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+*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 78130 ***
+
+
+
+
+                             NAZI CONSPIRACY
+                             AND AGGRESSION
+
+                               _VOLUME IV_
+
+                        _Office of United States
+                    Chief of Counsel For Prosecution
+                          of Axis Criminality_
+
+                             [Illustration]
+
+                UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
+                            WASHINGTON · 1946
+
+
+
+
+CONTENTS
+
+
+                                                     _Pages_
+
+  Document number 1409-PS through document number
+  2373-PS arranged numerically                        1-1107
+
+  (A descriptive list of documents appears at the end of the last
+  volume.)
+
+
+
+
+A collection of Documentary Evidence and Guide Materials Prepared by
+the American and British Prosecuting Staffs for Presentation before the
+International Military Tribunal at Nurnberg, Germany, in the case of
+
+  THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE FRENCH REPUBLIC, THE UNITED KINGDOM
+  OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND, and THE UNION OF SOVIET
+  SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
+
+                              --against--
+
+  HERMANN WILHELM GOERING, RUDOLF HESS, JOACHIM von RIBBENTROP,
+  ROBERT LEY, WILHELM KEITEL, ERNST KALTENBRUNNER, ALFRED ROSENBERG,
+  HANS FRANK, WILHELM FRICK, JULIUS STREICHER, WALTER FUNK, HJALMAR
+  SCHACHT, GUSTAV KRUPP von BOHLEN and HALBACH, KARL DOENITZ, ERICH
+  RAEDER, BALDUR von SCHIRACH, FRITZ SAUCKEL, ALFRED JODL, MARTIN
+  BORMANN, FRANZ von PAPEN, ARTHUR SEYSS-INQUART, ALBERT SPEER,
+  CONSTANTIN von NEURATH, and HANS FRITZSCHE, Individually and as
+  Members of Any of the Following Groups or Organizations to which They
+  Respectively Belonged, Namely: DIE REICHSREGIERUNG (REICH CABINET);
+  DAS KORPS DER POLITISCHEN LEITER DER NATIONALSOZIALISTISCHEN
+  DEUTSCHEN ARBEITERPARTEI (LEADERSHIP CORPS OF THE NAZI PARTY); DIE
+  SCHUTZSTAFFELN DER NATIONALSOZIALISTISCHEN DEUTSCHEN ARBEITERPARTEI
+  (commonly known as the “SS”) and including DIE SICHERHEITSDIENST
+  (commonly known as the “SD”); DIE GEHEIME STAATSPOLIZEI (SECRET STATE
+  POLICE, commonly known as the “GESTAPO”); DIE STURMABTEILUNGEN DER
+  N.S.D.A.P. (commonly known as the “SA”) and the GENERAL STAFF and
+  HIGH COMMAND of the GERMAN ARMED FORCES are as defined in Appendix B
+  of the Indictment,
+
+                                                             Defendants.
+
+
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1409-PS
+
+               1938 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 1709
+
+ Order concerning the Utilization of Jewish Property of 3 December 1938
+
+
+On the basis of Article 1 of the Second Regulation by the Administrator
+for the Four Year Plan based on the Decree of November 24, 1938 for the
+Reporting of Jewish-owned Property (RGBl I, 1668), the following is
+decreed in cooperation with the competent Reich Ministers:
+
+
+                   Chapter I _Industrial Enterprises_
+
+                               Article 1
+
+The owner of a Jewish industrial enterprise (Third Regulation under
+the Reich Citizenship Law of 14 June 1938, RGBl I 627) may be ordered
+to sell or liquidate the enterprise within a definite time. Certain
+conditions may be stipulated in the order.
+
+
+                               Article 2
+
+1. A trustee may be appointed for Jewish industrial enterprises, the
+owners of which have been ordered to sell or liquidate (Article 1), for
+the temporary continuation of the enterprise and for the completion
+of the sale or liquidation, especially if the owner of the enterprise
+has not complied with the order within the definite period and his
+application for an extension of time has been rejected.
+
+2. The trustee is empowered to undertake all judicial and extrajudicial
+actions and legal measures, which the business of the enterprise,
+its liquidation or sale require. His authority replaces any legally
+required power of attorney.
+
+3. The trustee must exercise the care of a responsible businessman and
+is subject to State control.
+
+4. The owner of the enterprise is to pay the expenses of the trustee in
+connection with his work.
+
+
+                               Article 3
+
+1. The owner of the Jewish industrial enterprise is to be notified of
+the instructions specified in Articles 1 and 2.
+
+2. In case of absence of the person affected, notification may
+take place through publication in the Deutsche Reichsanzeiger and
+Preussische Staatsanzeiger. In these cases the day of publication is to
+be considered the day of notification.
+
+
+                               Article 4
+
+As soon as the owner of the enterprise is notified of the order through
+which a trustee is appointed according to Article 2, he loses the right
+to dispose of the property for the administration of which the trustee
+has been appointed. He regains this right only if the appointment of
+the trustee expires.
+
+
+                               Article 5
+
+The consent for the sale according to Article 1 of the Decree based
+on the Decree of April 26, 1938, for the Reporting of Jewish-owned
+Property (RGBl I, 415) is necessary also in such cases in which the
+sale has been ordered; this also applies to the sale by a trustee.
+
+
+Chapter II _Land and Forest Enterprises Real Estate and other Property_
+
+                               Article 6
+
+A Jew (Article 5 of the First Regulation under the Reich Citizenship
+Law of November 14, 1935) (RGBl I, 1333), may be ordered to sell
+wholly or partly his land or forest enterprise, his other land or
+forest properties, his other real estate or other properties within a
+definite time. Certain conditions may be stipulated in the order. The
+regulations of Article 2 to 4 are to be applied accordingly.
+
+
+                               Article 7
+
+1. Jews cannot legally acquire real estate and mortgages.
+
+2. The regulations of Article 2, 4, 5 and 6 of the Decrees based on the
+Decree of 26 April 1938, for the Reporting of Jewish-owned Property
+(RGBl I, 415) are to be applied accordingly.
+
+3. At the foreclosure of real estate, the court ordering such sale must
+reject bids if there is reason to suspect that the bidder is a Jew.
+
+4. The rejection according to Paragraph 3 loses its force if the bidder
+protests against it immediately (Article 72, Paragraph 2 of the Law
+Regarding Foreclosure) and if he proves that he is not a Jew.
+
+5. If, as is provided in (4) the bidder protests the rejection of an
+offer, the decision on the public adjudication must not be made before
+two weeks after the conclusion of the auction.
+
+
+                               Article 8
+
+1. Jews require authorization to dispose of real estate and mortgages.
+They require authorization to dispose of other property if the sale
+has been ordered according to Section 6 of this decree. This also
+applies in the case of a trustee disposing of said property.
+
+2. The regulations of (1) also apply to contracts in which an
+obligation to sell is assumed.
+
+3. The regulations of Article 1 (2) and Article 2 of the Regulation
+under the Decree of 26 April 1938 for the Reporting of Jewish-owned
+Property (RGBl I, 415) are to be applied accordingly. In disposing of
+immovable property, the regulations of Articles 4, 5 and 6 of said
+Decree are also to be applied accordingly.
+
+4. In case of foreclosure of a piece of land, the bidder requires
+authorization for his bid; a bid for which the necessary authorization
+is not proven immediately is to be rejected. Where the Reich Law
+regarding Foreclosure and Forced Administration is in force, in cases
+of Article 81, (2) of said law, public adjudication to a person other
+than the highest bidder is permissible only if the person can prove
+that consent was given for this deal.
+
+
+                               Article 9
+
+1. The authorization according to Article 8 replaces those
+authorizations required according to the Regulation regarding Traffic
+in Real Estate of 26 January 1937 (RGBl I, 35), the Settlements (RGBl
+I, 659), the First Decree for the Execution of the Law of 17 August
+1937, Regarding the Protection of the Reich Frontiers and Reprisals
+(RGBl I, 905) as well as according to price fixing regulations.
+
+2. At the sale of land or forest enterprises or the granting of
+usufruct in such enterprises, the authorization according to Article
+8 replaces the authorization according to Article 1 of the decree
+based on the Decree of 26 April 1938 for the Reporting of Jewish-owned
+Property.
+
+
+                               Article 10
+
+1. If a Jew sells a piece of land which is situated within the confines
+of Berlin, the Reich Capital Berlin has a right of preemption for the
+purpose of carrying out the measures of the General Building Inspector
+for the rebuilding of the City.
+
+2. Articles 12 and 13 of the Decree of 5 November 1937 Regarding the
+Reconstruction of the Reich Capital Berlin (RGBl I, 1162) are to be
+applied accordingly.
+
+3. The right of preemption does not exist if the Reich, one of the
+German States, or the National Socialist Party is involved in the legal
+transaction as a buyer.
+
+
+             Chapter III _Compulsory Deposit of Securities_
+
+                               Article 11
+
+1. Within a week after this decree goes into effect, Jews must deposit
+all their stocks, shares in mines, bonds, and similar securities at a
+foreign exchange bank. New securities must be deposited within a week
+after their acquisition. The holder of securities belonging to a Jew
+may not deliver them to anyone but a foreign exchange bank for the
+account of the Jew.
+
+2. Insofar as securities are already deposited at a foreign exchange
+bank on behalf of Jews or titles registered or coupons deposited
+with an administrative authority for which preferred annuities will
+be granted, the Jews must immediately notify the said bank, the
+Administration of Public Loans or the administrative authority by a
+written declaration of the fact that they are Jews. In case of (1)
+Sentence 3, this declaration must be made to the said holder.
+
+3. The deposits and the registered titles are to be marked as Jewish.
+
+
+                               Article 12
+
+The disposing of securities deposited as Jewish, as well as the release
+of such securities require the consent of the Reich Minister of
+economics or an authority named by him.
+
+
+                               Article 13
+
+The provisions of Articles 11 and 12 do not apply to foreign Jews.
+
+
+              Chapter IV _Jewels, Gems and Objects of Art_
+
+                               Article 14
+
+1. Jews are forbidden to acquire, pawn or sell objects of gold,
+platinum or silver as well as precious stones and pearls. Such
+objects, except in the case of existence of attachments on behalf of
+a non-Jewish creditor at the time when this decree goes into effect
+may only be acquired by public purchasing offices, established by the
+Reich. The same applies to other jewels and objects of art insofar as
+the price of the individual objects exceeds one thousand Reichsmarks.
+
+2. The provisions of (1) does not apply to foreign Jews.
+
+
+                    Chapter V _General Regulations_
+
+                               Article 15
+
+1. The authorization for the sale of Jewish enterprises, Jewish real
+estate, or other Jewish property can be given under conditions that may
+consist in the payment of money by the buyer on behalf of the Reich.
+
+2. Authorizations of the kind mentioned in Paragraph 1 may also
+be granted with the proviso that the Jewish seller is to receive
+obligations of the German Reich or registered titles against the German
+Reich instead of the total or partial consideration as provided for in
+the sales contract.
+
+
+                               Article 16
+
+The regulations specified for Jews in Article II also apply to
+industrial enterprises as well as organizations, foundations,
+institutions, and other enterprises which are not industrial, insofar
+as they are to be considered Jewish according to the Third Regulation
+under the Reich Citizenship Law of 14 June 1938 (RGBl I, 627).
+
+
+                               Article 17
+
+1. The higher administrative authorities are qualified to issue
+instructions based on the regulations of Article I and II insofar as
+the special provisions of Paragraphs 3 and 4 are not to be applied. The
+higher administrative authorities are also to supervise the appointed
+trustees.
+
+2. Section 6 of the Decree of 26 April 1938 determines which
+authorities are higher administrative authorities within the meaning
+of this Decree Regarding the Registration of Jewish Property
+(Reichsgesetzblatt I, p. 414) with the proviso that the following
+authorities are qualified:
+
+  In Anhalt--the Anhalt State Ministry, Department of Economics;
+
+  In Baden--the Baden Minister of Finance and Economics;
+
+  In Wuerttemberg--the Wuerttemberg Minister of Economics;
+
+  In Austria--the Reich Commissar for the Reunion of Austria with the
+  German Reich or the authorities named by him;
+
+  In the Sudeten German territories--the Government Presidents.
+
+3. Insofar as it is a question of agricultural property, the
+Oberpraesident in Prussia (Agricultural Department) and the Higher
+Settlement Authorities in the non-Prussian States take the place of
+the higher administrative authorities. Insofar as it is a question of
+forest property, the Higher Forest Authorities take the place of the
+higher administrative authorities.
+
+*******
+
+[Articles 18 to 23 are not necessary for understanding of law]
+
+
+                               Article 24
+
+This decree goes into effect on the day of publication.
+
+  Berlin, 3 December 1938
+
+                                      Reich Minister of Economic Affairs
+                                                             Walter Funk
+
+                                              Reich Minister of Interior
+                                                                   Frick
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1412-PS
+
+               1938 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 1579
+
+     Decree relating to the payment of a fine by the Jews of German
+                      nationality of 12 Nov. 1938.
+
+The hostile attitude of the Jewry towards the German people and Reich,
+which does not even shrink back from committing cowardly murder, makes
+a decisive defense and a harsh punishment (expiation) necessary. I
+order, therefore, by virtue of the decree concerning the execution of
+the 4-year Plan of 18 Oct. 1936 (RGBl I, page 887) as follows:
+
+
+                               Section 1
+
+On the Jews of German nationality as a whole has been imposed the
+payment of a contribution of 1,000,000,000 Reichsmark to the German
+Reich.
+
+
+                               Section 2
+
+Provisions for the implementation are issued by the Reich-Minister of
+Finance in agreement with the Reich-Ministers concerned.
+
+  Berlin, 12 November 1938.
+
+                                 The Commissioner for the Four Year Plan
+                                                                 Goering
+                                                  General Field-Marshal.
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1415-PS
+
+               1938 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 1676
+
+Police Regulation of the Appearance of Jews in Public of 28 November
+1938
+
+On the basis of the Decree of 14 November 1938 Regarding the Police
+Decrees of the Reich Ministers (Reichsgesetzblatt I, P. 1582), the
+following is decreed:
+
+
+                               ARTICLE 1
+
+The Government Presidents in Prussia, Bavaria, and the Sudeten German
+areas, the proper authorities in the remaining provinces of the old
+Reich, the district captains (the Mayor in Vienna) in Austria and
+the Reich Commissar of the Saar district may impose upon Jews, both
+subjects of the German State and stateless Jews (Article 5 of the
+First Decree of 14 November 1935, Regarding the Reich Citizen Law,
+Reichsgesetzblatt I, p. 1333), restrictions as to place and time to the
+effect that they may not enter certain districts or may not appear in
+public at certain times.
+
+
+                               ARTICLE 2
+
+Whoever wilfully or negligently violates the regulations of Article I
+is to be fined up to 150 Reichsmarks or punished with imprisonment up
+to six weeks.
+
+
+                               ARTICLE 3
+
+This police decree goes into effect the day after its promulgation.
+
+  Berlin, 28 November 1938
+
+                                          The Reich Minister of Interior
+
+  By order:
+
+                                                               Heydrich.
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1416-PS
+
+               1935 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART 1, PAGE 1146
+
+               The Reich Citizenship Law of 15 Sept 1935
+
+The Reichstag has adopted unanimously, the following law, which is
+herewith promulgated.
+
+
+                               Article 1
+
+1. A subject of the State is a person, who belongs to the protective
+union of the German Reich, and who, therefore, has particular
+obligations towards the Reich.
+
+2. The status of the subject is acquired in accordance with the
+provisions of the Reich- and State Law of Citizenship.
+
+
+                               Article 2
+
+1. A citizen of the Reich is only that subject, who is of German- or
+kindred blood and who, through his conduct, shows that he is both
+desirous and fit to serve faithfully the German people and Reich.
+
+2. The right to citizenship is acquired by the granting of Reich
+citizenship papers.
+
+3. Only the citizen of the Reich enjoys full political rights in
+accordance with the provision of the laws.
+
+
+                               Article 3
+
+The Reich Minister of the Interior in conjunction with the Deputy of
+the Fuehrer will issue the necessary legal and administrative decrees
+for the carrying out and supplementing of this law.
+
+  Nurnberg, 15 Sept 1935 at the Reichsparteitag of Liberty
+
+                                       The Fuehrer and Reichs Chancellor
+                                                            Adolf Hitler
+
+                                     The Reichs Minister of the Interior
+                                                                   Frick
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1417-PS
+
+               1935 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART 1, PAGE 1333
+
+     First Regulation to the Reichs Citizenship Law of 14 Nov. 1935
+
+On the basis of Article 3, Reichs Citizenship Law, of 15 Sept. 1935
+(RGBl I, page 146) the following is ordered:
+
+
+                               Article 1
+
+1. Until further issue of regulations regarding citizenship papers,
+all subjects of German or kindred blood, who possessed the right to
+vote in the Reichstag elections, at the time the Citizenship Law came
+into effect, shall, for the time being, possess the rights of Reich
+citizens. The same shall be true of those whom the Reich Minister of
+the Interior, in conjunction with the Deputy of the Fuehrer, has given
+the preliminary citizenship.
+
+2. The Reich Minister of the Interior, in conjunction with the Deputy
+of the Fuehrer, can withdraw the preliminary citizenship.
+
+
+                               Article 2
+
+1. The regulations in Article 1 are also valid for Reichs subjects of
+mixed, Jewish blood.
+
+2. An individual of mixed Jewish blood, is one who descended from one
+or two grandparents who were racially full Jews, insofar as does not
+count as a Jew according to Article 5, paragraph 2. One grandparent
+shall be considered as full-blooded if he or she belonged to the Jewish
+religious community.
+
+
+                               Article 3
+
+Only the Reich citizen, as bearer of full political rights, exercises
+the right to vote in political affairs, and can hold a public office.
+The Reich Minister of the Interior, or any agency empowered by him, can
+make exceptions during the transition period, with regard to occupying
+public offices. The affairs of religious organizations will not be
+touched upon.
+
+
+                               Article 4
+
+1. A Jew cannot be a citizen of the Reich. He has no right to vote in
+political affairs, he cannot occupy a public office.
+
+2. Jewish officials will retire as of 31 December 1935. If these
+officials served at the front in the World War, either for Germany or
+her allies, they will receive in full, until they reach the age limit,
+the pension to which they were entitled according to last received
+wages; they will, however, not advance in seniority. After reaching the
+age limit, their pension will be calculated anew, according to the last
+received salary, on the basis of which their pension was computed.
+
+3. The affairs of religious organizations will not be touched upon.
+
+4. The conditions of service of teachers in Jewish public schools
+remain unchanged, until new regulations of the Jewish school systems
+are issued.
+
+
+                               Article 5
+
+1. A Jew is anyone who descended from at least three grandparents who
+were racially full Jews. Article 2, par. 2, second sentence will apply.
+
+2. A Jew is also one who descended from two full Jewish parents, if:
+(a) he belonged to the Jewish religious community at the time this
+law was issued, or who joined the community later; (b) he was married
+to a Jewish person, at the time the law was issued, or married one
+subsequently; (c) he is the offspring from a marriage with a Jew, in
+the sense of Section 1, which was contracted after the Law for the
+protection of German blood and German honor became effective (RGBl I,
+page 1146 of 15 Sept 1935); (d) he is the offspring of an extramarital
+relationship, with a Jew, according to Section 1, and will be born out
+of wedlock after July 31, 1936.
+
+
+                               Article 6
+
+1. As far as demands are concerned for the pureness of blood as laid
+down in Reichs law or in orders of the NSDAP and its echelons--not
+covered in Article 5--they will not be touched upon.
+
+2. Any other demands on pureness of blood, not covered in Article
+5, can only be made with permission from the Reich Minister of the
+Interior and the Deputy of the Fuehrer. If any such demands have
+been made, they will be void as of 1 Jan 1936, if they have not been
+requested from the Reich Minister of the Interior in agreement with
+the Deputy of the Fuehrer. These requests must be made from the Reich
+Minister of the Interior.
+
+
+                               Article 7
+
+The Fuehrer and Reichs Chancellor can grant exemptions from the
+regulations laid down in the law.
+
+  Berlin, 14 November 1935
+
+                                       The Fuehrer and Reichs Chancellor
+                                                            Adolf Hitler
+
+                                      The Reich Minister of the Interior
+                                                                   Frick
+
+                                               The Deputy of the Fuehrer
+                                                                 R. Hess
+                                      (Reich Minister without Portfolio)
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1419-PS
+
+                1939 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 864
+
+             Law concerning Jewish Tenants of 30 April 1939
+
+The Reich Government has enacted the following law which is hereby
+promulgated:
+
+
+       Article 1 _Abatement of the Tenancy Protection Provisions_
+
+A Jew cannot invoke the protection of the tenancy laws where the
+landlord in giving notice to vacate the premises can furnish him with a
+certificate from the communal authorities that his shelter is assured
+for the time subsequent to the expiration of the tenancy. This does not
+apply where the landlord is also a Jew.
+
+
+               Article 2 _Premature Dissolution of Lease_
+
+A lease may be dissolved, where only one of the parties to it is a
+Jew, by the other party at any time within the legal term of giving
+notice, notwithstanding that the lease is signed for a specified time,
+or that the stipulated time of giving notice is longer than that fixed
+by law. The landlord, however, may not give notice for vacating the
+premises earlier than the term agreed upon, where he does not furnish
+certificate from the communal authorities that the shelter of the
+tenant has been assured elsewhere subsequent to the vacating of the
+premises.
+
+
+                         Article 3 _Sub-Leases_
+
+Sub-leases may be concluded only between Jews and Jews. Permission to
+sublet is not necessary where the house owner is also a Jew.
+
+
+                         Article 4 _Billetting_
+
+1. Where the communal authority so requires, a Jew shall be required to
+receive Jews as tenants or as sub-tenants in premises which he occupies
+as owner or on the basis of a tenancy, or has rented from another
+Jew. Where he refuses to make an appropriate agreement with the new
+tenant, the communal authority may fix the terms of such an agreement
+with binding force on both parties. The amount of the rental and the
+compensation to the owner for the sub-lease shall be determined by the
+communal authority, and where it is not the controlling rent authority,
+in concurrence with the competent rent control authority.
+
+2. The commune is entitled to receive fees for establishing agreements
+and sub-leases.
+
+3. A tenancy, or sub-lease entered into under (1) may be dissolved
+by the owner or the sub-tenant only with the consent of the communal
+authority.
+
+
+                       Article 5 _New Tenancies_
+
+Jews may rent to others new or vacant premises only upon the consent of
+the communal authority. The provisions of Article 4 shall apply to such
+premises respectively.
+
+
+         Article 6 _Application to Cases of Limited Ownership_
+
+Where the application of Articles 1-5 depends on the premise that
+the lessor is a Jew, the owner of the parcel of land, or the person
+entitled to its use shall be considered the lessor, notwithstanding he
+cannot sign a lease, or has not signed the lease because of limitations
+upon his power over such property.
+
+
+                      Article 7 _Mixed Marriages_
+
+Where the application of this law depends on the premise that the
+lessor or the lessee is a Jew, the following shall apply in cases of a
+mixed marriage of a lessee or a lessor:
+
+1. Where the wife is a Jew, and where there are offsprings from the
+marriage, even where the marriage is no longer valid, the provisions of
+the law do not apply.
+
+2. Where the husband is a Jew and there are no offspring, the
+provisions shall apply, no matter where the wife or the husband is the
+tenant or the lessor.
+
+3. This does not apply to offsprings who are considered as Jews.
+
+
+           Article 8 _Right of Disposal_ [_Verfuegungsrecht_]
+
+1. Where the right of disposal of a parcel of land (property or right
+to use) [Nutzungsrecht] is transferred by a Jew to a non-Jew, after
+the effective date of this law, the provisions of this law shall apply
+as before the transfer, though a giving of notice to vacate before the
+time fixed is not permissible. This applies also to further transfers
+of the right of disposal.
+
+2. The provision of (1) shall not apply to premises which the
+beneficial owner shall desire to occupy himself, or to premises
+which shall not be claimed for use of Jewish tenants by the communal
+authority. A certificate from the communal authority is sufficient
+proof that claim to these premises has been relinquished.
+
+
+                 Article 9 _Term of Vacating Premises_
+
+1. Where a Jew is forced to vacate premises under the provisions of
+this law, an extension of the time limit for vacating may be granted
+to him only where he can furnish a certificate from the communal
+authorities that other shelter cannot be found for him, owing to
+obstacles, or where the immediate vacating of the premises cannot be
+undertaken without serious danger to the health of one of the persons
+affected. The term fixed may be extended in accordance with the same
+premises stated above.
+
+2. The provision of (1) shall respectively apply insofar as the person
+forced to vacate has not terminated the lease, where the obligation to
+vacate has not been pronounced in a judgment, or where the premises for
+the granting of a time extension do not occur until after the judgment
+has been pronounced. The local court having jurisdiction over matters
+of vacating shall render a decision on the extension of time on the
+application of the person required to vacate. Where a time extension
+is granted and no judgment to vacate has been rendered so far, the
+decision shall contain also the statement that after the expiration of
+such extension the premises shall be vacated; this decision shall be
+the equivalent of an executable order of dispossession.
+
+3. An immediate appeal against a decision refusing to grant an
+extension of time is permissible, even in such cases where only a
+decision against time extension is being protested by the tenant.
+
+4. Until the premises are vacated, both parties to the renting
+agreement shall be held to observe the same rules and regulations as
+before the termination of the agreement.
+
+5. The procedure under (2) shall be subject to the same court costs and
+lawyer’s fees as the procedure for temporary stay of distraint. For
+the estimate of costs Article 10 (1) shall apply correspondingly.
+
+
+                    Article 10 _Order of Definition_
+
+1. Who shall be considered a Jew, shall be determined by the definition
+given in Article 5 of the First Regulation under the Reich Citizenship
+Law of 14 November 1935 (RGBl I, 1333).
+
+2. The definition of Jewish enterprises under Article 1 of the Third
+Regulation under the Reich Citizenship Law of 14 June 1938 (RGBl I,
+627) shall be followed except insofar as Article 9 applies. A change in
+the ownership of a Jewish enterprise shall be considered as a change of
+the right of disposal in the sense of Article 8.
+
+
+    Article 11 _Treatment of Pending Legal Actions affecting Leases_
+
+1. Where a legal action against a Jew or the marriage partner of a
+Jew is pending when this law takes effect, the court may stay the
+proceedings on the application of the plaintiff, in order to make it
+possible for him to give the notice required under the provisions of
+this law. Where the plaintiff has given notice to terminate the lease,
+he may petition for the reopening of the case and change the plea from
+termination to dispossession. Where the legal action is terminated by
+the quitting of the tenant, or his acknowledgment of the obligation to
+vacate, the court costs shall be voided; the costs out of court shall
+be borne by the tenant.
+
+2. Where the tenant retracts the legal action for lease termination,
+the court costs shall be voided and the costs out of court shall be
+borne by each of the contending parties for himself.
+
+
+               Article 12 _General Reporting Requirement_
+
+1. The communal authority may issue orders for reports on premises
+rented to Jews, or on premises which may be used for the shelter of
+Jews in accordance with the provisions of this law.
+
+2. Whoever shall not, either wilfully or through negligence make such
+obligatory report, shall be punishable by a fine up to 150 Reichsmarks
+or by custody.
+
+
+                   Article 13 _Claims for Indemnity_
+
+No claims shall be made for indemnity against orders issued by the
+communal authority in accordance with the provisions of this law.
+
+
+                 Article 14 _Exceptions; Authorization_
+
+1. The effectiveness of this law in the Ostmark and in the Sudeten
+German Territories shall be reserved to a later date.
+
+2. The Reich Minister of Justice and the Reich Minister of Labor
+with the concurrence of the Reich Minister of the Interior shall
+be authorized to issue instructions for the administration and
+the enforcement of this law, as well as introduce the appropriate
+provisions in Austria and in the Sudeten German Territories.
+
+  Berlin, 30 April 1939
+
+                                        The Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor
+                                                            Adolf Hitler
+
+                                           The Reich Minister of Justice
+                                                             Dr Guertner
+
+                                             The Reich Minister of Labor
+                                                    His Deputy: Dr Krohn
+
+                                               The Deputy of the Fuehrer
+                                                                 R. Hess
+
+                                      The Reich Minister of the Interior
+                                                                   Frick
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1422-PS
+
+                1943 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 372
+
+  Thirteenth Regulation under the Reich Citizenship Law of 1 July 1943
+
+Under Article 3 of the Reich Citizenship Law of September 15, 1935
+(RGBl I, 1146) the following is ordered:
+
+
+                               Article 1
+
+1. Criminal actions committed by Jews shall be punished by the police.
+
+2. The provision of the Polish penal laws of 4 December 1941 (RGBl I,
+759) shall no longer apply to Jews.
+
+
+                               Article 2
+
+1. The property of a Jew shall be confiscated by the Reich after his
+death.
+
+2. The Reich may, however, grant compensation to the non-Jewish legal
+heirs and persons entitled to sustenance who have their domicile in
+Germany.
+
+3. This compensation may be granted in the form of a lump sum, not
+to exceed the ceiling price of the property which has passed into
+possession [Verfuegungsgewalt] of the German Reich.
+
+4. Compensation may be granted by the transfer of titles and assets
+from the confiscated property. No costs shall be imposed for the legal
+processes necessary for such transfer.
+
+
+                               Article 3
+
+The Reich Minister of the Interior with the concurrence of the
+participating higher authorities of the Reich shall issue the legal
+and administrative provisions for the administration and enforcement
+of this regulation. In doing so he shall determine to what extent the
+provisions shall apply to Jewish nationals of foreign countries.
+
+
+                               Article 4
+
+This regulation shall take effect on the seventh day of its
+promulgation. In the Protectorate Bohemia and Moravia it shall apply
+where German administration and German courts have jurisdiction;
+Article 2 shall also apply to Jews who are citizens of the Protectorate.
+
+  Berlin, 1 July 1943
+
+                                      The Reich Minister of the Interior
+                                                                   Frick
+
+                                          Chief of the Party Chancellery
+                                                              M. Bormann
+
+                                               Reich Minister of Finance
+                                              Count Schwerin von Krosigk
+
+                                               Reich Minister of Justice
+                                                            Dr. Thierack
+
+
+                                 PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1430-PS
+
+ [Excerpt of Volume 222 issued by the Reichsfuehrer of the Chief of the
+                   Reichs Security Main Office--RSHA]
+
+                                 SECRET
+
+               SEIZURE OF LEADING MEN OF THE SYSTEM ERA.
+
+       [Nazi expression for the 14 years of the Weimar Republic]
+
+                               June 1939
+
+
+                                CONTENTS
+
+  I. Index and Statistics                Page 1
+
+  II. Synopsis of Various groups         Page 3
+
+  III. Statistics of Various groups      Page 8
+
+  IV. List of all the persons           Page 17
+
+
+               INDEX AND STATISTICS OF ALL PERSONS SEIZED
+
+  In all the following were seized:                         553 Persons
+
+  Divided thus:
+        Group 1. Marxists--Communists                       192 Persons
+        Group 2. Liberalists--Pacifists                      82 Persons
+        Group 3. Confessional Parties                        76 Persons
+        Group 4. Right Opposition [Rechtsopositienen]        73 Persons
+        Group 5. Prominent Austrians of the System Era       48 Persons
+        Group 6. Scientists                                  17 Persons
+        Group 7. Artists                                     18 Persons
+        Group 8. Writers--Journalists                        47 Persons
+
+
+                               STATISTICS
+
+  Of all the people seized the following are:
+        Jews                                            58--(10%)
+        Free Masons                                      45--(9%)
+        Temporarily, or at the present time
+          still in protective custody,
+          prison or penitentiary                       102--(19%)
+
+  I. In the country there are:                         349--(63%)
+        1. Remaining in their old professions or
+           returned to them.
+           (Mainly State or official positions)         61--(11%)
+        2. People receiving pensions                   109--(20%)
+
+  II. Living Abroad                                    204--(37%)
+        1. Politically prominent people working on
+           emigration                                  138--(25%)
+        2. Distribution in the various countries:
+           France                                       61
+           Switzerland                                  26
+           England                                      19
+           The States                                   17
+
+
+                                 PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1435-PS
+
+  Speech of Min. Speer on 24 Febr. 1942 to the Gauleiter meeting. From
+                               Vol. 38--1
+
+*******
+
+_Gauleiter meeting 24 Febr. 1942. Munich_
+
+  [_Page 4_]
+
+I am grateful to fact that, also Party member Dr. Todt, in
+January, personally ordered the complete stoppage of work on his
+Reichsautobahnen as well as released all specialists and German Workers
+for the railroad construction in the East and his PWs for the armament
+industry.
+
+  [_Page 8_]
+
+I therefore proposed to the Fuehrer at the end of December that _all_
+my labor force, including specialists, be released for mass employment
+in the East.
+
+Subsequently the remaining PW’s about 10,000, were put at disposal of
+the armaments industry by me.
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1437-PS
+
+                1938 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 262
+
+                              Second Order
+     supplementary to the law concerning the re-uniting of Austria
+                         with the German Reich
+                          Dated 18 March 1938
+
+The following order is issued by virtue of Article III of the law
+concerning the re-uniting of Austria with the German Reich, dated 13
+March 1938 (RGBl I, page 237).
+
+
+                               Article 1
+
+The Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of German Police in the Reich Ministry
+of the Interior can take measures necessary for the maintenance of
+security and order, even beyond the legal limits otherwise set on such
+measures.
+
+
+                               Article 2
+
+The Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of German Police in the Reich Ministry
+of the Interior can delegate his powers to other departments.
+
+                               Article 3
+
+The order comes into force on the date of publication. Berlin, March
+18th, 1938
+
+                                      The Reich Minister of the Interior
+                                                                   Frick
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1438-PS
+
+               1938 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 1453.
+
+                               3rd. Order
+
+    supplementary to the decree of the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor
+     concerning the administration of the Sudeten-German territory
+                        Dated 22nd October 1938
+
+The following order is issued by virtue of Section 9 of the decree of
+the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor concerning the administration of the
+Sudeten-German territory, dated 1st. October 1938 (Reich Law Gazette,
+Page 1331):
+
+
+                               Article 1
+
+The Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police in the Reich
+Ministry of the Interior can take the administrative measures necessary
+for the maintenance of security and order, even beyond the legal limits
+otherwise set on such measures.
+
+
+                               Article 2
+
+The Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of German Police in the Reich Ministry
+of the Interior can delegate his powers to other departments.
+
+
+                               Article 3
+
+The order comes into force on the date of publication.
+
+  Berlin, 22nd. October 1938.
+
+                                      The Reich Minister of the Interior
+                                                                   Frick
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1439-PS
+
+ TREATY OF PROTECTION CONCLUDED BETWEEN THE GERMAN REICH AND THE STATE
+                              OF SLOVAKIA,
+
+                             March 23, 1939
+
+           [From 1939 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART II, PAGE 606.]
+
+Between the German Government and the Slovak Government, a treaty
+was signed on 18 March 1939 in Vienna and on 23 March 1939 in Berlin
+extending protection by the German Reich to the State of Slovakia.
+
+The treaty became effective on March 23, 1939; its text is published
+hereinafter.
+
+Berlin, March 24, 1939.
+
+                                                          VON RIBBENTROP
+                                       Reich Minister of Foreign Affairs
+
+  _Treaty of Protection to be extended by the German Reich to the State
+  of Slovakia_
+
+The German Government and the Slovak Government have agreed, after
+the Slovak State has placed itself under the protection of the German
+Reich, to regulate by treaty the consequences resulting from this fact.
+For this purpose the undersigned representatives of the two governments
+have agreed on the following provisions.
+
+ARTICLE 1. The German Reich undertakes to protect the political
+independence of the State of Slovakia and the integrity of its
+territory.
+
+ARTICLE 2. For the purpose of making effective the protection
+undertaken by the German Reich, the German armed forces shall have
+the right, at all times, to construct military installations and
+to keep them garrisoned in the strength they deem necessary, in an
+area delimited on its western side by the frontiers of the State of
+Slovakia, and on its eastern side by a line formed by the eastern
+rims of the Lower Carpathians, the White Carpathians and the Javornik
+Mountains.
+
+The Government of Slovakia will take the necessary steps to assure
+that the land required for these installations shall be conveyed to
+the German armed forces. Furthermore, the Government of Slovakia will
+agree to grant exemption from custom duties for imports from the Reich
+for the maintenance of the German troops and the supply of military
+installations.
+
+Military sovereignty will be assumed by the German armed forces in the
+zone described in the first paragraph of this Article.
+
+German citizens who, on the basis of private employment contracts, are
+engaged in the construction of military installations in the designated
+zone shall be subject to German jurisdiction.
+
+ARTICLE 3. The Government of Slovakia will organize its military forces
+in close agreement with the German armed forces.
+
+ARTICLE 4. In accordance with the relationship of protection agreed
+upon, the Government of Slovakia will at all times conduct its foreign
+affairs in close agreement with the German Government.
+
+ARTICLE 5. This treaty shall become effective as of the date of its
+signature and shall be valid for a period of twenty-five years. The two
+governments will reach an understanding on the extension of this treaty
+in due time before the expiration of that period.
+
+In witness whereof the representatives of the two parties have signed
+the above treaty in duplicate.
+
+Vienna, March 18, 1939. Berlin, March 23, 1939.
+
+                       For the German Government:
+                             VON RIBBENTROP
+
+                       For the Slovak Government:
+                             DR. JOZEF TISO
+                            DR. VOJTECH TUKA
+                            DR. F. DURCANSKY
+
+  [Cf. Document 2793-PS, which is the secret protocol to this treaty.]
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1445-PS
+
+                                                   Berlin, 15 June 1940.
+
+ Minutes about the Conference at the Reich Ministry of Economics on 14
+                         June 1940, 1600 hours
+
+_Represented_:
+
+  Ministry for Foreign Affairs (Ambassador Clodius)
+
+  Representative for the Four Year Plan (Director of Ministry Gramsch)
+
+  Reichsfuehrer S.S.
+
+  Foreign Exchange Department
+
+  Clearing Institute
+
+  Reich Ministry for Economics (various representatives)
+
+  O.K.W., Wi Rue Amt (I a M3)
+
+_Subject of the Conference_:
+
+  Utilization of the Belgian Dutch capital investments in South East
+    European corporations.
+
+_Result_:
+
+After a discussion of several hours the following regulations were
+considered as necessary:
+
+_a._ Immediate order by the Reichskommissar for the Netherlands and the
+Military Commander for Belgium. Issue of a regulation for prohibition
+of the disposal, destruction or transfer of securities held in these
+countries, furthermore a compulsory registration of the owners and
+trustees, an embargo on bank deposits, finally the cancellation of
+regulations about securities which contain change of locations of
+firms. (Compare paragraph A of document I a M3 of 23 May 1940.)
+
+_b._ In addition to this, after thorough consideration, shall be issued
+a legal regulation corresponding to the German law for foreign exchange
+regarding the disposal of foreign securities. In this law it shall
+be made possible to void with retroactive power change of locations
+of firms which took place since the beginning of the war. Provisions
+shall be made also for the appointment of Commissars to corporations
+and holding companies where after expiration of the registration date
+securities are hidden.
+
+_c._ In addition to this it shall be put into effect in the South-East
+states by the Mission chiefs that, where a permit is already required
+for the transfer of shares, no permit of any kind shall be granted and
+that in regions where no permit for the sale of shares is necessary,
+a law for these permits shall be established, but as a matter of
+principle these permits shall not be granted.
+
+_d._ Finally the attempt shall be made to gain an influence through the
+Dutch holding companies over their owned subsidiaries in view of the
+German economic warfare. (Compare with paragraph B of notice I a M3 of
+23 May 1940.)
+
+_e._ A confiscation of securities shall be disregarded because this
+would be against international law.
+
+_f._ The regulation drafts shall be completed by the Reich Ministry
+of Economics (R.W.M.) with assistance of the Labor Board of the
+Reich Ministry of Finance (A.A. des R.F.M.) and the Army High
+Command--Economy Armament Division (O.K.W. Wi Rue Amt.)
+
+
+                                 PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1456-PS
+
+                                                    Berlin, 20 June 1941
+
+  Chief of Agency for
+  Armament Economy
+  [Chef Wi-Rue Amt]
+  Colonel Jansen
+
+                               MEMORANDUM
+
+Following is the new conception of the Fuehrer, which Minister Todt has
+explained to me and which has been confirmed later on by Field Marshal
+Keitel:
+
+                                 Par. I
+
+The course of the war shows that we went too far in our autarchical
+endeavors. It is impossible, to try and manufacture everything we
+lack, by synthetic procedures or other measures. For instance, it is
+impossible, to develop our motor fuel economy to a point where we
+can entirely depend on it. All these autarchical endeavors ask for a
+tremendous amount of manpower, and it is simply impossible to provide
+it. One has to choose another way. What one does not have, but needs,
+one must conquer. The commitment of men which is necessary one single
+time, will not be as great as the one that is currently needed for the
+running of the synthetic factories in question. The aim must also be to
+secure all territories, which are of special interest to us for the war
+economy, by conquering them.
+
+At the time the 4-year-plan was established, I issued the statement
+where I made it clear that a completely autarchical economy is
+impossible for us, because the need of men will be too great.
+Nevertheless, my solution was always to provide the necessary reserves
+for missing stocks resp. to secure the delivery in wartime through
+economic alliances.
+
+                                Par. II
+
+In a conference between Todt--Pleiger--Thomas, it was determined:
+
+  Matter: “Detailed orders to the mining industries”.
+
+                                Par. III
+
+Todt suggests the construction of heavy special machinery at Krupp’s
+and Skoda’s.
+
+                                                         [Signed] THOMAS
+
+
+                                 PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1458-PS
+
+                           “THE HITLER YOUTH”
+
+                         by Baldur von Schirach
+
+           _Published by Koehler und Amelang, Leipzig 1934._
+
+_In place of a foreword._
+
+My Fuehrer! It is five years now since you gave me the mission to
+take over leadership of the National Socialist youth. At that time
+you explained to my collaborators and to me the idea of this youth
+organization. What you preached to us at that time as aim and demand,
+my Fuehrer, has taken on shape here before you. You asked at that
+time from me and my collaborators that we should create a community
+of youth in which no other law should be binding for the process of
+reconstruction but the law of achievement.
+
+Here, among the leaders of the Hitler youth are the sons of the
+poorest who exercise command over hundreds of thousands. What do the
+conceptions of poverty and richness mean in face of the reality of
+this community? In future days only those will be called poor who did
+not belong in their youth to this community. And further, my Fuehrer,
+you demanded from my collaborators and from me that we should not only
+unite the youth in enthusiasm, but also by discipline and order. We
+fought for years laboriously for this end, but today even this demand
+is fulfilled and proudly we feel ourselves as a worthy part of your
+great National Socialist Movement.
+
+But we were powerless regarding one of your demands. You told us then
+it would appear as a great success to you if we succeeded to hold
+together in one organization of the German one hundred thousand German
+youth. My Fuehrer, you forgot, that you had given this organization
+your name.
+
+You asked for one hundred thousand, and it was all who came. There is
+one thing which is stronger than you, my Fuehrer, that is the love of
+the young Germany for you.
+
+There are many gay hours in the year of the youth. This one, however,
+is in every year our happiest. Because more than other people, my
+Fuehrer, we feel to be chained to your person by our name. Your name is
+the happiness of the youth, your name, my Fuehrer, is our immortality.
+
+Baldur von Schirach to the Fuehrer at the occasion of the inspection of
+the Hitler Youth at the Reichs party day 1936.
+
+
+                               Chapter 1
+
+                From Union [Bund] to Nation [pp. 13-19]
+
+That which was formerly called the German youth movement [Jugend
+bewegung] is dead. This statement has nothing to do with ill will.
+
+No youth leader of our time will deny the merits of the scout
+[Wandervogel] Karl Fischers in his work with the German youth movement.
+That youth movement was as right for its own time as the Hitler Youth
+is right for the present. Without any doubt, many ideas and the form
+of life [Lebensform] of the Youth Movement helped to create the
+prerequisites on which the H J is building: The idea of self-leadership
+on the part of the youth, the declaration to fight against the
+standards of bourgeois society, the will to folkdom, homeland, or
+comradeship and many others, are akin to the feelings of the H. J. And
+yet: The first step into public life, the meeting which took place
+on 11 and 12 October 1913 on the “Hohen Meissner”, remained only an
+impulse. The best thing about the speech on the “Hohen Meissner” were
+the people who listened to it [p. 14]. What today’s youth is looking
+for in this, for the youth movement so important meeting, is the
+sincere will to form, to create.
+
+We, today, see clearer than the generation of that time that the value
+of their youth movement was in their silent work. The greater German
+idea and the really valuable return to folkdom and simplicity are
+achievements of the youth movement which seem to us more significant
+than the numerous manifestoes which were handed down to us. They
+had the courage to let themselves be ridiculed, a courage which the
+National Socialist Fighter of a decade later also had to have. And we
+must, if we want to do justice to this youth movement, look less to
+the picture of their actual appearance but more to the determination
+with which they followed their ideals. The political reality of youth
+was their cleanness, their decent behaviour, their political change
+[Umbruch]. The Youth movement was one of the few pleasant phenomena of
+the Wilhelmman era and it is characteristic for that time that youth
+was so delightful because it declared war on its time. Few leagues
+[Buende] of the postwar time have a right to refer to the former youth
+movement. They were a true copy of its weaknesses without its virtues.
+They ignored the lesson of the great war. They forgot that the time of
+a free and easy youth movement had undergone a break by the death of
+two million, which imposed on them the duties of unity and masculine
+constraint [Gebundenheit und maennliche Zucht--p. 15]. What was right
+up to 1 August 1914 was wrong after 9 November 1918.
+
+Some attempts were made to create a synthesis of youth and a militant
+movement [Wehrbewegung], attempts which started from the right
+principles. These attempts failed because their leaders were either
+representatives of pure militarism or at best of some lesser political
+ideas. Therefore, it was reserved to Adolf Hitler, the creator and
+supporter of an ideology [Weltanschauung], to determine the road of
+German youth. From the former youth movement the Hitler youth took over
+this or that form, out of the front of the World War it was given its
+content by Adolf Hitler. Its organization also has its prerequisite in
+the great war; its bearing is military, as was the bearing of those
+who came from the youth movement and who died in their gray coats in
+Flanders.
+
+Just as the youth of the “Hohen Meissner” felt, the front as the more
+important, so do we. Between the summer of 1914 and the spring of today
+lies a long dreary time through which we all passed consciously or
+unconsciously. Even those of us who had not been born at that time know
+it, every German knows it. As long as the German people will live, this
+time will live in their minds [p. 16].
+
+That at that time a whole nation stood in arms, Catholics and
+Protestants, beggars and millionaires, peasants and clerks, merchants
+and laborers, and that they all obeyed one will and were only Germans,
+nothing but Germans, that also started us on the march. No title, no
+privilege of birth, not a lot of money nor anything special of any kind
+made a difference then.
+
+We also want the same thing. The black years of war have passed, the
+spirit of the warrior remains. Again youth in Germany does not want
+profits, nor personal gain, but renders service and sacrifices to the
+community. That is the idea of the HJ: A comradeship of those Germans
+who do not want anything for themselves. Because they do not want
+anything for themselves they can do everything for their great nation.
+Not a youth with new rights--a generation of strict fulfillment of duty.
+
+The postwar period showed a sad picture of party-bound youth. “Whoever
+controls youth, controls the future” was the slogan, given the German
+National club to the Communist thieves’ den. Every lobby was dealing
+in youth. And they were successful. Young Germany took everything for
+gospel truth, sold itself today to this one, tomorrow to that one
+till finally, disappointed and disgusted, it turned its back on all
+these activities. Then came the time of exclusive sports, of exclusive
+indulging in entertainments and living to the fullest, the time of
+exclusive study, [p. 17]. “Politics is nonsense,” was the reply given
+to party functionaries.
+
+When Adolf Hitler began to speak this attitude was shaken. But now the
+satisfied citizen used the same argument which youth had found against
+him. He called for peace, for self-possession, for order. “Youth should
+not mix in politics,” because the defensive slogan of all the bourgeois
+parties which began to lose their young people to the Fuehrer. Anyone
+who at that time, 1924-25, among youth stood up for Adolf Hitler
+might have found that even youth leaders anxiously tried to avoid the
+alleged danger of influencing youth politically in the direction of
+National Socialism. Many comrades and I myself had to leave a militant
+organization [Wehrorganisation] to which I had become quite attached,
+because I had made a speech for Adolf Hitler there. At that time, many,
+like myself drew a dividing line between themselves and their friends
+and relatives and exchanged fight for the new ideal for the quiet life
+of a well protected home.
+
+We were not yet able to account for our conception in detail, we simply
+believed. And when Hitler’s book, “Mein Kampf” was published it was our
+bible which we almost learned by heart in order to be able to answer
+the questions of the doubters and superior critics. Almost every one
+who today is leading youth in a responsible position joined us during
+those years [p. 18].
+
+Again Youth was divided by politics but this time the problem was
+different. It was no longer a matter of national parties, of liberal
+and democratic ideas, it was this: Germany or Marxism, Germany or
+reaction. But youth also had been slightly infected with party ideas.
+Youth did not want to be convinced, it wanted to be overruled. Not
+the accuracy of the idea was questioned, but an attempt was made to
+prove that with such a small following it could not be successful. The
+National Socialist movement was regarded as a fractional party, the
+honest but, because of its pettiness, hopeless attempt of a man of
+whom it was not known if he had the necessary knowledge, the essential
+education. A bricklayer from Vienna, a man without college education,
+a self-taught person should liberate Germany? That was at best very
+doubtful.
+
+As there are old people who are young, there are also among the youth
+some who are old. I have met them in the universities, in the youth
+movement, everywhere. The people who are old in their hearts are like
+a pestilence to a healthy people. They represent the tenacious and
+embittered resistance against every new idea. But youth is an attitude.
+The paralyzed Chamberlain whose lips are forming words which only his
+wife can read and transcribe represents eternal youth as much as the
+old Goethe in his last days. His Faust, the Ninth Symphony and the will
+of Adolf Hitler are eternal youth and know neither time nor death [p.
+19].
+
+Yet there are men who are born old and are living their lives as if
+they were 70 years old. During the years of our fight we overcame
+those people and we fight them again and again. They are the living
+dead. Their coldness kills every slight stir of a new life. Only the
+collective force of passionate youth is able to destroy them.
+
+Let us do away with the old! Only eternal youth shall have its home _in
+our Germany_.
+
+
+                               Chapter 2
+
+     The development of the Hitler Youth movement [p. 20, par. 1].
+
+The idea for the foundation of a National Socialist youth organization
+came from the Fuehrer himself, while the name Hitler Youth was
+originated by Julius Streicher, who also named the Brown House. The
+name of the man who deserves the credit for having set up the first
+groups of the H. J. is Kurt Gruber.
+
+At the time of the beginning of the H. J. Kurt Gruber had just
+graduated from Law School. He devoted himself with great energy to his
+new task. From a small cellar in Plenen which served as Reichs office,
+we first organized a number of Saxonian H J groups, energetically
+assisted by the present Reich Governor in Saxony, Martin Mutschinanon.
+
+*******
+
+Here I would also like to mention that since 1928, Alfred Rosenberg
+also took a special interest in the National Socialist Youth. At that
+time we were trying to come to an understanding with the leagues.
+Alfred Rosenberg negotiated with the Eagles and Falcons, the “bensen”,
+and other leagues without fundamental results. I realized at that time
+that an understanding with the leaders of the leagues would never be
+possible [p. 23] and devoted myself to the principle of the totality of
+the Hitler Youth, which in the year 1933 cost all those leagues their
+independent existence.
+
+When, in 1930, the Fuehrer himself took over the high command of the
+SA [Storm Troops] and Ernst Roehm started his new office as Chief of
+Staff, the National Socialist Youth organizations were centralized in
+the SA. Kurt Gruber resigned. His nervous state was such that he was
+physically unable to continue his work. On 30 October 1931, the Fuehrer
+appointed me as Reichs youth leader of the NSDAP with the rank of a Lt.
+General [Gruppenfuehrer] in the SA. My old comrade, Dr. von Reuteln was
+given the leadership of the students’ league and also the leadership of
+the HJ, under my command. Now the organization of the HJ was thoroughly
+overhanded, which was necessary because Kurt Gruber had not been able
+to fully devote himself to his tasks as a leader especially during
+the last months of his activities. Dr. von Reuteln continued his
+work as a consultant for economic questions in the Executive Office
+[Reichsleitung] of the NSDAP but still found time for official trips
+and for night work at his desk to which the HJ owes the tightening of
+the threads of its organization which had become rather loose. At that
+time I had to go temporarily to Kufstein where I stayed with friends in
+a little mountain inn in order to avoid a prison term of three months
+[p. 24]. The previous year I had spoken against the Versailles dictate
+from the steps of Cologne University, violating a government order
+and, to begin with, was locked up in the Cologne prison, the so-called
+“Klingelpuetz”, which then often housed Dr. Robert Ley, at that time
+regional leader of Koeln-Aachen and another leading party comrade,
+Tom Winkelnkemper. There I stayed for 8 days till my case came up in
+court and was then sentenced to 3 months in prison without a time of
+probation according to the emergency decree by the Reichs President. I
+was very lucky to be set free after the sentence was passed. With great
+joy I still think of the dear Cologne party comrades who, headed by Dr.
+Ley stood in a mass before the gates of the prison when I was released.
+It was high time, I flew to Munich. The following day I took the train
+to Graz and was able to give to the Graz Student meeting the directive
+which was needed by the Fuehrer. The National Socialist Student League
+[Studentenbund] won its decisive victory. A National Socialist was
+unanimously elected leader of the German student body [Studentenschaft].
+
+Since that time around 12 months had gone by and I had reason to fear
+that I would be torn away any day now from my organizational work
+with the National Socialist Youth. My co-workers came to Kufstein for
+the most important conferences and I frequently crossed the border at
+night, raced through [p. 25] Germany in our “Nurnberg”, announced a
+meeting in Chemnitz while I made a speech in Berlin, and thus I escaped
+my well-deserved “vacation” in Cologne. Then came the time of Groener.
+One evening the Fuehrer came to my apartment in Munich and informed me
+that he intended to appoint me Reichsleader of the NSDAP the following
+day, and to take the National Socialist Youth organizations out of
+the SA. Since prohibition of the SA was threatening we might have
+avoided the simultaneous prohibition of the HJ. The Fuehrer bases the
+necessity of such a measure on the principle for which he stood from
+the beginning, and which I have used in this book as a motto: “Youth
+must be led by Youth”.
+
+By some accident the prompt announcement of my appointment was held
+up. Soon after this conversation the SA and with it the HJ were
+forbidden by Mr. Groener. Through Reuteln I raised some half-hearted
+objections with Groener, referring to the fact that at the time of
+prohibition I was no longer a member of the SA, but, of course, without
+results. There was no other way out but to continue work underground.
+Thus originated the National Socialist Youth movement, the NSJB [NS
+Jugendbewegung] without uniform, without insignia. At that time we
+traveled through Germany dressed like bandits. Blue sailor caps, white
+shirts [p. 26] and a brown sweater or some kind of civilian coat. But
+we recognized each other everywhere. At this time the HJ gained its
+best human material. Whoever came to us during this illegal time, boy
+or girl, risked everything. Thousands upon thousands were thrown out of
+their schools or became unemployed--but they clung the more tenaciously
+to our flag. It was a great time and as strange as it might seem we
+were never happier than at that time when we lived in constant danger.
+With pistols in our pockets we drove through the Ruhr district while
+stones came flying after us. We jumped every time we heard a bell ring
+because we lived in constant fear of arrests and expected our houses to
+be searched. I have hardly one piece of furniture in my possession that
+was not attached.
+
+One day even my “Nurnberg” was confiscated. That was going too far.
+They could have all the wardrobes and chests as far as I was concerned,
+but the car to us meant freedom, mobility, our work. The Fuehrer was
+then at Obersalzberg. I called him up and out of his own pocket he gave
+me the money to pay the printer who had the car attached. I breathed
+freely again, we were able to continue our work.
+
+At about this time I had a conference with Dr. von Reuteln, as a result
+of which I also took over the leadership of the Students’ League and
+the HJ as [p. 27] such. This came about in the most friendly manner.
+Reuteln wanted to get free anyhow to devote himself to his great
+tasks in the economic-political field, I myself wanted to exchange my
+somewhat formal responsibility for the HJ into a real one. We parted
+as the comrades which we still are today. Between us never existed any
+fundamental difference on essential points and The National Socialist
+Youth owes a deep gratitude to the man who outlined their road in a
+severe and straightforward manner.
+
+The membership of the National Socialist Youth organisation had grown
+to about 35,000. The number of applications was mounting day by day.
+We requested more office space from Reichs Treasurer Schwarz and
+he created generous working possibilities for us by putting at our
+disposal the entire top floor of the hotel “Der Reichsadler” in Munich.
+For the time being we had some space.
+
+With the moving into the hotel “Reichsadler” an unpleasant tension
+began to make itself felt which existed between the youth and Gregor
+Strasser, who had installed the offices of the organizational
+department in the same building. In my apartment on Koenigenstrasse I
+was lucky enough to be able to express my apprehensions about Strasser
+to the Fuehrer. Otherwise I never discussed these things with anybody,
+with the exception of Julius Streicher. But I received [p. 28] reports
+from all parts of the Reich through the youth organization. I knew
+what course Strasser was taking, who, at that time, was at the heights
+of his power. I knew of his connections and, from the beginning on,
+I was instinctively convinced of his unreliability in regard to his
+character. Gregor Strasser was an enemy of the National Socialist Youth
+out of the same instinct. It was, after all, a Hitler-Youth and not a
+Strasser Youth.
+
+The greatest worry of the years of struggle of 1930/31 was the lack of
+money. Very often we did not have the few gallons of gasoline which
+we needed for traveling. Another drawback was that none of us was,
+at that time, a member of the Reichstag and, therefore, had no free
+transportation. The reason was that we had not reached the necessary
+age of 25. Our compensation for expenses was just sufficient to cover
+our bare living expenses. By writing and lecturing I was able to make
+enough money to pay my own fare. Despite all the difficulties we were
+able to make all the necessary trips. The success of my staff was based
+on its mobility. Good leadership is not characterized by answering
+letters on time but by its contact with the fighting community. Thus
+the Fuehrer had brought us up and he preached again and again not to
+lose myself in paper work--one of the greatest and wisest teachings
+which I received from him.
+
+*******
+
+The HJ [Hitler Youth] used the winter of 1932/33 for many
+demonstrations [p. 31]. We drove through all of Germany and called the
+youth to the HJ. I will never forget a Fuehrer appeal in the beginning
+of January in Berlin, at the start of which I was searched for weapons
+by the police. Twenty days later we were in power. The most magnificent
+success was the conquest of the formerly Marxist industrial workers
+youth of the German West. Here my co-worker Hartmann Lauterbacher
+achieved great things.
+
+I will never forget the hour when we were sitting in the office of the
+district Ruhr-Niederrhein during an intermission between demonstrations
+on 30 January and received the news of Adolf Hitler’s appointment to
+the post of Reichs Chancellor. That same night I spoke in Herford in
+Westphalia. We all felt saved. The policemen [Schupos] who, on the
+previous day, were still persecuting us, greeted us with raised hands.
+It was one great fraternization. I spoke in two meetings, and going
+from one to the other I caught such a cold that shivering with fever
+I had [p. 32] to go home the next day, but in all my fever phantasies
+one thing remained vivid, that which we had won on that day: Hitler in
+power, Hitler in power. As soon as I had recovered I went to Berlin via
+Wuerzberg, Nurnberg where we had 2 demonstrations. Now the problem was
+to apply the victory of the movement to the entire youth. Our cabinet
+ministers were overburdened with their new tasks and were working
+day and night. We could not wait till they would find time to solve
+the youth question by their own initiative. Therefore, we had to act
+ourselves. My co-workers met in my Munich apartment and advised me
+to occupy the Reichs committee [Reichsausschuss] of the German Youth
+Leagues. I commissioned General [Obergebietsfuehrer] Nabersberg with
+50 members of the Berlin HJ to make a surprise raid on the Reichs
+Committee in the Alsenstrasse early the next morning. This was done
+and at noon the press had the report that the HJ had taken over the
+leadership of the Reichs Committee. The Reichs Committee was headed
+by an excellent man, General Vogt. As much as a surprise the turn of
+events was to him at first as quickly did this Prussian officer adjust
+himself to the new situation. I took his job away from him but he
+understood that this was a necessity and that only from the HJ the
+great unification of German Youth would be possible, on which, after
+all, he had worked all his life. General Vogt did not step aside [p.
+33] and was not offended, but remained intensely and truly interested
+in the objectives of the HJ and its aims. His book, “The German
+Boy-Service” [Der deutsche Jungendienst] is one of the most valuable
+books of German youth literature. And we are all proud of the fact that
+General Vogt today belongs to the Reichs Youth leadership and wears the
+Gold Honor insignia of the HJ.
+
+In the Reichs Committee [Reichsausschuss] we got a tremendous amount
+of material. All at once we were able to determine the strength of all
+the German youth leagues and to summon the influential personalities
+in these youth leagues. From this point I recognized the necessity of
+coming to grips with the Greater German Union. I appointed my co-worker
+Karl Nabersberg as my representative on the Reichs Committee and
+traveled through Germany in order to take a stand against The Greater
+German Union in many demonstrations. In the meantime I gained control
+over the Reichs league for German youth hostels [Reichsverband fuer
+deutsche Jugendherbergen] in a manner similar to the one employed
+with the Reichs Committee; with its leadership I commissioned a young
+merchant from Hamburg and bearer of the Golden Honor Insignia [Goldenes
+Ehrenzerchen] of the NSDAP, Johannes Rodatz.
+
+The Greater German Youth League [Grossdeutscher Jugendbund] was a
+combination of various leagues and organizations which came under the
+leadership of the deserving chief of staff of the fleet, Admiral von
+Trotha. This admirable man, who had served our Fatherland in war and
+peace with unselfish [p. 34] devotion fundamentally had the same ideas
+and plans for the Greater German League as I had for the Hitler Youth.
+That the Greater German League [Grossdeutscher Bund] could not fulfill
+these tasks was not the fault of the “Admiral”, as he was respectfully
+called by his Youth, the difficulties lay in the period itself. The
+Greater German League was not a political union, that is, leagues
+which partly were opposed to National Socialism were to be found in
+the Greater German League as well as organizations which ideologically
+were in agreement with the NSDAP, without, however, drawing any
+conclusions from it. The unification of youth could never be achieved
+by the external centralization of partly opposed leagues, but only by a
+philosophy of life which had to be accepted by the young generation as
+a new law for life. Only the Hitler Youth represented this idea.
+
+The differences between the Greater German League and the HJ grew from
+day to day. Friction, even frequently actual fighting, were day-by-day
+occurrences. This state of affairs could not be settled by compromise.
+We could not be satisfied with incorporation of the Greater German
+League as, always the incorporation of a youth league into the HJ for
+us was not even discussed. As all of us once, and that during difficult
+times, gave our unconditional pledge to Adolf Hitler, especially today
+every young German must be able to do so [p. 35]. The so-called and
+often praised individual life [“Eigenleben”] of such leagues is, in the
+last analysis, nothing but another form of “joiner tendency”. “Either
+all or nothing” is the principle of National Socialism.
+
+The position which I gave to the HJ was not strong enough to overcome
+the last quaint introspection [Eigenbroetelei] within the youth. Nobody
+saw that as clearly as the Fuehrer who was convinced of the necessity
+of giving to the leader of the HJ that backing by the state which he
+needed for his work. When we discussed these things I asked the Fuehrer
+to refrain from attachment to one specific ministry, a wish which was
+readily recognized by the Fuehrer. The Fuehrer himself stated that a
+ministry cannot exist without bureaucracy, but bureaucracy is death to
+youth. He intended to create an agency which in its freedom should have
+the possibility to work. Thus, in the Reichs Chancellory, in the middle
+of June 1933, he appointed me Youth leader of the German Reich [Jugend
+fuehrer des deutschen Reiches] by clasping hands. Reich Minister Dr.
+Frick, as their competent minister for youth questions, drew up the
+respective document. I was given authority to appoint representatives
+of the states [Landesbeauftragte] to carry out my instructions and I
+appointed the district leaders to these positions in all the states in
+execution of my right.
+
+The first thing I did was to dissolve the Great German league. Since I
+headed all [p. 36] German youth organizations and I had the right to
+decide on their leadership, I did not hesitate for a moment to take
+this step, which was for the HJ the elimination of an unbearable state
+of affairs. The leader of the Great German Bund, Admiral von Trotha,
+set an example of rare human greatness to German youth when he, after
+the incorporation of all leagues and organizations had been completed,
+one day made an end to all the fights and quarrels of the past years
+and, after his appointment to Honorary Leader [Ehrenfuehrer] of the
+Navy Hitler Youth, devoted himself unconditionally to the service in
+Adolf Hitler’s youth movement. Only to great personalities it is given
+to put youth to shame and at the same time obligate by a noble example.
+At that time many a German boy will have asked himself if he would
+be able to act in the same way in a similar situation and honestly
+answered with a “no”. From an educational point of view it was the
+most important deed that the Admiral, after his organization had been
+smashed, again adjusted himself to the tasks of the new generation out
+of his military sense of duty and his love for youth. When, today, the
+blue columns of our Navy Hitler Youth pass by their honorary leader,
+their eyes are not only shining with enthusiasm for the Admiral who
+once at a grave hour won eternal honor for the German Reich, but they
+also know in their hearts that this man is part of [p. 37] themselves.
+Following the incorporation of the “Stahlhelm” into the SA we were
+able to carry out the incorporation of the “Scharnhorst”, the youth
+organization of the “Stahlhelm”. But the “Scharnhorst” had to give
+up it’s individual existence when it joined the HJ. The individual
+“Scharnhorst” boys were detailed to the local branches of the HJ. This
+step would never have been possible without the initiative of Reichs
+Minister Saldte who was completely convinced of the necessity to create
+a large youth organization, which, also according to his opinion,
+could only be the HJ. That the many small and unimportant groups and
+leagues were incorporated goes without saying and took place without
+any resistance. The Marxist youth as well as all political youth
+organization I prohibited after the occupation of the Reichs Committee.
+The one million members of the HJ which we had on 30 January 1933 had
+now grown to a round three million. Only the two large confessional
+groups, the Protestant and the Catholic youth, were opposed to us. They
+already had lost a great number of their members to us but they still
+remained powerful factors in the life of German youth. Again and again
+I called together the district leaders [Gebietsfuehrer] of the HJ in
+order to discuss this subject. Again and again these true and tenacious
+fighters announced: We won’t stop now. From the last boy to the Reichs
+Youth leader we agreed that the HJ never should and would give in as
+regards this question.
+
+
+                               Chapter 3
+
+              Hitler Youth and Confessional Youth [p. 38]
+
+Towards the end of 1933 discussion about the eventual incorporation of
+the evangelical youth took place between the newly appointed Reichs
+Bishop Ludwig Mueller and myself. With great satisfaction we from the
+HJ could ascertain that the Reichs Bishop was fundamentally ready to
+lead the members of the evangelical youth leagues into the HJ, a point
+of view which differed somewhat from that of the chairman of the Young
+Men’s Protestant Work [Evangelisches Jungmaennerwerk], Dr. Stange. Dr.
+Stange actually tried to interfere with this new development against
+the will of the majority of his followers, but without success. And
+in December 1933 the Reichs Bishop and myself were able to inform the
+Fuehrer that incorporation of the protestant youth into the HJ had
+become a reality.
+
+Through the agreement with the Reichs Bishop the HJ believes to
+have shown the way by which a later understanding with the Catholic
+Youth Leagues also would be possible. By this agreement evangelical
+youth organizations in the old sense, that is leagues, which overlap
+the activities of the HJ are no longer in existence. As spiritual
+communities the Protestant [p. 39] groups continue to live in their
+innate field, namely that of the Protestant creed. The HJ guarantees
+their protestant members a certain evening each week for their
+confessional, religious activities. The agreement with the Reichs
+Bishop follows verbatim:
+
+1. The Protestant Youth Work [Evangelisches Jugendwerk] recognizes
+the unified state political education of German youth by the National
+Socialist State and the HJ [Hitler Youth] as representatives of the
+philosophy of the State.
+
+The youth of the Protestant Youth Work below 18 years of age is to
+be incorporated into the Hitler Youth and its subordinated branches.
+Anyone within this age group who does not become a member of the HJ,
+from now on shall not be a member of the Protestant Youth Work.
+
+2. Education in regard to open air sports (including gymnastics and
+sports) and in regard to state politics, up to 18 years of age, shall
+take place only within the HJ.
+
+3. All members of the Protestant Youth Work shall wear the official
+uniform of the Hitler Youth according to their membership in the HJ.
+
+According to this agreement the Protestant youth was incorporated into
+the Hitler Youth. With very few exceptions the young followers of the
+Reichs Bishop were glad to be freed from the inner struggle of the past
+months [p. 40]. The Reichs Bishop acted like a true spiritual advisor
+of this young community when he, by this agreement, opened for them the
+doors to the HJ and thus the doors to the people and the State.
+
+The confessional youth league [Konfessioneller Jugendbund] has no right
+of existence in our time. While the young German in the period of
+National Socialism is drawn to the community and thereby the attitude
+and way of living of the HJ, sometimes some dark pang of conscience
+holds him back to give in to this urge, to follow really his innermost
+thoughts. Particularly the catholic youth societies led their members
+into moral conflicts for which an educator of the youth cannot account.
+By promises for a life beyond they tried to hold the youth back from
+the disinterested surrender to the state. As if the all powerful would
+condemn this service on the people and could see anything objectionable
+in it. Because the youth does not make any difference between poor and
+rich, Protestant and Catholic, I am accused of being a “heathen” who
+does not believe in anything and instills the seed of the antichrist
+in the hearts of the unsuspecting youth. And yet, considering the
+confessional composition of our people, a real community of our
+youth can only exist if confessional questions are not discussed in
+this community, special confessional leagues are not tolerated. The
+Christian doctrine is attacked in the HJ as little as any [p. 41] other
+doctrine; the HJ does not care for class or confession but only for
+the Germandom. In this sense my slogan is to be understood; “The HJ is
+neither Protestant nor Catholic, it is German”.
+
+The church proclaims its right for a religious education. An
+uncontested and uncontestable right. The state, on the other side,
+demands through the HJ to exercise the ideological, political education
+and here the state has a claim which is as valid as that of the church.
+In fact a number of Catholic youth leaders are not concerned with this
+religious education. They occupy their youth organizations with tasks,
+accomplishment of which falls into the domain of the HJ. Home evenings
+(social gatherings), hikes, camps, games, sports, and training do not
+need a confessionally directed leadership, and yet it is exercised
+stubbornly by a certain circle of catholic youth leaders. Instead of
+bringing the German youth together where it can be united and should
+be united, these so called educators and youth leaders try to present
+even the cooking on hikes as a religious matter and think the young
+boy’s soul could be harmed if he saw that outside of the Catholic youth
+organization other people lived. The fact that since National Socialism
+seized the power, about 1½ millions of youths from the camp of the
+Catholic youth organizations joined the HJ manifests that the spirit of
+the followers is better than that of the leadership and shows how in
+the long run confessional, bourgeois thinking must capitulate before
+German socialism.
+
+A short while after the National Socialist revolution the beaten
+political parties undertook another feeble attempt to keep at least
+the youth somehow. The attempt failed; the youth of the bourgeois
+parties pledged itself to the socialism of Adolf Hitler. The youth
+leagues followed this example. Even the Protestant youth recognized the
+demand of the time and followed in faithful fulfillment of their duties
+the voice of their conscience. But on the spot where once the proud
+Zentrum stood that we could see work hand in hand with the Marxist
+traitors of the people in the Reichstag, there stands today a group of
+the Catholic youth organizations and opposes the “We” of our community
+with the “I” of their societies.
+
+Who wants Germany without compromise is an arch-enemy of any
+confessional principle in a state organization. Who would retreat here
+a hand’s width and be he a minister of the new Germany, would betray
+the tragic fight of the German people for its freedom. May the German
+people recognize the lesson of the last thousand years and for the
+first time proclaim an unconditional negation of all separating forces.
+
+There is no reason why there should not be found a solution in the
+question of the youth education to the satisfaction of the church as
+well as of the HJ, so much the more as the HJ does not restrict in
+any way the religious activities of its members. Neither attendance
+at the Sunday services nor participation in other church gatherings
+is being made difficult for the Catholic Hitler boys on the part
+of the leadership of the HJ. If, on the occasion of some big youth
+demonstrations which don’t take place too often, it was occasionally
+difficult for technical reasons to make it possible for the young
+people to attend church services it is by no means an indication of a
+sometimes alleged “anti-religious” attitude of the HJ. I even am of
+the opinion that religious meetings and arrangements in particular
+religious youth leagues are not at all in contradiction to the
+totalitarian claim of the HJ. Every effort which aims to deepen and
+intensify religious life must not only be welcomed by a responsible
+youth leadership but also be furthered. I believe to have shown by the
+treaty with the Reich bishop of the Protestant church that the HJ is
+willing to concede necessary space to the religious youth education.
+However, it must be demanded that under the cover-name of religious
+education the youth should in no way be influenced politically.
+The experiences of the past taught us that the confessional youth
+organizations do not occupy themselves exclusively with religious
+questions. The National Socialist movement as pillar of the state
+cannot be blamed if by reason of past experiences it makes security
+arrangements which should ban all dangers for the future.
+
+If the church visits of the youths do not correspond the expectations
+of the churches, it is not the fault of the youth. The real cause
+of this attitude of the youth is to be looked for in the want of
+comprehension with which some catholic youth leaders and unfortunately
+too many priests oppose the education of the HJ. They believe not to
+be able to part with the sport education of the catholic youth and
+overlook that the religious education itself suffers by the fight over
+the competences.
+
+Many Catholic Germans look with disgust at the mean fight which certain
+catholic youth leaders lead today for their existence and hundreds
+of thousands of catholic Hitler boys don’t have any appreciation of
+it that there should exist outside the HJ sport a catholic sport and
+catholic calisthenics. As faithful Catholics they stick to the church
+but they cannot see why this church demands all of a sudden territory
+which has nothing to do with religious education.
+
+No reasonable man in Germany can give a reason for the necessity of
+the existence of catholic youth organizations in their present form
+(catholic boys scouts, “German Jugendkraft”, etc.) and many important
+leaders of the catholic church have long been of the opinion that these
+organizations have no right of existence in the National Socialist
+state. The catholic youth itself--this I maintain by reason of the
+continuous going over, even of whole groups to the HJ--wants to
+cooperate in the National Socialist state. And not as confessional
+specialist league but as HJ.
+
+Catholics and Protestants have the same rights in Germany. This is
+not only valid for their relationship to the state but especially for
+their relationship to the National Socialist movement. If, however,
+the catholic youth is advised not to join the HJ, then this part
+of the German youth is deprived of a right which today every other
+young member of the community possesses. “Give to the emperor what
+is the emperor’s and to God what is God’s”. This profound wisdom of
+Christ shows us even today the possibility to terminate the tension
+between HJ and confessional youth organization. If the HJ leader works
+exclusively according to the instructions given to him and only cares
+for the ideological (that is to say the physical, mental and moral)
+education of the youth in his charge in Adolf Hitler’s sense and the
+priest just as exclusively for the religious, moral education within
+direction of the church and is nothing but a German servant of God, all
+prerequisites of a peaceful and confident work are given.
+
+For the solution of the catholic youth question in Germany there is
+but one way, which is agreeable to both parties; The Catholic youth
+organization restricts itself to the spiritual realm and gives up the
+expensive and unnecessary administration and leadership apparatus
+of the general presidents and secretaries [General praesidenten
+und sekretaere]. If the priest of every locality cares spiritually
+for the youth as part of his community, the church has sufficient
+occasion to exercise its religious education. The thought, to appoint
+Protestant and Catholic so called field chaplains or HJ chaplain
+is against our comradeship and therefore cannot be accepted. If a
+celebration of the National Socialist youth is held by a catholic and
+protestant clergyman, every boy and every girl feels the difference
+of the confession as a wall between them. Where a short while ago two
+young Germans marched shoulder to shoulder goes then a Catholic and a
+Protestant and with them the sorrow of the German history.
+
+Unity and community then becomes disunity and cleavage. Then the two
+millions of the great war would really have died in vain and so would
+the dead of the Feldherrnhalle [p. 47]. And those twenty one who as
+pioneers of the new unity were hunted to death by the Marxists and
+“Zentrum” leaders won’t belong to us any more.
+
+But we are spirit of their spirit. The idea for which they died is also
+the idea of our life. Their fight is our destiny [pp. 64-65].
+
+Self-leadership of youth is not to be understood from the bureaucratic
+point of view that every one at the age of 30 must resign from
+leadership. The principle: “Youth must be led by youth” is to be
+understood according to its meaning and not literally. Therefore, I
+principally do not apply any age limit. All set patterns are deadening.
+
+Germany is the country of the youth movement. Youth movement and youth
+self-leadership of youth are inseparable. It is not the purpose of the
+youth movement to give to young people a possibility to satisfy any
+power instincts. On the contrary, youth leadership means to be more
+severe with oneself than with the following. The HJ is a school for
+leaders. A leader in the true sense of the word is always the creative,
+the disciplined one.
+
+Therefore, the way to leadership shall be made difficult for a boy.
+If he is destined for it he will overcome the difficulties. But never
+shall there be another key to the gate of leadership than achievement.
+It is a matter of indifference who holds the key, the son of a worker,
+the son of a peasant or the son of a scientist. Only one thing is
+decisive: He must be of the aristocracy of achievement, of the only
+aristocracy which is known to the new youth [pp. 68-69].
+
+A single will leads the HJ. The power of authority of the HJ leaders,
+that of the smallest as well as of the largest unit is absolute,
+i.e., he has the unlimited right to give orders because he bears the
+unlimited responsibility. He knows that the responsibility of the
+higher one comes before that of the lower ones. Therefore, he submits
+silently to the instructions of his leaders even if they are directed
+against him personally. To him as well as to all young Germany the
+history of the HJ is proof of the fact that a youth community also
+can only be successful if it unconditionally recognized the authority
+of leadership. The success of National Socialism is a success of
+discipline. The structure of National Socialist Youth is built on the
+foundation of discipline and obedience. The teachings of the time of
+persecution apply even more to the period of victory and power. The
+small boy [Jungvolkjunge] who joins the movement of Adolf Hitler at the
+age of ten learns to subordinate his own little will to the laws which,
+strictly followed, are building states and making nations happy but
+which, when violated, result in the loss of freedom, in the collapse of
+folkdom. In the course of the following years he learns that discipline
+and subordination are not inventions of despotism that they have not
+been created by a few with a lust for power in order to secure their
+personal positions but that they are the prerequisites for the life of
+the nation and thereby for his own life.
+
+The great value of the organization for the youth lies in the
+following. In the circle of boys of his own age he gains, partly while
+playing, a knowledge which must be employed, especially to the life of
+the adult. And while he is being trained for discipline in a manner
+corresponding to his emotional life and his capacity to learn, he will
+see that his blind obedience affords the possibility of success to his
+group [Gefogschaft]. What is acquired in young years in the struggle
+with small tasks later serves the state in its big tasks.
+
+
+                               Chapter 4
+
+                       Work Abroad [pp. 154-162]
+
+The Reich Youth leadership does not pursue foreign politics.
+
+The Fuehrer created the Office of Foreign Affairs for the foreign
+activities of the National Socialism. What is done within the Foreign
+Department of the Reich Youth leadership never means an overcrossing of
+Party offices and State offices. The HJ deals with the youth and not
+with big politics. And even where the youth contacts the youth of other
+nations to exchange young people for study trips or camps, contact is
+made outside the political sphere. It is the purely human agreement
+of youth among themselves which in this way the Reich Youth leadership
+attempts to achieve.
+
+During the last year the most important meetings between German and
+foreign youth were:
+
+  The visit of the HJ in Hungary.
+
+  The counter visit of the Levente youth in Germany.
+
+  The German-English Youth Camp near Hamburg.
+
+  The trip of Department Leader Nabersberg to England and Turkey.
+
+  A lecture of Karl Nabersberg in Paris on the occasion of a meeting of
+    the “Sohlbergkreis”.
+
+  The visit of a Finnish Study Group [Studiengesellschaft].
+
+Also on the occasion of the visits of foreign youth leaders (i.e.
+Greek, Chinese and Japanese) to the Reich Youth leadership, contacts
+were made with foreign youth organizations.
+
+Every nation has the interest that its youth has a political outlook
+reaching as far as possible. Especially the National Socialist Germany
+is strongly interested that her youth knows and respects other nations
+as early as possible. The better the youth of Europe understands
+each other, the nicer for the future. A basic principle of the youth
+exchange is: no propaganda. Hitler boys who go abroad do not travel
+as propagandists of National Socialism; their task is not to teach,
+but to learn. They should see the beauty of the foreign landscape and
+explore the national characteristic of the host-country. I believe
+in a cooperation of the European youth at the basis of an agreement;
+its only program point should be: to know each other. It would be an
+utopian idea to believe that such a cooperation would improve the
+world. Probably the world would not improve but the people could become
+juster. In this connection we welcome the international exchange of
+pupils and only desire that it might be extended beyond the circle of
+pupils to the youth of all professions. The activity of the Foreign
+Department of the Reich Youth leadership is not only concerned with
+the relationship of the HJ to the youth of other nations, although
+this field is most clearly in evidence. It cares, in close cooperation
+with the League for Germandom Abroad [Volksbund fur das Deutschtum im
+Ausland], for the youth of the German settlements abroad, in Europe and
+South America, and awakens in the Reich German Youth the understanding
+for the brothers and sisters abroad.
+
+In a special main branch, the Central Office for Volksdeutsche Youth
+Work [Mittelstelle fuer Volksdeutsche Jugendarbeit], which took over
+the main tasks of the Central Office of German Youth in Europe, which
+in 1933 was attached to the organization of the Reich Youth leadership,
+the following fields are being worked on:
+
+  1. Borderland trips and trips abroad of the entire German youth.
+
+  2. “Volksdeutscher” labor service.
+
+  3. Schooling in the Reich of German youths living abroad.
+
+The borderland trips and trips abroad offer the possibility to give the
+young Germans abroad the contact with the new Germany by Reich German
+Youth hiking groups in form of performances (folk songs, folk dances
+and plays performed by laymen). At the same time, a selection by these
+youth hiking groups should be made in the German settlements abroad
+among those who appear suitable as youth leaders and therefore are to
+be called to the Reich for schooling.
+
+All borderland trips and trips abroad of youth hiking groups and
+individual youth hikers have to be authorized by the hike office of the
+central office. Thereby the hikes of the “wild hikers” should finally
+be prevented which were not always to the good of the German reputation
+abroad. On the other side the hikes should be arranged according to a
+certain plan, so that they can be directed into certain sections where
+a visit seems really appropriate.
+
+A special task of the central office is the so-called Volksdeutsche
+Labor Service which has the task of a systematic schooling of German
+Youth leaders living abroad. In four specially suited labor camps the
+sense of the labor service is clearly demonstrated to the Germans
+living abroad by special schooling methods, in order that they can
+apply what they learned in their home organization.
+
+Another branch of the Foreign Department has the task to combine the
+Reich German boys and girls inasmuch as is possible in youth groups in
+which National Socialist ideas are conveyed to them. To this effect
+the groups receive books and youth literature free of charge and
+especially such which establish the spiritual contact with the Reich
+German HJ. The work program provides the establishment of schooling
+camps of several weeks duration for German youths from abroad who above
+all should convey to the future leaders the experience of the present
+fatherland. Through our own press service, the Foreign Department tries
+to protect the rights of the German youth abroad in the Reich German
+Press. The daily appearing press service “Space of the East” [Ostraum]
+brings short news about the movement of the German youth organizations
+abroad and the German school abroad for Lithuania, Letland, Esthonia,
+Poland, Czechoslovakia, Austria, Rumania, and Yugoslavia. Another
+paper “The School Review for Germans Abroad” [Die Auslandsdeutsche
+Schulschaù] is delivered to a great number of German schools of higher
+learning. Furthermore the branch participates in the youth periodicals
+published by the Reich Youth leadership or in cooperation with it, and
+furnishes the German daily newspapers with articles of a principle
+nature about questions of the youth abroad, as well as the German
+newspapers abroad with news from the Reich and the German groups beyond
+the frontier. The branch “Press” in the Foreign Department is thereby
+the rallying point for the news on the movement of the German Youth
+abroad and the schools in the Reich for the Germans abroad.
+
+The branch “School” of the Foreign Department is of special importance.
+Its task is essentially to communicate to the HJ sufficient knowledge
+about the Germandom of the borders abroad and of foreign politics.
+To carry through the schooling in the units, borderland and foreign
+lecturers were appointed who on central instruction of the chief
+lecturer had to carry out the schooling in the individual units. The
+first instruction week for lecturers abroad on a systematic execution
+of the training program, was held from 4 to 10 December 1933 in
+Potsdam. The training program uses the following aides:
+
+  1. A regularly appearing schooling-letter with a publication of 65,000
+
+  2. Literature on the subject in general which is distributed to the
+     lecturers abroad
+
+  3. The periodical “People and Reich”
+
+  4. Contributions in newspapers and periodicals
+
+The training of the co-workers staff is to be extended by a number
+of additional training weeks and by supply of training material and
+establishment of competent libraries in the Oberbanne. Furthermore,
+special attention for the localities less than 100 km from the frontier
+is intended.
+
+The colonial branch keeps awake the memory of the cultural, scientific,
+economic and military achievements in the former German colonial
+territory within the organizations under the order of the Reich Youth
+leadership. Beyond this, the German youth shall be informed about the
+importance of colonial possession for the supply of the home economy
+with colonial products and raw materials. It will be taken into
+consideration concerning this schooling that the guiding line of the
+German population policy which aims at the utilization of the space
+in the East will not be violated. In the historical schooling the
+“colonial-guilt-lie” and the thereby intended defamation of the German
+people--also in regard before the colored nations--will be emphasized
+and it will be pointed out that equal terms for the German people are
+only obtained when these parts of the Versailles shame dictate are also
+rectified.
+
+Special colonial lecturers who are assigned to the headquarters of
+the HJ and BDM down to the Bann and Unterbann will attend to the
+carrying out of these tasks. These lecturers also will be prepared for
+the solution of their tasks in courses in the Reich Leader School in
+Potsdam and within the districts and subdistricts. The literature at
+present on hand about colonial questions which, however, is only for
+limited use for the schooling within the HJ since it was written under
+different political conditions, will be put at the disposal as work
+material. New material, in accordance with timely requirements, is in
+preparation and will serve in the future as basis for all work. The
+youth should be informed every three months by a “schooling-letter”
+about everything worth while in the field of the colonial question
+which should come down to the sub-leaders of the whole HJ and BDM. In
+this direction, friendly cooperation with the biggest society, the
+German Colonial Society, takes place; material is exchanged. As much as
+the promised shipping space is available, members of the HJ (colonial
+lecturers) should be sent to the former German colonial territories so
+that they can learn at the spot the present-day conditions and give the
+Germans there a sign of our attachment. Supported by what they have
+seen and lived, they should after their return work here to enlighten
+the HJ in the country.
+
+It would lead us astray to go into the details of the activities of
+the Foreign Department. Generalobergebietsfuehrer Karl Nabersberg
+devoted much energy to these duties and gave up even the leadership of
+the staff of the Reich Youth leadership with which he was charged for
+a time in favor of this task which had his particular interest. The
+thought that every Hitler boy and every BDM girl regardless in which
+part of the world they are, form a great comradeship and march together
+in spite of local separation in one direction and live and work in the
+same spirit was realized by the Foreign Department of the Reich Youth
+leadership.
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1462-PS
+
+                1939 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 709
+
+     First execution order to the law for the HITLER YOUTH (General
+                      Regulation) of 25 March 1939
+
+ Based on Article 4 of the law for the Hitler Youth of 1 December 1936
+               (Reichsgesetzblatt I, page 993), I Order:
+
+
+                               Article 1
+
+1. The youth leader of the German Reich is solely competent for all
+missions of the physical, ideological and moral education of the entire
+German youth of the Reich area outside of the house of the parents and
+the school. The competence of the Reichminister for science, education
+and public orientation remains unaffected as far as private education
+and social education are concerned.
+
+2. The following problems are transferred from the sphere of action
+of the Reich and Prussian Minister for science, education and public
+orientation to the sphere of action of the youth leader of the German
+Reich:
+
+  All affairs of youth care, the youth hostel system as well as of the
+  accident and liability insurance in the interest of youth care.
+
+  The question of competence for the year’s service on farms [LandJahr]
+  is left to a special regulation.
+
+3. The youth leader of the German Reich with the Hitler youth is
+subordinated to the Financial authority of the NSDAP.
+
+
+                               Article 2
+
+1. The Cadre Hitler Youth [Stamm HJ] exists within the Hitler Youth.
+
+2. Whoever was a member of the Hitler Youth since 20 April 1938, is a
+member of the Cadre Hitler Youth.
+
+3. Juveniles, who have had at least one year of good conduct in the
+Hitler Youth, and fulfill the conditions of ancestry for the acceptance
+into the NSDAP, may be accepted into the Cadre Hitler Youth. More
+specific regulations will be issued by the Reich Youth leader of the
+NSDAP in agreement with the Fuehrer’s deputy.
+
+4. The acceptance into the Cadre Hitler Youth of persons over 18 years
+of age, who are to be used in the leadership and administration of the
+Hitler Youth, can take place immediately.
+
+5. Only the Cadre Hitler Youth is an affiliate of the NSDAP.
+
+6. Membership in the Cadre Hitler Youth is voluntary.
+
+
+                               Article 3
+
+The Reichminister of the Interior will appoint the national agencies,
+subordinated to the youth leader of the German Reich, in agreement with
+Fuehrer’s deputy and the Reichminister of Finance.
+
+
+                               Article 4
+
+The members of the Hitler Youth are entitled, and are obliged, if
+ordered, to wear the prescribed uniform.
+
+  Berlin, 25 March 1939
+
+                                       The Fuehrer and Reichs Chancellor
+                                                            Adolf Hitler
+
+                                               The Deputy of the Fuehrer
+                                                                 R. Hess
+
+                       The Reichsminister and Chief of Reich Chancellery
+                                                             Dr. Lammers
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1463-PS
+
+                         Diary of the Navy 1944
+
+      The Commander in Chief of the German Navy, Admiral Doenitz.
+
+      “This war is a naval war and it will be decided on the High
+                        Seas.”--Admiral Doenitz.
+
+Admiral Karl Doenitz was born in Berlin-Gruenau on 16 September 1891,
+the son of an Engineer. He attended school in Berlin, Jena and Weimar.
+He entered the Imperial German Navy as a cadet on 1 April 1910 and
+was promoted to Lieutenant on 27 September 1913. As an ensign he was
+ordered to the light cruiser “Breslau”. There he witnessed the outbreak
+of the first world war when he was in the Mediterranean sea. His
+experiences while on this cruiser which later became the “Midilli” of
+the Turkish Navy he described in a little book published during the
+last war while he was a lieutenant (jg). The title of the book was
+“The cruises of the ‘Breslau’ in the Black Sea”. Doenitz who served
+as watch officer and adjutant received the Iron Cross 2nd class on 7
+January 1915. For a time he was air observer near the Dardanelles and
+subsequently in charge of a naval aviation squadron near San Stefano.
+On 5 May 1916 he received the Iron Cross first class and in the fall of
+that year returned to Germany.
+
+For a long time it had been the young officer’s burning desire to
+become an officer on a submarine. This wish of the young lieutenant
+(jg) was fulfilled when he was ordered to submarine school 2
+December 1916. This proved decisive in the life of this officer
+who indefatigably worked for the development of his weapon. Doenitz
+became at first watch officer on the Submarine “U-39” whose commanding
+officer, Lt (sg) Forstmann was one of the most successful submarine
+officers of the last war. Inspired with great daring, Forstmann was an
+officer who knew how to train aggressive and responsible commanders.
+Doenitz always remembers with special gratitude the decisive influence
+of his former teacher. After an artillery course Doenitz on 1 March
+1918 became Commander of “UC-25” and later “UB-68”. With these boats he
+carried on successful warfare against merchant shipping in the Atlantic
+and the Mediterranean.
+
+Lt. (jg) Doenitz placed himself at the disposal of the German Navy,
+dishonorably mutilated by the Versailles dictate, and aided in its
+reconstruction. He became a staff officer; he took over, during the
+attempted coup d’etat of Kaff, the command of the torpedo boat V5
+which was usable but without a commander. For three years then he was
+commander of a torpedo boat, and became afterwards officer in charge
+of torpedo inspection and for another three years filled a responsible
+position with the Naval High Command. After one year’s sea duty as
+navigation officer on the light cruiser “Nymphe” Doenitz became chief
+of the first squadron of Torpedo boats newly built for the German Navy.
+In the fall of 1928 Doenitz was promoted to lieutenant commander.
+While Doenitz already earlier was making plans for the reconstruction
+of the German U-boat fleet his new position for the first time, gave
+him the opportunity to put down his experiences and suggestions in
+the form of memoranda written for his superiors and other influential
+personalities. During this time, the organizational plans and other
+prerequisites were already formulated which made possible the
+subsequent rapid construction of new German U-boats. This was followed
+by another period during which he attended service schools and
+undertook sea duty. On one of his trips he went to India for several
+months. In 1934, he became Commanding officer of the Light cruiser
+“Emden” which at that time undertook a cruise in the Indian Ocean.
+
+When in 1935 Doenitz returned from this trip the Commander in Chief of
+the German Navy during a tour of inspection in Wilhelmshaven told him
+to his surprise that he was appointed Chief of the “Weddigen” U-boat
+flotilla. From this date, 27 September 1935, started the ceaseless
+construction of the new U-boats. At first two 250-ton boats were
+built. Doenitz lately promoted to Commander, devoted himself to his
+new duties with passionate zeal and after untiring day and night work
+he was able in a very short time to present an extensive plan for the
+reorganization of U-boat warfare. Again Doenitz donned his working
+clothes to drill and train his young officers, personally and with
+pitiless pace. He succeeded in closing a gap of 17 years, during which
+no training took place, with a few months of tireless work. Day after
+day, night after night, week after week he stood on the bridge of one
+of his U-boats indoctrinating the men in his charge, by hard thorough
+training, with the spirit of the men who manned the submarines during
+World War I. At the same time he collected new technical experience
+and new improvements in the development of different submarine types.
+Doenitz knew no let-down for himself. Regardless of weather, season or
+time of day he went with the boats, instructed and trained their crews,
+and led them through thousands of miles in the Baltic and North Sea * *
+*
+
+One must recall, that after World War I a skillfully directed British
+propaganda campaign created a world-wide general impression that the
+submarine as a naval weapon was a thing of the past since superior
+defensive measures had been instituted, namely the convoy system, and
+that in future naval engagements, submarines would be of only secondary
+importance. Commander Doenitz’ opinion was diametrically opposite; “The
+massing of boats in convoy must be answered by massing of U-boats to
+attack the convoy.” This maxim became the basis of his whole training
+program. The wolf pack tactics which later became so famous were
+originated and tested at a time of complete peace. The cruises in the
+Baltic and North Sea were followed by the first Atlantic maneuvers *
+* * Doenitz surrendered personal command over the U-Boat only after
+the number of flotillas increased, in order to devote himself to
+higher tasks of leadership. After the outbreak of the war, about 4
+years after the first U-boats were commissioned, the new weapon was in
+excellent condition and carried the stamp of a personality which was
+our ideal combination between commander and front-line officer. Doenitz
+on 28 January 1939 was promoted Commodore of U-boats and entered the
+war with but 40 of his elite boats. They attacked immediately within
+the first day. And at once this new weapon was a brilliant success.
+On 18 September 1939, Doenitz received a cluster to the Iron Cross
+1st class, for his success in the Baltic during the Polish campaign.
+When the position of “leader of U-boats” was changed into that of
+“Commander” Doenitz was promoted to Rear Admiral on 1 October 1939.
+* * * Prien went to Scapa Flow. There was a fighter. He knew it and
+said over and over: “I was only the paw of the Big Lion. What I did,
+I could do because I was his disciple.” All the “old guard” thought
+the same way and so did the commanding officers who returned to their
+bases with flags of victory flying. The crew likewise was inspired by
+the old man. With unparalleled enthusiasm and matter of factness, they
+undertook every dangerous mission against the life-line of the enemy
+who controlled the sea, a control which they undermined, and brought
+again the terror of the U-boats to the Seven Seas to the surprise of
+the whole world. In an endless chain, the U-boat Commanders reported
+success after success to their chief. In spite of the fact that his
+duties took on unmeasurable proportions since the beginning of the
+huge U-boat construction program the Chief was what he always was and
+always will be, leader and inspiration to all the forces under him.
+A clear regard for the essential and the decisive, power to act and
+aggressiveness are his main characteristics. In spite of all his duties
+he never lost touch with his men and he showed a masterly understanding
+in adjusting himself to the changing fortunes of war.
+
+Doenitz was in charge of the Naval operations Command Post situated on
+land. It is one of the strange and difficult characteristics of this
+form of Naval warfare that the Commander cannot be with his men, cannot
+make decisions on the spot but is forced to study the situation and
+give orders thousands of miles away from the actual location. The very
+strong ties between Doenitz and his men proved themselves in this case.
+They never felt, and that was said many times in mess halls and on
+enemy missions, that they had to make any of their difficult decisions
+alone. Tiny, brief answers following rendered radio reports proved that
+the Chief day and night was monitoring painstakingly their reports just
+as if he was with them, as if he stood on the bridge beside them * * *
+
+On 21 April 1940 Doenitz received the Knight’s Cross to the Iron Cross,
+a reward of the Fuehrer, which put the unique accomplishments of this
+battle-tested officer in its true light. On September 1940, he was
+promoted to Vice Admiral, a year and a half later on 14 March 1942
+he was promoted to Admiral, a reward for the heavy damages inflicted
+on the new enemy, the U.S.A. On 30 January 1943 Doenitz received the
+Supreme Command of the Germany Navy from the Fuehrer and concurrently
+was promoted to Gross Admiral.
+
+For the huge successes of the U-boats Doenitz received on 7 April
+1943 in recognition of his unique achievements in U-boat warfare from
+the Fuehrer personally as the 223rd Soldier of the Wehrmacht, the Oak
+Wreath to the Knights Cross of the Iron Cross.
+
+Even though the field of activity of the C in C of the German Navy has
+experienced a tremendous extent on his personal leadership in U-boat
+warfare and the personal care for his submarines, sailors, and for all
+units of the German Navy will also in the future remain the supreme law
+of all his action. Confidence merits confidence. The navy of Greater
+Germany will prove that it is worthy of its C in C.
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1472-PS
+
+                                [CABLE]
+
+                                                   Date 16 December 1942
+
+                             URGENT--SECRET
+
+  TEXT:
+
+In accordance with the increased recruitment of manpower into the
+concentration camps, which was ordered by 30 January 1943, the
+following may be applied in the Jewish sector.
+
+1. Total amount: 45,000 Jews.
+
+2. Start of transportation 11 January 1943.
+
+3. Completion of transportation 31 January 1943.
+
+The Reichsbahn [German State owned railway] cannot make available
+special trains for the evacuation during the period 15 December 1942/10
+January 1943 on account of the increased leave traffic of the Armed
+Forces.
+
+4. Breakdown: The 45,000 Jews consist of 30,000 Jews from the
+Bialystock district, 10,000 Jews from the Theresienstadt Ghetto. Among
+those are 5,000 able-bodied Jews who, so far, have been utilized in
+the Ghetto for necessary minor jobs, and 5,000 Jews who are generally
+incapacitated; also Jews over sixty years of age, in order to reduce
+in the interest of the extension of the Ghetto the excessive number
+of inmates to slightly below 48,000. I request special permission for
+this. As heretofore, only the Jews who have no special connections and
+relations, and who have no important decorations, have been earmarked
+for deportation; 3,000 Jews from the occupied areas in the Netherlands,
+2,000 Jews from Berlin which equals 45,000. In the total of 45,000
+are included physically handicapped [underlined] and others (old Jews
+and children). In making a distribution for this purpose, at least
+10,000 to 15,000 laborers [underlined], will be available when the Jews
+arriving at Auschwitz are assigned.
+
+                             The Chief of the security police and the SD
+                             Dept. IV, Div. B, Sec. 4, a-2093/42 g (391)
+
+                                                By Order of      MUELLER
+                                                       SS Gruppenfuehrer
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1481-PS
+
+                                          3.2.28 [in pencil], Fi 6/25 1.
+
+  Secret State Police
+  Munich State Police District Office
+  B. No. 52401/37 11 B.
+
+                                               Munich, 20 January, 1938.
+
+                                 Decree
+
+By virtue of par. 1 of the Reich President’s order for the protection
+of people and state of the 28.2.33 (RGBl 1 p. 83) the following decree
+is issued:
+
+The Guild of the Virgin Mary [die Marianische Jungfrauenkongregation]
+of the Bavarian diocese, including the diocese of Speyer, together
+with its branches and associations and the Societies of Our Lady
+[Jungfrauenvereinen] attached to it, is by police order to be dissolved
+and forbidden with immediate effect.
+
+The property belonging to the dissolved Guild is to be confiscated by
+the police. Not only is property in cash to be confiscated, but also
+any stock on hand and other objects of value. All further activity is
+forbidden the dissolved Guilds, particularly the foundation of any
+organization intended as a successor or as a cover. Incorporation
+as a body into other women’s societies is also to be looked on as a
+forbidden continuation of activity. Infringement against the above
+prohibition will be punished according to para. 4 of the order of
+28.2.1933.
+
+                                Reasons
+
+In a parish in Nurnberg the Guild of the Virgin Mary, going outside
+the sphere of the work proper to it, has occupied itself for years,
+to a most far reaching degree, with arrangements of a worldly and
+popular sporting character. Furthermore the president of the society
+has continuously supplied the Guild of the Virgin Mary, from its
+committee-members down to the women in charge of its groups, with
+seditious material, which served for seditious discussions. Furthermore
+the Guild of the Virgin Mary, particularly its leading circles, were
+trained and mobilized for purely political and seditious tasks.
+
+The whole behaviour of the Guild of the Virgin Mary had therefore to
+be objected to from various points of view. It could be repeatedly
+observed that the Guild engaged in purely worldly affairs, such as
+community games, and then in the holding of “Social Evenings”.
+
+This proves incontestably that the Guild of the Virgin Mary was active
+to a very great degree in a manner unecclesiastical and therefore
+worldly. By so doing it has left the sphere of its proper religious
+task and entered a sphere of activity to which it has no statutory
+right. The organization has therefore to be dissolved and forbidden.
+
+                                                         Signed. Beutel.
+
+  certified copy--[signature illegible]
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1482-PS
+
+                                                    Berlin, 20 July 1935
+
+  The Reich and Prussian Minister of the Interior
+  III P 3701/5
+
+                                 Secret
+                        Special Delivery Letter!
+
+                                                                 [Stamp]
+
+               The Reich Governor in Bavaria 22 July 1935--one enclosure
+                                                      Sign: Fi 6 July 22
+                                       [apparently signature, illegible]
+
+SUBJECT: Confessional youth organizations.
+
+A direct endangering of public security and order has resulted from
+the recently observed intensive activity of confessional, particularly
+Catholic youth organizations, which have in numerous cases considerably
+overstepped the limits imposed on them by political development and
+therefore in many places led to clashes with the organizations which
+stand behind the government, particularly the Hitler youth.
+
+I therefore respectfully request that, on the basis of paragraph 1 of
+the decree of 28 February 1933, the confessional youth organizations
+be forbidden to wear uniforms or uniform-like clothing and to assemble
+publicly with pennants and flags and that the wearing of insignia and
+the wearing of uniform costume as a substitute for uniforms as well as
+any outdoor sport activity be prohibited.
+
+I respectfully request that I be immediately informed of your
+disposition (of the matter).
+
+                                                       Signed: Dr. FRICK
+                                        certified: [signature illegible]
+                                       Ministerial Chancellery Secretary
+                                                [stamp] settled 1 August
+
+To the provincial governments (for Prussia: to the deputy chief and
+inspector of the Prussian secret state police)
+
+Munich M                                           [signature illegible]
+
+                                 Copies
+
+  To Reich Minister Kerrl, Reich Minister for Science, Education,
+    and Public Training, and the Reich governors with a request for
+    cognizance.
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1498-PS
+
+     The Reich and Prussian Minister of the Interior, VI 7770/3014
+
+                               Berlin NW 40, Koenigsplatz 6, 6 Nov. 1934
+                                      [telephone numbers, cable address]
+
+                                                                 [Stamp]
+
+                      Reich Governor of Bavaria 7 Nov 1934----enclosures
+                                                              GG 1/7 .m.
+
+                        SPECIAL DELIVERY LETTER
+
+To the State Governments for Prussia:
+
+  _a._ The Prime Minister--office of Secret State Police.
+  _b._ The Minister of Science, Art and Public Education.
+  _c._ The provincial Presidents and District Presidents.
+
+_For Information_
+
+  To The State Secretary and Head of the Praesidium Chancellery.
+
+  The State Secretary and Head of the Reich Chancellery.
+
+  The Minister of Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda.
+
+  Reich Governors (of the States).
+
+  Executive Board of the NSDAP, Division for the Cultural peace in
+    Berlin.
+
+  The Reich Bishop in _Berlin-Charlottenburg_.
+
+Subject: Evangelical Church Controversy.
+
+Lately there is an increase in cases in which ill-timed reports
+regarding the Evangelical Church reach the public. I therefore
+forbid--till further notice--all publications in the daily newspapers,
+in pamphlets or handbills, which are concerned with questions of
+the Evangelical Church, except only official announcements of the
+Church Government of the Reich. My edicts of 17 August 1934--III
+3033/3014--and of 1 November 1934--III 7570/3014--are to that extent
+abrogated.
+
+                                                          [signed] FRICK
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1514-PS
+
+Command of Mil. District VI
+
+Dept. of Prisoners of War V Az. K 3 Nr. 1417/44 secret.
+
+                                         Soest, Westphalia, 27 July 1944
+                                                        Phone: 1455/140.
+
+                                 SECRET
+
+  Reference: 1. OKW Az. 2f 24. 19b Chief of PW/general (Id) Nr. 1998/44
+                secret of 16.7.44
+
+             2. OKW Az. 2f 24. 19b AWA/PW general I (VIb) Nr. 2339/42
+                secret of 27.8.42
+
+             3. Mil. District VI, dept PW’s Az. K 8/a Nr. 751/42 secret
+                of 4.9.42
+
+             4. Mil. District VI, dept PW’s V Az. K 18/VI Nr. 1948/44 of
+                11.7.44
+
+             5. OKW Az. 2f 24. 11 Chief of PW/general (VIa) Nr. 979/43
+                secret of 19.4.43--reported by decree Mil. District VI,
+                dept PW’s Nr. 1015/43 secret.
+
+             6. Mil. District VI, dept PW’s Az. K 8 R Nr. 314/42 secret
+                of 7.4.42
+
+             7. Mil. District VI, dept PW’s V, Az. K 11 Nr. 1125/44
+                secret of 11.7.44
+
+Subject: Delivery of prisoners of war to the secret state police.
+
+Enclosed is the decree I referred to.
+
+The following, summarizing ruling is issued with respect to the
+delivery to the secret state police:
+
+1. _a._ According to the decrees 2 and 3, the commander of the camp
+has to deliver Soviet prisoners of war in case of punishable offenses
+to the secret state police and to dismiss them from imprisonment of
+war, if he does not believe that his disciplinary functions suffice to
+prescribe punishment for violations committed. Report of the facts is
+not necessary.
+
+_b._ Recaptured Soviet prisoners of war have to be delivered first to
+the nearest police office in order to ascertain whether punishable
+offenses have been committed during the escape. The dismissal from
+imprisonment of war takes place upon suggestion of the police
+office, Section A 6 of the decree referred to in No. 4 regarding the
+contraction of all regulations on the Arbeitseinsatz prisoners of war
+who have been recaptured and refuse to work.
+
+_c._ Recaptured Soviet officers who are prisoners of war, have to be
+delivered to the _Gestapo_ and to be dismissed from imprisonment of
+war. (Section C 1 of the decree referred to under 4 and under 5).
+
+_d._ Soviet officer prisoners of war, who refuse to work and those who
+distinguish themselves as agitators and have an unfavorable influence
+upon the willingness to work of the other prisoners of war have to be
+delivered by the responsible Stalag to the nearest state police office
+and to be dismissed from imprisonment of war. (Section C 1 of the
+decree referred to under 4 and 5).
+
+_e._ Soviet enlisted prisoners of war, refusing to work who are
+ringleaders and those who distinguish themselves as agitators and
+therefore have an unfavorable influence upon the willingness to work of
+the other prisoners of war, have to be delivered to the nearest state
+police office and to be dismissed from imprisonment of war. (Section C
+2 of the decree, referred to in 4).
+
+_f._ Soviet prisoners of war (enlisted men and officers), who with
+respect to their political attitude have been sifted out by the
+special purpose command [Einsatzkommando] of the security police and
+the security service, have to be delivered upon request by the camp
+commander to the special purpose command and to be dismissed from
+imprisonment of war. (Decree referred to in 6).
+
+_g._ Polish prisoners of war have to be delivered if acts of sabotage
+are proven, to the nearest state police office and to be dismissed from
+imprisonment of war. The decision rests with the camp commander. Report
+of the deed is not necessary. (Decree referred to under 7).
+
+2. A report on the delivery and dismissal from imprisonment of war
+in the cases mentioned under #1 of this decree, to the Mil. District
+Command VI, dept of prisoners of war, is not necessary.
+
+3. Prisoners of war from all nations have to be delivered to the secret
+state police and to be dismissed from imprisonment of war, if a special
+order of the OKW or of the Mil. District Command VI, department for
+Prisoners of War, is issued.
+
+4. Prisoners of war under suspicion of participating in illegal
+organizations and resistance movements have to be left upon request to
+the Gestapo for the purpose of interrogation. They remain prisoners of
+war and have to be treated as such. The delivery to the Gestapo and
+their dismissal from imprisonment of war has to take place only by
+order of the OKW or of the Mil. District Command VI, dept of prisoners
+of war.
+
+In case of French and Belgian prisoners of war and interned Italian
+military personnel, approval of Mil. District command VI, dept. of
+prisoners of war, has to be obtained--if necessary by phone--before
+delivery to the Gestapo for the purposes of interrogation.
+
+By order of the Mil. District Commander
+
+                                       The commander of prisoners of war
+
+                                                              The deputy
+                                                          [signed] FLEMM
+
+1 enclosure.
+
+Distribution:
+
+  Oflag VI/A, B, C, D.6,
+
+  Stalag VI/A, C, D, F, G, J.326 (VI/K)
+
+  Construction work battalion of PW (BAB) 6, 7, 12, 17, 18, 26, 35, 39,
+    45, 46, 106.
+
+  PW Roof repair battalion VI, XVI
+
+  PW Glass installation Battalion VI, XVI
+
+  District commander rear area of PW/Z.V. Staff/Counter intelligence
+    officer
+
+  file 5
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1517-PS
+
+                               TOP SECRET
+
+                               MEMORANDUM
+
+ About Discussions [of Rosenberg] with the Fuehrer on 14 December 1941
+
+To begin with, I [Rosenberg] asked the Fuehrer about my speech in the
+Sportpalast and referred to several points which seemed to call for
+further discussion. The Fuehrer was of the opinion that the speech was
+given prior to the declaration of war by Japan and therefore under
+different suppositions, but in view of this, still desires to think
+over several points. It probably would not be appropriate if I were
+to officially say that the provinces in the East were to remain under
+Germany. I said thereupon that I, too, had considered this point, that
+one can probably only say that the Eastern Provinces [Ostland] will
+remain under German protection. The Fuehrer was of the opinion, only to
+go so far that the provinces never would come under communism and now
+from the German side appear as secured.
+
+I remarked on the Jewish question that the comments about the New York
+Jews must perhaps be changed somewhat after the conclusion (of matters
+in the East). I took the standpoint, not to speak of the extermination
+[Ausrottung] of the Jews. The Fuehrer affirmed this and said that they
+had burdened the war upon us and that they had brought the destruction;
+it is no wonder if the results would strike them first.
+
+The Fuehrer further said that he did not deem it necessary to order
+forth the other nations to contribute as yet, since they can produce
+therein a legal claim for later. He does that from time to time in
+single negotiations. I told him that I, too, had written that down
+as a question. I would comply with these instructions to edit more
+carefully the corresponding paragraphs in my speech. The Fuehrer agreed
+throughout that I had touched upon the Asiatic conflict.
+
+Following, I laid before the Fuehrer the outline of a religious
+tolerance decree, to which the Fuehrer consented after careful
+consideration.
+
+Then I came to talk about the lecture of Professor Schuessler, to
+whom Dr. Dietrich had given instructions to evaluate the political
+testament of Peter the Great in an address. Dr. Dietrich had not
+previously informed me thereon. Upon my indication that this testament
+is a forgery out of the 18th Century, the Fuehrer thought that the
+authenticity was contradicted by a German scholar in the 19th Century.
+Thereupon I pointed out that this so-called testament was written in
+Polish circles and that it then was converted and changed by Napoleon
+in the political strife. However, I would make an accurate check. I
+asked the Fuehrer for a general rule that if the Fuehrer had specific
+desires over the press to have Dr. Dietrich inform me of these to
+insure a regulated working arrangement.
+
+The Fuehrer replied to the question by the military commanders in the
+occupied Eastern territories about the marriage of persons belonging
+to the Armed Forces with inhabitants of these territories that no
+marriages will be permitted during this war. After the war a relaxation
+could be introduced to agree with the political limits and blood
+relationship.
+
+I then spoke about the relation with Reich Commissioner Koch and told
+the Fuehrer that Koch had, through various declarations, created the
+impression among the officers of the High Command of the Armed Forces
+(OKW) as if he dealt directly with the Fuehrer and otherwise decided
+to rule without Berlin. Similar utterances that he made the law were
+made to collaborators and he also told me once that he regarded himself
+as coordinated. I made it clear to him that here exists a distinct
+official relation. I spoke with him regarding the above and I hope that
+clarification over the cooperation will result. I have only the wish
+that the Fuehrer no longer will receive Koch alone but only in my
+presence. The Fuehrer agreed immediately.
+
+Then I told the Fuehrer of the visit by General Kitzinger, who said
+that he was assigned with the thrashing of the harvest. For this
+purpose he was promised several divisions which have not yet arrived.
+Moreover, they took from him other units. The Fuehrer said that he
+would see to it that a change will be enforced and that divisions will
+be given him. On the conditions of the captured prisoners Kitzinger
+remarked that because of malnutrition [Entkraeftung] in the camps in
+his territory, some 2500 prisoners die daily. Anyhow, they are already
+unable to consume good food and one must count on it that not very many
+will remain. Aside from that, the manpower in the country is large
+enough--the land even partly over-populated.
+
+I further asked the Fuehrer if he had scrutinized the memoir on the
+establishment of Turkish legions. What I surmise, since the High
+Command of the Armed Forces (OKW) issued an order, is that beside the
+Turkish-Aserbeidschander Legion, other Caucasian legions will be set
+up also. The Fuehrer affirmed the question, and I once more referred
+to the danger of a Panturanian movement. I reported further about the
+petition of the Crimean tartars from Constantinople and the request
+to visit the prison camps and to inspect the countrymen. I told the
+Fuehrer that I had denied this request which he absolutely affirmed.
+The only thing one could do would be to segregate the 250 captured
+Crimean tartars with respect to Turkey, and to handle them accordingly.
+In conclusion, the Fuehrer once more emphasized that he later wished
+to have the Crimea cleaned out. I told him that I, too, had given
+much consideration to the renaming of the towns and thought to rename
+Simferopol to Gotenburg and Sevastopol to Theodorichhafen--this
+according to the instructions of the Fuehrer himself.
+
+Then I suggested a boundary settlement between Nikolajew and
+Transnistry to the Fuehrer, because the way things are, the Rumanians
+can look into all the shipbuilding installations; just an insignificant
+regulation will prevent this. I had also made this suggestion to
+General Field Marshal Keitel. The Fuehrer looked at the map and agreed
+to such a boundary regulation.
+
+Finally, I told the Fuehrer that I had in mind to go to Riga in January
+and to visit other territories during the next year. I begged the
+Fuehrer to allow me to obtain several coaches for a special train. I
+have already started dealings over the procurement of such coaches in
+Holland. The Fuehrer thought this all right and agreed with my wish.
+
+Thereupon I gave the Fuehrer an aforementioned letter of a Japanese
+scholar over the Japanese and National Socialistic Philosophy of Life
+as related to Christianity, over which we talked for a long time. The
+Fuehrer took the memoir with him, which immediately engrossed him.
+
+  Berlin, 16 December 1941
+
+  R/H
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1519-PS
+
+     The National Socialist German Workers Party Party Chancellery
+
+                                                    Fuehrer Headquarters
+                                                               30.9.1941
+
+  The Director of the Party Chancellery
+
+             [Stamp]
+
+  Gau Training Office, Franken
+  No. 2131
+  Received 8 Oct. 41
+  Sent
+
+                              CONFIDENTIAL
+
+                    Circular No. 21/41 Confidential
+
+                         (not for publication)
+
+_Subject: Treatment of Soviet Prisoners of War_
+
+For your information please find enclosed a regulation of the Supreme
+Command of the Armed Forces, dated 8.9.1941 on the treatment of Soviet
+prisoners of War. This regulation is _confidential_!
+
+                                                            Heil Hitler!
+
+                                                            sgd. Bormann
+
+One appendix overleaf
+
+Certified:
+
+Distribution:
+
+  Gauleiters
+  Kreisleiters
+
+       #       #       #       #       #
+
+  Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
+  Az. 2f 24.11 General Armed Forces Dept./P.W. (I)
+  No. 3058 41 Confidential
+
+                                           Berlin--Schoeneberg, 8.9.1941
+
+  2 Appendices                                       Badenschestrasse 51
+
+                              CONFIDENTIAL
+
+  _Subject_: Regulation for the treatment of Soviet prisoners of war.
+
+  _Reference_: 1. OKW/P.W. 26/41 Most Secret dated 16.6.1941 (only for
+                  the P.W. commandants in Service Command I and the
+                  General Government).
+
+               2. OKW/P.W. 2144/41 Secret dated 26.6.1941.
+
+               3. OKW/P.W. 2401/41 Secret dated 17.7.1941.
+
+               4. OKW/P.W. 15 No. 5015/41 dated 2.8.1941
+
+Appended is a collation of and/or additions to the orders already
+issued in various directives on the treatment of Soviet prisoners
+of war. The directives, already issued by Supreme Command General
+Headquarters for the operational areas, have been considered. By this
+order any orders on this subject become invalid so long as no direct
+reference is made to them in the appendix.
+
+                        Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
+
+  By order of
+
+                                                                Reinecke
+
+       #       #       #       #       #
+
+                                          Appendix to Diary--No. 3058/41
+                                            Confidential dated 8.9.1941.
+
+                              CONFIDENTIAL
+
+Regulation for the treatment of Soviet PWs in all prisoner of war camps.
+
+I. _Treatment of Soviet PWs in general._
+
+_Bolshevism is the deadly enemy of Nazi Germany._ For the first time,
+the German soldier is encountering not only a military opponent, but
+one, at the same time, steeped in the ideas of Bolshevism so pernicious
+to the people. The fight against National-Socialism has become part
+of his system. He conducts it by every means in his power: Sabotage,
+seditious propaganda, incendiarism, murder. The bolshevist soldier has
+therefore lost all claim to treatment as an honourable opponent in
+accordance with the Geneva Convention.
+
+It is therefore in keeping with the respect and honour of the German
+Armed Forces, that _every German soldier_ should hold himself severely
+aloof when dealing with Soviet prisoners of war. Treatment must be
+cool but correct. Any indulgence or even friendly disposition is to
+be punished very severely. The feeling of pride and superiority of
+the German soldier ordered to guard Soviet PWs, must at all times be
+visible even in public.
+
+The order for ruthless and energetic action must be given at the
+slightest indication of insubordination, especially in the case of
+Bolshevic fanatics. Insubordination, active or passive resistance must
+_immediately_ be broken completely by force of arms (bayonets, butts
+and firearms). The regulations on the use of arms in the Armed Forces
+can be applied only to a limited extent as these regulations apply
+under the assumption that _conditions will be generally peaceful_. With
+Soviet PWs it is already necessary for reasons of discipline, that the
+use of arms should be severe. Anyone carrying out an order, who does
+not use his weapons or does so with insufficient energy, is punishable.
+
+PWs attempting to escape are to be fired on without previous challenge.
+No warning shot must ever be fired. The regulations already made, in
+particular H. Dv. 38/11, page 13, etc., are invalid with regard to that
+point. On the other hand, no arbitrary action is permitted. PWs who
+are obedient and willing to work are to be treated correctly. However,
+caution and mistrust must never lapse when dealing with PWs. The use of
+arms against PWs is, as a rule, legal.
+
+Any contact between PWs and the civilian population must be prevented.
+This applies particularly to the occupied area. The segregation of
+higher-ranking PWs (Officers and NCOs), which has already been effected
+by the field forces, must be strictly maintained in the area of the
+Armed Forces Commanders and within the Reich. Any communication between
+higher-ranking personnel and the men, even by signs, must be rendered
+impossible.
+
+Camp-police must be formed from suitable Soviet PWs in the camp and in
+the larger fatigue details to be employed in carrying out the orders
+and upholding the discipline of the commandant. Within the wire fence,
+the camp police may be armed with sticks, whips or other similar
+weapons to enable them to carry out their duties effectively. The use
+of this kind of weapon by _German soldiers_ is absolutely forbidden.
+With the offer of better food, treatment and accommodation, an
+executive body should be created in the camp; this would decrease the
+work of the German guard personnel.
+
+
+II. _Treatment of members of racial groups._
+
+In accordance with orders issued to date, PWs have already been
+divided up, according to their race, in the “Home Organisation”
+[heimatorganisation] (General Government and Service Command I) as
+well as in the camps within the Reich. The following racial groups are
+concerned:
+
+  Racial Germans
+  Ukrainians
+  White Russians
+  Poles
+  Lithuanians
+  Latvians
+  Esthonians
+  Rumanians
+  Finns
+  Georgians.
+
+In so far as it has been impossible for special reasons to carry
+out this separation, it must now be done at once. This applies, in
+particular, to PWs newly captured in the Area of the Armed Forces
+Commanders.
+
+Members of the following racial groups must be speedily sent home:
+
+  Racial Germans
+  Ukrainians, White Ruthenians
+  Latvians
+  Esthonians
+  Rumanians
+  Finns
+  Lithuanians
+
+Special orders will be issued on the manner in which this release is to
+be effected.
+
+Should the attitude of individual members of these racial groups arouse
+the suspicion that they could be detrimental or dangerous to the German
+people or to National-Socialism, they are to be debarred from release
+and will be dealt with in accordance with section III.
+
+
+III. _Segregation of civilians and politically undesirable PWs taken
+     during the Eastern campaign._
+
+1. _Intentions._ The Armed Forces must rid themselves of all those
+elements among the PWs which must be considered as the driving
+forces of bolshevism. The special conditions of the Eastern Campaign
+demand _special measures_ which can be carried out on their own
+responsibility, free from bureaucratic and administrative influences.
+
+2. _The way to reach the appointed goal._ A. Apart from directing PWs
+into camps according to their nationality (see section II) PWs (also
+members of racial groups) and any civilians in the camps are to be
+divided as follows:
+
+  _a._ those politically undesirable
+
+  _b._ those politically harmless
+
+  _c._ those especially reliable in the political sense (who could be
+       employed in the reconstruction work in the occupied areas).
+
+B. Whereas the work of separation according to nationality, rank, etc.,
+is undertaken by the camp organisation itself, the Reichsfuehrer-SS has
+assigned _Special purpose units of the Security Police and the Security
+Service_ for the work of classifying PWs according to their political
+opinions. They are immediately subordinate to the Chief of the Security
+Police and the SD, have received special training for their special
+duties and carry out the measures and inquiries, within the framework
+of the camp organisation, according to regulations which they have
+already received from the Chief of Security Police and the SD.
+
+There must be the closest cooperation between the commandants,
+especially their defense officers, and the special purpose units.
+
+3. _Further treatment of groups segregated in accordance with No. 2._
+A. _Military personnel._ The special purpose unit of the Security
+Police and SD decides what persons are to be segregated as “politically
+undesirable elements”. Should individuals, considered as suspicious,
+later prove themselves to be _unsuspicious_, they should be sent back
+to the camp with the other PWs. Requests made by the special purpose
+units for other persons to be handed over, must be complied with.
+Officers will very often be liable for segregation as “political
+undesirables”. Even soldiers captured in civilian clothes, count as
+military personnel.
+
+B. _Civilians._ If they are harmless, efforts must be made to send them
+back quickly to the occupied area. The competent Armed Forces Commander
+(and/or the commander in the army area to the rear) decides the time
+this is to be brought about, with the approval of the competent office
+of the Chief of the Security Police and SD. The condition for this
+return is the assurance of employment in some work in their hometown
+or in specially created Labour-formations. The Armed Forces Commander
+(and/or the commander in the army area to the rear) is responsible for
+guarding them on the return journey. If possible, the camp will provide
+an escort unit. Politically undesirable civilians are to be treated as
+under A.
+
+C. _Reliable persons_ are to be separated from politically undesirable
+persons and directed into some other work of camp administration.
+
+(Special attention must be paid to racial Germans: it is, however quite
+possible that, even among these, there may be elements that must be
+considered as “politically undesirable”.)
+
+Should the reliable persons seem especially suited for employment in
+the reconstruction work in the occupied area, a request for release
+made by the special purpose unit of the Security Police and SD can be
+opposed only if there is an interest in any specific individual from
+the point of view of defense.
+
+
+IV. _Employment of Soviet PWs._
+
+1. _General._ Soviet PWs may be employed only in squads completely
+separate from civilians and PWs of other nationalities. (Employment
+in groups). The only places of work which can be considered are these
+where the PWs can work under the _constant_ supervision of the guard
+personnel. The separation from civilians and PWs of other nationalities
+must be enforced, not only in the billets, but also at the place of
+work. It must be stressed, in this connection, that the guard personnel
+must not be prevented from immediate use of their weapons out of
+consideration for a third person.
+
+2. _Special regulations for employment within the Reich._ The main
+principle for the employment of Soviet PWs within the Reich, is the
+assured security of German life and German property.
+
+The Armed Forces authorities in charge of employment have the sole
+responsibility for the orderly employment of Soviet PWs.
+
+Therefore, employment, first and foremost, must be taken up in work
+connected with the Armed Forces. In the case of employment in the civil
+sector, the local employment authorities can make suggestions, but
+the decision, contrary to the regulations on the employment of other
+PWs, rests with the Armed Forces authorities. In cases where all the
+conditions for constant supervision and complete separation from the
+civilian population cannot be complied with by a civilian place of work
+employment cannot be approved. Should one of these conditions lapse
+later on, the fatigue detail is to be withdrawn forthwith.
+
+In addition, the instructions OKW/PW (15) No. 5015/41, dated 2.8.41 is
+to be followed in detail. Anyone breaking it will be severely punished.
+
+3. _Guard duties._ The best possible trained energetic and prudent
+guard personnel are to be chosen to guard the Soviet PWs and constantly
+instructed by the Training Officer of the Military base camp [A. O. des
+M. Stammlagers].
+
+At least one guard must be assigned to each 10 PWs. There must,
+however, never be one guard alone on duty. Should a fatigue detail
+consist of _no more than_ 10 men, 2 guards must be employed to guard
+them. Guards should be equipped with hand grenades if possible. Those
+guarding larger squads must also be issued with machine guns or
+sub-machine guns.
+
+Places of work must be frequently examined by officers or experienced
+NCOs. They are responsible for seeing that the orders given are carried
+out to the letter.
+
+The notes, attached as an appendix, are to be made available for
+thorough and detailed perusal.
+
+The billets of Soviet PWs on fatigue details are to be under constant
+guard, even at night, and are to be inspected from time to time by the
+supervising authorities.
+
+
+V. _Final remarks._
+
+PW-commandants are to be made personally responsible that under
+all circumstances the above regulations are strictly observed by
+subordinate units. This duty may in no case cease or be influenced by
+a change in offices. Therefore all offices and units newly concerned
+and employed in this sphere must be made thoroughly acquainted with the
+content of the regulations.
+
+       #       #       #       #       #
+
+  Appendix to the Order of OKW/Gen. Armed Forces Dept. PW section No.
+         3058/41 Secret dated 8.9.1941 (for free distribution!)
+
+           Notes on the guarding of Soviet Prisoners of War.
+
+
+_Bolshevism is the deadly enemy of Nazi Germany_
+
+For the first time in this war, the German soldier is encountering
+not only a military opponent, but one, at the same time, politically
+educated, who sees in communism his ideal and in National-Socialism,
+his most provocative enemy. In the fight against National-Socialism,
+every method is, to him, legal: sniping, guerrilla warfare, sabotage,
+incendiarism, seditious propaganda, murder. Even a Soviet soldier in
+captivity, however harmless he may appear on the surface, will snatch
+any opportunity to show his hatred of everything German. It is quite
+possible that the PWs received corresponding instructions on how to
+act in captivity. It is essential, therefore, to treat them with the
+utmost vigilance, the greatest caution and complete mistrust.
+
+The principles to be followed by guard personnel are:
+
+1. Ruthless action at the slightest indication of insubordination
+or disobedience. Weapons are to be used unsparingly to put down
+resistance. PWs attempting to escape are to be fired on immediately
+(without a challenge) with the firm intention of hitting them.
+
+2. Any _conversation_--even on the march to and from the place of
+work--unless it concerns absolutely necessary official instructions,
+is _utterly forbidden_. No smoking at all is allowed on the march to
+and from the places of work--as well as during work. In the same way,
+all conversation between PWs and _civilians_ is to be prevented, if
+necessary by force of arms--even against the civilians.
+
+3. At the place of work also, a constant and careful supervision by
+German guard personnel is required. Each guard must always _keep a
+sufficient distance_ from the PWs to enable him, at any time, to use
+his weapons _without delay_. Never turn your back on a PW.
+
+4. Slackness is out of place even with a _PW who is obedient and
+willing to work_. He interprets it as weakness and draws his own
+conclusions.
+
+5. When German soldiers are ruthlessly carrying out given orders with
+all severity and harshness, any arbitrary action, maltreatment and,
+above all, the use of clubs and whips is forbidden. This would be out
+of keeping with the honour of German soldiers as armed men.
+
+6. The appearance of seeming harmless on the part of bolshevist PWs
+must never lead to the slackening of the above instructions.
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1520-PS
+
+ Notes about a discussion with the Fuehrer at the Fuehrer Headquarters
+                        on the 8th of May 1942.
+
+  Present at first Reich Minister Dr. Lammers [also Bormann and
+    Rosenberg, the author of the notes].
+
+I began with reporting to the Fuehrer about the results of the 1941/42
+collection of the NSDAP of books for the German Armed Forces resulting
+in more than 9 million books, from which 46,000 libraries were formed.
+
+Then I dealt with certain reproaches raised against the Ministry East.
+The article in the “information service” of the Ministry for Propaganda
+concerning construction and aims of the Ministry East appeared without
+any knowledge whatsoever on my part. I had, as a matter of principle,
+agreed with the Ministry for Propaganda that no publications whatsoever
+regarding the occupied Eastern Territories should be published without
+my express consent. This became essential because even ministers talked
+about the “_Policy of Colonisation_” in the East.--Then it was also
+said that I had declared 650 men as unfit for war service and thus
+deprived the armed forces of them, and that I also left 90 officers
+without work as an advance command in Taganrog. I want to state that,
+because of the newly reinforced decree, the Ministry East has handed
+over 650 men; however, up to a few weeks ago only 240 men have been
+called away. As concerns the 90 men in Taganrog, this is not a measure
+taken by me but by the Economic Staff East and the armed forces
+armament staff, resp. Therefore, this matter was none of my affair.
+Furthermore, this advance commando has been dissolved.
+
+As regards the resettlement of the Germans from Lithuania, the Fuehrer
+said that he was under the impression that people who had already
+settled here would have to be resettled again. I told the Fuehrer that
+it was not so, this was a matter concerning more than 30,000 settlers
+capable of resettlement who were still detained in camps and who were
+worn down by the prolonged camp life.
+
+At last I referred to the new Molotov memorandum regarding supposed
+horrors and our economic measures, which, as a matter of fact, refers
+to some statements in the so-called “Green Folder” of the economic
+staff East of the 4-year Plan. Presumably such statements had been
+discovered on the body of a shot agrarian leader; a year ago I had
+already expressed my concern about the too-clearly expressed tendencies
+of those statements. A number of agrarian leaders already had been
+killed, also three territorial commissioners already have been killed
+fighting the partisans.
+
+Thereafter I described to the Fuehrer the considerations which caused
+me to grant _self-administration_ to the Baltic countries. First of
+all this was not proclaimed by Law, but it was only my _decree_ to the
+Reich Commissioner with the corresponding directives. In practice it
+meant nothing beyond a confirmation of an already existing state of
+affairs and the abolition of a certain uncertainty. We were very short
+of officials and were thus forced to be most economical with human
+material. However, frequently efforts were noticeable to meddle with
+the trivialities of life which necessitates new demands and withdraws
+too many soldiers from the armed forces. It left the doors open for
+some people to escape army service. Furthermore, self-administration
+was connected with an increased willingness to work. After all there
+were enough safety clauses whereby the self-administration could not
+undertake anything without the sanction of the Commissioner General.
+In order to eliminate any possible political danger, an exception
+has been made with _Riga_. Riga has 10-12,000 officials and was to
+receive a German mayor who is not subordinated to the Lithuanian
+self-administration. Thereby a personal political policy of the
+Lithuanian Directorate would be avoided. By this measure Riga would be
+an experiment for annexed administration.
+
+We also created an historical alibi and had demonstrated that we were
+meeting the Baltic nations more than half way. If at a later date this
+would not be acknowledged, we had every justification to proceed more
+drastically. The Fuehrer kept all decrees and regulations in order to
+examine them. Yet during the whole of the report he made no comments.
+
+Afterwards the Fuehrer asked how all those economical measures were
+looked upon by the part of the Germans, whereupon I replied that, of
+course, the entire economical management was in German hands, and
+that this fact had produced a deterioration of the morale. Generally
+speaking the monopolistic companies and the ZHO [Zentralhandelsges.
+Ost--Eastern Central Trade], are fundamentally necessary, only they
+have to be supervised. Dr. Lammers interjected that private profits had
+to be throttled in order to avoid too strong a group of profiteers.
+I once more referred to the question of monopolies and wished to
+ascertain whether the Fuehrer intended an absolute tobacco monopoly
+for here, whereupon he declared that he was particularly interested in
+the retail monopoly. The question of arranging for the producers could
+still be settled at a later date. I replied that the economic leaders
+have not yet agreed upon the question of the producers. The opinion is
+frequently prevalent, that the production itself need not necessarily
+be a direct state monopoly. I told the Fuehrer that I shall have the
+whole question examined once again.
+
+Then the problem of _religious freedom_ for the occupied Eastern
+territories was discussed. The Fuehrer consulted Reichsleiter Bormann,
+who already had gathered much experience by the preparations for
+the Wartheland and for Austria. I explained the situations in the
+East was that various large ecclesiastical groups being formed, but
+that one should not allow such development to take place without
+supervision, but that one ought to direct same and that the intended
+decrees, respectively orders, were for the purpose of protecting
+us from unanticipated surprises. Bormann entirely agreed with this
+attitude, he merely questioned if the Reichminister East, who also had
+some standing in Germany, would not produce too close a dependency
+by a law which might have repercussions inside the Reich. What was
+to be understood under “religious freedom” was to be interpreted
+_by the Churches_, and he could anticipate, that such a law would
+produce hundreds of new letters and complaints on the part of the
+churches within the Reich. The Fuehrer considered a number of twists
+and forms which would eliminate such a danger, and after discussing
+its suitability the Fuehrer read the decree and gave his consent.
+Finally it was agreed that the whole question was not to be settled _by
+myself_ in the form of a law, but that the Reich Commissioners take the
+existing religious freedom so to speak for granted and would decree
+the necessary executive orders. I was then to watch the development
+continuously and retain the executive control. It is easily possible
+that the leaders of the churches in the Ukraine would combine in order
+to elect a patriarch. I pointed out that this was already the case for
+all practical purposes and that a steering of the matter is necessary.
+The Fuehrer asked me if I really thought that all the Ukrainians
+were faithful adherents of the church. I replied that with the older
+generation and the women it was certainly the case, the youth were
+already somewhat unaccustomed to church. Furthermore I had transported
+from Kiev to Berlin the “Atheist Museum”. In this the writings of the
+national writer of the Ukraine, Schewischenko, are quoted and may be
+possible to publish them in the Ukrainian language in a sense which
+in truth was not for the church. Also such freedom of expression of
+opinion has also to be guaranteed. Moreover the Fuehrer emphasized
+that after the war he would proceed against the churches with the
+fitting measures; he believed that he was still able to do something
+because of his authority which at a later date would be difficult for
+anybody else. He would not forget the attitude of the church during the
+war. I told the Fuehrer that I carried out church political lectures
+in a small circle in my lecture house in Dahlem, in which the whole
+problem was thoroughly examined, so that in the future the necessary
+ideological fight would also be carried out with the necessary
+knowledge and on the necessary scale.
+
+Then the treatment of the countries which were Germany’s wards was
+discussed. I pointed out that some representatives interpreted the
+point of view of the master race, by travelling up and down the
+country with the whip. It is true, formerly one used to say of the
+Slavs that they liked to be thrashed. But this had changed radically.
+Now the situation was that the public thrashing meant the same as for
+the Orientals “the losing of face.” Even the Bolshevics mistreated
+the prisoners abominably behind the walls, but never in public view.
+A number of incidents had occurred caused by thoughtless talk. It
+is necessary that our foreign representatives also know how _to
+keep silent_. The Fuehrer read the draft of my decree for the Reich
+Commissioner Ukraine and gave his consent to it.
+
+I then described to the Fuehrer the reception of the _three delegations
+of farmers_ in grateful acknowledgment of our agrarian legislation
+and produced all our propaganda, such as circulars, pamphlets,
+posters, translations of German writings, etc. The difficulty here,
+too, was that it had taken a long time until the 18 waggons could be
+transported. A part had remained in the Government General. The whole
+action was very successful. I then submitted to the Fuehrer photographs
+of Ukrainian men and women who were working in the Heinkel works. The
+Fuehrer expressed his surprise at the extraordinary good looks and even
+beauty of the people.
+
+I then dealt with the _employment of foreign workers_ in the occupied
+Eastern territories. I had appointed a special delegate for this who
+had been very active lately to cultivate all those existing connections
+and to institute new ones. At first the Danish minister Larsen had
+travelled the Eastland with the General-Director Junker who was
+the chief of the Danish committee for employment in the East. This
+journey already had produced tangible, practical results: in Port
+Kunda a large cement works was being rebuilt, the machinery would be
+delivered within a few weeks. After an initial starting time about
+75,000 tons of cement will be produced annually. Further erections of
+cement works would be possible. The completion of peat works could now
+be prepared in order to benefit from it in the following year. Two
+experts had to be sent there, and within a few weeks one could start
+with the installations. The same applies to large plaster factory,
+to the completion of concrete and wooden shoe factories. Since it
+will probably become impossible in the future to continue to provide
+the population with leather shoes. The factory will be capable of a
+daily output of 10,000 shoes. Furthermore, a number of other business
+plannings are also being considered. Especially the oil factory at
+Libau is ready to be taken over, also creameries, shipbuilding plants,
+etc. All those works thus promise a considerable increase in production
+for the coming years. Negotiations had taken place also with the Dutch,
+and Reich Commissioner Seyss Inquart had just now submitted a first
+draft regarding the employment of Dutch people in the region of Libau.
+It is planned to hand over to the Dutch people 500,000 ha of land to
+be cultivated under stipulation that after delivery of all that is
+claimed by the German administration, they are permitted to export
+the surplus to Holland. Some of the details had still to be settled.
+The Fuehrer thought one could as a matter of principle admit Dutchmen
+to the East, because if there were not more than 1000 people, then
+they would be absorbed. He did not wish large colonies. The matter
+was left undecided, to be thoroughly investigated. Moreover the DAF
+German Workers Front had bought a wharf at Varna in order to tackle the
+building of concrete ships.
+
+I then reported to the Fuehrer the planning of central office for
+planning in the East, and I gave him the names on the committee for the
+general policy, economics, etc. The supreme authorities of the Reich
+had sent their emissaries. Naturally nothing would be done at this
+stage in which might somehow hamper the war production.
+
+Then the discussion turned to Caucasia and _the policy of the AA_
+[Foreign Ministry] towards the Eastern territories. I reported to
+the Fuehrer that, for some time, we had picked out the best of the
+prisoners by commissions of the Ministry East. The OKW had now
+established the Turkestan Legion through direct collaboration with
+us. According to my information received from the manager of chief
+section “Policy”, the camp is in perfect condition, the Commander has
+learned the Turkestan language, and the Turkestans have accepted German
+military terms and have an anti-Bolshevist attitude. The legions of the
+Caucasians would be modeled on similar lines. If one had not in the
+beginning on the part of the SD, called all those peoples “Asiatics”,
+had them shot or left to their fate, there would be more troops at the
+disposal of the German Reich today. A new flag was created for the
+Turkestan legion, the half moon was done away with and in its place
+put bow and arrow. I showed the Fuehrer the individual symbols for the
+designs for flags for the Georgians, Armenians, Aserbeidschanians,
+Cubancossacks, and Kalmucks. The Fuehrer had no objections against
+these designs, however, he asked my opinion about the Armenians.
+I stated that Armenia was the best bolt between Turkey and
+Aserbeidschan, and thus could stop a Panturanian movement towards the
+East. Generally speaking the Armenian people themselves are stationary,
+a people of farmers who had considerable industrial skill.
+
+I then described to the Fuehrer our relationship with the Foreign
+Ministry. The Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs claimed the political
+handling of the Eastern territories, in as far as it has not been taken
+over directly within our administration. I said that the Reich Foreign
+Minister had formed a large Eastern committee and had despite our
+protests convoked in increasing measure the most varied emigrants. I
+read to the Fuehrer a list of emigrants from Turkey, from Paris, from
+Switzerland, all of whom were staying at the Adlon Hotel in Berlin.
+Two of them, according to our information, were well-known espionage
+agents. I thought it extremely risky to assemble here these emigrants
+from all parts of the world. The Fuehrer listened in surprise. I said
+that we prepared years ago already for the Eastern question. In this
+connection we had made possible the studies of Dr. Benzing and assigned
+him upon request for a certain period to the AA. The AA then created
+for him a separate department for planning and appointed him to be a
+Regierungsrat [Advisor of the Government].
