an unlimited period of +time, since through them Germany is being nailed down in a unilateral +manner, contrary to a the spirit of the agreement. + +But it solemnly declares that this measure is being taken only with +regard to those well known paragraphs which are discriminating against +the German people in a moral and factual way. + +Therefore, the Government of the German Reich shall absolutely respect +all other articles pertaining to the cooperation [Zusammenleben] of the +various nations including territorial agreements; revision which will +be unavoidable as time goes by, it will carry out by way of a friendly +understanding only. + +3. The Government of the German Reich has the intention not to sign +any treaty which it believes not to be able to fulfill. However, it +will live up to every treaty signed voluntarily even if it was composed +before this Government took over. Therefore, it will in particular +adhere to all the allegations under the Locarno pact as long as the +other partners of the pact also adhere to it. + +The Government of the German Reich regards the fact that it has to +respect the demilitarized zone, as an extremely difficult contribution +by a sovereign power, to the pacification, and it believes to be +compelled to call attention to the fact that the constant increase in +the number of troops on the other side may not just be regarded to be +of great comfort to these efforts. + + + PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2289-PS + + VOELKISCHER BEOBACHTER + + Berlin edition No. 68 + + Berlin, Sunday, 8 March 1936 + +The important speech of the Fuehrer in the Reichstag on 7 March reads +as follows: + +Men of the German Reichstag! France has replied to the repeated +friendly offers and peaceful assurances made by Germany by infringing +on the Rhine Pact through a military alliance with the Soviet Union, +exclusively directed against Germany. In this manner, however, the +Locarno Rhine Pact has lost its inner meaning and ceased in practice +to exist. Consequently, Germany regards herself for her part as no +longer bound by this dissolved treaty. The German Government are +now constrained to face the new situation created by this alliance, +a situation which is rendered more acute by the fact that the +Franco-Soviet Treaty has been supplemented by a Treaty of Alliance +between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union, exactly parallel in +form. In accordance with the fundamental right of a nation to secure +its frontiers and insure its possibilities of defense, the German +Government have today restored the full and unrestricted sovereignty of +Germany in the demilitarized zone of the Rhineland. + +* * * * * * * + +After a hard inner struggle I have, therefore, decided in the name of +the German Reich Cabinet [Reichsregierung] to submit the following +memorandum to the French Government and the other signatory powers of +the Locarno Pact today. + +* * * * * * * + +We have no territorial claims to make in Europe. We know above all that +all the tensions resulting either from false territorial settlements or +from the disproportion of the numbers of inhabitants to their living +spaces cannot, in Europe, be solved by war. + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2292-PS + + THE ARCHIVE [Das Archiv], March 1935, Page 1830. + + The German Air Force + +The Reich Minister for Aviation [Luftfahrt], 10.3 +General of the Airmen, Goering, in his talk with the +special correspondent of the Daily Mail, Ward Price, S i +expressed himself on the subject of the German Air-Force. 35 + +General Goering said: + +In the extension of our national defense, [Sicherheit] it was +necessary, as we repeatedly told the world, to take care of defense +in the air. As far as that is concerned I restricted myself to those +measures absolutely necessary. The guiding line of my actions was, not +the creation of an aggressive force which would threaten other nations, +but merely the completion of a military aviation [Luftfahrt] which +would be strong enough to repel, at any time, attacks on Germany. + +Until the present moment, this has been accomplished on a general +basis, as so far we have been discussing airmen in general only +without making any definite distinction from the military point of +view. The British government, among other proposals, asked Germany +to join an Air-Pact, whose object is to take joint action in the air +against an aggressor who disturbs the peace, i.e. to put our own Air +Force at the disposal of the threatened country. This is the British +demand. Germany, trying to do everything and trying to collaborate +everywhere where peace can be ensured, replied by a Note expressing +her agreement with such an effective protection as is represented by +the air-convention. + +In this Note Germany expressed to Britain the view that Germany would +be prepared to send her Air Force to the help of the threatened country. + +After the German government expressed willingness to help, it became +necessary to make a clear demarcation within German aviation, namely in +this respect: which air force will be able to be made available? This +situation brought about the decision as to those of the German aviation +who will in future belong to the Air Force and those who will in future +remain in civil aviation or in sport aviation. It was necessary to mark +this separation also outwardly, so that the members of the German Air +Force became soldiers according to the law and their leaders became +officers. This involves only a part of the persons who up to the +present moment have worked in the common German aviation. Therefore +the difference between our Air Force and our civilian aviation shows +itself clearly and distinctly in the various badges of rank and in the +designation of rank. + +I sum up: Our willingness to share in the effective defense of world +peace, our assent to hasten with help to the hard pressed country, made +the creation of a military aviation imperative, if our assent should +not remain merely an empty phrase. + +Answering the correspondent’s question about the hierarchy in the new +Air Force, its uniforms and its ranks the general said: “The Air Force +is under the orders of the Reich Minister for Aviation who controls +also civil aviation. His military rank is General of the Airmen +[General der Flieger]. The uniform remains similar to the uniform of +the sport aviation organization but outwardly it will be marked clearly +by military badges of rank. Similarly the names of rank correspond with +the military designation of rank from Lieutenant upwards to General +of the Airmen.” To the question concerning the nomination of German +Air-attaches in foreign missions General Goering replied that the +preparations for it were pending. Also about the numerical strength +of the Air Force he said that he could not yet give final figures. +As far as the percentage ratio to the Air Forces of other powers is +concerned, every sensible and decent man ought to realize that Germany, +being particularly threatened, needed such figures as would guarantee +the absolute safety of the German people. Asked about the role of the +Air Force within the Armed Forces, General Goering stated that at the +present moment, it was impossible to make a clear appreciation of the +situation. But that it was definite that the Air Force must be an +integral part of any defense and that without an Air Force the Army and +Navy, no matter how strong, were useless. + +In conclusion, the correspondent asked whether the German Air Force +will be capable of repelling attacks on Germany. General Goering +replied to that exactly as follows: “The German Air Force is just as +passionately permeated with the will to defend the Fatherland to the +last as it is convinced, on the other hand, that it will never be +employed to threaten the peace of other nations.” + + + PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2306-PS + + REVOLUTION OF EDUCATION + + Baldur von Schirach + +[Page 51] + +The struggle for the unification of the German youth is finished. I +considered it as my duty to conduct it in a hard and uncompromising +manner. Many might not have realized why we went through so much +trouble for the sake of our youth. And yet: The National Socialist +German Workers’ Party, whose trustee I felt I always was and always +will be, this party considered the struggle for the youth as the +decisive element for the future of the German nation. + +[Page 52] + +And I promise the German public that the youth of the German Reich, the +youth of Adolf Hitler will accomplish its duty in the spirit of the man +to whom alone their lives belong. + +[Page 63] + +I am responsible to the Reich that the entire youth of Germany will +be educated physically, morally, and spiritually in the spirit of the +National Socialist Idea of the State. + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2307-PS + + 1938 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 237 + + Law concerning the Reunion of Austria with the German Reich, March 13, + 1938 + +The Reich Government has ordained the following law, which is hereby +proclaimed: + +ARTICLE I. The Federal Constitutional Law of March 13, 1938, ordained +by the Austrian Federal Government, concerning the reunion of Austria +with the German Reich, hereby becomes a law of the German Reich. It has +the following text: + +By virtue of Article 3, Section 2, of the Federal Constitutional Law +concerning extraordinary measures in the constitutional field (R.G. +Blatt, I, No. 255, 1934), the Federal Government has ordained: + +Article 1. Austria is a province of the German Reich. + +Article 2. On Sunday, April 10, 1938, a free and secret plebiscite +shall be held for German men and women of Austria over twenty years of +age on the question of reunion with the German Reich. + +Article 3. In the plebiscite the majority of the votes cast shall +decide the issue. + +Article 4. The necessary regulations for the implementation and +supplementing of this Federal Constitutional Law shall be provided by +decree. + +Article 5. This Federal Constitutional Law shall enter into force on +the day of its proclamation. + +The Federal Government is entrusted with the execution of this Federal +Constitutional Law. + +Vienna, March 13, 1938. + +ARTICLE II. The laws at present in force in Austria shall remain in +force until further notice. The introduction of Reich law into Austria +will be effected by the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor or by the Reich +Minister to whom he may delegate this power. + +ARTICLE III. The Reich Minister of the Interior, in consultation with +the other Reich Ministers concerned, is empowered to issue the legal +and administrative regulations necessary for the implementation and +supplementing of this law. + +ARTICLE IV. This law shall enter into force on the day of its +proclamation. + + Linz, March 13, 1938. + + ADOLF HITLER, Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor; GOERING, General Field + Marshal, Reich Minister of Aviation; FRICK, Reich Minister of the + Interior; VON RIBBENTROP, Reich Minister of Foreign Affairs; R. + HESS, Deputy Fuehrer. + + + COPY OF DOCUMENT 2309-PS + + HEADQUARTERS + + THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY + + JUDGE ADVOCATE SECTION + + WAR CRIMES BRANCH + + APO 403 + 3 JA 122 21 June 1945 + +SUBJECT: Report of Investigation of War Crimes. + +TO: Commanding General, Third United States Army, APO 403. + +I. _AUTHORITY_ + +1. This investigation was conducted in conformity with letter, +Headquarters European Theater of Operations, file AG 000.5, OpJA. +Subject: Establishment of War Crimes Branches, 24 February 1945, by 2d +Lt. John J. Reid, AUS, Investigator-Examiner, from 25 April 1945 to 2 +May 1945 inclusive and pursuant to directive of Commanding General, +Third United States Army, a copy of the order which is attached hereto +as Exhibit A. + +II. _MATTERS INVESTIGATED--FLOSSENBURG CONC. CAMP (P-3338)_ + +2. _a._ Killing of interned Allied National Civil population and +Allied National PWs by various cruel and inhuman methods such as +neck-shooting, hanging, poison injections, forced suicides, lack of +medical treatment, starvation, beatings, and other numerous inhuman +methods purposely inflicted to result in death, (Violation of Geneva +Prisoners of War Convention, Rules of Land Warfare and the customary +law as observed by Civilized Nations). + +_b._ Living and working conditions of internees which were beyond +physical endurance and resulted in a systematic elimination of +prisoners. + +_c._ Starvation rations of internees which resulted in death and +permanent physical impairment of prisoners. + +_d._ Cruel and inhuman treatment and methods used by members of the +German Armed Forces and/or persons under their immediate command +against Allied National Civilians and Allied National Prisoners of +War. (Violation of Article 2 of the Geneva Convention. Paragraphs 73, +80, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 102, 105, 119, 127, 129, 132, 172, +FM 27-10 Rules of Land Warfare and in violation of the customary law +observed by Civilized Nations). + +_e._ Unlawful killing by shooting, hanging and other methods, of Allied +National Civil population who had been interned and/or otherwise +arrested by members of the German Armed Forces (Violation of the +customary laws observed by civilized nations). + +III. _PROCEEDINGS_ + +3. _a._ The testimony of all witnesses examined in the course of this +investigation was secured through the use of an interpreter after the +witness had been sworn under authority of Article of War 114, in the +following form: “You swear that the evidence you shall give in this +investigation now being conducted shall be the truth, the whole truth, +and nothing but the truth. So help you God.” The examination of each +such witness where practical was conducted in my presence. + +In the case at hand, it being impracticable to use a +stenographic-reporter, the witness after having first been duly +sworn was questioned regarding his knowledge of the matters under +investigation. The witness then propounded his testimony in a narrative +statement in his own handwriting, where practicable, and in his own +native language. The witnesses then after being sworn signed the +statement. The interpreter was also sworn in the following form: “You +swear that you will truly interpret in this investigation now being +conducted. So help you God.” + +_b._ The transcribed sworn testimony of each such witness whose name is +listed below is hereto attached as an exhibit, the number of which is +indicated in the lower right-hand corner of the paper preceded by the +letter “B.” + +SWORN STATEMENTS OF WITNESSES: See Appendix (1) for index and exhibits. + +UNSWORN STATEMENTS, LETTERS, REPORTS, ETC.: See Appendix (2) for index +and exhibits. + +_c._ PHOTOGRAPHS: + +1. Photographs of some of the SS personnel of Camp Flossenburg. See +Appendix (3) for index and photographs. + +2. Atrocity scenes. See Appendix (4) for index and photographs. + +IV. _SUMMARY OF FACTS_ + +4. Concentration Camp Flossenburg (Coord. P-3338), was founded in 1938 +as a camp for political prisoners. Construction was commenced on the +camp in 1938 and it was not until April 1940 that the first transport +of prisoners was received. From this time on the prisoners began to +flow steadily into the camp (Exh. B-1). Flossenburg was the mother camp +and under its direct control and jurisdiction were 47 satellite camps +or outer-commandos for male prisoners and 27 camps for female workers. +To these outer-commandos were supplied the necessary prisoners for the +various work projects undertaken. + +Of all these outer-commandos Hersbruck and Leitmeritz (in +Czechoslovakia), Oberstaubling, Mulsen and Sall, located on the Danube, +were considered to be the worst. The work at these camps mainly +consisted of underground labor, the purpose being the construction +of large underground factories, storage rooms, etc. This labor was +performed completely underground and as a result of the brutal +treatment, working and living conditions, a daily average of 100 +prisoners died. To the one camp Oberstaubling, 700 prisoners were +transported in February 1945 and on the 15th of April 1945 only 405 +of these men were living (Exh. B-1). During the 12 months preceding +the liberation, Flossenburg and the branch camps under its control +accounted for the death of 14,739 male inmates and 1,300 women. These +figures represent the deaths as they were obtained from the available +records in the camp, however, they are in no way complete as many +secret mass executions and deaths took place. In 1941 an additional +stockade was added to the Flossenburg Camp, to hold 2,000 Russian +prisoners. From these 2,000 prisoners only 102 survived. (Exh. B-1) + +Flossenburg Concentration Camp can best be described as a factory +dealing in death. Although this camp had in view the primary object of +putting to work the mass slave labor, another of its primary objectives +was the elimination of human lives by the methods employed in handling +the prisoners. (Exh. B-2) + +Hunger and starvation rations, sadism, housing facilities, inadequate +clothing, medical neglect, disease, beatings, hangings, freezing, +hand hanging, forced suicides, shooting, etc., all played a major +role in obtaining their objective. Prisoners were murdered at random, +spite killings against Jews were common. Injections of poison and +shooting in the neck were everyday occurrences. Epidemics of typhus and +spotted fever were permitted to run rampant as a means of eliminating +prisoners. Life in this camp meant nothing. Killing became a common +thing, so common that a quick death was welcomed by the unfortunate +ones. + +(See following List of Exhibits as References) + + Hunger and Starvation Exh. B-1, B-2, B-3, B-4 + Freezing Exh. B-11 + Medical Neglect Exh. B-1, B-12 + Torturous Beatings and Exh. B-1, B-2, B-6, B-12, B-3, + Floggings B-11, B-13, C-2 + Forced Suicides Exh. B-2, B-13 + Hangings Exh. B-1, B-2, B-4, B-5, B-6, + B-7, B-12, C-2 + Hand Hangings Exh. B-11 + Poison Injections Exh. B-1, B-8, C-1, C-2 + Typhus and Spotted + Fever Exh. B-1, B-2, B-9, C-1, C-3 + Shooting Exh. B-6, B-2, B-3, B-13, B-15 + +The system set up at this camp seemed to be one of mass elimination +of the prisoners caused by devious means. Starvation diets wilfully +designed to produce death within a few months played a major role. +Typhus and spotted fever were encouraged as a means of disposing of +many. There were innumerable executions, mistreatments, beatings, +flogging to death, which continued up until the time this camp was +overrun by our forces. Mass hanging took place. Generally, the persons +hanged were stripped naked. Oftimes they were beaten before hanging +till the unfortunate victims begged for immediate hanging to ease the +pain. At first the SS men in charge of the hangings were given extra +rations for each hanging. Later on the hangings became so numerous that +the extra rations were stopped. Hanging a person by his wrists with a +heavy barrel suspended from his ankles was another method of execution. +This caused the person’s insides to be torn up and he died. (Exh. B-11) +On Christmas 1944 a number of prisoners were hung at one time. The +prisoners were forced to view this hanging. By the side of the gallows +was a decorated Christmas tree and as expressed by one prisoner “it was +a terrible sight, that combination of prisoners hanging in the air with +the glistening Christmas tree.” (Exh. B-12) + +In March or April, 13 American or British parachutists were hung. They +had been delivered to this camp sometime before and had been captured +while trying to blow up bridges. (Exh. B-7, B-8a&b) + +Many thousands were tortured and killed by every known method. New +methods of brutal punishment and torture killing were devised by +certain members of the camp who became particularly known for their +sadistic methods. + +On April 20, 1945, approximately 15,000 prisoners were assembled to +make a forced march in the direction of Concentration Camp Dachau. The +evacuation of these prisoners was caused by the impending capture of +the camp by the Allies. These 15,000 prisoners were lined up in three +groups and started on this march. Only those prisoners who could walk +were taken and before leaving Flossenburg, many were executed, as +also were those who collapsed in rank awaiting the movement to start +the trek. No provision was made for the feeding of these prisoners or +sleeping on this trip. They marched in long columns guarded by SS +guards. (Exh. C-2) + +Thousands were killed on the way and the paths which they took were +littered with the dead. Groups of from 5 to 50 were taken out and +forced to dig pits and then were shot. (Exh. B-14, B-15, C-4, C-5). +Many graves were not even covered. As the already starved and weakened +prisoners fell from exhaustion, a group of SS guards bringing up the +rear would kill them by a shot in the back of the head. All who fell +out of line were immediately executed in this manner. Death was also +caused by beatings or bashings in the skulls. (Exh. B-1, B-3, B-13, +E-17) + +The prisoners marched from Friday till Monday during which time they +received only 100 grams of bread. They marched in the rain and slept +in the fields in the mud and water. Many died from exhaustion. On the +23rd day of April 1945, between the towns of Cham (U-5850) and Roding +(U-4868), they were liberated by the American Troops. (Exh. B-3, B-13) +(Photographs taken near Wetterfield (U-5070) of one of the graves on +this march.) (Exh. E-1 to E-17) + +5. The victims of Flossenburg included among them, Russian civilians +and prisoners of war, German nationals, Italians, Belgians, Poles, +Czechs, Hungarians, British, and American prisoners of war. No +practical means was available to complete a list of victims at this +camp, however, since the foundation of the Camp in 1938 until the day +of liberation it is estimated that more than 29,000 inmates died. (Exh. +B-1) + +6. _PERPETRATORS_ + +This camp was controlled and run by one class of people, SS troops. The +list of perpetrators includes a few civilian prisoners, who managed to +gain favor with the SS by carrying out orders of execution and beatings +upon their fellow inmates. These prisoners who obtained their immunity +and privilege at the cost of other men’s lives are deemed equally as +guilty. + +The citations referred to in the list of perpetrators is by no means +complete nor is the list of guilty persons complete. (See Appendix (5) +for index and exhibits.) + +V. _CONCLUSIONS_ + +7. That the exploitation, killing and atrocities committed upon +prisoners was a part of a well regulated scheme or plan of the Nazi SS +Group, is clearly indicated by the evidence presented here and resulted +in the death of thousands. + +Flossenburg Concentration Camp, Germany, was the scene of every type +and form of Nazi brutality and atrocity committed upon the unfortunate +individuals who happened to be sent to this camp. Practically every +nationality of Europe was at sometime or another represented in this +camp. The majority of prisoners, however, were Russians and Poles. No +line of demarkation was made between sexes. Men, women and children +were executed in the most brutal fashions. + +The responsibility for this camp must be placed upon all personnel who +held an active part as a member of the organizational set-up. Whether +these persons were ones who actually inflicted the mortal punishment +is of little consequence. They all at the least failed to lift a +restraining hand in the punishments and atrocities committed upon the +inmates therein. + + JOHN J. REID + 2d Lt, AUS + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2310-PS + + 1938 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 247 + + First Decree of the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor concerning the + Introduction of German Reich Law in Austria, March 15, 1938. + +By virtue of Article II of the law of March 13, 1938, concerning the +reunion of Austria with the German Reich (RGBl I, p. 237), I order: + +SECTION 1. (1) The sphere of validity of the official gazettes of the +Reich shall be extended to the province of Austria. + +(2) Reich laws which are proclaimed after the effective date of the law +of March 13, 1938, concerning the reunion of Austria with the German +Reich (RGBl I, p. 237), shall be valid for the province of Austria +unless their application to the province of Austria is expressly held +in abeyance. + +SECTION 2. From the effective date of this decree, the following shall +be applied in substance in the province of Austria: + +1. The Reich flag law of September 15, 1935 (RGBl I, p. 1145), with the +provision that Jews shall be forbidden to raise the Reich and National +Flag and to display the Reich colors; + +2. The law against formation of new parties of July 14, 1933 (RGBl I, +p. 479); + +3. The law for the preservation of unity of party and state of December +1, 1933 (RGBl I, p. 1016), as amended by the law of July 3, 1934 (RGBl +I, p. 529); + +4. The law concerning Reich governors of January 30, 1935 (RGBl I, p. +65) with the provision that instructions of Reich ministers to the +Reich Governor in Austria shall require, until further notice, the +approval of the Reich Minister of the Interior; + +5. The order for implementation of the Four-Year Plan of October 18, +1936 (RGBl I, p. 887); + +6. The Reich law concerning the compulsory registration of members of +the German State abroad of February 3, 1938 (RGBl I, p. 113). + +SECTION 3. (1) Regulations for effecting the transition shall be issued +by the Reich Minister of the Interior or by the Reich Governor in +Austria with the approval of the Reich Minister of the Interior. + +2. By this means regulations of the Reich and regulations of the +province of Austria can be assimilated in one another. + +3. Incompatible regulations of the province of Austria shall be +invalidated. + +SECTION 4. This decree shall enter into force on the day of its +proclamation. + + Vienna, March 15, 1938. + ADOLF HITLER, Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor + FRICK, Reich Minister of the Interior + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2311-PS + + 1938 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 245 + + Decree of the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor concerning the +Administration of the Oath to the Officials of the Province of Austria, + March 15, 1938. + +By virtue of Article II of the law of March 13, 1938, concerning the +reunion of Austria with the German Reich (RGBl I, p. 237), I issue the +following order: + +SECTION 1. Public officials of the province of Austria shall take an +oath of office upon entrance into service. + +SECTION 2. The oath of office of public officials reads: “I swear +that I shall be loyal and obedient to Adolf Hitler, the Fuehrer of +the German Reich and People, and that I shall observe the laws and +conscientiously fulfill the duties of my office, so help me God.” + +SECTION 3. The officials at present in office shall be sworn in +forthwith in accordance with Section 2. + +Jewish officials shall not be sworn in. + +SECTION 4. A person is Jewish if he is descended from at least +three racially full-blooded Jewish grandparents. A grandparent is +automatically considered a full-blooded Jew if he belonged to the +Jewish congregation. + +A Jewish half-breed descended from two full-blooded Jewish grandparents +is considered a Jew: + +_a._ If he belonged to the Jewish congregation on September 16, 1935, +or became a member of it thereafter. + +_b._ If he was married to a Jew on September 16, 1935, or entered into +marriage with one thereafter. + +SECTION 5. Anyone who refuses to take this oath shall be removed from +office. + +SECTION 6. The legal and administrative regulations necessary for +the implementation of this law shall be issued by the Reich Governor +(Austrian Provincial Government). + +SECTION 7. This decree shall enter into force on the day of its +proclamation. + + Vienna, March 15, 1938. + ADOLF HITLER, Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor. + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2313-PS + + 1938 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 254 + +Order for the Transfer of the Austrian National Bank to the Reichsbank, + March 17, 1938 + +By virtue of Article II of the law of March 13, 1938, concerning the +reunion of Austria with the German Reich (RGBl I, p. 237), I order: + +Section 1. The administration of the Austrian National Bank shall be +transferred to the Reichsbank. + +Section 2. The Austrian National Bank shall be liquidated, and its +assets placed by the Reichsbank to the Account of the Reich. + +Section 3. In taking over operations, the Reichsbank shall transfer to +its staff the entire personnel of the Austrian National Bank, with due +regard for legal and contractual rights. + +Section 4. This order shall enter into force upon its proclamation. + + Berlin, March 17, 1938. + + ADOLF HITLER, Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor + + FRICK, Reich Minister of the Interior. + + Count SCHWERIN VON KROSIGK, + Reich Minister of Finance. + + Dr. HJALMAR SCHACHT, Reich Minister + and President of the Reichsbank + + + PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2315-PS + + THE LAW OF THE REICH CHAMBER OF CULTURE + + [Das Recht der Reichskulturkammer] + + Edited by Karl Fr. Schrieber, + Publ. by Junkor und Duennhaupt, Berlin. Vol. 2 + (1 Jan. to 30 June 1935). + +Order concerning the Supervision of District Leaders of the Work of the + Reich Chamber of Culture [Page 25]. + + Dated 12 Nov. 1934 (Published in the daily press). + +In the process of unification of Party and State, it must be put into +effect that, in general, the same tasks of the Party and of the State +will also be administered by the same people. The Gau propaganda +chiefs of the Party are, according to that, also the district leaders +[Landesstellenleiter] of the Reich Ministry for National Enlightenment +and Propaganda. In compliance with this regulation, the Reich Chamber +of Culture must also be incorporated in the union of the Party and +State. Therefore, I order that the district leaders and the Gau +propaganda chiefs [Gaupropagandaleiter], as district administrators of +culture, exercise from now on supervision over the work of the Reich +Chamber of Culture in their districts. The individual chambers and +their district associations are instructed to adjust and to subordinate +their district formations and organizations in the Reich to those of +the district and of the Gau propaganda offices. The Gau leaders have +the privilege to suggest and to reject the appointment of personnel for +these offices. The appointment is then effected by the president of the +chamber. Guiding rules for the execution of this order will soon be +published in detail. + + Heil Hitler! + Signed: Dr. Goebbels + + # # # # # + + Order Concerning Closure of Newspaper Publications for the Purpose of + Eliminating Unsound Competitive Conditions + + [Pages 121-122] + + Dated 24 April 1935 (V.B. 35/25.4) + + # # # # # + +On the basis of paragraph 25 of the first decree concerning the +execution of the law on the Reich Chamber of Culture, dated 1 November +1933 (RGBl, I/1933, page 797ff), I decree the following: + +I. If a great number of newspaper publications exists in one locality, +whose operation depends on the sale of a higher circulation than can +altogether be disposed of according to local conditions and sound +principles of publication, individual publications can be discontinued +for the establishment of sound economic conditions. + +In order to obtain evidence, the publications may be subjected to an +examination; all inside information is to be given to the agencies +which I assign to undertake these examinations. + +II. For the execution of this order, the Reich Union of German +Newspaper Publishers is instructed to report to me those localities +in which, because of numerical overproduction, acute competitive +conditions exist, and to name the publication which ought to be +subjected to an examination. This union has, hereby, to act according +to the principles laid down in my announcement concerning “The press +in the second year of the National Socialistic State.” It is further +instructed to ascertain whether the closing of establishments can be +avoided by voluntary unifications. It will report to me until the 31st +of July 1935. + + Berlin, 24 April 1935. + + # # # # # + + The President of the Reich Chamber of the Press + + AMANN + +The article of the President of the Reich Chamber of the Press in +regard to “The Press in the second year of the National Socialistic +State” is concerned, among other things, with the numerical +overproduction that exists in newspaper publications. He demanded the +removal of this condition. Proceeding from the fact that already before +the 30th of January 1933, under the multiparty system at that time, +there was an excess of newspapers at hand, he states that this fact +stands out today even more strongly in the face of the subjugation +of parties and other special interests. He emphasized further that, +insofar as overproduction had been increased by the strong growth of +the official Party Press, the affected publications of competitors +would have to fall back behind the official Party Press. This point +of view will be brought into effect in the execution of the order for +the closing of newspaper publications for the purpose of eliminating +unsound competitive conditions. In particular, the unsound competitive +conditions are to be eliminated under which, newspapers with high +circulation in the course of the developments fought each other as +competitors. Considering the fact that in probably all these cases +there were fewer newspapers with high circulation on 30 January +1933 than at present, then the result, without doubt, is that the +publications concerned require such circulations, in order to be +profitable in relation to the size of their business, as cannot be +attained or maintained by means of sound advertising and competitive +measures under the competitive conditions prevailing at present. The +order thus serves the elimination of economically poor conditions +which, seen from a long-range view, must cause prejudice, far beyond +the small circle of the publications immediately concerned, to the +German Press and to its cultural missions. This order promotes the +conciliation and the organic development of the entire German Press. In +this way, the order assures the press the opportunity to fulfill its +noble task which it has to accomplish for the benefit of the nation +and the people. Of course, the execution of this order, as is already +indicated by its purpose, will be guided by the endeavor to utilize +the existing economical values in the future to the greatest possible +degree. The President of the Reich Chamber of the Press will therefore +endeavor at first in every individual case to effect agreements which +will relieve him of the necessity to issue orders for the closing of +establishments. In this sense, the instructions, given at the end of +Number II of the regulation, to the Reich Union of the German Newspaper +Publishers, are of special importance. + + + PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2319-PS + + ORGANIZATION BOOK OF THE NSDAP + + Edited by The Reichsorganisationsleiter of the NSDAP (4th edition, + 1937). Published by the Central Publishing House of the NSDAP, Franz + Eher’s Successor. + +[Pages 143-144] + +The Organization of the NSDAP in Foreign Countries + +The organization of the NSDAP in foreign countries (AO) is regulated +from the standpoint of organization along district lines. The Director +of the AO (with the rank of Gauleiter) is immediately subordinated +to the Fuehrer’s Deputy. The AO has its headquarters in Berlin. The +Director of the organization in foreign countries is at the same +time Chief of the Foreign Service Organization in the Foreign Office +and directs the unified supervision of German nationals in foreign +countries. + +_Duties and Authority_ + +The duty of the AO is to win over the German nationals in foreign lands +and in the shipping world to the National Socialist point of view +and to keep alive the idea of a racial community over all classes, +professions, and confessions in every single German, living in a +foreign country. + +The AO will keep itself aloof from all non-German issues. + +The AO is the only competent party office for all Party Organizations +abroad (with the exception of Danzig and Memel) and on board German +ships. The Director of the AO is responsible for all measures, +principles, and directives given in this sphere of activity. He is +further responsible for seeing that the Special directives issued by +all the competent offices of the Reich government are modified in such +a way that they are suitable for conditions abroad in order that German +interests are not under any circumstances endangered or damaged. + +All party members domiciled abroad, who take up permanent residence +there or who are employed in seagoing ships, are subordinate to the +AO and are not to be considered party members of districts within the +Reich. Party members engaged in shipping, who leave their work afloat +and are without work for at least six months, are to be transferred +to the appropriate Gau within Germany, also party members abroad who +return and take-up permanent residence in the fatherland. + +Members of the families of German seamen, residing at home and who +belong to the NS Women’s Organization are administered by the NS +Women’s group--shipping--of the organization of the NSDAP in foreign +countries. This pertains to all districts in which the AO--shipping has +divisions, subdivisions, and branches. + +_Organization_ + +The Staff of the AO carries the designation “Supervision of the +Organization of the NSDAP in Foreign Countries.” + +The AO of the NSDAP is subdivided into national groups, national +districts, districts, local groups, and branches. The term “national +group” is to be used only for those countries which are particularly +important as far as German nationals abroad are concerned. To all other +countries the term “national district” applies. + +The Party functionaries of the AO are: + +1. The Director with the rank of Gauleiter. + +2. The Deputy Director with the rank of Deputy Gauleiter. + +3. The heads of the national groups (on account of different +conditions in all of the different countries of the world in which the +organization is to be found) with the rank of a district office leader. + +4. The heads of national districts with the rank of a district leader. + +5. The district leaders. + +6. The leaders of local groups. + +7. The leaders of branches. + +The Office Chiefs in the Head Office of the AO, the commissioners for +foreign countries, under whom are several national groups and national +districts (partly in our part of the earth), and the leaders of the +national groups have the rank of a Gauamtsleiter. Subordinate to the +Director of the Office of AO Shipping Section of the NSDAP are: + +1. The divisional leaders in Bremen, Hamburg, Luebeck, and Stettin with +the rank of a Gauhaupt Stellenleiter. + +2. Local group and branch leaders on board German ships. + +In order to identify the political leaders and party members of the +AO, the leader has permitted the members of the AO to wear a special +badge. (See picture.) It portrays a black diamond which, set up on +its point, is worn on the left arm (lower end 2 centimeters above the +cuff). Within the black diamond are the two letters AO, for the Party +Functionaries in gold and for all others in silver. Party members wear +the badge _on the brown shirt_. The badge may only be worn, as long as +the party member in question belongs to the AO. It is to be discarded +as soon as he returns home and is transferred to a local group. + +The graphical plan of organization serves to illustrate the +organization in detail. + +The entire business of all party offices with the organizations of the +NSDAP abroad and in the shipping service must be carried out through +the Director of the AO. The associations belonging to the party, who +in the course of their operations endeavor to enlist German nationals +abroad may only do this within the framework of the AO. + +[Pages 295-312] + + + The Reichpropaganda Leader of the NSDAP and Propaganda Leader + +The propaganda of the NSDAP, its organizations and associate groups is +the responsibility of the Reichpropaganda leader of the Reich: + +_Duties_ + +1. He determines the entire propaganda aspect of the movement including +its organizations and associate groups. + +2. He lays down the directions to be followed by the party including +the organizations and associate groups as far as realizing the +Fuehrer’s wishes as regards culture are concerned. + +3. He exercises control over the entire German radio system in regard +to its interior organizational, cultural, and economic development. + +4. The saturating of the German nation with national socialist ideology +is his concern. + +5. He enlightens the people concerning the Fuehrer’s accomplishments +both as regards party and State. + +For propaganda purposes, the press, the radio, and films are put into +use. + +The Chief of Staff and adjutant are subordinate to the Reich propaganda +leader. + +The sphere of activity of the Reich propaganda leader can be divided +into five groups, and each group is under the control of an office of +its own. + + 1. Active propaganda. + 2. Films. + 3. Radio. + 4. Culture. + 5. Liaison Office. + + + Chief of Staff + +Directly subordinate to the Chief of Staff are: + +1. The “Reich ring for national socialist propaganda and national +enlightenment.” + +2. The “Reichsautozug Deutschland” and the “Hilfszug” Bavaria. + +3. The business center of the Reichpropaganda office. + +4. The main office of press propaganda. + +5. The main office for exhibitions and fairs. + +The duty of the Reich ring for National Socialist Propaganda and +national enlightenment is to insure the uniform direction of the +propaganda of all organizations and associated groups, through +the party. Through the duly qualified party functionaries one +representative from the propaganda offices of all organizations and +groups is allotted to the Reich ring. To these representatives are +added representatives of certain offices of the Reich government, etc. + +_Office of press propaganda._ The duty of the central office of the +press propaganda is to revise, on the basis of newspaper technique, +propaganda measures resulting from the general work of all offices +of the Reichpropaganda leader and to submit them to the competent +authorities of the national socialist party press as well as the rest +of the press. + +_Central office for exhibitions and fairs._ The duty of the central +office _for exhibitions_ and fairs is to supervise all exhibitions in +which the party intends to participate, from a propaganda point of view. + +1. _The Office of active propaganda._ The duty of active propaganda +is to effect the uniform execution of all active propaganda measures +from the large scale organizations of gigantic size with their +architectural-like structure down to the organizations of local groups, +and branches. + +This means that the whole propaganda organization of the movement, its +organizations and associated groups are combined. + +Parallel with the daily handling of current political questions, there +is the supplying of the entire speakers’ staff with information and the +provision of all propagandists of the Reich with the monthly magazine +“Our Will and Way.” + +As a supplement to speaking, there must be the designing and +distribution of appropriate placards and pamphlets as well as the +careful examination of convention reports on the part of the speakers +and the directors of propaganda. + +A complete picture of the propaganda can be seen from the statistical +survey of all reports coming from districts and Gaus (in regard to +propaganda). + +_Central office of speaker’s organization._ The central office of +speaker’s organization comprises by way of its subordinate office +“Speakers’ organization” all Reich, Gau, and district speakers of +the NSDAP as well as all Specialist Speakers of the organizations +and associated groups. This staff of speakers for the whole movement +is constantly furnished with material by the office of “Speakers’ +information,” which counts as the only material for speeches and the +only material for information by the party. + +The “Speakers’ Agency” of Reich speakers, shock troop speakers of the +Reich propaganda Directorate and cadets for the Shock troops operates +through the office of “Speakers’ Agency.” The “Speakers School” +subordinate to the central office does not only provide for a further +supply of political and specialized speakers but also for constantly +enriching the knowledge of all actively engaged speakers. For this +purpose a special “Reich School for Speakers” has been installed. + + + The Party Speakers + +Speakers are classified as follows: + + 1. Reich speaker. + 2. Speaker for the Shock troops and cadets. + 3. Gau speaker. + 4. District speaker. + 5. Specialized speaker. + +(When announcing meetings, the speakers designations as they appear +above are to be strictly adhered to). + +Their employment is decided as follows: + +_a._ The principle of capability. + +_b._ The merits of the veteran fighter. + +On principle, it is to be differentiated between political and +technical speakers. + +2. _Central office of the film industry._ The duty of the central +office of the film industry is to exhibit such films regularly as +adequately serve to enlighten and educate the masses and strengthen +national socialist ideology. Associated with the film division is the +office of photography. + +The central office of the film industry is divided into: + + Organization + Finance administration + Production and technique + Dramatic theory + Cultural films + Newsfilms + Photography + +3. _Central Radio office._ The radio organization of the NSDAP must +exercise a constant control over the entire German radio system in +order to synchronize the internal organization, cultural, technical, +and economic development of the radio system with national socialist +principles. + +The effects of radio propaganda are assured through the organization of +radio technicians with the assistance of all technical possibilities +as regards transmission, for the coordinating of the entire nation +in every corner of the Reich--whether listening in at home, in a +community, to a national broadcast. + +_Central bureau of Cultural Political Radio Activities and Radio +Organization_: Transmitting and receiving system, cultural productions +on the radio, broadcasts to schools, scientific radio work, radio for +youth. + +Organization of the broadcasting personnel (Reich radio association, +individual association of the Reich Kultur Association, associations of +people interested in radio) radio exhibitions. + +Central office of radio technique, technical transmission service +(loud speaker system), technical training in radio, short wave and +amateur transmission, telegraphy and ultra-short wave system, technical +production questions. + +_Central office of radio propaganda._ Propaganda operations by +radio, the recruiting of listeners, radio news system, political +Reichtransmissions. + +4. _Central office for culture._ The duty of the central office for +culture is to stimulate, to preserve, to supervise artistic creation in +the sense of the formal expression of the national socialist ideology +and to incorporate into the Party Propaganda its organizations, and +associate groups. The following serve this purpose among other things: + +_Central office of Architecture._ The issuing of general directions and +regulations concerning questions as regards the architectural structure +of monuments and such edifices which serve the public activity of the +national socialist movement. + +_Central office for artistic designs._ The issuing of general +directions and orders in regard to all other questions of the artistic +designing of symbols, objects, etc., which are used in the public +activities of the national socialist movement. + +The issuing of general directions and rules for the artistic setting +for demonstration and the organizing of National Socialist celebrations +making use of cultural means. + +_Central office of selection._ Part of the duties in this sphere of +activity are the screening and selecting of musical and poetical works +with the aim in view of using them at national socialist demonstrations +and celebrations. + +_Central office of program organization._ The drawing up of model +programs for celebrations of the national socialist movement and for +organizing settings for national socialist demonstrations on the basis +of the type of tradition formed in the fighting days [Kampfzeit]. + +Elimination of unsuitable settings which may find their way into the +movement through unauthorized agencies. War against trash, preservation +of definite national socialist aspect in the settings for celebrations, +the prevention of mystic and pseudoreligious falsification of our +ideology, as a result of prodigious constructions by misguided +cult devotees. Professional artists to be put to work following +above-mentioned directives. Suitable persons will be chosen by the +Reichpropaganda leader in the central office of culture, as permanent +co-workers, especially for the purpose of operating in specialized +fields. Practical courses for cultivation of folk songs for the purpose +of finding the proper personnel for the planning of activities in +all organizations of the movement. The “Proposals for the Planning +of National Socialist Celebrations” issued monthly by the Central +Office for Culture will furnish the leaders of propaganda and central +offices for culture, with the necessary material. Therein are also +found appropriate instructions for the planning of discussion evenings, +membership meetings, evening meetings of the Hitler Youth, evening +gatherings of SA and SS comrades, in a manner befitting our creed and +to avoid monotony. The unity of the Party and legitimate cohesion +within the cultural sphere is guaranteed through the coordination of +the important offices. The Reich propaganda leader of the NSDAP is also +president of the cultural association. + +The Director of the office for culture of the Reich propaganda +Directorate is also the director of Reich culture in the Reich Cultural +Association. + +5. _Liaison officer._ The duty of the liaison officer is to centralize +all business with Reichministries, officials, and public bodies, +etc. Thus it is assured that the general principles of propaganda +are brought to the knowledge of the appropriate Reich officials. In +reverse, the liaison office brings all problems and instructions, that +emanate from the Reich propaganda ministry to the knowledge of the +Reich propaganda Directorate. + +In order to coordinate the propaganda of both the party and the state, +it is the duty of the liaison office to bring the general principles +of the Reich propaganda directorate to the knowledge of the bodies +subordinate to the Reichministry for national enlightenment and +propaganda which are also associated with and administered by this +Ministry. + +The Gau, Office of Propaganda, as commissioner of the Gauleiter for +the entire propaganda aspect of the national socialist movement, the +Gauleiter Propaganda takes precedence over the Gau Propaganda Office. + +For the purpose of carrying out the work of the district, the following +leaders are under his jurisdiction as is the case with the Reich +propaganda Directorate. + +1. Director of active propaganda. + +2. Director of films. + +3. Director of radio. + +4. Director of culture. + +5. Director of The Gauring for national socialist propaganda and +popular enlightenment. + +6. Liaison officer. + +The duties technically correspond to those of the Reichpropaganda +Directorate. + +The Gauleiter Propaganda is also director of national culture of the +Reich cultural association. In this way it is assured that the cultural +will of the national socialist movement is carried out even in the +most insignificant parts of the Reich Cultural association (Reich +Music Association, Reich Association of Fine Arts, Reich Literary +Association, Reich Press Association, Reich Film Association, Reich +Radio Association). + +The Gauleiter Propaganda is also, in most instances, Director of the +National Office for enlightenment of the people and propaganda. + +_The District Propaganda Office._ + +The Director of District propaganda is the commissioner of the +Kreisleiter for the entire propaganda aspect of the party within this +district. + +The following are the responsibility of the Director: + +1. Active propaganda. + +2. Films. + +3. Radio. + +4. Culture. + +5. Kreisring for national socialist propaganda and popular +enlightenment. + +6. Liaison office. + +The liaison office maintains the connection between the Landrats and +Regional [Bezirk] offices. + +The duties technically correspond to those of the Gau Propaganda Office +(according to need). + +_The Director of the Local Group Propaganda._ + +The Director of the Local Group Propaganda is responsible to the Party +Functionary of the local group for the entire propaganda aspect of the +movement. + +In order to execute his duties, specialists on culture, films and radio +are subordinate to him. He solves all problems of active propaganda +direct, and he must also remain in constant communication with the +appropriate mayor and chairman of the district council, respectively. +In addition to that he maintains contact with the organizations and +associate groups. + +The duties technically correspond to those of the office of district +propaganda as may be needed. + +_The Leader of the Branch [Stuetzpunkt] Propaganda_ + +His sphere of activity corresponds with that of the leader of the local +group propaganda. + + + The Chief of the Reich press of the NSDAP Offices of the Press and + Commissioners + +In his decree of February 28, 1934, the Fuehrer formulated the sphere +of activity reserved for the Chief of the Reich press of the NSDAP, the +decree of the Fuehrer is as follows: + +I. The Chief of the Reich press of the NSDAP is vested with the +following powers: + +1. He determines on my behalf the general policy of the entire +editorial work within the party press. Moreover, he is as my Chief of +press the final authority for all press releases of the party and all +offices. + +2. The editorial Staff of the Party Press as well as Gau journalists +of the NSDAP are subordinate to the Chief of the Reich press as far +as work is concerned. He has the right to interfere in all personal +questions. + +3. All existing press divisions, press bureaus, etc., existing within +the party or within its subsidiary or subordinate organizations +(political organization, SA and SS, Hitler Youth, German labor front), +regardless of the particular organizational status of their work in the +field of publishing, are subordinate to the Chief of the Reich press of +the NSDAP and responsible to him. + +4. The Chief of the Reich press of the NSDAP approves all news services +and correspondence, which are issued by one of the offices of the NSDAP +or regarded as national socialist. + +The Chief of the Reich press of the NSDAP can take all necessary +measures for the execution of his duties. + + Berlin, February 28, 1934. + + Signed: Adolf Hitler. + +Corresponding with this order of the Fuehrer, the Office of the Chief +of the Reich press of the NSDAP is the central office for all the +political publishing activity of the party. + +II. The technical authorities directly subordinate are: + +1. _The Chief editors of the party press._ They are the responsible +editorial leaders of the National Socialist party papers owned by the +party and are directly responsible to the Chief of the Reich press as +regards their editorial work. They have to be confirmed by the Chief of +the Reich press and they can have the rank of a leader of a district +office. + +2. _The press representatives of the individual offices of the Reich +Government._ They take care of the press interests of the larger +organizations and party offices within the framework of the editorial +and political principles of the Chief of the Reich press. + +3. _The journalistic-political organ of the NSDAP._ + +_a._ Editor-in-Chief of the Office of the District Press: The office of +the district press is that office of the district which with the help +of the party offices of the district, subordinate to it and associated +with it as regards problems of journalism, represents the interests of +the party through the medium of the papers and periodicals published in +this district. This representation of interests involves particularly +the progressive cooperation of the whole journalistic life of the +district. + +The office of the district press has the following functions to perform: + + + _News and Information Service_ + +The office of the district press furnishes the newspapers, by means +of the regularly appearing National Socialist Gau Service, with all +the news material in regard to all Party arrangements and events in +the district. Moreover, its news information service, based on records +is at the disposal of all papers for dealing with all questions, +concerning the party. + + + _The Personal News Service_ + +The office of the district press makes information accessible to +editors through press conferences, receptions with functionaries of the +individual party offices, etc. It informs the editorial boards of the +district of the special journalist political wishes of the Gauleitungen. + + + _Information given to the party press_: + +The office of the district press, on the basis of reports of the +political press organ, informs the editorial boards of the party press +about the wishes of the readers in regard to newspaper technique. +Moreover, it is in charge of local reporting of party affairs and +educates the editorial board and press officials as regards newspaper +technique. + +_b._ The editor of the district press and the head of the local group: + +The editor of the district press and the head of the local group +respectively, have duties that are technically derived from those of +the Head of the Office of the district press. Permission to publish +must, however, in all cases be granted through the head of the office +of the district press. Press representatives of the organizations and +offices can also be requested here. In the hands of the press chiefs of +the local groups, who can have the rank of a head of the office of a +local group, there lies, above all, the reporting of local party news, +namely, the journalistic evaluation of the entire social service work +of the local group, formulated in accord with the directives of the +political journalistic service. + +III. In order to carry out his duties, the Chief of the Reich press has +established the following bureaus in Berlin, as well as in Munich: + +1. _The press personnel bureau with the office in Munich._ The press +personnel bureau works out all personal questions, especially that +concerning the conferring of the “party press armband” upon proved +national socialist editors. (The armband is to be worn on the left +forearm only on special occasions). Moreover in a special department +the official gazette of the Reich Government is being prepared. + +2. _The political press bureau with its office in Berlin._ The +political press bureau concerns itself with the general principles +regarding the work of the party press as well as the entire use of the +political press organ of the party. + +The head of the political press bureau has also been chosen by the +chief of the Reich press as his commissioner for the entire press +service system of the party and exercises the right of controlling and +vetoing all press releases, which are issued by party bureaus or those +which are regarded as national socialist. + +The head of the political press bureau is editor-in-chief of the +national socialist party press service [N.S.K.] The NSK is the only +official press service of the NSDAP and it alone is empowered to +publish in the name of the party, for all Reich Government offices, +including their subsidiary and subordinate organizations. The NSK as +press service is at the disposal of all the editorial staffs of the +whole German press. + +The political press bureau has its headquarters in the NS press House +in Berlin. In the NS Press House all party papers are represented by +their own Berlin editors. + +[Pages 307-310]. + + + The Reich Director of the Press + +_Duty_ + +The Reich Director of the Press has to perform the duties of a +publisher and politician [verlagspolitische Aufgaben]. + +He is commissioned to furnish the German people with a press, which +owes allegiance to them and is responsible to them and which is +to reflect the life and the experiences of the German community. +Furthermore, the Reich Director of the Press has the duty of taking the +necessary measures to enforce the demands made on him as publisher and +politician which are laid down in the program of the NSDAP under point +23 and to see that they are carried out. The latter applies especially +to the decree of April 25, 1935 relative to “the preservation of the +independence of the newspaper publishing business” and to the “closing +of newspaper publishing houses for the purpose of eliminating unhealthy +conditions of competition.” Finally he is commissioned to publish all +the standard literature for the national socialist movement. + +_Authority_ + +The Reich Director of the Press is authorized by the Fuehrer to take +all necessary measures for the execution of his duty and he has the +following powers: + +1. The recognition of periodic publications as official party organs. + +2. The decision concerning the founding and the appearance of periodic +publications, which are published by party members, even when they do +not aspire to recognition as official party organs. + +3. _a._ The issue of general regulations for the whole publishing +business to the entire press published by party members. The +regulations are valid as orders, as long as nothing else is laid down +by the Reich Director of the Press. + +_b._ The decision over all questions of publication whose significance +is a matter of principle and extends beyond the individual publication, +when he takes this decision upon himself. The publications in these +instances are obliged to submit these questions to the final decision +of the Reich Director of the Press. + +_c._ The inspection at any time of all official party publications and +their economic organization and direction, as well as the right and +power of exercising influence. + +The responsibility of the individual publishers for the direction of +the publishing business is not affected thereby. + +4. The employment of responsible directors and their deputies only +takes place by the Reich Director of the press, who has to decide +the person and the contract. The Reich Director of the Press decides +whether the existing contract is to be continued or dissolved. The +Reich Director of the Press is also empowered to appoint commissioners +for directing publication, and their directives are to be followed by +the publishers’ staffs and by the entire firm. The right of appointing +commissioners over the publishers’ staffs is reserved for the Reich +Director. + +_Subordination_ + +The following are subordinate to the Reich Director of the Press: + +1. The governing board of the Reich Director of the Press. The +governing board sponsors and inspects the NS district publications. +These are the ones recognized as party organs and as party newspapers +which are exclusively party property. The directors of the NS +district publications are political leaders on the staff of the +district leader and are personally and officially subordinate to him. +From a professional point of view the directors of the NS district +publications are exclusively subordinate to the Reich Director of +the Press. His approval is necessary for changes of personnel. Lower +classifications in districts, etc., do not exist. + +2. The central publishing house of the NSDAP with its publications: +Voelkischer Beobachter, Der Angriff, Illustrierter Beobachter, +Der S.A.--Mann, das Schwarze Korps, N.S.--Funk und Bewegung, +Funktechnischer Vorwaerts, Der Arbeitsmann, Die H.J., Die Bewegung, Die +Brennessel, N.S.--Monatshefte, Die N.S.--Gemeinde, Der Schulungsbrief, +Unser Wille und Weg, Aufklaerungs und Rednerinformations--Material, +Reichsplanung, Deutsche Presse, Verordnungsblatt der Reichsleitung +der NSDAP, Der Parteirichter, Mitteilungsblatt der Kommission fuer +Wirtschaftspolitik, Das Parteiarchiv, Der S.A.--Fuehrer (as well as the +entire literature of the movement.) + +The Reich director of the press is at the same time President of the +Reich Press Association. In the following organizations, which are not +party bureaus, the Reich Director of the Press is represented by a +commissioner who has to direct the supervision of and the liaison with +these organizations: + + Reichassociation of German Newspaper Publishers. + + Reichassociation of German Publishers of Periodicals. + + Professional Association of the Radio-Press. + + Professional Group of Student Publications. + + Professional Group of the Youth Press. + + Professional Staff of the Catholic Church Press. + + Reich Association of the Evangelical Press. + + Reich Association of the German Press and Information Bureau, + Incorporated. + + Association of German Newspaper and Periodical Wholesalers. + + Reich Association for the Recruiting of Periodical Trade. + + Reich Professional Staff of the German Newspaper and Periodical Trade. + + Reich Association of German Railway Station Booksellers. + + Reich Association of German Reading Circle Proprietors. + + Reich Association of German Newspaper Stenographers. + + Reich Association of the German Press. + + Professional Staff of Publishing House Employees. + + German Book Publishers. (Organized Brokers’ Association and League of + Reich German Book Publishers). + + Recruiting Office of German Economy. + + + The Chief of the Foreign Press + +I. The Chief of the Foreign Press of the NSDAP is the highest party +functionary for all matters affecting the foreign press. He is +subordinate to the Fuehrer and his deputy. He is in charge of the +governing body of all foreign Party Press Bureaus. + +II. The offices of the chief of the foreign press are at the disposal +of all party offices, organizations, and associated groups in all +matters affecting the foreign press. (For example, instruction +concerning German and foreign papers and periodicals abroad as well as +foreign press correspondents in Germany.) + +III. The Chief of the foreign press has offices in Berlin, +corresponding to the office of the Fuehrer and his deputy in Berlin +(with Referat: United States of North America) and Munich. The main +office is in Berlin. + + + Foreign Political Office of the NSDAP + +I. 1. The foreign political office (APA) of the NSDAP includes two +different fields of operation: one domestic, the other foreign, in +character. + +2. In the domestic field, the APA is entrusted with the task of +introducing the foreign political aims and endeavors of the National +Socialist State into all offices and organizations of the party. + +3. In the foreign field, the APA is entrusted with the task of +enlightening those in foreign lands and especially the foreigners +who visit Germany or remain there as foreign correspondents, of the +nature and aims of National Socialism in order to arouse thereby the +understanding of other people for the fundamental needs of the German +people and to convince foreign nations that National Socialism in +Germany desires peace for progress and peace with other nations without +at the same time rejecting the defence of their right to existence. + +II. 1. The APA is divided into three main offices: + +A. Office for Foreign Referats with the Main Offices. + +_a._ England and Far East. + +_b._ Near East. + +_c._ South East. + +_d._ North. + +_e._ Old Orient. + +_f._ Controls, personnel questions, etc. + +B. Office of the German Academic Exchange Service. + +In order to effect as close cooperation as possible between the German +academic exchange service and the party, the president of the German +academic exchange service is chief official in the APA. + +C. Office of Foreign Commerce. + +2. Moreover, there is in the APA a main office for the press service +and an educational office. + +[Page 312] + +The Commissioner of the Fuehrer for the Surveillance of the Whole +Spiritual and Ideological Education of the NSDAP. + +In order to effect the surveillance of the whole spiritual and +ideological education of the NSDAP the Commissioner makes use of the +following offices: + +1. Chief of Staff. + +2. Office of artistic development. + +3. Philosophy and pedagogy. + +4. Central office of national and ancient history. + +5. Historical Referat. + +6. Referat for Aryan ideology. + +7. Referat for Nordic questions. + +8. Central office for educational questions. + +9. Referat for collection of material and curriculum (surveillance). + +10. Referat Organizations. + +11. Central office for the cultivation of literature. + +12. Referat ideological information. + +13. Organization and business administration. + +14. Press Office. + +15. Association for the Education of the whole movement. + +For the purpose of promulgating an ideological train of thought, the +Commissioner publishes the periodical “NS Monthly Magazine.” + +* * * * * * * + +[Page 327] + + + Colonialpolitical Office + +For the treatment of all colonialpolitical and colonial economic +questions within the national socialist movement and its press, +the colonialpolitical office only issues general principles and +instructions (see point 2 of the decree of the Fuehrer’s Deputy 17/34, +series 71). + +The colonialpolitical office is operated only as an office in the Reich +Government of the NSDAP. + +* * * * * * * + +[Page 337] + + + Official Party Board of Examiners for the Protection of NS Literature + +I. The official Party Board of Examiners is not a censorship office, +but an office for the protection and defense against pseudo-national +socialist literature and it insures that the National Socialist +ideology is not misused by an unqualified man and commercially +exploited in a way that deceives the public: + +II. The official Party Board of Examiners gives an opinion on: + +1. The NS literature in a narrower sense. + +To this belongs the NS literature that has come into existence by +its immediate identification with the movement. This literature, +corresponding with national socialist ideology, is exclusively +political. + +2. Literature related to national socialism. + +From the point of view of time, this covers a very broad field and +includes the literature dealing with political thoughts and demands +that lie within the line of national socialist development. + +III. A reliable staff of lecturers is at the disposal of the official +examining Party Board of Examiners in an advisory capacity. Writings +which have been considered satisfactory by the examiners will be added +to the NS Library [NSB]. The chairman of the PPK leaves the publishing +to the decision of the report by the lecturers. It is stated in this: + +1. The work is unobjectionable from the standpoint of the political +will represented by the party. The work will be marked unobjectionable +in this case, i.e. the following sentence may be printed in the work. +No objections are raised by the NSDAP against the publication of this +writing. + +2. Against the contents of a work no objections are offered. However, +it cannot be classified as belonging to national socialist literature +in a more narrow sense. + +Here however, there is the possibility that the work will be added to +the NSB under the category of literature related to national socialism. +Such a work embodies in its text no notice that it has been examined. + +3. The work does not agree with the principles of the NSDAP; hence it +is rejected. Here there are the following possibilities: + +_a._ The work may be put on sale but not brought into relationship with +national socialism. + +_b._ The writing may no longer be distributed. More detailed +instructions are given by the president of the Reich Chamber of +Literature. + +4. Construction & Organization of PPK see Plan of Organization. + + + PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2320-B-PS + + ORGANIZATION BOOK OF THE NSDAP (1940) + +“The young driver who has received his training in the six-week courses +of the NSKK will be well prepared in body and spirit when the time +comes for his military service, and will wear with pride the dress of +the Armed Forces of the Nation.” + +[Page 394]. + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2322-PS + + HITLER’S SPEECH BEFORE THE REICHSTAG + + 1 SEPTEMBER 1939 + +Members of the German Reichstag: + +For months we have been tormented by a problem once imposed upon us +by the Dictate of Versailles and which, in its deterioration and +corruption, had now become utterly intolerable. Danzig is a German +City. The Corridor was and is German. All these territories owe their +cultural development exclusively to the German people, without whom +absolute barbarism would reign in these Eastern territories. Danzig +was separated from us. The Corridor was annexed by Poland. The German +minorities living there were mistreated in the most appalling manner. +Already during the years 1919/20 more than one million people of German +blood were driven from their homes. As usual, I have tried to change +this intolerable state of affairs through proposals for a peaceful +revision. It is a lie if it is claimed throughout the world that we +insure all our revisions only by applying pressure. There was ample +opportunity for fifteen years before National Socialism assumed power +to carry through revisions by means of a peaceful understanding. This +was not done. In every single case did I then take the initiative, not +once but many times, to bring forward proposals for the revision of +absolutely intolerable conditions. + +As you know, all these proposals were rejected. I need not enumerate +them in detail: proposals for a limitation of armaments, if necessary +even for the abolition of armaments, proposals for restrictions on +methods of warfare, proposals for eliminating methods of modern warfare +which, in my opinion, are scarcely compatible with international +law. You know my proposals for the necessity of the restoration of +German sovereign rights over the territories of the German Reich, the +countless attempts for a peaceful solution of the Austrian problem +which I have made, and later, on the problem of the Sudetenland, +Bohemia, and Moravia. It was all in vain. One thing, however, is +impossible: to demand that a peaceful revision should be made of an +intolerable state of affairs, and then obstinately refuse such a +peaceful revision. It is equally impossible to assert that in such a +situation to act on one’s own initiative in making a revision is to +violate a law. For us Germans the Dictate of Versailles is not a law. +It does not work to force somebody at the point of a pistol and by +threatening to starve millions of people into signing a document and +afterwards proclaim that this document with its forced signature was a +solemn law. + +In the case of Danzig and the Corridor I have again tried to solve the +problems by proposing peaceful discussions. It was obvious that they +had to be solved! That the deadline for this solution may perhaps be of +little interest to the Western Powers is conceivable. But for us this +deadline is not a matter of indifference! First and foremost, it was +not and could not be a matter of indifference to the suffering victims. +In Conferences with Polish diplomats I have discussed the ideas which +you have heard me express here in my last speech before the Reichstag. +No one can say that this was an improper procedure or even unreasonable +pressure. + +I then had the German proposals clearly stated and I feel bound to +repeat once more that nothing could be fairer or more modest than those +proposals submitted by me. And now I want to tell the world that only I +could afford to make such proposals. Because I know very well that at +that time I placed myself in a position contrary to the conception of +millions of Germans by acting the way I did. + +Those proposals were rejected. But not only that! They were answered by +mobilization, by increased terrorism, by intensified pressure on the +people of German blood living in these territories, and by a gradual +economic, political and, during the past few weeks, even military +strangulation and blockade of the Free City of Danzig. Furthermore, +Poland virtually began the war against the Free City of Danzig. +Furthermore, she was not prepared to settle the problems of the +Corridor in a fair manner satisfying the interests of both parties. +And lastly, she did not even dream of fulfilling her obligations +with regard to the minorities. I have to state here that Germany has +fulfilled her obligations in this respect! + +Minorities living in Germany are not subject to persecution. Let any +Frenchman get up and declare that French citizens living in the Saar +territory are being oppressed, ill-treated, or deprived of their +rights. No one can make such an assertion. + +For four months I have watched these developments without taking action +but not without issuing repeated warnings. Recently I have made these +warnings more and more emphatic. Over three weeks ago, the Polish +ambassador was, at my request informed that if Poland persisted in +sending further notes in the nature of an ultimatum to Danzig and in +further oppressing the people of German blood, or if she should attempt +to ruin Danzig economically through customs measures, Germany could no +longer look on without taking action. I have left no room for doubt +that in this respect the Germany of today is not to be confused with +the Germany that existed before. + +Attempts have been made to justify the action against the German +minorities by declaring that they had provoked them. I am wondering in +what the “provocation” through the women and children who are being +mistreated and deported, consisted, or the “provocations” of those who +were tortured in the most beastly and most sadistic manner and finally +killed! One thing, however, I do know: there is not one single great +power with any honor who would tolerate such conditions for any length +of time. + +In spite of it all I have made one last attempt. Although I am deeply +convinced that the Polish Government--perhaps also because of its being +dependent on an unrestraint, wild military rabble--is not seriously +interested in a real understanding, I have nevertheless accepted a +proposal by the British Government for mediation. The latter proposed +that it would not carry on any negotiations but assured me that it +would establish a direct contact between Poland and Germany in order to +get the discussion going once more. + +I must here state the following: I accepted that proposal. For these +discussions I had drawn up the fundamentals which are known to you. +And then I and my Government were sitting for two whole days waiting +for the Polish Government to make up its mind whether to finally +dispatch a plenipotentiary or not! Until last night it had not sent any +plenipotentiary but informed us through its ambassador that at present +it was considering the question whether and to what extent it might be +able to accept the British proposals; it would inform England of its +decision. + +Members of the Reichstag! If such treatment is meted out to the German +Reich and its Chief, and the German Reich and its Chief were to submit +to such treatment, then the German Nation would deserve no better than +to disappear from the political scene. My love of Peace and my endless +patience must not be mistaken for weakness, much less for cowardice. +Therefore, I have last night informed the British Government that +things being as they are, I have found it impossible to detect any +inclination on the part of the Polish Government to enter into a really +serious discussion with us. + +Thus, these proposals for mediation are wrecked, for in the meantime +the answer to these offers had been, firstly, the order for Polish +general mobilization, and secondly new grave atrocities. Repetitions +of the latter incidents occurred last night. Only recently twenty-one +frontier incidents had occurred, there were fourteen last night. Three +of them were very grave. + +For that reason, I have now decided to talk to Poland in the same +language Poland has been using toward us for months. + +If there are statesmen in the West who declare that their interests +are involved, I can only regret such a declaration; however, not for +one single minute could that persuade me to deviate from the execution +of my duties. I have solemnly declared and repeat once more that we +have no claims at all on these Western powers, and shall never demand +anything from them. I repeatedly offered Britain our friendship, and if +necessary closest cooperation. Love, however, is not to be offered by +one partner only; it’ll have to find response from the other. Germany +has no interests in the West, our fortifications in the West shall be +the frontiers of the Reich for all times. We have no other aims in the +future, and this attitude of the Reich will remain unchanged. + +Some of the other European powers understand our attitude. First of +all I’d like to thank Italy for having supported us all this time. +But you’ll also understand that we do not want to make an appeal for +any foreign help in this struggle. This task of ours we shall solve +ourselves. + +The neutral powers have assured us of their neutrality just like we +have previously guaranteed their neutrality. This assurance we consider +a sacred obligation, and as long as nobody breaks their neutrality, we, +too, shall observe it painstakingly. What could we desire or want from +them? + +I am happy to be able to inform you here of an event of special +importance. You are aware of it that Russia and Germany are governed +by two different doctrines. There was only one single question to be +cleared up: Germany has no intention of exporting her doctrine, and the +minute Russia does not intend to export her own doctrine to Germany, I +no longer see any reason why we should ever be opponents again. Both of +us agreed on this one point: any struggle between our two people would +only result in benefits for others. We have therefore resolved to enter +into an agreement which will exclude any application of force between +us in the future, which compels us to consult each other in certain +European questions, which makes economic cooperation possible and above +all makes sure that these two great powers don’t exhaust their energies +in fighting each other. + +Any attempt on the part of the Western Powers to alter these facts will +prove futile, and in that connection I should like to state one thing: +this political decision signifies an enormous change for the future and +is absolutely final. + +I believe that the whole German people will welcome this political +attitude. In the World War, Russia and Germany fought each other and up +to the end they both suffered. That shall not happen a second time! The +non-aggression and consultation pact was yesterday finally ratified in +Moscow and in Berlin. + +In Moscow, the pact was acclaimed just as you have acclaimed it here. +I approve of every word in the speech made by Mr. Molotov, the Russian +Commissar for Foreign Affairs. + +Our aims I am determined to solve: + +Firstly, the question of Danzig; + +Secondly, the question of the Corridor; + +Thirdly, to see to it that a change shall take place in Germany’s +relations to Poland, which will insure a peaceful coexistence of the +two powers. + +I am determined to fight until either the present Polish Government is +willing to effect this change or another Poland Government is prepared +to do so. + +I am determined to eliminate from the German frontiers the element of +insecurity, the atmosphere which permanently resembles civil war. I +shall see to it that peace on the Eastern frontier shall be the same as +it is on our other frontiers. + +I shall carry out all necessary actions in such a manner that they +shall not contradict the proposals which I have made known to you here, +members of the Reichstag, as my proposals to the rest of the world. + +That is, I will not wage war against women and children! I have +instructed my air force to limit their attacks to military objectives. +However, if the enemy should conclude from this that he might get away +with waging war in a different manner he will receive an answer that +he’ll be knocked out of his wits! + +Last night for the first time regular soldiers of the Polish Army +fired shots on our territory. Since 5.45 a.m. we have been returning +their fire. From now on, every bomb will be answered by another bomb. +Whoever fights with poison gas will be fought with poison gas. Whoever +disregards the rules of human warfare can but expect us to do the same. + +I will carry on this fight, no matter against whom, until such time as +the safety of the Reich and its rights are secured! + +For more than 6 years now I have been engaged in building up the German +armed forces. During this period more than 90 billion Reichsmark were +spent building up the Wehrmacht. Today, ours are the best equipped +armed forces in the world and they are far superior to those of 1914. +My confidence in them can never be shaken. + +If I call upon the Wehrmacht and if I ask sacrifices of the German +people and, if necessary, unlimited sacrifices, then I am in the right +to do so, for I myself am just as ready today as I was in the past to +make every personal sacrifice. I don’t ask anything of any German which +I myself was not prepared to do at any moment for more than four years. +There shall not be any deprivations for Germans in which I myself shall +not immediately share. From this moment on my whole life shall belong +more than ever to my people. I now want to be nothing but the first +soldier of the German Reich. + +Thus I have put on once again the coat which has always been the +most sacred and dearest to me. I shall not put it aside until after +victory--or I shall not live to see the end. + +Should anything happen to me in this war, my first successor shall be +Party member Goering. Should anything happen to Party member Goering, +his successor shall be Party member Hess. To these men as your leaders +you would then owe the same absolute loyalty and obedience that you owe +to me. In the event that something fatal should happen to Party Member +Hess, I am about to make legal provisions for the convocation of a +senate appointed by me, who shall then elect the worthiest, that is to +say the most valiant among themselves. + +As a National Socialist and a German soldier I enter upon this fight +with a stout heart! My whole life has been but one continuous struggle +for my people, for its resurrection, for Germany, and this whole +struggle has been inspired by one single conviction: faith in this +people! + +One word I have never known: capitulation. And if there was anybody +who’d think that hard times are ahead of us I’d like him not to forget +the fact that at one time a Prussian king with a ridiculously small +staff confronted one of the greatest coalitions ever known and came +forth victoriously after three campaigns because he possessed that +strong and firm faith which is required of us in these times. + +As for the rest of the world, I can only assure them that a November +1918 shall never occur again in German history. + +I ask of every German what I myself am prepared to do at any moment: to +be ready to pay with his life for his people and for his country. + +Whoever believes to have a chance to evade this patriotic duty directly +or indirectly, shall perish. We will have nothing to do with traitors. +We all are acting only in accordance with our old principle: our own +life matters nothing, all that matters is that our people, that Germany +shall live. + +I expect of you, as deputies of the Reich, that you will do your duty +in whatever position you are called upon to fill. You must carry the +banner of resistance, cost what may. Let no one report to me at any +time that in his province, in his district or in his group or in his +cell the morale is low. Bearers, responsible bearers of the morale +are you! I am responsible for the province your district! None has +the right to shun this responsibility. The sacrifice that is demanded +of us is not greater than the sacrifice which has been made by many +generations in the past. All those men who before us have traveled +the most bitter and hardest road did nothing different from what we +are called upon to do; the sacrifice they made was no less costly, no +less painful, and therefore no easier than the sacrifice that may be +demanded of us. + +I also expect every German woman to take her place with unflinching +discipline in this great fighting community. + +German youth, needless to say, will do with heart and soul what is +expected and demanded of it by the nation and by the National Socialist +State. + +If we form this community, forged together, ready for everything, +determined never to capitulate, then our strong will shall master every +emergency. + +I conclude with the words with which I once started my fight for power +in the Reich. At that time I said: “If our will is so strong that it +cannot be broken through any distress, then our will and our German +state will be able to master and subjugate distress.” + + Germany--Sieg Heil! + + + PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2324-PS + + RECONSTRUCTION OF A NATION + + Hermann Goering, Aufbau Einer Nation (1934) + +[Pages 86-87] + +I declared at that time before thousands of fellow Germans, each bullet +which leaves the barrel of a police pistol now, is my bullet. If one +calls this murder, then I have murdered; I ordered all this, I back it +up; I assume the responsibility, and I am not afraid to do so. + +Through a network of outer offices converging into the headquarters +in Berlin, I am daily, one could almost say hourly, informed about +everything that happens in widespread Prussia. + +[Page 89] + +We had to deal ruthlessly with these enemies of the state. It must not +be forgotten that at the moment of our seizure of power over 6 million +people officially voted for communism and about 8 million for marxism +in the Reichstag elections in March. + +Thus the concentration camps were created, to which we had to send +first all the thousands of functionaries of the Communist and Social +Democratic parties. + +[Page 92] + +The Gestapo deserves a great deal of credit for the success of the +revolution and for the consolidation of its achievements. Right in the +middle of this constructive work, occurred the blaze that destroyed +the high cupola and the auditorium of the Reichstag. Criminal hands +had set this fire, had put the German Reichstag in flames, in order to +give a last beacon to dying Communism, so that it could make one last +desperate thrust before the Hitler government was consolidated. The +blaze was to be the signal for the Communist party for general terror, +for a general uprising and for civil war. That it did not have these +consequences, Germany and the world owe not to the noble motives of +Communism, but solely to the iron resolution and the hard fist of Adolf +Hitler and his closest collaborators, who struck more quickly than the +enemy had expected, and harder than he could imagine, and with the +first blow suppressed Communism once and for all. + +That night, when I ordered the arrest of 4,000 Communist functionaries, +I knew that by dawn Communism had lost a great battle. + + + PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2325-PS + + 1935 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 470 + + Decree on the Execution of Article 118 of the German Municipal Order, + 26 March 1935. + +On the basis of Article 118 of the German municipal order of 30 +January, 1935 (Reichsgesetzblatt I, p. 49) I decree: + + + Article 1 + +The Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor reserves for himself the duties of the +commissioner for the NSDAP for the city of Munich. + + + Article 2 + +1. The gauleiter appoints as commissioner for the NSDAP: + +_a._ The Kreisleiter for communities belonging to a Kreis [“Kreis,” an +administrative district]. + +_b._ The Kreisleiter for Stadtkreise [city districts] or, one of the +Kreisleiters, in case there are several party districts within one city +district. + +* * * * * * * + +Munich, 26 March 1935 + + The Deputy of the Fuehrer + R. HESS + Reich Minister without Portfolio. + + + PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2326-PS + + 1936 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 893 + + Reich Principles Regarding Recruiting, Appointment, and promotion of + Reich and Provincial Officials, October 14, 1936. + +* * * + + + PROMOTION + + + Article 8 + +Only that official can be promoted who, besides absolutely fulfilling +his general duties; + +_a._ In consideration of his former political attitude offers absolute +guarantee therefor, and has proved since January 30, 1933, that he +takes the part of the National Socialist State at all times and +represents it effectively. + +_b._ Has given documentary proof that he and his spouse are of German +or related blood (Article 1 a. paragraph 3 of the Reich officials law). + +_c._ In his official achievements and abilities, completely fulfills +the demands of the higher office. Length of service alone does not +justify promotion in any case. + +* * * * * * * + +Berchtesgaden, 14 October 1936. + + The Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor + ADOLF HITLER + + The Reich Minister of Interior + FRICK + + For the Reich Minister of Finance + REINHARDT + + The Deputy of the Fuehrer + R. HESS + Minister without Portfolio + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2327-PS + + _TOP SECRET_ + + Third Army Group + Ia Nr. 150/39 g.K. Chiefs + Re: Fall Weiss + Top Secret (Chefsache) + “Only by officer” + + Dresden 6.14.1939 + + + 20 Copies + + Control No. 8 + +1. The commander-in-chief of the army has ordered the working out of a +_plan of deployment against Poland_ which takes in account the demands +of the political leadership for the opening of war by surprise and for +quick success. + +2. The order of deployment by the High Command, “Fall Weiss” authorizes +the Third Army Group (in Fall Weiss 8th Army Headquarters) to give +necessary directions and orders to all commands subordinated to it for +“Fall Weiss.” + +3. Enclosed are sent: + + _a._ Aims of the operation (Enclosure 1). + _b._ Organization of the forces (Enclosure 2). + _c._ Survey of arrival (Enclosure 3). + _d._ Signal Communication (Enclosure 4). + _e._ Regulations for the supply (Enclosure 5 will follow). + _f._ Enemy situation (Enclosure 6). + _g._ Directions for execution (Enclosure 7). + +4. The order of deployment “Fall Weiss” will be put into operation on +20 August 1939; all preparations have to be concluded by this date. + +The former deployments “Case West” and “Case East” are valid until 19 +August 1939. + +5. For the instruction on the tasks due to this order for deployment, +the principles of order OKH Genstb d.H.