+
+It subsequently refused to return him to us. The same applies in the
+case of the Turkestanian Kayum. The questions had long been discussed
+with him. We had merely loaned him to the AA for the purpose of
+broadcasting propaganda. Now the AA was sending him to Paris, in order
+to collect emigrants. The Fuehrer gave the strictest instructions to
+the Reich Minister Dr. Lammers, to inform the AA officially that it
+had to discontinue its activities in the East instantly. It was also
+to release the retained personalities to the Ministry East, and he did
+not wish any further inquiries. I further explained that I had talked
+to State Secretary v. Weizsaecker a few weeks ago and requested him
+to inform the Reich Foreign Minister that I was looking forward to
+speaking to him personally. Weizsaecker said that the two points of
+view differed. When Weizsaecker was asked about it after some time, he
+said that he did not understand from this talk that _he_ was to arrange
+the meeting between Ribbentrop and myself. We have interpreted this
+remark that the matter was to be put off until after the Congress of
+emigrants had been convoked in Berlin. Some days ago we were informed
+by a liaison man of the AA that they did not at all consider the
+attitude which I had reported to the Fuehrer in regard to the Caucasian
+people, as binding for them but that it was of a purely private
+character. The Fuehrer once more emphasized his point of view.
+
+I then reported to the Fuehrer on the work of the preparatory
+reconstruction staffs. With the exception of a few personalities whom
+the Fuehrer preferred not to have employed or preferred to be used
+in Germany the Fuehrer accepted the proposed list of personalities.
+The tasks of Reich Minister Speer and his relationship with me were
+then thoroughly discussed. The Fuehrer said that he, for example,
+had made the worst experiences in regard to the matters of railroad
+traffic by the fact that the Government General had its own railroad
+administration between the front lines and the Reich. Because of these
+circumstances a lot of misunderstandings and frictions were caused.
+The separate administrations did not function and interfered with the
+uniform technical direction so that very nearly catastrophic conditions
+resulted, if the _entire_ administration of railroad traffic had not
+been transferred to the Reich Ministry of Communication. Only by these
+means had it become gradually possible to increase the daily number
+of trains from 125 to 220. For the construction of main thoroughfares
+and armament works it is also necessary that a central office has
+control, and Speer already proved at the beginning of his official
+duties that he knew how to tackle a job well. He succeeded to solve
+many a technical task in very short time, which normally would have
+taken months, and he, the Fuehrer, was most satisfied with this choice.
+I told the Fuehrer that I had promised my utmost support to Speer from
+the very beginning and that I had accepted in principle his first
+drafts for an arrangement, with the only exception of two points, that
+is this arrangement should remain in force beyond the duration of the
+war and secondly, that the department Chief of the O.T. [Organisation
+Todt], who should have a rank of about Oberregierungsrat, should be
+able to pass a decision against the Reich Commissioners.
+
+The Fuehrer thereupon stated repeatedly that the Reich Ministry Speer
+would be dissolved on the very day peace was declared and all his
+present tasks would be split up. The management of the artery roads
+through the East, however, had still technically to be centrally
+conducted. They are, therefore, tasks for the immediate war effort.
+Speer also neither has the intention nor the commission to start
+building houses now, but he must be empowered to prevent the building
+anywhere of large administrative palaces or similar buildings, which
+are not war essential. Dr. Lammers suggested to include by way of
+agreement or decree of the Fuehrer, that this decree was only for
+the duration of the war. I then described to the Fuehrer the present
+general situation, according to which new plenipotentiaries-in-chief
+endeavoured to carry out direct actions in the occupied Eastern
+territories, overlooking those dignitaries who were appointed by the
+Fuehrer himself. At the moment the problem of the employment of labor
+was under discussion. In those places where the commissioners-in-chief
+had been informed in good time and had the possibility to enlighten
+the populations concerned, it was possible to achieve a considerable
+voluntary readiness for work. In many other instances one adopted
+measures of enforcement immediately, without taking any consideration
+of the commissioner-in-chief, with the result that in certain towns a
+flight into the woods took place, in order that they would not be--to
+use their own phrase--deported. Those men would decidedly increase
+the number of partisans and thus endanger our lines of supply. Other
+forced laborers had left the trains going into the Reich during the
+night, with the result that they arrived half empty at the frontier
+of the Government General. They, too, would constitute a danger. As a
+result at places which were included in the Four Year Plan themselves,
+the very Four Year Plan had withdrawn workers who were partially
+lost, and thus the opposite result was achieved, that is a noticeable
+deterioration of the situation and ill feeling of the population. I
+already received a number of reports from the Ukraine and from Latvia
+which confirm this state of affairs. If now medium or lower technicians
+proceeded similarly without regard of the commissioners-in-chief, these
+conditions would deteriorate considerably without thereby achieving
+the technical effects. I point out that development. If Reich Minister
+Speer would retain his authority in its old form, I would be forced to
+decline the responsibility for conditions in the future and, in any
+case, could not be subjected to criticism if the political situation
+would worsen very decisively thereby. The Fuehrer listened to the
+report most attentively, as was my impression, and then he said that,
+in any case, the arterial roads had to be secured by technical means
+in order to supply the frontier with guns and ammunition. The matter
+was then discussed once more. I pointed out what great effort it took
+me to restrain the supreme Reich authorities from interfering with
+the occupied Eastern territories; the arguments, however, were so
+convincing, that one realized to a large extent that the direction
+of the East could only be carried out centrally. If this painfully
+achieved position was now to be broken by such a far-reaching decree
+for Speer, the tendency would revive everywhere to interfere with
+the occupied Eastern territories disregarding the Ministry East. The
+Fuehrer said that under no circumstances should that happen, and he
+instructed Dr. Lammers, that he was to reject such demands on the
+Fuehrer’s orders.
+
+Dr. Lammers was ordered to draft a formulation of the tasks of Reich
+Minister Speer in the occupied Eastern territories in relationship to
+myself for the duration of the war.
+
+In the course of the discussion a number of other matters were also
+dealt with. The Fuehrer approved the final version regarding uniforms
+of the occupied territories. I reported to him the results of the
+exhibition in Agram, Bruxelles and of the work progress of the
+exhibition “Fight for Europe”.
+
+The question of the awarding the iron cross to the Estonians,
+Lithuanians, and Latvians to a problem of the OKW. The Armed Forces are
+in favor of such awards. However, there are some political objections.
+The Fuehrer believes to see a danger in it, that in case of future
+complications the bearer of the EK [iron cross] might have to be
+subjected to disciplinary punishment. I explained that soldiers of the
+Baltic nations--according to many utterances--looked upon an award as
+a guarantee for Reich citizenship. Thereby the political effect of
+a Germanisation and on the other hand the skimming of nationalistic
+forces would become possible. The matter was to be examined once again.
+
+I informed the Fuehrer of my intention to start my first official
+journey into the Eastland on the 14th May. The Fuehrer authorized me to
+extend his greetings to the appointed administrative corps.
+
+I then reported to the Fuehrer the results of metal collection in the
+Eastland which produced 2,500 tons. By collecting those metals still
+available in the economy, the figure would be raised to 3,500 tons. The
+collection of wools too had reached the average of the Reich.
+
+I handed the Fuehrer a file note regarding the development of rubber
+plantations, which has been fostered by the foreign policy office of
+the NSDAP since 1936. Despite all the official refusals the plants were
+at first cultivated in Athens, later on the Reich Food Minister granted
+a few acres of land in Germany. Now it is cultivated in the Wartheland
+and in the Government General, and later on in the Ukraine where from
+1943 on more than 100,000 ha will be worked. The harvest will then
+provide enough to fill the gap which is still open from synthetic
+rubber production.
+
+During the report I turned the conversation toward the planning
+departments of the ministry. I said that after nearly one year no
+high official had yet been appointed because of the many discussions
+with the competent Reich departments. I mentioned the case of party
+member Cranz who was supposed to be my immediately subordinated chief
+of press in the East, but whom the ministry of finance did not want to
+grant to me as a Ministerialdirektor. Dr. Lammers was of the opinion
+that one could not start right away with the highest ranks. If Cranz
+was now appointed Ministerialrat then he could be promoted within a
+year. I said that Cranz was already a year in the Ministry. Nor was
+it a question of appointing the _major_ Cranz, but of the journalist
+who had followed this profession for nearly 20 years. I said that
+the ministry also had to be on an equal footing in its negotiations
+with the Reich Commissar. This was not an ordinary Special department
+ministry [Ressortministerium], but it had other, far more extended
+tasks. The Fuehrer agreed with this point of view and asked about
+how large the Reich Commissioners Offices were. After mentioning the
+number of rooms I added that a Reich Commissioner was in reality like a
+minister president, who was governing a large country. Here, too, the
+Fuehrer agreed, and he said that to begin with he was not much in favor
+to create a ministry for the East Commission. I was surprised, because
+Dr. Lammers had made out to me that just the creation of a ministry was
+the wish of the Fuehrer. I told the Fuehrer that at that time I had
+made special propositions. I then requested Dr. Lammers to give me his
+support in this matter.
+
+                                                              Signed: R.
+
+  Berlin, 13th May 1942.
+  R/H.
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1521-PS
+
+                       BAVARIAN POLITICAL POLICE
+
+                                  Copy
+
+               Munich, Briennerstr. 50, August 24th, 1934
+
+                                                      Telephone 28341-46
+
+Reg. No. 33668 I 1 Nh must be quoted in further correspondence. To the
+Bureau of Secret State Police--Central Office
+
+                                                        _Berlin S.W. 11_
+                                                   Prinz Albrecht St. 8.
+
+Reference
+
+  National mourning on the occasion of the death of Reich President and
+  Generalfeldmarschall von Hindenburg; here--the carrying out of para.
+  III of the decree of the Reich Government dated 2.8.34.
+
+Enclosure
+
+1 Copy
+
+Several telephone reports which reached here as early as the evening
+of the 2nd of August, 1934, from offices of the Party and regional
+[Bezirk] authorities, concerning refusal to sound the funeral knell
+ordered by the Reich Government, and also numerous written reports,
+caused the Bavarian Political Police to come to the decision, a copy of
+which is enclosed, and which has already been submitted to your office.
+
+The result was as follows: In more than 70 parishes bells were not
+tolled on the 2nd of August, in 20 parishes on the 2nd and 3rd of
+August, and in 4 parishes on the 2nd, 3rd and 4th of August. The reason
+given in about 56 cases was that no definite order had been issued
+from the responsible diocesan office, or dean’s office. Of the clergy
+involved, 32 in all are politically tainted--two of them read holy
+mass on the 26th of July for the deceased Chancellor of the Austrian
+Confederation Dollfuss, or remembered him in a sermon and had prayers
+said for him. It appears that no special order of the senior church
+authorities was necessary for this. In one case the sacristan was
+interrupted in ringing the knell by the priest.
+
+When asked for an explanation by enraged fellow Germans and fellow
+party members, every possible excuse was used--let us only call
+attention to the following ones, to show what type they were:
+
+Alleged disturbance of the religious service.
+
+Nothing is done on orders from lay authorities.
+
+Absence, either accidental, or alleged to be by reason of duty.
+
+Alleged state of decay of the belfry.
+
+Alleged defectiveness of the bells.
+
+Alleged ignorance of the decree of the Reich Government.
+
+Hindenburg was a Protestant; by a decree of the Bavarian Ministry of
+Public Worship and Education (Resolution of the State Minister for
+Education and Public Worship, dated 29.6.34, No. I 19763) the vicar was
+only pledged to obey the order of the church authorities with respect
+to the ringing of church bells.
+
+Alleged incompetency.
+
+Bells had only been rung in the morning on the occasion of the 20th
+anniversary of the outbreak of war.
+
+On his own authority, the bishop of Wuerzburg, Matthias Ehrenfried,
+a _sufficiently well-known_ cleric, fixed the ringing of bells for
+the morning, between 11-0 and 12-0 o’clock. [pencil note referring to
+underling] How so?
+
+Another minister had the incredible lack of taste to point out that
+the enforced ringing of church bells when Kurt Eisner was shot, had
+been the occasion of the order that this should in future only be done
+by order of the church authorities. The mentioning of the name of the
+immortal President of the Reich von Hindenburg in the same breath as
+an incident connected with Eisner, the traitor and Jew, is the most
+despicable feature [Gemeinheit] of the affair.
+
+From the foregoing it is not difficult to see that the Catholic clergy
+in their intolerance, have done their utmost to disturb the peace
+between laymen and clergy. There is no doubt that the obstructive
+attitude of the clergy is due, on the one hand, to that fact that the
+deceased Reichpresident was a Protestant, and on the other, to the
+fact that the Catholic Church was to obey a suggestion made by the
+National-Socialist Reich Government. The conduct shown in this case
+provides once more a clear evidence of the international attitude and
+lack of German feeling and perception in Catholic clerical circles.
+
+In three cases the taking into protective custody, in order to
+guarantee them personal safety, of refractory clergy could not be
+avoided, in the interests of the maintenance of public security and
+order, and on account of the anger of the people.
+
+The following clergy are in question:
+
+The Parish priest, Father Johann Quinger of Altenkunstadt BA.,
+Lichtenfels. He was taken into protective custody on 3.8 on the express
+order of the State Ministry of the Interior, because he assaulted SA
+leaders and SA men who were ringing the bells against his wishes. He
+was released from custody on 10.8.34.
+
+The Parish priest, Father Ludwig Obholzer of Kiefersfelden BA
+Rosenheim. For his personal safety he was in police custody from 2400
+hours on the 2.8.34, till 1000 hours on 3.8.34. On 5.8.34, he said
+sarcastically in his sermon, referring to the SA men who had carried
+out the ringing of the funeral knell on their own account, “Lord
+forgive them, for they know not what they do!”
+
+The Parish priest, Father Johann Nepomuk Kleber of Wiefelsdorf, BA.,
+Burglengenfeld, refused to ring the church bells on the 2nd and 3rd.
+He is badly tainted politically and had to be taken into protective
+custody from the 5th to the 8th of August 34 in the interests of his
+own safety.
+
+The behaviour of the diocesan office of the _archbishopric of Munich
+and Freising_, [underlined in red pencil], which is in accordance with
+the principle “Attack is the best defence” deserves special note. In
+two letters of the 10th and 11th of August 1934 a touching complaint
+is lodged about the behaviour of members of the SA and the Party on
+ringing the church bells without authorization, and also about the
+fact that the clergymen named above were restricted in their personal
+liberty. In this connection it should be stressed that the clergy
+concerned were treated with extreme leniency. We could refer here to
+the case of Quinger, where the SA men, in spite of the injuries which
+the clergyman inflicted on them, with exemplary discipline did not
+return the assaults. The State authorities did everything to ensure
+the continuance of worship undisturbed. Moreover, the length of
+imprisonment was confined in all cases to the minimum.
+
+It must again be pointed out, most emphatically, that the unspeakable
+behaviour of the clergy concerned in this matter leads us to deduce
+the existence of a very special frame of mind, and spotlights the true
+internal attitude of the Catholic clergy to the National-Socialist
+State. It is not to be wondered at if here and there, in face of
+the incredible behaviour of the clergy and the threadbare excuses
+they used, the people and the SA resorted to an act of self-defense
+which was not perhaps in conformity with strict law, but was very
+understandable. Narrow-minded jurisprudence, as the elders of the
+church choose to practice it, is not in place here, and is not
+understood by the mass of the people, as events have shown.
+
+Since the diocesan office of the archbishopric of Munich and Freising
+has announced that it will also “report” the incidents to the Reich
+Ministry of the Interior, it is absolutely necessary to acquaint the
+above office with the contents of the present report.
+
+                                                                By order
+
+                                                          signed Brunner
+                                                                 [Stamp]
+
+                                               Reich Governor of Bavaria
+                                                        28 Aug. 1934 1/1
+                                                              enclosures
+                                                          Mark Ge 2/28.8
+
+(Above) _Copy_ to the Reich Governor of Bavaria, for the attention of
+State Secretary Hofmann, Munich, requesting that it should be noted.
+
+  By order
+
+                                                              Jenner [?]
+
+  Copy checked 24.9.34.                     [Several illegible initials]
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1526-PS
+
+                                  Copy
+
+  Prof. Dr. Wolodymyr Kubijowytsch,
+  Chairman of the Ukrainian Main Committee.
+
+                                                  Cracow, February 1943.
+
+  To the Governor General, Reich Minister Dr. Frank.
+
+  Your Excellency:
+
+Complying with your wish I send you this letter, in which I should
+like to state critical conditions and the painful happenings, which
+create especially grave conditions for the Ukrainian population within
+the General-Government. As to the German-Ukrainian relations and the
+general situation of the Ukrainian people, I have included all that in
+my letter, known as well to you, which I addressed to the Secretary
+of State Dr. Buehler as far back as December 1942. In that letter I
+stressed mainly the alarm of the Ukrainian population in regard to the
+uncertainty about their national future within the New Europe. Here I
+would like to quote some real happenings and add my reflections on them.
+
+The center of these is the question: Shall the Ukrainians work
+successfully in favor of final victory; they must be granted the
+security which, while absolutely necessary to them, unfortunately
+does not exist. For under the present conditions the Ukrainians are
+neither sure of their possessions nor of their lives. The matter of
+re-privatisation has not yet been settled. Inhuman treatment, severe
+pressure to forced labor, unfounded arrests, and lastly the shootings
+of great numbers are happenings not too infrequent these days.
+
+I. _Question of Re-privatisation._
+
+Of primary importance for the further shaping of German-Ukrainian
+relations is the problem of re-privatisation. The whole Ukrainian
+people have connected with the German victory in the East their hope
+that now all remainders of the Bolshevist Regime shall be extinguished
+finally.
+
+The views of the Ukrainian people are basically those of private
+property and economy. The Ukrainian peasant is prepared to undergo the
+greatest privations and sacrifices in favor of the State, if only he
+be allowed to work in tranquility; this feeling of inner tranquility
+he can but gain in the knowledge that the soil on which he and his
+ancestors have toiled, will remain his property in the future. The
+Ukrainian population received with gratitude the proclamation of your
+Excellency of 1 August 1941 in which, you Sir, have solved this problem
+at its roots and have stated re-privatisation to be the general rule
+for the economy of the State. Now, however, the attitude of some
+authorities looks as if the re-privatisation would be questioned still
+and as if in the new social order there was no place for private
+property. This situation is very cleverly made use of by the hostile
+whispering propaganda. Especially widely has the rumor been spread that
+private property has not yet been reintroduced for the reason that a
+large action of resettlement of the Ukrainians from Galicia to the East
+is to be expected.
+
+Actions, such as measures of adjusting real property at the expense
+of peasant property (in the districts of Tarnopol, Rawa, Ruska,
+Kalusch, etc.), survey of real property of peasants (in the district of
+Czortkow) and imposing of fees for the use of land (Czortkow, Zloczow,
+etc.) give such rumors the appearance of probability (enclosure 1).
+
+It is clear that for this reason there appears a great alarm and
+nervousness amongst the rural population which must badly influence the
+inclination for work and the output of agricultural production.
+
+The uncertainty as well as all the consciously false interpretations of
+such measures through the whispering propaganda, could only be ended by
+a definite carrying out of the principle of the Proclamation mentioned.
+
+
+_II. Measures for finding labor._
+
+The general nervousness is still more enhanced by the wrong methods of
+finding labor which have been used more and more frequently in recent
+months. The wild and ruthless man-hunt as exercised everywhere in towns
+and country, in streets, squares, stations, even in churches, at night
+in houses, has badly shaken the feeling of security of the inhabitants.
+Everybody is exposed to the danger, to be seized anywhere and at any
+time by members of the police, suddenly and unexpectedly, and to be
+brought into an assembly camp. None of his relatives knows what has
+happened to him only months later one or the other gives news of his
+fate by a postcard.
+
+I beg to mention some instances with their respective proofs:
+
+  _a._ During such an action a pupil in Sokol lost his life and another
+       one was wounded (enclosure 2).
+
+  _b._ 19 Ukrainian workers from Galicia, all provided with identity
+       cards, were assigned in Cracow to a transport of “Russian
+       prisoners-of-war” and delivered into a punitive camp in Graz
+       (enclosure 3).
+
+  _c._ 95 Ukrainians from Galicia, recruited for work in Germany by
+       the labor offices in the middle of January, were sent to Pskow in
+       Russia, via Eastern Prussia, where most of them died under
+       distress (enclosure 4).
+
+  _d._ Seizure of workers under pretext of military recruitment
+       (Zalesczyki); kidnapping schoolboys during school time (Biala
+       Podloaska, Wlodawa, Hrubieschow) (enclosure 5).
+
+
+_III. Question of Personal Security._
+
+Treatment of human beings.
+
+Already the kind of treatment meted out to our compatriots by the lower
+instruments of the German authority, adds much to make the general
+situation more grave. The Ukrainians expected the treatment of members
+of those nations who fought against Germany, because they belong to
+a people who have never done anything against the Germans and their
+interests. Now every Ukrainian cannot fail to become convinced that
+most of the Germans do not make any distinction, and that they are
+accustomed to treat all peoples of the East similarly, whether friend
+or foe. Too often the Ukrainian is exposed to the danger, when dealing
+with the lower authorities, to be personally insulted, to be slandered,
+even to be ill-treated. Innumerable instances could be mentioned
+proving this sort of treatment. In the enclosure I give only a small
+selection of especially grave cases (enclosure 6).
+
+Wholesale shootings.
+
+Of much worse character are the wholesale shootings of absolutely
+innocent persons, such as happened in Lubycza Koroliwska and then in
+Lwow and Czortkow.
+
+In Lubycza Koroliwska, district of Rawa Ruska, 46 peasants, including
+31 Ukrainians, were shot without trial (4 October 1942) (enclosure 7).
+
+During the second half of November 1943, 28 Ukrainians were shot in
+Lwow, 56 in Czortkow, also without trial. (enclosure 8).
+
+Arrests in December 1942.
+
+In December 1942 the police undertook a cleansing action among the
+so-called disturbing elements, leading very soon, however, to wholesale
+arrests of innocent, quiet citizens. They are under arrest and in
+danger to lose their good health for certain, if not their life.
+(enclosure 9).
+
+How acute and well founded this fear is, is proved by what happened to
+6 Ukrainian girls from Kolomea, who were arrested in February 1942 and
+who disappeared without leaving any trace. (enclosure 10).
+
+Revision in the St. George Cathedral, Lwow.
+
+In connection with the cleansing action mentioned above a raid was
+carried out even in the St. George’s cathedral in Lwow. The fact
+itself, especially because of the behavior of the police at this place
+which is sacred to the Ukrainians, produced a deep resentment and bad
+feelings amongst the population. This was used by hostile propaganda at
+once. Generally, it is pointed out that not even during the Bolshevist
+occupation raids took place on the hill of St. George, and that several
+visits by Bolshevist professors and students were always undertaken
+with great respect for the place and the person of the Metropolitan.
+
+Special action against the asocial elements.
+
+Since 15 January a special action began against the so-called asocial
+elements in Galicia. In the whole area about 5,000 persons were
+arrested. The purpose of this action was said to be the removal of
+those elements, who did not wish to work, were active in the black
+market and by so doing made the work of the authorities more difficult.
+This action however, did not obtain the right result, and the victims
+were leading personalities of the Ukrainian cultural and economic life
+as well as employees of several state authorities and members of the
+Ukrainian Aid Committee.
+
+These wholesale arrests raised an extraordinary nervousness and anxiety
+among the delegates of our committee and in large spheres of the
+Ukrainian population.
+
+
+_IV. Irregular conditions and Partisan nuisance in the District of
+     Lublin._
+
+[This chapter deals with partisan activity and the risks to which the
+loyal Ukrainian population is exposed thereby. Irrelevant].
+
+
+_V. Collective responsibility._
+
+General remarks.
+
+The Ukrainian people consider as particularly painful the application
+of methods of collective responsibility. The large masses of the
+people generally have no understanding for the principle of collective
+responsibility; they take it as absence of justice to be punished for a
+deed one has neither done nor approved of. Generally, the principle of
+collective responsibility may be considered as justified if applied to
+a racial community which is homogenous. The partisan nuisance, however,
+is particularly spread out in the mixed Polish-Ukrainian areas, and
+the Ukrainian community can by no means bear any responsibility for
+misdeeds done by Poles. But even in areas with the almost homogenous
+population, as e.g. in Galicia, the Ukrainian people could only be held
+responsible if they were possessed of some means of executive power
+towards those members. Today they have no such means. For the reasons
+stated, the application of the principle of collective responsibility
+against the Ukrainian people is unjust and inexpedient in its present
+state of organization and especially in the mixed areas. The collective
+responsibility often hits the leading circles in town and country whose
+feelings are pro-German, but who are powerless against both the Polish
+dissenters and against their own irresponsible hot-heads and despairing
+persons.
+
+Thus it happens that the collective responsibility which has the
+purpose of exterminating anti-German elements quite to the contrary
+annihilates or weakens positively pro-German elements and creates bad
+feelings and bitterness. Thus in the district of Lublin about 400 such
+Ukrainians perished.
+
+We mention but some of the most convincing instances:
+
+Wholesale shootings.
+
+On 25 December 1942 the military police surrounded the village of
+Przewale, in the district of Zamose, area of Lublin, herded together a
+large number of Ukrainians and Poles. When the manager of the estate
+declared he needed the Poles for work, the Poles were set free, the
+Ukrainians, however, numbering 16, were shot dead; among the persons
+shot was a 15 years old girl, Eugenie Tybyczuk (encl. 15).
+
+In the village of Nodosow (district of Lubin) 8 pro-German Ukrainians
+who had been persecuted by the Poles because of their patriotic views
+in pre-war time, were shot on 30 October 1942.
+
+On 29 January 1943 in the village of Sumyn (collective community of
+Tarnowatka, district of Lublin) 45 Ukrainians, including 18 children
+between the ages of 3 and 15 were shot, and on 2 February 1943 in the
+villages of Pankow and Scharowola (collective community of Tarnowatka)
+19 Ukrainians were shot, including 8 children, aged 1 to 13 years
+(encl. 16).
+
+The greatest bitterness is created by the killing of innocent children,
+because the population is unable to understand that the German
+authorities could consent to or order such deeds.
+
+The tragic events in Lubycza Koroliwska and Kubycza Kniazi (districts
+of Rawa Ruska, area of Lublin) have been mentioned above (encl. 7).
+
+Conclusion.
+
+The happenings in Galicia mentioned in this report have been submitted
+to Governor Dr. Waechter and the Department Head Dr. Bauer in writing
+and verbally. We repeat them herein, in order to complete the picture
+of the General Government.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+Cracow, 25 February 1943.
+
+       #       #       #       #       #
+
+
+_Table of Enclosures._
+
+  1. The surveying measures in the area of Czortkow.
+
+  2. The events at Sokal.
+
+  3. The behavior of the Polish employees of the labor office.
+
+  4. Minutes (fate of the Ukrainian workers in Pskow).
+
+  5. Memorandum for the files (false recruiting of workers to the
+     Reich).
+
+  6. Memorandum for the files (ill-treatment of Ukrainians).
+
+  7. Shooting of 46 peasants in Lubycza Koroliwska, district of Rawa
+     Ruska.
+
+  8. Shootings in Lwow and Czortkow in November 1942.
+
+  9. Arrests in Galicia in December 1942.
+
+  10. Uncertain fate of arrested Ukrainian women students from Kolomea.
+
+  11. List of some well-known Ukrainian citizens, arrested in January
+      1943 in the area of Kolomea, Stryj, and Kamionka Strumilowa.
+
+  12. Arrests and shootings of persons unfit for work in the district
+      of Sanok.
+
+  13. Anti-Ukrainian activities of persons unfit for work in the
+      district Biljoraj.
+
+  14. Activities of partisans in the district of Biala Podlasko during
+      the second half of the year 1942.
+
+  15. Shooting of 16 Ukrainians in the village of Przewale.
+
+  16. List of the Ukrainians shot in the village of Sumin, community of
+      Tarnowatka on 29 January 1943.
+
+
+_Enclosure 1._
+
+_The Surveying Measures in the District of Czortkow._
+
+In September of last year the Chief Inspectorate of agricultural land
+[Hauptlandinspektion] in Czortkow was formed under the management of
+the former District Surveyor [Kreislandinspektor].
+
+Employed were the engineers-surveyor Jwanenko, a Russian, and the
+draughtsman Sach, a Pole; further the land-surveyors from Brzezany
+and Tarnaopol and some other German employees who were brought to
+Czortkow. Travelling in the district of Czortkow they drew maps showing
+the position of the communities with special regard to all farms and
+marking the better farms. About the middle of December the activities
+of this institution ceased, probably up till the end of April 1943.
+Rumor has it that German peasants to the number of 50,000 who are to be
+transferred from Germany into this district should be settled on these
+better farms.
+
+
+_Enclosure 2._
+
+_The Events at Sokal._
+
+On 24 October 1942 between 13 and 14 hours, when the school boys went
+home from school, they were stopped by detachments of military police
+on the street and together with other people were formed into one
+unit. There was a panic as nobody knew what was going to happen to
+these people. People began to flee from the streets. The school boy
+Jaroslau Meda who was just passing with his father, the secretary of
+the collective community of Parchacz also started to run. The father
+tried to calm him and called him back as there was no danger. A
+military policeman, however, saw him fleeing and shot at him wounding
+him fatally, so that he died in the local hospital half an hour later.
+
+At the same time two military policemen went into the Ukrainian hostel
+for schoolboys and took away some boys. The others were at lunch in
+the dining-room and therefore remained unnoticed. In front of the
+schoolboys’ hostel the schoolboy Wassyl Krawtschuk was caught by a
+military policeman and wounded so seriously in the thigh by a bayonet
+that he had to be taken to hospital.
+
+The student of theology Osyyp Karawan was severely beaten until he
+fainted.
+
+The public school teacher Michael Duliba was beaten publicly.
+
+It is to be stressed that nobody knew that this action of collecting
+people was to procure workers to load carrots at the station. When
+the headmaster of the public school informed the manager of the local
+labor office by phone and asked for his help, the latter replied he
+had no time to spare for this matter at the moment. Thereafter, the
+headmasters of the Ukrainian schools informed the manager of the local
+labor office that they would put their boys at the disposal of the
+authorities in every case there was unforeseen and undelayable work to
+be done in town after having received fair warning provided no other
+labor was available.
+
+
+_Enclosure 3._
+
+                                  Copy
+
+                                                     Zborow, 6 Oct. 1942
+
+  Ukrainian Aid Committee, Branch Zborow.
+  To the Ukrainian Main Committee in Lwow.
+  Department for food.
+
+  Subject: The behavior of the Polish employees of the labor office in
+           Cracow towards our laborers.
+
+We present the minutes prepared by our office together with Mr. Procyk
+Lukas on 28 September 1942 who returned from Germany.
+
+He reports:
+
+Ukrainian laborers coming to Cracow, though provided with certificates
+and identification papers, are being transferred by the Polish
+employees of the labor office together with the transports of Russian
+civilian and brought to punitive camps.
+
+Many Ukrainians fell victim to such Polish provocations. The situation
+of these people is all the more tragic, as they do not know the
+German language and their certificates and identification papers were
+destroyed by the above mentioned Polish employees.
+
+Below we give a list of the Ukrainian laborers who are in the punitive
+camp in Graz as Russians and refugees:
+
+  [Follows a list of 19 names].
+
+The situation of the above named is tragic. I was lucky to escape. With
+complete confidence in me and tears in their eyes they asked me to
+report their condition to the Committee.
+
+                                                  [signed] Procyk Lukas.
+
+
+_Enclosure 4._
+
+                                Minutes.
+
+Michaljlo Kost, Bohdan Janiw, Iwan Baran (son of Iwan), Iwan Baran
+(son of Mykola) and Olexa Chimjak, all from Koniuschky, Koroliwiski,
+district of Komarow, were sent by the labor office for work to Germany
+on 12 January 1942.
+
+They came to Pwzemysk, where they stayed for a whole week awaiting
+medical inspection. After the medical inspection they were joined to
+the transport which was to go to Germany. However, they were driven via
+Warsaw, East Prussia to Russia and were brought to the town of Pskow.
+With them were 95 Ukrainian lads from Galicia, including 18 lads from
+the village of Koniuschky, Koroliwiski. They were accompanied by a
+military escort. On 28 January 1942 they arrived in Pskow. At first,
+they worked in the woods felling trees, later building a bath-house.
+
+In the beginning they received half a loaf of bread as daily ration,
+and later one loaf for seven persons daily, black coffee at breakfast
+and supper and soup at dinner time.
+
+They never had a day off, they had to work even on Sundays. Terrible
+frost persisted throughout--to 58 centigrades (below zero), but the
+lads got no warm clothes, they worked in the clothes they had brought
+with them. After arriving in Pskow the workers lived in unheated huts
+without beds. The huts were made from wood and it was very cold there;
+only after two weeks were they billeted in a hall with beds, but they
+were unable to get warm with the blankets they had brought with them.
+Many of them fell ill from hunger and cold, 18 had to be taken to
+hospital (there was no room for several persons) where they remained
+for 2 to 3 weeks. The sick were refused bread, because they were said
+to be simulants. In the hospital the sick received 50 grammes of bread
+and some warm water and some soup and potatoes at about 16 hours.
+
+Anyone unfit for work was sent away forcibly. Many escaped from
+the huts during the winter, one died. 13 lads from the village of
+Koniuschky, Koroliwiski escaped, three were arrested, and we know
+nothing about the others; they certainly did not return home.
+
+5 of the above mentioned lads were declared unfit for work by a
+military commission and sent to Lwow and then home where they arrived
+completely exhausted. Of the 95 persons in the hutments in Pskow up
+to April, only 14 remained, 8 from the district of Jarowiw and 1 from
+Grodek. Those 14 persons, hungry and weak, were released to go home.
+
+These workers received no pay.
+
+  Komarow, 22 April 1942.
+
+                                  Confirmed by signature: Mychajlo Kost,
+                                                           Bohdan Janiw,
+                                                             Iwan Baran.
+
+
+_Enclosure 5._
+
+_Memorandum for the files._
+
+In November of last year an inspection of all males of the age groups
+1910 to 1920 was ordered in the area of Zaleschozyki (district of
+Czortkow). After the men had appeared for inspection, all those who
+were chosen were arrested at once, loaded into trains and sent to the
+Reich. Such recruiting of laborers for the Reich also took place in
+other areas of this district. Following some interventions the action
+was then stopped.
+
+The labor office in Biala Podlaska carried out the recruiting for work
+of the students at the commercial college. When the officials recruited
+more students than ordered, the main doors and doors to the class-rooms
+were locked; consequently a panic amongst the students broke out, and
+even some students fled through the windows.
+
+Similar events occurred in Wlodawa and Hrubieschow in consequence of
+which the schools were closed for some time.
+
+
+_Enclosure 6._
+
+  _Memo for the files._
+  _Re: Ill-treatment of Ukrainians._
+
+_a._ On 11 November 1942 Irene Malaschtschuk, a public school girl
+working in a German food store in Czortkow, was, whilst working
+(attending to German customers) hit in the face several times by a
+Security Policeman without any reason whatsoever. When questioned why
+he did it, she received the answer: because you did not pay any special
+attention to me.
+
+_b._ In September 1942 a meeting took place in Chodorow in the presence
+of the District Farmer of Stryj, the District Agricultural Expert,
+the Chairman of the Ukrainian Aid Committee, the Land Commissioner,
+the District Farmer, the Chairman of the Delegation in Chodorow,
+and mayors and bailiffs of the district of Chodorow concerning the
+delivery quotas. During the discussion of the quota action the District
+Farmer said that the communities of Hranky, Kuty, and Bortniky had not
+delivered their ordered quota of vegetables, then he ordered the Mayor
+of Hranky, Kuty to come up and hit him in the face in front of the
+assembly.
+
+_c._ The chief of the price control office in Zloczow, H. Mok, who
+personally controls the delivery of foodstuffs into the town, stopped
+a woman on the way who was carrying a few kilos of carrots. Mr. Mok
+ordered his interpreter, a Jew, to search the woman; the Jew did it
+in such a manner as to offend the dignity of a human being and of the
+woman.
+
+_d._ The District Farmer Benzin in Biala Polaska shot at innocent
+Ukrainian peasants from the villages of Polenow and Nosow, whilst on
+duty on 30 July 1942, two of whom died. Benzin was arrested, but the
+event caused great indignation in the whole area.
+
+_e._ On 9 August 1942 the Ukrainian student Iwan Wowtschyschyn was
+beaten without any reason whatsoever by a Polish railroad policeman on
+the station in Przemysl; when the student tried to defend himself, he
+was fatally wounded with the bayonet.
+
+Generally, there are strong complaints all over the country about the
+way Polish members of the railroad police treated Ukrainians.
+
+
+_Enclosure 7._
+
+  _Shooting of 46 peasants in Lubycza, district of Rawa Ruska._
+
+In the early morning on Sunday, 4 October 1942, some groups of the
+Special Service detachments, stationed near Belsez, came to the
+village of Lubycza Koroliwska and Kubysca Kniazi and called out all
+male villagers. The men were convinced that it was a matter of some
+urgent work for the village and obligingly hurried to the place of
+assembly. There they were formed in rank and file and requested to name
+2 saboteurs within two minutes otherwise every fifth man would be shot.
+As, however, no acts of sabotage had been committed in the village, no
+saboteurs could be named. Then, 45 men and 1 woman were chosen from the
+crowd and shot dead in two groups in the presence of their relatives,
+viz. in Lubycza, Koroliwska and Kubycza, Kniazi.
+
+Amongst the 46 shot were 31 Ukrainians.
+
+The pretence for these tragic mass-shootings was a fire which occurred
+in the stables of the said Special Service detachments near Belsez
+during the night of 3-4 October, when 3 horses were said to have
+perished. Probably this fire was set alight by the carelessness of the
+stable-boys and was extinguished at once.
+
+The community of Lubycza, Koroliwska has been known as one of the most
+loyal of the whole district. The very same day (4 October 1942) the
+Governor of the province of Galicia, during a celebration in Lwow,
+especially mentioned the community as one conscious of their duties
+regarding the delivery of their quotas; this was officially published
+(Lwiwski Wisti) (Lemberger Nachrichten 6 October 1942).
+
+The village Kubycza is 8 km. away from the place where the fire took
+place. The above mentioned stable is not within the village boundaries
+of Lubycza, Koroliwska.
+
+It should be noted here that in spite of repeated assurances given by
+the District Captain [Kreishauptmann] the injured families in Lubycza,
+Koroliwska have so far not received any compensation.
+
+
+_Enclosure 8._
+
+As a reprisal for the shooting of a member of the German police in
+Lwow who was killed by an unknown perpetrator in the second half of
+November 1942, 28 Ukrainians were shot in Lwow, and 56 in Czortkow who
+were at the time in prison in these towns. Nobody was told the reason
+for the shooting, and the shootings in Czortkow were carried out in
+broad day-light before the eyes of the frightened population. Among
+the persons shot were many suffering from typhoid who were taken from
+the hospital whilst unconscious, loaded on to trucks, and taken to the
+place of execution.
+
+These shootings were to be considered as reprisals against the
+so-called “Bandera” group. Among the persons shot were elderly citizens
+who had no connection whatever with the activities of this group, as
+for instance Dr. Olexa Kossak, lawyer from Kolomea, engineer Andrij
+Pjaseckyj, head-gamekeeper in Janiw near Lwow all of whom had been
+vouched for not only by myself and Dr. Kost Pankiskyj, but by Reich
+Germans as well.
+
+
+_Enclosure 9._
+
+_Arrests in Galicia in December 1942._
+
+In December 1942 the police made arrests among the so-called restless
+elements.
+
+In the whole province of Galicia arrests were made, especially among
+the young people among whom followers of the partisans were looked for.
+On this occasion a number of elderly citizens were arrested, who were
+but vaguely connected with the suspects. Thus, for instance, the owners
+of houses where the suspect lived as a lodger were arrested as well as
+guests present in the house at the time of arrest. On interventions
+by the representatives of the Ukrainian Main Committee in Lwow the
+police answered in order to release the persons arrested by mistake.
+Since then 2½ months have passed and the persons arrested by mistake
+are still in prison. They are treated there as criminals and are not
+certain of their lives.
+
+A typical example of this is the fact that 50 Ukrainians died of misery
+and hunger in the prison in Czortkow. The Ukrainian Aid Committee in
+Czortkow tried to obtain a permit to send food to the prisoners, but
+without success; although the commander of the police agreed, the
+prison-commander insisted that the command of the Lwow police had to
+grant permission.
+
+
+_Enclosure 10._
+
+_Uncertain fate of arrested Ukrainian women students._
+
+On 5 February 1942, 6 Ukrainian women students and school girls from
+Kolomea were arrested and in the spring sent on to Czortkow. Since then
+their relatives are unable to obtain any news about their fate.
+
+The personal data of the arrested:
+
+  [follow 6 names together with names of respective parents and date
+    and place of birth].
+
+
+_Enclosure 11._
+
+_List_ of some well-known Ukrainian citizens, members of the Ukrainian
+Aid Committee and employees of the State Administration, the
+Self-Government and the Economic Authorities, also of the old men and
+students who were arrested in January 1943 in the districts of Kolomea,
+Stryj, and Komionka, Strumilowa:
+
+  [follows names by localities.]
+
+
+_Enclosure 12._
+
+  _Arrests and shootings of persons unfit for work in the District of
+    Sanok._
+
+During the period from 18 to 24 January 1943 about 300 persons were
+arrested in the neighborhood of Sanok in accordance with lists compiled
+some time before by the local mayors on orders of the authorities. Some
+of them were soon set free, but the fate of the rest is unknown to us
+and their families. The shootings which are daily taking place on the
+Jewish cemetery promise no good.
+
+On 17 and 18 January 1943 many persons from the districts Sanok and
+Jaslo were arrested in the station in Tarnow whilst riding in the
+direction of Cracow; so far their families have no news about their
+fate. Thus, for instance 4 persons were arrested from the village of
+Losie, district Jaslo, viz.:
+
+  [follow 4 names and addresses.]
+
+One of them went to see a doctor in Cracow, the others were on business
+trips to Warsaw.
+
+On 18 January 1943, 14 persons who were unfit for work were shot
+together with 80 Jews in Ustrzyki Dolne; they were buried together in
+a ditch. Among these 14 were old men and invalids, for instance from
+Lutswyska; Iwan Lesky, 68-70 years old, invalid of the Austrian Army
+who worked as a tiler, Jurko Schkrabak and his wife, both about 70
+years of age, and 3 other unknown persons, a female beggar from Ustrzky
+called “Haramsymka”. We do not know the names of the other people
+shot. It should be pointed out that the Ukrainians celebrated a second
+Christmas evening on that day called “Schtschedryj Wetschir”.
+
+As this holiday is celebrated by the Ukrainians with great piety,
+the shootings of these innocent people on this holy day caused great
+indignance and embitterment. These events depress the Ukrainian
+population. The view is current that now the shootings of the Jews
+come to an end those of the Ukrainians begin. The case of Ustrzyki is
+commented upon as follows: The Germans do not care about any non-German
+sanctity and holidays, they even shoot Ukrainians on the Ukrainian
+“Schtschedryj Wetschir” (the case in Ustrzyki).
+
+The Ukrainian population is suspicious of all orders given by the
+German authority and even keep away from the soup kitchens, for fear
+that those in need may be considered as beggars and shot.
+
+
+_Enclosure 13._
+
+_Anti-Ukrainian activities of partisans in the District of Bilgoraj._
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+
+_Enclosure 14._
+
+  _Activities of partisans in the district of Biala Podlaska during the
+    second half of 1942._
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+
+_Enclosure 15._
+
+_Shooting of 16 Ukrainians in Przewala._
+
+On 17 December 1942 the population of Zubowice, district of Tyschowce
+was moved away and racial Germans were settled in their place. The
+Polish population of Zubowice, warned the day before by a certain
+Kolesche of the coming evacuation fled, but the Ukrainians stayed and
+were evacuated to the little town of Tyszowce and its suburbs, with
+the help of the representatives of the Ukrainian Aid Committee. This
+evacuation affected 128 Ukrainian families, 486 persons in all.
+
+Some days later a few farms in Zubowice and the surrounding country
+as far as the village of Przewale were burnt down. It is obvious that
+these fires were started by escaped Poles who hid in the forests or
+the neighboring Polish villages, for all farms burnt down belonged to
+Poles prior to the evacuation; the Ukrainians who were evacuated in
+an organized manner and went willingly to destinations far off, viz.
+Zamlynie and Dubyna, were certainly not interested in burning down
+farms in Zubowice, particularly not their own farms.
+
+As reprisal the arrests in Zamlynie and the shooting of persons in the
+village Przewale, near Zubowice, were carried out on 24 December 1942.
+This village is inhabited by 337 Poles and only 122 Ukrainians. On
+intervention by the Local Farm Administrator Poles have been separated
+and released from amongst the people arrested at random, the remaining
+Ukrainians, however, among them the 58 years old Ukrainian teacher
+and trustee of the Aid Committee in Zamosc, Banda Onofer, and his 75
+years old mother-in-law Marie Rewus were shot. The names of the other
+Ukrainians who were shot are: (follows a list of 10 names including one
+of a person aged 80 years).
+
+
+_Enclosure 16._
+
+  _List of the Ukrainians shot on 29 January 1943 in the village of
+    Sumin community of Taranwatka._
+
+[Follows a list of 45 names, giving family state, age, and remarks.
+Remarks to No. 16: Wounded, in hospital, to No. 19: Village Mayor, to
+No. 31: Wounded, in hospital, No’s: 39 & 45: wounded, in hospital.]
+
+Total 8 men, 19 women, 18 children.
+
+                                      The delegate: Pastor Matwijtschuk.
+
+       #       #       #       #       #
+
+  _List of Ukrainians shot 2 February 1943 in the villages of Pankow
+    and Scharowola._
+
+[Follows a list of 19 names, giving family state, age and remarks.
+Remarks to No’s: 4, 14, 15, 16, 17: Wounded].
+
+Total 4 men, 7 women, 8 children. In the village Pankow 5 Poles have
+been shot. In the village Scharowola 6 Poles have been shot.
+
+                   Delegation Ukrainian Aid Committee Tomascho Lubelsko.
+                                                 Delegate: Matwijtschuk.
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1531-PS
+
+I.
+
+  Reich Security Head Office Amt IV
+  Bk. No. 409/39 Top Secret
+
+                                                 Berlin, 26 October 1939
+
+                              _Top Secret_
+
+_a._ To all State Police District Offices.
+
+_b._ To the Gestapo office (according to restricted distribution C.)
+
+_For information_
+
+_a._ To all inspectors of the Security police and the SD.
+
+_b._ To the Inspector-General of the reinforced SS-Death’s Head Units
+(with 8 copies for the camps).
+
+_Subject_: Execution of protective custody.
+
+By order of the Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police,
+all prisoners under protective custody due for transference to a
+concentration camp will, during the war, be assigned to a special
+penal section. The only exceptions will be prisoners under protective
+custody, who are assigned to a camp as a preventative police measure,
+(particularly those under index A), or those who are expressly exempt
+on the nominal role.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+In order to achieve a further deterrent effect, the following must, in
+future, be observed in each individual case.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+3. _The length of the period of custody must in no case be made known_,
+even if the Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police or the
+Chief of the Security Police and the SD has already fixed it.
+
+The term of a commitment to a concentration camp is to be openly
+announced as “until further notice.”
+
+In serious cases, there is no objection to the increasing of the
+deterrent effect by the spreading of a cleverly carried out _rumor
+propaganda_, more or less to the effect that, according to hearsay,
+in view of the seriousness of his case, the arrested man will not be
+released for 2 or 3 years.
+
+4. In certain cases, the Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German
+Police will order flogging in addition to detention in a concentration
+camp. Orders of this kind will, in future, also be transmitted to the
+State Police District Office concerned. In this case too, there is no
+objection to spreading the rumour of this increased punishment as laid
+down in Section 3, paragraph 3, in so far as this appears suitable, to
+add to the deterrent effect.
+
+5. Naturally, particularly suitable and reliable people are to be
+chosen for the spreading of such news.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+  By Order
+
+                                                        (signed) Mueller
+                                          Authenticated: (signed) Bleeck
+                                                    Chancellery employee
+
+       #       #       #       #       #
+
+  II
+  Chief of the Security Police and the SD
+  Bk. No. IV--226/42 Top Secret
+
+                                                  Berlin, 12th June 1942
+                                                   120 Copies 110th Copy
+
+
+                               TOP SECRET
+
+  _As Top Secret_
+
+  to all Chiefs of the Security Police and the SD
+
+  to all Directors of Groups IV A, IV B, IV C, and IV E of the Reich
+    Security Head Office
+
+  to all Commanding Officers of the Security Police and the SD
+
+  to all Heads of the State Police District Offices
+
+  _For Information_
+
+  to the Inspectors of the Security Police and the SD
+
+  _Subject_: Third degree
+
+
+  _Enclosure: 1 receipt_
+
+In order to simplify things the Decree of the Chief of the Security
+police and the SD of 1.7.37 Bk. No. 28 (II) 301/37 Secret (to be
+destroyed according to sealed orders) will be superseded by the
+following new ruling, with immediate effect:
+
+1. Third degree may only be applied if it is clear from preliminary
+investigation that the prisoner can give information on important
+facts, as social or subversive to the State and to the Reich, but will
+not disclose what he knows, and the information cannot be obtained by
+investigation.
+
+2. Third degree may, under this supposition, only be employed against
+Communists, Marxists, Jehovah’s Witnesses, saboteurs, terrorists,
+members of resistance movements, parachute agents, anti-social
+elements, Polish or Soviet-Russian loafers or tramps. In all other
+cases, my permission must first be obtained.
+
+3. Third degree may not be used to extort confessions of a prisoner’s
+own crimes. Also this method may not be employed against persons who
+are temporarily detained by law for further investigations.
+
+My previous permission is also necessary in exceptional cases.
+
+4. Third degree can, according to the circumstances, consist, among
+other methods, of very simple diet (water and bread), hard bunk,
+dark cell, deprivation of sleep, exhaustion drill, but also in the
+administration of flogging (for more than 20 strokes a doctor must be
+consulted).
+
+                                                                   I. V.
+                                                        (signed) Mueller
+                                        Authenticated: (signed) Nellmuth
+                                           Registered Secretary (Female)
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1534-PS
+
+                          Berlin, W.8., Wilhelm Street 79, 30 January 37
+
+  My Fuehrer:
+
+I thank you for the confidence which you have placed into me during
+the four years of your leadership and for the honour you do me in
+offering to admit me to the party. My conscience forbids me however to
+accept this offer. I believe in the principles of positive christianity
+and must remain faithful to my Lord and to myself. Party membership
+however would mean that I should have to face without contradiction
+the steadily aggravating attacks by party offices on the Christian
+confessions and those who want to remain faithful to their religious
+convictions.
+
+This decision has been infinitely difficult for me. For never in my
+life I have performed my duty with greater joy and satisfaction than
+under your wise state leadership.
+
+I ask to be permitted to resign.
+
+                                                  With German Greetings!
+                                                     Your very obedient,
+                                             (signed)     Baron v. Eltz.
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1536-PS
+
+                               TOP SECRET
+
+  Reich Minister for Air and C-in-C Air Force [initials written in ink]
+
+                                                          12 August 1938
+
+                                 Draft
+
+                                                   General Officers only
+                                                       2 copies 2nd Copy
+                                             Access only through officer
+
+  General Staff 5.Division No. 21/38. Top Secret General Officers only
+    (Ic)
+
+  Re: Freudenthal Affair
+
+  Ref: Abwehr II No. 42/38. Top Secret General Officers only.
+
+A. As Appendix 1 please find enclosed a translation by Major d.G.
+Moericke on which the following comment is made:
+
+1. The report from the Abwehrstelle Breslau still does not prove that
+the real circumstances are known to the two Sudeten Germans or even
+widely in Sudeten German circles. Nevertheless, there is still no need
+for Czech authorities to have any knowledge of them.
+
+If the worst comes to the worst it is a question, in eventual remarks
+made by Macholdt to Pilz, of suppositions which are nevertheless very
+near to the truth of the matter.
+
+2. For the time being there is no reason for stopping preparations for
+the Fr. operation.
+
+3. Punishable behaviour on the part of Major Moericke cannot be deduced
+purely from the Abwehrstelle report. Rather, as far as can be seen
+from here, has Major Moericke carried out the task allotted to him
+skilfully and provided good evidence.
+
+B. In the course of further preparations, the following measures are
+recommended:
+
+1. Not a single word on the matter will be mentioned to informers
+[V-Leute].
+
+2. The fields will not be purchased through middlemen. Neither will
+any influence be brought to bear on the owners in order to effect any
+change in the cultivation of the land according to local custom and the
+time of the year.
+
+3. In the event of the suspected endangering of our plans, as a result
+of treachery, then it will be a question of sham reconnoitring of
+landing grounds in other areas and spreading of rumors as a camouflage.
+
+4. It is worth considering whether Macholdt and Pilz cannot be called
+back to Germany on some pretext and retained here temporarily.
+
+C. Further to the preparations which have already been carried out, the
+following proposals have been made by the Luftwaffe:
+
+1. Continual supervision of the state of the agricultural cultivation
+of the landing grounds in question, in accordance with Appendices 2, 3,
+4.
+
+2. Continual supervision of the area around Freudenthal with regard to
+whether Czech defence measures against their intended employment are
+being undertaken.
+
+Reconnoitring of further landing grounds, if possible by 10 September,
+in the following areas:
+
+  _a._ Freudenthal--Spachendorf--Hof--Braunseifen--Freudenthal.
+
+  _b._ Around Sternberg (up to a radius of 5 km).
+
+  _c._ Around Olmuetz (up to a radius of 10 km).
+
+As landing grounds are considered flat open stretches, above all dry
+meadows and clay strips with a surface area of approximately 500 × 500
+m. and larger.
+
+If possible it is requested that photographs similar to Appendices 3
+and 4 are brought along.
+
+By order of
+
+                                                                 Schmidt
+
+Distribution:
+        Abwehr II, 1st Copy received with 4 appendices
+        General Staff 5th Division (Ic), 2nd Copy 13/8
+                                                   [signature illegible]
+
+       #       #       #       #       #
+
+  Appendix 1 to Reich Minister for Air and C-in-C Air Force. General
+    Staff 5th Division. No. 21/38. Top Secret General Officers only
+    dated 12.8.38.
+
+                               TOP SECRET
+
+                                                         Berlin 4.8.1938
+                                                   General Officers only
+                                             Access through Officer only
+
+                              Transaction
+
+Major of the General Staff Moericke, Air Attaché at the German
+Legation, Prague, states:
+
+I was ordered by the General Staff of the Air Force to reconnoitre
+the land in the region Freudenthal/Freihermersdorf for landing
+possibilities.
+
+For this purpose I obtained private lodgings in Freudenthal with the
+manufacturer Macholdt, through one of my trusted men in Prague.
+
+I had specifically ordered this man to give no details about me to M,
+particularly about my official position.
+
+I used my official car [Dienst Pkw] for the journey to Fr. taking
+precautions against being observed.
+
+The manufacturer M. is head of the Sudeten German Glider Pilots in
+Fr. and said to be absolutely reliable by my trusted man. My personal
+impression fully confirmed this judgment. No hint of my identity was
+made to him, although I had the impression that M. knew who I was.
+
+At my request, with which he complied without any question, M.
+travelled with me over the country in question. We used M’s private car
+for the trip.
+
+As M. did not know the country around Beneschau sufficiently well,
+he took with him the local leader of the F.S., a Czech reservist of
+the Sudeten German Racial Group, at the time on leave. He was in
+uniform. For reasons of camouflage I was entirely in agreement with
+this--without actually saying so.
+
+As M., during the course of the drive, observed that I photographed
+large open spaces out of the car, he said “Aha, so you’re looking
+for airfields!” I answered that we supposed that, in the case of any
+serious trouble, the Czechs would put their airfields immediately
+behind the line of fortifications. I had the intention of looking over
+the country from that point of view.
+
+To my question as to when the farmers in this part were generally in
+the habit of ploughing up the fields he answered: “Always immediately
+after the harvest.”
+
+I thought that in this way he wanted to express the fact that the
+Czechs would no longer be able to use the fields as airfields even
+shortly after harvest.
+
+Before leaving Fr. I bound M. to absolute secrecy as regards what he
+had seen.
+
+From the conversation between M. and the Leader of the F.S. in
+Beneschau, whose name I do not know, I noticed that they knew several
+of the Abwehr informers [V-Leute] in Freudenthal and Beneschau. Both M.
+and the 2nd companion are minor informers [V-Leute].
+
+As I have at the moment no incentive to believe that M. has not kept
+his promise, I can only presume that Pilz is the same person as the
+leader of the F. S. in Beneschau, who, accompanied us at the time,
+and a subordinate informer [V-Mann] to the informer [V-Mann] in the
+Security Office [Abwehrstelle] at Breslau.
+
+I believe it to be out of the question that the real purpose of my
+reconnaissance be known.
+
+Should measures be invoked against Macholdt or Pilz on the grounds of
+the report from the Security Office at Breslau, I urgently request a
+hearing beforehand.
+
+                                                 Moericke, Major d. G.H.
+
+                                                                g. w. o.
+
+                                                     Schmidt, Maj. d. G.
+
+       #       #       #       #       #
+
+  Appendix 2 to Reich Minister for Air and C-in-C of the Air Force,
+    General Staff 5th Division.
+
+       No. 21/38. Top Secret General Officers only dated 12.8.38.
+
+                            [Section of map]
+
+                                                   General Officers only
+
+                                             Access through Officer only
+
+  Appendix 3 to Reich Minister for Air, etc.
+
+                              [photograph]
+
+  Landing-ground south of Freudenthal; taken from southern edge of
+    Freudenthal looking west.
+
+  Appendix 4, Sectional picture of airfields _a_ and _b_ [4
+    photographs].
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1538-PS
+
+                                 SECRET
+
+  Office Foreign Intelligence Dept Foreign Affairs Nr 173/41 (g.K.Chefs
+    III org)
+
+                                                            May 24, 1941
+
+  [Stamp] Air-Corps-Operational, 7 copies
+
+          Staff I a, 2 copies
+
+     May 24, 41
+
+     No. 279.
+
+                           [Stamp] TOP SECRET
+
+                   (to be forwarded) By Officer only
+
+     To be presented to the Chief of the Armed Forces High Command.
+
+[Marginal note:]
+
+The Military Attaché Tokio reports with No. T 47 signed May 23.
+
+In interview with Akita on handling of relations between Japan and USA
+in the press, desire was expressed to hear Okamoto on the form in which
+Japan would start hostilities in case of a war between USA and Germany.
+Instead of a reception by Okamoto visit with Akita who explained:
+
+[Marginal note:]
+
+    To be presented to the Chief of the Office Foreign Intelligence
+                        (simultaneously for ZL).
+
+1. In case USA enters war, Japan acknowledges treaty obligations at
+once. However, would not open hostilities immediately. Preparations for
+attack on Singapore and Manila stand.
+
+2. Possible war Russia-Germany causes USA entry into war. Japanese
+action as mentioned under 1 plus preparation of possible attacks (on)
+Vladivostok and Blagowesqensk.
+
+[Marginal note:]
+
+   (To be presented to the) Operational Staff of the Air-Forces I. C.
+
+3. Conclusion of conflict with China important before new tasks for
+Japanese Armed Forces. I am stressing first that Japanese recognition
+of obligations under treaty needs confirmation by immediate opening of
+hostilities.
+
+Signature: Bueckner
+
+                                                                  U R Ia
+
+                                                      Schmid [in crayon]
+
+                                                                  May 24
+
+  Copy to:
+
+        L.
+
+        3 Skl
+
+        Sonderstb H.H.K.
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1541-PS
+
+                          TOP MILITARY SECRET
+
+  The Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces High Command/armed forces.
+
+  Command Staff/armed forces, Section L Nr. 33 406/40
+
+                               TOP SECRET
+
+  Matter of Chief                                             Fuehrer #9
+  Only through Officer                                  13 December 1940
+  [illegible notations]                              12 Copies, 9th Copy
+
+                          Direction Number 20
+
+                            Operation Marita
+
+1. The result of the battles in Albania is not yet decisive. Because
+of a dangerous situation in Albania it is doubly necessary that the
+British endeavor be foiled to create airbases under the protection of a
+Balkan front, which would be dangerous above all to Italy as well as to
+the Rumanian oil fields.
+
+2. My plan therefore is (_a_) to form a slowly increasing task force in
+Southern Rumania within the next months.
+
+(_b_) After the setting in of favorable weather, probably in March, to
+send this task force for the occupation of the Aegean North coast by
+way of Bulgaria, and if necessary to occupy the entire Greek mainland
+(Operation Marita). The support of Bulgaria is to be expected.
+
+3. For the _concentration of the task force_ in Rumania are necessary:
+
+(_a_) The 16th Panzer Division which arrives in December on an army
+mission, and whose task remains unchanged.
+
+(_b_) Following will be a task force of about seven divisions (final
+wave) to be dispatched to Southern Rumania. Engineers in the required
+strength for the preparation of the Danube crossing can conveniently be
+attached for transport to the 16th Panzer Division (as instructional
+troops). The field commander of the army will await my decision for the
+proper moment for them to be employed on the Danube.
+
+(_c_) Preparations are to be made for further transport to take in the
+calculated maximum for the operation Marita (total of 24 divisions).
+
+(_d_) It is the mission of the Air Force to give air protection to the
+concentration, as well as preparing the necessary primary and reserve
+installations on Rumanian soil.
+
+4. The _Operation Marita_ itself is to be prepared on the following
+basis:
+
+(_a_) The primary mission of the operation is the occupation of the
+Aegean coast, and the Bay of Saloniki. It may be necessary to continue
+the attack across Larissa and the Isthmus of Corinth.
+
+(_b_) Flank protection against Turkey will be the task of the Bulgarian
+forces, although it is to be secured and strengthened through the
+alerting of German Forces.
+
+(_c_) It is not certain whether the Bulgarian forces will take part
+in the attack. Likewise the Yugoslavs position cannot yet be clearly
+determined.
+
+(_d_) It will be the mission of the _Air Force_ to support the drive of
+the army in all phases, to liquidate the opposing air force, and, as
+far as possible, to occupy British strongpoints on the Greek Islands
+through airborne landings.
+
+(_e_) The question in which fashion the Operation Marita is to be
+supported by the Italian forces, and how coordination of the operations
+is to take place, awaits a later decision.
+
+5. The military preparations which will produce exceptional political
+results in the Balkans demands the exact control of all the necessary
+measures by the General Staff.
+
+The transport through Hungary and the arrival in Rumania will be
+reported step by step by the General Staff of the armed forces and are
+to be explained at first as a strengthening of the Germany Army mission
+in Rumania.
+
+Consultations with the Rumanians or the Bulgarians which may point to
+our intentions as well as notification of the Italians are each subject
+to my consent; also the sending of scouting missions and advanced
+parties.
+
+6. After the completion of the Operation Marita it is contemplated to
+use the access of the forces used therein for a _new undertaking_.
+
+7. I anticipate reports from the Chiefs concerning their plans, which
+has already taken place as regards the Army. I want to be presented
+with exact timetables for the planned preparations, as well as for the
+necessary recallings from the armament industry (reconstruction of
+Furlough Divisions).
+
+                                                    Signed: Adolf Hitler
+
+     Witnessed: [signature illegible] Captain in the General Staff
+
+Distribution:
+
+  Commander of the Armies (Operational Section), 1st Copy
+
+  Commander of the Navy (Sea War Direction), 2nd Copy
+
+  Commander of the Air Force (Air Force General Staff), 3rd Copy
+
+  Chief of the German Army Mission to Rumania, 4th Copy
+
+_Supreme Command of the Armed Forces:_
+
+  Command Staff, 5th Copy
+
+  Section L, 6-9 Copies
+
+  UNV, 10th Copy
+
+  Chief of Army Transport Forces, 11th Copy
+
+  Foreign Counter Intelligence Office, 12th Copy
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1544-PS
+
+                            File Memorandum
+
+                on my parting visit with the Chancellor
+
+After an exchange of irrelevant courtesies, the conversation turned
+to the speech of the Chancellor [Bundeskanzler]. I said to him that
+though he had used very cordial expressions on the German mission of
+Austria his dramatic advocacy of her independence which he apparently
+considered threatened had drowned out this testimony to a large extent,
+to say nothing about some unnecessary pinpricks against Germany. To
+his assertion that he had reestablished his authority in the country
+by this speech I added that this speech also had provoked a debate
+yesterday in the French Chamber. In my opinion it was greatly to be
+regretted that the Austrian question had again become the center of
+European discussions. For Germany an Austrian independence supported
+by French and Czech crutches was intolerable, for it would lead to
+arguments which might easily endanger the peace concluded recently.
+
+The Chancellor admitted this without qualifications and requested
+me to inform the Reich Foreign Minister as soon as possible that
+neither he nor any other political agency in Austria had instigated
+this debate in the French Chamber, and that he shared my opinion on
+its extraordinarily disrupting effects. On my request he stated his
+willingness to publish Sunday morning an article in the official paper
+“Wiener Zeitung” (Viennese Newspaper) in which he would clearly detach
+the problem of Austrian independence from French interests. And he had
+instructed the Austrian press to carry only meagre excerpts of the
+debate in the Chamber.
+
+I then introduced into the conversation the widespread opinion that
+he had acted under “brutal pressure” in Berchtesgaden. I myself had
+been present and been able to state that he had always and at every
+point had complete freedom of decision. The Chancellor replied he had
+actually been under considerable moral pressure, he could not deny
+that. He had made notes on the talk which bore that out. I reminded
+him that despite this talk he had not seen his way clear to make any
+concessions, and I asked him whether without the pressure he would have
+been ready to make the concessions he made late in the evening. He
+answered: “To be honest, no!” It appears to me of importance to record
+this statement.
+
+In parting I asked the Chancellor never to deceive himself that Austria
+could ever maintain her status with the help of Non-German, European
+combinations. This question would be decided only according to the
+interests of the German people. He asserted that he held the same
+conviction and would act accordingly.
+
+Vienna, 26 Feb 1938
+
+                                                               /s/ Papen
+
+
+                                 PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1546-PS
+
+N. THE OCCUPATION OF NORWAY ON 9 APRIL 1940.
+
+                          [RAEDER MEMORANDUM]
+
+In the beginning of October 1939, I had a discussion on the Norwegian
+question with the Commander of Naval Group East, Admiral Carls, with
+whose opinions I completely agreed. After that I gave the Fuehrer an
+oral report on the dangers of an occupation of Norwegian bases by
+the British and on the possibilities to forestall such a move. The
+Fuehrer to whom I submitted a short memorandum promised to think it
+over. About at the beginning of December, the Fuehrer received reports
+on the activity of the National Samling movement in Norway under the
+leadership of Quisling and its successes. The incorporation of Norway
+into a Germanic empire under German leadership and with elimination
+of English influence was the aim of this movement. These matters were
+obviously carried to the Fuehrer by Rosenberg. Around the 12 Dec.
+1939 the Fuehrer commanded the OKW to effect the preparations for
+the occupation of Norwegian bases in the coming spring. As it was a
+question of an operation of _all three branches of the Armed Forces_
+it had to be worked out by the Armed Forces High Command in which the
+special Naval adviser took the chief part and took the lead in working
+it out in accordance with a memorandum prepared by the Sea Warfare
+Command and in close cooperation with the Sea Warfare Command.
+
+I had left the _Danish Question_ open in my report to the Fuehrer
+supposing that after the occupation of the Norwegian coast the English
+influence in Denmark could be completely eliminated in such wise that
+the intelligence service there could not cause any more harm and the
+Danish Government would comply with the demands of the German High
+Command without function. However, the Fuehrer decided to occupy
+Denmark at the same time.
+
+The Navy made the decision to transport the _first group_ of the
+occupation troops with their equipment on warships and to land them
+under their immediate protection. Even though the combat-readiness
+of the warships was impaired by loading them with troops, by this
+method the possibility of a punctual landing at the ordered time was
+best provided for. Further groups with munition and supplies were to
+be loaded on steamships which were to arrive simultaneously or soon
+after the warships. The difficulty was that at that time the divisions
+of the army still demanded to be transported with all equipment and
+“rear echelon service” while a considerable limitation of their
+equipment would have been necessary and possible. Considerable demands
+of transport space were made by the Air Forces for their ground
+organization for which no experience existed at all up till then.
+The Navy had already in peacetime an organization of “Naval Service
+Offices” in all large German ports which worked in close touch with
+the Merchant Marine and were at all times exactly informed of the
+location and the readiness for sailing of the German merchant ships of
+their area. Material for the rebuilding of these ships for transport
+purposes was at their disposal, plans for such rebuilding were ready in
+their hands. In January these offices received directives to have the
+necessary transport space ready in spring. A transport in a westerly
+direction was given as the reason for camouflage purposes. The Air
+Force did not join this organization that also was very favourable for
+secrecy, but gave the order for their extensive transports to a certain
+firm with which it had already cooperated at the time of the transports
+to Spain. This included certain dangers for secrecy and eliminated the
+experience of the Navy. Moreover, the command of the Air Force did not
+approach with particular enthusiasm this task in the work of which not
+the Air Force, but the not so well liked Navy, had the leading part. In
+the Navy the impression existed that some things could have been better
+done with regard to the reconnaissance of airfields in Norway and to
+the preparations for the improvement and the building of airfields.
+
+The preparations for the enterprise were rendered more difficult
+by the long and very cold winter of 1939/40 which delayed quite a
+bit the bringing up of the steamers involved in the transport from
+the eastern part of the Baltic Sea and their loading. With all the
+effort to forestall the English in the occupation--their unneutral
+action against the German supply ship in Flekkefjord in 1940 made the
+apprehension of the German Command appear only too well founded--the
+date for the landing was fixed by the Fuehrer not earlier than on
+April 9, 1940 in which regard it could not be helped that according to
+the latest information received the English planned an enterprise in
+Norwegian waters for April 8--it remained open whether mine-laying on
+occupation of air bases. My request to fix the landing on April 7 was
+unfortunately not granted by the Fuehrer.
+
+The general order for the execution of the landing was signed by the
+Fuehrer; detailed directives valid for all armed forces were given
+by the High Command in which, as already mentioned, the special Navy
+adviser took the lead. The ports of embarkation were distributed from
+Wesermmende to Stettin-Swinenmende along the coast. The transportation
+of the troops to the ports was undertaken only in the last hours before
+departure without their knowing where they were being transported. It
+was particularly difficult for the keeping of the secret that for the
+enterprise in Northern Norway some units of Southern German mountain
+troops were destined whose appearance in Northern Germany was already
+conscious enough by itself. But we succeeded in keeping them uncertain
+about the destination until to their complete surprise, they were
+embarked on the destroyers in Wesermmende in the night of April 7. The
+number of the Army and air units I cannot state anymore from memory at
+present. Also, the composition of the landing troops I can give only in
+general terms.
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1551-PS
+
+            1936 REICHS MINISTERIALBLATT i.V., PAGES 946-948
+
+    Assignment and Channels of the Chief of German Police within the
+                Ministry of the Interior of 26 June 1936
+
+(1) For your information, I publish in the enclosures my edicts,
+concerning the appointment of a chief of regular police and that
+of a chief of security police (enclosure (1)), and concerning the
+administrative divisions within the realm of the German police
+(enclosure (2)), effective today.
+
+(2) Official communications in regards to police matters with Reich and
+Prussian Ministry of the Interior are to be handled as follows:
+
+(_a_) Letters and communications for me personally, as well as letters
+and communications of fundamental importance, are to be addressed:
+
+To the
+
+  Reichsleiter SS and Chief of German Police in the Reich Ministry of
+    the Interior
+
+                              Berlin SW 11
+                         Prinz-Albrecht Str. 8
+
+(_b_) Letters and communications, which refer to matters to be handled
+by the headquarters of the regular police according to my edict about
+the administrative divisions within the realm of the Chief of German
+Police, are to be addressed:
+
+To the
+
+  Reichsleiter SS and the Chief of German Police in the Reich Ministry
+    of the Interior (Chief of Regular Police)
+
+                              Berlin NW 7
+                          Unter den Linden 74
+
+(_c_) Letters and communications, which refer to matters to be handled
+by the headquarters of the Security Police according to my edict about
+the administrative divisions within the realm of the Chief of German
+Police, are to be addressed:
+
+To the
+
+  Reichsleiter SS and the Chief of German Police in the Reich Ministry
+    of the Interior (Chief of Security Police)
+
+                              Berlin SW 11
+                         Prinz-Albrecht Str. 8
+
+Phone # Chief of German Police: A2 (Flora) 0040
+
+Phone # Chief of Regular Police: A2 (Flora) 0034
+
+Phone # Chief of Security Police: A2 (Flora) 0040
+
+To the lower agencies, the communities and community organizations as
+well as bodies of public law.
+
+To the highest Reich officials, the Prussian Prime Minister, the
+Prussian Minister of Finance, the General Manager of the German
+Railroad, the Directorate of the Reichsbank by copy.
+
+       #       #       #       #       #
+
+                                                    Berlin, 26 June 1936
+
+Inclosure #1
+
+  The Reichleiter SS and Chief of the German Police in the Reich
+    Ministry of the Interior
+
+Appointment of a Chief of Regular Police and a Chief of Security Police
+
+(1) On the basis of the execution edict of the Reich Minister of the
+Interior to the edict of the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor, in reference
+to the appointment of a Chief of German Police, I herewith appoint
+General of Police Kurt Daluege as chief of the regular police and SS
+Gruppenfuehrer Reinhard Heydrich as Chief of the Security Police.
+
+(2) From the entire police force [Vollzugspolizei] the following come
+under:
+
+  The Chief of Regular Police:
+    Safety Police [Schutzpolizei]
+    Rural Police [Gendarmerie]
+    Local Police [Gemeindepolizei]
+
+  The Chief of Security Police:
+    The Political Police
+    The Criminal Police
+
+(3) The authority over fields of action of the Chief of German Police,
+not mentioned here, is explained in the plan of administrative division
+(Inclosure #2)
+
+To the (a) General of Police Daluege, (b) SS Gruppenfuehrer Heydrich.
+
+       #       #       #       #       #
+
+  Inclosure #2                                       Berlin 26 June 1936
+
+The Reichleiter SS and Chief of the German Police in the Reich Ministry
+of the Interior O/S No 2/36
+
+ Administrative division within the realm of the Chief of German Police
+
+On the basis of #1 of the edict of the Reich and Prussian Minister of
+the Interior of 25 June 1936 (not published), for the execution of the
+edict of the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor regarding the appointment of
+a Chief of German Police, I therefore order (with permission of the
+Reich- and Prussian Minister of the Interior):
+
+1. The functioning of the branches, under the jurisdiction of the Chief
+of German Police, will be handled by two (2) headquarters:
+
+_a._ The regular police, which will include the following branches:
+
+  Household, pay, welfare, economy and police law.
+
+  General administrative affairs of the state police, as far as they
+    concern the regular police.
+
+  Safety police.
+
+  Traffic police.
+
+  Rural police [Gendarmerie], local police [Gemeindepolizei], civil
+    service legal affairs.
+
+  Medical and veterinary affairs.
+
+  National defense and army matters, as far as they have been put under
+    the jurisdiction of the regular police. Personnel affairs of
+    officials of the regular police.
+
+(The security police is to participate in all actions, which affect the
+security police).
+
+The headquarters “Regular Police” is entrusted with the functioning of
+the following branches in conjunction with the headquarters “security
+police” if the latter are concerned:
+
+  Administrative police; and
+
+  Personnel affairs of police presidents and police directors.
+
+_b._ The security police, which will include the following branches:
+
+  Political police,
+
+  Lodge affairs, freemasonry, fraternity affairs, criminal police,
+
+  Disciplinary affairs within the criminal police,
+
+  General administrative affairs of the state police, as far as the
+    security police is concerned,
+
+  Press law,
+
+  Weapons law and traffic with arms,
+
+  Passports affairs:
+    General cases.
+    Special cases.
+
+    Agreements with foreign states about the free passage of the border
+      [kleinen Grenzverkehr].
+
+    Foreign legionnaires (passport matters).
+
+    Immigration of Jews from the East.
+
+National defense and army matters, as far as they have been put under
+the jurisdiction of the security police.
+
+  Alien affairs:
+    General cases.
+    Police regulations for foreigners.
+    Special cases.
+    Fugitives [refractaere], deserters.
+    Deportations.
+    Reimbursement.
+    Foreign workers.
+    Border disputes.
+    Extradition of foreigners.
+    Registration of foreigners.
+    Statistics of foreigners.
+
+  Border disputes; Foreign Legion.
+
+  Personnel affairs of all officials of the security police.
+
+  Personnel affairs of all officials of the political and criminal
+    police.
+
+(The regular police is to participate in all actions, which affect the
+regular police).
+
+2. I confer the leadership of the headquarters Regular Police upon
+General of Police Daluege. I confer the leadership of the headquarters
+Security Police upon SS Gruppenfuehrer Heydrich.
+
+3. The chiefs of the headquarters Regular Police and Security Police
+will sign:
+
+  For the Chief of the German Police
+              “acting for”
+
+  For the Reich and Prussian Minister of the Interior
+                               “by order”
+
+The chiefs of the headquarters Regular Police and Security Police in
+their offices, in which cases their department heads and assistants are
+to sign:
+
+                               “by order”
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+  To _a._ General of Police Daluege
+
+     _b._ SS Gruppenfuehrer Heydrich
+
+  Communication to ______________________
+
+Report on Sterilization in Germany and occupied countries to be sent to
+the members of Committee I Submitted by Dr. B. Ecer ANNEX B
+
+Detailed Statement on the murdering of ill and aged people in Germany
+
+1. The murdering can be traced back to a secret law which was released
+sometime in Summer 1940.
+
+2. Besides the Chief Physician of the Reich Dr. L. Conti, the
+Reichsfuehrer SS Himmler, the Reichs Minister of the Interior Dr. Frick
+as well as other men, the following participate on the introduction of
+this secret law:
+
+_a._ The Councillor of the Ministry Dr. Herbert Linden of the Reich’s
+Ministry of the Interior.
+
+_b._ Dr. Staehle-Nagold, the Chief Physician of Wuerttemberg.
+
+_c._ Councillor of Medicine /Obermedizinalrat/ Dr. Hermann
+Pfannmueller, Director of the Sanatorium and Nursing Institution
+Eglfing-Haar near Munich.
+
+_d._ Professor Dr. Werner Heyde, Director of the Psychiatric and
+Neurological Clinic in Wuerzburg.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+3. As I have already stated, there were / after careful calculation
+/ at least 200,000 mainly mentally deficient, imbeciles, besides
+neurological cases and medically unfit people /these were not only
+incurable cases/, and at least 75,000 aged people.
+
+4. The murders were mainly accomplished in Muensingen/Wuerttemberg and
+Linz o/Danube; several gas-chambers with cremation chambers directly
+attached were constructed there. As the gas-chambers are next to the
+training grounds of the troops in Muensingen, it is believed that the
+mentally deficient who were murdered there, were used for experimenting
+with new poison-gases.
+
+5. The transport from the institutions to the gas-chambers is carried
+out by SS Kommandos. These call themselves “Gemeinnuetzige Transport
+A. G., Berlin, Luetzowufer.” This Limited Company also stores the
+individual medical case histories of the murdered inmates of the
+institutions.
+
+6. The inmates of the many smaller and middle-sized institutions
+were murdered almost without exception. The larger institutions are
+partly--to keep up the pretence to the outside world--still at hand,
+but they now only have a fraction of the original number of their
+inmates; for example there are now only some 500 inmates instead of
+2500 in Berlin-Buch; in Stadtroda/Thueringen only about 150 instead
+of 600; in Kaufbeuren/Bayern only 200 instead of 1000, etc. Of the
+larger Sanatoriums and Nursing Institutions the following were already
+closed down completely some time ago; Illenau/Baden 800 inmates;
+Berlin/Herzberge 2500 inmates, Kreutzburg/Oberschlesien 1500 inmates;
+Sonnenstein/Sachsen 800 inmates; Werneck/Unterfranken-Bayern 111
+inmates; Steinhof/Wien 3000 inmates, and others, most probably now also
+Schleswig with 1000 beds. Guenzburg with 400 etc. etc.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+                                               Written in December 1941,
+                                                       /sgd/ Dr. T. Lang
+
+This is to certify, that the above report by Dr. T. Lang dated Dec.
+1941 is part of the original report of the Czechoslovak War Crimes
+Commission.
+
+Nurnberg 8. Dec. 1945                                  for Col. Dr. Ecer
+
+                                                      Capt. Dr. Hochwald
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1573-PS
+
+                                 SECRET
+
+                                  Copy
+
+  The chief of the Security Police and the Security Service. IV D 3-3
+    B/41 g.Rs.-
+
+                                                    Berlin, 18 Jun. 1941
+
+                               TOP SECRET
+
+                             Express letter
+
+To all state police Administrative office
+
+  (To the State Police, attention SS Stubaf. RR. Nosske or
+    representative at Aachen)
+
+  _Subject_: Measures to be taken against Emigrants and civilian
+             workers who came from the great Russian areas and against
+             Foreign workers.
+
+  _Reference_: None
+
+To prevent the unauthorized and arbitrary return of Russian, Ukrainian,
+White Ruthenians, Cossack and Caucasian emigrants and civilian workers
+from the territory of the Reich to the East and to prevent attempts
+at disorder by foreign workers in the German production, I decide as
+follows:
+
+1. The managers of the branch offices [Stuetzpunkt] of the
+Russian, Ukrainian, White Ruthenian and Caucasians trustee office
+[Vertrauensstellen] as well as the relief committee and the leading
+members of the Russian, Ukrainian, White Ruthenian, Cossack and
+Caucasian emigration organisations are to be notified immediately that
+they are not allowed to leave their domicile without permission of
+the security police until further notice. Also they are to be told
+to apply the same measures to the members who are under their care.
+Their attention is to be called to the fact that they will be arrested
+because of unauthorized leaving of the place of work and domicile.
+I request you to have a check up of the attendance of branch office
+leaders if possible by daily requests in these concerns.
+
+2. Emigrants and foreign workers are to be arrested if it seems
+necessary in the situation if there is no doubt of their guilt and if
+they are under the suspicion of having been active for the U.S.S.R.
+in transmitting news. The measure is to be in readiness, however, it
+should not be executed before the pass word “Fremdvoelker” has been
+transmitted by means of Urgent telegram.
+
+3. In case of refusals to work or in making propaganda for the enemy or
+suspicion of sabotage among all foreign laborers arrests and protective
+custody should be applied most strictly.
+
+4. Persons who violate issued decrees or who try to provoke
+disturbances in factories or meetings by inflammatory speeches to the
+emigrants or foreign workers are also to be arrested.
+
+5. It is an absolute necessity for the maintenance of German production
+to its capacity that emigrants and foreign workers remain at their
+places of work. In case, conditions in certain communities require
+that special measures be taken to reach this objective. I ask for
+appropriate action and report.
+
+The RSHA to be kept posted how these measures are carried out. The
+decree also is to be applied to emigrants who came from the Baltic
+states--Lithuanians, Latvians and Estonians.
+
+By order
+
+                                                             /s/ MUELLER
+                                        Certified correct: /s/ Signature
+                                          (L.S.)      Chancellery clerk.
+
+       #       #       #       #       #
+
+                                                     Aachen, 3 July 1941
+
+  _Note_: The original decree can be found under IIIc under File No.
+          20/41 top secret
+
+                                                                Koernert
+                                                          Krim-Assistent
+
+
+                                 SECRET
+
+  Secret State Police, State Police Bldg.-Aachen
+  II E br.-No. 6/41 top Secret
+
+                                                    Aachen, 22 Jan. 1942
+
+1. The written record of these proceedings was worked out and sent
+through as a secret matter under II E under No. 303/41.
+
+  2. R II deliver                                 taken care of 22. Jan.
+
+3. To the Top Secret File
+
+By order
+
+                                                        [illegible] Koer
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1574-PS
+
+SECRET STATE POLICE [Gestapo]
+
+  Secret Police Office, Reich Security Head Office. IV C 2--5719/
+    4540/43 g
+
+   Berlin SW 11 Prinz Albrecht Strasse 8. 19 January 1944 Warrant for
+                          “Protective Custody”
+
+  Christian Name & Surname: _James_, Cook Steele.
+  Date and Place of birth: 29.20.1918 at Malseta, S. Rhodesia
+  Occupation: Warrant Officer
+  M or S: Married
+  Nationality: British Subject
+  Race (to be stated in case of non-Aryans)
+  Address: Gresham Farm Marandellas, S. Rhodesia
+
+       is being taken in protective custody.
+
+                                Reasons
+
+It has been established by the State Police that he/she endangers the
+existence and the security of the people and the state by his/her
+conduct, in that he/she has been proved to be guilty of activities to
+the detriment of the German Reich and there is reason to suspect that
+he would, if released, commit acts prejudicial to the interests of the
+Reich.
+
+received 23.1.44. 1400 hrs
+
+  [initials]
+
+                                                 (Sgd) Dr. Kaltenbrunner
+                                    Certified correct: (sgd) Kriminalrat
+
+Steele should not know of the existence of this warrant [written in
+  pencil; illegible initials follow].
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1582-PS
+
+  Bra/V
+  SS-Untersturmfuehrer Dr. med. Sigmund RASCHER
+  MUNICH, Trogerstr. 56
+
+Dear Dr. Rascher:
+
+Shortly before flying to Oslo, the Reichsfuehrer SS gave me your letter
+of 15 May, 1941, for partial reply.
+
+I can inform you that prisoners will of course be gladly made available
+for the high-flight researches. I have informed the Chief of the
+Security Police of this agreement of the Reichsfuehrer SS, and
+requested that the competent official be instructed to get in touch
+with you.
+
+I want to use the opportunity to extend my cordial wishes to you on the
+birth of your son.
+
+I shall refer as soon as possible to the second part of your letter.
+
+                                                             Heil Hitler
+
+                                                By order [initials] R Br
+                                                     SS-Sturmbannfuehrer
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1583-PS
+
+                                 SECRET
+
+  Reichsfuehrer SS.
+  RG/V
+
+  Field Command Post 16 November 1942
+
+    Personal Headquarters, Reichsfuehrer SS
+
+1. To SS Lt. Gen OHL, BERLIN
+
+Dear OHL,
+
+The following struck me during my visit to Dachau on the 13 Nov 1942
+regarding the experiments conducted there for the saving of people
+whose lives are endangered through exposure [Unterkuhlung] in ice, snow
+or water and who are to be saved by the employment of every method or
+means:
+
+I had ordered that suitable women are to be set aside from the
+Concentration Camp for these experiments for the warming of those who
+were exposed. Four girls were set aside who were in the Concentration
+Camp due to loose living, and being prostitutes, they formulate a
+danger of contagion. Among those four was a 21 year old girl named
+Ursula Kraus, who naturally was not to be set aside for this. Kraus
+was a person under the care of the State [Fuersorgezoegling] and has
+already been sick twice with venereal disease. Nevertheless she belongs
+to that type of girl upon whom the attempt must be made in order to
+save her for the German people and for her own later life.
+
+In addition, I found during this opportunity that some madmen in the
+women’s Concentration Camp had told the feminine prisoners at the
+time of selection of prostitutes for the Camp brothel, that those who
+volunteered would be released after a half year.
+
+I order:
+
+1. Only such prostitutes are to be selected for the Camp brothel who
+from the beginning can be taken for granted as not being able to be
+saved for a later regulated life, judging from their previous living
+and bearing. Also, that we are not guilty of spoiling a person who
+could still be saved for the German people. Such women can only be
+released from the Concentration Camp if they according to their age, do
+not constitute a destruction to the youth, to health (by contagion), or
+to the public welfare and security. The money which they earn in the
+camp brothel shall be an old-age security for them.
+
+2. Fundamentally, all youths who can still be saved are to be
+segregated from the older prostitutes in living quarters and work. A
+difference must be made between those who cannot be reformed,--who must
+remain isolated in the camps, and those who came into the camp to be
+reformed and can eventually be saved. The best and most ideologically
+inclined custodians are to be employed for the latter.
+
+In addition, I refer to the fact that the whipping penalty as a whole
+but especially for women, is to be the last measure, it is only to be
+used
+
+_a._ if all other punishment such as arrest, solitary confinement, diet
+of bread and water, hard labor, were of no avail.
+
+_b._ in individual cases of desertion or in actual attacks, which
+must be inflicted for intimidating and especially exemplary reasons.
+The whipping penalty is no instrument for responsible commanders or
+supervising custodians who are too lazy or incompetent to reeducate. In
+all cases in which food was stolen, the guilty one is to be placed on
+bread and water from 3 to 5 days as punishment for first offense. The
+whipping penalty is only then to be inflicted upon repeated offenses.
+
+I ask you to personally check the conditions in the women’s
+concentration camps. Otherwise we must feel guilty since girls who
+could still be saved will be ruined for always through false treatment
+and repeated bad company in which we placed them (exactly as is the
+case in the prisons and reform schools of the law).
+
+                                                            Heil Hitler!
+                                                                    Your
+                                                     (signed) H. Himmler
+
+2. Inspector of the Concentration Camps, Oranienburg
+
+Carbon copy with request for acknowledgment.
+
+                                                             SS Lt. Col.
+
+
+                               PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1584-I-PS
+
+          Teletype Goering to Himmler, dated 14 February 1944
+
+                               TOP SECRET
+
+                      CHIEF REICH SECURITY OFFICE
+
+                            Teletype Section
+
+                                 URGENT
+
+                                               Transmitted by [Initials]
+
+                                Received
+
+  -------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------------
+   Hour  |  Day  | Month | Year  | from  | by
+    240  |   15  |   2   |  44   |  E2   |  [Initials]
+  -------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------------
+
+FS--No. 24411
+
+t-KR-RM Asien Nr. 0170 14/2 2030--QEM--GKDOL--to Reichsfuehrer-SS
+Reichs Minister Himmler, Berlin SW 11-Reference: Letter Journal No.
+72/44.-
+
+Subject: Formation of the 7th Airforce group squadron for special
+purposes 7 (Z.B.V.7)
+
+I received your request to form another squadron of airforce group for
+special purposes 7 (Z.B.V.7) and ordered examination by the air force
+operational staff [Luftwaffenfuehrungsstab]. At the same time I ask you
+to put at my disposal as great a number of Concentration Camp [K Z]
+convicts as possible for air armament, as this kind of manpower proved
+to be very useful according to previous experience. The situation of
+the air war makes subterranean transfer of industry necessary. For work
+of this kind Concentration Camp [KZ] convicts can be especially well
+concentrated at work and in the camp. Such installations are necessary
+in order to secure production of the now fully developed most modern
+airplanes. The Fuehrer upon his visit in Insterbrug has attached great
+value to these airplanes. Intermediate negotiations have already been
+held between my and your departments. I would be especially grateful
+for your support in carrying out this task.
+
+Heil Hitler--Yours Goering, Reich Marshal of Greater Germany. ADF
+391/44 GKDOS.
+
+
+                                     TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1584-III-PS
+
+                               TOP SECRET
+
+  The Reichsfuehrer-SS                               Field Command Post.
+  Personal Staff                                           10 March 1944
+  Diary No.
+  _Subject_: Use of Prisoners in the air craft industry-M.
+  To the SS-Brigadefuehrer FEGELEIN
+  _Fuehrer Headquarters_
+
+  Dear Hermann!
+
+Enclosed I am sending you copy of a letter for your information. It was
+given to the Reich marshal on 9 March 1944 by the Reichsfuehrer-SS.
+
+                                                            Heil Hitler!
+                                                         (initialled) DR
+
+1 enclosure
+
+       #       #       #       #       #
+
+                                                            9 March 1944
+  1879/44 secret                                    Field-command office
+  Subject: Employment of prisoners in the aviation industry.
+  Reference: Teletype of 14 February 1944.
+                            Top Reich Secret
+
+                       Most honored Reichsmarshal
+
+Following my teletype letter of the 18 Feb. 44 I herewith transmit a
+survey on the employment of prisoners in the aviation industry.
+
+This survey indicates that at the present time about _36000 prisoners_
+are employed for the purposes of the air force. An increase to a total
+of _90,000 prisoners_ is contemplated.
+
+The production is being discussed, established and executed between the
+Reich ministry of aviation and the chief of my economic-administrative
+main office, SS-Obergruppenfuehrer and General of the Waffen-SS, Pohl
+respectively.
+
+We assist with all forces at our disposal.
+
+The task of my economic-administrative main office, however, is not
+solely fulfilled with the delivery of the prisoners to the aviation
+industry as SS-Obergruppenfuehrer Pohl and his assistants take care of
+the required working speed thru constant control and supervision of the
+workgroups [Kommandos] and therefore have some influence on the results
+of production. In this respect I may suggest consideration of the fact
+that in enlarging our responsibility thru a speeding up of the total
+work, better results can definitely be expected.
+
+We also have for some time adjusted our own stone-quarries to
+production for the airforce. For instance in Flossenbuerg near Weiden
+the prisoners employed previously in the quarry are working now in the
+fighter plane program for the Messerschmitt corporation, Regensburg,
+which saw in the availability of our stone-mason shops and labor forces
+after the attack on Regensburg at that time a favorable opportunity for
+the immediate partial transfer of their production. Altogether 4000
+prisoners will work there after the expansion. We produce now with 2000
+men 900 sets of engine cowlings and radiator covers as well as 120,000
+single parts of various kinds for the fighter ME 109.
+
+In Oranienburg we are employing 6000 prisoners at the Heinkel works now
+for construction of the HE 177. With that we have supplied 60% of the
+total crew of the plant.
+
+The prisoners are working without fault. Up till now 200 suggestions
+regarding the improvement of work have been handed in at Heinkel from
+the ranks of the prisoners, which were used and were rewarded with
+premiums. We are increasing this employment to 8000 prisoners.
+
+We also have employed female prisoners in the aviation industry. For
+instance at the mechanical workshops in Neubrandenburg 2500 women
+are working now in the manufacture of devices for dropping bombs and
+rudder control. The plant has adjusted the total serial production to
+employ prisoners. In the month of January 30,000 devices as well as 500
+rudder controls and altitude regulators have been manufactured. We are
+increasing employment to 4000 women. The performance of the women is
+excellent.
+
+In our own plant in Butschowitz near Bruenn [Brno] we produce also
+for the air force, there however with civilian workers. This plant
+supplies 14,000 wooden-built rear control apparatus for ME 109 to the
+Messerschmitt corporation, Augsburg.
+
+The movement of manufacturing plants of the aviation industry to
+subterranean locations requires _further_ employment of about 100,000
+prisoners. The plans for this employment on the basis of your letter of
+14 Feb 1944 are already under way.
+
+I shall keep you, most honored Reichsmarshal, currently informed on
+this subject.
+
+                                                             Heil Hitler
+                                                          (initialed) HH
+
+
+                             Use of Prisoners for the Aircraft Industry.
+
+  -----------------------+---------------+---------+-----------------------
+                         |   Number of   |         |
+                         |   Prisoners   | Man-Hrs |
+                         +-------+-------+---------+
+       Camp & Plant      |planned| used  | January |       Production
+  -----------------------+-------+-------+---------+-----------------------
+  _Auschwitz_:           |       |       |         |
+                         |       |       |         |
+  AA fortification staff,|       |       |         |
+   Auschwitz             |   250 |   191 |  48,788 | Construction of AA
+                         |       |       |         | positions.
+                         |       |       |         |
+  Ost-Maschinenbau GmbH, |       |       |         |
+   (Factory),            |       |       |         |
+   Schwientochlowitz     | 1,500 |   730 | 196,067 | AA gun production:
+                         |       |       |         | _prod. result Jan_:
+                         |       |       |         | 105 guns.
+                         |       |       |         |
+  Siemens & Schuckert,   |       |       |         |
+   Auschwitz             | 1,500 |    90 |  19,240 | at first completion
+                         |       |       |         | of plant, later
+                         |       |       |         | switch and control
+                         |       |       |         | instruments for night
+                         |       |       |         | fighters.
+                         |       |       |         |
+  _Buchenwald_:          |       |       |         |
+                         |       |       |         |
+  Erla-Maschinenwerk     |       |       |         |
+   GmbH., Leipzig        | 2,800 | 1,550 | 176,105 | air plane parts
+                         |       |       |         | production
+                         |       |       |         | _prod. result_
+                         |       |       |         | _Jan_:
+                         |       |       |         |  360 wings for BF 109
+                         |       |       |         |  290 fuselages BF 109
+                         |       |       |         |  304 tail assemblies
+                         |       |       |         |
+  Junkers-Flug-&         |       |       |         |
+   Motorenwerke AG.,     |       |       |         |
+   Schoenebeck           | 2,000 | 1,310 | 362,619 | air plane parts
+                         |       |       |         | production
+                         |       |       |         |
+  Polte, Arnstadt        |   100 |    87 |  24,112 | finishing of AA
+                         |       |       |         | cartridge cases;
+                         |       |       |         | _prod. result Jan_:
+                         |       |       |         | 181,000 AA
+                         |       |       |         | cartridge cases.
+                         |       |       |         |
+  Leichtmetallwerke      |       |       |         |
+   Rautenbach Wernigerode| 1,200 |   772 | 189,832 | production of cylinder
+                         |       |       |         | blocks for airplane
+                         |       |       |         | motors
+                         |       |       |         |
+  _Dachau_:              |       |       |         |
+                         |       |       |         |
+  High frequency research|    15 |    15 |   3,290 | high frequency
+                         |       |       |         | development
+                         |       |       |         |
+  BMW, Munich-Allach     |12,000 | 3,434 | 908,606 | air plane motor
+                         |       |       |         | production--
+                         |       |       |         | construction &
+                         |       |       |         | subterranean building
+                         |       |       |         |
+  Dornier Works GmbH.,   |       |       |         |
+   Neuaubing             | 3,000 |    60 |   9,527 | at first construction
+                         |       |       |         | of workers’ camp,
+                         |       |       |         | later plane part
+                         |       |       |         | production.
+                         |       |       |         |
+  Engineer Kimmel, Munich|    25 |    23 |   7,925 | building of radio
+                         |       |       |         | measuring instruments
+                         |       |       |         | _prod. result Jan_:
+                         |       |       |         | 35 RC-generators.
+  Air force research     |       |       |         |
+   institute, Munich     |   400 |    40 |   --    | building of air force
+                         |       |       |         | research institute
+                         |       |       |         | Ottobrunn
+                         |       |       |         |
+  Messerschmitt AG.,     |       |       |         |
+         Augsburg--      |       |       |         |
+     ”       Haunstetten | 3,400 | 2,695 | 740,640 | air plane production
+                         |       |       |         |   Me
+     ”       Gablingen   |   600 |   352 |   --    | air plane production
+                         |       |       |         |   Me
+     ”       Dachau      |   600 |   192 |  35,766 | manufacture of plane
+                         |       |       |         |  parts
+     ”       Kottern     | 1,000 |   341 |  57,050 | first building of
+                         |       |       |         |   factory, then plant
+                         |       |       |         |   parts production
+                         |       |       |         |
+  Air force planning     |       |       |         |
+   office, Sudelfeld     |    25 |    25 |   4,660 | building of
+                         |       |       |         |  experimental station
+                         |       |       |         |  for high frequency
+  Praezifix, Dachau      |   400 |   356 |  94,067 | production of standard
+                         |       |       |         |  plane parts and
+                         |       |       |         |  screws
+  H. Sachse KG. Kempten. | 1,000 |   374 |  91,630 | first building of
+                         |       |       |         |  factory/start
+                         |       |       |         |  production of
+                         |       |       |         |  propeller control
+                         |       |       |         |  instruments.
+                         |       |       |         |
+  _Flossenbuerg_:        |       |       |         |
+                         |       |       |         |
+  Dt. Erd- & Steinwerke  |       |       |         |
+   GmbH, Floss.          | 4,000 | 1,911 | 422,158 | plane parts production
+                         |       |       |         | for Me _prod. result
+                         |       |       |         | Jan_: 900 noses &
+                         |       |       |         | radiator covering;
+                         |       |       |         | 120,000 parts.
+                         |       |       |         |
+  Erla-Maschinenwerk     |       |       |         |
+   GmbH,                 |       |       |         |
+      Johanngeorgenstadt |   600 |   564 | 117,524 | air plane parts
+                         |       |       |         |  production.
+      Milsen             |   500 |    30 |   --    | air plane parts
+                         |       |       |         |  production.
+                         |       |       |         |
+  Geramic Works Bohemia, |       |       |         |
+   Neurohlau             |   100 |   100 |  10,764 | plane parts
+                         |       |       |         | production.
+                         |       |       |         |
+  Luftfahrtgeraetewerk,  |       |       |         |
+   Zwodau                | 1,500 |   199 |  28,314 | instrument prod. for
+                         |       |       |         | air force.
+                         |       |       |         |
+  _Herzogenbusch_:       |       |       |         |
+                         |       |       |         |
+  Dt. Erd- & Steinwerke  |       |       |         |
+   GmbH. Herzogenbusch   |   600 |   411 |  35,248 | air plane
+                         |       |       |         | disassembling plant
+                         |       |       |         | _prod. result Jan_:
+                         |       |       |         |  12 planes
+                         |       |       |         |           disassembled
+                         |       |       |         |  35 motors     ”
+                         |       |       |         | 120 wings      ”
+                         |       |       |         |
+  Air force field        |       |       |         |
+   construction office 3 | 1,000 |   265 |  64,800 | runway construction
+                         |       |       |         | for airport.
+                         |       |       |         |
+  _Mauthausen_:          |       |       |         |
+                         |       |       |         |
+  Dt. Erd- & Steinwerke  |       |       |         |
+   GmbH., Mauthausen     |   500 |   423 |  82,632 | plane parts
+                         |       |       |         | construction for Me
+                         |       |       |         | _prod. results
+                         |       |       |         | January_:
+                         |       |       |         |  25 plane fuselages
+                         |       |       |         |
+  Flugmotoren GmbH.,     |       |       |         |
+   Wiener-Neudorf        | 3,000 | 1,983 | 417,328 | first building, later
+                         |       |       |         | plane parts prod.
+                         |       |       |         |
+  Heinkel-Werke AG,      |       |       |         |
+   Schwechat             | 3,200 | 2,065 | 486,206 | air plane parts
+                         |       |       |         | production
+                         |       |       |         |
+  _Natzweiler_:          |       |       |         |
+                         |       |       |         |
+  Dt Erd- & Steinwerke   |       |       |         |
+   GmbH, Natzweiler      |   400 |   261 |  63,221 | disassembling of Ju
+                         |       |       |         | motors & welding of
+                         |       |       |         | air torpedoes.
+                         |       |       |         |
+  _Neuengamme_:          |       |       |         |
+                         |       |       |         |
+  Jastram,               |       |       |         |
+   Hamburg-Bergedorf     |    80 |    80 |  21,554 | air plane parts
+                         |       |       |         | production
+  Messap GmbH.,          |       |       |         |
+   Hamburg-Langenhorn    |   120 |   110 |  31,422 | production of fuse
+                         |       |       |         | mechanisms
+                         |       |       |         | _prod. result Jan_:
+                         |       |       |         |16 800 balance wheels
+                         |       |       |         | S30
+                         |       |       |         |53 900 balance wheels
+                         |       |       |         | S60
+                         |       |       |         |15 600 time fuses S30
+                         |       |       |         |46 700 time fuses S60
+                         |       |       |         |
+  _Ravensbrueck_:        |       |       |         |
+                         |       |       |         |
+  Air ministry testing   |       |       |         |
+   ground, Peenamuende-W |   600 |   598 | 125,000 | building
+                         |       |       |         |
+  Geraetewerk Pommern    |       |       |         |
+   GmbH, Stargard        |   550 |   283 |  81,129 | production of aerial
+                         |       |       |         | torpedoes
+                         |       |       |         |
+  Heinkel-Werke AG,      |       |       |         |
+   Barth.                | 2,000 | 1,721 | 435,155 | air plane production
+                         |       |       |         |
+  Mechan. Werkstaetten   |       |       |         |
+   GmbH. Neubrandenburg  | 4,000 | 1,981 | 529,126 | production of bomb
+                         |       |       |         | release mechanism and
+                         |       |       |         | Fz.G.76; _prod. Jan._
+                         |       |       |         |   23,000 lock 50/X
+                         |       |       |         |    1,500 lock 2000
+                         |       |       |         |      150 PVC 1006
+                         |       |       |         |      500 rudder
+                         |       |       |         |       machines
+                         |       |       |         |      400 ER 4 L-“2”
+                         |       |       |         |
+  Siemens & Halske,      |       |       |         |
+   Berlin, work          |       |       |         |
+   Ravensbrueck          | 2,400 |   872 | 242,867 | communication
+                         |       |       |         | equipment
+                         |       |       |         | product. (e.g. throat
+                         |       |       |         | microphones)
+  Silva-Metallwerke      |       |       |         |
+   GmbH, Genthin         |   600 |   596 | 154,224 | production of AA
+                         |       |       |         | ammunition
+                         |       |       |         | _prod. result Jan._:
+                         |       |       |         |  518 200 2-cm shells
+                         |       |       |         |  927 500 2-cm shells
+                         |       |       |         |   (various styles)
+                         |       |       |         |  965 000 13-mm shells
+                         |       |       |         |
+  Veltener-Maschinenbau  |       |       |         |
+   GmbH., Volten         |   600 |   596 | 146,873 | production of plane
+                         |       |       |         | parts.
+                         |       |       |         |
+  _Sachsenhausen_:       |       |       |         |
+                         |       |       |         |
+  Heinkel-Werke AG,      |       |       |         |
+   Oranienburg           | 6,500 | 5,939 |1,699,978| plane mass production.
+                         |       |       |         | _Prod. result_
+                         |       |       |         | 15 plane bodies He 177
+  Luftschiffbau Zepplin  |       |       |         |
+   GmbH, Oranienburg     |   300 |   221 |  54,006 | production and repair
+                         |       |       |         | of balloons
+                         |       |       |         | _prod. result Jan_:
+                         |       |       |         | 120 balloons repaired
+                         |       |       |         | and part work for
+                         |       |       |         | 40 new balloons.
+                         |       |       |         |
+  _Ostland               |       |       |         |
+  Concentration          |       |       |         |
+  Camp_:                 |       |       |         |
+                         |       |       |         |
+  Air force field        |       |       |         |
+   building direction.   |       |       |         |
+   Spilve                | 1,000 | 1,000 | 280,776 | building of airport.
+                         |       |       |         |
+  Field building         |       |       |         |
+   direction 3/I, Kauen  | 1,000 |   829 | 222,186 | building of airport.
+                         |       |       |         |
+  AA booty repair shop,  |       |       |         |
+   Kauen                 |   200 |   162 |   4,920 | rebuilding of booty AA
+                         |       |       |         |
+  Kopperschmidt & Soehne,|       |       |         |
+   Riga                  |    20 |    20 |   6,160 | production of plane
+                         |       |       |         | turrets.
+                         |       |       |         |
+  It was recently agreed |       |       |         |
+   to use further:       |       |       |         |
+                         |       |       |         |
+  _Buchenwald_:          |       |       |         |
+                         |       |       |         |
+  Anhydrit               |10,000 |  --   |   --    | plane production of
+                         |       |       |         | Ju underground
+                         |       |       |         |
+  Ago, Oschersleben      | 1,500 |  --   |   --    | plane production
+                         |       |       |         | Focke-Wulf fighters.
+                         |       |       |         |
+  _Gross-Rosen_:         |       |       |         |
+                         |       |       |         |
+  Famo, Bunzlau          | 1,500 |  --   |   --    | servicing of FW night
+                         |       |       |         | fighters, Ta 154.
+                         |       |       |         |
+  _Mauthausen_:          |       |       |         |
+                         |       |       |         |
+  Esche II               |10,000 |  --   |   --    | kind of production to
+                         |       |       |         | be decided by air
+                         |       |       |         | Ministry.
+                         |       |       |         |
+  _Natzweiler_:          |       |       |         |
+                         |       |       |         |
+  Geraetewerk Pommern    |       |       |         |
+   GmbH., branch         |       |       |         |
+   Diedenhofen           |   600 |  --   |   --    | production of aerial
+                         |       |       |         | torpedoes.
+                         |90,785 |35,839 |8,733,495|
+  -----------------------+-------+-------+---------+-----------------------
+
+                            The Chief of the
+                SS Economics Administration Main Office
+           Berlin, 21 February 1944      (signed) Pohl I. [?]
+         SS Obergruppenfuehrer and General of Armed Forces SS.
+
+The Reich Minister for Armament and War Production
+
+TAE-No. 475/44 top secret
+
+(Signed) Pohl
+
+[Initialled] HH
+
+                                 Berlin, Pariser Platz 3, 17 April 1944.
+
+                                                         Phone: 11 00 52
+
+                                                                    Pohl
+
+                               TOP SECRET
+
+Fighter staff, attention: Field Marshal MILCH
+
+Fighter staff, attention: Chief of office SWR
+
+_For Information_
+
+  Reichsfuehrer-SS and chief of the German Police, Reichleader HIMMLER
+
+  Head of armament office Lt Gen Dr Ing. h. c. Waeger
+
+  Plenipotentiary-General for Construction, Director Stobbe-Dethleffsen
+
+1. Using tables and drawings as an illustration I have in conjunction
+with Field Marshal Milch informed the Fuehrer on the work of the
+fighter staff in pointing to the extraordinarily pleasing and
+successful cooperation of the newly created organization with all
+offices and works. He is cognizant of the fact that the greatest part
+of the transfer has been fixed according to plan and that as the
+first step the decentralization above the ground can be concluded by
+approximately August and that the second step aiming at the total
+subterranean security of the most sensitive works will be concluded by
+the end of the year.
+
+2. Field Marshal Milch has reported as a result of the meeting on
+construction of the “central planning” to the Fuehrer, that of
+the amount of construction demanded, because of the extraordinary
+aggravation of the all-over situation, only the most important part of
+the construction work could be accomplished. The Fuehrer demands that
+in spite of that both the large plants, each of at least 600,000 qm,
+which he demanded should be constructed with all energy. He consents
+that one of these works will not be built in concrete but in accordance
+with the proposal as an enlargement and in the immediate vicinity of
+the present central works as the so-called central construction and
+will come under the management of the Junkers works.
+
+The Fuehrer agrees to the suggestion that the second large building
+project will, because of lack in labor and material, not be carried
+out on German territory, but on suitable ground (first of all gravel
+foundation and possibilities for transportation) in the immediate
+proximity of the border, on French, Belgian or Dutch territory,
+as long as the plant is constructed behind a fortified zone. The
+suggestion to build on French territory is favored by the fact that
+it will then be much easier to make the necessary labor available. In
+spite of that the Fuehrer asks to try, to construct this second works
+in an essentially secure territory, namely in the Protectorate. If
+the labor can not be supplied there either, the Fuehrer wants to get
+in touch in person with the Reichsfuehrer SS and will cause him to
+provide the approximately 100,000 men required, thru the securing of
+corresponding Jewish contingents from Hungary. The Fuehrer demands that
+a meeting take place with him shortly in order to discuss the details
+in the presence of the men concerned.
+
+3. An immediate task for the central construction besides assuring the
+supply of the bottleneck products of the Junkers works which is to be
+executed step by step, is the planning and securing of ME 262 at the
+rate of 1000 a month and of an additional fighter plane at the rate of
+2000 a month.
+
+                                                             Heil Hitler
+
+                                                           signed: SPEER
+
+                                                  Certified: Capt. Stein
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1590-PS
+
+[several illegible notations]
+
+Re: Taking of hostages
+
+OKH received: 1 Oct. 1941
+
+                                                          5 copies--copy
+
+                                                            OKH/Gen. Qn.
+
+                                                       (W. Bfh. Suedost)
+
+                                          Military Commander, South-East
+
+Attacks on members of the Armed Forces lately committed in the occupied
+territories gave reason to point out that it is advisable that military
+commanders always have at their disposal a number of hostages of
+different political tendencies, namely:
+
+1. nationalist
+
+2. democratic-bourgeois, and
+
+3. communist
+
+It is important that among them shall be well-known leading
+personalities or members of their families, whose names are to be made
+public.
+
+Depending on the membership of the culprit, hostages of the
+corresponding group are to be shot in case of attacks.
+
+It is asked that commanders be accordingly instructed.
+
+[partly illegible notation]
+
+                                  Chief of the Armed Forces High Command
+
+                                                        (signed) Keitel.
+
+Complied with in France and Belgium.
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1600-PS
+
+                  The State-Picture Gallery in Dresden
+
+  The Director.                                 Dresden-Al, 1 June 1940.
+
+  To: Ministerialrat Dr. Hanssen
+
+  Berlin W 8, Wilhelmstr. 64
+
+  Dear Ministerialrat!
+
+Permit me to express my thanks for having sent me the copy of the
+letter of the State Secretary Dr. Landfried.
+
+I herewith enclose a copy of my letter of 16 March 1940 to Reichsleiter
+Bormann, referring mainly to the _confiscated property of the convents
+in the Ostmark_. In accordance with the Fuehrer’s decree on Jewish
+property, a generally applicable procedure may be recommended in this
+case, too; the Fuehrer should have the final word in the distribution
+to the individual consumers, rather the first option on any purchase.
+This regulation should be made to be retroactive as of the time of the
+assumption of power if possible.
+
+                                                            Heil Hitler!
+
+                                                        Yours faithfully
+
+                                                               H. Posse.
+
+1 enclosure.
+
+       #       #       #       #       #
+
+At the Fuehrer’s present HQ, 16 Jan 41 Bo/Fu
+
+R.L.M.B.
+
+1. Director Dr. Posse, _Dresden-Hellerau_
+
+                                                             _Personal!_
+
+                                                           _Registered!_
+
+  Tunnigtweg 14
+
+  Dear Dr. Posse!
+
+Enclosed herewith I am sending you the pictures of the altar from the
+convent in Hohenfurth near Kruman. The convent and its entire property
+shall be confiscated in the immediate future because of the attitude,
+hostile towards the State, of its inhabitants.
+
+It shall be up to you to decide whether the pictures shall remain in
+the convent at Hohenfurth or be transferred to the museum in Linz after
+the latter shall be completed.
+
+I await your decision in the matter.
+
+                                                            Heil Hitler!
+
+                                                       Faithfully yours,
+                                                  [initialed by Bormann]
+
+Enclosures
+
+2. Presented again: 3 May 1941.
+
+       #       #       #       #       #
+
+                                                 Dresden-Al, 16 May 1941
+
+                 The State-Picture Gallery in Dresden.
+
+The Director.
+
+The Reichsleiter Martin Bormann,
+
+Berlin W 8, Wilhelmstr. 64
+
+_Personal!_
+
+Dear Reichsleiter!
+
+I report that I have returned today from a weeks trip to Oberdonau and
+Vienna. Besides checking on the confiscated convents and monasteries,
+the main reason for my trip to Linz and Oberdonau was to find out
+_whether any of the confiscated convents offered facilities suitable
+for temporarily storing the collections acquired by the Fuehrer_.
+
+After having seen the convents at Hohenfurth, St. Florian,
+Krenesmunster, Schloegel, Wilhering etc., and after having discussed
+the matter with Gauleiter Eigruber and his deputies, I found that
+the _convent in Krenesmunster is extremely suited for this purpose_.
+There are in this convent 50-60 rooms that can be locked; the various
+new acquisitions can be stored there temporarily. There is also
+the “Emperor’s Stall” there, 25 m long, and a flight of 7 rooms in
+good shape, at present the picture-gallery of the convent, not very
+valuable, is on exposition. From time to time, the newly acquired
+collections may be presented to the Fuehrer there.
+
+Krenesmunster is situated in the woods, far away from industrial area;
+therefore, a threat from the air hardly exists.
+
+In case the Fuehrer should agree with the proposal to have
+Krenesmunster as a depot for Linz, it is suggested that the Germans
+from Bessarabia who are at present living in the convent, be moved into
+another convent, in order to safeguard the stocks, particularly against
+fire.
+
+Therefore, I beg to have the Fuehrer state his intentions regarding
+their proposal which is also supported by Gauleiter Eigruber not only
+is the collection Lanz in Amsterdam, packed in the meantime, awaiting,
+also several other collections of paintings for which there’d hardly
+be space enough in Munich, are ready, and so is Dr. Topfer’s library
+which was bought in Switzerland. Also very rich stocks, already packed
+and stored in Vienna, confiscated from Jewish owners, and many new
+acquisitions from Vienna could be brought to Krenesmunster. This
+way, room could be made in Vienna and what remains of confiscated
+art-treasures could be distributed.
+
+                                                            Heil Hitler!
+
+                                                        Yours faithfully
+                                                               H. Posse.
+
+       #       #       #       #       #
+
+Report on the trip, undertaken on orders to Cracow and Warsaw, so as to
+    ascertain the kind and the amount of confiscated art-treasures.
+
+It was impossible to carry out the order as such, as well as that part
+of it which drafting of a plan as to how to dispose of the confiscated
+art treasures, since most of them were still packed away in cases and
+were either stored in Cracow, or in other places, particularly in
+Warsaw ready for shipment to Cracow.
+
+Since 6 October, under the direction of Understate secretary Dr.
+Muhlmann, as the special deputy of General Field Marshall Goering
+and as the Director of the Department of Science and Training, the
+storing of all the valuable Art treasures has been in full swing with
+assistance of suitable experts from Berlin, Vienna, and Breslau, and,
+so far as I could determine it has been almost completely carried out.
+
+Works of art and culture, mainly from Warsaw were saved, particularly
+from the badly damaged chateau of the Kings whose furniture and
+interior decorations were salvaged to a large extent. In Cracow,
+box-cars containing the works of art secured from public, clerical and
+private ownership arrived almost daily. The Art treasures are being
+collected in the particularly suitable building of the Jagellonic
+Library in Cracow and are being set up there properly, a task which may
+be finished by February 1940. As soon as the task of collecting shall
+be finished and an inventory is made so that a complete survey of the
+entire valuable Polish Art-treasure can be made, I shall again travel
+to Cracow so as to carry out the order given me.
+
+The official pictorial service is photographing all important works of
+art little by little. The governor general shall present these pictures
+in the form of a photo-Album to the Fuehrer.
+
+I was able to gain some knowledge on the public and private collections
+as well as clerical property in Cracow and Warsaw. It is true that
+we cannot hope too much to enrich ourselves from the acquisition of
+great Art works of paintings and sculptures there with the exception
+of the Veit Stoss-altar and the plates of Hans von Kulmbach in the
+Church of Maria in Cracow, the Raffael, Leonardo and Rembrandt from
+the collection Czarborpki and several other works from the National
+Museum in Warsaw--works of a rather high value of whose existence we
+in Germany had already known. Richer and more extensive is the Polish
+stock of “objects d’art”, such as handicraft in gold and silver of
+German origin to a large part, (particularly from the Church of Maria
+and the cathedral of Wawel) tapestries, arms, porcelains, furniture,
+bronzes, coins, valuable parchment-scrips, books, etc. Those were the
+principal fields of interest for Polish collectors, besides their
+interest in Polish National Art, particularly of the 19th century. It
+is characteristic that apart from original paintings so many copies
+can be found in Polish castles and private collections (for example
+Czartoryski, Wilano etc). However, many thousand works of art of all
+kinds ought to be found in the Jagellonic Library.
+
+As I said before, I shall not be able to make proposals regarding
+the distribution as long as an inventory of the entire material
+does not exist. However, I should like to reserve for the museum
+in Linz the three most important paintings of the Czartoryski
+collection, namely the Raffael, Leonardo and Rembrandt which are at
+present in the Kaiser-Frederick Museum in Berlin. We in Dresden are
+particularly interested in the interior decorations of the castle
+of the Kings in Warsaw since Saxonian architects and artists have
+created them; therefore, the suggestion is made that the salvaged
+parts of it (panellings, doors, inlaid floors, sculptures, mirrors,
+glass-chandeliers, porcelains etc) be used for the interior decoration
+of the Pavillion of the “Zivinges” in Dresden.
+
+A number of fine drawings of Albrecht Durer’s and other old German
+masters kept in the Ossolinemm in Lemberg, has fallen into Russian
+hands. Maybe at least Durer’s 27 pieces could still be salvaged for
+Germany.
+
+While in Warsaw, a Polish colleague of mine whom I have known, for
+quite some time told me that the storing of the art treasures was
+begun already in June 1939; by the end of July the entire official
+museum property was packed in cases and ready for shipment. In spite of
+that the Poles did not manage to carry any important stocks away and
+save them for themselves, with the exception of the famous tapestry,
+collection of Wawel, the riding costumes kept there also, arms and
+historically valuable pieces like the blood-banner of the Prophet
+which, as far as I could ascertain, fell into Russian hands.
+
+                                                         /s/ Hans Posse.
+
+
+                                 PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1602-PS
+
+  Dr. med. Sigmund RASCHER       MUNICH, 15 May 1941
+
+                                                        Trogerstrasse 56
+
+Dear Reichsfuehrer,
+
+My sincere thanks for your cordial wishes and flowers on the birth
+of my second son. This time, too, it is a strong boy, though he has
+come 3 weeks too early. I may send you a picture of both children
+incidentally. * * *
+
+For the time being I have been assigned to the Luftgaukommando VII,
+Munich, for a medical course. During this course, where researches
+on high-altitude flights play a prominent part (determined by the
+somewhat higher ceiling of the English fighter planes) considerable
+regret was expressed at the fact that no tests with human material had
+yet been possible for us, as such experiments are very dangerous and
+nobody volunteers for them. I put, therefore, the _serious_ question:
+can you make available two or three professional criminals for these
+experiments? The experiments are made at “Bodenstaendige Pruefstelle
+fuer Hoehenforschung der Luftwaffe”, Munich. The experiments, by which
+the subjects can, of course, die, would take place with my cooperation.
+They are essential for researches on high-altitude flight and cannot
+be carried out, as has been tried, with monkeys, who offer entirely
+different test-conditions. I have had a very confidential talk with a
+representative of the air forces Surgeon who makes these experiments.
+He is also of the opinion that the problems in question could only be
+solved by experiments on human persons. (Feeble-minded could also be
+used as test material). * * *
+
+I hope sincerely, highly esteemed Reichsfuehrer that, in spite of the
+immense burden of work you carry, you are in the pink of health.
+
+With my heartiest wishes, I am with Heil Hitler your gratefully devoted
+
+                                                  (signature) S. RASCHER
+
+(Z--2)
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1616-PS
+
+Dr. S. RASCHER SS-Hauptsturmfuehrer
+
+                                                Munich, 17 February 1943
+
+  To the Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police Mr. Heinrich
+    Himmler
+
+Berlin SW 11 Prinz Albrecht Str. 8
+
+Dear Reichsfuehrer!
+
+Enclosed I present to you in condensed form a summary of the results of
+the experiments made in warming up people who have been cooled off by
+using animal heat.
+
+Right now I am attempting to prove through experiments on human beings
+that it is possible to warm up people cooled off by dry cold just as
+fast as people who were cooled off by remaining in cold water. The
+Reich physician SS, SS-Gruppenfuehrer Dr. Gravitz doubted very much
+that that would be possible and said that I would have to prove it
+first by 100 experiments. Up to now I have cooled off about 30 people
+stripped in the open air during 9-14 hours to 27°-29°. After a time
+corresponding to a transport of one hour, I put these subjects in a
+hot bath. _Up to now_ every single patient was completely warmed up
+within one hour at most, though some of them had their hands and feet
+frozen white. In some cases a slight fatigue with slightly rising
+temperature was observed on the day following the experiments. I have
+not observed any fatal results from this extremely fast warming up. I
+have not so far been able to do any warming up by “Sauna” as ordered
+by you, my dear Reichsfuehrer, as the weather in December and January
+was too warm for any experiments in the open air, and right now the
+camp is closed on account of typhoid and I am not allowed therefore to
+bring the subjects to these experiments into the SS-Sauna. (I have been
+vaccinated several times and continue myself to make the tests within
+the camp in spite of the typhoid in the camp.) It would be best if I
+were transferred to the Waffen-SS soon and could go together with Neff
+to Auschwitz and * * * the question of the warming up of persons who
+have frozen on land * * *.
+
+                       [rest of document missing]
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1617-PS
+
+                                 SECRET
+
+The Reichfuehrer SS
+
+Berlin, SW 11, B. Prinz Albrecht Strasse 8 Field Command Post
+
+                                                           November 1942
+
+Dear Comrade Milch!
+
+You will recall that through General Wolff I particularly recommended
+to you for your consideration the work of a certain SS Fuehrer,
+Dr. Rascher, who is a physician of the air force on leave [Arzt des
+Beurlaubtenstandes der Luftwaffe].
+
+These researches which deal with the behavior of the human organism
+at great heights, as well as with manifestations caused by prolonged
+cooling of the human body in cold water, and similar problems which are
+of vital importance to the air force in particular, can be performed
+by us with particular efficiency because I personally assumed the
+responsibility for supplying asocial individuals and criminals who
+deserve only to die [todeswuerdig] from concentration camps for these
+experiments.
+
+Unfortunately you had no time recently when Dr. Rascher wanted to
+report on the experiments at the Ministry for Aviation. I had put
+great hopes in that report, because I believed that in this way the
+difficulties, based mainly on religious objections, which oppose Dr.
+Rascher’s experiments--for which _I_ assumed responsibility--could be
+eliminated.
+
+The difficulties are still the same now as before. In these “Christian
+medical circles” the standpoint is being taken that it goes without
+saying that a young German aviator should be allowed to risk his life
+but that the life of a criminal--who is not drafted into military
+service--is too sacred for this purpose and one should not stain
+oneself with this guilt; at the same time it is interesting to note
+that credit is taken for the results of the experiments while excluding
+the scientist who performed them.
+
+I personally have inspected the experiments, and have--I can say this
+without exaggeration--participated in every phase of this scientific
+work in a helpful and inspiring manner.
+
+We two should not get angry about these difficulties. It will take at
+least another ten years until we can get such narrow-mindedness out
+of our people. But this should not affect the research work which is
+necessary for our young and splendid soldiers and aviators.
+
+I beg you to release Dr. Rascher, Stabsarzt in reserve, from the air
+force and to transfer him to me to the Waffen-SS. I would then assume
+the sole responsibility for having these experiments made in this
+field, and would put the results, of which we in the SS need only a
+part for the frost injuries in the East, entirely at the disposal of
+the air force. However, in this connection I suggest that with the
+liaison between you and Wolff a _“non-Christian” physician should
+be charged, who should be at the same time honorable as a scientist
+and not prone to intellectual theft_ and who could be informed of
+the results. This physician should also have good contacts with the
+administrative authorities, so that the results would really obtain a
+hearing.
+
+I believe that this solution--to transfer Dr. Rascher to the SS,
+so that he could carry out the experiments under my responsibility
+and under my orders--is the best way. The experiments should not be
+stopped; we owe that to our men. If Dr. Rascher remained with the air
+force, there would certainly be much annoyance; because then I would
+have to bring a series of unpleasant details to you, because of the
+arrogance and assumption which Professor Dr. Holzloehner has displayed
+in the post of Dachau--who is under my command--about me in utterances
+delivered to SS Colonel Sievers. In order to save both of us this
+trouble, I suggest again that Dr. Rascher should be transferred to the
+Waffen SS as quickly as possible.
+
+I would be grateful to you if you would give the order to put the low
+pressure chamber at our disposal again, together with step-up pumps,
+because the experiments should be extended to include even greater
+altitudes.
+
+                                      Cordial greetings and Heil Hitler!
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1618-PS
+
+S. RASCHER
+
+Intermediate report on intense chilling experiments in the Dachau Camp,
+                       started on 15 August 1942
+
+_Experimental procedure_
+
+The experimental subjects (V P) were placed in the water, dressed in
+complete flying uniform, winter or summer combination, and with an
+aviator’s helmet. A life jacket made of rubber or kapok was to prevent
+submerging. The experiments were carried out at water temperatures
+varying from 2.5° to 12°. In one experimental series, Occiput and brain
+stem protruded above the water, while in another series of experiments
+the Occiput (brain stem) and back of the head were submerged in water.
+
+Electrical measurements gave low temperature readings of 26.4° in
+the stomach and 26.5° in the rectum. Fatalities occurred only when
+the brain stem and the back of the head were also chilled. Autopsies
+of such fatal cases always revealed large amounts of free blood,
+up to ½ liter, in the cranial cavity. The heart invariably showed
+extreme dilation of the night chamber. As soon as the temperature in
+these experiments reached 28°, the experimental subjects (VP) died
+invariably, despite all attempts at resuscitation. The above discussed
+autopsy finding conclusively proved the importance of a warming
+protective device for head and Occiput when designing the planned
+protective clothing of the foam type.
+
+Other important findings, common in all experiments, to be mentioned.
+Marked increase of the viscosity of the blood, marked increase of
+hemoglobin, an approximate five fold increase of the leukocytes,
+invariable rise of blood sugar to twice its normal value. Auricular
+fibrillation made its appearance regularly at 30°.
+
+During attempts to save severely chilled persons, it was shown that
+rapid re-warming was in all cases preferable to slow re-warming,
+because after removal from the cold water, the body temperature
+continued to sink rapidly. I think that for this reason we can dispense
+with the attempt to save intensely chilled subjects by means of animal
+heat.
+
+Rewarming by animal warmth--animal bodies or women’s bodies--would be
+too slow. As auxiliary measures for the prevention of intense chilling,
+improvements in the clothing of aviators come alone into consideration.
+The foam suit with suitable neck protector which is being prepared
+by the German Institution for textile research [Deutsches
+Textilforschungsinstitut] Muenchen-Gladbach deserves first priority
+in this connection. The experiments have shown that pharmaceutical
+measures are probably unnecessary if the flier is still alive at the
+time of rescue.
+
+                                                 (signed) Dr. S. Rascher
+
+Muenchen--Dachau, 10 September 1942.
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1621-PS
+
+                                SECRET!
+
+  The Reichsfuehrer SS Personal Staff
+  File Nr. 19/9/43a/Pers/V
+
+                                          Command Post, 12 November 1942
+                                                          [Rubber Stamp]
+                                        Personal Staff, Reichsfuehrer SS
+                                     [illegible notation] Administration
+                                                                 Secret/
+
+                                SECRET!
+
+1. To SS Major General Rauter
+
+The Hague
+
+Dear Major General,
+
+The SS Captain Dr. Rascher is in need of medico-physiological
+appliances. He points out that there are sufficient appliances at the
+University of Leyden and at the University of Utrecht, which could be
+put to use.
+
+The Reichsfuehrer SS asks you to attempt to obtain these appliances,
+which would still have to be listed in detail by SS Captain Dr.
+Rascher resp. by SS Colonel Sievers, through the Reich Commissar.
+SS-Hauptsturmfuehrer Dr. Rascher resp. SS-Standartenfuehrer Sievers
+will submit the list directly to you.
+
+                                                            Heil Hitler!
+
+                                                         (signed) Brandt
+
+Transmitted to
+
+  2. SS Colonel (SS-Standartenfuehrer) Sievers
+
+  3. SS Captain (SS-Hauptsturmfuehrer) Dr. Rascher, with the request
+  that the above be noted and the necessary steps taken.
+
+                                                      [Signed illegible]
+                                                   SS-Lieutenant Colonel
+
+       #       #       #       #       #
+
+                                SECRET!
+
+                                                          [Rubber Stamp]
+                                         Personal Staff Reichsfuehrer SS
+                                                    (illegible notation)
+                                                                  SECRET
+
+Dr. S. Rascher, SS Captain
+
+                                SECRET!
+
+File Memorandum.
+
+Procurement of medico-physiological appliances is so difficult in
+Germany that the continued conduct of experiments is seriously
+endangered. If the necessary appliances cannot be procured, it will
+be very much more difficult to build up the Institute for Functional
+Research in Military Science within the framework of the Ancestral
+Heritage Organization [Ahnenerbe].
+
+The Institutes of the Universities of Leyden and Utrecht, however, are
+very plentifully equipped with the very best scientific appliances at
+both these universities is not feasible, however, since the University
+of Leyden is, and will remain, closed, notwithstanding all rumors,
+and since the University of Utrecht works with only half its usual
+enrollment.
+
+SS Lieutenant Colonel Sievers therefore suggests that the Reichsfuehrer
+SS write a letter to Reich Governor Dr. Seyss-Inquart saying that it is
+request that the Reich Governor put the appliances of the University
+Institutes concerned at the disposal of the Ancestral Heritage
+Organization [Ahnenerbe], initially on a loan basis.
+
+                                                    (signed) Dr. Rascher
+
+Munich, 12 November 1942
+
+                         [Handwritten notation]
+
+                          Dr. Brandt to Reuter
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1637-PS
+
+          1938 REICHS MINISTERIALBLATT, i. V., PAGES 1089-1091
+
+    Acceptance of members of the Security Police into the SS of the
+                      N.S.D.A.P. of 23 June 1938.
+
+Ministerial-Blatt of the Reich and Prussian Ministries of the Interior,
+                              Berlin, 1938
+
+No. 28, p. 1090
+
+_Appointments, Wages, Maintenance, Service Regulations_
+
+ Circular of the Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police in the
+     Reich Ministry of the Interior for 23.6.1938--S-V 3 No. 72/38
+
+  -------------------------+-------------------------+--------------------
+           The             |      The                | Corresponds to the
+  -------------------------+-------------------------+--------------------
+  Criminal-assistant       | Office helper           | SS Sergeant
+   aspirant in preparatory |  [Amtsgehilfe           | [SS
+   service                 |  Betenmeister]          | Unterscharfuehrer]
+   [Kriminal-Assist-Aniv.  |                         |
+   im Verbereitungsvienst] |                         |
+  -------------------------+-------------------------+--------------------
+  Criminal-Assistant       | Superintendant          | SS-Staff Sergeant
+   aspirant                |   [Hausmeister]         | [SS-
+   [Kriminal-Assist-Aniv]  |                         | Scharfuehrer]
+  -------------------------+-------------------------+--------------------
+  Criminal assistant       | Police office assistant.| SS-Technical
+   [Kriminal-Assist]       |  [Pol-Buereassist]      | Sergeant [SS-
+                           | Police-Prison-Technical | Oberscharfuehrer]
+                           |   Sergeant. [Poli-      |
+                           |   Gefaengnisoberwachtm] |
+  -------------------------+-------------------------+--------------------
+  Chief Criminal           | Police-Prison-Master    | SS-Master Sergeant
+    Assistant.             |  Sergeant [Pol-         | [SS
+    [Krim-Oberassist]      |  Gefaengnis-Hauptwachtm]| Hauptscharfuehrer]
+  -------------------------+-------------------------+--------------------
+  Criminal secretary       | Police-secretary        | SS-Lieutenant
+   [Krim-Sekretar]         |  [Pol-Sekretar]         | [SS-
+  Criminal district        | Office-Secretary        | Untersturmfuehrer]
+   secretary               |  [Kanzleisekretaer]     |
+   [Krim-Bez. Sekretar]    | Police secretary first  |
+                           |  class                  |
+                           |  [Pol-Obersekretaer]    |
+                           | Technical secretary     |
+                           |  [Techn-Sekretaer]      |
+  -------------------------+-------------------------+--------------------
+  Criminal inspector       | Ministerial registrator | SS-First
+   [Krim-Inspektor]        |  [Min-Registrator]      | Lieutenant [SS-
+  Criminal commissar up    | Police inspector        | Obersturmfuehrer]
+    to 15 years of service | [Pol-Inspektor]         |
+   [Krim-Kommissar]        | Assessor                |
+                           |  [Assessor]             |
+  -------------------------+-------------------------+--------------------
+  Criminal commissar with  | Police inspector        | SS-Captain
+    over 15 years of       |  [Pol-Inspektor]        | [SS-
+    service                |  with 300 Reichsmark    | Hauptsturmfuehrer]
+    [Krim-Kommissar]       |  additional salary.     |
+  Criminal counsellor      | Police inspector first  |
+   [Krim-Rat] up to 15     |  class                  |
+   years of service.       |  [Pol-Oberinspektor]    |
+                           | Government-Assessor     |
+                           |  [Reg-Assessor]         |
+                           | Police counsellor up to |
+                           |  15 years of service.   |
+                           |  [Pol-Rat]              |
+  -------------------------+-------------------------+--------------------
+  Criminal counsellor with | Police counsellor with  | SS-Major
+    over 15 years of       |  over 15 years of       | [SS-
+    service [Krim-Rat]     |  service. [Pol-Rat]     | Sturmbannfuehrer]
+  Criminal director        | Office-counsellor       |
+   [Krim-Direktor]         |  [Amtsrat]              |
+  Government and criminal  | Government-counsellor   |
+   counsellor              |  [Reg-Rat]              |
+   [Reg. u. Krim-Rat]      |                         |
+  -------------------------+-------------------------+--------------------
+  Government counsellor    | Government counsellor   | SS-Lieutenant
+  first class and          |  first class            | Colonel [SS-
+  criminal counsellor.     |  [Oberreg-Rat]          | Obersturmbann-
+  [Oberreg.-und Krim.-Rat] |                         | fuehrer]
+  -------------------------+-------------------------+--------------------
+  Government and criminal  | Government director     | SS-Colonel
+    director               |  [Reg-Direktor]         | [SS-
+    [Reg.-und Krim.-       | Ministerial             | Standartenfuehrer]
+    Direktor]              |  counsellor [Min-Rat]   |
+  Reich-criminal director  |                         |
+   [Reichskrim-Direktor]   |                         |
+   ------------------------+-------------------------+--------------------
+With the aim of fusing members of the German Police with the
+“Schutzstaffel” of the National Socialist German Workers Party into one
+uniformly turned out State Protective Corps [Staatsschutzkorps] of the
+National Socialist Reich, I decree as follows:
+
+I. (1) Members of the Security Police can upon request be received into
+the Schutzstaffel of the _NSDAP_ if they
+
+  1. fulfill the general requirements of the SS and
+
+  2. _a._ Up to 30.1.1933 (inclusive) have been members of the NSDAP
+      or of its affiliates (the Sturmabteilung, the National Socialist
+      Motor Corps, the Hitler Youth) even if they have meanwhile
+      honorably resigned from these affiliates.
+
+                                   or
+
+     _b._ for a static period [seit einem ... liegenden Zeitpunkt]
+          before 30.1.1933 were sponsoring members of the SS
+         [Foerderndes Mitglied]
+
+                                   or
+
+     _c._ Have seen service for at least three years in the Security
+          Police under the direction of the Reichsfuehrer SS and have
+          proven themselves.
+
+(2) Permit for admission of a wider circle of persons I reserve for
+myself.
+
+(3) Admission according to the general requirements is not affected by
+this circular.
+
+II. 1. Upon transfer into the SS, the grade held in the police will be
+changed to a corresponding one in the SS. Former members of the SS, SA,
+NSKK (National Socialist Drivers Corps) who held a higher rank, will be
+incorporated with the same high rank. When promoted within the security
+police, an assimilation of ranks will take place in every case.
+
+3. I myself will make decisions about incorporation of members of the
+security police with higher ranks.
+
+4. The employees of the security police will be put into that SS rank
+which corresponds to their rank as civil servant, according to their
+jobs.
+
+5. Members of the security police incorporated into the SS up to
+the publication of these ordinances will be promoted to the SS rank
+corresponding to their police rank, provided they do not already hold
+such, or a higher SS rank.
+
+III. 1. Members of the security police incorporated into the SS will be
+assigned to the units of the security service of the Reichsfuehrer-SS,
+according to more detailed instructions of the chief of the security
+police and of the security main office of the Reichsfuehrer-SS.
+
+2. The chief of the security police and of the security main office
+regulates the SS-service relations [Dienstverhaltnisse] and obligations
+of the members of the security police who were incorporated into the SS.
+
+IV. 1. The applications of members of the security police for admission
+to the SS are to be directed to the chief of the security police
+through service channels.
+
+2. The applications are to be submitted according to the following
+sample:
+
+  _SAMPLE_:
+
+                                                        (Place and date)
+
+  I herewith request admission to the security service of the
+  Reichsfuehrer-SS in conformity with the circular of the
+  Reichsfuehrer-SS and Chief of the German police in the Ministry of
+  the Interior of June 23rd, 1938-S.V.3 number 72/38 (R M Bli V. page
+  1089)
+
+    First and last name: _______________________________________
+    ____________________________________________________________
+                        (rank and office)
+
+    Day, month and year of birth: ______________________________
+
+    Place of birth: ____________________________________________
+
+    Party membership number, district [Ortsgruppe]: ____________
+
+    Last SS-, SA-, NSKK or HJ rank and number,
+    last SS, SA-, respectively HJ district
+    [Dienststelle]: ____________________________________________
+    ____________________________________________________________
+
+    Separated from the SS etc. on the __________________________
+
+    (with indication, whether transferred directly to the police, or, if
+    otherwise, which service relations in the meantime)
+
+    Day of joining the NSDAP, SS, SA, HJ _______________________
+
+    Helping member [Foerderndes Mitglied] of the SS since: _____
+
+    Working in the security police since: ______________________
+
+    To The Chief of the security police through channels.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+V. This circular is to be brought to the attention of all members of
+the security police.
+
+To the Reichsstatthalter, the state governments, the Reichscommissioner
+for the Saarland, the Prussian supreme and government presidents,
+the office of the secret state police [Gestapo], the Reich criminal
+police office [Reichskrim-Pol-Amt], the federal police main offices
+[Staatspol-Leitstellen] and federal police office [Staatspol-Stellen],
+the criminal police main offices [Krim-Pol. Leitstellen] and criminal
+police offices [Krim-Pol Stellen], the commander of the leaderschool of
+the security police [Kommandeur der Fuehrerschule der Sicherheitspol].
+
+To the SS main office, the main office for security
+[Sicherheitshauptamt], the security service leaders [SD-Fuehrer] of the
+higher levels of the SS [SS-Oberabschnitte] and the security service
+lower levels [SD-Unterabschnitte]. by copy.
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1638-PS
+
+              1938 REICHS MINISTERIALBLATT, iV, PAGE 1906
+
+ Cooperation of the Agencies of the General and Interior Administration
+       with the S.D. of the Reichsfuehrer SS (SD) of 11 Nov. 1938
+
+(1) The Security Service of the Reichsfuehrer SS (SD) has, as the
+intelligence organization for Party and nation--in particular for the
+support of the Security Police--important missions to fulfill. The
+SD thereby becomes active on a national mission. This necessitates a
+close and sympathetic cooperation between the SD and the authorities
+for general and internal administration. Therefore, inquiries of the SD
+are to be answered in the same way as inquiries of all national office
+are treated. Likewise, the sections of the SD are obligated to furnish
+information to the general and internal administration.
+
+(2) Business between the SD and the Reich Ministry of the Interior
+proceeds solely through the Chief of the Sicherheitshauptamt, business
+between the SD and the remaining authorities of general and internal
+administration only through the higher levels of the SD. Business
+between the authorities for general and internal administration of
+the SHA proceeds through the Reich Ministry of the Interior, business
+between the authorities for general and internal administration and
+the other SD offices in Prussia through the Regierungs-Praesident or
+Ober-Praesident, in the other provinces through the corresponding
+authorities. In doubtful cases the combined decision of the Reich
+Ministry of the Interior and of the Reichsfuehrer SS should be obtained.
+
+Supplement for municipalities, municipal groups, other corporate bodies
+of the public law: I request, to act accordingly.
+
+To lower authorities municipalities, municipal groups, other corporate
+bodies of the public law.
+
+
+                               PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1639-A-PS
+
+Mobilization Book for the Civil Administration 1939 Edition [Pages 2-18]
+
+  Armed Forces High Command                        Berlin, 18th Feb 1939
+  No. 265/39 g.Kdos. I IVa.                       125 copies, 101st copy
+  Re: Reprint of Mobilization Book for the Civil Administration.
+
+1. Enclosed is the Reprint for 1939 of the “Mobilization Book for the
+Civil Administration” with the request to destroy Mobilization Books
+(Z), hereby made obsolete, at the beginning of the new mobilization
+year.