--1 Division (Ib Nr. 2000/36 top +secret of 12.19.36) are to be applied. + +The instruction can be carried down to the responsible officers of the +corps commands to the Division Commanders (G-3 (Ia) and G-4 (Ib)) of +the divisions and the commandants and staff officers of the Garrison +Headquarters. Permission to inform further persons must be requested +by names. Communication with the SS-Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler must be +instituted only by special order. The order for their commitment is to +be prepared. + +6. Tenth Corps Command (Gen KdX) and XIII Corps and lo. Div. can +perform the necessary reconnaissance in Silesia while observing the +appropriate precautionary measures (civilian clothes, motor vehicle, +with civilian license number). + +7. The whole correspondence on “Fall Weiss” has to be conducted under +the classification Top Secret [Chefsache]. This is to be disregarded +only if the content of a document, in the judgment of the chief of the +responsible command is harmless in every way--even in connection with +other documents. + +8. For the middle of July a conference is planned where details on the +execution will be discussed. Time and place will be ordered later on. +Special requests are to be communicated to Third Army Group before 10 +July. + +9. I declare it the duty of the Commanding Generals, the divisional +commanders and the commandants to limit as much as possible the number +of persons who will be informed, and to limit the extent of the +information, and ask that all suitable measures be taken to prevent +persons not concerned from getting information. + + Commander-in-Chief of Army Group 3 + Signed F. Blaskowitz. + + # # # # # + + TOP SECRET + + Enclosure 1 to 3rd Army Group + Ia Nr. 150/39 + g-Kdo. Chefs of 14 June 1939 + + TOP SECRET [GKdos] + “Only by officer” + Top Secret [Chefsache] + + 20 Copies + + Control No. 8 + + Aims of Operation “Fall Weiss” + +1. _a._ The operation, in order to forestall an orderly Polish +mobilization and concentration, is to be opened by surprise with forces +which are for the most part armored and motorized, placed on alert in +the neighborhood of the border. The initial superiority over the Polish +frontier-guards and surprise that can be expected with certainty are to +be maintained by quickly bringing up other parts of the army as well to +counteract the marching up of the Polish Army. + +_Accordingly all units have to keep the initiative against the foe by +quick acting and ruthless attacks._ + +_b._ If the development of the Political situation should show that a +surprise at the beginning of the war is out of question, because of +well advanced defense preparations on the part of the Polish Army, +the Commander-in-Chief of the army will order the opening of the +hostilities only after the assembling of sufficient additional forces. +The basis of all preparations will be to surprise the enemy. + +Case b--is to be prepared in theory by the High Command only so that +necessary changes can be quickly carried out. + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2329-PS + + SECRET + + [Stamp] + Top Secret + Through officers only + The Commander in Chief of the Army + Operations Section (Ia) + General Staff of the Army + + HQ, Army High Command + +No. 4402/39 Secret + + 7, October 1939. + 11 copies, + 2nd copy + +General von Beck takes over command of the newly formed Army Group B on +10th October 1939 at 12.00 hours. + +Task of Army Group B is the protection of the German boundary from the +mouth of the Ems to the line of demarcation with Army Group C. For this +task Army Group B holds the western fortifications; the resistance +begins on the border. + +The Dutch border between Ems and Rhine is to be observed only. + +At the same time, Army Group B has to make all preparations according +to special orders, for immediate invasion of Dutch and Belgian +territory if the political situation so demands. + +The order for the occupation is given by the Army High Command; until +then, any border isolation of Dutch or Belgian territory must be +avoided most carefully. + + signed von Brauchitsch + certified Hensinger. + [signature] Jaiymyer + + _Distribution_ + + Army Group B} by telegraph + Army Group C} + + [Handwritten notes] + Chief J. N. W + 8-10-39 + + Supreme Hq + + Chief of Army Signal Corps + + Chief of Quartermaster IV + + Org Department + + Gen of Air Force with Commander in Chief of the Army operation + + Insp F 9/10 Me 10oo2/39 g. K. + Ju 8-10 + + Department (1a, 11, 111) + [Hand written notes] + Archives of the Army. + 21st Army Group 6623 (9) F A LIL + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2330-PS + + COPY + + Nurnberg + August 29, 1935 + +Police Headquarters; Nurnberg-Fuerth + +Re: Protective Custody. + + + Order for Protective Custody + +On the basis of Article 1 of the VI of the Reich President for the +protection of people and state, of 28 Feb., 1933 (RGBl I, p. 83) the +ministerial decree of May 2, 1934, No. 2186 a 39, herewith is taken +into protective custody: + +Effective as of 3 August 35: + +First and last name: Josef Simon + +Place and date of birth: May 23, 1865 in Schneppenbach, B. A. Alzenan. + +Marital Status and Profession: Widowed, former Trade Union Secretary. + +Citizenship: Subject of the German Reich. + +Religion: Free thinker. + +Place of residence: Nurnberg-N. Ziegelsteinstr. 106 + +The arrestee has no right to appeal against the decreed protective +custody. + + + Reasons: + +Simon was for many years a member of the Socialist Party and +temporarily a member of the Union Socialiste Populaire. From 1907 to +1918 he was Landtag deputy of the Socialist Party; from 1908 to 1930 +Social Democratic City Counsellor [Stadtrat] in Nurnberg. In view of +the decisive role which Simon played in the international trade unions +and in regard to his connection with international Marxist leaders and +central agencies, which he continued after the national recovery, he +was placed under protective custody on 3 May, 1933, and was kept, until +25 January 1934, in the Dachau Concentration Camp. Simon is under the +urgent suspicion that even after this date he played an active part +in the illegal continuation of the Socialist Party. He took part in +meetings which aimed at the illegal continuation of the Socialist Party +and propagation of illegal marxist printed matter in Germany. + +Through this radical attitude which is hostile to the State, Simon +directly endangers public security and order. + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2331-PS + + Bavarian Political Police Nurnberg, 20 December 1935 + + + _Declaration_ + +I have been informed that I shall be released from protective custody, +and that I have to expect to be taken into protective custody again in +case that I should behave in a manner inimical to the State, or if I +should be active in this sense. + +I have been informed that, for my physical protection I may return into +protective custody upon my own request. + +I have been informed that I have to report in person at the Gend. +Station Ziegelstein, competent for my residence, on every second day of +the week at the same hour. + + [signed] Josef Simon + +Simon Josef, residing Nurnberg-N, Ziegelstein St. 106, widower, trade +union secretary; born 23 May 1865 at Schneppenbach. + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2332-PS + +Concentration Camp Flossenbuerg + +Az II. Political Department/Sch. + + Flossenbuerg, 22 December 1941. + +To Frau Grete Staimer, Nurnberg. + +In reply to your letter of 12 December 1941, enclosed please find +the desired death certificate. At the same time I certify that the +cremation has taken place in the crematorium of Flossenbuerg. + +After the submission of a burial certificate from the competent +cemetery officials the urn with the ashes can be sent to you free of +charge. + + The Camp Commander + By order of + (Signed) Fassbinder + Official Secretary. + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2333-PS + +Police Presidium, Nurnberg-Fuerth + +Protective Police [Schutzpolizei] 3rd Police District + + Nurnberg, 29 Dec. 1941 + +To Frau Elise Herrmann, Nurnberg, Juvenllestr. No. 26 + +Your husband, Paul Herrmann, died of an infection in the concentration +camp, Flossenbuerg, on December 28, 1941. + +The corpse cannot be inspected because of the danger of infection. + +The cremation will take place in the crematory of Flossenbuerg. + + The Secret State Police Office + Nurnberg-Fuerth + /s/ Mueller + + Authenticated + [illegible] + District Police Lt. + + +* * * + + + Death-Certificate + + No. 7/1942 + +The baker Karl Herrmann, Lutheran Religion + +Residence: + + Flossenbuerg Concentration Camp + died on 28 December 1941 at 1400 hours + in Flossenbuerg Concentration Camp + +The deceased was born 24 November 1873 in Wassertruedingen. + +The deceased was married to Elise, nee Steiner, Nurnberg. + + Flossenbuerg, 2 January 1942 + +[Stamp of Registrar, Flossenbuerg/Oberpfalz] + + The Registrar: + /s/ Jaum + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2334-PS + + Statement of Lorenz Hagen + +During the night of 17th to 18th March 1933, the offices of the ADGB +[Allgemeiner Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund; German Trade Unions], which +are located in Nurnberg, Breite Gasse 25/27, as well as the offices of +the Builders’ Union and the Unions of the Bookbinders, Bookprinters, +Lithographers, Textile Workers and Carpenters were completely destroyed +by the SA under the leadership of SA-Brigadier General [SA-Oberfuehrer] +Wurzbacher. All the office furniture was smashed and thrown into the +courtyard, the safes overturned, forced open from the back and robbed. +The typewriters, adding machines, mimeograph machines, etc., were +stolen. + +The ADGB possessed a huge library of about 10,000 volumes for the +use of its members. Every single book was torn and thrown into the +courtyard. + +The Workers’ Secretariat, which was joined to the ADGB, had an +extensive professional library of about 500 volumes, among them +valuable works on literature of social security and labor legislation. +These were also thrown out and torn to pieces. A similar fate met +about 750 to 800 files covering the cases of beneficiaries of pensions +(social, war and accident cases) whose claims for pensions were being +worked on. + +The SA posted continuous guards in the office building and nobody was +permitted to enter. When I made the attempt to enter in spite of it, +Wurzbacher said: “The Red rascal will get in but will not come out +alive.” When I got in later in spite of him, the SA tried to catch me, +but I escaped. + +In order to guarantee the continued function of the trade union, which +was most urgently needed at that time, I set up an emergency office +in Nurnberg, Hummelsteinerweg. This was occupied on 2 May 1933 by SA, +led by Pessler who was the District-leader [Gauobmann] of the NSBO +[National Socialist Factory Cell Organization; Nationalsozialistische +Betriebszellen Organisation later DAF; the German Labor Front]. Erhardt +Kupfer, the district secretary of the ADGB, was arrested at that time, +kicked with rifle butts and led away by the SA in shackles. As the +deputy of NSBO, a certain Mueller was appointed. Three SA men guarded +the office day and night. Upon seizure, Pessler’s first question to me +was: “Where do you have your cars? I know you have three cars.” When I +answered that I never had a personal car, he threatened to put me in +jail until I would confess. When he finally realized that I did not +have a car, he asked me what funds the Nurnberg local committee of the +ADGB possessed. I said truthfully: “235,000 RM minus the sum stolen by +the SA from the safes when they broke into the offices on the Breite +Gasse and which amounted to about 4,000 RM.” Whereupon he threatened +again to have me arrested but he did not do so, probably on the basis +of the general order not to arrest the chairmen of the local committees +[Ortsausschussvorsitzende]. I learned about this order only a few days +ago. + +On 1 June 1933, the deputy Mueller came into the office and asked me +whether I had not been arrested yet. I said no and indicated that the +night before I had been in the apartment of my mother-in-law who was +severely ill. I left the office without being noticed, hurried home, +packed the most necessary things, and left by bicycle with my wife. We +stayed away for about five weeks, traveling from one place to another. + +After returning, I was arrested towards the end of August 1933, +under the charge that I had agitated against the National Government +and had conducted illegal recruiting for the forbidden ADGB and +the Socialdemocratic Party. When no proof could be produced, I was +released, but arrested again after 3 days. This time I was accused +of having had knowledge of the arsenal of the Reichsbanner (Militant +Organization of German Social democrats), and that I had organized the +arming of the members of the Trade Union Offices. In cross-examinations +conducted over many weeks, they tried to force a confession out of +me. When I did not confess anything, I was to go to the concentration +camp in Dachau. However, my wife succeeded in preventing this. After +3½ months, I was released again. After this release I tried to start +a business, no matter of what kind. It was in vain. Similarly, it was +impossible for me to find work in my former line as engine-builder. +Reason: political unreliability. Thus I lived on a weekly unemployment +benefit of 14.40 marks, with my wife, until my further arrest in +August 1935. At this time I was charged with participation in the +so-called middle-German insurrection of 1934, and with the smuggling +of illegal writings from abroad. In spite of the greatest efforts and +the application of the foulest methods, such as the poorest and most +inadequate food, depriving me of fresh air, threatening me with being +shot and beaten, again the Gestapo did not succeed in proving anything +against me. I was again set free after 12½ weeks. During this period +of confinement, Kriminalrat Otto, the Gestapo-chief, tried to persuade +my wife to convert me to National Socialism. He told her: “If your +husband comes to us, this will be of greater value for us than the +adherence of 1,000 other people. Your husband would get a position in +which he would earn 3 times as much as ever before.” My wife refused +consistently. + +The same story as before: unemployment, occasional meagre earnings, +until the next arrest on 26 January 1938. This time they did a +fullsized job and arrested my wife too. We were accused of preparing +high treason against the country [Hoch- und Landesverrat] as well +as maintaining connections abroad. The interrogations lasted until +the middle of April. The Gestapo agent Beetz had a predilection for +interrogations at night. Five searchlights illuminated the spot where +you were sitting. Behind and before me, and on both sides, four men +sat a distance of a few meters, pointing their revolvers at me and +clicking the triggers. The interrogations, which were of course always +fruitless, were repeated sometimes two or three times in one night. +Terms like “Greatest scoundrel,” “most common criminal,” and others +were used. One morning at five o’clock, Beetz called me and said: “You +know your wife has been arrested too. She had a complete breakdown and +struggles with death in her cell. She expressed the wish to see you +once more before her death. I am willing to grant her wish, but only +if you make a full confession.” When I refused he had me taken back +into my cell and in an indescribable psychic condition. Beetz asserted +several times that the material at hand condemning me was sufficient +for 5 years in the penitentiary. I then demanded to be taken before the +investigating judge. This, however, was refused, and on 20 April 1938, +I was shipped to Dachau Concentration Camp. There I came immediately +into solitary confinement and had to undergo 32 days of severe bunker +(strenger Bunker)-punishment. During this time I had to sleep on a +wooden board without blankets, and received warm food only every 4th +day. On 9 July, I was released from the bunker and taken into the +camp. There I had to perform the heaviest work, in spite of my greatly +weakened physical condition. One day I received from an SS guard a kick +in the back which threw me against a lorry which was just passing by, +and thus I broke my lower right rib. Once when a prisoner had escaped +from the camp, all of the camp-inmates had to fall out after work and +stand at attention in ranks throughout the night. There were 17 dead +next morning. On 13 July 1939, on order of the Nurnberg-Gestapo, I was +taken off work and again put into the bunker and received again 64 days +of rigid bunker-arrest until 28 September 1939, and was then shipped to +Buchenwald Concentration Camp. There I came into the bunker again and +stayed there until my release. During the whole time in Buchenwald I +had to sleep on a board without a blanket. The food in the Buchenwald +camp was so inadequate and inferior that at the time of my release I +was a skeleton with skin over it. I wish to add that during my transfer +to Camp Buchenwald, I suffered an inguinal rupture on the left side +when jumping from a railroad car. + +The release from the camp was accompanied by the express warning not +to reveal anything about happenings in the camp. Otherwise, I would be +returned there and never would have a chance to get out again. After +my return to Nurnberg, I had to report daily at 10 o’clock sharp at +the main office of the Gestapo. From July 1941, I had to report twice +weekly to the police station in my district. After I was completely +bombed out, on 9 March 1943, the order to report was rescinded. + +After this release from Camp Buchenwald, I again could not find a job +anywhere, although the Gestapo had told me that if I could not show +that I had a job within 6 weeks, I would be returned to the camp, since +my release was tentative only. It was only due to the kindness of a +textile shop owner who employed me in spite of the warnings of the +Gestapo that I was not taken into protective custody again. + +On 22 August 1944, I was again taken to Dachau Concentration Camp +because of the attempt against Hitler’s life, and I remained there for +six weeks. + +I may add that I had to undergo 6 house-searches during which +everything in my apartment was upset. In these instances, all books +which seemed to be dangerous, magazines, pamphlets, etc., were taken +away. + +I was chairman of the A.D.G.B., Local Committee of Nurnberg, 1930-33. + + (signed) Lorenz Hagen + Chairman of ADGB, + Local Committee of Nurnberg + formerly: Karthaeusergassergasse + Residence: Furth, Ritter v. + Aldebertstr. 3. + +Today on the 17th of November 1945, I have reread each single page of +the statement given by me on 19 October 1945 and I have signed it. I +declare hereby under oath that this statement is true. + + Signed: Lorenz Hagen + +Sworn to before me this 17th day of November 1945 at the Justice +Building, Nurnberg, Germany. + + Signed: D. A. Sprecher, O2055516 + Captain, AUS + + # # # # # + + Appendix to the Statement of the Chairman of the ADGB, Local Committee + of Nurnberg + +When I arrived at the concentration camp at Dachau, the manager of the +Stokers and Machinists Union, Josef Staimer, who had been active in the +above organization until 1933, was still in the Dachau camp. He had +been arrested in March 1933 and shipped to Dachau. He was released from +there near the end of 1938 or the beginning of 1939. + +Karl Hermann, manager of the Union of Factory Workers, pay office +[Zahlstelle] of Nurnberg, was for several weeks imprisoned in the same +cell with me when I was taken into protective custody in 1935 in the +prison of Nurnberg. The total period of his imprisonment was about 7 +weeks at that time. The reason for his arrest was to force him to give +his approval of the notarial transfer of the house of the Factory Union +to the DAF. As private owner of the house, Hermann had been appointed +together with another colleague of his organization to be the trustee +of this house by the organization. In 1943 the two above mentioned men +were taken to the Concentration Camp Flensburg. In 1944 they died in +the camp. + +During my stay in Dachau, we had Brigadier-General [Oberfuehrer] +Loritz, who was the commander of the SS-Death Head-Unit +[Totenkopfstandarte] and chief camp commandant. He was a violent, +brutal man. Here is only one example for this: + +For a while I was occupied in an SS clothing camp with a +prisoner-detachment. An SS 1st Lt. who was in the tailoring section, +whose name I unfortunately do not recall, sent a prisoner to the gate +of the building on which there was a clock to find out what time it +was. Loritz caught sight of the man, struck at him with his riding-whip +and had his name taken. When the detachment returned at noon, the man +was led away and without being allowed to defend himself, he received +25 lashings [stockhiebe] and 3 days arrest with water and bread. The +rest of the detachment had to stand at attention during the noon recess +and return to work without eating. The camp commander of Dachau at that +time was Captain Koegel, who was transferred in September 1938 to the +concentration camp for women in Lichtenburg, near Prettin, where my +wife was at the time of this transfer. + +Captain Gruenewald followed him as camp commander. Gruenewald was +transport commander when we were shipped to Buchenwald. I myself saw, +during the unloading of the train at Weimar, how Gruenewald hit Czech +arrestees, older people, in the face and neck with his fist. One of the +men fell to the ground and could rise only with difficulty. + +In my time, the SS-First Sergeants [Rapportfuehrer; work +detail-leaders] were Hofmann from Bamberg and Luedtkemeyer, from +Northern Germany. These two were also very brutal fellows, with whom +beating and smacking on the pettiest grounds were the order of the day +for satisfying their sadistic inclinations. + + [signed] Lorenz Hagen + Residence: Furth, Ritter v. + Aldebertstr. 3. + Office: Nurnberg, formerly + Krathausergasse 12. + +Today, on the 17th of November 1945, I have reread a duplicate copy of +the appendix, which is an exact copy of the appendix to my statement of +19 October 1945. I have found that this statement is true. I declare +this hereby under oath. + + [signed] Lorenz Hagen + Lorenz Hagen + +Sworn to before me this 17th day of November 1945 at the Justice +Building, Nurnberg, Germany. + + D. A. Sprecher, O2055516 + Captain, AUS + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2335-PS + + Josef Simon, born May 23, 1865 + +Since 1900, first chairman of the German shoemakers Union, located in +Nurnberg. + +In April, 1933, Georg Pessler, Nurnberg, Guntherstr. 33/I, the deputy +assigned by the Nazis for the trade unions, came into our office, +Essenweinstrasse 1 and declared that trade union dues were embezzled +there. When we asserted that no embezzlements had occurred in our +office, he asked for the cash book which we submitted to him. After +turning the pages for a short while, he declared: “25,000 Marks are +missing”. He put the cash book into the safe, closed the safe and gave +the key to the policeman, who had come with him. + +We asked for an official public accountant to examine the books. A +few days later the accountant, who had been assigned by Pessler, +arrived and after checking he ascertained that with a cash amount of +4¼ millions there was a surplus of 13 pfennigs in the safe. In spite +of this testimony, Pessler did not return the keys of the safe to us, +closed our bank and checking accounts and asserted in meetings of +factories that we had embezzled union dues. Only 3 weeks later could we +get the keys of the safe again with the aid of the police. + +On 2 May 1933, our office in Nurnberg was occupied; I myself had +gone to Berlin on 1 May, because a meeting of the ADGB [Allgemeiner +Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund: German Trade Unions] was to take place +there on 2 May. The trade union building there was occupied and the +majority of the officials were arrested. + +I was arrested on 3 May at 6 a. m., in my apartment in Berlin at the +request of the Criminal Police of Nurnberg. After being kept in police +custody in Berlin until 9 May, I was taken to the prison in Nurnberg +and was shipped to the Dachau concentration camp on 30 June together +with other arrested people (the social-democratic City Counsellors +[Stadtraete] of Nurnberg). In Dachau the SS Guards had stirred up the +Communists who had been imprisoned there for quite some time with these +words: “Today your tormentors [Bonzen] will arrive, give them a nice +welcome”. It was only due to the insight of a few reasonable Communists +that they kept their comrades from violent acts; nevertheless, we were +greeted in the camp with the vilest invectives. If it had come to acts +of violence, we would of course have defended ourselves and then the SS +would have shot at the people, fighting with each other. That was the +intention of the SS as we learned later. + +The Communist Scheberle from Roothenbach near Lauf was Camp Senior +and was in charge of assigning work details. He made us who had come +in on 30 June fall out early on 1 July; we had to form ranks and then +he shouted: “Reichstag deputy Simon step forward!” In this way a +considerable number, particularly those who had had some responsible +job, were called up and then we were led by the SS to work. I was +ordered to collect horse dung which was lying on the roads of the camp +with my bare hands, without shovel or broom and to carry it to a nearby +container. Since I did not bend down fast enough in the opinion of +my guard, an SS man about 19-20 years, he yelled at me and demanded +faster work. I answered: “When you will be 68 years old and have +sciatica, you will not bend down so fast either”. By collecting the +partly wet horse dung, my hands were soiled very much. When the work +was finished, I asked the guard whether I could wash my hands at the +water hydrant. He refused with the words: “No, you can go and eat with +them”. In the afternoon we had to fall out again and were assigned for +work. I was ordered together with 19 other prisoners (among them, the +meanwhile deceased “Kupfer”, district leader of the ADGB) for work in +the kitchen. There we had to clean the still very hot food-kettles. +Since the circumference of the kettle was so big that we could not +reach the other end, we had to crawl into the hot kettles which almost +burnt our shoes. Bathed in sweat, we had to perform the work. When this +was over, we had to line up in a group to have our photographs taken. +I was in the center and a ready-made sign was hung around my neck +which bore the inscription: “I am a class conscious Socialdemocratic +tormentor [Bonze].” Twice I tore the sign off and left it hanging only +after having been threatened with beatings. After the pictures were +taken, the younger ones had to fall in line and after the command +“Attention” was given, the commander went to the rear and commanded +“Forward march”, then “halt”, and said: “Repeat the following words: +Fuehrer, we thank you that today for the first time we were able to +perform some honest work”. Then I was to go with the penal company to +the gravel-pit. My son who was also in Dachau asked to go to the penal +company instead of me. That was granted. Gradually, I was no longer +assigned to work details. Anyhow there was a regulation that people +over 65 should not be assigned to work any longer. In spite of this +regulation, I, with my 68 years, was treated as mentioned above. + +I was not mistreated, but at each and every opportunity abused with +vile invectives. After almost 9 months of protective custody, among +them 7 months in Dachau, I was released on 25 January 1934. Though I +had to report every other day in Nurnberg to the police and was watched +by the Gestapo. + +At the beginning of August 1935, I was rearrested on the following +grounds: “Simon was for many years a member of the Socialdemocratic +Party and for a while of the Independent Socialdemocratic Party. +From 1907 to 1918 he was Landtagdeputy of the Socialdemocratic Party +and from 1908 to 1930 Social Democratic City Counsellor [Stadtrat] +in Nurnberg. In view of the decisive role which Simon played in +international trade unionism and in regard to his connections to +international Marxist leaders and central agencies which he continued +after the National Revolution, he was placed under protective +custody on 3 May 1933 and was kept until 25 January 1934 in the +Dachau Concentration Camp. Simon is under the grave suspicion that +even after this date he worked for the illegal continuation of the +Socialdemocratic. He took part in meetings which aimed at the illegal +continuation of the Socialdemocratic Party and at the propagation of +illegal Marxist printed matter in Germany. + +Through this radical attitude, hostile to the State, Simon directly +endangers public order and safety.” + +I was released from this protective custody on 20 December 1935. But it +was this protective custody which caused much psychic suffering to me +and undermined my health. + +When in 1934 we were released from Dachau, the commander “Eicke” +delivered an address, at the end of which he said: “Remember this, +whoever returns here does not get out any more.” Now I was afraid every +day to get to Dachau again, and I was repeatedly threatened with it. +Therefore, I suffered strongly in body and soul. My heart and nerves +were particularly affected and there was in addition the bad food. When +I was released on 20 December, I was already sick. Nevertheless, I had +to report to the police every other day. When on 27 December I wanted +to fulfill again my obligation to report there, I collapsed and lost +consciousness in the garden of the police building. The ambulance took +me home and I was unconscious for almost 3 hours. I recovered only +gradually but since that time I suffer from a weak heart. + + [signed] Josef Simon + Nurnberg, 18 October 1945 + +I hereby declare under oath the correctness of the above statement +which oath is given by me on this thirteenth day of November 1945 at +Nurnberg, Justice Building, before Captain D. A. Sprecher, AUS. + + [signed] Josef Simon + Josef Simon + +Sworn to before me, this 13th day of November 1945 in the Justice +Building, in Nurnberg, Germany. + + [signed] D. A. Sprecher + D. A. Sprecher, O2055516, Capt., AUS + + # # # # # + + Josef Simon, Nurnberg, Ziegelsteinstr. 106 + +As above already stated in my report on my arrest, my son Willi was +also arrested on 29 June and taken to Dachau Concentration Camp. +Nothing could be proved against him, except that he was my son. My son +“Josef” was to be arrested also and taken to Dachau. He avoided being +arrested by fleeing and going via Schleswig-Holstein to Denmark, where +he lives and works at present as a refugee. + +My son Willi was asked by the SS guards in Dachau what sort of post he +held. When he answered that he had had none, he was slapped in the face +and ordered to confess, and at each declaration that he had no post he +was slapped in the face again and again. Then the SS men poured water +out in the basement of the washhouse and while my son had to wipe it +off with a little rag he was beaten several times. After he had wiped +up the water, the basement was drenched again with water and under +further beatings he again had to wipe up the water. + +During bathings in the winter of 1933 the prisoners who in the opinion +of the SS did not get ready soon enough in the cold washroom were +sprayed with a hose while half-dressed and chased outside. Because of +the wet clothing my son contracted a severe cold in the form of an +arthritis of the hip. He came into the dispensary. The pains became +worse all the time and finally he was taken to a clinic in Munich for +examination. The physician declared that my son had to remain in the +clinic for treatment. This, however, was refused by the accompanying +SS and he was taken to Dachau again, where he was again taken to the +dispensary. I visited him in the dispensary and asked the medic to put +his bed near the stove, a request that was granted. Only after several +weeks did the condition of my son improve, and on 18 January 1934 he +was released from Dachau. + +For the truth of the above statements vouches. + + [signed] Josef Simon + Nurnberg, 23 October 1945 + +I have again read carefully the report submitted by me on 23 October +1945 and I hereby declare under oath that the content is true. This +statement is herewith made by me today, the 13 November 1945 at +Nurnberg, in the Justice Building before Captain D. A. Sprecher, AUS. + + [signed] Josef Simon + Josef Simon + +Sworn to before me, this 13th day of November 1945 in the Justice +Building, Nurnberg, Germany. + + [signed] D. A. Sprecher + D. A. Sprecher O2055516 + Captain, Army of the United States + + # # # # # + + Josef Simon, Nurnberg, Ziegelsteinstr. 106. + +Karl Hermann, official of the Union of the Factory Workers, was +arrested together with Staimer, on the denunciation by his nephew that +he had together with Staimer, listened to foreign radio stations; they +were shipped to the concentration camp Flossenbuerg in the Oberpfalz. +There he was slain and the ashes were sent to his family. + +I cannot name witnesses for this deed, but I attach a death certificate +sent to his family. [See Document 2333-PS] + +I vouch for the truth of the above statements. + + [signed] Josef Simon + Nurnberg, 23 October 1945 + + # # # # # + +Josef Simon + +Nurnberg + +Ziegelsteinstr. 106 + +When I was shipped on 30 June 1933 to the Dachau Concentration Camp, +I met there Josef Staimer, an official of the Unions of Stokers and +Machinists, who had already been arrested in April and sent to Dachau. +As far as I remember, he was not released from Dachau until 1938. + +In 1940, Staimer together with Hermann was arrested again on the basis +of a denunciation and came to Flossenbuerg Concentration Camp in the +Oberpfalz. He was slain there after a few months and burned in the +Crematorium. The ashes were sent to his family. + +I cannot name witnesses for this deed, but I attach a death certificate +sent to his family. [See Document 2332-PS] + +For the truth of the above statements vouches. + + [signed] Josef Simon + +Nurnberg, 23 October 1945 + +I have reread carefully both reports, as submitted by me on 23 October +1945, and declare herewith under oath, that the content is true. This +statement is herewith made by me today, the 13th of November 1945 at +Nurnberg, in the Justice Building before Captain D. A. Sprecher, AUS. + + [signed] Josef Simon + Josef Simon + +Sworn to before me, this 13th day of November 1945 in the Justice +Building in Nurnberg, Germany. + + [signed] D. A. Sprecher + D. A. Sprecher, O2055516, Captain, AUS. + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2336-PS + +GERMAN LABOR FRONT + +_Organization Office_ + + Chief Directorate of the Political Organization [P.O.] National + Socialist Factory Cells Organization + + Berlin W., 27 June 1933 + Luetzowufer 18, II + + + SPECIAL CIRCULAR + + on the Securing of the Associations of the German Labor Front [DAF] + Against Hidden Marxist Sabotage. + +To all: + + Leaders of Worker and Employee Associations of the DAF Regional + [Bezirke], + + District [Kreis] and Local Chapter Directorate [Ortsgruppenleitungen] + of the Worker and Employee Associations of the DAF, + + Regional Leaders of the DAF, + + Regional Leaders of German industry + +and + + National Socialist Works Organization [N.S.B.O.] of + + “Landes” Representatives of the NSDAP + + “Gau” Factory Cell Leaders of the NSDAP + + District Factory Cell Leaders of the NSDAP + + Local Chapter Factory Workers [Ortsgruppenbetriebswarte] of the NSDAP + in Berlin and the Reich. + + [Stamp] + +Main Archives of the NSDAP No.____ + + [Stamp] + Entered in the index of books + 3 A/C current No. A-202. + + # # # # # + +Dear Party comrades. + + + The Situation + +Today the third SA-man from Berlin has died, following on the burial +yesterday, with the greatest ceremony, of his two comrades. The +murderer was _a Marxist trade union member_.--A few days ago SA-men +were fired at by _Marxists_ in two other cities of the Reich.--Enemy +aircraft dropped revolutionary _Marxist_ leaflets over Berlin.--Shortly +before the final edition of today’s local newspapers came out, it +became known that a gigantic new scandal of corruption has been +discovered in a land settlement society. The former _Marxist_ “Gau” +chairman of the Textile Workers’ Union [Textilarbeiter-Verbandes] has +been arrested as the chief swine and money maker. In Silesia signs have +been discovered of a secret _Marxist_ organization (Communist Party). + +This is a small selection of daily events, chosen at random. _Marxists +as murderers, Marxists as inciters to corruption, Marxists as +foreign agents, Marxists as conspirators against the state and its +institutions._ The notorious enemies of the state are opposed by the +great mass of honest German workers who fight for work and bread. For +fourteen years the “labor leaders” of Prague, Paris, Amsterdam, Warsaw +gave to the millions of German workers _stones_ instead of bread, +_servitude to a foreign political system_ instead of liberty. The 30th +January, 5th March, 2nd May, 22nd June finally struck one weapon after +the other out of the hands of this “Fuehrer” mob [gesindel]. The force +and thoroughness of the National Socialist coups [Aktionen] made those +who did not disappear into concentration camps creep into every dark +corner. + + + They Played Dead. + +However, now the generosity of National Socialism towards its +adversaries, which was rightly mentioned by party comrade Dr. Ley in +one of the last decrees of the DAF leaders, seems to have encouraged +them to new treasonable activities from the darkness. There is much to +indicate this. Here is just a small sample from a report submitted by +the Gestapo, Berlin: + +The functionaries of the free trade unions have received instructions +to dismiss the assertions of the National Socialist Works Organization +regarding the former embezzlement of union funds as slanderous. What is +aimed at is permanent agitation on a considerable scale, particularly +with the cooperation of the treasurers of the Social Democrat Party. +All trade union members who have joined the National Socialist Works +Organization so as not to lose their jobs are registered with full +details and then visited by functionaries in their homes. An attempt is +being made to group together all “class-conscious” workers who reject +Fascism. The aim is to keep the trade unions as fighting organs in +spite of National Socialist leadership. The old trade union leaders are +convinced even today that there is no suitable soil in Germany for the +plant of Fascism; nevertheless every effort should be made to shorten +its existence. + +These new working methods are contrived on the instructions of the +international association of trade unions with which the leading German +trade unionists are, as ever, in close contact. In short, the activity +of the functionaries of the Marxist parties and Trades Unions is +becoming more and more effective [aktiv]. + +They want again, although of course considerably weakened, to use as +a spring board the countless millions of German workers who long for +work and bread. They shoot their arrows from ambush, try to organize +themselves illegally, and now and then even assume a cynical and +impertinent attitude. _But they must have got a totally wrong idea +of us! We are awake!_ As new and qualified leaders of the workers +and employees of the DAF and as political officials [Amtswalter] of +the victorious National Socialist Works Organization, the sword of +the DAF, and finally also the old, confirmed National Socialists who +are accustomed to persecution, in all the leading and authoritative +positions of the DAF, are, thank God, guarantees that the doings of our +enemies come to nought. + +Since we know that, we act accordingly. Our aim is: + +1. _Expulsion of the last leading Marxist from all units of the +associations of the “German Labour Front”;_ + +2. _Therefore no softness, no false belief that we can “convert” them, +since they hate us from the very bottom of their hearts and because +Marxist big-wigs [Bonzen] can never be converted;_ + +3. _No more financial settlements, no respecting of all their +dishonestly made agreements;_ + +4. _Close observation and a close check on their private activities, +for they carry on propaganda against the state under the cloak of +honest citizens;_ + +5. _See to it that they are regarded by the people as outlaws who +really deserved to be hanged;_ + +6. _Have close observation instituted in the factories;_ + +7. _Finally do everything that helps the German workers and the German +employees but cuts off the deposed Marxist big-wigs from every type of +activity hostile to the state._ + +_We_ have one aim only; to unite the whole of German labour in a mighty +block of workers for the blessing of the people and state. _Adolf +Hitler_ is the protector [Schirmheer] of the DAF--_that explains +everything_. + +The _Marxists_, at home and abroad, have also one aim only; to +annihilate National Socialism and thus create chaos in Germany, nay, in +Europe. The fronts are thus clear. The law of the National Socialist +revolution demands therefore not only unceasing toil, but _fast_ work +at this very moment. Therefore the following orders are issued. + + + A + +_For the “General Association [Gesamtverband] of German Workers” of the +DAF_ + +1. _The organization office of the DAF is drawing up a “List of +Outlaws” [Geaechteten]_ + +_which is valid for the entire Reich and in which the names of all +those Marxist trade union “big-wigs” [Bonze] will be included, who +have carried on in the past and are still carrying on the most furious +struggle against National Socialism and are continuing it in secret. +Anyone on the “List of Outlaws”, will not be given work in the future. +All organizations which have any vital connection with German industry +are being sent this printed list, in order to prevent any of these +traitors to the workers from returning to the factories by crooked +means and possibly continuing their mutinous activity there._ + +_In this connection, the Association leaders [Verbandsleiter] of the +“General union [Gesamtverband] of German Workers” of the DAF will issue +detailed executive instructions._ + +2. _No treasurer (or person holding similar office) in the associations +may be a Marxist because these persons have the greatest opportunity of +forming illegal nucleus groups. It goes without saying that suspicious +treasurers, who can of course continue their former activities in +spite of the fact that they no longer have the right to collect +subscriptions, should be constantly watched._ + +3. _The local group associations [Verbandsortssgruppe] are to be filled +up as soon as possible with the members of other associations or groups +who have been brought into line (Christian, former yellow, Evangelic, +and Catholic workers unions, etc.) so that the block of “free” +association members which has up to now been a closed community, may +be split up. Public places known to have been frequented by the Social +Democrat, Reichsbanner, or Communist Party, may no longer be used as +meeting places of the local group association [Verbandsortsgruppen]._ + + + B + +_For the General Association [Gesamtverband] of German employees of the +DAF._ + +_It is above all the Catholic party leaders whom the Trade Unions have +taken over who should be removed from the associations, those men +who, it has been ascertained, are maintaining their connections with +political Catholicism just as they always have. They are dangerous +because they simulate submission and cheerful cooperation while in +reality they wantonly hold up our work of reconstruction and make no +secret of it among themselves. For example, here is one of many reports +from our intelligence service_: + +“On Sunday, 23 April, at 11 A. M. in the Vincent-House at Breslau +a meeting of the Christian trade unions was held to which all the +representatives of the authorities were invited. The report was given +by the Chief Editor of the “Deutsche”, Wiedfeld of Berlin. The meeting +came to an end about 1:00 p. m. and closed with the National Anthem. +In the afternoon the delegates from the province assembled to discuss +the report in the absence of the representatives of the various +authorities. No comment was permitted on Herr Wiedfeld’s report in +the morning, in order to appear in a good light in the eyes of the +representatives of the authorities, and this was expressly stated by +the chairman of the afternoon meeting. The lively discussion showed +immediately the methods followed and the goal aimed at by the Christian +Trades Union. Violent attacks were launched against the present Reich +Cabinet [Reichsregierung]. A representative of the Christian Trade +Union attacked the Reich Chancellor, asserting that Adolf Hitler would +never allow the leaders of the Christian Trade Unions to voice their +opinions. + +Then they spoke of the National Socialist Works Organization and +pulled it to pieces. Citing a number of examples they went on to +make further attacks on the Reich Cabinet and the National Socialist +Works Organization. First the Government was attacked; they said, for +instance, that cars were left free of tax, while a great tax was levied +on margarine and thus the standard of living of the poor was lowered. +There had never been so much holiday work in upper Silesia as under the +present Government. They declared that the NSDAP will have the surprise +of its life in Autumn, when the people will have nothing to eat, they +will then take to open fighting and destroy National Socialism in the +same way as the Socialist Party has been destroyed today. We dealt with +1918 (i.e. Christian trade union) and will deal with the Nazis too. One +must be on one’s guard against Minister Goering, for this fellow is +heading straight for Dictatorship. It is important to keep a good watch +on the National Socialist Works Organization, inform the people of +every mistake and explain to the people that the Nazis are completely +unable to carry out what they say.” + +_This “Christian”, sabotage applies of course also to the Workers’ +Associations._ + + + C + +_For the branches [Gliederungen] of the National Socialist Works +Organizations_ + +_1. The National Socialist Works Organization is above all the security +organ of the entire German Labour Front, i.e. it has to protect day +and night the great work of our slowly progressing unification of all +German workers and prevent any kind of sabotage. This is carried out in +two ways:_ + +_a. Through the already National Socialist Works Organization officials +[Amtswalter] in the associations themselves and_ + +_b. By keeping a watch on factories, houses and public places +which appear suspicious to us, by means of NS B. O. patrols +drawn from the “Gau” and District [Kreis] factory cell-divisions +[Betriebszellenabteilung] and the local group factory wardens +[Ortsgruppenbietriebswarte] detailed instructions will be issued later +to the Gau factory cell divisions direct._ + +_2. However, the branches of the National Socialist Works Organization +must themselves be subjected to a thorough purge of members because +their rapid growth has brought us many unreliable elements._ + +_It is only the man who pledges his life-time unreservedly, +unselfishly, and devotedly to the fight for the rise of German labour +(brain and manual workers), and thus for the whole people, who should +be a member of the National Socialist Works Organization. But any man +who has joined the National Socialist Works Organization on the chance +of amassing wealth, or has regarded his membership as a safeguard +against losing his job, etc., in short, any man who has joined this +fighting body [Kampftruppe] for material reasons, must leave it. The +man who was a Marxist only yesterday and fought openly against us, but +today will have nothing more to do with it, must also leave. These +are nothing but dangerous disruptive elements [Spaltpilze] who poison +morale when it comes to tests of endurance._ + +_It would be a definite benefit for the National Socialist Works +Organization if quite 100,000 of our most recent members leave our +ranks. The Gau factory cell leaders [Gau-Betriebszellenleiter] must +therefore issue orders to this effect._ + +_3. Herewith an order is issued effective until further notice, +prohibiting National Socialist Works Organization officials +[Amtswalter] and/or ordinary members beyond the N.S.W.O. membership +number 450,000, from holding any positions whatever in the associations +of the German Labour Front. The new members do not yet possess that +degree of suitability for leadership which we must demand for the great +tasks which have to be accomplished in these associations._ + +_Care has been taken that those “freshmen” who are not needed as +officials [Amtswalter] in the National Socialist Works Organization or +in the associations, are thoroughly familiarized by rapid courses with +National socialist ideas, so that they can then be employed._ + +_4. All positions on factory and employee counselors’ councils in +Germany must be filled by National Socialists. There must no longer +be any factory in which Marxists or “Christians” hold the leading +positions. Orders should therefore be given immediately that Communist +and Catholic factory or employee councils who are still holding office +should be dismissed. To prevent this being carried out in a wild and +undisciplined manner, it is laid down that the responsible Regional +leader of the German Labour Front, in conjunction with the Gau Director +of factory cells should from time to time, decide on the necessary +orders (in agreement with the Regional leader of German industry)._ + +The above schemes [Ausfuehrungen] and orders are _to be put into effect +immediately_ with proven National Socialist thoroughness. No pardon to +the enemy but stake all for the victory of the National Socialistic +revolution. + + Signed Muchow + +Director of the Office of the Organization of the German Labour Front +and Deputy Director of the National Socialist Works Organization of the +Political Organization of the N.S.D.A.P. + + + PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2340-PS + + 1937 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 41 + + German Public Officials Law of 27 January 1937 + +A career as a public official, rooted in the German people and +permeated by National Socialist ideology and loyalty bound to the +Fuehrer of the German Reich and people, forms a foundation pillar +of the National Socialist State. Therefore the Reich Government has +enacted the following law, which is hereby promulgated. + + + CHAPTER I + + Official Relationship [Beamtenverhaeltnis] + + + ARTICLE 1. + +(1) The German official stands in a public service and trust +relationship to the Fuehrer and to the Reich. + +(2) He carries out the will of the state, which is based on the +National Socialist German Labor Party. + +(3) The state demands of the official absolute obedience and complete +fulfillment of duty; in return it guarantees him a position for life. + +* * * * * * * + + + CHAPTER II + + Duties of Officials + + 1. General + +* * * * * * * + + + ARTICLE 3. + +(1) A position in the public service is proof of confidence on the +part of the state leadership, which the official must justify by being +constantly aware of the increased duties which his position imposes +upon him. Fuehrer and Reich demand of him true patriotism, a spirit +of self-sacrifice, and complete dedication of his efforts, obedience +to his superiors, and comradeship toward his colleagues. He must be a +model of loyal fulfillment of duty to all his fellow citizens. He must +be faithful to the death to the Fuehrer, who assures him his special +protection. + +(2) The official must at all times support without reservation the +National Socialist State and in all his behavior must be guided by the +fact that the National Socialist German Labor Party, in indissoluble +union with the people, is the basis of the German state concept. He +must report to his superiors occurrences which might endanger the +existence of the Reich or of the National Socialist German Labor Party, +even when he has not learned of them in the course of his official +duties. + +(3) The public official is responsible for conscientious fulfillment +of his official duties. By his conduct, on or off duty, he must prove +himself worthy of the respect and confidence which his profession +enjoys. He must not permit any member of his household to engage in any +dishonorable activity. + + + 2. Oath of Allegiance. + +* * * * * * * + + + ARTICLE 4. + +(1) The official confirms his special unity with the Fuehrer and the +Reich with the following oath, which he must take upon entering upon +his first duty: + +“I swear: I will be loyal and obedient to the Fuehrer of the German +Reich and people, Adolf Hitler, obey the law, and conscientiously +perform my official duties, so help me God.” + +(2) If a law permits members of a religious affiliation to use other +forms of affirmation instead of the oath, the official who is a member +of such a religious affiliation may use such form of affirmation. + +(3) If the official declares that he has objections to taking the oath +in religious form, he can take it without the final words. + +* * * * * * * + + + CHAPTER IV + + Appointments and Transfers + + 1. Appointments + +* * * * * * * + + + ARTICLE 25. + +(1) Only a person who is of German or related blood and who, if he +is married, has a spouse of German or related blood can become an +official. If the spouse is a mixed-blood second degree, an exception +may be made. + +(2) An official may marry only a person of German or related blood. +If the betrothed is a mixed-blood, second degree the marriage may be +approved. + +(3) For the admission of an exception under subdivision 1, 2nd +sentence, and the approval under subdivision 2, 2nd sentence, the +supreme office authority in agreement with the Reich Minister of the +Interior and the Deputy of the Fuehrer are the competent authorities. +The same authorities may also permit exceptions to subdivision 1, 1st +sentence and subdivision 2, 1st sentence, in individual cases. + + + ARTICLE 26. + +(1) Furthermore, only such person may assume public office, who-- + +1. is a citizen of the Reich or is not a citizen yet only because he +does not yet fulfill the requirements therefore because of his age, + +2. has the preliminary training prescribed for his career or, in the +absence of such regulations, the customary preliminary training or +other special requirements for the office to be entrusted to him, and + +3. offers guarantee that he will at all times support the National +Socialist State without reservation. + +(2) Exceptions to subdivision 1, No. 1 require the approval of the +Reich Minister of the Interior in agreement with the Deputy of the +Fuehrer or the authorities appointed by them. + +* * * * * * * + + + CHAPTER VII + + Termination of Official Relationship + +* * * * * * * + + + 2. Dismissal from Office + + (a) Refusal to take the oath + +* * * * * * * + + + ARTICLE 57. + +Whoever refuses to take the oath of allegiance prescribed by law is to +be dismissed. + + + 3. Retirement + +* * * * * * * + + + (d) Political Reasons + +(1) The Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor may retire a life-time or +temporary official on the request of the supreme office authority in +agreement with the Reich Minister of the Interior, if the official no +longer offers guarantee that he will at all times support the National +Socialist State. + +(2) The facts justifying this request are to be ascertained in an +investigation in which the questioning of witnesses and excerpts on +oath is permissible and in which the official is to be heard. + +Berlin, 26 Jan. 1937 + + The Fuehrer and Reichs Chancellor + Adolf Hitler + + The Reichs Minister of the Interior + Frick + + The Reich Minister of Finance + Count Schwerin von Krosigk + + + PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2341-PS + + 1939 REICHSGESETZBLATT, No. 38, 2 MARCH 1939, PAGE 371 + + Decree on the education and careers of German officials of 28 February + 1939 + +* * * * * * * + +Par. 2. + +The applicants must belong or have belonged to the party or one of +its formations. In the selection the personal aptitude and character +are decisive. Honorably discharged workers and soldiers (cf. par. 16 +(1) and par. 17 of the decree on the care for soldiers and workers in +the form of 29 Dec 1937--RGBl I, p. 1417) and children of child-rich +families have preference. For pension applicants the special decrees +apply. + +* * * * * * * + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2342-PS + + 1936 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 369 + + Law on the People’s Court and on the 25th amendment to the Salary Law + of 18 April 1936 + +The Reich Cabinet [Reichsregierung] has passed the following law which +is hereby promulgated: + + + CHAPTER I + + + ARTICLE 1. + +The People’s Court is a regular Court in the sense of the law on +judicial organizations. + + + ARTICLE 2. + +The People’s Court is comprised of one president and the necessary +numbers of presidents of the senate and councillors as main official +members [hauptamtliche Mitglieder]. + + + ARTICLE 3. + +The president, the presidents of the senate and the councillors are +appointed for life-time. They have to be qualified for the judge’s +office and must have completed their 35th year of age. + + + ARTICLE 4. + +The honorary members of the People’s Court are appointed by the Fuehrer +and Reichs Chancellor for the duration of 5 years upon recommendation +of the Reichsminister of Justice. + + + ARTICLE 5. + +Senates are formed at the People’s Court, the number of which is +determined by the Reichsminister of Justice. + + + ARTICLE 6. + +If it is necessary for lawful course of affairs, permanently employed +judges may be called in temporarily as assistant judges to the People’s +Court in case of an accumulation of business. The delegation of an +assistant judge may be called off before the end of the time, for which +the assistant judge has been called in, only if the emergency, by which +it was caused, does no longer exist. + + + ARTICLE 7. + +The office of the public prosecutor at the People’s Court is filled +by one or several Reich prosecutors or State prosecutors. They are +nonjudicial officials, must however be qualified for the judge’s office. + + + ARTICLE 8. + +At the People’s Court an office will be established which will be +filled with the necessary number of recording officials. + + + CHAPTER II + + + ARTICLE 9. + +The Reich pay law of 10 December 1927 (RGBl I, p. 349) will be changed +as follows: + +1. To the pay class A will be added: + +a. in pay group Ib after “directors of law courts”: “Chief State +Prosecutors at the People’s Court”; + +b. in pay group 10a after “Sergeant of the German Supreme Court” +[Reichsgerichtswachtmeister]; + +2. To the pay class B will be added: + +a. in pay group 3b under Section “Reichministry of Justice” before +“president of the highest court of Justice” [Kammergerichtspresident]: +“President of the People’s Court”; + +b. in pay group e under section “Reichministry of Justice” after +“Senate President at the German Supreme Court,”: “Senate president at +the People’s Court, Reich Prosecutor as head of the State Prosecutor’s +office at the People’s Court” and in note I after “German Supreme +Court”: “and at the People’s Court as well as the Reich Prosecutor as +head of the State Prosecutor’s office at the People’s Court”; + +c. in pay group 8 under Section “Reichministry of Justice” before +“Presidents of District Courts at Courts with 30 or more organic +[planmaessig] judges in the district”: “Councillors at People’s Courts”. + + + ARTICLE 10. + +Of the positions printed in the budget of the Reichministry of Justice +for the financial year of 1935 (individual plan IX) at Chapter 2 +(German Supreme Court) the following positions are transferred to +Chapter 2a (People’s Court): + + Group B 7: 1 Reich Prosecutor. + + Group A 2b: 2 Chief State Prosecutors. + + Group A 2d: 4 senior judges in law courts of justice (6 of whom to be + transformed in future). + + Group A 4b: 6 Chief inspectors of the Government. + + Group A 4c: 2 inspectors of the Government. + + Group A 7: 6 Secretaries. + + Group A10: 6 Sergeants of the German Supreme Court + [Reichsgerichtswachtmeister]. + +(2) In the budget of the Reichministry of Justice (Individual Plan IX) +the following organic positions will be newly created in Chapter 2a +(People’s Court): + + Group B 3b: President of the People’s Court. + + Group B 6: 2 Senate presidents at the People’s Court, 1 Reich + Prosecutor (under transformation of the Reich Prosecutor’s position + of Group B 7 transferred from the German Supreme Court). They + receive an irrevocable extra pay of 1000 RM which can be added to + the base pay, for purpose of pension [pensionsfaehig]. + + Group B 8: 6 Councillors at the People’s Court. + + Group A 1b: 2 Chief State Prosecutors at the People’s Court. + + Group A 2b: 2 Chief State Prosecutors. + + Group A 10a: 1 Chief Messenger’s supervisor. + He receives extra pay for this position of 300 RM which can be added + to the base pay for the purpose of pension [pensionsfaehig] and is + irrevocable. + + 5 Sergeants of the People’s Court under transformation of 5 + positions of sergeants of the German Supreme Court taken over from + the German Supreme Court. + + + CHAPTER III + +In as far as laws or other regulations refer to the Chief Reich +Prosecutor as authority of indictment at the People’s Court, his place +will be taken by the Reich Prosecutor at the People’s Court. + + + CHAPTER IV + +The Reichministry of justice will issue the legal and administrative +regulations necessary for the execution of this law. + + + CHAPTER V + +(1) This law shall take effect as of 1st April 1936. + +(2) The honorary members of the People’s Court appointed on the basis +the former regulations continue to remain in office according to their +appointment hitherto. The same holds good with regard to members who +have to be qualified for the judge’s office. On 31st October 1936 +however those are being eliminated who will not have been appointed up +to this date to main official members of the People’s Court. + +(3) If members of the German Supreme Court and Reich Prosecutors are +being transferred to the People’s Court up to 1st April 1937, they will +receive in case of their being retired at least the pension to which +they would have been entitled if they had remained in their former +positions at the German Supreme Court. + + Berlin, 18. April 1936 + + The Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor + Adolf Hitler + + The Reichministry of Justice + Dr. Guertner + + The Reichministry of Finances + Count Schwerin von Krosigk + + The Reich War Ministry and Supreme + Commander of the Armed Forces + von Blomberg + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2344-PS + + RECONSTRUCTION OF A NATION + + [Aufbau Einer Nation] + + by Hermann Goering, 2nd Edition, Published by E. S. Mittler & Son, + Berlin 1934, [Page 89]. + +* * * * * * * + +Against the enemies of the State, we must proceed ruthlessly. It cannot +be forgotten that at the moment of our rise to power, according to +the official election figures of March 1933, six million people still +confess their sympathy for Communism and eight million for Marxism.... +_Therefore, the concentration camps have been created, where we +have first confined thousands of Communists and Social Democrat_ +functionaries. + +* * * * * * * + + + PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2347-PS + + 1935 REICHSVERWALTUNGSBLATT, Vol. 56, No. 29, Pages 577-578, dated 20 + July 1935 + + (Editorial Board: A. Mirow, _Dr. H. H. Lammers_, H. Pfundtner, Dr. O. + Koellreutter, Dr. F. A. Medicus) + + + II. COURT DECISIONS + +Survey of decisions of the Supreme Administrative Court +[Oberverwaltungsgericht] + + + Police in General + + (Rush-reprint) + +Since the Law on the Secret State Police [Geheime Staatspolizei] of 30 +November 1933 (GS.S. 419) became effective, decisions of the Office of +the Secret State Police [Geheimes Staats Polizeiamt] can no longer be +contested according to the provisions of the Law on the Administration +of Police. The only remedy against them is a complaint to the superior +authority. + +Legal status of the Bureau of the Secret State Police according to the +Law on the Secret State Police of 30 November 33. + +On September 4 1934 the Association Secretary filed a suit against the +Secret State-Police at the District-Administrative Court in Berlin. The +association asserted that on 23 August 1934 their president had been +informed by two officials of the office of the Secret State-Police that +the assets of the association would be sequestrated for the purpose of +an eventual confiscation. + +With the decision of 1 November 1934 the District-Administrative Court +decided to dismiss the suit. + +The appeal of the plaintiff against this decision could not have any +success. + +The District-Administrative Court in this case dismissed the suit on +the ground of the inadmissibility of such an action to this court. +According to the principle of enumeration quoted by the judge of first +instance a suit can be filed with the administrative courts only if +legal provisions expressively rule to that effect. The right of legal +redress as provided by the law relating to the Police-Administration +applies according to the wording of this law only to the police orders +issued by the ordinary police-authorities, i.e. the police-authorities +of the community, the district, or the province. The sequestration +order in question has not been issued by an ordinary police-authority; +on the contrary it had been issued by the Office of Secret +State-Police, the legal status of which has been provided by the Law of +30 November 1933. + +With this law an authoritative status was given to the Secret +State-Police which was basically different from the one at the +time it was created, based on the Law of 26 April 1933. By virtue +of this last-mentioned law, the Office of the Secret State-Police +should act in political matters “at the side of or in the place of +the ordinary police-authorities” and “should have the status of a +Province-Police-Authority”.... + +This legal status was changed, as the District-Administrative-Court +properly recognized, when the “Secret State-Police” was created. An +authoritative organization was created thus, the status of which +is expressly determined by law to be exempt from the sphere of the +Minister of Interior, otherwise competent in all Police matters. + +Section 1, subsection 1, sentence 1 and 2 of the Law of 30 November +1933 quotes: + +“The Secret State Police is forming an independent branch of the +interior administration. Its chief is the Prime Minister”. The +conception “interior administration” here is not used in the usual +meaning of today according to which this word designates the specified +affairs within the sphere of the Minister of the Interior--as for +instance in comparison with the administration of commerce or public +instruction, etc.... + +That the Secret State Police became an independent organization is +clearly shown on one side by the fact that it is subordinated as a +whole to the Prime Minister, and then by the creation of special +authorities designated with specific names. + +Concluding from all this the legal status of the Office of the Secret +State Police since the Law of 30 November 1933 became effective is the +following: The office is part of a special authoritative organization, +the “Secret State Police” which forms an independent branch of the +Administration of the Prussian State. It has, like the Secret State +Police as a whole, its special field as to the nature of its tasks: +the management of affairs of the political police. Therewith the +characteristic signs are given of a “Special Police Authority” within +the purview of Section 2, subsection 2 and section 8 of the Law +relating to the Administration of the Police, an authority detached +from the organization of the ordinary police-authorities entrusted with +a special police task. It cannot be considered part of the limited +circle of police authorities, i.e. State [Landes] authorities, Kreis +or local authorities, pursuant to Section 2, subsection 1 of the Law +relating to Police-Administration, as in relation to them it figures +rather as a central authority pursuant to the mentioned provisions of +Section 3, subsection 2 of the law of 30 November 1933. + +From the thus signified character of the Office of the Secret State +Police, which therefore doubtlessly forms a special-police-authority +it can be concluded that its orders as mentioned before, +are not subject to the provisions of the law relating to the +Police-Administration in regard to means of redress. Neither does the +Law of 30 November 1933 provide for the contesting of a decision by +a suit (filing an appeal) at the administrative court. Therefore the +party affected by such orders has only the general legal remedy of a +complaint to the supervisory authority. + + Decree of 2 May 1935 III. C. 43/35 + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2348-PS + +Statement of Standarten Fuehrer Walther Rauff made on 19 October 1945: + +I hereby acknowledge the attached letters, written by Dr. Becker +(Lieut.) on 16 May 1942 and received by me on 29 May 1942, as a genuine +letter. + +I did on 18 October 1945 write on the side of this letter a statement +to the effect that it was genuine. + +I do not know the number of death vans being operated and cannot even +give an approximate figure. + +The vans were built by the Saurer Works, Germany, located, I believe, +in Berlin. Some other firms built these vans also. + +In so far as I am aware these vans only operated in Russia. + +In so far as I can state these vans were probably operating in 1941, +and I personally feel that they were operating up to the termination of +the war. + +I do not personally know the number of persons killed in the death vans. + +I would like to state that the reason why Dr. Becker wrote this letter +to me was due to the fact that I was the chief of the Section under +which were included such divisions as + + (1) Ammunition + (2) Telephone + (3) Telegraph + (4) Radio + (5) All Trucks. + +This group was known as II D. + +When this letter was received, I referred it to a Captain Pradl for +appropriate action. The letter was discussed by Captain Pradl and +myself, and I believe that Pradl was instructed by me to have the +technical matters, of which the letters complained, remedied. I only +saw Dr. Becker once or twice and had no part in the actual appointing +of Dr. Becker to this position. I was never present when the death vans +were operating with persons in them being killed, however I did see +a death van as a sample and was interested merely from a technical +viewpoint. I was chief of this technical section from February 1940 +until March 1940. + +From May 1940 to May 1941 I was in the German navy. From September 1941 +to May 1942 I was in Prague. I then became chief of the section again +from May 1942 to June 1942. + +I wish to point out that my specific interest in these death vans was +the lower part where the motor was located. + +I wish to state that my immediate superior was an individual of +ministerial grade by the name of Standarten Fuehrer Siegert. He was +chief of AMT II RSHA, and Siegert gave me orders to supply the chassis +of these death vans. Insofar as I can recall I only supplied 5 or 6. + +The immediate superior of Standarten Fuehrer Siegert was Obergruppen +Fuehrer Reinhardt Heydrich, chief of S. D. + +The immediate successor of Siegert was an individual by the name of +Spacil who succeeded Siegert around July or August of 1942, taking over +the same duties and same responsibilities as Siegert and remaining +chief of the section until the termination of the war. I believe that +Siegert returned to a position in the Ministry of Finance on being +relieved by Spacil. + +I understand that this statement was made under oath and I hereby swear +that all statements contained in this affidavit are the truth, the +whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help me God. + + Standarten Fuehrer Rauft + + Witnessed by the following:-- + Captain J. F. C. Bagshaw, + Captain G. K. Heller, + Captain C. A. Crowther. + + + PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2349-PS + + THE MYTH OF THE 20TH CENTURY + + by Alfred Rosenberg + + Published by Hoheneichen Publishing House, Muenchen 1941. + +[Page 215] + +We recognize today that the central maximum values of the Roman and +the Protestant Church as negative Christianity do not correspond to +our soul, that they are in the way of the organic forces of the Nordic +racially determined peoples, must give way to them (these forces), +and must let themselves be re-evaluated in the sense of a Germanic +Christianity. That is the thought behind today’s religious searching. + +* * * * * * * + +[Page 514] + +The idea of honor--national honor--is for us the beginning and end of +our entire thinking and doing. It does not admit of any equal-valued +center of force alongside of it, no matter of what kind, neither +Christian love, nor the Free-Masonic humanity, nor the Roman philosophy. + +* * * * * * * + +[Page 608] + +A German religious movement which would like to develop into a +folk-church will have to declare that the idea of neighborly love is +unconditionally to be subordinated to the idea of national honor, that +no act of a German church may be approved which does not primarily +serve the safeguarding of the folkdom. + +* * * * * * * + +[Page 616] + +A German religion will, bit by bit, present in the churches transferred +to it, in place of the crucifixion the spirit of fire--the heroic--in +the highest sense. + +* * * * * * * + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2351-PS + + THE ARCHIVE, Vol. 34-36, Page 1716 + + compiled by Ernst Jaenicke, Berlin. + + Edited by Alfred-Ingomar Berndt. + + Published by Otto Stollberg, publishers, Berlin, March 1937. + +[Rosenberg in a speech on 7 March 1937 stated:] + +The education of youth can only be carried out by those who have +rescued Germany from disaster. It is therefore impossible to demand one +Fuehrer, one Reich and one firmly united people as long as education is +carried out by forces which are mutually exclusive of each other. + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2352-PS + + THE ARCHIVE, Vol. 43-45, Page 1029 + + compiled by Ernst Jaenicke, Berlin, + + Edited by Alfred-Ingomar Berndt. + + Published by Otto Stollberg, publishers, Berlin, November 1937 + +[Kerrl said in a speech at Fulda, 27 November 1937:] + +We cannot recognize that the Church has a right to insure that the +individual should be educated in all respects in the way in which it +holds to be right; but we must leave it to the National Socialist State +to educate the child in the way it regards as right. + + + PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2353-PS + + BASIC FACTS FOR A HISTORY OF GERMAN WAR AND ARMAMENTS ECONOMY + +[Page 35] + + + IV + +The influence of central organization on development and activities of +the war economy organization + +Centralization of the Supreme Reich authorities, ordered in case of +war, has influenced the development and the activities of the war +economy organization to such an extent, that it is necessary to discuss +this matter in detail. + +The foundations had already been laid for the central organization of +the Supreme Reich authorities in the event of a war, prior to 1933 +in many discussions and decrees, but it was radically altered when +the national socialists came into power and especially by the decease +of Reichpresident von Hindenburg. The latest orders were decreed +in the Reich Defense law of May 21, 1935, supposed to be published +only in case of war, but already declared valid for carrying out war +preparations. As this law (see Appendix IV, 1) fixed the duties of the +Armed Forces and the other Reich authorities in case of war, it was +also the fundamental ruling for the development and activity of the war +economy organization. + +* * * * * * * + + + XV + +[Page 135] + +War and Armament Economic Measures from entry into Austria (1938 till +mobilization 1939) + +The discussion between the Fuehrer and the Austrian Chancellor of State +Schuschnigg on February 12, led to the military-political measures +against Austria, which concluded with the entry into Austria on +March 13. This action against Austria, disguised under the code name +“Action Otto” prepared in a short time, has resulted in a wealth of +experience of utmost importance, for the preparation of mobilization +and especially for the economic preparations, and has in the course of +the year led to changes in the regulations regarding mobilization. + +* * * * * * * + +[Page 136] + +The action was prepared and started without the cooperation of the +WStb. The result was, that the military measures created great +confusion in the economic sphere leading to unpleasant conditions for +the army and also for the economy for the time being. + +* * * * * * * + +[Page 141] + +The experience gained during the action in Austria caused the OKW to +issue new regulations, preparing the separating of the mobilization +of the Armed Forces from the mobilization of the civilian elements. +Mobilization of the Armed Forces without public announcement (X-case) +was prepared; nevertheless there should be the possibility of +proceeding at any time from the mobilization of the Armed Forces only, +to a general mobilization of State, Nation and Economy. The basic idea +is, that all actions and regulations in case-X are based on Civil law, +a state of defense has not been declared and martial law has not been +proclaimed. The appropriate measures were ordered on July 5 by the +OKW. WStb and GBW expressed justifiable misgivings regarding these new +regulations, as mobilization of the Armed Forces before mobilization +of economy would create considerable confusion and endanger the smooth +running of the economic mobilization. On the demand for a divided +mobilization was necessary from a military-political point of view, it +was accepted in spite of the objections of the WStb and GBW. + +* * * * * * * + +[Pages 142-143] + +The first _planned_ action of the war economy organization during +an actual operation was at the time of the entry into the Sudeten +territory. Liaison officers of the OKW [WStb] were attached to the +corps commandos, they were in charge of technical war economy units and +finally, War Economy Offices for special missions were created to take +over definite Economic departments. The military-political developments +during the occupation of the Sudeten German territory evolved in +such a manner, that the liaison officers as well as the technical +war economy units and the offices of WWi were rarely in action. The +planned preparation for action by these administrative units and their +activities in the Sudeten German territory nevertheless provided +experience which was also very valuable for the later Mob-preparations. +Primarily it was admitted by all departments, that the installation of +the liaison officers of the OKW [WStb] at the corps commandos is of +great value not only to the troops but also for OKW, and is a necessity +in modern warfare. This proved especially valuable insofar as the +chiefs of the Civil government were as a rule not instructed in their +duties and authority, and the offices for special missions, first had +to give them the necessary directives for their task. + +* * * * * * * + +[Page 146] + +At the beginning of the year 1939 a new level was reached as regards +the military-political situation--the occupation of Bohemia and +Moravia by the German army and the abrogation of the sovereignty of +Czechoslovakia. These operations also were prepared “war economically” +by the creation of war economy units, who had, as in the case +Sudetenland, a very small scope for action. Immediately after the +occupation, a war economy inspectorate for special missions was set +up, which took over all the duties of the Czechoslovak secretaryship +general for National Defense and which was transformed into the +Inspectorate of War Economy Prague on March 30, 1939 already. The main +duties of the Inspectorate are: + + Utilization of the total industrial economy of the Protectorate for + the purpose of Reichdefense; + + Control of manufacture of war material for at home and abroad and + + Effect synchronization of demands to be made by military and civilian + Reich authorities and the industrial economy of the Protectorate. + + Furthermore they are assigned: + + The instruction of the Reichprotector on the economic demands to be + made in the interest of Reichdefense and to advise him concerning + legislation resulting therefrom; + + Air raid precautions in industry and guarding of factories and the + Defence Measures [Abwehrmassnahmen] in the factories. + +* * * * * * * + + + XVIII + +[Pages 181-184] + + Execution of the economic mobilization + +Before discussing the actual process of the economic mobilization +I regard it as my duty, to give my opinion on the possibility of +successful warfare as regards war economy, from my experience as +Chief of the WStb gained during August 1939. During this time many +conferences were held with the then Generaloberst Keitel discussing our +readiness for war and conditions in regard to armaments as compared +with that of the prospective enemy states. During all these discussions +I maintained the point of view, that a war with Poland would present +no problem for us, but that for a great world war of long duration, +our economic structure would be too weak and that, in the case of a +world war, decisive measures, conforming to a total war, would have to +be carried out immediately. These objections and the resulting demands +were nevertheless ignored. + +The process of German mobilization in 1939 was most intensively +influenced by the progress of the military-political situation and +was carried out with the idea of surprising the enemy, at the right +moment. The experience gained during the operations against Austria, +Sudetenland and Czechoslovakia, which led to separate and camouflaged +mobilization, formed the basis for the measures to be taken. The +tension, existing between Germany and Poland since July, was used to +take all the measures, necessary for a surprise attack on Poland. +Some of these preparations as far as war economy was concerned were +the acceleration of the delivery of armaments, which in particular +was carried out by the branches of the Armed Forces and, for the +organization of War-economy, the forming of war economy units to be +attached to the attacking armies. + +After August 1, the formation and distribution of VO of WStb took +place, they were attached to the AOK; on August 24, formation of war +economy units for the attacking armies concerned. On August 25, orders +for the camouflaged mobilization were released, with Aug. 26, ordered +as the first X-day. (see Appendix XVIII, 1 and Appendix XVIII, 2). In +this manner the form of mobilization was ordered, which represented the +most unfavorable form for the mobilization of war economy. Reiterated +objections against divided mobilization, submitted by WStb as late +as August 24, were overridden by the Chief of OKW, while the Supreme +Command was of the opinion, that a war with Poland did not necessitate +a General mobilization, and any other form of mobilization was out of +question for political reasons. + +On August 25 18.30 a copy of case X was remitted to the inspectorates +of War economy (copy, see Appendix XVIII, 3). + +The decree of August 25 orders expressly that case X shall not be +extended in its entirety to civilian matters. Even though it was +ordered that future proposed mob measures must not be endangered by +unplanned demands, requisitions and commandeerings, there was still +considerable danger in the mobilization being divided and carried out +at different times. This was especially applicable as far as economy +was concerned insofar as regulations for economy read that with the +utmost consideration of economy in general only the most important war +factories should be maintained at their former level and that only +isolated war factories should be immediately speeded up to produce +a large output. These regulations, in consideration of the Economic +Policy which was to oppose every unnecessary change, and also of the +kind of propaganda adopted were bound to endanger the planned process +of economic mobilization. + +The preparations, covering many years of work, for the mobilization +of Economy were consequently, for the most part, invalid. This +regulation was unfortunately to become an inconvenience later on when +starting up the Armaments Industry and the economy of war and was even +noticeable for the first four years of the war up to the declaration +of total war in 1943. A large number of the measures, contained in the +preparation for mobilization of the WStb and invalidated by the above +regulation, were not executed until 1943 as a result of demands by the +Reichminister for Armaments and ammunition. + +On August 27, 1939, the regulation on the administration of economy was +issued, whereby the Oberpraesidenten were charged with executing and +directing all economic measures of the GBW. Included in this was the +official founding of the District Economy offices, the Provincial Food +offices [Landesernaehrungsaemter], Offices of forestry and economy of +timber [Holzwirtschaftsaemter] forming finally the organization, that +should have been in force long ago as a result of the mobilization +order by GBW. + +* * * * * * * + +[Pages 273-275] + + + B. War Economy + +The year 1940 was the first acid test for the value and necessity +of the War Economy organization. After it had proved its value at +home by the measures taken to strengthen the war economy of Germany +especially in reestablishing the German war industry and reconstructing +the armament industry and had earned the constant appreciation of +Field Marshal Goering and the Reichminister for War, it now remained +to prove that the organization was also able to support the combat +troops, to administer the economy of occupied countries and put it into +operation again, and that there was an absolute necessity for such an +organization in the present war. That this point of view is correct, is +proved by the fact, that all allied as well as enemy states constructed +similar organizations, imitating the German pattern. + +The operations against Denmark and Norway and the western campaign +against Holland, Belgium and France brought full proof; the year 1942 +has more than confirmed this point of view. + + + _1. War Economy Measures during the occupation of Denmark and Norway_ + +The occupation of Denmark and Norway brought for the German War Economy +organization a gratifying and manifold task. The office Wi Rue was +informed of the planned execution of these operations at the end of +February, and thereupon ordered the preparation of the measures to be +taken as regards war economy. It was decided, that a small staff under +the direction of Major Neef (Group leader in the dept. of raw materials +Wi Rue) should carry out the appropriate, preliminary preparations, for +the organization which were to be carried out in accordance with the +directives of OKW-WFA and the Oberquartiermeisters of group XXI charged +with the operational preparations. Commander in chief of Group XXI was +von Falkenhorst, General in the infantry; Colonel of General staff +Baentsch, Oberquartiermeister. The war economy specialists, coordinated +under Major Neef, was assimilated into the staff of group XXI on March +20, under the title “Group War Economy” and VO of OKW/Wi Rue office. + +The first performance of the group was the compilation of material +on the economic structure of Denmark and Norway. Then it worked on +the war economy and armament part of the “Demands of OKW to the +political plenipotentiaries of the Fuehrer in the Danish and Norwegian +Governments”, and the economic measures in the “Special instructions on +conduct during occupation of Denmark and Norway”. + +Furthermore, special tasks were given to the war economy officers +concerned and their first duties defined as follows: + +a. Support of the military commanders in the utilization of the economy +of the country in the interest of the armed forces; + +b. Identification and safeguarding of supplies against unauthorized +seizure or transport; + +c. Starting or restarting of production plants; any further war economy +and armament tasks should be undertaken only by special order of OKW. + +The working staff was able, during the four weeks available, to compile +detailed material, providing the respective war economy departments +with valuable material for their duties. All necessary orders, +directives and so forth were issued in a special calendar in order of +mobilization. + +* * * * * * * + +[Pages 276-282] + +On April 2 it was decided to select April 9 as the day on which the +operation should be carried out. + +The execution of the operation was on the whole carried out according +to plan. Provision was made that the WO should reach their posts +together with their respective staffs, namely, Major Neef by air, +the WO Osbjerg and Aarhus over-land, the remaining gentlemen in the +warships in which the staffs were transported, while all WO, though +partly under heavy fighting, reached their objective on April 9, +Major Neef was not able to reach Oslo until April 12, because of the +opposition near Oslo. + +The unified War Economy Organization which had been prepared for Norway +and Denmark depended upon the regulation that the Senior Command for +special missions XXXI in Denmark was subordinate to group XXI in +Norway. When it soon became evident that this arrangement did not work +because of distances and because of the conflicting behavior of the +Norwegian and Danish governments, it was decided on April 10 to make +the Senior Command for Denmark directly subordinate to the Commander in +Chief of the Army, while group XXI together with the forces operating +in Norway was to remain subordinate to the OKW. As a result of this +change it also became necessary to divide the War Economy organization. +The War Economy Liaison Office Denmark was placed under the supervision +of the administrator of Danish economy, on the staff of the political +plenipotentiary of the Fuehrer in Copenhagen; the organization Norway +under Major Neef remained attached to group XXI. + +In Norway as well as in Denmark the assignment of War Economy Offices +to the military detachments has proved successful. The War Economy +Offices were burdened with so many problems that their small staff +barely sufficed; they were very quickly maids of all work. + +As soon as the offices were well established in their new districts and +the most important military problems had been settled, they quickly +attended to the construction of the War Economy Organization. + +In Norway for the first few days after the occupation, the German +Ambassador Dr. Braeuer, remained the political plenipotentiary of +the Fuehrer. As Foreign Office commissioner, dealing with economic +problems, Min. Direktor Sarnow of the Reich Wi. M. was attached to him. +Major Neef immediately tried to secure a definition of the fields of +work. However, when this did not meet with any success, for the sake +of the work, he arranged with Min. Dir. Sarnow that the office of WO +Norway as should be incorporated into the Staff of the commissioner +dealing with economic problems, as Main Division II. This measure, +however, was never carried out, because both Dr. Braeuer and Min. +Dir. Sarnow were recalled on April 22 and the Gauleiter of the NSDAP +Terboven was named by the Fuehrer as Reichcommissioner of the occupied +Norwegian territories. All attempts by Major Neef to clarify the status +and spheres of activity with the 2nd in Command of the Reich Commissar +Gauwirtschaftsberater Otte, were for the time being unsuccessful. On +April 27 the former Liaison Office was changed to the War Economy Staff +Norway. The WO as a branch office was subordinate to the latter. + +In Denmark, Commander Dr. Forstmann quickly succeeded in coming to +an understanding with the German Ambassador von Renthe-Fink and his +commercial attaché Dr. Krueger in regard to the spheres of activity. On +May 27 the office was renamed “War Economy Staff Denmark.” + +The details concerning the establishing of the War Economy offices, +their growth, and their manifold tasks have been thoroughly described +in the accounts of the WStb Denmark and Norway. Hence, within the scope +of this report the details will not come under discussion. In short, +attention should only be drawn to the tasks as a whole, and the most +important experiences during this first large-scale operation of the +War Economy Organization. + +The problems which faced the war economy officers during the +occupation of Denmark and Norway were very extensive and embraced +both military as well as economic problems in all fields of economy. +The military leaders were glad that officers trained in war economy +were at their disposal, who were qualified to solve questions of an +economic-organizational character and, as authorities, could negotiate +with Danish and Norwegian Officials. At this moment the manner in which +the War Economy Organization had been formed, proved its worth in that +there was personnel trained in military as well as industrial and +commercial fields. Thus it happened that problems were entrusted to the +WO which really lay beyond the scope of their activities. The following +may be named: + + Supplying troops with food, Motor vehicles and fuel, + + Procuring billeting possibilities for the troops, + + Securing money and regulating the currency problem, + + Procuring material (cement, wood, etc.), + + Providing coal, + + Regulating transportation, + + Loading troops onto ships, + + Procuring raw materials and finished products, + + Putting the fishing industry into operation, + + Rationing food for the armed forces and the civilian population, + + Rationing of fuel, + + Cooperating with the sailings of ships putting in and out, + + Administering the loading of ships, + + Checking over claims for compensation for war damage and requisitions, + + Utilization of fish garbage and the manufacture of fish flour, + + Price regulations for the purchase and renting of real estate for the + armed forces, + + The loaning of horses and seed for agriculture. + +These and similar problems had to be taken over by the WO, because the +competent offices of the Armed Forces Departments were not there or +were not in the position to solve these problems. + +Only after these problems had been solved, was it possible for the +WO to cope with the real problems affecting war economy, which dealt +immediately with the seizing and securing of the most important +agricultural supplies and the reestablishing of the means of +subsistence. + +Then the problems in Denmark and Norway shaped themselves in different +ways as a result of the war situation (see appendix XX, 6). As early as +June 15 the order could be issued regarding Denmark that the country be +treated as being in the domestic theatre of operations; and therefore +it was possible to quickly begin to make full use of the Danish defense +and armament industry. The exploitation of the armament industry in +Norway could only follow at a slower pace and at a later period, +because it was regarded as being enemy territory. The utilization of +the Danish and Norwegian economy followed within the