+
+2. The Reprint takes effect on the 1st April 1939. The annexes V, XIX,
+and XX will be forwarded after their completion.
+
+3. An expression of opinion on the proposals handed in here will not
+take place in detail any more, insofar as the expression has not
+already been made.
+
+4. The necessity of cooperation between Ministers and the highest Reich
+agencies is not always pointed out in the column “Remarks”. It is to be
+understood that the cooperation needed for preparations and carrying
+out of the measures must be guaranteed, even without an express
+directive.
+
+                Chief of the Armed Forces High Command.
+                                                                 Keitel.
+
+Distribution list on the next page.
+
+  Distribution’s List:                                             Copy
+
+  Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor                                        1
+
+  Deputy of the Fuehrer                                            2- 3
+
+  Attention SS Brigadier General _Knoblauch_
+  Prussian State-Ministry                                          4- 5
+
+  Attention Counsellor of the Ministry _Bergbohm_
+  Ministry for Foreign Affairs                                     6- 7
+
+  Attention Counsellor of the Legation Dr. _Freiherr v.d.
+   Heyden-Rynsch_
+
+  GBV [Plenipotentiary-General for Administration] Chief of
+   Operational Staff
+
+    Attention State Secretary Dr. _Struckart_
+      for Reich Ministry of the Interior                           8- 9
+      for Reich Ministry of Justice                               11-12
+      for Reich Ministry of Science, Education and Popular
+       Culture                                                    13-14
+      for Central Reich Office for regional planning              15-16
+
+  GBW [Plenipotentiary-General for Economics] Chief of the
+   Operational Staff
+
+    Attention Ministerial Director _Sarnow_ for GBW
+     [Operational Staff]                                         17-18
+    for Reich Ministry of Economics                              19-20
+    for Reich Ministry of Food and Agriculture                   21-22
+    for Reich Labor Ministry                                     23-24
+    for Reich Chief Forester                                     25-26
+
+  Reich Ministry of Finance                                      27-28
+  Attention Counsellor of the Minister, Privy Counsellor
+   Dr. _Bender_
+
+  Reich Ministry of Finance                                      29-30
+  Attention Finance President _von Dietz_
+
+  Reich Ministry of Communications                               31-33
+  Attention Chief of Section of the Ministry _Baur_
+
+  Reich Ministry of Communications                               34-35
+  Attention State Railway Director Dr. _Ebeling_
+
+  Reich Postal Ministry                                          36-37
+  Attention Counsellor of the Ministry _Honold_
+
+  Reich Ministry for Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda        38-39
+  Attention Lt Colonel _Wentscher_
+
+  Reichbank Directorate                                          40-41
+  Attention Reichsbank Director Dr. _Mueller_
+
+  Inspector General of the German Highways                       42-43
+  Attention Government Construction Counsellor _Henne_
+
+  OKH (Army High Command) (2nd Section of the General Staff
+    of the Army)                                                 44-73
+
+  OKM (Navy High Command) (A.II)                                 74-81
+
+  Reich Ministry for Air Travel and Air Force High Command
+   (2nd Section of the General Staff of the Air Force)           82-93
+
+  _OKW_: (Armed Forces High Command)
+    L Ia                                                            94
+    L Ia Prop.                                                      95
+    L II                                                            96
+    L IVa                                                           97
+    L IVb                                                           98
+    L IVd                                                           99
+    WNV                                                            100
+    W Stb                                                      101-103
+
+    A Ausl./Abw. (Foreign Intelligence Section)                104-106
+    AWA (J)                                                        107
+    WH                                                             108
+    Being kept by L IVa                                        109-125
+
+       #       #       #       #       #
+
+                                 Part I
+
+_of the Mobilization Schedule for the Civil Administrative Authorities_
+
+_Introduction to the Mobilization Schedule for the Civil Administrative
+                             Authorities._
+
+
+                       A. _Principles & Concepts_
+
+1. Preparedness for defense on the part of the whole nation is the
+condition for an effective defense of the Reich.
+
+2. It is through _mobilization_ that Wehrmacht, Economy, State and
+People are carried over from a state of peace to a state of war.
+
+The mobilization of the Wehrmacht comprises:
+
+(_a_) The securing of the necessary foundations for the establishment,
+leadership and supplying of the needs of the war-Wehrmacht,
+
+(_b_) the building up of peace units to war strength,
+
+(_c_) the establishment of new war units,
+
+(_d_) the establishment of the reserve Wehrmacht.
+
+_The Mobilization of Economy_ comprises the collecting of all
+_economic_ forces and holding them in readiness to work at their
+highest capacity in the service of the conduct of the war.
+
+_The Mobilization of State & People_ comprises:
+
+(_a_) the turn-over of State Leadership and the life of the people
+to the requirements of the conduct of the war as regards politics,
+sociology and constitutional law; and
+
+(_b_) making available for the conduct of the war all the material
+forces of the people.
+
+3. A case of war can arise instantaneously or start as a result of
+foreign political tension. The preparation and schedule of mobilization
+must take both possibilities into account.
+
+The “_state of defense_” and the “_state of war_” in the sense of R.V.
+Law will be ordered expressly in accordance with the Reichs defense law
+by the Fuehrer and Reichs Chancellor.
+
+With the declaration of the “_state of war_”, the war laws and
+regulations come into force without further orders. The legal
+consequences provided in other laws for the state of war also become
+effective.
+
+If no “_state of defense_” has previously been ordered, the regulations
+concerning the state of defense will come into force with the
+declaration of the state of war.
+
+It is to be reckoned with that foreign political considerations (war
+guilt question, etc.) will not give rise to a declaration of a state
+of war, even if it should come to armed conflict with a foreign enemy.
+Legal provision is therefore to be made by which regulations for “war”
+in various laws will come into force for the case in question. These
+regulations must be formulated in such a way that no “war” exists as
+understood in international law.
+
+For this reason the legal consequences provided in the various laws for
+the “the case of war” will not come into force with the mobilization
+decree (X or mobilization case).
+
+4. The _period of tension_ possibly preceding a case of war must be
+exploited to the limit of foreign political endurance in order that the
+Reich may be made ready for war.
+
+For these reasons the _3 following stages must be distinguished from
+each other in the schedule of mobilization_.
+
+4. _a._ “_The period of tension_”
+
+During the period of tension the fundamentals for the reliable
+execution of the mobilization proper should be created, and individual
+measures for mobilization should be taken in advance, whereby as far as
+possible foreign political liability and any kind of provocation abroad
+are to be avoided.
+
+These “_advance measures_” will be arranged in the mobilization plans
+of the armed forces, according to stages of tension. Within these
+advance measures there will be no distinction of special stages for
+the civil administration, since it is necessary to have a much more
+flexible regulation.
+
+The advance measures will be executed on the basis of peace
+legislation. The fact and the purpose of the advance measures are to
+be camouflaged as much as possible within the civil administration
+concerned.
+
+The “_period of tension_” as such will not be ordered; it is merely the
+technical term for a period of special political tension in foreign
+relations, during which preparatory measures (advance measures) can be
+ordered.
+
+4. _b._ _Mobilization without public announcement_ (“_X case_”):
+
+While its purpose is to be camouflaged as far as possible, it is to
+bring about the systematic mobilization of the armed forces, and
+if necessary the camouflaged mobilization of the state, economy and
+people. A possibility exists that “Case X” will only be ordered for the
+armed forces or parts of it.
+
+If no official announcement of the state of defense is made, the
+execution of the mobilization must be assured through administrative
+channels. The peace time laws: Law relating to Participation in
+Defense measures, emergency service decree, etc. (Wehrleistungsgesetz,
+Notdienstverordnung, u.a.) adapted for camouflaged mobilization will
+serve as legal basis.
+
+Case X may be ordered without being preceded by the measures provided
+in sub 4a.
+
+4. _c._ _General mobilization with public announcement._
+(“_Mobilization case_”--“_Mob case_”):
+
+This includes the mobilization of the armed forces and the state of
+the national economy as well as of the entire people, if no special
+limitations have been ordered in the mobilization decree (for instance
+local limitations). In the normal case, the order for general
+mobilization initiates the provided mobilization measures of the armed
+forces, and of all civil authorities and offices, with the exception
+however of specially designated measures for the supervision and
+checking of the information service.
+
+In all cases these measures will only come into force by a special
+order of the Supreme High Command of the Armed Forces.
+
+Just as in Case X, the execution of general mobilization is based on
+the peace laws adapted for a camouflaged mobilization.
+
+The general mobilization (Mob case) can be ordered without being
+preceded by the period of tension or by mobilization without official
+announcement (Case X).
+
+5. _Publication and Execution of Mobilization Measures._
+
+5. _a._ The measures provided for the _period of tension_ will be
+ordered singly, in groups or in their entirety by the Fuehrer &
+Reich Chancellor (after considering proposals from the appropriate
+Reich Dept.) on the application of the Chief of the OKW, or of the
+Plenipotentiary for the Reich Administration or the Plenipotentiary
+for Economy who will act in conjunction with the Chief of the OKW.
+The measures ordered by the Fuehrer and Reichs Chancellor will be
+communicated to the highest civil administrative authorities through
+the OKW, and to the Departments under the Plenipotentiaries for the
+Reich Administration and Economy through the latter.
+
+The measures ordered have to be carried out according to the
+instructions of the highest Reich authorities, provided that the
+authorities of the Armed Forces have not been specially ordered to
+charge the intermediate and lower civil authorities with the execution
+of the measures.
+
+This is applicable for the following cases (or, as circumstances may
+dictate, not till the incidence of Case X or general mobilization).
+
+(1) _Evacuation and clearing of battle territory_ according to
+directives for the “evacuation of Reichs territory threatened by the
+enemy”, Vol. 1, Nos. 14 and 15, or (respectively) “clearing of the
+battle territory of the west” and the corresponding provisions for the
+East.
+
+(2) _Establishment of the Frontier Guards_ incl. initiation of the
+attached special intelligence network acc. to the provisions for the
+VGAD of Sept. 1937 No. 24 & Appendix 10, No. 12.
+
+(3) _Establishment of the VGAD_ incl. initiation of the special
+intelligence network acc. to the provisions for the VGAD of Sept. 1937,
+App. 1, No. 2 & App. 10, No. 12.
+
+(4) _Establishment of Field Police Units--Key Words_ (not code numbers)
+may be agreed with the military authorities for these measures.
+
+The purpose of all other key words made known to the civil authorities
+by the military commands is exclusively that of informing the
+authorities concerned about measures coming within the _military_
+sphere. Those key words are not to be entered in the mobilization
+calendar, but are to be added on a special sheet.
+
+Notwithstanding all this, a _mutual understanding_ with military
+authorities concerning the _preparation_ of the various measures
+in time of peace and their _execution_ (after proclamation through
+civilian channels) in war time is absolutely necessary wherever
+military and civil measures come into contact.
+
+5. _b._ Case X _(Mobilization without public announcement)_ is ordered
+by the Fuehrer and Reichs Chancellor. Publication to the highest Reichs
+authorities is carried out in the same manner as for the “advance
+measures”.
+
+Various mobilization measures will be decreed within the civil sphere
+through release [Ausloesung] of code words, or through special order if
+Case X applies only to the armed forces or parts of it.
+
+The measures for mobilization are carried out by the highest Reichs
+authorities under their exclusive responsibility with the limitation
+that the fact of mobilization must not be mentioned publicly
+(diplomatic channels, press, public proclamations and announcements,
+radio, etc.). To achieve this purpose it must be stressed that it is
+necessary to camouflage the individual measures as much as possible
+without endangering their execution ... The main purpose is not to
+offer legal grounds to the prospective enemy for the opening of
+hostilities or their own mobilization. For that purpose, the necessary
+suspension of various measures contained in Section II (mobilization)
+of the mob. calendar will be ordered by the High Command of the Armed
+Forces.
+
+In principle every proclamation and suspension of code numbers during
+the period of tension or in case X must be made known to the High
+Commands of the three branches of the Armed Forces by the High Command
+of the Armed Forces.
+
+5. _c._ _General mobilization with public announcement_ (case of
+mobilization):
+
+The general mobilization will be decreed publicly by the
+“Mobilization-order” of the Fuehrer and Reichs Chancellor.
+
+5. _d._ Preparations are being made to enable parts of the Wehrmacht
+to move out at increased speed. In order that the units of the Army &
+the Navy to whom this applies may be _prepared to move out_ and the
+Luftwaffe _prepared to take off_, the civil administration authorities
+are required to render special assistance. This measure may be ordered
+during the period of tension.
+
+As this preparedness (for moving out or taking off) only applies
+to certain territories of the Reich and only affects certain
+administrative authorities, the latter will receive their instructions
+direct from those Wehrmacht authorities in whose territory the
+preparedness for moving out or taking off is being established. In
+addition, the order to prepare for the march-out or take-off will be
+communicated to the appropriate Reich ministries, the G.B. and so on,
+by the OKW.
+
+6. _Dissemination of the mobilization orders through the various
+administrative channels_:
+
+In case of mobilization the general mobilization with public
+announcement (case of mob.) will be announced to the Reichs authorities
+etc., the intermediate and lower civil authorities by a mob. cable
+through the DRP [German Reichs Postal Service].
+
+The DRP organizes for that purpose a dissemination plan in agreement
+with the other Reichs authorities. The “general mobilization” will also
+be made public by means of radio, public announcements, etc.
+
+The highest Reichs authorities will issue individual orders in their
+spheres for the “period of tension” and for “Case X”. Announcements
+concerning the stages of mobilization and the measures to be taken
+therefor will not be circulated through district cables by the DRP.
+
+All mobilization orders are to be passed on by the quickest means to
+the subordinate authorities.
+
+If the orders are passed on by phone, the identity of the civil servant
+transmitting the order is to be ascertained by appropriate questioning,
+in order to guard against deception. If doubts remain as to the
+identity of the person calling, they are to be dispelled by a further
+call.
+
+The ordering of measures which concern, directly or indirectly, offices
+of the armed forces or authorities of other departments must be made
+known to those authorities.
+
+If an authority learns about the stages of mobilization through
+unofficial channels, then it must immediately be ascertained through
+contact with superior authorities whether measures may be taken. The
+means of dissemination of mob. orders must be defined in the mob.
+calendars of the authorities. It is assumed that the night and day
+telephone service will be organized within the framework of the advance
+measures for the period of tension.
+
+
+                  _B. Preparations for Mobilization._
+
+   _Principles for the drafting of the “Mobilization Schedule for the
+                  Civil Administrative Authorities”._
+
+7. The mobilization plans of the Wehrmacht and the Mobilization
+Schedule for the civil administration provide the responsible State
+Government with a general survey of the volume of preparations for
+mobilization and of their political scope. They have been so adjusted
+to each other that the unification of the entire mobilization is
+secured.
+
+8. The mobilization schedule for the civil administrative authorities
+comprises in general all the measures of the civil state administration
+which on the one hand directly support the operational capacity of the
+Wehrmacht, or on the other hand serve the preparedness for war on the
+part of state, economy and people.
+
+9. The mobilization stages discussed sub. no. 4--
+
+  (a) period of tension
+
+  (b) mobilization without public announcement (Case X)
+
+  (c) general mobilization with public announcement (mob. case)
+
+form the _basis_ for the drafting of the “mobilization schedule for the
+civil administration”.
+
+9. _a._ The _advance measures for the period of tension_ form the
+content of _Section I_ in every part of the mobilization schedule.
+
+The advance measures for the civil administrative authorities in the
+period of tension are made flexible to conform to any development of
+the political & economic situation. Insofar as the advance measures
+for the civil administration give direct support to the Wehrmacht,
+they will be ordered from case to case so as to conform to the advance
+measures of the Wehrmacht.
+
+9. _b._ The measures for _mobilization_ form the content of _Section
+II_ in every part of the mob. schedule, with the proviso that in
+the case of “mobilization without public announcement (Case X)”
+they will be carried out according to the provisions of No. 4.b
+without publication, whereas in the case of general mobilization with
+public announcement (mob. case) they will as a rule be subject to no
+restrictions. The specially designated measures (code number) for the
+supervision and checking of the intelligence service will in _no_ case,
+however, come into force except by special order of the OKW (No. 4.c).
+
+The advance measures for the period of tension are printed in red in
+Section II (mobilization).
+
+The purpose of the said summary in Section II is to afford a complete
+survey in case mobilization should arise suddenly (without a previous
+period of tension).
+
+The mob. measures common to all administrative authorities are listed
+in a special _Part II of the mobilization schedule_. They are not
+included in the separate parts of the mob. schedule.
+
+10. Every part of the “Mobilization Schedule for the civil
+administrative authorities” (and therewith all the highest Reich
+Departments) is furnished with certain _code numbers_ with which the
+various measures are to be designated at all times.
+
+The purpose of these code numbers is to enable certain measures to
+be put into effect quickly and under certain circumstances to be
+camouflaged. In order to guard against confusion with the code numbers
+of the Wehrmacht units, the letter _Z_ (for Zivilverwaltungen- i.e.
+civil administration) is to be set _before_ the code number wherever
+code numbers are given in the mob. schedule of the civil administration.
+
+11. The “mobilization schedule for the civil administrative
+authorities” contains in--
+
+  _Part I_
+
+  The introduction to the mob. schedule              No. 1-100
+    for the civil administrative
+    authorities
+
+  _Part II_
+
+  Measures applicable to all                Code No. 0101-0500
+    administrations and in its subsequent
+    parts measures of the various
+    supreme Reich Departments.
+
+  _Part III_
+
+  Foreign Office                            Code No. 0501-1000
+
+  _Part IV_
+
+  Reich Ministry of the Interior            Code No. 1001-1500
+
+  _Part V_
+
+  Reich Ministry for Popular                Code No. 1501-2000
+    Enlightenment & Propaganda
+
+  _Part VI_
+
+  Reich Ministry of Justice                 Code No. 2001-2500
+
+  _Part VII_
+
+  Reich Ministry for Science,               Code No. 2501-3000
+    Education and Popular Culture
+
+  _Part VIII_
+
+  Reich Traffic Ministry (Motor             Code No. 3001-3500
+    traffic, shipping & waterways)
+
+  _Part IX_
+
+  Reich Post                                Code No. 3501-4000
+
+  _Part X_
+
+  Reich Traffic Ministry                    Code No. 4001-4500
+    (Railway Sections)
+
+  _Part XI_
+
+  General Inspector for German              Code No. 4501-5000
+    roadways
+
+  _Part XII_
+
+  Special measures of the Plenipotentiary   Code No. 5001-5500
+    for Economy
+
+  _Part XIII_
+
+  Reich Ministry for Economy                Code No. 5501-6000
+
+  _Part XIV_
+
+  Reich Ministry for Food and               Code No. 6001-6500
+    Agriculture
+
+  _Part XV_
+
+  Reich Ministry of Finance                 Code No. 6501-7000
+
+  _Part XVI_
+
+  Reich Ministry of Labor                   Code No. 7001-7500
+
+  _Part XVII_
+
+  Reich Forests Director                    Code No. 7501-8000
+
+  _Part XVIII_
+
+  Reichbank Directorate                     Code No. 8001-8500
+
+  _Part XIX_
+
+  Reich Department for Space                Code No. 8501-9000
+    Regulation
+
+  _Part XX_
+
+  NSDAP                                     Code No. 9001-9500
+
+12. The various civil administrations will in their own sphere of
+authority keep _mobilization calendars_ based on the general measures
+set forth in the “mobilization schedule for civil administrative
+authorities”.
+
+These calendars will comprise the individual measures and explanations
+necessary for the execution of the general measures in the same order
+and with the same code numbers as in the mobilization schedule.
+
+That the code numbers of the mobilization schedule should agree with
+those on all mob. calendars is necessary to enable the measures ordered
+in accordance with the mob. schedule to be passed on quickly and
+camouflaged.
+
+_The mobilization calendars of the civil administrative authorities_
+shall be drafted and passed on in the same way in compliance with the
+executory provisions laid down by the OKW.
+
+
+_C. Securing of sufficient money to cover mobilization._
+
+13. The money set aside in the Reichsbank establishments for the
+purposes of the armed forces and the civil administration in the case
+of mobilization may be used for the advance measures and for the
+mobilization without public announcement (“Case X”).
+
+The absolutely necessary payments before the publication of a
+mobilization order are to be entered under a special section of
+the present budget appropriations for the time being and will be
+transferred to the war budget later on, unless otherwise directed. This
+regulation is to be added to all mobilization calendars.
+
+
+_D. Dates for Mob. Preparations in the Civil Administration._
+
+14. In order that a new measure should be included in the mobilization
+schedule for the civil administrative authorities, application must be
+made to the Chief of the Reich Defense Committee (Section Defense of
+the Reich in the OKW).
+
+15. In order that consistency may be preserved in preparing measures
+for the calendar for any mobilization year, alterations, and where
+possible, new measures should only be applied for once a year--at the
+latest--November 1st.
+
+On the basis of such applications the mob. schedule will be altered by
+the following 1st of February in such a way that it will be decisive
+for calendar preparations for the current mob. year (April 1-March 31).
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1642-PS
+
+
+Distribution List for the Secret map of the Soviet Union (European part)
+
+  OKW--(Supreme Command Armed forces):
+    Keitel, Jodl, Warlimont, Munch, Wedell, Canaris      6
+
+  Office for the Four year plan:
+    Koerner, Neuman, Gramsch and 12 others              15
+
+  Foreign office:
+    Grosskopf                                            2
+
+  OKH--(High Command Army):
+    Brauchitsch and Quartermaster-General                3
+
+  OKM--(High Command Navy):
+   Raeder and 1 other                                    2
+
+  Propaganda Ministry:
+    Goebbels, Gutterer                                   3
+
+  Reichs Ministry for Economy:
+    Funk                                                11
+
+  Police:
+    Himmler and 3 others                                 4
+                                                        --
+                                                        36
+
+  Own Ministry:
+    Sch., Mall., Leibl, Siew., Korpp, Meyer, Dreyer      8
+                                                        --
+                                                        44
+
+  [illegible]                                            2
+                                                        --
+                                                        46
+
+    and 50 persons
+
+  _Title of map_:
+    Union of the Socialist
+    Soviet republics
+    European part
+    scale 1 : 400000000 kilometer
+
+
+                                 Map I
+
+  OKW /(Supreme Command of the armed forces)
+  Office for Economy and armament/
+  Economy
+  (Wi Rue Amt/Wi)
+  1. March 1941
+
+[Explanatory note: The map was found among the Rosenberg documents in a
+red folder carrying the remark “Frontiers”, with a distribution list in
+Rosenberg’s own handwriting. This distribution list refers apparently
+to plans worked out by Rosenberg for the administration of the occupied
+territories as the map shows lines in blue pencil indicating possibly
+the extent of the intended administration through the Rosenberg
+Ministry.]
+
+
+                                            SYNOPSIS OF DOCUMENT 1643-PS
+
+  Synopsis of letter written 29 November 1942 by Dr. Casdorf to various
+    Reich officials: Leader of the SS; Chief of the German police; Main
+    Government Office of Economics of the SS.
+
+Invitation extended to various responsible officials for a meeting
+to be held on 17 December 1942 at 10 o’clock, for the purpose of
+discussing the legal aspects of the confiscation of property by the SS
+for enlarging the concentration camp at Auschwitz as suggested in the
+attached letter.
+
+       #       #       #       #       #
+
+  Synopsis of letter written 7 November 1942 by SS General Pohl to the
+    Reich Minister of Finance for the enlargement of the concentration
+    camp at Auschwitz.
+
+The Reichsfuehrer of the SS expressed the wish that the territory of
+Auschwitz concentration camp should be increased to about 4640 acres
+and become a private estate owned by the Reich. The area in question
+(to be confiscated as soon as possible) belonged to various owners such
+as (1) Jewish and Polish private land owners, (2) towns in which most
+of the industrial property belonged to the Poles and the Jews, (3) the
+Polish State, (4) the community, (5) the church, (6) racial Germans.
+
+Different authorities were in charge and different rules had to be
+applied which made the transfer of property an impractical legal
+procedure. For this reason, the Minister of Justice introduced a
+new regulation on 23 May 1942 which made a new system of property
+registration possible.
+
+The SS suggests that the Reichskommissar, for the securing of the
+German element, should be authorized to transfer estates under
+categories 2-6. Racial Germans should be compensated for their estates
+in money or in allotting other ground properties to them.
+
+It is desired that all authorities concerned should be notified and
+invited for a discussion on this subject. In this meeting, Dr. Fiedler
+(Office of the Reichskommissar for the strengthening of the German
+element) and Mr. Korch [Zentralbodenamt] should participate.
+
+       #       #       #       #       #
+
+  Synopsis of teletype letter from the Chief of the ORPO to the
+    Regierungspraesident in Kattowitz, 8 December 1942, forwarded to the
+    Reich Minister on 9 December 1942.
+
+The chief of police orders:
+
+The creation of an independent police district for the concentration
+camp and quarters [Lager und Wehnsiedlung] for inmates in Auschwitz,
+headed by the camp commandant. This new regulation will not
+affect the police functions of the Landsrat in Bielitz or of the
+Regierungspraesident in Kattowitz. The commander of the camp will be
+the police chief of the town of Auschwitz. The disciplinary measures
+ordered by the camp commander against the camp inmates should not have
+the character of police measures, and his functions as camp commander
+and police chief should be kept distinct. The field police can be
+ordered by the camp commandant for special duty within the camp itself;
+but such an order can be given only by the camp commander.
+
+       #       #       #       #       #
+
+  Synopsis of a copy of minutes of meeting held on 17 and 18 December
+    1942 about the confiscation of territory for the enlargement of the
+    Auschwitz concentration camp.
+
+In order to be able to enlarge the territory of the Auschwitz
+concentration camp, it would be expedient to transfer all the estates
+to be confiscated to the “Zentralbodenamt” which is an agency of the
+Reichsfuehrer SS. However, in order to carry out this transaction, all
+those agencies which are at present responsible for the various types
+of real estate in question, have to give their approval.
+
+The officials in charge of the church property and of the former Polish
+State property gave their consent to release the estates under their
+jurisdiction to the Zentralbodenamt. However, the representative of
+the Reich Minister of the Interior claimed that he had no authority to
+dispose of the property.
+
+Of the community, in spite of arguments to the contrary from other
+officials, a further discussion on 21 December 1942 was to be held
+between the representatives of the Reich Ministry of the Interior and
+the Reichsfuehrer SS.
+
+On 18 December 1942 the representative of the Haupttreuhandstelle Ost
+agreed to release the estates under their jurisdiction and empower
+the officials in charge to initiate the transactions. The still
+remaining legal requirements for the release of properties belonging
+to industrial enterprises, racial Germans, and the town of Auschwitz
+were finally discussed. The list of participants appears on page
+4. Attached, an authorization from the Reich Minister of Finance
+(Haupttreuhandstelle Ost) issued 12 January 1943, giving full power
+of attorney to the Bodenamt of the Reichsfuehrer SS to make out the
+necessary declarations in regard to the real estates.
+
+       #       #       #       #       #
+
+  Synopsis of teletype letter from Dr. Hoffman, representing the Reich
+    Ministry of the Interior, to the Regierungspraesident in Kattowitz,
+    dated 22 January 1943.
+
+The territory of the Auschwitz concentration camp will be changed into
+an independent estate. For this purpose it must become the property
+of the Reich, represented by the Reichsfuehrer SS. This transaction
+must be carried out quickly. Land belonging to the Auschwitz district
+or to former Reich communities will be transferred after individual
+agreements have been made between the owners and the Reichsfuehrer SS
+or his agencies. The other community property will be transferred to
+the Bodenamt from the respective communities through the mediation of
+the Regierungspraesident. Regardless of how much of a property will
+become part of the new concentration camp estate, it will have to be
+purchased in its entirety. After the measurements have been completed,
+the part not needed for the camp estate will be returned to the
+original owner. In the Interior the Reichsfuehrer will administer the
+property.
+
+Finally the legal aspects of the compensation are discussed.
+
+       #       #       #       #       #
+
+  Synopsis of letter from Dr. Hoffman, representative of the Reich
+    Ministry of the Interior, to the Oberpraesident of Kattowitz, dated
+    9 June 1943.
+
+Inquiry as to whether the new Auschwitz estate has already been formed.
+
+       #       #       #       #       #
+
+  Synopsis of letter from the Chief President of Upper Silesia to the
+    Reich Minister of the Interior, dated 16 August 1943.
+
+Since the new estate of the concentration camp Auschwitz could not
+be created fast enough because two private properties could not be
+purchased, the President of Upper Silesia issued a decree creating
+a new district for Auschwitz. This decree, issued 31 May 1943, is
+attached in two copies. It gives a detailed description of the border
+line of the newly created Auschwitz district. Relevant maps are
+enclosed in folder.
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1650-PS
+
+            SECRET STATE POLICE--STATE POLICE OFFICE COLOGNE
+
+                         Branch Office, Aachen
+
+  To be transmitted in secret--To be handled as a secret government
+    matter.
+
+DOR. BERLIN NUE 19 507 March 4 1944 1430--WF--
+
+To all State Police Directorates except PRAGUE and BRUNN--Inspectors of
+the Security Police and of the Security Service.
+
+  Subject: Measures to be taken against captured escaped prisoners of
+    war who are officers or not working non-commissioned officers,
+    except British and American prisoners of war.
+
+The Supreme Command of the Army has ordered as follows:
+
+1. Every captured escaped prisoner of war who is an officer or a not
+working non-commissioned officer, except British and American prisoners
+of war, is to be turned over to the Chief of the Security Police and of
+the Security Service under the classification “Step III” regardless of
+whether the escape occurred during a transport, whether it was a mass
+escape or an individual one.
+
+2. Since the transfer of the prisoners of war to the security police
+and security service may not become officially known to the outside
+under any circumstances other prisoners of war may by no means be
+informed of the capture. The captured prisoners are to be reported
+to the Army Information Bureau as “escaped and not captured”. Their
+mail is to be handled accordingly. Inquiries of representatives of
+the Protective Power of the International Red Cross, and of other aid
+societies will be given the same answer.
+
+3. If escaped British and American prisoners of war who are officers or
+not working non-commissioned officers, respectively, are captured they
+are to be detained at first outside the prisoner of war camps and out
+of sight of prisoners of war; if Army owned buildings are unavailable
+they are to be placed in police custody. In every instance the Corps
+Area Command will request speedily the Supreme Command of the Army
+(Chief, Prisoner of War Section) for a decision as to whether they
+are to be turned over to the Chief of the Security Police and of the
+Security Service.
+
+In reference to this, I order as follows:
+
+1. The State Police Directorates will accept the captured escaped
+officer prisoners of war from the prisoner of war camp commandants and
+will transport them to the Concentration Camp Mauthausen following the
+procedure previously used, unless the circumstances render a special
+transport imperative. The prisoners of war are to be put in irons on
+the transport--not on the station if it is subject to view by the
+public. The camp commandant at Mauthausen is to be notified that the
+transfer occurs within the scope of the action “Kugel” [translator’s
+note: the literal translation of “Kugel” is “bullet”]. The State
+Police Directorates will submit semi-yearly reports on these transfers
+giving merely the figures, the first report being due on 5 July 1944
+(sharp). The report is to be made under the reference “Treatment of
+Captured Escaped Prisoners of War who are officers within the Scope
+of the Action ‘Kugel’.” In the case of special events, reports are to
+be submitted immediately. The State Police Directorates will maintain
+exact records.
+
+2. For the sake of secrecy, the Supreme Command of the Armed Force has
+been requested to inform the prisoner of war camps to turn the captured
+prisoners over to the local State Police Office and not to send them
+directly to Mauthausen.
+
+3. Captured escaped British and American officers and not working
+non-commissioned officers are to be detained in police custody in a
+city in which a State Police office is located provided the Army has no
+suitable quarters. In view of the existing crowding of police prisons,
+the State Police officer will accept captured prisoners only if the
+Army actually does not dispose of any suitable space. The prisoner of
+war camp commandants are to be contacted in reference to their quarters
+immediately after the receipt of this order. In the interest of the
+secrecy of this order, confinement outside of police jails, e.g. in
+Labor Education Camps is not permissible.
+
+4. If escaped prisoners of war who are officers and not working
+non-commissioned officers except British and American prisoners of
+war are captured by police authorities, reasons of practicability
+render it unnecessary to return the prisoner to the prisoner of war
+camp commandant once the facts have been clarified adequately. The
+prisoner of war camp is to be informed of the capture and is to be
+requested for a transfer under the classification “Step III”. Captured
+escaped British and American prisoners of war who are officers and
+non-commissioned officers are always to be turned over to the Army.
+
+5. The city and county police authorities are not to be informed of
+this order.
+
+  Chief of the Security Police and of the Security Service
+  IV D5d--B.NR. 61/44 GRS.--For the Chief--(signed) Mueller.
+    SS General.
+  Branch Office Aachen.                              Aachen 6 March 1944
+  _IV D No. 26/44 g Rs_
+
+  1. Two extract copies were made of this order.
+     1st Copy to IV A--6 March.
+     2nd Copy to IV D--2 March.
+  2. To be filed with IV C.--IV 3 Noted.
+
+                                                         ROSCHER 19 June
+                                              [two illegible signatures]
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1652-PS
+
+                1933 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 135
+
+   Decree of the Reichs President for Protection against treacherous
+  Attacks on the Government of the Nationalist Movement 21 March 1933
+
+On the basis of Article 48, Par. 2 of the constitution the following is
+decreed:
+
+
+                                 Par. 1
+
+1. Any person possessing a uniform of an organization supporting the
+government of the nationalist movement without being entitled thereto
+through membership in the organization or otherwise, will be punished
+with imprisonment up to two years.
+
+2. Any person wearing the uniform or an insignia representing
+membership of an organization designated in Par. 1, without being a
+member of the organization, will be punished with imprisonment of at
+least one month.
+
+
+                                 Par. 2
+
+1. Whoever commits a punishable act against persons or objects or
+threatens the same and while so doing wears or carries with him
+the uniform or insignia designating membership in an organization
+of the kind listed in Section 1 (1) without being a member of the
+organization, will be punished with a penitentiary sentence; in case of
+mitigating circumstances, with imprisonment of not less than 6 months.
+
+2. If the offense was committed with the intention to incite a revolt
+or to create fear or panic among the populace or to cause difficulties
+for the German Reich in its foreign affairs, the punishment is a
+penitentiary sentence of from 3 years to life. In especially severe
+cases the death penalty may be exacted.
+
+3. According to these regulations a German can also be prosecuted if he
+has committed the offense in a foreign country.
+
+
+                                 Par. 3
+
+1. Whoever purposely makes or circulates a statement of a factual
+nature which is untrue or grossly exaggerated or which is apt to
+seriously harm the welfare of the Reich or of a state or the reputation
+of the national government or of a state government or of the parties
+or organizations supporting these governments, is to be punished,
+insofar as no more severe punishment is decreed in other regulations,
+with imprisonment up to two years and, if he makes or spreads the
+statement publicly, with imprisonment of not less than three months.
+
+2. If through this deed, heavy damage for the Reich or a state
+resulted, penitentiary punishment can be exacted.
+
+3. Whoever commits an act through negligence, will be punished with
+imprisonment up to 3 months, or by a fine.
+
+
+                                 Par. 4
+
+Whoever has acquired membership in an organization surreptitiously is
+counted as a non-member in the application of this decree.
+
+
+                                 Par. 5
+
+This decree becomes effective on the day following its publication.
+
+Berlin, 21 March 1933
+
+                                                        Reichs President
+                                                          von HINDENBURG
+
+                                                       Reichs Chancellor
+                                                            Adolf HITLER
+
+                                         Reichs Minister of the Interior
+                                                                   FRICK
+
+                                     For the Reichs Minister for Justice
+                                     The Deputy of the Reichs Chancellor
+                                                               von PAPEN
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1653-PS
+
+                1934 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 81
+
+First regulation concerning the new building of the Reich of 2 February
+                                  1934
+
+Under the authority of Article 5 of the law on the Reconstruction of
+the Reich from 30 January 1934 (Reichsgesetzblatt I, page 75), the
+following decree is published herewith:
+
+
+                               Article 1
+
+To exercise sovereign rights--a function which was transferred from
+the provinces onto the Reich--shall be a function exercised by the
+provincial governments as a mandate and on behalf of the Reichs, since
+the Reich shall not make use of its right to exercise this function,
+either generally or in individual cases.
+
+
+                               Article 2
+
+Treaties or agreements in the realm of administration which the
+provinces may have concluded among each other or with the Reich shall
+not be affected by this transfer of the sovereign rights from the
+provinces onto the Reich.
+
+
+                               Article 3
+
+1. Laws need the assent of the competent Minister of the Reich.
+
+2. In his own domain the competent Minister of the Reich may order that
+the drafts of laws be submitted to him before the law is published.
+
+
+                               Article 4
+
+The highest echelons of the provincial governments shall, within the
+realm of their tasks, obey the orders issued by the competent Ministers
+of the Reich.
+
+
+                               Article 5
+
+Employees of the provincial governments may be transferred into the
+Reich’s civil service, and employees of the government of the Reich may
+be transferred into the civil service of the provinces.
+
+
+                               Article 6
+
+This decree became valid on 30 January 1934.
+
+Berlin, 2 February 1934
+
+                                            The Minister of the Interior
+                                                                   FRICK
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1654-PS
+
+      1935 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PAGE 369, Nr. 28 dated 16 March 1935
+
+                         TO THE GERMAN PEOPLE!
+
+When in November 1918, the German people trusting the assurances given
+in Wilson’s 14 points, laid down their arms, after four and a half
+years of glorious resistance in a war which they never wanted, they
+believed, not only to have rendered a service to tortured mankind but
+also toward a great idea. Suffering the most, under the consequences
+of this insane battle, millions of our people faithfully grasped at
+the thought of a reorganization of the relationship between people.
+This would be improved by the elimination of secret diplomatic cabinet
+politics on one hand, and the horrible means of war on the other. The
+harshest results of defeat which are history appeared, to many German
+people as the necessary sacrifices in order to free the world once and
+for all of similar horrors.
+
+The idea of the League of Nations has probably not aroused a more
+hearty approval in other nations than in the German which lost all
+earthly happiness. And so it was easy to understand, why the German
+people occupied and fulfilled the inane requests for destruction of
+armaments. The German people, and especially the administration, were
+convinced that through their fulfillment of orders for disarmament,
+laid down at Versailles, an international disarmament program was
+going to be started and guaranteed. For only in a fulfillment of
+these orders, by both sides, lies a moral sensible justification for
+a demand, which if unilaterally imposed and executed, will lead to
+eternal discrimination and with that, to a declaration of inferiority,
+of a great nation. But such a peace treaty could never be the
+prerequisite for a real inner reconciliation of the people and with
+that lead to a pacification of the world; but it would only create an
+eternal burning hatred. Germany has fulfilled the imposed disarmament
+obligations laid down by the Inter-Allied Control Commission.
+
+The following were the works of the destruction of the German military
+power and its means which were certified to, by this commission.
+
+
+                                A. Army
+
+      59 897     guns and barrels
+     130 558     machine guns
+      31 470     trench mortars and barrels
+    6007 000     rifles and carbines
+     243 957     machine gun barrels
+      28 001     gun carriages
+       4 390     trench mortar carriages
+   38750 000     projectiles
+   16550 000     hand and rifle grenades
+   60400 000     fuzes
+  491000 000     small arms ammunition
+     335 000     shells
+      23 515     cartridges and bullets
+      37 600     powder
+      79 500     empty shells
+     212 000     telephones
+       1 072     flamethrowers
+          31     armored trains
+          59     tanks
+       1 762     observation cars
+       8 982     wireless stations
+       1 240     Field bakeries
+       2 199     pontoons
+         981     pieces of equipment for soldiers and
+    8230 350     sets of equipment for soldiers
+       7 300     pistols and revolvers
+         180     machine gun sleighs
+          21     mobile workshops
+          12     AA gun carriers
+          11     caissons
+      64 000     steel helmets
+     174 000     gas masks
+       2 500     machines of former war industry
+       8 000     rifle barrels
+                                 B. Air
+
+  15 714     fighter planes and bombers
+  27 757     Airplane engines
+
+
+                                C. Navy
+
+   26  battleships
+    4  coast guard vessels
+    4  destroyers
+   19  small destroyers
+   21  school and special ships
+   83  torpedo boats
+  315  U-Boats
+
+
+                           Remarks to A and B
+
+Further under the destruction duties; vehicles of all kinds, means of
+gas attack and partly gas defense, gas and explosives, searchlights,
+sighting mechanisms, range-finding and sound-ranging devices, optical
+apparatus of all kinds, harnesses for horses, narrow gauge equipment,
+field printing shops, field kitchens, workshops, slash and stabbing
+weapons, steel helmets, ammunition transport material, normal and
+special machines of the War industry as, buildings, blueprints thereof,
+airplane and zeppelin hangars, etc.
+
+Following this unprecedented historical fulfillment of a treaty, the
+German people had the right to expect the redemption of the introduced
+duties also from the other side.
+
+Because:
+
+1. Germany has disarmed.
+
+2. In the peace treaty it was plainly required that Germany must be
+disarmed in order to set precedent for general disarmament; this means,
+it was said that only in Germany’s armament alone lies the basis for
+the armament of other nations.
+
+3. The German people were filled with such principles in its
+governments and in its Parties which completely agreed with the
+pacifistic-democratic ideals of the League of Nations and its founders.
+
+While Germany however had fulfilled its obligations on one side of the
+treaty, there remained the redeeming of the obligations on the other
+side. That means: the high treaty-makers of the former victorious
+states have unilaterally released themselves from the obligations of
+the Versailles treaty!
+
+Not enough that every disarmament, was in some way or another
+comparable to the German destruction of arms, discontinued, no:
+Not even a standstill in the armament was seen, on the contrary
+the armament of a whole number of states became visible. What was
+discovered during the War in the way of new destructive machinery
+now was completed in a methodical-scientific way. In the field of
+creating mighty tanks, fighters and bombers, uninterrupted and terrible
+improvements took place. New large guns were constructed, new high
+explosive, incendiary and gas bombs were developed.
+
+In the meantime however, the world resounded again with war cries as if
+there never had been a World War and never a Versailles Treaty. Germany
+was an empty powerless space, among these highly armed War states,
+which continually made available the most modern motorized equipment
+[Kraefte] and had no defense against any menace or threat. The German
+people recall the disaster and suffering from fifteen years of
+economical distress, political and moral humiliation. It is therefore
+easily understood when Germany began to ask loudly for the redeeming of
+the promise of the disarmament of the other nations.
+
+Because this is clear, the world would not tolerate a hundred year long
+peace but it must be an unmeasurable blessing to her. But it would not
+endure a hundred year long break between conqueror and conquered.
+
+The feeling regarding the moral rectification and necessity of an
+international disarmament was not only active in Germany but also
+within many other nations. Out of the pursuance of these strengths
+resulted attempts to try and direct an armament reduction by means
+of conferences and thereby bring about a general international
+assimilation on a lower level.
+
+And so resulted the first proposition for an international armament
+abrogation, of which we have the memory of the MacDonald Plan as being
+significant.
+
+Germany was prepared to accept this plan and to take it as foundation
+of a final agreement.
+
+It failed due to the rejection by other nations and was finally
+abandoned. Since the German people and Reich under such circumstances
+found no realization in the equality of rights solemnly guaranteed in
+the December declaration of 1932, the new German government saw in
+themselves, the guardians of the honor and the living rights of the
+German people; they were not in the position to continue to take part
+in such conferences or to belong to the League of Nations.
+
+Even after the leaving of Geneva, the German Government was still
+prepared not only to consider proposals by other nations but also to
+make several practical proposals themselves. They undertook thereby
+the conception, which was coined by other nations themselves, that the
+creation of short services Armies are inappropriate for purposes of
+aggression and therefore are to be recommended for a peaceful defense.
+
+They were therefore prepared to convert the long-service Reichswehr
+into a short service Army according to the wishes of other nations.
+Their proposals of the winter 1933/34 were practical and easy to
+accomplish. Their rejection as well as the final rejection of the
+similar proposed Italian and English plan however led us to believe
+that the inclination toward a further sensible fulfillment of the
+Versailles disarmament provision no longer exists.
+
+Under these circumstances, the German government was forced to take
+every necessary measure which would guarantee the termination of
+conditions, which are just as unworthy as menacing; of the helpless
+defenselessness of a great people and Reich.
+
+They started out from the same motivations as the very true expression
+given by Minister Baldwin in his last speech:
+
+“A country, which is not willing to seize the necessary precautionary
+measures for its own protection will never have might in this world,
+neither moral nor material might.”
+
+The Government of the present day German Reich however, only wishes one
+single moral and material might; it is the power to be able to protect
+the peace for the Reich and with that, peace for all of Europe!
+
+Therefore she did everything that was in her power and what could serve
+toward the furtherance of the peace.
+
+1. For a long period of time she has proposed to all her neighbor
+nations, the signing of non-aggression pacts.
+
+2. She has sought and found an agreeable arrangement with the eastern
+neighbor nation, which, thanks to the great arbitrary understanding,
+has for ever decontaminated the menacing atmosphere which existed when
+they took over the power, and it will lead to a lasting understanding
+and friendship between the two peoples.
+
+3. She has finally given France the solemn security that Germany, after
+the effectuated arrangement of the Saar question will not place or
+raise any more territorial claims against France. She believes thereby
+to have created, in a historically rare form the prerequisite for the
+termination of a hundred year long conflict between two large nations
+through a great political and essential sacrifice.
+
+However, the German government must witness to its regret, that for
+months a continually rising rearmament is taking place in the world.
+She sees in the creation of a Soviet-Russian Army of 101 Divisions,
+which means 960,000 men in present peacetime strength, an element which
+could not be foreseen at the time of the composition of the Versailles
+Treaty.
+
+She sees further signs of rejecting the disarmament idea, proclamated
+in its time, in the overdoing of similar measures. It is far from the
+German Government to reproach any nation. However, she sees today that
+through the present resolved introduction of the two-year military
+service in France, the basic ideas of the creation of a short service
+defense Army has been abandoned in favor of a long-service organization.
+
+This, however, was one of the arguments used in the demands on Germany,
+to surrender its Reichswehr.
+
+* * * Under these circumstances, the German government feels that it
+is impossible longer to postpone taking the necessary measures for the
+security of the Reich, or even to hide them from the knowledge of the
+world.
+
+Therefore, if it now complies with the desire, expressed in the
+speech of the English Minister Baldwin on November 28, 1934 for a
+clarification of the German intentions, then this is done:
+
+1. IN ORDER TO GIVE THE GERMAN PEOPLE THE CONVICTION AND THE OTHER
+STATES THE KNOWLEDGE THAT THE MAINTAINING OF THE HONOR AND SECURITY OF
+THE GERMAN REICH WILL, FROM NOW ON, AGAIN BE ENTRUSTED TO THE GERMAN
+NATION’S OWN POWER.
+
+2. But in order, by fixing the extent of the German measures, to
+invalidate these assertions which wish to imply that the German people
+are striving for a position of military hegemony in Europe.
+
+What the German government desires, as the guardian of the honor
+and interests of the German nation, is to guarantee the extent of
+those means of power which are required not only for maintaining the
+integrity of the German Reich, but also for the international respect
+and esteem of Germany as a co-guarantor of the general peace.
+
+For in this hour the German government renews, before the German people
+and before the whole world, the assurance of its determination never
+to trespass the limit of guarding German honor and the freedom of the
+Reich, and especially of its determination to (wish to) form, in the
+national German armament, not an instrument of military attack, but
+rather exclusively one for defense, and thus for maintaining the peace.
+
+In so doing, the German Reich Cabinet expresses the confident hope that
+the German people, which thus regains its honor, may be permitted, with
+independent equal right, to make its contribution to the pacification
+of the world in a free and open cooperation with the other nations and
+their governments.
+
+In this spirit the German Reich Cabinet has today passed the following
+law:
+
+
+    Law for the Organization of the Armed Forces of March 16, 1935.
+
+The Reich Cabinet has passed the following law which is herewith
+promulgated:
+
+
+                               Section 1
+
+Service in the Armed Forces is based upon compulsory military duty.
+
+
+                               Section 2
+
+In peace time, the German Army, including the police troops transferred
+to it is organized into:
+
+  12   Corps and
+  16   Divisions.
+
+
+                               Section 3
+
+The Reich Minister of War is charged with the duty of submitting
+immediately to the Reich Ministry, detailed laws on compulsory military
+duty.
+
+Berlin, March 16, 1935
+
+                    The Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor
+                              ADOLF HITLER
+
+  The Reich Minister of Foreign Affairs
+      FREIHERR VON NEURATH
+
+  The Reich Minister of the Interior
+      FRICK
+
+  The Reich Minister of Finance
+      GRAF SCHWERIN VON KROSIGK
+
+  The Reich Minister of Economics
+    Acting: HJALMAR SCHACHT
+      President of the Board of Directors of the Reichsbank.
+
+  The Reich Minister of Labor
+      FRANZ SELDTE
+
+  The Reich Minister of Justice
+      DR. GUERTNER
+
+  The Reich Minister of Defense
+      VON BLOMBERG
+
+  The Reich Minister of Post and Traffic
+      FREIHERR VON TELTZ
+
+  The Reich Minister of Nutrition and Agriculture
+      R. WALTER DARRE
+
+  The Reich Minister for Public Enlightenment and Propaganda
+      DR. GOEBBELS
+
+  The Reich Minister for Air
+      HERMANN GOERING
+
+  The Reich Minister of Science Education and Popular Culture
+      RUST
+
+  The Reich Minister without Portfolio
+      R. HESS
+
+  The Reich Minister without Portfolio
+      KERRL
+
+  The Reich Minister without Portfolio
+      Dr. HANS FRANK
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1659-PS
+
+                1938 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 303
+
+ Second order concerning plebiscite and election for the greater German
+                       Reichstag of 24 March 1938
+
+On the basis of par. 4 of the Second Decree regarding the Reichstag
+election law of 18 March 1938 (RGBl I, p. 258) the following is decreed
+in supplement to pars. 8 and 32 of the First Decree of 22 March 1938
+for the people’s vote and for the election to the Greater German
+Reichstag:
+
+
+                               Article 1
+
+1. The ballot is printed as follows:
+
+[Illustration:
+
+PEOPLE’S VOTE AND THE GREATER GERMAN REICHSTAG BALLOT
+
+Do you agree with the accomplishment, on 13 March 1938, of the
+
+REUNITING OF AUSTRIA WITH THE GERMAN REICH and do you vote for the list
+of our Fuehrer ADOLF HITLER?
+
+YES NO
+
+]
+
+2. The ballot for the qualified voters with the exception of the
+Austrian qualified voters (par 8 of the First Decree) consists of white
+or yellow paper.
+
+3. The ballot for the Austrian qualified voters (par. 32 section 1 of
+the First Decree) consists of green paper.
+
+
+                               Article 2
+
+1. The ballot for soldiers of the former Austrian Army (par 32 section
+2 of the First Decree) is printed as follows:
+
+[Illustration:
+
+PEOPLE’S VOTE ON THE 10 APRIL 1938 BALLOT
+
+Do you agree, German Soldier, with the ratification on the 13 March
+1938 of the
+
+REUNITING OF AUSTRIA WITH THE GERMAN REICH?
+
+YES NO ]
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1660-PS
+
+                1938 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 631
+
+  Decree for the registration for the active service in Austria in the
+                       year 1938 of 16 June 1938
+
+I. The registration for the active service in the army for the year
+1938 in the country of Austria will be conducted during the time from
+16 August until 10 September 1938.
+
+II. To be called for registration:
+
+1. All those subject to duty, born in the year 1917, without regard to
+their physical fitness and regardless whether they were exempt from
+induction in spring of the year 1938;
+
+2. All those volunteers of other years of birth who were considered
+“general service”;
+
+3. All those subject to duty considered “general service” or “limited
+service” at the time of induction of the class of 1915 and 1916 who
+have registered with reserve commands and who have as yet not been
+trained;
+
+4. The volunteers who have reported, or want to report, in June 1938,
+for induction into active service for the fall of 1938 (for the
+Luftwaffe also for the spring of 1939), without regard whether or not
+they have been physically examined.
+
+III. Charged with this task are--
+
+  in the higher administrative echelons:
+
+    The Landeshauptmaenner (governors of provinces); in Vienna the
+      mayor,
+
+  in the district police echelons:
+
+    in the cities, the mayor, and the State police officer, as far as
+      they are on hand,
+
+    in Vienna the Chief of Police,
+
+    in the rural districts the district governors.
+
+IV. This decree is based upon Article 37, Section 2 of the draft law
+dated 21 May 1935 (Reichsgesetzbl. I, page 609) and the decree of the
+Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor regarding the transfer (carrying over)
+of the institutional law according to the draft law dated 22 May 1935
+(Reichsgesetzblatt I, page 615) and the decree on the introduction
+of the general draft in the country of Austria dated 15 June 1938
+(Reichsgesetzblatt I, page 631).
+
+  Berlin, 16 June 1938
+
+                       The Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces
+                                                                  Keitel
+
+                                      The Reich Minister of the Interior
+                                                                   Frick
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1662-PS
+
+               1938 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 1580
+
+  Order eliminating Jews from German economic life of 12 November 1938
+
+On the basis of the Decree of 18 October 1936 for the execution of the
+Four Year Plan (RGBl I, p. 887), the following is ordered:
+
+
+                               Article 1
+
+1. From January 1, 1938, operation of retail shops, mail order houses,
+independent exercise of handicrafts is forbidden to Jews. (Article 5 of
+the First Decree to Reich citizenship law [Reichsbuergergesetz] of 14
+Nov 1935--RGBl I, 1933).
+
+2. Moreover it is forbidden to Jews from the same date to offer goods
+or services in the markets of all kinds, fairs, or exhibitions or to
+advertise such or accept orders therefor.
+
+3. Jewish shops operated in violation of this order will be closed by
+police. (Third Decree to Reich citizenship law of 14 June 1938-RGBl I,
+627).
+
+
+                               Article 2
+
+1. No Jew can manage a firm according to the interpretation of the term
+“manager” under the law for national labor of 20 Jan 1934. (RGBl I, 45).
+
+2. If a Jew is a leading employee in a business concern he may be
+dismissed with notice of six weeks. At expiration of this period all
+claims resulting from the employee’s contract, especially claims of
+compensation or pensions, become null.
+
+
+                               Article 3
+
+1. No Jew can be a member of a cooperative society.
+
+2. Jewish members of cooperatives lose membership from 21 Dec 1938. No
+notice is necessary.
+
+
+                               Article 4
+
+Competent Reich Ministers are empowered to issue rules required by this
+decree. They may permit exceptions so far as this is necessary for
+transfer of Jewish firms into non-Jewish hands or for liquidation of
+Jewish concerns and in special cases in order to insure supplies.
+
+  Berlin, 12 November 1938
+
+                                 The Commissioner for the Four Year Plan
+                                                                 Goering
+                                                   General Field Marshal
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1665-PS
+
+               1940 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 1270
+
+   Order concerning treatment of property of Nationals of the former
+                   Polish State of 17 September 1940
+
+On the basis of the Decree to Implement the Four Year Plan of 18
+October 1936 (RGBl I, 887) in conjunction with the Decree for the
+Introduction of the Four Year Plan in the Eastern Territories of 30
+October 1939 (RGBl I, 2125) the following is decreed for the area of
+the Greater German Reich, including annexed Eastern territories:
+
+
+                               Article 1
+
+1. Property of nationals of the former Polish State within the area
+of the Greater German Reich, including annexed Eastern territories,
+is subject to confiscation, administration by commissioner and
+sequestration in accordance with the following regulations.
+
+2. This does not apply to the property of persons who have gained
+German citizenship in accordance with Article 6 of the edict of the
+Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor concerning organization and administration
+of Eastern territories, dated 8 October 1939 (RGBl I, 2042). The
+competent authority (Article 12) may permit additional exceptions.
+
+3. Nationals of the former Free City of Danzig who are of Polish
+nationality are considered as nationals of the former Polish State.
+
+
+                               Article 2
+
+1. Confiscation will be applied in case of property belonging to:
+
+_a._ Jews.
+
+_b._ Persons who have fled or who have absented themselves for longer
+than temporary period.
+
+2. Confiscation may be applied:
+
+_a._ If the property is needed for the public good, especially for
+purposes of national defense or the strengthening of German folkdom.
+
+_b._ If the owners or other persons entitled to it immigrated into the,
+then, area of the German Reich after 1 October 1918.
+
+3. Confiscation may be limited to individual articles of property.
+
+4. As a rule the following articles are to be exempted from
+confiscation:
+
+_a._ Movable articles destined exclusively for personal use.
+
+_b._ Cash, bank and savings bank deposits as well as stocks and bonds
+up to a total value of one thousand marks.
+
+
+                               Article 3
+
+Properties are stationary and movable objects (with all accessories),
+credits, shares, judgments, and interests of all sorts.
+
+
+                               Article 4
+
+1. With the sequestration the previous owners lose the rights of
+disposal of the sequestered properties. The competence of the general
+governor in accordance with the ordinance for public administration of
+farm and forestry industries and territories in the annexed Eastern
+areas of 12 Feb 1940 (RGBl I, 355) remains unaffected.
+
+2. Whoever has sequestered property in his possession or custody, must
+administer it until further notice. Changes or disposal of the property
+or its profits are only to be permitted within the limits of regular
+business. All measures which go beyond this, especially the disposal
+of plots of land, must have the permission of the competent office
+(Article 12).
+
+
+                               Article 5
+
+1. The commissarial administration can be ordered for property which is
+subject to sequestration, insofar as ordinary administration demands it.
+
+2. Orders by the commissarial administration serve as confiscation at
+the same time.
+
+
+                               Article 6
+
+1. The commissarial administrator is appointed by the competent office
+(Article 12). He will receive a written appointment. He can be recalled
+at any time.
+
+2. In the direction of businesses, he must use the same caution which
+a regular businessman or administrator would and is responsible for
+all the damages which result through breach of duty. He must report to
+the competent office (Article 12) at all times all of the information
+requested by it and insofar as nothing else is determined he still
+must report it concerning his administrative activity monthly without
+further request.
+
+3. The commissarial administrator can be held to the fulfillment of his
+obligations by the competent office--without prejudice to his criminal
+responsibility--by means of an automatic fine of up to 10,000 RM.
+
+
+                               Article 7
+
+1. The commissarial administrator is empowered to take all judicial and
+extrajudicial actions, which the administration of the property entails
+within the limits of ordinary business.
+
+2. The administrator needs a special permission of the competent office
+(Article 12) prior to:
+
+_a._ Selling or mortgaging lots.
+
+_b._ Changing the subject or the legal form of an enterprise.
+
+_c._ Doing legal business which results in the sale or winding-up of an
+enterprise or of a management or the sale of an administrated stock of
+goods or other property which is not divided.
+
+_d._ Renting professional, agriculture and lumber enterprises and farm
+and timber lots over 10 hectars.
+
+_e._ Undertaking other legal business whose settlement is made
+dependent upon previously established authority of the competent
+office (Article 12) by means of public announcement in the German
+Reichsanzeiger and the Prussian Staatsanzeiger.
+
+3. Legal affairs which are undertaken without the authority required by
+Article 2 are not valid.
+
+
+                               Article 8
+
+1. The administrator will receive a remuneration for his activity which
+will be determined by the competent office.
+
+2. The costs of the commissarial administration including the
+remuneration will be borne by the concern, property, or portion of
+property, administered.
+
+
+                               Article 9
+
+1. Sequestered property can be confiscated in favor of the Reich by
+the competent office if the public weal, particularly the defense of
+the Reich or the consolidation of the German nationality [Volkstums],
+requires it.
+
+2. Before confiscation the sequestered property is to be determined
+according to more detailed directives of the competent office (Article
+12).
+
+The Reich is the security for the debts of the confiscated property up
+to the amount of the sale value of the confiscated property. Judgments
+against confiscated properties remain valid.
+
+4. The disposal of confiscated property is granted the office which was
+competent for the confiscation (Article 12). In the case of disposal
+of agricultural property an accord will be reached between the Reich
+Commissar for the strengthening of German nationality and the Reich
+Minister for Food and Agriculture.
+
+5. The regulation of the type and extent of compensation which will be
+granted for property losses attendant upon the carrying out of this
+decree remains withheld. For measures of the competent agency (Article
+12), on the basis of Articles 16 and 17, no compensation will be
+granted.
+
+
+                               Article 10
+
+1. A commissarial (provisional) administration can also be established
+over the property of legal persons, societies, clubs and other
+associations of individuals in which subjects of the former Polish
+State in the year 1939 still either had a preponderant capital interest
+or whose administration was decisively influenced by members of the
+former Polish State.
+
+2. During the existence of the commissarial administration the
+authority of chief and of the other persons authorized for
+representation or administration will be dormant; the same thing for
+the powers of all other organs.
+
+3. Only the shares and holdings of subjects of the former Polish State
+are subject to confiscation in this case.
+
+
+                               Article 11
+
+1. The sequestration or the regulation of the commissarial
+administration are upon request of the competent authority (Article
+2) to be entered into the register of deeds or any other appropriate
+public register. The entry of the name of the commissarial
+administrator can also be demanded.
+
+2. Insofar as the register of deeds or other appropriate public
+register becomes incorrect as a result of measures on the basis of this
+decree, it is upon request of the competent authority to be corrected.
+Article 1, section 3 to 5 of the second decree for the execution and
+completion of the law on the granting of compensation in case of
+confiscation or transferral of property of 18 March 1938 (RGBl I, 317)
+is to be applied appropriately.
+
+
+                               Article 12
+
+1. For measures and decisions on the basis of this decree the
+commissioner for the four year plan--chief-trusteeship East--is
+the competent authority; for agriculture including agricultural
+side-enterprises, the Reich Commissar for the strengthening of German
+nationality.
+
+2. The competent authorities according to subparagraph (1) can delegate
+the exercise of their powers entirely or partially to other agencies.
+Complaints against their decisions will be directed to the competent
+authority according to Sect (1). The complaint will have no delaying
+effect. It is not permissible if more than one year has gone by since
+the issuance of the disputed decision.
+
+
+                               Article 13
+
+If anybody opposes the sequestration or the ruling of the commissarial
+administration with the assertion that he is a member of the German
+people, then the proceedings are to be suspended. The competent
+authority (Article 12) will entrust the decision concerning membership
+in the German people to the local governor [Regierungspraesident].
+The person concerned also has the right of requesting that his
+nationality be determined. Complaint against the decision of the
+Regierungspraesident to the Reich Minister of the Interior is
+permissible. The decision on membership in the German people is
+binding, upon the proceedings of the competent authority (Article 12)
+on the basis of this decree.
+
+
+                               Article 14
+
+The regulations to be issued according to Article 2, 5 and 10 will
+be effected by a written order which is to be made known to person
+concerned. This personally making known may be substituted by a sign,
+poster, or public proclamation.
+
+
+                               Article 15
+
+1. Disposal of property and property rights of subjects of the
+former Polish State, who do not come under the regulations governing
+exceptions of Article 1, Section 2, need the approval of the
+competent authority (Article 12) to be valid. This is not true for the
+disposition of claims upon interest and other continuous earnings.
+
+2. The competent authority decides whether approval according to
+Section 1 is necessary. The decision is binding upon courts and
+administrative agencies. The competent authority (Article 12) must upon
+demand issue a certificate that approval is not necessary.
+
+
+                               Article 16
+
+1. All sorts of compulsory sales of objects are by this decree
+subject to sequestration may only be begun with the assent of the
+competent authority (Article 12). If one of the competent authorities
+according to Article 12 has assented, it has no influence upon further
+proceedings, if it has wrongly asserted its competence.
+
+2. If it is to be feared that the debtor will escape the compulsory
+sale, or an immediate seizure is called for, for some other reason,
+then upon order of the court authorizing the compulsory sale the
+compulsory sale can be begun before issuance of the necessary approval,
+according to Section 1. It should, in this case, be limited to the
+measures permissible in the execution of an attachment and be continued
+from this point only when the approval has been issued. Upon demand of
+the competent authority (Article 12) the court authorizing a compulsory
+sale must order the lifting of the temporary attachment measures.
+
+
+                               Article 17
+
+1. If in the incorporated Eastern territories bankruptcy proceedings
+are opened on the property of a bankrupt, then the provisions of
+Article 16 are valid accordingly, for the liquidation of the property
+belonging to the estate of the bankrupt.
+
+2. If the opening or discontinuance of bankruptcy proceedings in the
+incorporated Eastern territories depends upon whether the value of
+the bankrupt estate corresponds to the cost of the proceedings, then
+objects which according to this decree are subject to confiscation,
+shall only be regarded as belonging to the bankrupt estate, if the
+competent authority (Article 12) has agreed to their liquidation in
+bankruptcy proceedings.
+
+
+                               Article 18
+
+It can be publicly announced that property coming into consideration
+for sequestration is to be registered. The announcement of registration
+for agricultural property takes place in agreement with the Reich
+Minister for Food and Agriculture.
+
+
+                               Article 19
+
+The competent authority (Article 12) can demand information of
+everybody for the carrying out of its tasks. Administrative agencies
+and courts must give it official help, especially they must question
+witnesses and experts upon its demand.
+
+
+                               Article 20
+
+1. Whoever undertakes to deprive the agencies indicated in Article
+12 or those empowered to dispose of the property by said agencies or
+otherwise in any way undertakes to thwart, to evade, or to prejudice
+the effect of the sequestration in order to create a profit for himself
+or another, will be punished with imprisonment and fine or one of these
+penalties.
+
+2. In aggravated cases the punishment will be confinement to a
+penitentiary. If the culprit acts out of insubordination against the
+political new order or the case is otherwise especially aggravated the
+sentence of death is to be given.
+
+
+                               Article 21
+
+1. Whoever intentionally or carelessly fails to fulfill or fulfills
+incorrectly, or incompletely, an obligation to report or give
+information incumbent upon him according to an executionary regulation
+issued to implement this law or a regulation issued according to
+Articles 18 and 19, will be punished with imprisonment and fine.
+
+2. The criminal prosecution will be instituted only upon request of the
+competent authority (Article 12).
+
+
+                               Article 22
+
+1. The following remain unprejudiced:
+
+_a._ The regulation for the securing of the necessary establishments
+for the fitting out of the Reich’s war harbor Gdynia of 21 December
+1939 (RGBl I, 2475);
+
+_b._ The decree on the public exploitation of agricultural and
+sylvicultural enterprises and real estate in the incorporated Eastern
+territories of 12 February 1940 (RGBl I, 355) with the provision that
+upon the undertaking subject to public exploitation the provisions of
+Articles 1, 2, 3, 4 Section 1, Articles 9, 11, 12 Section 1, Articles
+14, 18, 19, 20, 21 and 23 of this decree will be applied;
+
+_c._ The ordinance on the handling of enemy property of 15 Jan 1940
+(RGBl I, 191) with the provision that property of the subjects of the
+former Polish State, who have their residence or permanent domicile in
+the territory of an enemy state, will be treated according to this
+decree, insofar as it is located in the Greater German Reich including
+the incorporated Eastern territories.
+
+_d._ The decree on confiscation in the occupied former Polish
+territories (except Eastern Upper Silesia) of 5 Oct 1939, P. 25.
+
+_e._ The decree on the employment of Jewish property of 3 Dec 1938
+(RGBl I, 1709) with following:
+
+1. The sequestration according to Article 2 and the regulation of a
+commissarial administration according to Articles 5 and 10 of this
+decree do not take place in the case of property of Jews, which the
+Jewish owners had already been ordered to sell on the basis of Articles
+1 to 6 of the decree on the disposal of Jewish property at the time
+this law came into effect. The proceeds of this sale can be confiscated.
+
+2. The approval according to Article 15 of this decree is not necessary
+insofar as a license is prescribed by Article 8 of decree on employment
+of Jewish property;
+
+_f._ The decree of the Reich protector in Bohemia and Moravia on Jewish
+property of 21 June 1939 [Verordnungsblatt des Reichsprotektors in
+Boehmen und Maehren p. 45] and the decree of the Reich protector in
+Bohemia and Moravia on the removal of the Jews from the economy of the
+protectorate of 26 Jan 1940 [Verordnungsblatt des Reichsprotektors in
+Boehmen and Maehren P. 45] with the provision that the proceedings for
+the removal of Jews will also be carried out in regard to the property
+of subjects of the former Polish State according to these provisions,
+in agreement with the chief-trusteeship East; for the sequestration and
+confiscation the agencies named in Article 12 remain competent.
+
+2. Furthermore all regulations conflicting with this one, issued since
+28 August 1939 in the incorporated Eastern territories including
+the territory of the former Free City of Danzig, especially such
+regulations which grant the right to sequester, to install commissarial
+administrators or trustees, or to confiscate, become invalid.
+
+3. The measures and legal transactions of the commissariat
+administrator undertaken with the approval of the competent agencies
+are not subject to the necessity of being approved according to
+the decree to assure the orderly development of the economy in the
+incorporated Eastern territories of 31 Jan 1940 (RGBl I, 255). In the
+case of property disposal an understanding will be established with
+the competent Reichs governor or provincial governor or the highest
+Reichs authority, which according to Article 3 Section 2 of the decree
+of 31 Jan 1940 have withheld their consent. If in cases of especial
+importance such an understanding cannot be established, then the
+commissioner for the four year plan will make the decision.
+
+4. Measures of the competent authorities (Article 12) which have been
+taken before this decree became effective, are valid if they are in
+accordance with the provisions of this decree or with the law as it
+stood previously.
+
+5. Insofar as sequestrations, confiscations, or the installation of
+commissarial administrators have been carried out by anyone else
+but the competent agencies (Article 12), their confirmation is to
+be applied for in writing. If the confirmation of them is not then
+forthcoming, the previously directed measures become null and void. The
+same is true if a decision is not reached on the confirmation before
+31 October 1940. The competent agencies are authorized to prolong this
+period to a reasonable degree in individual cases.
+
+6. The provisions of Section 5 are not valid for trustees, who at the
+time this law came into effect were installed according to Articles
+2 and 6 of the decree on the employment of Jewish property of 3 Dec
+1938 (RGBl I, 1709) for the temporary carrying on, transferral, or
+winding up of Jewish business undertakings or for the administration
+or transferral of other property of Jews. The legal position of these
+trustees remains unchanged.
+
+
+                               Article 23
+
+1. The commissioner for the four year plan will issue the necessary
+legal regulations for the carrying out of this law--for agriculture
+including subsidiary enterprises pertaining to agriculture--with
+the agreement of Reich commissar for the strengthening of German
+nationality and of the Reich Minister for Food and Agriculture.
+
+2. The commissioner for the four year plan in agreement with the Reich
+Minister of Finance and the Reich Minister for Economic Affairs can
+decree by means of legal regulations a simplified settlement, diverging
+from the provisions of the law as it stands, of the legal affairs of
+those persons whose property is subject to confiscation according to
+this decree.
+
+3. The necessary administrative regulations for the carrying out
+of this decree will be issued by the commissioner for the four
+year plan--Chief Trusteeship East--in agreement with the competent
+authorities.
+
+
+                               Article 24
+
+1. This decree becomes effective one week after its proclamation.
+
+2. The commissioner for the four year plan will fix the time of its
+becoming invalid.
+
+  Berlin, 17 September 1940
+
+                                 The chairman of the ministerial council
+                           for the defense of the Reich and commissioner
+                                                  for the four year plan
+
+                                                                 GOERING
+                                                          Reichs Marshal
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1666-PS
+
+                1942 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 179
+
+   Decree of the Fuehrer concerning a plenipotentiary general for the
+                 utilization of labor of 21 March 1942
+
+In order to secure the manpower requisite for the war industries as
+a whole, and particularly for armaments, it is necessary that the
+utilization of all available manpower, including that of workers
+recruited [angeworbenen] abroad and of prisoners of war, should
+be subject to a uniform control, directed in a manner appropriate
+to the requirements of war industry, and further that all still
+incompletely utilized manpower in the Great German Reich, including
+the Protectorate, and in the General Gouvernement and in the Occupied
+Territories, should be mobilized.
+
+Reichsstatthalter and Gauleiter Fritz Sauckel will carry out this task
+within the framework of the Four Years Plan, as Plenipotentiary General
+for the utilization of labor. In that capacity he will be directly
+responsible to the Commissioner for the Four Years Plan.
+
+Section III (wages) and Section V (utilization of labor) of the Reich
+Labor Ministry, together with their subordinate authorities, will
+be placed at the disposal of the Plenipotentiary General for the
+accomplishment of his task.
+
+  Fuehrer-Headquarters, 21 March 1942
+
+                                                             The Fuehrer
+                                                            Adolf Hitler
+
+                    The Reich Minister and Head of the Reich Chancellery
+                                                             Dr. Lammers
+
+                       The Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces
+                                                                  Keitel
+
+
+                1942 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 180
+
+    Ordinance for the execution of the Fuehrer’s decree concerning a
+      Plenipotentiary General for Arbeitseinsatz of 27 March 1942
+
+In pursuance of the Fuehrer’s Decree of 21 March 1942 (RGBl I, 179), I
+decree as follows:
+
+1. My manpower sections [Geschaeftsgruppen Arbeitseinsatz] are hereby
+abolished. (Circular letter of 22 Oct 1936/St. M. Dev. 265). Their
+duties (recruitment and allocation of manpower, regulations for labor
+conditions [Arbeitsbedingungen]) are taken over by the Plenipotentiary
+General for Arbeitseinsatz, who is directly under me.
+
+2. The Plenipotentiary General for Arbeitseinsatz will be responsible
+for regulating the conditions of labor (wage policy) employed in the
+Reich Territory, having regard to the requirements of Arbeitseinsatz.
+
+3. The Plenipotentiary General for Arbeitseinsatz is part of the Four
+Year Plan. In cases where new legislation is required, or existing laws
+require to be modified, he will submit appropriate proposals to me.
+
+4. The Plenipotentiary General for Arbeitseinsatz will have at
+his disposal for the performance of his task the right delegated
+to me by the Fuehrer for issuing instructions to the higher Reich
+authorities, their branches and the Party offices, and their associated
+organisms and also to the Reich protector, the General-Governor, the
+Commander-in-Chief, and heads of the civil administrations.
+
+In the case of ordinances and instructions of fundamental importance
+report is to be submitted to me, in advance.
+
+  Berlin, 27 March 1942
+
+                                       The Deputy for the Four Year Plan
+                                                                 Goering
+                                                           Reich Marshal
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1669-PS
+
+                NATIONAL SOCIALIST GERMAN WORKERS PARTY
+
+  Deputy of the Fuehrer
+  H/J
+
+                                              Munich, Briennerstrasse 45
+                                                    Tel: 54901 and 58344
+                                                 Munich, 28 August 1933.
+
+  Mr. Dr. Albrecht Hanshofer
+
+                                                                  BERLIN
+
+  Society of Geography, Wilhelmstr, BERLIN
+
+  My dear Doctor:
+
+Many thanks for both your letters of the 23 and 24 of this month. I
+made all necessary arrangements concerning the Standartenfuehrers,
+immediately.
+
+I would like very much to speak to Haselblatt before his convention
+starts. Probably I will be at Berlin around September 7. I don’t know
+yet if I shall be able to attend the Convention myself.
+
+Concerning the American, would you please tell him, that in one case
+it is no longer the question of a “party” in the sense of the “custom”
+practiced since Washington’s time, that we are striving for, but this
+party is a section of the State itself. It is of utmost interest to me
+to know, whether any American official representatives ever attended
+meetings of the fascist party.
+
+I reported the statements of the Polish Chief of Staff.
+
+                                                   With hearty greetings
+                                                                    your
+                                                [Signature] Rudolf Hess.
+
+Registered!
+
+       #       #       #       #       #
+
+                                                    Berlin, August 1933.
+
+  EAST PRUSSIA
+  Dear Mr. Hess:
+
+Today I have only two reports to pass on to you, having received them
+from a generally well informed source.
+
+Primarily: Assertion of the Polish Chief of staff: “Once the damned
+civilians thwarted our East Prussian aim with their scruples &
+hesitation. That will not happen again. Precaution has been taken that
+these people are sent to a Concentration Camp if they should still dare
+to obstruct us.”
+
+Secondly: A very delicate matter. It is known to yourself, that
+at some place in your organization, there are people, unable to
+subordinate their personal initiative for the benefit of the common
+good. I am informed that a personage very highly esteemed abroad,
+but completely retired at home, H * * * h B * * * g has to fear for
+her individual safety. The source of this insecurity, I was told is
+S.A. Standartleader Schoeneberg. I don’t have to point out to you the
+repercussions, abroad, which any personal accident would provoke. * * *
+Could you take care of internal curbing.
+
+                                                   With hearty Greetings
+                                                             Always Your
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1674-PS
+
+            1938 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PAGE 1044, 17 Aug. 1938
+
+The second decree for the execution of the law regarding the change of
+the surnames and forenames of 17th August 1938.
+
+On the basis of Article 13, of the law of 5 January 1938
+(Reichsgesetzblatt I.S.9) concerning the change of the surnames and
+given-names, the following is ordered:
+
+
+                                 Art. 1
+
+1. Jews may be given only such given-names as are cited in the
+directives issued by the Ministry of Interior concerning the
+utilization of given-names.
+
+2. Para. (1) is not applicable to Jews who are foreign citizens.
+
+
+                                 Art. 2
+
+1. In so far as the Jews are still using some other given-names
+different from those which are at their disposal according to Art.
+1,--they are obliged to assume by the 1st January 1939, a second,
+additional given-name as follows; for males, the given-name Israel and
+for females the given-name Sara.
+
+2. The person having to assume an additional forename according to para
+(1) is obliged to give a written notification in this matter to the
+registration office at which his birth, and marriage are registered.
+The same notification is to be given to the proper police-official
+in the registerer’s place of residence or customary habitat. The
+notifications are to be reported within a month from the date requiring
+him to assume an additional given-name.
+
+3. In so far as the birth or marriage of the person who must register
+has been verified by a German diplomatic representative of a Consul, or
+has been verified in a German protectorate,--the notification, which
+must be made, is to be forwarded to the Register-Office I, Berlin. If
+the place of residence or customary habitat of the person registering
+is abroad, the notification in question, mentioned in Para (2),
+sentence (1) is to be forwarded to the competent German Consul instead
+of to the competent police-official.
+
+4. For people who are unable, or are partially unable to conduct
+their own affairs, the obligation to register rests upon the legal
+representative.
+
+
+                                 Art. 3
+
+As far as is customary in juridical and business procedure to indicate
+the given-names, the Jews are obliged always to indicate at least
+one of their given-names. In so far as they are required to assume
+an additional given-name as mentioned in Art. 2,--this additional
+given-name is to be indicated also. The present directives regarding
+the management of a business are not hereby altered.
+
+
+                                 Art. 4
+
+1. Whoever deliberately disobeys the directives of Art. 3 is to be
+punished by imprisonment of up to six months. Cases of negligent
+disobedience will be punished by imprisonment of no more than one month.
+
+2. Whoever deliberately or carelessly neglects to give the proper
+notification according to Art. 2 is to be fined or punished by
+imprisonment of no more than one month.
+
+Berlin, 17th, August 1938.
+
+                                        Reichs Minister of the Interior:
+                                           Representative, Dr. Stuckart.
+
+                                             Reichs Minister of Justice:
+                                                           Dr. Guertner.
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1676-PS
+
+  Voelkischer Beobachter
+  Southern Germany Edition
+  28/29 May 1944
+
+                     A Word on the enemy air-terror
+                     by Reichsminister Dr. Goebbels
+
+Nowadays, it is no longer disputed by anyone that the enemy air-terror
+pursues almost exclusively the aim of breaking the morale of the German
+civil population. The enemy wages war against the defenseless, against
+women and children in particular, in order to compel the men of our
+country to yield. This intention of his is proved on one hand by the
+facts themselves and on the other hand by the abundance of existing
+statements by enemy publicists. As far as the facts are concerned one
+needs only to visit one of the often bombed towns in the Reich or in
+the occupied territory in order to determine without doubt by one’s own
+examination that our war potential is damaged by perhaps at the most
+only 1% by enemy air-terror and the remaining 99% plainly falls upon
+the civil sector.
+
+A short time ago, the leading representatives of the French, and
+Belgian Episcopate, who certainly cannot be suspected of acting
+according to German orders, objected with flaming protest directed
+to the international public against the enemy’s barbarous methods of
+aerial warfare, which kills old people, women and children, as well as
+destroys churches, venerable cultural monuments and thickly settled
+civilian residential sections, without any military objectives being
+apparent. To this we need to add nothing more.
+
+Our enemies do not try to conceal their intentions in this matter. One
+does not need to look far in British and American press in order to
+find substantial proof of this. “Lay the great cities in ruins and you
+will crush the will to fight”. Thus wrote the English air expert T. M.
+Epaight in his book “Air power and the cities” in 1930. Nothing in this
+tendency of the British aerial warfare has changed since then. “It is
+not possible to draw a boundary-line between the civil population and
+the combatants”. With this cowardly excuse the “Daily Mail” attempts to
+justify publicly this rough and low method of the enemy aerial warfare.
+Much more explicit becomes influential British naval officer who states
+in the English military publication “The Army Quarterly”: “Does the
+concept of non-combatants exist at all? A small child is neither in
+peace nor in war a useful member of the national community. No one has
+in reality the right to demand inviolability for himself even if he
+can attempt to do so in the name of humanity. Germany must become more
+desolate than the Sahara Desert”.
+
+The well known London’s newspaper “News Chronicle” is not missing in
+this choir of hatred. It adds “We favor that every living being in
+Germany be wiped out. Man, woman, child, bird and insect. We would not
+let even a blade of grass grow”. This causes the respected British
+author H. G. Wells to name the following demand: “Treat the German
+people like a troublesome native tribe”. The American publicists are
+no less robust. One of their leading spokesmen Raymond Clapper writes
+with evident pleasure: “Terror and brutality are the best sides of
+aerial warfare!” One might object, perhaps, that not all influential
+Americans and Englishmen think this way. Wrong! Even the Anglican High
+Church declares in its official organ “Church of England” on the 28
+of May 1943: “It is a perverse view of Christianity to suppose that
+civilians must not be killed”. Even the Archbishop of York, Dr. Cysill
+Barbett, blesses the barbaric methods of the Anglo-American aerial
+terrorism in his pastoral letter of June 1943 with the words: “It is
+only a small evil to bomb German civilians.”
+
+We had so far desisted from making known to the German people the
+meanest of the statements from which we have only presented a small
+selection and which all together represent a simple demand for the
+murder of women and children, because we were afraid that in view of
+this cynicism it would take measures of self-defense and revenge itself
+with the same measures upon the enemy pilots who bail out of shot down
+enemy planes. In the meantime, however, circumstances have arisen which
+prevent us from continuing to maintain this reserve in the future.
+
+The Anglo-American terror flyers in the last few weeks, besides
+indiscriminately bombarding the residential quarters of our cities have
+taken to attacking the German civilian population openly, directly
+and without even any superficial respect, for the international rules
+of warfare, by strafing them and slaughtering them in cold blood. No
+more excuses can be brought toward in this matter because the enemy
+planes sweep low over villages, fields and highways, and direct their
+machine-guns upon harmless groups of people who are minding their own
+business. This has nothing more to do with war. This is naked murder.
+There is no rule of international law which the enemy can call on in
+this matter. The Anglo-American pilots place themselves through such
+a criminal mode of warfare, outside the pale of every internationally
+recognized rule of warfare. On last Sunday, for example, to take only
+one of a thousand examples, in the rural countries of Saxony, groups of
+playing children were attacked by strafing, and suffered considerable
+casualties.
+
+No one will be astonished by the fact that the population concerned
+which, as is known in the whole world, can understand any soldierly
+type of warfare has been seized with a terrible rage on account of
+these cynical crimes. It is only possible with the aid of arms to
+secure the lives of enemy pilots who were shot down during such
+attacks, for they would otherwise be killed by the sorely tired
+population. Who is right here? The murderers who after their cowardly
+misdeeds await a humane treatment on the part of their victims, or the
+victims who wish to defend themselves according to the principle: “An
+eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth”? This question is not hard to
+answer. In any case it would be demanding too much of us if it were
+asked of us that we use German Soldiers for the defense of murderers of
+children against the parents who seized with blind rage, having just
+lost their most valuable treasure through the brutal cynicism of the
+enemy, take measures of self-defense. If the English and Americans as
+they themselves say, regard and treat us as troublesome native tribes,
+then it is our business whether we stand for it. The German people is
+known in the whole world for the fact that it gives to war what war
+demands from it. But too much is too much and here the boundaries of
+what can be borne have been far overstepped.
+
+It seems to us--hardly possible and tolerable to use German police
+and soldiers against the German people when it treats murderers of
+children as they deserve. Even the arbitrary methods of warfare of the
+Anglo-Americans must end somewhere. The pilots cannot say that they as
+soldiers acted upon orders. It is not provided in any military law that
+a soldier in the case of a despicable crime is exempt from punishment
+because he passes the responsibility to his superior, especially if the
+orders of the latter are in evident contradiction to all human morality
+and every international usage of warfare. Our century has obliterated
+to a great extent the boundaries between warfare and crime on the part
+of the enemy. It would be demanding too much of us to expect that we
+should silently accommodate ourselves as victims to this unlimited
+barbarity.
+
+We reach these conclusions in a completely objective manner. In these
+questions our people think much more radically than its government.
+It has always been our wish that the war should be conducted in a
+chivalrous manner. The enemy, apparently, does not want this. The whole
+world is a witness for that. If this revolting condition continues, it
+will also be witness for the fact that we can find ways and means to
+defend ourselves against these criminals. We owe this to our people
+which decently and bravely defend its life and therefore has in no way
+deserved to be declared fair game for the enemy killers.
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1678-PS
+
+     DOCUMENTS OF GERMAN POLITICS, VOLUME 5, PAGES 372, 373 and 376
+
+Statement of accounts of the Reich Organization Leader of the NSDAP,
+Dr. Ley, at the 5th yearly session of the German Labor Front in
+Nurnberg, on 11 September 1937.
+
+In speaking of “Soldiers of Labor” I have to demand that such soldiers
+of labor exist in reality. I have to demand that everybody march at
+the same cadence and in the same spirit. The factory-community is
+only then complete when every manager takes his place as an ordinary
+work-crew member among his crew. We shall not rest or relax before this
+is accomplished. Otherwise everything would be reduced to beautiful
+phrases resulting only in beer sessions and distribution of cigarettes.
+No, same cadence and stride, same pack and same marching, then no
+outward distinction between the entrepreneur and the worker shall exist
+anymore, and sometimes a worker might even look better from a racial
+point of view than the entrepreneur. And if the latter was adequately
+polished and drilled, he will lose his feeling of superiority and
+“curse” exactly like the others. That is necessary, and with this I
+come to another point.
+
+My collaborators and myself found no rest. We too wanted to to have
+laws and legal foundations, I was constantly pursued with that request.
+I asked the Fuehrer myself: “My Fuehrer, can’t we too get a law?”
+
+The Fuehrer refused. That’s why I say: He was of greatest help to us.
+Had the Fuehrer given in at the time, we would be in bad shape now. The
+Fuehrer said: “I think it’s wrong. For once I want you to make a law
+through habit in Germany. For once I want to try if it isn’t possible
+in Germany to set up an authority without having to issue laws and
+decrees on the part of the State. It must be possible to create a great
+institution and establishment, based only on a law through habit and it
+must be possible to make this law through habit of a much greater force
+than any other law and justice.”
+
+Once I said to the Fuehrer: “My Fuehrer, actually I am standing with
+one foot in jail, for today I am still the trustee of the comrades
+“Leipart” and “Imbusch”, and should they some day ask me to return
+their money, then it will be found that I have spent it, either by
+building things, or otherwise. But they shall never again find their
+property in the condition in which they handed it over to me. Therefore
+I would have to be convicted.”
+
+The Fuehrer laughed then and remarked that apparently I felt extremely
+well in this condition.
+
+It was very difficult for us all. Today we laugh about it. * * *
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+We have only 70,000,000 altogether. Therefore we must use everybody. We
+have work for at least 300,000,000 and that figure is increasing from
+year to year. We must have new space. We want to repeat that again and
+again. We have told the world often enough. We are a people without
+space and we shall never forget that factor in all our social measures.
+
+We need space, and we must never give this up in all our measures. We
+must never lose sight of that. That’s why we need a healthy people and
+healthy men.
+
+We succeeded--and this is about the most important accomplishment for
+the German Labor Front--in eliminating the association-character of
+the trade unions and the employer-associations, and for it we have
+substituted the conception “Soldier of Labor” [Soldat der Arbeit].
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1680-PS
+
+         10 Years Security Police and SD--Die Deutsche Polizei,
+
+                            1 February 1943.
+
+When the Fuehrer assumed the direction of the fate of the German Reich
+and people on 30 January 1933, he found in the domain of the police,
+as in all other fields, a situation which bore all the signs of the
+irresponsible incapability of the Weimar system. The concept of a
+police force, together with the Marxist-Liberal tendency and their
+characteristic practices were the main reasons for the insufficiently
+organized and therefore in many respects helpless condition of the
+police.
+
+This was particularly obvious in that part of the police system to
+which was assigned the task of the safekeeping of the community against
+inner-political dangers from the beginning of all historical state
+activity. The activities to which we are accustomed today under the
+concept of “Security Police” was, under the “Weimar Interim State” in
+its political police field, exclusively directed towards a prevention
+of the unavoidable collapse of its system, especially against the
+National Socialist movement, with the use of more or less brutal means
+of power of the state, and was decisively handicapped in the domain
+of criminal police by the organizational splintering as well as the
+liberalistic sympathy towards crimes and criminals which existed at
+that time.
+
+The task of the New National Socialist Security Police, which became
+apparent with the assumption of power in 1933, had to include as a
+nucleus the creation of an organism with the view towards the vital
+necessities of the people and without consideration of the individual
+interest the safeguarding of the communities against all disturbances
+and destructions. The prerequisite for its organization was the strict
+coordination of the political and criminal police, which were split
+through the federal state regulations and which alone could provide
+the necessary striking power for the struggle against the enemies
+of the nation and in the service of the commands of the leadership.
+The foundation for this achievement of restoration were the National
+Socialist views of the world, the occupation of important positions by
+proved national socialistic fighters and the inner core of a large part
+of the police officials which had remained unharmed in spite of all the
+attempts to rouse them.
+
+The fight against the political, as well as the individual criminal
+which was the responsibility of the political departments of the police
+administration and of the criminal police and which is now combined
+under the term of “Security Police” took a continuously developing form
+in the execution of its central goal, as well as in its content as in
+its organization. With the knowledge that the police in the National
+Socialistic State, of which it is a distinguished representative,
+must not only be the best friend of the people but also, and just for
+the same reason, the most pitiless adversary of all the enemies of
+the nation, the preventive fight against criminals was added to the
+activities of the security police which was previously mainly punitive
+and executive. This constitutes a decisive innovation in the general
+development of the police. The activities of the security police were
+furthermore considerably supported by the communication service, and
+partially made possible only by the development of the security service
+of the Reichsfuehrer SS, which was created upon the assumption of power
+which came into ever closer personal and organizational contact with
+the security police in the course of years.
+
+The general development of the police since 1933 was outwardly
+characterized by:
+
+  The Reichs Reconstruction Law [Reichsneuaufbaugesetz] of 1934
+    (central directive law for the federal states in individual
+    domains).
+
+  The merger of the Reichs Ministry of the Interior and the Prussian
+    Ministry of Interior of 1934.
+
+  The Fuehrer decree concerning the creation of a Chief of the German
+    Police dated 17 June 1936.
+
+  The law about finance measures in the domain of the police of 1937,
+    the German Police official law of 1937.
+
+Within the general development of the police since 1933, the following
+regulations were of decisive importance for the security police and SD:
+
+Decree of the Reichsfuehrer SS and the Chief of the German Police
+in the Reichs Ministry of the Interior of 26 June 1936 (Transfer of
+Direction of the Security Police, newly created from the political,
+secret state and criminal police to the SS Gruppenfuehrer HEYDRICH
+as chief of the Security Police.) Decree of the Reich and Prussian
+Ministers of the Interior concerning appointment of inspectors of the
+Security Police, dated 20 Sept 1936.
+
+Decree of the Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police of 27
+Sept 1939, concerning the merger of the central bureaus of the security
+police and the SD along with the
+
+Decree of execution of the chief of the Security Police and the SD of
+the same date concerning the creation of a Central Bureau of Reich
+Security [RSHA].
+
+The organizational development of the three branches, Secret State
+Police [Gestapo], Criminal Police, and Security Service [SD] of the
+Reichsfuehrer SS, which are now merged under the leadership of the
+Chief of the Security Police and SD took place in its details, as
+follows:
+
+
+1. _The Secret State Police_ [_GESTAPO_]
+
+The first step towards the creation of a Secret State Police
+replacing the Political Police Forces of the various federal states
+was undertaken in Prussia by the law concerning the establishment
+of a Secret State Police, dated 26 April 1933. The same day a
+circular decree was issued by the Prussian Ministers of the Interior
+regulating the tasks and responsibilities of the Secret State Police
+and establishing a State Police Bureau in each government district of
+Prussia as a subordinate to the Secret State Police Bureau. The creator
+and Chief of the Secret State Police in Prussia was Prime Minister
+Hermann GOERING. The State Police Bureaus were separated from their
+organizational connection with the District Government or the police
+administrations of the State and appointed as independent authorities
+of the Secret State Police, in the spring of 1934 by a circular decree
+of the Prime Minister and the Chief of the Secret State Police.
+
+Parallel to that development in Prussia, the Reichsfuehrer SS Heinrich
+HIMMLER created in Bavaria, the Bavarian Political Police, and also
+suggested and directed in the other federal states outside of Prussia
+the establishment of Political Police. The unification of the Political
+Police, of all the federal states, took place in the spring of 1934
+when Hermann GOERING appointed Reichsfuehrer SS Heinrich HIMMLER, who
+had meanwhile been nominated as Commander of the Political Police
+Forces of all the federal states possible. The Prussian law about the
+Secret State Police, dated 10 Feb 1936, then summed up the developments
+hitherto and determined the position and responsibilities of the Secret
+State Police in the executive regulations issued the same day.
+
+A new decisive chapter of the development began with the appointment
+of the Reichsfuehrer SS as Chief of the German Police by means of the
+Decree of the Fuehrer mentioned above dated 17 June 1936, and the
+nomination which followed of SS Gruppenfuehrer Maj Gen HEYDRICH, who up
+to then, had been Chief of the Secret State Police Bureau and Chief of
+the Central Security Bureau of the SS, as Chief of the Security Police
+(Secret State Police and Criminal Police). The term “Secret State
+Police” was decreed by the Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German
+Police on 28 August 1936 in the process of establishing uniformity
+for all the political police forces of the federal states and their
+organization adapted to the one existing in Prussia by the creation
+of State Police Bureaus. The Chiefs of the State Police Bureaus
+assumed the functions of the political executive with the current
+“Oberpraesident” (later on also with the Reich Governor), that is the
+president of the Government, according to the decree of the Reich and
+Prussian Ministers of the Interior, dated 20 Sept 1936.
+
+On the basis of these forms of organization and with the help of the
+powers bound up with them, the fight against the open and hidden
+political enemies of the National Socialist peoples State was taken up
+by the Secret State Police after the assumption of power and is still
+being tried on today. Its activity is not only limited to solving
+political crimes already committed or to seizing their perpetrators,
+but they are equally interested in the prevention of these crimes,
+thus eliminating these dangers for the community at their very start.
+Constant investigation and observation of the enemies of the State and
+quick action in the case of recognition or after commitment of the act,
+thus go hand in hand. The Secret State Police by carrying out these
+tasks, contributed decisively to the fact that the National Socialist
+construction work could be executed in the past ten years without any
+serious attempts of interference by the political enemies of the nation.
+
+
+2. _The Criminal Police_
+
+The subordination of the Criminal Police of the Reich under the
+Chief of the Security Police, as decreed on 26 June 1936 became the
+fundamental basis for the uniform development throughout all Germany of
+the Criminal Police, which had been organized differently in all the
+federal states up to this time, namely for the establishment of the
+Reich Criminal Police in its present form of organization. The circular
+decree of 20 Sept 1936 stated the first fundamental regulations for
+the reorganization of the Criminal Police of the State, separating
+the Prussian State Criminal Police Bureau, in locality as well as
+function, from the Police Presidency in Berlin and charging it with the
+professional direction of the Criminal Police of all the German federal
+states, State as well as communal. The Reich Central Bureau for the
+struggle against the international and professional criminals as well
+as against habitual instinctive criminals, which was attached to the
+State Criminal Police Bureau, was particularly characterized in the
+course of this process by its close relationship to the practices of
+the Criminal Police.
+
+The whole territory of the Reich was simultaneously divided into
+Criminal Police Bureaus on the basis of criminal geographical
+delineation of spheres of competence in place of the State Criminal
+[Police] offices. The new spheres occasionally combined several
+criminal police offices. Insofar as Criminal Police District Offices
+are not affiliated to State Police Administrative Offices, local duties
+falling within criminal police jurisdiction are to be taken care of by
+the crime sections of these State Police Administrative Officers.
+
+In the course of further organizational development, the title of
+Reichskriminalpolizeiamt [Reich Criminal Police Bureau] was conferred
+on the Prussian State Criminal Police Bureau through a decree of 16
+July 1937. This bureau was directly subordinated to the Chief of
+Security Police.
+
+This newly created organizational system rendered possible the
+successful activity of the German Criminal Police, which also became
+increasingly more perfect in technical fields. From then on Criminal
+Police did not limit itself to repressive activity, but paid much
+attention to preventive combatting of crime on the basis of national
+protective ideology. The correctness of planning and development
+is demonstrated most clearly in the decline of criminality in the
+subsequent period.
+
+
+3. _The Security Service of the Reichsfuehrer SS (SD)_
+
+Recognizing that accurate knowledge of the enemy, of his methods and
+aims, is one of the most important bases of any successful struggle
+the Reichsfuehrer SS created an intelligence service organization as
+early as 1932 under the then SS-Standartenfuehrer (Colonel) Reinhard
+HEYDRICH. From the beginning members of the SS were the full-time
+agents of the SD, which had emerged from the SS.
+
+After the seizure of power the leaders of the National-Socialist
+movement felt the necessity for current objective information about
+newsworthy events. This caused the NSDAP to issue an ordinance on 9
+June 1934 which merged all information facilities then existing within
+the Party organization with the SD, and declared the latter to be sole
+Party information service. The original task of intelligence coverage
+of the enemy was thereby expanded to general intelligence activity.
+
+In the course of the development as a whole, an increasingly closer
+cooperation of the SD with the offices of the Security Police resulted
+as a matter of course. The successful combatting of all activity
+hostile to the state by the Security Police can be traced back to
+a considerable extent to the intelligence groundwork of the SD. In
+addition the field of activity of the SD was progressively expanded,
+because top Reich authorities delegated to the SD in a series of
+agreements the task of informing these authorities about the effects of
+official measures upon popular morale. These agreements also regulated
+the details of cooperation between these top Reich authorities and the
+SD. Today the exploration of the situation in all fields of life from
+the information point of view is incumbent upon the Security Service
+(SD) of the Reichsfuehrer SS, with special consideration of the morale
+factors and repercussions among the population. The results of its
+variegated and responsible activity transmit an objective, always
+up-to-date picture of the situation to the leading authorities of Party
+and State. In addition they form valuable hints for current planning of
+the competent authorities.
+
+The organizational structure within which the SD became active
+during the first years of its existence and was headed by the Chief
+of the Main Security Bureau of the SS, to whom in turn the regional
+subdivisions were subordinate. The elimination of SD-Oberabschnitte in
+September 1939 resulted in direct functional connection between the
+SD-Abschnitte, as the regional subdivisions were now termed, and the
+Main Security Bureau as central authority. The current close personal
+and organizational connection between the SD and the Security Police
+resulted from the Decree of the Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of German
+Police, dated 27 September 1939. This Decree amalgamated the central
+authorities of the security police and of the SD, and vested it in the
+newly-created Chief of Security Police and SD, and above him in the
+Reich Main Security Bureau. Since that time the SD-(Leit)-Abschnitte
+and their subordinate offices have been under the jurisdiction of the
+Reich Main Security Bureau.
+
+The above description of the history of the Secret State Police
+[Gestapo], of the Criminal Police and of the Security Service [SD] of
+the Reichsfuehrer SS only recounts the external stages of development.
+It can express only incompletely the great degree of personal
+initiative and unlimited National-Socialist prowess in work and
+organization which was brought to bear by the authoritative leadership
+personalities in building up the undertaking. However, the result
+of this concentrated effort is such that in these decisive times an
+apparatus was created on an entirely new basis which was from the
+beginning a necessary and effective instrument in the hands of the
+nation’s leadership and proved that it is capable of protecting the
+national community against protracted interference with communal life.
+It is obvious that these entire tasks could be handled only by men who
+are deeply rooted in National Socialist ideology, and who are ready to
+devote not only their total working capacity, but also their life, to
+the comprehensive realization of the National Socialist idea in the
+course of the fulfilment of their duties which is frequently dangerous.
+Because of this, and according to the wish of the Reichsfuehrer SS
+and of their late Chief, General Heydrich, it is the duty of the
+Security Police and of the SD not only to form a perfectly working
+administrative machinery, but in addition it is their duty to form
+a battle community sworn to a common ideology and brotherhood. The
+currents of strength generated by this battle community in fulfilling
+its difficult task of continuous combatting of everything inimical to
+the nation, a task which has to be accomplished in inglorious silence,
+shape the National Socialist idea ideologically. These currents of
+strength also shape the basic law of the SS, from the members of
+which Security Police and SD are recruited in increasing measure.
+Tangibly they shape the continuous work in thoroughly training the
+individual. Ideological schooling, comradeship, professional education
+and physical fitness are inculcated without cease; they take up a
+prominent position side by side with the professional daily routine
+proper, especially in the schools of the Security Service and the SD
+established for these purposes.
+
+Trained in such a manner, Security Police and SD could do justice even
+to the great additional requirements, which the four year battle for
+the living rights of the German people brought in its train. In all
+battle areas, and in all occupied territories, the men of the Security
+Police and of the SD stand side by side with the Armed Forces. In a
+struggle full of sacrifice they devote all their strength to keep the
+rear of the front free, and to help make secure German reconstruction
+in occupied territory. In the offices of the home front, on the other
+hand, the men employed make certain that the fight for life of the
+German people is not impaired by criminal elements. Through increased
+effort they equalize the additional tasks and the additional work,
+which are necessitated by the war as such and especially by the reduced
+number of personnel due to drafting of men for front-line duty. All
+faithful to the words of the Reichsfuehrer SS, to do more than their
+duty in time of war.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+
+                                        PARTIAL COPY OF DOCUMENT 1689-PS
+
+                       CZECHOSLOVAKIA FIGHTS BACK
+       A Document of the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs
+                              Published by
+                   American Council on Public Affairs
+                        Washington, D. C., 1943
+                       [Pages 110, 111, and 114]
+
+On December 2, 1942, a special order issued by the “Protectorate”
+Ministry of Agriculture excluded the Jews not only from buying
+unrationed foods, but even from receiving them as a gift from any
+private citizen. The same order has left it to the discretion of the
+Ministry of Agriculture to exclude Jews entirely or partially from
+obtaining rationed food, thus exposing the remnants of the Jewish
+community to death by starvation.
+
+One hour on five days a week has been allowed for shopping, this hour
+being fixed at a time when after, first the Germans and then the
+Czechs, have done their buying, the small stocks are mostly exhausted.
+
+After the occupation of Poland, Hitler designated Lublin and its
+immediate district as a reservation in which all Jews from the occupied
+countries were to be concentrated. Some 2,000 Jews of Moravska Ostrava
+were the first to be sent there. A year later, at the end of October
+1941, 48,000 Czech Jews were already picked out for deportation. Men
+between the ages of sixteen to fifty were sent to labor camps, while
+their womenfolk and children were taken to special settlements in
+Eastern Poland.
+
+At the end of June, 1942, deportation to Poland began on a large scale.
+The Gestapo was instructed to prepare by every Monday and Thursday
+contingents of a thousand Jews each. Those to leave were given a day
+or two’s notice. The Nazi records of the Jewish registration were out
+of date and it often happened that the call-up cards were addressed to
+persons who had died years ago, had left the country or had already
+been deported. In such cases the daily quota of a thousand was made up
+by people simply picked up from the streets or dragged from their beds
+at night-time. The Gestapo took a delight in so selecting the deportees
+that families were split, wives separated from their husbands, and
+even small children from their mothers. Those left at home were never
+allowed to bid farewell to their relatives or friends. But sometimes,
+on early summer mornings, their Czech friends could watch those gloomy
+processions of the outlawed marching to the railway station and passing
+for the last time through the streets of Prague.
+
+At the end of 1942, no Jewish life in Bohemia and Moravia was left. Out
+of the 90,000 Czech Jews more than 72,000 have been deported.
+
+Although the deportations went on, leaving at the end of August, 1942,
+only some 20,000 Jews in Slovakia, most of them in ghettos the Nazis
+were still not satisfied. At the end of November, 1942, a special
+committee was set up to consider the final expulsion of the remainder
+of the Jews. By then, out of the 95,000 Jews, 76,000 had already been
+deported.
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1696-PS
+
+  THE REICHSMINISTER OF THE INTERIOR
+  IV g 4178 /39-5100
+
+                         Berlin, NW 40, Koenigsplatz 6, 16 November 1939
+                                                              Telephone:
+                                       Dept. Z, I, II, V, VIII, 11 00 27
+                                                         Dept II, IV, VI
+                                         (Unter den Linden 72); 12 00 34
+                                      Tel. Address: Reichsinnenminister.
+
+  To the Head of the Hospital (for Mental cases)
+  Kaufbeuren
+    or his Deputy in Kaufbeuren.
+
+With regard to the necessity for a systematized economic plan for
+Hospitals and Nursing Institutions, I request you to fill up the
+attached Registration Forms immediately, in accordance with the
+attached instructional leaflet, and to return them to me. If you
+yourself are not a doctor the Registration Forms for the individual
+patients are to be filled in by the superintending doctor. The filling
+up of the questionnaires is, if possible, to be _done on a typewriter_.
+In the column “Diagnosis” I request a statement as exact as possible,
+also a short description of the condition if feasible.
+
+In order to expedite the work, the registration forms for the
+individual patients can be despatched here in several parts. The last
+consignment must, however, in any case have arrived at this Ministry
+_at the latest_ on 1 January 1940. I reserve for myself the right,
+should occasion arise, to institute further official enquiries on the
+spot through my representative.
+
+                                                    p.p. (Sd.) DR. CONTI
+
+  Certified.
+          (Sd.) Illegible
+          Administrative Secretary.
+
+       #       #       #       #       #
+
+_Registration Form 1_
+
+                                                    _To be typewritten._
+
+  Current No. __________
+      Name of the institution: _______________________________________
+      at: ____________________________________________________________
+  Surname and Christian name of the patient: _______  at birth _______
+  Date of birth: _____   Place: ________   District: _________________
+  Last place of residence: ____________   District: __________________
+  Unmarried, married, widow,
+    widower, divorced: ________  Religion ________  Race[1] __________
+  Previous profession: ________ Nationality: __________   Army Service
+                                                         when? 1914-18
+                                                        or from 1.9.39
+                                                        ______________
+  War injury (even if no connection with
+    mental disorder) Yes/No __________________________________________
+  How does war injury show itself and in what
+    does it consist? _________________________________________________
+  Address of next of kin: ____________________________________________
+  Regular visit and by whom (Address): _______________________________
+  Guardian or nurse (Name, address): _________________________________
+  Responsible for payment: ___________________________________________
+  Since when in that Institution: ____________________________________
+  Whence and when handed over: ___________  Since when ill: __________
+  If has been in other Institutions, where and how long: _____________
+  Twin  yes ___  Blood relations of unsound mind: ____________________
+         no
+  Diagnosis: _________________________________________________________
+  Clinical description (Previous history, course, condition; in any case
+    ample data regarding mental condition): ____________________________
+  Very restless? yes ________  Bedridden?  yes _______________________
+                  no                        no
+  Incurable bodily illness: yes    (which) ___________________________
+                             no
+      Schizophrenia: Fresh attack _______ Final Condition ____________
+                                          good recovery
+      Mental debility: weak _________ Imbecile ________ Idiot ________
+      Epilepsy: psychological alteration ___________ Average frequency
+                                                of the attacks _______
+  Therapeutics (Insulin, Cardiazol, Malaria, Permanent result: yes ___
+                Salvarsan etc. When?) _________________        no ____
+  Admitted by reason of para. 51, para. 42b StrGB etc ________________
+                                              through ________________
+  Crime: ___________________ Former punishable offences: _____________
+  Manner of employment (detailed description of work): _______________
+  Permanent }                                       Yes ______________
+            } Employment, independent worker
+  Temporary }                                        No ______________
+
+  Value of work (if possible compared with average performance of healthy
+    person) __________________________________________________________
+    This space to be left blank.
+                                _________________ Place, Date ________
+                            __________________________________________
+                            Signature of the head doctor or his
+                            representative (doctors who are not
+                            psychiatrists and neurologists please state
+                            same.)
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[1] German or of similar blood (of German blood), Jew, Jewish mixed
+breed Grades I or II, Negro (mixed breed).
+
+       #       #       #       #       #
+
+       PUBLIC UTILITY
+  AMBULANCE TRANSPORTATION G.m.b.H.
+  Dept. II/d, H/K
+
+                                           Berlin, W. 9. 12th. May, 1941
+
+  To the Director of the Hospital of the District association of
+    Swabia,
+    Kaufbeuren/Bavaria.
+
+                                                      Potsdamer Platz 1.
+
+  Dear Director,
+
+By order of the Reich Defence Commissioner I must remove mental
+cases from your institution and from the Branch at Irrsee to another
+institution. A total of 140 persons are to be transported, 70 on 4th
+June and 70 on 5th June. I forward you herewith Transport Lists Nos.
+8, 9, 10 and 11 in triplicate. The additional names on the lists are
+intended for possible deficits (discharged meanwhile, died, etc.).
+
+The marking of the patients is most suitably done by means of a strip
+of adhesive tape, on which the name is written in ink-pencil, to be
+pasted between the shoulder blades. At the same time the name is to be
+put on an article of clothing.
+
+The hospital reports and personal histories are to be prepared for the
+transportation and to be handed to our Director of Transport, Herr
+Kuepper, in the same way the personal possessions of the patients, as
+well as money and articles of value.
+
+I enclose property information cards and information cards as to the
+defrayer of the expenses, which, accurately filled out, must be handed
+in at the time of transportation. Money and articles of value, besides
+being noted on the property information cards, must also be noted on
+separate special lists (in duplicate). Transportation takes place:
+
+On 4th June, 8.46 a.m. from Kaufbeuren--70 patients.
+
+On 5th June, 8.46 a.m. from Kaufbeuren--70 patients.
+
+Our director of transport, Herr Kuepper, will visit you the previous
+day, in order to discuss further details with you.
+
+I further request you to provide the patients with food (2-3 slices of
+bread and butter each and some cans of coffee).
+
+[Pencil note illegible]
+
+                                                            Heil Hitler!
+                                                   [signature illegible]
+                        Public Utility Ambulance Transportation G.m.b.H.
+
+       #       #       #       #       #
+
+           PROVINCIAL ASSOCIATION FOR SOCIAL WELFARE SWABIA.
+
+           Address: Augsburg 1, P.O. Box Regierungspraesident
+
+                                                            Tel No. 5842
+                                       Cashier’s Office: Principal Govt.
+                                              Cashier’s Office Augsburg.
+                                              Post Office check account:
+                                                         Munich No. 1624
+                                                             Enclosures:
+
+  Director: Dr. Faltlhauser, of the Hospital, Kaufbeuren.
+
+  Your reference: 2080. Your letter of 13.11.40. Our ref: (to be
+    given always) II-B-7-2.
+
+                                                      Augsburg, 6.5.1941
+
+  Concerning the transfer of patients.
+
+I have the honour to inform you that the female patients transferred
+from your institution on 8.11.1940 to the institutions in Grafeneck,
+Bernburg, Sonnenstein and Harthein all died in November of last year.
+
+                                                   [signature illegible]
+
+       #       #       #       #       #
+
+                                  Copy
+
+  No. 5255 c 39
+  Ministry of State of the Interior.
+  Oberregierungsrat Gaum.
+
+                                              Munich, 24th November 1942
+                                        To the Director of the Hospital,
+                                                Kaufbeuren, Obermed. Rat
+                                                        Dr. Faltlhauser.
+
+  To Head Physician Dr. W. Leinisch
+    Guenzburg.
+
+  Re letter of 13.11.1942.
+
+  Dear Doctor,
+
+In your letter of 13.11.1942 you requested me to send suitable
+epileptics for the carrying out of your research work. I had an
+opportunity of discussing this with the Obermedizinalraeten Dr.
+Faltlhauser and Dr. Pfannmueller. Both will willingly deliver you
+suitable patients. For various reasons patients from the Institution
+at Kaufbeuren are primarily to be chosen. If this institution has
+no suitable material, I agree to the transfer of patients from
+Eglfing-Haar to Guenzburg for your research work. I request you to get
+into touch with Dr. Faltlhauser.
+
+                                                            Heil Hitler!
+                                                         (Sd.)     GAUM.
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1701-PS
+
+Copies distributed to Gauleiter Dr. Wilhelm von Allwoerden [?]
+
+                                                                 11 Aug.
+                                                                       H
+                                                   Berlin, 9 August 1943
+
+  The Reich Minister of the Interior
+  Pol. SV A I No 844/43
+  To the Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellory _in Berlin
+    W8_
+  For the information of the other Reich ministers.
+  _Subj_: Law on the treatment of enemies of the society.
+    In addition to my letter of 19 March 1942--
+  _Enclosures_: 55. --
+
+After the draft of the law on the treatment of enemies of the society
+has been completely rewritten, I am sending the enclosed new draft
+with the consent of the Reich Minister of Justice, Dr. Thierack and ask
+that the law be approved in a circulatory manner. The necessary number
+of prints is attached.
+
+The Chief Plenipotentiary for the Reich Administration has again
+agreed on the importance of the law in war, considering the existing
+directions for curbing the making of laws and the administrative
+activity. Furthermore I refer to my letter of 19 March 1942 and to the
+reasons attached to the draft.
+
+                                                               /s/ Frick
+
+       #       #       #       #       #
+
+The Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories
+
+                                                Berlin W 35, 22 Dec 1943
+
+                              Tele--letter
+
+To the Reich Minister of the Interior for the information of the
+Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellory and the other Reich
+Ministers.
+
+  _Subject_: Law on the Treatment of Enemies of Society.
+               To Pol. SVA 1 No. 844/43 of 9 August 1943
+
+I have basic objections against the draft of the law. In Par 2, Dir. 4,
+I assume that the police will inform the penal prosecuting authority
+also of such cases in which it does not consider--for legal or actual
+reasons--that a punishable act has been committed or can be proved,
+especially if it wants to connect the behavior of the culprit with
+consequences adverse to him. The penal prosecuting authority should
+be able to determine also in dubious cases whether the possibility of
+penal prosecution exists. I therefore suggest to formulate Par. 2, Dir.
+4, of the law draft about as follows:
+
+“If there is suspicion of a punishable act by enemies of society, the
+police will inform the penal prosecuting authorities about it.”
+
+Because, in the framework of the draft, the basic regulation of the
+connections between penal justice and police has become mandatory,
+an exact definition of the respective competence seems necessary to
+me. In the expected executory decree it should hence be made clear,
+as it was already provided in the draft of the executory decree (Par.
+4) for the first draft of the law, that police actions because of the
+same matter are not admissible anymore if a court has freed (a party)
+because of proven innocence or lack of proofs, except for custody
+measures in case of freeing for lack of proofs. Furthermore, it should
+be determined that the police can not take other than custody measures
+after the penal term of a person judged by a court because of the same
+facts. Further, I think it necessary to have a fundamental clearing
+of the question whether, and if so--to what degree police measures
+are admissible after refusal of a decree of custody or other judicial
+directions, regardless of the reason for refusal.
+
+Finally, I mention for consideration if the words “the regime of the
+time of the system” in Dir. 3 of the official document, taken from
+the newspaper language, could not be replaced to advantage by another
+expression.
+
+I especially direct your attention to the printing mistake in the
+last but two dir. of the reason, in which in the third line it should
+probably read “protective surveillance” instead of “protective custody”.
+
+                                                               Rosenberg
+                                                               attested:
+                                                    chancellery employee
+
+                              Offic. Stamp
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1702-PS
+
+  Rec’d: 1025/44g
+  encl: 1 Aug. 44
+
+                                  Copy
+                                 SECRET
+
+                                                                   II 1C
+
+                           Evacuation Report
+                  of District Commissariat of Kasatin
+                           [Illegible notes]
+
+  REPORTER: District Commissar STEUDEL, Kasatin.
+  Time of report: 8 November to 28 December 1943.
+
+1. The military situation in November/December 1943.
+
+Immediately following the capture of Kiev by the Soviets on 7 November,
+the district town of Wassilkow as well as the important railroad
+center Fastow, belonging to the district of Wassilkow, fell into enemy
+hands, (8-9 November). The following day, the Soviets attempted to
+advance farther along the rail line Fastow-Kasatin. They succeeded in
+capturing with weak armored and infantry spearheads in one move, the
+stations of Kozanka, Popilnva and Browki, situated along this line, and
+to execute further sudden advances past the station of Czernorudka.
+For this reason the district of Wtscheraische had to be evacuated on
+15 November. I withdrew the Germans committed there to the district
+of Rushin situated 20 kilometers to the South. The withdrawal was
+effected according to plan and without friction, with all implements,
+after all camps had been evacuated previously; the cattle--above
+all the valuable breeds (Oxen and colt stables) led back. German
+tractors and farm machines transported away and all businesses had
+been crippled. (Fundamentally, the chief command of the 4th Armored
+Army, in whose zone these battles took place, had ordered that in the
+district West of the Dnjepr, in contrast to the ones to the East, no
+destructions of farm goods or businesses should take place).
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+_The results of the hereby described military events_ between 8
+November and 20 December were as follows:
+
+In a conference, called by me, of the authoritative leaders of all
+offices of the civilian sector on 8 November, I ordered the immediate
+start of, and discussed in detail, measures for the most far-reaching
+decentralization. At the same time, the leaders of all vital, above
+all of the economic food industry, were informed to effect, in case of
+an evacuation, the crippling of factories (by taking away important
+and hard-to-replace machine parts, belts, etc.,) and to prepare this
+already now. Up till then, however, all factories had to be kept
+running at full capacity. It should be emphasized here, praisingly,
+that all measures ordered by me in strictest accordance with the army
+economic leader [A.W.F.] of the chief command of the 4th Armored
+Army, were executed by the responsible parties and their staff in an
+exemplary manner, and with the greatest conscientiousness. Although the
+delivery of cars, for conceivable reasons, did meet with considerable
+difficulties, we succeeded, due to the splendid cooperation of the
+authoritative Reich German organizations of military and civil
+government, in transporting to the West approximately 80% of the most
+vital goods (grain, cattle, sugar, etc), or in making them available
+for the armed forces for immediate use as provisions for the fighting
+troops.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+5. In the midst of the conditions, almost restored to normal, I
+received _a call on_ _the eve of the 25th of December from the Army_
+according to which _the Soviets_ with superior forces of tanks and
+motorized troops, had exerted a strong renewed pressure on the line of
+Kotscherowo-Brusilow-Fastow and along the street Kiev-Shitomir with the
+main advance in a South West direction. Shortly afterwards, the long
+distance calls, as per attached inclosure number 2, was put through
+according to which the able-bodied male population in the ages between
+15 and 65 as well as the cattle had to be led back in the direction
+East of the line Kililowka-Berkitschew-Shitomir. The transporting of
+the able-bodied population was charged to the military authorities by
+the chief quartermaster of the army, while beginning with the morning
+of 26 December. I discussed and ordered in detail, during an immediate
+conference for the whole district the shipment of all the cattle.
+This action started successfully on that day according to plan, while
+the discussions over the seizure of the male population were not
+yet concluded in the afternoon hours of the 26th of December and no
+positive measures of any kind were taken.
+
+       #       #       #       #       #
+
+                              Enclosure II
+
+                                 SECRET
+
+  Kdt. rueckw. A. Geb. 585
+  _Abt. Qu. Nr. 452/43 geh._
+
+                                           In the field 25 December 1943
+
+To the District Commissar KASATIN
+
+1. The able-bodied male population between 15 and 65 years of age and
+the cattle are to be shipped back from the district East of the line
+Belilowka-Berditschen-Shitomir (places excluded).
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+4. Destruction of farm goods and factories in all places must not take
+place, only a crippling of factories for several weeks will be executed
+by army economic leader (A.Wi.Fue.).
+
+                                                               In charge
+                                                   [signature illegible]
+                                                             Lt. General
+
+  Distribution:
+    See original.
+
+       #       #       #       #       #
+
+                             Enclosure III
+
+                                  Copy
+
+                                 SECRET
+
+  High Command of the 4th Armored Army
+  O. Qu/Qu 2 Nr. 1662/43/ secret
+
+                                                      Army Headquarters,
+                                                        26 December 1943
+
+  Re: Evacuation measures.
+
+1. The city of Berditschew is to be evacuated of Reich Germans, German
+[Volksdeutschen] agencies of the civil government, government of
+the country, able-bodied population. The cattle is to be taken away.
+Execution of evacuation measures is charged to the civil government.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+4. No destructions are to take place as far as they are not expressly
+ordered by the armored army. All factories are to be prepared for
+crippling so that this can be accomplished in the shortest possible
+time. The electricity and water plants are to be taken over by the
+technical troops.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+6. The same measures are to be prepared for Kasatin in such a way that
+they can be started at once at the command of the armored army.
+
+                                For the High Command of the Armored Army
+                                          The Chief of the General Staff
+                                                               In charge
+                                                 Original signed MUELLER
+                                                  Colonel, General Staff
+
+  Correct:
+  [signature illegible]
+  Lt Colonel, General Staff.
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1708-PS
+
+                   National Socialistic Yearbook 1941
+                       Edited by: Dr. Robert Ley
+        Published by: Central Publishing House of the N.S.D.A.P.
+                      Franz Eher, successor Munich
+
+                        The program of the NSDAP
+
+The program is the political foundation of the NSDAP and accordingly
+the primary political law of the State. It has been made brief and
+clear intentionally.
+
+All legal precepts must be applied in the spirit of the party program.
+
+Since the taking over of control, the Fuehrer has succeeded in the
+realization of essential portions of the Party program from the
+fundamentals to the detail.
+
+The Party Program of the NSDAP was proclaimed on the 24 February 1920
+by Adolf Hitler at the first large Party gathering in Munich and
+since that day has remained unaltered. Within the national socialist
+philosophy is summarized in 25 points:
+
+1. We demand the unification of all Germans in the Greater Germany on
+the basis of the right of self-determination of peoples.
+
+2. We demand equality of rights for the German people in respect to the
+other nations; abrogation of the peace treaties of Versailles and St.
+Germain.
+
+3. We demand land and territory (colonies) for the sustenance of our
+people, and colonization for our surplus population.
+
+4. Only a member of the race can be a citizen. A member of the race can
+only be one who is of German blood, without consideration of creed.
+Consequently no Jew can be a member of the race.
+
+5. Whoever has no citizenship is to be able to live in Germany only as
+a guest, and must be under the authority of legislation for foreigners.
+
+6. The right to determine matters concerning administration and law
+belongs only to the citizen. Therefore we demand that every public
+office, of any sort whatsoever, whether in the Reich, the county or
+municipality, be filled only by citizens. We combat the corrupting
+parliamentary economy, office-holding only according to party
+inclinations without consideration of character or abilities.
+
+7. We demand that the state be charged first with providing the
+opportunity for a livelihood and way of life for the citizens. If it
+is impossible to sustain the total population of the State, then the
+members of foreign nations (non-citizens) are to be expelled from the
+Reich.
+
+8. Any further immigration of non-citizens is to be prevented. We
+demand that all non-Germans, who have immigrated to Germany since the 2
+August 1914, be forced immediately to leave the Reich.
+
+9. All citizens must have equal rights and obligations.
+
+10. The first obligation of every citizen must be to work both
+spiritually and physically. The activity of individuals is not to
+counteract the interests of the universality, but must have its result
+within the framework of the whole for the benefit of all.
+
+Consequently we demand:
+
+11. Abolition of unearned (work and labour) incomes. Breaking of
+rent-slavery.
+
+12. In consideration of the monstrous sacrifice in property and blood
+that each war demands of the people personal enrichment through a war
+must be designated as a crime against the people. Therefore we demand
+the total confiscation of all war profits.
+
+13. We demand the nationalization of all (previous) associated
+industries (trusts).
+
+14. We demand a division of profits of all heavy industries.
+
+15. We demand an expansion on a large scale of old age welfare.
+
+16. We demand the creation of a healthy middle class and its
+conservation, immediate communalization of the great warehouses and
+their being leased at low cost to small firms, the utmost consideration
+of all small firms in contracts with the State, county or municipality.
+
+17. We demand a land reform suitable to our needs, provision of a law
+for the free expropriation of land for the purposes of public utility,
+abolition of taxes on land and prevention of all speculation in land.
+
+18. We demand struggle without consideration against those whose
+activity is injurious to the general interest. Common national
+criminals, usurers, Schieber and so forth are to be punished with
+death, without consideration of confession or race.
+
+19. We demand substitution of a German common law in place of the Roman
+Law serving a materialistic world-order.
+
+20. The state is to be responsible for a fundamental reconstruction
+of our whole national education program, to enable every capable
+and industrious German to obtain higher education and subsequently
+introduction into leading positions. The plans of instruction of
+all educational institutions are to conform with the experiences of
+practical life. The comprehension of the concept of the State must
+be striven for by the school [Staatsbuergerkunde] as early as the
+beginning of understanding. We demand the education at the expense of
+the State of outstanding intellectually gifted children of poor parents
+without consideration of position or profession.
+
+21. The State is to care for the elevating national health by
+protecting the mother and child, by outlawing child-labor, by the
+encouragement of physical fitness, by means of the legal establishment
+of a gymnastic and sport obligation, by the utmost support of all
+organizations concerned with the physical instruction of the young.
+
+22. We demand abolition of the mercenary troops and formation of a
+national army.
+
+23. We demand legal opposition to known lies and their promulgation
+through the press. In order to enable the provision of a German press,
+we demand, that: a. All writers and employees of the newspapers
+appearing in the German language be members of the race: b. Non-German
+newspapers be required to have the express permission of the State
+to be published. They may not be printed in the German language: c.
+Non-Germans are forbidden by law any financial interest in German
+publications, or any influence on them, and as punishment for
+violations the closing of such a publication as well as the immediate
+expulsion from the Reich of the non-German concerned. Publications
+which are counter to the general good are to be forbidden. We
+demand legal prosecution of artistic and literary forms which exert
+a destructive influence on our national life, and the closure of
+organizations opposing the above made demands.
+
+24. We demand freedom of religion for all religious denominations
+within the state so long as they do not endanger its existence or
+oppose the moral senses of the Germanic race. The Party as such
+advocates the standpoint of a positive Christianity without binding
+itself confessionally to any one denomination. It combats the
+Jewish-materialistic spirit within and around us, and is convinced that
+a lasting recovery of our nation can only succeed from within on the
+framework: common utility precedes individual utility.
+
+25. For the execution of all of this we demand the formation of a
+strong central power in the Reich. Unlimited authority of the central
+parliament over the whole Reich and its organizations in general. The
+forming of state and profession chambers for the execution of the laws
+made by the Reich within the various states of the confederation.
+The leaders of the Party promise, if necessary by sacrificing their
+own lives, to support by the execution of the points set forth above
+without consideration.
+
+Adolf Hitler proclaimed the following explanation for this program on
+the 13 April 1928:
+
+
+                              Explanation
+
+Regarding the false interpretations of Point 17 of the program of
+the NSDAP on the part of our opponents, the following definition is
+necessary:
+
+“Since the NSDAP stands on the platform of private ownership it happens
+that the passage” gratuitous expropriation concerns only the creation
+of legal opportunities to expropriate if necessary, land which has
+been illegally acquired or is not administered from the viewpoint of
+the national welfare. This is directed primarily against the Jewish
+land-speculation companies.
+
+
+                                 PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1709-PS
+
+        [Report of Special Delegate for Art Seizures, July 1943]
+
+[_Page 68 Par. 134_]
+
+The collection Lubomierski in Lemberg contained among others 31
+valuable hand drawings by Albrecht Duerer. An offer made in the spring
+of 1940 by a special commissioner through the foreign office to the
+Russian government, to exchange these drawings by Duerer for equally
+valuable Russian works of arts and literary monument, was refused.
+On the day of the capture of Lemberg, the special commissioner, Dr.
+Muehlmann and the museum director Dr. Kudlich went there by order
+of the Reichmarshal, to conduct a search for the hand drawings. The
+investigation encountered considerable difficulties, because the
+Russians had reorganized the system of museums in Lemberg and because
+the collection Lubomierski did not exist any more.
+
+In the course of further investigations Prof. Gebarowicz of the
+Bawarowski-museum, who had publicized the drawings in the past, was
+thoroughly interrogated also. Finally he explained that he kept the
+drawings carefully hidden from the Russians in the Bawarowski-museum.
+On demand, he also brought them out from concealment.
+
+After thorough examination, the sequestration was announced, and a
+regular receipt was issued.
+
+The special commissioner has turned over these hand drawings in July
+1941 to the Reichmarshal in person, who brought them to the Fuehrer
+into the headquarters, where they still are. By specific order of the
+Fuehrer, they remain temporarily in his possession.
+
+The following single drawings are affected, which were entered in the
+supplement of the catalogue (31 drawings on 23 cartons):
+
+  Carton I         1. Self portrait
+                   2. 6 pillows
+  Carton II        3. The young steer
+  Carton III       4. Nude with mirror
+                   5. Partial sketch of the same figure
+  Carton IV        6. Nude woman with headscarf in a niche on a sphere
+  Carton V         7. Nude man with lion
+                   8. Nude man with mirror
+                   9. Attached weak reprint of the same figure
+  Carton VI       10. Corner ornament with eagle
+                  11. The holy family
+  Carton VII      12. Drapery study
+                  13. Nude man lying down
+  Carton VIII     14. Oarsman
+  Carton IX       15. Horse
+  Carton X        16. Europa on the steer
+  Carton XI       17. Corpus Christi
+  Carton XII      18. Nude woman with a staff
+  Carton XIII     19. Sampson with the city gates of Gaza
+  Carton XIV      20. Mary and child
+                  21. Childhead
+  Carton XV       22. Pictures of the emperors Charlemagne and
+                          Sigismund
+  Carton XVI      23. The holy family in a hut
+  Carton XVII     24. Study for a Madonna and the head of an old man
+                  25. Two geometric drawings
+  Carton XVIII    26. Mary with a child in an indicated renaissance hall
+  Carton XIX      27. Christ as king of the universe
+  Carton XX       28. Man’s head with a cap
+  Carton XXI      29. Lamentations over Christ
+  Carton XXII     30. Head of a deer
+  Carton XXIII    31. Study for an adoration, left kneeling Mary, right
+                        Holy Joseph
+
+[_Page 77, Par. 148_]
+
+
+                 _Works of art for decorative purposes_
+
+On the desire of the Governor General, a number of 2nd and 3rd class
+art objects was made available to him for exhibition and decorative
+purposes,--Reference Paragraph 141 and 142.--The architect Franz
+Koettgen in Krakau was charged with the execution of this mission,
+especially the furnishing of Castle Kressendorf and the castle in
+Krakau. A list was made by the special commissioner, in which all
+objects, put at the disposal of architect Koettgen, were exactly listed
+in detail.
+
+During the conference with the architect Koettgen, on 30 July 1942, the
+latter promised, to continue the inventory, already started by him,
+more rapidly, and to conclude by the end of 1942 at the latest. He
+furthermore said he was willing, to provide the special commissioner
+after the completion of the inventories with a directory of the
+location of the individual objects. The completeness of the transferred
+art objects and their careful storing can only be examined after the
+completion of the inventories.
+
+A copy of the above mentioned lists on the object, put at the disposal
+of Koettgen is added to the report as enclosure Nr. 8.
+
+[_Page 80_]
+
+Of the objects, taken from the depot of the special commissioner in the
+state library in Krakau as of 1 Aug 1942, the following were inspected:
+
+
+ I. In Berlin in the depot of the special Commissioner and in the safe
+                          of the German Bank:
+
+                                                      _Catalogue No._
+  East German Master 1430 “Picture of the Vesper”            4
+  German Master 16th century “Picture of a bearded man”     17
+  Master von Kappenberg “Mary with child”                   27
+  Dirk Bouts “Annunciation of Mary”                         35
+  Netherland Master “Lamentation over Christ”               42
+  Berckheyde “Small Houtpoort in Haarlem”                   45
+  Breughel “Folksfestival”                                  47
+  Gerrit Dou “Rembrandt’s mother”                           51
+  Pinturicchio “Madonna and child”                         138
+  Raffael “Picture of a young man”                         141
+  Venetian Master “Mary and child”                         145
+  de Largilliere “Portrait of a lady”                      158
+  Further two 2nd class pictures, namely “The lustful
+    old man” (unequal lovers), “Fugger’s Portrait”.
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1721-PS
+
+                              CONFIDENTIAL
+
+  Supreme SA Command
+  FO No 82/277-38 n.f.D. Ha/Hbl.
+
+                                                MUNICH, 29 November 1938
+                                            For Use of the Services Only
+                                                           Distributor I
+
+Subject: Measures against the Jews.
+
+The Stabsleiter of the Fuehrer’s deputy, in Order No. 189/38 (not to be
+made public), makes the following announcement:
+
+  “In connection with the actions against the Jews arising from the
+  public, valuable objects had to be safeguarded here and there by the
+  offices of the Party and its branches for the protection of German
+  public property. I order that such objects be turned over at once to
+  the nearest office of the Secret State Police, and receipts be given
+  therefor.”
+
+  “If, in connection with these actions, the offices of the Party and
+  their branches should become aware or have been aware of thefts,
+  which unfortunately may have occurred, it is to be reported at once
+  to the nearest Police Station. The same is to be done upon the
+  appearance of suspicious objects.”
+
+  “The offices of the police are to be aided to the fullest extent in
+  accomplishing their assignment.”
+
+                                         Chief of the Fuehrungshauptamt:
+                                                        Signed: JUETTNER
+                                                      Obergruppenfuehrer
+
+  Official
+  /s/ [Illegible]
+      Standartenfuehrer
+      STAMPED: SA Group Kurpfalz 1543
+      /s/ [Illegible]
+  30 November 1938
+
+       #       #       #       #       #
+
+CONFIDENTIAL
+
+  SA der NSDAP
+  50th Brigade (Starkenburg)
+  Division F Reference No 4309
+
+             DARMSTADT, 2 Moosbergstrasse 11 November 1938
+  Tel. 7042 and 7043 Postal checking account: Frankfurt on
+  the Main 234-38 Bankaccount City Savings Bank 155
+  To: SA Group Electoral Palatinate [Kurpfalz] _Mannheim_
+
+The following order reached me at 3 o’clock on 10 November 1938.
+
+“On the order of the Gruppenfuehrer, all the Jewish synagogues within
+the 50th Brigade are to be blown up or set on fire immediately.”
+
+“Neighboring houses occupied by Aryans are not to be damaged. The
+action is to be carried out in civilian clothes. Rioting and plundering
+are to be prevented. Report of execution of orders to reach Brigade
+Fuehrer or office by 8:30.”
+
+I immediately alerted the Standartenfuehrer and gave them the most
+exact instructions; the execution of the order began at once.
+
+I hereby report that the following were destroyed in the area of:
+
+Standarte 115
+
+  1. Synagogue at Darmstadt, Bleichstrasse destroyed by fire.
+
+  2. Synagogue at Darmstadt, Fuchsstrasse destroyed by fire.
+
+  3. Synagogue at Ober/Ramstadt interior and furnishings wrecked.
+
+  4. Synagogue at Graefenhausen interior and furnishings wrecked.
+
+  5. Synagogue at Griesheim interior and furnishings wrecked.
+
+  6. Synagogue at Pfungstadt interior and furnishings wrecked.
+
+  7. Synagogue at Eberstadt destroyed by fire.
+
+Standarte 145
+
+  1. Synagogue at Bensheim destroyed by fire.
+
+  2. Synagogue at Lorsch in Hessen destroyed by fire.
+
+  3. Synagogue at Heppenheim destroyed by fire and blown up.
+
+  4. Synagogue at Birkenau destroyed by fire.
+
+  5. Prayer House Alsbach destroyed by fire.
+
+  6. Meeting room Alsbach destroyed by fire.
+
+  7. Synagogue at Rimbach furnishings completely destroyed.
+
+Standarte 168
+
+  1. Synagogue in Seligenstadt destroyed by fire.
+
+  2. Synagogue in Offenbach destroyed by fire.
+
+  3. Synagogue in Klein-Krotzenburg destroyed by fire.
+
+  4. Synagogue in Steinheim on the Main destroyed by fire.
+
+  5. Synagogue in Muehlheim on the Main destroyed by fire.
+
+  6. Synagogue in Sprendlingen destroyed by fire.
+
+  7. Synagogue in Langen destroyed by fire.
+
+  8. Synagogue in Egelsbach destroyed by fire.
+
+Standarte 186
+
+  1. Synagogue in Beerfelden blown up.
+
+  2. Synagogue in Michelstadt furnishings wrecked.
+
+  3. Synagogue in Koenig furnishings wrecked.
+
+  4. Synagogue in Hoechst i/Odenwald furnishings wrecked.
+
+  5. Synagogue in Gross-Umstadt furnishings wrecked.
+
+  6. Synagogue in Dieburg furnishings wrecked.
+
+  7. Synagogue in Babenhausen furnishings wrecked.
+
+  8. Synagogue in Gross-Bieberau destroyed by fire.
+
+  9. Synagogue in Fraenk. Crumbach furnishings destroyed.
+
+  10. Synagogue in Reichelsheim furnishings destroyed.
+
+Standarte 221
+
+  1. Synagogue and Chapel in Gross Gerau destroyed by fire.
+
+  2. Synagogue in Ruesselheim torn down and furnishings destroyed.
+
+  3. Synagogue in Dornheim furnishings destroyed.
+
+  4. Synagogue in Wolfskehlen furnishings destroyed.
+
+                                 The Fuehrer of Brigade 50 (Starkenburg)
+
+                                                         /s/ [Illegible]
+                                                          Brigadefuehrer
+
+           Stamped: SA Group Electoral Palatinate (Kurpfalz)
+                              11 Nov 1938
+
+  /s/ [Illegible]
+
+       #       #       #       #       #
+
+                              CONFIDENTIAL
+
+                                Notice!
+
+8.35 Oberfuehrer Durein [?] for the area of Brigade 51 reports
+completion of the matter of the Synagogues.
+
+Everything has been carried out up to Roelsheim [?] near Germersheim.
+
+  10 Nov 38                                            (s)   [Illegible]
+
+       #       #       #       #       #
+
+                              CONFIDENTIAL
+
+                             Note for Files
+
+  Telephone call by the Fuehrer of Brigade 50, Darmstadt.
+  Brigadefuehrer Lucke.
+
+Brigadefuehrer Lucke reports at 9 o’clock on 10 November 1938:
+The Jewish church at Darmstadt, the Synagogue at Darmstadt, and
+the Synagogue at Eberstadt were destroyed by fire. The Synagogue
+in Darmstadt destroyed and burned out. The Synagogue in Eberstadt
+destroyed and burned out. The Synagogues in Griesheim, in Graefenhausen
+and Oberramstadt destroyed. The Synagogue in Bensheim destroyed by
+fire. The Synagogue in Lorsch near Bensheim destroyed by fire. The
+Synagogue in Heppenheim blown up. The Synagogues in Rimbach and
+Birkenau destroyed. The Prayer Hall at Alsbach a.d.B. destroyed.
+Meeting-room in the Jewish cemetery in Haehnlein destroyed. The
+Synagogue and Church in Gross-Gerau destroyed by fire. The Synagogue in
+Ruesselsheim wrecked. In addition, the Synagogue and wooden church in
+Dornheim were demolished. In Offenbach the big Church and the Synagogue
+were destroyed by fire. Synagogues that may still exist will also be
+found and destroyed.
+
+  Mannheim, 10 Nov 1938                                    /s/   LOHMANN
+                                                       Sturmhauptfuehrer
+  Copied:
+
+       #       #       #       #       #
+
+                              CONFIDENTIAL
+
+                             Note for Files
+
+  Telephone call from Brigade 151, Saarbruecken, by Sturmhauptfuehrer
+  Rossel.
+
+Sturmhauptfuehrer Rossel reports at 9.15 on the morning of 10 November
+1938. Tonight the Synagogue in Saarbruecken was set on fire, and the
+Synagogues in Dillingen, Merzig, Saarlautern, Saarwillingen and
+Broddorf were also destroyed. Jews were taken into protective custody.
+The fire departments are occupied with extinguishing the fires. In the
+area of Standarte 174 all Synagogues were destroyed.
+
+  MANNHEIM, 10 November 1938
+  Copied:
+
+                                                        /s/   ZIMMERMANN
+                                                       Standartenfuehrer
+
+       #       #       #       #       #
+
+                              CONFIDENTIAL
+
+                             Note for Files
+
+  Telephone call from the Fuehrer of Standarte 250, Bruchsal,
+    Standartenfuehrer Ritter von Eberlein.
+
+Standartenfuehrer Ritter von Eberlein reports at 9.00 on the morning
+of 10 November 1938. In the early morning of 10 November 1938, between
+the hours of 4.30 and 6.00 o’clock, the Synagogue at Bruchsal burned
+down to the foundations. The crowd broke all shop windows of the Jewish
+stores in the city; the alerted SA put guards before the Jewish stores
+to prevent plundering. The Rabbi and several prominent Jews had to be
+taken into protective custody for their own safety. This was done by
+the Gestapo. The Synagogue at Philippsburg also burned down at the same
+time. The infamous Rabbi Neuburger, who is known because of his foreign
+connections was taken into protective custody by instigation of the
+SA. During the night the Synagogues at Wiesloch, Walldorf and Malsch
+were also destroyed. The male Jews had to be taken into protective
+custody for their personal safety. In the area of Sturmbann III/250 the
+Synagogues at Sinsheim, Neidenstein, Neckar-Bischofsheim, Hoffenheim,
+Wollenberg and Ittlingen were also destroyed.
+
+  MANNHEIM, 10 November 1938
+  Copied:
+
+                                                        /s/   ZIMMERMANN
+                                                       Standartenfuehrer
+
+       #       #       #       #       #
+
+                              CONFIDENTIAL
+
+                             Note for Files
+
+Standarte 17 reports by telephone call from Sturmbannfuehrer. Then at
+10.13 o’clock in the morning of 10 November 1938: The Synagogues at
+Ludwigshafen and Frankenthal were burned down completely this morning
+between 7 and 8 o’clock. Several Jewish stores were demolished.
+
+  MANNHEIM, 10 November 1938
+  Copied:
+
+                                                      /s/    [Illegible]
+                                                       Standartenfuehrer
+
+
+                                 PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1723-PS
+
+  DECREES, REGULATIONS, ANNOUNCEMENTS [The German publication entitled
+         “Verfuegungen, Anordnungen, Bekanntgaben”] Pp. 430-39.