framework of +the “Proposals by the armed forces for the regulating of the general +questions in regard to war and armament economy.” (see appendix XX, 7). + +Very soon it was necessary for the Wi Rue department and the War +Economy offices in Denmark and Norway to take sharp measures in order +to avoid duplication of work and the overlapping of the WT in Danish +and Norwegian concerns. Above all, it was important for the sake of +currency stabilization to keep a firm hand over the buyers of the WT, +because they were causing danger to the currencies of the countries +by flooding them with fiduciary monetary tender. It very soon became +finally necessary to adopt measures to make the raw material available +for those orders placed with Denmark and Norway, because, in part, the +raw materials needed for the purpose of filling these orders were not +to be had there. + +In order to hasten the process of getting Norwegian industry into +operation again, the Wi Rue Amt. sent German industrial and economic +personnel to Norway, who, as middlemen, were to quickly establish +confidential relationships and who on account of their expert knowledge +were to accelerate the revival of Norwegian Economy. + +The experiences of the first months of the occupation show that it is +absolutely necessary to provide units operating independently with War +Economy Offices, since in a modern war economic problems are submitted +to the commanders which can only be solved by trained personnel. It is +self evident that, later on, a major portion of the problems must be +transferred to the civilian Economic departments, which will be set +up, and that the soldier confines himself to the solution of economic +problems that serve the troops, as long as no solution is found, as +later proved to be the case, in the Netherlands. + +The staffing of the WO for Denmark and Norway was in most cases +too small, because the problems were too complex and the fields of +operation allotted to them were too large. + +Yet it is an established fact that the War Economy Offices, in Denmark +and Norway especially, rendered invaluable services to the troops +during the first months and that an organization for the reopening of +industrial operations and to carry out the commissions of the WT was an +absolute necessity. + +Moreover, the outstanding work of the War Economy offices in Denmark +and Norway was the main reason for the fact that, in 1941, it was +possible to carry out, according to plan, the enormous work for the +defense of the country, which was required of the Economies of Denmark +and Norway by the Supreme Command. + +* * * * * * * + +[Pages 283-284] + + + _2. Campaign in the West_ + +The operations against France, Holland and Belgium brought about the +first real use of the war economy organization in enemy territory. It +was accomplished in close cooperation with General Qu. of the Army. + +At the start of the war, the Armed Forces operating in the West were, +by reason of the experience gained during the campaign in Poland, +supplied with Army Economic Officers [Armeewirtschaftsfuehrer-A Wi Fue] +who simultaneously were the liaison with the armament offices in the +border territory. + +The primary duties of the A Wi Fue attached to the Western armies were +the tasks of economic evacuation and immobilization and only at the +end of 1939 did the preparations for the entry into Holland, Belgium +and France come to the foreground. The process of economic evacuation +in the homeland rested mainly with the competent Rue commandos of +the homeland, who had arranged the necessary preparations by way +of mobilization, in accordance with the clearance measures already +prepared during peacetime. + +Especially in the Saar territory the VO had a complicated task to +perform, and was able to demonstrate the value of its existence for +defense also. + +* * * * * * * + +[Pages 313-315] + + + _Negotiations with friendly and neutral states on war economy and also + delivery of war material._ + +The year 1940 brought special problems for the office of Wi Rue as far +as trade in war material was concerned as a result of the deliveries, +necessitated by the military political situation, to Russia, Finland, +Roumania and Italy. + +As previously reported in 1939, according to the German-Russo treaty +of August 19, 1939, the German deliveries on credit were to attain +in the next two years the sum of 200 millions RM, 120 millions RM, +thereof during the first year. It was indicated that German deliveries +of material to the value of 500 millions RM were desired during the +first year alone. As such quantities of machines, vehicles, apparatus, +etc., could not be obtained from the production point of view in such a +short time, and as the Russians had also included war material in their +request, the preponderant desire, from the beginning, at the Foreign +office and the Reichministry of economy was, to put at the disposal of +the Russians as much finished war material as possible. + +As reported previously, the Russians had made ready for their first +reciprocal delivery valuable foods and raw material (1 million tons +cereals, 500,000 tons wheat, 900,000 tons of oil by-products, 100,000 +tons of cotton, 500,000 tons phosphates, 80 millions RM of timber, +10,000 tons of flax, manganese, platinum, and the transit for 1 million +tons of Soybeans), and in consideration of the importance of these +quantities to the German war economy and the importance which the +Supreme Command attached to the maintaining of pleasant relations with +Soviet Russia, the question of immediate reciprocal deliveries became +steadily more pressing. + +The desire to produce war material became stronger from week to week, +so strong that OKW created a special Referat at Wi Rue charged with +working on the Russian demands and arranging them in accordance with +the German production program. Appendix XX, 21 and XX, 22 gives an idea +of the progress of the arrangements. + +As the Russians delivered quickly and well, it was imperative to +accelerate German deliveries. Consequently the German High Command +decided to offer the Russians even more war material, that was already +manufactured or under construction, and whose monetary value was +great. The great cruiser Luetzow especially came into this category, +other ordnance installations for ships, patterns for heavy artillery +and tanks and important patents [lizenzen] for war material. As these +contracts for this material did not satisfy the Russian requests, the +Fuehrer ordered, on March 30, that--as far as necessary--the delivery +of war material to the Russians should have priority over the delivery +to the German Armed Forces. + +This order put some of the Army departments in a difficult position, +as the High command also wanted production for the German requirements +stepped up and demanded punctual delivery. + +On August 14, the Chief of Wi Rue, during a conference with +Reichmarshal Goering, was informed, that the Fuehrer desired punctual +delivery to the Russians only till spring 1941. Later on we would have +no further interest in completely satisfying the Russian demands. +This allusion moved the Chief of Wi Rue to give priority to matters +concerning Russian War Economy. + +By the end of October 1940, Reichmarshal Goering insisted once more, +on pressure being exerted for accelerated deliveries to the Russians +according to plan, (file notice from Oct. 5, see Appendix XX, 23). + +Later on the urgency of the Russian deliveries diminished, as +preparations for the campaign in the East were already under way. + +The Russians carried out their deliveries as planned, right up to the +start of the attack; even during the last few days, transports of +India-rubber from the Far East were completed by Express transit trains. + +* * * * * * * + +[Pages 323-324] + +The production program ordered by decree of the Fuehrer on Aug. 20, +and instituted by reason of urgency, on Sept. 20, was stepped up again +on Sept. 27, and amended insofar as the equipment under the code word +“Achse” (African campaign) was to be given priority over all other +equipment, including the ones in the special category. + +As both the Army and Minister Todt were urging the high priority of the +Panzer-and Achse-program, the Navy demanded its “Seeloewe”-measures +accelerated and aerial armaments were being even more intensified, +the Chief of Wi Rue office, at a conference of Chiefs of departments, +presided over by Fieldmarshal Keitel, pointed to the difficulties +of accelerating everything at the same time, with the bad situation +as regards manpower. He demanded once more a clarification of the +organization, which was really the most important thing. Resulting from +this the following decision was made by the WFSt on Dec. 3.40, enclosed +as Appendix XX, 35. + +This decision affected future measures as follows: + +1. there is no longer any mention of an Invasion of England but only of +a siege of England. + +2. aerial defence of the homeland was placed at the top of the list for +the first time. + +3. the prospective big action (Russia) mentioned for the first time, +and its postponement to some later date admitted as possible. + +Shortly before--on Nov. 6, 1940--Reichmarshal Goering, for the first +time made a statement to the effect, that we should prepare ourselves +for a long war, and therefore planning of raw material should be +considered in this perspective, (see file on Report at Beauvais on Nov. +6.40, Appendix XX, 36). + +At the beginning of December, instructions were received, that for the +time being there was no question of an Invasion of England, and that +the “Seeloewe”-preparations should merely be concluded. + +* * * * * * * + +[Pages 368-373] + + + _War Economy_ + +The year 1941 was, as far as war economy was concerned, mostly +dominated by the preparations, respectively the execution of the action +in the Balkans, the war in the East and the war in Africa. + +The respective preparations go back to the year 1940. The development +of the Italo-Albanian-Greco war, the establishing of a German military +mission in Roumania and the possibility of German participation in the +Italian war in Africa had led as early as August 1940 to a War Economy +Staff Roumania and in October a War Economy Staff Africa being created +by the office of Wi Rue to deal with the problems connected with +these theatres of war and charged with working out all the questions +appertaining thereto. By the middle of November 1940 Colonel Gen. staff +Spalcke was delegated to Roumania as member of the German military +mission, and charged with the representation for war economy in the +Balkan countries and in Africa and the completion of the necessary +basis as regards war economy for an operation were intensively +processed in the office of the Wi. Rue. + +In November 1940, the Chief of Wi Rue together with Secretaries of +state Koerner, Neumann, Backe and General von Hanneken were informed by +the Reichmarshal of the action planned in the East. + +By reason of these directives the preliminary preparations for the +action in the East were commenced by the office of Wi Rue at the end of +1940. + +The preliminary preparations for the action in the East included first +of all the following tasks: + +1. Obtaining of a detailed survey of the Russian Armament industry, its +location, its capacity and its associate industries. + +2. Investigation of the capacity of the different big armament centers +and their dependency one on the other. + +3. Determine the power and transport system for the industry of the +Soviet Union. + +4. Investigation of sources of raw materials and Petroleum (crude oil). + +5. Preparation of a survey of industries other than armament industries +in the Soviet Union. + +These points were concentrated in one big compilation, “War Economy of +the Soviet Union” and illustrated with detailed maps, etc. + +Furthermore a card index was made, containing all the important +factories in Soviet-Russia, and a lexicon of economy in the +German-Russian language for the use of the German War Economy +Organization. + +For the processing of these problems a task staff, Russia, was created, +first in charge of Lieutenant Colonel Luther and later on in charge of +Brigadier General Schuberth. The work was carried out according to the +directives from the Chief of the Office resp. the group of depts. for +foreign territories with the cooperation of all departments, economy +offices and any other persons, possessing information on Russia. +Through these intensive preparative activities an excellent collection +of material was made, which proved of the utmost value later on for +carrying out the operations and for administering the territory. + +Simultaneously detailed investigations were made of the situation as +regards fuel and rubber in the case of a major action in the East, on +the basis of the demands made by the Chief of General Staff of the +Armed Forces and the Gen. Qu. of the Airforce, which will be discussed +later on. + +Included in the processing of the Russian problem were matters of war +economic nature connected with the Balkans and Africa. + + + _Balkans_ + +While the preparations for the Russian Campaign could be completed +as planned, the measures for the action in the Balkans had to be +improvised on account of the unsuccessful revolutionary outbreak in +Yugoslavia. Only Colonel Wendt, as VO was sent to AOK--12 in Roumania +at the beginning of January as planned, and given charge of T. B. 13. +The preparations were arranged for an entry into Greece only. When +the revolt in Yugoslavia started, the preparations had to be altered. +Department IV of VO AOK--12 was divided, the one half under Colonel +Wendt to follow the assault of AOK--12, direction Belgrade, the other +half under Captain v. Illberg to accompany the forces attacking towards +Greece. Half a battalion each of T.B. 13 was put at the disposal of +Colonel Wendt and Capt. v. Illberg, respectively. + +With the arrival of the second army Col. Fach was installed VO in +charge of T. B. 6 and 8. Furthermore he had specialists at his +disposal, familiar with the economy of Yugoslavia and Greece. Dr. Pook +of the Wi Rue Office was dispatched to manage copper mines at Bor. + +Details of operations and results of the war economy units during the +action in the Balkans; (see report of OKW (Wi Rue Bureau) No. 27438/41 +secret, of June 4, 1941, Appendix XXI, 10). + +Even during the operations, organization of a War Economy Staff Serbia +with a Wi. Commando at Belgrade was ordered, the staff was closely +connected with Consul General Neuhausen charged with the Economic +Administration of Serbia, by the Reichmarshal. + +Also + +a. a war economy officer Agram for the territory of Croatia and + +b. a Rue-commando Klagerfurt for the Yugoslavian territories turned +over to the Reich, were appointed (see Appendix XXI, 11). + +The war economy staff Serbia quickly became of great importance for +supplying the troops operating in the Balkans, and later on deserved +much credit for the utilization and securing of the Yugoslavian raw +materials, important for German armaments and by organizing the +transport of these raw materials. The seizing of the still usable +factories in Serbia and Croatia for assimilation into the German +Armament Industry had already been started in April (s. Wi Rue Bureau +No. 22-261/62 of April 29, 41. Appendix XXI, 12 and XXI, 13) and +represented useful support for the W. T. especially for repair work +but also for the manufacture of material of all kinds. The concerns +processing raw material could be built up in the course of time to +form a valuable support for the German war economy, the deliveries of +copper, bauxite, tin, chromium, asbestos and mica were of considerable +importance. + +As the territory of Greece, by order of the Fuehrer (see appendix, Wi +Rue Bureau No. 22-263/41 2 of May 29, Appendix XXI, 14) was ceded to +the Italians for economic exploitation, war economy offices were only +installed in Greece where needed by the Army or for the security of +transportation. + +There was one Wi Kdo each established in Salonica and Athens. At +the same time the confiscation and utilization was ordered of the +factories, in the areas of Salonica and Athens occupied by German +troops, necessary for war economy and armament (see Wi Rue Bureau, No. +22-263/41 s. file XXI, 15). The factories in Athens were especially +important as repair plants for the airforce. But also by the delivery +of oil and tobacco to the army and to the homeland the war economy +offices rendered considerable service. + +* * * * * * * + +[Pages 380-381] + +The compilation was the result of the deliberations concerning +the planned operation in the East, ordered by the Reich Marshall +in November 1940. The Office of Economy and Armament [Wi Rue +Amt] had taken pains to give a completely objective picture of +the situation regarding Defense and armament economy [wehr--und +Ruestungswirtschaftliche Lage] of the USSR and had held it necessary, +to refer to the points which might cause difficulties for a military +operation. + +The result of this work compiled carefully on the basis of safely +proved facts is summed up at the end as follows: + +“Any operation leading to the occupation of the European part of USSR +(without the Ural territory), will bring the following results: + +I. During the first months Germany will be relieved in the field of +nutrition and raw materials, if a quick seizure should succeed in + + a. _preventing the destruction of stocks_ + + b. _capturing the mineral oilfields of the Caucasus undestroyed and_ + + c. _solving the problem of transportation._ + +II. _For longer duration_ of the war an _effective relief_ is dependent +on the following prerequisites: + +a. _in all fields_: + + 1. _on the solution of the transportation problem,_ + + 2. _On the staying_ [_verblieb; translator’s note: may also mean: + “whereabouts”_] _of the people (population) and winning them over to + collaborate._ + +b. _in the field of agriculture_: + + 1. _on preventing destruction of the “M.T.S.” and the possibility of + replacing their pool of tractors and machines by taking up production + again in the USSR._ + + 2. _on the possibility of fuel supply._ + +c. _in the industrial field_: + + 1. _on the capture of powerworks undestroyed or on their fast + restoration._ + + 2. _on securing the delivery of raw materials not existing in the + European part of the USSR to the industry._ + +III. _The supplying of Germany with India-rubber, tungsten, copper, +platinum, tin, asbestos and manila hemp remains unsolved_ until +communication with the Far East will be established. + +IV. The territory south of the mouth of Volga and Don inclusive of the +Caucasus must be included in the operation. _The Caucasian fuel supply +is indispensable for the exploitation of the occupied territories._ + +V. _In the field of just the armament-industry_ it will lead to taking +possession of about 75% of the total _Russian armament industry and +almost 100% of the precision tool-manufacturing and optical industry_. + +_The USSR will keep about 25% of the mere armament and scarcely 1% of +the precision tool-manufacturing and optical industry._” + +* * * * * * * + +[Pages 404-406] + +In addition to the Italian negotiations, until June 1941 the +negotiations with Russia were accorded a great deal of attention. The +Fuehrer issued the directive that, in order to camouflage German troop +movements, the orders Russia has placed in Germany must be filled as +promptly as possible. Since the Russians only made grain deliveries, +when the Germans delivered orders placed by the Russians, and since +in the case of individual firms these deliveries to Russia made it +impossible for them to fill orders for the German armed forces, it +was necessary for the Wi Rue office to enter into numerous individual +negotiations with German firms in order to coordinate Russian orders +with those of the German from the standpoint of priority. In accordance +with the wishes of the Foreign Office, German industry was instructed +to accept all Russian orders, even if it were impossible to fill them +within the limits of the time set for manufacture and delivery. Since, +in May especially, large deliveries had to be made to the Navy, the +firms were instructed to allow the equipment to go through the Russian +Acceptance Commission, then, however, to make such a detour during its +transportation as to make it impossible for it to be delivered over the +frontier prior to the beginning of the German attack. + +As a result of the visit of the Hungarian Minister, Excellence Bartha, +the trade in war material with Hungary came once more into the +foreground. Above all, the Hungarians demanded German help in equipping +their air force, as well as anti-aircraft guns, searchlights, and +listening devices, tanks, artillery and communications equipment, and +heavy guns. For this they offered free facilities for the manufacture +of gauges and fuses, artillery equipment, trucks and tank trucks. +The Hungarians were promised help in almost all fields, however, not +until the summer of 1942, because it was thought that by this time the +campaign in the East would have come to an end. Technical help for the +saving of raw material with the issuing of licenses was offered them +immediately. The shifting of German orders to Hungary was put into +effect. + +The negotiations with Roumania and Finland covered more ground, because +both states made considerable demands for the improvement of the +equipment of their units designed to fight against Russia. First of +all, the Roumanians asked for anti-aircraft equipment, prime movers, +and trucks for the motorization and artillery equipment of all kind; +moreover, they asked that the artillery and munition orders placed +in France and with the Boehler works be executed. The Finns demanded +long-range guns, anti-aircraft guns, fuses, airplanes and help in +carrying out motorization. In accordance with the directive from the +Fuehrer, the Roumanians were promised help as much as possible, while +the Finns were to be put off until later. + +When the operations opened in the East, the demands became greater and +more urgent; the Finns, especially, called for raw materials and fuel. +These demands were met in the case of both these countries as much as +possible. + +Bulgarian wishes lay, particularly, in the field of motorization and +communications and in the delivery of armoured reconnaissance cars and +tanks. Only small deliveries could be made; in general the Bulgarians +were instructed that these states, which were actually in the battle, +must receive first delivery. + +Moreover, the negotiations with Turkey were of special importance. +The office of Wi Rue was instructed to specially cultivate these +negotiations, and to offer as much war material to the Turks as +possible, on the one hand for military-political reasons, on the other +hand, in order to force the Turks to make deliveries of chromium. Since +the Foreign Office wanted in full to assure the treaty for deliveries +of Turkish chromium for the year 1942/43, more deliveries of war +material, which partly constituted former Turkish orders, were promised +for 1942. + +* * * * * * * + +[Page 479] History will know only a few examples of cases where a +country has directed even in peacetime all its economic forces so +deliberately and systematically towards the requirements of war as +Germany was compelled to do in the period between the two world wars. + +* * * * * * * + +[Page 38] In the (Reich Defense) Law the appointment of a General +Plenipotentiary for the Economy was provided for, a post for which +Reichsbank President Dr. Schacht was contemplated. He was to have +the right to give directions on economic questions to all ministries +concerned with economic problems. He was charged with the preparation +of all economic war measures with the exception of the armament +industry which was to be handled by the Army High Command. + +* * * * * * * + +[Page 59] If it is said for example, that “not the economy, but +politics represents fate”, this principle should be recognized only +with the reservation that politics may receive its decisive impulse +from the economic necessities of a nation. The fundamental urge to +expand a nation which does not find the basis for its food production +in its own soil, is an imperative for the shaping of policy. + +* * * * * * * + +[Page 84] If it was possible in a few years to develop the thirty-two +monopoly factories of the Treaty of Versailles into an armament +industry sufficient for our large army, this is due very largely to the +work of the offices of the Military Economy Organization. + +* * * * * * * + +[Page 127] In spite of the limitations in rearmament ordered by the +Minister of War in 1937, the demands of the Army for steel remained so +high that the Minister of Economics announced his misgivings regarding +the economy as a whole. The War Minister stated that, in view of +the existing foreign exchange situation, the condition of the whole +economy, and thereby of rearmament, was jeopardized by a continuous +fall of exports, and consequently he requested the introduction of raw +material quotas, by means of which the management of rearmament and of +other important programs was to be accomplished. + +* * * * * * * + +[Page 145] Complaints about excessive loads of work at factories and +about continuous modifications of order schedules were received all +the time from industry. By means of the spreading of orders and the +admission of new firms, the Military Economy Organization and the +armament offices succeeded in carrying out the armament programs more +or less according to plan and to fulfill the demands of the leaders. + +* * * * * * * + +[Pages 173-174] The enlargement of gunpowder and explosives production +was started as a large scale action. At the suggestion of the Economy +Staff, Field Marshal Goering ordered the drafting of a plan for +the manufacture of gunpowder and explosives in 1938 and charged +General-Director Krauch of I. G. Farben with the execution of this +plan. The plan was set up on July 12th, 1938, as the so-called +“Karinhall” plan and scheduled the creation of a capacity of 12,000 +tons of gunpowder per month, 19,000 tons of explosives, and 4,000 tons +of poison gas until October 1st, 1940. By October 1st the capacity was +to be + + Gunpowder 18,000 tons, + Explosives 24,000 tons, + Poison gas 8,000 tons, per month. + +In view of numerous difficulties, particularly due to the lack of +foreign exchange for the purchase of machines, due further to a +smaller allocation of raw materials and shortage of workers, the speed +of production contemplated by Dr. Krauch could not be maintained; +consequently the scheduled figures could not be reached by the time of +the outbreak of war. + +* * * * * * * + +[Pages 181-182] The course of German mobilization in 1939 was greatly +influenced by the development of the military-political situation and +was guided by the idea of a surprise of the enemy. The experiences made +during the operations against Austria, Sudetenland, and Czechoslovakia, +which led to a partial and camouflaged mobilization, formed the basis +of the measures to be taken. The tension existing between Germany and +Poland since July was used in order to prepare all measures necessary +for a surprise attack against Poland. + + + PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2354-PS + + ORGANIZATION BOOK OF THE NSDAP + + [Organisationsbuch der NSDAP] 5th, 6th and 7th Edition, Central NSDAP + Press, 1938, Munich + +[Fifth Edition, Pages 367-371a] + + + Training of the S.A. + +In order to obtain uniform training, a systematical arrangement of +three major groups is provided: + +_a_ ideological education and training + +_b_ general training + +_c_ active service + +These groups comprise essentially the following individual fields: + +_Group a_: + +1. Education and training according to the doctrines and aims of the +Fuehrer as they are set forth in the “Kampf” and in the party program +for all phases of our lives and our National Socialist ideology. + +2. The teachings of the history of the German people for the tasks of +our time. + +3. Exercise of the National Socialist doctrine of duty. + +_Group b_: + +1. Security police service, + +2. Physical exercises, + +3. Marching exercises, + +4. Terrain service, + +5. Small-caliber shooting practice, + +6. Gas and air-raid protection, + +7. Service of special units, (Maritime, Communications, Engineers, and +Cavalry units). + +_Group c_: + +1. Assemblies and demonstrations + +2. Contests and performance examinations for S.A. sport insignia + +3. Security service + +4. Home service (catastrophe service, etc.) + +The training of leaders is the prerequisite for the total training. The +suitability of the SA leaders for their positions was first established +through examinations. + +Leaders designated as suitable will be educated and trained step by +step according to the previously mentioned points of view and according +to the special educational guidance of the Office of the Chief of Storm +Troops [Oberste SA-Fuehrung]. + + + The SA Sport Insignia [Page 369] + +The new state demands a resistant, hardened generation. In addition to +the ideological education of the mind, a fighting training of the body +must be required by means of simple, useful, and natural body exercises. + +In order to create increased incentive and aims for the endeavors of +youth, I reestablish the + + + SA Sport Insignia + +for the entire SA and for all its former branches, which is earned by +means of a performance test after a conscientiously executed period of +training. + +In order to give conscious expression to the fostering of a valiant +spirit in all parts of the German people, I further decide that this +SA Sport Insignia can also be earned and worn by persons who are +not members of the movement, inasfar as they comply racially and +ideologically with the National Socialist requirements. + +Enforcement regulations are decreed by the Chief of Staff. + +Berlin, 15 February 1935. + + Chief of Storm Troops [Der Oberste SA-Fuehrer] + Signed: Adolf Hitler + +* * * * * * * + +The performance test includes three groups of exercises: + + Body exercises, + Military sports, + Topographical (naval) services. + + Group I Body exercises: + 100-meter race, + Broad jump, + Shot-put, + Throwing of hand grenades, + 3000-meter race. + + Group II Military sports: + 25-Kilometer march with pack, + Firing of small-caliber arms, + Aimed throwing of hand grenades, + 200-meter cross-country race with gas masks over 4 obstacles, + Swimming or bicycle riding, + Basic knowledge of first aid in case of accidents. + + Group III Terrain service: + Orientation, + Terrain observation, + Estimate of terrain, + Estimate of distance, + Camouflage, + Observing and reporting, + Utilization of terrain and general behavior in terrain service. + +Special regulations for SA naval units: + + Group I Body exercises: + unchanged + + Group II Military sports: + 15-kilometer march with pack instead of 25-kilometer. + + Group III Naval service: + 25 minutes of long-distance rowing in cutter seamanship + in and on the boat, throwing of lines, + knotting and splicing, + signaling and transmitting of Morse code messages, + compass, designation of navigable water, + navigation lights, rules on turning aside, + general seamanlike behavior while in naval service. + +*** + +[Sixth Edition, Pages 359, 364a, 364b, 365] + + +Structure of the S. A. + +1. S.A. Units + +The S.A. extends over the whole Reich territory. + +It is organized according to political and local [Landsmannschaftlich] +viewpoints into S.A. groups as follows: + + S.A. Group--Alpenland + + S.A. Group--Bavarian Ostmark (Govt. Dist. lower Bavaria, upper + Palatinate and upper Franconia) + + S.A. Group--Berlin-Brandenburg (Province Mark Brandenburg and Greater + Berlin) + + S.A. Group--Danube + + S.A. Group--Franconia (Govt. Dist. central and lower Franconia) + + S.A. Group--Hansa (Free