+
+                           _Security Police_
+
+Cooperation of the Party offices with the Secret State Police [Gestapo].
+
+In a summary of all the previously issued decrees on the cooperation
+between the Party and the Gestapo I refer to the following and ordain:
+
+1. To the Gestapo has been entrusted the mission by the Fuehrer to
+watch over and to eliminate all enemies of the Party and the National
+Socialist State as well as all disintegrating forces of all kinds
+directed against both. The successful solution of this mission
+forms one of the most essential prerequisites for the unhampered
+and frictionless work of the Party. The Gestapo, in their extremely
+difficult task, is to be granted support and assistance in every
+possible way by the NSDAP. The supervision of the Party itself does not
+come under the jurisdiction of the Gestapo.
+
+I prohibit all offices of the Party, its organizations and associated
+groups to conduct investigations and interrogations regarding
+affairs which concern the Gestapo only. All occurrences of a
+political-criminalistic nature are to be reported without prejudice
+along Party channels and as ever brought to the knowledge of the
+Gestapo immediately.
+
+2. The secret state police must report automatically all occurrences
+of a criminal nature, even if it includes Party Members, to the
+responsible public prosecutor according to the laws of the National
+Socialist State, in force for all nationals. In such cases, the State
+police offices will notify, as before, the county and Gauleiters
+concerned, of the reports made to the public prosecutor. Reports will
+include reasons for the incidents. In the interest of the movement the
+functionaries [Hoheitstrager] are obliged to suspend, if necessary,
+the party members, after contacting the responsible Party Court;
+the latter will hold a public hearing, to decide on the temporary
+suspension.
+
+
+  _Invitation of the leaders of offices in the Security Police and the
+              Security Service to attend Party meetings._
+
+In order to establish closer connections between all the offices of the
+Party and their organizations and the office leader of the Security
+Police and SD, the leader of the Party Chancellor asks that they should
+be invited in the future to all large official meetings of the Party.
+
+
+   _The taking over of political offices by officials of the Gestapo_
+
+The Secret State police has the mission to safeguard the unhampered
+development of all forces active in the party and released by it in the
+National Socialistic State.
+
+Since it is still in a state of being organised and the available
+officials and employees are very much in demand they are only to be
+employed in order to take over positions in the Party in as much as it
+is compatible with their official duties in the Secret State Police.
+
+I, therefore, ask to check in every single case and in close harmony
+with the department of the Secret State Police concerned, whose leader
+welcomes the taking over of political functions by officials and
+employees of the Secret State Police, whether the transfer of political
+missions into the Party can be justified in the interest of the
+official obligations of the Secret State Police.
+
+
+    _Presentation to the State Police upon request by Party offices_
+
+The Chief of the Security Police and SD has issued the annexed decrees
+of 29 March 1940 and 4 November 1940. It is ordered herewith that
+departments of the Secret State Police will be obliged to execute the
+presentation request when the same emanates from the Reichsleiters
+or the Gauleiters. If the request for presentation originates from
+subordinate departments of the party it will only be granted if
+particular interests of the State Police seem to warrant a presentation.
+
+In the future the county administration and local administrations are
+to direct all requests through the district administration to the
+responsible department of the Secret State police.
+
+       #       #       #       #       #
+
+                                                   Berlin, 29 March 1940
+
+  The Chief of the Security Police and SD
+    I A 1 NR. 102/40-176
+  To all State police departments
+
+  By way of information to the Inspectors of the Security Police and SD.
+
+  Subject: Presentation to the State Police upon request by Party
+    offices.
+
+Repeated requests by Party offices for presentation to the State Police
+of Volksgenossen who did not heed the summons of the Party offices,
+cause the following regulations to be decreed:
+
+1. If the district administration makes the request the same is to be
+granted as long as no important interests of the State Police interfere.
+
+2. If a party office subordinate to the district administration
+requests the presentation, the same has to be denied in as far as no
+important interests of the State Police seem to warrant a presentation.
+
+                                                        Signed: HEYDRICH
+
+Verified: Schoenbrunn of the Chancellery
+
+       #       #       #       #       #
+
+                                            Berlin SW 11 4 November 1940
+
+  The Chief of the Security Police and SD
+    IB 1 NR 763/40-151
+
+  To All State Police Departments
+
+  By way of information to the Inspectors of the Security Police and SD
+
+  Subject: Presentation to State Police upon request of Party Offices
+
+  Reference: Decree of 29 March 1940 IA 1 NR 102/40-176
+
+In supplement to my decree of 29 March 1940 I order that presentation
+requests by Reichsleiters be granted in so far as important interests
+of the State Police do not interfere.
+
+                                                        Signed: HEYDRICH
+
+       #       #       #       #       #
+
+                          _Protective Custody_
+
+Protective custody must be viewed as the strongest measure in order to
+impressively instruct the Volksgenossen, who maliciously neglect their
+duties toward the community or endanger the security of the State,
+that they have to conform themselves to the universal interests and to
+adapt themselves to State discipline. Therefore it should only serve as
+a means of combatting real enemies of the Reich, but should never be
+used for the clarification or punishment of different or insignificant
+offenses.
+
+An excessive use of protective custody, as well as its infliction
+without previous indisputable clarification of the state of affairs and
+the question of guilt, is neither justified with regard to the future
+of the one involved nor with respect to the reduction of its moral
+effect.
+
+Therefore it must be expected that protective custody is only to be
+employed in really pressing and substantial cases.
+
+I request that the county leaders be instructed orally to avoid any
+written communications; special emphasis on secrecy.
+
+
+                  _Protective Custody_ (_Regulations_)
+
+Through the circular of the 25 January 1938, the Reich Minister of
+the Interior has issued new regulations regarding the introduction of
+protective custody. In the following, I announce the wording of this
+decree for confidential information.
+
+       #       #       #       #       #
+
+                                                     Berlin 25 Jan. 1938
+
+The Reich Minister of the Interior
+
+The following regulations regarding protective custody go into effect
+on the 1 February 1938. At the same time, the following are rescinded:
+
+a. My decree of 12 April 1934--I 3311 A/28.2 along with the supplement
+of 26 April 1934 and 10 July 1934 (directed to governments of the
+states and to the Reichstatthalters).
+
+b. My decree of 12 April 1935--VI B 757A/3014 along with the
+supplementary decree of 1 June 1935 VI B 11568/3014 (directed to the
+governments of the states, Reichstatthalter, Prussian presidents of
+government districts).
+
+c. My decree of 17 June 1935--III P 3311/329 (directed to the state
+government and the Reichstatthalter.)
+
+d. The decree of office of Secret State Police of 3 July 1934--B Nr.
+19582 II I D (directed to the presidents of the Prussian government
+districts).
+
+e. The decree of the Political Police Commander of the Lands of the 9
+Sept 1935--B. Nr. 37840/35 II I D (directed to the Political police of
+the states and the Prussian State Police offices).
+
+
+                        Article 1 Admissibility
+
+Protective custody can be decreed as a coercive measure of the
+Secret State Police against persons who endanger the security of the
+people and the state through their attitude, in order to counter all
+aspirations of enemies of the people and state.
+
+Protective Custody shall not be decreed for penal purposes or as a
+substitute for punitive arrest. Punishable offenses have to be decided
+finally by the courts.
+
+
+                          Article 2 Competence
+
+1. The Secret State Police exclusively is competent for the application
+of protective custody.
+
+2. Motions in behalf of the application of protective custody have
+to be directed to the Secret State police through the State police
+offices. Every motion has to be substantiated in detail; the statements
+of the arrested person have to be considered in it. A copy of the
+hearing of the person temporarily apprehended has to be forwarded
+immediately.
+
+3. Protective custody may only be inflicted if the accused has
+previously had a hearing on offenses imputed to him.
+
+
+                       Article 3 Temporary Arrest
+
+1. The Secret State police bureau, the offices of the State police
+director and of the State Police are authorized under the provisions of
+par. 1 to order the temporary arrest of persons:
+
+a. If it is feared that the freedom will be abused for activities
+hostile to the state.
+
+b. If danger of under-cover activities exists.
+
+c. If there is suspicion of escape.
+
+2. The accused has to be notified at the latest within 24 hours after
+the arrest. He is to be heard on the grounds for the infliction of the
+temporary arrest according to protocol.
+
+3. A temporarily arrested person has to be released at the latest after
+an elapse of 10 days from the day of apprehension if the Secret State
+police bureau has in the meantime not decreed protective custody (5).
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+
+                          Article 6 Execution
+
+The protective custody has to be executed generally in the State
+Concentration Camps.
+
+
+                           Article 7 Duration
+
+1. Protective custody shall only be upheld as long as it serves its
+purpose.
+
+2. The Secret State police bureau authorizes release from protective
+custody. For that reason the bureau investigates periodically but not
+exceeding 3 months, whether the protective custody should be cancelled.
+The release must have taken place, at the latest, on the third day
+after the lifting of the protective custody.
+
+
+                          Article 8 Foreigners
+
+As a matter of principle deportation procedure has to be carried out
+against foreigners who have been taken into protective custody unless
+particular reasons interfere.
+
+
+                    Article 9 Executory Regulations
+
+The Chief of the Security Police issues the necessary regulations for
+the execution.
+
+
+                                 PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1724-PS
+
+      Press conference on August 4, 1938 headed by Regional Leader
+                       [Gauamtsleiter] Schoeller
+
+                                                        Duration: 1 hour
+
+  [Page 1, par. 4]
+
+The breaking up of the synagogue (information must still be secret).
+
+On August 10, 1938 at 10 o’clock A. M. the breakup of the synagogues
+will commence. Gauleiter Julius Streicher will personally set the crane
+into motion with which the Jewish symbols (Star of David etc.) will be
+torn down. This should be arranged in a big way. Closer details are
+still unknown.
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1725-PS
+
+                1935 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 502
+
+Ordinance on Enforcement of the Law for Securing the Unity of Party and
+                         State of 29 March 1935
+
+By virtue of the law for securing the unity of Party and State of 1
+December 1933 (RGBl I, 1016) I order:
+
+
+                               ARTICLE 1
+
+1. The NSDAP and the Hitler Youth Movement, Inc. are to be expunged
+in the corporation register. The property of these corporations has
+without liquidation become the property of the NSDAP as a corporation
+of public law.
+
+2. The land deeds and other public records are to be corrected free of
+charge on request.
+
+3. Until the decree of the statute of the NSDAP (Article 1, Section
+2 of the Law for Securing the Unity of Party and State of 1 December
+1933), the previous statute of the National Socialist German Workers’
+Corporation, Inc., is applicable in this sense to the NSDAP as a
+corporation of public law.
+
+
+                               ARTICLE 2
+
+The SA,
+
+The SS,
+
+The National Socialist Driver Corps [Kraftfahrkorps],
+
+The Hitler Youth (including the Jungfolk, the League of German Girls
+and Jungmaedel),
+
+The National Socialist German Student League,
+
+The National Socialist German Women’s Auxiliary [Frauenschaft], are
+components of the party.
+
+
+                               ARTICLE 3
+
+The National Socialist League of German Physicians, Inc.,
+
+The League of National Socialist German Jurists, Inc.,
+
+The National Socialist Teachers’ League, Inc.,
+
+The National Socialist People’s Welfare, Inc.,
+
+The National Socialist War Veterans’ Administration, Inc.,
+
+The Reich League of German Officials, Inc.,
+
+The National Socialist League of German Technologists,
+
+The German Labor Front (including the National Socialist foundation
+“Kraft durch Freude”),
+
+are the organizations affiliated to the NSDAP.
+
+
+                               ARTICLE 4
+
+1. The components of the NSDAP possess no legal character of their own
+and no property of their own.
+
+2. The NSDAP forms with its components as a corporation of public
+law, a unit for the domain of the entire organization, with reference
+to property rights. Therefore the entire corporation is exclusively
+obligated and justified as to property rights.
+
+3. The Reich Treasurer of the NSDAP is the Plenipotentiary of the
+Fuehrer in all legal matters relating to property of the NSDAP. The
+Plenipotentiary rights include the right to assign sub-powers of
+attorney generally or for individual matters.
+
+
+                               ARTICLE 5
+
+1. The affiliated organizations can possess their own legal character.
+
+2. The affiliated organizations are subject to the financial
+supervision of the Reich Treasurer of the NSDAP.
+
+3. The other legally determined supervisory rights are not touched by
+the financial supervision of the Reich Treasurer of the NSDAP.
+
+
+                               ARTICLE 6
+
+All authorities have to assist the Reich Treasurer of the NSDAP and his
+agent in the fulfillment of his duties and to conform with the requests
+of the Reich Treasurer of the NSDAP, which go to them on the basis of
+this order.
+
+
+                               ARTICLE 7
+
+1. The first enforcement order of 23 March 1934 (Voelkischer
+Beobachter, Munich edition No. 86 of 27 March 1934 and Berlin edition
+No. 87 of 28 March 1934) on the law for securing unity of party and
+state dated 1 December 1933 is abrogated.
+
+2. Likewise all previous orders and regulations contrary to the above
+enforcement order on the law for securing unity of party and state of 1
+December 1933 are abrogated.
+
+
+                               ARTICLE 8
+
+1. The Deputy of the Fuehrer issues terms for enforcement and
+supplementing Articles 2 and 3 of this order. The Reich Treasurer of
+the NSDAP issues the remaining terms for execution of this order.
+
+2. This law takes effect on the day following its announcement.
+
+Berlin, 29 March 1935
+
+                                        The Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor
+                                                            Adolf Hitler
+
+                                               The Deputy of the Fuehrer
+                                                                 R. Hess
+                                        Reich Minister without Portfolio
+
+                                      The Reich Minister of the Interior
+                                                                   Frick
+
+
+                                                COPY OF DOCUMENT 1726-PS
+
+ STATEMENT OF THE NETHERLANDS GOVERNMENT IN VIEW OF THE PROSECUTION AND
+              PUNISHMENT OF THE GERMAN MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS
+
+        Enclosure “h” entitled: _Central Bureau for Statistics_
+
+     THE DEPORTATION OF NETHERLANDS WORKMEN TO GERMANY [Pages 1-3].
+
+The enlistment of working labourers took quite a different course. Many
+big and reasonably large business concerns, especially in the metal
+industry, were visited by German commissions who appointed workmen
+for deportation. This combing out of the concerns was called the
+“Sauckel-action”, so named after its leader, who was charged with the
+appointment of foreign workmen in Germany.
+
+The employers had to cancel the contracts with the appointed workmen
+temporarily, and the latter were forced to register at the labour
+offices, which then took care of the deportation under supervision of
+German “Fachberater”.
+
+Workmen who refused (relatively few) were prosecuted by the
+“Sicherheitsdienst” (SD). If captured by this service, they were mostly
+lodged for some time in one of the infamous prisoners camps in the
+Netherlands and eventually put to work in Germany.
+
+In this prosecution the “Sicherheitsdienst” was supported by the German
+Police Service, which was connected with the labour offices, and was
+composed of members of the N.S.B. and the like.
+
+At the end of April 1942 the deportation of working labourers started
+on a grand scale. Consequently in the months of May and June the number
+of deportees amounted to not less than 22,000, resp. 24,000 of which
+many were metal workers.
+
+After that the action slackened somewhat, but in October 1942 another
+top was reached (2,600). After the big concerns, the smaller ones had,
+in their turn, to give up their personnel. * * *
+
+This changed in November 1944. The Germans then started a ruthless
+campaign for manpower, passing by the labour offices. Without warning,
+they lined off whole quarters of the towns, seized people in the
+streets or in the houses and deported them.
+
+In Rotterdam and Schiedam where these raids (razzia’s) took place on 10
+and 11 November, the amount of people thus deported was estimated at
+50,000 and 5,000 respectively.
+
+In other places where the raids were held later, the numbers were much
+lower, because one was forewarned by the events. The exact figures are
+not known as they have never been published by the occupants.
+
+The people thus seized were put to work partly in the Netherlands,
+partly in Germany.
+
+The events of the war then took such a turn that further deportations
+did not take place. But still in the North and East of the country,
+many men, up to 60 years, were seized and forced to build defence works
+in the neighbourhood of their homes.
+
+
+                                 PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1741-PS
+
+                                 PART 3
+
+  S BLN NR 51 7 AUG 8 AUG 0800--
+  TO the Chairman of the German-French Economic Commission,
+  Ambassador HEMMEN,
+  Wiesbaden Hotel 4 Jahreszeiten.
+
+                                                          [Rubber Stamp]
+
+                                 German Armistice Delegation for Economy
+
+                                                 Wiesbaden 8 AUGUST 1940
+                                                         NO. 30 Incl. 1.
+
+  NO. 70--
+
+Enclosed, I forward to you a copy of the draft of the note on
+occupation costs, which corresponds to the decisions made in the
+meeting of the H.P.A. on 31 July, and which in the meantime has the
+consent of the Chief of the OKW. I request to forward the note now.
+
+                                                     By Order /S/ WIEHL.
+
+       #       #       #       #       #
+
+  NOTE: For the Chairman of French Delegation with the German Armistice
+    Commission General Huntziger
+
+  My General:
+
+By order of my government, I have the honor to inform you of the
+following:
+
+1 According to Article 18 of the German French Armistice Agreement of
+22 June 1940, the costs for the maintenance of the German occupational
+troops on French soil are to be borne by the French government. To
+carry out this term, an early settlement is necessary.
+
+2 Considering the impossibility to calculate the costs accurately
+at present, until further notice, daily installments of at least 20
+million marks are necessary. These installments may be paid in French
+francs, Reichcredit checks [Reichskassen Scheinen] or other values,
+to be agreed on. The conversion of French francs has been fixed on
+a currency ratio at 1:30, subject to a later different settlement.
+The billeting of the German occupation troops on French soil is not
+included in the settlement of installments. The billet owners will be
+compensated for the billeting costs by the French government outside of
+the settlement of installments.
+
+3 The settlement is in force from the period beginning 25 June 1940.
+The back payments are due with the settlement of installments. The
+further amounts are to be paid every time for a period of ten days in
+advance.
+
+4 Certificates of requisition for material in kind, issued by the
+German occupation, exclusive of billeting, as far as they have been
+issued after the coming into force of the settlement of installments,
+will be registered as payment for the cost of the occupation by the
+French government. However, the certificates of requisition, which were
+issued by the German occupational troops before the coming into force
+of the settlement of installments, are to be redeemed by the French
+government without deducting it from the costs of occupation. I request
+my General to confirm to me the receipt of this note, and to notify
+me about the measures which the French government has made about the
+execution of the above settlement.
+
+Permit me, My General, to express my utmost respect,
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+
+PART 6
+
+  Wiesbaden     No. 29     17.9.40     2010     Secret
+                               Teletype
+  Foreign            Berlin
+                                 Secret
+
+  Del. No. 120.
+
+In your teletype No. 171 of 12 September, concerning occupation
+expenses, it is stated in number 2 that it is the wish of the Reich
+Finance Ministry to inform the French delegation explicitly “that
+the installments did not constitute a settlement by a lump sum, but
+that they would have to be adapted to the actual necessities arising
+from the current war situation and the current requirements of the
+occupation troops”. I hesitate considerably, to communicate this
+request to the French delegation for the following two reasons:
+
+In my notes of 8 August 1940--Del. W. 280 of 15 August 1940--Del. W.
+331--and of 20 August 1940--Del. W. 408, the idea of installments has
+always been expressed clearly. The idea of a settlement by a lump
+sum has never been discussed with the French. The French delegation
+has therefore no reason, up to now, to assume that the installments
+constituted a settlement by a lump sum. The instruction requested by
+the Reich Finance Ministry would, on the contrary, only arouse the
+idea of a settlement by a lump sum in the minds of the French, which I
+consider as disastrous.
+
+General von Stuelpnagel informed me more officially, that numerous
+German Divisions have been transferred to the East from France. This
+fact cannot remain unknown to the French permanently. He draw my
+attention to that fact because he thought that this decrease of the
+armed forces in France would certainly influence the amount of the
+occupation expenses.
+
+The transmission of the communication to the French delegation at
+present in the wording “as necessitated by the current war situation
+and the current requirements of the occupation troops” as desired by
+the Reich Finance Ministry, contains the further danger, that the
+French delegation would claim a reduction of the installments because
+of the decrease in the number of troops.
+
+I ask you for your decision.
+
+                                                          Signed: HEMMEN
+
+  2015 NR 29 Received BO AUSW AMT (Foreign Office) Berlin.
+
+       #       #       #       #       #
+
+                                 PART 7
+
+                                               Wiesbaden 23 October 1940
+
+Armistice Commission for Economic Affairs
+
+The President of the French Delegation for Economic Affairs French
+Delegation
+
+  To Monsieur Hemmen
+     Minister Plenipotentiary
+     President of the German Armistice
+     Delegation for Economic Affairs.
+
+  No. 6318/DE
+  [Rubber Stamp]
+  German Armistice Delegation for Economic Affairs Wiesbaden
+  24 October 1940
+  No. 1532
+  Enclosures
+
+  Sir:
+
+By order of my government I have the honor to communicate the following
+to you:
+
+In a note dated the 12th of October, the German government answered
+a note of the 26th of August in which the French government had made
+a formal protest against the payments demanded from her to cover
+the expenses of the German occupation troops in France. The German
+government refuses all discussion, both on the distinction between
+“occupation troops” and “operational troops”, and on the rate of
+exchange between Reichsmarks and francs.
+
+It further refuses or denies the French government the right to watch
+and receive information about the way in which the sums paid for the
+costs of occupation are used, as well as about the requisitioning of
+lodgings and economic requisitions.
+
+The French government profoundly regrets this reply. It considers, in
+fact, that events have fully justified the position it took up.
+
+After having recalled once more the essential distinction which it
+makes between “occupation troops” and “operational troops”, the
+French government pointed out to the government of the Reich the two
+considerations which, in its opinion, make a fresh examination of the
+problem necessary.
+
+1. Facts have shown that the rate of exchange fixed for the conversion
+of the Reichsmark into francs was too high. This rate of exchange
+did not take into account the respective levels of prices in France
+and Germany at the time when it was fixed. It anticipated a very
+considerable rise in French prices, which the German authorities
+considered inevitable. Actually this rise did not take place and the
+buying power of the franc remains much higher, than that implied by the
+maintenance of the present parity.
+
+The French government is all the more surprised at its protest against
+the rate of exchange between francs and Reichsmarks not having had any
+results, as it had itself suggested, in case the rate were modified, a
+formula allowing the pay and allowances received by the German troops
+for their expenses in France to remain at the figures at present paid
+in francs.
+
+An immediate consequence of the rate of exchange of 20 francs to the
+mark is that the sum demanded on account, for the maintenance of the
+occupation troops, which is reckoned in Reichsmarks, is out of all
+proportion to the real expenses of these troops. As a matter of fact,
+the credit balance of the account opened by the Bank of France for
+the German military administration is enough to cover the costs of
+occupation for a long time to come.
+
+2. It is obvious that the payments demanded by the government of the
+Reich should be reduced in proportion to the number of German troops in
+France. But it is clear that this number has diminished considerably
+since the daily payment was fixed.
+
+The French government is all the more justified in arguing from the
+above facts, as it is faced by an extremely serious economic problem,
+owing to a lack of raw materials and insufficient means of transport,
+which have led to considerable unemployment. The result is that, if the
+level of the costs of occupation fixed in August is persisted in, the
+burden will become more and more difficult to bear as time goes on.
+
+The French government therefore has to make a formal request for
+a revision of the present daily payment. This reduction is amply
+justified, both by the real needs of the occupation troops and by
+France’s economic capacity. If it does not take place soon, the French
+government will inevitably be unable to continue its payments.
+
+The French government, anxious to carry out the Armistice Convention
+which it signed, wanted to give the government of the Reich this loyal
+explanation of the position it is forced to take up. It appeals to the
+feeling of great comprehension of the German government and hopes that
+this sincere explanation will induce the latter to grant the revision
+requested in this note.
+
+  I am, sir,
+
+                                                /S/   Yves de Boisanger.
+
+  [Rubber Stamp]
+  THE PRESIDENT
+  French Armistice Delegation
+  For Economic Affairs.
+
+       #       #       #       #       #
+
+                                 PART 8
+
+  French Delegation for Economic Affairs
+
+                                                Wiesbaden, 18 March 1941
+                                                          [Rubber Stamp]
+                        German Armistice Delegation for Economic Affairs
+                                                           18 March 1941
+                                                                No. 5409
+                                                             Enclosures.
+
+  No. 15447/DE
+
+  The President of the French Delegation for Economic Affairs, to
+    Monsieur Hemmen Minister Plenipotentiary
+
+  President of the German Armistice Delegation for Economic Affairs.
+
+Sir:
+
+I have the honor to communicate the following to you on the orders of
+my government:
+
+Since the fixation of the daily indemnity by Germany, the French
+government has paid over 108 million as occupation costs.
+
+The burden of this payment, aggravated as it is to this degree, can no
+longer be borne by the economy of this country without serious danger.
+There is a risk of its causing a disorganization of its social and
+political structure from which German interests would be the first to
+suffer.
+
+The representatives of the German government have several times
+manifested their intention of dealing considerately with France’s
+domestic order and her attempts at recovery.
+
+It is the purpose of safeguarding the economic forces necessary for
+Franco-German collaboration that the government has the honor of
+setting forth the motives and objects of its request for the revision
+of the indemnity.
+
+
+                               I. MOTIVES
+
+                             1. _Monetary_
+
+The total of the sums paid by France is so great that financing has to
+be covered by repeated appeals to the Bank of France.
+
+As a result, the monetary circulation is increasing at an exceptionally
+dangerous rate.
+
+In January 1939 it did not exceed 110 milliards. In January 1941 it
+had already been doubled. At the present rate it will soon reach three
+times its pre-war volume.
+
+
+                             2. _Economic_
+
+This enormous mass of buying power weighs down an impoverished country,
+whose reserves have been exhausted by war and whose production is
+cramped by the lines of demarcation. It can not be reabsorbed by taxes,
+since budgetary recoveries, which already represent a very heavy
+burden on the taxpayer, do not exceed 60 milliard francs. It can not
+be absorbed by loans, since subscriptions to treasury bonds only just
+cover the expenses of the French state.
+
+The mass of currency thus exercises considerable pressure on prices, so
+that it is difficult to prevent them rising.
+
+
+                           3. _Psychological_
+
+This is particularly the case owing to the fact that, all holders of
+francs are showing an increasing propensity to fly from money. The
+rise in the rate of interest on shares, hoarding by merchants and
+individuals and rise in real estate prices reveal the progressive
+depreciation of the national currency.
+
+The fall of the franc was considerably accelerated when, the
+State’s Fourth Convention with the Bank of France (20 January 1941)
+became known. It is to be feared that the publication of the Fifth
+Convention, dated the 20th of February, will be still more disastrous,
+unless it is accompanied by the announcement of a revision of the
+indemnity.
+
+
+                              II. OBJECTS
+
+
+                    1. _Reduction of the indemnity_
+
+The indemnity was fixed at 400 million francs per diem, as the result
+of a decision by the German Armistice Commission for Economic Affairs
+on the 8th of August 1940, to meet the expenses of the occupation
+troops.
+
+But these troops have decreased in number since the armistice, and
+one must reintroduce the distinction between operational troops and
+occupation troops, the latter being the only ones who were to be
+supported by France, according to the Armistice Convention.
+
+Furthermore, the debits actually entered on the account of the Reich
+Credit Bank [Reichskreditkasse] with the Bank of France have been used
+to cover other needs than that of supporting German troops.
+
+Finally, in spite of these non-military uses to which the indemnity
+has been put, German expenses have not absorbed the credits which were
+opened.
+
+Thus it came about, that on the 12th of March 1941 the payments made by
+France amounted to 108 milliards, while the Germans had only drawn up
+to half this figure.
+
+It would therefore only be fair, to reduce the daily payment of 400
+millions by a very considerable fraction.
+
+
+    2. _Incorporation of all French obligations into the indemnity_
+
+The present indemnity does not include all the obligations which France
+has to meet.
+
+The French State meets the expenses of lodging and billeting separately.
+
+The fiscal exonerations which Germany recently decided her purchases
+in France should enjoy, deprived the French Treasury of a considerable
+income.
+
+It would only be fair that the new payment should cover all the
+obligations falling on France as a result of the occupation.
+
+
+           3. _Reduction of the rate of exchange of the mark_
+
+The rate adopted for the mark, as a result of the decision of the 8th
+August, is 20 francs to the Reichsmark, whereas the official parity
+between the two currencies is 17 francs, and real parity, based on a
+comparison of their buying power, is still lower than this figure.
+
+This over-valuation of German currency does not have as its only effect
+a considerable aggravation of the burden of tribute. It also exerts an
+upward pressure on French prices which tend to adjust themselves to
+German prices, on the basis of the excessive rate of exchange of the
+mark.
+
+The parity between the two currencies should therefore be brought back
+to a level which stands in a closer relationship to economic realities.
+
+
+                4. _Alteration of the method of payment_
+
+The habit of making payments in currency in settlement of the
+requisitions supplied to the occupation authorities is the principal
+cause of the exaggerated monetary circulation.
+
+It is therefore essential that the needs of the German occupation
+troops be met, in principle, only by requisitions in kind;
+
+that the methods used in the Rhineland from 1919 onwards be taken as an
+example and the French authorities be made responsible for obtaining
+these requisitions and debiting the occupation account with the value
+of the products and services provided in France;
+
+that payments in currency be limited to a few purchases direct from
+commerce and industry made by soldiers of the German army out of their
+pay;
+
+that payment for purchases in Germany for the maintenance of the
+occupation troops in France be met by the Reichsmarks which the French
+Compensation Office holds in Berlin. The cost of these supplies would
+be debited to the account opened to follow the use of the daily
+indemnity.
+
+The French government strongly hopes, that the reasons for her
+preoccupations will be understood. It urgently requests, that talks
+be begun rapidly, so that the indemnity can be readjusted before
+the currency has lost its value completely. It counts on the German
+government agreeing to no new payments being made, until the necessary
+negotiations have been completed, as the needs of the occupation troops
+are covered for many months by the money at present credited to them in
+the Bank of France.
+
+                                                         I am, Sir, etc.
+                                              /S/     Yves de Boisanger.
+
+  [rubber stamp]
+  The President
+  French Armistice Delegation
+  for Economic Affairs.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+
+                                PART 20
+
+  Paris 11 Sep 1941
+
+                                                                     C 3
+                                                      Del. W. No. 9659 P
+
+  1. _Foreign BERLIN_
+  Del W. No. 443 of 11 Sep 1941
+
+                           _Teletype Secret_
+
+After extensive examination of the situation, I would like to suggest
+urgently, in reference to our dilatory treatment of the occupation
+costs, ordered by the telegram from there of 2 Aug 1941--No.
+3863--and strictly complied with up to now, to make a new appeal to
+the Reichsminister for Foreign Affairs, to authorize me to sign the
+agreement over the reorganization reached with the French delegation,
+according to my telegram of 22 July 1941, Del. W. No. 372, and to put
+it into force.
+
+In fact, it absolutely complies with Ambassador Abetz’s opinion,
+forwarded there in his telegram of 15 Aug 1941, paragraph 1, that our
+consent for a fundamental readiness to decrease the occupation costs
+has been given to Admiral Darlan on 7 May 1941 for the concessions,
+granted us in Syria. As it is reported to me, General Huntziger
+has represented the opinion to De Boisanger, that there may be a
+misapprehension or incomplete notification of German agencies, if now
+the settlement of the occupation costs are brought up in connection
+with the North African questions.
+
+I further point out, that the present arbitrary de facto settlement
+of the payment of 15 instead of 20 million RM daily, already extends
+over 4 months, and that this represents for France the practically most
+favorable situation, and probably pleases more than the new regulation
+for 10 million RM credit plus 3 million RM transfer daily. It is
+still more important, that with a further delay of the settlement of
+occupation cost, a series of important questions, which are regulated
+with the reorganization simultaneously, remain further unsolved _at the
+same time_, and disadvantages for us come about from this:
+
+1. The purchase of further French interests abroad is obligatory
+in most cases because of war-economical reasons. However, the
+reorganization, agreed to, cannot be taken up for that, as long as a
+total solution is still uncompleted. The Reichsministry for Economy
+reports that the negotiations are practically at a standstill at
+present for this reason. Therefore, the disadvantage lies with us alone
+in these subjects, while 60 million RM for the purchase of interests
+with the coming into force of the reorganization.
+
+2. The execution of armament deliveries from France always presents
+to our armed forces authorities difficulties, which result from the
+payment. An immediate coming into force of the transfer of goods would
+directly result in favor of our war potential.
+
+3. I can secure the final appointment of the German foreign trade
+commissioner at the same time, for which especially the Four Years’
+Plan and the military commander show a lively interest.
+
+But the stoppage also has a disadvantageous effect on the other work
+of the delegation. I am forced to approach the French government
+every week with new demands, mostly war-economically important, among
+them the construction of a German-French clay factory in France for
+deliveries of additional 100,000 tons of clay per year, the renting of
+several thousand trucks with French drivers, and the purchase of 15,000
+French trucks, converted to wood gas for transports to Russia.
+
+Everywhere the energetic cooperation of the French government and in
+part serious pressure by the government on its own economic circles
+are necessary for the execution of these problems. Because of the
+well-known tendency of the French government to hide themselves in
+case of such economic desires behind the general political situation,
+my efforts now ran against continually increasing difficulties. It
+is therefore desired to reinstitute the previous status as soon as
+possible, and to keep the field of endeavor of my delegation free and
+independent of the prevailing political constellations, as much as
+possible.
+
+For these reasons, I recommend, that the present uncertain situation
+of the occupation cost question, which can only have a disadvantageous
+effect on us ourselves, be ended soon, and that the new settlement be
+ordered by us now.
+
+[In ink] Ambassador Abetz has been informed of this telegram before it
+was forwarded.
+
+                                                         /s/      Hemmen
+
+1735 No. 23 one received foreign office KR
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+
+                                PART 22
+
+  FOREIGN OFFICE Ambassador Ritter                                   C.3
+
+                                            “Westfalen”, 14 October 1941
+                                     [STAMP] German Armistice Commission
+                                               Wiesbaden 18 October 1941
+                                                               Nr. 10628
+
+Dear Mr. Hemmen,
+
+I have received your letter of 29 September 1941--Del. W. No. 10093 P.
+
+The Reich Foreign Minister does not consider it appropriate to approach
+the Fuehrer with the regulation of the occupation expenses at the
+present.
+
+  With friendly greetings
+
+                                                             Heil Hitler
+                                                                   Yours
+                                                          signed: Nitter
+
+To The Ambassador Hemmen German Embassy Paris
+
+       #       #       #       #       #
+
+                                PART 23
+
+                                                Paris, 4th November 1941
+                                                   Place du Palais-Royal
+
+  French Delegation to the German Armistice Delegation for Economic
+    Affairs
+
+German Armistice Delegation f. Economic Affairs
+
+  Wiesbaden 5 November 1941 No. 11116 Enclosures
+
+The President of the French Delegation for Economic Affairs,
+
+  To Monsieur Hemmen Minister Plenipotentiary President of the German
+    Armistice Delegation for Economic Affairs
+
+Sir,
+
+In execution of the decisions taken by the German government with
+regard to the payment of the costs of occupation, the French government
+has, since August 1940 made periodic payments which, on the 31st
+October 1941, totalled 183,200,000 francs. It was also obliged
+to defray certain expenses (particularly the lodging of troops)
+directly--expenses which amounted at this same time, to nearly 8
+milliards and to cover the deficit in the Franco-German clearing
+account, which is, at the moment, in the neighborhood of 11 milliard
+francs.
+
+The French government protested several times against the size of this
+imposition, drawing the attention of the German Government to the grave
+dangers it entails, both from the financial and from the economic point
+of view.
+
+Its fears on this point are unfortunately being shown to be better
+founded every day.
+
+The expenses resulting to the French Treasury from the occupation alone
+are as high as the expenses of the State itself. The sums paid towards
+the costs of occupation are also often used to a large extent to defray
+expenses which have nothing to do with the maintenance of troops.
+
+It is clear that such burdens are disappropriate to the present
+resources of France and that they can be covered only by treasury
+expedients.
+
+The national revenue is diminishing continually. If the efforts made in
+the field of agriculture result in an increase in the productivity of
+the soil, industrial activity slows down. An increase in taxation would
+produce a hardly noticeable result, and one must, on the contrary,
+expect the product of these taxes to diminish more or less rapidly. One
+is therefore forced to borrow at short call, either from the Bank of
+France or from individuals and credit establishments, up to 70% of the
+needs. In this way the public debt and the advances from the fiduciary
+swell at an alarming speed, whatever the effects may be of the measures
+taken to manipulate certain elements of this debt and to make it less
+onerous (conversion, consolidation, reduction of rates of interest).
+
+The mass of means of payment created to deal with the expenses
+resulting from the occupation, seriously imperils economic equilibrium.
+Inflation takes place in spite of the efforts of the government to
+limit its volume and its consequences.
+
+The prices of foodstuffs of daily use and of industrial products are
+maintained by rationing and taxation, but nevertheless tend more and
+more irresistibly to rise, and each day it is harder to prevent too
+rapid a rise in the cost of goods and property.
+
+The increasing abundance of money available is shown both by the
+increased circulation of bank notes and by the increase in stocks held
+in private and public institutions.
+
+The monetary circulation, which was about 160 milliard francs in June
+1940, has today reached the figure of 250 milliards, in other words,
+it has increased by over 56%. During the same period bank deposits
+increased by about 50%.
+
+The smallness of the quantity of goods offered is at the same
+time accentuated by supply difficulties and by the extent of the
+requisitions carried out in the occupied zone.
+
+This development is leading to a catastrophy like that suffered by
+Germany 20 years ago.
+
+When the French government signed the Armistice, it firmly intended
+reestablishing the economic situation. All its efforts since then have
+aimed particularly at keeping the monetary situation under control, in
+spite of difficulties of all kinds and, particularly, in spite of the
+enormous costs of occupation.
+
+The French government is resolved to persevere in this path, but it
+cannot do so usefully if the payments imposed by the German government
+continue to render all its efforts useless in advance. It wants to warn
+it once more.
+
+    I am, Sir, etc.
+
+                                                 sgd. Yves de Boisanger.
+
+[rubber stamp] The President French Armistice Delegation for Economic
+Affairs
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+
+                                PART 27
+
+                        _Telegram (Secret Ch V)_
+
+                 Berlin, 19 February 1942, 1343 o’clock
+
+                                                              Wako Paris
+  Nr. 50 of 19 Feb. Citissime.
+  Matter to be kept under lock C
+
+  Att: Mr. Hemmen
+
+        German Armistice Delegation for Economics
+
+          Wiesbaden 20 February 1942 No. 1309 Enclosures
+                                                              [Initials]
+
+In answer to report of 3 and 11 February No. 736 and No. 189 of 16
+February and telegram of the 18th No. 43.
+
+1. Reich Foreign Minister has ordered on 16 February that you orally
+transmit to the Governor de Boisanger that the German Government
+considers the letter of Finance Minister Bouthillier to the Reich
+Minister of Finances only as a personal statement, not as an official
+communication of the French Government. In case the French government
+wishes to make a statement concerning the question of occupation costs
+this should be directed by the authorized French chief of negotiations
+to the authorized German chief of negotiations. In connection with this
+communication you are to warn Mr. de Boisanger regarding the end of Mr.
+Bouthillier’s letter emphatically against an arbitrary discontinuation
+of the payments for occupation costs by the French Government and to
+point out to him that such a discontinuation would create a serious
+situation and result in corresponding German counter measures.
+
+2. The Reich Minister of Finance has on 17 February declared that he
+approves these steps and that he is not going to answer the letter.
+However, he has suggested an internal discussion of the question of
+occupation costs to which the Reich Foreign Minister also agreed
+regarding the report of the OKW on the actual daily expenditures.
+The discussion will take place soon in agreement with the competent
+department and your reports mentioned in the beginning will also be
+discussed.
+
+3. Reich Foreign Minister, by the way, has issued for all your
+negotiations the general directive, considered at an earlier date,
+that you are to break off negotiations and depart for Berlin in case
+the French assume an attitude which is not becoming to them as the
+conquered ones.
+
+                                                                  Wiehl.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+
+                                PART 29
+
+  French delegation to the German armistice delegation for economic
+    affairs
+
+Ref.: P 276/DE
+
+                                                     Paris, 4 March 1942
+                                                   Place du Palais-Royal
+
+  From: The president of the French delegation to the German armistice
+    delegation for economic affairs.
+
+  To: Monsieur Hemmen, Minister Plenipotentiary, president of the
+    German armistice delegation for economic affairs.
+
+Sir,
+
+I have the honour to inform you of the following by order of my
+government.
+
+Ever since August 1940 the French government has continuously drawn the
+attention of the German Government to the extremely grave consequence
+which must necessarily accrue to French economics and finance from
+payments towards the costs of the occupation.
+
+The French delegation to the German armistice delegation for economic
+affairs has time and again made personal and written representations on
+this point; the question has also been taken up regularly by members of
+the French government and their representatives every time they had a
+chance to discuss Franco-German problems with the German authorities;
+lastly, the French finance minister considered it his duty, in view of
+the seriousness of the situation, to make a direct appeal to the German
+finance minister.
+
+The French government declared, as soon as it was informed of the
+German Government’s demands, that it only agreed under duress to make
+payments out of proportion to the obligations accruing to it out of
+the armistice agreement; it has protested against the German refusal
+to differentiate between occupation and operational troops and against
+the rate of exchange imposed between the franc and the mark, which
+enabled the German army, by reason of the very low level of French
+prices, to effect enormous requisitions in the occupied territory.
+Finally, it has proved again and again that the daily payments of 20
+million Reichsmarks exceeded the total requirements of occupation and
+operational troops, since the sums placed at the disposal of the German
+authorities were never sent in their entirety, although they were even
+used otherwise than for the expenses of the German army in France
+(purchases of goods by the Reich, purchases of stocks and shares, etc.).
+
+These representations remained without effect, and those protests
+were never accepted. Only one series of discussions was opened in May
+1941; it continued for over three months and had no other result than
+the reduction of the daily payments to 15 million Reichsmark and an
+admission by the German government that this amount could very well be
+reduced a lot more. Even these concessions were made dependent by the
+Germans on extremely heavy compensations in the form of transfers which
+the French Government only accepted for a limited period and in order
+to facilitate an agreement.
+
+More than seven months have gone by and this question is still
+outstanding. It is now impossible to put off a decision any longer,
+since the effects on French economics and finance of the payments
+exacted under occupation costs are now fully visible.
+
+On February 28th, in other words after 20 months of occupation France
+will have paid 219,200,000,000 francs and another 9,000,000,000 odd
+under the heading of military accommodation costs. Payments for the
+year 1942 based on present facts and exclusive of accommodation costs
+will reach 110,000,000,000, which is considerably more than the total
+fiscal receipts of the French state.
+
+       #       #       #       #       #
+
+                                PART 30
+
+  Dir. Ha Pol Nr. Buero RAM with the request for further transmission.
+
+                                                   Berlin, 10 March 1942
+
+             Notes Concerning occupational cost regulation
+
+With the approval of the Reich minister for Foreign Affairs all the
+departments took up again the question concerning the occupational
+costs.
+
+According to the opinion of all the ministries expressed unanimously,
+negotiations with France concerning the occupational costs have become
+necessary, because a suspension or diminution of the payments on the
+part of the French was to be feared on one hand (Bouthillier-letter)
+and because the OKW on the other hand protested again with
+determination against the, in July 1941, proposed reduction of the
+installments to 10 million RM’s per day because of its current needs in
+France.
+
+After careful deliberation of the question, all departments, the Armed
+Forces included, took the point of view that the reduction to 10
+billion RM’s should not be conceded to the French as a final settlement
+on the occasion of new negotiations, but that they should be granted a
+breathing spell of about 6 months, from 1 April 1942--1 October 1942,
+which should exclude any further discussion of that question until that
+date. This is insofar of tactical importance as in that manner the old
+amount of the installments of 15 to 20 million RM’s is being maintained
+and thereby the important concession of a reduction to 10 million RM as
+a political concession is left open.
+
+It has been agreed upon, that:
+
+1. A current transfer from the existing credit amounting to 2 million
+RM per day in merchandize and 1 million RM in securities (stocks) and
+participation must be insisted upon for the meeting of the so-called
+external occupation costs.
+
+2. The French Government should see to it that the expenditures for the
+occupational costs figure in the budget in a lawful manner.
+
+3. A general regulation of the absolutely necessary tax-, wage- and
+price-reform and other measures for the prevention of the danger of an
+inflation must be demanded simultaneously.
+
+The decision proved indisputably that we had no real efficacious
+counter-measures at our disposal in the case of an arbitrary suspension
+or diminution of the occupational costs by France. To make ourselves
+paid by sequestering the bank-note reserve of the Bank of France or
+by sequestering French State- or private property would only be of
+temporary efficacy, not to mention the political effect of such a
+measure of force. This would direct itself very soon against the proper
+German interest, because the present efficacious French cooperation in
+the execution of great armament orders and the distribution of orders
+would suffer strongly by it.
+
+Considering these viewpoints, I ask for the authority to instruct
+the German Armistice delegation for economy in Paris to conduct the
+negotiations with the French delegation in that sense.
+
+                   Hereby submitted to the Foreign Minister of the Reich
+                                            through the State secretary.
+
+                                                           signed: Wiehl
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+
+                                PART 32
+
+Draft/KA
+
+                               Final Copy
+
+                                                          SR/17 Oct 1942
+                                                  Paris, 16 October 1942
+                                               Del. W. No. 347 secret RS
+
+1) To the Foreign office Berlin
+
+(in ink) written in eight copies 3 copies of which to Berlin:
+
+  1 FRH v. Mahs
+  1 Int Ley (2)
+  1 Ambassador-Paris
+  1 Capt. Brandt
+  1 Qva
+
+  To the decree of 18 September this year--Ha Pol Frie 839/secret and
+    in connection with the report of 24 August this year--Del.
+
+W. No. 307 secret RS
+
+_Subject_: Occupation costs in France
+
+  2 information copies
+
+I. In addition to the suggestions of the German armistice delegation
+for economy in its above-mentioned report and for the preparation of
+the execution of the decision of the HPA of the 7 September 1942 in the
+question of occupation costs, the following suggestions are made:
+
+If one starts out, that because of political and financial reasons
+the French government does not find itself ready for the continuous
+advance of the occupation cost account above the daily installment of
+15 million RM for the purpose of retention of a minimum amount of the
+account, because it will mean an increase of the cost of occupation,
+then it will depend during the coming negotiation with the French
+government upon getting its agreement to the suggestion of the German
+armistice delegation for economy, to settle the expenditures, unrelated
+to the occupation, which have been paid thus (or from occupation cost
+funds, via the clearing, to retain the occupation cost funds for their
+proper purpose).
+
+1. In connection with this suggestion, it must be attempted to solve
+two questions:
+
+a. One single transfer of a larger amount via clearing to the
+occupation cost to equalize at least partly the expenditures, unrelated
+to occupation costs, already paid in the first half year of 1942 from
+occupation cost funds;
+
+b. Continuous monthly transfer via clearing of funds from Germany,
+which are necessary for the settlement of expenditures, unrelated to
+occupation costs.
+
+At first it will depend upon making it clear to the French that we
+are forced to make a difference between expenditures for occupational
+purposes, and expenditures, unrelated to occupation costs. It is yet
+to be considered in detail, which instances are to be mentioned to the
+French as examples of expenditures, unrelated to the occupation costs.
+Without doubt, these will include in the past the funds out of which
+the compensations were paid for the requisitioned horses, and in the
+future the expenditures for food and fodder deliveries consigned for
+Germany. However, there are strong doubts about mentioning the black
+market purchases here also. At the end, the only thing to do will
+be to justify the distribution to the French by generally military
+reasons, which cannot be described in detail. Of course, such a basis
+for negotiations makes the accomplishment of the new German demands for
+the transfer via clearing of the continuously necessary funds of 150
+million RM monthly more difficult, because the French will recognize
+that therewith additional purchases of goods outside the contingencies
+agreed to are to be paid.
+
+Since the costs of the occupation have increased greatly especially
+since the beginning of the year, there is a definite reason to demand
+from the French that they also agree for the past to the settlement of
+at least a part of the expenditures, unrelated to occupation costs,
+in such a form that an amount as big as possible, is paid in via
+clearing and transferred by France to the occupation cost account. In
+that manner, it could be accomplished that the occupation cost account
+will again be replenished by this amount. In the first half year of
+1942, 280 million RM have been spent for the purchase of horses, and
+600 million RM for the purchase of the Raw Material Trading Co. Ltd.
+(Roges). Of course, it will not be possible to get from France the
+consent for the transfer of an amount of that size.
+
+In case of the one single payment as well as in case of the future
+continuous monthly payments for expenditures, unrelated to the
+occupation costs, the French authorities will neither be informed about
+the distribution of the accounts, the latter of which are to be paid as
+lump sum payments at the end of each month, nor about the purpose.
+
+It is a prerequisite for the settlement, that the procurement of funds
+in Reichsmarks is secured in the past as well as in the future.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+3. This type of settlement of the question of occupation costs secures
+the procurement of French funds in a simple practical form, and fits
+into the frame of the German-French financial transaction. Naturally,
+it amounts to a further considerable financial burden on French
+economy; but it does not appear in the form of an increase of the
+occupation costs.
+
+The idea to balance this internal account at the final settlement of
+the occupations at the conclusion of the peace can be combined at the
+same time with the special internal bookkeeping of these expenditures,
+unrelated to the occupation costs, separate from other clearing
+transfers.
+
+II. The fact that in the meeting of the HPA it was not finally given
+up to increase the amount of francs of the installments by change of
+the exchange rate, causes the German armistice delegation once more
+conclusively to take a standpoint to this question.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+However, a new evaluation of the Franc by 50% does not lie in the
+German interest. The present economical situation of France can no
+longer be compared with the one of 1940, where the interior purchasing
+power of the Franc was about in the ratio of 1 RM=10 Francs.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+The account has dropped since 1 July 1942 until 15 October 1942 from
+2,476 billion RM to 1,532 RM.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+                                                              /s/ Hemmen
+
+       #       #       #       #       #
+
+                                PART 33
+
+  Received: 28 October 1942 at 9:40 o’clock from: A. A. Bln by: Buehler
+
+Initials
+
+                                                         Incoming stamp:
+                               German Armistice Delegation for Economics
+                     Wiesbaden 28 October 1942 no. 353 g. Rs. Enclosures
+
+From Foreign Office, Berlin
+
+To German Armistice-Delegation for Economics
+
+                                                                   Paris
+
+                               Citissime!
+
+Telegram (secret code) No. 307 of 27 October.
+
+Matter to be kept under lock C.
+
+1. For your information: Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs has
+ordered, as there might arise political objections against increased
+demands from France, more exact explanation how in detail the increase
+of daily expenditures for occupation has been brought about, in
+particular, who is responsible for the fact that from the account of
+occupation costs demands have been satisfied which do not represent
+actual occupation costs. OKW, Department of Wehrmacht Budget and
+Administration, declare themselves not to be in a position to explain
+more fully the use of occupation cost amounts and expenditures
+unrelated to occupation costs.
+
+II. Therefore I ask you to contact the bookkeeper of occupation cost
+account, get the necessary documents and vouchers and wire back.
+What matters is to get a survey of amount and purpose of the issue
+of green checks to the various authorities entitled to make demands
+[Bedarfstraeger] since the beginning of this year which should easily
+appear from the books of the issuing office. Greatest speed is demanded
+as these documents are needed for another submission to Reich Foreign
+Minister.
+
+                                                               /s/ Wiehl
+
+decoded: Buehler
+
+Pencil notes:
+
+1. How large is the part administered by _v. Lenz_? How large is the
+part administered by Berlin? Who gives to Roges. To whom else does
+Berlin give allotments.
+
+2. How far does Lenz know for that purposes the amounts are used which
+he allots to branches of the Wehrmacht, etc.
+
+3. What are green checks?
+
+       #       #       #       #       #
+
+                                PART 34
+
+  OKW                                            Berlin, 6 November 1942
+  2 f 32 Beih. 1A WV (XVI)
+  3145/42 secret
+
+                                 SECRET
+
+To the Foreign Office
+
+Subject: Occupation costs France
+
+  Reference: a. Note of the DWFW Del. W. 347 g of 16 Oct 42
+             b. Meeting of committee for trade policy of 22 Oct. 42 and
+                30 Oct 42
+
+The Chief Intendant with the military Commander in France has
+reported that in the past deliveries have been made amounting to a
+total of 90,000,000 RM monthly which could have been paid by way of
+the German-French clearing system, because the procured goods were
+exported from France. The following figures have been obtained from
+the present monthly average of the year 1942 but they can only serve
+as a conjecture because the elimination of those goods which were not
+procured for the requirements of the units of the German Wehrmacht
+stationed in France is very difficult on basis of the available
+documents. The following items are involved:
+
+   1. Food supply and forage              ca. 11   mill. RM
+   2. Spirits, wine and champagne         ”    4    ”    ”
+   3. Red wine for troops                 ”    0.6  ”    ”
+   4. Canteen goods of all kinds          ”    1    ”    ”
+   5. Billeting utensils                  ”   16    ”    ”
+   6. Tools for vehicles                  ”    3    ”    ”
+   7. Procurements of ordnance staffs     ”    0.4  ”    ”
+   8. Procurements of air force           ”   23.5  ”    ”
+   9. Procurements of horses              ”   15    ”    ”
+  10. Purchases by Wehrmacht procurement
+      office                              ”    4    ”    ”
+  11. Procurements by the departments
+      North and Pas de Calais             ”    5.3  ”    ”
+  12. War risk premiums                   ”    2.5  ”    ”
+  13. Navy                                ”    5    ”    ”
+                                         -----------------
+                                         ca. 91    ”    ”
+
+These procurements have been transacted at the prices resulting from
+the general increase of prices in France. As the procurements were
+made for service branches outside of France, payment by way of the
+German-French clearing system is permissible as a matter of principle.
+Funds of occupation costs have been claimed so far, because the
+final customer of the goods in most cases is not known at the time
+of procurement. The payment and final entry into the books of these
+expenditures is the duty of the procurement office in France.
+
+The amount of 150 mill. RM provided so far for carrying out the flat
+clearing process [Pauschalclearingverfahren] with France can be reached
+only by including the purchases made by the Roges “Raw Material Trading
+Company Ltd.” [Rohstoffhandelsgesellschaft m k H] on the black market.
+Objections have been made hereto, because resale of the goods bought
+on the black market [“S-Markt”] is practicable only with subsidies to
+reduce the prices granted by the Reich Minister of Finances, and it
+is irresponsible to incur a commercial debt in the amount of these
+subsidies given by the Reich Minister of Finance, in order to procure
+goods which bring a considerably lower price than that expended.
+Payment of the procurements on the black market should be possible,
+however, at least to the amounts _actually_ obtained by the Roges
+through resale. The amount of 150 mill. RM would almost be reached
+if the Roges were required to transfer by way of the German-French
+clearing the proceeds obtained by resale of the goods with exception of
+the Reich subsidies for price reduction.
+
+If this settlement should not be practicable carrying out of the flat
+clearing process could be restricted to the amount of 90 mill. RM per
+month. In this case, the French Government in accordance with the
+suggestion of the Reich Minister of Finances of 27 October 1942 should
+be obliged to provide in form of occupation costs the surplus amount
+missing from the 150 mill. RM.
+
+The excess consumption of occupation cost funds in 1942, as already
+thoroughly pointed out in the last meetings of the Committee for Trade
+Policy, is primarily due to the decrease in purchasing power of the
+franc, and it is to be assumed that this decrease compared with 1940
+is at least one third. In addition, payments to a considerable extent
+had to be made from the occupation cost funds which were not allotted
+to meet the demands of those units of the German Wehrmacht stationed
+in France. On 15 January the B account of occupation costs was
+approximately _3 bill. RM._ The reason for the decrease appears from
+the following compilation:
+
+  a for procurement of goods exported from
+    France during the period of 1 Jan.-31 Oct
+    1942 an estimated 10 × 90 mill. RM             900   mill. RM
+
+  b to Roges Raw Material Trading Company
+    Ltd. for purchases on black market             700    ”    ”
+
+  c for procurement of foreign bills by the Navy
+    (the purchase of foreign bills with French
+    francs was necessary to buy and repair merchant
+    ships in Spanish harbors. These merchant
+    ships are to serve for supplying Rommel’s
+    Panzer army in Africa)                          40    ”    ”
+
+  d Reimbursement to Foreign Office (account
+    Syria)                                           4    ”    ”
+
+  e Allotments in favor of families of French
+    workers working in Germany                       1.5  ”    ”
+
+  f Special commissioner Rumania                     1.3  ”    ”
+
+  g Costs of building completions for directors
+    of French powder factories                       0.2  ”    ”
+                                                 ---------------
+                                                  1647    ”    ”
+
+Therefrom it appears that the decrease of reserves of occupation cost
+funds amounting to 3000 mill. RM on 15 January 1942 is primarily
+due to expenditures for purposes unrelated to the occupation. Also
+in the above compilation are not included the bills issued by the
+Reichskreditkasse imported into France. Of these probably a not
+immaterial part has been imported by troop units transferred to
+France, but to carry out procurement of goods destined for export
+from France. Consequently, it may be assumed that the requirements
+of the Wehrmacht units stationed in France up to now could have been
+approximately satisfied from the installments of 450 mill. RM made
+available every month by the French Government. It is further pointed
+out that a considerable part of the above-listed expenditures unrelated
+to occupation, in particular the expenditures for purchases on the
+black market (S-Markt) and for French food deliveries not destined for
+the occupation troops proper, have not been caused by the OKW.
+
+                                                    The Chief of the OKW
+                                                          b. Dr. Kersten
+                                                            Del. W. 7479
+
+       #       #       #       #       #
+
+                                PART 35
+
+  Received 4 December 1942
+  at 16 - - o’clock
+  from AA Berlin
+  by Mk.
+
+                                                          [Rubber Stamp]
+                                 German Armistice Delegation for Economy
+                                               Wiesbaden 4 December 1942
+                                                      No. 399 top secret
+
+  Telegram from Foreign Office, Berlin to German Armistice Delegation
+    for Economy Paris
+
+Citissime
+
+Telegram (Secret, coded, Verf) No. 352 of 4 Dec.
+
+Secret
+
+Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs has ordered the submission of a vote
+with reasons, _whether_ the _French potential can bear_ the increase
+of occupation cost payments, demanded by us. One must if possible gain
+clarification before a decision, whether for instance as result of
+black market purchasing actions, a development would be started, which
+would lead to Greek conditions.
+
+Request _by return_ that _documents and standpoint, necessary_ for
+vote, is wired, if _necessary_ in connection with _military commander_
+and _Embassy_.
+
+                                                              /s/ Wiehl.
+
+decoded: Buehler
+
+       #       #       #       #       #
+
+                                PART 36
+
+  Dir. Ha Pol 379                                Berlin, 8 December 1942
+
+                    Note re French occupation costs
+
+Following the note dated 27 November--Dir. Ha Pol 371
+
+According to instructions, I submit in the annex a note of delegate
+Hemmen about the financial capacity of the French to pay the increased
+expenditure rates of the occupation as well as about the dangers
+threatening French finances arising from the payments of occupation
+costs and about the methods to meet these dangers. Delegate Hemmen
+comes to following conclusion.
+
+1. The increased payments of 25 million RM daily (yearly 182 billion
+francs) are bearable and by no means dangerous for the French finances.
+The yearly French national income amounted to 432 billion francs for
+1942. The daily per capita war expenses are at present in Germany 2.90
+RM and thus 6 times as high as in France with 0.40 RM.
+
+2. The danger point for the French finances lies in the fact that
+the French government has done nothing until now to counteract the
+threatening inflation which is due to the war expenditures, so that
+a price increase of 50-60 per cent and a devaluation of the franc of
+about one third took place.
+
+3. Therefore it is necessary to raise simultaneously with the demand
+for increased occupation costs the demand for effective French
+financial, monetary and price regulations and to secure their strictest
+execution under German guidance and control.
+
+This result on the whole corresponds to the decisions of the HPA
+which were laid down in my former note. As suggested there, it can be
+demanded from the French to increase the daily part-payments from 15
+to 25 million RM; however, as it has been also suggested there, it
+is to be insisted that the measures which are needed against further
+price increase should be carried out without delay and in an absolutely
+effective way. The investigations which were conducted by the OKW and
+by the Reich Ministry for Finance come to the same conclusion.
+
+In doing so, it is not sufficient to leave this to the French
+government alone, but we ourselves have to intercede. The nomination of
+a special commissioner with similar tasks as in Greece will at present
+not be necessary and not even feasible in France, for the simple reason
+that it would be unwise to entirely unburden the French government
+of its own responsibilities to maintain the order of economics and
+finances. But it seems necessary to persuade the French government to
+accept a collaboration with one or more German advisors in order to
+introduce and carry out the necessary measures. This function could
+be assigned to the delegate Hemmen and to his delegation in such a
+manner that the negotiations they have conducted until now would be
+changed into a collaboration with the corresponding French governmental
+agencies. The necessity for this could be presented to the French
+government with the double motivation that, as an occupying power, our
+interest is not only in that further inflation should be prevented
+in France and that we can demand this in our capacity as receiver
+of the occupation costs on the basis of the armistice contract, but
+that we also have the same interests on account of the far-reaching
+interweaving of the French and German industries which was achieved
+through mutual free negotiations.
+
+Furthermore, the German side has to do its share that nothing should
+happen in the further course which would enhance the inflationary
+tendencies in France. I have agreed with State Secretary Koerner that
+the Foreign Office and the Four Years’ Plan should most closely follow
+further development in this respect and intervene as soon as necessary.
+State Secretary Koerner has told me that the Reich Marshal announced
+his decision to curb and, if necessary, to stop the black market action
+if it should become apparent that it has undesirable consequences in
+this respect. Also, further liaison will be maintained by the Foreign
+Office with the OKW which has already taken provisions to reduce the
+military expenditures to the absolutely necessary minimum in order to
+observe permanently this point of view.
+
+In this way both on French as well as on German sides everything will
+be done to prevent the possible dangers of the payment of increased
+occupation costs.
+
+Herewith submitted via the State Secretary to the Reich Foreign
+Minister with the request to approve the planned procedure.
+
+                                                            signed Wiehl
+
+Copies to:
+
+  Buero Reich Foreign Ministry
+  St. S
+  U. St. S. Pol
+  Dir. Ha Pol
+  Dg. Ha Pol
+  Delegate Hemmen
+  Ha Pol Frie
+  Ha Pol II a
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+
+                                PART 41
+
+                                                      12th February 1943
+
+The Head of the Government
+
+                                                          [Rubber stamp]
+                         German Armistice Delegation f. Economic Affairs
+                                              Wiesbaden, 13 January 1943
+                                                         No. Del. W. 165
+                                                             enclosures:
+
+  To his Excellency, Monsieur Hemmen, Minister Plenipotentiary German
+    Armistice Delegation for Economic Affairs
+
+Sir,
+
+On the 15th December 1942 the German government asked me through you
+to increase the payments towards the costs of occupation by 10 million
+RM (200 million French francs), which would bring the daily total of
+payments to 25 million RM, as against 15 millions, or 500 million
+French francs as against 300 millions.
+
+During our conversation of the same day, the 15th December, at the
+German Embassy, I pointed out to you:
+
+on one hand that these payments exceeded France’s ability to pay;
+that they would oblige the French government to cover this increase
+by advances from the Bank of France, and would in consequence risk
+compromising the French currency irretrievably;
+
+on the other hand that the French payments exceeded the concept of
+occupation costs and really constituted a French contribution to the
+common defence of Europe;
+
+that, wishing to collaborate and to render effective aid to the German
+war-effort under existing circumstances, I accepted these extra
+payments.
+
+In formulating your request for an increase, you declared that close
+cooperation should be instituted between our two countries, with the
+purpose of seeking and applying common measures intended to ensure
+the stability of the French currency and of French economy. You
+mentioned, on this subject, that the German government would appoint
+a plenipotentiary to the French government, whose mission would be to
+advise the French government.
+
+I declared myself ready to cooperate closely in the financial field as
+in all others, but I formally rejected the appointment of a financial
+adviser, as this would undermine the authority of the French government
+and risk ruining the confidence of investors.
+
+It is in fact necessary to point out that the daily payments which are
+the object of your request of the 15th December for an increase, do not
+represent the total of the financial burdens on my country. Besides
+these payments, France bears the lodging and billeting expenses of the
+German troops in the occupied zone, as well as the advances made for
+the functioning of the Franco-German clearing agreement.
+
+I had also pointed out to you, in our conversation of the 15th
+December, that a demand from the Italian Government could be expected.
+Since then, although the Franco-Italian Armistice Convention does not
+put part of the costs of maintenance of the Italian occupation troops
+on France, the Italian government has requested advances.
+
+Finally, I consider that the daily payments should, from the day that
+they are raised to 25 million RM, i.e., 500 million French francs,
+include all obligations falling on France as a result both of the
+occupation and of the Clearing agreement, and should take into account
+any advances which may eventually be granted to the Italian government.
+
+It has not been possible to hold any conversations since December; I
+consider that negotiations on these various points are essential and
+should be pursued without delay.
+
+While waiting for these negotiations to end up the necessary agreement,
+I inform you that I accept from now, under the conditions I have just
+described, a provisional increase in the daily payments as from January
+1943, to 25 million RM, i.e., 500 million French francs.
+
+The French government will immediately take steps to meet, on this
+basis, the new payments which have been demanded from it, and
+particularly to make up the difference in the payment made on the 11th
+January 1943 at the old rate.
+
+    I am, sir, etc.
+
+                                                   [signature illegible]
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+                                      H. Hartlieb I propose a note 2/Nov
+          Received 2 November 1943 at 1630 o’clock from AA Berlin by Kn.
+                                                          [Rubber Stamp]
+                                 German Armistice Delegation For Economy
+                                              Wiesbaden, 2 November 1943
+                                                                No. 4492
+                                                                  Inclo.
+
+From S Berlin, Foreign Office No. 52 Nov 1617 Etat
+
+To Delegation Hemmen Paris
+
+No. 196=Secret Letter
+
+  Reference: _written Decree HA POL FRIE 808 of 28 and 836 of 30
+    October [penciled note: not yet received] and 838 of 2 November._
+
+All departments concerned attach the _greatest importance_ to the
+continued payment of the French occupation cost payment, previously
+paid to Italy, because of the condition of the occupation cost and of
+the increased demand, which has been caused by the occupation of the
+Southern French area, which was up to now reserved for the Italian
+armed forces. I therefore request, to demand from the French government
+the transfer of all payments promised to Italy, to the Reich. If the
+French government should raise any legal objections then I request to
+point out without going into legal questions that the German Reich
+has taken over the protection of the areas occupied by Italy up to
+now. If necessary, certain concessions can be made, according to the
+suggestion by the Four Years’ Plan, to which the Reich Minister of
+Finance has also agreed, in the question of the additional payment of
+2.8 billion Francs for the previous additional demands of the Italians
+in the connection with war and occupation damages. The Reich Minister
+of Finance requests to point out to the French government also that its
+representatives themselves, during the negotiations of the delegate
+of the Reich cabinet (Reichsregierung) for economic and Financial
+questions, always have entered the Italian occupation costs as debit
+items. Request report on the acceptance of your demarche.
+
+                                                          Dumont *  *  *
+
+No. 6 of 2 November 1943 1630 Rec’d Wako Paris Ka † †
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+
+                                PART 44
+
+                                                      Paris 23 June 1944
+
+_Minister of Finance_
+
+_Minister’s Office_
+
+                                                          [rubber stamp]
+                        German Armistice Delegation f. Economic Affairs.
+                                                 Wiesbaden, 23 June 1944
+                                                                No. 2126
+                                                              Enclosures
+
+  [rubber stamp]
+  Minister’s office
+  Ministry of National Economy
+  and Finance
+
+Sir,
+
+I have the honour to confirm the conclusions reached in our talk of the
+21st June.
+
+The payments towards the costs of occupation, which have till now been
+made every 10 days and in advance, will provisionally, to fit in with
+present circumstances, be made monthly and in advance, on the 21st of
+each month.
+
+On the 25th of June next a settlement will be made, which will cover
+the monthly period from the 21st June to the 20th July, taking into
+account the payment made on the 21st June. From the 21st July, monthly
+payments will be made in advance at the rate previously agreed.
+
+These new regulations for the payments were adopted owing to the
+exceptional circumstances which justify the request you addressed to
+me in the note of the 19th June. They impose new burdens on the French
+Treasury at a time when, as you know, the monetary situation fills me
+with the liveliest apprehension.
+
+I therefore count on the system of making the payments every 10 days
+being reintroduced as soon as possible.
+
+  I am, sir, etc.
+
+                                                   [signature illegible]
+
+Monsieur Hemmen Minister Plenipotentiary
+
+  President of the German Armistice Delegation for Economic Affairs
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+
+                                PART 46
+
+                                                   Konzept/Ss _No. 2318_
+
+Paris, 11 July 1944
+
+  1. To the Foreign Office Berlin Teletype-C7-(only from to in secret
+  cipher)
+
+  [In handwriting] “Citissime”
+  No. 87 of 11 July 1944
+  after cabled order of 8 July No. 71.
+
+I ask for the consent of the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs to
+enter negotiations with the French government on the following basis:
+
+1. The OKW demands an increase of the French occupation cost payments
+from 25 million RM a day or 750 million RM a month plus 50 million RM
+for Italian occupational costs to 33.3 million RM a day or 1 billion RM
+per month and proposed to the Foreign Office to instruct my delegation
+to enter negotiations with the French Government to that effect. The
+RFM (Reich Finance Ministry) and the Four Year Plan agreed to that
+demand.
+
+The expenditures for occupational cost have since the beginning of
+the year constantly exceeded the income because of the increasing
+preparations on the Atlantic coast, made necessary by the war. Those
+excess expenditures were covered by using the remaining credits on
+the account of occupational costs and by a payment of one month of
+occupational costs in advance which we demanded a short time ago.
+
+These expenses increased to an even larger extent during the last few
+months, especially since the beginning of the invasion. While they
+still amounted to 900 million RM in May, they increased to 950 million
+RM in June and will reach 1100 millions in July. All reserves which
+were available up to now will be exhausted by the middle of August at
+the latest. New means for the conduct of war in France must therefore
+be procured until then according to the demand of the OKW.
+
+2. The income of the French Government from Tax-Sources, and mainly the
+raising of money through loans and short term bills of exchange has on
+the other side decreased considerably since the extensive paralyzation
+of the economic life, the industries and the transportation system in
+France. The French Government consequently has been forced for the last
+few months to use the _advances of money_ of the Bank of France at an
+ever-increasing rate. Those advances increased from _about 10 billions_
+of F. Frs. to 18 billions of F. Frs. _in May_ and _25 billions_ F.
+Frs. in June. The newly demanded payments will also have to be raised
+through the use of the bank-note credit, that means, through the
+printing of bank notes.
+
+The French Government can on the other hand hardly be surprised,
+considering the actual circumstances, if we approach them with the
+demand for increased payments.
+
+We know from confidential sources that Laval and Finance Minister
+Cathala already expect such a demand.
+
+3. Considering, however, the political necessities and the already
+mentioned difficult financial situation of France, and in appreciation
+of the fact that the French Government has kept its financial
+obligations for 4 years without interruption, I propose the following:
+
+1. to designate the new increase of payments which has now become
+necessary, as _temporary_ and to leave open the possibility of our
+readiness to reopen negotiations for an eventual re-diminution, as soon
+as the military situation in France permits.
+
+2. _Not_ to designate that new demand as an increase of the
+occupational costs in the spirit of the Armistice treaty, because
+that demand, which was explicitly motivated by the OKW, as to cover
+the increased expenses for our conduct of war in France, could
+only with difficulty be reconciled with the obligation to pay the
+“_cost for the maintenance of our occupation troops_”, as based on
+the Armistice-treaty. I recommend rather to present it _as special
+contribution of the French Government and the French people_ for the
+repelling of Bolshevism (original version reads: “repelling of the
+Anglo-Saxon invasion of Europe” but it has been changed in pencil to
+read as above) and the defense of Europe. Such a formulation lies in
+the political line of Laval and his repeated declarations. This does
+not change the fact, that those payments, like the previous increase,
+will also be made through the account of occupational costs and will
+thus continue to be treated as such.
+
+3. In order to provide _also an exterior character_ to that idea, I
+propose to negotiate about a single additional effort of _1 billion
+RM_ to be paid in _monthly installments_ of 200 million RM each. At
+the expiration of 4 months a further contribution by France could
+eventually be negotiated again, according to the then prevailing
+military situation.
+
+                                        With the consent of the embassy.
+                                                         signed: Hemmen.
+
+       #       #       #       #       #
+
+                                PART 47
+
+                           Copy as concept/Ss
+
+  German Armistice Delegation for Economics
+  Paris, 31 July 1944
+
+1. Note for the President of the French Delegation to the German
+Armistice Delegation for Economics, Governor de Boisanger.
+
+  Mr. President!
+
+Following a special order of the Reich Cabinet, I have the honor to
+communicate the following to you:
+
+According to Article 18 of the Armistice treaty the French Government
+has to defray the expenses for the support of the German occupation
+troops on French soil.
+
+The daily occupation expenditures for the Wehrmacht in France are at
+present more than 35 million RM. Since 11 November 1942 the French
+Government has paid daily installments of 25 million RM to the
+occupation costs. Due to the deficit thus resulting every month the
+last reserves from the occupation cost account have been used up in the
+meantime as you repeatedly had occasion to notice for yourself. By my
+exchange of notes with Minister Cathala on the future monthly advance
+payments of occupation costs of 19 and 23 June 1944 the necessarily
+resulting insolvencies could be overcome, however, the existing deficit
+could not be removed. I therefore request the French Government now to
+increase the installments of occupation costs effective on 1 August of
+this year to 35 million RM daily.
+
+In accordance with the said exchange of notes of 19 and 23 June
+1944--No. 2076--the installments are to be paid monthly in advance on
+the 21st of the preceding month. The additional amount of 200 million
+RM for the period of 1 to 20 August has therefore become due and is to
+be paid before 15 August 1944.
+
+I request you, Mr. Governor, to acknowledge receipt of this note and
+to inform me of the orders given by the French Government in order to
+carry out the above demand of the Reich Cabinet.
+
+Please accept, Mr. President, the expression of my deepest respect.
+
+                                                               s. Hemmen
+                                                               President
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+
+                                PART 49
+
+                    _By special route via Altkirch_
+
+  Belfort, 20 August 1944                                    No. 2739 IV
+
+                               _Teletype_
+
+  Foreign
+
+                                _Berlin_
+
+  No. 111 of 20 August 1944
+  In connection with No. 107 of 11 August.
+
+As I reported on 12 August the 8 billion-rate promised by President
+Laval for 12 August has finally been paid on time after considerable
+difficulties had been overcome (compare my report of 16 August). There
+was an unmistakable tendency to put off this payment until after the
+approaching bank-holidays to the 16th in the hope that by that time
+the development of the military situation would prevent the payment
+(American tanks had already been reported in Chartres).
+
+In addition to the increase of occupation cost payments I negotiated
+since 7 August upon suggestion of our military agencies with the
+Governor of the Bank of France, de Boisanger, about transport for
+safeguarding of the large reserves in bills in Paris (60 billion F.
+frs.) and Clermont Ferrand (80 billion F. frs.) to eastern France.
+
+Readiness of the Bank of France to do so was undoubtedly present, the
+existing transport facilities and the requisite military protection
+however extremely slight. A first transport of 25 billion from
+Paris to Nancy was scheduled for 12 August; simultaneously also the
+installment of 8 billion due on the 12th was to be sent off because
+there would be no other transport opportunity for it. This transport
+was carried out. For a second transport of 25 billion the military
+could no more make available any trucks. Railroads are also out.
+Therefore, the German Bank commissioner tried to transfer 10 billion F.
+frs. on 2 trucks of the Bank of France in another transport about the
+completion of which there is no report yet.
+
+Still greater were the difficulties of transport and protection for the
+transfer of 80 billion reserves in bills from Clermont-Ferrand to Dijon
+and Lyon, because there direct transport is being obstructed by Maquis
+and transport therefore had to be directed via Paris.
+
+Ten billion of these did arrive. Further transports are improbable in
+view of the development in the meantime.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+However, on the morning of the following day, 17 August, I again
+negotiated orally with Minister Cathala and Governor de Boisanger
+about our demand for increase of occupation costs. Cathala at this
+opportunity declared as per order of President Laval that the French
+government now definitely refuses the demanded increase for reasons
+already stated. I stated that therewith I had to consider our
+negotiations as definitely frustrated and therefore reserve subsequent
+decisions to my government. As I had learned in the meantime that the
+convention in the Bank of France necessary for the installment of 8
+billion due on 21 August had not yet been applied for, i.e., that on
+the due date new difficulties for the payment had to be expected, I
+expressed the definite expectation of the Reich Cabinet that order to
+pay the balance will be issued on time by the Ministry of Finances,
+Cathala thereupon declared that the French Government for a period
+of more than 4 years always fulfilled its obligations promptly. As
+long as he functioned as Minister of Finances he always considered it
+his special duty to fulfill the obligations contracted by the French
+Government; he would act the same way now in case he should still be
+in office on the 21 August. By saying so he distinctly alluded to
+the pending plans for a change of government and the present serious
+situation of President Laval.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+[Note: The original shows numerous corrections in ink. Translation
+followed the corrected version.]
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+
+                                PART 51
+
+  Copy                                     In the field 7 September 1944
+  The Military Commander in France
+  To Distribution
+
+The French government has not yet paid the 2nd September installment
+of the occupation costs which were due 21 August. For the securing of
+the French for the armed forces, stationed on French soil, I order the
+following.
+
+The administrative headquarters [Feldkommandanturen; FK] mentioned in
+the distribution, will confiscate at once half of the cash amounts of
+francs at the branch of the Bank of France, located at their official
+station, and will cause the removal under military guard to the
+following Reichskreditkassen: Belfort, Colmar, Muehausen, Strassburg,
+Saargemund, and Saarlautern. According to the situation of end of
+July, the following cash amounts were with the branches of the Bank of
+France: Belfort 698 million francs, Besancon 642, Epinal 853, Luneville
+93, Nancy 1,411, Nevers 1,016, Saint Die 181, Vesoul 227.
+
+Furthermore, 2 billion francs in thousand-franc notes are in the vault
+of the Bank of France in Nancy or Epinal, which were brought via
+transport in the middle of August from Paris to Nancy. Those 2 billion
+francs are also to be confiscated and to be removed.
+
+                                                           /s/ Kitzinger
+                                                General of the Air Force
+
+  _Distribution_
+
+               (in pencil)
+  FK Belfort      698
+  Besancon        642
+  Epinal          853
+  Luneville        93
+  Nancy         1,411
+  Nevers        1,016
+  Saint Die       181
+  Vesoul          227
+                -----
+                6,131 : 2 = 3 billion francs
+                          + 2 billion francs
+                       ---------------------
+                            5 billion francs were to be confiscated
+
+Order was forwarded by telephone
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+
+                                PART 53
+
+               German Armistice Delegation for Economics
+
+                                              Wiesbaden 16 November 1944
+                                                     No. 2971 Enclosures
+                                                           Berlin C 111,
+                                                         7 November 1944
+
+Chief Administration of the Reichskreditkassen
+
+  Journal No. 10906/44 Re: Your letter of 12 October 1944 No. II 2846
+
+The French moneys in the amount of frs. 2,931,000,000 deposited with us
+by the military commander in France have been accounted for by us with
+the Bank of France, Belfort branch, as per our letter of 25 October
+1944, photocopy of which is enclosed.
+
+                          Chief Administration of the Reichskreditkassen
+                                                    [initials illegible]
+
+  To the
+  German Armistice
+  delegation for Economics
+  (12 b) _Salzburg_
+  Hotel Osterreichischerhof
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1742-PS
+
+  The Reichmarshal of the Greater German Reich.
+  V.P. 18727/6/3
+  _Distribution_:
+
+                                                Berlin, October 26, 1942
+                                              W8 No. 3, Leipziger Street
+
+  OKW W.F.St.
+  OKW Wi Amt,
+  OKH Gen.St.d.H.
+  OKW Gen. Qu.
+  Chef d. Gen.St.d. Luftw.
+  Reichsfuehrer SS, Ostmin.
+  Reichsernaehrungsmin.
+  Chef wi Srab Ost
+  Gen. Bev. f. d. Arb. Eins.,
+  Org. Todt,
+  Reischsarbeitsdienst, Chefgr. Ernaehrung.
+
+Simultaneously with the intensified combating of gang activities,
+[Bandentaetigkeit] ordered by the Fuehrer, and with the cleaning up
+of the Hinterland in particular that behind the Army Group Middle, I
+request that the following aspects are taken into consideration and
+that the deductions drawn therefrom are put into practice.
+
+1. During combating of the underground and the combing through of the
+areas contaminated by them, all the available _cattle stock_ there,
+must simultaneously be driven off to safe areas. _Food supplies_ are
+to be evacuated and protected similarly, so that they will no more be
+accessible to the bands.
+
+2. All masculine and feminine labour which can be considered for some
+kind of employment, must be seized by force and transported to the
+plenipotentiary Chief of the Labour Exchange who will employ them in
+the safe areas of the hinterland or at home. The accommodation of the
+children in the hinterland camps is to be regulated separately.
+
+3. In the execution of the directives outlined under pars 1 and 2,
+no regard is to be paid to whether the agricultural or any other
+production in these areas will suffer or succumb owing to these
+measures. Since up to now these band infested areas have nothing to
+show in the way of production anyway, but were directly or indirectly
+useful to the bands.
+
+I request all authorities concerned, in as far as it is necessary, in
+mutual agreement, to effect the requisites within their spheres of
+competence, in order to act according to the directives outlined by me.
+
+About the detailed delimitation of areas an Agreement must be reached
+between the various head groups of agriculture of the Economy Offices
+[Wirtschaftsdienststellen].
+
+                                                   (signed)      Goering
+                                                               attested:
+                                                                Schwimpe
+                                              Registrar of the Ministry.
+
+
+                                 PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1743-PS
+
+[Page 1] Economic Operations Staff East
+
+                               TOP SECRET
+
+Note: Up to mobilization day these instructions are to be treated as
+“Top secret”, as of mobilization day open for “Restricted”.
+
+ _Guiding Principles for the Economic operations in the newly occupied
+                          Eastern territories_
+
+                           (Green portfolio)
+
+         Section I Assignments and organization of the Economy
+
+       Berlin, June 1941 Printed at the Armed Forces High Command
+
+_Introductory remark._ [page 3]
+
+The “green portfolio”, Section I, serves the military leadership and
+the Economic offices for orientation in the Economic assignments in
+the Eastern territories to be newly occupied. It contains instructions
+concerning the supplying of the troops from that land and provides the
+guiding principles for the troops to assist the Economy.
+
+The instructions and guiding principles contained in the “green
+portfolio” correspond to the military orders issued by the armed forces
+high command and the branches of the armed forces.
+
+
+                     The Major Economic Assignments
+
+The following executions are first of all intended for orientation
+during the course of operations. But they contain simultaneously the
+guiding principles, which serve for the duration of the occupation
+as a fundamental principle. The Economic arrangements necessary in
+the further progress of the occupation will be released as soon as
+the great political aim is publicized, which will be determined in
+connection with the necessary improvement of the German war Economy.
+
+I. In accordance with the commands given by the Fuehrer, all measures
+are to be taken which are necessary, to bring about the immediate and
+highest possible exploitation of the occupied territories in favor of
+Germany. On the contrary all measures are to be refrained or to be held
+back that could be harmful to this goal.
+
+II. The Exploitation of the territories to be newly occupied must be
+executed first of all in the realm of food and mineral oil economy.
+To gain for Germany as much food stuff and mineral oil as possible is
+the main goal of this action. Aside of that order raw materials are
+to be transported from the occupied territories for the German War
+Economy, insofar as it is technically possible and with a view towards
+the production to be maintained outside. As far as kind and amount of
+the factory production to be maintained the occupied territory, to be
+reconstructed or newly ordered is concerned, this likewise is also in
+the very first line to be decided according to the needs, provided by
+the exploitation of the agriculture and the mineral oil Economy for the
+German War Economy.
+
+For the Economic leadership in the occupied territories the main points
+are to be clearly outlined in accordance with this. This is valid with
+regards to the main aim as well as for the individual assignments
+and those that serve to aid their execution. From that it can be
+further concluded, that these assignments, that cannot agree with the
+given basic direction toward the goal, respectively those that may
+make their retention difficult, must be left out of consideration,
+no matter if their individual compilation does appear desirable.
+The conception would be totally off the track, if it would come to
+the point to uniformly pursue the idea in the occupied territories,
+that it can be directly restored to order and reconstructed with the
+greatest expediency. The treatment of the individual districts of
+the country will have to be on the contrary, entirely varied. Only
+those territories must be economically promoted and urgently kept in
+order in which considerable food and mineral oils can be rendered
+accessible for us. In other sections of the country, which cannot feed
+themselves--therefore in big sections of north and middle Russia--the
+economic operations must be limited to the available supplies.
+
+Which mobilization factories are to be maintained or reconstructed, is
+reserved for later decision.
+
+III. The individual fields consist of the following [Page 4]:
+
+a. Food and agriculture:
+
+1. The main assignment to be accomplished as soon as possible, is the
+uninterrupted supply of the German troops, in order thereby to relieve
+the supply situation in Europe and to ease the burden on the means of
+transport. The entire need of oats for the armed forces is to be taken
+care of from middle Russia, the main section for the growth of oats,
+insofar as it cannot be obtained from other occupied territories. In
+South-Russia it is to be achieved to feed barley and corn instead of
+oats.
+
+2. The main weight in procuring of food stuff for the domestic economy
+has to be placed on grain and oil fruits. The surplus of the crop
+that can be obtained and stocks in the southern territories are to
+be secured by all means, the proper handling of the harvest is to be
+watched, the removal into agricultural deficient Middle and North
+Russia has to be stopped ruthlessly, insofar as exceptions are not
+ordered or made necessary in order to feed the troops.
+
+b. The main weight as far as industrial raw materials are concerned,
+is to be placed on mineral oil. Under these measures, which do not
+serve the food management, all tasks connected with the production and
+shipment of mineral oil, will have first priority, by all means. For
+the execution of the decrees in the mineral oil field, especially to be
+issued for the Caucasus, the Continental Oil Company will be appointed.
+* * *
+
+c. The industries which provide for the functioning in the German
+interest, of agricultural production in surplus territories, the
+production of mineral oil and raw material production, are to be put
+into operation immediately.
+
+d. In order to tackle the transportation problem in the German
+interest, particular attention is to be paid to
+
+  1. Street buildings in South territories and the thoroughfares,
+
+  2. The extension of the railroad tracks, especially the building of
+     two track lines in the most important traffic districts,
+
+  3. The improvement of canals, unloading facilities in the inland
+     waterways, especially in the North and South traffic,
+
+  4. Rebuilding of harbor facilities. * * *
+
+
+                  Organisation of the Economy [Page 5]
+
+                              A. General.
+
+The Reichsmarschall has formed the “Wirtschaftsfuehrungsstab Ost”
+which is under his immediate jurisdiction and which will be run by
+Staatssekretaer Koerner, as his representative, for the uniform
+management of the Economy administration in the zone of operations
+and in administration districts, to be established later. For the
+representation of the military interests, for the preparation and for
+the duration of the military operations, the Chief of the War Economy
+and Armament Office, General of the Infantry Thomas, has the authority
+which he exercises as a Member of the Wirtschaftsfuehrungsstabes Ost.
+
+The directives of the Reichsmarschall include all phases of the Economy
+incl. food and agriculture. They will be carried out by the subordinate
+economy agencies (see B).
+
+The orders of the “Wirtschaftsfuehrungsstabes Ost” will be transmitted
+by the Chief of the Wi Rue office to the advanced “Wirtschaftsstab Ost”
+in the occupied territory which will be located during the operations
+in the vicinity of the OKH/Gen Qu.
+
+B. Organization of the Economy in the zone of operations.
+
+The subordinate Economy agencies of the “Wirtschaftsstab Ost” are,
+as far as they are active in the zone of operation, assigned to the
+Command agencies of the Army and militarily under their jurisdiction,
+namely:
+
+a. In the rear area of the army:
+
+  One each economy inspection team with the Commanders of the army rear
+    area,
+
+  One each of several economy Commands with the security divisions,
+
+  One group IV Wi each with the field administration headquarters.
+
+b. in the Army zone:
+
+  One each group IV Wi [V.O. Wi Rue Office] with the AOK’s [Army high
+    commands]
+
+  One each group IV Wi with the field administration headquarters, who
+    have advanced into the Army zone and who are under the jurisdiction
+    of the AOK’s, also in case of need, economy commands advanced into
+    the Army zone militarily under the jurisdiction of the AOK’s. * * *
+
+    C. Organization of the Economy for the political Administration
+                               districts.
+
+Regulation will follow later by the Reichsmarschall.
+
+The execution of the economic detailed tasks [Page 9].
+
+1. Within the food economy, the procurement of grain and oil containing
+plants is the foremost task. All measures for this will be taken with
+a view of long duration (bringing in of the harvest, safe storage,
+preparation and cultivation of the fields for autumn, to make available
+manpower and machines, the seed, fertilizer, throttling of the
+consumption of the domestic population. As much use as possible, is to
+be made of the setting up of simple community kitchens.)
+
+The supplying of the troops from the land [Page 14].
+
+As far as the troops have to be supplied from the land, attention is
+called to the following:
+
+I. Food, Clothes, housing needs and consumer goods.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+2. The food, housing, consumer goods and Clothes found in the zone of
+combat and in the rear areas, are in the first place at the disposal of
+IVa in order to satisfy the immediate needs of the troops (notice par.
+3).
+
+3. In order to facilitate the possibility of transfer of food stocks
+at a later date, the required supplies for the immediate needs of the
+troops, are if possible not to be taken from stocks which are in a
+general favorable locality for the shipment to Germany. (At railroad
+stations and waterways, in harbor, especially baltic harbor, the border
+states, in the vicinity of the German borders.)
+
+4. All food, housing, consumer goods and Clothes stocks which have not
+been taken over in the zone of combat and the Army rear areas by IVa
+and its agencies for the immediate use of the troops, will be put at
+the disposal of IV Wi, who thereby will be responsible for the care and
+Transfer to the economy agencies next in line.
+
+5. In the Army rear area the economy agencies who are taking over the
+preliminary work done by IV Wi will be charged with reconnaissance,
+security and care of the food, housing, consumer goods and Clothes
+stocks. The assignment to the troops will be made through the Wi
+agencies to the permanent local food supply agencies, who will
+determine the requirements of all troops of the different branches
+and report them to the local competent economy agencies. These will
+regulate the supply demands. * * *
+
+II. Fuel and tires.
+
+a. The troops will resort to the stocks found by them.
+
+Only in an emergency can be used:
+
+a. stocks of the gas, water, electricity and mine facilities
+
+b. gasoline and lubricants for farm and vital Industries
+
+c. stocks of the motor tractor stations.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+War-Booty, Services for pay, Army booty, prize [Page 19].
+
+I. General.
+
+1. Although according to the Hague Convention the entire movable
+property of the enemy country can be taken away without compensation,
+however for the time being only the movable property of the enemy
+army shall be treated as booty. Other movable property of the state
+may however be used by the troops in case of need, it is however to
+be treated as private property and to be paid for in case of use or
+acquisition.
+
+2. The payment is to be made in case of values up to 1000 RM in
+Reichskassennotes, amounts exceeding 1000 RM by issuance of receipts.
+
+Receipts may be issued by every agency in the rank of battalion or
+higher, unless exceptions have to be made due to a situation of the
+fighting or in case different directives have not been given by the OKH.
+
+3. When taking over property for which there is no owner a receipt will
+be given to the Senior member of the community or a report will be made
+to the field administration headquarters.
+
+4. With the establishment of the Field administration headquarters
+[Feldkommandanturen] and the permanent local economy agencies, the
+latter will be charged, in connection with the military agencies, with
+the procurement and making available the requirements of the troops
+from the Economy. In urgent cases the troops may even then secure their
+immediate needs independently. If possible, the local competent Field
+administration headquarters will be notified in such a case.
+
+Raw materials, Management of goods [Page 23].
+
+An exact regulated production and distribution of goods by
+interpolation of special merchandise pools will be out of question
+as far as the new territories to be occupied are concerned, with the
+exception perhaps of the Baltic states.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+C. All raw materials, processed and half processed goods, useful to us
+will be withdrawn from the market. This will be initiated by IV Wi’s
+and the economy agencies through suitable measures such as appeals and
+orders, through decrees for confiscation or through military guard or
+both.
+
+Money and Credit system [Page 24].
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+2. Gold reserves and foreign currency are to be secured. Further action
+will be taken by the Economy command upon notification.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+5. Reichskreditkassen will be established as soon as possible.
+They are personally and in fact under the jurisdiction of the
+Chief administration of the Reichskreditkassen in Berlin. The
+Reichskreditkassen are charged with the regulation of the Money and
+Credit system. They will discharge their duties with Reichskreditkassen
+notes which will be issued in 50, 20, 5, 2, 1 and 0.50 RM
+denominations. The Reichskreditkassen notes are legal tender along with
+the currency of the country. The ratio of the Reichsmark in relation
+to the currency of the Country will be fixed through decrees by the
+authorities in charge.
+
+The Reichskreditkassen notes serve as well the purpose to keep the
+economy of the occupied country intact, as far as this is important
+for us in the interest of peace and order, as well as to satisfy and
+balance the money requirements of the German troops. The first will
+be achieved by granting credits to industrial and other enterprises
+also to financial institutions or also to state and district
+administrations, if the granting of credits is in the German interest
+(compare 3).
+
+The financial institutions of the occupied countries are also to be
+induced to open accounts with the Reichskreditkassen.
+
+The Army has been ordered to pay its troops, after they cross the
+border, only with Reichskreditkassen notes or with the currency of the
+country and to use German change only in the smallest denominations
+of 10, 5, 2 and 1 Reichspfenning if the foreign change is not
+available. The money in the hands of the soldiers at the time of the
+invasion, in the amount of more than 0.50 RM, has to be exchanged
+into Reichskreditkassen notes at the nearest Reichskreditkasse by the
+Finance office of the troops.
+
+6. The Army has the order to see to it that the soldiers on their
+part pay in the occupied territory only with Reichskreditkassen notes
+or in the currency of the foreign country at the established rate of
+exchange. A decree will be issued in due time to the effect that in the
+occupied territory along with the currency of the foreign country, the
+Reichsmark in the form of Reichskreditkassen notes will also be a legal
+tender and what the rate of exchange will be.
+
+7. The maintenance of the rate of exchange of the Reichskreditkassen
+notes is especially important. The way of their acceptance by
+the population is therefore carefully to be observed. Should any
+difficulties arise of the kind that the population refuses to accept
+Reichskreditkassen notes at all or only to another than the fixed rate
+of exchange, so if necessary it must be counteracted by punishment. The
+Economy agencies will report about such incidents.
+
+To the maintenance of the rate of exchange pertains also that in case
+of subscription to forced loans and also when selling merchandise
+to the population not only the currency of the foreign country is
+demanded, but also Reichskreditkassen notes will be accepted at the
+rate of exchange by us.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+9. The Reichskreditkassen will work in closest cooperation with
+the Economy agencies. They have, notwithstanding the fact that
+they are under the jurisdiction of the Chief administration of the
+Reichskreditkassen, to bring in line their measures with the intentions
+of the Economy inspector with regard to the Money and Credit system.
+
+Foreign Trade and Exchange [Page 25].
+
+1. General.
+
+With regard to the question of Trade and Exchange between the occupied
+territories and third countries is to be taken into account, that all
+surplus of goods are in principle destined for German consumption. So
+far as removal is not possible, the goods will be, for the time being,
+stocked and secured, and be held ready for later removal. Therefore
+trade between the occupied territories and third countries is for the
+time being, fundamentally not possible. Directives for carrying on
+trade at a later date, with third countries in the interest of Germany,
+will be given as soon as the situation is clearer.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+Price Control [Page 26].
+
+A decree or announcement of a most simple character will prohibit
+the raise of prices and other compensations (also wages) and make it
+a punishable offense. This is only a temporary solution. A change
+of prices which are subject to political conditions will have to be
+considered.
+
+For agricultural products, the following rates are fixed, which may not
+be exceeded in the occupied territories.
+
+The IV Wi and the economy agencies will take care of their publication.
+Food purchases for the troops as well are to be made at the established
+prices only.
+
+  1. Field products, prices for 1 dz:
+      Wheat                                 140 Ruble
+      Rye                                   120   ”
+      100% Grain                            145   ”
+      Barley                                110   ”
+      Oats                                  120   ”
+      Corn                                  100   ”
+      Peas                                  160   ”
+      Millet                                100   ”
+      Buckwheat                             130   ”
+      Potatoes                               50   ”
+      Hay                                    30   ”
+      Straw                                  15   ”
+
+  2. Processed Products, prices for 1 dz:
+      80% Wheat flour                       200 Ruble
+      85% Rye flour                         155   ”
+      Sugar                                 400   ”
+
+  3. Animals (living)
+      Cattle (for each dz.)                 500 Ruble
+      Hogs (for each dz.)                   600   ”
+      Calves (for each dz.)                 250   ”
+      Sheep (for each dz.)                  200   ”
+
+  4. Dairy products
+      Milk (each 1.)                          1 Ruble
+      Butter (each kg.)                      44   ”
+
+
+                                 PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1746-PS
+
+    Conference between Field Marshal List and Representatives of the
+                        Bulgarian General Staff
+
+ (Agreement between Germany, Bulgaria and Rumania for attacking Greece
+             and eventually Turkey). dated February 8, 1941
+
+[_Page 1, Line 5-14:_]
+
+_Minutes_ of questions discussed between the representatives of the
+Royal Bulgarian General Staff and the German Supreme Command--General
+Field Marshal List--in connection with the possible movement of German
+troops through Bulgaria and their commitment against Greece and
+possibly against Turkey, if she should involve herself in the war.
+
+[_Page 1, Line 19--Page 2, Line 24:_]
+
+1. During the operation of the German troops against Greece or Turkey,
+the Bulgarian army will not be committed in an offensive way against
+the two mentioned countries, according to an agreement between the two
+governments. It will be reinforced, in order to safeguard the new order
+on the Balkan.
+
+2. Up to the arrival of German troops on the Bulgarian South and
+Southeast border, the Bulgarian army will alone defend its territory
+with its own troops for the beginning, with about the following
+deployment:
+
+  at least 6 Bulgarian divisions on the Bulgarian-Turkish border
+
+  sufficient forces for the protection of the border, on the Greek
+    border,
+
+  reinforced border protection on the Yugoslavian border
+
+Later on, the Bulgarian army is also responsible for adequate
+protection along those fronts where German forces will not become
+offensive.
+
+The mobilization and the deployment of these forces may start
+immediately in a camouflaged way. However, in order that these measures
+will have the desired effect, the deliveries to Bulgaria must be
+fulfilled immediately by Germany (enclosure I).
+
+The German supreme command will do everything in its power, so that its
+troops will appear on the Bulgarian-Turkish and Bulgarian-Greek border
+in sufficient numbers in the shortest time.
+
+For this purpose, from the beginning a sufficient amount of German
+forces--mainly armored and motorized divisions--will be moved in the
+shortest time behind the Bulgarian border protection troops. This move
+will start with the deployment of the two armored divisions which
+already are in the Dobrudscha as well as with the armored and motorized
+divisions which are in Walachia. The other forces provided for the
+operations, that means more infantry and armored divisions, will follow
+behind, depending on weather, road, and bridge situation.
+
+[_Page 3, Line 3-12:_]
+
+3. The Bulgarian and the German general staff will take all measures in
+order to camouflage the preparation of the operations and to assure in
+this way the most favorable conditions for the execution of the German
+operations as planned.
+
+The representatives of the two general staffs consider it to be
+suitable to inform their governments that it will be good to take
+the necessity of secrecy and surprise into consideration, when the
+three-power treaty is signed by Bulgaria in order to assure the success
+of the military operations.
+
+[_Page 3, Line 13--Page 4, Line 27:_]
+
+4. In order to protect Bulgaria from any possible enemy before and
+after the beginning of the operations, the German supreme command will
+take the following measures:
+
+a. _Against Turkey_: From the beginning, sufficient German forces,
+mainly armored divisions, will be thrown against the Turkish border
+behind the Bulgarian defensive front. At the same time, the German air
+force will stand ready for active defense.
+
+If Turkey should attack Bulgaria, while the German operations against
+Greece are being carried out, the Bulgarian army will defend itself,
+supported by sufficient German forces. The German supreme command will
+take all necessary measures immediately, in order to beat and throw
+back the Turkish army with German troops, so that an extended defense
+by Bulgarian troops will be avoided on the Turkish front.
+
+The same also goes for Greece, if the Greeks should attack Bulgaria
+during the German operations against Turkey.
+
+b. _Against Greece_: Motorized advance units shall thrust immediately
+against the Greek-Bulgarian border as fast as possible, in order to
+stand there as support for the protection of the Bulgarian border.
+
+c. _Against Yugoslavia_: If Yugoslavia should attack, the columns of
+the German infantry divisions would take over the protection against
+the West, at first, which are deployed on the right flank to the rear.
+Other German forces would get at Yugoslavia from another side, too. It
+is assumed in this case, that a reinforced Bulgarian border protection
+exists also along the Bulgarian-Yugoslav border.
+
+d. _Against Russia_: Sufficient German forces are ready on the German
+Eastern border, to be used for any purpose. Moreover, German instructor
+troops are available in Rumania, in addition to the Rumanian army.
+
+e. _Against landing attempts_: The German troops are in a position
+to take a hand at any time in the defense against a possible landing
+on the Black Sea coast, in cooperation with the air force. Besides,
+the supreme command of the army List will make its suggestions at the
+competent German navy office, in order to strengthen the protection of
+the two ports Varna and Burgas, according to the already known wishes
+of the Bulgarian supreme command.
+
+The Bulgarian army will also do its part to guarantee the protection of
+the two ports by providing forces there.
+
+[_Page 4, Line 32--Page 5, Line 27:_]
+
+6. The supply of the German troops on their march through Bulgaria and
+during their operations against Greece or Turkey will be provided from
+their own German stocks. However, in order to relieve the railroad and
+transportation system, especially with regard to feeding facilities,
+assistance from the Bulgarian side is necessary. This assistance will
+only be within the limits of the so-called “Contingents” [Kontingent].
+The details about the installation of the necessary dumps, about
+purchases, payment of work, etc., as well as export and import control,
+will be regulated by a special commission.
+
+[Remark in pencil] (L IV Is taken care of)
+
+7. It will be necessary to use the Bulgarian national installations
+(railroad, postal system, etc.), for the purposes of the German armed
+forces, as far as it will be bearable for the Bulgarian economy. The
+details about it will be regulated by the special commissions which
+are already in Sofia. It is presumed that especially the railroad
+net and the rolling stock will be placed at the disposal of the
+German army for its requirements. For that purpose it is necessary
+that the Bulgarian railroad receives an extra allowance of about 100
+locomotives, 1500 freight cars and 30 km rail material, in order to
+satisfy all requirements of the Bulgarian army, the Bulgarian economy
+and the German army. Operation and management of the Bulgarian national
+railroad, postal and telegraphic service are to remain in Bulgarian
+hands. Transportation required by the German army will be organized
+by the Bulgarian general staff. The details about the service of
+the railroads, postal and telegraphic systems will be discussed and
+regulated by a special commission.
+
+[_Page 6, Line 6-11:_]
+
+10. The activity of the counter intelligence service [Abwehr Dienst]
+of the German and Bulgarian general staffs is already regulated by a
+special commission.
+
+11. The question of command function in Bulgaria could not yet be
+finally settled. The German high command will come back to this
+question in the near future.
+
+[_Page 6, Line 15-26:_]
+
+13. Questions which might come up later will be taken care of by
+further conferences.
+
+14. The conditions laid down above, as far as political questions are
+concerned, will be in effect only after the approval by the German
+supreme command of the armed forces. Nevertheless, the preparations
+for the execution of the operations will be made with all energy,
+regardless of the above fact.
+
+In order to enable the Bulgarians to carry out in time the last
+preparations for the deployment, it is necessary that the Bulgarian
+general staff should be informed of the crossing of the border by the
+Germans 10 days ahead of time.
+
+                                 Finis
+
+
+    PART II Conference of Hitler and the German High Command _on the
+             situation in Yugoslavia. Dated March 27, 1941_
+
+[_Page 1--Page 4, Line 13:_]
+
+W F St
+
+                                                  Berlin, March 27, 1941
+
+                               Top Secret
+
+                                                         1st copy W F St
+                                                            _2nd copy L_
+                                                         3rd copy W Kr G
+
+Only for general officers
+
+To be transmitted by officers only.
+
+             _Discussion about the situation in Yugoslavia_
+
+                                                 [stamp] [several pencil
+                                                     marks and initials]
+                                 OKW/W F St Dept L (I M I) 29 March 1941
+                                                  No 44391/41 top secret
+
+Present:
+
+  Fuehrer
+  Reich Marshal
+  Chief OKW
+  Chief W F St
+  Major General Bodenschatz
+  Colonel Schmundt
+  Commander von Puttkamer
+  Lieutenant-Colonel Scherff
+  Major von Below
+  Major Christian
+
+Later on the following persons were added:
+
+  Supreme commander of the army (Ob.d.H.)
+  Chief of the General staff of the army (Chef Gen St d H)
+  Colonel Hensinger
+  Lieutenant-Colonel Sieverth
+  Reich Foreign Minister
+  Ambassador Hewel
+  Brigadier General (Gen.Maj.) von Waldan
+  Colonel Schmidt
+  Brigadier General (Gen.Maj.) von Rintelen.
+
+_The Fuehrer_ describes Yugoslavia’s situation after the coup
+d’etat. Statement that Yugoslavia was an uncertain factor in
+regard to the coming Marita-action and even more in regard to the
+Barbarossa-undertaking later on. Serbs and Slovenes were never
+pro-German. These governments never sit securely in the saddle, because
+of the nationality problem and the officers caste (Kamarilla), which
+is always inclined to start a coup d’etat. In the present time, the
+country had only one strong man, namely Stojodinowitsch, and Regent
+Prince Paul had him thrown over, to his own disadvantage.
+
+The present moment is for political and military reasons favorable for
+us to ascertain the actual situation in the country and the country’s
+attitude toward us, for if the overthrow of the government would have
+happened during the Barbarossa-action, the consequences for us probably
+would have been considerably more serious.
+
+The Fuehrer is determined, without waiting for possible loyalty
+declarations of the new government, to make all preparations in order
+to destroy Yugoslavia militarily and as a national unit. No diplomatic
+inquiries will be made nor ultimatums presented. Assurances of the
+Yugoslav government which cannot be trusted any how in the future will
+be taken note of. The attack will start as soon as the means and troops
+suitable for it are ready.
+
+It is important that actions will be taken as fast as possible. An
+attempt will be made to let the bordering states participate in a
+suitable way. An actual military support against Yugoslavia is to be
+requested of Italy, Hungary, and in certain respects of Bulgaria too.
+Rumania’s main task is the protection against Russia. The Hungarian and
+the Bulgarian ambassador have already been notified. During the day, a
+message will still be addressed to the Duce.
+
+Politically, it is especially important that the blow against
+Yugoslavia is carried out with unmerciful harshness and that the
+military destruction is done in a lightning like undertaking. In this
+way, Turkey would become sufficiently frightened and the campaign
+against Greece later on would be influenced in a favorable way. It can
+be assumed that the Croats will come to our side when we attack. A
+corresponding political treatment (autonomy later on) will be assured
+to them. The war against Yugoslavia should be very popular in Italy,
+Hungary, and Bulgaria, as territorial acquisitions are to be promised
+to these states; the Adria coast for Italy, the Banat for Hungary, and
+Macedonia for Bulgaria.
+
+This plan assumes that we speed up the schedule of all preparations
+and use such strong forces that the Yugoslav collapse will take place
+within the shortest time.
+
+_In this connection, the beginning of the Barbarossa-operation will
+have to be postponed up to 4 weeks._
+
+The military operations are to be carried out in the following way:
+
+1. Begin the operation Marita as early as possible with the limited aim
+to capture Greek-Thracia and the basin of Saoloniki and to win the high
+terrain of Edessa; for that purpose march [Ausholen] across Yugoslav
+territory.
+
+2. Push from neighborhood South of Sofia in direction Skoplje in order
+to relieve the flank of the Italian front in Albania.
+
+3. Push with stronger forces from the area around Sofia in direction
+towards Nis, then towards Belgrad, in cooperation with
+
+4. Stronger German forces penetrating from the area around Graz and
+Klagenfurt in direction South-East with the aim to destroy the Yugoslav
+army.
+
+[_Page 5, Line 3-9_:]
+
+5. The main task of the airforce is to start as early as possible with
+the destruction of the Yugoslavian airforce ground installations and to
+destroy the capital Belgrade in attacks by waves; besides the air force
+has to support the advance of the army.
+
+For this purpose, it is possible to make use of the Hungarian ground
+installations.
+
+[_Page 6, Line 7-12_]
+
+_The Fuehrer_ orders the immediate starting of all preparations. He
+expects the plans of the different parts of the armed forces during the
+evening of March 27th. General von Pintelen is ordered to receive the
+message and verbal orders from the Fuehrer during the night of March 27.
+
+                                              [illegible pencil initial]
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+
+                                 PART V
+
+Subject: Tentative plan for the coordination of the German and Italian
+operations against Yugoslavia. Dated: March 28, 1941
+
+  The Chief of the operational staff of
+    the Armed Forces of the Supreme Command
+    of the Armed Forces.
+
+                                                  Berlin, March 28, 1941
+
+[in pencil] Handed over to Gen. von Rintelen on March 28, 1941 at 4 P.
+M.
+
+Only for general officers
+
+To be transmitted by officers only
+
+                                KW/W F St [Stamp] [several pencil marks]
+
+
+     Tentative Plan for the coordination of the German and Italian
+                     operations against Yugoslavia.
+
+1. In the event that the political development requires an armed
+intervention against Yugoslavia, it is the German intention to attack
+Yugoslavia in a concentric way as soon as possible, to destroy her
+armed forces, and to dissolve her national territory.
+
+2. For this purpose, the following units are being formed:
+
+a. One assault group South of Sofia for the advance in direction
+Skoplje and South, in order to occupy the Southern part of Yugoslavia
+as basis for the combined attack against Greece and to remove the
+danger for the rear of the Italian front in Albania.
+
+b. One assault group which will be deployed around Graz and under
+certain circumstances also in the Southwest Hungary, in order to
+penetrate into Yugoslavia later in the direction Belgrad and Westward.
+
+c. Probably an Hungarian attack group reinforced by German forces which
+will be committed in the general direction towards the Danube on both
+sides of Belgrad.
+
+3. If the weather situation permits, the operation against Greece will
+start on April 2nd or 3rd. In this operation, the right flank will
+move across Yugoslavian territory. In the beginning, its aim will be
+limited to the occupation of the basis of Saloniki and the high terrain
+of Edessa.
+
+4. Therefore, the following tasks result for the participation of the
+Italian armed forces:
+
+a. Flank protection for the German attack group Graz by advancing
+towards the line Split-Yajele, with forces as strong as possible.
+
+b. Shifting to the defense on the Greek-Albanian front and deployment
+of an attack group, in order to join with the German forces committed
+around Skoplje and South.
+
+c. Elimination of the Yugoslav naval forces.
+
+d. Later on, resumption of the attacks against the Greek front in
+Albania.
+
+For the inner-political integration of the Yugoslav national territory
+it is especially desirable to favor the Croat independence movements
+in every respect and to treat the Croats as friends of the Axis. It
+will therefore be opportune to avoid any air attacks against Croat
+territory, as long as it is not a question of commitment against enemy
+troops fighting there.
+
+5. The following chronological schedule of the German operations may be
+expected:
+
+a. Attack against Greece: April 2nd-3rd
+
+b. Attack from the area South of Sofia on April 3rd or April 4th
+
+c. Attack from the area around Graz and East of it: April 12th.
+
+                                                     [illegible initial]
+
+
+                                 PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1751-PS
+
+                                 SECRET
+
+  SS Main Office Economy Administration [SS Wirtschafts-Verwaltungs
+    Hauptamt]
+
+Department Chief [Amtsgruppenchef]
+
+  Concentration Camps                            Dramenburg, 12 May 1944
+  DI/Az,:14 h 2/Na/s-
+  Geheim Tgb-Nr. 605/44
+
+  Re: assignment of prisoners for experimental purposes
+
+  To the Camp Commanders of Concentration camps Da, Sah, Bu, Mau, Flo,
+    Neu, Au.I III, br-Ro, Natz, Stu, Rav, Herz, Aufenth, Camp Bergen,
+    Belsen
+
+  Group leader D Riga, one copy each for KL Riga, Kauen, Vaivara
+
+  SS Wirtschafter Ost, Krakau with one copy each for KL Lublin,
+    Warschau and Plaszow.
+
+There is cause to call attention to the fact that in every case
+permission for assignment has to be requested here _before_ assignment
+of prisoners is made for experimental purposes.
+
+To be included in this request are number, kind of custody, and in
+case of aryan prisoners, exact personal data, file number in the Main
+Reich’s Security Office and reason for detainment in the concentration
+camp.
+
+Herewith, I explicitly forbid assignment of prisoners for experimental
+purposes without permission.
+
+                                          [signature illegible] (Waffen)
+                                          SS Lt Gen and Lt Gen of the SS
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1752-PS
+
+                                 SECRET
+
+       _Preparations already made for the International Congress_
+
+Reichsleader Alfred Rosenberg received the order from the Fuehrer to
+stage an anti-Jewish congress. The date for this congress was fixed for
+11.7. after a discussion, and after the corresponding preparations had
+been made.
+
+The following preparations for the congress have been undertaken:
+
+1. In Germany.
+
+2. abroad.
+
+1. _Preparations in Germany._
+
+a. The financing of the congress has been taken on by the Reich
+Treasury of Chief, Schwarz. Further, after the Fuehrer had decided on
+Cracow as the site of the congress, Reich Minister and General Governor
+Frank has taken over all the costs that arise within his General
+Government.
+
+b. _The site of the meeting._
+
+All negotiations concerning billeting, feeding and welfare of the
+guests, the lecture rooms etc. have been readily settled with the
+offices of the General governor. (Instead of Cracow, a place that is
+safe from air raids, for instance Zakopane, can be selected at any
+time.)
+
+c. The program of lectures has been discussed with the appropriate
+offices,
+
+1. Foreign Office
+
+2. Propaganda Ministry
+
+3. Head Office for internal security
+
+and has met with general approval. The Reich Foreign Minister as well
+as Reich Minister Dr. Goebbels have given their assent to the program.
+
+d. German speakers and lecturers have been visualized, among others
+three German Ministers. The promise of these three gentlemen to attend
+seems certain. Some lectures are already on hand.
+
+The final preparations, those for the cultural extra items on the
+programme, have been taken in hand. (See the letter from Reichsleader
+Rosenberg to Reichsleader Bormann concerning the appearance of the
+Berlin Philharmonic Orchestra, with Furtwaengler as conductor.)
+
+Even the formation of international organisations for investigating and
+combatting Jewry, which have been provided for in connection with the
+congress, have been brought about, and scientific presidents of the
+organisations have been earmarked. Some individual personalities have
+already been approached. Amongst others we already have the promise of
+Geheimrat Professor Dr. Eugen Fischer to be president of the European
+organisation for the “racial-biological questions of Jewry”.
+
+e. The following have been entered as honorary members:
+
+  Reich Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop
+
+  Reich Minister of the Interior and Reichsleader of the SS Heinrich
+    Himmler
+
+  Reich Minister Dr. Goebbels
+
+  Reich Minister and Governor Dr. Frank
+
+2. _Preparations abroad_
+
+The Foreign Office has accepted the task of contacting the prominent
+European people, with the exception of a few of the occupied
+territories in Europe, via its representatives abroad.
+
+The German representatives abroad have received several official
+instructions, according to which they are
+
+a. to propose delegates to be invited,
+
+b. nominate lecturers,
+
+c. approach the representatives of governments with a view to their
+participating at the congress.
+
+In the course of these instructions being carried out, the
+following have promised their participation, or membership of the
+congress-committee and membership of the honorary committee:
+
+  Italy:   Minister for National Enlightenment Mezzasoma (honorary
+             committee)
+
+           The former Minister of State Preziosi (congress-committee and
+             congress lecturer)
+
+  France:  Minister for Education Abel Bonnard (Honorary committee)
+             Secretary of State Paul Marion (congress-committee)
+
+  Hungary: Minister for the Interior von Jarossh (honorary committee
+             and congress lecturer)
+
+  Holland: The leader of the NSB, Mussert (Personally invited by
+             Reichsleader Rosenberg during the latter’s stay in Holland)
+
+  Arabia:  The Grand Mufti of Jerusalem (honorary committee and congress
+             lecturer)
+
+  Iraq:    Prime Minister Gailani (honorary committee)
+
+  Norway:  At the present moment a representative of Reichsleader
+             Rosenberg has arrived here, in order personally to convey
+             an invitation to Prime Minister Quisling to attend the
+             congress.
+
+Contacts have also been established with countless other countries. For
+the time being the promises to attend of the prominent representatives
+are not yet at hand. On the other hand promises have been received from
+delegates from Sweden, Roumania, Slovakia and illegal delegates from
+Switzerland, Spain and Portugal. Further the office of General in the
+SS Berger has undertaken to invite renowned leaders of the Germanic
+volunteers in the SS to take part in the congress. Amongst others,
+Britons and Americans are visualised in this connection, who are also
+willing to speak.
+
+The occupied eastern territory is included via the Ministry for the
+East. A number of promises to attend have been received from renowned
+personalities in this territory. Lectures have already been received
+from foreign speakers, amongst others from the former Minister of State
+Preziosi.
+
+3. Reason for the importance of the Congress at the present time. The
+reports from outside Germany and the anti-German allied propaganda try
+to make believe beyond all doubt that the whole war is being kindled by
+the other side more and more as a crusade, because the German nation
+plans to destroy the “Jewish People”.
+
+The Soviet Union: We refer to the pro-semitic Molotov-congress in
+Moscow.
+
+U.S.A.: We refer to permanent session of the Jewish Congress.
+
+The _last new_ beginning 6. 5. 1944.
+
+England: We refer to the English failure to pay attention to their own
+White Paper regarding Palestine problem.
+
+At the same time, we point out the slowly rising anti-Semitic feeling
+in the countries of our opponents. It seems necessary that the feeling
+caused by enemy propaganda that National Socialism is retreating on all
+fronts, be refuted by this great anti-Jewish Congress.
+
+The invasion army is not fighting against the barbarian Germany of
+annihilation of Jews but it is fighting for world Jewry!
+
+What kind of propaganda is being duly turned out on the German side?
+
+To give up this plan or to postpone this International Congress _to an
+indefinite date_, after half of Europe has already been won for this
+plan would support or strengthen the propaganda conducted against us.
+
+It must be borne in mind that not a German authority but an
+international assembly is responsible for the Congress and issues
+invitations to it.
+
+The preparations for the Congress have so far progressed with the
+greatest possibilities of disguise.
+
+An arrangement, which has been made on general lines, mentions only an
+International historic and scientific congress taking place in a Town
+in the East of the Reich.
+
+  Berlin, 15th June 1944.
+  Hg/We
+
+                                                     /s/ Hans Hagemeyer,
+                                                 Head of the Department.
+
+
+                                 PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1757-PS
+
+                    _REPORT OF GOERING’S COMMISSION_
+
+  for the investigation of the Aryanisations carried out in the Gau of
+ Franconia between 9.11.38 and 9.2.39 and the irregularities connected
+                 therewith which have been established
+
+[P.9] k. By an order of the Reich Chancellor of the Exchequer of
+the 2nd September 1938, No. 57/38, issued with the agreement of the
+Fuehrer’s deputy, all party offices, including organisations and
+attached formations, are forbidden to accept administrative dues,
+donations, gifts, bequests or material payments of any other kind
+for the participation of the party in economic tasks, including the
+transfer of Jewish firms to persons of German race, nor are they
+allowed to make the fulfillment of such tasks dependent on the payment
+of contributions, etc. The order was addressed to all Gau treasurers
+and reached the Gauleaders as well, among others.
+
+[P.12] From the course of events one can only assume that the Reich
+Chancellor of the Exchequer’s order of the 2nd September 1938 No. 57/38
+about the ban on financial payments for the cooperation of the Party
+in Aryanisation and other economic tasks was considered in Franconia
+to be superseded, and that they thought themselves entitled to obtain
+considerable sums of money for the Gau of Franconia in connection with
+Aryanisation.
+
+[P.13] l. Following upon the November demonstrations, the deputy
+Gauleader, Holz, took up the Jewish questions. His * * * reasons can be
+given here in detail on the basis of his statement of the 25th March
+1939:
+
+“_The 9th and 10th November 1938._ In the night of the 9/10 November
+and on the 10th November 1938 events took place throughout Germany
+_which I considered to be the signal for a completely different
+treatment of the Jewish question in Germany_. Synagogues and Jewish
+schools were burnt down and Jewish property was smashed both in shops
+and in private houses. Besides this, a large number of particular
+Jews were taken to concentration camps by the police. Towards midday
+we discussed these events in the Gauleiter’s house. All of us were of
+the opinion _that we now faced a completely new state of affairs on
+the Jewish question_. By the great action against the Jews, carried
+out in the night and morning of the 10th November, _all guiding
+principles and all laws on this subject had been made illusory_. We
+were of the opinion (particularly myself) that we should now act on our
+own initiative in this respect. I proposed to the Gauleiter that, in
+view of the great existing lack of houses, the best thing would be to
+put the Jews into a kind of _internment camp_. Then the houses would
+become free in a twinkling and the housing shortage would be relieved,
+at least in part. Besides that, we would have the Jews under control
+and supervision. I added “The same thing happened to our prisoners of
+war and war internees.” The Gauleiter said that this suggestion was,
+for the time being, impossible to carry out. Thereupon I made a new
+proposal to him: I said to him _that I considered it unthinkable that,
+after the Jews had had their property smashed they should continue to
+be able to own houses and land_. I proposed that these houses and this
+land ought to be taken away from them, and declared myself ready to
+carry through such an action. I declared that by the Aryanisation of
+Jewish land and houses _a large sum could accrue to the Gau out of the
+proceeds_. I named some millions of marks. I stated that in my opinion,
+this Aryanisation could be carried out as legally as the Aryanisation
+of shops. The Gauleiter’s answer was something to this effect: “_If you
+think you can carry this out, do so. The sum gained will then be used
+to build a Gau school._” The very same afternoon I began to organize
+the Aryanization of land. I stated here as in my memorandum, too, _that
+I considered this Aryanisation of Jewish land as a logical continuation
+of the events of the 9th and 10th November_. I was of the opinion that
+I was doing a service to the Party by trying to bring it money. I was
+further of the opinion _that the transfer of the land and houses from
+Jewish to German hands was a National-Socialist action_.”
+
+[P.16] Holz appointed commissioners for Nurnberg and Furth to carry out
+the Aryanisation of Jewish landed property * * *
+
+[P.18] 2. The Aryanisation was accomplished by the alienation of
+properties, the surrender of claims, especially mortgage claims, and
+reductions in buying price.
+
+The payment allowed the Jews was basically 10% of the nominal value
+or nominal sum of the claim. As a justification for these low prices,
+Holz claimed at the Berlin meeting of the 6th February 1939 that the
+Jews had mostly bought their property during the inflation period for a
+tenth of its value. As has been shown by investigating a large number
+of individual cases selected at random, this claim is not true.
+
+[P.70] Favoritism shown to third parties and irregularities during the
+Aryanization of properties.
+
+[P.72] _Schoeller case._ c. Gauamtsleiter Fritz Schoeller bought
+_Grimmstrasse 3, Nurnberg_ by a contract of the 15th November 1938.
+The house has a nominal value of RM 43,300 and an exchange value of
+RM 50,000. The buying price was fixed at RM 5,000. Holz admitted
+(statement of the 27th March 1939) that he was in agreement with
+the buying of the property. He based his agreement on the fact that
+Schoeller was an old and deserving party member and deserved particular
+consideration owing to his family circumstances.
+
+
+Report of German Commission to Goering on Streicher. [Extract from Part
+                                  II]
+
+[P. 139] On the other hand, the minority of the shares of the
+Mars-Werke, Nurnberg, with a face value of Reichsmark 112,500, were
+acquired through publishing house manager Fink for the Gauleiter
+according to the latter’s instructions at the instigation of the
+deceased SA Brigadier General Koenig. These shares were in the
+possession of the Jewish banking house Kohn, the proprietor of which
+was at that time in protective custody. Verlagsdirektor Fink, as agent
+for the Gauleiter, acquired the parcel of Mars-Werke shares from this
+Jew at 5 per cent of the face value, i.e., the sum of Reichsmark 5,600.
+
+In the presence of Fink, Koenig informed the Gauleiter in detail of
+the completed transaction. The Gauleiter gave his complete assent and,
+in addition, gave the order to transfer the parcel of shares from the
+account of the banking firm Kohn to the account of Fink at the Dresdner
+Bank. He further ordered that his name should not be mentioned at all
+in connection with the transaction.
+
+By order of the Gauleiter, Fink withdrew Reichsmark 5,600 from a
+Stuermer account, and later, also acting for the Gauleiter, he bought
+the remainder of the shares of the Mars-Dresdner Bank, at 60 per cent
+for the Gauleiter with Stuermer funds.
+
+After Fink learned of the investigating commission he discussed the
+matter with Gauleiter Streicher. Streicher told Fink that he would keep
+the shares, because they had no connection with the Aryanization of
+estates, and if the purchase of the Mars shares should be contested he
+would simply pay over the required sum to the Reich.
+
+After the investigating commission had started to work Gauleiter
+Streicher sent for Fink and told him the following: “The police have
+found out about the Mars shares. We will simply say that the shares
+were not bought for me but for the Fraenkische Tageszeitung!!” [P. 145]
+Thanks to the efforts of the district economic adviser and president
+of the chamber of commerce Strobl, it was possible to persuade the
+Hungarian consul Pfaller to buy the estate of the Gauleiter on Lake
+Constance without ever having seen it, for a price of Reichsmark
+240,000. It is noteworthy that the Gauleiter and people close to him
+had a very bad opinion of Consul Pfaller, but after the purchase of
+the estate the Gauleiter sent him a picture. In order to avoid the
+Gauleiter’s appearing personally as the seller, a sham contract was
+made with publisher Willmy, so that the latter would appear to the
+outside world as the seller of the estate.
+
+[P. 152] Gauleiter Streicher likes to beat people with a riding whip,
+but only if he is in the company of several persons assisting him.
+Usually the beatings are carried out with sadistic brutality.
+
+The best known case is that of Steinruck, whom he beat bloodily in
+the prison cell, together with deputy Gauleiter Holz and SA Brigadier
+General Koenig. After returning from this scene to the “Deutscher
+Hof” he said: “Now I am relieved. I needed that again!” Later he also
+stated several times that he needed another Steinruck case in order to
+“relieve” [erloesen] himself.
+
+In August 1938 he beat editor Burker at the district house, together
+with district office leader Schoeller and his adjutant Koenig.
+
+On 2 December 1938 he asked to have three youthful criminals (15 to 17
+years old) who had been arrested for robbery brought to the room of the
+director of the criminal police office in Nurnberg-Fuerth. Streicher,
+who was accompanied by his son Lothar, had the youths brought in singly
+and questioned them about their sex life and in particular, through
+clear and detailed questioning, he laid stress on determining whether
+and since when they masturbated. One of the youths did not know the
+word, whereupon Streicher gave him a vivid description. The last one of
+these three boys he beat with his riding whip, with blows on the head
+and the rest of the body.
+
+[P. 151] From 1934 to 1938 Gauleiter Streicher employed the Jew Jonas
+Wolk as contributor to the Stuermer. Wolk wrote for the Stuermer under
+the pseudonym of “Fritz Brandt”. In addition, Wolk did spy work for
+the Gauleiter abroad. From February 1937 to August 1938 the Stuermer
+paid the Jew Wolk a fee of Reichsmark 8,262.39. Wolk was previously
+convicted six times, among other things with loss of civic rights.
+It is especially significant that Streicher had the Jew Wolk paid
+by the Fraenkische Tageszeitung from 1934 to 1937. The Fraenkische
+Tageszeitung paid Wolk the sum of Reichmark 9,623.65.
+
+[P. 160] According to the statement of the district treasurer
+[Gauschatzmeister], his financial adviser, and several other persons,
+Streicher is regarded as extremely brutal. The statements made by
+Verlagsdirektor Fink are especially significant. He declared that he
+was convinced that the Gauleiter would have him bumped off one of these
+days, as soon as he found out that Fink had told the truth to the
+investigating commission.
+
+[P. 161] According to reports of reliable witnesses, Gauleiter
+Streicher is in the habit of pointing out on the most varied occasions
+that he alone gives orders in the district of Franconia. For instance,
+at a meeting in the Collosseum in Nurnberg in 1935 he said that nobody
+could remove him from office. In a meeting at Herkules Hall, where
+he described how he had beaten Prof. Steinruck, he emphasized that
+he would not let himself be beaten by anybody, _not even by an Adolf
+Hitler_.
+
+[P. 166] For, this also must be stated here, in Franconia the Gau acts
+first and then orders the absolutely powerless authorities to approve.
+
+[P. 172] In general it is to be said that Koenig was regarded as the
+evil spirit in Franconia. In an unheard-of-manner he tyrannized the Gau
+leader, the authorities and the population, and he knew how to make
+the influence of his power felt everywhere. Koenig’s word carried the
+weight of that of the Gauleiter.
+
+[P. 174] In favor of Strobl [pencil note: Director of the AEG,
+Gau economic adviser, and president of the Chamber of Industry
+and Commerce] it must be said that he, in contrast to almost all
+other defendants, immediately told the truth on all points in his
+interrogations. It is primarily thanks to him that clearness was
+quickly reached in many cases which could be verified.
+
+As an excuse for his incorrect acts Strobl states that he like all
+other persons in the Gau of Franconia was to such an extent under the
+pressure of Gauleiter Streicher and his adjutant Koenig that he would
+never have dared to do anything against the orders of the two men
+mentioned.
+
+[P. 179] By the law of April 1938 it is decreed that all applications
+for Aryanization shall be submitted to the competent Gauleiter. From
+that time on Strobl submitted the applications, which he had up to
+that time handled by himself, to the adjutant of the Gauleiter, SA
+Brigadier General Koenig for approval. He makes the excuse that it had
+been the practice in Franconia for the adjutant to take care of almost
+all matters as agent for and deputy of the Gauleiter. Every order of
+Brigadier General Koenig was equivalent to an order of the Gauleiter.
+
+
+                                                COPY OF DOCUMENT 1759-PS
+
+  United Mexican States    }
+  Mexico, Federal District }
+  Embassy of the United    } ss
+  States of America        }
+                           }
+
+  Mexico City, D. F.       }
+                           } ss
+  Mexico                   }
+
+Raymond H. Geist, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:
+
+I came to Berlin in December, 1929, as Consul and continued in that
+capacity, exercising my official functions until the end of 1939. In
+1938 I was appointed First Secretary of the Embassy and continued in
+that office discharging at the same time my duties as consul. During
+the entire period of ten years my work was of such character that
+I frequently came into contact with many officials of the German
+Government. After the Nazis came to power in 1933, these contacts
+increased owing to the much more frequent occasions on which it was
+necessary to intervene with German officials in order to protect the
+rights of American citizens and their properties. During this period I
+not only had many official contacts but also friends and acquaintances,
+both in Berlin and elsewhere in Germany. My work permitted and
+occasionally required travel in Germany. It was my custom to make
+bicycle trips, as well as excursions by automobile to various points
+particularly in the environs of Berlin, often to the extent of fifty
+miles. Although I do not have the first-hand information with regard
+to developments under the National Socialists for all of Germany that
+I have regarding the neighborhood of Berlin, I saw enough during my
+excursions, and was told enough by friends and acquaintances to know
+that the activities hereafter described in and around Berlin were being
+substantially duplicated all over Germany.
+
+There were indeed few military establishments in the neighborhood of
+Berlin in 1929 and until 1933 there were the Casernas at Potsdam and
+the military establishment at Doeberitz. After the Nazis came to power,
+military establishments of all sorts grew up with enormous rapidity.
+Before the end of 1933, during my frequent excursions, I discovered
+outside of Berlin on nearly every road leaving from the city new large
+military establishments, including training fields, airports, barracks,
+proving grounds, anti-aircraft stations and the like. For these
+establishments most of the ground was broken during the year 1933;
+there were probably fifty within the immediate vicinity of Berlin.
+Most of these establishments were being openly prepared, nevertheless
+they were under guard. It was apparent with respect to others that an
+attempt was made to preserve secrecy. I recall in particular that the
+large anti-aircraft station near my house in the Gruenwald was built
+under secrecy, likewise a munitions dump burrowed in the hills of
+Wildpark near Potsdam was also built under secrecy. Being disguised as
+a German and speaking the language, I was able on my bicycle trips to
+penetrate certain of these establishments where at various times I saw
+military exercises, including the use of tanks, in various maneuvers.
+I recall from my travels beyond Berlin and the information and reports
+which I had from friends and acquaintances that the same feverish
+preparations were in progress throughout the length and breadth of
+Germany, in fact, all establishments which could serve a military
+purpose were converted to military uses.
+
+I also saw the preparations being made for building up the new army. I
+visited the camps of the compulsory labor service, the _Arbeitsdienst_,
+which was well under way by the end of 1933, with camps established
+all over Germany. Though this was ostensibly a labor service, it was
+essentially military in character, as is well known. I saw the men
+working on reclamation projects and was informed that they worked two
+hours in the morning and two hours in the afternoon, the balance of
+the time being spent in military tactics and in instruction in Nazi
+ideology. So that when conscription went into effect in 1935 through
+the medium of these camps, it was possible for the Germans to put a
+trained army of at least 3,500,000 men, which formed the nucleus of the
+future army of aggression.
+
+Particularly through the years 1933 and 1934 the hordes of storm
+troopers SA were much in evidence practicing military exercises.
+They were being converted into a military organization. I frequently
+encountered the storm troopers deployed in fields and in forests
+engaged in military technical exercises. This was all the part of a
+general plan to prepare Germany’s manpower for war.
+
+I witnessed, too, scores of times, the training of the Hitler Youth,
+which included boys from 14 to 17, who dressed in their uniforms, were
+likewise generally in evidence wherever I chose to travel. I frequently
+saw them in the woods near Berlin, deployed in ravines, in fields,
+woods and hillsides staging mock attacks, employing the technique of
+actual maneuvers. Frequently they were under the direction of uniformed
+leaders and at times under officers of the Reichswehr. This type of
+training of the youth extended everywhere in Germany. Frequently my
+route of travel had to be changed in order not to find myself in the
+midst of some maneuvers which required the use of roads or paths along
+which I was riding. It was not considered wise to get too close to
+these operations, particularly if they were on an extensive scale.
+
+The _Deutsche Jungvolk_ (boys from the ages of 6 to 14) was also the
+vehicle for military training. They were also in evidence throughout
+the country. I frequently met them marching. I saw them engaged in
+military exercises in the school yards during the school recesses,
+particularly throwing hand grenades usually under expert adult
+leadership. Often I have seen these children in large numbers engaged
+in what were obviously military maneuvers, and under the direction of
+adult uniformed officers.
+
+I had occasion, at times, to witness the organizations which were
+created for the girls that were part of the Hitler Youth and were
+also incorporated in the so-called _Arbeitsdienst_, usually located
+somewhere near the camps for men. The resultant illegitimate children
+were a definite planned result of the program; they were part of the
+manpower and the army for the next generation. The shame and the grief
+of parents over this program fostered and urged by the Nazis although
+it existed, was seldom openly expressed on account of dangers to which
+the parents might expose themselves.
+
+So far as the youth were concerned, the entire program was carried
+on with lavish propaganda and enough benefits to the participants to
+make it extremely popular. The Nazis provided the youth with special
+trains, special trucks, special bathing beaches, food and other
+privileges. At the same time, the semi-hysteria which was maintained
+about the whole National Socialist program made it impossible for
+parents or anyone else to speak against it even if they had wished to
+do so. The German people were well acquainted with the goings on in
+concentration camps and it was well known that the fate of anyone too
+actively opposed to any part of the Nazi program was liable to be one
+of great suffering. Indeed, before the Hitler regime was many months
+old almost every family in Germany had had first-hand accounts of the
+brutalities inflicted in the concentration camps from someone either in
+the relationship or in the circle of friends who had served a sentence
+there; consequently the fear of such camps was a very effective brake
+on any possible opposition.
+
+In addition to what I saw during these many years with my own eyes
+regarding the preparation and the building of a huge armed force,
+I received reliable information from trustworthy sources as to its
+scope and strength. One of my close friends in Berlin was one George
+Graffenstein, who lived at 34 Altenauerstrasse, just across the street
+from me. He was a German, formerly a member of Meile Printing Company
+of Chicago and a man strongly opposed to the Nazis. He had been an
+officer in the German army in the First World War; therefore he knew
+a large number of the officers of Reichswehr. Occasionally he gave in
+his house beer-evenings which a number of Reichswehr officers attended,
+including certain generals. To these parties I was occasionally
+invited. One of these generals was General Goettke, who was the head
+of the artillery on the General Staff and a very close friend of
+Graffenstein. In addition, Graffenstein’s nephew was on the General
+Staff and was at the same time the liaison between the Reichswehr
+and the S.A. Late in 1934, George Graffenstein told me that from the
+information which he had received from his friends, the armament
+program was already so complete, so far advanced, so gigantic and
+all-inclusive, that there was no doubt of Germany’s winning the war
+on sheer weight of arms alone. That same information was given to me
+directly by certain of the high officers of the Reichswehr, whom I met
+at Graffenstein’s house.
+
+By the middle of 1934 it had become obvious that the rearmament
+program, though in its beginning, was being planned on a vast scale so
+that it could not possibly be considered as defensive armament but only
+as a weapon for offensive war. This was, however, not a conclusion of
+my own; but it was openly stated as such to me. Graffenstein told me in
+1934, during the conversations to which I have already referred, that
+the purpose of the program was an aggressive war. He told me that he
+had been so informed by General Goettke in particular. This statement
+was borne out by other persons who were in the know in Germany at
+that time. I confirmed his statements by my own conversations with the
+generals who gathered in his house. They intimated to me, not only that
+Germany was embarked upon an inevitable program toward war but even
+gave me indications of the general plan, namely, the drive to the East
+and the attack upon Russia, after Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Austria
+had been eliminated. This was as early as 1934, and I had many similar
+conversations along the same line at Graffenstein’s house during the
+following years.
+
+Similar information was constantly being confirmed from other sources
+at later dates. For instance, in December 1938, I had a conversation
+with General Franz Halder, who was then Chief of Staff, at the house
+of Dr. Etscheit, a prominent Berlin lawyer. Halder stated to me: “You
+must take into account the National Socialist program in the East.
+If you, the Western powers, oppose our program in the East, we shall
+have to go to war with you.” During this conversation he made it
+clear to me that the program of the Nazis for expansion in the East
+was unalterably fixed and decided upon. It included the attack on
+Poland, the annexation of Austria, territorial expansion in Yugoslavia,
+Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Russia, particularly in the Ukraine. The
+latter provinces would have to be German. When I replied to Halder
+that I was positive the Western powers would never tolerate any such
+aggressive program and that inevitably it would not only mean war with
+England and France but with the United States as well Halder replied:
+“That is a pity.”
+
+The same information as to the aggressive intention of the Nazis was
+given to me by a friend, Count von Bismarck, formerly Counselor of the
+German Embassy in London. He was violently anti-Nazi. In Germany, where
+I knew him, he held no official position, deriving his income from
+his estates in East Prussia; but he was a man with wide contacts in
+officialdom, particularly in the Foreign Office. He said that the Nazis
+were headed for war, for huge aggressive adventures, that conquest of
+the East was a major part of the vast plan and that conquest of the
+West would only follow, when complete victory in the East solidified
+Germany’s strength and resources in those quarters. He made this
+statement to me in 1936 and we discussed it often in 1937 and 1938. He
+was extremely disturbed, not over the aggressive plans of the Nazis,
+but over their manner of converting Germany into a slave State, which
+he repudiated entirely. He considered that the course of the Nazis
+militarily could not be hindered and furthermore, no country was
+preparing to stop them.
+
+I also had the same information from another reliable source. After
+Hitler came to power in 1933, General von Hammerstein withdrew from
+public life. He had been head of the Reichswehr under Chancellor
+Bruening. Although he was then retired, he knew and associated
+intimately with the Generals of the German Army, as he was among them
+_primus inter pares_. He told me of the German program for aggressive
+war during a long conversation which we had during a musical recital
+in 1938 at Dr. Paul Kempner’s home. The army, he said, was at a
+highly mechanized strength, extremely mobile and ready for anything.
+He was sure, in view of the preparations and the excellent character
+of the German equipment that the German Army was then an instrument
+of invincible striking power. He stated categorically that it was a
+superb instrument which had been formed to wage war and that it would
+not be much longer delayed. He did not know the plans and details but
+he confirmed the information that I had from all sources, that Germany
+intended to strike in the East and that the war in the West depended on
+whether or not the Western powers would endeavor to intervene when the
+German war machine started moving.
+
+Of these aggressive designs I learned also from other sources. A
+personal friend, Dr. Hans Henniger, a veterinarian in Berlin, was an
+intimate friend of an officer by the name of Schlessicher (I believe
+that is the correct spelling), who was the responsible purveyor to the
+German Army, therefore a high member of the Quartermaster Corps. I
+do not remember his exact title. Dr. Henniger received from this man
+information constantly with regard to the preparations being made by
+the Germans in 1939. A month before March 15, 1939, I was informed of
+the plans for marching into Prague on that date and that large stocks
+of food and other equipment were being accumulated near the border of
+Czechoslovakia. On March 15, 1939, the German Army rolled into Prague.
+
+I also had a good deal of personal experience with and first-hand
+knowledge of the internal policies from 1935 to 1939. Indeed, from the
+very outset of the regime, I had intimate and continuous contact with
+various officers of the German Government in the course of my duties as
+an American official protecting American citizens or protesting against
+their mistreatment. The acts of violence against American citizens were
+numerous, particularly during the early years of 1933 and 1934. In
+addition, I was constantly receiving information as regards other Nazi
+tactics and the nature and number of victims from a variety of sources;
+the victims themselves on many occasions, both American and German,
+told me their experiences and appealed for help; relatives and friends
+of victims, both those who came back and those who did not; the foreign
+newspaper correspondents and, to a very considerable degree, I received
+information from the Gestapo itself.
+
+For a period I dealt directly with Herr Heinrich Himmler, then
+subsequently with Herr Reinhard Heydrich and often with Dr. Werner Best.
+
+My vigorous relations with the Gestapo began in March, 1933. In fact
+I knew the organization of the secret police and dealt with that
+organization before the Nazis came to power. It was then the Politische
+Abteilung des Politizeipraesident, i.e., the political division of
+the Politizeipraesidium, which was charged with supervisory and
+preventive functions with regard to political matters, then chiefly
+investigating the terror of Communists. It was located in Berlin at
+the Politizeipraesidium. On March 6, 1933, it was moved from the
+Politizeipraesidium to No. 8 Prinzalbrechtstrasse and became the
+famous Gestapo [Geheimstaatpolizei], its first chief was Rudolf Diels,
+who was succeeded by Heinrich Himmler, in May, 1934. I knew well not
+only Diels but also Himmler, his second in command, Reinhard Heydrich
+and his administrative officer, Dr. Werner Best. The organization at
+No. 8 was huge with over 1,000 persons employed there. Besides, as
+rapidly as administrative measures permitted, Gestapo headquarters
+were established throughout Germany, not only in the cities but in
+provincial places to such an extent that the smallest hamlet and
+village fell under direct Gestapo supervision. At the beginning of
+the Hitler regime, the only organization which had meeting places
+throughout the country was the S.A. (storm troopers). Until the Gestapo
+could be organized on a national scale the thousands of local S.A.
+meeting places became the “arrest points.” There were at least fifty
+of these in Berlin. Communists, Jews, and other known enemies of the
+Nazi party were taken to these points and, if they were enemies of
+sufficient importance, they were immediately transferred to the Gestapo
+headquarters. During 1933 and 1934, when the Gestapo became universally
+organized, the S.A. were gradually eliminated as arresting agents
+and the S.S. [Schutzstaffe] were incorporated as administrative and
+executive officials into the Gestapo. By the end of 1934, the S.A. had
+been fairly well eliminated and the S.S., the members of which wore
+elegant black suits and were therefore called Elite Guards, became
+almost identical as functionaries with the Gestapo.
+
+Immediately in 1933, the concentration camps, as soon as they were
+established, were put under the immediate charge of the Gestapo and
+they remained exclusively a Gestapo institution. Only “political”
+prisoners were held in the concentration camps. Ordinary criminals
+remained the responsibility of the regular police authorities and the
+established courts. On being sentenced, they were confined in the
+regular prisons. These confinements were always the result of duly
+carried out legal procedure. Incarceration in concentration camps was
+carried out without any legal procedure, neither indictment nor trial.
+Prisoners were, occasionally, released from the concentration camps
+and turned over to the prosecuting attorney for prosecution before
+the legal courts of justice. A prisoner accused of high treason, for
+example, whose offense might carry a death sentence, would be released
+to the prosecuting attorney for trial in the people’s court. All
+felonies were tried by the regular courts.
+
+As I have stated, my frequent contacts with this entire Gestapo
+organization began with the first wave of terrorist acts in the week of
+March 6-13, 1933. That wave was accompanied by universal mob violence.
+Since 1925, one of the cries of the Nazi party had been “Jude Verrecke”
+(Death to the Jews) and when the Nazi party won the elections in March,
+1933, on the morning of the sixth, the accumulated passion blew off in
+wholesale attacks on the Communists, Jews, and those who were suspected
+of being either. Mobs of S.A. men roamed the streets, beating up,
+looting, and even killing persons.
+
+No American citizen, so far as I am aware, was killed, but a number of
+them were assaulted and injured and appealed to the Consulate General
+for aid and protection. For example, Nathaniel Wolff, an American
+citizen, who resided in Rochester, New York, made an affidavit which
+stated:
+
+  This morning, March 6, at 5 o’clock, there came into my room five or
+  six Nazis with drawn revolvers. They abused me, called me a dirty
+  Russian Jew and started going through my belongings. They asked me
+  what remarks I had made. I replied that I had made none that I knew
+  of and that I am not interested in politics. One of them shouted “Do
+  you call throwing bombs not being interested in politics?” Another
+  asked at the same time, “Are you the Wolff who lived in the Pension
+  Stephanie?” Having left the Stephanie on account of difficulties
+  with the Portier regarding the price of the room and his behavior, I
+  whistled very softly, intimating that I understood the source of the
+  denunciation. Thereupon one of the Nazis remarked: “Du Scheiss Jude,
+  warum pfeiffst du?” and hit me in the jaw. They said that they would
+  take me to the police station, whereupon I answered, “The quicker,
+  the better, because my conscience is absolutely clear.” One of them
+  said, “Do you call throwing bombs having a clear conscience?” The
+  intruders were not accompanied by an officer, nor did they carry
+  “Hilfspolizei” armbands. They took me in an automobile to an address
+  in the Knewbeck Strasse beyond the Kant Strasse (I believe No. 67 or
+  76, Gartenhaus left, I think three or four flights up the stairs).
+  I was conducted to a bare room in which the shutters were closed
+  and the windows boarded, evidently to prevent sounds from getting
+  out, where, after my possessions were taken away including my keys,
+  I was left with two guards who spent the time abusing the Jews. At
+  five minutes before seven, the group who had arrested me returned
+  with two or three members including one who was apparently a leader,
+  when I was again abused, that is, they gave me to understand that
+  they imagined I was implicated in communistic activities. I remarked
+  that I should like to send a telegram to my cousin, Alan Steyne at
+  the Hamburg American Consulate, and asked if I had the right to
+  do so, whereupon the leader replied: “As a foreigner you have no
+  right, and especially not as a Jew.” One of the men then proceeded
+  to bind my hands and feet as closely and as painfully as possible. I
+  still bear the marks of the bruises on my wrists. I was questioned
+  about various English and French letters which had been found in
+  my room and taken along with them and then I was left about half
+  an hour alone because they evidently discussed my fate. After some
+  time one of the group returned and advised me that every one had a
+  right to his own political opinions as long as no attempt was made
+  to mix into politics. He remarked that nothing was to be gained by
+  brutality, undid the rope and freed my hands and feet and gave me
+  a cup of coffee and said, “Probably the thing isn’t so bad because
+  women chatter a great deal” and that I was denounced by a girl. After
+  a few minutes he elaborated the statement that the girl, Paula, of
+  the Pension, had denounced me as having the intention of throwing
+  bombs at the Nazi parade. I expressed my astonishment and told him
+  the facts of the case. He appeared to laugh it off and asked me if
+  I would be willing to sign a paper on the condition that they would
+  release me. I said “yes.” They then said I would have to go to the
+  police to have my signature attested to and one of the men who had
+  come in, in the meanwhile, went out to draft the paper I was to sign.
+  He returned with the paper which read: (1) “I am a Jew,” (2) “I will
+  leave tonight for Paris,” (3) “I promise never again to set my foot
+  on German soil.” “I attest that no physical violence was done to me
+  and that none of my property was stolen.” This paper I signed. They
+  told me to put on my coat and come to the police. Instead of taking
+  me to the police station they took me to Charlottenburg towards the
+  Gruenwald. When I asked to which police station they were taking me,
+  they replied “You’ll get there soon enough.” When we were near the
+  Heer Strasse they pretended that the automobile was broken down and
+  informed me that I would have to walk through the woods to get to the
+  police station. We proceeded into the woods where three members drew
+  their pistols and the other two brought straps out of their pockets
+  and informed me that they were going to teach me a lesson and made as
+  if they were about to tie me to a tree. They said that they intended
+  to beat the life out of me and “You can walk back afterwards.” I
+  replied that I hoped I would be able to walk. This was probably about
+  eight o’clock and we were entirely alone as nobody had followed us.
+  I took off my coat myself and remarked “If one can’t help oneself,
+  one may as well make the best of it.” One of them threw my coat
+  to the ground and said “Get ready” and after making a threatening
+  gesture, said “You can go home now!” pointing to the wrong direction,
+  whereupon they walked rapidly to the automobile and disappeared
+  yelling after me, “Keep your mouth shut.” I was also threatened that
+  if they ever caught me in Germany again, they would know how to get
+  me out of the way. * * *
+
+Another American, Herman I. Roseman, made an affidavit which stated:
+
+  Yesterday, March 10, 1933, in the afternoon at about 4:30, I came
+  out of “KDW” with my fiancee, Fraulein Else Schwarzlose, residing in
+  Wilmersdorf, Kaiser-Allee 172, and proceeded to walk along Tauentzien
+  Strasse. A man in S. A. uniform stepped on my toe purposely,
+  obviously offended me and said “Pardon.” I said “bitte,” and walked
+  ahead. He followed me and kicked me saying: “Na und?” A policeman saw
+  this and walked ahead, paying no attention to attacks made on me.
+  Then I took my passport out of my pocket, showed it to the second
+  policeman, and said that I was an American citizen, but he walked
+  ahead, obviously not able to afford me protection, or at least being
+  unwilling. The S.A. man continued to attack me, struck me in the
+  face, wounded me over the eye, and continued to do me bodily harm.
+  During this attack, all the time my walking along, we reached another
+  policeman, and I applied to him, showing my passport and said: “I am
+  an American and am entitled to protection.” He shrugged his shoulder
+  and said “What can I do?” By this time the S.A. man had obviously
+  inflicted enough attack upon me and walked away.
+
+  Upon my appeal the policeman brought my fiancee and me to the station
+  house at 13 Bayreuther Strasse. My fiancee and I reported to the
+  officer in charge. He heard the story and said that he was sorry, but
+  that there was nothing to do. My face was bleeding. The policeman
+  said that he had had orders not to interfere in any affair in which
+  an S.A. man took part. I then asked him what I could do to protect
+  myself. He said that there was nothing to do but to wait until the
+  situation was better. He added that the police were absolutely
+  powerless, and were under the direction of the S.A., and that there
+  were S.A. [Sturm-Abteilung] in the police itself. Thereupon I
+  departed * * *
+
+Another American, Mrs. Jean Klauber, made an affidavit which stated:
+
+  That on the night of Friday, March 10, 1933, she and her husband
+  had retired for the night when they were awakened by a prolonged
+  ringing of their apartment bell. They heard pounding upon the street
+  door and a demand for immediate entry, and a concurrent threat to
+  break the door down. The street door was opened by the janitor’s
+  wife, and a party of four or five men entered and went at once to
+  the apartment of the deponent where they again rang and pounded on
+  the door. Mr. Klauber asked who was there, and was answered--“The
+  police.” He opened the door and a party of four or five men in brown
+  uniforms, one wearing a dark overcoat and carrying a rifle, pushed
+  in, jostling Mr. and Mrs. Klauber aside. One asked Mrs. Klauber where
+  the telephone was and she indicated the room where it was to be
+  found, and started to go there. Thereupon, she was knocked down by
+  one of them. They went on to the bedroom where Mr. and Mrs. Klauber
+  followed them, and there they demanded their passports. Mr. Klauber
+  went to the wardrobe to get his, and was stopped, being asked by the
+  intruders whether he was carrying any weapons. Being clothed only
+  in pajamas, his denial was accompanied by a gesture indicating his
+  garb. He then turned to the wardrobe, opened it, and reached for one
+  of his four suits hanging there in where he thought the passport
+  was, and was immediately attacked from behind by all but one of the
+  intruders, who beat him severely with police clubs, the one with
+  the overcoat and rifle standing by. Remarks were shouted such as
+  “Look. Four suits, while for fourteen years we have been starving.”
+  Mrs. Klauber tried to inquire the reason for their actions, and was
+  answered--“Jews. We hate you. For fourteen years we have been waiting
+  for this, and tonight we’ll hang many of you.”
+
+  When the intruders stopped beating Mr. Klauber he was unconscious,
+  and they demanded the passports again of Mrs. Klauber. Mrs. Klauber
+  found her American passport and her German passport (required by
+  local authorities as the wife of a German citizen, and issued by the
+  Police at Munich after her arrival here), and the intruders took both
+  in spite of Mrs. Klauber’s protests that she was American. She then
+  searched for her husband’s passport, laid hold of his pocket-book,
+  and in her excitement offered it to them. Though full of money they
+  refused it, and again demanded the passport. Mrs. Klauber then found
+  it and handed it over.
+
+  Then the intruders returned to the unconscious Mr. Klauber, saying
+  “He hasn’t had enough yet,” and beat him further. Then they left,
+  saying “We are not yet finished,” and just as they departed, one of
+  them said to Mrs. Klauber “Why did you marry a Jew? I hate them” and
+  struck her on the jaw with his police club * * *
+
+I personally can verify that the police had been instructed not
+to interfere; that is that there was official sanction for these
+activities. Affidavits taken from numerous victims attest this fact.
+I had become acquainted with the two police officers stationed at
+the corner of Bellevuestrasse and Tiergartenstrasse near where the
+Consulate General was located; these officers told me that they and
+all the other police officers had received definite instructions not to
+interfere with the S.A., the S.S. or the Hitler Youth.
+
+For the Germans who were taken into custody by the Gestapo, chiefly
+Communists at that time, there was, from my experience and from the
+information that I had from all sources, a regular pattern of brutality
+and terror. Upon arrest, the victims would be systematically subjected
+to indignities and brutalities such as beatings, kicking, pushing
+downstairs, deprivation of food and all comforts, and threats of much
+worse. After the victims had been imprisoned--usually in cellars, since
+both the headquarters at No. 8 Albrechtstrasse and the S.A. meeting
+places usually had them--they would be beaten with various degrees
+of severity. If the Gestapo believed that the victim--particularly
+Communist leaders--had information as to other alleged accomplices they
+would give systematic beatings, usually when stripped and tied on a
+table. This would go on often for many days until they had extracted
+the information they wanted or killed the victim.
+
+Based on all of the reports which I had from many sources, my judgment
+is that the victims were numbered in the hundreds of thousands all
+over Germany. Many of them were ultimately released. I can state with
+certainty that the contemporaneous accounts in foreign newspapers, such
+as the London Times and the American newspapers which I have seen, are
+accurate.
+
+The second wave of terror was not so systematic nor so concentrated as
+to point of time. It was directed chiefly against the Jews, and was
+chiefly the result of the ruthless and occasionally violent enforcement
+of numerous decrees and orders, such as the Nurnberg Decrees. After
+the initial outbreak in March, 1933, and all through that year and the
+next, the Jews still in Germany had, in many cases, come to believe
+that things might become a little better and that they could live in
+some sort of peaceable relationship with the Nazis, even though they
+were reduced to the status of second or third class citizens. In 1935,
+however, the pressure on them began to increase and they began to be
+excluded completely from certain civil activities. The terrorism was
+continued all the time to some degree; but the enforcement of the new
+decrees in 1935 was characterized by such brutality and ruthlessness
+that it warrants special attention. Inadvertent violators were dealt
+with, for example, with great severity.
+
+The 1938 wave of terror was a very pronounced and definite one. Again
+the object was the Jews, particularly the wealthy ones. The ostensible
+occasion was the murder of the German diplomat, von Rieth, by a
+French Jew, but the violence was in no sense spontaneous. Dr. Best,
+the Administrative Officer of the Gestapo, told me that the terror
+had been decided upon and ordered by Hitler himself, and that he, Dr.
+Best, could, therefore, do nothing about it. Actually that statement
+corroborated what everyone knew. Innumerable persons with whom I talked
+and who witnessed the violence told me that at all of the synagogues,
+which had been set on fire by the Nazis, the fire departments were
+always present, but never acted except to prevent the fires from
+spreading to neighboring non-Jewish properties. Nor did the police
+interfere with any of these acts of vandalism and incendiarism.
+
+I personally did not see any of the violence nor the burning of
+the synagogues while the acts were being perpetrated, as the mobs
+throughout Germany commenced to work at midnight on November 8, 1938,
+and carried through their activities during the early morning hours of
+November 9. At that time I was on my way to the Wartburg Castle, and on
+the day of November 9 I saw the burned synagogues and the looted and
+smashed shops in Eisennach, and later in Berlin. I also know that at
+this time many of the wealthy Jews, who had previously escaped attack,
+were arrested, among whom were relatives of American citizens. Pursuant
+to requests from the United States, some of which were transmitted
+through the Department of State, I personally intervened with the
+Gestapo through Dr. Best, and secured the return of nearly twenty
+victims from the Saxonhausen Concentration Camp. Among these victims
+were Fritz Warburg and Eugene Garbaty. I think that many, perhaps most
+of these people, were released in the space of ten days or two weeks
+with the warning that if they remained in Germany they would have
+cause to regret it. In all cases the victims were subjected to rough
+treatment. Those who returned from the concentration camp and whom I
+saw in my office had their hair closely clipped, a common outward sign
+that they had been at Saxonhausen.
+
+The Gestapo authorities with whom I spoke on my frequent, and often
+daily visits to the Gestapo headquarters did not hesitate to state
+that they regarded Communists in particular as subversive and as an
+element dangerous to the State, and that it was necessary to wipe
+them out. Diehls, the first chief of the Gestapo, in particular, whom
+I saw nearly every day of the March wave of terror in 1933, made no
+attempt to conceal the systematic character of the roundups of what he
+called “subversive persons”; though he did attempt to justify it to
+me as necessary to the safety of the State. While denying that any
+violence against American citizens was contemplated, he admitted that
+it was being undertaken against Germans. Terroristic tactics, however,
+in all their various forms, were so completely and thoroughly the
+actuating policy, that it would have been wholly redundant to discuss
+it. They and I both understood that it was the mainspring of all
+Gestapo activity--indeed of all Nazi activity--and that it was beyond
+discussion.
+
+On one occasion I received a clear and definite admission of the Nazi
+terroristic policy with respect to many of their victims. In 1938 I
+was making strenuous efforts to free a young man from a concentration
+camp. He had been arrested in March, 1933, for aiding certain of his
+comrades to escape Germany, and had been sentenced by regular courts
+to a sentence of 2½ years. When he was released from the Brandenburg
+Prison at the end of that time, he was taken into custody by the
+Gestapo and sent to Dachau, the notorious concentration camp, and from
+there to Buchenwald. I had tried over a long period of time to secure
+his release by appeals personally to Himmler, Heydrich and Best, and
+had failed. In 1938, however, I was told by Ministerialraet Krohne, in
+the Ministry of Justice, that if I could reach Gruppenfuehrer Eiche of
+the Todtenkopfverbaende (Death’s Head Regiments) I might be successful.
+Eiche was then the head of all German concentration camps. After having
+first been told officially by the Gestapo that no such person existed,
+I was finally able by a ruse to secure his telephone number whereupon,
+through the recommendation of Krohne, I was able to make an appointment
+with Eiche at the Saxonhausen Concentration Camp near Berlin. He told
+me that with respect to Communists and any other persons who were
+suspected of holding views contrary to the Nazi conception of the
+State, such persons were “Asociale”, that is, impossible of social
+assimilation and, therefore, they must be physically eliminated from
+society or destined to perpetual confinement. Thaelman, the leader of
+the Communists in the Reichstag, was, as is well known, kept during the
+Hitler regime in perpetual confinement. His ultimate fate has never
+been revealed.
+
+On another occasion I was given considerable information by a high
+official of the Gestapo as to the policy of the Nazis with respect to
+the Jews. I had had a considerable contact with the head of the Jewish
+section of the Gestapo, known as the “Judische Abteilung der Gestapo”,
+one Dr. Hasselbacher, in connection with making arrangements for
+official representatives of the American Joint Distribution Committee
+to visit certain Jewish centers throughout Germany, for which
+visits, of course, the permission of the Gestapo was necessary. These
+negotiations brought me frequently in touch with Dr. Hasselbacher,
+whom I came to know very well. He told me that Germany will be made
+“Judenrein”, that is, clean of Jews. He said that all the Jews who
+failed to leave Germany would be exterminated. That statement was
+made in 1938 before the extermination camps were established, but the
+statement of Hasselbacher clearly indicated the eventual emergence
+of extermination camps in accordance with the general Nazi plan; for
+certainly the Jews were unable to leave Germany, even if they had been
+permitted to do so by the Nazis, as no world-wide arrangement had been
+made to receive them in other countries.
+
+I had a great deal of experience with the systematic measures which
+were taken to confiscate property of non-Nazis, particularly Jews.
+Force of circumstance and a settled governmental policy made this
+campaign a more gradual one. Drastic and sudden action would have led
+to the alienation of a great deal of ready assets owned by the Jews
+and would have tended to destroy the economic value of Jewish-owned
+property. It would also have resulted in the physical destruction or
+hiding by Jews of things of value, as indeed did happen to a great
+extent. Consequently, the Nazis permitted many Jews, particularly those
+of wealth and position, to remain unmolested for many years, giving the
+Jews the faithless and false assurance that they were exempted from the
+general repressive program for various reasons. For example, I knew
+well the leading German cigarette manufacturer, Eugene Garbaty. Until
+September, 1938, he was in complete control of his fortune. During that
+month, however, he was compelled to sell his factory, worth between
+seven million and ten million marks for the sum of one million marks.
+In October, 1938, his country estate near Dresden, valued probably over
+two million marks, was simply confiscated with no payment at all. It
+was to be used, as the authorities stated, for a welfare center for
+German Youth. After his experience in the Pogrom of November 8, 1938,
+Garbaty applied for a passport and received one only after paying a
+bribe of 500,000 marks to the corrupt Count Heldorf, Chief of Police
+in Berlin, and enough other fines to equal the million marks that he
+had received for his factory. He left Germany with nothing, except
+that earlier, by bribing the customs officials with approximately
+250,000 marks, he had been able to get valuable art treasures out of
+Germany. Garbaty is now a citizen of the United States and is living in
+Connecticut.
+
+Another instance of the same nature occurred with respect to my
+landlord, Mr. Franz Rinkel, who told me the entire story of his
+persecution at the hands of the Nazis. He had a fine house at No. 2
+Bruckenalle in Berlin, in which I lived. Rinkel was one of the victims
+sent to Saxonhausen and whom, after the space of a week, I was able
+to rescue. One Dr. Lilienthal, a fanatical Nazi lawyer practicing in
+Berlin, coveted Rinkel’s house. The general system of expropriating
+the property of the Jews was illustrated in this particular case.
+My landlord was approached by Dr. Lilienthal and told the price the
+latter desired to pay, a mere fraction of the value of the estate.
+He was given a few days to make up his mind to sell at that price.
+He sold because he knew that if he did not, he would be accused of
+some trumped-up crime and taken away to the concentration camp. Dr.
+Lilienthal took possession of Rinkel’s house. I know that on many
+occasions where it was thought necessary to increase the pressure, the
+prospective purchaser or his agent would be accompanied by a uniformed
+S.A. or S.S. man. I know because I lived in the immediate neighborhood
+and know the individuals concerned, that Baron von Neurath, one time
+Foreign Minister of Germany, got his house from a Jew in this manner.
+Indeed, he was my next door neighbor in Dahlem. Von Neurath’s house was
+worth approximately 250,000 dollars. I know too that Alfred Rosenburg,
+who lived in the same street with me, purloined a house from a Jew in
+similar fashion. There were, of course, innumerable instances in which
+Nazis used their positions in the Party to void debts and the like.
+An illustration of this were the cases of the persons who came to the
+Consulate in Berlin and informed us of the circumstances. For example,
+Max Schussler, an American citizen, made an affidavit which states:
+
+  * * * I own several apartment houses in Berlin, one situated at
+  Ring Strasse 11, Berlin-Steglitz. On the property at Ring Strasse
+  11 resides a tenant by the name of Hans Zink, who owns and operates
+  a restaurant in those premises. He has been in arrears in his rent
+  for about a year. Since the first of February of this year, that
+  is, since the new Government came into power, he has refused to
+  pay his rent. I gave instructions to the Sheriff to have him put
+  out. Yesterday two uniformed men came to my office and spoke to my
+  secretary and said that if I do not recall the order to the Sheriff
+  to have Zink evicted, something will happen to me. I did not see
+  these men. My secretary received them. She stated they wore black
+  trousers and brown shirts. She referred them to my attorney, Felix
+  Szkolny, Charlottenstrasse 17, Berlin S.W. 68. They went to the
+  attorney, but he refused to give the order. They came to my office
+  again and said to my secretary that if I did not give the order in
+  writing and hand it over to a certain address within an hour’s
+  time, something would happen. I then called the police station at
+  Alexandrinenstrasse 134, Revier No. 113, and a police officer came to
+  my office and accompanied me to a taxi, when I went home.
+
+  About a week before, it may be noted, Zink had come to my office and
+  insisted on my rescinding the order of eviction, and said, “I care
+  nothing about law; we are now in power, remember that. Do anything
+  you please, I am not going out of the office until you cancel the
+  order”. I called the police, and an officer came. Zink said, “I do
+  not care what you say”. After about ten minutes the officer put him
+  out.
+
+  At two o’clock Tuesday morning, March 7, I was awakened and faced by
+  two men with pistols, who had come into the house. They were allowed
+  to enter by the janitress, as they claimed to be “Hilfspolizei”, and
+  also by my maid. These two men were accompanied by two others in
+  civilian clothes, the former wearing the brown National Socialist
+  uniforms. They said, “Here, dress yourselves, quick too”. My wife
+  asked them to turn about while she dressed, but they refused. She
+  was compelled to remove her night gown at the point of a revolver
+  and stand naked before the intruders. When she protested they said,
+  “Don’t be theatrical”. My wife then wanted to telephone, but they
+  said, “No, sit down. Do not touch the telephone”, while they kept
+  their pistols pointed at us all the time. I sat down. One of them
+  said, “Have you got a fountain pen? You sign that”. I had to sign
+  the order to the Sheriff cancelling the order of eviction, and had
+  to sign another letter to the tenant Zink, stating that the order
+  of eviction was called off. I hesitated to sign and they drew their
+  revolvers on me, and my wife in terror fell to her knees, and then
+  I signed. I asked if they had credentials, and they pointed to the
+  “Hakenkreuz” on their sleeves and said that was their credentials.
+  They then said, “If you recall that order tomorrow, you will be
+  dead”. After I signed, they left * * *
+
+Actually, all Nazis used their positions in the Party as a means
+of enriching themselves. I have already spoken of the bribe to the
+customs officials and the Foreign Office officials, which Mr. Garbaty
+was compelled to pay. Another instance of the venality of the Nazi
+officials was illustrated in the case of Mendelssohn Bartholdy, who
+owned a house near me and whom I knew well. He was told by Count
+Heldorf, Chief of Police in Berlin, through his stooge, one Herr
+Schmidt, that his passport would cost him 250,000 marks. Bartholdy told
+me the facts and asked me if he should pay. Knowing the Nazi practices
+and the danger which he ran as a Jew in Germany, I advised him to pay.
+He did, got his passport and visa, and left Germany. This happened in
+November, 1938.
+
+I was informed by a personal friend, a Jewish banker in Berlin, Herr
+Kempner, whom I believed to be qualified to make an accurate estimate,
+that the total confiscations from Jews in Germany was between seven and
+eight billion marks.
+
+I had less experience with the manner in which the Nazis operated in
+industrial firms. However, from the accounts of numerous American
+businessmen with manufacturing plants in Germany, accounts which agreed
+with the information which I had with respect to similar activities
+in German factories, I know that the Nazis used their Party position
+to obtain authority and power. Many American businessmen told me
+that they had serious troubles operating their factories because
+the Nazi officials in the establishment, usually recruited from the
+workmen, attempted to take over the management themselves, and engaged
+consistently and ruthlessly in acts of persecution against non-Nazi
+workmen. Many German firms were actually dominated by fanatical Nazis,
+usually persons who had had no previous position of importance, such
+as janitors, timekeepers and the like. Their position in the Nazi
+hierarchy gave them importance in the enterprise out of all proportion
+to their standing and position.
+
+                       [Signed] Raymond H. Geist
+
+Subscribed and sworn to before me William L. Brewster Vice Consul of
+the United States of America, duly commissioned and qualified, in
+Mexico, D. F., Mexico, this 28th day of August 1945.
+
+                                            [Signed] William L. Brewster
+                             Vice Consul of the United States of America
+                                                        Service No. 6684
+                                                           Tariff No. 38
+                                                      No fee prescribed.
+
+
+                                               COPY OF DOCUMENT 1760--PS
+
+  United Mexican States   }
+  Mexico Federal District }
+  Embassy of the United   } SS
+    States of America     }
+
+George S. Messersmith, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:
+
+During the period 1930 to the late spring of 1934, I was Consul General
+of the United States of America in Berlin. During that period and
+particularly during the years 1933 and until my departure for Austria
+in the late spring of 1934, the nature of my work brought me into
+frequent contact with German Government officials. As background for
+this statement it is pertinent to state that this contact with German
+Government officials in the highest categories was necessary by me as
+Consul General, and some of my principal associates, because of the
+circumstances of the period.
+
+In the period immediately preceding the coming into power of the
+National Socialists it was necessary for me and some of my principal
+associates in the Consulate General to have contact with high
+officials of the German Government because of unsettled state of
+affairs in Germany due to the uncertain political situation; this
+involved difficulties for American firms of various kinds which made
+the intervention of the Consulate General in the line of its regular
+duty necessary. In addition to this contact with the officials of the
+Government, as a matter of further duty I had contact with individuals
+in all parties in Germany in order to keep myself and therefore our
+Government currently informed with regard to developments in the
+political picture in Germany. During that period, and before the
+National Socialists came into power, I therefore had contact of an
+informed character with persons in the National Socialist Party for
+the purpose of securing information as to their aims and objectives,
+but that contact was, before the access to power of that party, with
+secondary rather than with the first ranking members thereof.
+
+Immediately after the access to power of the National Socialist
+Government in the beginning of 1933, all sorts of steps of an arbitrary
+character were taken by the new Government and by its various agencies
+and dependencies which affected the rights of American citizens and
+property and in the carrying through of my official duty as Consul
+General I had the primary responsibility for the protection of American
+citizens and property. In consequence of this responsibility I had to
+see frequently almost all of the high ranking members of the German
+Government with the exception of Hitler and a very large number of
+officials below the rank of Minister. The nature of my duties was such
+that a considerable portion of my days had to be spent in visits on
+such officials to discuss the protection of American interests and
+property. Some of these secondary officials I had known before the
+Party came to power, for information purposes.
+
+It is difficult to explain adequately in a statement of this kind the
+circumstances under which these officials of the Nazi German Government
+frequently took occasion to talk to me most frankly about matters of
+general Nazi policy and to discuss frankly and freely the aims and
+purposes of the Nazi regime. Frequently our conversations were long
+and difficult because of the matters which I had to present and on
+which I had to take the firmest stand. Not infrequently at the end of
+such official conversations they spoke freely and without any reserve
+with regard to the aims of the regime.
+
+It is the more important to bring this out in this preliminary section
+of my statement because I did not at any time conceal from any of these
+Nazi officials my complete lack of sympathy with the course they were
+pursuing nor did I hesitate to say to them what I considered was the
+danger of the course which they were pursuing not only for Germany but
+for Europe and the rest of the world. Their freedom of expression to me
+was all the more interesting in view of the fact that I never hesitated
+to assert in the strongest possible way the rights of the United States
+and of its citizens when they were violated. It requires a knowledge
+of the circumstances of the time, of the character and psychology of
+these high Nazis and secondary Nazi officials to be able to appreciate
+that the fact that I was forthright in my views and did not hesitate
+to express them and particularly that we stood out so strongly for
+the rights of our country and our citizens that led them to respect
+me and my associates and to reveal to me more than they very probably
+revealed to other foreign representatives. Whatever the reasons may
+have been, however, the Nazi Government officials, almost without
+exception from the highest to the lowest with whom I had contact, were
+on most occasions amazingly frank in their conversation and without any
+concealment of their aims.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+[Omitted is a part of this affidavit in which Mr. Messersmith lists the
+names, and states his impressions of, the following:
+
+   1. Hermann Goering
+   2. General Milch
+   3. Hjalmar Schacht
+   4. Hans Frank
+   5. Wilhelm Frick
+   6. Count Schwerin von Krosigk
+   7. Joseph Goebbels
+   8. Richard Walther Darre
+   9. Robert Ley
+  10. Hans Heinrich Lammers
+  11. Otto Meissner
+  12. Franz von Papen
+  13. Walther Funk
+  14. General Wilhelm Keitel
+  15. Admiral Eric von Raeder
+  16. Admiral Karl Doenitz
+  17. Dr. Bohle
+  18. Dr. Stuckert
+  19. Dr. Krupp von Bohlen
+  20. Dr. Davidson]
+
+In the late spring or early summer of 1934, I cannot recall the exact
+date, I left my post as Consul General at Berlin to go to Vienna
+where I remained until the late spring of 1937. During my stay in
+Austria, I had intimate official and personal contact with the highest
+officials of the Austrian Government as well as with many of the
+secondary and lower ranking officials. I had this intimate contact
+with these officials of the Austrian Government from the very outset
+due, undoubtedly, to the fact that when I came to Austria it was
+already well known that I was an outspoken opponent of all that the
+Nazi Government and leaders stood for. In consequence, even though
+I was the Minister of a country which was considered in Austria as
+having no immediate concern in Austria’s foreign relations, I received
+much information from the many Austrian officials on developments in
+Austro-German relations and in their relations with other countries
+in Europe. Among those whom I saw frequently and from whom I obtained
+information were the following:
+
+  President Miklas
+  Chancellor Dollfuss
+  Chancellor Schuschnigg
+  Foreign Minister Berger-Waldenegg
+  Police President and Minister of Security, Hofrat Skubl.
+
+In addition, I should add that there were both in Berlin and in Vienna
+a corps of correspondents, many of whom were of outstanding ability and
+with whom I was in frequent contact.
+
+Finally, I should say that during my stay in Austria I made fairly
+frequent trips to Berlin and on many of these saw and talked with
+the same persons whom I had known during my residence there as
+Consul-General. Thus I maintained my German sources of information as
+well as acquiring new Austrian ones.
+
+I feel fully qualified, therefore, to speak with authority on the
+matters which follow in this statement. The specific conversations and
+events which I recite are, of course, specific facts which I set forth
+here as facts. As to many of them, I have refreshed my recollection as
+details from contemporaneous reports and letters which I wrote during
+this period. The opinions which I offer are, I believe, fully warranted
+by the sum total of information which I received from all sources.
+
+From the very beginnings of the Nazi Government, I was told by both
+high and secondary Government officials in Germany that incorporation
+of Austria into Germany was a political and economic necessity and that
+this incorporation was going to be accomplished “by whatever means
+were necessary”. Although I cannot assign definite times and places,
+I am sure that at various times and places every one of the German
+officials whom I have listed earlier in this statement told me this
+with the exception of Schacht, von Krosigk and Krupp von Bohlen. I
+can assert that it was fully understood by everyone in Germany who had
+any knowledge whatever of what was going on that Hitler and the Nazi
+Government were irrevocably committed to this end and the only doubt
+which ever existed in conversations or statements to me was “how” and
+“when”.
+
+At the beginnings of the Nazi regime in 1933, Germany was, of course,
+far too weak to permit any open threats of force against any country,
+such as the threat which the Nazis made in 1938. Instead it was the
+avowed and declared policy of the Nazi Government to accomplish the
+same results which they later accomplished through force through the
+methods which had proved so successful for them in Germany--obtain a
+foothold in the cabinet, particularly in the Ministry of the Interior
+which controlled the police, and then quickly eliminate the opposition
+elements. During my stay in Austria I was told on any number of
+occasions by Chancellor Dollfuss, Chancellor Schuschnigg, President
+Miklas and other high officials of the Austrian Government that the
+German Government kept up constant and unceasing pressure upon the
+Austrian Government to agree to the inclusion of a number of Ministers
+with Nazi orientation. The English and French Ministers in Vienna with
+whom I was in constant and close contact confirmed this information
+through statements which they made to me of conversations which they
+had with high Austrian officials.
+
+In order to compel the Austrian Government to accept their terms the
+Nazis resorted to almost every conceivable measure, including economic
+pressure, propaganda, and most important of all, terroristic acts.
+My information concerning these terroristic outrages came partly
+from official communiques of the Austrian Government, partly from
+responsible news sources, and to a very considerable extent from Skubl,
+the Police President and later Minister of Public Security, whom I
+saw frequently and knew well. The Austrian secret police under the
+direction of Skubl, it should be noted, was one of the most efficient
+in all of Europe.
+
+The outrages were an almost constant occurrence, but there were
+three distinct periods during which they rose to a peak. During the
+first two of these periods--in mid-1933, and in early 1934--I was
+still in Berlin. However, during that period I was told by high Nazi
+officials in conversation with them that these waves of terror were
+being instigated and directed by them. I found no concealment in my
+conversations with high Nazi officials of the fact that they were
+responsible for these activities in Austria. These admissions were
+entirely consistent with the Nazi thesis that terror is necessary and
+must be used to impose the will of the Party not only in Germany but
+in other countries. I recall specifically that General Milch was one
+of those who spoke frankly that these outrages in Austria were being
+directed by the Nazi Party and expressed his concern with respect
+thereto and his disagreement with this definite policy of the Party.
+
+During the wave of terroristic acts in May and June 1934, I had already
+assumed my duties as American Minister in Vienna. The bomb outrages
+during this period were directed primarily at railways, tourist
+centers, and the Catholic Church, which latter, in the eyes of the
+Nazis, were one of the strongest organizations opposing them. I recall,
+however, that these outrages diminished markedly for a few days during
+the meeting of Hitler and Mussolini in Venice in mid-June 1934. At that
+time Mussolini was strongly supporting the Austrian Government and was
+strongly and deeply interested in maintaining Austrian independence
+and sovereignty and in keeping down Nazi influence and activity in
+Austria. At that time also Hitler could not afford an open break with
+Mussolini and undoubtedly agreed to the short cessation of these bomb
+outrages on the insistence of Mussolini because he, Hitler, wished to
+achieve as favorable an atmosphere for the meeting between him and
+Mussolini as possible. The cessation of the bomb outrages during the
+Hitler-Mussolini conversations was considered by me and by the Austrian
+authorities and by all observers at that time as an open admission on
+the part of Hitler and the German Government that the outrages were
+systematically and completely instigated and controlled from Germany.
+
+While I cannot recall at this time the details of the terroristic
+acts, they were fully reported in the Legation despatches of the
+period. These reports were based upon intimate and frequent contact
+with high Austrian officials and many of the details I received from
+the then head of the Austrian Police, Dr. Skubl. While there was no
+doubt whatever that these outrages had been conducted and directed by
+Germany, there was ample evidence as to the origin of the outrages from
+the fact that fragments of the bombs collected by the Austrian police
+showed that they were of German manufacture and had been introduced
+from Germany into Austria. While I do not recall having seen any of
+these bomb fragments myself, I recall specifically having been told
+by high Austrian authorities that they had seen them and that there
+was no doubt as to the origin of the bombs. A further proof that these
+outrages were directed from Germany, although in most cases the bombs
+were actually planted by Austrian Nazis, is found in the fact that the
+records of the Vienna Police and Courts at the time will show that when
+some of these Nazis were arrested they declared proudly that they had
+committed these acts.
+
+At various times I or A. W. Kliefoth, Counselor of the Legation,
+reported on these outrages because of their significance. Quotations
+from some of these despatches are as follows:
+
+  Trunks containing inflammable material were placed in the
+  three leading railway stations of Vienna and timed to explode
+  simultaneously on the evening of May 6. The damage was very slight.
+  The police charged the Nazis with the Crime.
+
+  An official communique, dated May 10, announced that on the previous
+  evening a bomb was exploded near the Philadelphia Bridge in Vienna,
+  wounding two persons. The same evening a bomb was exploded in one of
+  the local beer gardens, at which a picnic of the Heimwehr was being
+  held, slightly wounding a woman.
+
+Official despatch from Vienna dated May 15, 1934.
+
+  During the past week the continuation of the Nazi terrorist
+  activities in bombing public places and railway lines, with the
+  object of damaging the Austrian tourist trade, some of which
+  are described below, was the source of serious concern to the
+  authorities. This terrorism was carried out according to a well
+  organized plan, undoubtedly conducted by Nazi agents in Germany. The
+  explosives used by the Nazis during the past week, according to the
+  Foreign Office, were all manufactured in Germany and smuggled into
+  Austria.
+
+  In a communique dated May 24, the authorities also admitted a number
+  of other bomb outrages at Brannau, Bad Ischl and Dorf an der Pram.
+  While the damage to both life and property was small--no lives
+  were lost--the Government admitted its inability to cope with the
+  situation with the existing measures of security.
+
+  The authorities further confirmed officially, on May 25, a bomb
+  explosion on May 23 in the residence of the Archbishop of Salzburg,
+  which caused considerable damage. At Monag, near Salzburg, on May 23,
+  a bomb explosion wrecked a flower-kiosk, causing damages amounting
+  to 10,000 schillings. A nine year old child was severely injured in
+  Anleiten, near Ried.
+
+Official Despatch from Vienna dated May 29, 1934.
+
+  The Nazi terrorist outrages continued during the past week in spite
+  of the Government’s notification regarding the application throughout
+  Austria of martial law for crimes of public violence. These crimes,
+  now punishable by death, include malicious acts against public order,
+  and damage to the railway, telegraph, telephone and wireless services
+  of the State.
+
+  The new development in the recent outrages was that many of the acts
+  were directed against the property of the Roman Catholic Church,
+  which in the eyes of the Nazis was the strongest organization
+  opposing the Nazi regime.
+
+  In addition to the attempted bombing of the Archbishop’s palace in
+  Salzburg, a few days previously, a bomb was exploded on May 20 in an
+  annex to the Archbishop’s palace in Feldkirch, which caused minor
+  damages. The police charged Nazis with the outrages and arrested a
+  number of suspects. During the night of May 27, a bomb explosion
+  broke windows in the churches and vicarages of St. Paul in Carinthia.
+
+  In Linz, on May 26, a bomb exploded before the entrance of one of the
+  schools, breaking 44 windows. The school was empty at the time the
+  outrage was committed. During the same night, an attempt was made to
+  blow up the electric works at Brannau, causing a temporary suspension
+  of the electric service.
+
+  Other outrages, not reported by the press, included an attempt to
+  blow up one of the bridges over the Danube in Vienna on May 30, a
+  bomb explosion in one of the popular cafes, and numerous bombings of
+  telephone and newspaper kiosks.
+
+Official Despatch from Vienna dated June 4, 1934.
+
+  The National Socialist terrorism in Austria, which started slowly
+  and cautiously several weeks ago, culminated in a heavy and rather
+  serious outbreak on June 8 to June 11, threatening not only the
+  peace and security of the country, but the foreign tourist trade, an
+  exceedingly important item in Austria’s economic life. The attempts
+  to wreck the railway lines near Vienna and in other parts of Austria,
+  as well as terrorist outrages in the principal tourist centers,
+  occupied the attention of the Government above all other matters.
+  After a number of important cabinet sessions, new measures were
+  adopted to counteract the terrorism, and the matter was also the
+  subject of diplomatic conversations between Austria and Germany.
+
+Official Despatch from Vienna dated June 13, 1934.
+
+  The outrages in Austria during the week ending June 23, while almost
+  as numerous as in the week preceding, were less violent in character.
+  The attacks were directed, as heretofore, against the quarters of
+  anti-Nazi associations and persons, public utilities, but less
+  against the railway communications. Additional stores of explosive
+  materials were uncovered in Vienna and elsewhere.
+
+  * * * * * * *
+
+  A recent terrorist explosion in the Vienna School of Agronomy caused
+  damages amounting to about 40,000 schillings. As a result of the Nazi
+  outrages, the school has been closed for one week.
+
+  In an attempted bomb attack on the post office in Bregenz, the
+  capital of the Province of Vorarlberg, the police seized a supply
+  of explosives bearing labels of “Sprengstoffwerke Kloster Lechfeld,
+  G.m.b.H.”, “Dynamit A.G. Hamburg, Alfred Nobel & Co.”, and “Fabrik
+  Wurzendorf”, explosive factories domiciled in Germany.
+
+Official Despatch from Vienna dated June 25, 1934.
+
+  During the week ending June 30 there were less terrorist outrages of
+  major importance, but the number of small outrages, bomb explosions,
+  attacks on electric, water, and railway establishments had not
+  decreased. The principal attacks were directed against Catholic
+  institutions, ex-National Socialists, and the city of Salzburg. The
+  purpose in the latter case was to frighten foreign tourists away from
+  the Summer Music Festivals at Salzburg.
+
+  A bomb which exploded in the Roman Catholic vicarage in Kapfenberg,
+  in the Province of Styria, on June 24, resulted in the death of the
+  Chaplain, Reverend Franz Eibel. Several other persons were slightly
+  injured. The death was one of terrorism, although there were several
+  cases of attacks. Likewise there were attacks on other Church
+  institutions in different parts of the country.
+
+  A series of outrages were reported on June 28 from Salzburg and
+  adjoining tourist centers. Bombs were exploded in the market place
+  and elsewhere, and attempts were made to blow up the electric and
+  railway communications. The outrages were particularly directed at
+  Salzburg at this time in view of the forthcoming Summer Festivals,
+  which ordinarily attract thousands of non-German tourists. Similar
+  attacks were made the same day in the Provinces of Vorarlberg and
+  Tyrol.
+
+Official Despatch from Vienna dated July 3, 1934.
+
+  A series of lesser outrages were reported from all parts of Austria
+  on Sunday, July 15. A large amount of explosives were stolen from
+  a shop in Gloggnitz; the director of the institution was fined 600
+  schillings and sentenced to two weeks imprisonment for negligence in
+  guarding the supplies. In Unterkirchen, on July 17, a bomb explosion
+  damaged the local vicarage and the electric works. On July 18 a bomb
+  explosion in Innsbruck injured one person, whereas in St. Kathrein
+  a house was damaged. In Vienna on July 18 a public telephone was
+  damaged, and set on fire. The perpetrator, a National Socialist, was
+  immediately apprehended by the Police. At Edlach, a summer resort
+  about 100 kilometers from Vienna, an attempt was made to bomb the
+  railway. A similar attempt was made in a Tyrolian mountain railway
+  station.
+
+Official Despatch from Vienna dated July 26, 1934.
+
+In addition to these outrages, the Nazis attempted to bring pressure
+upon Austria by means of the “Austrian Legion”. This organization, a
+para-military force of several thousand men, was stationed near the
+Austrian border in Germany as a constant and direct threat of violent
+action against Austria. It was without any question sanctioned by the
+Nazi Government of Germany as it could otherwise not have existed,
+and it was armed by them. It was made up of Austrian Nazis who had
+fled from Austria after committing various crimes in Austria and by
+Austrians in Germany who were attracted by the idle life and pay given
+by the German authorities.
+
+After the July Putsch, in August 1934, in Vienna I was told by the
+British Military Attaché in Vienna of a conversation which he had
+had with the German Military Attaché in Vienna, General Muff. It
+may be observed here that to my knowledge General Muff was a rather
+influential person in Germany and one who played a preponderant role in
+the German Legation in Vienna. General Muff told the British Military
+Attaché that he had just been in Germany and had spent three days with
+Hitler at Berchtesgaden, during which time he had several conversations
+with Hitler. He said then--in August 1934--that the Austrian Legion had
+not yet been dissolved and that Hitler had talked at length with him
+about the Legion. General Muff did not deem it worth while to conceal
+to the British Military Attaché the fact that the Austrian Legion had
+been armed and that the Nazis had armed it. I saw General Muff later
+myself and received the same impression as to these facts although he
+was not as frank and direct in his statements with me as he had been
+with the British Military Attaché.
+
+The events of the Putsch of July 25, 1934, are too well known for me
+to repeat them in this statement. I need say here only that there can
+be no doubt that the Putsch was ordered and organized by the Nazi
+officials from Germany through their organization in Austria made up
+of German Nazis and Austrian Nazis. Dr. Rieth, the German Minister in
+Vienna, was fully familiar with all that was going to happen and that
+was being planned. The German Legation was located directly across the
+street from the British Legation and the Austrian secret police kept
+close watch on the persons who entered the German Legation. The British
+had their own secret service in Vienna at the time and they also kept
+a discreet surveillance over people entering the German Legation.
+I was told by both British and Austrian officials that a number of
+the men who were later found guilty by the Austrian Courts of having
+been implicated in the Putsch had frequented the German Legation. In
+addition, I personally followed very closely the activities of Dr.
+Rieth and I never doubted on the basis of all my information that Dr.
+Rieth was in close touch and constant touch with the Nazi agents in
+Austria; these agents being both German and Austrian. Dr. Rieth could
+not have been unfamiliar with the Putsch and the details in connection
+therewith. I recall, too, very definitely from my conversations with
+the highest officials of the Austrian Government after the Putsch,
+their informing me that Dr. Rieth had been in touch with von Rintelen,
+who it had been planned by the Nazis was to succeed Chancellor Dollfuss
+had the Putsch been successful.
+
+It may be that Dr. Rieth was himself not personally sympathetic with
+the plans for the Putsch but there is no question that he was fully
+familiar with all these plans and must have given his assent thereto
+and connived therein.
+
+As this Putsch was so important and was a definite attempt to overthrow
+the Austrian Government and resulted in the murder of the Chancellor
+of Austria, I took occasion to verify at the time for myself various
+other items of evidence indicating that the Putsch was not only made
+with the knowledge of the German Government but engineered by it. I
+found and verified that almost a month before the Putsch, Goebbels told
+Signor Cerruti, the Italian Ambassador in Berlin, that there would be a
+Nazi Government in Vienna in a month. On the evening before the Putsch,
+a pamphlet appeared in the streets of Berlin from which it appeared
+that the Nazi Government had full knowledge of what was planned the
+next day in Vienna. An attempt was made by the German authorities in
+Berlin to suppress this pamphlet and this effort was partly successful
+but copies of it were available at the time and I recall an officer
+of our Embassy in Berlin, whose name I cannot specifically recall at
+this time, informing me that he had seen a copy thereof. Articles also
+appeared in some of the German papers of July 25, indicating that they
+had information as to the time that the Putsch was to take place. I
+will not go into detail as to the character of the evidence but there
+is no question from the historical record and the facts as known to me
+from direct knowledge at the time that the Putsch was engineered and
+directed by the German Government from Berlin and Munich.
+
+For two years following the failure of the July 25 Putsch, the Nazis
+remained relatively quiet in Austria. Very few terroristic acts
+occurred during the remainder of 1934 and as I recall in 1935 and
+most of 1936; this inactivity was in accordance with directives from
+Berlin as direct evidence to that effect, which came to my knowledge
+at that time, proved. Early in January, the Austrian Foreign Minister,
+Berger-Waldenegg, furnished me a document which I considered accurate
+in all respects and which stated:
+
+  “The German Minister here, von Papen, on the occasion of his last
+  visit to Berlin, was received three times by Chancellor Hitler for
+  fairly long conversations, and he also took this opportunity to call
+  on Schacht and von Neurath. In these conversations the following
+  instructions were given to him:
+
+  “During the next two years nothing can be undertaken which will
+  give Germany external political difficulties. On this ground,
+  everything must be avoided which could awaken the appearance of
+  Germany interfering in the internal affairs of Austria. Chancellor
+  Hitler will, therefore, also for this reason not endeavor to
+  intervene in the present prevailing difficult crisis in the National
+  Socialist Party in Austria, although he is convinced that order
+  could be brought into the Party at once through a word from him.
+  This word, however, he will, for foreign political reasons, give
+  all the less, as he is convinced that the for him desirable ends
+  may be reached also in another way. Naturally, Chancellor Hitler
+  declared to the German Minister here, this does not indicate any
+  disinterestedness in the idea of Austria’s independence. Also, before
+  everything, Germany cannot for the present withdraw Party members
+  in Austria, and must, therefore, in spite of the very real exchange
+  difficulties, make every effort to bring help to the persecuted
+  National Socialist sufferers in Austria. As a result, Minister of
+  Commerce Schacht finally gave the authorization that from then on
+  200,000 marks a month were to be set aside for this end (support of
+  National Socialists in Austria). The control and the supervision of
+  this monthly sum was to be entrusted to Engineer Reinthaler, who,
+  through the fact that he alone had control over the money, would
+  have a definite influence on the Party followers. In this way it
+  would be possible to end most quickly and most easily the prevailing
+  difficulties and division in the Austrian National Socialist Party.
+
+  “The hope was also expressed to Herr von Papen that the recently
+  authorized foundation of German ‘Ortsgruppen’ of the National
+  Socialist Party in Austria (made up of German citizens in Austria)
+  would be so arranged as not to give the appearance that Germany is
+  planning to interfere in Austrian internal affairs.
+
+  “He was also informed that an effort would be made through the
+  easing of the Auslandesperre, particularly with reference to the
+  more westerly Austrian Alps sections, so that to the German-Austrian
+  Alpenverein (Alps Association) a particular role was to be given. The
+  easing of the Auslandesperre was naturally only to be accorded to
+  those who obligated themselves to visit the more westerly Austrian
+  Alps sections and to go to fixed towns and live in specified hotels
+  or inns.”
+
+This policy of the Nazis was dictated solely by considerations of
+expediency. The basic aim of achieving Anschluss remained wholly
+unchanged. The brutal murder of Dollfuss, the Austrian Chancellor, and
+the unquestioned direct attack on Austrian sovereignty through the
+Putsch, directed by the German Government from Germany, had so shocked
+public opinion in Austria and in Europe that the Nazis could not afford
+for the time being to take open action.
+
+That the policy of Anschluss remained wholly unchanged was confirmed to
+me by Franz von Papen when he arrived in Vienna as German Minister. It
+will be recalled that he accepted this assignment as German Minister
+even though he knew that he had been marked for execution in the St.
+Bartholomew’s massacre on June 30, 1934. When, in accordance with
+protocol, he paid me a visit shortly after his arrival in Vienna,
+I determined that during this call there would be no reference to
+anything of importance and I limited the conversation strictly to
+platitudes which I was able to do as he was calling on me in my office.
+I deemed it expedient to delay my return call for several weeks in
+order to make it clear to von Papen that I had no sympathy with and
+on the other hand was familiar with the objectives of his mission
+in Austria. When I did call on von Papen in the German Legation, he
+greeted me with “Now you are in my legation and I can control the
+conversation”. In the baldest and most cynical manner he then proceeded
+to tell me that all of Southeastern Europe, to the borders of Turkey,
+was Germany’s natural hinterland, and that he had been charged with
+the mission of facilitating German economic and political control over
+all this region for Germany. He blandly and directly said that getting
+control of Austria was to be the first step. He definitely stated that
+he was in Austria to undermine and weaken the Austrian Government and
+from Vienna to work towards the weakening of the Governments in the
+other states to the South and South East. He said that he intended to
+use his reputation as a good Catholic to gain influence with certain
+Austrians, such as Cardinal Innitzer, towards that end. He said that
+he was telling me this because the German Government was bound on this
+objective of getting this control of Southeastern Europe and there was
+nothing which could stop it and that our own policy and that of France
+and England was not realistic.
+
+The circumstances were such, as I was calling on him in the German
+Legation, that I had to listen to what he had to say and of course I
+was prepared to hear what he had to say although I already knew what
+his instructions were. I was nevertheless shocked to have him speak so
+baldly to me and when he finished I got up and told him how shocked
+I was to hear the accredited representative of a supposedly friendly
+state to Austria admit that he was proposing to engage in activities
+to undermine and destroy that Government to which he was accredited.
+He merely smiled and said, of course this conversation was between
+us and that he would, of course, not be talking to others so clearly
+about his objectives. I have gone into this detail with regard to this
+conversation as it is characteristic of the absolute frankness and
+directness with which high Nazi officials spoke of their objectives.
+
+Nazi activities, forced underground in this period, were by no means
+neglected. The Party was greatly weakened for a time as a result of
+the energetic measures taken against the Putsch and as a result of the
+public indignation. Reorganization work was soon begun. In October
+1934 the Austrian Foreign Minister, Berger-Waldenegg, furnished me
+the following memorandum, which he told me had been supplied to the
+Austrian Government by a person who participated in the meeting under
+reference.
+
+  “A meeting of the chiefs of the Austrian National Socialist Party
+  was held on the 29th and 30th of September, 1934, at Bad Aibling in
+  Bavaria.
+
+  “The meeting occupied itself principally with the reorganization
+  of the Austrian National Socialist Party and particularly with the
+  measures to be taken to this end in the Tirol.
+
+  “Measures were decided upon as to the means to be used to create
+  better contact between the party leadership and its members as well
+  as with respect to new propaganda measures.
+
+  “One principal point on the agenda had reference to the preparatory
+  measures to be taken for taking over the power in Austria. It
+  was decided to give to all of the Party Headquarters in Austria
+  instructions preparatory to new Terroristic acts. The necessary
+  material, however, is nevertheless until new instructions are issued
+  not to be transported from the German border into Austria, but shall
+  be kept assembled at appropriate places on the German side of the
+  entire Austro-German frontier.
+
+  “From a report received by the Party chiefs on the situation in
+  Vienna and upper Styria, it is established that agreements have been
+  concluded with the Communists and with the Socialists with respect to
+  a uniform and common procedure.
+
+  “The agents of the Party Direction in Germany have received orders in
+  every Austrian district to prepare lists of all those persons who are
+  known to actively support the present Government and who are prepared
+  closely to cooperate with it.
+
+  “When the next action against the Government takes place these
+  persons are to be proceeded against just as brutally as against all
+  those other persons, without distinction of party, who are known to
+  be adversaries of National Socialism.
+
+  “In a report of the Party leaders for Austria the following
+  principles have been emphasized:
+
+  “A. The taking over of the power in Austria remains the principal
+  duty of the Austrian National Socialist Party. Austria has for the
+  German Reich a much greater significance and value than the Saar. The
+  Austrian problem is the problem. All combat methods are consecrated
+  by the end which they are to serve.
+
+  “B. We must on every occasion which presents itself appear to be
+  disposed to negotiate, but arm at the same time for the struggle. The
+  new phase of the struggle will be particularly serious and there will
+  be this time two centers of the terror, one along the German frontier
+  and the other along the Yugoslav frontier.”
+
+The Austrian Legion was kept in readiness in Germany. Although it
+was taken back some miles further from the Austrian frontier, it
+remained undissolved in spite of the engagement which had been taken
+to dissolve it. The Austrian Government received positive information
+to this effect from time to time which it passed on to me and I had
+direct information to the same effect from reliable persons coming from
+Germany to Vienna who actually saw the Legion.
+
+On the surface, however, German activities consisted principally of
+efforts to win the support of prominent and influential men through
+insidious efforts of all kinds, including the use of the German
+Diplomatic Mission in Vienna and its facilities and personnel. Von
+Papen as German Minister entertained frequently and on a lavish scale.
+He approached almost every member of the Austrian Cabinet, telling
+them, as several of them later informed me, that Germany was bound to
+prevail in the long run and that they should join the winning side if
+they wished to enjoy positions of power and influence under German
+control. Of course, openly and outwardly he gave solemn assurance that
+Germany would respect Austrian independence and that all that she
+wished to do was to get rid of elements in the Austrian Government like
+the Chancellor, Schuschnigg and Starhemberg as head of the Heimwehr and
+others, and replace them by a few “nationally-minded” Austrians, which
+of course meant Nazis. The whole basic effort of von Papen was to bring
+about Anschluss.
+
+In early 1935, the Austrian Foreign Minister, Berger-Waldenegg,
+informed me that in the course of a conversation with von Papen, the
+latter had remarked “Yes, you have your French and English friends
+now and you can have your independence a little longer”. The Foreign
+Minister, of course, told me this remark in German but the foregoing
+is an accurate translation. The Foreign Minister told me that he had
+replied to von Papen “I am glad to have from your own lips your own
+opinion which agrees with what your chief has just said in the Saar
+and which you have taken such pains to deny.” Von Papen appeared to
+be terribly upset when he realized just what he had said and tried
+to cover his statements, but according to Berger-Waldenegg, kept
+constantly getting into deeper water.
+
+Von Papen undoubtedly achieved some successes, particularly with
+men like Glaise-Horstenau and others who had long favored the
+“Grossdeutschtum” idea, but who nevertheless had been greatly disturbed
+by the fate of the Catholic Church. Without conscience or scruple,
+von Papen exploited his reputation and that of his wife as ardent and
+devout Catholics to overcome the fears of these Austrians in this
+respect.
+
+Developments in the fall of 1935 and the spring of 1936 gave Germany
+an opportunity to take more positive steps in the direction of the
+Nazification of Austria. Italy, which had given Austria assurance
+of support of the most definite character against external German
+aggression, and on one occasion by mobilizing her forces, had
+undoubtedly stopped German aggressive action which had been planned
+against Austria, embarked on her Abyssinian adventure. This and the
+reoccupation of the Rhineland in 1936 completely upset the balance in
+Europe. The French and the British Minister informed me that as early
+as August 1935, they had informed their Governments, on the basis of
+conversations with the Austrian Foreign Minister, that if there was
+to be any Danubian Pact, it would have to come into being rapidly for
+the Austrian Government would be forced to negotiate with Germany even
+though it would have no confidence that any such agreement arrived at
+would be respected.
+
+The result of all these forces was the Austro-German accord of July 11,
+1936, the public text is as follows:
+
+  “Convinced that they are thereby rendering a valuable contribution
+  toward the peaceful development of Europe, and believing that they
+  are thereby doing the best service to the various common interests
+  of the two German States, the Government of the German Reich and the
+  Government of the Austrian Federal State have decided to restore
+  normal and friendly mutual relations.
+
+  “It is therefore declared:
+
+  “1. In the sense of the statement made by the Fuehrer and Reich
+  Chancellor on May 21, 1935 the German Government recognizes the full
+  sovereignty of the Federal State of Austria.[2]
+
+
+  FOOTNOTES:
+
+  [2] On May 1935, in a speech in the Reichstag, Hitler had stated
+  with respect to Austria (I quote from _Documents on International
+  Affairs_, Vol. I, 1935, published by the _Royal Institute of National
+  Affairs_, (London, 1936) p. 171):
+
+    “Germany neither intends nor wishes to interfere in the internal
+    affairs of Austria, to annex Austria, or to conclude an
+    ”_Anschluss_“. The German people and the German Government have,
+    however, the very comprehensible desire, arising out of a simple
+    feeling of solidarity due to a common national descent--namely,
+    that the right to self-determination should be guaranteed, not only
+    for foreign nations but to the German people everywhere. I myself
+    believe that no regime which does not rest on public consent and is
+    not supported by the people can continue permanently.”
+
+
+  “2. Each of these two Governments shall regard the internal political
+  conditions of the other country, including the question of Austrian
+  National-Socialism, as a domestic concern of that country, upon which
+  it will exert neither direct nor indirect influence.
+
+  “3. The Austrian Federal State Government’s general policy and its
+  policy toward Germany in particular shall be constantly guided by the
+  Principle that Austria recognizes herself to be a German State. The
+  Rome Protocol of 1934, together with its additional clauses of 1936,
+  and the relations of Austria to Italy and Hungary, as partners in the
+  said protocols are not hereby affected.
+
+  “Recognizing that the relaxation of tension desired by both parties
+  can be brought about only if in addition certain preliminary
+  conditions are established by the Governments of both countries,
+  the Reich Government and the Austrian Federal Government shall in
+  a series of detailed measures create these required preliminary
+  conditions.”
+
+Even more important than the terms of the agreement published in the
+official communique, was the contemporaneous informal understanding,
+the most important provisions of which were, that Austria would (1)
+appoint a number of individuals enjoying the Chancellor’s confidence
+but friendly to Germany to positions in the Cabinet; (2) would devise
+means to give the “national opposition” a role in the political life
+of Austria and within the framework of the Patriotic Front, and (3)
+would amnesty all Nazis save those convicted of the most serious
+offenses. This amnesty was duly announced by the Austrian Government
+and thousands of Nazis were released, and the first penetration of the
+_Deutsche Nationaler_ into the Austrian Government was accomplished
+by the appointment of Dr. Guido Schmidt as Secretary of State for
+Foreign Affairs, and of Dr. Edmund Glaise-Horstenau as Minister without
+portfolio.
+
+The significance of these arrangements can best be explained by quoting
+from an official dispatch which I wrote in October 1934 when concern
+was being expressed with regard to conversations which Chancellor
+Schuschnigg was reported as having with the “moderate Nazis”,
+Reinthaller and Riehl. I then reported as follows:
+
+  “It is obvious, however, that in view of certain well known facts,
+  these conversations will be followed with interest. A major
+  consideration which will not be disregarded is the fact that
+  Chancellor Hitler himself has always been in favor of indirect rather
+  than direct action in bringing Austria into the German picture. It
+  is his belief that the way to be followed is to get representatives
+  of the National Socialist Party into the penetration. It is an
+  indication of political astuteness, for it is quite certain, in the
+  opinion of many objective observers, that if once a militant, even
+  though small, National Socialist minority gets representation in the
+  Cabinet, it will be the forerunner of absorption. To explain why
+  this is so is rather difficult, as it requires a full appreciation
+  of many factors at play in Germany and in Austria. Briefly, however,
+  it may be epitomized in the terroristic policy which is one of the
+  primary principles of National Socialism. Even before July 25,
+  when the National Socialist Party was legally prohibited, it was
+  very difficult to get proper police and judicial action against
+  National Socialists who committed terroristic acts or who were
+  plotting against the Government. This inaction came, not through
+  sympathy with the movement or through lack of definite knowledge
+  of overt acts, but through fear--through fear of reprisals when
+  a National Socialist regime might come, and that if it did come,
+  those who had proceeded, even though in the line of duty, against
+  National Socialists, would be dealt with with the barbarity and
+  intolerance with which National Socialism has treated its opponents
+  in Germany. The determined attitude of the Government after July
+  25, strengthened the administration of justice and of the security
+  forces, and this changed attitude came about as a result not only
+  of the feeling within the country that National Socialism would not
+  come now, but also as a result of the action of the powers in support
+  of the independence of Austria. Should the conversations which the
+  Government is having with the National Socialist groups reawaken
+  this fear, or should there be any weakening of the attitude of the
+  Government towards National Socialist be admitted even to indirect
+  or subordinate participation in the Government, it would undoubtedly
+  bring back this fear in an even more acute form and bring into what
+  element of weakness.
+
+  “The fact that these conversations are taking place need, therefore,
+  not be considered as being intrinsically a disturbing factor in the
+  internal and external situation of Austria, but should these National
+  Socialist elements in the Government, there is reason for the gravest
+  concern, not only so far as the internal situation in Austria is
+  concerned, but this might become the focal point of disturbance
+  without the country * * *”
+
+The sequel of the agreement was the only one which could have been
+expected in view of all the facts and previous recorded happenings.
+Active Nazi operations in Austria were resumed under the leadership of
+a certain Captain Leopold, who it was known definitely was in frequent
+touch with Hitler. The Nazi program was now to form an organization
+through which the Nazi could carry on their operations openly and
+with legal sanction in Austria. There were formed in Austria several
+organizations which had a legal basis but which were simply a device
+by which the Nazis in Austria could organize, and later seek inclusion
+as a unit in the Patriotic Front. The most important of these was the
+_Ostmarkischer Verein_, the sponsor of which was the Minister of the
+Interior Glaise-Horstenau. Through the influence of Glaise-Horstenau
+and the pro-Nazi Neustadter-Sturmer, this organization was declared
+legal by the Courts. I made specific mention of the foregoing because
+it shows the degree to which the situation in Austria had disintegrated
+as a result of the underground and open Nazi activities directed from
+Germany.
+
+Even more open recognition of the Nazis was demanded. In January 1937,
+Captain Leopold submitted a memorandum of Nazi demands, which, though
+not formally received, were known to and considered by the Austrian
+Cabinet.
+
+The Leopold memorandum is as follows:
+
+
+               For the Internal Pacification of Austria.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+[In Mr. Messersmith’s affidavit there appears at this point the body
+of Captain Leopold’s lengthy memorandum. It includes Captain Leopold’s
+statement of the existing situation in Austria. It includes the
+following demands: (1) An amnesty for all punishments or privations
+suffered for National Socialist or National activity or sympathy;
+(2) equal treatment for National Socialists, including freedom of
+political activity and cultural activity; abolition of laws and
+sanctions used by the Government against Nazi activity. The memorandum
+advocates cooperation on the basis of political principles including: A
+broadening of the Patriotic Front; changes in the Cabinet; an alliance
+with the Reich; common racial stock as a political aim, and the
+application of anti-Semitic measures; an early plebiscite on Anschluss.]
+
+Later, a petition circulated by Leopold was submitted to the Austrian
+Government, demanding authorization to form a “nationalistic party”,
+which was to be incorporated as a group in the Political Front. It was
+a Party which its sponsorship plainly marked as openly Nazi. Pressure
+for the acceptance of these demands was exercised by staging frequent
+demonstrations and circulating propaganda, all of which was financed
+in and from Germany. Even as soon after July 11 as July 29, 1936,
+when the Olympic Torch was carried through the streets of Vienna,
+there were violent Nazi disorders. From then on, and until Austrian
+sovereignty was destroyed, there were constant arrests and trials of
+persons accused of distributing illegal literature or staging illegal
+demonstrations, accompanied by numerous press comments of more or less
+violence.
+
+The Austrian Government sought to counteract this pressure in some way
+by allowing activity in favor of a restoration of the Hapsburgs. On his
+visit to Vienna in late February 1937, von Neurath took occasion to
+register Germany’s emphatic opposition to any such move. I remember von
+Neurath’s visit very clearly. I had known him well and was on friendly
+terms with him while I was stationed in Berlin. At that time and after
+the Nazi came into power, he told both Ambassador Dodd and me that he
+had remained as Foreign Minister when the Nazi came into power in order
+that he might exercise “a restraining influence” and render service to
+his country. This may have been the initial motive of von Neurath but
+he rapidly became one of the most complete and in some ways effective
+instruments of the Nazis. If he was not in accord with what they did,
+he was a perfect instrument in helping to carry it through.
+
+Although I had known him well in Berlin and had on occasions been in
+his house in small gatherings, when he came to Vienna in 1937, there
+were a number of ceremonies and receptions given by the Austrian
+Government to which the Diplomatic Corps was invited. When he met me
+at these meetings he treated me with great coolness and even disdain,
+knowing my complete lack of sympathy with the program to which he
+had committed himself, and this manner of treating me with disdain
+and open disregard was probably his way of protecting himself and
+his own feelings of shame. Shortly after the visit of von Neurath,
+Chancellor Schuschnigg in my conversations with him told me that in his
+conversations with von Neurath, during the visit, von Neurath had been
+just as bad as if Habicht or Frauenfeld had been talking when they had
+discussed the German demands for the inclusion of Nazis in the Austrian
+Cabinet.
+
+About the same time, Schuschnigg made some concessions to ease the
+pressure from the Nazis. In February, he appointed a so-called
+“Committee of Seven”, consisting among others of Dr. Jury and a man
+named Tavs, to discuss “nationalistic ambitions” with him. In June,
+following the visit of Glaise-Horstenau and General Kraus and Leopold
+to Hitler in Berlin, and the increased Nazi activities following,
+Schuschnigg appointed Seyss-Inquart and Dr. Pembauer to devise a means
+whereby the “Nationalists” could be incorporated into the Patriotic
+Front.
+
+Dr. Seyss-Inquart himself was a prominent Vienna Lawyer, who had
+long been an intimate personal friend of Chancellor Schuschnigg. The
+Chancellor himself told me on various occasions that Dr. Seyss-Inquart
+had frequently attempted to convince him that the admission of the
+Nazi into the Austrian Cabinet would be for the best interest of
+Austria, in that it would relieve the pressure on Austria by Germany,
+and that he (Seyss-Inquart) at all times professed a sincere desire to
+maintain the independence of Austria. I had little personal contact
+with Seyss-Inquart but I knew from various sources absolutely reliable
+that while Seyss-Inquart was making these protestations to the
+Chancellor with whom he had had this intimate friendship, and which
+the Chancellor repaid by his confidence, Seyss-Inquart was in fact
+completely insincere. He was known at the time, and I had knowledge
+of this, to be in frequent contact with many high officials of the
+German Government and that he had had contact with Hitler himself. My
+information on this point was obtained not only from sources in Austria
+but also from acquaintances in Germany. There is only one thing which
+can be said in favor of Seyss-Inquart at the time and that is that he
+perhaps did believe the German protestations made to him that Austria’s
+independence would be respected. It is difficult, however, to conceive
+that a man who was known to have the legal ability and intelligence
+of Seyss-Inquart could have been completely taken in by these
+protestations. The probabilities are that at least from the outset he
+used his friendship with Chancellor Schuschnigg in order to help to
+destroy the independence of his country in order to make a place for
+himself.
+
+I left Vienna on July 11, 1937, in order to assume the post of
+Assistant Secretary of State in Washington. I, therefore, left Vienna
+before the final tragedy occurred. The final outcome, however, was
+then already foreseeable. From the tenor of the Italian Minister’s
+conversations with me it was clear that Italy would not or could not
+any longer defend Austria militarily against German aggression. It was
+also clear that Austria could not resist the German pressures alone.
+Although France had given very definite assurances as to her interest
+in maintaining Austria’s independence and England had expressed her
+interest therein, the Austrian Government was less and less able to be
+assured of real support. When the Austrian government could no longer
+expect the full military support of Italy, it knew that its fate was
+sealed. Hitler was, therefore, free to work his will in Austria. The
+only question remaining was when he would do it and when he considered
+it opportune. The work of disintegration, set forth in this statement,
+had had its effect. Early in 1938, apparently satisfied that England
+and France would not move and knowing that Italy could not and would
+not oppose him, Hitler struck the final blow at Austria’s independence,
+bringing to a climax what must be recorded in history as one of the
+most insidious, dastardly, unjustified and altogether effective series
+of measures to undermine and bring about the end of a sovereign state,
+during the course of which machinations and operations the Nazi
+Government nevertheless consistently openly proclaimed its friendliness
+towards Austria and its intentions of maintaining its respect for its
+sovereignty and independence.
+
+                                                 [Signed] G. Messersmith
+
+Subscribed and sworn to before me, William L. Brewster, a Vice Consul
+of the United States of America, duly commissioned and qualified, in
+Mexico, D.F., Mexico, this 28th day of August 1945.
+
+                                            [Signed] William L. Brewster
+                             Vice Consul of the United States of America
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1765-PS
+
+  The commissioner for the four year plan
+  Plenipotentiary for special missions
+
+                                     Berlin W8, Behrenstr. 43, 15 Jan 43
+                                 SECRET
+
+  To
+
+1. His excellency, the Reich marshal of the Greater German
+Reich--commissioner for the four-year plan--
+
+  _a._ Attention the secretary of state Koerner or his representative
+
+  _b._ Attention the ministerial dirigent Dr. Gramsch or his
+       representative
+
+  _c._ Attention ministerial councillor Dr. Kadgien or his
+       representative
+
+  _d._ Attention ministerial councillor Legler, or his representative
+
+2. the commissioner for the four-year-plan- central planning-Attention
+state councillor Schieber or his representative.
+
+3. The high command of the armed forces
+
+  _a._ Office of economics--attention General Thomas or his
+       representative
+
+  _b._ Special staff HWK, attention Admiral Groos, or his representative
+
+  _c._ Office of foreign intelligence, attention Admiral Canaris, or
+       his representative
+
+  _d._ Army Administration Office, attention General Osterkamp, or his
+       representative
+
+  _e._ Armed forces budget dept., attention Ministerial dirigent Dr.
+       Tischbein, or his representative
+
+  _f._ Armed forces administrative dept., attention Intendant General
+       Dr. Biehler, or his representative.
+
+4. The High Command of the army--Quartermaster General, attention Maj.
+Gen. Wagner or his representative.
+
+5. The Reich minister for Aviation and supreme commander of the
+Airforce, attention Field Marshal Milch, or his representative
+
+  _b._ Administrative office of the airforce, attention General Crosrav
+       or his representative
+
+  _c._ Dept. GI--attention chief engineer Sellschopp, or his
+       representative
+
+6. The high command of the navy, attention Admiral-General Witzell, or
+his representative.
+
+7. The Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police
+
+  _a._ SS Main office of economic administration, attention SS
+       brigadier General Loerner, or his representative.
+
+  _b._ SS-Office for raw materials--SS-Colonel Kloth, or his
+       representative.
+
+8. The Foreign Office
+
+  _a._ Attention Ministerial Director Wiehl, or his representative
+
+  _b._ Attention VLR. Bisse, or his representative
+
+  _c._ Attention Minister Hemmen, or his representative
+
+9. The Ammunition Ministry
+
+  _a._ Attention Reichsminister Speer, or his representative
+
+  _b._ Attention Commercial Attaché Ruckenbrod, or his representative
+
+10. Reich Minister for Nutrition
+
+  _a._ Attention Secretary of State Backe, or his representative
+
+  _b._ Attention Ministerial Director Dr. Moritz, or his representative
+
+11. Reich Minister of Finance
+
+  _a._ Attention Reichsminister Count Schwerin-Krosigk, or his
+       representative
+
+  _b._ Attention Ministerial Councillor von Knorre, or his
+       representative
+
+  _c._ Attention Government Councillor Nitschke, or his representative
+
+12. The Reichsminister of Economy
+
+  _a._ Attention the secretary of State Dr. Landfried, or his
+       representative
+
+  _b._ Attention to the under secretary of state von Jagwitz, or his
+       representative
+
+  _c._ Attention for the President Kehrl, or his representative
+
+  _d._ Attention to the Ministerial Councillor Dr. Drexl, or his
+       representative
+
+  _e._ Attention of the Chief Councillor of government Dr. Goetze, or
+       his representative
+
+13. The Main Office for Reich Security [RSHA]
+
+  _a._ Attention SS-Brigadier General Ohlendorf, or his representative
+
+  _b._ Attention SS-Colonel Schellenberg, or his representative
+
+14. The Reich Commissioner for price control
+
+  _a._ Attention Minister Fischboeck, or his representative
+
+  _b._ Attention Government councillor Dr. Wurst, or his representative
+
+15. The Auditor-Generals Office of the German Reich
+
+  _a._ Attention Ministerial Councillor Kuesel-Glogau, or his
+       representative
+
+  _b._ Attention Office Councillor Rueger, or his representative
+
+16. The Military Commander in France
+
+  _a._ Attention KVCh Dr. Michel, or his representative
+
+  _b._ Attention KVACh Frhr. v. Mahs, or his representative
+
+  _c._ Attention OKVR Bolck, or his representative
+
+  _d._ Attention Intendant of General Staff Lenz, or his representative
+
+17. The Military Commander in Belgium and Northern France
+
+  _a._ Attention KV Chief Reeder, or his representative
+
+  _b._ Attention Ministerial dirigent Dr. Schlumprecht, or his
+       representative
+
+  _c._ Intendant in charge, Intendant of General Staff Fritsch, or his
+       representative
+
+18. Commissar of the Reich for the occupied Dutch Territories
+
+  _a._ Reichscommissar Dr. Seyss-Inquart, or his representative
+
+  _b._ Dept. of industrial economy, attention Chief Councillor of
+       government Dr. Heinemann, or his representative
+
+  _c._ Dept. of the four-year plan, attention Mr. Pluemer, or his
+       representative
+
+19. Commander of the Armed Forces in the Netherlands
+
+  _a._ General Christiansen, or his representative
+
+  _b._ Intendant in charge, intendant of General Staff Dr. Geyer, or
+       his representative
+
+20. The Plenipotentiary General for Economy in Serbia, Consul General
+Neuhausen, or his representative
+
+21. The Supervisory Office in Paris, attention Lt. Col. Koch, or his
+representative, two copies
+
+22. The Supervisory Office in Belgium, attention Lt. Col. V. Parish, or
+his representative, two copies
+
+23. The Supervisory Office in Lille, attention Major Woehlke, or his
+representative, two copies
+
+24. The Supervisory Office Netherlands, attention SS-Major Hanke, or
+his representative, two copies
+
+25. The Supervisory Office Belgrade, attention Major Werner, or his
+representative, two copies
+
+26. The Roges trading Company Ltd., attention Director Kraney, or his
+representative
+
+Enclosed I send copy of my second report of findings with the request
+for acknowledgement.
+
+                                                             Heil Hitler
+                                                     signed: J. Veltjens
+
+                                                                  Col AC
+                                                              certified:
+
+                                                                Hillmann
+                                                         office employee
+
+  The commissioner for the four-year plan
+  plenipotentiary for special missions
+
+
+                                 SECRET
+
+2. Report of findings of the plenipotentiary for special missions
+
+A. _Obtaining of war important goods on the black market in the
+occupied western territories_ and in Serbia.
+
+  I. The black market up to the issue of the order to the
+     plenipotentiary for special missions.
+
+  II. Development of the black market since the 1 July 1942.
+
+    1. General
+
+    2. The organization created by the plenipotentiary for special
+       missions.
+
+    3. Scope of the previous purchases (per 30 Nov. 1942).
+
+  III. The further development
+
+B. Obtaining of harbor installations and machines from shut down plants.
+
+  I. Harbor installations
+
+  II. Machines
+
+C. Christmas action.
+
+D. Miscellaneous.
+
+       #       #       #       #       #
+
+A. _Providing of war important goods on the black market in the
+occupied western territories and in Serbia._
+
+
+I. The black market up to the issue of the order to the plenipotentiary
+for special missions.
+
+The beginning of a black market in the occupied territories can already
+be ascertained in the time before the German troops entered. It started
+however, on a large scale after the German occupation and as matters
+were, the occupation authorities could not prevent this.--The following
+reasons have necessarily led to its rise:
+
+1. The scarcity of goods in consequence of the exploitation and
+rationing as a result of hoarding as an escape into material values
+(particularly in metals) and as a result of removal for the purpose of
+sabotaging the German Military power.
+
+2. The impossibility of enforcing price limits completely and
+consequently a constant enlargement of the divergence of price between
+raw materials and finished products on one hand and between goods and
+wages on the other.
+
+3. The impossibility of controlling the prices on the German
+model because of the lack of personnel in the German supervisory
+organizations.
+
+4. The lack of effective support of the counter-measures by the
+individual administrative state authorities, primarily in France.
+
+5. The inefficient criminal justice of the individual state criminal
+authorities.
+
+6. The lack of discipline in the civilian population.
+
+This development was accelerated--particularly since the year 1942--by
+the attitude of numerous offices of the armed forces and other German
+organizations. The raw materials and finished products needed by these
+offices could often not be placed at disposal on the desired scale
+by the home land within the framework of existing priority measures.
+Consequently it became often actually the practice simply to use
+the way of supply through the black market. The activity of German
+agencies on the black market gradually reached an extent which led to
+increasingly more unbearable conditions; it was daily routine for the
+black marketeers to offer their goods simultaneously to several offices
+for sale and that that office which offered the best price received the
+merchandise so that the individual German formations in this manner not
+only snatched the merchandise away from one another, but also, inflated
+the prices.
+
+Finally the black market dealings took a course which gave impetus to
+the most serious fears with respect to market- and currency policy.
+The military commanders in France, Belgium and northern France and
+the Reichscommissar for the occupied territories of the Netherlands
+therefore took measures during the course of the year 1941 to bring
+this development to a halt. However, in this respect the lever was
+not--at any rate not primarily--inserted at the price side because this
+promised only little success in the face of the internal conditions
+prevailing in the occupied territories; just as little could a
+stricter control of prices be considered at that time. The central
+occupation authorities rather began to do business themselves on the
+black market, with the aim of slowly gaining control of it and then to
+kill it gradually. These actions can be viewed as the predecessors of
+the organization of the Bfs, (Plenipotentiary for special missions)
+here also the purchased goods were distributed centrally and because
+the winding up was also executed through the Roges (in France) or
+through the AWG (in Belgium) and the Bfs in Holland in conjunction
+with the department “four year plan” of the Reich commissioner on the
+one hand and the departments of the Reich on the other. The purchase
+was at times made through a single purchasing agency. However, such a
+procedure had to be denied the desired success as long as it was not
+possible to hold off all the other offices from activity on the black
+market; it would have been a prerequisite for this, that all central
+authorities in the Reich had instructed the departments subordinated to
+them accordingly, but this was only done in part.
+
+Finally, in June 1942 the plenipotentiary for special missions [Bfs] in
+agreement with all central authorities was ordered to take charge of
+the seizure and central control of the black markets. With that, the
+prerequisite for an effective beginning regarding the problem of the
+black market and with it the struggle against it existed for the first
+time.
+
+
+II. Development of the black market since 1 July 1942.
+
+1. General.
+
+The plenipotentiary for special missions has from the beginning on
+viewed the purpose of the mission given to him less in presenting the
+highest possible figures of purchases; the final aim was set rather to
+combat the black market that is, to bring it to an end.
+
+The starting point had to be however, that as long as in the occupied
+territories an essential part of the goods existing or produced at all,
+disappears by reason of inefficient control or various other reasons
+in the black market, in the interest of supplying the German war
+economy with the most important raw materials and finished products, as
+textiles and PX rations, seizure of these goods could not be avoided.
+One fact is overlooked again and again: that the black market is not
+a phenomenon evoked through the activity of the plenipotentiary for
+special missions or other departments, but--as is shown under I--has
+developed inevitably from the economic situation of the market and will
+exist and have to be exploited in the German interest as long as no
+way has been found to break it up completely or at least check it to
+the extent that the amount of goods caught through it are meaningless
+within the framework of the total supply. However, the figures given
+later on in detail show that for the time being there cannot be any
+question about it.
+
+But the figures given later on show also that the purchases made on the
+black market could contribute essentially to the covering of many gaps
+in the supply of the German war economy without impairing the quota of
+deliveries in the occupied territories. Therefore the purchases can
+already for this reason not be refrained from as long as it has not
+been established that the goods can be secured in another way. The
+objection that these goods could have been secured anyhow within the
+frame work of the normal supply--and then much cheaper,--is incorrect.
+A typical example is the result of the last negotiations with France
+regarding leathergoods: Upon the desire of the Reichsminister of
+economics, the chief plenipotentiary for special missions had agreed to
+stopping the purchases on the leather and hide market, if the French
+who had complained about the German buying activity on the black
+market, would oblige themselves to deliver additionally in 1943 the
+same amount which had been bought in 1942 on the black market; the
+French declared that they did not feel in a position to do this. The
+objection mentioned is overlooking the fact that merchandise which had
+once been withdrawn from production or had been produced illegally,
+will never again become “white”. What is done cannot be undone, the
+black market is in existence and would also exist without any doubt
+if not a single German department would work in this field. The black
+market receives new impulse again and again and that on the one hand
+from the supply side, and
+
+  1. from the large hidden stocks still in existence,
+
+  2. from the illegal production which is taking place continuously
+     (this subject will have to be investigated later on more in
+     detail),
+
+  3. in France--at any rate up to date--through continuous supply from
+     the unoccupied territory;
+
+on the other hand, at the always increasing scarcity of goods every
+item finds a buyer, either from the civilian population or industry,
+or through purchase on the part of the Italians, Swiss, Spaniards;
+yes, numerous purchases could even be ascertained--in particular
+in unoccupied France--by the English or--evidently through British
+instigation--from neutral sources, as for instance the Portuguese which
+do not serve any other purpose than that of depriving Germany of the
+merchandise.
+
+The consequence of such sudden cessation of purchases through the
+organization of the plenipotentiary for special missions would
+therefore only be that a so far not inconsiderable source of raw
+materials and war important finished products dries up without
+achieving on this account the end of the black market. Besides, it has
+to be doubted with good reason that it would be possible to keep up the
+prohibition of purchases which was issued to the German departments
+in the occupied territories, if the delivery by the organization of
+the plenipotentiary for special missions would suddenly cease. This
+applies particularly for the cases of the so-called immediate-need
+[Sofort-Bedarf]. The conception that the black market will come to an
+end if no more is bought on the part of the Germans, is incorrect.
+[Marginal notation in handwriting is inserted here: “Yes, our work
+has to begin _here_; with it we hit then the French black market
+primarily”.]
+
+The central purchasing organization of the plenipotentiary for special
+missions for instance does not buy agricultural products (only some
+particularly reasonable items in price have been bought, which however
+are not at all worth mentioning within the framework of the total
+supply) and nevertheless the black market is the most significant just
+on this sector.
+
+It has been explained that further activity on the black market at the
+scale up to date will in the long run not be bearable any more for the
+budget of the Reich. However, in this respect it has to be pointed
+out that the greatest part of the purchases--that is the ones made in
+France--have been financed from the French costs of occupation. Of RM
+1,107,792,819----the total amount of purchases, RM 929,100,000 have
+been financed from French occupational funds. Therefore a debit to the
+budget of the Reich did not arise to this extent.
+
+The claim that the black market or the activity of German departments
+on the black market would bring about an increasing decline of the
+currency in the occupied territories, cannot be recognized as the
+truth. The decline of the currency which has in part actually occurred
+already, is not a consequence of the black market, but on the contrary,
+the inflationary tendencies accompanying the increasing scarcity of
+goods have evoked the rise of the black market.
+
+At this place it will not be necessary to elaborate on the advantages
+of a centralized obtaining of the purchases on the black market; only
+two points of view shall be emphasized:
+
+1. While in the time before the commissioning of the plenipotentiary
+for special missions, the prices on the black markets rose always
+further,--for the most part a consequence of the mutual competition of
+the individual German buyers--it has since been possible, to stabilize
+the prices of most goods, and this in spite of the fact that the
+_general_ level of prices in the occupied territories has risen further.
+
+2. While until the commissioning of the plenipotentiary for special
+missions, the individual German departments received and used the goods
+purchased by themselves uncontrolled, without regard to the degree of
+necessity, the distribution now takes place within the scope of total
+planning by the Reich according to the degree of _urgency_.
+
+In summarizing, it has to be said that in the face of the supply
+situation of the Reich, it cannot be refrained from skimming the black
+market now as before as long as there are still concealed stocks of war
+important goods. With regard to this higher interest all other points
+of view have to remain in the background.
+
+2. The organization created by the plenipotentiary for special missions.
+
+In his report at the end of August 1942, the plenipotentiary for
+special missions has presented in detail the organization created
+by him for the getting hold of and centralized control of the black
+market. Therefore here a short review only shall be given.
+
+The general control and supervision of the purchasing activity is the
+task of the supervising offices newly created for this purpose.
+
+They are:
+
+  _a._ the supervising office France with its seat in Paris
+
+  _b._ the supervising office Belgium and Northern France with its seat
+         in Brussels
+
+  _c._ the supervising office Belgium and Northern France, Lille
+         branch, with its seat in Lille
+
+  _d._ the supervising office Netherlands with its seat in the Hague
+
+  _e._ the supervising department Serbia with its seat in Belgrade.
+
+Principle and directives for the execution are on the one hand
+“the instructions for the winding up of stocks of merchandise of
+uncertain origin” issued by the plenipotentiary for special missions
+in agreement with the military commanders of the Reich commissar for
+the occupied Dutch territories and on the other hand the contracts
+concluded by the Roges raw material trading company Ltd. with the
+purchasing organizations. The purchases themselves are made by a
+restricted number of authorized purchasing organizations, of which
+there are in France 11, in Belgium 6, in the Netherlands 6 and in
+Serbia 3. Thereby the total purchasing activity is subordinated to the
+central supervision of the plenipotentiary for special missions. Each
+purchasing organization is only authorized for a quite definite kind
+of goods. The engagement of a number of purchasing organizations which
+will on first sight appear comparatively high was necessary, because
+the black marketeers by experience want to sell for the most part only
+to certain departments, with which they have cooperated before and
+because they refuse to cooperate with other buyers whom they did not
+know previously; it had to be taken care, however, that none of the
+existing sources dried up. Participation has been prohibited to all
+other departments by corresponding orders of the central authorities in
+the Reich and the military commanders of the Reich commissioner.
+
+The financing of purchases and the transportation of the goods will
+be taken care of by the Reich-owned Roges Ltd.; the goods are then
+distributed according to the urgency of the individual consumers in
+agreement with the instructions of the centralized planning or the
+departments charged by the centralized planning. It is the additional
+task of the Roges Ltd., to level the purchasing prices down to the
+German internal price; lower prices, however, will not be granted for
+deliveries to the armed forces, authorized and--in case of investment
+goods--to big plants. The adherence to the directives is guaranteed
+by the fact that the purchasing organizations at each offer may only
+then perform the transaction, if the supervising department has given
+its permission through an expert. The experts for their part will make
+their decision on the basis of the price and quality limits given by
+the plenipotentiary for special missions or the Reich departments.
+
+3. Scope of the previously made purchases (up to 30/11/1942).
+
+_a._ Since the beginning of the action (that is since purchases have
+been directly centralized by the military commander or the Reich
+commissar with centralized distribution of goods in the Reich).
+
+Up till now since the beginning of the action purchases have been made
+in the total amount of RM 1,107,792,818.64, of which
+
+  in France    RM    929,100,000.00
+  in Belgium   RM    103,881,929.00
+  in Holland   RM     73,685,162.64
+  in Serbia    RM      1,125,727.00
+
+Payment takes place in France from the funds for occupation, in the
+other countries through clearing.
+
+In the following is a statement of the quantities involved:
+
+1. _Metals_:
+
+66,202 tons to the value of RM 273,078,287.00 of which there are
+
+  _a._ non-ferrous metals 58,742 tons, in particular copper and copper
+         containing material (34,000 tons), lead and lead alloys (14,500
+         tons), furthermore (in the succession of their quantity) zinc,
+         aluminum, tin, nickel, magnesium, antimony, manganese ore;
+
+  _b._ material containing iron (tools, junk, etc.) 7,460 tons.
+
+2. _Textiles_:
+
+To the total value of RM 439,040,000.00, of which there are 22,672,000
+pieces of linen, suits (particularly workers’ clothing), overcoats,
+etc., 5,488,000 kg yarn and miscellaneous, 40,642,000 m cloth and
+ribbons, 10,072,000 pairs of gloves, suspenders, etc.
+
+3. _Leather, skins, and hides_:
+
+To the total value of RM 120,754,000.00, of which there are 5,053,000
+kg raw hides, 3,390,000 square feet of finished leather, 1,783,000
+pieces of hides, chamois, etc., 801,000 pairs of shoes, and 694,000 kg
+leather for soles and other shoe soling articles.
+
+Furthermore was bought:
+
+  industrial oils and fats (1,330 tons)
+  food oils and fats (346 tons)
+  wool
+  household articles
+  PS goods including paper articles
+  wines and alcoholic drinks
+  equipment for engineers
+  sanitary necessities
+  sacks
+
+The factors leading to excessive raising of prices of essential goods
+are at the present time the following:
+
+  -----------+--------+---------+-------------
+             |        |         |    The
+             | France | Belgium | Netherlands
+  -----------+--------+---------+-------------
+  Metals     | 9      |  9      |  5-6½
+  Textiles   | 4      |  6½     |  5
+  Hides      | 6½     |  6      |  4
+  Leather    | 6½     |  6      |  6
+  -----------+--------+---------+-------------
+
+Since beginning of the action the following items were bought in
+_France_--against payment from occupation funds:
+
+  Metals                                              RM 248,000,000.00
+  Textiles                                            RM 340,000,000.00
+  Hides, skins, leather                               RM 112,000,000.00
+  Wool                                                RM   3,000,000.00
+  Oils & fats (for industrial and food purposes)      RM  12,000,000.00
+  Household goods                                     RM  46,600,000.00
+  PK goods                                            RM  33,000,000.00
+  Wines and alcoholic drinks                          RM  50,000,000.00
+  Sacks                                               RM  10,500,000.00
+  Paper and packing material                          RM   5,000,000.00
+  Food and pleasure items                             RM  33,000,000.00
+  Chemical products                                   RM   8,000,000.00
+  Sanitary necessities                                RM  12,000,000.00
+  Miscellaneous                                       RM  16,000,000.00
+                                                    -------------------
+       TOTAL SUM                                      RM 929,100,000.00
+
+Since beginning of the action the following items were bought in
+_Belgium_--against payment by clearing:
+
+  Metals                     RM   13,784,000.00
+  Textiles                   RM   43,755,000.00
+  Leather, skins & hides     RM    4,030,880.00
+  Wool                       RM    2,179,720.00
+  Industrial oils & fats
+  Chemical products
+  Food-oils & fats           RM    3,815,159.00
+  Household goods            RM    2,512,912.00
+  Furniture                  RM      418,035.00
+  Paper & packing material   RM    5,561,268.00
+  Food & pleasure items      RM    3,393,955.00
+  Engineer equipment         RM    7,500,000.00
+  Miscellaneous              RM   16,931,000.00
+                            --------------------
+        TOTAL SUM            RM  103,881,929.00
+
+Since beginning of the action the following items were bought in the
+_Netherlands_--against payment through normal bank transactions:
+
+  Non-ferrous metals                RM    6,706,744.00
+  Textiles                          RM   55,285,568.00
+  Wool                              RM      753,878.00
+  Leather, hides & skins            RM    4,723,130.00
+  Wooden barrels                    RM      254,982.00
+  Furniture                         RM      272,990.00
+  Food-and pleasure items           RM      590,859.00
+  Chemical-and cosmetic articles    RM      152,191.00
+  Various iron-and steel goods      RM    3,792,166.00
+  Rags                              RM      543,416.00
+  Motor oil                         RM       52,284.00
+  Raw diamonds                      RM       25,064.00
+  Miscellaneous                     RM      531,890.00
+                                   --------------------
+        TOTAL SUM                   RM   73,685,162.00
+
+In Serbia was bought against payment through clearing:
+
+  Non-Ferrous metals in the amount of RM 1,125,727.00
+
+The action began here only in the month of November. Up to date the
+goods charged to the receivers amounted to a total of RM 86,084,910.06.
+
+The reasons why, at a total delivery of RM 1,107,792,819.00 no larger
+quantities could be completely wound up, are various (aggravation of
+the winding up through the procedure in fixing the prices, difficulties
+in transportation, lack of personnel). The Plenipotentiary for special
+missions has instigated measures, in order to accelerate the wind-up in
+the future.
+
+_b._ Since the beginning of the activity by the plenipotentiary for
+special missions, on the 1/7/1942, the following was bought (up to
+30/11/1942):
+
+  Altogether for              RM  840,382,893.00
+  of which
+  metals                      RM  174,982,697.00
+  textiles                    RM  318,013,354.00
+  leather, skins and hides    RM   82,265,070.00
+
+The figures mentioned above comprise roughly about the same period of
+time (1/7/-30/11, i.e., five months) as the purchasing action of the
+military commander or the Reichs Commissar before commissioning of the
+plenipotentiary for special missions (in France 6 months, in Belgium 2
+months, in the Netherlands 7 months); the figures are however several
+times higher (RM 840,382,893.00--in contrast to RM 267,409,926.00).
+This proves more than anything else that and to what degree, the
+concentration of purchases on the black market through the organization
+of the plenipotentiary for special missions and the placing of the
+purchased goods at the disposal of the total planning of the Reich
+succeeded.
+
+
+III. The further development.
+
+There is not any doubt that the black market as such from the viewpoint
+of political economy is extremely undesirable and that therefore
+everything has to be attempted to bring it to an end. In this respect
+it is also necessary that the German purchasing activity be stopped
+as soon as possible. But on the other hand, as has already been
+explained above in detail, the delivery of war important raw materials
+and finished products cannot be refrained from. The plenipotentiary
+for special missions has therefore made his own suggestions to the
+departments involved to the effect the purchasing activity be abandoned
+by degrees if the black market is suppressed by corresponding measures;
+in this respect it must be certain however, that the quantities of
+goods which flowed up to date to the black market will now go into
+the “white” production and into normal trade. Naturally, however,
+repressive measures have to precede this; only then can the gradual
+abandoning of the purchasing activity take place in order to impair the
+total influx of goods as little as possible.
+
+In examining the measures to be taken for the fight against it, a
+distinction must be made between the sources, from which the black
+market is fed. First, there are the concealed stores established for
+most varied reasons whose sale will bring a one time flow of goods.
+Second, the black market is fed by continuous illegal production. It is
+certain that with continued duration of the war the second mentioned
+source will gain more and more in importance; therefore special
+attention has to be paid to it.
+
+The illegal production has its cause--aside from the general lure
+of higher prices--in the fact that the price divergence between raw
+materials and finished products has partly become so great that it
+cannot be bridged any more within the framework of normal production
+without endangering the solvency of the enterprise. Often the
+capacity of the enterprise is exploited only incompletely so that the
+entrepreneur, even if it is only in order to avoid a shut-down, turns
+to procurement of raw materials illegally in order to produce beyond
+his quota, that is, illegally. Previously the purchases in unoccupied
+France which were sent on special routes into the occupied territory,
+formed a third and considerable source. It remains to be seen, whether
+it is now possible to supervise production in the up to now unoccupied
+part of France on a stricter basis so that, here also, the fight
+against the black market can be initiated.
+
+According to the conception prevailing here, the following measures for
+the removal of the black market would have to be effected:
+
+1. Enlargement of the price supervision.--As an increase in personnel
+of the German departments entrusted with the supervision does not
+or only at a restricted scale seem possible, the administrative
+authorities of the individual state have to be constrained to show more
+activity.
+
+2. The enactment of severer penalties for violations against measures
+of economic management taken in accordance with the German example
+because only then can the lack of discipline in the civilian population
+resulting from their individualistic and liberalistic attitude be
+removed. A supervision of the verdicts of the penal authorities of the
+individual states seems to be recommendable.
+
+3. The announcement of awards for reporting violations against measures
+of economic management amounting to a not too small percentage of the
+value of the objects confiscated on the basis of the report.
+
+4. Engagement of spies and agents provocateurs.
+
+     Besides for the prevention of illegal production:
+
+5. Shut down of all plants which are not manufacturing for war purposes.
+
+6. Stricter shut-downs or merger of plants whose capacity is exploited
+immediately only.
+
+7. Stronger supervision of the production in factories.
+
+8. Stricter scrutiny in the allotment of raw materials for the
+distribution of orders.
+
+9. A price policy which gives to the enterprises sufficient prices and
+guarantees them the existence.
+
+In order to create for the purchasing organizations of the
+plenipotentiary for special missions the basis for purchasing activity
+on the black market in the face of the administrative authorities of
+the individual state in the occupied territories, the plenipotentiary
+for special missions has in Belgium and in the Netherlands effected
+a “decree on the clarification of unexplained goods” or a “general
+decree”. Hereby the supervising departments and their purchasing
+organizations were given simultaneously the possibility of approaching
+through purchases of goods the source of error in management and
+control. In accordance with it a suggestion was made by the
+plenipotentiary for special missions also to Ambassador Hemmen for
+France, which will result in the issue of such a decree for France also
+in cooperation with the military commander.
+
+Most important and promising of success for the beginning appears the
+measure outlined in 2 whereby the initial effort should be made toward
+commerce and there again first toward retail business. As soon as a
+number of draconic penalties has occurred, the retail dealers will in
+their own interest refrain from buying excessively priced merchandise
+from the wholesalers and manufacturers. The latter face then only the
+organization of the plenipotentiary for special missions; then it
+could be started by degrees to let the illegal producers crack up.
+The plenipotentiary for special missions has in this respect already
+performed certain preliminary work by directing part of the purchasing
+organizations to try to approach the manufacturers by eliminating of
+the black market traders.
+
+The repressive measures mentioned above--particularly under 1 and
+2--have to be performed in close cooperation with the individual state
+authorities; it is recommendable that as soon as possible proper
+measures be taken on the part of the German occupation authorities. The
+measures have to be accompanied by purposeful propaganda of press and
+radio (branding the black market as a crime against one’s own people);
+in order to build psychologically foundation for the strict measures
+with the population and to rouse it to cooperation.
+
+Further, French and Belgium government--and economic circles--among
+others also the French chief of government--have lately found it
+necessary to complain about the organized German purchasing activity.
+In the face of such representations--aside from various other
+arguments--it should be pointed out that also on the part of Germany
+the greatest interest exists in the disappearance of the black market,
+but its existence is, in the main, the fault of the government
+authorities themselves, through their incapability in the supervision
+of prices and their laxity in penal prosecution, whereby, lack of
+discipline is bred within their own population.
+
+  B. Providing of fort installations and machines from shut-down plants.
+
+I. Harbor installations.
+
+A large amount of harbor equipment exists in the occupied western
+territories, which at the present time is not or is insufficiently
+used. On the other hand, in the eastern territories as well as partly
+in the Reich there exists an urgent need for such harbor installations.
+The plenipotentiary for special missions has therefore received the
+directive to seize these idle potentialities, in agreement with the
+departments involved. The determination of the objects to be shipped
+is up to the Reich commissar for navigation or those needing the
+goods after confiscation by the responsible navy departments, the
+plenipotentiary for special missions effects the financial settlement
+and puts the objects for installation at the disposal of those needing
+them. So far installations of that kind could already be provided for
+Oslo and for Hamburg; further transactions are in the process of being
+executed.
+
+II. Machines.
+
+Another task of the plenipotentiary for special missions is the
+seizure of machines from closed down plants. It is certain that large
+potentialities, particularly in machine-tools which are badly needed
+at home for the armament productions, are at the present time still
+idle. In agreement with the plenipotentiary for special missions,
+the military commander and the plenipotentiary for the production of
+machines a so-called “arbitration offices for machines” is anticipated
+in Belgium and the Netherlands. One of the main difficulties in this
+field lies in the overcoming of the resistance of both the owner of the
+plants involved and the individual state authorities in the occupied
+territories. Here the occupational authorities will have to employ all
+their initiative in order to break this resistance.
+
+
+C. Christmas-Action.
+
+At the end of August 1942 the plenipotentiary for special missions
+received a further special task, i.e. the providing of Christmas
+presents for the German people. Initially the action was calculated to
+amount to RM 300,000,000 (internal price). This task was undertaken
+immediately with all possible vigor, though it could be foreseen
+that providing and transportation of such quantities of goods in the
+comparatively short time available until Christmas could hardly be
+achieved; as the providing should if possible take place in the normal
+way--by payment through clearing also in France--and _not_ on the black
+market, an organization had first to be created in order to master this
+task.
+
+Actually it was possible to provide goods to the value of approximately
+RM 244,000,000 (purchase price) up to the 20 December 1942. But on
+account of the difficulties of transportation occurring in conjunction
+with the political events in France as well as the procedure necessary
+for fixing the prices and other reasons, it was impossible to bring all
+of these goods to Germany and to make them available for sale on time.
+2,306 box-cars with 11,138,229 kg and further by ship 6,335 bales of
+goods with over 100,000 kg arrived in Germany. In the first place they
+comprise cosmetics, toys and in general gift-articles. Distribution
+was primarily made in the bomb-damaged regions as well as in the
+big cities Berlin, Vienna, Hamburg, Breslau, Koenigsberg and in the
+industrial region of Waldenburg and Upper Silesia. A conclusive report
+in the Christmas-action will be presented in the course of the month of
+February. If an identical action should be contemplated in the year of
+1943 on the basis of experiences made it would have to be started in
+the course of the month of March.
+
+D. Miscellaneous.
+
+Recently a report has been made to the commissioner for the four-year
+plan on the other fields of activity of the plenipotentiary for special
+missions insofar as the providing of additional shipping space for war
+important purposes is concerned.
+
+A report on the special imports by way of blockade running is
+anticipated.
+
+On the orders issued recently
+
+  _a._ in the field of the so-called “commodity-arbitrage”
+  _b._ the economic use made of enemy property,
+
+a report shall be rendered at opportune time.
+
+                                                     Signed: J. Veltjens
+                                               Colonel of the Air-Force.
+
+Berlin, 15 Jan. 1943
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1770-PS
+
+                1933 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 161
+
+      Law concerning Factory Representative Councils and Economic
+                     Organizations of 4 April 1933
+
+The Reich Cabinet has decided the following law which is hereby made
+public:
+
+
+                               Chapter I
+
+                   _Factory Representative Councils_
+
+
+                               Article 1
+
+1. The Highest Authority of the Federal State can postpone the
+elections for the Legal Factory Representative Council for the Federal
+State, parts of the Federal State or for individual enterprises until
+30 September of this year at the latest for reasons of public safety
+and order.
+
+2. The Factory Representative Council existing up to date remains
+in office in the case of postponement of the elections. Filling of
+vacancies in Factory Representative Councils caused by dismissal of
+members is only necessary if the number of its members has fallen below
+half of the legal number of members or if they number less than three.
+The new members of the Factory Representative Council required for its
+minimum strength will be nominated from the eligible workers by the
+highest authority of the Federal State or the authority appointed by it.
+
+
+                               Article 2
+
+The highest authority of the Federal State can cancel the membership
+of members who have been appointed contrary to the spirit of State and
+economy [die in Staats- oder Wirtschaftsfeindlichem Sinne eingestellt
+sind.] It can appoint new members for the Factory Representative
+Councils from the eligible workers to replace the eliminated members.
+
+
+                               Article 3
+
+The aforementioned regulations will be applied accordingly to the
+“United Factory Councils”, created according to Article 50 of the
+Factory Council Law and to the “Special Representations” formed
+according to Articles 61 and 62. Article 93 of the Factory Council Law
+will not be applicable in the case of disputes concerning the execution
+of the above-mentioned regulations.
+
+
+                               Article 4
+
+The competent highest Reich authorities will be appointed to exercise
+the powers for the highest authority of the Federal State contained in
+Chapter I, in the case of the administrations and enterprises of the
+Reich, including the German Railroad Company and the Reichsbank.
+
+
+                               Article 5
+
+The regulations contained in Article 1, para. 2 and Article 2, 2nd
+sentence are also applicable to measures taken before the effectiveness
+of this law.
+
+
+                               Chapter II
+
+                         _Dismissal of Workers_
+
+The right to oppose dismissal of a worker contained in Article 84
+of the Factory Council Law is not applicable if the dismissed is
+suspected of an unfriendly attitude towards the State. The worker can
+appeal within a week to the authority declared competent according to
+Chapter I, Article 2. That authority decides, after hearing all those
+concerned, whether the suspicions are justified or not. The dismissal
+is cancelled if its findings are negative.
+
+
+                              Chapter III
+
+ _Representation of Economic Organizations within the Miners Insurance_
+
+
+                               Article 1
+
+Article 184, Article 157, sentences 2 and 3 and Article 180, part 3 of
+the Reich Mining Law are hereby revoked.
+
+
+                               Article 2
+
+The Reich Labor Minister can charge members of the insurance or mine
+supervision authorities, as commissioners with the tasks of the
+instances which are in office at the time; the commissioners are under
+the authority of the Reich Labor Minister.
+
+
+                               Chapter IV
+
+             _Legal Representation before the Labor Court_
+
+The following part 3 is added to Article 11 of the Labor Court Law:
+
+The Reich Labor Minister can, in agreement with the Reich Economy
+Minister and the Reich Minister of Justice, put other organizations on
+the same level for legal representation as the organizations named in
+parts 1 and 2.
+
+
+Chapter V
+
+_Directives of Execution_
+
+The Reich Labor Minister has the power to issue legal decrees and
+general administrative directives in order to insure the execution of
+the Regulations of this Law; he is authorized to change regulations of
+the Reich Mining Law in order to adapt them to the decrees of Chapter
+III of this Law.
+
+  Berlin, 4 April 1933
+
+                                                    The Reich Chancellor
+                                                            Adolf Hitler
+
+                                                The Reich Labor Minister
+                                                            Franz Seldte
+
+                                      The Reich Minister of the Interior
+                                                                   Frick
+
+                                       For the Reich Minister of Justice
+                                           The Reich Minister of Finance
+                                              Count Schwerin von Krosigk
+
+                                           The Reich Minister of Economy
+                                                               Hugenberg
+
+
+                                 PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1773-PS
+
+                   THE LAW OF THE GENERAL GOVERNMENT
+
+           [Das Recht des Generalgouvernements] Krakau, 1941
+
+
+                     _E 8. Impounding of Valuables_
+
+  E 800. Decree on the Sequestration of Property of the Former Polish
+         State in the General Gouvernement.--15 November 1939
+
+On the basis of Article 5, section 1 of the decree of the Fuehrer
+and Reich Chancellor governing the administration of occupied Polish
+territory dated 12 October 1939 (RGBl I, page 2077), I issue the
+following order:
+
+Article 1--1. All movable and stationary property of the former
+Polish State with accessories, including all demands, participation,
+rights and other interests inside the General Gouvernement, will be
+sequestered for the purpose of securing all manner of public valuables.
+
+2. The seizure, administration, and utilization of the sequestered
+property is the duty of the department “Trusteeship for the General
+Gouvernement” in the office of the Governor General.
+
+Article 2--The director of the department “Trusteeship for the General
+Gouvernement” will in agreement with the director of the finance
+department in the office of the Governor General issue the regulations
+required to execute this decree, in particular on the duty to make a
+declaration of the wealth belonging to the former Polish State as well
+as the treatment of rights of third persons on the wealth of the former
+Polish State and of claims against this wealth.
+
+Article 3--This regulation will be effective on the day of its
+publication.
+
+                                   The Governor General for the Occupied
+                                                      Polish Territories
+                                                                   FRANK
+
+       #       #       #       #       #
+
+  E 810. Decree on the Right of Ownership of Wealth of the former
+         Polish Territories.--24 September 1940
+
+On the basis of Article 5, section 1 of the decree of the Fuehrer and
+chancellor of the Reich of 12 Oct 1939 (RGBl I, page 2077), I issue the
+following order:
+
+Article 1--The property sequestered on the basis of Article 1, section
+1 of the decree on the confiscation of the wealth of the former Polish
+State within the General Gouvernement of 15 Nov 39 (Verordnungsblatt
+GGP, page 37) will be transferred to the ownership of the General
+Gouvernement. A legal right of the General Gouvernement will not be
+established by this transaction.
+
+Article 2--1. Rights of third persons in the property mentioned in
+Article 1 expire insofar as they existed before 20 November 1939.
+
+2. It will be determined later on whether and to what extent an
+indemnification can be granted to persons, especially to rightful
+foreign claimants, for legal losses suffered through the action.
+
+Article 3--The seizure and administration of the property mentioned in
+Article 1 will be executed until further notice on the basis of the
+regulation on the confiscation of the wealth of the former Polish State
+within the General Gouvernement of 15 November 1939 (Verordnungsblatt,
+GGP, page 37) and of the first executionary decree issued on 16 March
+1940 (Verordnungsblatt GGP II, page 175).
+
+Article 4--The director of the department “Trusteeship for the General
+Gouvernement” in agreement with the director of the finance department
+in the office of the governor general will be in charge of the property
+mentioned in Article 1.
+
+Article 5--This regulation will be effective on the day of its
+publication.
+
+                                                    The Governor General
+                                                                   FRANK
+
+       #       #       #       #       #
+
+  E 845. Decree on the Confiscation of Art Objects in the General
+         Gouvernement.--16 December 1939
+
+On the basis of Article 5, section 1 of the decree of the Fuehrer and
+Chancellor of the Reich on the administration of the occupied Polish
+territories of 12 Oct 1939 (RGBl I, page 2077), I order the following:
+
+Article 1--All art objects in public possession in the General
+Gouvernement will be confiscated for the fulfillment of public tasks
+of common interest insofar as it has not already been seized under the
+decree on the confiscation of the wealth of the former Polish State in
+the General Gouvernement of 15 November 1939 (Verordnungsblatt GGP,
+page 37).
+
+Article 2--With the exception of art collections and art objects which
+were the property of the former Polish State, art objects will be
+considered as owned by the public:
+
+1. private art collections which have been taken under protection by
+the special commissioner for the seizure and safekeeping of the art and
+cultural treasures.
+
+2. all ecclesiastical art property with the exception of those objects
+required for the daily performance of liturgic actions.
+
+Article 3--1. In order to determine whether art objects are public
+property in the sense of this regulation, every private and
+ecclesiastical art possession has to be registered with exact data on
+the kind, nature and number of pieces.
+
+2. Everyone who possessed or at the present time is in possession of or
+else is entitled to dispose of such objects of art since 15 March 39,
+is obliged to register the same.
+
+3. Everyone is obliged to make upon request truthful and appropriate
+statements.
+
+Article 4--The special commissioner appointed by me for the seizure and
+safekeeping of the art and cultural treasures will determine in cases
+of doubt what art collections and art objects in detail will have to
+be regarded on the basis of Article 2 of this regulation as public art
+property. He also will decide on the eventual necessary exceptions.
+
+Article 5--1. He will be punished with imprisonment
+
+1. Who undertakes to conceal, sell or remove objects of art from the
+General Gouvernement.
+
+2. Who refuses or else gives incorrect or incomplete information
+required from him on the basis of this decree.
+
+2. The special court is competent for the trial.
+
+Article 6--The special commissioner appointed for the seizure
+and safekeeping of the art and cultural treasures will issue the
+regulations necessary for the execution of this decree.
+
+Article 7--This regulation will be put into effect immediately.
+
+                                   The Governor General for the Occupied
+                                                      Polish Territories
+
+                                                                   FRANK
+
+       #       #       #       #       #
+
+  E 846. First Enforcement Regulation for the Order of 16 December 1939
+         on the Confiscation of Art Objects in the General Gouvernement.
+
+In order to execute the decree on the confiscation of art objects in
+the General Gouvernement of 16 December 1939 (Verordnungsblatt GGP,
+page 209), I order the following:
+
+Article 1--The registration decree in Article 3, section 1 of the
+regulation must be carried out by 15 February 1940 with the office of
+the special commissioner for the seizure and safekeeping of the art and
+cultural objects, Cracow, Bergakademie.
+
+Article 2--1. Objects of artistic, cultural-historical and historical
+value which originate from the time before 1850, have to be registered.
+
+2. The registration includes the following:
+
+  _a._ paintings
+
+  _b._ sculpture
+
+  _c._ products of handicraft (for instance antique furniture, china
+       ware, glass, golden and silver objects, Gobelins, rugs,
+       embroideries, lace-work, paramente, etc.)
+
+  _d._ drawings, engravings, woodcuts, etc.
+
+  _e._ rare manuscripts, musical manuscripts, autographs,
+       book-paintings, miniatures, prints, covers, etc.
+
+  _f._ weapons, armors, etc.
+
+  _g._ coins, medals, seals, etc.
+
+3. Regarding the art objects mentioned in section 2, detailed
+information has to be given, if possible, on the master, the time
+of production, the contents of the representation, measurements and
+material (for instance, wood, canvas, bronze, etc.)
+
+Article 3--The special commissioner will send in writing his decision
+in doubtful cases or in the eventual necessary exceptions as provided
+for in Article 4 of the decree. The decision will be final.
+
+Article 4--Scientific experts will be entrusted with the execution of
+the decree.
+
+                                   The Governor General for the Occupied
+                                                      Polish Territories
+
+  By order:
+
+                                                           Dr. MUEHLMANN
+
+
+                                 PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1774-PS
+
+            ORGANIZATIONAL LAWS OF THE GREATER GERMAN REICH
+
+  “Verfassungsrecht des Grossdeutschen Reiches” by Ernst Rudolf Huber.
+
+         FUEHRER, AND REICH-CABINET [REICH REGIERUNG, Page 223]
+
+_a._ The Structure of the Reich-Cabinet
+
+The political direction of the Reich is the task of the Fuehrer. The
+Fuehrer selects, in all fields of political developments the goals
+which should be attained, determines the methods to be used and makes
+all fundamental decisions when necessary. The authority of the Fuehrer
+[Fuehrergewalt] is the “Political Authority” in the new Reich. The
+term “Leadership” expresses better the mobilization of the collective
+political force of the people towards the achievement of the common
+goal, than the term “Government” which has been used heretofore for
+the highest authority of the State. The Fuehrer has the only final
+power to decide in all matters concerning movement [party], people,
+and Reich. He possesses and bears the historical responsibility to his
+people. Even in instances, where the law assigns certain tasks to the
+“Reichsregierung”, it is the Fuehrer who is responsible for the final
+decision.
+
+The Fuehrer avails himself, however, in his decisions of the counsel
+and the constructive cooperation of his collaborators, especially the
+Reich-Cabinet, which combines the Subordinate-Fuehrers [Unterfuehrer]
+of the various departments of the State. The legal position of the
+Reich-Minister was originally laid down by the Reich-Minister Law
+of March 27 1930 (RGBl I 96). In its place Section XIII of the
+German Civil Servant Law is now applicable, with the exception of
+the regulations concerning the official salaries, service quarters,
+moving--and travel expenses, where the old law remains valid. The
+Reich-Ministers are appointed by the Fuehrer and maintain a public
+service relationship towards him and the Reich. They take a special
+oath before the Fuehrer when they assume their functions. They
+cannot belong to any economic enterprise as chairmen or members
+of administrative or supervisory councils while they hold office
+(“economic incompatibility”). The Reich-Ministers can be dismissed
+from their offices at any time by the Fuehrer. No disciplinary action
+against them will be taken. Special treatment of the Reich-Ministers is
+based on the fact that they are not “Civil Servants”. Civil Servants
+are only the members of the Bureaus which are sub- and coordinated
+to the hierarchic administrative structure, but not those who occupy
+immediate state-directing positions to whom the Reich-Ministers belong
+according to the present constitutional law.
+
+The Fuehrer and Reich-Chancellor is at the top of the Reich-Cabinet. He
+hands down the directives for the over-all operation of the Government
+and the basic principles for the various departments. A number of
+Bureaus are subordinated to him for direct counsel and assistance, as
+follows:
+
+1. The Reich-Chancellery (Chief: Reich-Minister, Dr. Lammers)
+
+2. The Supreme-Command of the Armed Forces (Chief: Generaloberst (Gen.)
+Keitel)
+
+3. The Presidential Chancellery (Chief: State Minister Dr. Meissner)
+
+4. The Privy Cabinet Council (President: Reich-Minister Frh. von
+Neurath)
+
+The Reich-Cabinet [Reich Regierung] comprises furthermore the
+department ministries proper. It is constituted in the following manner
+according to the official order of rank laid down in the year 1939:
+
+1. The Deputy Commander for the Fuehrer (Reich-Minister Hess)
+
+2. The Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (Generaloberst (Gen.) Keitel)
+
+3. General Field-Marshal Goering (Deputy for the 4 Year Plan)
+
+4. Foreign Office (v. Ribbentrop)
+
+5. Reich-Minister of the Interior (Dr. Frick)
+
+6. Reich-Minister for Enlightenment of the People and Propaganda (Dr.
+Goebbels)
+
+7. Reich Air-Minister (Gen. Field-Marshal Goering)
+
+8. Reich Finance Minister (v. Schwerin-Krosigk)
+
+9. Reich-Minister of Justice (Dr. Guertner)
+
+10. Reich-Minister of Economy (Funk)
+
+11. Reich-Minister for Food and Agriculture (Darre)
+
+12. Reich-Minister of Labor (Seldte)
+
+13. Reich-Minister for Science, Education and National Culture (Dr.
+Rust)
+
+14. Reich-Minister for Ecclesiastical Affairs (Kerrl)
+
+15. Reich-Minister of Transportation (Dr. Dorpmueller)
+
+16. Reich Postal Minister (Ohnesorge)
+
+17. Reich-Minister Frank (Legal Affairs Reich-Fuehrer)
+
+18. Reich-Minister Schacht
+
+19. Reich-Minister Seyss-Inquart
+
+20. Reich Forest-Office (Gen. Field-Marshal Goering)
+
+The Commanders-in-Chief of the Army (Generaloberst (Gen.) v.
+Brauchitsch) and of the Navy (Great-Admiral Raeder) have also the rank
+of Ministers. Furthermore, the following participate regularly in the
+sessions of the Government, whenever matters of their department are
+being discussed:
+
+1. The Prussian Finance Minister, Dr. Popitz.
+
+2. The Reich-Fuehrer SS and the Chief of the German Police, Himmler.
+
+3. The Reich Labor Leader in the Reich-Ministry of the Interior, Hierl.
+
+4. The Chief of the Organization in Foreign Countries in the Foreign
+Office, Bohle. In addition, the following Supreme Reich-Bureaus are
+immediately subordinate to the Fuehrer:
+
+1. Court of Accounts of the German Reich (State-Minister, retired,
+Mueller).
+
+2. Inspector General for the German Road System (Dr. Todt).
+
+3. Reich Office for Area Control [Raumordnung] (Kerrl).
+
+4. Youth-Fuehrer of the German Reich (v. Schirach).
+
+Furthermore, the following are immediately subordinate to the Fuehrer:
+
+1. The German Reich-Bank (President Reich-Minister Funk).
+
+2. Inspector General of Constructions for the Reich Capital (Professor
+Speer).
+
+3. Counsellor General of Constructions for the Capital of the (party)
+movement (Professor Giesler).
+
+4. Reich Construction Counsellor for the town of Linz on the Danube.
+
+The directors of these Reich Bureaus act as direct advisers and
+collaborators of the Fuehrer in their department without being members
+of the Reich-Government by authority of their office.
+
+A privy cabinet council, to advise the Fuehrer in the basic problems
+of foreign policy, has been created by the decree of 4 February 1938
+(RGBl I, 112). This privy cabinet council is under the direction of
+Reich-Minister v. Neurath, and includes the Foreign Minister, the
+Air Minister, the Deputy Commander for the Fuehrer, the Propaganda
+Minister, the Chief of the Reich-Chancellery, the Commanders-in-Chief
+of the Army and Navy and the Chief of the Supreme Command of the
+Armed Forces. The privy cabinet council constitutes a select staff of
+collaborators of the Fuehrer which consist exclusively of members of
+the Government of the Reich; thus, it represents a select committee of
+the Reich Government for the deliberation on foreign affairs.
+
+The law on the Supreme Leader of the State makes provision for
+the nomination of a Deputy Commander for the Fuehrer and also a
+Vice-Chancellor. Up to July 1934, von Papen, then Reich Minister, was
+Vice-Chancellor. Since then, no such nomination has been promulgated.
+The Deputy for the 4 Year Plan has a sort of representation in all
+matters concerning the 4 Year Plan, “all competent instances of party
+and state” being combined in his person, and he has been given the
+power to “issue directives to all authorities, including the highest
+Reich-Authorities and all offices of the party, its subdivisions
+and its affiliated associations”. The deputy for the 4 Year Plan is
+therefore within the limits of his authority superior to the other
+Reich Ministers, particularly to the economic and military departments.
+But he is not only superior to the offices of the State but also to
+those of the party. He is (with the exception of the Fuehrer) the only
+central authority which by virtue of an office (and not by virtue
+of a personal union of a party and State office) can issue binding
+directives to the offices of the party and the State. Considering the
+tremendous importance of the 4 Year Plan, this position of the deputy
+is an important means for securing unity between party and State.
+
+This same object is furthermore pursued by the Office of the Deputy
+Commander for the Fuehrer. While the Deputy for the 4 Year Plan
+constitutes an authority of the State with the power to issue
+directives to the party, the Deputy Commander for the Fuehrer
+represents a party instance with authority to cooperate in State
+affairs to a large extent. The “Ministry Hess”, with its Liaison-Staff
+is charged to assert the influence of the party in the legislation and
+administration of the State. All projects of politically important laws
+have to be submitted to the Deputy Commander for the Fuehrer for his
+preliminary examination. He naturally has the power to propose laws
+from his side. His influence on the administration affects particularly
+the selection of personnel. All appointments to be made by the Fuehrer
+have to be examined first by the Deputy Commander for the Fuehrer.
+Besides these individual powers, it is the duty of the Deputy Commander
+for the Fuehrer to assert the will of the (party) movement in the
+organization of the State, to settle difficulties which develop, to
+investigate complaints, and thus to guarantee unity of party and State.
+
+Unity of party and Reich-Cabinet is furthermore secured by the numerous
+personal unions i.e. association of Central State Offices with
+corresponding party offices. Such personal unions exist in the cases
+of the Food Minister and the Propaganda Minister, the Chief of the
+German Police and the Reich Labor Leader, the Chief of the Organization
+in the foreign countries, and the Reich Youth Fuehrer. Furthermore,
+the majority of the Reich-Ministries is occupied by leading old party
+members. Finally, all Reich Ministers have been accepted by the party
+on 30 January 1937 and have been decorated with golden party insignia.
+
+   _b._ The Reich-Cabinet as the bearer of responsible collaboration.
+
+The relationship between the Fuehrer and the Reich-Cabinet differs
+from the Weimar colleague-like system as well as from Bismarck’s
+Chancellor System. The great political principles are determined by
+the Fuehrer; the will of the government is not expressed by vote, as
+under the colleague-like system; doubts and differences of opinion
+are also settled by the Fuehrer (in contrast to the provisions of
+Section 57 of the Weimar Constitution). The Reich-Ministers who act as
+advisers to the Fuehrer owe him loyalty and obedience in accordance
+with the oath they have to take by virtue of the law of 16 October
+1934. The Fuehrer is therefore not “primus inter pares” (first among
+equal ones), as it was featured in the colleague-like system, but he
+is absolutely superior to the other Reich-Ministers. But, if therefore
+the principle of authority prevails within the Reich-Cabinet it is not
+permitted in this case in the least to become a formal bureaucratic
+mechanism like the one that characterized the Chancellor System of
+Bismarck. In the latter, the collaborators of the Reich-Chancellor,
+the State-Secretaries, were not independent and responsible chiefs of
+their departments, but they were the subordinates of the Chancellor and
+administered in his name and by his orders the various Reich-Offices,
+at the top of which stood the Chancellor. Even the law of 17 March
+1878 concerning deputies did not change that state of affairs to any
+extent. Such a bureaucratic system does not permit the collaborators
+to develop a sense of enjoying responsible action and power of
+resolution and prevents genuine deliberation, the prerequisite of
+which is independence of the advisor. This is characteristic of an
+administrative state, where everything depends on the authoritarian
+technical functioning of the State apparatus. In the Reich of the
+Fuehrer the decisive factors are that the collaborators are subordinate
+leaders, that they are therefore possessed themselves with the desire
+for creative leadership and responsibility.
+
+The Fuehrer does not avail himself of the Reich-Ministers as
+subordinate executive organs. The Reich-Cabinet is not a technical
+apparatus. It is therefore inadmissible to consider the Reich-Ministers
+as mere “Chiefs of Reich Offices” who preside over bureaucratic
+institutions, rather Reich-Ministers in particular must become genuine
+sub-leaders if the entire Reich is to be imbued with the spirit of
+the Fuehrer system. In the Reich Cabinet, the Fuehrer procures for
+himself the independent and responsible collaborators who do not only
+technically direct the various offices but who are also capable to
+act in a constructive and creative manner, within the scope of their
+assignments. The Reich-Ministers are therefore not only advisors but
+at the same time responsible creative assistants of the Fuehrer, who
+administer their offices independently under the direction of the
+Fuehrer. The prerequisite for the Fuehrer Principle which has been
+realized in the Reich-Cabinet, is independent cooperation based on
+confidence and responsibility, of the Fuehrer’s closest followers.
+Thus, the Fuehrer Principle presents far higher requirements than the
+bureaucratic absolutism and its not too different Chancellor System of
+Bismarck.
+
+In view of this structure of the Reich-Cabinet it is only natural
+that the counter-signature, prescribed in Section 50 of the
+Weimar Constitution for all decrees and regulations issued by the
+Reich-President, becomes unnecessary for the decisions of the Fuehrer.
+They do not require the counter-signature of the Minister of the
+respective department. Compulsory counter-signature was an institution
+of the constitutional and parliamentary system. The Minister who
+counter-signed the orders of the Chief of State assumed thereby
+responsibility before parliament. The counter-signature was thus
+inseparably connected with the parliamentary responsibility of the
+Ministers; it lost its political foundation with the revolutionary
+elimination of parliamentarianism of any form. However, also in the New
+Reich during the period of Reich President Hindenburg’s administration,
+counter-signature of presidential acts by the Reich-Chancellor was
+maintained. Of course, the counter-signing Reich-Chancellor or
+Reich-Minister did not assume any more the “responsibility before
+the Reichstag”, as was the case within the limits of the Weimar
+parliamentary system. The counter-signature was used in this case
+rather as a suitable technical form for safeguarding the unified
+direction of the State as long as a dual Chief of State existed.
+This technical reason for maintaining the counter-signature was
+rendered unnecessary with the assumption of the presidential powers
+by the Fuehrer. Today, it is not necessary any more according to
+constitutional law. The decrees of the Fuehrer have legal force,
+even if they are not counter-signed by a Reich-Minister. Such was
+particularly the order of execution of the 4 Year Plan of 18 October
+1936 (RGBl I, 887) which in fact contains a law issued by the Fuehrer
+alone without any counter-signature.
+
+As a rule, the decrees of the Fuehrer, are on the other hand, even
+today co-signed by the Minister of the department concerned. Authorized
+to co-sign are the Reich-Ministers, within the limits of their
+departments. Furthermore the Chiefs of the Presidential-Chancellery
+and of the Reich-Chancellery for their departments (Decree of 22
+November 1934, not published), and also the State-Secretaries of a
+Reich-Minister who is temporarily unavailable (Decree of 20 March
+1935, RMinBl. 423). The decrees concerning the party are co-signed
+by the Deputy Commander of the Fuehrer, decrees concerning the range
+of problems of the 4 Year Plan by the Deputy of the 4 Year Plan and
+the military decrees by the Chief of the Supreme Command of the
+Armed Forces. The Chiefs of the Supreme Reich-Bureaus who are not
+Reich-Ministers are not authorized to co-sign.
+
+Co-signature is being regularly maintained for two reasons. For
+once, the co-signature brings out the fact that the Minister of the
+department is more than a mere technical auxiliary tool of the Fuehrer,
+that he performs rather independent and objective work which requires
+of course the approval of the Fuehrer but which is nevertheless the
+Minister’s own work and performance. Thus, the co-signature gives
+prominence to the fact that the Minister is an independent collaborator
+and not only an executive instrument. Also, the co-signature is
+therefore documentary proof--and this is the second reason--for the
+responsibility of the Minister of the department, naturally not
+before the Parliament but before the Fuehrer himself. By co-signing
+the Minister accepts the responsibility before the Fuehrer that the
+decree is practical, has been carefully considered and thoroughly
+worked out. Such a responsibility of the Minister before the Chief of
+the State could not exist under the radical parliamentary Republic.
+The independence of the Minister from the Chief of State and his
+responsibility before the Parliament would have been weakened in that
+way. Under the old constitutional system, on the other hand, (as well
+as under the presidential system formed after the constitutional
+system) this responsibility of the counter-signing Minister also
+before the Chief of State was in existence. This type of “Minister
+responsibility” is indispensable under the Fuehrer Constitution. In
+view of the number and the importance of affairs, it is self-evident
+that the Fuehrer needs the advice, the suggestions, and the proposals
+of his collaborators; political leadership is impossible without
+reliable collaborators. The Ministers are responsible to the Fuehrer
+by their oath for competent and reliable counsel and preparation of
+his decisions. This responsibility of the Ministers of the various
+departments finds its public expression by their counter-signature.
+This counter-signature is not necessary, nevertheless. The Fuehrer can
+do without it and issue all decrees and decisions which have full legal
+effect by his own accord.
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1775-PS
+
+The OKW is asking the Fuehrer’s decision, concerning the following
+proposals:
+
+Orders will be given immediately, after the detailed numbers and
+letters have been released by the Leader, for accomplishment.
+
+1. To take no real preparatory measures in the Army or Luftwaffe. No
+troop movements or redeployments.
+
+2. Spread false, but quite credible news, which may lead to the
+conclusion of military preparations against Austria,
+
+  _a._ through V-men [V-Maenner] in Austria,
+  _b._ through our customs personnel at the frontier,
+  _c._ through traveling agents.
+
+3. Such news could be:
+
+  _a._ Furloughs are supposed to have been barred in the Sector of the
+       VII A.K.
+
+  _b._ Rolling stock is being assembled in Munich, Augsburg, and
+       Regensburg.
+
+  _c._ Major General Muff, the Military Attaché in Vienna has been
+       called for a conference to Berlin. (As a matter of fact, this is
+       the case).
+
+  _d._ The Police Stations located at the frontier of Austria, have
+       called up reinforcements.
+
+  _e._ Custom officials report about the imminent maneuvers of the
+       Mountain Brigade in the region of Freilassing, Reichenhall and
+       Berchtesgaden.
+
+4. Order a very active make-believe-wireless exchange in Wehrkreis VII
+and between Berlin and Munich.
+
+5. Real maneuvers, training flights, and winter maneuvers of the
+Mountain Troops near the frontier.
+
+6. Admiral Canaris has to be ready beginning on February 14th in the
+Service Command Headquarters in order to carry out measures given by
+order of the Chief of the OKW.
+
+7. An answer is requested to Lt General Keitel through the
+Reich-Chancery.
+
+                                                         Signed--Keitel.
+
+  14.2  7:30 Captain Eberhardt gives the information by phone,
+             that the Fuehrer has given his approval in all points.
+             Answer came only around 2 at night through Reich-Chancellery.
+
+        9:00 Telephone message transmitted to Admiral Canaris in
+             Munich.
+
+
+                                 PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1778-PS
+
+                 THE POISONOUS MUSHROOM [Der Giftpilz]
+
+  A Stuermer book for young and old Fables by Ernst Hiemer
+  Pictures by Fips
+  Published by Der Stuermer--Nurnberg copyright 1938
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+[P.6] “It is almost noon,” he said, “now we want to summarize what we
+have learned in this lesson. What did we discuss?”
+
+All children raise their hands. The teacher calls on Karl Scholz, a
+little boy on the first bench. “We talked about how to recognize a Jew.”
+
+“Good! Now tell us about it!”
+
+Little Karl takes the pointer, goes to the black board and points to
+the sketches.
+
+“One usually recognizes a Jew by his nose. The Jewish nose is crooked
+at the end. It looks like the figure 6. Therefore it is called the
+“Jewish Six”. Many non-Jews have crooked noses, too. But their noses
+are bent, not at the end but further up. Such a nose is called a hook
+nose or eagle’s beak. It has nothing to do with a Jewish nose.”
+
+“Right!” says the teacher. “But the Jew is recognized not only by his
+nose...” The boy continues. The Jew is also recognized by his lips. His
+lips are usually thick. Often the lower lip hangs down. That is called
+“sloppy”. And the Jew is also recognized by his eyes. His eyelids are
+usually thicker and more fleshy than ours. The look of the Jew is
+lurking and sharp.
+
+[P.9] Then the teacher goes to the desk and turns over the black board,
+on its back is a verse. The children recite it in chorus:
+
+  From a Jew’s countenance--the evil devil talks to us,
+
+  The devil, who in every land--is known as evil plague.
+
+  If we shall be free of the Jew--and again will be happy and glad,
+
+  Then the youth must struggle with us--to subdue the Jew devil.
+
+[P.32] Inge sits in the reception room of the Jew doctor. She has to
+wait a long time. She looks through the journals which are on the
+table. But she is much too nervous to read even a few sentences.
+Again and again she remembers the talk with her mother. And again
+and again her mind reflects on the warnings of her leader of the BDM
+[League of German Girls]: “A German must not consult a Jew doctor! And
+particularly not a German girl! Many a girl that went to a Jew doctor
+to be cured, found disease and disgrace!”
+
+When Inge had entered the waiting room, she experienced an
+extraordinary incident. From the doctor’s consulting room she could
+hear the sound of crying. She heard the voice of a young girl: “Doctor,
+doctor leave me alone!”
+
+Then she heard the scornful laughing of a man. And then all of a sudden
+it became absolutely silent. Inge had listened breathlessly.
+
+“What may be the meaning of all this?” she asked herself and her heart
+was pounding. And again she thought of the warning of her leader in the
+BDM.
+
+Inge was already waiting for an hour. Again she takes the journals
+in an endeavor to read. Then the door opens. Inge looks up. The Jew
+appears. She screams. In terror she drops the paper. Frightened she
+jumps up. Her eyes stare into the face of the Jewish doctor. And this
+face is the face of the devil. In the middle of this devil’s face is
+a huge crooked nose. Behind the spectacles two criminal eyes. And the
+thick lips are grinning. A grinning that expresses: “Now I got you at
+last, you little German girl!”
+
+And then the Jew approaches her. His fleshy fingers stretch out after
+her. But now Inge has her wits. Before the Jew can grab hold of her,
+she hits the fat face of the Jew doctor with her hand. Then one jump
+to the door. Breathlessly Inge runs down the stairs. Breathlessly she
+escapes the Jew house.
+
+[P.61]
+
+The pimpf [Hitler boy between 10-14] so far has not said anything.
+Suddenly he stops. Then he grasps his two friends by the arm and pulls
+them away. They stop in front of a bill-board. They read a large
+poster. It says Julius Streicher makes an address in the People’s Hall
+about “The Jews are our misfortune”.
+
+“That is where we go!” shouts Konrad, “I wanted to hear him speak for a
+long time.” “I have heard him once before at a meeting two years ago,”
+says Erich. “Do tell us all about it!” the two pimpfs beg.
+
+The Hitler youth recounts:
+
+“The meeting was overcrowded. Many thousands of people attended.
+To begin with, Streicher talked of his experiences in the years of
+struggle, and of the tremendous achievements of the Hitler Reich. Then
+he began to talk about the Jewish question. All he said was so clear
+and simple that even we boys could follow it. Again and again he told
+about examples taken from life. At one time he talked most amusingly
+and cracked jokes, making all of us laugh. Then again he became most
+serious, and it was so quiet in the hall that one could hear a needle
+drop. He talked of the Jews and their horrible crimes. He talked of the
+serious danger which Judaism is for the whole world.
+
+  “Without a solution of the Jewish question there will be no salvation
+  of mankind.”
+
+That is what he shouted to us. All of us could understand him. And
+when, at the end, he shouted the “Sieg-Heil” for the Fuehrer, we all
+acclaimed him with tremendous enthusiasm. For two hours Streicher spoke
+at that occasion. To us it appeared to have been but a few minutes.
+
+
+                                 PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1780-PS
+
+  Excerpts from General Jodl’s Handwritten Diary, February 1937-August
+                                 1939.
+
+
+                                 _1937_
+
+_4 February_:
+
+Decisive conference about the scarcity of raw materials by the
+Commissioner of four-year plan.
+
+Only 50% of steel and iron available, therefore rationing necessary.
+Full allotment only for export. Armed forces and constructions for
+four-year plan must be cut down by about 40%. Therefore, requests for
+money have to be converted into requirements for raw materials. Three
+branches of the Armed Forces and L. for R.V. special resources must
+make up a priority sequence. Until further notice no more orders to be
+placed with industry so they will have a chance to fill the many orders
+previously placed with them.
+
+The sentence “Money is an unimportant factor” has come true, even in
+another sense. The main part is the raw materials.
+
+Bad harvest and [illegible], especially bread grain [Brotgetreide],
+demand considerable use of foreign currency for the feeding of the
+people.
+
+_31 March_:
+
+Report to the Minister about the maneuvers of the Armed Forces. The
+Field Marshal emphasized the necessity to bring some influence to bear
+(on the maneuvers) in so far as a special Armed Forces problem has to
+be dealt with daily. These exercises are to be designated as “Armed
+Forces Maneuvers” (army, etc.). After two years, a two front war i.e.,
+two maneuvers, should be presented.
+
+_5 November_:
+
+Hitler develops his ideas of future development, intentions, and
+conduct of policy to the Commanders-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, the
+Army, the Navy and the Air Force.
+
+There is a divergence in the recording of his ideas as made by the
+Chief of the Armed Forces Office (War Department) [des Chef WA (R Kr.
+Min)] and by the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force (Directive to the
+Chief of the General Staff of Air Force). (No minutes were kept).
+
+Intention of L to put ideas on paper and transmit them to the Services
+(C-in-C Air Force); furthermore, to incorporate them into mobilization
+instructions.
+
+
+                                 _1938_
+
+_11 February_:
+
+In the evening and on 12 February General K., with General v. Reichenau
+and Sperrle, at the Obersalzberg. Schuschnigg together with G. Schmidt
+are again being put under heaviest political and military pressure. At
+2300 hours Schuschnigg signs protocol.
+
+_13 February_:
+
+In the afternoon General K. asks Admiral C. and myself to come to his
+apartment. He tells us that the Fuehrer’s order is to the effect that
+military pressure by shamming military action should be kept up until
+the 15th. Proposals for these deceptive maneuvers are drafted and
+submitted to the Fuehrer by telephone for approval.
+
+_14 February_:
+
+At 2:40 o’clock the agreement of the Fuehrer arrives. Canaris went
+to Munich to the Counter-Intelligence office VII and initiates the
+different measures.