City of Hamburg and Mecklenburg) + + S.A. Group--Hesse (Parts of the Free State of Hesse, upper Hesse, the + Province of Hesse, and Hesse-Nassau) + + S.A. Group--Highland (Hochland) (Govt. Dist. upper Bavaria and Swabia) + + S.A. Group--Palatinate (Govt. Dist. Rhenish Palatinate, Saar, and + Rhenish Hesse) + + S.A. Group--Middle (Province of Saxony and Free State of Anhalt) + + S.A. Group--Lower Rhine (Parts of Rhine Province and the Ruhr + District) + + S.A. Group--Lower Saxony (Parts of Province of Hannover and Free + State of Brunswick) + + S.A. Group--Nordmark (Province of Schleswig-Holstein, Free City of + Luebeck) + + S.A. Group--North Sea (parts of Province of Hannover and Westphalia, + Free State of Oldenburg, Free City of Bremen) + + S.A. Group--Ostland (Province of East Prussia and Free State of + Danzig) + + S.A. Group--Ostmark (Province of Grenzmark) + + S.A. Group--Pomerania (Province of Pomerania and parts of Grenzmark) + + S.A. Group--Saxony (Free State of Saxony) + + S.A. Group--Silesia (Province of upper and lower Silesia) + + S.A. Group--Sudeten + + S.A. Group--Suedmark + + S.A. Group--Southwest (Free State of Baden and Wurttemberg) + + S.A. Group--Thuringia (Free State of Thuringia) + + S.A. Group--Warthe + + S.A. Group--Vistula + + S.A. Group--Westphalia (Province of Westphalia) + + S.A. Group--Westmark (Rhine Province and part of the Province of + Hesse-Nassau) + +2. Special Units [Identical with corresponding passage in 5th and 7th +editions] + +In order to comply with the manifold demands on the services of the +S.A. during demonstrations, assemblies, catastrophes, and accidents, as +well as to preserve the efficiency of S.A. men, S.A. members have been +organized into special and technical units. There are: Marine, Mounted, +Communications, Engineer and Medical units. + +Their organization into companies, battalions, and so forth, and their +subordination are variously regulated according to location and the +given circumstances. + +_a._ Marine S.A.: The Marine S.A. includes all S.A. men who by +occupation are or have been sailors of the merchant marine, the navy, +or interior shipping, as well as men who are connected with shipping in +any way or particularly interested in it. + +The seagoing S.A. men, who come into contact with the population of +other countries, should represent National Socialist will and thought +[Wollen and Denken]. + +For this reason their ideological education and professional training +is a main mission of the marine S.A. + +This schooling and training is given aboard ship in the board troops +[Bordtrupps] and on land in the marine S.A. units. + +Further tasks are service in catastrophes and accidents, especially +those caused by water. For this purpose thorough training in seamanship +is given each marine S.A. man. + +_b._ Mounted S.A.: As the mainstay of the national socialist riding +corps [NSRK], the S.A. cavalry is responsible for the training of +German youth in riding and driving, before military service, as well as +additional training in riding for men already in the service (compare +discussion on Page 373 “National Socialist Riding Corps”). The S.A. +cavalry further cultivates riding and driving activities within the S.A. + +_c._ Communications S.A.: The task of the Communications S.A. +is to enable the responsible leader during assemblies and other +demonstrations and in the catastrophe service to exercise control +over subordinated or employed units. The training therefore +extends primarily to telephone service. Beyond that, however, the +communications S.A. men are also trained in sending and receiving +Morse Code signals. The “Communications Certificate of the S.A.” is +a certificate of merit for those S.A. men who wish to enlist in the +signal corps of the armed forces. + +_d._ Engineers S.A.: The tasks of the S.A. engineers include +catastrophe protective service during incidents capable of damaging the +German national property. + +Every S.A. engineer has to prove in thorough technical examinations his +degree of training and his initiative [Einsatzbereitschaft]. + +The examinations are entered in a performance book, which also contains +the “S.A. Engineers Certificate” as certificate of merit. + +_e._ Medical S.A.: The S.A. doctors and S.A. medical personnel +organized into medical units will supervise and care for the bodily +health and efficiency of the individual S.A. man as well as units under +their jurisdiction. + +Schools of the S.A. for special units + +_a._ Marine S.A. Schools: The following schools are available for +training the marine S.A.: Marine S.A. school “DUSTERNBROCK” and +the training sailing ship “DUHNEN.” The school “DUSTERNBROCK” has +to accomplish above all practical and theoretical training in boat +service, in row, sail and power boat, according to the regulations of +the navy. + +The continuation of seamanship training takes place on the seagoing +training ship “DUHNEN.” Here one gets used to the ship and learns +to know and serve it in all its parts and equipment, and here also +knowledge of weather and steering is taught and applied. + +_b._ Reich Riding Leadership School. (See under +REICHSREITERFUEHRERSCHULE on page 373). + +_c._ Reich Communications School of the S.A.: Here the S.A. leaders of +communications units are trained in all particulars of communications. +Here they also become eligible through examinations for the “S.A. +Communications Certificate.” + + + THE S.A. REGIMENT “FELDHERRNHALLE” + +The S.A. Regiment “Feldherrnhalle” has its seat in Berlin, Voss-Strasse +1. It consists of six garrisoned battalions stationed in: Berlin, +Munich, Hattingen, Krefeld, Stettin, and Stuttgart. + +S.A. General [Obergruppenfuehrer] Hermann Goering was appointed by +the Fuehrer on 12 January, 1937, as Chief of the S.A. Regiment +“Feldherrnhalle”. The S. A. regiment is directly subordinated to +the chief of staff. Its mission, beyond regular S.A. service, is to +supervise bureaus of the S.A., the party, and the state. It is to be +ready at all times for any and all purposes. + +[Seventh Edition, page 359, 367] + + + BRANCHES OF THE S.A. + +1. S.A. Units + +The S.A. embraces the entire territory of the Reich. It is divided +according to political and local (LANDSMANNSCHAFTLICH) points of view +into the following groups: + + S.A. Group--Alpenland (District /Gau/ Upper Danube, Salzburg, + Tyrol-Vorarlberg) + + S.A. Group--Bayernwald (Govt. Dist. Lower Bavaria, Upper Palatinate + and Upper Franconia) + + S.A. Group--Berlin-Brandenburg (Province Mark Brandenburg and Greater + Berlin) + + S.A. Group--Danube (Gau Lower Danube, Vienna) + + S.A. Group--Elbe (Province of Saxony and Free State of Anhalt) + + S.A. Group--Franconia (Govt. Dist. Central and Lower Franconia) + + S.A. Group--Hansa (Free City of Hamburg and Mecklenburg) + + S.A. Group--Hesse (Parts of the Free State of Hesse /Upper Hesse/, + the Province of Hesse, and Hesse-Nassau) + + S.A. Group--Highland (Hochland) (Govt. Dist. Upper Bavaria and Swabia) + + S.A. Group--Palatinate (Govt. Dist. Rhenish Palatinate, Saar + District, Rhenish Hesse, Lorraine) + + S.A. Group--Central Rhine (Rhine Province, Part of the Province of + Hesse-Nassau, Luxemburg) + + S.A. Group--Neckar (Part of the Free State of Baden and Wuerttenberg) + + S.A. Group--Lower Rhine (Parts of the Rhine Province and of the Ruhr + District) + + S.A. Group--Lower Saxony (Part of the Province of Hannover and Free + State of Brunswick) + + S.A. Group--Nordmark (Province of Schleswig-Holstein, Free City of + Luebeck) + + S.A. Group--North Sea (Parts of the Province of Hannover and + Westphalia, Free State of Oldenburg, Free City of Bremen) + + S.A. Group--Upper Rhine (Parts of the Free State of Baden and Alsace) + + S.A. Group--Oder (Province of Grenzmark) + + S.A. Group--Pomerania (Province of Pomerania and parts of Granzmark) + + S.A. Group--Saxony (Free State of Saxony) + + S.A. Group--Silesia (Province of Upper and Lower Silesia) + + S.A. Group--Sudeten (Reich Gau Sudetenland) + + S.A. Group--Suedmark (Gau Styria and Carinthia) + + S.A. Group--Tannenberg--(Province of East Prussia) + + S.A. Group--Thuringia (Free State of Thuringia) + + S.A. Group--Warthe (Reich Gau Wartheland) + + S.A. Group--Vistula (Reich Gau Danzig--West Prussia) + + S.A. Group--Westphalia (Province of Westphalia) * * * + + + WITHDRAWAL FROM THE S.A. + +Service with the S.A. is and remains voluntary. As in recruitment for +the S.A. no advantages may be promised and no pressure whatsoever may +be exerted, the S.A. man should have the possibility to withdraw from +the S.A. if he believes that he can no longer agree with S.A. views or +if he is not in a position to fulfill completely the duties imposed +on him as a member of the S.A. On presentation of honorable reasons +in a corresponding written petition, the S.A. member can be “released +from the S.A. by own request.” However, if he shows no interest or +if he has joined the ranks of the S.A. merely because of a whim or +for the sake of a good opportunity, there ensues a “discharge from +the S.A. according to number 127_b_ of the SADV/1” (official measures +for insuitability for service in the S.A.). If he is guilty of any +disciplinary or political or possibly criminal offenses, the competent +disciplinary officer can declare him as “punished with permanent +discharge from the S.A.” In serious cases “exclusion from the S.A.” can +be declared. + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2355-PS + + 1938 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 258 + + Second Law on the Right to Vote for the Reichstag, 18 March 1938. + +The government of the Reich has decided to pass the following law which +is proclaimed herewith: + + + Article 1 + +The electoral list for the Reich shall replace the electoral list for +the Kreise. + + + Article 2 + +One or more candidates may be nominated on the electoral list for the +Reich. + + + Article 3 + +For the elections to the Reichstag in Austria, the same general rules +which are valid for the elections to the Reichstag apply, inasmuch as +the requirements of the plebiscite in Austria of 10 April 1938 do not +necessitate different regulations. + + + Article 4 + +The Reich Minister of the Interior is authorized to change the orders +on the procedure of the elections as much as may be necessary, in order +to simplify this procedure. + +Berlin, 18 March 1938. + + The Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor + ADOLF HITLER + + The Reich Minister of the Interior + FRICK + + + PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2357-PS + + SPEECH BY HITLER BEFORE REICHSTAG, 20 February 1938 + + DOCUMENTS OF GERMAN POLITICS [Dokumente der deutschen Politik] Part + VI, 1, Pages 50-52. + +In the fifth year following the first great foreign political agreement +of the Reich, it fills us with sincere gratification to be able to +state that in our relations with the State with which we had had +perhaps the greatest differences, not only has there been a detente, +but in the course of these years there has been a constant improvement +in relations, * * * This good work, which was regarded with suspicion +by so many at the time, has stood the test, and I may say that, since +the League of Nations finally gave up its continual attempts to +unsettle Danzig and appointed a man of great personal attainments as +the new commissioner, the most dangerous spot from the point of view +of European peace has entirely lost its menacing character. The Polish +State respects the national conditions by this State, and both the +city of Danzig and Germany respect Polish rights. And so the way to a +friendly understanding has been successfully paved, an understanding +which, beginning with Danzig, has today, in spite of the attempts of +certain mischief-makers, succeeded in finally taking the poison out of +the relations between Germany and Poland and transforming them into a +sincere, friendly cooperation. + +Relying on her friendships, Germany will not leave a stone unturned to +save that ideal which provides the foundation for the task which is +ahead of us--peace. + + + PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2358-PS + + SPEECH DELIVERED BY HITLER IN THE SPORTSPALAST IN BERLIN ON 26 + SEPTEMBER 1938 + +[Quoted from the Voelkischer Beobachter, Munich Edition, special +edition for Tuesday, 27 September 1938.] + +“I have conducted really a practical peace-policy during these years. + +“I approached all apparently impossible problems with the firm +determination to solve them in a peaceful manner even at the cost of +more or less heavy German concessions. I am a front-line soldier myself +and I know the hardships of a war. _I wanted to spare the German people +from it._ I approached therefore problem after problem with the solid +determination to try everything for a peaceful solution. + +“The most difficult problem with which I was confronted was that of our +relations with Poland. There was a danger that Poles and Germans would +regard each other as hereditary enemies. I wanted to prevent this. I +know well enough that I would not have been successful if Poland had +had a democratic Constitution. For these democracies which indulge +in phrases about peace are the most blood-thirsty war agitators. +In Poland there ruled not a democracy but _a man_; and with him I +succeeded, in precisely one year, in coming to an agreement which, for +10 years to begin with, entirely removed the danger of conflict. We +are all convinced that this agreement will bring lasting pacification. +We realize that there are two peoples which must live together, and +neither of which can do away with the other. A people of 33 millions +will always strive for an outlet to the sea. A way to understanding, +then, had to be found. * * *” + +“And now we are confronted with the last problem which must be solved +and which will be solved. It is the last territorial claim which I have +to make in Europe, but it is a claim from which I will not swerve, and +which I will satisfy, God willing.” + +* * * + +“I have little to explain. I am grateful to Mr. Chamberlain for all his +efforts. I have assured him that the German people want nothing but +peace; but I have also told him that I cannot go back beyond the limits +of our patience. + +“I assured him, moreover, and I repeat it here, that when this +problem is solved there will be no more territorial problems for +Germany in Europe. And I further assured him that from the moment +when Czechoslovakia solves its other problems, that is to say, when +the Czechs have come to an arrangement with their other minorities, +peacefully and without oppression, I will no longer be interested in +the Czech State. And that, as far as I am concerned, I will guarantee. +We don’t want any Czechs at all. But I must also declare before the +German people that in the Sudeten German problem my patience is now +at an end. I made an offer to Herr Benes which was no more than the +realisation of what he had already promised. He now has peace or war +in his hands. Either he will accept this offer and at length give the +Germans their freedom, or we will get this freedom for ourselves.” + + + PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2360-PS + + SPEECH BY HITLER BEFORE THE REICHSTAG, 30 January 1939 + +[Quoted from the Voelkischer Beobachter, Munich Edition, Tuesday, 31 +Jan. 1939.] + +“On account of this intolerable provocation which had been aggravated +by a truly infamous persecution and terrorization of our Germans there +I had resolved to solve once and for all, and this time radically, the +Sudetan German question. On May 28 I ordered (1) that preparations +should be made for military action against this state by October 2. +I ordered (2) the immense and accelerated expansion of our defensive +front in the West.” + + + PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2367-PS + + Voelkischer Beobachter, South German Edition + + Nr. 123/124 Saturday and Sunday 2 and 3 May 1936 + +The Fuehrer begins speaking now amid the cheers of the whole of Germany: + +“The lies that Germany will pounce upon Austria tomorrow or the day +after are being spread again (jeers and laughter of the crowd). I +ask myself: Who are these elements who do not want peace and mutual +understanding, who must stir up and sow distrust continuously, who are +they in reality?” + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2368-PS + + EXTRACTS FROM SPEECH BY HITLER BEFORE REICHSTAG + + 30 January 1937 + + DOCUMENTS OF GERMAN POLITICS [Dokumente der deutschen Politik] Part + VI, 2, Page 42. + +“By a series of agreements we have eliminated existing tensions and +thereby contributed considerably to an improvement in the European +atmosphere. I merely recall an agreement with Poland, which has worked +out to the advantage of both sides. * * * + +“True statesmanship will not overlook realities, but consider them. +The Italian nation and the new Italian State are realities. The German +nation and the German Reich are equally realities. And to my own +fellow-citizens, I would say that the Polish nation and the Polish +State have also become a reality. * * * + +“The German Reich with its strong Army will protect her own security +and her own honor. But, fully convinced that there is for Europe no +greater good than peace, the German Reich will always be a responsible +and conscious promoter of the European peace idea. * * *” + + + PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2371-PS + + 1933 MINISTERIAL GAZETTE FOR THE PRUSSIAN INTERNAL ADMINISTRATION + + [Ministerialblatt fuer die Preussische Innere Verwaltung] Page 503 + + Execution of ordinance for security of people and state (national + security) + + Dated: 28 Feb. 1933 (RGBl I, Page 83) + + Rd. Erl. d. M.d. J. (KDR) 3.3.1933--II--1121 (Circular) + +As a defense against the criminal, communist activities and a means of +ruthless suppression of this source of peril, whose extremely dangerous +scope has been revealed at the last minute, the Reich president decided +on 28 Feb. 1933 to proclaim the decree for the protection of the people +and the state. Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, page 83. + +For the actual application of the measures authorized in this decree, I +give the following directions: + +1. Sect. 1 of the decree not only suspends temporarily articles +114, 115, 117, 118, 123, 124 and 153 of the constitution; it rather +eliminates all other Reich and state limitations in this matter, as far +as this is necessary or practical in order to reach the aims of this +decree. Within this framework police officials thus may go beyond the +restrictions laid down by the provisions of sections 14 and 41 of the +Prussian police code, their orders still remain police ordinances of +police warrants and thus as far as form is concerned remain subject to +the applicable regulations. However, violations are punished according +to sect. 4 of the decree which in this respect prevails, according +to p. 4 of the preceding decree. Conforming to the aim and purpose +of the decree, the additional permissible actions will be directed +primarily against the communists, but also against all those working +with the communists or even indirectly supporting or promoting their +criminal aims. To avoid any blunder, I remind you that the decree for +the protection of the people and state, dated 28 Feb. 1933, should be +used against members or institutions other than communist, anarchist or +social democratic parties or organizations, when such measures serve +for the defense against such communist tendencies in their broadest +meaning. In other cases the decree of 2 April 1933 shall be applied. +Labor unions shall not be put on the same level with social-democratic +organizations. + +2. The local police has principal jurisdiction for all those police +measures, which are permissible after the legal limitations mentioned +under 1. have been removed. The jurisdiction has been changed by my +decree of 3 Feb. 1933, (G.S. page 33) based on section 3 par. 5 of +the Prussian police Code. Consequently all regulations dealing with +the suspension of a periodical or the restriction of property have +to be issued from the state police offices. Regulations concerning +personal liberty, the right to assemble and congregate, or restrictions +concerning the secrecy of mails, communications, telegraph and cable +may be ordered by the district police only, (Section 3, part 2, P.V.G.). + +3. All orders under Section 1 of the decree of 28 Feb. 1933 must be +in writing and signed by the competent chief of police of his general +appointed deputies or a deputy appointed for such a measure. In cases +of restriction of personal liberty, freedom of speech including freedom +of press and property rights the involved person is to be served at the +latest at the beginning of the procedure with a certified copy of such +an order statement. In cases of interferences with the secrecy of mail, +postal service, telegraph and cable one certified copy of the order is +to be sent immediately to the post office concerned, as well as to the +regional postal office. This order does not affect the existing formal +requirements and prerequisites under which restrictions of personal +liberty, of free speech incl. free press, of the right to organize and +assemble, interference in the secrecy of postal, telegraph, and cable +services, orders of search and seizure, and limitations upon property +rights, could be carried out in accordance with prevailing legal +provisions. + +4. The state police departments have to keep themselves informed on all +measures taken in their districts in accordance with sect. 1, of the +decree of 28 Feb. 1933, and they have to report to me on the 5th and +20th of each month on measures taken in the second, resp. first half +of the preceding month. Unless specially ordered, individual measures, +including the suspension of periodicals in accordance with section 1 of +this decree need not be reported unless it concerns a very important +case. + +5. If on principle (see figure 1, par. 2 of this circular) or for some +special reason the application of the decree for the protection of +the people and state (RGBl I, Page 83) dated 28 Feb., 1933, seems out +of question or not advisable, the provisions of the decree for the +protection of the German people (RGBl I, page 35) dated 4 February +1933, and the applicable executive directions remain in effect +unchanged. + + To all police dept. M Bli v. 1, page 233. + + # # # # # + + Reorganization of the political police Circular decree of the Ministry + for the Interior of 26 April 1933--II 1000/53 + +In order to guarantee effective counter-measures against all activities +endangering the existence and security of the state, the state +government has decided to reform the organization of the political +police more severely than before and to create the necessary conditions +for speedy and successful operations. For this purpose and for the +benefit of a uniform supreme management of the political police the +Office of Secret State Police (which is) directly subordinated to +myself has been established in Berlin SW 11, Prinz Albrechtstrasse +8 by the law of 26 April 1933 printed in annex 1 (Gesetz-Sammlung, +Seite 122) (collection of laws, page 122). Its duty is to investigate +all political activities endangering the state by special executors +with the assistance of outside bureaus for the individual provincial +police districts (State-Police-Bureaus) and with the support of the +ordinary police authorities within the entire territory of the state, +to collect and exploit the results of these investigations, to keep +myself, the Minister for the Interior, permanently informed, to prepare +and provide at all times the necessary proofs for my decisions, and +finally to report all politically important observations and statements +also to other police authorities and provide them with suggestions. +Furthermore the Office of the Secret State Police is authorized within +the sphere of its activity to request political measures from other +police-authorities and to give them instructions. + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2372-PS + + 1936 REICH MINISTERIAL GAZETTE [RMBl]--Part V, Pages 1344-5 + + Unified designation of the Offices of the Secret State Police in the + Reich + + (Decree of RF-SS and Chief of German Police in the Reich Ministry of + Interior 28 August 36) + +After the Reichsfuehrer SS was installed as Chief of the German Police, +the unified direction of all branches of the police and also the +designation of the offices must become pronounced. + +The greatest differences existed previously among the individual states +[Laender] in the field of the political police. At present there are +17 different designations. The unified form of the credentials of the +officials of the political police calls for a unified designation of +their offices in order to eliminate confusion and misunderstanding +among outsiders. Also the simplification of the business transactions +calls for assimilation. + +1. Therefore the political police of the German states will carry the +designation of Secret State Police [Geheime Staatspolizei] from 1 +October 1936 on. + +2. The state central authorities of the Secret State Police carry the +designation + +_a._ in Prussia: + + Secret State Police Bureau [Geheime Staatspolizeiamt] + +_b._ in the rest of the state: + + State police main office [Staatspolizeileitstelle] or State police + office (Staatspolizeistelle) + + and so + + in Baden State police main office Karlsruhe + + in Bayern State police main office Munich + + in Wuerttenburg State police main office Stuttgart + + in Sachsen State police main office Dresden + + in Anhalt State police office Dessau + + in Braunschweig State police office Braunschweig + + in Bremen State police office Bremen + + in Hamburg State police office, Hamburg + + in Hessen State police office Darmstadt + + in Luebeck State police office Luebeck + + in Mecklenburg State police office Schwerin + + in Oldenburg State police office Oldenburg + + in Thueringen State police office Weimar + +The state police directive offices have the tasks of a state police +office for the area of their jurisdiction, a final regulation hereon is +withheld. * * * + +To the Prussian secret state police office in Berlin, the political +police of the exterior Prussian states.--For information to the +Prussian Ministry President as chief of the Prussian secret state +police, the state cabinet of exterior Prussia, the main office +Ordnungs-Police, the Prussian state criminal police office in Berlin, +the Prussian Supreme and Government President. + + + TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2373-PS + + EXCERPTS FROM GERMAN PUBLICATIONS + +1. “The first chairman is responsible for the entire leadership of the +movement. He divides the work among the committeemen, subordinated to +him, as well as among the otherwise necessary collaborators. Each of +these gentlemen is therefore fully responsible for the tasks that have +been allotted to him. He is subordinate only to the first chairman, who +has to concern himself with the cooperation of everyone responsible. +Through selection of persons and issuance of general directives he must +bring about this collaboration himself. + +“This law of essential responsibility has gradually become a matter of +course within the movement, at least insofar as it concerned the party +leadership.” + + (MEIN KAMPF, Adolf Hitler, Munich, 1933, page 661) + +2. “How shall I give expression, my Fuehrer, to what is in our hearts? +How shall I find words for your deeds? Has there ever been a mortal +as beloved as you, my Fuehrer? Was there ever belief as strong as the +belief in your mission? God sent you to us for Germany.” + + (Goering, Speeches and Writing, [Reden und Aufsaetze] + Munich, 1938, page 326) + +3. “Above all was God’s hand which has visibly guided the Fuehrer and +his Movement. Only those who have no faith, claim that chance has +persecuted us. In reality Moltke’s word was proven to be true in regard +to the Fuehrer and the Party; namely, that in the long run only the +strong will have good luck. What had been prepared quietly and had +grown organically during ten years, swept over all of Germany like a +torrent on 30 January 1933 and during the time which followed. There +was nobody in the country and in the world who could have escaped the +powerful, resounding rhythm of these events. It was as if a whole +people awoke from its sleep, threw off in one quick move the chains +which oppressed it and rose like a Phenix out of the ashes of a fallen +system. And out of the flame and enthusiasm with which the masses of +millions of people yielded to Hitler and his idea, the cry which once +before at the time of the crusades had made Germany rise, seemed to +come again: ‘It is God’s will!’ + +“And as he gave us his blessing, he denied it to the others. Although +they called for him loudly from their pulpits and party-seats, their +work was not his work, their faith was not his faith and their will not +his will. + +“It is not mere chance that millions in Germany are of the holy +conviction that National Socialism is more than politics, that in it +the word and the will of God proclaim itself, that the bulwark it has +created against Bolshevism was conceived on higher inspiration as the +last salvation of Occidental culture before the threat of Asiatic +atheism.” + + (Joseph Goebbels, From Kaiserhof to Reich Chancellery, + [Vom Kaiserhof zur Reichskanzlei], 1934, page 12.) + +4. “It is with pride that we see that one man is kept above all +criticism--that is the Fuehrer. + +“The reason is that everyone feels and knows: he was always right and +will always be right. The National Socialism of us all is anchored in +the uncritical loyalty, in the devotion to the Fuehrer that does not +ask for the wherefore in the individual case, in the tacit performance +of his commands. We believe that the Fuehrer is fulfilling a divine +mission to German destiny! This belief is beyond challenge.” + + (Hess, Speeches [Reden] Munich, 1928, page 25; + Radio speech at Cologne, 25 June 1934) + +5. _The Technique of the State_--“Therefore the Fuehrer principle in +administration means; instead of the results of a majority vote, to +entrust in each case the decision to a definite person with clear-cut +authority who will be solely responsible toward above and who will +carry out the execution of the decision toward below.” + + (Hans Frank, German Law, [Deutsches Recht] + V. 11, Berlin, 1941, p. 2626; + + also Otto Koellreutter, German Administrative Law, + [Deutsches Verwaltungsrecht], Berlin, 1938, p.8.) + + + * U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1946--693257 + + # # # # # + + + + +Transcriber’s note + + +Punctuation and spelling has been maintained except where obvious +printer errors have occurred. Since these documents were written +by different individuals there can be variants in spelling and +capitalization between them. + +This volume has no German diacritics, only French diacritics. As a +result, Goering and Fuehrer are spelled without umlauts throughout. + +Use of asterisks in text denote missing/illegible words. Separation of +individual documents is indicated with + + # # # # # + +Tables that were wider than the default margin were formatted to +fit. + +A fact was corrected on Page 626: “I separated this service already in +1941 from the troops.” It was changed to 1931. + +A couple of sentences had missing words. The following missing words +were added: + +Page 399: “Jeschonnek shares the opinion we should to Bardufoss” +“Jeschonnek shares the opinion we should =go= to Bardufoss” + +Page 433: “would then have a compartment all themselves” “would then +have a compartment all =to= themselves” + +One sentence had an unclear adjective and was changed: + +Page 851: “laws and cabinet decisions are repeated effective +immediately” “laws and cabinet decisions are =reputed= effective +immediately” + + + + + +*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 78130 *** |