+
+The effect is quick and strong. In Austria the impression is created
+that Germany is undertaking serious military preparations.
+
+_15 February_:
+
+In the evening an official communique about the positive results of the
+conference at the Obersalzberg is issued.
+
+_16 February_:
+
+Changes in the Austrian government and general political amnesty.
+
+_22 February_:
+
+At 1300 hours General K. sees the Fuehrer in order to inform him about
+the planned advances [Vorstoesse].
+
+_3 March_:
+
+The Austrian question is becoming critical. 100 officers shall be
+dispatched there. The Fuehrer wants to see them personally. They
+should not see to it that the Austrian Armed Forces will fight better
+against us, but rather that they do not fight at all.
+
+_10 March_:
+
+By surprise and without consulting his ministers, Schuschnigg ordered a
+plebiscite for Sunday, 13 March, which would bring strong majority for
+the Legitimists in the absence of plan or preparation.
+
+Fuehrer is determined not to tolerate it. The same night, March 9 to
+10, he calls for Goering. General v. Reichenau is called back from
+Cairo Olympic Committee. General v. Schebert is ordered to come, as
+well as Minister Glaise-Horstenau, who is with the District leader
+[Gauleiter] Burckel in the Palatinate. General Keitel communicates the
+facts at 1:45. He drives to the Reichskanzlei at 10 o’clock. I follow
+at 10:15, according to the wish of General v. Viebahn, to give him the
+old draft.
+
+“Prepare case Otto.”
+
+1300 hours: General K informs Chief of Operational Staff (and) Admiral
+Canaris. Ribbentrop is being detained in London. Neurath takes over the
+Foreign Office.
+
+Fuehrer wants to transmit ultimatum to the Austrian Cabinet. A personal
+letter is dispatched to Mussolini and the reasons are developed which
+force the Fuehrer to take action.
+
+1830 hours: Mobilization order is given to the Command of the 8th Army
+(Corps Area 3), 7th and 13th Army Corps; without reserve Army.
+
+Air puts 300 JU-52 in readiness for dropping of propaganda pamphlets.
+In addition, one Pursuit Squadron [Jagdgruppe], 3 bomber groups
+[Kampfgeschwader] and two companies as airborne troops with transport
+planes are held ready at civilian airports [Friedensflugplatze] in
+Bavaria.
+
+Subordinated to the Army are: one commander of the Air Force, 2F, 3H
+Squadrons, courier squadron, 1 heavy AA Bn., Regt. General Goering.
+
+_11 March_:
+
+Instruction No. 1 of the Fuehrer is given on 11 March at 2:00 without
+signature; at 1300 hours with his signature.
+
+The Army is joined by the SS Military Units (V. T.) by regiments,
+40,000 men of the police and the Totenkopf Unit Upper-Bavaria as second
+wave.
+
+1700 hours: The Navy has ordered all ships back home.
+
+1800 hours: Schuschnigg has resigned; Seyss-Inquart is chancellor. SA
+and SS perform duty in uniform. Own movements have commenced. Frontier
+will not be crossed at the moment. Air Force plans large scale
+propaganda flights for tomorrow. The police force will be needed in any
+case and will be mixed with the troops.
+
+1835 hours: Department L. has been informed. Colonel Winkler and
+Oberfuehrer Petri have also been informed. The Air Force has its doubts
+if it should initiate the movements that have not yet started.
+
+Decision: yes.
+
+2030 hours: Briefing received from Major General Viebahn that the
+situation has changed once more. The occupation will take place.
+
+_Later undated entry._
+
+After annexation of Austria, the Fuehrer mentions that there is no
+hurry to solve the Czech question because Austria has to be digested
+first. Nevertheless, preparations for Case Green will have to be
+carried out energetically; they will have to be newly prepared on the
+basis of the changed strategic position because of the annexation of
+Austria. State of preparations (see memorandum L I a of 19 April)
+reported to the Fuehrer on 21 April.
+
+The intention of the Fuehrer not to touch the Czech problem as yet is
+changed because of the Czech strategic troop concentration of 21 May,
+which occurs without any German threat and without the slightest cause
+for it.
+
+Because of Germany’s self-restraint, its consequences lead to a loss
+of prestige of the Fuehrer, which he is not willing to take once more.
+Therefore, the new order is issued for “green” on 30 May.
+
+_22 May_:
+
+Fundamental conference between the Fuehrer and K. Henlein (see
+enclosure).
+
+_23 May_:
+
+Major Schmundt reports ideas of the Fuehrer. Further conferences, which
+gradually reveal the exact intentions of the Fuehrer, take place with
+the Chief of the Armed Forces High Command (OKW) on 28 May, 3 and 9
+June, see enclosures. (War Diary L)
+
+_30 May_:
+
+The Fuehrer signs directive Green, where he states his final decision
+to destroy Czechoslovakia soon and thereby initiates military
+preparation all along the line. The previous intentions of the
+Army must be changed considerably in the direction of an immediate
+break-through into Czechoslovakia right on D-Day [X-Tag], combined with
+aerial penetration by the Air Force. Further details are derived from
+directive for strategic concentration of the army. The whole contrast
+becomes acute once more between the Fuehrer’s intuition that we must do
+it this year and the opinion of the army that we cannot do it as yet,
+as most certainly the Western Powers will interfere and we are not as
+yet equal to them.
+
+_10 August_:
+
+The Army chiefs and the chiefs of the Air Force groups, Lt. Col.
+Jeschonnek and myself are ordered to the Berghof. After dinner the
+Fuehrer makes a speech lasting for almost three hours, in which he
+develops his political thoughts. The subsequent attempts to draw the
+Fuehrer’s attention to the defects of our preparation, which are
+undertaken by a few generals of the Army, are rather unfortunate. This
+applies especially to the remark of General Wietersheim, in which to
+top it off he claims to quote from General Adams [die er noch dazu dem
+General Adams in den Mund legt] that the western fortifications can
+only be held for three weeks. The Fuehrer becomes very indignant and
+flames up, bursting into the remark that in such a case the whole Army
+would not be good for anything. “I assure you, General, the position
+will not only be held for three weeks, but for three years.” The cause
+of this despondent opinion, which unfortunately enough is held very
+widely within the Army General Staff, is based on various reasons.
+First of all, it (the General Staff) is restrained by old memories;
+political considerations play a part as well, instead of obeying and
+executing its military mission. That is certainly done with traditional
+devotion, but the vigor of the soul is lacking because in the end they
+do not believe in the genius of the Fuehrer. And one does perhaps
+compare him with Charles XII. And since water flows downhill, this
+defeatism may not only possibly cause immense political damage, for
+the opposition between the Generals’ opinion and that of the Fuehrer
+is common talk, but may also constitute a danger for the morale of the
+troops. But I have no doubt that [?] the Fuehrer will be able to boost
+the morale of the people in an unexpected way when the right moment
+comes.
+
+_21-26 August_:
+
+Visit to Germany of the Hungarian Regent [Reichsverweser]. Accompanied
+by the Prime Minister, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Honved
+Minister v. Raatz [?].
+
+They arrive with the idea that in the course of a great war, after a
+few years, and with the help of German troops, the old state of Hungary
+can be reestablished. They leave with the understanding that we have
+neither demands from, nor claims against them, but that Germany will
+not stand for a second provocation by Czechoslovakia, even if it should
+be tomorrow. If they want to participate at that moment, it is up to
+them.
+
+Germany, however, will never play the role of arbitrator between them
+and Poland. The Hungarians agree; but they believe that, when the issue
+arises, a period of 48 hours would be indispensable to them to find out
+Yugoslavia’s attitude.
+
+_6 September_:
+
+Chief of General Staff, General of Artillery Halder, has a conference
+with the Hungarian Chief of General Staff Fischer.
+
+Before that he is briefed by me on the political attitude of the
+Fuehrer--especially his order not to give any hint on the exact moment.
+The same with OQI, General v. Stuelpnagel.
+
+_8 September_:
+
+General Stuelpnagel OQI asks for written assurance that the Army High
+Command will be informed five days in advance if the plan is to take
+place. I agree and add that the over-all meteorological situation can
+be estimated to some extent only for two days in advance, and that
+therefore, the plans may be changed up to this moment. (D-day-2) [X-2
+Tage].
+
+General Stuelpnagel mentions that for the first time he wonders whether
+the previous basis of the plan is not being abandoned. It presupposed
+that the Western Powers would not interfere decisively. It gradually
+seems as if the Fuehrer would stick to his decision even though he may
+no longer be of this opinion. It must be added that Hungary is at least
+moody and Italy reserved.
+
+I must admit that I am worrying too, when comparing the change of
+opinion about political and military potentialities, according to
+directives of 24 June, 5 Nov 37, 7 Dec 37, 30 May 38, with the last
+statements.
+
+In spite of that one must be aware of the fact that the other nations
+will do everything they can to apply pressure to us. We must pass
+this test of nerves, but because only very few people know the art of
+withstanding this pressure successfully, the only possible solution is
+to inform only a very small circle of officers of news that causes us
+anxiety, and not to have it circulated through anterooms as heretofore.
+
+1800 hours to 2100 hours: Conference with Chief of Army High Command
+and Chief of General Staff of the Air Force (present were Jeschonnek,
+Kammhuber, Sternburg and myself).
+
+We agree about the promulgation of the D-day order [X-Befehl] (X-1, 4
+o’clock) and preannouncement to the Air Force (D-Day-1, 7 o’clock).
+The “Y time” has yet to be examined; some formations have an approach
+flight of one hour.
+
+_10 September_:
+
+General Halder back from Nurnberg. He reports that the Fuehrer signed
+decree subordinating the Reich Labor Service to the Army High Command,
+as of 15 September. Furthermore it was decided that the 13th and 2nd
+motorized divisions would join the Reichenau Army and their place would
+be taken by two other divisions [3 words illegible].
+
+_11 September_:
+
+In the afternoon conference with Secretary of State Jahnke from the
+Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda on imminent common
+tasks.
+
+The joint preparations for refutation [Wiederlegung] of our own
+violations of international law, and the exploitation of its violations
+by the enemy, were considered particularly important.
+
+_15 September_:
+
+In the morning conference with Chief of Army High Command and Chief of
+General Staffs of Army and Air Forces; the question was discussed what
+could be done if the Fuehrer insists on advancement of the date, due to
+the rapid development of the situation.
+
+_16 September_:
+
+General Keitel returns from the Berghof at 1700 hours. He graphically
+describes the results of the conference between Chamberlain and the
+Fuehrer. The next conference will take place on the 21st or the 22nd in
+Godesberg.
+
+With consent of the Fuehrer, the order is given in the evening by the
+Armed Forces High Command to the Army High Command and to the Ministry
+of Finance, to line up the V.G.A.D. along the Czech border.
+
+In the same way, an order is issued to the railways to have the empty
+rolling stock kept in readiness clandestinely for the strategic
+concentrations of the Army, so that it can be transported starting 28
+September.
+
+_17 September_:
+
+Contrary to the previous intention to transfer all Sudeten Germans with
+previous military training to the Replacement Army, the Fuehrer issues
+order to unite them into a Sudeten German Free Corps. The Armed Forces
+High Command puts Lt. Col. Koechling (reporter on youth questions) at
+the disposal of Konrad Henlein as advisor to Henlein.
+
+_19 September_:
+
+Order is given to the Army High Command to take care of the Sudeten
+German Free Corps.
+
+_20 September_:
+
+England and France have handed over their demands in Prague, the
+contents of which are still unknown. The activities of the Free Corps
+start assuming such an extent that they may bring about, and already
+have brought about, consequences harmful to the plans of the Army.
+(Transferring rather strong units of the Czech Army to the proximity of
+border). By checking with Lt. Col. Koechling, I attempt to lead these
+activities into normal channels.
+
+Toward the evening the Fuehrer also takes a hand and gives permission
+to act only with groups up to 12 men each, after the approval of the
+Corps HQ.
+
+_21 September_:
+
+The motorized reinforcements by the L. take effect.
+
+1130 hours: Telephone call from the Adjutant of the Fuehrer, Captain
+Engel, (it is submitted during the conference with the Chiefs by
+Captain Eberhardt). “The Fuehrer has received news five minutes ago
+that Prague is said to have accepted unconditionally.”
+
+1245 hours: Department heads are informed and directive is given to
+continue preparation for “Green”, but nevertheless to get ready with
+everything necessary for a peaceful penetration. Orders to the Ic and
+Ib of Navy High Command and Chief of General Staff of the Air Force;
+General Stumpf to be informed.
+
+_22 September_:
+
+1920 hours: Ia reports about a telephone call from Godesberg by General
+von Stuelpnagel on behalf of Keitel. Subject: a) Date cannot yet be
+ascertained (D-Day); continue preparations according to plan. In case
+“Green” occurs, it will not be before 30 September. If it occurs
+sooner, it will probably be improvised.
+
+_25 September_:
+
+By order of the Fuehrer, two Death Head [Totenkopf] SS battalions have
+moved into the panhandle territory near Asch [Acher Zipfel] to the rear
+of the Free Corps.
+
+_26 September_:
+
+Chief of the Armed Forces High Command, acting through the Army High
+Command, has stopped the intended approach march of the advance units
+to the Czech border, because it is not yet necessary and because the
+Fuehrer does not intend to march in before the 30th in any case. Order
+to approach towards the Czech frontier need be given on the 27th only.
+
+In the evening of the 26th, fixed radio stations of Breslau, Dresden
+and Vienna are put at the disposal of the Reich. Ministry for Popular
+Enlightenment and Propaganda for interference with possible Czech
+propaganda transmissions.
+
+Question by department “Foreign Countries” whether Czechs are to be
+allowed to leave and cross Germany. Decision from Chief of the Armed
+Forces High Command: yes.
+
+1515 hours: The Chief of the Armed Forces High Command informs General
+Stumpf about the result of the Godesberg conversations and about the
+Fuehrer’s opinion. In no case will X day be before the 30th.
+
+It is important that we do not permit ourselves to be drawn into
+military engagements because of false reports, before Prague replied.
+
+A question of Stumpf about Y hour results in the reply that on account
+of the weather situation, a simultaneous intervention of the Air Force
+and Army cannot be expected. The Army needs the dawn, the Air Force can
+only start later on account of frequent fogs.
+
+The Fuehrer has to make a decision for the commanders in chief who is
+to have priority.
+
+The opinion of Stumpf is also that the attack of the Army has to
+proceed. The Fuehrer has not made any decision as yet about commitment
+against Prague.
+
+2000 hours: The Fuehrer addresses the people and the world in an
+important speech at the Sportspalast.
+
+_27 September_:
+
+1320 hours: The Fuehrer consents to the first wave of attack being
+advanced to a line from where they can arrive in the assembly area by
+30 September.
+
+_28 September_:
+
+Stapf (?) reports about a conference with Goering where the latter
+states that a Great War can hardly be avoided any longer. It may last 7
+years, and we will win it.
+
+1700 hours: Tension relaxes. The Fuehrer has decided on a conference
+with Chamberlain, the Duce, and Daladier in Munich.
+
+_29 September_:
+
+The pact of Munich is signed. Czechoslovakia as a power is out. Four
+zones as set forth will be occupied between the 2nd and 7th of October.
+The remaining part of mainly German character will be occupied by the
+10th of October. The genius of the Fuehrer and his determination not
+to shun even a World War have again won the victory without the use of
+force. The hope remains that the incredulous, the weak and the doubtful
+people have been converted and will remain that way.
+
+
+                                 _1939_
+
+_23 August_:
+
+Received order from Armed Forces High Command to proceed to Berlin and
+take over position of Chief of Armed Forces Executive Office. (WFA).
+
+1100 hours-1330 hours: Discussions with Chief of Armed Forces High
+Command. X day has been announced for 26 August. Y time has been
+announced for 0430 hours.
+
+
+                                 PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1786-PS
+
+   WAR DIARY OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF THE ARMED FORCES OPERATIONS STAFF
+
+  WF. St. KTB (1) 1943
+  14 Mar. 1943
+
+The treatment of captured partisans has been laid down in the combat
+directive for the combatting of partisans in the East [Kampfanweisung
+fuer die Bandenbekaempfung] of 27.11.42 (cf. 27.11/11/1) and Hitler’s
+order [Fuehrerbefehl] of 16.12 (cf. 16.12/1). On the basis of the
+foregoing the Reichsfuehrer SS ordered on the 30.12 that persons
+suspected of being partisans or their assistants, who are not to be
+executed, are to be transferred to concentration camps in Germany.
+
+This order, which corresponds to the terms of reference already
+decreed, differs from an order already given on the 30.10.42 by the
+Commander in Chief [Oberbefehlshaber] of the 18th Army, which calls for
+the shooting without discrimination of all members of partisan groups
+and which is covered by the subsequent orders of the 15.11 and 16.12
+only on their strictest interpretation. The Reichsfuehrer SS therefore
+sent to the Armed Forces Operations Staff [Wehrmachtfuehrungstab]
+on the 21.1 a letter of the Chef der S.P. and S.D. in which it is
+requested that, in the area of the 18th Army also, partisan helpers and
+persons suspected of such activity, should be dealt with in accordance
+with the terms of reference of 30.12.
+
+The Armed Forces Operations Staff handed the matter over on the 25.1
+to the Army General Staff [Generalstab des Heeres] competent for the
+combatting of partisans, and thereby conforming with the ruling given
+by the Reichsfuehrer SS. This decision was confirmed by the Chief
+of the High Command of the Armed Forces [Chef des Oberkommandos der
+Wehrmacht].
+
+Since the ruling of the combat directive, figs. 85, 86 & 104, provides
+for work in Germany as a punitive measure for partisan helpers and
+suspects and has proved to be disadvantageous for the enlistment
+of voluntary workers, the General Plenipotentiary for Labour
+[Generalbevollmaechtigter fuer den Arbeitseinsatz], has requested that
+no threat of forced labour in Germany as a punitive measure should be
+made, or that at least, suspects should be described as such to the
+labour authorities for the purpose of supervision.
+
+The General Quartermaster together with the Economic Staff (East)
+[Wirtschaftsstab Ost] has proposed that the deportees should be sent
+either to prison camps or to “training centers in their own area”, and
+that deportation to Germany should take place only when the deportees
+are on probation and in less serious cases.
+
+In view of the Armed Forces Operations Staff this proposal does not
+take sufficient account of the severity required and leads to a
+comparison with the treatment meted out to the “peaceful population”
+which has been called upon to work. He recommends therefore
+transportation to concentration camps in Germany which have already
+been introduced by the Reichsfuehrer SS for his sphere and which he
+is prepared to introduce for the Armed Forces [Wehrmacht] in the case
+of an extension to the province of the latter. The High Command of
+the Armed Forces [Oberkommando der Wehrmacht] therefore orders that
+partisan helpers and suspects who are not to be executed should be
+handed over to the competent Higher SS and Police Leader and orders
+that the difference between “punitive work” and “work in Germany” is to
+be made clear to the population.
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1796-PS
+
+                                                            7 April 1941
+
+  W Kr Gesch.
+
+                                  Copy
+
+                                                      3 Copies, 3rd Copy
+
+  Major of the General Staff Deyhle
+
+                                                 Berlin, 18 October 1940
+                                                      2 Copies, 2nd Copy
+
+                         Notes to the War Diary
+
+  1st. End of March 1939:
+
+The Fuehrer decides to make military preparations for the gradual,
+seemingly unavoidable conflict with _Poland_, in such manner that these
+can be executed in late summer 1939. Thereby the Fuehrer hopes only to
+have to wage war on one front (“Fall Weiss”).
+
+  2nd. The following months: _Minutes under the Fuehrer’s influence_:
+
+_a._ Attack by the forces from East Prussia;--OKH will first of all
+deploy the forces from South West Part of East Prussia in order to
+eliminate the Corridor as soon as possible. The Fuehrer considers
+attack further East more suitable in order to reach a decisive solution
+at the very beginning (causing the Vistula line to fall, thereby
+preventing the Poles from making a new stand behind the Vistula).
+
+_b._ Forming of 14 divisions. Fourth wave (Welle) to consist of E units.
+
+_c._ All preparations to be camouflaged as defensive measures.
+
+
+_Basis_ for 1st and 2nd:
+
+_a._ Directive for “Fall Weiss” OKW/L of April 1939.
+
+_b._ “Chronological table” for Weiss OKW/L of July 1939.
+
+_c._ Correspondence OKW/L with sections of the Armed Forces.
+
+_d._ Beginning of the War diary L.
+
+3rd. August 1939:
+
+_In spite of the English guarantee to Poland_, and thereby a war on 2
+fronts becoming almost unavoidable, the Fuehrer decides to settle the
+account with Poland after having prevented encirclement by means of _an
+agreement with Russia_.
+
+  4th. September 1939: _Polish Campaign mainly under the Influence of
+  the Fuehrer_:
+
+_a._ “Great Pincers” (strongly motorized forces to attack the Eastern
+part of East Prussia towards South behind Vistula, moreover motorized
+forces to push forward in plenty of time across lower Vistula towards
+East Prussia).
+
+_b._ Capture of Warsaw. Must be carried out _before_ the Russians reach
+the Vistula.
+
+_c._ Reinforcement of the Western Front. Extension northwards to the
+Belgian/Dutch border, in order to incite the French/British Army to
+march into Holland and Belgium; in addition to this also hasten the
+construction of the Northern part of the West Wall.
+
+5th. End of September 1939:
+
+_Decision of the Fuehrer_, to attack _in the West_ and this as soon
+as possible since the French/British Army is not yet ready. Intention
+of attacking through Belgium and Holland (at least southern part) is
+certain from the start. From the very beginning it is the Fuehrer’s
+idea not to repeat the Schlieffen-plan but to attack in approximately
+a west-north western direction through Belgium and Luxembourg under
+strong protection of the Southern flank, and to gain the Channel coast.
+
+After conclusion of the Eastern campaign the restrictions hitherto
+existing in regard to warfare in the West are progressively being
+lifted. They served the purpose, while the Eastern campaign was in
+Progress, of not inciting the enemy in the West to greater action, by
+German measures.
+
+6th. October 1939:
+
+Attack to begin at the earliest about 10 Nov. OKH is of the opinion
+that the preparations of the Army will not be absolutely complete by
+this time. Frequently the opinion is advocated--by no means shared by
+the Fuehrer--that an attack in the West is unnecessary, the war could
+perhaps be won for us satisfactorily if we were to wait a little.
+
+Fuehrer is determined to attack in November only if the _weather_ will
+permit operations by the mass of the Luftwaffe since only then can one
+of our most important trumps become effective.
+
+How situation would turn out if _France/England_ march into
+_Belgium/Holland_, is constantly the concern of the Fuehrer. Immediate
+attack of the German Western Army [Sofortfall] must be prepared for
+this event.
+
+7th. End of October 1939: _Influence of the Fuehrer_:
+
+_a._ Employment of _motorized_ forces in direction Sedan is suggested
+by the Fuehrer. Preparations are under way for moving Army group B and
+concentrating them at A after, in accordance with previous deployment
+of troops, main concentration had been at Army Group B.
+
+_b._ Re-occupation of Holland, it has been decided that Holland is not
+to be occupied for the time being, rapid occupation in case of English
+landing should however be possible at any time.
+
+_c._ Question of using parachute and airborne troops is being taken up
+by the Fuehrer.
+
+8th. Beginning of November 1939: Mainly under _Influence of the
+Fuehrer_:
+
+_a._ Permanent reinforcement of the southern mot. group, which is to
+advance against Sedan.
+
+_b._ Reinforcement of the Western Army to the utmost capacity.
+
+The weather conditions prevent the execution of the attack in the West.
+
+9th. 23 November 1939: _Speech by the Fuehrer_ to the Generals and
+Admirals.
+
+10th. End of November 1939: _Influence of the Fuehrer_ above all
+
+_a._ Holland is to be occupied immediately.
+
+_b._ Shifting of the main concentration of Army Group B to A appears to
+have even better prospects.
+
+_c._ Deployment of 7th FL. Div. (Deliberation of further possibilities).
+
+_d._ Important to maintain element of surprise, therefore motorized
+units which are still all located at home will be moved up to the Rhine
+in order not to betray to the enemy the imminent beginning of the
+attack, by the moving up to the front.
+
+_e._ Capture of the bridges at Maastricht and of the Fort Eben Emael,
+since destruction of the bridges would render impossible the fast
+advance of the sixth Army.
+
+First directive for _warfare against England_ (no. 9) is issued.
+Purpose: concentration of all combat weapons for important targets.
+
+At a conference in the map-room of the OKW (Supreme Command of the
+Armed Forces) in the Reich Chancellery, the Fuehrer expresses anew his
+opinion that _the attack planned in the West_ will lead to the greatest
+victory in world history.
+
+11th. December 1939:
+
+In spite of the _severe winter_ the Fuehrer as always still continues
+to consider it desirable to carry out the _attack in the West_ as soon
+as possible and not to delay it until spring. Reasons:
+
+_a._ England/France must not be allowed under any circumstances to
+steal a march on us by occupying Belgium and Holland since then--on
+account of the danger to the Ruhrbasin--the war could hardly be won.
+
+_b._ Time is not on our side but on the enemy’s (see notes of Major
+Deyhle).
+
+The Fuehrer is carefully watching the Russo-Finnish war (on account of
+the possibility of the Western powers joining in to the advantage of
+Finland).
+
+12th. Beginning of January 1940:
+
+The introductory movements in _preparation for the big attack_ are
+ordered anew by the Fuehrer, soon however checked again on account of
+the weather condition, although most important operational basis fall
+into Belgian hands and thereby there is a possibility of our intentions
+becoming known.
+
+For the deployment of the 7th FL. Division a new possibility becomes
+more and more probable: Capture of the “Fortress Holland”.
+
+13th. Middle of January 1940:
+
+During the past weeks probable _dates_ for our attack in the West _have
+become known_ in Belgium and Holland. The reason can not be determined,
+the main fault lies possibly in the long waiting time just before the
+attack (issue of order 7 days beforehand).
+
+In order better to maintain the _surprise_ element beyond the time of
+attack, the Fuehrer orders therefore a _change in the alert procedure_.
+
+The idea that the decisive point of the attack will have to be reached
+by breaking through Southern Belgium (thus the total attack to be
+concentrated on the left) is being worked out by the Fuehrer in even
+greater detail.
+
+The occupation of the whole of Holland is ordered. For this also the
+7th FL. Division is to be employed. Extensive deceptive measures are
+ordered. The “Sofortfall” remains in effect.
+
+The Fuehrer _makes up his mind_ to utilize the Danish and _Norwegian
+space_ for the German warfare.
+
+The Fuehrer considers what possibilities exist for forming new units.
+The setting up of the division’s 7th and 8th wave is then ordered. * * *
+
+
+                                 PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1799-PS
+
+ War Diary; Armed Forces Operations Staff (L/K.T.B. WFSt, Volume 6A, 1
+                        Aug. 1940-26 Mar. 1941)
+
+                                ANNEX 1
+
+Report to the Fuehrer on 5 December 1940
+
+The Chief of the General Staff of the Army then reports about the
+planned operation in the East. He expanded at first on the geographic
+fundamentals. The main war industrial centers are in the Ukraine, in
+Moscow and in Leningrad.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+The Fuehrer declares that he is agreed with the discussed operational
+plans and adds following: The most important goal is to prevent that
+the Russians should withdraw on a closed front. The eastward advance
+should be combined until the Russian air force will be unable to attack
+the territory of the German Reich and, on the other hand, the German
+air force will be enabled to conduct raids to destroy Russian war
+industrial territories. In this way we should be able to achieve the
+annihilation of the Russian army and to prevent its regeneration.
+
+The first commitment of the forces should take place in such a way to
+make the annihilation of strong enemy units possible.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+It is essential that the Russians should not take up positions in the
+rear again. The number of 130-140 Divisions as planned for the entire
+operation is sufficient.
+
+1 August 1940-March 26, 1941
+
+
+                                        PARTIAL COPY OF DOCUMENT 1800-PS
+
+         PRELIMINARY REPORT ON GERMANY’S CRIMES AGAINST NORWAY
+
+             [Prepared by the Royal Norwegian Government.]
+
+[Page 17]
+
+                           Other Violations.
+
+In different places in Norway the Germans appeared in Norwegian
+uniforms during battles. This was the case in the district of Bergen
+according to a Communique of the 14th of April, 1940, during the
+struggles in Valdres and in Narvik. Reports have been received that at
+one place the Germans even put on women’s clothes, in order to reach a
+favourable position.
+
+Where the Germans passed, the civilians found their homes in an
+indescribable condition after the battle, even if the Germans had not
+set fire to the houses. The so-called German “informal requisitions”
+which actually meant plundering and destruction, were later compensated
+for to the extent of about 9 million kroner in all, partly by Norwegian
+authorities and partly by German authorities, that is, by money drawn
+out of the Bank of Norway [Norges Bank] by the Germans.
+
+On 25th April, 1940, Ulvik in Hardanger was reduced to ruins, as a
+reprisal measure, as the Germans claimed that civilians there had
+fired on German troops. Damage was done to more than 400 buildings and
+chattels amounting to a total of 2.3 million kroner. [Page 26]
+
+
+                  B. CRIMES AGAINST NORWEGIAN PROPERTY
+
+                  a. Wanton ravaging and destruction.
+
+4. As a result of the advance of the Russian troops and the retreat
+of the German Army in Finnmark, October-November 1944, the Germans
+practised the “scorched earth” policy for the first time in Norway.
+Orders were issued that the civilian population was to evacuate and
+that all houses, transport and stores were to be destroyed. As a result
+of this about 30,000 houses were damaged, apart from 12,000 items of
+damage to chattels, amounting to a total of about 176 million kroner
+(Appendices 31 and 32).
+
+[Page 62]
+
+Appendix 31.
+
+
+                           TO THE POPULATION:
+
+The evacuation of a part of North Norway has been rendered a military
+necessity as a result of the treachery of a Finnish Government clique.
+
+This evacuation necessitates the removal of the civilian population,
+as the enemy has proved that, in those territories occupied by him,
+he ruthlessly and brutally forces the civilian population to give him
+active assistance in achieving his aims.
+
+This means that no shelter or means of existence of any kind can
+be left to the Bolshevisk enemy in the fighting zone. All such
+installations as housing accommodation, transport facilities and food
+stocks must be destroyed or removed.
+
+The population in these districts will therefore be deprived of the
+basis for their existence so that in order to be able to survive they
+must evacuate to those Norwegian territories which are still protected
+by the German Wehrmacht.
+
+For this reason, the German occupation authorities have declared
+themselves prepared to support, by all means at their disposal, the
+civil evacuation which the Norwegian authorities are carrying out.
+
+In the interests of the people themselves all means by which they can
+effect their own evacuation are to be used to the greatest possible
+extent.
+
+It is above all essential for a successful evacuation that all fishing
+smacks and other craft which are available in this area shall be fully
+employed. Owners of craft who try to evade evacuation must be prepared
+for severe counter-measures such as the shooting and sinking of craft
+and crew.
+
+He who does not comply with these unequivocal instructions exposes
+himself and his family to possible death in the arctic winter without
+house or food.
+
+  (signed) Terboven.
+  Reichskommissar for the Occupied Norwegian Territories.
+
+                                                      (signed) Rendulic.
+                                                         Colonel-General
+                                           Commander-in-Chief 20th Army.
+
+    Proclamation by Terboven and General Rendulic on the evacuation
+                              of Finnmark.
+
+
+                                 PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1807-PS
+
+                      [EXTRACT FROM JODL’S DIARY.]
+
+16.6.42.
+
+The operational staff of the Navy [Skl], applied on the 29th May,
+for permission to attack the Brazilian sea and air forces. The Skl
+considers that a sudden blow against the Brazilian naval and merchant
+ships is expedient at this juncture (_a_) because defence measures are
+still incomplete (_b_) because there is the possibility of achieving
+surprise and (_c_) because Brazil is to all intents and purposes
+fighting Germany at sea.
+
+
+                                 PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1808-PS
+
+  Address by the Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff, Col. Gen.
+   Jodl to the Officers and Officials of the Armed Forces Operations
+               Staff. July 24, 1944: 19:30 hours, page 4.
+
+Those making the attempt may have thought also that the men around
+Hitler were climbers and servile characters. But how did matters
+really stand? I, for example, was drawn in, even though I knew the
+movement before 1933 but little and could do nothing for it for the
+very reason that I was a soldier. Rather, I was against any relaxing of
+the discipline, bound as I was by my oath to the Reich President. Of
+course, my aims were, by and large, the aims of the movement, since my
+thinking was always nationalistic, social, and anti-Catholic, and since
+loyalty and obedience were the bases of life for me. And thus this
+train of thought is also disposed of.
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1809-PS
+
+ General Jodl’s Diary (Armed Forces Operational Staff) from 1 February
+                             to 26 May 1940
+
+_1 February 1940_:
+
+The Fuehrer requests that Major Kieritz be sent from here in good time
+with special mission.
+
+Col. Schmundt and Capt. Deyhle are back from the West.
+
+Conclusion:
+
+  1. Morale and discipline--excellent
+
+  2. Tactical mobility is impossible because of the weather. One cannot
+     withdraw more than 15 km. Army Group B, on the contrary, deems
+     weather excellent to overcome floods.
+
+  3. In all divisions, formerly committed in the East, the automotive
+     position is very bad. Up to 40% are missing--each of these 40
+     divisions should be provided with up to 100 vehicles.
+
+1700 hours General Jeschonnek.
+
+  1. Attitude of parachute units. In front of the Hague, they have to
+     be strong enough to break in even forcibly. The 7th division
+     intends to drop units near the town.
+
+  2. Political mission contrasts to some extent with violent action
+     against the Dutch air force.
+
+  3. Walcheren Ioland will have to be occupied as soon as possible.
+
+  4. Immediate use requires some arrangements.
+
+    To be eliminated:
+
+    Commitment of K against Eben Emael
+
+      against bridge C
+
+    “Fieselor Stork” airplane in front of Army Group A.
+
+    The ground Forces already will take up position at dusk, if
+    possible.
+
+    7th Fl. Division is to be in readiness, but will not take up
+    position without further orders.
+
+  5. Question about general intentions? Time.
+
+  6. Is it not possible to tackle H alone; that would already be a
+     tremendous improvement in conducting aerial warfare.
+
+  7. The Air Force wants permission to attack every kind of commercial
+     shipping in the 30-mile zone as well as everything anywhere making
+     use of arms: French vessels, cargo boats.
+
+_2 February_:
+
+Fuehrer is furious about presentation by Ordnance Bureau which needed
+8 days to demonstrate to him--not by actual constructing but only
+theoretically--that the Czech 4.7-cm anti-tank gun is not usable with
+armored car 3.
+
+Fuehrer decides as to Jeschonnek’s questions of 1 February:
+
+_a._ one has to employ in the Hague [d.H.] forces of such strength that
+they will be able to take over command there. In order to achieve that,
+a landing can be made in the center of the Hague.
+
+Unlimited use of arms against airfields and anti-aircraft guns is
+authorized.
+
+Relative to an attack against all ships, found between the English East
+Coast and the English mine fields, as desired by air, the Foreign
+Office is still to be consulted and Admiral Schuster, Chief Air Force,
+1700 hours, states in that matter that he does not want any exception.
+
+Italian and Japanese ships to be considered, which were sailing to
+Newcastle, until a short time ago.
+
+Important, that, though we signed an agreement about submarine warfare,
+we never signed one about manner of air warfare.
+
+Reported to the Fuehrer on 3 February
+
+The Spanish have supplied a German submarine and convoyed a merchant
+ship from Bilbao to Santander.
+
+Opinions of the newspapers: Spain is not ungrateful. Photos of Church
+Services, does Fuehrer agree with them?
+
+The Foreign Office wants that within the 30 mile zone the Air Force
+shall _not_ attack--
+
+  _a._ Japanese and Italian ships.
+  _b._ Danish Maltesian cross ships.
+  _c._ All passenger boats which do not fire.
+
+_3 February_:
+
+General Gerke: Railroads are unable to accomplish big tasks. No
+reaction to our transports. It seems possible that he got news about
+the reliefs. Opportune to keep movement going. Proposal to prepare
+again an A-movement to deceive the enemy. Empty rolling stock for 6
+divisions available, organization transports are rolling. Will head of
+transportation service be able to release state of readiness, so that
+he can gather empty rolling stock during 4 days.
+
+To consult Fuehrer. _The chief of Transportation Corps West requires
+one week’s time (225 trains)._ 70 trains are at the disposal of the
+armies.
+
+315 trains are needed for second echelon. An order will be issued on
+this matter on D-day.
+
+Afterwards remain 3rd, 4th, and 5th echelon.
+
+Total 660 trains, including 80 for tanks and 70 for armies (among them
+10,000 army cars).
+
+Altogether 60 fewer trains ready than before.
+
+_Air raid protection._
+
+_Ammunition train has no special protection. If machine gun car is
+added, the enemy flier will be aware of the fact, that this is an
+important train._ The wave before the trains should attack the enemy
+plane with best results. Ammunition trains often remain for weeks,
+personnel for its protection become demoralized.
+
+Ammunition trains, regulating stations and storage areas to be spread
+out and protected. Assembly stations are enlarged to assembly areas.
+
+Maintenance units are kept in readiness in the most endangered areas
+between the Rhine and the line Kassel-Hanover.
+
+Ruhr area has 15 different ways to give way.
+
+_Rumania_ wants to get supply of rail track material (from Poland.)
+
+_1340_ locomotives and _40000_ cars will be manufactured by the end of
+1940 or maybe beginning of 1941. Stock _23000_ locomotives, 8000 of
+which are heavy freight train locomotives for Armed Forces transports.
+This will only replace the loss.
+
+_4 February_:
+
+Will the Court-Martial be re-activated?
+
+Bodenschatz: Army Group C should not get out of hand [Keinen zauber
+machen] on minus-1 day.
+
+Fuehrer gives his agreement that 225 trains in position of readiness
+may be used for other purposes by the chief of transportation corps
+until 12 February.
+
+Proposal to the Fuehrer about continuation of aerial warfare within the
+30 mile zone. Fuehrer agrees with proposal and talks with the Minister
+for Foreign Affairs in the afternoon.
+
+_5 February_:
+
+Special staff “Weser Exercise” meets and is welcomed by Chief of Armed
+Forces High Command, gets instructions.
+
+Representative of Air Force is still missing.
+
+_6 February_:
+
+Consumption of gasoline is not reduced. Stocks further diminished by
+30000 tons.
+
+Deception even of Armed Forces High Command.
+
+Office Reinicke and Thomas, that is to say Chief of Armed Forces High
+Command,
+
+W Pr that is to say Chief of Armed Forces Operational Office.
+
+Fuehrer leaves in the evening.
+
+15:30 hours conference with General Jeschonnek, Col. v. Waldau and Col.
+Warlimont.
+
+Air Force submits following questions:
+
+Does X time remain unchanged? Yes. Deceptive action intolerable for
+Army Group C on A-1 day. Navy is not interested in Walcheren. Does not
+see any danger from the English side. New idea: carry out actions H and
+Weser Exercise only and guarantee Belgium’s neutrality for the duration
+of the war.
+
+Discussed once more affair Risberg with Chief of Armed Forces High
+Command.
+
+_8 February_:
+
+Chief of Transportation Corps reports: Reich Railroads now admit that
+they cannot handle any additional burden at this moment. They are not
+ready for war. Although they hardly got any military requests, they
+cannot supply the domestic economy right now.
+
+It is only a question of engines, now, there are enough cars available
+everywhere.
+
+  Transportation:    80% railroad.
+                     18% water transport.
+                      2% road transport.
+
+Transportation by water has to be brought to double of current capacity.
+
+Radio receivers can be transformed into transmitters without particular
+difficulties.
+
+Paris probably only by Gen. F.... [Fermont?], rue de Louvre.
+
+_9 February_:
+
+Chief of Armed Forces High Command received by Field Marshal Goering at
+10 o’clock. Newspaper correspondents from the Protectorate may be sent
+to the West Wall (Fuehrer gave permission on 10 February).
+
+_10 February_:
+
+The difficult situation in Transportation is presented by me in written
+form to the Chief of the Armed Forces High Command.
+
+13:00 hours: Conference of Fuehrer with General Halder. Before that,
+inspection of 4.7 tank destroyer on tank I, chassis satisfying
+[befriedigt].
+
+Field Marshal has explained, that he is able to start at night anyhow.
+Flying into the area of ... from the sea.
+
+During the World War, we have dropped 28,000 tons. Thus, the Air Forces
+does not want to anticipate, but prefers start at night. Planes shall
+not fly over Luettich and Eben Emael in order to avoid any alarm there.
+
+  113,000 trucks driving in the W * * *
+
+  45,000 of them are suited for Armed Forces.
+
+  We are able to produce 4000 trucks.
+
+  Fuehrer states, all the iron has been taken away from Todt, even that
+  put aside by him (he wanted to build 3000 additional ones).
+
+_For the first time, the problems of transportation, motor vehicles and
+gasoline have been reported to the Fuehrer more impressively._
+
+Fuehrer agrees that the 225 trains for the first wave of Army High
+Command reserves may still be used further on by the Chief of the
+Transportation Corps.
+
+_11 February_:
+
+First report from France about our troop movements and reinforcements
+in the west, which were terminated on 1 February already.
+
+_12 February_:
+
+Fuehrer has a cold. No report.
+
+_13 February_:
+
+The Army requested survey about the strength of the armies and
+reserves, divided into batteries, battalions and tanks [Btn. Btlen u.
+Kampfwagen], induces the Fuehrer again to open the question of the
+center of gravity.
+
+He says: Most of the armed tanks [Geschuetzkampfwagen] have been
+directed to areas of secondary importance. Armored Divisions at 4th
+Army can do little in barricaded and fortified area.
+
+They will be stopped at the latest on the Maas river and must be
+withdrawn. The 16th or 12th Army will then miss them. One should lead
+them together in direction of Sedan. The enemy does not expect our main
+assault there. The documents of fliers, who landed, have convinced them
+[the enemy] still further in their opinion that our intention is only
+to take possession of the Dutch and Belgian channel coast.
+
+A great number of tanks with 8th Tank Division does not seem necessary,
+a mechanized division in 3 or 4 parts with tanks assigned, should
+suffice. (It may be that this is a wish of the SSV division.)
+
+I hand over to the Fuehrer a summarized report, from which the great
+possibility for formation of a center of gravity south of the line
+Luettich-Namur becomes obvious (at least 5 times the strength of the
+forces committed north of that line). I bring to his attention that
+the thrust against Sedan is a tactical secret path, where one can be
+surprised by the God of War. If the French attack from the south flank,
+we must veer to the south.
+
+Fuehrer still thinks it possible, that the enemy will not engage the
+battle at all. Anyhow he will do it automatically. After half a day the
+news from Holland and Belgium may be so threatening already that he
+will decide to stand still.
+
+I don’t believe it.
+
+At 17:30 hours Col. v. Greifenberg and Lt. Col. Heusniger are summoned
+to discuss these questions.
+
+The Fuehrer disapproves of the wearing of regular army uniforms by
+persons who are not members of the army or the Fuehrer’s headquarters.
+
+Recommends taking care of motor vehicles and fuel. Higher speeds result
+in doubled tire consumption.
+
+Chief of Armed Forces High Command has a cold and will remain at home
+in the afternoon.
+
+Have learned from Admiral Canaris that the echelon Reivel is to be put
+to use against the Caucasus with bulk from Bulgaria. The Air Force must
+explain with whom this false idea originated.
+
+Inquiries made to the Chief of the Operational Division: whether there
+is a sufficient quantity of cloth for flags on hand? Change of position
+of the Army High Commands.
+
+Proper designation of own troops:
+
+  (_a_) Front line: white.
+  (_b_) In line of company CPs: swastika flag.
+  (_c_) Rear echelons: yellow rectangle.
+
+Communicated Fuehrer’s ideas to Col. Warlimont, von Greifenberg and
+to Lt. Col. Heusniger, at 17:30 hours. Instructions requested how we
+should proceed in future.
+
+_14 February_:
+
+Ziegenberg plant cannot be completed before June due to technical
+difficulties. Emergency installation can be made ready for operation by
+the middle of March, but in that case the Air Force must be in Nauheim
+or on the train.
+
+_Colonel Schmundt_ must make a report on the distribution of personnel
+to WNV.
+
+Copper advance from Wifo stocks now to WNV, later back to Wifo.
+
+Political action against the increase in frontier road-blocks [?] in
+Luxemburg.
+
+_Dr. Dorpmueller telegraphed to the chief of the Transportation Corps_:
+The condition of the Reich Railroads requires that all nonessential
+transportation of the Armed Forces be postponed until warmer weather
+sets in.
+
+_15 February_:
+
+The Fuehrer approves my article on the Finnish-Russian conflict. Is
+to be published in the Voelkischer-Beobachter. Backlog congestion of
+railroads increased by 200 trains.
+
+Certainty that nothing will happen to W.
+
+Instructions to the 18th Army.
+
+_16 February_:
+
+Corps on left flank of 16th and not 6th Army.
+
+Landing at the Hague....
+
+Capture Fort Hendrik.
+
+10 divisions of the 8th wave [must receive 3 batteries].
+
+No off-standard types of vehicles must be permitted to be used at the
+front, as long as standard army models are still being used in industry.
+
+_To the Chief of the Luftwaffe_ [taken care of].
+
+Air raid protection....
+
+Speakers for troops, danger if commanders order the speeches themselves.
+
+Chief of the Armed Forces High Command.
+
+  WNV training of 300 to 400 men
+      land postal clerks at Verst.      [?]
+                                        Not yet
+  from the Chief of the Air Force       at present
+
+_6 new German consuls appointed in Scandinavia._
+
+_C. has given orders for large-scale preparations for offensive._
+
+Fortress [Fest] drill of “Grafemvoeln”.
+
+Special security by counterintelligence coordination of press.
+
+Brief reports in the provincial newspapers for enemy intelligence
+service. Request authorization to land at Myden with a load of
+machines. Alternative preparations at C. should work in the same
+direction. Pr. Battleship “Repulse” in dock. Complete flop of this
+news report. Altmark in Bergen, British submarines expected. Burgedeyk
+submarine 48 Schulz unsuccessful [?] submarines.
+
+       Chief of Armed Forces High Command.
+       Press Conference at Foreign Office.
+
+Chief of the Navy High Command wishes to talk the Halifax problem over
+once more and then speak to the Fuehrer. Now applications of mines
+only. Chief of Navy, High Command will take this matter up again with
+the Fuehrer. L. ask what with report of General Staff Officers.
+
+_17 February_:
+
+Incident with tankship “Altmark”, 6 dead, 4 seriously injured. 1700
+hours: Newly promoted Commanding Generals and General Rommel at
+Fuehrer’s table for dinner. (Geyr, Manstein, Schmidt, Reinhardt,
+Glumne). Complaints that guns in armored cars IV only * * * have not to
+2000 m. After dinner Manstein reports his ideas about the operations
+of Army Group A. He says, the decisive blow will not fall west of the
+Maas, but it must be overcome between Sedan-Charleville. If the enemy
+crosses the river, we are able to beat him and cross the River Maas
+together with him. In the south therefore, we must have strong armor or
+none at all. What is in the rear cannot reach the battlefield in time.
+
+_18 February_:
+
+On the basis of my discussion with Greifenberg on 13 February Chief
+of the Armed Forces High Command and General Halder reported to the
+Fuehrer the following intention:
+
+1. To shift the demarcation line between Army Group A and B in line
+Luettich-Namur.
+
+2. To employ stronger armored forces in front of the 12th and 16th
+army, weakening by the measure Army Group B (1st and 5th armored) and
+ground forces reserved (9th armored division).
+
+3. Intention to go to the front any way with a very small staff one
+night preceding A Day.
+
+Fuehrer approves all three suggestions but insists that in distributing
+the heavy tanks III, III t and IV due consideration should be given to
+the tasks to be expected. That is to say not such a large number of
+heavy tanks as it is the case now with the 8th Armored and 6th Armored
+Division.
+
+_19.II_
+
+Fuehrer displeased with behavior of Graf Spee crew on the Altmark. No
+resistance, no British losses.
+
+Fuehrer presses energetically, preparations for the Weser Exercise
+Equip steamships. Put units in readiness. Will talk to staff.
+
+In order to speed up preparations I advise to appoint one of newly
+promoted commanding generals with his staff as leader.
+
+Fuehrer approves.
+
+Chief of Army reports about problems of organization.
+
+_20 February_:
+
+Discussion and consideration how case “Weser Exercise” is to be carried
+through. Equipment is to be taken on board ships ahead of the troops.
+Designation of units depends on equipment on hand.
+
+1500 hours discussion concerning that matter through Chief of Armed
+Forces High Command with General Fromm. Intention, to take two
+divisions with technical equipment as second wave.
+
+_21 February_:
+
+Fuehrer talks to General von Falkenhorst and charges him with
+preparation of the Weser Exercise. Falkenhorst accepts gladly.
+Instructions to each of the 3 branches of the armed forces.
+
+Proposal from Fromm to use only units with German material. Therefore
+7th Fl. Div., 22nd Division, one regiment of the 1st mountain division.
+Two divisions of the 7th wave, motorized brigade (rifle brigade. 11
+with armored car 1).
+
+Fuehrer wishes that western connections of the “Spicherer Hoehen” be
+advanced and fortified with pillboxes.
+
+Colonel v. Greifenberg transmits.
+
+_22 February_:
+
+Fuehrer expresses his intention to go to Munich for Sunday.
+
+At the beginning of operations he does not want to go to Ziegenberg but
+to the Eagle’s Nest [Felsen].
+
+Colonel Juppe ordered:
+
+  _a._ to have a drawing made of the chain of command.
+
+  _b._ to consider, in what way the communications can be technically
+       improved at the Eagle’s Nest and vicinity.
+
+Commander Junge informed about proposed points in his report by the
+Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. Important 3 points:
+
+  _a._ Submarines into the Mediterranean.
+
+  _b._ Esthonian submarines.
+
+  _c._ Discordance Navy-Airforce about the moment for the beginning of
+       mine laying. Air force beginning 1 May with 3000, Navy with
+       Heinckel 115 now, already 1845 hours Chief of the Armed Forces
+       High Command informed.
+
+_Noon._ Todt reports to the Fuehrer concerning extension of railroad
+gauges [?] [Schienenhoehen]. Fuehrer approves that extension will be
+built according to schedule.
+
+_23 February_:
+
+Navy High Command reports that during last night 2 destroyers were sunk
+by our own planes [Leberecht Maas and ...]. Navy High Command stresses
+that this is the consequence of uncoordinated conduct of sea warfare,
+regardless whether it is conducted under, on or above the sea. One
+takes pains not to get excited; what would happen if there should be
+heavy losses. Fuehrer is furious. He is right. He says: “I would not
+say anything if the whole Navy were sunk in battle with the enemy, but
+it is inexcusable if that happens on account of lack of coordination.”
+
+Gasoline reserve for motor vehicles.
+
+_24 February_:
+
+Clear up, whether Navy is authorized to start already now with mine
+laying. Who will ask Duce, whether our own submarines have to enter the
+Mediterranean?
+
+Engel informs about inquiry results Todt and Schmundt. The latter calls
+long distance from Munich. Fuehrer has ordered completion of Eagle’s
+Nest for Armed Forces Operational Staff and Air Force. [Zug] (air group
+[?]) Heinrich will have to stay east of the Rhine.
+
+Army High Command as strongly as possible in forests. Officer from the
+General Staff and an officer from Intelligence Service are to go to
+Eagle’s Nest 26 February. There to reconnoiter together with Todt.
+
+1430 hours. Orally transmitted to Chief of Operational Department and
+to Lieutenant Colonel Heusinger the matter. Chief of the High Command
+is informed. Staff Falkenhorst arrives in Berlin and starts to function
+XXIst Corps.
+
+_25.II._
+
+Disturbing reports from Turkey. Communication apparently cut off.
+
+Chief of Armed Forces High Command inform General Halder about
+Fuehrer’s intention to have an Operational Staff of the Army High
+Command near the Eagle’s Nest also.
+
+_26.II._
+
+Fuehrer raises the question, whether it is better to undertake the
+Weser Exercise before or after case “Yellow”.
+
+Chief of the Air Force charged with examining this problem. Fuehrer
+decides that Navy will have to wait with starting of mine laying by
+means of planes, until situation will permit large-scale employment of
+air force [transmitted to Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force].
+
+Talked with Chief of Air Force and Chief of Staff about work on and
+about housing of Air Force near Eagle’s Nest at the beginning. Air
+Force to Rodert or Muenstereifel or train nearby.
+
+_27 February_:
+
+60 Tons of leaflets shall be dropped down in the near future. Fuehrer
+approves the schedule but will not issue proclamation to Armed Forces
+from here on A Day.
+
+_28 February_:
+
+I make the following proposition to the Chief of the Armed Forces
+High Command and after that to Fuehrer: Case “Yellow” and Weser
+Exercise have to be prepared in such a manner that they will become
+quite independent from another regarding time and strength. Fuehrer
+completely agrees with that proposition if there is any possibility for
+it.
+
+1500 hours, staff Falkenhorst reports about preparations made so far.
+In this connection I explain to him the new basis of preparations.
+
+Proposition for employment of forces
+
+  N    4 airborne companies
+       2 Mountain divisions
+  D    1 corps headquarters
+      22 infantry divisions less
+       2 division, 7th wave pol. division
+       1 div. 3rd wave regional defense unit.
+
+It has yet to be decided, whether reinforcement 11th rifle brigade
+is to be directed first to group D and then to group N or to group N
+immediately.
+
+Proposition as regards combat planes too high.
+
+_29 February_:
+
+1500 hours, Report of staff Falkenhorst with Kranke, Buschenhagen,
+Dnaus very satisfactory to Fuehrer. He approves the suggestions.
+
+Fuehrer wishes also to have a strong group at Copenhagen and detailed
+elaboration in which way the individual coastal batteries are to be
+overpowered. Commander-in-Chief of Air Forces is instructed to make out
+immediately the order for Army, Navy, and Air Force, and Chief “WZ”
+order concerning increasing of the staff.
+
+According to my proposal outfit transport ships immediately and with
+them bring horses over here from East Prussia.
+
+1300 hours, Order to Juppe to speed up construction of Eagle’s Nest, 11
+March according to interim solution (operational staff of the Commander
+in Chief of the Armed Forces in hunting lodge and at the same time
+permanent solution). (Army High Command with operational department and
+parts of O.A.IV.)
+
+The same evening order concerning personal requirements of the staff
+and requisition to the branches of the armed forces.
+
+_1 March_:
+
+Fury at Army High Command because transfers. Consultation with Chief
+of Armed Forces High Command. After my discussion with Jeschonnek
+scaling-down of requisitions.
+
+_2 March_:
+
+Agreement with Army. Field Marshal rages and gets unfriendly towards
+Chief of Armed Forces High Command, goes to see Fuehrer at 1300 hours.
+During the afternoon new requisitions are put forward which are
+somewhat reduced after consulting with Army and Air Force.
+
+1100 hours: Assistant Secretary of State Welles with the Fuehrer. The
+appointment of a new Minister for Ordnance is to be expected because
+Fuehrer is dissatisfied with production of equipment and munition.
+
+Letter from the Chief of the Armed Forces High Command to the Field
+Marshal.
+
+_3 March_:
+
+Fuehrer expresses his opinion about the necessity of prompt and strong
+action in Norway very sharply. No delay by branches of Armed Forces.
+Rapid acceleration is necessary.
+
+Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force is against any proposition to
+subordinate Air Force units to XXI Corps.
+
+Fuehrer decides to undertake Weser Exercise before case “Yellow”, with
+several days interval.
+
+_4 March_:
+
+Discussion with General Jeschonnek. All units of the Air Force are
+subordinated to X Fl. K. This receives its order through High Command
+of the Air Forces, upon demand of the Staff of XXIst Corps.
+
+Fuehrer orders that the Air Force shall provide the anti-aircraft
+battalion for the Weser exercise South.
+
+3rd mountain division to be in Berlin already on March 6th.
+
+_1000 hours_: Chief of the Air Force is informed.
+
+_1300 hours_: Chief WNV is charged with securing communications from
+Falkenhorst to us. The former has to go to Luebeck to the X Fl. K.
+
+_1500 hours_: Chief WNV is instructed to set up * * * platoon company
+only after X-day. After that time, use expedients and send some men
+with the tactical troops.
+
+_1700 hours_: General Bodenschatz complains about exclusion of the
+Field Marshal from Weser exercise. He said that 110 officers of the Air
+Force had been consulted in advance. Such subordination is intolerable.
+
+  Mad at General K
+  I certify this error.
+
+Chief of the Armed Forces High Command is informed that General
+Rundstedt is supposed to feel sick. Intend to talk about it with
+Commander-in-Chief of the Army. If it is true, v.R. would have to be
+replaced by List in good time.
+
+Himmler or Canaris are to provide personnel who are familiar with the
+Hague. These to Wenninger and are grabbed there by Kiertz.
+
+Proclamations:
+
+  _a._ faked ones,
+  _b._ proclamations that everything is going well.
+
+Student wants separate proclamations for Holland.
+
+_5 March: 1500 hours_:
+
+Big conference with the 3 Supreme Commanders about Weser exercise.
+Field Marshal vents his spleen, because he was not consulted
+beforehand. He dominates the discussion and tries to prove that all
+previous preparations are good for nothing.
+
+_Result_:
+
+  _a._ Stronger forces to Narvik,
+
+  _b._ Navy shall leave warships in the ports (Hipper or Luetzow in
+       Trondheim),
+
+  _c._ Christian and may be excluded, for the beginning,
+
+  _d._ 6 divisions should be calculated for Norway,
+
+  _e._ To get a foothold immediately in Copenhagen, too.
+
+After this, the following make a report: General von Kesselring,
+Student, Sp * * * Richthofen, Captain Koch, 1st lieutenant Witzig
+about the case “Festung” [fortress] and actions by glider-borne troops
+against the bridges of Vroenhofen and Veldvezelt, furthermore against
+Fort Eben-Emael. Accusations are made that Army Group B is supposed to
+have said that it would take 3-4 days until forces of the army could
+attack the fort.
+
+_6 March_:
+
+_7 March_:
+
+Falkenhorst with Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force. The preparations
+have now materialized. The Fuehrer signs a directive containing all
+changes subsequent to the conference of March 5th. Nothing is to be
+changed any more now.
+
+_8 March_:
+
+Fuehrer wishes to have issued special orders for the Weser exercise in
+another form. They are to be divided into military orders which have
+to be made known to the tactical troops and into general instructions
+concerning actions of the Plenipotentiary of the Reich.
+
+Fuehrer is outraged about report of the Field Marshal that the Army
+does not care for occupation of the area in front of the left wing of
+the Army led by Busch by airborne troops dropped from “Stork” planes,
+because divisions can get there only after several days. I object that
+it will naturally be better to employ these troops there, where armored
+divisions will arrive faster.
+
+_9 March_:
+
+Fuehrer is outraged when he learns that Prince Oskar is commanding
+officer of a regiment. Schmidt was just about to suggest that he should
+be given command of a division, but he managed not to mention it.
+
+Buschenhagen reports to me about the preparations for W and submits the
+schedule.
+
+Fuehrer does not appear at table.
+
+In the evening of March 8th, I again bring seriousness of the gasoline
+situation to the attention of the Chief of the Armed Forces High
+Command. Nothing efficacious has been done to improve the situation.
+Industry regularly uses up 80,000 tons a month.
+
+There is pressing need for the appointment of a Deputy-General for Fuel
+Economy (General von Schell).
+
+_10 March_:
+
+Fuehrer makes his wonderful speech in the arsenal on the occasion of
+Memorial day.
+
+The news about the Finnish-Russian negotiations are very favorable,
+from a political point of view.
+
+The French press rages about it because they consider it necessary to
+cut Germany off from the Swedish ore. In a military way, the situation
+is disturbing for us, because, if peace should be concluded soon, the
+motivation for the prepared action of the group Falkenhorst will be
+difficult.
+
+_11 March_:
+
+Fuehrer has objections against the iron cross in gold (color effect
+black-gold), as it means abandoning tradition. Rather create a new
+decoration.
+
+On the other hand, he agrees with the Oak-Leaves for the Knight’s
+Cross. The Chief of the Armed Forces High Command presents a list of
+the tanks at hand in the armed forces.
+
+Fuehrer wants a basic ruling that only such people should be appointed
+in the Armed Forces and in Civil Service who have no relatives abroad.
+The danger is too great that they will get into conflict with their own
+conscience. The schedule (for the Weser exercises) is presented to the
+Fuehrer. Also the special orders which the Fuehrer takes along.
+
+_12 March_:
+
+Fuehrer is very much satisfied with Ribbentrop’s conference in Rome.
+Duce remains steadfast, wants to talk with Fuehrer personally next
+week on the Brenner. Conclusion of peace between Finland and Russia
+deprives England, but us, too, of any political basis to occupy Norway.
+
+The preparations are ready to the extent that March 20th could be
+W-day. However, unfavorable ice conditions compel postponement by 1-2
+days.
+
+_13 March_:
+
+Fuehrer does not yet give order for “W”. He is still looking for some
+justification.
+
+_14 March_:
+
+English keep vigil in the North-Sea with 15-16 submarines; the reason
+is doubtful, either to prevent a German action. Fuehrer has not yet
+decided, how to justify the Weser exercise. Wrong news report in the
+American newspapers.
+
+Commander-in-Chief of the Navy is in doubt, whether it is still
+important to play at preventive war [?] in Norway. The question is,
+if it wouldn’t be better to carry out case “Yellow” before the Weser
+exercise.
+
+The danger in that case is that the English will immediately get a
+foothold in Narvik, because we would have started with neutrality
+violation.
+
+At noon, Colin Rosz visits the Fuehrer. Interesting explanations about
+Japan-China and Russia.
+
+_15 March_:
+
+Fuehrer wants the following material for the conference with the Duce
+on March 18th:
+
+  1. Large-scale map of the distribution of our own forces (207
+     divisions).
+
+  2. Maps about the distribution of enemy and neutral forces. France,
+     England, Holland, Belgium, Switzerland, Norway, Denmark, Sweden,
+     Hungary.
+
+  3. Terminal map of the Finnish-Russian conflict.
+
+  4. Strength of our own Air Force.
+
+_1330 hours_: Lunch with Army Group A and with Chief of the General
+Staff.
+
+_1500 hours_: Reports of Army Group Commander and Army Commanders,
+including Group Kleist; very satisfactory.
+
+_16 March_:
+
+Worries that the English will proceed against Norway, as overhead radio
+messages indicate. As the English have retired 7 submarines, such an
+action does not seem probable any longer.
+
+Army Group B reports about its evaluation of the situation and its
+intentions.
+
+Detailed preparations are done very well. Displeasure about
+disconnection of the 4th army. Mutual assistance is eliminated.
+
+Lack of reinforcements, if the 6th army should be successful, after
+all. 6th army shifts its center of gravity to 4th Corps, and also draws
+3 armored divisions of the 2nd echelon there. 10th and 9th Corps have
+no anti-aircraft protection.
+
+Jeschonnek transmits that Army Bush needs another 25 “stork” planes.
+
+_17 March_:
+
+Fuehrer leaves at noon for conference with Duce on the Brenner.
+
+News of the successful raid of the Air Force against Scapa Flow.
+Fuehrer is in high spirits.
+
+_18 March_:
+
+Nothing important. Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force (Chef L) is
+informed about the report of the commanders in the West.
+
+_19 March_:
+
+Fuehrer returns from the conference with the Duce beaming with joy
+and very much satisfied. Complete harmony, Duce is resolute; but he
+cannot fight a long war. Duce is highly impressed and agrees with the
+opinion of the Fuehrer’s that the decision against France is being
+made. Whatever happens at the periphery in the meantime is unimportant.
+At the end, Duce told Ciano: “My decision is made. Did you hear,
+Fuehrer?” Balkan should and must remain quiet. Complete understanding
+for Fuehrer’s cooperation with Stalin.
+
+Fuehrer deeply moved by enthusiasm of the Tyrolian’s England song [“We
+will sail against England...”--translator’s note].
+
+Chief of Armed Forces High Command very much depressed because of
+Todt’s appointment. I try to persuade him not to insist on the
+“agreement”. It is much better, to separate the tasks clearly. The
+quests of the Armed Forces are laid down by the Fuehrer and transmitted
+to Dr. Todt by the Armed Forces High Command. Dr. Todt has full powers
+to fulfill these requests.
+
+_20 March_:
+
+During the night, the English attack Sylt and Hoermann [?]. No success.
+
+At noon, the Fuehrer signs an order which appoints Todt as Minister for
+Ordnance.
+
+Wedel is instructed by the Chief of the Armed Forces High Command to
+celebrate the 40th anniversary of service by the Commander-in-Chief
+of the Army in a modest way only. The achievements of individual
+personalities can be appreciated only during or after the war.
+
+In the evening, annihilating blow against an English convoy; 42000 tons
+of big boats (10-12000 tons) have been sunk.
+
+_21 March_:
+
+Objections of Group 21 [Grp. XXI] about the long interval between
+taking up readiness positions at 05,30 hours and finishing of the
+diplomatic action. Fuehrer rejects any earlier negotiations, because
+otherwise calls for help will be offered, it has to be broken
+ruthlessly. The political plenipotentiaries will have to strongly
+emphasize the military measures taken, and will even have to exaggerate
+them.
+
+_22 March_:
+
+Reported to Fuehrer, how we want to proceed at the proposed discussions
+with the Italian General Staff. First, inquiry by attaché in Rome, how
+they believe they can take some burden off us. Only then to proceed to
+possibility of an operation across the Upper Rhine. Discussion with
+General Staff only once our cards are on the table.
+
+American newspaper correspondents inspect the small damage on Sylt.
+
+_24-25 March_:
+
+Fuehrer at Obersalzberg.
+
+No special events.
+
+The English start to molest our merchantmen in the Danish and Norwegian
+territorial waters, or even fire at them.
+
+_26 March_:
+
+The Fuehrer is back.
+
+Discussion about deadlines for operations.
+
+Fuehrer sticks to it: first Weser exercise, dark nights necessary for
+it. Thus about 4-5 days later. Commander-in-Chief of the Navy reports,
+urges to start laying mines with planes, as 1270 mines will already be
+at hand by end of April. Fuehrer wants to think it over some more.
+
+_27 March_:
+
+Our own submarine stranded near Lindesnaes, one submarine and boat 37
+come to help. Are to ask for permission to stay in Norwegian waters, if
+necessary, 2300 PM. Discussion of the Fuehrer with Commander-in-Chief
+of the Army and of Army Group C. First and Seventh army.
+
+Fuehrer explains his intentions with the Italians about to strike.
+Operational aim plateau Langres.
+
+Deceptive actions of First Army in case “Yellow” agreed to. Attacks
+proposed in case of 95th, 93rd, 75th, 268th, 215th, and 246th
+divisions. These have favorable effects, but deceptive measures of the
+7th army will not take place, because of the preparation of case Brown
+(Ital.).
+
+_28 March_:
+
+Duce attaches importance to General Staff talks, Graziani intends to
+send General Roatta to B. in April. The Norwegians are interning U
+21 seemingly because of awkward statements by the commander, who did
+not claim engine trouble but mistaken navigation. But it may also be
+a mistake made in translation. Individual naval officers seem to be
+lukewarm concerning the Weser exercise and need stimulus. The three
+chiefs von Falkenhorst are also pondering matters, which are none of
+their business. Kranke sees more disadvantages than advantages.
+
+In the evening, the Fuehrer steps into the map room and explains
+sharply that he will not be content with the Navy again quitting the
+Norwegian ports right away. Narvik, Trondheim, and Oslo will have to
+remain occupied by naval forces. Bad impression on ground forces.
+
+_29 March_:
+
+Talk with Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, 1200 hours. Wants decision
+about commitment of air mines.
+
+Fuehrer talks to him alone about retaining of ships. Admiral of the
+Fleet [Grossadmiral] rejects Narvik, but wants to examine, if Trondheim
+cannot be set up as a base immediately.
+
+Commander-in-Chief of the Navy draws attention to the fact that they
+want fuel from him, because the army will run out of it by the end of
+May. This is the consequence of the wrong arrangements with Shell and
+not to buy in Mexico, like the Navy did it.
+
+3 PM: Commander-in-Chief of the Force with the Fuehrer.
+
+_30 March_:
+
+U-21 not set free yet by the Norwegians. Negotiations under way.
+
+Fuehrer thinks about activation of another 10-12 new divisions. Where
+are the mortars committed?
+
+L II ordered to present an outline of personnel and materiel, from
+which it could be determined, if and when new activations are possible.
+
+_31 March_:
+
+Nothing of importance.
+
+_1 April_:
+
+German fighters shoot 7 enemy fighters down. 1300 hours: Falkenhorst
+again gives general report about Weser exercise. 1300 hours: Breakfast,
+then discussion with all commanding officers primarily concerned.
+
+Fuehrer has a very good impression about thoroughness of preparations.
+
+_2 April_:
+
+1530 hours: Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force, Commander-in-Chief of
+the Navy, and General von Falkenhorst with the Fuehrer. All confirm end
+of the preparations. Fuehrer orders carrying out of the Weser exercise
+for April 9th.
+
+Protests of the commanding officer of the Air Force that some warships
+leave ports again right away. Fuehrer, too, disapproves of that, but
+does not want to intervene too much in an exclusive concern of naval
+warfare.
+
+Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force agrees to plan to start aerial
+torpedo war [LM-Krieg] now.
+
+Fuehrer wants that Luetzow shall be used for the transport of troops to
+Trondheim, in spite of tasks later on.
+
+Find out, if it is not possible to land debarkation troops by fishing
+boat, in order to capture the bridge strong point of Vordingborg.
+
+_3 April_:
+
+Movements of the first 3 ships of the leading echelon [Ausfuhrstaffel]
+started at 0200 hours. Lt. Commdr. Junge reports at 1600 hours that the
+3 ships have instructions how to act against Norwegians. I immediately
+instruct Councillor of Legation Hewel in order to inform the Foreign
+Minister what the situation is, in case one of the ships of the leading
+echelon should be examined by Norwegians. The Chief of the Armed Forces
+High Command also informs the Fuehrer at 1815 hours about it.
+
+1830 hours Reich Foreign Minister informed by Fuehrer. Chief of Armed
+Forces High Command asked to join discussion.
+
+_4 April_:
+
+Slight alarm, as some news from Norway indicates increased
+preparedness. Sweden has asked what preparations for troops shipments
+in Stettin are supposed to mean (boats under Reich Naval Ensign)
+[Reichsdienstflagge].
+
+Fuehrer drafts the proclamations. Piepenbrock, Chief of
+Counter-Intelligence service 1, returns with good results of the talk
+with Quisling from Copenhagen.
+
+News that 2 armored coastal vessels [Kuestenpanzer] are in Narvik and
+that 2 submarines are expected.
+
+_5 April_:
+
+Weser exercise runs according to plan. Some alarm report from the
+source of a Belgian agent [V-Mann] appears unworthy of belief. The
+Chief of the Armed Forces High Command instructs General von Rintelen
+at 1930 hours.
+
+_6 April_:
+
+Weser exercise runs according to plan. The high-pressure weather area
+over the Northern North-Sea, which was predicted yesterday, is not
+taking place and that favors the action of the navy. Fuehrer puts great
+emphasis on the fact that the families of all deserters will be checked
+carefully. Navy records long English radio message, but is unable to
+decipher it.
+
+_1500 hours_: General Gerke reports that his movements according to
+plan.
+
+_1600 hours_: Talks in room of the Chief of the section for Foreign
+Countries in presence of Chef L and Military Attaché in Rome with
+General Marras.
+
+_1700 hours_: Report that Luetzow is dropping out and can go to Oslo
+only, because auxiliary engines did not take part. Fuehrer agrees to
+this decision.
+
+_7 April_:
+
+No disquieting news. Hipper with destroyers seems to have been reported
+by an English submarine on Sunday morning, April 7th.
+
+Prince Axel of Denmark has the intention to visit Field Marshal Goering
+on Monday.
+
+_8 April_:
+
+Day of highest tension. The English put 3 mine fields in the Norwegian
+territorial waters and make that public.
+
+Leading echelon is far off with several ships because of lack of pilots.
+
+Only 1 ship near Narvik, everything else seems to be hardly beyond
+Bergen.
+
+Boat Rio de Janeiro is torpedoed; since horses and men in uniform are
+landed, the impending project becomes known to the Norwegians.
+
+Group Hipper gets into a battle with an English destroyer and
+annihilates it.
+
+_9 April_:
+
+The surprise effect succeeds in Bergen, Trondheim, Narvik, and from the
+air in Stavanger. Not at Christiansand and in Oslo.
+
+Bluecher sinks after heroic fight. Commanding Admiral and Commander 103
+(Kdr 103) of it, on deck up to the last moment, swim to land.
+
+Luetzow has to take over lead and lower boats.
+
+Heavy fighting for coastal fortifications. Fortress Christiansand
+fought to surrender by planes and Karlsruhe.
+
+_10 April_:
+
+Chief of naval forces [Flottenchef] reports 2 turrets gone, only 25
+miles.
+
+First breaking through of British destroyers in Narvik.
+
+The Koenigsberg destroyed by enemy dive bombers. Bornholm occupied.
+
+_11 April_:
+
+Luetzow on voyage home. Oslo hit by torpedo.
+
+Norwegian warships are put into service.
+
+Denmark does not belong any longer to jurisdiction of XXIst Corps.
+Railroads Oslo-Bergen and Oslo-Drontheim destroyed.
+
+_12 April_:
+
+Still 6 destroyers left ready for use in Narvik, Freighter
+[Treckdampfer] Jon Wellom in N., otherwise no ship of the leading
+echelon. Bulk of the submarines ordered outside the ports occupied by
+us.
+
+Hundalen on the iron-ore railroad reached. Strong enemy air attack on
+Bergen.
+
+_13 April_:
+
+* * * Mountain battery flown to lake near Narvik with Ju 52 planes.
+Concentration of strong English naval forces near Harstadt in process.
+
+  Much booty in Oslo.
+  1650 hours naval battle in Narvik.
+  Battleships and Hipper arrived in home ports.
+
+_14 April_:
+
+Dietl is not being attacked, but is separated from Northern group.
+Terrible excitement. All details are to be ordered from here.
+
+Steamship Baerenfelsis sunk in the course of attack on Bergen.
+
+Another 3 airforce anti-aircraft batteries on board ship torpedoed by
+submarine.
+
+Fuehrer wants that Dietl tries to fight his way through to the South. I
+argue against this impossible idea.
+
+_15 April_:
+
+_16 April_:
+
+Reproaches against the navy, especially because the battle was not
+engaged by battleships and because she does not succeed in speeding up
+the transports (Unjustified--I strongly argue against it).
+
+_17 April_:
+
+During the night from the 16th to 17th Staff Officer from Admiralty
+arrives in Narvik and delivers written report by Dietl with call for
+help from Stavanger, since English naval forces are firing there.
+Air-Force notified. The Fuehrer again states in a temperamental way
+that the Gr. Dietl will have to march South or will have to be picked
+up. I advocate again in a very strong way that
+
+  _a._ a march South is impossible,
+
+  _b._ even a transport can evacuate only very small units, leads to
+       the loss of many planes and breaks the moral backbone of the
+       Dietl group.
+
+They will continue to fight on the Swedish border for a long time. A
+thing should be considered lost only when it is actually lost. 1200
+hours: Field Marshal with Jeschonnek. Has to be regrouped. Draws combat
+teams to Ralburg and transport groups back into Slesvig. 1530 hours:
+Admiral of the Fleet [Grossadmiral] with Admiralty Staff Officer from
+Narvik who reports verbally about his experiences in Narvik. Each piece
+of bad news leads to the worst fears. Chief of Air-Force and of L IH
+[Army Air-Forces?] presents an evaluation of the situation I fully
+agree to. I present to the Fuehrer this and the proof that we do not
+have enough long range planes to pick up troops from Narvik, anyhow.
+Furthermore, an order which is delivered by courier and composed in our
+sense.
+
+To fight and tie down forces and not to give up.
+
+Even a professor who knows Norway is fetched from Innsbruck and asked
+whether mountain troops can get from Narvik to Fauske is impossible
+judging from my mountain experience.
+
+In the evening, the Fuehrer signs the order to Dietl which I had
+prepared, to hold out as long as possible.
+
+_18 April_:
+
+Fuehrer is again calm. He gives orders to Captain von Sternburg in
+a way conforming entirely with our point of view. It might even be
+possible to change last night’s order even more towards a sense of
+holding out and tying down forces.
+
+The situation, too, looks better. The strong shipping losses of the
+English give them something to think about.
+
+Quiet day which does our somewhat strained nerves good.
+
+Sternburg leaves by plane with additional verbal orders.
+
+_1600 hours_: General Jeschonnek shares the opinion we should go to
+Bardufoss. I refuse that. The troops cannot hold out.
+
+Important is * * * of the forces on hand, most important the thorough
+destruction of the railroad.
+
+2. He expresses doubts whether the landing of the 22nd division
+which takes several days still runs satisfactorily in view of the
+preparations in Holland. I emphasize that we have to open for ourselves
+at least the entry into the Southern front of the fortress Holland and
+that we have to keep it open.
+
+_19 April_:
+
+Renewed crisis. Political action has failed. Envoy Braner is recalled;
+since Norway is at war with us, the task of the Foreign Offices is
+finished. According to the Fuehrer’s opinion, force has to be used.
+Gauleiter Terboven is supposed to be put in charge.
+
+Field Marshal works in the same direction; he criticizes that the
+behavior against the civilian population is not energetic enough, that
+it was possible to occupy the electrical plant, that not enough troops
+are brought up by the navy. The Air-Force cannot do everything.
+
+Chief of the Armed Forces High Command leaves room, leadership chaos is
+again threatening, because even details are being overruled from above,
+and all orderly work of the competent military leadership (Navy High
+Command and Gr. XXI) is in vain.
+
+In the evening, Terboven arrives; after supper, the Fuehrer instructs
+him alone. It is doubtful, if it will be possible to limit him to the
+activity of a Civilian Commissar [Zivilkommissar], as I suggest it; we
+will have to talk to him personally.
+
+_20 April_:
+
+Fuehrer’s birthday. Chief of the Armed Forces High Command and the
+Supreme Commanders congratulate. All the tempests have quieted down.
+
+The movements to Oslo and Narvik make progress. No English landings.
+Fuehrer has a discussion with the Field-Marshal, with Himmler,
+Terboven, Reichsleiter Bormann.
+
+Before that, the Chief of the Armed Forces High Command has told the
+Fuehrer about all possible points of friction between an independent
+head of the government and the Military Commander in Norway. It seems
+that reports of the Air Force have induced the Fuehrer to form the
+opinion that the Norwegians are already conducting guerilla warfare and
+sabotage on a large scale. Already on the 19th, I contradicted such
+an opinion. We must not lead the Norwegians to passive or even active
+resistance, because that is precisely the aim of the English, after all.
+
+_21 April_:
+
+Reports about landings on a larger scale near Andalsnes and Namsos
+become more tangible.
+
+On the evening of April 20th, the General [Generaloberst] leads a long
+fight in order to word the text of the order to Terboven in such a way
+that the military necessities are taken into account.
+
+Fuehrer would like to bring big vessel with personnel and materiel to
+Trondheim.
+
+Commander-in-Chief of the Navy considers that to be impossible,
+especially now.
+
+_22 April_:
+
+Fuehrer is increasingly worried about the English landings and
+the consequent impossibility to set up ground communications with
+Trondheim. Without success, I compare the difficult situation of the
+English, who have no usable port and no airdrome at their disposal.
+
+The Field-Marshal somewhat quieter, in view of the good weather
+forecasts for the Air Force today.
+
+_23 April_:
+
+The excitement grows, because the 163d and 196th divisions are making
+small progress towards the North and new bridge demolitions are being
+reported. Fuehrer orders that no more motorized units [11th rifle
+brigade] are to be sent to _Stavanger_, but immediately 2 mountain
+divisions instead. 3rd is to be brought up to full strength again. 4
+ships of the Iller class, in addition a 5000t steamer, later 2 larger
+East Asia boats are to be brought to Bergen convoyed by capital ships,
+in order to make the troops there mobile and ready for battle.
+
+Forces in Narvik to be reorganized right away, in order to make the 3d
+mountain division again steadfast for battle.
+
+No heavy artillery is to go to Norway for ground combat. The heavy
+battalion of the 2nd mountain division remains in the West, those
+of the 3d mountain and 69th division are at the disposal of the
+Commander-in-Chief of the Army.
+
+Fuehrer talks to Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force.
+
+  _a._ Anti-aircraft reinforcements for Stavanger.
+
+  _b._ Bombers for ground fighting in Oslo, Fighters for ground
+       fighting in Oslo.
+
+In the evening Lieutenant-Colonel von Lossberg returns from Oslo. He
+reports the favorable situation in a somewhat schoolmasterly way, but
+does not know any details. He brings along an English battalion order.
+
+_24 April_:
+
+The situation looks much more favorable, a fast advance on the right
+flank is to be expected with mechanized Battalion Goering.
+
+Lieutenant-Colonel Boehme confirms that picture after his return from
+the front. He brings collected orders of the captured English brigade
+detachment along. Very great political success to be anticipated with
+that.
+
+_1130 hours_: Field-Marshal reports, especially the situation in
+Trondheim. Lieutenant-Colonel Boehme, back from the battle field,
+reports favorably, rapid progress. Fuehrer regrets the halting of the
+11th rifle brigade. I refuse to send them again now.
+
+_2300 hours_: Schmundt back, even more favorable news. Boehme brings
+English orders for the entire project of Norway’s occupation by the
+English. Complaint about lack of clear orders in the Air Force.
+
+_25 April_:
+
+Optimistic mood continues. Fuehrer very happy about Schmundt’s
+report and about exact orientation. Talks adversely about Lossberg
+to Bodenschatz; Lossberg’s somewhat braggard report has created
+displeasure, although he did not know any details. Preparation of an
+action on the basis of the orders found on captured Englishmen.
+
+Order to Kraatzer W Pr and Counter Intelligence Bureau for foreign
+countries [Amt Abwehr/Ausland].
+
+Report by Sternberg about his task in Narvik.
+
+Order by me to Chief L to give out a strong directive that nobody but
+Armed Forces High Command will give orders to Gr. Narvik. All men there
+are subordinated General Dietl exclusively.
+
+The Belgian government resigned.
+
+_26 April_:
+
+Suggestion to the Fuehrer to omit naval transport to Bergen with
+battleships and to bring these mobile parts of the 69th Division back
+to Oslo. Italian ambassador Atolico is recalled, because he does not
+take a clear pro-German attitude.
+
+At 1500 hours the Commander-in-Chief of the navy reports.
+
+Fuehrer drops request for transporting troops to Bergen convoyed by
+heavy naval forces.
+
+Commander-in-Chief of the Navy reports that everything which could be
+possibly thought of has been done for the safeguarding of * * * the
+Westwall will be extended * * * Sp * * * solidified.
+
+Major Soltman reports about the interrogation of the Englishmen, and
+delivers additional important documents, among them the secret chain of
+command [Rangliste]. At noon, the first prisoners arrived in Berlin.
+They are being interrogated in the Alexander Barracks and confirm the
+authenticity of the orders. All material is handed over to the Foreign
+Office.
+
+Until 0330 in the Reich Chancellery, where Fuehrer formulates the
+government statement together with Foreign Minister. It will be
+published on the * * *
+
+_27 April_:
+
+Fuehrer voices intention to start with case “Yellow” between 1st and
+7th May. I point out that the Air Force and the Transportation Chief
+have to be initially notified 3 days ahead of time.
+
+Motor column [Mot.Kol.] Fischer gets stuck 100 miles [Km?] south of
+Drontheim in front of many destroyed bridges.
+
+Group (Gr) XXI is crying for engineers and cross-Country motor
+vehicles. They will have to get along with their own engineers. After
+all, there are 19 engineer companies. Order to get all engineers up to
+the front.
+
+_28 April_:
+
+Advance movement direction Drontheim is halting. Nevertheless the
+English are retiring fast according to their communiques.
+
+_29 April_:
+
+Fuehrer decides: Air Force can commit another 2 groups (new) in Norway
+on Tuesday and Wednesday, but must be ready for Yellow on Sunday.
+
+Commander-in-Chief of the Navy commits heaviest flat * * * for the
+safeguarding of * * * [?]
+
+Emden still to be left in Baltic (O), Employ 2 East Asia steamboats for
+Oslo-transport.
+
+Falkenhorst wants his motorized and mountain battalion with engineer
+platoon and battalion brought to Drontheim by air.
+
+Commander-in-Chief of the Army has to be compelled first to set up the
+missing regiment for the 3rd mountain division so rapidly than it can
+roll immediately behind the 2nd mountain division.
+
+Fuehrer is worried about Drontheim and is not quite to be dissuaded yet
+from readying heavy artillery and also the 1st mountain division for
+Norway.
+
+_30 April_:
+
+At 13.35 hours I am able to report to the Fuehrer that line of
+communication on land between Oslo and Drontheim has been established.
+Fuehrer is happy with joy. At noon, I have to sit next to him.
+
+The special communique is released right away. It remains to be decided
+now, whether to keep in readiness the 1st mountain division (no) and
+heavy artillery (no). At 18.30 hours the report comes in that Dombaas
+has been reached, too, and that the enemy is retiring. Opdal on the
+railroad Drontheim-Dombaas has also been occupied. Fuehrer releases
+order of the day to the soldiers in Norway.
+
+_1 May_:
+
+More big successes in Norway on land and in the air.
+
+Fuehrer orders that starting Saturday, May 4th, everything must be in
+readiness to start operations for case Yellow the following day, when
+ordered.
+
+_2 May_:
+
+Victory report from Norway. Pursuit direction Andalsnes. The English
+flee to the boats. Norwegians give up the Commander of Moeren-Romsdal,
+Gen. Hang offers capitulation.
+
+Field Marshall with Kesselring, Jeschonnek, Student, Sponek again
+report about case “Festung” [fortress]. It will be carried out. Landing
+on super-highway possible.
+
+Difficulty is the strong echelonment in depth [Tiefenstaffelung] of the
+bridge position near Moerdyk and north of it.
+
+Air Force is to get order on the 3rd at noon, whether to guide in
+[einweisen] or not to guide in, that whether means to use or not to use
+parachutists and airborne units.
+
+_3 May_:
+
+After evaluation of weather, Fuehrer decides that X-day will not be
+before Monday, 6 May.
+
+Air Force notified by code word “Do not guide in.” [“Nicht einweisen”]
+
+Field Marshal protests against draft of the comprehensive description
+of operations in Norway, where Armed Forces High Command is mentioned
+and where the name Pellengahr appears, but not Milch.
+
+Fuehrer rejects request of the Air Force to set up a listening post
+[Horchstelle] in the Caucasus.
+
+Prepared White Book concerning unneutral actions of Holland and Belgium
+does not seem to satisfy the Foreign Office completely. To my mind the
+material is more than sufficient.
+
+A new order goes out to group XXI, especially as several foreign news
+reports say that Namsos, too, will be evacuated.
+
+Dr. Todt transmits exact details.
+
+_4 May_:
+
+Reports about evacuation of Namsos by the English. Great successes of
+the Air Force against the English fleet. Battleship, heavy cruiser and
+destroyer, in addition to 12000 ton transport sunk.
+
+Fuehrer himself wants to make comprehensive report about the campaign
+in Norway. He is furious about it that people other than himself meddle
+with this reporting. He stated that the Armed Forces High Command is
+his staff. Fuehrer designates Tuesday, May 7th as X-day.
+
+The flanks of Gr. Dietl are being pressed hard in Narvik. I am afraid
+he remains too long in front.
+
+_5 May_:
+
+Field Marshal reports that an English 1500 ton submarine minelayer
+was sighted on the Swedish coast. He makes an onslaught aimed at
+subordinating all Naval Air units under the Commander-in-Chief of the
+Air Force.
+
+Fuehrer has finished justification [Begruendung] for case “Yellow”.
+Wednesday, May 8th, is designated as A-day.
+
+_6 May_:
+
+Detailed orders for May 8th for A-day are issued, and for transmission
+of the code words Augsburg and Danzig.
+
+_7 May_:
+
+Fuehrer railroad train was scheduled to leave Finkenkrug at 16.38 hours.
+
+But weather remains uncertain and therefore, the order valid up to this
+time is rescinded. Next decision May 8th until 1200 hours.
+
+1100 hours: The Field Marshal with Bodenschatz and Jeschonnek at the
+Fuehrer’s.
+
+1500 hours: Admiral of the Fleet [Grossadmiral] Raeder.
+
+Mine damage of the Gneisenau only very insignificant. One destroyer may
+be recalled from Drontheim, as a second one is still ready for sailing.
+
+Fuehrer very much agitated about new postponement, as there is danger
+of treachery particularly in brown leaflets [in braunen Blaettern].
+Talk of the Belgian Envoy to the Vatican to Brussels permits the
+deduction that treason has been committed by a German personality who
+left Berlin for Rome on April 29th.
+
+Fuehrer again emphasizes that the greatest achievement of endurance
+[Dauerleistung] is that of the foot-slogging combat-soldier.
+
+_8 May_:
+
+Alarming news from Holland, canceling of furloughs, evacuations,
+road-blocks, other mobilization measures; according to reports of the
+counterintelligence service the British have asked for permission to
+march in but the Dutch have refused.
+
+According to reports the measures of the Dutch are partly directed
+against the coast and partly against us. It is not possible to obtain
+a clear picture, whether the Dutch don’t work hand in hand with the
+English or whether they actually want to defend their neutrality
+against the first attacker. Evaluation of the weather shows slow
+improvement of the whole situation, but development fog in the next
+days still have to be taken into consideration.
+
+Fuehrer does not want to wait any longer.
+
+Field Marshal wants postponement until the 10th, at least.
+
+Chief of the Armed Forces High Command presses for early action.
+Fuehrer is very agitated; then he consents to postponement until May
+10th, which is against his intuition, as he says. But not one day
+longer. Departure of Envoy Kieritz, who was scheduled to leave at 12.57
+hours is stopped at the last minute. Is not supposed to leave until May
+9th.
+
+In the evening, I arrange the different telegrams with him.
+
+_9 May_:
+
+Fuehrer decides to fall in on May 10th for sure. Departure with Fuehrer
+train at 17.00 hours from Finkenkrug.
+
+After report Jeschonnek that weather situation will be favourable on
+the 10th, the code word Danzig is given at 2100 hours.
+
+The same to Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force.
+
+_10 May_:
+
+Morning arrival in Emskirchen still during darkness. At 0530 hours in
+the Eagle’s nest.
+
+_11-13 May_:
+
+The operations take a course favorable beyond expectation. The Dutch
+offer desperate resistance. Bridges at Maastricht, and all bridges
+north of it, are blown up. Only the railroad bridge at Gemrep falls
+into our hands undamaged. Fort Eben Emael is taken and the bridges
+in Mordeyk south of Dortrecht as well as the important ones over the
+Albert Canal west of Maastricht are taken over by parachutists and
+glider-borne personnel and are held by them. Airborne operation of the
+Sponek Division is met by heaviest resistance and is badly mauled.
+However, the different units hold out. On the R., the junction of the
+9th armored division with them is effected. The citadel of Luettich is
+being broken into.
+
+_14 May_:
+
+Order number 11 issued, which orders the concentration of all armored
+and mechanized units in front of the 4th army.
+
+Holland capitulates.
+
+_16 May_:
+
+Fuehrer insists very much on transfer of all armored and mechanized
+units from Army Group B to A, and on speediest bringing up of strong
+reserves behind the 4th and 12th army. OKH gives orders to pull these
+units out from B and to add them via F ... to the fifteenth corps
+as new Armored Group Hoeppner. According to report Reichau, there
+are indications that the enemy is giving up the Dyle position or its
+Southern part, at least. Therefore, Army High Command receives the
+option to carry out the junction of Armored Group Hoeppner also in
+front of Nanner, which the enemy seems to be evacuating.
+
+Engle reports after visit at 4th army that that army has reached the
+French-Belgian border near Beauchmont, after a heavy tank battle.
+
+_1600-1830 hours_: Field Marshal Goering with the Fuehrer, talk with
+Jeschonnek about forthcoming tasks of the Air Force and intentions
+concerning Narvik, utilizing the new airdrome near * * *
+
+_17 May_:
+
+_18 May_:
+
+Day of great tension. The commander-in-chief of the Army has not
+carried out the intention of building up, as quickly as possible, a
+new flanking position to the South. Instead of turning march to the
+west. For this reason the 10th Armored Division and the 2nd and 29th
+Motorized Divisions are still entrenched in the defensive flanking
+positions.
+
+The commander-in-chief of the Army and General Holdes are called
+immediately and ordered to adopt the necessary measures immediately
+(see note in the files).
+
+Chief of the Armed Forces High Command is flying immediately by plane
+to General Rundstedt at Bastogne.
+
+I further give an order supplementing the previous directive. It veers
+the 1st Mountain Division and the rear echelons of the 4th Army, to the
+South and South-West for an attack.
+
+_19 May_:
+
+_20 May_:
+
+Break-through becomes more and more clearly outlined. True, Army Group
+“B”, respectively Chief are very vexed because their Armored Corps was
+taken away from them, but it was the right thing to do. On the 20th, we
+already have all armored and mechanized divisions, except the 9th one,
+in the middle of the break-through wedge. While we were still afraid on
+the 19th that the bulk of the French-English army might have escaped to
+the South, it becomes increasingly evident on the 20th that more than
+20 divisions are still north of the Somme.
+
+Now everything depends on sealing off the Abbeville gap and the Army
+Corps Kleist reaches it in the evening of the 28th. In the forenoon of
+the 20th, at the Army High Commands conference, the Fuehrer declares
+the new directive for continuation of operations against the French
+Army.
+
+1. Annihilation of the enemy north of the Somme and gaining of the sea
+coast.
+
+2. Sudden thrust forward between Oise and sea, until Seine river is
+reached.
+
+3. Principal Attack on both sides of Reims in south-westerly direction,
+accompanied on the right flank east of Paris by heavy forces.
+
+4. For secondary reasons penetration of the Maginot line by
+lighter forces between St. Avold and Sarreguemines in direction of
+Nancy-Luneville.
+
+General von Stuelpnagel is ordered, not to follow up any more former
+intention, to attack the Plateau of Langres with 20 Italian Divisions
+crossing the Upper Rhine. The Italians rather should attack the French
+Alpine Front and pin down French forces on the Upper Rhine. This they
+can prepare already now, without having commenced hostilities.
+
+Fuehrer is beside himself with joy. Talks in words of highest
+appreciation of the German Army and its leadership. Is working on the
+peace treaty, which shall express the tenor only: Return of territory
+robbed over the past 400 years from the German people, and other values.
+
+First negotiations in the forest of Compiegne like in 1918.
+
+British can get a separate peace any time after restitution of the
+colonies.
+
+A special memorandum of the Chief of the Armed Forces High Command
+containing the emotion-chocked words of the Fuehrer when receiving
+the telephone report of the Commander-in-Chief of the Army about the
+capture of Abbeville, is in the files.
+
+_21 May_:
+
+Commander in Chief of the Army together with Halder reports at 09.45
+about situations and later intentions. The Commander-in-Chief of the
+Army wants to operate by-passing Paris on the West with the entire
+Armored and mechanized units under Reichman’s command, and in addition
+to this to attack with he wants to attack the Upper Rhine with 18
+divisions. This would change the intentions of the Fuehrer, expressed
+by him on the 20th. Fuehrer declares his agreement for the time being.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+In the afternoon the Fuehrer explains to Chief of the Armed Forces High
+Command and to me, that he had changed his mind. He believes, that it
+is wrong to employ all Armed and Mechanized Divisions West of Paris,
+that it would be better to direct the main thrust, also with the bulk
+of Armored Forces, to by-pass Paris in the east (transmitted by me to
+Greifenberg in the evening).
+
+Report of Commander-in-Chief of the Navy to Fuehrer at 1200 hours. In
+the afternoon Field Marshal and Jeschonnek.
+
+The Fuehrer is a little nervous in the evening about the fact, that
+infantry divisions are not pushed forward fast enough. Possibly they
+are being held back in order to obtain improvements of position of the
+VIth and VIIth Corps. If possible, one must employ transport groups.
+
+Fuehrer stays in map room until 0130 hours.
+
+_22 May_:
+
+Chief of the Armed Forces High Command decides after that to fly to
+Army Group A in Charleville early on the 22nd. Brings back a report
+much more pleasant than the situation map indicates. It becomes
+apparent that Headquarters of 4th Army has ordered General Kluge to
+commit the 1st Army Corps south of Sombre, so that it will be in front
+rather than in the rear of the French border fortifications.
+
+The Fuehrer approves at 1300 hours directive, submitted by me,
+concerning sparing of human lives of the 10th Army by disengagement
+from the Maginot line, cessation of unnecessary attacks, bringing up of
+all Divisions and mobile GHQ troops to the rear of 4th Army.
+
+Sharp pressure of Army Group B towards the West. The Fuehrer
+furthermore approves commitment of an airborne Battalion already in
+readiness and of 2 companies Mountain troops, with short training, in
+Narvik.
+
+Army High Command draws a very optimistic picture of the situation at
+1700 hours and intends to continue at 1200 hours on left wing West of
+Arras towards North.
+
+But Jeschonnek reports at 1900 hours, that French tanks reached point
+3 kilometer in front of Arras and were stopped only there by dive
+bombers, pursuit planes and Anti Aircraft Artillery.
+
+_24 May_:
+
+The Fuehrer flies together with me and Schmundt to Army Group A to
+Charleville.
+
+He is very happy about the measures of the Army Group, which correspond
+entirely with his ideas. He learns to his surprise that the Army High
+Command, without informing the Fuehrer and the High Command of the
+Armed Forces, has subordinated the 4th Army and a number of Divisions
+to its rear, to Army Group B. Fuehrer is very much displeased and
+thinks this regulation is a mistake not only in military respect but
+also psychologically wrong. Commander-in-Chief of the Army is ordered
+to report, and shifting of dividing-line is rescinded. New crisis
+of confidence, especially since Field Marshal reports earlier that
+an order of the Army High Command in no way pushes the Army Group B
+onward, but even invites it to make available reserves that can be
+spared.
+
+For that reason a new order is issued in the evening (a) not to advance
+beyond the line Sandez-St.Omer-Graveline towards the East. Besides that
+each change regarding the Chain of command among the Armies is subject
+to approval of the Fuehrer.
+
+The Fuehrer signs Order #13 regarding continuation of operations.
+
+He prohibits the proposed talk by General von Melsch in the Foreign
+Office to foreign journalists about the war situation, if necessary
+this shall be done by W PR [Armed Forces Propaganda?]
+
+Very favorable report of the Commander in Chief of the Air Force and
+the Commander in Chief of the Army about the situation.
+
+It becomes obvious, that the surrounded enemy is no longer capable of
+concerted action.
+
+Situation in the East becomes threatening because of Russian
+concentration of forces against Bessarabia.
+
+_25 May_:
+
+In the morning the Commander-in-Chief of the Army arrived and asks
+permission armored mechanized division to push forward from the High
+terrain Vimy-St.Omer-Graveline towards in the West into the level
+terrain. Fuehrer is against it, leaves decision to Army Group A. They
+decline for the time being because tank, shall rest a while, to be
+ready for tasks in the South.
+
+At noon, Commander of 22 Divisions (Parachute Divisions) Count Sponek,
+reports about his experiences between the Hague and Rotterdam. He had
+heavy losses, but accomplished the incredible.
+
+Air Force reports great successes near Narvik.
+
+The unlimited expansion plan of the SS causes general apprehension.
+Lutz protests in a letter to the General [Generaloberst] against
+mentioning of the Armed-SS [Waffen-SS] in Armed forces High Command
+communiques. But this came from the Fuehrer in a proclamation to the
+troops in the Dutch theater of operations. General Dietl has received
+parachuted mountain troops in Narvik after a course of training lasting
+only 10 days, no losses.
+
+_26 May_:
+
+In the morning the Fuehrer sends for Commander-in-Chief of the Army
+and agrees because 18th and 6th army advance slowly and because,
+resistance in the South in front of the 2nd Army Corps has stiffened,
+that tank units and infantry divisions push forward in direction of
+Tournai, Cassel and Dunkerque from the West, especially because the
+enemy on their part do not advance against the mountain positions but
+dig themselves in defensive positions and improve them. In conjunction
+therewith the Commander-in-Chief of the Army reports about his
+intentions for further conduct of the operations (All sketch). Of the
+12 Divisions, committed for the first push northwest of Paris, 6 shall
+join Army Group B (9th and 4th Army). First push possible around 31
+May. 2nd push 6 to 8 days later (Main attack A and B), 3rd push at C
+will be in readiness starting 15 June.
+
+The problem Paris is to be considered, not only from a military, but
+also from a political point of view.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+If Paris is surrendered or if revolutionary features come to the fore,
+then Paris must be occupied at once. If Paris is defended, we will
+strongly disengage ourselves for the time being.
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1814-PS
+
+                     ORGANIZATION BOOK OF THE NSDAP
+
+                    Editions of 1936, 1938 and 1940.
+
+  Editor, the Reich Organization Leader of the NSDAP (Dr. Robert Ley).
+   Published by the Central Publishing House of the NSDAP, Franz Eher
+                    Successor, Munich. Pages 86-88.
+
+     THE ORGANIZATION OF THE NSDAP AND ITS AFFILIATED ASSOCIATIONS
+
+The Party was created by the Fuehrer out of the realization that if
+our people were to live and advance towards an era of prosperity they
+had to be led according to an ideology suitable for our race. They
+must have as supporters men above average, that means, men who surpass
+others in self-control, discipline, efficiency, and greater judgment.
+The party will therefore always constitute a minority, the order of the
+National Socialist ideology which comprises the leading elements of our
+people.
+
+Therefore the party comprises only fighters, at all times prepared
+to assume and to give everything for the furtherance of the National
+Socialist ideology. Men and women whose primary and most sacred duty is
+to serve the people.
+
+The NSDAP as the leading element of the German people control the
+entire public life, from an organizational point of view, as well as
+from that of affiliates, the organizations of the State administration,
+and so forth.
+
+In the long run it will be impossible to let leaders retain responsible
+offices if they have not been recognized by the Party.
+
+Furthermore, the party shall create the prerequisites for a systematic
+selection of potential “Fuehrers”.
+
+The reconstruction of the National Socialist organizational structure
+itself is demonstrated by the observation of the following principles:
+
+  The Fuehrer Principle.
+
+  The subordination and coordination within the structure of the entire
+    organization.
+
+  The regional unity.
+
+  The expression of the practical community thought.
+
+
+I. FUEHRER PRINCIPLE [Fuehrerprinzip]
+
+The Fuehrer Principle requires a pyramidal organization structure in
+its details as well as in its entirety.
+
+The Fuehrer is at the top.
+
+He nominates the necessary leaders for the various spheres of work of
+the Reich’s direction, the Party apparatus and the State administration.
+
+Thus a clear picture of the tasks of the party is given.
+
+The Party is the order of “Fuehrers”. It is furthermore responsible for
+the spiritual-ideological National Socialist direction of the German
+people. The right to organize people for their own sake emanates from
+these reasons.
+
+This also justifies the subordination to the party of the organizations
+concerned with the welfare of the people, besides the inclusion of
+people in the affiliates of the party, the SA, SS, NSKK, the Hitler
+Youth, the NS Womanhood, the NS German Student Association and the NS
+German “Dozentenbund” [University teachers association].
+
+This is where the National Socialist Fuehrer structure becomes more
+strongly apparent.
+
+Every single affiliate is cared for by an office of the NSDAP.
+
+The leadership of the individual affiliates is appointed by the Party.
+
+The Reich Organization Leader [Reichsorganisationsleiter] of the NSDAP
+is simultaneously leader of the DAF. The NSBO is the organization
+bearer of the DAF.
+
+The Leader of the Head-Office for Public Welfare also handles within
+the “Personalunion” the National Socialist Welfare and the Winter
+Relief.
+
+The same applies to:
+
+  The Reich Justice Office [Reichsrechtsamt] for the NS
+    “Rechtswahrerbund”,
+
+  The head office for public health for the NS. German Medical
+    Association,
+
+  The head office for educators for the NS Teachers Association,
+
+  The head office for civil servants for the Reich Association of Civil
+    Servants,
+
+  The head office for war victims for the NS. War Victim Relief,
+
+  The head office for technology for the NS. Association of German
+    Technology.
+
+The Racial Political Office handles the Reich Association of families
+with many children, the NS Womanhood [Frauenschaft] and the “Deutches
+Frauenwerk”.
+
+The Reich Office for agrarian politics of the NSDAP remains furthermore
+in closest touch with the “Reichnaehrstand” [Reich Nutrition Office]
+which is anchored in the State. Direct handling and personal contact of
+the leaders is also provided in this manner.
+
+All attached affiliates, as well as the offices of the Party, have
+their foundation, in the same manner as in the Reich direction, in the
+sovereign territories, in the “Gaue” and furthermore in the districts
+(Kreise) and if required in the local groups of the NSDAP. This applies
+also to cells and blocks in the case of the NS Womanhood, the DAF,
+and the NSV. The members of the attached affiliates will be included
+in local administrations, respectively district sectors or district
+comradeships which correspond geographically to local groups of the
+Party.
+
+
+II. FUEHRER PRINCIPLE. SUBORDINATION AND COORDINATION WITHIN THE TOTAL
+ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE
+
+The Fuehrer structure would be split, though, if all subdivisions,
+including attached affiliates were completely independent in their
+structure from the smallest unit up to the “Reichsfuehrung” and were
+they to come only at the top directly under the Fuehrer.
+
+Like a four-story building, if we consider the four Sovereign
+territories [Reich, Gau, etc.] whose pillars and walls go up to the
+roof without having supporting joists (wooden stays) or connections
+on the various floors. Furthermore, it would not be reconcilable with
+the Fuehrer principle, which assumes complete responsibility, to
+assume that the Leader of a subdivision, as well as of an affiliated
+organization, would be in the position to guarantee beyond a
+professional and factual responsibility the political and ideological
+attitude of _all_ the sub-leaders down to the smallest unit on the
+basis of his Reich leadership. The total independence of individual
+organizations would necessitate furthermore, the creation of an
+organizational, personal and educational apparatus for each one of
+them. This, in turn, would create eventually, in spite of the best will
+of the responsible “Reichsleiters” [Reich Leaders], central offices and
+office leaders in the Reich Leadership [Reichsfuehrung] of the party,
+differences in the various organizations. Those differences would
+later on of necessity take the shape of completely different systems
+in regional, vertical, and personal respects, etc. within the National
+Socialist regime.
+
+The Subdivisions NS German Student Association, NS Womanhood
+Association, NSD [Dozentenbund] and the affiliates and their leaders
+come therefore under the authority of the competent sovereign leaders
+of the NSDAP. At the same time their structure is professionally
+effectuated from the bottom up and they are subordinated to their
+immediately superior organization in the sovereign divisions of the
+Party, from a disciplinary point of view, that is to say insofar as
+organization, ideology, politics, supervision and personal questions
+are concerned.
+
+Thus a solid anchorage for all the organizations within the party
+structure is provided and a firm connection with the sovereign leaders
+of the NSDAP is created in accordance with the Fuehrer Principle.
+
+[In the 1943 edition the text remains the same, but the topical
+sentences “I. Fuehrer Principle” and “II. Fuehrer Principle.
+Subordination and Coordination within the Total Organizational
+Structure” are changed to “I. Construction of the Organization” and
+“II. Subordination and Coordination within the Total Organizational
+Structure”.]
+
+
+                                 PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1815-PS
+
+                                                      Berlin 12 May 1941
+
+  R.S.H.A.
+  IV B I
+  To all Staatspolizei-leit-stellen
+
+  _For information_:
+      The SD-Leit-Abschnitten
+      The Inspekteuren der Sipo/SD
+
+  Concerning: The Study and Treatment of Church Politics
+
+The Chief of the R.S.H.A. has issued an order, which is to come into
+immediate operation, in which the Sipo and SD Study and Treatment
+of Church Politics, which has hitherto been divided between the
+SD-Abschnitte and Stapostellen, shall now be taken over entirely by
+the Stapostellen. (See the plan for the division of work issued by
+the R.S.H.A. on 1.3.41. In addition to combatting opposition, the
+Stapostellen thus take over the entire ‘Gegnernachrichtendienst’ in
+this sphere.)
+
+In order that the Stapostellen should be in a position to take
+over this work, the Chief of the Sipo/SD has ordered that ‘Church
+Specialists’ hitherto employed in the SD-Abschnitten, should be
+temporarily transferred to the same posts at Stapostellen, and operate
+the Nachrichtendienst (Intelligence Service in the Church Political
+Sphere) there.
+
+On the orders of the Chief of the R.S.H.A., and after reaching
+agreement with the heads of Amts III, II, and I, these ‘Church
+Specialists’ specified in the attached lists will thus be transferred
+from the SD-Abschnitten to the Stapostellen, quoted. Further
+instructions for transference or removal will be issued by Amt. I.
+Those Stapostellen which are unable to obtain any SD-‘Specialists’ must
+immediately train those of their specialists who appear most suitable
+for Nachrichtendienst work.
+
+The Chief of the R.S.H.A. has furthermore ordered that
+‘Nachrichtendienst’ files concerning Church Political Opposition,
+hitherto the property of the SD-Abschnitte should be handed over to
+the Stapostellen. However, material concerning Confessional influence
+on the lives of the people is to remain with the SD-Abschnitten. In
+doubtful cases the Stapostellen are to be given an opportunity of
+making copies or photostats of these reports.
+
+Since it is essential that in this particular sphere the opposition
+should be kept under constant observation, with no possibility
+of loopholes, I am endeavoring to ensure that the change-over in
+organization should take place immediately.
+
+On I.VI.1941 all Stapostellen are to send in reports on the completion
+of the actual change-over of organization, and, at the same time, draw
+up a list of personnel, giving the names of those ‘Specialists’ who,
+after the reorganization, are doing executive work in the Stapostellen,
+and of those who are conducting the intelligence proper of the
+Nachrichtendienst.
+
+I then intend, at the end of June, to summon all these specialists to
+a conference [Arbeitstagung] in Berlin, at which they will receive
+important instructions for the carrying-out of their work.
+
+                                                          Signed Mueller
+                                          Beglaubigt: Kanzleiangestellte
+
+       #       #       #       #       #
+
+                                                        Berlin 14.8.1941
+
+  R.S.H.A.
+  IV B
+  To all Stapo-leit-stellen
+
+  _Information_: From the Inspectors of the Sipo/SD
+
+  _Concerning_: Conference of the Specialists in Church Affairs
+    [Kirchenbearbeiter] attached to the Stapostellen.
+
+On 22d and 23d of September 1941 a Conference for Church Specialists
+attached to Stapo-leit-stellen will take place in the Lecture-Hall of
+the Stapoamt, Prinz-Albrechtstrasse 8, Berlin SW II. Date of arrival:
+21.9.41. Uniform: Brownshirt and trousers worn with jackboots.
+
+I leave it to the heads of the Stapo-leit-stellen as to whether they
+send those officials responsible for the entire ‘Kirchenbearbeitung’
+(Treatment and Study of Church Politics) to this conference, or
+officials in charge of both the executive and intelligence branches
+(SD-members). In each case those taking part in the conference must
+have their names sent in before 10.9.1941, in order that accommodation
+may be found for them. Billeting forms will be issued on arrival in
+Berlin on the 21st at the Stapoamt Watchroom, Room I. Passes are to
+be given up at the entrance of the lecture-hall at the opening of the
+conference at 9 hrs.--22.9.41.
+
+                                                                Heydrich
+                                          Beglaubigt: Kanzleiangestellte
+
+       #       #       #       #       #
+
+                                                  Aachen, 8 October 1941
+
+     Report of Hammes on Conference dated 8 October 1941 at Aachen
+
+       _Notes on the Conference of Church Specialists attached to
+                          Stapo-leit-stellen_
+
+On the 22d and 23d September 1941 a Conference of Church Specialists
+attached to Stapo-leit-stellen was held in the Lecture-Hall of the
+R.S.H.A. in Berlin, in which 141 Specialists took part.
+
+I. _On 22.9.1941_
+
+1. The latest developments in the Church Political situation, and our
+outstanding tasks at this moment--SS-Stubaf. Hartl.
+
+2. Sipo measures for combating the Political Church and
+Sects--Regierungsrat Rotu & Reg. Ass. Harnensbruch.
+
+3. Nachrichtendienst tasks in the conflict with Political Catholicism
+in the Reich--SS-Ostuf. Kunze.
+
+4. Vatican world-politics, and our Nachrichtendienst
+tasks--SS-Untersturmfuehrer Jakobs.
+
+II. _On 23.9.1941_
+
+5. Present conditions within the German Protestant
+Church--SS-Obersturmfuehrer Stiller.
+
+6. Treatment of the Sect problem, and the combating of
+Sects--SS-Hauptscharfuehrer Ehrhardt.
+
+7. World-Protestantism and the Oxford Movement--Nachrichtendienst work
+evolving from these subjects--SS-Obersturmfuehrer Stiller.
+
+8. The problem of the Church in the Eastern regions, and
+Nachrichtendienst measures--SS-Untersturmfuehrer Wandesleben.
+
+9. The present Nachrichtendienst problem of
+Freemasonry--SS-Hauptsturmfuehrer Kolrep.
+
+10. Summary of the most important points in the treatment of Church
+Political opposition--SS-Sturmbannfuehrer Hartl.
+
+In the absence of SS-Obergruppenfuehrer Heydrich, the Conference was
+opened by SS-Brigadefuehrer Mueller, who, after a short speech of
+welcome, and introduction handed over to the first lecturer. The most
+important lectures--those under I, items 2 and 3, have been noted down
+and filed.
+
+The main aim and object of the conference has been to familiarize the
+specialists as thoroughly as possible with their material, and, by
+stimulating their interest, enable them to fulfill their duties to the
+best of their ability.
+
+Nothing of great moment came to light in the discussions. Finally
+SS-Stub. Hartl, also deputizing for the absent Heydrich, summed up the
+most important points in the treatment of Church Political affairs. He
+summarized the culminating points as follows:
+
+1. Avoidance of all sweeping measures and actions against the Church
+and its establishments.
+
+2. Suspension of measures taken against monasteries/convents, including
+“camouflaged” measures of this type.
+
+3. Action is still to be taken as before in individual cases, but the
+R.S.H.A. is to be informed in each case. In particularly serious cases
+the decision of the Fuehrer will be sought.
+
+4. Above all it must be ensured that the Church does not win back any
+lost ground. We must see to it that we retain any position won.
+
+5. The greatest importance is to be attached to Church Political
+activity. Any material that is of the slightest significance, or could
+become of significance, is to be carefully examined. On the Fuehrer’s
+instructions photostats are to be made of all documents seized, and
+other material of this type, as in such cases duplicate copies are in
+no way sufficient for the introduction of decisive measures.
+
+The “Nachrichtennetz” is to be fostered with the greatest of care, and
+enlarged through the recruitment of new V-Personen. Particular value is
+attached to contacts between Church circles and “Staatsstellen.”
+
+The lecturer closed with the following words:
+
+Each one of you must go to work with your whole heart and a true
+fanaticism. Should a mistake or two be made in the execution of this
+work, this should in no way discourage you, since mistakes are made
+everywhere. The main thing is that the enemy should be constantly
+tackled with determination, will, and effective initiative.
+
+                                                          Signed: HEINZE
+                                                      Kriminal-Secretaer
+
+                                                          Signed: HAMMES
+                                               Kriminal-Kommissar z. Pr.
+
+       #       #       #       #       #
+
+                                               Aachen, 26 September 1941
+
+    Report of Regierungsrat Roth’s speech before Conference dated 26
+                             September 1941
+
+ _Sicherheitspolizei measures for combating Church Politics and Sects_
+
+While describing the aim and methods of the Political Church in its
+oppositional activities, the executive measures which, in accordance
+with the Concordat, are at the disposal of the Stapo, were discussed.
+
+a. Punishable offences and infringements of the law by members
+of the Church are to be submitted to the Kripo for processing.
+Nachrichtendienst evaluation, and the compiling of evidence for a final
+breakdown is the responsibility of the Stapo.
+
+b. It has been demonstrated that it is impracticable to deal with
+political offences (malicious) under normal legal procedure. Owing to
+the lack of political perception which still prevails among the legal
+authorities, suspension of this procedure must be reckoned with. The
+so-called “Agitator-Priests” must therefore be dealt with in future
+by Stapo measures, and, if the occasion arises, be removed to a
+Concentration Camp, if agreed upon by the RSHA.
+
+c. Offences and crimes against the “Sammlungsgesetz” [Order to
+contribute to Party Funds] and the “Flaggenerlass” [Order to beflag
+Churches etc.,] come under normal procedure. [A penciled note states
+that this is not always so, and that it depends on the case in
+question.]
+
+d. The necessary executive measures are to be decided upon according to
+local conditions, the status of the person accused, and the seriousness
+of the case--as follows:
+
+1. Warnung (Warning)
+
+2. Sicherungsgeld (Fine)
+
+3. Redeverbot (Forbidden to preach)
+
+4. Aufenthaltsverbot (Forbidden to remain in parish)
+
+5. Betaetigungsverbot (Forbidden all activity as a Priest)
+
+6. Kurzfristige Festnahme (Short-term arrest)
+
+7. Schutzhaft (Protective custody)
+
+The instructions for the application of individual measures are known.
+The following points must be remembered:
+
+_The Aufenthaltsverbot_ (Forbidden to remain in parish) is very much
+feared by all the clergy. In one case a Vicar-General appealed to the
+RSHA for the lifting of the ban, and begged that they would rather
+place the priest under short-term arrest. The “Aufenthaltsverbot” is
+to be enforced in any case where the continued stay of the priest in
+his former parish is likely to bring about dissension and disquiet
+among the population. It should be applied, for instance, in the event
+of a priest returning from arrest, in order to prevent him from being
+feted as a martyr. Care must be taken that the measure is only enforced
+where really expedient (encumbering of another Stapostelle).
+
+_Redeverbot_ (Forbidden to preach) is intended chiefly as a measure
+against itinerant preachers, and will only be brought against
+residential ones when they exceed their normal offices as priests, and
+preach much injurious matter.
+
+_Betaetigungsverbot_ (Forbidden all activities as a priest) has not yet
+been applied, but is possible.
+
+_Schutzhaft_ (Protective custody). As already stated, in accordance
+with the Order issued by the RSHA on 24.8.36 the “Agitator Priest” is
+to be taken into long-term imprisonment. The technical execution of
+this lies in the hands of the Referat IV C 2, while it is IV B I’s
+responsibility to present the charges.
+
+Actions against societies are not at the moment possible as a
+widespread State measure. However, in cases where the Society has
+been involved in anti-state activity, or appears superfluous or
+undesirable, local measures may be applied. Small funds/properties
+may be liquidated. Funds may also be handed over to the NSV. In cases
+of activities against the State the only method is confiscation of
+funds. Proposals for “Declaration of Enmity to People and State” with
+the object of confiscation of property, are principally to be directed
+to the RSHA, which works nonexecutively, and directs the necessary
+negotiations with the MdI.
+
+_Monasteries/Convents._ It is not expected at the present that
+they will be declared as hostile to the State. During the process
+of “Dissolution” it should be remembered that the Law of 10.2.36
+suffices as a legal basis for the disposal. It is not essential that
+the Order of 28.2.33 should be quoted, and it will only be brought
+up if the Stapo measures are to come under “legal justification”
+(Betaetigungsverbot 4).
+
+_Actions against Monasteries/Convents._ About 100 monasteries in the
+Reich have been dissolved. Various incidents which may be traced back
+to bad tactical procedure by Stapo officials, have led to disagreeable
+consequences. Should the inmates of the monasteries put questions
+to the appointed officials, those officials must refer them to the
+Aktionsleiter [officer in charge of the proceedings].
+
+Churches are to be seized at the same time, but, if possible, should
+not be closed. As long as the confiscation is not absolute, any
+action which interferes with property, or causes any alteration to it
+should be avoided. The principle to be followed during the period of
+“Sicherstellung” is that life should go on within the framework of an
+ordered administration.
+
+Further points made were:
+
+Retreats, recreational organizations, etc., may now be forbidden on
+grounds of industrial war-needs, whereas formerly only a worldly
+activity could be given as a basis.
+
+Youth camps, recreational camps are to be forbidden on principle.
+Church organizations in the evening may be prevented on grounds of the
+black-out regulations.
+
+Processions, pilgrimages abroad are to be forbidden by reason of the
+overburdened transport conditions. For local events too technical
+traffic troubles and the danger of air attack may serve as grounds for
+their prohibition (one Referent forbade a procession, on the grounds of
+it wearing out shoe leather).
+
+There are no new regulations regarding the despatch of Confessional
+literature to the troops, and the restrictions on Confessional
+publications.
+
+Visas are always to be denied where the applicant cannot offer the
+excuse that he will dedicate himself unreservedly to working for the
+Fatherland while abroad. There are, however, possible exceptions. In
+principle the intention still holds good, that no foreign priest should
+enter the Reich, and that no German priest should travel abroad, above
+all, not to the “Aufbaugebiet.”
+
+In the meantime the Church Ministry has adopted the view of the
+RSHA, in which it was decided that Polish civilian workers and
+prisoners-of-war must definitely be separated at Services.
+
+The RSHA requests that questions of policy should be submitted to
+them, but that, on the other hand, they should not be bothered with
+unnecessary inquiries. Above all, definite proposals on how to handle
+the case in question should always be given, and not just requests for
+direction or decision.
+
+The immediate aim: The Church must not regain one inch of the ground it
+has lost.
+
+The ultimate aim. Destruction of the Confessional Churches to be
+brought about by the collection of all material obtained through
+Nachrichtendienst activities, which will, at a given time, be produced
+as evidence for the charge of treasonable activities during the German
+fight for existence.
+
+                                                          Signed: HAMMES
+                                                Kriminal-Kommissar z.Pr.
+
+       #       #       #       #       #
+
+                                 SECRET
+
+Excerpt from Note 16 concerning the Conference held by the Inspector in
+                Dusseldorf on 23.9.41. (Pp. 26, 27, 28.)
+
+14. _Cooperation between Stapo/and SD in the sphere of Church Politics_
+
+The study and treatment of the efforts of the Catholic Church in its
+opposition to the present State is, from both a communication and
+executive angle, the responsibility of the Stapo (‘Gegnerbekampfung’).
+The treatment of the efforts of the Church, and their repercussions in
+the sphere of ‘religious life’ is, however, the task of the SD.
+
+From this it can be seen that a close cooperation in the future within
+the sphere of the “Catholic Church” is especially necessary. It is the
+duty of the Stapostellen to inform the SD-Abschnitte of any general
+points to be observed during the course of ‘Gegnerbekampfung,’ in order
+that the SD-Abschnitte can evaluate these facts from a religious angle.
+The SD-Abschnitte are to inform the Stapostellen of any observations
+which might be of assistance to them in their fight against the church
+as an opponent of the State. Gegnerbekampfung and research in the
+religious sphere must go hand in hand. The SD-Abschnitte must hand
+over to the Stapostellen those V-Maenner who are working entirely,
+or for the greater part, in ‘Gegnerbekampfung.’ However, if mutually
+agreed upon, the SD-Abschnitte, who may still have a certain claim on
+these V-Maenner by virtue of their work in the religious sphere, may
+retain one or another of them to contribute work in this sphere. It
+is desirable, however, that the appropriate official attached to the
+Stapostelle should start taking over the direction of the V-Maenner by
+stages as soon as possible.
+
+The Inspector has asked for a general ruling from RSHA concerning the
+direction of the ‘Kirchenreferat’ by the Stapo offices, and at the same
+time expressed the opinion that it was not absolutely essential that
+the responsibility of this should rest principally on the executive
+officials. The RSHA has made a corresponding decision in which it
+shall be left to the Stapoleiter in every individual case to choose
+who should be entrusted with the general direction and control of the
+‘Kirchenreferat.’ It is therefore up to the Stapo leader [leiter] to
+decide, by the efficiency of his work, who is the more capable, and to
+appoint him head of the Referat. (Order of the Chief of Sipo/SD 18.9.41
+IV B.) The Inspector is to be informed as soon as possible of the
+subsequent decision.
+
+       #       #       #       #       #
+
+                                                 Berlin, 22 October 1941
+
+  Reichssicherheitshauptamt IV B 1--2744/41 g
+  _To all Stapostellen_
+  _For information to_:
+
+  a. The Fuehrers of all SD-(Leit) Abschnitte
+
+  b. To all Inspectors of the Sipo/SD
+
+  c. To the “Befehlshaber der Sipo/SD in Generalgouvernement KRAKAU”
+
+  d. To the “Kommandeure der Sipo/SD--KRAKAU, LUBLIN, RADOM, WARSCHAU.”
+
+  _Concerning_: Present Conditions within the Organization of the
+    Catholic Church.
+
+_Enclosure_: 1 Report.
+
+_Minute_
+
+I am inclosing a report on the present position of the Organization of
+the Catholic Church. This report is designed to serve as a basis for:
+
+a. The education of the appropriate Specialist.
+
+b. To aid “Nachrichtendienst” activity.
+
+The following directions must be followed concerning Nachrichtendienst
+activity:
+
+1. If at all possible to verify that Bishops are using the papal
+nunciate courier to deliver their report to Rome, and vice versa, we
+should be informed.
+
+2. It should be found out which priests, members of Holy Orders, and
+Laymen are used by the Bishops to bring their reports to and from Rome.
+Wherever possible, attempts should be made to intercept this method of
+reporting through V-Maenner.
+
+3. If possible, the reports submitted to Rome every 5 years should be
+intercepted, especially when an opportunity arises in connection with
+Stapo action.
+
+4. Where tension is known to exist between Bishops, the Bishop and
+Nuncio, or the Bishops and the “Instanzen” subordinate to them, this is
+to be utilized for Nachrichten purposes.
+
+5. Since there are at the moment 13 Arch- and Bishoprics vacant in
+Greater Germany, efforts must be made to obtain the lists of Bishop
+candidates.
+
+6. If not already known, it must be found out with what particular
+department the individual Bishops are concerned, under the aegis of
+the Bishops Fulda Conference. Those Stapostellen in whose area there
+is a Bishop entrusted with special duties--(The Bishop of Berlin with
+Press work, the Bishop of Mainz with “Jugendseelsorge,” the Archbishop
+of Freiburg with charity work, the Bishop of Passau with work
+connected with the Church in the Eastern regions ... etc. ...) have
+Nachrichtendienst tasks of especial Reich importance.
+
+7. Points discussed during the Diocesan Synodes are to be obtained
+wherever possible, and should be immediately submitted to IV B 1 at the
+R.S.H.A.
+
+8. The following directive is given for local Nachrichtendienst
+activity--
+
+a. In every case where a Sachbearbeiter attached to a Stapostelle has
+an Archbishopric in his area, he must have a thorough knowledge of the
+particular sphere of work in which the individual Referenten of the
+appropriate Ordinarists are engaged.
+
+b. The Episcopal Chancery is of particular importance within the
+Episcopal Ordinariat. Similarly, and especially in the case of an
+“Action,” the diocesan archives and the Episcopal secret archives are
+of especial significance.
+
+c. The Deans are of particular importance to Aussenstellen, since
+they are described as the eyes and ears of the Bishop. Should the
+opportunity arise, the yearly reports which they have to submit to the
+Bishop, should be obtained and evaluated locally.
+
+d. In order to ensure that the Nachrichtendienst organization is as
+comprehensive as possible, an all-embracing Nachrichtennetz should be
+spread among the more insignificant members of the clergy.
+
+9. It must be discovered which of those members of Orders, and priests
+of German origin are employed in important posts at the Vatican--other
+than those named in the report; we must be immediately informed of this.
+
+10. The Specialists of the individual Stapo(leit)stellen have to
+extract the names of those Papal “Protonotare,” Chamberlains, Prelates,
+and Chaplains who are officiating in their districts, and devote extra
+attention to them in the course of their Nachrichtendienst duties.
+Especial watch must be kept in order to discover to what extent they
+are employed as “agents” to and from the Vatican.
+
+11. Reports are also to be submitted on those theological students
+destined for Papal Institutes, and Priests returning from such
+institutes to Germany. Should the opportunity arise of placing someone
+for Nachrichtendienst purposes in one of these institutes, in the guise
+of a theological student, we should receive immediate notification.
+
+                                                        Signed: Heydrich
+                                                     Attested: KLANN [?]
+                                                       Chancellery Clerk
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1816-PS
+
+ STENOGRAPHIC REPORT OF THE MEETING ON “THE JEWISH QUESTION” UNDER THE
+     CHAIRMANSHIP OF FIELD MARSHALL GOERING IN THE REICHS AIR FORCE
+
+                     (12 November 1938--11 o’clock)
+
+
+                                 Part I
+
+_Goering_: Gentlemen! Today’s meeting is of a decisive nature. I have
+received a letter written on the Fuehrer’s orders by the Stabsleiter of
+the Fuehrer’s deputy Bormann, requesting that the Jewish question be
+now, once and for all, coordinated and solved one way or another. And
+yesterday once again did the Fuehrer request by phone for me to take
+coordinated action in the matter.
+
+Since the problem is mainly an economic one, it is from the economic
+angle that it shall have to be tackled. Naturally a number of legal
+measures shall have to be taken which fall into the sphere of the
+Minister for Justice and into that of the Minister of the Interior;
+and certain propaganda measures shall be taken care of by the Minister
+for Propaganda. The Minister for Finance and the Minister for Economic
+Affairs shall take care of problems falling in their respective resorts.
+
+In the meeting, in which we first talked about this question and came
+to the decision to aryanize German economy, to take the Jew out of it,
+and put him into our debit ledger, was one in which, to our shame, we
+only made pretty plans, which were executed very slowly. We then had a
+demonstration, right here in Berlin, we told the people that something
+decisive would be done, but again nothing happened. We have had this
+affair in Paris now, more demonstrations followed and this time
+something decisive must be done!
+
+Because, gentlemen, I have enough of these demonstrations! They don’t
+harm the Jew but me, who is the last authority for coordinating the
+German economy.
+
+If today, a Jewish shop is destroyed, if goods are thrown into
+the street, the insurance company will pay for the damages, which
+the Jew does not even have; and furthermore goods of the consumer
+goods belonging to the people, are destroyed. If in the future,
+demonstrations which are necessary, occur, then, I pray, that they be
+directed, so as not to hurt us.
+
+Because it’s insane to clean out and burn a Jewish warehouse then have
+a German insurance company make good the loss. And the goods which
+I need desperately, whole bales of clothing and what-not, are being
+burned; and I miss them everywhere.
+
+I may as well burn the raw materials before they arrive. The people of
+course, do not understand that; therefore we must make laws which will
+show the people once and for all, that something is being done.
+
+I should appreciate it very much if for once, our propaganda would make
+it clear that it is unfortunately not the Jew who has to suffer in all
+this, but the German insurance companies.
+
+I am not going to tolerate a situation in which the insurance companies
+are the ones who suffer. Under the authority invested in me, I shall
+issue a decree, and I am, of course, requesting the support of the
+competent Government agencies, so that everything shall be processed
+through the right channels and the insurance companies will not be the
+ones who suffer.
+
+It may be, though, that these insurance companies may have insurance
+in foreign countries. If that is the case, foreign bills of exchange
+would be available which I would not want to lose. That shall have to
+be checked. For that reason, I have asked Mr. Hilgard of the insurance
+company, to attend, since he is best qualified to tell us to what
+extent the insurance companies are protected against damage, by having
+taken out insurance with other companies. I would not want to miss
+this, under any circumstances.
+
+I should not want to leave any doubt, gentlemen, as to the aim of
+today’s meeting. We have not come together merely to talk again, but
+to make decisions, and I implore the competent agencies to take all
+measures for the elimination of the Jew from German economy and to
+submit them to me, as far as it is necessary.
+
+The fundamental idea in this program of elimination of the Jew from
+German economy is first, the Jew being ejected from the Economy
+transfers his property to the State. He will be compensated. The
+compensation is to be listed in the debit ledger and shall bring a
+certain percentage of interest. The Jew shall have to live out of this
+interest. It is a foregone conclusion, that this aryanizing, if it
+is to be done quickly, cannot be made in the Ministry for Economy in
+Berlin. That way, we would never finish.
+
+On the other hand, it is very necessary to have safety precautions so
+that the lower echelons, Statthalter, and Gauleiter will not do things
+unreasonably. One must issue correction directives, immediately.
+
+The aryanizing of all the larger establishments, naturally, is to be my
+lot--the Ministry for Economy will designate, which and how many there
+are--it must not be done by a Statthalter or his lower echelons, since
+these things reach into the export trade, and cause great problems,
+which the Statthalter can neither observe, nor solve from his place.
+
+It is my lot, so that the damage will not be greater than the profit,
+which we are striving for.
+
+It is obvious gentlemen, that the Jewish stores are for the people, and
+not the stores. Therefore, we must begin here, according to the rules
+previously laid down.
+
+The Minister for Economic Affairs shall announce which stores he’ll
+want to close altogether. These stores are excluded from aryanizing at
+once. Their stocks are to be made available for sale in other stores;
+what cannot be sold, shall be processed through the “Winterhilfe” or
+taken care of otherwise. However, the sales values of these articles
+shall always be considered, since the State is not to suffer but should
+profit through this transformation. For the chain and department
+stores--I speak now only of that, what can be seen, certain categories
+have to be established, according to the importance of the various
+branches.
+
+The trustee of the State will estimate the value of the property and
+decide what amount the Jew shall receive. Naturally, this amount is to
+be set as low as possible. The representative of the State shall then
+turn the establishment over to the “Aryan” proprietor, that is, the
+property shall be sold according to its real value.
+
+There begins the difficulties. It is easily understood that strong
+attempts will be made to get all these stores to party-members and to
+let them have some kind of compensations. I have witnessed terrible
+things in the past; little chauffeurs of Gauleiters have profited so
+much by these transactions that they have now about half a million.
+You, gentlemen, know it. Is that correct?
+
+                                (Assent)
+
+Of course, things like that are impossible. I shall not hesitate to act
+ruthlessly in any case where such a trick is played. If the individual
+involved is prominent, I shall see the Fuehrer within two hours and
+report to him.
+
+We shall have to insist upon it, that the Aryan taking over the
+establishment is of the branch and knows his job. Generally speaking
+he is the one who must pay for the store with his own money. In other
+words, an ordinary business transaction is to be sought--one merchant
+selling, the other one buying a business. If there are party members
+among the contenders, they are to be preferred, that is if they have
+the same qualifications: first shall come the one who had the most
+damage, and secondly, selection should be according to length of Party
+membership.
+
+Of course, there may be exceptions. There are party-members who, as
+may be proven, lost their business concessions by action of the
+Schuschnigg or Prague Government, and so went bankrupt. Such a man has
+naturally first option on a store for sale, and he shall receive help
+if he does not have the means to help himself. The trustee of the State
+can justify this help, if he is more business like in the transfer.
+This party-member should have the chance to buy the store for as cheap
+a price as possible. In such a case the State will not receive the full
+price, but only the amount the Jew received. Such a buyer may even
+receive a loan besides, so that he will get off to a good start.
+
+I wish to make it clear that such a proceeding shall only be legal
+if the party-member has once owned such a store. For example, a
+party-member was the owner of a stationery store, and Schuschnigg took
+away the concession to operate it so that the man lost the store and
+went bankrupt. Now, if a Jewish stationery store is being aryanized,
+this party-member should get the store on conditions which he’ll be
+able to fulfill. Such a case shall be the only exception though, in
+all other cases the procedure shall be of a strictly businesslike
+nature whereby the party-member, like I said before, shall have the
+preference, if he has the same qualifications as any other candidate,
+who is not a member of the party.
+
+When selling for the actual value we shall find only about 60 Aryans
+ready to take over 100 Jewish stores. I don’t think that we have a
+German for every Jewish store. You must not forget that the Jew sees
+his main activity in the field of trade, and that he owns 90% of it. I
+doubt that we’d have a demand big enough. I even doubt that we’d have
+enough people, particularly now since everybody has found his field of
+work.
+
+Therefore, I ask the Minister for Economy to go beyond what we think
+ought to be done for the sake of the principle, in liquidating the
+establishments. I ask him to go further, even though there won’t be any
+candidates. That’ll be perfectly alright.
+
+The transfer of stores and establishments shall have to be executed
+by the lower echelons, not through Berlin but through the Gaue and
+through the Reichstatthalterschaft. Therein shall be the seat of the
+members of the Board of Trustees, even if it consists of a few people
+only. The Statthalter and his people cannot do this job; the trustees
+will have to tackle it. But the Statthalter shall be the authority
+which supervises, according to the regulations given him, the trustees,
+particularly in dealings such as the transfer to party-members.
+
+Naturally, these establishments cannot disappear all at once but we’ll
+have to start by Monday, in a manner that shall make it obvious that a
+change has begun to materialize. Besides that, certain stores could be
+closed which will make things here easier.
+
+Another point! I have noticed that Aryans took over a Jewish store and
+were then so clever to keep the name of the Jewish store as “formerly,”
+or kept it altogether. That must not be; I cannot permit it. Because it
+may happen--what has just happened--stores were looted because their
+signboards bore Jewish names--because they had once been Jewish, but
+had been “aryanized” a long time ago. Names of former Jewish firms
+shall have to disappear completely, and the German shall have to come
+forward with his or his firm’s name. I ask you to carry this out quite
+definitely. That much then regarding aryanizing of stores and wholesale
+establishments, particularly in regard to signboards and of all that is
+obvious!
+
+Of the consequences resulting from this for the Jew, I shall speak
+later, because this is connected with other things.
+
+Now for the factories. As for the smaller and medium ones, two things
+shall have to be made clear.
+
+1. Which factories do I not need at all--which are the ones where
+productions could be suspended? Could they not be put to another use?
+If not, the factories will be razed immediately.
+
+2. In case the factory should be needed, it will be turned over to
+Aryans in the same manner as the stores. All these measures have to
+be taken quickly, since Aryan employees are concerned everywhere. I’d
+like to say right now that Aryan employees shall have to be given
+employment immediately after the Jewish factory is closed. Considering
+the amount of labor we need these days, it should be a trifle to keep
+these people, even in their own branches. As I have just said; if the
+factory is necessary, it will be aryanized. If there is no need for
+it, it being abandoned shall be part of the procedure of transforming
+establishments not essential, for our national welfare into one that
+is essential for it--a procedure that shall take place within the next
+few weeks. For it, I shall still need very much space and very many
+factories.
+
+If such a factory is to be transformed or razed, the first thing
+to be done is check the equipment. The questions arising will be:
+Where can this equipment be used? Could it be used after the place
+is transformed? Where else might it be needed badly? Where could the
+machinery be set up again? It follows that aryanizing factories will be
+an even more difficult task than the aryanizing of stores.
+
+Take now the larger factories which are run solely by a Jewish owner,
+without control by a Board of Directors; or take corporations where the
+Jews might be in the Supervisory Council or Board of Directors. There
+the solution is very simple: the factory can be compensated in the same
+manner as in the sale of stores and factories; that is, at a rate which
+we shall determine, and the trustee shall take over the Jew’s interest
+as well as his shares, which he in turn may sell or transfer to the
+State, which will then dispose of them. So, if I have a big factory,
+which belonged to a Jew or a Jewish corporation, and the Jew leaves,
+perhaps with his sons who were employed there, the factory will still
+continue to operate. Maybe a director will have to be appointed because
+the Jew has run the factory himself. But otherwise, particularly if the
+maintenance of the establishment is very essential everything will run
+smoothly.
+
+Everything is very simple. I now have his shares. I may give them to
+some Aryan or to another group or I may keep them. The State takes them
+over and offers them at the stock market, if they are acceptable there
+and if it so desires, or it makes use of them in some other way.
+
+Now, I shall talk of the very big establishments, those in which the
+Jew is in the Board of Directors, in which he holds shares etc., and
+so is either the owner or one of the coowners; in any case in which he
+is greatly interested. There too, things are comparatively simple; he
+delivers all of his shares which shall be bought at a price fixed by
+the trustee. So the Jew gets into the account book. The shares shall
+be handled like I’ve just explained. These cases cannot be taken care
+of by the Gaue and Reichsstatthalter, but only by us here on top;
+because we are the only ones to decide where these factories are to be
+transferred to, how they may be affiliated with other establishments
+or to what an extent the State shall keep them or hand them over to
+another establishment belonging to the State. All this can only be
+decided here. Of course, the Gauleiter and Statthalter will be glad to
+get hold of the shares, and they’ll make great promises to beautify our
+capital cities, etc. I know it all! It won’t go! We must agree on a
+clear action that shall be profitable to the Reich.
+
+The same procedure shall be applied where the Jew has a share in, or
+owns property of German economy. I am not competent enough to tell
+off hand in what forms that might be the case, and to what an extent
+he’ll have to lose it. Anyway, the Jew must be evicted pretty fast from
+German economy.
+
+Now, the foreign Jews. There we’ll have to make distinctions between
+the Jews who have always been foreigners--and who shall have to be
+treated according to the laws we arranged with their respective
+countries. But regarding those Jews who were Germans, have always lived
+in Germany and have acquired foreign citizenship during the last year,
+only because they wanted to play safe. I ask you not to give them any
+consideration. We’ll finish with these. Or have you any misgivings?
+We shall try to induce them through slight, and then through stronger
+pressure, and through clever maneuvering--to let themselves be pushed
+out voluntarily.
+
+_Woermann_: I’d like the Foreign Office to be included, since a
+generally valid decision could hardly be made.
+
+_Goering_: We cannot consult you in every case, but on the whole we
+will.
+
+_Woermann_: Anyway, I’d like to make known the claim of the Foreign
+Office to participate. One never knows what steps may become necessary.
+
+_Goering_: Only for important cases! I do not like to take this
+category under special consideration. I have learned only now to what
+extent that has been done, particularly in Austria and Czechoslovakia.
+If somebody was a Czech in Sudetenland, we do not have to consider
+him at all, and the Foreign Office doesn’t have to be consulted
+because that person now belongs to us. And in Austria and also in
+Sudetenland, too many become all of a sudden Englishmen or Americans or
+what-not--and generally speaking we cannot consider that a great deal.
+
+
+                          [Part II is missing]
+
+
+                                Part III
+
+_Funk_: That is quite a decisive question for us: should the Jewish
+stores be reopened?
+
+_Goebbels_: If they will be reopened is another question. The question
+is will they be restored? I have set the deadline for Monday.
+
+_Goering_: You don’t have to ask whether they’ll be reopened. That is
+up to us to decide.
+
+_Goebbels: Number 2._ In almost all German cities synagogues are
+burned. New, various possibilities exist to utilize the space where
+the synagogues stood. Some cities want to build parks in their place,
+others want to put up new buildings.
+
+_Goering_: How many synagogues were actually burned?
+
+_Heydrich_: Altogether there are 101 synagogues destroyed by fire; 76
+synagogues demolished; and 7,500 stores ruined in the Reich.
+
+_Goering_: What do you mean “destroyed by fire?”
+
+_Heydrich_: Partly, they are razed, and partly gutted.
+
+_Goebbels_: I am of the opinion that this is our chance to dissolve
+the synagogues. All those not completely intact, shall be razed by the
+Jews. The Jews shall pay for it. There in Berlin, the Jews are ready
+to do that. The synagogues which burned in Berlin are being leveled by
+the Jews themselves. We shall build parking lots in their places or new
+buildings. That ought to be the criterion for the whole country, the
+Jews shall have to remove the damaged or burned synagogues, and shall
+have to provide us with ready free space.
+
+_Number 3_: I deem it necessary to issue a decree forbidding the Jews
+to enter German theaters, moving houses, and circuses. I have already
+issued such a decree under the authority of the law of the chamber for
+culture. Considering the present situation of the theaters, I believe
+we can afford that. Our theaters are overcrowded, we have hardly any
+room. I am of the opinion that it is not possible to have Jews sitting
+next to Germans in movies and theaters. One might consider, later on,
+to let the Jews have one or two movie houses here in Berlin, where they
+may see Jewish movies. But in German theaters they have no business
+anymore.
+
+Furthermore, I advocate that the Jews be eliminated from all positions
+in public life in which they may prove to be provocative. It is still
+possible today that a Jew shares a compartment in a sleeping car
+with a German. Therefore, we need a decree by the Reich Ministry for
+Communications stating that separate compartments for Jews shall be
+available; in case where compartments are filled up, Jews cannot claim
+a seat. They shall be given a separate compartment only after all
+Germans have secured seats. They shall not mix with Germans, and if
+there is no more room, they shall have to stand in the corridor.
+
+_Goering_: In that case, I think it would make more sense to give them
+separate compartments.
+
+_Goebbels_: Not if the train is overcrowded!
+
+_Goering_: Just a moment. There’ll be only one Jewish coach. If that is
+filled up, the other Jews will have to stay at home.
+
+_Goebbels_: Suppose, though, there won’t be many Jews going on the
+express train to Munich, suppose there would be two Jews in the train
+and the other compartments would be overcrowded. These two Jews would
+then have a compartment all to themselves. Therefore, Jews may claim a
+seat only after all Germans have secured a seat.
+
+_Goering_: I’d give the Jews one coach or one compartment. And should a
+case like you mention arise and the train be overcrowded, believe me,
+we won’t need a law. We’ll kick him out and he’ll have to sit all alone
+in the toilet all the way!
+
+_Goebbels_: I don’t agree. I don’t believe in this. There ought to be a
+law. Furthermore, there ought to be a decree barring Jews from German
+beaches and resorts. Last summer * * *
+
+_Goering_: Particularly here in the Admiralspalast very disgusting
+things have happened lately.
+
+_Goebbels_: Also at the Wannsee beach. A law which definitely forbids
+the Jews to visit German resorts!
+
+_Goering_: We could give them their own.
+
+_Goebbels_: It would have to be considered whether we’d give them
+their own or whether we should turn a few German resorts over to them,
+but not the finest and best, so we cannot say the Jews go there for
+recreation.
+
+It’ll also have to be considered if it might not become necessary to
+forbid the Jews to enter the German forests. In the Grunewald, whole
+herds of them are running around. It is a constant provocation and
+we are having incidents all the time. The behavior of the Jews is so
+inciting and provocative that brawls are a daily routine.
+
+_Goering_: We shall give the Jews a certain part of the forest, and the
+Alpers shall take care of it that various animals that look damned much
+like Jews,--the Elk has such a crooked nose,--get there also and become
+acclimated.
+
+_Goebbels_: I think this behavior is provocative. Furthermore, Jews
+should not be allowed to sit around in German parks. I am thinking
+of the whispering campaign on the part of Jewish women in the public
+gardens at Fehrbelliner Platz. They go and sit with German mothers and
+their children and begin to gossip and incite.
+
+_Goebbels_: I see in this a particularly grave danger. I think it
+is imperative to give the Jews certain public parks, not the best
+ones--and tell them: “You may sit on these benches” these benches
+shall be marked “For Jews only.” Besides that they have no business
+in German parks. Furthermore, Jewish children are still allowed in
+German schools. That’s impossible. It is out of the question that any
+boy should sit beside a Jewish boy in a German gymnasium and receive
+lessons in German history. Jews ought to be eliminated completely from
+German schools; they may take care of their own education in their own
+communities.
+
+_Goering_: I suggest that Mr. Hilgard from the insurance company be
+called in; he is waiting outside. As soon as he’ll be finished with his
+report, he may go, and we can continue to talk. At the time Gustloff
+died, a compensation for the damage Germany had suffered, was prepared.
+But I believe that at present we should not work it through raised
+taxes but with a contribution paid only once. That serves my purpose,
+better.
+
+                           (Hilgard appears)
+
+Mr. Hilgard, the following is our case. Because of the justified anger
+of the people against the Jew, the Reich has suffered a certain amount
+of damage. Windows were broken, goods were damaged and people hurt,
+synagogues burned, etc. I suppose that the Jews, many of them are also
+insured against damage committed by public disorder, etc.
+
+                            (Hilgard: “Yes”)
+
+If that is so, the following situation arises; the people, in their
+justified anger, meant to harm the Jew; but it is the German insurance
+companies that will compensate the Jew for damage. This situation is
+simple enough; I’d only have to issue a decree to that effect that
+damage, resulting from these risks, shall not have to be paid by the
+insurance companies. But the question that interests me primarily, and
+because of which I have asked you to come here, is this one: In case of
+reinsurance policies in foreign countries, I should not like to lose
+these, and that is why I’d like to discuss with you ways and means by
+which profit from reinsurance, possibly in foreign currency will go to
+the German economy, instead of the Jew. I’d like to hear from you, and
+that is the first question I want to ask: In your opinion, are the Jews
+insured against such damage to a large extent?
+
+_Hilgard_: Permit me to answer right away. We are concerned with three
+kinds of insurances. Not with the insurance against damage resulting
+from revolt or from risks. But with the ordinary fire insurance, the
+ordinary glass insurance, and the ordinary insurance against theft.
+The people, because of their contracts, who have a right to claim
+compensation are partly Jews, partly Aryans. As for the fire insurance,
+they are practically all Jewish, I suppose. As for the department
+stores, the victim is identical with the Jew, the owner and that
+applies more to the synagogues, except for neighbors to whose places
+the fire may have spread. Although the damage done to the latter’s
+property seems to be rather slight, according to the inquiries I made
+late last night.
+
+As for the glass insurance which plays a very important part in this,
+the situation is completely different. The majority of the victims,
+mostly the owners of the buildings are Aryans. The Jew has usually
+rented the store, a procedure which you may observe all over, for
+example on Kurfuerstendamm.
+
+_Goering_: That is what we’ve said.
+
+_Goebbels_: In these cases, the Jew will have to pay.
+
+_Goering_: It doesn’t make sense, we have no raw materials. It is all
+glass imported from foreign countries and has to be paid for in foreign
+currency! One could go nuts.
+
+_Hilgard_: May I draw your attention to the following facts: the
+glass for the shop windows is not being manufactured by the Bohemian,
+but by the Belgian glass industry. In my estimation, the approximate
+money-value to which these damages amount is $6,000,000--that includes
+the broken glass, glass which we shall have to replace, mainly to
+Aryans because they have the insurance policies. Of course I have to
+reserve final judgment in all this, Your Excellency, because I have had
+only one day to make my inquiries. Even counting on about half of the
+$6,000,000 being spent in transacting the business-specialists from the
+industry itself are more confident in this matter than I am, we might
+well have to import glass for approximately $3,000,000. Incidentally,
+the amount of the damage equals about half a whole year’s production
+of the Belgian glass industry. We believe that half a year will be
+necessary for the manufacturers to deliver the glass.
+
+_Goering_: The people will have to be enlightened on this.
+
+_Goebbels_: We cannot do this right now.
+
+_Goering_: This cannot continue! We won’t be able to last with all
+this. Impossible! Go on then! You suggest that the Aryan is the one who
+suffers the damage; is that right?
+
+_Hilgard_: Yes, to a large extent, as far as the glass insurance goes.
+
+_Goering_: Which would have to replace the glass.
+
+_Hilgard_: Yes. Of course there are cases in which the Aryan, the owner
+of the store is identical with the owner of the building. That is so
+with all department stores. In the case of the department store Israel,
+the owner is the Jew.
+
+_Goering_: And now the third category.
+
+_Hilgard_: Under this fall the victims of thievery.
+
+_Goering_: I have to ask you a question. When all kinds of goods were
+taken from the stores and burned in the streets, would that also be
+thievery?
+
+_Hilgard_: I don’t think so.
+
+_Goering_: Could that be termed as “Riot”?
+
+_Hilgard_: That is just the question which we are unable to decide
+at this moment. Is it ordinary theft if entry into a dwelling or a
+container of any kind is forced and something is taken away?
+
+_Goering_: That is a case of “Riot.”
+
+_Hilgard_: Riot does not mean much since we have very little insurance
+against damage caused by riots--these were discarded by us long ago.
+
+_Goering_: But this here is “Rioting.” That is the legal term. There
+was no theft, and no individual broke into any place. But a mob rushes
+in and knocks everything to pieces, or “Public Disturbances.”
+
+_Hilgard_: Public disturbance. It is no riot.
+
+_Goering_: Are they insured against damages caused by public
+disturbances?
+
+_Hilgard_: No, no more. May I show this by an example. The most
+remarkable of these cases is the case Margraf Unter Den Linden. The
+Jewelry store of Margraf, is insured with us through a so-called
+combined policy. That covers practically any damage that may occur.
+This damage was reported to us as amounting to $1,700,000 because the
+store was completely stripped.
+
+_Goering_: Daluege and Heydrich, you’ll have to get me this jewelry
+through raids, staged on a tremendous scale!
+
+_Daluege_: The order has already been given. The people are being
+controlled all the time. According to reports, 150 were arrested by
+yesterday afternoon.
+
+_Goering_: These things will otherwise be hidden. If somebody comes
+to a store with jewels and claims that he has bought them, they’ll be
+confiscated at once. He has stolen them or traded them in all right.
+
+_Heydrich_: Besides that, looting was going on in the Reich in more
+than 800 cases, contrary to what we supposed; but we have already
+several hundred people who were plundering, and we are trying to get
+the loot back.
+
+_Goering_: And the jewels?
+
+_Heydrich_: That is very difficult to say. They were partly thrown
+into the street and picked up there. Similar things happened with
+furriers, for example, in Friedrichstrasse, district C, there the
+crowd was naturally rushing to pick up minks, skunks, etc. It’ll
+be very difficult to recover that. Even children have filled their
+pockets, just for fun. It is suggested that the Hitler Youth is not
+to be employed and to participate in such actions without the Party’s
+consent. Such things are very easily destroyed.
+
+_Daluege_: The Party should issue an order to the effect that the
+police will immediately receive a report in case the neighbor’s wife,
+(everybody knows his neighbor) has a fur coat altered or in case
+somebody appears wearing new rings or bracelets. We’d like the Party to
+support us here.
+
+_Hilgard_: These damages are not covered by the policy, I believe. May
+I say a word in general about our liabilities and a “Petidum” of the
+Versicherungswirkschaft report. We’d like to make it our point, Mr.
+General Field Marshall, that we shall not be hindered in fulfilling the
+obligations for which our contracts call.
+
+_Goering_: But I have to. That is important for me.
+
+_Hilgard_: If I may give reasons for this request, I’d like to say
+that it simply has to do with the fact that we carry out, to a large
+extent, quite a number of international transactions. We have a very
+good international basis for our business transactions, and in the
+interest of the equilibrium of the Foreign exchange in Germany, we have
+to make sure that the confidence in the German insurance shall not be
+ruined. If we now refuse to honor clear-cut obligations, imposed upon
+us through lawful contract, it would be a black spot on the shield of
+honor of the German insurance.
+
+_Goering_: It wouldn’t the minute I issue a decree--a law sanctioned by
+the State.
+
+_Hilgard_: I was leading up to that.
+
+_Heydrich_: The insurance may be granted, but as soon as it is to be
+paid, it’ll be confiscated. That way we’ll have saved face.
+
+_Hilgard_: I am inclined to agree with what General Heydrich has just
+said. First of all, use the mechanism of the insurance company to check
+on the damage, to regulate it and even pay, but give the insurance
+company the chance to * * *
+
+_Goering_: One moment! You’ll have to pay in any case because it is
+the Germans who suffered the damage. But there’ll be a lawful order
+forbidding you to make any direct payments to the Jews. You shall also
+have to make payment for the damage the Jews have suffered, but not to
+the Jews, but to the Minister of Finance.
+
+                            (Hilgard: Aha!)
+
+What he does with the money is his business.
+
+_Schmer_: Your Excellency, I should like to make a proposal. A certain
+rate should be fixed, say 15% or maybe a little higher, of all the
+registered wealth, I understand one billion is to be confiscated so
+that all Jews shall pay equally, and from the money raised this way,
+the insurance companies shall be refunded.
+
+_Goering_: No. I don’t even dream of refunding the insurance companies
+the money. The companies are liable. No, the money belongs to the
+State. That’s quite clear. That would indeed be a present for the
+insurance companies. You make a wonderful Petidum there. You’ll fulfill
+your obligations, you may count on that.
+
+_Kerl_: It seems that in one respect, we’ll have to arrange this
+somewhat differently. As far as the glass insurance goes, the fact of
+the matter is that the owners of the buildings will definitely have to
+be paid for the damage, as stipulated. The majority of these companies,
+with the exception of one Joint Stock Company in Cologne, are all very
+small reciprocity companies [Gegenseitsvereine]. They won’t be able to
+make up for the damage. We’ll have to find out how far they are covered
+by reinsurance which I cannot tell at the moment.
+
+_Hilgard_: In this connection, the reinsurance plays a relatively
+small role, except for the large fire-insurance policies taken out by
+department stores. There is not reinsurance in the glass insurances,
+for the simple reason that, under normal conditions glass insurance is
+one of our best branches in the insurance business; and therefore does
+not need reinsurance. I have to add, though, that the amount of this
+damage is approximately twice as high as the amount of damage for an
+average year. It makes all our calculations wrong and completely wipes
+out our chance for profit.
+
+                         (Interrupted by Kerl)
+
+No, sir, that is the way it is. The whole premium of the German glass
+insurance amounts to $14,000,000, if I am not wrong. Under normal
+conditions it amounted to 4 or 5 million. The glass insurance is our
+greatest asset. So far, the greatest profits were made in it. But now,
+the amount of this damage is alone twice as high as the amount for
+one ordinary year. With the various special glass insurances, it is
+altogether different.
+
+_Goering_: One moment! 4 to 5 millions normally. Twice as much would be
+about 10 million. You suggested 14 million. There are still 4 million
+left.
+
+_Hilgard_: We’ll also have to pay for the expenses. No, it is a very
+great catastrophe for us. Let me point out that the damage in the whole
+of Germany, in my estimation, shall amount to approximately 25 million
+mark. I wanted to be careful.
+
+_Heydrich_: We estimate that the damage to property, to furniture and
+to consumer-goods amounts to several hundred million; although that
+includes the damage the Reich shall suffer from loss of taxes--sales
+taxes, taxes on property, and on income. I assume that the Minister for
+Finance too, has been informed of all this.
+
+_V. Krosigk_: I have no idea about the extent.
+
+_Heydrich_: 7,500 destroyed stores in the Reich.
+
+_Daluege_: One more question ought to be cleared up. Most of the goods
+in the stores were not the property of the owner but were kept on the
+books of other firms, which had delivered them. Then there are the
+unpaid for deliveries by other firms, which definitely are not all
+Jewish but Aryan, those goods that were delivered on the basis of
+commission.
+
+_Hilgard_: We’ll have to pay for them, too.
+
+_Goering_: I wished you had killed 200 Jews, and not destroyed such
+values.
+
+_Heydrich_: There were 35 killed.
+
+_Kerl_: I think we could do the following: Jews we don’t pay anyhow.
+As for Aryans, payment shall have to be made. The insurance company
+may contact us through the “Reichsgruppe” and we shall investigate
+each case. I am thinking of the small reciprocity companies; it
+should be easy to find out whether they are capable of paying or not.
+In their cases, the amounts involved are not too large. We may find
+an arrangement for this later on; I am thinking of one in which the
+insurance companies arrange for recompensation exclusively to Aryan,
+and once they know the results of their inquiries, contact us. We shall
+then find a way out for these small companies. Of course only in cases
+where it is absolutely necessary.
+
+_Funk_: That is not necessary. I’d like to refer to what I’ve said
+before about the decree. That seems to be the easiest solution.
+
+_Goering_: We cannot do that. These people make a point of their
+ability to pay.
+
+_Funk_: If the Jews pay for it, the insurance companies don’t have to
+pay.
+
+_Goering_: Right, well, gentlemen, this is all very clear. We’ll stick
+to it. At this moment every insurance company, except Mr. Hilgard
+who is here, counts on having to pay for the damage. They want to
+pay too, and I understand this very well. They’ll have to want that,
+so they cannot be reproached for not being secure enough to pay. The
+glass insurance, and a point was made of that, has brought the highest
+profits so far. That means they’d have enough surplus money, and if
+they haven’t divided it all up in dividends, they’ll have savings
+enough for the compensation. Such an insurance company will have to be
+in a position to pay for a damage of 10, 12, 15 million, that is three
+times the amount paid in the normal year. If they are unable to do
+that, then we’ll have to wonder whether we should let small companies
+live at all. It would be insane to keep insurance companies which would
+be unable to pay for such a damage. To permit an insurance company like
+that to exist would simply mean to cheat the people. I suggest now the
+following. The damage shall be determined in each case. And for the
+time being, the insurance companies shall have to honor their contract
+in every respect and shall have to pay.
+
+
+                          [Part IV is missing]
+
+
+                                 Part V
+
+_Goering_: Now for the damage the Jew has had. At Margraf’s the jewels
+disappeared, etc. Well, they are gone, and he won’t get them refunded.
+He is the one who has to suffer the damage. As far as the jewels may
+be returned again by the police, they belong to the State. Now for the
+consumer foods which were thrown into the street, stolen, or burned.
+There too, the Jew will be the one who has the damage.
+
+As for the goods that were kept on the basis of commissions, the Jew
+shall have to make good for the damage.
+
+_Goebbels_: That doesn’t have to be put in the decree, though. This
+decree is quite sufficient the way it is.
+
+_Hilgard_: I wonder to what an extent insurance companies in foreign
+countries might be involved in this.
+
+_Goering_: Well, they’ll have to pay. And we’ll confiscate that.
+
+_Hilgard_: As for this merchandise sold on the basis of commissions, I
+can imagine that the American supplier of fur coats, shipping them from
+England or from America would in many cases insure it with English or
+American insurance companies!
+
+_Goering_: Then they’ll pay him for the damage. The question merely is
+the following: do you think there are reinsurances for all this damage
+in foreign countries?
+
+_Hilgard_: Very few, amounting to very little.
+
+_Goering_: Of course, the Aryan cannot report any damage because he
+hasn’t had any. The Jew will make good.
+
+The Jew shall have to report the damage. He’ll get the refund from
+the insurance company but the refund will be confiscated. After it’s
+all said and done, there will remain some profit for the insurance
+companies since they can’t have to make good for all the damage. Mr.
+Hilgard, you may enjoy yourself.
+
+_Hilgard_: I have no reason for that--the fact that we won’t have to
+pay for all the damage is called profit!
+
+_Goering_: Just a moment! If you are compelled under the law to pay
+5 million and all of a sudden there appears an angel in my somewhat
+corpulent form before you, and tells you: you may keep 1 million--why,
+cannot that be called making a profit? I should actually split with
+you, or whatever you’d call it. I can see it, looking at you. Your
+whole body grins. You made a big profit.
+
+  (Remark: Let’s initiate a tax for damages, resulting from public
+    disturbance, to be paid by the insurance companies)
+
+_Hilgard_: For me it goes without saying that the honorable German
+merchant cannot be the one who suffers. I have discussed this matter
+with the enterprises and I have spoken for it that the Aryan must not
+be the one who has the damage. But it is decidedly he who has it,
+because all the insurance companies, not one insurance company, are the
+ones that shall have to pay higher rates and at the same time shall
+receive lower dividends. Therefore, all the insurance companies are
+the losers. That is so, and that’ll remain so, and nobody can tell me
+differently.
+
+_Goering_: Then why don’t you take care of it that a few windows
+less are being smashed! You belong to the people too! Send your
+representatives out. Let them instruct the people. If there should be
+any more questions speak to Mr. Lange.
+
+            (Reichsgruppenleiter Hilgard leaves the meeting)
+
+Gentlemen, let us continue.
+
+_Woermann_: I think that the foreign Jews are left out completely in
+Article 1. They are covered only by Article 2. But they should also be
+taken care of in Article 1. Otherwise they can be dealt with only if
+they are insured, and not if they are not insured.
+
+_Goering_: Well, they’ll have to insure themselves--or what else do you
+mean?
+
+_Woermann_: As for insurance, the foreign Jews are, to my
+understanding, mentioned only in Article 2 and 3, and not in Article 1.
+If I remember correctly, you were going to say in Article
+
+1: “Jews inside the country.” Well, we’ll have plenty of complaints
+then.
+
+_Goering_: Pardon me. According to Article 2, they’ll receive their
+compensation.
+
+                    (Woermann: If they are insured!)
+
+The number of those who are not insured is negligible.
+
+_Heydrich_: I’d like to say one more thing of primary importance. In
+the decree we should not mention the confiscation. We can do that
+easily.
+
+_Goering_: No, you cannot do that tacitly. A clear legal procedure will
+have to be employed there. But that is not what Mr. Woermann means, he
+is talking about these foreign Jews who are not insured. As far as they
+are insured, they are covered. This here concerns those who are not
+insured. That may be the case here and there.
+
+_Woermann_: We shall then have plenty of complaints.
+
+_Goering_: I’d like to avoid paying too much attention to the foreign
+Jews.
+
+_Woermann_: But if Article 2 contains that provision, Article 1 may as
+well have it. The first draft by the Minister for Justice covered it
+all very nicely.
+
+_Guertner_: Now, if I don’t misunderstand, Mr. Woermann, he is
+primarily concerned with the obligation for restoration which shall
+be valid generally while only Jews who have German citizenship are
+mentioned regarding the insurance.
+
+I’d like to know whether there are any objections against compelling
+also the foreign Jews to restore the damage, and to inform him that he
+shall not be paid the money from the insurance.
+
+_Goering_: He is quite able to do that.
+
+_Woermann_: Even if he is not insured?
+
+_Guertner_: Oh!
+
+_Goering_: There should hardly be such instances. Let’s take a chance
+on it.
+
+_Stuckart_: If he is not insured, he’ll have to have the damage
+restored anyway. How can he then make claims against anybody?
+
+_Goering_: He cannot.
+
+_Woermann_: He can file claims against the State.
+
+_Stuckart_: According to which law? Damage caused by riots? We won’t
+recognize riots.
+
+_Goering_: Perfectly right.
+
+_Woermann_: Generally speaking, may I say: regarding foreign Jews, the
+reservation that the contract is to be taken into consideration was
+made only for the organization. That is valid for all branches which we
+have discussed today, and also for the expropriation.
+
+_Goering_: Like the Fuehrer says, we’ll have to find a way to talk this
+over with the countries which also do something against their Jews.
+That every dirty Polish Jew has a legal position here and we have to
+stand him--that ought to cease. The Fuehrer was not very happy about
+the agreement that was made with the Poles. He thinks we should take a
+few chances and just tell the Poles: all right, we are not going to do
+that; let’s talk over what we may be able to accomplish together; you
+are doing something against your own Jews in Poland; but the minute the
+Itzig has left Poland, he should suddenly be treated like a Pole! I’d
+like to disregard these stories from foreign countries a little.
+
+_Woermann_: It ought to be considered whether or not, the U S might
+take measures against German property. This question cannot be handled
+equally for all countries. I have to make a formal and general
+reservation.
+
+_Goering_: I have always said and I’d like to repeat it that our
+steamship companies and German companies in general should finally
+catch on and liquidate their investments in the U S, sell them, etc.
+That country of scoundrels does not do business with us according to
+any legal rules. Once before they stole everything from us, that is why
+I don’t understand how we could do it again, just for some temporary
+profit. It is dangerous. You can do it with a regular country but not
+with one that cares for the Right as little as the U S. The other day I
+had the American ambassador with me, we talked about the zeppelin and
+I told him: “We don’t need any helium, I fly without helium but the
+prerequisite will have to be that this ship will be flying to civilized
+countries where the Right prevails. It goes without saying that one
+cannot fly to such gangster-states.” He had a rather silly look on
+his face. One ought to tell these Americans. But you are right, Mr.
+Woermann, it ought to be considered.
+
+_Woermann_: In other words, the foreign office is granted the right to
+be consulted.
+
+_Goering_: Granted, but I’d like to avoid mentioning the foreign Jews
+as long as we can help it. We’d rather have the foreign office take
+part in these cases where that question becomes acute, so that some
+compromise can be reached.
+
+_Woermann_: Generally, and in particular cases.
+
+_Funk_: The decisive question is: Are the Jewish stores to be reopened
+or not?
+
+_Goering_: That depends on how big a turn-over these Jewish stores
+have. If it is big, it is an indication that the German people are
+compelled to buy there, in spite of its being a Jewish store, because a
+need exists. If we’d close all Jewish stores which are not open right
+now, altogether before Christmas, we’d be in a nice mess.
+
+_Fischboeck_: Your Excellency, in this matter we have already a very
+complete plan for Austria. There are 12,000 Jewish artisan and 5,000
+Jewish retail shops in Vienna. Before the National Revolution, we had
+already a definite plan for tradesmen, regarding this total of 17,000
+stores. Of the shops of the 12,000 artisans, about 10,000 were to be
+closed definitely and 2,000 were to be kept open. 4,000 of the 5,000
+retail stores should be closed and 1,000 should be kept open, that is,
+were to be aryanized. According to this plan, between 3,000 and 3,500
+of the total of 17,000 stores would be kept open, all others closed.
+This was decided following investigations in every single branch and
+according to local needs, in agreement with all competent authorities,
+and is ready for publication as soon as we shall receive the law which
+we requested in September; this law shall empower us to withdraw
+licenses from artisans, quite independently from the Jewish question.
+
+_Goering_: I shall have this decree issued today.
+
+_Fischboeck_: It was granted us in connection with the economic plan
+for Austria. I believe the only reason why it was not yet published
+was that negotiations between the Reich Ministry for Economic Affairs
+and the National Food Corporation were going on. A basic agreement had
+already been reached. We’ll be able to close these 10,000 stores as a
+matter of mere routine as soon as the decree will be issued. As for the
+actual execution of the matter, somebody will have to take care of the
+merchandise in these stores. Until last week we had intended to more or
+less leave it up to the Jews themselves to liquidate the warehouses.
+We cannot do that anymore. We intend to create a central agency which
+shall take care of the merchandise to be used. Generally, the best
+procedure might be to turn the merchandise over to the particular
+branch which in turn shall divide it up among the Aryan stores. These,
+in turn, shall resell it on the basis of commissions or for a fixed
+price.
+
+If this is carried out as planned, it’ll concern only the approximately
+3,000 remaining stores which shall be aryanized, according to the
+investigations made in the various branches. Actual buyers for about
+half of these stores are waiting: their contracts have been checked
+and are ready to be approved. If many of these cases were not approved
+sooner, it is only because the decision on the planning had not yet
+been made. As for the remaining 15,000 stores, negotiations have
+also gone rather far in many cases. We think that a deadline should
+be set, say until the end of the year. If, by the end of the year,
+definite buyers for the stores designated for Aryans, cannot be found,
+it’ll have to be examined once more whether the stores should not be
+liquidated. In most cases that will be possible; an artisan’s shop is
+of a rather individual character. As for retail stores, it would never
+be urgent enough, so as to say that the economic worth was too big. The
+very few stores which would still remain and found to be necessary but
+for which no buyer was available, could be taken over by trustees. This
+way, I believe that fewer than 100 stores would be left, and by the end
+of the year we would have liquidated all the Jewish-owned businesses
+which so far have been obvious as such in the eyes of the public.
+
+_Goering_: That would be excellent.
+
+_Fischboeck_: Out of 17,000 stores 12,000 or 14,000 would be shut down
+and the remainder aryanized or handed over to the bureau of trustees
+which is operated by the State.
+
+_Goering_: I have to say that this proposal is grand. This way, the
+whole affair would be wound up in Vienna, one of the Jewish capitals,
+so to speak, by Christmas or by the end of the year.
+
+_Funk_: We can do the same thing over here. I have prepared a law
+elaborating that, effective 1 January 1939, Jews shall be prohibited
+to operate retail stores and wholesale establishments as well as
+independent artisan shops. They shall be further prohibited from
+keeping employees or offer any ready products on the market. Wherever a
+Jewish shop is operated, the police shall shut it down. From 1 January
+1939, a Jew can no longer be employed as an enterpriser as stipulated
+in the law for the Organization of National Labor from 20 January 1934.
+If a Jew holds a leading position in an establishment without being
+the enterpriser, his contract may be declared void within 6 weeks by
+the enterpriser. With the expiration of the contract all claims of the
+employee, including all claims to maintenance, become obliterated.
+That is always very disagreeable and a great danger. A Jew cannot be a
+member of a corporation; Jewish members of corporations shall have to
+be retired by 31 December 1938. A special authorization is unnecessary.
+The competent Ministers of the Reich are being authorized to issue the
+provision necessary for the execution of this law.
+
+_Goering_: I believe that we can agree with this law.
+
+                             (Remark: Yes)
+
+Of course there remain a few things to be straightened out even after
+1 January. We shall be able to handle them with these general methods
+which we shall have to employ for handling all other Jewish property.
+As for the Jewish stores, we may proceed vigorously; we believe that by
+Christmas enough buyers shall be found to take over the stores which
+from now on shall be entirely under pressure. Also the merchandise may
+be taken the way you have proposed it. To me, all this seems to be
+prepared in an excellent manner.
+
+_Funk_: In every single store everything is there.
+
+_Schmer_: Everything is there, except that we have no control, anymore,
+over this business with the trustees. I personally am of the opinion
+that we don’t need it at all; so far we have managed quite well with
+the aryanization. For those few stores that are to be kept open, we
+shall easily find buyers. All other rooms shall be rented without much
+ado. There is a great need for this right here in Berlin.
+
+_Goering_: But my dear friend, that way the Jew will receive the full
+amount.
+
+_Schmer_: He will receive the amount that is far below the value, and
+the aryanizing shall have to be authorized, as before.
+
+_Goering_: The Jew will receive the amount which won’t be put into the
+account book.
+
+_Schmer_: No. We can arrange that later. He cannot swallow the money.
+The amount is fixed, and under the law the Jew is compelled to
+report every change in his financial status, so that it can easily
+be controlled. He won’t run away; we’ll keep it in the Reich. The
+only thing you’d have to do is to issue a decree, or to transfer the
+provisions of Article 7 on to the Ministry for Economic Affairs in
+order to confiscate the Jewish property. He cannot run away from us.
+
+_Goering_: Mr. Schmer, could not the following be done: Somebody will
+become aryanized and get 300,000 marks into his hands. He runs into the
+next-best jewelry store around the corner and buys one piece of jewelry
+after another, and on the same day disappears across the border.
+
+_Schmer_: In that case, we’ll have to report this change in his
+property.
+
+_Goering_: But if he wants to scram!
+
+_Fischboeck_: The OK on the aryanizing is not being given the minute
+the price for the purchase is being paid. We do that the following way.
+The aryanizing is being authorized only under the condition that the
+price for the purchase is to be paid in installments lasting over a
+long period of time, in case the buyer is unable to pay; or, in case
+payment is being made, that the amount is to be put in the bank of a
+frozen account.
+
+_Goering_: We could do the same thing here.
+
+_Schmer_: In the provisions for the execution of the law we may
+stipulate that from a certain level on, payment shall have to be made
+in bonds of the Reich or something similar. That would have to be a
+decree made by the authorities which OK the aryanizing.
+
+_Daluege_: The number of Jewish stores is unknown. Until yesterday,
+7,500 were reported to us and the number does not increase.
+
+_Fischboeck_: Because of what has happened the day before yesterday in
+Vienna, 5,000 were shut down there. There were 40,000 altogether.
+
+_Schmer_: Shall the arrangement made in Austria remain?
+
+_Goering_: Nothing will be changed there.
+
+_Fischboeck_: Everything can be shut down at any time.
+
+_Heydrich_: I know that a very high limit has been set for registering,
+3,000 I believe.
+
+_Fischboeck_: More than 5,000.
+
+_Goering_: Is that the same in the Reich?
+
+_Fischboeck_: Yes, in the Reich too. In this connection, I’d like to
+make a few more remarks. What we are very much concerned with, is the
+situation regarding the Jewish apartment houses which contribute a
+large percentage of Jewish wealth. Surprisingly enough, the Jewish
+national wealth in Austria is reported to amount to 320 million marks
+only; the value of the apartment houses alone amounts to 500 million.
+We should appreciate it very much if the regulation which makes it
+possible to requisition Jewish property would be made to be valid also
+for the apartment buildings; thus we would be enabled to have these
+houses administered by a board of trustees and to give the Jews the
+right to have a claim on the debit ledger of the Reich. That could
+also be an occasion to cash the contribution, which might be deducted
+this way in advance. The administration of these blocks of apartment
+buildings wouldn’t be a problem at all. The only thing we’d need for
+it would be managers, and there’d be plenty of them. We’d like to
+requisition the apartment buildings and also any bonds that way. This
+question of the bonds has been left open so far. In Austria, a very
+large part of Jewish wealth, 266 billion Reichsmarks, is invested in
+bonds of all kinds, in shares or simply in bonds bringing a fixed rate
+of interest. In my opinion, a danger for the market does not exist
+because the Ministry for Economic Affairs would have control over
+these bonds. We’ll pay by handling out claims, on the debit-ledger of
+the Reich. Therefore, the finances of the Reich won’t be affected,
+the Minister for Finance shall only pay 3% for the claims on the
+debit-ledger of the Reich. He in turn receives internal loans, that
+means saves money. And if the bonds are not being sold, one might keep
+them 30 years until those claims on the debit-ledger of the Reich shall
+be expired.
+
+_Funk_: Why should Jews not be allowed to keep bonds?
+
+_Goering_: Because that way he would actually be given a share.
+
+_Funk_: That is entirely new.
+
+_Goering_: No. I said very clearly before; bonds and shares.
+
+_Funk_: Shares yes, but not internal loans.
+
+_Fischboeck_: It is certainly better to pay the Jew 3% instead of 4%.
+We’d have no possibility to control Jewish wealth the minute we’d let
+him have shares.
+
+_Goering_: Gentlemen, no arguments. It is out of the question that he’d
+keep the shares. He’ll have to turn them in.
+
+_Fischboeck_: In that case I’d like you to arrange this by calling
+the shares in so that the stock market won’t be ruined. That can very
+easily be done. They’ll be turned in. Administering the shares is
+also much simpler. The trustee turns the shares over to the depot and
+receives claims on the debit-ledger of the Reich in their place. With
+this, the whole affair is settled. The only question is whether you
+want to recall the shares or not.
+
+_Funk_: This way, the Reich will become possessor of half a billion
+shares.
+
+_Goering_: Yes, yes.
+
+_Goebbels_: He’ll be able to get rid of them according to its needs.
+
+_Fischboeck_: But it is a business based on profits.
+
+_V. Krosigk_: I am wondering, first whether it will bring us profits. I
+grant you that, though. But secondly, an entirely new point of view has
+to be entered here. I can very well see the point in what the Minister,
+Mr. Fischboeck, says. As for the values that otherwise bring fixed
+rates of interest, it is an entirely new idea to expropriate the Jew
+also in this, though the intention had been to refrain his status as
+the owner of the shares.
+
+_Fischboeck_: The reason why this is so very important is that our
+whole action shall remain without success as long as the Jews shall be
+in the possession of values, which they may realize quickly and employ
+for any other undertaking.
+
+_Goering_: That’s it. We want to prevent the Jews from again secretly
+manipulating against us.
+
+_Fischboeck_: For example, if we don’t want the Jews to possess jewelry
+we can prevent them from having it by allowing them to possess only
+Internal Loan bonds, that means that they could acquire the jewelry
+only by paying with bonds.
+
+_Goering_: Nobody would pay them claims on the debit-ledger.
+
+_Fischboeck_: They are not transferable.
+
+_Goering_: Only if authorized.
+
+_Heydrich_: Is it not possible to issue an order forbidding the Jew to
+invest his money in certain values, such as art treasures?
+
+_Goering_: The arrangement with the registration in the debit-ledger
+is much simpler. Claims on the debit-ledger are not transferable. He
+cannot do anything with them, and he cannot do much with those 3½%.
+
+_Heydrich_: But we’ll also have to find an arrangement for confiscation
+of valuable objects in Jewish possession.
+
+_Goering_: What he has now in his possession, that’ll come.
+
+_Schmer_: Article 7 of the decree states that the use of Jewish wealth
+in German economy shall be regulated through the Four Year Plan.
+
+_Goering_: I think Fischboeck’s proposal is very good. We should give
+it the form of a draft now, find the apartment buildings, the shares,
+etc.
+
+_Fischboeck_: I should also like to have a decision made on the
+following question. In Austria, individuals, not institutions, owe the
+Jews 184 billion Reichsmarks. This way the Jews certainly have invested
+money in a way we don’t like. That is money which they have loaned
+out to other Jews, oftener enough to an Aryan. This way, a dependency
+of the Aryan artisan from the Jewish creditor is created which we do
+not want. Now the question arises, and I would answer yes. Should
+trustees not be created to administer these debts and then pay with
+claims on the debit-ledger, according to demand coming in. The goal of
+this procedure would be to make the debtor independent from the Jewish
+creditor, to insert Aryan trusteeship and pay the Jew, as far as his
+demands could actually be met. Therefore it does not have to be paid.
+So we should have to insert trusteeship in this case also, but the
+difference to that in the case of the bonds would be that we won’t
+simply pay but leave the decision for payment up to the trusteeship.
+
+_Funk_: If word of this debate should reach the public, we’d have a run
+on the capital market tomorrow.
+
+_Fischboeck_: That’s why we have postponed these ideas all the time. We
+have examples for it that the Jews have sold, head over heel, bonds of
+internal loans, shares and everything they had.
+
+_Goering_: I could stop that with a single decree, ordering the
+immediate stoppage of traffic of Jewish capital. He is punishable who
+buys from Jews, and his purchase shall be confiscated. I would not do
+it any other way.
+
+
+                          [Part VI is missing]
+
+
+                                Part VII
+
+_Frick_: The Ministry of the Interior shall have to take part in it.
+
+_Goering_: I have said so before.
+
+                          (Shout by Goebbels)
+
+* * * that is a misunderstanding. That is now the committee which is
+elaborating on nothing but on this problem which is being tackled. How
+are the shares, how are the claims on the debit-ledger to be handled?
+Therefore, I shouldn’t like to have anybody else in the Committee, in
+order to keep it as small as possible.
+
+_Buerkel_: Is the plan for the aryanizing to be discussed also?
+
+_Goering_: Mr. Fischboeck shall bring that up. This place is the crux
+of the matter. I hope you have listened properly so that you know
+exactly what is to be valid for the Sudetengau! Of course, I too am of
+the opinion that these economic measures ought to be strengthened by a
+number of Police-action-Propaganda-measures and cultural displays so
+that everything shall be fixed now and the Jewry will be slapped this
+week right and left.
+
+_Heydrich_: In spite of the elimination of the Jew from the economic
+life, the main problem, namely to kick the Jew out of Germany, remains.
+May I make a few proposals to that effect?
+
+Following a suggestion by the Commissioner of the Reich, we have
+set up a center for the Emigration of Jews in Vienna, and that way
+we have eliminated 50,000 Jews from Austria while from the Reich
+only 19,000 Jews were eliminated during the same period of time; we
+were so successful because of the cooperation on the part of the
+competent Ministry for Economic Affairs and of the foreign charitable
+organizations.
+
+_Goering_: The main thing is, you cooperated with the local leaders of
+the “Green Frontier.”
+
+_Heydrich_: That amounted to a very small number, your excellency.
+Illegal * * *
+
+_Goering_: This story has gone through the whole world press. During
+the first night the Jews were expulsed into Czechoslovakia. The
+next morning, the Czechs grabbed them and pushed them into Hungary.
+From Hungary, they were returned to Germany and from there into
+Czechoslovakia. They traveled around and around that way. They landed
+finally on an old Barge in the Danube. There they lived, and wherever
+they tried to go ashore, they were barred.
+
+_Heydrich_: That was the report. There weren’t even 100 Jews.
+
+_Goering_: For practically two weeks, a number of Jews left every
+midnight. That was in the Burgenland.
+
+_Heydrich_: At least 45,000 Jews were made to leave the country by
+legal measures.
+
+_Goering_: How was that possible?
+
+_Heydrich_: Through the Jewish Kulturgemeinde, we extracted a certain
+amount of money from the rich Jews who wanted to emigrate. By paying
+this amount, and an additional sum in foreign currency, they made it
+possible for a number of poor Jews to leave. The problem was not to
+make the rich Jew leave but to get rid of the Jewish mob.
+
+_Goering_: But children, did you ever think this through? It doesn’t
+help us to extract hundreds of thousands from the Jewish mob. Have you
+ever thought of it that this procedure may cost us so much foreign
+currency that in the end we won’t be able to hold out.
+
+_Heydrich_: Only what the Jew has had in foreign currency.
+
+                           (Goering: agreed)
+
+This way. May I propose that we set up a similar procedure for the
+Reich, with the cooperation of the competent government agencies, and
+that we then find a solution for the Reich, based on our experiences,
+after having corrected the mistakes, the General Field Marshall has so
+rightly pointed out to us.
+
+                           (Goering: agreed)
+
+As another means of getting the Jews out, measures for Emigration ought
+to be taken in the rest of the Reich for the next 8 to 10 years. The
+highest number of Jews we can possibly get out during one year is 8,000
+to 10,000. Therefore, a great number of Jews will remain. Because of
+the aryanizing and other restrictions, Jewry will become unemployed.
+The remaining Jews gradually become proletarians. Therefore, I shall
+have to take steps; to isolate the Jew so he won’t enter into the
+German normal routine of life. On the other hand, I shall have to
+restrict the Jew to a small circle of consumers, but I shall have
+to permit certain activities within professions; lawyers, doctors,
+barbers, etc. This question shall also have to be examined.
+
+As for the isolation, I’d like to make a few proposals regarding police
+measures which are important also because of their psychological effect
+on public opinion. For example, who is Jewish according to the Nurnberg
+laws shall have to wear a certain insignia. That is a possibility which
+shall facilitate many other things. I don’t see any danger of excuses,
+and it shall make our relationship with the foreign Jew easier.
+
+_Goering_: A uniform?
+
+_Heydrich_: An insignia. This way we could also put an end to it that
+the foreign Jews who don’t look different from ours, are being molested.
+
+_Goering_: But, my dear Heydrich, you won’t be able to avoid the
+creation of ghettos on a very large scale, in all the cities. They
+shall have to be created.
+
+_Heydrich_: As for the question of ghettos, I’d like to make my
+position clear right away. From the point of view of the police, I
+don’t think a ghetto in the form of completely segregated districts
+where only Jews would live, can be put up. We could not control a
+ghetto where the Jews congregate amidst the whole Jewish people. It
+would remain the permanent hideout for criminals and also for epidemics
+and the like. We don’t want to let the Jew live in the same house with
+the German population; but today the German population, their blocks or
+houses, force the Jew to behave himself. The control of the Jew through
+the watchful eye of the whole population is better than having him by
+the thousands in a district where I cannot properly establish a control
+over his daily life through uniformed agents.
+
+_Goering_: We’d only have to forbid long-distance calls.
+
+_Heydrich_: Still I could not completely stop the Jews from
+communicating out of their districts.
+
+_Goering_: And in towns all of their own?
+
+_Heydrich_: If I could put them into towns entirely their own, yes. But
+then these towns would be such a heaven for criminals of all sorts that
+they would be a terrific danger. I’d take different steps. I’d restrict
+the movement of the Jews and would say; in Munich, the governmental
+district and the district
+
+* * *
+
+_Goering_: Wait a minute! I don’t care so much for it that the Jews
+don’t appear in spots where I don’t want them. My point is this one:
+if one Jew won’t have any more work, he’ll have to live modestly. He
+won’t be able to go far on his 3½%--to restaurants, etc. He’ll have to
+work more. That’ll bring about a concentration of Jewry which may even
+facilitate control. You will know that in a particular house only Jews
+are living. We shall also have concentrated Jewish butchers, barbers,
+grocers, etc., in certain streets. The question is of course whether we
+want to go on tolerating that. If not, the Jew shall have to buy from
+the Aryan.
+
+_Heydrich_: No, I’d say that for the necessities in daily life, the
+German won’t serve the Jew anymore.
+
+_Goering_: One moment. You cannot let him starve. But there’ll be the
+following difficulty. If you say that the Jews will be able to have
+so and so many retail stores, then they’ll again be in business, and
+they’ll continually have to sell for the wholesaler.
+
+_Schmer_: In a small town that wouldn’t work at all.
+
+_Goering_: It could only be worked out if you’d reserve in advance
+whole districts or whole towns for the Jews. Otherwise, you’ll have to
+have only Germans do business, and the Jew shall have to buy from them.
+You cannot set up a Jewish barbershop. The Jew will have to buy food
+and stockings.
+
+_Heydrich_: We’ll have to decide whether we want that or not.
+
+_Goering_: I’d like to make a decision on that right now. We cannot
+make another subdivision here. We cannot argue: so and so many stores
+will remain for the Jew because then again no control will be possible
+since these stores in turn would have to work with wholesale stores.
+I’d say, all stores should be Aryan stores, and the Jew may buy there.
+One may go one step further and say that these and these stores
+will probably be frequented mostly by Jews. You may set up certain
+barbershops operated by Jews. You may make concessions in order to
+channel certain professions into certain streets for certain tasks. But
+not stores.
+
+_Heydrich_: What about the ghetto? Would the Jew have to go to an Aryan
+district to buy?
+
+_Goering_: No. I’d say that enough German storekeepers would love to
+dwell in the ghetto if they could do some business there. I wouldn’t
+alter the principle that the Jew shall have no more say in German
+economy.
+
+_Heydrich_: I shouldn’t like to comment on that. Now a few things which
+are important also from a psychological angle.
+
+_Goering_: Once we’d have a ghetto, we’d find out what stores ought to
+be in there, and we’d be able to say: you, the Jew so and so, together
+with so and so, shall take care of the delivery of goods. And a German
+wholesale firm will be ordered to deliver the goods for this Jewish
+store. This store would then not be a retail shop but a cooperative
+store, a cooperative one for Jews.
+
+_Heydrich_: All these measures would eventually lead to the institution
+of the ghetto. I’d say one shouldn’t want to build a ghetto. But these
+measures, if carried through as outlined here, shall automatically
+drive the Jews into a ghetto.
+
+_Funk_: The Jews will have to move quite close together. What are
+3 million? Everyone will have to stand up for the next fellow. The
+individual alone will starve.
+
+_Goering_: Now, as to what Minister Goebbels has said before, namely
+compulsory renting. Now, the Jewish tenants will be together.
+
+_Heydrich_: As an additional measure, I’d propose to withdraw from
+the Jews all personal papers such as permits and driver’s licenses.
+No Jew should be allowed to own a car, neither should he be permitted
+to drive because that way he’d endanger German life. By not being
+permitted to live in certain districts, he should be furthermore
+restricted to move about so freely. I’d say the Royal Square in Munich,
+the Reichsweihestatte, is not to be entered any more within a certain
+radius by Jews. The same would go for establishments of culture, border
+fences, military installations. Furthermore, like Minister Dr. Goebbels
+has said before, exclusion of the Jews from public theaters, movie
+houses, etc. As for cultural activities, I’d like to say this: cultural
+activities in holiday resorts may be considered an additional feature,
+not absolutely necessary for the individual. Many German Volksgenossen
+are unable to improve their health through a stay at a resort town. I
+don’t see why the Jew should go to these places at all.
+
+_Goering_: To health spas, no.
+
+_Heydrich_: Well, then I’d like to propose the same thing for
+hospitals. A Jew shall not lie in a hospital together with Aryan
+Volkgenossen.
+
+_Goering_: We’ll have to manage that gradually.
+
+_Heydrich_: The same applies to public conveyances.
+
+_Goering_: Are there no Jewish Sanatoriums and Jewish hospitals?
+
+                            (Remarks--Yes!)
+
+We’ll have to finagle all this. These things will have to be
+straightened out one right after another.
+
+_Heydrich_: I only meant to secure your approval in principle so that
+we may start out on all this.
+
+_Goering_: One more question, gentlemen: What would you think the
+situation would be if I’d announce today that Jewry should have to
+contribute this 1 billion as a punishment?
+
+_Buerckel_: The Viennese would agree to this whole-heartedly.
+
+_Goebbels_: I wonder if the Jews would have a chance to pull out of
+this, and to put something on the side.
+
+_Brinkmann_: They’d be subject to punishment.
+
+_V. Krosigk_: Mr. Fischboeck, one question: Could this authorization be
+ordered without their closing out their securities?
+
+_Funk_: They are all registered. They’ll also have to register the
+money.
+
+_V. Krosigk_: But for the time being they may dispose of it.
+
+_Goering_: It won’t help them to cash them all. They can’t get rid of
+the money.
+
+_Funk_: They’ll be the ones to have the damage if they sell their
+stocks and bonds.
+
+_Fischboeck_: There is a certain danger, but I don’t think it is very
+great. But only then, when all the other measures shall definitely be
+carried out during next week.
+
+_V. Krosigk_: They have to be taken during the next week at the latest.
+
+_Goering_: I would make that a condition.
+
+_Fischboeck_: Maybe it is good that we put ourselves under pressure
+this way.
+
+_Goering_: I shall close the wording this way; that German Jewry shall,
+as punishment for their abominable crimes etc., etc., have to make a
+contribution of 1 billion. That’ll work. The pigs won’t commit another
+murder. Incidentally, I’d like to say again that I would not like to be
+a Jew in Germany.
+
+_V. Krosigk_: Therefore, I’d like to emphasize what Mr. Heydrich has
+said in the beginning; that we’ll have to try everything possible, by
+way of additional exports, to shove the Jews into foreign countries.
+The decisive factor is that we don’t want the society-proletariat here.
+They’ll always be a terrific liability for us.
+
+                        (Frick: “and a danger!”)
+
+I don’t imagine the prospect of the ghetto is very nice. The idea of
+the ghetto is not a very agreeable one. Therefore, the goal must be,
+like Heydrich said, to move out whatever we can!
+
+_Goering_: The second point is this. If, in the near future, the German
+Reich should come into conflict with foreign powers, it goes without
+saying that we in Germany should first of all let it come to a showdown
+with the Jews. Besides that, the Fuehrer shall now make an attempt with
+those foreign powers which have brought the Jewish question up, in
+order to solve the Madagascar project. He has explained it all to me
+on 9 November. There is no other way. He’ll tell the other countries.
+“What are you talking about the Jew for?--Take him!” Another proposal
+may be made. The Jews, gotten rid of may buy territory for their
+“coreligionists” in North America, Canada, or elsewhere.
+
+I wish to summarize: The Minister of Economic Affairs shall direct the
+committee and he shall in one form or another, take all steps necessary
+within the next few days.
+
+_Blerning_: I fear that during the next few days, beginning Monday,
+the Jews will start to sell bonds on internal loans for hundreds of
+thousands, in order to provide themselves with means. Since we control
+the course of the internal loan in order to sell more bonds, the
+Reich-Treasury, Loan-Committee or the Reich Minister for Finance should
+have to back this internal loan.
+
+_Goering_: In what way could the Jew bring his bonds on the market?
+
+                         (Remark: “Sell them”)
+
+To whom?
+
+(Remark: “on the stock market--he orders a bank to do it.”)
+
+Well, I’ll prohibit selling internal loan bonds for three days.
+
+_Blerning_: That could be done only through a decree.
+
+_Goering_: I can’t see any advantage for the Jew. He won’t know himself
+how and he’ll have to pay. On the contrary, I believe he won’t move.
+
+_Goebbels_: For the time being he is small and ugly and stays at home.
+
+_Goering_: I don’t think it would be logical. Otherwise we’ll have to
+do it. The reason why I want this decree in a hurry is that for the
+time being we have peace but who can guarantee that there won’t be new
+trouble by Saturday or Sunday. Once and for all I want to eliminate
+individual acts. The Reich has taken the affairs in its own hand. The
+Jew can only sell. He can’t do a thing. He’ll have to pay. At this
+moment, the individual Jew won’t think of throwing anything on the
+market. There’ll be some chatter first, and then they will begin to run
+to us. They’ll look for those great Aryans with whom, they’ll think
+they may have some luck, the so-called various mailboxes of the Reich
+with whom they can lodge their protests. These people will run my door
+in. All that takes some time, and by then we’ll be ready.
+
+_Daluege_: May we issue the order for confiscating the cars?
+
+_Goering_: Also the Ministry of the Interior and the Police will have
+to think over, what measures will have to be taken. I thank you.
+
+                     [Conference closed at 2.40 PM]
+
+
+                                 PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1817-PS
+
+              ORGANIZATION BOOK OF THE NSDAP, 1936 EDITION
+
+  The Reich Organization Leader of the NSDAP, published by the Central
+ Publishing House of the NSDAP, Franz Eher Successor, Munich. Page 211.
+
+
+              BUREAU FOR FACTORY TROOPS [AMT WERKSCHAREN]
+
+I. _TASK_:
+
+The factory troops in the National Socialist Community “Strength
+through Joy” [NS--Gemeinschaft “Kraft durch Freude”] carry out the
+following tasks:
+
+1. To help and come to the rescue, in their capacity as a young factory
+guard, whenever there is a question of bringing the German working man
+strength through joy.
+
+2. Shaping of factory celebrations and festivals in order to permeate
+the factories with National Socialist ideology and philosophy, with
+special regard to the creation of a new ritual.
+
+3. To be an ideological shock squad [Weltanschaulicher Stosstrupp]
+within the factory.
+
+
+                                 PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1818-PS
+
+              ORGANIZATION BOOK OF THE NSDAP, 1940 EDITION
+
+ The Reich Organization Leader of the NSDAP [Dr. Robert Ley] published
+  by the Central Publishing House of the NSDAP, Franz Eher Successor,
+                        Munich. Pages 195-196b.
+
+
+                 BUREAU FOR FACTORY TROOPS AND TRAINING
+
+The Bureau of Factory Troops and Training [Werkschar und Schulung]
+is simultaneously a Bureau under the jurisdiction of the Reich
+Organization Leader of the NSDAP--Main Training Bureau.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+The education and training of the Bureau of Factory Troops and Training
+has in mind the totality of the tasks of the NSDAP and of the German
+labor front. It comprises political shaping of the will, and conveying
+trade knowledge, and includes the whole labor policy on an ideological
+basis, character education, and creation of a soldierly attitude
+[Soldatisch-haltungsmaessige Ausrichtung].
+
+It is the aim of the German labor front training to enable the factory
+troops and the German labor front functionaries to lead the workers of
+the German people, and thereby to render real the National Socialist
+community of factory, accomplishment and people.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+
+      THE FACTORY TROOPS OF THE GERMAN LABOR FRONT IN THE FACTORY
+
+Regulations for its building:
+
+The Factory Troop as an organization exists only in the factory. It is
+the nucleus of the factory community.
+
+The Factory Troops Leader:
+
+The confirmed factory chairman [Betriebsobmann] of the German Labor
+Front leads, under the same title, the Factory Troops of the factory.
+For training and commitment of the shock squad [Stosstrupp] the factory
+chairman deputizes a shock squad leader [Stosstruppfuehrer].
+
+Membership in the Factory Troops:
+
+Membership in the Factory Troops is voluntary and it presupposes
+readiness to fight for a National Socialist conception of work and for
+a German worker’s community.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+
+                       TASK OF THE FACTORY TROOPS
+
+Under the leadership of the factory chairman, it is the task of the
+Factory Troops to guarantee, under all circumstances and by all means,
+the political security and readiness of the factory to commit itself.
+
+Not through words and speeches alone, but primarily through their
+example, the Factory Troops shall convince the community of their
+fellow-workers of the justice of the National Socialist will, and
+educate them to utmost effort, to highest accomplishments, and to most
+extreme devotion.
+
+It must remain the aim of the Factory Troops to fuse the factory into
+a closely-meshed, single-willed community capable of the highest
+accomplishments for the people and the Reich. Commitment:
+
+Directives and regulations for physical coordination, commitment
+and utilization of the Factory Troops are issued by the Reich
+Organizational Leader, or on his behalf by the head of the Central
+bureau, or the German Labor Front chairmen of district [Gau] county
+[Kreis] and locality [Ort], so far as it is not a question of Factory
+Troops tasks falling within the professional sphere of activity of the
+factory.
+
+The competent regional chairmen (district, county and locality) are
+solely responsible for the over-all commitment of the Factory Troops.
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1822-PS
+
+
+[Item 1]
+
+1. Letter of the Fuehrer with wording of 25 August 1939 transmitted to
+me by telephone from the Reich Labor Ministry.
+
+2. Telegram No. 370 of 25 August 1939 concerning transmittal of
+Fuehrer’s letter to Duce.
+
+3. Second letter of Fuehrer to Duce, dated 25 August 1939 transmitted
+by telephone by the Reich Labor Ministry to the Ambassador.
+
+4. Tel. No. 371 of 25 August 1939 concerning transmission of second
+letter of Fuehrer.
+
+5. Note of Envoy von Plessen concerning telephone call from Berlin,
+dealing with alleged contradiction between telegram 370 and a letter
+transmitted by Ambassador Attolico in Berlin.
+
+6. Note of 26 August 1939 on same subject.
+
+7. Letter of Duce to Fuehrer of 26 August, transmitted at 1210 hours by
+telephone in Berlin by Count Ciano to Attolico.
+
+       #       #       #       #       #
+
+[Item 2]
+
+                                                  Rome, August 25, 1939.
+
+                      Embassy Courier (Btsch./Kr.)
+
+                    Telegram in code (Secret Ch. V.)
+
+                                (Valid)
+
+  Foreign Affairs
+  _Berlin_
+
+                               Citissime
+
+  No. 370 of 25 August                                        Top Secret
+  To: The Minister of Foreign Affairs.
+  Subject: Today’s Telephonic Instructions.
+  V. 1. Encoding: Fink/Grade/Haupmann.
+     2. Dispatched: Krueger/Limberg/Zimmerm.
+     3. To me dispatched in sections (last one at 11 p. m.)
+                         [Illegible notations]
+
+I have personally handed on to the Duce in the Palazzo Venezia at 1520
+o’clock in the presence of Ciano the contents of today’s letter of
+the Fuehrer conveyed here by telephone. The Duce, who was possessed
+of great calmness, at first, read the letter through entirely, and
+then went over it, with me sentence for sentence, at which time,
+he translated the sentences into Italian for Ciano, who is not
+conversant with German, and, in fact, as I was able to convince myself,
+completely, correctly, and true to the meanings.
+
+Among this comments upon the individual themes, I shall single out the
+following:
+
+He was entirely satisfied with the non-aggression pact with Moscow.
+He, himself, already in the Spring had offered such a suggestion to
+Field Marshal Goering, pointing out, indeed, at this juncture, the need
+of adopting a moderate attitude, since our two nations, who for ten
+years on account of ideological reasons have been oriented for a fight
+against Moscow, must have the time needed for a readjustment. In spite
+of the suggestion made at that time, he, himself, is and remains an
+implacable anticommunist.
+
+(Here I interrupted with the view that the German position against
+communism self-evidently remains entirely unchanged and that in regard
+to this fact Moscow has never been left in doubt.)
+
+The comment in the letter concerning the attitude of the Japanese
+Cabinet he regarded as being correct. The fault lies with the Japanese
+Ministry of the Navy, which is opposed to adopting an unambiguous
+position against England.
+
+The reaction he also expects the pact with Moscow to have upon Rumania
+appeared to be of most lively interest to him. Consideration for
+Bessarabia would paralyze Rumania’s freedom of movement in favor of
+Poland in the case of conflict. Thus Rumania would be left to the
+Hungarians.
+
+With an approving nod of the head he agreed that Turkey would now have
+to revise its attitude.
+
+He described the worsening of German-Polish relations as so acute that
+an armed conflict can no longer be avoided. The moment to consider
+possibilities of preventing the conflict has now passed, because
+the Polish mentality--supported by England’s attitude--is no longer
+responsive to reasonable suggestions, no matter from which side they
+might come. Otherwise he might have imagined that the Poles would have
+sought, for example, immediate reapproachment with Germany, if they
+correctly appreciated the danger threatening their existence; and, to
+prove clearly their willingness to negotiate, they would first of all
+have given Danzig to Hitler, without reservations and without any talks
+on negotiations. Then one might have considered the removal of further
+reasons for discord--he cited the Polish Corridor and Silesia--by means
+of direct German-Polish talks; in his opinion that would have been
+possible. Finally, a general conference might have followed in order
+to solve the other big controversial questions--points of differences
+between Italy and France, German colonies, distribution of raw
+materials, armament questions. This would have assured European peace
+for 15-20 years, as is desired by all. Such considerations, however,
+are outdated by the precipitous course of events. He had now adjusted
+himself to the fact that the outbreak of a general conflagration is
+not only unavoidable but immediately imminent. The question of the
+exact date interested him most, and he wanted to know whether I could
+tell him more about that. I answered the question by pointing out the
+corresponding places in the letter. He seemed to realize that nothing
+more could be said at the moment by anybody. But he emphasized that
+he attached much value, for obvious reasons, to the fact that he
+should be informed as fast as possible. But in view of the speed of
+the developments he understood the difficulties of such notification.
+Finally, he stated again that he would have preferred open conflict
+2 to 3 years hence and gave his reasons. And he believed the reasons
+also applied to us, especially in view of the condition of our fleet.
+However, developments are now forcing us in another direction. In any
+case, he expressly emphasized, he is with us, unconditionally and with
+everything.
+
+At the end of the talk he made comments about the prospects of an armed
+German-Polish conflict which should be decided in our favor by our army
+in a very short time.
+
+Ciano, who led me out after I took leave of the Duce, summarized
+his impressions of the situation by saying that any discussion over
+possibilities to keep the peace was outdistanced by the course of
+events. No longer the word “peace,” but “victory” would govern his
+action.
+
+                                                               Mackensen
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1823-PS
+
+  Telegram in Cipher (Good)
+  Sent Berlin 27 Aug 1939 00-32 hours
+  Rec Rome same day 02-25
+  Rec Embassy 27 Aug 1939 03-40
+
+                   Deciphering Nr. 403 of 26 Aug 1939
+
+  [illegible pencil mark] For Chief of Agency personally. Sealed
+    matter. Decipher personally. Strictly secret. To Ambassador v.
+    Mackensen personally.
+
+The Reich Minister requests that the following reply of the Fuehrer be
+forwarded to the Duce immediately.
+
+                                 Duce!
+
+I have received the information concerning your final attitude. I
+respect the motives and influences determining your resolution. Perhaps
+it will nevertheless be for the best. Of course, in my opinion,
+this will be true only if the world does not receive any inkling of
+the intended attitude of Italy, at least not till actual fighting
+starts. For this reason I beg you heartily to support my struggle
+psychologically in your press and any other means. I also beg of you,
+Duce, if it is possible for you to force at least England and France to
+immobilize certain parts of their strength, by demonstrative military
+actions, or to keep them in any case, in a state of uncertainty. But
+the most important thing is this, Duce: should, as mentioned, the big
+war start, the situation in the East will be solved, before the two
+Western powers can achieve any success. This winter or at the latest by
+spring I intend to deploy in the West forces at least equal to those of
+France and England. The blockade will be of little effect, especially
+under the altered circumstances in the East and as a result of my
+autarchic preparations. Its danger during the progress of war will not
+increase but decrease. Now I have a big favor to ask you, Duce. You and
+your people could help me most in this hard struggle by supporting me
+with Italian manpower, manpower for industrial as well as agricultural
+purposes. Should you later on in the course of developments be forced
+or be in a position to intervene, the intensified autarchic basis of
+the Reich would be of the utmost importance to you. In reiterating my
+entreaty for the granting of this special favor, I wish to thank you
+for all the efforts you have made in our common cause.
+
+                                                            Adolf Hitler
+
+End of Letter: Schmidt.
+
+       #       #       #       #       #
+
+                                  COPY
+
+Letter of the Fuehrer transmitted telegraphically to his Excellency
+Ambassador v. Mackensen, received at 3:40 o’clock, 27 August 1939, for
+immediate delivery to Il Duce.
+
+                                 DUCE!
+
+                  [Text of message the same as above].
+
+
+                                 PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1828-PS
+
+    Extract from Memorandum Handed to German Foreign Office by Count
+ Magistrati, forwarded by von Weizacker to Ambassador von Mackensen in
+                          Rome 7 August 1939.
+
+2. * * * Above all it must be most _clearly_ and _unmistakably_ stated
+that when the Fuehrer decides that the opportune time to start a war
+has come, Italy is ready to agree a _hundred percent_. If Germany has
+to mobilize, Italy will also do so _at the same time_, since it intends
+to meet its obligations fully and with all its forces. As said already
+before, this should be _clearly_ understood. * * *
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1831-PS
+
+BTSCH/KR
+
+                                  NOTE
+
+On behalf of the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs, VLR Kordt calls
+at 11:15 with the information that two telegrams, numbered 439 and 440
+are on the way to me. The Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs requests
+that I should get in touch with the postal authorities to have these
+telegrams delivered to me with the greatest possible speed. They
+contained the text of two letters by the Fuehrer to the Duce, but I
+was to keep this information to myself. I was to hand these to the
+Duce personally as quickly as possible. When I asked when were the
+telegrams sent off and how long they were which I had to know in order
+to estimate for when to make an appointment with the Duce, Mr. Kordt
+stated that until then only No. 439 had been sent off at 10:30, whereas
+No. 440 was still being in the process of coding. One of the telegrams
+was about half a page long, the other, two. I told Mr. Kordt that I
+would take the necessary steps, but that I had to point out already now
+that one should not entertain any false hopes as to the time that would
+elapse.
+
+At 11:50 the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs calls me up from the
+Reich Chancellery personally and requests me to have the Fuehrer’s
+two letters to the Duce received immediately by telephone, as their
+transmission by telegraph would presumably take too long and then
+to deliver the letters to the Duce with greatest speed. Then the
+telephonic transmission of the text of the two telegrams followed
+immediately.
+
+Immediately afterwards VLR Kordt called me and told me that he had just
+transmitted to us the Fuehrer’s two letters to the Duce by telephone.
+Referring to our previous telephone conversation he asked me to take
+the further steps. I answered that meanwhile the Minister for Foreign
+Affairs has called me personally and that I had already received
+the text of the letters over the telephone through another line. We
+ascertained together that thus the text of these letters has arrived
+here over three routes.
+
+At 12:15, I informed the office RM by telephone that the Duce would
+receive me at 1 o’clock.
+
+After the audience with the Duce, I informed by telephone the Office RM
+at 1:50 about the delivery of the letters, adding that a telegram about
+my conversation with the Duce would be sent immediately.
+
+ROME, 1 September 1939
+
+                                                      (Signed) Mackensen
+
+       #       #       #       #       #
+
+                         Coded Telegram (Copy)
+
+  From Berlin: 3 September 1939, 2:50 hours
+  Arr. Rome: 3 September 1939, 3:00 hours.
+  Arr. Embassy: 3 September 1939, 6:30 hours
+
+                                DECODING
+
+  No. 450 dated 2 September 1939.
+  For High Officials or their representatives in person.
+  Top Secret. To be decoded in person.
+  Top Secret.
+  For the Chief of the Mission for personal and confidential
+    information.
+
+The Italian Ambassador handed to the State Secretary at the Duce’s
+order following copy for the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor and for The
+Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs:
+
+Italy sends the information, leaving, of course, every decision to the
+Fuehrer, that it still has a chance to call a conference with France,
+England and Poland on following basis: 1. Armistice which would leave
+the Army Corps where they are at present. 2. Calling the conference
+within 2-3 days. 3. Solution of the Polish-German controversy which
+would be certainly favorable for Germany as matters stand today.
+
+This idea which originated from the Duce has its foremost exponent in
+France.
+
+Danzig is already German and Germany is holding already securities
+which guarantee most of her demands. Besides, Germany has had already
+its “moral satisfaction.” If it would accept the plan for a conference,
+it will achieve all her aims and at the same time prevent a war which
+already today has the aspect of being universal and of extremely long
+duration.
+
+Duce does not insist on it, but he lays particular emphasis that above
+should be brought to the immediate attention of von Ribbentrop and of
+the Fuehrer.
+
+End of Copy
+
+The answer to the Italian Ambassador was promised by 3 September.
+
+                                Woermann
+
+       #       #       #       #       #
+
+  Telegram Heading in Italian
+  773 S Berlin AW1/2 977 630/626 3/9 2051 Etat--459
+
+  For the Ambassador
+
+I request that the following message from the Fuehrer be forwarded to
+the Duce personally:
+
+Duce
+
+I first want to thank you for your last attempt at a mediation. I would
+have been ready to accept, but only under condition, that there would
+be a possibility to give me certain guarantees that the conference
+would be successful. Because, for the last two days the German troops
+are engaged in an extraordinarily rapid advance in Poland. It would
+have been impossible to devaluate the bloody sacrifices made thereby
+by diplomatic intrigues. Nevertheless, I believe that a way could have
+been found, if England would not have been determined to wage war
+under all circumstances. I have not given in to the English, because,
+Duce, I do not believe that peace could have been maintained for more
+than ½ year or 1 year. Under these circumstances, I thought that, in
+spite of everything, the present moment was better for resistance. At
+present, the superiority of the German armed forces in Poland is too
+overwhelming in all fields that the Polish Army will collapse in a very
+short time. I doubt whether this fast success could be achieved in one
+or two years. England and France would have armed their allies to
+such an extent that the crushing technical superiority of the German
+armed forces could not have become so apparent anymore. I am aware,
+Duce, that the fight which I enter, is one for life and death. My own
+fate does not play any role in it at all. But I am also aware that one
+cannot avoid such a struggle permanently and that one has to choose
+after cold deliberation the moment for resistance in such a way that
+the probability of the success is guaranteed and I believe in this
+success, Duce, with the firmness of a vouch. Recently you have given
+me the kind assurance that you think you will be able to help me in a
+few fields. I acknowledge this in advance with sincere thanks. But I
+believe also--even if we march now over different roads--that fate will
+finally join us. If the National Socialistic Germany were destroyed by
+the Western democracies, the Fascist Italy would also have to face a
+grave future. I was personally always aware of this community of the
+future of our two governments and I know that you, Duce, think the same
+way. To the situation in Poland, I would like to make the brief remark
+that we lay aside, of course, all unimportant things, that we do not
+waste any man in unimportant tasks, but direct all on acts in the light
+of great operational considerations. The Northern Polish Army which is
+the Corridor, has already been completely encircled by our action. It
+will be either wiped out or will surrender. Otherwise, all operations
+proceed according to plan. The daily achievements of the troops are far
+beyond all expectations. The superiority of our air force is complete,
+although scarcely one third of it is in Poland. In the West I will
+be on the defensive. France can here sacrifice its blood first. Then
+the moment will come when we can confront the enemy also there with
+the full power of the nation. Accept my thanks, Duce, for all your
+assistance which you have given to me in the past and I ask you not to
+deny it to me in the future.
+
+                         (Signed) Adolf Hitler
+
+End of message. Cable report is requested
+
+                               Ribbentrop
+
+       #       #       #       #       #
+
+  Rome, 4 September 1939
+  Foreign Berlin
+  No. 418 of 4 September 1939
+  Telegram, secret code procedure (good)
+
+  CITISSIME to telegram No. 495 of 3rd of this month and in connection
+    with telegram No. 414 of 3 September.
+
+
+                               TOP SECRET
+
+Duce remarked during the presentation of the Fuehrer’s message, which
+took place in Ciano’s presence at 0940, that he would forward his view
+point by letter. He explained somewhat as follows, during the ensuing
+conversation of a half an hour: they never had considered in the
+least to let himself be used in an action of arbitration, which had
+as prerequisite the withdrawal of German troops. No man on earth can
+seriously consider the thought as worthy of discussion, to make such
+an offer to troops, which, furthermore, are advancing successfully.
+He refused such ideas with actual indignation, also he would not
+consider the “symbolic withdrawal” suggested by Paris. In view of the
+strong appeal by France to make one last attempt, he had forwarded the
+suggestion under the self-evidence supposition, that the remaining of
+the army corps, where it should be a prerequisite. In this case, if we
+had considered the agreement of the Fuehrer to the suggestion possible,
+he would perhaps even have advised it. However, England, which is
+guilty for the entire development of the German-Polish conflict, did
+apparently not want to let it come to a compromise. He seemed to know,
+that the Polish Ambassador in London still exercised in the last
+minutes a decisive influence on the position at the British Cabinet.
+The declaration by England, which brought about the stage of war, and
+which France followed up the last, only hesitantly, is absolutely
+“diotic,” brought about by people who apparently have never even
+studied a map. For what form should such a war take? It can only be
+waged on water, on land or in the air. Breaking out of the Maginot Line
+on land, over-running of the West Wall would be a hopeless undertaking,
+which will hardly be attempted by the French. Even if our fleet is
+modest, in any case the Navy cannot undertake anything decisive. The
+air force would attempt to drop a few bombs, maybe it would destroy
+this and that installation, but even that has nothing to do with the
+decision, especially if we limit ourselves in the air as well to the
+defensive. In brief, the declaration of war is an absolutely absurd
+undertaking, because the only thing actually left would be the war of
+attrition and that would also be harmful to the one who declares it.
+
+If the Fuehrer’s message says that the Fuehrer and the Duce “would
+now go separate ways”, he is of an entirely different opinion. On
+the contrary, the most complete agreement in respect to methods and
+goal prevails, and especially militarily, he has done everything to
+the last, what the Fuehrer desired of him, and he continues his
+preparation most intensively. In Lybya, the critical month for him is
+September, after which even there, he will be armed for a successful
+defense. Already today, he ties down 400,000 men of the opponent by
+his measures on the Alpine frontier and in Africa. He will send to
+the Fuehrer, via the military attaché (who is invited this evening to
+the home of Gen. Pariani) all the details of his military measures
+with appropriate carbo-graphic material, which he also showed me and
+explained most thoroughly. I can leave the reporting on this to the
+military attaché. I only wish to emphasize the Duce’s remark, that the
+mobilization measures did not only pass without any friction, but also
+that the spirit of those conscripted and of their families, thanks to
+the generous subsidy allotted to them, is excellent.
+
+At the end, the Duce repeated his assurance of every assistance desired
+by us, particularly, in the question of workers and (on a suggestion of
+mine) by the press.
+
+Duce was in a confidential mood.
+
+                                                          /s/ MACKENSEN.
+
+
+                                 PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1832-PS
+
+The Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs called me on the telephone at
+2200 hours from the Reich Chancellery and reported as follows:
+
+According to authentic information, the rumors spreading in Rome,
+by way of the Italian embassy in Berlin, that a relaxation of the
+situation is to be noted and that conferences are being held. We wanted
+to state on the contrary, that just the opposite is true and that
+the situation is getting more serious from hour to hour. “The Armies
+are marching”. It would be good if I would see to it that the rumor
+mentioned above should not be believed by the Duce and Ciano.
+
+                                                   Rome, 27 August 1939.
+
+  to the notice of:                                            Mackensen
+
+  1. B. R. [initialed]
+  2. Military attaché [initialed]
+  3. Naval attaché [initialed]
+  4. Air attaché [initialed]
+  5. to be returned to me.
+     Rome, 27 August 1939.
+       [initialed]
+
+
+                                 PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1834-PS
+
+  FOREIGN OFFICE
+  RAM NO. 56/R
+
+                                                    Berlin, 2 March 1941
+
+                            STRICTLY SECRET
+
+                                Personal
+
+In the inclosure is forwarded, for strictly confidential and purely
+personal information, an extract of a report on my conference with the
+new Japanese Ambassador Oshima in Fuschl on 23 February 1941. These
+statements are of fundamental significance for orientation on the
+general political situation facing Germany in early Spring 1941.
+
+                                                      Signed: Ribbentrop
+
+  To: The German Embassy in
+    Ankara
+    Madrid
+    Moscow
+    Rome (_Quir._)
+    Rome (Vat.)
+
+  The German Legation in
+    Athens
+    Belgrade
+    Bern
+    Budapest
+    Bukarest
+    Helsinki
+    Lisbon
+    Pressburg (Bratislava)
+    Sofia
+    Stockholm
+      one each
+
+       #       #       #       #       #
+
+                                                                   65215
+
+  Enclosure
+  To RAM No. 56/R
+
+STRICTLY SECRET
+
+Extract from the report of the conference of the Reich Foreign Minister
+          with Ambassador Oshima in Fuschl on 13 February 1941
+
+After particularly cordial mutual greetings, the RAM (Reich Foreign
+Minister) declared that Ambassador Oshima had been proved right in
+the policy he had pursued regarding Germany in the face of the many
+doubters in Japan. By Germany’s victory in the west these policies had
+been fully vindicated. He (the RAM) regretted that the alliance between
+Germany and Japan, for which he had been working with the Ambassador
+for many years already, had come into being only after various detours,
+but public opinion in Japan had not been ripe for it earlier. The main
+thing was, however, that they are together now.
+
+Expanding upon the general political situation the Reich Foreign
+Minister declared: The Fuehrer had always looked for an understanding
+with England and he (RAM) had himself been sent to England as an
+ambassador in his time to undertake a last attempt in this direction.
+A certain possibility had existed in the person of King Edward, even
+though it had been doubtful from the beginning whether the king would
+prevail. He (the RAM) had been more than skeptical already at his
+arrival in London, and had considered the chances for an understanding
+as 100 to 1. Thus the war-inciter clique in England had then won the
+upper hand. When he (the RAM) left England, _war was unavoidable_. Then
+when it came to war the Fuehrer decided on a _treaty with Russia_--a
+necessity for _avoiding a two-front war_. Perhaps this moment was
+difficult for Japan. The treaty was, however, in the interest of Japan,
+for the Japanese empire was interested in as rapid a German victory
+as possible, which was assured by the treaty with Russia. Furthermore
+he (the RAM) had made it clear to Stalin as well as to the public
+that the treaty between the Reich and Russia in no way affected the
+German-Japanese relationship. Now the _German-Japanese alliance_ has
+been concluded. Ambassador Oshima is the man who gets credit for it
+from the Japanese side. After conclusion of the alliance the question
+of its further _development_ now stands in the foreground. How is the
+situation in this respect?
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+As for the war against _England_, we had poor weather for our bombers
+during the Fall and Winter to be sure, but in spite of this, heavy
+damage has been done which has had a strongly retarding effect on
+English war production, etc. The bombings would continue in increasing
+measure so that we hope to destroy very much more than America was able
+to replace. We now had air supremacy over the whole continent. The time
+when we should win air supremacy over England would depend on further
+developments.
+
+At sea the commitment of U-boat weapon had thus far been comparatively
+slight; after the end of March the commitment of the U-boat weapon
+would multiply in a short time. Then with the combination Air
+Force-U-Boat weapon we would deal terrible blows to England. The loss
+of tonnage already was making considerable difficulties for the
+English food supply. Meat and fats were already scarce. It was now a
+matter of reducing imports by sinking to a definite level below the
+absolute minimum for English existence. Thereby England’s situation
+would take catastrophic shape overnight. The landing in England is
+prepared; its execution, however, depends on various factors, above all
+on weather conditions.
+
+Concerning _America_, the Reich Foreign Minister went on, it must be
+noted that Roosevelt is the most bitter enemy of Germany and Japan. As
+far as he was concerned he would like to enter the war. However we have
+an interest in keeping America out of the war. Should America enter
+the war in spite of this it could not wage the war militarily at all.
+The vast spaces of the oceans lying between us and America made this
+impossible. In East Asia, America would hardly dare to send its fleet
+beyond Hawaii, as it would then be threatened with destruction by the
+Japanese fleet. In the Atlantic Ocean there is a lack of commitment
+possibilities with the exception of England. Landing in Europe is
+impossible, and Africa also is too far removed. Supply points for the
+fleet and land troops are lacking. This points to the creation of
+American air bases in England for practical purposes. But in an air war
+we are located in a strategically advantageous position with respect to
+England. We could bomb England concentrically from the broad basis of
+the European coast while England had to spread out in fanlike fashion
+in its attacks on Europe and must thereby split up its forces. In an
+air duel--Europe vs. England--Germany would always be superior. We
+believed, however, that it should be possible to keep America out of
+the war by skillfully coordinated politics of the allied powers.
+
+The Fuehrer would beat England wherever he would encounter her.
+Besides our strength is not only equal, but superior to a combined
+English-American air force at any time. The number of pilots at our
+disposal was unlimited. The same was true for our airplane production
+capacity. As far as quality is concerned ours was always superior to
+the English (to say nothing about the American) and we were on the way
+even to enlarge this lead. By order of the Fuehrer the anti-aircraft
+defense too would be greatly reinforced. Since the army had been
+supplied far beyond its requirements, and enormous reserves had been
+piled up (the ammunitions plants have been slowed down because of the
+immense stock of material), production would now be concentrated on
+submarines, airplanes and anti-aircraft guns.
+
+Every eventuality had been provided for; the war has been won today
+militarily, economically and politically. We had the desire to end the
+war quickly and to force England to sue for peace soon. The Fuehrer
+was vigorous and healthy, fully convinced of victory and determined
+to bring the war to a quick and victorious end. To this end the
+cooperation with Japan was of importance. However, Japan, in its own
+interest, should come in as soon as possible. This would destroy
+England’s key position in the Far East. Japan, on the other hand, would
+thus secure its position in the Far East, a position which it could
+acquire only through war. There were three reasons for quick action:
+
+1. Intervention by Japan would mean a decisive blow against the center
+of the British Empire (threat to India, cruiser-warfare, etc.). The
+effect upon the morale of the British people would be very serious and
+this would contribute toward a quick ending of the war.
+
+2. A surprising intervention by Japan was bound to keep America out
+of the war. America, which at present is not armed as yet and would
+hesitate greatly to expose her Navy to any risks West of Hawaii, could
+do this even less so in such a case. If Japan would otherwise respect
+the American interests, there would not even be the possibility for
+Roosevelt to use the argument of lost prestige to make war plausible
+to the Americans. It was very unlikely that America would declare war
+if it then would have to stand by helplessly while Japan takes the
+Philippines without America being able to do anything about it.
+
+3. In view of the coming new world order it seems to be in the
+interest of Japan also, to secure for herself already during the war
+the position she wants to hold in the Far East at the time of a peace
+treaty. Ambassador Oshima agreed with me entirely and said that he
+would do everything to carry through this policy.
+
+The Reich Foreign Minister mentioned further that, if America should
+declare war because of Japan’s entry into the war, this would mean that
+America had had the intention to enter the war sooner or later anyway.
+Even though it would be preferable to avoid this, the entry into the
+war would, as explained above, be by no means decisive and would not
+endanger the final victory of the countries of the Three-Power Pact.
+The Foreign Minister further expressed his belief that a temporary lift
+of the British morale caused by America’s entry into the war would be
+cancelled by Japan’s entry into the war. If, however, contrary to all
+expectations, the Americans should be careless enough to send their
+Navy in spite of all, beyond Hawaii and to the Far East, this would
+represent the biggest chance for the countries of the Three-Power
+Pact to bring the war rapidly to an end. He, the Foreign Minister,
+is convinced that the Japanese fleet would then do a complete job.
+Ambassador Oshima replied to this, that, unfortunately he does not
+think the Americans would do it, but he is convinced of a victory of
+his fleet in Japanese waters.
+
+The Minister for Foreign Affairs further explained that closest
+cooperation was required for the common waging of the war, particularly
+as far as intelligence service and press were concerned. The
+cooperation with the Italians is already exemplary; the same is true
+for the cooperation with Rumania, Hungary and Slovakia. The press,
+radio, etc. of these countries were already so synchronized with each
+other that they form one single weapon. The same kind of close contact
+must be established with Japan. The Ambassador welcomed this and
+intends to set up a program with our men determining how our Japanese
+propaganda can be most effectively intensified in all fields.
+
+Ambassador Oshima explained that when the Three-Power Pact was
+concluded, various opinions were still present in Japan. It was then
+that the Emperor intervened with an edict. It must be stated, however,
+that, impressed by the German victory in the West, the Japanese people
+are now entirely for the Three-Power Pact.
+
+Ambassador Oshima remarked further that in Japan, under the
+influence of the events, the hard feelings against America had risen
+considerably. The Reich Foreign Minister referred to the recent
+statement of Nomura, the Japanese Ambassador in the U.S.A., concerning
+Japan’s attitude in case of America’s entry into the war, and mentioned
+that he considered it appropriate to talk plain language with the
+U.S.A. Ambassador Oshima remarked hereto that the Japanese Ministry of
+Foreign Affairs had given instructions to that effect. The Minister for
+Foreign Affairs pointed out that particularly in view of the desire
+to keep America out of the war, plain language must be used. Only if
+the U. S. realized that they were confronting firm determination,
+would they hold back. The people in the U. S. did not like National
+Socialism. However, they were not willing to sacrifice their sons and
+therefore were against an entry into the war. The American people felt
+instinctively that they were drawn into the war for no reason, by
+Roosevelt and the Jewish wire-pullers. Therefore, our politics with
+the U. S. should be plain and firm, but, of course, not aggressive. In
+the U. S. they must realize that Germany, Italy and Japan had no hard
+feelings for the American people, but that should the U.S.A. have any
+aggressive desires, they would confront an iron front of determined
+people, a front, at that, which includes practically the whole world.
+One would therefore have to work in close cooperation against the
+attempts of misrepresentation by the British propaganda. As far as
+speeches and addresses of a principle nature are concerned it would be
+necessary to keep up a continuous exchange of ideas. In this connection
+the Minister for Foreign Affairs referred to a recent remark by
+Matsuoka concerning Japanese willingness to act as mediator for peace
+negotiations. This remark had been extensively exploited by the enemy
+propaganda.
+
+The Reich Foreign Minister continued by saying that it was Japan’s
+friendship which had enabled Germany to arm after the Anti-Comintern
+Pact was concluded. On the other hand, Japan had been able to penetrate
+deeply into the English sphere of interest in China. Germany’s victory
+on the continent has brought now, after the conclusion of the Three
+Power Pact, great advantages for Japan. France, as a power, was
+eliminated in the Far East (Indochina). England too was considerably
+weakened, Japan had been able to close in steadily on Singapore. Thus,
+Germany had already contributed enormously to the shaping of the future
+fate of the two nations. Due to our geographical situation we should
+have to carry the main burden of the final battle in the future, too.
+If an unwanted conflict with Russia should arise we should have to
+carry the main burden also in this case. If Germany should ever weaken,
+Japan would find itself confronted by a world-coalition within a short
+time. We were all in the same boat. The fate of both nations was being
+determined now for centuries to come. The same was true for Italy. The
+interests of the three countries would never intersect. A defeat of
+Germany would also mean the end of the Japanese imperialistic idea.
+
+Ambassador Oshima definitely agreed with these statements and
+emphasized the fact that Japan was determined to keep its imperial
+position. The Reich Foreign Minister then discussed the great problems
+which would arise after the war for the parties of the Three Power
+Pact from the shaping of a new order in Europe and East Asia. The
+problems arising then would require a bold solution. Thereby no
+overcentralization should take place, but a solution should be found
+on a basis of parity, particularly in the economic realm. In regard
+to this the Reich Foreign Minister advanced the principle that a
+free exchange of trade should take place between the two spheres of
+interest on a liberal basis. The European-African hemisphere under the
+leadership of Germany and Italy, and the East-Asian sphere of interest
+under the leadership of Japan. As he conceived it, for example, Japan
+would conduct trade and make trade agreements directly with the
+independent states in the European hemisphere, as heretofore, while
+Germany and Italy would trade directly and make trade agreements with
+the independent countries within the Japanese orbit of power, such
+as China, Thailand, Indochina, etc. Furthermore, as between the two
+economic spheres, each should fundamentally grant the other preferences
+with regard to third parties. The Ambassador expressed agreement with
+this thought.
+
+The Reich Foreign Minister then touched upon the question, explicitly
+pointed out as theoretical, that the contracting powers might be
+required, on the basis of new affronts by the U.S.A., to break off
+diplomatic relations. Germany and Italy were fundamentally determined
+on this; after signing of the Three-Power Pact we should proceed if
+the occasion arises, but also jointly in this matter. Such a lesson
+should open the eyes of the people in the U.S.A. to the situation
+and under certain conditions bring about a swing toward isolation in
+public opinion. Naturally a situation had to be chosen in which America
+found herself entirely in the wrong. The common step of the signatory
+powers should be exploited correspondingly in propaganda. The question,
+however, was in no way acute at the time.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1835-PS
+
+Urgent. To Ambassador:
+
+  Fuehrer and RAM request you immediately to transmit the following
+  letter by Fuehrer to Duce.
+
+Report execution.
+
+Berlin, 28.3.41. 0,5 -
+
+Duce, events force me to give you, Duce, by this quickest means, my
+estimation of the situation and the consequences which may result from
+it.
+
+1. From the beginning, I have regarded Yugoslavia as a dangerous factor
+in the controversy with Greece. Considered from the purely military
+point of view, German intervention in the war in Thrace would not be at
+all justified, as long as the attitude of Yugoslavia remains ambiguous
+and she could threaten the left flank of the advancing columns, on our
+enormous front.
+
+2. For this reason, I’ve done everything and honestly have endeavored
+to bring Yugoslavia into our community bound together by mutual
+interests. Unfortunately these endeavors did not meet with success,
+or they were begun too late to produce any definite result. Today’s
+reports leave no doubt as to the imminent turn in the foreign policy of
+Yugoslavia.
+
+3. I don’t consider this situation as being catastrophic but
+nevertheless a difficult one, and we, on our part, must avoid any
+mistake if we do not want, in the end, to endanger our whole position.
+
+4. Therefore, I have already arranged for all necessary measures in
+order to meet a critical development with necessary military means.
+The change in the deployment of our troops has been ordered also in
+Bulgaria. Now I would cordially request you, Duce, not to undertake
+any further operations in Albania in the course of the next few days.
+I consider it necessary that you should cover and screen the most
+important passes from Yugoslavia into Albania with all available force.
+
+These measures should not be considered as designed for a long period
+of time but as auxiliary measures designed to prevent for at least
+fourteen days to three weeks a crisis arising.
+
+I also consider it necessary, Duce, that you should reinforce your
+forces on the Italian-Yugoslav front with all available means and with
+utmost speed.
+
+5. I also consider it necessary, Duce, that everything which we do and
+order be shrouded in absolute secrecy and that only personalities who
+necessarily must be notified, know anything about them. These measures
+will completely lose their value should they become known.
+
+6. Today I called in the Bulgarian and the Hungarian ministers and
+outlined to them my thoughts on the situation and, with view to
+military developments, to arouse their interest by explaining to both
+of them, the negative and positive effects which would arise for
+them in this case. Since without the aid of Hungary and Bulgaria,
+operations, Duce, cannot develop with the swiftness which might be
+necessary under the circumstances.
+
+If possibly in the course of tomorrow, I will inform you, Duce, more
+thoroughly about all this.
+
+7. Therefore, General von Rintelen will report to you, Duce, tomorrow
+if the weather is suitable for flying and will tell you the military
+dispositions which are being prepared, and which we shall carry out.
+
+Duce, should secrecy be observed as to these measures, then in case
+action on our part should become necessary, I have no doubt that we
+will both achieve a success no less than the success in Norway a year
+ago. This is my unshaken conviction.
+
+Accept my heartfelt and friendly greetings. Yours.
+
+                                                   (Signed) Adolf Hitler
+
+End of letter, Bureau of Minister.
+
+With the directive that Ambassador Mackensen transmit this letter
+tonight to Duce.
+
+                                                      Howel 27.3.41 2400
+
+
+                                 PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1842-PS
+
+  Notes on the discussion of the Reich Foreign Minister Von Ribbentrop
+with the Duce in the presence of Count Ciano as well as the ambassadors
+     von Mackensen and Alfieri, in Rome on the 19th September 1940.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+All the same, Germany had won air superiority, and was bombing England,
+and particularly London, by day and by night, whilst the British
+were at most sending a few planes over Germany at night, in order to
+drop bombs there at random. During the day no British plane dared to
+fly over German territory. Germany, however, was carrying out strong
+reprisal attacks by day as well as by night. On one occasion the German
+Luftwaffe had been ready for a large scale attack as early as August.
+But this attack had to be called off because of bad weather. A really
+large scale attack had not taken place since, because the Fuehrer
+wanted to accept the responsibility for this only when it was certain,
+that such an attack would mean the beginning of England’s destruction.
+Although Germany had merely carried out reprisal bombings from the air,
+their results for England had already been extraordinarily serious.
+With a continuation of these attacks London would be in ruins within a
+short time. The British armament factories had been seriously affected,
+and important ports, such as Portland, had been entirely crippled.
+Moreover, all aerodromes from the South Coast to London had been made
+unusable.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+With regard to Greece and Yugoslavia, the Foreign Minister stressed,
+that it was exclusively a question of Italian interests, the settling
+of which was a matter for Italy alone, and in which Italy could be
+certain of Germany’s sympathetic assistance. But it seemed to us to
+be better not to touch on these problems for the time being, but to
+concentrate on the destruction of England with all our forces instead.
+Where Germany was concerned, she was interested in the northern German
+districts (Norway etc.), and this was acknowledged by the Duce.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+The Reich Foreign Minister further announced a statement by the Fuehrer
+regarding the military part of the Spanish problem, i.e., the conquest
+of Gibraltar. The Spaniards wanted to conquer Gibraltar by themselves.
+But so as to prevent any failure, Germany would provide Spain with
+special troops equipped with special weapons, and a few squadrons of
+planes. The Fuehrer had carefully examined the Gibraltar problem from
+the military point of view, and had come to the conclusion, that the
+conquest of the rock was absolutely possible, but only then, if the
+Spaniards were to be given assistance.
+
+The Reich Foreign Minister then showed the Duce the German map
+regarding the Spanish territorial demands, and this was duly noted by
+the Italian gentlemen. A question which was put to the Duce by the
+Reich Foreign Minister, showed, that the Spanish ambitions did not
+clash with Italy’s in any way. In this connection the Reich Foreign
+Minister announced Serrano Suner’s intention, also to make a visit to
+Rome.
+
+On his return to Berlin, he (the Reich Foreign Minister) intended to
+sign a secret protocol with Serrano Suner, dealing with Spain’s entry
+into the war, as well as the supplying of Spain with the aforementioned
+materials, recognizing the Spanish ambitions, and providing an attack
+against Gibraltar as a declaration of war. The protocol would also
+state, that Spain’s entry into the war would be left to the judgment
+of that country. It had been verbally provided, that Spain would come
+into the war as soon as Franco had completed his preparations, and
+particularly after the German special weapons and troops as well as
+planes had arrived at their destinations in Spain.
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1850-PS
+
+_Filing reference_ 11 C-2 [in ink]
+
+  _Subject_: Negotiation between Obergruppenfuehrer Krueger, Oberst
+    Karmann, Oberst Lorenz, in the Chambers of the Reich Board of
+    Trustees on 8 July 1933.
+
+Oberst Karmann stated that the Armed Forces had so far maintained no
+contact whatsoever with the ex-service men. The only contact which
+the ex-service men have, is the vote of their maintenance at the
+Reich Ministry of Labor. Oberst Karmann intends to establish an
+Ex-service men’s Association for which membership of the SA is laid
+down as a condition. Ex-service men wait for about 3 years from the
+time their active service ends until they obtain a Civil Service
+post. Roughly estimated, they number about 20,000 men. In addition,
+approximately 8,000 non-commissioned officers and men are released
+yearly. The demand for these ex-service men is so great that, for
+example, Oberst Karmann has difficulty in obtaining personnel for his
+establishment. Oberst Karmann, however, wishes to send ex-service men
+compulsorily to the S.A., as soon as this is required by the Chief
+of Training. As a rule, the ex-service men go where they receive the
+best pay. Furthermore, Oberst Karmann explained his ideas on the
+recruitment of non-commissioned officers of the reserve. Forestry
+and customs officials should, for example, do several years military
+service with the Reichswehr. A similar provision should be made for
+officials of other categories. The settling of the question regarding
+the disadvantages of ex-service men in the SA, compared to those
+in the Labor Service has been postponed until a later date. Oberst
+Karmann mentioned that ex-service men, who were not appointed to good,
+regularly paid positions in the S.A. would, when they claimed their
+right to maintenance, be at a great practical disadvantage as regards
+their financial circumstances by reason of their S.A. service. He would
+see that there was official compensation for this.
+
+Berlin, 8 July 1933.
+
+                                                            131 Fl [ink]
+                                                                 C002167
+
+       #       #       #       #       #
+
+  Confidential                                                 5 July 33
+  filing reference [in ink]                                        [ink]
+
+_Discussion with Oberst v. Vietinghoff, Chief of Armed Forces Division,
+                     on Wednesday the 5th July 33._
+
+1. _Leadership of Reich Youth_ [Reichsjugendfuehrung]. The question
+of the powers of the Head of the Reich Youth in connection with
+pre-military training.
+
+I state that, by a decision of the Fuehrer, the spheres of duty of the
+Head of the Reich Youth, the Reich Commissar for Sport and the Chief of
+Training are sharply defined. I sent a draft to Munich to that effect.
+
+2. _Students._ A discussion is taking place today between Oberst v.
+Vietinghoff and Gerullis regarding the question of military sports for
+students. Oberst v. Vietinghoff is of the opinion that these matters
+also should be placed under the control of the Chief of Training.
+
+I mentioned my preliminary negotiations with Herr Schwab, formerly with
+the General Armed Forces Office [AWA-Allgemeines Wehrmachtsamt] who, as
+liaison official on the Staff, was arranging this matter of military
+sports for students on the right lines.
+
+Oberst v. Vietinghoff believes that the Prussian Ministry of Education
+and Public Worship, will make certain difficulties and would very much
+like to take a service-officer into the ministry as technical advisor.
+He suggested Hauptmann von Bernuth for this purpose.
+
+3. I then gave an extensive outline of Bernuth’s duties; he was working
+out the guiding principles for the training of men and the leaders
+for the military camps and schools for leaders in accordance with the
+wishes of the Reich Minister for Defense [Reichswehrministerium] with
+regard to pre-military training, in addition, however, he should make
+the technical preparations for weapon-training. Oberst v. Vietinghoff
+declared himself in agreement.
+
+Hauptmann v. Bernuth is being given a long-term appointment to my
+staff. 002168 131 F2 [ink]
+
+4. _Labor Service._ Military sports in Labor service camps are
+suspended for considerations of foreign policy. Dr. Stellbrecht has
+been to Oberst v. Vietinghoff to inform him that the Labor Service is
+being organized on the wrong lines.
+
+5. _The Office for Defence Policy_ [Wehrpolitisches Amt]. My answer to
+Oberst v. Vietinghoff’s question was that of the “Wehrpolitisches Amt”
+must not interfere with my sphere of duties and that I considered it
+advisable to dissolve it.
+
+Oberst v. Vietinghoff is of the opinion that the “Wehrpolitisches Amt”
+has become superfluous and that all questions relating to military
+sports should again be decided by the Chief of Training.
+
+6. _The budget._ I drew Oberst von Vietinghoff’s attention to the fact
+that the budget question must find its solution through the S.A., that
+it was not advisable for the Reich Ministry for Defence to put the care
+for the budget on behalf of the Chief of Training, for that might cause
+difficulties. I drew attention to Oberst v. Reichenau’s suggestion and
+how it would work out.
+
+Oberst v. Reichenau recommends that the budget adviser to the Chief
+of Training should contact Major Osterkamp, the expert of the Reich
+Ministry for Defense, who is very experienced in these matters. It
+would then be easier to get the budget passed by the Reich Ministry for
+Finance.
+
+I declared myself ready to examine the budget, in conjunction with
+the Reich Ministry for Defense, as soon as it was decided upon.
+Furthermore, the Fuehrer’s demand in Reichenhall that I should train
+250,000 SA men and leaders within a year so that they would be at the
+disposal of the Reichswehr in case of emergency, is the basis on which
+I shall act.
+
+In accordance with this demand of Hitler’s I should have to examine
+the possibilities of instructional training and draw up my budget
+accordingly. Deductions from the budget made by the Reich Ministry
+would not be allowed.
+
+7. The _Reich Trusteeship_. Oberst v. Vietinghoff asked when I was
+taking over the Trusteeship of the Reich, to which I answered that I
+had had a talk with Neuville today and that he had requested me in the
+course of this discussion to go with him the next morning to Minister
+Seldte to obtain information regarding the winding-up of affairs.
+
+Oberst v. Vietinghoff considers this step superfluous, and only
+calculated to cause further delay. I assured him that I was of the same
+opinion.
+
+8. _Branch Leaders_ [Zweigstellenleiter]. I referred to my order to
+the main groups; it is to be left to them to employ Branch Leaders as
+Training Inspectors as they are required. If they were not needed, the
+former Branch Leaders would have to leave their posts.
+
+Berlin, 5 July 1933.
+
+                                                          131 F4 C002170
+
+       #       #       #       #       #
+
+                                 SECRET
+
+                                     Filing Reference 11 C-3 [Ink] Bauen
+
+  Discussion with Reich Defense Minister v. Blomberg on 15 July, 0930
+                                 hours.
+
+1. My note of 13.7 to General v. Blomberg showed both parties that, in
+fact, there had been a misunderstanding in the way the budget question
+was viewed. General v. Blomberg had not been informed that Oberst v.
+Reichenau had tried to have the budget for the Chief of Training of the
+S.A. introduced by the Reich Ministry for Defense.
+
+The Fuehrer’s statement of 12.7 regarding the basic regulations for
+pre-military fitness training for youth, which had been shown to him
+today, had cleared all doubts.
+
+At the last discussion he had merely intended to grant to the Chief of
+Training from his own special Fund for Training purposes, money which
+might possibly be refused by the Reich Minister for Finance. He had
+only wished to offer his services for this purpose, and today agreed
+with me that the Reich Ministry of the Interior should decide upon the
+budget for the Chief of Training and put the case before the cabinet.
+
+2. With a view to a practical solution of the budget problems he
+suggests that a discussion should take place between the Chiefs at the
+beginning of August, in which the Ministers Frick, Schwerin-Krosigk,
+and v. Blomberg should take part; he recommended also that I should
+first have a word with State Secretary Reinhard in the Reich Ministry
+for Finance to smooth the way.
+
+3. General v. Blomberg had me explain to him the forms of training in
+the military camps and requested that the very necessary camouflage
+measures be taken.
+
+4. Relationship of the higher S. A.--Fuehrerkorps to the Reich Ministry
+for Defense. Berlin, 15.7.33.
+
+                                                                C002171.
+
+       #       #       #       #       #
+
+  Ki/Eg                                            Berlin, 1 Sept. 1933.
+
+                            Filing Reference
+
+  Subject: Enrollment in the SA of members of the Reichswehr who are
+    due for release.
+
+                                               for the archives [in ink]
+
+Discussion (1.9. 1933/0936 hours) between _Oberst Hinria_ and Hauptmann
+von Wolf (general section and Armed Forces Section of Reich Ministry of
+Defense) on the one hand and Stabsfuehrer Waehmann and Adjutant Kiefer
+on the other.
+
+_Oberst Hinria_ expressed the wishes of the members of the Reichswehr.
+The latter wish, on entering the SA after their demobilization to
+receive a rank corresponding to their last appointment. They consider
+it inadvisable that, _for example_ a non-commissioned officer on
+entering the SA should have, as his superior in rank, a man who was
+formerly under him.
+
+As opposed to this, Stabsfuehrer Waehmann holds that this idea is
+contrary to the spirit and the service instructions of the SA, for it
+is a demand which is particularly stressed in the SA that one should
+place oneself voluntarily under the orders of another.
+
+With regard to the Unions [Treubuende] the commonly held opinion is
+voiced that their main purpose was to prevent the members of the
+Reichswehr due for release from going over to the left. After the
+assumption of power, since this danger was averted, this purpose will
+no longer be held good in future. Nevertheless, Oberst Hinria advocates
+their continued existence, for the reasons stated below.
+
+_Suggestions for a temporary solution_: In future the Reichswehr will
+presumably only be recruited from members of the S.A. Thus the men
+being demobilized, will automatically return to the S.A. Therefore, the
+solution for this period is simple.
+
+  Filing reference [in ink]                              131 Gi [in ink]
+
+       #       #       #       #       #
+
+                                 SECRET
+
+                            Filing reference
+
+                                                         11 C-5 [in ink]
+
+ _Discussion with State Secretary Reinhard, Reich Ministry for Finance
+                        on the morning of 18.7_
+
+1. I reported to State Secretary Reinhard on the whole question of the
+budget for the new sphere of duties assigned to Chief of Training; I
+also asked that the further payment of the budget funds granted by the
+Reich Ministry for Finance and belonging to the Reich Trusteeship,
+since dissolved, should be cleared up for the current financial year.
+
+2. Preliminary examination of the supplementary budget drafted by me
+for the financial year 33/34 and an additional demand of approximately
+25 millions.
+
+State Secretary Reinhard considers it very difficult under the
+circumstances to carry through the supplementary budget for the current
+financial year. He was informed that the Reich Ministry for Finance
+wishes to dispose of the funds granted from the Reich Trusteeship,
+but on the other hand considers it necessary that the discussion of
+Chiefs mentioned by General v. Blomberg should take place between the
+Ministries. Taking the long view, State Secretary Reinhard believes
+that the estimated budget could still be approved if the unemployment
+problem were solved in the autumn. This is in his opinion a preliminary
+condition.
+
+In addition, however, Finance Minister Krosigk had the matter of
+the budget in his own hands, for he [Reinhard] has to solve all the
+problems relating to unemployment.
+
+  Berlin, 18 July 1933.
+
+[illegible initials] R. [ink]
+
+                                                      131 E (1) [in ink]
+
+       #       #       #       #       #
+
+                                 SECRET
+
+                                                   11 C-4 [in ink] Bauen
+
+                            Filing Reference
+
+ _Discussion with Ministerial Director Gerullis, Prussian Ministry for
+           Public Worship and Instruction, on 17 and 18.7.33_
+
+1. Gerullis is fundamentally of the opinion that all military sports in
+the colleges and universities should be in the hands of the Chief of
+Training. He declared himself to be in agreement with my suggestion to
+take onto my staff as liaison officer a Student Leader who is still to
+be nominated, (Schwab or Krueger) and who, according to my suggestion,
+is to be responsible for all training in military sports.
+
+In addition it is necessary for carrying this out further, that the
+S.A. Leaders etc., at present appointed as instructors in military
+sport in the Colleges and universities, should once again be summoned
+to a special course in order to do their training on the new lines.
+Gerullis suggests Councillor Ministerialrat Haupt, present at today’s
+discussion, as representative for Prussia. [3 illegible words in ink
+and illegible initials follow]
+
+2. From 1 October, five officers of the General Staff are to be
+appointed for 3 years to the Universities of Koenigsberg, Breslau,
+Berlin, Cologne, and Frankfurt-on-Main to teach military tactics, leave
+of absence being granted for that period.
+
+
+ (Regulars, 5 senior Staff officers for this) [marginal note in pencil]
+
+They will give lectures on military tactics in those universities.
+On 1 September these gentlemen will be brought to Berlin and will
+make contact with the Chief of Training. Questions regarding Military
+Training are to be cleared up with me by these gentlemen. This ruling
+is the joint decision as mentioned by Oberstleutnant Weissenberger, who
+also took part in the discussion of the Reich Ministry for Defense and
+the Prussian Ministry for Public Worship and Education.
+
+3. With regard to the former soldiers of the Reichswehr _now_ united
+in the Unions it was said: The SA has no interest in incorporating the
+Unions, for all elements who do not believe firmly in the principles of
+the new idealogy, are unwanted. (There is also no power of authority
+over these unions). _The troop commanders should, however, be
+guaranteed authoritative influence over the unions in their commands._
+They should then see to it that:
+
+1. All those who have hitherto been members of the Unions, who are
+suitable by reason of their ideology, are incorporated into the S.A.
+
+2. That the members of the Reichswehr due for release in the future
+continue to join the unions which are under the supervision of the
+Commanders, but are without exception incorporated into the SA. The
+necessary foundations for this enrollment are to be laid immediately
+upon entry into the Reichswehr and also constantly during military
+service.
+
+Oberst Hinria has also set up for future use the following organization
+and order of service:
+
+1. SA with preparation for the Reichswehr.
+
+2. Period of service with the Reichswehr.
+
+3. Re-entry into SA after release.
+
+4. Transfer to the S.A. Reserve [SA--Handwehr] after the age of 45.
+
+(Expansion of the Kyffhaeuser Union to form the SA Reserve.)
+
+                                          [illegible pencilled initials]
+                                                        131 G 2 [in ink]
+
+       #       #       #       #       #
+
+Personal [in pencil]
+
+Ch 25/4/33 [in ink] [Illegible initials]
+
+                                                         11C- 7 [in ink]
+                                                       5 September 1933.
+
+  To the Chief of Naval Command for the attention of Konteradmiral Dr.
+    N. C. Gross.
+
+                                                          _Berlin W. 10_
+                                          Koenigin Augustastrasse 38-42.
+
+K/Kl.
+
+Sir:
+
+I am very much obliged for the dates of the Fleet Maneuvers sent to me
+at the request of the Chief of Naval Staff [Chf der Marineleitung].
+
+On the 17th inst. I shall go on board in Pillan punctually at 1200 and
+will take the liberty of reporting in good time when and where, I shall
+be arriving in Pillan, for before that I shall probably be on a duty
+visit in East Prussia.
+
+I take this opportunity of expressing a personal wish.
+
+The Chief of Staff, Oberstleutnant Roehm, informed me that he will
+also be present at the Fleet Maneuvers. I should be very grateful if
+I could go on board the same cruiser, for I think that particularly
+with regard to the whole question of the training of Naval-SA units, my
+presence might be of value. Since the problems relating to this are my
+responsibility, it would be a great advantage to me, if the opportunity
+were offered me, to discuss the question and all its complications with
+the Chief of Staff. In Nurnberg I took the opportunity of discussing
+the matter with Korvettenkapitaen Kieseritzky, who is assigned to
+my staff. Korvettenkapitaen Kieseritzky believes, however, that it
+is unlikely that my request will be fulfilled on account of the
+distribution already on hand.
+
+For this reason, Sir, I am again applying directly to you.
+
+Perhaps Korvettenkapitaen Kieseritzky could inform me briefly whether
+my request can be granted.
+
+Your very faithfully,
+
+                                                             Heil Hitler
+                                                            K. [Krueger]
+                                                     Obergruppenfuehrer.
+                                                 C--2177 131 D2 (in ink)
+
+       #       #       #       #       #
+
+_For filing_ 11C-8
+
+                                        received 31.10.33 Initials [ink]
+
+                                 SECRET
+
+                            Filing reference
+
+1. The speech delivered by the Fuehrer to the SA leaders on the evening
+of Tuesday the 17.10, has induced me to bring up for decision by the
+Chief of Staff, the question, as to whether it is right that the SA
+training in the Army of the Reich should be continued. In the clearly
+expressed declaration of the Fuehrer there might be lost a suggestion
+of apprehension, if we trained the SA in the Reichswehr; informers and
+spies might have the opportunity of passing information regarding that
+training to our foreign political opponents.
+
+The Chief of Staff intends to decide this question before the
+Gruppenfuehrer at the Gruppenfuehrer discussion on 23.10, while I am
+commissioned to discuss the decision intended at the Reich Ministry
+for Defense. If the Reich Minister for Defense assumes complete
+responsibility for the resulting consequences, the Chief of Staff
+agrees to the training of the SA in the army.
+
+I informed Hauptmann von Dernuth on 18.10 of this wish of the Chief of
+Staff, with the request that he would inform Oberst von Reichenau to
+that effect, and obtain the decision of the Reich Minister for Defense.
+
+On 19.10, 1100 hours, Oberst von Reichenau asked me to attend a
+discussion during which this question was approached again. Oberst
+von Reichenau drew attention to the fact that, to reject the training
+of the SA in the Army of the Reich, by this decision of the Chief of
+Staff, would mean that the training by special courses would also be
+a thing of the past and also the entire training in frontier-guard
+duties would be rendered impossible. I replied that, with regard to
+the questions of frontier protection, no conversation had taken place
+between the Chief of Staff and myself. This point would therefore need
+special consideration.
+
+       #       #       #       #       #
+
+                                                        C002177/1 P.T.O.
+
+Filing reference [in ink]
+
+The Chief of Staff is placing the decision with the Reich Minister for
+Defense, who, for his part, bears the responsibility for the training
+of the SA in the Army of the Reich.
+
+The clearly-expressed speech of the Fuehrer on 17.10 caused the Chief
+of Staff to clear up the question of responsibility in such a way as to
+leave no room for doubt; for this reason it was absolutely necessary
+that the Reich Minister for Defense should make inquiries of the
+Chancellor.
+
+If the Reich Minister for Defense assumed full and complete
+responsibility for the training in the Army of the Reich, the Chief of
+Staff saw no reason to cease training the SA in the Army.
+
+II. Oberst von Reichenau showed me the letter written by
+Obergruppenfuehrer von Jagow to the Reich Minister for Defense by
+way of reply to the complaint made by the Reich Minister for Defense
+regarding Obergruppenfuehrer von Jagow.
+
+Since it was possible to misinterpret the wording of von Jagow’s
+letter, I repeated to Oberst von Reichenau the remarks I had made to
+Jagow, which the Reich Minister for Defense made in my presence. It
+appeared that Obergruppenfuehrer von Jagow had had the opportunity
+on the occasion of his visit to Berlin on 17.10, to speak to
+Korvettenkapitaen von Langsdorff at the Reich Defense Ministry on the
+suspension of weapon training in the SA camps. A remark made by Jagow
+on this subject, which was quite unimportant and only reached Minister
+von Blomberg in the course of a report, was the reason for Minister von
+Blomberg’s complaint regarding Obergruppenfuehrer von Jagow.
+
+Oberst von Reichenau remarked that there had been a misunderstanding
+on the part of the Reich Minister for Defense and, after examining
+the facts, he was of the opinion that the complaint made by the Reich
+Minister for Defense about Obergruppenfuehrer von Jagow, which was
+reported by word of mouth to Obergruppenfuehrer Krueger had been
+unnecessary.
+
+                                                               C002178/1
+
+Reich Minister for Defense von Blomberg would now feel induced to write
+to Jagow.
+
+III. Discussion regarding the appointment of personnel to the Reich
+Ministry for Defense.
+
+IV. Discussion about the case of von Reichenau, von Obernity, and
+Gruppenfuehrer Franken. It so happened that, through Hauptmann
+Fenchtlinger, Nurnberg, a conversation between himself and
+Gruppenfuehrer von Obernity has come to the knowledge of the ministry.
+
+Oberst von Reichenau is very anxious that this misunderstanding should
+be removed. He will therefore write a personal letter to Gruppenfuehrer
+von Obernity.
+
+Berlin, 19 October 1933.
+
+                                                         /s/     Ringen.
+                                                               C002179/1
+
+
+                                 PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1851-PS
+
+                      THE NEW GERMANY SPEAKS HERE
+
+              Book 11, Reichsfuehrer SS HEINRICH HIMMLER.
+
+ The Security Squadron as an Anti-Bolshevist Battle Organization. 1936.
+
+    Central Publishing House of the NSDAP., Franz Eher, Succ. Munich
+
+
+                               OBEDIENCE.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+[Page 23, line 31 to page 24, line 27]
+
+The fourth directive and virtue, which applies to us, is that of
+obedience; of obedience, which arises unconditionally through
+the highest spontaneity, through the service to our ideology
+[Weltanschauung], which is ready to make every necessary sacrifice of
+pride, superficial honors and of everything, which is dear and valuable
+to us; of obedience, not hesitating once, but following every order,
+which is given by the Fuehrer, or has lawfully been given by one of
+the superiors; the virtue of obedience, which keeps silent even during
+the time of the political fight, when the will of freedom believes
+to have to rise indignantly, which, with wide-awake senses and with
+strict attention toward the enemy, does not raise a finger, which also
+obeys unconditionally, and goes over to the attack, even if it should
+believe, in its heart, that it cannot conquer.
+
+We are so honest, that we do not claim about ourselves, that all these
+laws are understood by the very last man, and in their last deepest
+sense. But we believe to be able to claim, that now for six years, the
+SS has generally assembled according to these directives, was organized
+and lives according to them. We know, that year for year, we will
+accept more of these virtues, and that they will more and more become
+the natural property of every SS man. We are convinced, when fate
+determines sooner or later, that as the first generation of the SS, we
+are no more, then we can hand down these virtues as a full heritage, as
+the best tradition to those, who are SS men after us.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+[Page 28, line 17 to page 29, line 9]
+
+
+                             BLOOD and SOIL
+
+I, as Reichsfuehrer SS, who am myself a peasant according to ancestry,
+blood and being, would like to state this second fact in front of
+you, German peasants: The idea of blood, advocated by the SS from
+the beginning would be condemned, if it were not tied eternally
+with the conviction about the value and holiness of the soil. From
+the beginning, the Race and Settlement Main Office [Rasse- und
+Siedlungs-Hauptamt], has incorporated the term “Blood and Soil” in its
+name, although with different words, but in the same meaning. I can
+assure you, that it is not a coincidence, that the Reich Leader of
+Peasants [Reichsbauernfuehrer des Deutschen Reiches] has belonged to
+the SS as a leader for years, and that he, as a SS Lt. Gen. is Chief of
+its Race and Settlement Main Office, as much as it is no coincidence,
+that I am a peasant, and belong to the Reich Council of Peasants
+[Reichsbauernrat]. Peasants and SS men both do not belong to those
+kind of men, who speak superfluously many kind and friendly words. But
+let it be said here clearly and plainly, as it was until now, so it
+should be according to our will in the future. Wherever Adolf Hitler’s
+peasants stand, they shall always have the SS at their side as their
+most faithful friend, just as we know, that wherever Adolf Hitler’s
+SS stands, it will have at its side the German peasant as its best
+friend and comrade. That is how it is today, and that is how it will be
+forever.
+
+[Page 29]
+
+I know that there are some people in Germany who become sick when they
+see these black coats; we understand the reason for this and do not
+expect that we shall be loved by too many. All those who love Germany
+close at heart will and shall respect us; those who shall fear us, in
+any way or at any time, must have a bad conscience toward the Fuehrer
+and the nation. For these persons we have established an organization
+called Security Service, and likewise, we the SS, place the men for the
+service in the Secret State Police. We shall unremittingly fulfill our
+task, the guaranty of the security of Germany from the interior, just
+as the Wehrmacht guarantees the safety of the honor, the greatness, and
+the peace of the Reich from the exterior. We shall take care that never
+again in Germany, the heart of Europe, will the Jewish-Bolshevistic
+revolution of sub-humans be able to be kindled either from within or
+through emissaries from without. Without pity we shall be a merciless
+sword of justice for all those forces whose existence and activity we
+know on the day of the slightest attempt, may it be today, may it be in
+decades or may it be in centuries.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+[Page 31]
+
+Every one of us knows, that he does not stand alone, but that this
+tremendous force of two hundred thousand men, who are bound together by
+oath, gives him unmeasurable strength, and he knows as well, that he,
+as a representative of the black corps, must do honor to this community
+by his best performance at his place. Thus we assemble and march
+according to unalterable laws as a national socialist, soldierly order
+of distinctly Nordic men, and as a sworn community, of its clans, on
+our way into a far future, and we wish and believe, that we do not only
+want to be the descendants who fought it out better, but above that the
+ancestors of later generations, necessary for the eternal life of the
+German, Germanic people.
+
+
+                                 PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1852-PS
+
+    “THE GERMAN POLICE” by Dr. Werner Best, Pp. 14-20 1940 edition.
+
+_III. LAW._ The conception and formation of “police” law, which governs
+the duties and activities of the “police” in detail, is based on the
+conception of the law and its formation in general.
+
+1. Law. a. The personal-human (individual-human) conception of law.
+
+For the personal-human (individual-human) conception, “law” is only
+that law laid down by those who are concerned with the validity of
+the law or those commissioned by them, in accordance with the rules
+of the fundamental law--the “constitution”--or a legal decree based
+on law, whereas the administrative decree which governs the actions
+of the authorities is not regarded as law. Every action which is not
+based upon the law and does not come within its framework, is wrong and
+illegal, insofar as it concerns individual men, because their agreement
+to such action cannot be stated or supposed.
+
+b. The people’s conception of “Law”.
+
+According to the people’s conception, law is every rule which fulfills
+the unity of the people’s “organs”--organizations and individuals--and
+which is sanctioned or approved by the leaders. There is, therefore, no
+difference between stronger and weaker “rules”, between “constitutional
+Law” and “common law”, between “law”, “orders” and “decrees”, between
+“public” and “private” law. The will of the leaders, in whatever form
+it is expressed whether through law, order, decree, single order or
+collective order, regulation of an organization or regulation of
+competence, etc., administers law and alters all theretofore valid law.
+
+2. “Police” law. There is no written “Police” law of the German Reich,
+which rules the duties and activities of the Police (actual “Police”
+law).
+
+The only government ruling, in which the “police duties” are mentioned,
+without any more detailed specification, is in the Fuehrer’s and Reich
+Chancellor’s decree concerning the appointment of the Chief of the
+German Police and Reich Ministry of the Interior, dated 17th June 1936
+(Reichsgesetzblatt I, p. 487):
+
+  For the unification of the police duties in the Reich, a chief of
+  German Police of the Reichs Ministry of the Interior is appointed
+  who will be commissioned with the leadership and organization of
+  all police matters in the administrative sphere of the Imperial and
+  Prussian Ministry of the Interior.
+
+The contents of the “police duties”, which in this are specifically
+recognized by the leader as special State duties, must be gathered from
+the written and unwritten “law”, through which the action of the police
+is at present determined.
+
+a. The written “police” law.
+
+Written “police” law, which governs the duties and activities of the
+“police” exists at present only as common law of the individual German
+states. As an example, the Prussian Police Administration Law of
+1.6.1931 (Prussian Law Manual, p. 77) is referred to.
+
+The extent to which this written law can still be regarded as valid,
+evolves upon two points of view, insofar as differences of common law
+definitions can be established, firstly, to exercise duties uniformly
+in the German Reich, different rules in different districts cannot be
+recognized; secondly, in differences of common law, the laws drawn
+up by the national socialist regime take precedence over the laws of
+earlier times which are still valid.
+
+The most important national socialist ruling on duties for a part of
+the “police” is contained in the Prussian Law of 10.2.1936 (Prussian
+Law Manual, p. 21) about the Secret State Police. Clause 1 of this law
+reads:
+
+  The Secret State Police has the task of investigating and combatting
+  all activity dangerous to the state within the whole territory
+  of the state, of collecting and evaluating the results of the
+  investigations, of giving information to the government of the state,
+  of keeping other authorities posted as to facts important for them,
+  and of supplying them with suggestions. The Chief of the Secret State
+  Police in agreement with the Minister of the Interior decides what
+  individual matters come within the sphere of the Secret State Police.
+
+  The sphere of competence of the organs of the ordinary administration
+  of justice remains unaffected.
+
+Thus the “police” task for a branch of the “police” has been defined
+according to the law of the land, in such a way that it conforms to the
+task which forms the basis of the people’s conception of “police”: the
+safeguarding of national order against disturbance and destruction.
+
+The decree for the protection of people and state of 28.2.1933 (Reich
+Law Publication I p. 83) is to be regarded not as “police” law, i.e.
+as the direction of police duties and activity, but as the expression
+of the changed conception of “state” after the national socialist
+revolution, out of which arose the new conception of “police”.
+Paragraph 1 of this decree reads:
+
+  The articles 114, 115, 117, 118, 123, 124 and 153 of the constitution
+  of the German Reich are annulled until further notice. Therefore
+  restrictions as regards personal freedom, the right of free
+  expression of opinion including freedom of the Press, the right of
+  forming unions and holding meetings, infringements on the secrecy
+  of letter, post, telegraph and telephone communications, orders for
+  house-searches and confiscation of property, as well as restrictions
+  on property, even beyond the limits already fixed by law, are
+  admissible.
+
+By means of this legal statement it was formally made clear at the
+very moment of the revolution, that individual decisions of the law
+valid until then, even of constitutional law, are no longer to be
+used, as they are incompatible with the new conception of “state”;
+since that time countless other legal decisions of the past--even
+those of constitutional law--have been regarded as being no longer
+applicable without formal repeal or annulment, because they are no
+longer compatible with the new constitution of the state. The decree
+of 28.2.1933 for the protection of people and state was not a “legal
+foundation”, i.e. a statement of their duties and their activity,
+but only the confirmation of the fact that the duties which they had
+already begun to undertake were in accordance with the will of the
+highest governing body to set things right.
+
+Both the second clause of the law of 18.3.1938 (Reich Law Publication
+I p. 262) dealing with the reunification of Austria and the German
+Reich and the third clause of the decree of the Fuehrer and Reich
+Chancellor of 22.10.1938 (Reich Law Publication I p. 1453) dealing with
+the administration of the Sudeten-German territories, served as the
+desired formal clarification, in the territories newly acquired by the
+Reich, that the restrictive legal decisions of the past must not stand
+in the way of the fulfilling by the “police” of their duties in Reich
+territory. The first paragraph of both these clauses is practically
+identical and reads:
+
+  The Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police in the Reich
+  Ministry of the Interior can take the necessary measures for the
+  maintenance of security and order (in the decree of 22.10.1938:
+  administrative measures) even beyond the legal limits otherwise laid
+  down for this purpose.
+
+b. The unwritten “Police” law.
+
+Not only the legal regulations drawn up by the national socialist
+regime, but also the whole activity of the German police since the year
+1933 sanctioned by the highest governing body of the Reich--and partly
+on its sole instructions--as well as the rearrangement of the “police”
+regulations, show that the duty of the “police” is conceived by the
+government in the sense represented here, and that any other conception
+of the duty of the “police” can no longer be valid.
+
+Thus all legal definitions which are at odds with this must be
+considered as altered in the sense of this new conception, without
+formal cancellation or alteration of the individual earlier laws. For
+the making of laws as a result of popular “voices” working together,
+of actively operating organizations and of “actively” or “passively”
+cooperating individuals, for the fulfilling of a definite task--here
+the task of the “police”--must not be contradictory in itself, or
+only because an individual law drawn up at an earlier date has not
+been formally altered, and to which laws at variance with the will of
+the government remain tied. At an early date this conception became
+evident in the administration of justice of individual German High
+Administrative Courts. The High Administrative Court of Saxony has
+already explained in a decision of 18.1.1935 (published in the Reich
+Administrative Publication of 1935, p. 117 ff.):
+
+  According to it (the national socialist conception of state and law),
+  law is not the sum total of the single regulations expressly laid
+  down by the legislator. Legislation is rather only the expression of
+  the ideas of right which are rooted in the people. Not legislation
+  but these ideas of law (“conceptions of right”), according to which
+  laws are formed in steady development, represent “law” * * * In this
+  sense, “law” as common law, i.e. as the orderly way in which the
+  people lives as a community, is recognized as taking precedence over
+  the statutes themselves.
+
+This means that the orderly or regular way in which the people
+fulfills the “police” task through its “voices”--organizations and
+individuals--is “police” law, which takes precedence over statutory
+law, insofar as this does not reproduce the contents of the “police”
+law which is valid at the time but which belongs to an earlier date and
+has meanwhile been altered.
+
+The unwritten “police” law, i.e. law which is not laid down in
+statutory form, by means of which all “police” action is determined,
+does not however consist of mere “ideas of law” which are “rooted
+in the people”, but of many sorts of regulations which in different
+forms--law, order, decree, single command, general command,
+organizational and competence regulations, etc.--were laid down by the
+highest governing body of the Reich or with its sanction. The “police”
+never acts in a lawless or illegal manner so long as it acts according
+to the rules laid down by its superiors--up to the highest governing
+body. The High Administrative Court of Hamburg rightly states in its
+judgment of 19.11.1937 (published in the Juristischen Wochenschrift
+1937, p. 3335 f.):
+
+  According to its nature, the police must only deal with what the
+  government wants to know is being dealt with.
+
+What the “government” wants to know is being “dealt with” by the police
+is the essence of “police” law, and is that which guides and restricts
+the actions of the police. As long as the “police” carries out the will
+of the government, it is acting legally; should it overstep the will of
+the government, then it is no longer a matter of “police” action, but
+it is a case of a breach of duty by a member of the police.
+
+Whether the will of the government lays down the “right” rules, i.e.
+those possible and necessary for police action--thus the “police”
+law suitable for and beneficial to the people--is no longer a
+question of law, but a question of fate. For actual misuse of the
+“right-to-put-right” on the part of a people’s government, whether it
+consist of harmful severity or of harmful weakness, will be punished
+more surely before history by fate itself with misfortune and overthrow
+and ruin, because of the violation of the “laws of life”, than by a
+State Court of Justice.
+
+[Pages 38-39]:
+
+As the intelligence service of the German National Socialist Labor
+Party, the Security Service has first of all the task of investigating
+and keeping a watch over all forces, events and facts which are of
+importance for the domination of the National Socialist idea and
+movement in German territory. With this task follows that duty laid
+down by the Reich Minister of the Interior--the duty of supporting the
+Security Police--which is fulfilled, so far as it goes, under State
+orders. In support of the task of the Security Police in securing the
+ranks of the German people against interference and destruction of any
+kind, the Security Service has to watch over every sphere of life of
+the German people with regard to the activities of inimical forces and
+the result of state and political measures, and to inform continually
+the competent State authorities and offices about the facts which have
+come to light. Finally, it has to investigate politically and explore
+fundamentally the activities and connections of the great ideological
+arch-enemy of National Socialism and the German people, in order
+thereby to render possible a purposeful and effective fight against it.
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1855-PS
+
+                 ORGANIZATION BOOK OF NSDAP, Page 418.
+
+Bravery is valued by the SS man as the highest virtue of men in a
+struggle for his ideology.
+
+He openly and unrelentingly fights the most dangerous enemies of the
+State: Jews, Free Masons, Jesuits, and political clergymen.
+
+However, by his example, he recruits and convinces the weak and
+inconstant, who have not been able to bring themselves to the National
+Socialistic ideology.
+
+
+                                 PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1856-PS
+
+                 HERMANN GOERING, SPEECHES AND ESSAYS.
+
+   Edited by Dr. Erich Gritzbach, Third Edition. Published by Central
+  Publishing House of the NSDAP Franz Eher Successor, Muenchen. (1939)
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+Excerpt from speech entitled: “We Bear the Responsibility”, delivered
+at an NSDAP demonstration on 3 March 1933, at Frankfurt am Main [page
+27]:
+
+  Fellow Germans, my measures will not be crippled by any judicial
+  thinking. My measures will not be crippled by any bureaucracy. Here
+  I don’t have to give Justice, my mission is only to destroy and
+  exterminate, nothing more! This struggle, fellow Germans, will be
+  a struggle against chaos and such a struggle I shall not conduct
+  with the power of any police. A bourgeoise state might have done
+  that. Certainly, I shall use the power of the state and the police
+  to the utmost my dear Communists, so that you won’t draw any false
+  conclusions but the struggle to the death, in which my fist will
+  grasp your necks, I shall lead with those down there,--those are the
+  brown shirts.
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1857-PS
+
+              _VOELKISCHER BEOBACHTER_, 26 July 1934 p.I.
+
+      The Fuehrer elevates the SS to a standing of an Independent
+                             Organization.
+
+                                                         Munich, 25 July
+
+The Reich Press Office announces the following order of the Fuehrer:
+
+In consideration of the very meritorious service of the SS, especially
+in connection with the events of 30 June 1934, I elevate it to
+the standing of an independent organization within the NSDAP. The
+Reichsfuehrer SS, like the Chief of Staff, is therefore directly
+subordinate to the highest SS fuehrer. The Chief of Staff and the
+Reichsfuehrer SS are both invested with the party rank of Reichsleiter.
+
+Munich, 20 July 1934.
+
+                                                       /s/ Adolf Hitler.
+
+
+                                 PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1861-PS
+
+                1934 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 45
+
+            Law Regulating National Labor of 20 January 1934
+
+The Government of the Reich has decided to enact the following law
+which is hereby made public:
+
+
+                              _SECTION I_
+
+The Leader of the enterprise and the board of employee representatives.
+
+
+                             _Paragraph 1_
+
+The entrepreneur works in the factory as leader of the enterprise
+together with the employees and the workers who constitute his
+followers for the furtherance of the aims of the enterprise and for the
+common benefit of people and state.
+
+
+                             _Paragraph 2_
+
+1. The leader of the enterprise makes the decisions for the employees
+and laborers in all matters concerning the enterprise, as far as they
+are regulated by this law.
+
+2. He is responsible for the well-being of the employees and laborers.
+The employees and laborers owe him faithfulness according to the
+principles of the factory community.
+
+
+                             _Paragraph 3_
+
+1. In the case of legal persons and personal groups the legal
+representatives will be the leaders of the enterprises.
+
+2. The entrepreneur or in the case of legal persons or personal groups,
+the legal representatives can appoint a person who participates in the
+management of the enterprise in a responsible capacity as their deputy.
+This must be done if they do not direct the enterprise themselves. In
+matters of lesser importance they can also appoint another person.
+
+3. Should the court of honor legally deprive the leader of the
+enterprise of his qualifications to be a leader, then a new
+entrepreneur must be appointed.
+
+
+                             _Paragraph 4_
+
+1. Administrations are also considered as enterprises in the sense of
+this law.
+
+2. Subordinate enterprises and parts of the enterprise which are
+connected with the main enterprise through common direction will only
+be considered as independent enterprises if they are situated far away
+from the main enterprise.
+
+3. The regulations of this law, with the exception of paragraphs 32
+and 33, do not apply to Ships, Inland navigation and Air-transport and
+their crews.
+
+
+                             _Paragraph 5_
+
+1. Representatives recruited from the employees and laborers act in an
+advisory capacity to the leader of an enterprise with, in the rule,
+at least 20 employees. They constitute with the leader and under his
+direction the board of representatives of the enterprise.
+
+2. To the employees and laborers in the sense of the regulations
+concerning the board of representatives belong also the persons who
+do piece work at home, who work mainly for the same enterprise either
+alone or with their families.
+
+
+                             _Paragraph 6_
+
+1. It is the duty of the board of representatives to increase the
+mutual confidence within the enterprise-community.
+
+2. It is the task of the board of representatives to discuss
+all measures concerning the improvement of the output, the form
+and execution of the general labor conditions, especially the
+enterprise regulations, the execution and the improvement of
+enterprise-protection, the strengthening of the ties between the
+members of the enterprise among themselves and toward the enterprise
+as well as the welfare of all the members of the community.
+It is furthermore their task to liquidate all quarrels within
+the enterprise-community. They must also be heard prior to the
+determination of punishment for violation of the plant-rules.
+
+3. The board of representatives can charge certain representatives with
+the execution of certain of its tasks.
+
+
+                             _Paragraph 7_
+
+(1) The number of representatives is as follows:
+
+  in enterprises with  20- 49 employees      2
+  in enterprises with  50- 99 employees      3
+  in enterprises with 100-199 employees      4
+  in enterprises with 200-399 employees      5
+
+(2) These numbers are increased by one representative for each
+300 supplementary employees until they reach the maximum of ten
+representatives.
+
+(3) An equal number of deputies shall be designated.
+
+(4) Employees, workers and those who do piece work at home are to be
+considered in the choice of trustees.
+
+                                             The Chancellor of the Reich
+                                                            Adolf Hitler
+
+                                             The Reich Minister of Labor
+                                                            Franz Seldte
+
+                                  The Reich Minister of Economic Affairs
+                                                             Dr. Schmitt
+
+                                           The Reich Minister of Justice
+                                                            Dr. Guertner
+
+                                           The Reich Minister of Finance
+                                               Graf Schwerin von Krosigk
+
+                                          The Reich Minister of Interior
+                                                                   Frick
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1862-PS
+
+                1936 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 887
+
+ Ordinance for the Execution of the Four Year Plan of 18 October 1936.
+
+The realization of the new Four Year Plan--announced by me at the Party
+Congress of Honor--requires homogeneous leadership of all forces in the
+German nation and the strict coordination of all competent authorities
+in Party and State.
+
+The execution of the Four Year Plan, I intrust to Minister-President
+General Goering.
+
+Minister-President General Goering shall take all steps necessary for
+the execution of the task put before him; he is authorized to issue
+decrees of ordinances and general administrative directives. He is
+empowered to receive reports from all governmental agencies, including
+the highest agencies of the Reich and from all Party offices, their
+departments and attached organizations--and issue orders to them.
+
+Berchtesgaden, 18 Oct 36
+
+                                 The Fuehrer and Chancellor of the Reich
+                                                            Adolf Hitler
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1866-PS
+
+  Record of the conversation between the Reich Foreign Minister and the
+    Duce in the Palazzo Venezia on the 13th May 1941, in the presence of
+    Count Ciano.
+
+To begin with the Reich Foreign Minister conveyed the Fuehrer’s
+greetings to the Duce.
+
+He would shortly propose to the Duce a date for the planned meeting,
+which he would like to take place as soon as possible. As the place for
+the meeting he would probably prefer the Brenner. At the present moment
+he was, as the Duce well understood, still busy with the Hess affair
+and with a few military matters, but could be at his disposal after
+that for a meeting.
+
+The Duce replied that he would agree with all the Fuehrer’s proposals
+concerning the place and date of this meeting. That he was prepared
+to go to Germany, to meet him at the Brenner, or to arrange for the
+conversation to take place anywhere else in Italy.
+
+The Reich Foreign Minister then said that the Fuehrer had sent him
+to the Duce, in order to inform him about the Hess affair and the
+conversation with Admiral Darlan about the Hess affair. He remarked
+that the Fuehrer had been completely taken aback by Hess’ action, and
+that it had been the action of a lunatic.
+
+Hess had been suffering for a long time from a bilious complaint and
+had fallen into the hands of magnetists and nature cure doctors who
+allowed his state of health to become worse.
+
+All these matters were being investigated at the moment as well as the
+responsibility of the aides-de-camp who had known about Hess’ forbidden
+flights. Hess had for weeks carried out secret practice flights in a
+M.E. 110. Naturally he had acted only from idealistic motives. His
+being unfaithful to the Fuehrer was utterly out of the question. His
+conduct had to be explained by a kind of mysticism and a state of mind
+caused by his illness.
+
+The Reich Minister went on to say that Hess was undoubtedly convinced
+that England was facing imminent defeat, but that the English could not
+take the step of drawing the necessary conclusions.
+
+Being sympathetically inclined towards England Hess had conceived the
+crazy idea of using Great Britain’s Fascist circles to persuade the
+British to give in. He had explained all this in a long and confused
+letter to the Fuehrer. When this letter reached the Fuehrer, Hess was
+already in England. It was hoped in Germany that he would perhaps
+have an accident on the way, but he was now really in England and had
+tried to contact the former Marquis of Clydesdale, the present Duke
+of Hamilton. Hess quite wrongly considered him as a great friend of
+Germany and had flown to the neighbourhood of his castle in Scotland.
+He had thus carried out his plan at the risk of his life. The Fuehrer
+who was naturally and personally deeply stricken by these events,
+took up a very severe attitude under the circumstances, demoted Hess
+immediately and stated that he would have Hess shot immediately if he
+returned to Germany. The investigation of the event was continuing, but
+it was quite clear that Hess had not acted out of lack of faithfulness
+towards the Fuehrer.
+
+The Duce replied that he was also of the opinion that Hess was no
+traitor. From the political point of view he did not consider the
+results of his action serious. He was wondering what Hess intended to
+say in England. It was said that his first words after being found were
+to the effect that he had always had a great sympathy for England.
+
+Without failing to see that the psychological results of Hess’ flight
+were not slight, one could nevertheless say that the prosecution of the
+war and public opinion in the Axis countries remained untouched by it.
+In 3 or 4 days the whole affair would gradually subside. The question
+arose as to whether anyone in Germany knew about Hess’ attitude to
+England, and whether Hess had perhaps wanted to save England.
+
+The Reich Foreign Minister remarked here that in Germany Hess had had
+supporters mainly among the * * * [illegible] party members, but that
+now every German was wondering how it was possible that Hess could have
+done such a thing. The Fuehrer would want first to see in what way
+enemy propaganda would make use of this affair. Considering England’s
+morale and its situation, Churchill could naturally not use Hess’ peace
+idea as propaganda material; this would immediately cause trouble
+among his own people. The British would probably rather direct their
+propaganda tactics towards making out that they regarded the whole
+event as a sign of discord and internal division and as an outcome of
+an allegedly difficult position of the Reich, and would also maintain
+that Germany would now no doubt have to make peace soon. If it should
+be necessary, the Fuehrer would carry out an energetic counter-attack
+against this propaganda and would, if necessary, summon the Reichstag,
+in order to clarify the whole situation there.
+
+The Duce repeated his unworried view of the affair and remarked that to
+him also it seemed best that the whole truth should be told about the
+whole affair.
+
+Going on to the matter of the talks with Admiral Darlan, the Reich
+Foreign Minister explained to the Duce that two subjects especially had
+been discussed:
+
+  1. the assistance which France could give in Syria for the support of
+     Iraq, and
+
+  2. the facilities she could provide for German-Italian supplies to
+     North Africa.
+
+Darlan had agreed to deliver to Iraq certain quantities of arms and
+war materials out of the stocks stored in Syria under Italian control.
+Part of these arms would, no doubt, already be on their way to Iraq.
+Ambassador Rahn and a French official had flown to Syria and had
+submitted a directive of the Vichy Government to the local Government
+Commissioner, General Deuz, according to which he was to provide all
+the deliveries and other facilities recommended by the two delegates.
+Darlan had, furthermore, put landing places for German aircraft and
+stocks of petrol at their disposal.
+
+At the same time, Ambassador von Papen had been recalled to Germany and
+been instructed, as he, the Reich Foreign Minister, could inform the
+Duce confidentially, to endeavour to obtain from the Turks permission
+for the secret passage of arms for Iraq through Turkish territory.
+
+According to the impression he left, Darlan would certainly do all that
+was possible to help the Axis. Although, of course, one could not
+look into his heart, he yet definitely appeared to be an enemy of the
+English.
+
+Should a large-scale transport of arms reach Iraq it would be possible
+to move airborne troops into the regions, who could then advance
+against the British with the material found there and who could, under
+certain circumstances, attack Egypt from the East from Iraq.
+
+The Duce stated his point of view on the Iraq question:
+
+1. One must definitely help Iraq, as a new front against the British
+would be created in this way and the indignation, not only of the
+Arabs, but also of the great number of Moslems would be aroused.
+Already the Grand Mufti had summoned the Arabs of the world to a
+holy war against England. In answer to an interpellation by the
+German Foreign Minister, the Duce declared that he ascribed a certain
+importance to these events in any case.
+
+2. It would be necessary to get possession of Crete and Cyprus (the
+“anteroom” of Syria). If one could then obtain, from the French,
+permission to land troops and planes in Syria, the Axis powers help
+to Iraq could be very substantial. The Italians had already prepared
+five planes, which would proceed to Baghdad via Rhodes, in order to
+transport their 400 machine-guns, as well as 20 anti-tank guns. In
+addition, 12 fighter planes were ready for action.
+
+Should the passage of arms through Turkey prove impossible, one would
+have to march against England from Syria. The great advantage here lay
+in the 100 km stretch of desert which had to be overcome in the event
+of an attack on Egypt from Syria, as compared with the 500 km stretch
+of desert in the case of an attack on Egypt from the West.
+
+In answer to an interpolation by the Reich Foreign Minister as to how
+long Iraq would be able to hold out against the British, the Duce
+replied that the Head of the Iraq Government had declared that he could
+hold his own against the British, provided only he received some war
+material. If, however, he received no aid, opposition would, in the
+Duce’s opinion, be overcome by the British in 3 or 4 weeks. He was also
+wondering whether the de Gaullist movement in Syria would not perhaps
+put difficulties in the way of French assistance. The Reich Foreign
+Minister replied to that that Darlan appeared convinced that he could
+carry out the business in Syria as planned.
+
+With regard to Tunis, the Reich Foreign Minister, reported on the
+purchase of lorries and the recent concession that these lorries could
+be sent to Tripolitania with freight. Darlan had agreed to place an
+Algerian harbour, Baume, at their disposal for the unloading of the
+materials transported by sea, (as these things could be carried out
+more easily in Algeria than in Tunis). The Reich Foreign Minister also
+mentioned, in this connection, that Darlan had told him that he would
+like it, for personal reasons, if lorries were sold to Germany only.
+Should Italy wish to obtain such vehicles from the French, he proposed
+that the sale should first take place to Germany, and that the trucks
+should then be given by the Reich to Italy. The Duce and Count Ciano
+agreed to this procedure.
+
+In reply to the Duce’s question as to what Germany had conceded to
+France in exchange for these concessions, the Reich Foreign Minister
+pointed to the lowering of the occupation costs from 20 to 15 millions
+which, although it had not yet been definitely fixed, was expected,
+as well as to certain facilities with the regard to the Line of
+Demarcation. Further the rearming of some torpedo boats.
+
+The Fuehrer had laid down as a principle that France could be granted
+facilities to the extent to which she on her part made the war against
+England for the Axis easier.
+
+The Reich Foreign Minister answered the Duce’s question as to whether
+concessions had been made regarding French prisoners of war in the
+negative and mentioned that the Fuehrer had first of all reminded
+Darlan of how the German prisoners of war had only been released in the
+year 1920, when the World War had already been over a long time.
+
+The Reich Foreign Minister further pointed out that he had suggested to
+Darlan that if France should now grant facilities for the continuation
+of the war against England, such an attitude would be taken into
+account when the peace was signed. Furthermore he had stressed to
+Darlan the necessity that France choose now, and place herself
+unambiguously on the side of the Axis. Germany had certain wishes
+concerning naval bases in Morocco for the maintenance of her submarines
+and surface vessels. If France agreed to that, she (Germany) would
+allow her some destroyers to arm, as she had long requested to do.
+Beyond this, Germany did not, for one moment, anticipate assistance
+from France on a larger scale, just as she did not expect the possible
+assistance of the French Fleet against England.
+
+It had been made clear to Darlan that in future the Axis powers would
+be the decisive centre of power in Europe and that France would have to
+toe the line in this respect.
+
+It was also pointed out that France must, of course, count on having
+to make concessions in the Mediterranean in the peace treaty; the
+Italian demands were indeed known to them. She might, however, receive
+compensation for the concessions elsewhere, e.g. in Africa, at the
+expense of England.
+
+In a private tete-a-tete conversation, Darlan declared to the Reich
+Foreign Minister that he wished to assist the Axis powers against
+England under all circumstances, after the Reich Foreign Minister had
+analysed to him the three possibilities which offered themselves to
+France, namely, that France could either work against Germany, in which
+event she would be destroyed, or she could adopt a waiting attitude,
+which, however, would also be to her detriment. Finally she could give
+clear evidence of her will to cooperate with the Axis, and would then
+receive an honourable position amongst the peoples of Europe.
+
+The Duce replied that there were two camps in France, those who
+wanted to wait, and those who were in favour of collaboration. When
+the Yugoslav campaign began, people in France had hoped that it would
+end unfavourably for the Axis. The opinion of French politicians was
+beginning to waver. Typical of the trend of public opinion was the
+fact, that in those days the monument of King Alexander of Yugoslavia
+in France had been decked with flowers by the population. But when the
+French saw how quickly Germany was victorious in the Balkans, they
+immediately turned round towards collaboration again. In Vichy the
+majority belonged to the camp that wanted to await events. Count Ciano
+here added that the only difference between Vichy and Paris was that
+in Paris people were saying: “Let us hope the British win,” whilst
+in Vichy people were saying, “Let us hope those British swine win”.
+To this the Reich Foreign Minister added, that of course chauvinists
+continued to exist in France and would have to be weeded out according
+to a plan yet to be laid down. In his opinion Pétain was an old fox,
+whose memory deserted him just at the moments when it best suited him.
+A few days before, and in connection with the invitation to Admiral
+Darlan to come to the Berghof [Hitler’s residence in Berchtesgaden], he
+had written a letter to the Fuehrer, which factually contained nothing
+of importance, but which nevertheless indicated that in France people
+were gradually becoming more and more certain that the war was finally
+lost. It was the Fuehrer’s opinion that final victory against England
+must under all circumstances be achieved. For this purpose he wanted to
+obtain from France a maximum of facilities, without in any way binding
+himself. The French questions would be dealt with on this basis, and it
+would now have to be seen how far Darlan was prepared to go along this
+road. But, as already stated, France would only be granted concessions
+in proportion to facilities for the battle against England. When the
+French would participate on a large scale in the battle against England
+was still undecided.
+
+To this the Duce remarked that France could give many small, but very
+important bases to the Axis. In this connection he stressed the fact
+that France always drew closer to the Axis when the Axis gained a
+victory. But as soon as things were not making any proper headway, she
+made eyes at England and the United States. The latter, particularly,
+would have to be watched closely in this connection. The Reich Foreign
+Minister agreed with this and remarked that if France was to attach
+herself in any way to the Axis organization, this fact would make a
+deep impression on the United States.
+
+The Duce agreed with this conception, and referred in this connection
+to the policy, expressed by the Fuehrer, of the unity of all Europe
+against England. Russia and Spain were alone absent from this united
+front. Serrano Suner had actually stated that Spain would march after
+this year’s harvest. But this seemed to him to be extremely doubtful.
+To this the Reich Foreign Minister remarked that at the beginning of
+this year Franco had unfortunately left the Axis completely in the
+lurch. This he had to note with regret again and again. If he had
+cooperated at that time, Gibraltar would today not be in the hands of
+the British, and the Spanish people would probably have far more to eat
+than now, when alms from England and America could not save them either.
+
+The Duce returned to his remark concerning the united front of Europe
+against England and the two countries, Spain and Russia, that were
+absent from it, with the remark that, to him, it seemed that it would
+be advantageous if a policy of collaboration with Russia could be
+carried out. He asked the Reich Foreign Minister whether Germany
+excluded such a possibility, i.e. collaboration with Russia. The Reich
+Foreign Minister replied that Germany had treaties with Russia, and
+that the relations between the two countries were in other respects
+correct. He personally did not believe that Stalin would undertake
+anything against Germany. But should he do so, or should he carry out
+a policy that was intolerable to Germany, then he would be destroyed
+within 3 months.--The Duce agreed to this.--The Fuehrer would certainly
+not look for any quarrel, but he had nevertheless taken precautions
+for all eventualities. He had in no way come to any decision, but as a
+result of certain occurrences and want of clearness on the part of the
+Russians, he had become suspicious. Thus, for example, the Russians
+had strengthened their forces along their western Frontier, which of
+course caused Germany to reinforce her troops too, but only after the
+Russians started it.
+
+But Russia would never be a problem that could have any influence on
+the final victory against England. She would never be able to interfere
+with Germany, for Germany had such a large number of troops available
+that she could easily deal with any eventuality.
+
+The Duce then enquired whether Germany was not receiving deliveries
+of raw materials from Russia, whereupon the Reich Foreign minister
+mentioned the figures 1 million tons of oil and 1½ million tons of
+corn, and added that these deliveries were coming in relatively well.
+
+During the further course of the conversation, the subject of Japan,
+and in particular the Japanese-American exchange of opinions, was
+touched upon. In this connection the Reich Foreign Minister stressed
+the fact that the principle that Japan shared a common destiny with
+Germany and Italy had been so clearly understood by the Japanese that
+he (the Reich Foreign Minister), did not think Japan would pursue a
+policy which would not in the end align itself once more with the
+policy pursued by Germany and Italy. In this connection the Reich
+Foreign Minister referred to Matsuoka’s remarks that he was forced into
+frequent manoeuvres for reasons of home politics, and that on occasion
+he might be forced to do things that would not be easily understood in
+Germany. At any rate he (the Reich Foreign Minister) trusted Matsuoka,
+although of course he could not know what was going on inside his
+heart. It was unfavourable that the discussions with Roosevelt were
+being conducted via Admiral Nomura, for at heart Nomura inclined rather
+towards the Anglo-Saxons. Matsuoka had, for the time being, made the
+following further enquiries:
+
+1. Whether the United States were willing to enter into an undertaking
+not to enter into the European conflict, and
+
+2. What was the attitude of the United States on the problem of the
+Philippines.
+
+If against all expectations, Japanese policy should follow a course
+which does not correspond with the spirit of the Tripartite agreement,
+great opposition would certainly arise all over Japan and Ambassador
+Oshima would probably become the soul of such a real revolution. But
+these affairs should be handled carefully, and we should avoid creating
+unnecessary difficulties for Matsuoka.
+
+The whole affair shows that Roosevelt is beginning to get alarmed,
+probably because he is gradually realizing that, in case of warlike
+complications, he can accomplish nothing, because of America’s bad
+armament position, and therefore wishes to keep his back free.
+
+The Duce remarked, in this connection, that it would without doubt be
+favourable to Germany, and Italy if Matsuoka were in this manner to
+prevent the United States entering the war. On the other hand, the
+motive of his actions could, of course, also be Japan’s desire to keep
+out of the war herself.
+
+To that, the German Foreign Minister remarked that, if a forcing
+hand were played and it were laid down that the American system of
+protecting convoys meant war, the Americans would most probably
+hesitate, because American rearmament was the biggest bluff in the
+world’s history.
+
+In this connection the Duce referred to the split which had appeared
+in the United States and quoted speeches by Hoover and Lindbergh as
+the most prominent opponents of Roosevelt’s policy. As against this,
+the Jews and their propaganda were so strong that they had brought the
+whole of America under their influence. But if in a country a War party
+fights against a Peace party the War party usually wins, because war is
+much nearer the soul of man than peace.
+
+The German Foreign Minister replied that the same naturally went for
+Japan as well, and that it was his conviction that sooner or later
+Japan would enter the war on the side of the Axis to exploit the
+opportunities offered. Anyhow he was absolutely certain that Japan
+would meet her treaty obligations.
+
+The Duce went on to speak about Turkey, which he called Germany’s and
+Italy’s trump card. He asked the German Foreign Minister whether he
+believed that Turkey would go with Germany and Italy.
+
+The German Foreign Minister replied that Germany was in the act of
+trying to influence Turkey in this sense. The preliminary conditions
+were favourable, in so much as it was not in Turkey’s interests to let
+great masses of English troops assemble in Iraq, so that Germany hoped
+to be able to draw the Turks over to her side. A certain improvement in
+the attitude of the Turkish press could already be noted.
+
+Later on in the discussion the German Foreign Minister spoke about a
+great intended propaganda drive in the British Empire, with the motto
+that the Axis would support the liberation of all peoples oppressed by
+the British. In this connection he mentioned the presence in Germany of
+the Indian Nationalist leader--Bose--news which the Duce received with
+surprise and great interest. The Duce agreed to this kind of propaganda.
+
+In conclusion, the German Foreign Minister explained the plans
+according to which he intended to employ Bose for Indian propaganda
+and he emphasized that the development of any antagonism between Bose
+and Ghandi should be avoided. Besides, Ghandi had written a very good
+article against the British a short while before.
+
+In conclusion, the Duce mentioned in this connection that Italy was
+in contact with the Fakir of Ipi and was attempting by means of large
+sums of money to get him, as well as the Grand Mufti, to carry on some
+activity in the interests of the Axis. Even if these actions were
+not very extensive, they would nevertheless create some unpleasant
+difficulties for the English.
+
+When parting, the possibility of having another discussion next morning
+shortly before the return flight of the German Foreign Minister, was
+left open.
+
+This discussion took place in a very cordial spirit.
+
+Fuschl, the 14th May 1941.
+
+                                                                SCHMIDT.
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1871-PS
+
+Minutes of the conference between the Fuehrer and the Italian Minister
+for Foreign Affairs, Count Ciano, in the presence of the Reich Foreign
+Minister of Obersalzberg on 12 August 1939.
+
+At the beginning of the conference the Fuehrer with the aid of maps
+explained to Count Ciano the present situation of Germany from the
+military standpoint. He emphasized particularly the strength of the
+German fortifications in the west. There are three break-through points
+in the west at which the French had in former times always attempted
+to break through for geographical and strategic reasons, which have
+now been protected with particular care, so that a break-through
+seems impossible here as well. Moreover, fortifications have also
+been built along the Luxemburg and Belgian borders up to the Dutch
+border, so that a violation of Belgian neutrality would no longer give
+France any military advantages, but would only involve the danger that
+Belgium would join the German side in order to defend her neutrality
+and under pressure from the Flemish part of the population. The only
+remaining possibility of attack is therefore theoretically through the
+Netherlands. But they too would, in the opinion of the Fuehrer, defend
+their neutrality energetically because they would know that if they
+should participate in a general conflict they would lose their East
+Asiatic colonies, which are almost undefended, to Japan. Moreover, the
+Netherlands are completely unsuitable as an assembly area for a large
+army because of the numerous rivers and the possibility of flooding
+large parts of the land which lies below sea level. In case of a breach
+of Dutch neutrality Germany would of course move into the country
+immediately and would have the possibility of reaching the Meuse in a
+few hours because of its proximity to the German border. Besides, the
+Rhine which is 1 to 1½ km wide in Holland offers natural protection
+against attacks from this direction.
+
+The third possibility of attacking Germany is a blockade by the British
+Navy. But it must be kept in mind the ships used for the blockade would
+be attacked from the air from Germany, since all of England is within
+the radius of attack of the German air force, because of the long range
+of the latest German bombers. There are no further possibilities of
+attack on Germany. The Nordic countries would no doubt remain neutral
+and are safe from air attack from any side, since there is hardly any
+question of occupying such large areas as Norway and Sweden. In the
+same way Switzerland would certainly defend her neutrality to the last
+against any invader.
+
+Germany has likewise built strong fortifications in the East. The
+Fuehrer showed Count Ciano the various fortification systems of East
+Prussia (Koenigsberg, Heilsberg triangle, border fortifications).
+On the rest of the German frontier (Grenzmark, Silesia) strong
+fortifications are also being built, which have been developed,
+particularly on the Polish border opposite Berlin, into an impregnable
+system of lines lying one behind the other. Of course the capital is
+exposed to air attacks, since it lies only 150 km from the Polish
+border, particularly since because of its size (28 km north to south
+and 45 km east to west) the city could be bombed from a very great
+altitude (8 to 9,000 meters) without the possibility of attacking
+certain targets but with the certainty that the bombs would hit
+somewhere within the city.
+
+Proceeding to the military situation of the western powers and Poland
+the Fuehrer again pointed out England’s vulnerability from the air.
+Although some progress has been made in air craft production, the
+anti-aircraft defense is still quite backward. It is known that England
+decided on a certain type of anti-aircraft gun only last fall, and we
+have enough experience on the basis of our own 7 years of rearmament
+to know that mass production is possible only a long time after the
+choice of a prototype, so that effective anti-aircraft defense can be
+expected in England only after 1 to 2 years. Moreover, London and other
+great cities and industrial centers have the same disadvantage which
+characterizes Berlin’s position in regard to Polish air attacks: from
+high altitude, out of range of the present English AA guns which are
+left from the war, bombing can be carried out in absolute safety, which
+would be successful in any case in the general target area.
+
+At the present time England has no increase in sea power to record. The
+first units of the ships under construction cannot be put in service
+for some time. As for the land army, 60,000 men have been called up
+since the introduction of compulsory military service. If England
+keeps the necessary troops at home, she will be in a position to put
+at the disposal of France only two infantry divisions and one armored
+division. Furthermore she can transfer a few groups of bombers to
+France but hardly any groups of fighters, since the German air fleet
+would attack England immediately upon the outbreak of war, and the
+English fighter planes would be urgently needed for the protection of
+their own country.
+
+In regard to France’s situation--the Fuehrer said that in a general
+conflict after the expected conquest, within a short time, of Poland,
+Germany would be in a position to assemble 100 divisions at the
+Westwall, which would force France to assemble all available forces
+from the colonies, from the Italian border, and elsewhere at the
+Maginot line for the life and death struggle which would then begin.
+Moreover, it is his opinion that the French cannot overrun the Italian
+fortifications any more than the Westwall.
+
+At this point Count Ciano showed signs of extreme doubt.
+
+The Polish Army varies greatly in its value. Besides several crack
+divisions there are a number of inferior units. Poland is very weak
+in AA and anti-tank defense. At present France and England cannot
+supply her. If, however, Poland is supported economically for a
+considerable period of time by the West, she could acquire these
+weapons, and Germany’s superiority would be reduced. The fanatics of
+Warsaw and Cracow are opposed by the indifferent peasant population
+of other districts. Besides, the composition of the population of
+the Polish state must be considered: out of 34 million inhabitants
+1½ million are German, about 4 million are Jews, and an estimated 9
+million Ukrainians, so that there are considerably fewer real Poles
+than the total population, and even these, as mentioned before, have
+to be differently evaluated in regard to fighting power. Under these
+circumstances, Poland would be conquered by Germany in a very short
+time.
+
+As Poland makes it clear by her whole attitude that in case of conflict
+she will in any event be on the side of the enemies of Germany and
+Italy, quick liquidation at this moment would only be of advantages for
+the unavoidable conflict with the western democracies. If a hostile
+Poland should remain on Germany’s Eastern frontier, not only the 11
+East Prussian Divisions, but also further contingents would be tied up
+in Pomerania and Silesia, which would not be the case in the event of
+previous liquidation. Generally speaking, it would be best to liquidate
+the pseudo-neutrals one after the other. This is fairly easily done, if
+one Axis partner protects the rear of the other, who is just finishing
+off one of the uncertain neutrals, and vice versa. Italy may consider
+Yugoslavia such an uncertain neutral. At the visit of Prince Regent
+Paul he (the Fuehrer) suggested, particularly in consideration of
+Italy that Prince Paul clarify his political attitude toward the Axis
+by a gesture. He had thought of a closer connection with the Axis and
+Yugoslavia’s leaving the League of Nations. Prince Paul agreed to the
+matter. Recently the Prince Regent was in London and sought reinsurance
+from the western powers. The same thing was repeated that happened in
+the case of Gafencu, who was also very reasonable during his visit
+to Germany and who denied any interest in the aims of the western
+democracies. Afterwards it was learned that he had later assumed a
+contrary standpoint in England. Among the Balkan countries the Axis
+can completely rely on Bulgaria, which is in a sense a natural ally
+of Italy and Germany. That is why Germany has supported Bulgaria as
+much as possible with supplies of weapons and will continue to do so.
+Yugoslavia would stay neutral only as long as it would be dangerous to
+take the side of the western democracies openly. At the moment when
+there would be a turn to the worse for Germany and Italy, however,
+Yugoslavia would join the other side openly, hoping thereby to give
+matters a final turn to the disadvantage of the Axis. Rumania is afraid
+of Hungary and is militarily very weak and internally corrupt. King
+Carol would doubtless not give up his neutrality unless absolutely
+necessary.
+
+Hungary is friendly and Slovakia is under German influence and even has
+German garrisons in some parts.
+
+Returning to the question of Danzig, the Fuehrer explained to Count
+Ciano that it is impossible to yield on this point. He has agreed
+with Italy to withdraw the Germans from South Tyrol, but for that
+very reason he must carefully avoid everything that could give the
+impression that a precedent has been created by the withdrawal of
+the Germans from South Tyrol, which could be applied to other
+regions, too. Besides, his justification to the German people of the
+withdrawal of these Germans from Italy is the German policy, which is
+in general, directed toward the east and the north-east. The east and
+the north-east--i.e., the Baltic countries--have always been Germany’s
+uncontested sphere of interest, just as the Mediterranean is Italy’s
+own sphere. Germany needs the grain and wood-producing countries of
+these eastern regions for economic reasons as well. Danzig is not
+only a case of material interests, however, although this city is the
+biggest Baltic port. The turn-over amounts to 40% of the tonnage of
+Hamburg.
+
+Danzig, the Nordic Nurnberg, is an old German city, which awakens
+sentimental feelings in every German, and just this psychological
+element forces the Fuehrer to respect public opinion. To make the
+situation easier to understand for an Italian, Count Ciano should
+imagine that Trieste is in the hands of Yugoslavia and a strong Italian
+minority on Yugoslavian territory is being treated with brutal force.
+It can hardly be supposed that Italy would look on calmly for very long.
+
+_Count Ciano_ replied to the Fuehrer’s explanations by first pointing
+out the great surprise among the Italians at the absolutely unexpected
+seriousness of the situation. Neither in the Milan conversations nor
+in the talks on the occasion of his visit to Berlin was any indication
+given by the Germans that the situation with regard to Poland was so
+serious. On the contrary, the Reich foreign minister had declared that
+in his opinion the question of Danzig will be settled in the course of
+time. On the basis of this state of affairs, the Duce decided, true
+to his conviction that a conflict with the western democracies is
+unavoidable, to make his preparations for that eventuality and made
+his plans for a certain period of time of 2 to 3 years. If a conflict
+is unavoidable now, Italy would of course be on Germany’s side, as the
+Duce re-emphasized just before Count Ciano’s departure, but for various
+reasons, enumerated in detail, Italy would welcome a postponement of
+the general conflict.
+
+_Count Ciano_ then explained, with the aid of a map, the Italian
+position at the outbreak of a general conflict. Italy believes, he
+said, that a conflict with Poland would not be restricted to that
+country, but would grow into a general European war.
+
+_The Fuehrer_ remarked that opinions differ on that point. He
+personally is firmly convinced that the western democracies will in the
+end shy away from precipitating a general war.
+
+_Count Ciano_ replied that he hoped the Fuehrer was right, but he did
+not believe it. In any case, one should adapt one’s reflections to
+the worst possibility, i.e., to general conflict. Since the Abyssinian
+conflict Italy has actually been constantly living in a state of war
+and therefore urgently needs a breathing spell. Count Ciano proved
+with the aid of figures how great Italy’s material effort had been,
+especially in the Spanish conflict. Italy’s stock of raw materials is
+now exhausted. She needs time to restock her warehouses.
+
+She must also transfer her war industries, all of which are in an
+exposed location, to the south, in order to be better able to defend
+them. In the same way the Italian artillery, particularly the AA
+defense, is greatly in need of modernization. The long coast line and
+other exposed points are not sufficiently defended.
+
+The strength of the fleet is also extremely unfavorable. At the
+moment Italy can put against the combined English and French 11 to
+12 battleships only 2 of its own, while in a few years a total of 8
+battleships will be available.
+
+At this point the Fuehrer remarked that of course England and France
+will have additional battleships of 35,000 and 40,000 tons.
+
+_Count Ciano_ pointed out the long Italian coastline, which is hard to
+defend and the numerous bases at the disposal of the English and French
+fleets, giving particular attention to the Greek ports.
+
+The Italian colonies are especially vulnerable at present. Lybya is
+hard to attack from Egypt, it is true, while from Lybya there is the
+possibility of advancing to Marsah Matru. The situation in regard to
+Tunisia is quite different. The proportion of the Italian and French
+Arab population is 1 to 20, while the strength of white troops is 1 to
+5 to Italy’s disadvantage. Besides, the Italian fortifications on the
+French frontier are quite inadequate. Only recently new armored bunkers
+were delivered.
+
+Though Abyssinia is almost pacified, with the exception of certain
+regions along the border of the English territory, where the English
+create difficulties among the population with their money and
+propaganda, this pacification is only on the surface. It would be
+sufficient, in a general conflict for a few English airplanes to drop
+leaflets over Abyssinia, saying that the world had risen against Italy
+and that the Negus would return, to make the revolt of the Abyssinians
+flare up again. Besides, Abyssinia would be cut off completely from the
+motherland in case of a conflict, and the fate of the 200,000 Italians
+in Abyssinia would be very uncertain. In a few years there would be an
+army of 4 to 500,000 men in Abyssinia, and if a conflict should break
+out then it would be possible to attack the Sudan, Kenya, and French
+Somaliland successfully.
+
+The islands of the Dodecanese would be in difficulties because of the
+attitude of Turkey. Of course Leros and Rhodes could defend themselves
+for years.
+
+Albania is a completely undeveloped country and would make an effective
+base for operations against the Balkans only after several years.
+First roads have to be built and the natural resources (iron, copper,
+chromium, and petroleum) have to be exploited, and then one could
+consider, as the Fuehrer had indicated, advancing successfully on
+Saloniki and in other directions of the Balkans, as along the five
+fingers of an outstretched hand.
+
+Italy has plans of economic autarchy which cannot be realized for
+several years and which would then put Italy in a position to withstand
+even a prolonged war without difficulties. Another reason for the
+Duce’s desire to postpone the conflict is the Italians abroad, who were
+to be brought back to Italy according to plan. One million Italians
+live in France, of whom about 700,000 are definitely lost for Italy.
+The other 300,000, however, would be used by France as hostages in case
+of a conflict, as could be seen from some measures taken by France in
+September of last year.
+
+Besides, the Duce personally attaches great importance to the orderly
+execution of the world’s fair in 1942, for which Italy made big
+preparations and from which she hopes for good results in the economic
+field, especially as regards the inflow of foreign currency.
+
+Besides these considerations, which are based on Italy’s position,
+there are others of a general political nature which recommend
+postponement of a general conflict. The Duce is convinced that the
+encirclement system of the western democracies would doubtless work
+at the present time. But after a certain length of time the points
+of friction and the seeds of disunity would come to the fore among
+the partners of the encirclement front, and the front would gradually
+disintegrate.
+
+Moreover, the Duce is convinced that the present enthusiasm in England
+and France will not last very long. Soon, particularly in France, the
+union sacree will once more be replaced by party discord, on condition
+that the Axis keeps quiet for a time. At the present time it is only
+due to the Axis that internal differences have been buried in the
+respective countries.
+
+Japan’s position would also be much stronger after the termination
+of the China conflict, which is to be expected in two years, while
+Roosevelt’s position in America would be seriously weakened after a
+period of calm in the field of foreign politics, so that he could not
+be elected president for a third time, which would certainly be the
+case if a conflict should break out soon.
+
+Spain, which has just acquired government friendly to the Axis (Serano
+Suner, Beigbeder), needs peace after the civil war, but would stand at
+the side of the Axis in 2 to 3 years as a power not to be neglected.
+Thus, for example, within 2 years Spain would build 4 battleships of
+35,000 tons each, the plans for which have just been taken to Spain by
+an Italian General. The construction is to take place in El Ferrol.
+
+For these reasons the Duce wishes strongly (le Duce insiste) that the
+Axis powers should make a gesture which would emphasize anew the will
+of peace of Italy and Germany. This could be done by the publication of
+a communique which Count Ciano had given to the Reich foreign minister
+on the previous day and which he now presented again in the following
+English (and French version): * * *
+
+Count Ciano said in connection with this tentative communique that
+the Duce had at first contemplated a proposal for a conference, but
+conscious of the Fuehrer’s misgivings, he now makes another suggestion
+in a milder form and is very much interested in its acceptance.
+
+_The Fuehrer_ declared concerning the conference plan that in future
+meetings of the powers it will not be possible to exclude Russia. In
+the German-Russian conversations the Russians made it plain, with
+reference to Munich and other occasions from which they had been
+excluded, that they would not tolerate this any more. Besides the 4
+main powers, Poland and Spain would also have to be included in such a
+conference, besides Russia. This means, however, that Italy, Germany,
+and Spain would oppose England, France, Russia, and Poland, which
+certainly is an unfavorable position.
+
+_Count Ciano_ replied that the Duce is of the opinion that the one who
+wins at a conference is the one who is ready to let the conference fail
+if necessary and to accept war as a possible result. Moreover, the
+Duce took the Fuehrer’s misgivings into consideration and modified his
+proposal. He sees in an Italian and German peace gesture, as suggested
+in this proposal, the advantage that the western powers, which are
+internally not at all ready for war--but would surely start it at the
+present moment, if they were, so to speak, forced to the wall by the
+Axis and saw no other way out, according to the conviction of the Duce,
+based on very reliable information from the democracies. [Translator’s
+note: This sentence is incomplete--possibly something was omitted
+in copying]. The suggested gesture of Germany and Italy represents a
+face-saving way out for the western powers, which they will certainly
+use, for there are wide circles which warn against war and which would
+be backed up by a peace gesture. This means, however, that Poland,
+which would doubtless be abandoned by the western powers, would be
+isolated after a time and would have to agree to reasonable solutions
+of the existing difficulties.
+
+_The Fuehrer_ replied that there is no time to be lost in the solution
+of the Polish problem. The further we get into fall the harder military
+operations in the east of Europe will be. The air force could hardly be
+employed at all after the middle of September in those regions because
+of the weather conditions, while the motorized forces would also be
+unusable because of the condition of the roads, which are rapidly
+turned to mud by the rains which set in in the fall. From September to
+May Poland is one big swamp and absolutely unsuitable for any military
+operations. Thus Poland could simply occupy Danzig in October--and she
+probably intends to do so--without Germany’s being able to do anything
+against it; for it is out of the question to shell and destroy Danzig.
+
+_Count Ciano_ asked by what time the question of Danzig will have
+to be settled, in the Fuehrer’s opinion. _The Fuehrer_ replied that
+this question will have to be settled one way or the other by the
+end of August. The Fuehrer replied to Ciano’s question as to how
+the Fuehrer imagined the solution, that Poland will have to give up
+Danzig politically, whereby her economic interests will of course be
+preserved, and that she will have to contribute by her general attitude
+to a release of the tension. It is doubtful whether Poland will be
+willing to do so; for hitherto she had rejected the German proposals.
+The Fuehrer personally made these proposals to Beck on the occasion
+of his visit to Obersalzberg. They were very favorable for Poland. In
+exchange for the political return of Danzig to Germany, with complete
+preservation of Polish economic interests and the establishment of
+a connection between East Prussia and the Reich, Germany conceded a
+border guarantee, a 25-year friendship pact, and Polish participation
+in influence on Slovakia. At that time Beck acknowledged the proposal
+with the remark that he wanted to examine it. The sharp refusal was
+only the consequence of English intervention. Poland’s aims can,
+moreover, be seen clearly in her press. All of East Prussia should be
+occupied, they want to advance to Berlin, etc. In the long run it is
+unbearable for a big power to tolerate such a hostile neighbor at a
+distance of only 150 km from its capital. The Fuehrer is therefore
+determined to use the opportunity of the next political provocation, in
+the form of an ultimatum, brutal mistreatment of Germans, an attempt
+to starve out Danzig, or something similar, to attack Poland within
+48 hours and to solve the problem in this way. This would mean a
+considerable strengthening of the Axis, just as an Italian liquidation
+of Yugoslavia would mean a considerable increase of power for the Axis.
+
+_Count Ciano_ asked when such an undertaking against Poland is to be
+expected, since Italy must of course prepare for all eventualities. The
+Fuehrer replied that under the prevailing circumstances an attack on
+Poland is to be expected at any moment.
+
+A telegram from Moscow and one from Tokyo were handed to the Fuehrer
+during this exchange of opinions. The conference was interrupted for
+a short time, and then Count Ciano was informed of the contents of
+the Moscow telegram. The Russians agreed to the sending of a German
+political mediator to Moscow. The Reich foreign minister added that the
+Russians were completely informed about Germany’s intentions against
+Poland. He himself had informed the Russian charge d’affaires, by order
+of the Fuehrer.
+
+_The Fuehrer_ remarked that in his opinion Russia would not be willing
+to pull chestnuts out of the fire for the western powers. Stalin’s
+position is endangered as much by a victorious Russian army as by a
+defeated Russian army. Russia is, at the most, interested in enlarging
+her access to the Baltic a little. Germany has no objection to that.
+Besides, Russia would hardly take the part of Poland, whom she hates
+from the bottom of her heart. The sending of the English-French
+military mission to Moscow has only the purpose of averting the
+catastrophic state of political negotiations.
+
+After further discussion of the communique proposed by Count Ciano,
+the Fuehrer said that he wanted to think over for a day, this proposal
+as well as Count Ciano’s explanation of the general situation, and he
+therefore suggested that the discussion be resumed the next day.
+
+                                                 Salzburg 12 August 1939
+
+                                                         signed Schmidt.
+
+
+                                 PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1874-PS
+
+ Notes on the Conference Between General Field Marshal GOERING and the
+                  DUCE in the Presence of Count CIANO
+
+                                                           15 April 1939
+
+[_Page 4, par. 2_]
+
+However, the heavy armament of Czechoslovakia shows, in any case, how
+dangerous this country could have been, even after Munich, in the event
+of a serious conflict. Because of Germany’s action the situation of
+both axis countries was ameliorated, among other reasons because of the
+economic possibilities which result from the transfer to Germany of the
+great production capacity (armament potential) of Czechoslovakia. That
+contributes toward a considerable strengthening of the axis against
+the Western powers. Furthermore, Germany now need not keep ready a
+single division for protection against that country in case of a bigger
+conflict. This, too, is an advantage by which both axis countries will,
+in the last analysis, benefit.
+
+[_Page 5, par. 2_]
+
+* * * the action taken by Germany in Czechoslovakia is to be viewed
+as an advantage for the axis in case Poland should finally join the
+enemies of the axis powers. Germany could then attack this country
+from 2 flanks and would be within only 25 minutes flying distance from
+the new Polish industrial center which had been moved further into
+the interior of the country, nearer to the other Polish industrial
+districts, because of its proximity to the border. Now by the turn of
+events it is located again in the proximity of the border.
+
+[_Page 6, par. 2_]
+
+Furthermore the Fieldmarshal happened to talk about the date at
+which Germany would be prepared best for a greater test of strength.
+In this connection he pointed out that Germany at the moment was
+comparatively weak on the sea because both the new battleships which
+had been launched recently would be ready for commissioning only next
+year and two additional battleships would be launched only next year.
+In the airforce also, regrouping and adaptation of a new bomber type
+“JU 88”, the production of which had yet to begin, was taking place.
+This new German bomber had such a range that it would be possible to
+attack not only England herself, but moreover that would push forward
+into a western direction, in order to bomb the ships which come from
+the Atlantic to England. Of course, Germany was ready for action, if
+suddenly some conflict should come up. But if one was considering at
+what period of time the armament situation was most favorable, both
+the facts mentioned above--the insufficient armament at sea and the
+reconversion of the airforce to the new type of bomber--should not be
+disregarded. Besides in the fall already a monthly production of 280
+planes of the “JU 88” and at the end of the year of 350 planes, could
+be counted upon. On the basis of these calculations he came to the
+conclusion that in 9 months or one year the situation for the axis,
+from a military point of view, would be more favorable. On the other
+hand it was true that the rearmament in England and France had not made
+very much progress. In many cases, the factories for the production of
+war material were only in a state of construction. England would most
+likely not be able to show any results worth mentioning before 1942 for
+her new beginning high pressure rearmament in the air.
+
+Furthermore, the Fuehrer considered it almost out of the question
+that England and France would not stand together. According to the
+German point of view, both countries would in any conflict eventually
+support each other to the utmost. Only if England should execute a
+complete reversal of her policy, and the costs and risks of her present
+political line should become too high, she would perhaps adapt herself
+to confining her efforts to the preservation of the empire and give
+the authoritarian countries a free hand for the securing of their
+vital necessities. At the present time England had a weak government
+which had yielded to the pressure of the leftist circles. England had
+deviated from her old line in a way that it offers assistance only on
+the basis of her own judgment of the situation in question from case
+to case and she had, in completely turning away from her traditional
+policy of giving support from time to time only on the basis of her own
+judgment of the situation at the time, now obliged herself in advance
+to render support, and that under conditions which could be determined
+by the other partner. It was another question, of course, how England
+could fulfill her guarantee obligation in fact. How was she going to
+help Poland or Rumania, for instance? She did not have the possibility
+of sending troops and could actually fulfill her obligations only by
+setting ablaze a general war.
+
+All in all, however, it had to be stressed, that the situation of the
+axis was very strong and that it could defeat all possible opponents in
+a general conflict.
+
+
+                                 PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1877-PS
+
+                                                        Report RAM 19/41
+
+   REPORT ON THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE REICH MINISTER FOR FOREIGN
+ AFFAIRS [RAM] AND THE JAPANESE FOREIGN MINISTER MATSUOKA IN BERLIN ON
+                             29 MARCH 1941.
+
+The RAM resumed the preceding conversation with Matsuoka about the
+latter’s impending talks with the Russians in Moscow, where they had
+left off. He expressed the opinion, that it would probably be best,
+in view of the whole situation, not to carry the discussions with the
+Russians too far. He did not know how the situation would develop.
+One thing, however, was certain, namely that Germany would strike
+immediately, should Russia ever attack Japan. He was ready to give
+Matsuoka this positive assurance, so that Japan could push forward
+to the South on Singapore, without fear of possible complications
+with Russia. The largest part of the German army was anyway on the
+Eastern frontiers of the Reich, and fully prepared to open the attack
+at any time. He (the RAM) however believed, that Russia would try to
+avoid developments leading to war. Should Germany however enter into
+a conflict with Russia, the USSR would be finished off within a few
+months. In this case, Japan had of course even less reason to be afraid
+than ever, if it wants to advance on Singapore. Consequently, it need
+not refrain from such an undertaking because of possible fears of
+Russia.
+
+He could not know of course, just how things with Russia would develop.
+It was uncertain, whether or not Stalin would intensify his present
+unfriendly policy against Germany. He (the RAM) wanted to point out to
+Matsuoka in any case, that a conflict with Russia was anyhow within
+the realm of possibility. In any case, Matsuoka could not report to
+the Japanese Emperor upon his return, that a conflict between Russia
+and Germany was impossible. On the contrary, the situation was such,
+that such a conflict, even if it were not probable, would have to be
+considered possible. * * *
+
+Next, the RAM turned again to the Singapore question. In view of the
+fears, expressed by the Japanese, of possible attacks by submarines,
+based on the Philippines and of the intervention of the British
+Mediterranean and Home fleets, he had again discussed the situation
+with General-Admiral Raeder. The latter had stated, that the British
+Navy during this year would have its hands so full in the English home
+waters and in the Mediterranean, that it would not be able to send even
+a single ship to the Far East. General-Admiral Raeder had described the
+U.S. submarines as so bad, that Japan need not bother about them at
+all.
+
+Matsuoka replied immediately, that the Japanese Navy had a very low
+estimate of the threat from the British Navy; it also held the view,
+that in case of a clash with the American Navy, it would be able to
+smash the latter without trouble. However it was afraid, that the
+Americans would not take up the battle with their fleet; thus the
+conflict with the United States might perhaps be dragged out to five
+years. This possibility caused considerable worry in Japan.
+
+The RAM replied, that America could not do anything against Japan in
+the case of the capture of Singapore. Perhaps for this reason alone,
+Roosevelt would think twice before deciding on active measures against
+Japan. For while on one hand he could not achieve anything against
+Japan, on the other hand there was the probability of losing the
+Philippines to Japan; for the American President, of course, this would
+mean a considerable loss of prestige, and because of the inadequate
+rearmament, he would have nothing with which to offset such a loss.
+
+In this connection, Matsuoka pointed out, that he was doing everything
+to reassure the English about Singapore. He acted as if Japan had
+no intention at all regarding this key position of England in the
+East. Therefore it might be possible, that his attitude toward the
+British would appear to be friendly in words and in acts. However,
+Germany should not be deceived by that. He assumed this attitude not
+only in order to reassure the British, but also in order to fool the
+pro-British and pro-American elements so long, until one day he would
+suddenly open the attack on Singapore.
+
+In this connection, Matsuoka stated, that his tactics were based on
+the certain assumption, that the sudden attack against Singapore would
+unite the entire Japanese nation with one blow. (“Nothing succeeds like
+success,” the RAM remarked.) He followed here the example of the words
+of a famous Japanese statesman, addressed to the Japanese Navy at the
+outbreak of the Russo-Japanese war: “You open fire, then the nation
+will be united”. The Japanese need to be shaken up to awaken. After
+all, as an oriental, he believed in the fate, which would come, whether
+you wanted it or not. * * *
+
+Matsuoka then introduced the subject of German assistance in the blow
+against Singapore, a subject which had been broached to him frequently,
+and mentioned the proposal of a German written promise of assistance.
+
+The RAM replied, that he had already discussed these questions with
+Ambassador Oshima. He had asked him to procure maps of Singapore in
+order that the Fuehrer--who probably must be considered the greatest
+expert on military questions at the present time--could advise Japan on
+the best method of attack against Singapore. German experts on aerial
+warfare, too, would be at their disposal; they could draw up a report,
+based on their European experiences, for the Japanese on the use of
+dive-bombers from airfields in the vicinity against the British fleet
+in Singapore. Thus the British fleet would be forced to disappear from
+Singapore immediately.
+
+Matsuoka remarked, that Japan was less concerned with the British
+fleet, than with the capture of the fortifications.
+
+The RAM replied, that here too, the Fuehrer had developed new methods
+for the German attacks on strongly fortified positions, such as the
+Maginot Line and Fort Eben Emael, which he could make available to the
+Japanese.
+
+Matsuoka replied in this connection, that some of the younger expert
+Japanese naval officers, who were close friends of his, were of the
+opinion, that the Japanese naval forces would need three months until
+they could capture Singapore. As a cautious foreign minister, he had
+doubled this estimate. He believed, he could stave off any danger which
+threatened from America, for six months. If, however, the capture of
+Singapore required still more time and if the operations would perhaps
+even drag out for a year, the situation with America would become
+extremely critical and he did not know as yet how to meet it.
+
+If at all avoidable, he would not touch the Netherlands East Indies,
+since he was afraid that in case of a Japanese attack on this area,
+the oilfields would be set afire. They could be brought into operation
+again only after 1 or 2 years.
+
+The RAM added, that Japan would gain decisive influence over the
+Netherlands East Indies simultaneously with the capture of Singapore. *
+* *
+
+Berlin, the 31st of March 1941.
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1881-PS
+
+                                                        Notes Fueh 20/41
+
+                                 NOTES
+
+ regarding the discussion between the FUEHRER and the Japanese Foreign
+ Minister MATSUOKA in the presence of the Reich Foreign Minister and of
+   the Minister of State MEISSNER in Berlin on the 4th of April 1941.
+
+Matsuoka further mentioned, that he was induced to make those endeavors
+for peace particularly in view of the personality of Cardinal Caspari.
+
+Furthermore he had endeavored to convince the Pope, that the United
+States and particularly the American President prolonged the war in
+Europe and in China. It was not the question to determine, if America
+or its President were right or wrong. They certainly had their definite
+reasons for their policy. Notwithstanding the question of right or
+wrong, one had to state the fact that they prolonged the war in Europe
+and in China. In regard to China, he tried to convince the Pope that
+Japan was not fighting the Chinese or China herself, but merely the
+Bolshevism which threatened to spread in China and in the entire Far
+East. It is regretful that America and England sided with Bolshevism.
+
+The Fuehrer interrupted that both countries also sided in Spain with
+Bolshevism.
+
+Matsuoka then also expressed the request, that the Fuehrer should
+instruct the proper authorities in Germany to meet as broad-mindedly as
+possible the wishes of the Japanese Military Commission. Japan was in
+need of German help particularly concerning the U-boat warfare, which
+could be given by making available to them the latest experiences of
+the war as well as the latest technical improvements and inventions.
+Japan would do her utmost to avoid a war with the United States. In
+case that country should decide to attack Singapore, the Japanese navy,
+of course, had to be prepared for a fight with the United States,
+because in that case America probably would side with Great Britain.
+He (Matsuoka) personally believed, that the United States could be
+restrained by diplomatic exertions from entering the war at the side of
+Great Britain. The Army and Navy had, however, to count on the worst
+situation, that is with war against America. They were of the opinion
+that such a war would extend for five years or longer and would take
+the form of guerilla warfare in the Pacific and would be fought out in
+the South Sea. For this reason, the German experiences in her guerilla
+warfare are of the greatest value to Japan. It was a question how such
+a war would best be conducted and how all the technical improvements of
+submarines, in all details such as periscopes and such like, could best
+be exploited by Japan.
+
+To sum up, Matsuoka requested that the Fuehrer should see to it that
+the proper German authorities should place those developments and
+inventions concerning navy and army which were needed by the Japanese
+at their disposal.
+
+The Fuehrer promised this and pointed out that Germany too considered
+a conflict with the United States undesirable, but that it had already
+made allowances for such a contingency. In Germany one was of the
+opinion that America’s contributions depended upon the possibilities
+of transportation, and that this again is conditioned by the available
+tonnage. Germany’s war against tonnage, however, means a decisive
+weakening not merely against England, but also against America. Germany
+has made her preparations so that no American could land in Europe. She
+would conduct a most energetic fight against America with her U-boats
+and her Luftwaffe, and due to her superior experience, which would
+still have to be acquired by the United States, she would be vastly
+superior, and that quite apart from the fact that the German soldiers
+naturally rank high above the American.
+
+In the further course of the discussion the Fuehrer pointed out that
+Germany on her part would immediately take the consequences, if Japan
+would get involved with the United States. It did not matter with whom
+the United States would first get involved if with Germany or with
+Japan. They would always try to eliminate one country at a time, not
+to come to an understanding with the other country subsequently, but
+to liquidate this one just the same. Therefore, Germany would strike,
+as already mentioned, without delay in case of a conflict between
+Japan and America, because the strength of the tripartite powers lies
+in their joint action, their weakness would be if they would let
+themselves be beaten individually.
+
+Matsuoka once more repeated his request, that the Fuehrer might give
+the necessary instructions, in order that the proper German authorities
+would place at the disposal of the Japanese the latest improvements and
+inventions, which are of interest to them, because the Japanese navy
+had to prepare immediately for a conflict with the United States.
+
+As regards Japanese-American relationship, Matsuoka explained further
+that he has always declared in his country, that sooner or later a war
+with the United States would be unavoidable, if Japan continued to
+drift along as at present. In his opinion this conflict would happen
+rather sooner than later. His argument went on, why should Japan,
+therefore, not decisively strike at the right moment and take the risk
+upon herself of a fight against America? Just thus would she perhaps
+avoid a war for generations, particularly if she gained predominance
+in the South Seas. There are, to be sure, in Japan many who hesitate
+to follow those trends of thought. Matsuoka was considered in those
+circles a dangerous man with dangerous thoughts. He, however, stated
+that, if Japan continued to walk along her present path, one day she
+would have to fight anyway and that this would then be under less
+favorable circumstances than at present.
+
+The Fuehrer replied that he could well understand the situation of
+Matsuoka, because he himself was in similar situations (the clearing of
+the Rhineland, declaration of sovereignty of armed forces). He too was
+of the opinion that he had to exploit favorable conditions and accept
+the risk of an anyhow unavoidable fight at a time when he himself was
+still young and full of vigor. How right he was in his attitude was
+proven by events. Europe now was free. He would not hesitate a moment
+to reply instantly to any widening of the war, be it by Russia, be it
+by America. Providence favored those who will not let dangers come to
+them, but who will bravely face them.
+
+Matsuoka replied, that the United States or rather their ruling
+politicians had recently still attempted a last maneuver towards
+Japan, by declaring that America would not fight Japan on account
+of China or the South Seas provided that Japan gave free passage
+to the consignments of rubber and tin to America to their place of
+destination. However, America would war against Japan the moment she
+felt that Japan entered the war with the intention to assist in the
+destruction of Great Britain. Such an argument naturally did not miss
+its effect upon the Japanese, because of the education oriented on
+English lines which many had received.
+
+The Fuehrer commented on this, that this attitude of America did not
+mean anything but that the United States had the hope that, as long as
+the British World Empire existed, one day they could advance against
+Japan together with Great Britain, whereas, in case of the collapse
+of the World Empire, they would be totally isolated and could not do
+anything against Japan.
+
+The Reich Foreign Minister interjected that the Americans precisely
+under all circumstances wanted to maintain the powerful position of
+England in East Asia, but that, on the other hand, it is proved by this
+attitude to what extent she fears a joint action of Japan and Germany.
+
+Matsuoka continued that it seemed to him of importance to give to the
+Fuehrer an absolutely clear picture of the real attitude inside Japan.
+For this reason he also had to inform him regretfully of the fact
+that he (Matsuoka) in his capacity as Japanese Minister for Foreign
+Affairs could not utter in Japan itself a single word of all that
+he had expounded before the Fuehrer and the Reich Foreign Minister
+regarding his plans. This would cause him serious damage in political
+and financial circles. Once before he had committed the mistake, before
+he became Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, to tell a close
+friend something about his intentions. It seems that the latter had
+spread these things and thus brought about all sorts of rumors, which
+he as Foreign Minister had to oppose energetically, though as a rule
+he always tells the truth. Under these circumstances he also could not
+indicate, how soon he could report on the questions discussed to the
+Japanese Premier or to the Emperor. He would have to study exactly
+and carefully in the first place the development in Japan, so as to
+make his decision at a favorable moment, to make a clear breast of
+his proper plans towards the Prince Konoye and the Emperor. Then the
+decision would have to be made within a few days, because the plans
+would otherwise be spoiled by talk.
+
+Should he, Matsuoka, fail to carry out his intentions, that would be
+proof that he is lacking in influence, in power of conviction, and in
+tactical capabilities. However, should he succeed it would prove that
+he had great influence in Japan. He himself felt confident that he
+would succeed.
+
+On his return, being questioned, he would indeed admit to the Emperor,
+the Premier and the Ministers for the Navy and the Army, that Singapore
+had been discussed; he would, however, state that it was only on a
+hypothetical basis.
+
+Besides this, Matsuoka made the express request not to cable in the
+matter of Singapore because he had reason to fear that, by cabling,
+something might leak out. If necessary he would send a courier.
+
+The Fuehrer agreed and assured him, after all, that he could rest
+entirely assured of German reticence.
+
+Matsuoka replied he believed indeed in German reticence, but
+unfortunately could not say the same of Japan.
+
+The discussion was terminated after the exchange of some personal
+parting words.
+
+Berlin, the 4th of April 1941.
+
+                                                         Signed: SCHMIDT
+
+
+                                 PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1882-PS
+
+                                                          Aufz RAM 21/41
+
+Notes on the talk between the Reich Foreign Minister and the Japanese
+Foreign Minister Matsuoka in Berlin on 5 April 1941.
+
+[Pages 2 to 3]
+
+Matsuoka then spoke of the general high morale in Germany referring
+to the happy faces he had seen everywhere among the workers during
+his recent visit to the Borsig Works. He expressed his regret that
+developments in Japan had not as yet advanced as far as in Germany and
+that in his country the intellectuals still exercised considerable
+influence.
+
+The Reich Foreign Minister replied that at best a nation which had
+realized its every ambition could afford the luxury of intellectuals,
+most of whom are parasites, anyway. A nation, however, which has to
+fight for a place in the sun must give them up. The intellectuals
+ruined France; in Germany they had already started their pernicious
+activities when National Socialism put a stop to these doings; they
+will surely be the cause of the downfall of Britain, which is to be
+expected with certainty.
+
+In answer to a remark by Matsuoka, that Japan was now awakening and,
+according to the Japanese temperament, would take action quickly after
+the previous lengthy deliberation, the Reich Foreign Minister replied
+that it was necessary, of course, to accept a certain risk in this
+connection, just as the Fuehrer had done so successfully with the
+occupation of the Rhineland, with the proclamation of sovereignty of
+armament, and with the designation from the League of Nations. * * *
+
+[Pages 9 to 11]
+
+The Reich Foreign Minister replied that the new German Reich would
+actually be built up on the basis of the ancient traditions of the
+Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation, which in its time was the only
+dominant power on the European Continent.
+
+In conclusion, the Reich Foreign Minister once again summarized the
+points he wanted Matsuoka to take back to Japan with him from his trip:
+
+1. Germany had already won the war. With the end of this year the
+world would realize this. Even England would have to concede it, if it
+had not collapsed before then, and America would also have to resign
+herself to this fact.
+
+2. There were no conflicting interests between Japan and Germany. The
+future of both countries could be regulated for the long run on the
+basis that Japan should predominate in the Far East, Italy and Germany
+in Europe and Africa.
+
+3. Whatever might happen, Germany would win the war. But it would
+hasten victory if Japan would enter the war. Such an entry into the war
+was undoubtedly more in the interest of Japan than in that of Germany,
+for it offered a unique opportunity which would hardly ever return, for
+the fulfillment of the national objectives of Japan, a chance which
+would make it possible for her to play a really leading role in East
+Asia.
+
+Matsuoka replied that he himself could only repeat that he had long
+been of the opinion that every nation would be offered an opportunity
+only once in a thousand years. Japan was confronting such an
+opportunity, and she would have to assume the risk connected with it.
+She would have to act decisively at the right moment in order to take
+advantage of this unique opportunity.
+
+                                           Berlin, the 7th of April 1941
+                                                            Sig. Schmidt
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1889-PS
+
+  _Account_ Concerning the conference of the Fuehrer with the Italian
+         Ambassador Attolico on August 31, 1939 at 1900 hours.
+
+The Fuehrer handed the Italian Ambassador a copy of the German
+proposals and a press notice, pointing out that because of the Polish
+Government the proposals are now void. The mediation attempt of England
+must, therefore, be considered as having failed.
+
+Ambassador Attolico recalled that the Fuehrer on the occasion of a
+mediation offer made a few days ago by Mussolini had declared that
+England had just made a proposal and that one would wait for its
+result. Since the Fuehrer had stated himself now, that the English
+proposal must be considered as having failed, the question arises now
+if the Duce on his part could not take over a mediation. He asks,
+therefore, the Fuehrer if it were all right if the Duce would mediate
+from now on.
+
+The Fuehrer replied, one had to wait first of all for future
+developments. He is not in the mood to be slapped in the face time
+and again by Poland, and does not want to bring the Duce into an
+uncomfortable position through acceptance of his mediation. He is
+certain that because of the spiritual conception of the Poles, they
+wouldn’t listen to the Duce either.
+
+To the question of Attolico whether herewith everything is at an end,
+the Fuehrer answered yes.
+
+Herewith submitted to the Foreign Minister as per instructions. Berlin,
+1 September 1939
+
+                                                    (signed) Dr. Schmidt
+                                                              Ambassador
+
+
+                                 PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1893-PS
+
+     Organization Book of the NSDAP 1943 edition, Editor the Reich
+  Organization Leader of the NSDAP (Dr. Robert Ley), Published by the
+  Central Publishing House of the NSDAP, Franz Eher Successor, Munich.
+
+[Page 6 e.]
+
+3. Resignations.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+Authorized to decree dismissal on the basis of a lawful decision of a
+party court are:
+
+  (_a_) The Local Chapter Directors [Ortsgruppenleiter].
+  (_b_) The County Directors [Kreisleiter].
+  (_c_) The District Directors [Gauleiter].
+  (_d_) The Fuehrer.
+
+[Page 7]
+
+6. Duties of the Party Members.
+
+The commandments of the National Socialists:
+
+  The Fuehrer is always right.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+  The program be your dogma:
+
+  It demands your utter devotion to the movement:
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+  Right is, what serves the movement and thus Germany which means the
+  Nation.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+[Page 13]
+
+The aims of the Party are Only Ideological Ones.
+
+It must be attempted to transfer all professional duties which, during
+the reconstruction in connection with the rebuilding of the Reich, are
+still being executed by the Party, to the affiliated organizations or,
+if possible, to the State administration in due time. If necessary, and
+if possible, directives to this effect will be issued by the competent
+officers of the Reich Directorate [Reichsleitung].
+
+The party as an instrument of ideological education, must grow to be
+the Leader Corps [Fuehrerkorps] of the German nation.
+
+This Leader Corps is responsible for the complete penetration of the
+German Nation with the National Socialist spirit and to overcome the
+dependence on the international influences in which the nation is still
+partly rooted.
+
+It will further be the duty of this Fuehrerkorps to see that the
+professional and general duties within the affiliated organizations and
+within the State administration will be handled according to National
+Socialist directives.
+
+[Page 14]
+
+The Political Director [Der Politische Leiter].
+
+The basis of the Party organization is the Fuehrer thought. The public
+is unable to rule itself either directly or indirectly. The man best
+suited for the job will be a Fuehrer. He will be carried by the
+confidence of the people. All Political Directors stand as appointed
+by the Fuehrer and are responsible to him. They possess full authority
+towards the lower echelons. In choosing the Political Director the
+main consideration will be to put the right man in the right place *
+* * . In principle this is to be noted: Only a man who has absorbed
+the school of subordinate functions within the Party has a claim to
+the higher Fuehrer offices if he should be otherwise suited. We can
+only use Fuehrers who have served from the ground up. Any Political
+Director who does not conform to these principles is to be dismissed or
+to be sent back to the lower offices, as Blockleiter, Zellenleiter, for
+further training.
+
+Each Political Director must be conscious always, as a Political
+Fuehrer, that leadership does not only confer greater powers, but first
+and foremost higher duties * * * .
+
+[Page 15]
+
+The Type of the Political Director.
+
+All this shows the character of the Political Director. The Political
+Director is not an office worker but the Political Deputy of the
+Fuehrer * * * . With the Political Director we are building the
+political leadership of the State * * * . The type of the Political
+Director is not characterized by the office which he represents. There
+is no such thing as a Political Director of the NSBO, etc., but there
+is only the Political Director of the NSDAP.
+
+[Page 16]
+
+The Oath of the Political Director.
+
+The Political Director is sworn in yearly. The oath is worded as
+follows:
+
+  “I pledge eternal allegiance to Adolf Hitler. I pledge unconditioned
+  obedience to him and the Fuehrers appointed by him.”
+
+The Political Director is inseparably tied to the ideology and the
+organization of the NSDAP. His oath only ends with his death or with
+his expulsion from the National Socialist community.
+
+[Page 17]
+
+The Protection of the Honor of the Political Director.
+
+The leading personalities of State and Party are protected against
+vicious attacks upon State and Party. (See Section 6).
+
+This law primarily protects leading Party members from District
+Directors on up.
+
+Should, however, a situation exist which is liable to degrade the Party
+and its institutions (for instance an allegation of embezzlement by a
+Kreisleiter in which matter nothing was being done which would mean, in
+other words, that bad conditions were tolerated) the prosecution may be
+directed by authority of paragraph 1 of the law.
+
+In case of attacks which are liable to degrade the Party and its
+officers prosecution may be requested through the competent State
+prosecutor after consultation with the proper law office of the Party.
+
+[Page 19]
+
+The Appointment of Political Directors.
+
+1. The Fuehrer appoints the following Political Directors:
+
+(_a_) Reichsleiter and all Political Directors to include the Directors
+of the Women’s Leagues within the Reich Directorate [Reichsleitung].
+
+(_b_) Gauleiters to include the Directors of an office of the Gau
+Directorate, as well as the Directors of the Women’s League’s of the
+Gau.
+
+(_c_) Kreisleiters.
+
+Their appointment will be published in the official paper
+[Verordnungsblatt].
+
+2. The Gauleiter appoints:
+
+(_a_) The Political Directors and the Directors of the Women’s Leagues
+within the Gau Directorate, and the Directors of the Main Offices up to
+Associate Directors [Mitarbeiter].
+
+(_b_) The Political Directors and the Directors of the Women’s Leagues
+in the Kreis Directorate.
+
+(_c_) The Local Chapter Directors [Ortsgruppenleiter].
+
+3. The Kreisleiter appoints: The Political Directors and the Directors
+of the Women’s Leagues of the Local Chapter [Ortsgruppen] to include
+Block and Cell Directors and Block Helpers, as well as the Political
+Directors in the factories (inasmuch as they are Party members). All
+Political Directors and Directors of the Women’s Leagues will be issued
+an identity card.
+
+[Page 24]
+
+All political directors irrespective of the local chapter, the county,
+or the district in which they may be in office will wear a uniform
+office suit.
+
+All political directors irrespective in what party offices they execute
+their duties, be it in the political directorate, the administration,
+the party courts, the affiliated associations or in the factories, will
+wear a uniform office suit.
+
+[Page 49]
+
+
+               _MEETINGS OF MEMBERS AND PUBLIC MEETINGS_
+
+The bearers of sovereignty of the party are responsible for the
+membership meetings planned by all party offices and affiliated
+associations. They will be approved:
+
+1. By the local chapter director if they do not go beyond the local
+chapter in their importance.
+
+2. By the county directors if they do not go beyond the county in their
+importance.
+
+3. The district directors if they have a general political significance
+for the district.
+
+The meetings will be conducted along the lines laid down by the local
+organization and propaganda offices.
+
+[Page 50]
+
+
+                      _CELL EVENINGS OF THE NSDAP_
+
+1. Time of meetings:
+
+Cell evenings of the NSDAP will be held once a month.
+
+2. Conduct of the Cell Evenings:
+
+The cell evenings of the Party will be conducted by the cell director
+of the NSDAP. If no suitable cell director is on hand--either because
+of his short time in office or insufficient indoctrination--the meeting
+will be in the hands of the local Chapter Director of the NSDAP.
+
+3. Participants:
+
+  (_a_) Participation at a cell evening is compulsory for:
+
+        All political directors of the cell:
+
+        Block leaders and block helpers, cell foremen and block foremen
+          living within the cell zone.
+
+        Factory cell and factory block foremen of the German Labor Front
+          [DAF] and their co-workers.
+
+        NSV cell and block managers:
+
+        Cell and block leaders of the Women’s League and the co-workers
+          of the NSV and NSF whose domicile is within the Cell Zone.
+
+        All Party members within the cell;
+
+        All members of organizations of the NSDAP. * * *
+
+5. Program of the Cell Evenings. (During War Time):
+
+Following are the rules for the program of a cell evening:
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+(_b_) Lecture (not over 30 minutes) based on the directives issued by
+the Reich Directorate for Propaganda of the NSDAP.
+
+[Page 50A-51]
+
+
+                 _LEADER CONFERENCES--TIME OF MEETINGS_
+
+1. Leader conferences in the local chapter zone.
+
+(_a_) Local chapter directors and office chiefs, cell directors and
+block directors possibly in the presence of cell and block foremen, as
+well as cell and block managers and cell and block directors of the
+Women’s League, as well as the local leaders of the organizations and
+possibly the deputies of the Kreis offices (health, education, civil
+servants, county policy, etc.).
+
+                                                           Once a month.
+
+(_b_) Cell directors with block directors and cell foremen, cell
+managers and cell directors of the Women’s League.
+
+                                                           Once a month.
+
+(_c_) Block directors with block foremen, block managers, block leaders
+of the Women’s League and block helpers.
+
+                                                           Once a month.
+
+(_d_) All officers of the local chapter are also to participate in:
+
+  1. The official formation within the region of the local chapter (may
+     be combined with leader conference (_a_)).
+
+  2. Official formations of the county.
+
+                                                     Every three months.
+
+  3. The District Day. [Gautag].
+
+                                                  One every three years.
+
+  4. The County Day. [Kreistag].
+
+     If coinciding with District Day, County Day will be cancelled.
+
+                                                            Once a year.
+
+(_e_) Participation in schooling:
+
+      1. Participants: The political directors, foremen, managers,
+         advisers, directors of the Women’s League, etc.
+
+  * * * * * * *
+
+                                                           Once a month.
+
+(_f_) Participation in education.
+
+  The political directors of the local chapter; in the evenings or
+  Sunday mornings, sport to be conducted concurrently. (For further
+  details see AVM).
+
+                                                          Twice a month.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+2. Leader conferences in the county [Kreis]:
+
+(_a_) County director and his staff every 8 to 14 days.
+
+(_b_) If possible the county director is to arrange for a week end
+course of 1½ to 2 days duration. (Possibly at a county school
+[Kreisschule], with the participation of the directors of the county
+offices and local chapter directors.)
+
+                                                     One every 3 months.
+
+Purpose: To hear fundamental lectures, to gather socially in the
+presence of the bearer of sovereignty, to get to know each other, to
+overcome difficulties of personal and professional nature by a mutual
+exchange of thought.
+
+In counties having a large number of local chapters, these courses
+can be divided. Participation in these conventions is compulsory and
+official duties are not constituted an excuse under any circumstances.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+(_d_) The bearers of sovereignty will meet at least once a month with
+the leaders of the SA, SS, NSKK, HJ, as well as the RAD, and NSFK, in
+so far as they are located within their sector for mutual orientation.
+
+3. Leader conferences in the District:
+
+(_a_) District leaders [Gauleiter] with his staff every 8 to 14 days.
+
+(_b_) It is further absolutely necessary that the directors of the
+GAU offices will meet with the county directors of their district
+once every three months for a three day convention (possibly at a
+district schooling castle) where they will have an opportunity to
+overcome difficulties of personal and professional nature, apart from
+hearing fundamental lectures, by social gatherings in the presence
+of the bearer of the sovereignty, by getting to know each other and
+by a mutual exchange of ideas. Participation in these conferences
+is compulsory and duty would not constitute an excuse under any
+circumstances.
+
+(_c_) The arrangement of social meeting in the presence of leaders
+of the organizations of RAD and NSFK of the respective zone of
+sovereignty. In the course of these meetings differences of opinions
+may be straightened out in discussions.
+
+(_d_) The bearer of sovereignty will meet at least once a month with
+the leaders of the SA, SS, NSKK, HJ, as well as the RAD and the NSFK
+who are within the zone for the purpose of mutual orientation.
+
+[Page 98]
+
+Bearers of Sovereignty--[Hoheitstraeger].
+
+Sectors of Sovereignty--[Hoheitsgebiete].
+
+Among the Political Directors [Politische Leiter] the Bearers of
+Sovereignty assume a special position. Contrary to the other Political
+Directors who have departmental missions and serve as advisers to the
+Bearers of Sovereignty, the Bearers of Sovereignty themselves are in
+charge of a geographical sector known as the Sector of Sovereignty
+[Hoheitsgebiete].
+
+Bearers of Sovereignty are:
+
+  The Fuehrer.
+  The District Directors [Gauleiter].
+  The County Directors [Kreisleiter].
+  The Local Chapter Directors [Ortsgruppenleiter].
+  The Cell Directors [Zellenleiter].
+  The Block Directors [Blockleiter].
+  The Sectors of Sovereignty are:
+  The Reich.
+  The District.
+  The County.
+  The Local Chapter.
+  The Cell.
+  The Block.
+
+Within their Sector of Sovereignty the Bearers of Sovereignty have
+sovereign political rights. They represent the Party within their
+Sector, internally and externally, and they are responsible for
+the entire political situation within their Sector. The Bearers of
+Sovereignty supervise all Party officers within their jurisdiction and
+they are responsible for the maintenance of discipline within their
+sector. On the other hand, the Directors of the Offices, etc., and
+of the affiliated organizations are responsible to their respective
+Bearers of Sovereignty as regards their specific missions apart from
+their responsibility towards their departmental superiors. The Bearers
+of Sovereignty are superior to all Political Directors, Managers,
+etc., within their sector. As regards personal considerations Bearers
+of Sovereignty, from a Local Chapter Director on up are endowed with
+special rights. They may, within the provisions of their general
+directives regarding personnel authorizations, appointments, leaves and
+dismissal of Political Directors, execute the judgments of the Party
+law courts which have jurisdiction within their Sector of Sovereignty.
+
+The Bearers of Sovereignty of the Party are not to be administrative
+officials for a certain sector but are to move in a continuous vital
+contact with the Political Directors and the population within their
+sector. The Bearers of Sovereignty are responsible for the proper and
+good supervision of all members of the nation within their sector. The
+supervision within a Local Chapter of the NSDAP should, if possible,
+not be conducted through its business office but through the Blocks
+and Cells and by the Directors of those units. Through the arrangement
+of regular interview hours everyone should be given the opportunity to
+contact his Bearer of Sovereignty.
+
+* * * The Party intends to achieve a state of affairs in which the
+individual German will find his way to the Party not only in cases of
+emergency but where the Party, upon its own initiative, as desired by
+the Fuehrer, will currently supervise and care for all members of the
+nation.
+
+[Page 70]
+
+
+                     _POLITICAL LEADERS AND THE SA_
+
+The political leaders conduct the practical political work and care for
+the German nation.
+
+The SA is the instrument of training and education through the Party.
+The parallel organizations, SS and NSKK, are charged with maintaining
+physical fitness and soldierly spirit within their organizations and
+with the possibility of commitment as an inner political troop.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+Smooth cooperation in the service of the Movement and the avoidance of
+all petty jealousies is the absolute duty of both parties.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+Mutual Leader Conferences.
+
+To emphasize unity and to promote it, the following principles will
+apply:
+
+Hoheitstrager [bearers of sovereignty], gauleiters, kreisleiters, etc.,
+will meet at least once a month with the leaders of the SA, SS, NSKK,
+and HJ, as well as RAD and NSFK, as found within their zone for the
+purpose of mutual orientation.
+
+More than that, it is desirable to invite the SA leader to other
+political Fuehrer talks and the political leader to the SA Fuehrer
+talks.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+[Page 71]
+
+The Hoheitstrager is responsible for the entire political appearance of
+the Movement within his zone. The SA leader of that zone is tied to the
+directives of the Hoheitstrager in that respect.
+
+Requisitioning the SA.
+
+The Hoheitstrager is the ranking representative of the Party to include
+all organizations within his zone. He may requisition the SA located
+within his zone from the respective SA leader if they are needed for
+the execution of a political mission. The Hoheitstrager will then
+assign the mission to the SA.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+Should the Hoheitstrager need more SA for the execution of a political
+mission than is locally available, he then applies to the next higher
+office of sovereignty which, in turn, requests the SA from the SA
+office in his sector.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+[Page 75]
+
+
+                     _POLITICAL LEADERS AND THE SS_
+
+The directives laid down with regard to the relationship to the SA are
+similarly applicable to the SS.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+
+                    _POLITICAL LEADERS AND THE NSKK_
+
+The directives laid down with regard to the relationship to the SA are
+similarly applicable to the NSKK.
+
+[Page 76]
+
+
+                     _POLITICAL LEADERS AND THE HJ_
+
+The directives laid down with regard to the relationship to the SA are
+similarly applicable to the HJ.
+
+In appointing leaders of the HJ and the DJ, the office of the HJ must
+procure the approval of the Hoheitstrager of his zone. This means that
+the Hoheitstrager can prevent the appointment of leaders unsuited for
+the leadership of youth. If his approval has not been procured, an
+appointment may be cancelled if he so requests.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+The political leader has the right to requisition the HJ, in the same
+manner as the SA, for the execution of a political action.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+[Page 76a]
+
+
+        _THE POLITICAL LEADERS AND THE NS AVIATION CORPS (NSFK)_
+
+General Collaboration.
+
+The ranking unit leader of the NSFK within the zone will be consulted
+during the general leader conferences by the Hoheitstrager of the
+NSDAP. Similarly, the Hoheitstrager or his deputy will be invited to
+general leader conferences and other meetings of the NSFK.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+[Page 76b]
+
+
+           _THE POLITICAL LEADER AND THE REICH LABOR SERVICE_
+
+General Collaboration.
+
+Although the Reich Labor Service is no longer an organization within
+the NSDAP--on the basis of the Labor Duty Law of 26 June 1935--the
+connection of this service with the Party is demonstrated by the
+appointment of the Reich Labor Leader to be Reichsleiter of the NSDAP.
+
+To emphasize this union, the leaders of the Reich Labor Service within
+the zone will participate in the monthly leader conferences of the
+Hoheitstrager. More than that, it is desirable that the Reich Labor
+Leader will be invited to other political Fuehrer talks and, vice
+versa, the political leader to meetings of the Reich Labor Service.
+
+[Page 77]
+
+
+                  _THE POLITICAL LEADER AND THE STATE_
+
+To achieve unity of Party and State, the Chief of the Party Chancellery
+has been given the powers of a Reich Minister. In fundamental
+questions, the official channels of all Party offices and organizations
+of the NSDAP with the ministries and other State authorities and, in
+the opposite direction, of all State offices with organizations of the
+Party go through the Party Chancellery. This method will assure unified
+procedure of the Party towards the State.
+
+The Chief of the Party Chancellery must be heard prior to the
+appointment of any higher civil servant; he will indicate the judgment
+of the Party towards the person of the proposed civil servant. To
+make sure of agreement between the municipal administration and the
+Party, the deputy of the NSDAP will have a decisive voice in the
+appointment and dismissal of the mayor, the alderman, and the municipal
+councillors, and furthermore, in the following decisions of the mayor:
+
+1. The decree of principal directives.
+
+2. The bestowal of honorary citizen rights and honorary titles.
+
+The Chief of the Party Chancellery appoints the deputy of the NSDAP.
+On the basis of his directives, the gauleiter appoints the deputies
+as follows: for town and country districts, the kreisleiter. If
+this official happens to be an employee of a municipality or of an
+inspectorate, a gau inspector will be appointed. In special cases, the
+gauleiter may appoint himself as deputy.
+
+[Page 92]
+
+Membership in Affiliated Organizations.
+
+The tasks of the affiliated organizations are laid down by the chief
+offices of the Party which have jurisdiction in the zone of those
+organizations.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+Only those organizations may claim to uphold the Fuehrer principle and
+the form of National Socialist organization and thus be recognized
+as promoting the continuation of State and people in the National
+Socialist sense who have found, and will find in the future, structure,
+supervision, and general character through the Party.
+
+All others, living an existence of their own, are to be turned away as
+outsiders and must either change or disappear from public life.
+
+[Page 99]
+
+
+                          _BLOCK OF THE NSDAP_
+
+
+                             A. BLOCKLEITER
+
+1. Regional Sector.
+
+The household: The household is the basic community upon which the
+block and cell system is built. The household is the organizational
+focal point of all the Germans united in an apartment and including
+roomers, domestic help, etc.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+The block of the NSDAP consists of 40 to 60 households (if possible no
+more than 50).
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+2. Personnel Questions.
+
+_a._ The blockleiter is Hoheitstrager of the NSDAP.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+_c._ Subordination: Within the local chapter the blockleiter is
+subordinate to the cell leader in disciplinary matters.
+
+_d._ Appointment: The blockleiter will be appointed by the
+Ortsgruppenleiter (local chapter director).
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+3. Tasks and Jurisdiction.
+
+The blockleiter has jurisdiction over all matters within his zone
+relating to the Movement, and he is fully responsible to the cell
+leader.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+[Page 101]
+
+It is his duty to find people disseminating damaging rumors and to
+report them to the Ortsgruppe so that they may be reported to the
+respective State authorities.
+
+The blockleiter must not only be preacher and defender of the National
+Socialist ideology towards the members of nation and Party entrusted
+to his political care, but he must also strive to achieve practical
+collaboration of the Party members within his block zone and he must
+make those of special talents and ability known to the Hoheitstrager.
+
+[Page 102]
+
+The blockleiter shall continuously remind the Party members of their
+particular duties towards the people and the State.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+Furthermore, the blockleiter completes a list (card file) about the
+households.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+[Page 103]
+
+It is the blockleiter’s aim to achieve to the greatest extent possible
+that the sons and daughters of families within his zone become members
+of the various formations of the HJ, SA, SS, NSKK, as well as the
+corresponding affiliated organizations of the Party, and the German
+Labor Front, that they visit the National Socialist meetings, rallies,
+celebrations, etc. In short, the blockleiter must be an untiring
+activist and propagandist of the Movement.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+In principle, the blockleiter will settle his official business
+verbally, and he will receive messages verbally and pass them on in
+the same way. Correspondence will only be used in cases of absolute
+necessity and practicability.
+
+[Page 104]
+
+5. Attitude Towards Members of the Nation.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+_a._ The blockleiter conducts National Socialist propaganda from mouth
+to mouth. He will eventually awaken the understanding of the eternally
+dissatisfied as regards the frequently misunderstood or wrongly
+interpreted measures and laws of the National Socialist government.
+He is to encourage the members of the nation to ask questions and he
+is to point out that they may go ahead and talk to him without having
+to expect difficulties. He will admonish them, however, to exercise
+discretion towards other members of the nation as regards loose talk.
+It is not necessary for him to fall in with complaints and gripes about
+possibly obvious shortcomings of any kind in order to demonstrate this
+solidarity, but he must always be eager to think in a positive manner
+and to influence those under his care by his attitude of confidence. *
+* *
+
+_b._ A condition to gain the confidence of all people is to maintain
+absolute secrecy in all matters. * * *
+
+[Page 110]
+
+
+                        _THE CELL OF THE NSDAP_
+
+
+A. CELL LEADER
+
+1. Regional Sector.
+
+The cell consists of four to eight blocks.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+2. Personnel Questions.
+
+_a._ The cell leader is the Hoheitstrager of the NSDAP immediately
+superior to the block leader.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+[Page 112]
+
+3. Mission and Jurisdiction.
+
+The missions of the cell leader correspond to the missions of the block
+leader.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+[Page 116]
+
+
+             _THE LOCAL CHAPTER [ORTSGRUPPE] OF THE NSDAP_
+
+1. Regional Sector.
+
+The zone of sovereignty includes one or more communities; if necessary,
+towns may be subdivided into several zones of sovereignty.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+[Page 119]
+
+3. The Local Chapter Director.
+
+I. Personnel Questions.
+
+_a._ The Ortsgruppenleiter of the NSDAP in his capacity as
+Hoheitstrager is endowed with special rights.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+[Page 119a]
+
+_c._ Place of Rank: The Ortsgruppenleiter is directly subordinate to
+the respective (County Director) [Kreisleiter].
+
+_d._ Appointment: The Ortsgruppenleiter is appointed by the Kreisleiter.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+[Page 120]
+
+II. Mission and Jurisdiction.
+
+(1) General Responsibility.
+
+Contrary to the time before the assumption of power, the actions of the
+NSDAP are not limited to the care of its members but now include the
+care of the entire German nation. This results in the following basic
+conditions for the Ortsgruppenleiter and his office chiefs:
+
+The Ortsgruppenleiter and his office chiefs must manage their Party
+duties in addition to the fulfillment of their professional and family
+duties.
+
+Therefore, the proper conduct of Party tasks is only possible if the
+tasks of the individual and, in particular, the honorary co-workers of
+the Party are as limited as possible.
+
+As Hoheitstrager, all expressions of the Party will emanate from him;
+he is responsible for the political and ideological leadership and
+organization within his zone of sovereignty.
+
+The Ortsgruppenleiter carries the over-all responsibility for
+the political results of all measures initiated by the offices,
+organizations and affiliated associations of the Party. The Party
+office directors (office chiefs, etc.) within the staff of the
+Ortsgruppenleiter are the deputies of the Hoheitstrager in their
+respective offices.
+
+The Ortsgruppenleiter has the right to protest to the Kreisleiter
+against any measures contrary to the interests of the Party with
+regards to a unified political appearance in public.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+[Page 121]
+
+(2) Special Tasks and Duties.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+_c._ Leader Conferences: The Ortsgruppenleiter has the duty to issue
+directives in regular conferences.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+[Page 130]
+
+
+                    _THE KREISLEITUNG OF THE NSDAP_
+
+[Page 131]
+
+4. The County Director [Kreisleiter]
+
+I. Personnel Questions.
+
+_a._ Place of Rank: The Kreisleiter is directly subordinate to the
+Gauleiter.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+_c._ Appointment: The Kreisleiter is appointed by the Fuehrer upon
+suggestion of the Gauleiter.
+
+[Pages 132-133-134]
+
+II. Mission and Jurisdiction of the Kreisleiter.
+
+The Kreisleiter carries the over-all responsibility towards the
+Gauleiter within his zone of sovereignty for the political and
+ideological training and organization of the political leaders, the
+Party members, as well as the population.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+[Page 136]
+
+
+                       _GAULEITUNG OF THE NSDAP_
+
+The Gauleitung--Gauleiter and Gau staff--have the political leadership
+of a designated sector of the Reich and there they perform creative
+work.
+
+1. Regional Sector.
+
+The Gau represents the concentration of a number of Party counties
+[Parteikreis].
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+4. The Gauleiter.
+
+The Gauleiter is directly subordinate to the Fuehrer. He is appointed
+by the Fuehrer.
+
+The Gauleiter bears the over-all responsibility to the Fuehrer for
+the sector of sovereignty entrusted to him. The rights, duties, and
+jurisdiction of the Gauleiter result primarily from the mission
+assigned by the Fuehrer and, apart from that, from detailed directives.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+[Page 140b]
+
+7 B. Functions.
+
+(1) The edition of the official gazette of the Gauleitung.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+(3) The central coordination office of the Gau directorate with
+the State authorities (Reich deputies, police, Gestapo, etc.). The
+arrangement of conferences between the Gauleiter and offices outside
+the Party (State, economy, and others) inasmuch as several Gau
+main offices or Gau offices are interested, in the presence of the
+respective professional Gau office directors.
+
+(4) The installation of the M Section into the Gau staff office and,
+thus, the connection to the Armed Forces.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+(7) Preparation of matters of pardon and commutation of sentence.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+[Page 141a]
+
+C. Structure.
+
+To be able to handle all these tasks the staff office director of the
+Gau is assigned the necessary number of co-workers. The above-mentioned
+tasks of the staff office director of the Gau are combined in the
+following main offices.
+
+(1) Referee for questions of the Armed Forces (mobilization matters).
+
+(2) Information and report matters.
+
+(3) Pardon matters.
+
+(4) Matters of interior conduct of business in as far as these are not
+a concern of the Gau treasurer.
+
+(5) Chancellery for personal-official concerns of the Gauleiter and the
+Deputy Gauleiter.
+
+(6) Law consultant of the Gau.
+
+(7) Complaints and reception of visitors.
+
+[Page 146]
+
+
+                             _THE FUEHRER_
+
+The recognition of the sociological mismanagement in pre-war Germany
+which prevented the growth of a genuine people’s community, the
+front line experiences of the World War filled with the spirit of
+comradeship, and the disgust with the traitorous pacifist postwar
+Germany, matured the Fuehrer’s decision to become a politician and to
+give the German people a state form which would assume its justified
+life interests for centuries.
+
+To achieve this aim the Fuehrer created the National Socialist German
+Workers’ Party. He filled it with his spirit and his will, and with it
+he conquered the power of the State on 30 January 1933. The Fuehrer’s
+will is supreme in the Party. As supreme bearer of sovereignty in the
+Movement, he possesses the right of pardon in Party court matters.
+
+By authority of the law about the Chief of State of the German Reich,
+dated 1 August 1934, the office of the Reich President has been
+combined with that of the Reich Chancellery. Consequently, the powers
+heretofore possessed by the Reich President were transferred to the
+Fuehrer, Adolf Hitler. Through this law, the conduct of Party and State
+has been combined in one hand. By desire of the Fuehrer, a plebiscite
+was conducted on this law on 19 August 1934. On this day, the German
+people chose Adolf Hitler to be their sole leader. He is responsible
+only to his own conscience and to the German nation.
+
+To assist him, particularly in party-political questions, the Fuehrer
+uses the _Party Chancellery_.
+
+The Chief of the Party Chancellery, to guarantee closest collaboration
+between the offices of the Party and the State authorities, has the
+powers of a Reich Minister and is a member of the Reich Cabinet.
+
+With the execution of tasks particular to the Party, the Fuehrer has
+entrusted the _Reichsleiter_ within the Reich Directorate of the NSDAP.
+
+[Pages 148-149]
+
+
+                  _THE REICH DIRECTORATE OF THE NSDAP_
+
+The NSDAP represents the political conception, the political
+conscience, and the political will of the German nation. Political
+conception, political conscience, and political will are embodied in
+the person of the Fuehrer. Based on his directives and in accordance
+with the program of the NSDAP, the organs of the Reich Directorate
+directionally determine the political aims of the German people. It
+is in the Reich Directorate where the strings of the organization of
+the German people and the State meet. By endowment of the Chief of the
+Party Chancellery with the powers of a Reich Minister, and by special
+administrative directives, the penetration of the State apparatus with
+the political will of the Party is guaranteed. It is the task of the
+separate organs of the Reich Directorate to maintain as close a contact
+as possible with the life of the nation through their sub-offices in
+the Gaus. Observations at the front are to be collected and exploited
+by the offices of the Reich Directorate.
+
+The structure of the Reich Directorate is thus that the channel from
+the lowest Party office upwards shows the most minute weaknesses and
+changes in the mood of the people, and that the directives thereby
+produced in the Reich Directorate will reach the outer command posts of
+the Party quickly and clearly.
+
+The Reich Directorate, then, sees to it that the reports of the
+mood of the people will move from the lower to the higher echelons
+uninterruptedly and quickly, and that the will of the Fuehrer will
+reach the most distant branches quickly and accurately, even as in the
+healthy organism of a tree, where the roots receive the food from the
+soil and lead it into the leaves while the juices formed in the leaves
+are being sent to the most distant roots. This coordination guarantees
+an ever-renewed reception of power and an ever-strengthening anchorage
+of the roots, and it permits the crown to spread further and further,
+to reach higher and higher, and yet to withstand wind and weather.
+
+Since the National Socialist Movement has originated from the people,
+it is the most noble task of the Reich Directorate to watch that the
+strong roots of the Party--namely its ties within the nation--will not
+die off.
+
+Another essential task of the Reich Directorate is to assure a good
+selection of leaders. It is the duty of the Reich Directorate to see
+that there is leadership in all phases of life, a leadership which
+is firmly tied to National Socialist ideology and which promotes its
+dissemination with all its energy.
+
+Apart from the general great political tasks which are the
+responsibility of the Reich Directorate, it will also see that the
+Party is well organized in all its offices. For that purpose, the
+Reich Organization Leader exercises a continuous supervision of the
+organizations of the entire Party apparatus, and he prevents the birth
+of a bureaucracy which would paralyze the striking power of the Party.
+It is the supreme task of the Reich Organization Leader to preserve the
+Party as a well-sharpened sword for the Fuehrer.
+
+The inner organization of the Reich Directorate serves for the
+execution of the above-named tasks. The number of its offices is so
+arranged that there will be a representation of all phases of national
+life within the Reich Directorate. The offices will have subordinate
+organizations in the other zones of sovereignty as may become
+necessary. The tasks, jurisdiction, etc., of the offices are further
+defined in detail in the following chapters.
+
+
+                                 PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1903-PS
+
+    Decrees, Regulations, Announcements [Verfuegungen, Anordnungen,
+ Bekanntgaben], Vol. II. Edited by the Party-Chancellery. Published by:
+  Zentralverlag der NSDAP, Frz. Eher Nachf. GmbH., Muenchen. Page 510.
+
+  Decree of the Fuehrer on the execution of the decree concerning the
+     Deputy General for the mobilization of labor [Arbeitseinsatz].
+
+
+In the following the Fuehrer’s decree on the extension of the authority
+of the Deputy General for the Arbeitseinsatz is made public:
+
+“Decree of the Fuehrer on the execution of the decree concerning the
+Deputy General for the Arbeitsdienst of 30 September 1942.
+
+I herewith authorize the Deputy General for the Arbeitseinsatz,
+Reich-governor and district-leader [Gauleiter] Fritz Sauckel to
+take all necessary measures for the enforcement of my decree
+referring to a Deputy General for the Arbeitseinsatz of 21 March
+1942 (Reichsgesetzblatt I, Page 179) according to his own judgment
+in the Greater German Reich, in the Protectorate, and in the
+Government General [Generalgouvernement] as well as in the occupied
+territories, measures which will safeguard under all circumstances
+the regulated deployment of labor [geordneter Arbeitseinsatz] for the
+German war-economy. For this purpose he may appoint commissioners
+[Beauftragte] to the bureaus of the military and civilian
+administration. These are subordinated directly to Deputy General
+for the Arbeitseinsatz, in order to carry out their tasks. They are
+entitled to issue directives to the competent military and civilian
+authorities in charge of the Arbeitseinsatz and of wage-policy.
+
+More detailed directives will be issued by the Deputy General for the
+Arbeitseinsatz.
+
+Fuehrer-Headquarters 30 Sept 1942
+
+                                                             The Fuehrer
+                                                      Sign. Adolf Hitler
+
+                       The Reichminister and Chief of the Reich-Chancery
+                                                       Sign. Dr. Lammers
+
+                                    The chief of the German High Command
+                                                          Sign. Keitel.”
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1913-PS
+
+1943 REICHSARBEITSBLATT, PART I, PAGE 588
+
+  Agreement between the Plenipotentiary General for the Arbeitseinsatz
+  and the German Labor Front concerning the care of non-German workers
+
+The Commissioner for the Four Year Plan
+
+The Plenipotentiary General for the Arbeitseinsatz VIc 5783/291
+
+                                                   Berlin, 20 Sept. 1943
+
+  To the presidents of the Gau employment offices and
+    to the Reich Trustees of Labor
+    as well as to the directors of the employment offices.
+
+
+                               AGREEMENT
+
+The following agreement has been concluded between the Plenipotentiary
+General for the Arbeitseinsatz, Gauleiter and Reich Governor
+[Reichstatthalter] Sauckel and the Reichsleiter of the German Labor
+Front, Reichsorganisation leader Dr. Ley.
+
+1. The German Labor Front, on the basis of decree Nr 4 of the
+Plenipotentiary General for the Arbeitseinsatz of 7 May 1942--GBA
+405/42 (Nr 2b) has the sole and exclusive mission of caring for all
+foreign workers employed within the Reich. Excluded are the farm
+workers employed in the Reich food administration.
+
+2. The Reichsleiter of the German Labor Front, Reichsorganisationleiter
+Dr. Ley, in collaboration with the Plenipotentiary General for
+the Arbeitseinsatz, Gauleiter Sauckel, will establish a “central
+inspection” for the continuous supervision of all measures concerning
+the care of the foreign workers mentioned under 1. This will have the
+designation:
+
+  “Central inspection for the care of foreign workers.”
+
+The central inspection for the care of foreign workers exercises its
+functions upon directives and in the name of the Plenipotentiary
+General for the Arbeitseinsatz and of the Reichsleiter of the German
+Labor Front. In order to avoid all duplication of work, it will be its
+sole responsibility, to scrutinize all measures taken for the care of
+foreign workers employed in the factories and camps, also to remove
+immediately all defects discovered--as far as possible--on the spot and
+to issue the necessary instructions for this.
+
+The authority of the Plenipotentiary General for the Arbeitseinsatz
+to empower the members of his staff and the presidents of the state
+employment offices to get direct information on the conditions
+regarding the employment of foreigners in the factories and camps, will
+remain untouched.
+
+3. The central inspection for the care of foreign workers will be
+continuously in touch with the main office VI of the Plenipotentiary
+General for the Arbeitseinsatz. It will instruct the office on the
+general observations made and will make suggestions for changes, if
+that should become necessary.
+
+4. The offices of the administration of the Arbeitseinsatz will be
+constantly informed by the “central inspection for the care of foreign
+workers” of its observations, in particular immediately in each case in
+which action of State organizations seems to be necessary.
+
+This agreement becomes effective on the day of its signing.
+
+Berlin, 2 June 1943
+
+  Dr. Robert LEY                                           Fritz SAUCKEL
+
+       #       #       #       #       #
+
+For the carrying out of this agreement I order the following:
+
+1. The supervision of all welfare measures in the realm of the
+employment of foreign workers is the sole responsibility of the
+central inspection for the care of foreign workers. Complaints about
+bad quarters, food, deficient provision of free time activities and
+cultural and propagandistic care will in the future be directed by me
+to the central inspection for investigation and elimination of possible
+deficiencies. The labor offices and Gau labor offices must direct
+complaints and protests coming to them to the locally competent office
+of the German Labor Front.
+
+The central inspection will inform the Plenipotentiary General for
+Arbeitseinsatz regarding its decisions and the measures instituted by
+it and their completion.
+
+2. The employment of foreign workers, their identification,
+equalization between the plants, transfers, supervision of practical
+and vocationally correct employment in the plant, the promotion of
+instructional measures to increase production, as well as drafting of
+the labor-contract regulations, the carrying out of pay regulation
+measures, and the supervision of the orderly paying of foreign
+workers, remain as formerly the task of the competent offices of the
+administration of the Arbeitseinsatz and Reich trusteeship.
+
+3. The directives for the employment of eastern and western laborers
+given in Va 5780.28/90 of 9 January and Va 5780/196 of 4 February 1943
+remain in force with the provision that the labor offices and Gau labor
+offices and the specialists employed with them for the inspection of
+camps for eastern laborers need only undertake the tasks mentioned
+under No. 2.
+
+4. The close interrelationship of the tasks of the Arbeitseinsatz
+and the care of foreign labor demands, independently of the measures
+to be effected, for the execution of the above agreement, a constant
+and close cooperation between the offices of the administration of
+the Arbeitseinsatz and the offices of the German labor front. If, for
+example, it is determined in the execution of Arbeitseinsatz measures,
+that an insufficient labor performance on the part of foreign labor
+results from absence of welfare work, then the competent agencies of
+the German Labor Front are to be informed of this without delay so
+that the latter may effect the correction of existing deficiencies.
+On the other hand the offices of the German Labor Front will bring
+to the attention of the competent agencies of the Arbeitseinsatz
+administrative findings made in the course of their welfare work which
+require an evaluation from the point of view of the Arbeitseinsatz.
+
+For the adjustment of individual questions of cooperation between the
+offices concerned and the erection of a permanent exchange of findings
+the Gau labor offices will enter into negotiations with the appropriate
+administration [Gauwaltungen] of the German Labor Front and will inform
+the labor offices on the rulings effected for the districts.
+
+By order
+
+                                                            Dr BEISIEGEL
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1914-PS
+
+Decrees, Regulations, Announcements [Verfuegungen, Anordnungen,
+Bekanntgaben], 1st part, 1943 Edition--Editor: The Party Chancellery.
+Published by the Central Publishing House of the NSDAP, Franz Eher,
+successor, Muenchen. Pages 318-320.
+
+       #       #       #       #       #
+
+                               AGREEMENT
+
+The following agreement between the Reich Minister for the Occupied
+Eastern Territories, Reichsleiter Alfred Rosenberg and the director
+of the German Labor Front, Reichsorganisationsleiter Dr. R. Ley, was
+reached today:
+
+I. On the basis of the agreement reached on June 2, 1943, between
+the Deputy General for the Arbeitseinsatz, Gauleiter Fritz Sauckel
+and the leader of the German Arbeitsfront, Reich Organisationsleiter
+Dr. R. Ley, concerning a “Central inspection for the care of foreign
+laborers”, in order to avoid in the future duplication of work and
+overlapping in plants and camps in which foreign workers are employed
+or housed, special inspections of the plants and community camps
+will be effected only by the central inspection. In order to secure
+cooperation between the Reich Ministry for the occupied Eastern
+territories and the Central Inspection, a liaison agency will be
+created in the Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories.
+
+II. The Central Inspection for the care of foreign laborers is directed
+to give upon request the liaison office of the Reich Minister for the
+Occupied Eastern Territories, all information in questions related to
+the care of foreigners.
+
+III. If, in special cases, the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern
+Territories considers that a committee should be dispatched in order
+to inspect camps and plants, this will be done with the consent and
+cooperation of a representative of the central inspection for the care
+of foreign workers.
+
+IV. However, the leader of the liaison agency will have at any time
+access to the community camps and plants in which workers from the
+Occupied Eastern Territories are housed or employed. Nevertheless, in
+these cases too the central inspection will have to be given advance
+notice of the intended inspections.
+
+V. This agreement comes into force on the day of signing.
+
+
+                               AGREEMENT
+
+1. A liaison office of the Propaganda Ministry to the German Labor
+Front is established in the office of the Arbeitseinsatz between the
+Reichminister for Enlightenment and Propaganda, Dr. Goebbels and the
+Director of the German Labor Front, Reichsorganisationsleiter Dr. Ley
+as the result of the agreement reached on 2 June 1943, between the
+Deputy General for the Arbeitseinsatz, Gauleiter Fritz Sauckel and the
+Director of the German Labor Front, Dr. Ley about the establishment of
+a “Central inspection for the care of foreign laborers”.
+
+2. A similar agency will be created in the Gau administrations between
+the Reich Propaganda Office and/or the Gau Propaganda Office and the
+main section of the Arbeitseinsatz of the German Arbeitsfront.
+
+3. The liaison agencies have to see that all the measures for
+caretaking should be carried out in closest cooperation.
+
+4. In order to secure this cooperation, it will be ascertained that
+all reports, especially those of the central inspection, should be
+currently maintained to liaison agents.
+
+5. The liaison agents will be currently notified of the visits to camps
+and plants effected by the German Arbeitsfront and by the delegates of
+the Central Inspection; it will be at their discretion to take part in
+these visits in person or by a representative. In special cases the
+liaison agent or his representative can also visit camps and plants
+after notifying the DAF.
+
+6. This agreement comes into force on the day of signing.
+
+       #       #       #       #       #
+
+Chief of Security Police and SD.
+
+IV D--626/43 (ausl Arb.)
+
+                                                                  Berlin
+                                                           June 21, 1943
+                                                           Night Letter!
+
+To the inspectors of the Security Police and of the SD.
+
+Subject: Central inspection for the care of foreign laborers.
+
+For the permanent control of all measures for the care of foreign
+workers employed in the Reich--except in agriculture--the leader of the
+DAF has created:
+
+  “Central Inspection for the care of foreign labor”, in
+  cooperation with the Deputy General for Arbeitseinsatz.
+
+This Central inspection has the task of supervising all the measures
+for the care of foreign labor in plants and camps, of correcting the
+detected flaws right on the spot, as far as possible and to issue the
+directives which are necessary for this purpose.
+
+The leader of Central Inspection for the care of foreign labor is the
+Hauptdienstleiter of the NSDAP.
+
+                       Party member Otto Gohdes.
+
+The erection and tasks of this central inspection will not interfere
+with the measures for which the Security Police and SD are responsible.
+The preventive tasks of the police which aims at an orderly treatment
+and care of foreign laborers to avoid incidents undesirable from the
+standpoint of the Security Police, will be considerably supported and
+secured by the central inspection and its delegates. The delegates of
+the central inspection for the care of foreign laborers are instructed
+to carry out their activities in close cooperation with the agencies of
+the Security Police and of the SD, particularly with the State Police
+(directive) agencies. I request, therefore, that close cooperation be
+afforded the delegates of the central inspection, that they be strongly
+assisted and taken everywhere committed, even where the care of foreign
+laborers does not forward the interests of the Security Police and the
+SD.
+
+Care of laborers of a German blood.
+
+In order to do justice to the particular position of people of German
+blood [Volksdeutschen], the DAF--Office of the Arbeitseinsatz--has
+confidentially instructed its agencies to carry out the care of
+Volksdeutschen in cooperation with the agencies of the Volksdeutschen
+information office and to avoid that foreign liaison agencies should
+take care of the Volksdeutschen workers. In the future, the DAF and the
+State Labor Office will not submit to the foreign liaison agencies such
+plants which employ only Volksdeutschen from the country in question.
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1915-PS
+
+                1938 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 111
+
+ Decree concerning the leadership of the Armed Forces, 4 February 1938
+
+From now on, I take over directly the command of the whole Armed Forces.
+
+The former Armed Forces department in the Reichs War Ministry will come
+directly under my command with all its tasks which it fulfilled under
+the jurisdiction of the “supreme command of the Army” and my military
+staff.
+
+At the head of the staff of the supreme command of the Armed Forces
+is the former Chief of the Armed Forces department as “Chief of the
+supreme command of the Armed Forces”. He is equal in rank to a Reichs
+Minister.
+
+At the same time, the supreme command takes the responsibility for
+the affairs of the Reichs Ministry of War, and by my order, the chief
+of the supreme command of the Armed Forces exercises the authority
+formerly belonging to the Reichs Minister.
+
+It is the supreme command of the Armed Forces’ duty to carry out in
+peace time in accordance with my instructions, the preparation of the
+defense system of the Reich.
+
+Berlin 4 February 1938
+
+                                       The Fuehrer and Reichs Chancellor
+                                                           Adolph Hitler
+
+                                           The Reichs Minister and Chief
+                                               of the Reichs Chancellery
+                                                             Dr. Lammers
+
+                                        The Chief of the Supreme Command
+                                                     of the Armed Forces
+                                                                  Keitel
+
+
+                                 PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1918-PS
+
+HIMMLER’S ADDRESS TO OFFICERS OF THE SS-LEIBSTANDARTE “ADOLF HITLER” ON
+       THE “DAY OF METZ” (PRESENTATION OF HISTORICAL NAZI FLAG).
+
+Now I would like to bring another matter to your attention. Very
+frequently the member of the Waffen-SS thinks about the deportation
+of this people here. These thoughts came to me today when watching
+the very difficult work out there performed by the Security Police,
+supported by your men, who help them a great deal. Exactly the same
+thing happened in Poland in weather 40 degrees below zero, where we
+had to haul away thousands, ten thousands, hundred thousands; where
+we had to have the toughness--you should hear this but also forget it
+again immediately--to shoot thousands of leading Poles, where we had to
+have the toughness, otherwise it would have taken revenge on us later.
+We also had to bring in, in this winter of 40 degrees below zero, ten
+thousands of Germans, and had to take care of their needs--that the
+women were warm; that, when they bore children, these children did
+not experience want and destitution; where we had to take care of
+their horses; where we had to take care of the baggage of these poor
+Germans from Volkynia; all duties where the proud soldier says: “My
+God, why do I have to do that, this ridiculous job here...!” Gentlemen,
+it is much easier in many cases--and that I would like to tell you
+this once, or would like to recall to you, you will gladly admit: in
+many cases it is much easier to go into combat with a company than to
+suppress an obstructive population of low cultural level in some area
+with a company, or to carry out executions, or to haul away people, or
+to evict crying and hysterical women, or to return our German racial
+brethren across the border from Russia and to take care of them. I want
+to tell you: In the entire Waffen-SS we must begin to view the other
+great activity of the entire SS [Gesamt-SS] and entire police. We must
+see to it that you consider the activity of the man in green uniform as
+just as valuable as the activity you yourself are engaged in. You have
+to consider the work of the SD man or of the man of the Security Police
+as a vital part of our whole work just like the fact that you can carry
+arms. You are the ones to be envied, because if you do something, if a
+unit achieves fame, then one can talk of fame, and it can be decorated.
+It is much more difficult in many other positions--and with that I do
+not want to underestimate your achievements; I would be the last one
+to do that--but, believe me, in many places it is much more difficult,
+this silent work-compulsion, this silent activity, this standing
+guard over our ideology, this necessity of remaining steadfast, this
+necessity of not compromising is very much more difficult in places.
+Now I want to tell you something else; I mentioned before that we
+absolutely were in danger of suffocating within ourselves, within the
+leadership corps [Fuehrerkorps]. There did not seem to be a way out.
+Either we would have become senile or we had to kick the people out too
+soon. Today, in the future, in time of peace, the possibility does not
+exist that a man, or a leader, provided he is worth his salt, does not
+perform valuable work in some position or that satisfactory work is not
+assigned to him. Of course we will do it in such a way--let there be no
+doubt about it--that we put the most capable ones into each position.
+In other words, if there are four company commanders, the most capable
+one will be promoted to battalion commander, the one who is best fitted
+for that activity. The other three, or the other 2, will be utilized
+in some activity which is just as valuable, but for which he is better
+adapted. In general, everyone should understand that the course of the
+past two years, which were pure war years with preparation for war,
+are of course not completed, education for Political Officers will
+become much more strongly emphasized. I would like to use this word
+for once, Political Leader, Political Officer. A period will commence
+where someone will be platoon leader in the Waffen SS for 3 or 4 years.
+During that time he will attend this training course or that, and
+already as a young leader he will come to know the sphere of activity
+of all other branches in the SS, in courses lasting 6 to 8 weeks. From
+the beginning it will then happen that mutual understanding sets in,
+mutual esteem and the absolute conviction that the duties of the other
+guy are very, very difficult, and are very, very valuable. On the
+other hand, I will not allow any branch to grow where the leading men,
+the members of the Fuehrercorps, are not at least reserve leaders of
+the Armed SS and did not get at least far enough to be able to lead a
+company as reserve leader. This way coherence will be achieved which
+is necessary. I believe that you can get an idea from what I said to
+the men today--and you as leaders can add to it by drawing your own
+conclusions--what the entire SS will have to do in order to secure
+our Reich, I mean in the first place with respect to ideology and
+safeguarding of the race [Blut] by settlements and extending of our
+Lebensraum, with respect to the work in colonies, and we shall have
+garrisons far away in South-Africa, and we shall have garrisons in the
+Arctic winter, as we have not in Kirkenes, that is up there on the
+North cape we are also going to have a garrison of a few battalions,
+we shall have garrisons on the Bug, and we shall now have garrisons in
+the West, where certainly Metz will not be the most distant western
+frontier. If we think the right way, some things will be of decisive
+importance. You would be surprised if I wanted to carry out immediately
+after the war when peace begins with an iron hand what I indicated
+today in my class with the men, that we must win the peace and be hard
+against ourselves. The first two years of peace will be decisive for
+our future. After victory we must nowhere become megalomaniacs, we must
+not relax in any respect but we must start an unheard-of education of
+ourselves. It is necessary, that obedience be granite-like, or else it
+would be impossible to have distant garrisons like Kirkenes which at
+times cannot be reached even by modern means, or colonial garrisons, if
+the officers there, the leader there, does not act strictly [eisern] in
+accordance with his orders and would take any consequences rather than
+disregard in any way an order, a basic order, given.
+
+We shall have to do one thing: After the war we shall apply an
+unheard-of discipline against ourselves as far as external values are
+concerned they also are important. Whether it concerns our clothes
+or anything else, because you see, it is a great plus and a great
+danger at the same time, that what we are doing after the war, during
+Adolf Hitler’s life, will live on for centuries to come, and if we
+make a mistake, the mistake will live on for centuries, because silly
+descendants will say: “Yes this is what they did in Adolf Hitler’s
+time, consequently we must act likewise!” If we strike up a wrong
+tune, this wrong tune will resound through centuries. And mistakes
+unfortunately do grow in dimension the longer they are continued.
+Therefore, it is necessary that we train ourselves in the future in an
+unheard-of way. I believe it is not the right thing for us to do to
+discuss these worries which I have with each one of you separately. The
+one or the other among you who talks here and there like a fool and
+believes he must talk wildly in the Cassino might say: “For Heaven’s
+sake, those people up there don’t know, they have not the slightest
+idea!” Our idea goes very far and I know exactly what is going on
+within the troop, know exactly what they think and how they feel. You
+must also consider the following: I cannot concentrate my mind solely
+on--now, please don’t become conceited--the most splendid part of the
+SS because it is the most positive part and because the trade you are
+following is the most positive and most manly, I cannot do that, I must
+always have the entire SS in my mind.
+
+If I did not see this part, I would deny life to this most positive
+and most manly part of our activity; i.e., the Armed SS. I would deny
+your life. Because this armed SS will live only if the entire SS is
+alive. If the entire corps is actually an order which lives according
+to these laws and realizes that one part cannot exist without the
+other--you are unimaginable without the general SS, and the latter is
+not imaginable without you. The police is not imaginable without the
+SS, nor are we imaginable without this executive branch of the state
+which is in our hands. The Fuehrercorps is not imaginable without the
+national-political institutions of education which we are building
+up now, and vice versa we cannot fill up our ranks without contact
+with the youth, we cannot exist without the business enterprises. A
+field which probably is unknown to most of you because nothing has
+ever been said about it. I want to tell you just a little bit of
+it: The apartment-building program which is the prerequisite for a
+healthy and social basis of the entire SS as well as of the entire
+Fuehrercorps can be carried out only when I get the money for it from
+somewhere; nobody is going to give me the money, it must be earned,
+and it will be earned by forcing the scum of mankind, the prisoners,
+the professional criminals to do positive work. The man, guarding
+these prisoners, serves just as hard as the one on close-order drill.
+The one who does this and stands near these utterly negative people
+will learn within 3 to 4 months * * * and we shall see: In peacetime
+I shall form guard-battalions and put them on duty for 3 months
+only--to fight the inferior being [Untermenschentum], and this will
+not be a boring guard duty, but if the officers handle it right, it
+will be the best indoctrination on inferior beings and the inferior
+races. This activity is necessary, as I said, 1. to eliminate these
+negative people from the German people, 2. to exploit them once more
+for the great folk community by having them break stones and bake
+bricks so that the Fuehrer can again erect his grand buildings and 3.
+to in turn invest the money, earned soberly this way, in houses, in
+ground, in settlements so that our men can have houses in which to
+raise large families and lots of children. This in turn is necessary
+because we stand or die with this leading blood of Germany and if the
+good blood is not reproduced we will not be able to rule the world.
+Please understand: We would not be able to hold the great Germanic
+Reich which is about to take shape. I am convinced, that we can hold
+it, but we have to prepare for that. If we once had not enough sons
+those who will come after us will have to become cowards. A nation
+which has an average of 4 sons per family can venture a war: if 2 of
+them die, 2 transplant the name. The leadership of a nation having
+one son or two sons per family will have to be faint-hearted at any
+decision on account of their own experience because they will have to
+tell themselves: We cannot afford it. Look at France, which is the best
+example. France had to accept from us a dictate. It could no longer
+dictate to us because they could not continue. All the things which
+sometimes seem strange to you because other things were more urgent
+during the last 2 years, because I could not explain them sufficiently
+to you, the leaders, because sometimes I did not explain them to you in
+order not to make too public what was just starting life, so that the
+tender nursling would not be pulled out by people who don’t like us. I
+preferred that very often not even my own troops knew anything about
+it and let the small nursling secretly grow into a small tree. Then
+when it is big, nowadays everything is big, now the trees are not being
+uprooted. Everything that seemed strange to you: “Why do we have to
+contribute to the spring of life [Lebensborn]?” “Why do we have to join
+the saving’s cooperative?” “Why do we have to do this and to do that?”
+If anything like that turns up, I demand from you in future:
+
+In the first place be SS men who have the creed that everything
+being done is all right. One piece fits the other, even if you don’t
+recognize it beforehand, even if it does not appear at first sight
+that they fit each other. In the end, everything will be all right.
+The ultimate aim for those 11 years during which I have been the
+Reichsfuehrer SS has been invariably the same: To create an order
+of good blood which is able to serve Germany. Which unfailingly and
+without sparing itself can be made use of because the greatest losses
+can do no harm to the vitality of this order, the vitality of these
+men, because they will always be replaced. To create an order which
+will spread the idea of nordic blood so far that we will attract all
+nordic blood in the world, take away the blood from our adversaries,
+absorb it so that never again, looking at it from the viewpoint of
+grand policy, nordic blood in great quantities and to an extent worth
+mentioning will fight against us. We must get it and the others cannot
+have it. We never gave up the ideas and the aim conceived so many
+years ago. Everything we did has taken us some distance further on the
+way. Everything we are going to do will lead us further on the way. It
+can only be carried out, if everyone of us looks beyond the things he
+likes in his activity, his company, his regiment--and you are supposed
+to love it you may be proud of it--looks beyond it towards the great
+common goal, here the SS, and the SS also is only a means to an end,
+always the Reich, the ideology, created by the Fuehrer, the Reich,
+created by him, the Reich of all teutons.
+
+
+                                 PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1919-PS
+
+ Speech of the Reichsfuehrer-SS at the meeting of SS Major-Generals at
+                        Posen October 4th, 1943
+
+                            The 1941 attack
+
+In 1941 the Fuehrer attacked Russia. That was, as we can well see now,
+shortly,--perhaps 3 to 6 months--before Stalin prepared to embark on
+his great penetration into Central and Western Europe. I can give a
+picture of this first year in a few words. The attacking forces cut
+their way through. The Russian Army was herded together in great
+pockets, ground down, taken prisoner. At that time we did not value the
+mass of humanity as we value it today, as raw material, as labour. What
+after all, thinking in terms of generations, is not to be regretted,
+but is now deplorable by reason of the loss of labour, is that the
+prisoners died in tens and hundreds of thousands of exhaustion and
+hunger [p. 3].
+
+It is basically wrong for us to infuse all our inoffensive soul and
+spirit, our good-nature, and our idealism into foreign peoples [p. 22].
+This is true since the time of Herder who clearly wrote “Voices of
+the Nations” [Stimmen der Voelker], in a state of drunkenness, thereby
+bringing [p. 23] on us, who come after him, such immeasurable sorrow
+and misery. This is true for instance, of the Czechs and the Slovenes
+to whom we gave their consciousness of nationality. They were just not
+capable of it themselves; we had to discover it for them.
+
+One basic principle must be the absolute rule for the SS man: we must
+be honest, decent, loyal, and comradely to members of our own blood
+and to nobody else. What happens to a Russian, to a Czech does not
+interest me in the slightest. What the nations can offer in the way
+of good blood of our type, we will take, if necessary by kidnapping
+their children and raising them here with us. Whether nations live
+in prosperity or starve to death [verrecken--to die--used of cattle]
+interests me only in so far as we need them as slaves for our Kultur;
+otherwise, it is of no interest to me. Whether 10,000 Russian females
+fall down from exhaustion while digging an anti-tank ditch interests
+me only in so far as the anti-tank ditch for Germany is finished. We
+shall never be rough and heartless when it is not necessary, that is
+clear. We Germans, who [p. 24] are the only people in the world who
+have a decent attitude towards animals, will also assume a decent
+attitude towards these human animals. But it is a crime against our own
+blood to worry about them and give them ideals, thus causing our sons
+and grandsons to have a more difficult time with them. When somebody
+comes to me and says, “I cannot dig the anti-tank ditch with women and
+children, it is inhuman, for it would kill them,” then I have to say,
+“You are a murderer of your own blood because if the anti-tank ditch is
+not dug, German soldiers will die, and they are sons of German mothers.
+They are our own blood.” That is what I want to instil into the SS
+and what I believe have instilled into them as one of the most sacred
+laws of the future. Our concern, our duty is our people and our blood.
+It is for them that we must provide and plan, work and fight, nothing
+else. We can be indifferent to everything else. I wish the SS to adopt
+this attitude to the problem of all foreign, non-Germanic peoples,
+especially Russians. All else is vain, fraud against our own nation and
+an obstacle to the early winning of the war.
+
+
+Foreigners in the Reich
+
+We must also realize that we have 6 to 7 million foreigners in Germany.
+Perhaps it is even 8 million now [p. 43]. We have prisoners in Germany.
+They are none of them dangerous so long as we take severe measures
+at the merest trifle. It is a mere nothing today to shoot 10 Poles,
+compared with the fact that we might later have to shoot tens of
+thousands in their place, and compared to the fact that the shooting
+of these tens of thousands would then be carried out even at the cost
+of German blood. Every little fire will immediately be stamped out
+and quenched, and extinguished,--otherwise--as in the case of a real
+fire--a political and psychological surface-fire may spring up among
+the people.
+
+
+                      The Communists in the Reich
+
+I don’t believe the Communists could attempt any action, for their
+leading elements, like most criminals, are in our concentration camps.
+And here I must say this--that we shall be able to see after the war
+what a blessing it was for Germany that, in spite of all the silly talk
+about humanitarianism, we imprisoned all this criminal sub-stratum of
+the German people in concentration camps: I’ll answer for that. If they
+were going about free, we should be worse off. For then the sub-humans
+would have [p. 44] their NCOs and Commanding Officers, then they would
+have their councils of workers and military. As it is, however, they
+are locked up, and are making shells or projectile cases or other
+important things, and are very useful members of human society.
+
+
+                           The SS in wartime
+
+Now I come to our own development, to that of the SS in the past
+months. Looking back on the whole war, this development was fantastic
+[p. 51]. It took place at an absolutely terrific speed. Let us look
+back a little to 1939. At that time we were a few regiments, guard
+units [Wachverbaende] 8 to 9,000 strong,--that is, not even a division,
+all in all 25 to 28,000 men at the outside. True, we were armed, but
+really only got our artillery regiment as our heavy arm two months
+before the war began. We will recapitulate which tasks, which duties,
+and which assignments we have been given in the last 4½ years. But
+first I would like to enumerate and make known once more some outward
+changes.
+
+
+                          Changes in Personnel
+
+The following changes have taken place at the Main Offices:
+
+Our comrade, SS Lieutenant General Kaltenbrunner has succeeded
+our fallen friend Heydrich. Unfortunately he is ill today. He has
+phlebitis, but it is, I am glad to say, not dangerous. That [p. 52] is
+why he could not come.
+
+Our old friend Daluege has such severe heart trouble that he has to
+undergo courses of treatment and now has to retire from active service
+for 1½ to 2 years.--I would like this evening to send our two friends,
+Daluege especially, and Kaltenbrunner too, a teleprint or a telegram in
+the name of all of us. As I have said, we may hope that Daluege will
+have recovered in about two years, and can then return to the front and
+get into harness.
+
+SS Lieutenant General Wuennenberg is in charge as his deputy. He
+has been in charge of the police division up till now, and was then
+appointed to be Officer Commanding IVth SS armored corps. He is General
+of the Waffen-SS and the police, and is in charge of the uniformed
+regular police [ordnungspolizei] as their Head.
+
+SS-Gruppenfuehrer Breithaupt has succeeded our old comrade and friend
+Scharfe as Chief of the SS-court of justice.
+
+SS-Obergruppenfuehrer Hofmann has made a change. He has given up the
+Main office for race and settlement [Rasse--u. Siedlungshauptamt] and
+has become Senior Executive SS and Police Officer [Hoehre SS--und
+Polizeifuehrer] for the South-West.
+
+SS-Obergruppenfuehrer Hildebrandt has left Oberabschnitt Weichsel, and
+has become Chief of the Main Office for race and settlement [p. 53].
+
+SS-Obergruppenfuehrer Schmidt has left the Head Office for Personnel at
+his own request and has joined my personal staff for special duties. He
+is succeeded by SS-Gruppenfuehrer von Herff.
+
+One of my closest and most long-standing colleagues,
+SS-Obergruppenfuehrer Wolff, has now, I am glad to say, recovered
+completely from a severe illness which greatly endangered his
+life--(it was an operation for removing stones from the kidney)--and
+is now,--this is a new appointment--Supreme Executive SS and Police
+Officer for the whole of occupied Italy. He therefore has charge of 25
+to 30 million people. Under him he has SS-Gruppenfuehrer Globocnik as
+Senior Executive SS and Police Officer for the coastal area. He too
+could not come today.
+
+Senior Executive SS and Police Officers have since been appointed as
+follows: for Croatia--Kammerhofer, who on account of the Croatians is
+not called Senior Executive SS and Police Officer, but Commissioner of
+the Reichsfuehrer SS; for Serbia, Meyszner was appointed earlier, for
+Greece--[p. 54] Stroob at the moment but--I would like to tell you this
+now--I am transferring him from there to Schimana. Officials in Greece
+will become Senior Executive SS and Police Officers, and thus not
+command the Galician SS--Volunteer Division. SS-Gruppenfuehrer Pancke
+is to become Senior Executive SS- and Police Officer for Denmark.
+
+
+Chief of the Anti-partisan Units [Bandenkampf-Verbaende]
+
+In the meantime I have also set up the department of Chief of the
+anti-partisan units [p. 57]. Our comrade SS-Obergruppenfuehrer von dem
+Bach is Chief of the anti-partisan units. I considered it necessary
+for the Reichsfuehrer SS to be in authoritative command in all these
+battles, for I am convinced that we are best in a position to take
+action against this enemy struggle, which is a decidedly political one.
+Except where the units which had been supplied and which we had formed
+for this purpose were taken from us to fill in gaps at the front, we
+have been very successful.
+
+It is notable that, by setting up this department we have gained [p.
+58] for the SS in turn a division, a corps, an army, and the next step,
+which is the High Command of an army or even of a group--if you wish to
+call it that.
+
+
+                 Regular uniformed Police and the Sipo
+
+Now to deal briefly with the tasks of the regular uniformed police and
+the Sipo. They still cover the same field. I can see that great things
+have been achieved. We have formed roughly 30 police regiments from
+police reservists and former members of the police--police officials
+as they used to be called. The average age in our police battalions is
+not lower than that of the Security battalions of the Armed Forces.
+Their achievements are beyond all praise. In addition, we have formed
+Police Rifle Regiments by merging the police battalions of the “savage
+peoples”. Thus we did not leave these police battalions untouched but
+blended them in the ratio of about 1:3. That is why we have, at the
+present moment of crisis, a far greater stability than could be seen
+among the other units made up of natives or local inhabitants.
+
+
+                         SS-industrial concerns
+
+I now come to other individual great spheres of activity, of which it
+is important for you all to know [p. 63]. We have huge armament works
+in the concentration camps. This is the sphere of activity of our
+friend SS-Obergruppenfuehrer Pohl. Every month we put in many millions
+of hours of work for armaments. We tackle the most thankless tasks
+and--I must give this its [p. 64] due--whether in the concentration
+camps, in Pohl’s industrial works, or outside at the offices of the
+Senior Executive SS and Police Officers or in the workshops of the
+Head Office of SS administration, one thing is obvious: wherever we
+are, we are SS-men. Where things are in a bad way, we act. I want
+every subordinate trained to this end. We want to help, unhampered
+by quibbles regarding authority, for we want to win the war. What
+we are doing, we are doing for Germany. Whether it is a question of
+building a road, if a tunnel is not going ahead somewhere, or if it
+is an invention which for sheer red-tape does not come to fruition,
+or anything else; where we can get to work, we get to work. What we
+are doing in our armament works will be a remarkable and noteworthy
+achievement, even if we can only assess it and prove it when the war is
+ended.
+
+
+                      The Clearing out of the Jews
+
+I also want to talk to you, quite frankly, on a very grave matter.
+Among ourselves it should be mentioned quite frankly, and yet we will
+never speak of it publicly. Just as we did not hesitate on June 30th,
+1934 to do the duty we were bidden, and stand comrades who had lapsed,
+up against the wall and shoot them, so we have never spoken about it
+and will never [p. 65] speak of it. It was that tact which is a matter
+of course and which I am glad to say, is inherent in us, that made us
+never discuss it among ourselves, never to speak of it. It appalled
+everyone, and yet everyone was certain that he would do it the next
+time if such orders are issued and if it is necessary.
+
+I mean the clearing out of the Jews, the extermination of the Jewish
+race. It’s one of those things it is easy to talk about--“The Jewish
+race is being exterminated”, says one party member, “that’s quite
+clear, it’s in our program--elimination of the Jews, and we’re doing
+it, exterminating them.” And then they come, 80 million worthy Germans,
+and each one has his decent Jew. Of course the others are vermin, but
+this one is an A-1 Jew. Not one of all those who talk this way has
+witnessed it, not one of them has been through it. Most of _you_ must
+know what it means when 100 corpses are lying side by side, or 500 or
+1000. To have stuck it out and at the same time--apart from exceptions
+caused by human weakness--to have remained decent fellows, that is what
+has made us hard. This is a page of glory in our history which has
+never been written and is never to be [p. 66] written, for we know how
+difficult we should have made it for ourselves, if--with the bombing
+raids, the burdens and the deprivations of war--we still had Jews today
+in every town as secret saboteurs, agitators and trouble-mongers. We
+would now probably have reached the 1916/17 stage when the Jews were
+still in the German national body.
+
+We have taken from them what wealth they had. I have issued a strict
+order, which SS-Obergruppenfuehrer Pohl has carried out, that this
+wealth should, as a matter of course, be handed over to the Reich
+without reserve. We have taken none of it for ourselves. Individual men
+who have lapsed will be punished in accordance with an order I issued
+at the beginning, which gave this warning: Whoever takes so much as
+a mark of it, is a dead man. A number of SS men--there are not very
+many of them--have fallen short, and they will die, without mercy. We
+had the moral right, we had the duty to our people, to destroy this
+people which wanted to destroy us. But we have not the right to enrich
+ourselves with so much as a fur, a watch, a mark, or a cigarette or
+anything else. Because we have exterminated a bacterium we do not want,
+in the end, to be infected by the bacterium and die of it. I will not
+see so much as a small area of sepsis appear here or gain a [p. 67]
+hold. Wherever it may form, we will cauterize it. Altogether however,
+we can say, that we have fulfilled this most difficult duty for the
+love of our people. And our spirit, our soul, our character has not
+suffered injury from it.
+
+
+                       The bearing of the SS-man
+
+If I make a statement for us all and in the presence of all of us of
+all that we have done this year in the form of--I would almost say--a
+statement of accounts, then there is one thing that I must not overlook
+and pass over: the significance of the bearing of the SS-man.
+
+
+                       The Principle of Selection
+
+We are a product of the law of selection [p. 70]. We have made our
+choice from a cross-section of our people. This people came into being
+aeons ago, through generations and centuries, by the throw of the dice
+of fate and of history. Alien peoples have swept over this people and
+left their heritage behind them. Alien blood-streams have flowed into
+this people, but it has, nevertheless in spite of terrible hardships
+and terrible blows of fate, still had strength in the very essence of
+its blood to win through. Thus this whole people is saturated with,
+and held together by Nordic-Phalian-Germanic blood, so that after all
+one could, and can, still speak of a German people. From this people,
+of such varied hereditary tendencies, as it emerged from the collapse
+after the years of the battle of liberation, we have now consciously
+tried to select the Nordic-Germanic blood, for we could best expect
+this section of our blood to contain the creative, heroic and
+life-preserving qualities of our people. We have gone partly by outward
+appearances, and for the rest have kept these outward appearances in
+review by making constantly new demands, and by repeated tests both
+physical and mental, both of the character and the soul. Again and
+again we have sifted out and cast aside what was [p. 71] worthless,
+what did not suit us. Just as long as we have strength to do this will
+this organization remain healthy. The moment we forget the law which
+is the foundation of our race, and the law of selection and austerity
+towards ourselves, we shall have the germ of death in us, and will
+perish just as every human organization, every blossom in this world
+does some time perish. It must be our endeavour, our inner law, to
+make this blossoming and fructifying last for our people as long as
+possible, bringing as much prosperity as possible, and--don’t be
+alarmed--if possible for thousands of years. That is why, whenever we
+meet and whatever we do, we must be mindful of our principle: blood,
+selection, and austerity. The law of nature is just this: What is
+hard is good; what is vigourous is good; whatever wins through in the
+battle of life, physically, purposefully and spiritually, that is what
+is good--always taking the long view. Of [p. 72] course sometime--and
+this has happened often in history--someone can get to the top by
+deceit and cheating. That makes no difference to nature, to the fate of
+the earth, to the fate of the world. Reality, that is, Nature, Fate,
+removes the impostor after a time--time not reckoned in generations
+of man but in historical periods. It must be our endeavour never to
+deceive ourselves, but always to remain genuine, that is what we must
+continually preach and instill into ourselves, and into every boy and
+each one of our subordinates.
+
+
+                          The SS after the war
+
+One thing must be clear, one thing I would like to say to you today:
+the moment the war is over, we will really begin to weld together
+our organization, this organization which we have built up for 10
+years, which we imbued and indoctrinated with the first most important
+principles during the 10 years before the war. We must continue to do
+this--we,--if I may say so, we older men--for twenty years full of
+toil and work, so that a tradition 30, 35, 40 years, a generation, may
+be created. Then this organization will march forward into the future
+young and strong, revolutionary and efficient to fulfill the task of
+giving the German people, the Germanic people the super-stratum of
+society which will combine and hold together this Germanic people
+and this Europe, and from which the brains which the people needs
+for industry, farming, politics, and as soldiers, statesmen and
+technicians, will emerge. In addition this super-stratum must be so
+strong and vital that every generation can unreservedly sacrifice
+two or three sons from every family on the battlefield, and that
+nevertheless the continued flowing of the bloodstream is assured.
+
+
+                       The Virtues of the SS-Man
+
+I will speak now of the most important virtues which I began years ago
+to preach and to impress on this organization, on this whole General-SS
+[Allgemeine-SS]--for that is the basis of this organization--and which
+are just now in the 5th year of war of such decisive significance and
+importance.
+
+1. Loyalty
+
+We have, I am glad to say, not had a single case among our ranks so
+far, of an SS-Man being disloyal. Let this one thing be our guiding
+principle: If within the sphere of your knowledge there is ever
+anyone who is disloyal to the Fuehrer or to the Reich, even if it
+is only in thought, you must see to it that this man is thrown out
+of the organization and we will see to it that he departs this life
+[p. 74]. For everything,--I have said this one already and repeat
+it today,--everything can be forgiven in this world, but one thing
+cannot be forgiven among us Teutons: that is disloyalty. It would be
+unforgivable and is unforgivable. Downfalls, like the downfall of
+Badoglio in Italy must not and will not happen in Germany. The name
+Badoglio will in future be the name for bad dogs, the name of abuse for
+four-legged mongrel curs, just as in the olden days the name Thersites
+was the name of abuse for traitors.--We can only say one thing and
+preach it constantly: Let the German people show, by unparalleled and
+wholehearted loyalty on the part of each one of its men and each one of
+its women that is worthy of being permitted to live at the time of an
+Adolf Hitler, and worthy of this leader having arisen for it, who has
+dedicated his life full of care, full of responsibility, full of work,
+to our German Teutonic people.
+
+2. Obedience
+
+Obedience is demanded and given in the soldier’s life morning, noon,
+and night. And the little man always obeys or usually does. If he does
+not, he is put in prison. The question of obedience in [p. 75] the case
+of senior officials in the state, party and the army, and even here
+and there in the SS, is more difficult. I would like here to state
+something clearly and unequivocally: It is a matter of course that the
+little man must obey. It is even more a matter of course that all the
+senior leaders of the SS, that is, the whole corps of Gruppenfuehrer,
+are a model of blind obedience. If anyone thinks that an order is based
+on a misunderstanding on the part of the superior or on a false basis
+it goes without saying that it is his duty and responsibility--that
+is, the duty and responsibility of every one of you--to say so, and
+also to state his reasons truthfully like a man if he is convinced
+that they deprecate the order. But the moment the superior concerned
+or the Reichfuehrer-SS--that applies to the Corps of Gruppenfuehrer
+in most cases--or even the Fuehrer has made the decision and given
+the order, it must be carried out, not only in word and letter, but
+also in spirit. Whoever carries out the order must do so as a good
+steward, as a true representative of the authority giving the command.
+If you thought at first that this would be right and that that would
+not be right or even wrong, then there are two alternatives. Thus if
+a man thinks that he cannot be answerable for obeying an order, then
+he should say quite honestly: [p. 76] I cannot be answerable for it. I
+beg you to excuse me from it. Then the order will usually be: You must
+still carry it out. Or you think: his nerve has gone he’s weak. Then
+you can say: Good, retire on a pension. But orders must be sacred. If
+the Generals obey, then the armies obey automatically. The more our
+territory grows, the more does this sacredness of orders apply. It was
+not all difficult to enforce an order in our little Germany. But to
+enforce an order once we--and I am convinced of this--have garrisons
+in the Urals,--that _is_ more difficult. Here it will not always be
+possible to make sure that the order is carried out. Our controlling
+authority may not, may never be,--as in Russia--the Commissar. The
+only Commissar we have must be our own conscience, devotion to duty,
+loyalty, obedience. If you lead the way with this example, gentlemen,
+every subordinate will follow this example. But you will never be able
+to demand obedience of your men if you do not give the same obedience
+to authority over you, and give it blindly and without reserve.
+
+3. Bravery
+
+To bravery, I think we need least to exhort ourselves, for our leaders
+and men are brave [p. 77].
+
+4. Truthfulness
+
+I now come to a fourth virtue, which is very rare in Germany, to
+truthfulness. One of the greatest evils which has spread during the war
+is the lack of truthfulness in messages, reports, and statements which
+subordinate departments in civil life, in the state, the party and the
+Services send in to the departments over them. The message, the report
+is the basis of every decision. It is actually the fact that one can
+now in many spheres assume in wartime that 95 out of 100 messages are
+untrue or only half true or semi-correct [p. 80].
+
+While on the subject of truthfulness I now come to another matter [p.
+83]. It must so come about in war and in peace--in peace this will be
+above all a training task--that we SS-men no longer conclude written
+agreements, but that among us, as used to be the case formerly, the
+giving of one’s word and the hand-shake signify the contract, and that
+the hand-shake of one SS-man is--if necessary--certainly for 1 million
+or more. It must so happen that the hand-shake or the promise of an
+SS-man is more proverbially reliable than mortgage upon the greatest
+value of anybody else’s. It must be so!
+
+If we conclude agreements, we must keep them. If I make a contract
+with an agent, even with a blackguard, I keep the contract. I take
+my stand unreservedly on this point of view. If I announce in the
+Generalgouvernement, that anyone who informs against a Jew who has
+sought shelter and gone into hiding, shall have a third of the Jew’s
+property, then it often happens that Secretary Huber or Second Lt.
+(SA) Huber who--when he can--makes illegal trips, or does not hesitate
+[p. 84] to order a new telephone or new pencils, who, that is, never
+saves,--suddenly begins to save for the German Reich. He says for
+instance: This Jew has 1200 RM. What, that means I would have to pay
+out to the Pole who denounced him 4000 RM. No, I’ll save that for
+Germany. The Pole shall only get 400 RM. So a little man goes and
+breaks the promise of a whole organization. That sort of thing should
+be impossible.
+
+If we make a promise, it must be kept. If one Reichsfuehrer-SS pledges
+to anyone support for his organization--as may very often be the case
+now in the Balkans--this pledge must be kept. We must acquire such
+a reputation for the keeping of contracts in the whole world, we in
+the SS, that we thereby gain for Germany advantages of the greatest
+value, namely faith through confidence. Many will come to us, who
+will not approach official departments. The Balkans are always in a
+state of confusion. That is a blessing. If they were united it would
+be terrible. Things are chaotic in the Caucasus and in Russia. We can
+only see to it--this is also a [p. 85] precept,--that the territories
+we have occupied and the peoples we rule over never become united, that
+they always remain disunited. For they would only be united against us.
+If therefore we pledge our protection to a party [Splittergruppe] who
+approaches us, it must be quite out of the question for any member of
+the SS or the police, any member of the whole organization to go and
+break the promise. This promise must be sacred.
+
+
+                            Practical Tasks
+
+In the way of practical duties for the Senior SS executive and [p.
+103] Police Officers I see above all one task, which applies at
+the same time to the Heads of the Main Offices as well. For me the
+Senior SS Executive and Police Officer is the representative of the
+Reichsfuehrer-SS in his area. It would be an evil day if the SS
+and police fell out. It would be an evil day if the Main Offices,
+performing their tasks well meaningly but mistakenly made themselves
+independent by each having a downward chain of command. I really think
+that the day of my overthrow would be the end of the SS. It must be,
+and so come about, that this SS organization with all its branches--the
+General-SS which is the common basis of all of them, the Waffen-SS, the
+regular uniformed police [Ordnungspolizei], the SIPO, (with the whole
+economic administration, schooling, ideological training, the whole
+question of kindred), is, even under the tenth Reichsfuehrer-SS _one_
+bloc, _one_ body, _one_ organization. Alas if we do not bring them
+together. Alas if the individual main offices, the individual chiefs
+had a false conception of their duty here, if they believed they were
+doing a good thing, whereas in fact they were taking the first step
+toward the end. We have come a long way on the road to amalgamation. In
+the hard battles of this year the Waffen-SS has been welded together
+in the bitterest hours from the most varied divisions and sections,
+and from these it formed: body-guard units [Leibstandart], military
+SS [Verfuegungstruppe], Death’s head units, and then the Germanic SS.
+Now when our “Reich”, Death’s Head Cavalry Divisions and “Viking”
+Divisions were there, everyone knew in these last weeks: “Viking” is at
+my side, “Reich” is at my side, “Death’s Head” is at my side,--“Thank
+God”, now nothing can happen to us.--The regular uniformed police and
+Sipo, General-SS and Waffen-SS must now gradually amalgamate too, just
+as this is and [p. 105] must be the case within the Waffen-SS. This
+applies to matters concerning filling of posts, recruiting, schooling,
+economic organization, and medical services. I am always doing
+something towards this end, a bond is constantly being cast around
+these sections of the whole to cause them to grow together. Alas, if
+these bonds should ever be loosened,--then everything--you may be sure
+of this--would sink back into its old insignificance in one generation,
+and in a short space of time. It could then be said that that would be
+no pity; if it wasn’t worth keeping alive, it should come to an end.
+That is right. I would not hear of anything being kept, even if it is
+my, our SS which is so dear to us, if it was not worth keeping alive.
+
+Only I think that we could not be answerable for it to Germany, and
+to Germania, for this Germanic Reich needs the SS organization. She
+needs it at least for the next few centuries. Then, in a hundred, a
+thousand, or two thousand years another form will surely be found. When
+we are dead and gone, some remnant of us with a few of our fundamental
+ideas will pull through and carry on. Out of this will grow something
+new again, just as here and there we took over, and now bear, a torch
+from the time of the Teutons, from the age of chivalry, from the
+Vehmic organization, and from the [p. 106] Prussian army, in order to
+light a great light from it. It will be just like that later on. I
+believe that today we could not afford to let anything happen to this
+SS. That is why I urge one thing on all of you, on you, my heads of
+the main offices, my Senior Executive SS and Police Officers, and on
+this whole corps of Gruppenfuehrers, the highest gradation in this
+hierarchy of the SS organization: Always see the whole, always look at
+the whole organization, never at your branch of it only, or only your
+Oberabschnitt but always see the SS, and above it the Germanic Reich,
+and above that our Fuehrer who has created and is still creating this
+Reich.
+
+
+                               The Future
+
+When the war is won,--then, as I have already told you, our [p. 112]
+work will start. We do not know when the war will end. It may be
+sudden, or it may be long delayed. We shall see. But I say to you
+_now_, if an armistice and peace comes suddenly, let no-one think that
+he can then sleep the sleep of the just. Get all your Commanders,
+Chiefs and SS-Fuehrers attuned to this; only then, gentlemen, shall
+we be awake, for then, so many others will fall into this sleep. I am
+going so to rouse the whole SS, and keep it so wide awake that we can
+tackle reconstruction in Germany immediately. Then Germanic work will
+be begun immediately in the General-SS, for then the harvest will be
+ripe to be taken into the granary. We shall then call up age-groups
+thereby law. We shall then immediately put all our Waffen-SS units
+into excellent form, both as regards equipment and training. We shall
+go on working in this first 6 months after the war, as though the
+big offensive were starting on the next day. It will make all the
+difference, [p. 113] if Germany has an operative reserve, an operative
+backing, at the peace or armistice negotiations, of 20, 25 or 30
+SS-divisions intact.
+
+If the peace is a final one, we shall be able to tackle our great work
+of the future. We shall colonize. We shall indoctrinate our boys
+with the laws of the SS-organization. I consider it to be absolutely
+necessary to the life of our peoples, that we should not only impart
+the meaning of ancestry, grandchildren and future, but feel these to
+be a part of our being. Without there being any talk about it, without
+our needing to make use of rewards and similar material things, it
+must be a matter of course that we have children. It must be a matter
+of course that the most copious breeding should be from this racial
+super-stratum of the Germanic people. In 20 to 30 years we must really
+be able to present the whole of Europe with its leading class. If the
+SS, together with the farmers,--we together with our friend Backe, then
+run the colony in the East on a grand scale, without any restraint,
+without any question about any kind of tradition but with nerve and
+revolutionary impetus, we shall in 20 years push the national boundary
+[Volkstumsgrenze] 500 kilometers Eastwards.
+
+I requested of the Fuehrer today, that the SS--if we have fulfilled
+our task and our duty by the end of the war--should have the privilege
+of holding Germany’s most Easterly frontier as a defence frontier
+[p. 114]. I believe this is the only privilege for which we have no
+competitors. I believe not one person will dispute our claim to this
+privilege. We shall be in a position there to exercise every young
+age-group in the use of arms. We shall impose our laws on the East.
+We will charge ahead and push our way forward little by little to the
+Urals. I hope that our generation will successfully bring it about
+that every age-group has fought in the East, and that every one of our
+divisions spends a winter in the East every second or third year. Then
+we shall never grow soft, then we shall never get SS members who only
+come to us because it is distinguished or because the black coat will
+naturally be very attractive in peacetime. Everyone will know that: “if
+I join the SS, there is the possibility that I might be killed.” He
+has contracted in writing that every second year he will not dance in
+Berlin or attend the carnival in Munich, but that he will be posted to
+the Eastern frontier in an ice-cold winter. Then we will have a healthy
+elite for all time. Thus we will create the necessary conditions for
+the whole Germanic people and [p. 115] the whole of Europe, controlled,
+ordered and led by us, the Germanic people, to be able, in generations,
+to stand the test in her battles of destiny against Asia, who will
+certainly break out again. We do not know when that will be. Then, when
+the mass of humanity of 1 to 1½ milliards lines up against us, the
+Germanic people, numbering, I hope, 250 to 300 millions, and the other
+European peoples, making a total of 600 to 700 millions--(and with
+an outpost area stretching as far as the Urals, or, a hundred years,
+beyond the Urals)--must stand the test in its vital struggle against
+Asia. It would be an evil day if the Germanic people did not survive
+it. It would be the end of beauty and “Kultur”, of the creative power
+of this earth. That is the distant future. It is for that that we are
+fighting, pledged to hand down the heritage of our ancestors.
+
+We see into the distant future, because we know what it will be. That
+is why we are doing our duty more fanatically than ever, more devoutly
+than ever, more bravely, more obediently and more thoroughly than ever.
+We want to be worthy of being permitted to be the first SS-men of the
+Fuehrer, Adolf Hitler, in the long history of the Germanic people,
+which stretches before us.
+
+Now let us remember the Fuehrer, Adolf Hitler, who will create the
+Germanic Reich and will lead us into the Germanic future [p. 116].
+
+                                                Our Fuehrer Adolf Hitler
+                                                              Sieg Heil!
+                                                              Sieg Heil!
+                                                              Sieg Heil!
+
+       #       #       #       #       #
+
+ Speech of the Reichsfuehrer-SS Heinrich Himmler at Kharkow April 1943
+
+  My SS-Fuehrer,
+
+It is perhaps very strange, that we should meet in a university of the
+Russian State, here at Kharkow,--at this Kharkow, which has played so
+great a part, and really will play a still bigger part in the history
+of the war. Until last year it was of no very great significance. This
+year it has become, like Stalingrad, but in the reverse sense, a city
+of destiny in German war history, in German history. I have asked you,
+the Commanding Officers of the three SS-Divisions, who took part in
+this campaign from the Dnieper to Kharkow and carried out this campaign
+practically alone and forced a decision, to come together here in
+order, as has been the custom for many many years, as long as there
+has been an SS, to meet each other again, and in order once more to
+establish a few facts about the past and the future.
+
+I would like, in a few words, to outline the whole position and
+situation with regard to the war.
+
+Today, Germany is on the borders of Europe everywhere. These European
+frontiers stretch up as far as the North Cape, down the Norwegian
+coast, through Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium and France and jump
+over to Africa, continue to Tunis to form a bridgehead, run across as
+far as the frontiers formed by the sea, then from Greece and Crete up
+to the borders of the neutral states of Turkey and Bulgaria, to join
+hands again here in the East. I would like to give it a name: it is the
+great fortress of Europe.
+
+It will undoubtedly happen, that the enemy will make the attempt,
+today, tomorrow or the next day, at some time, to break into this
+fortress of Europe at one point or another. That will undoubtedly be
+the case. Possibly he will be able to force an entry for a shorter or
+longer period at one point or another in places which we do not have
+in our personal and responsible control, or which we are not defending
+with our arms [p. 2]. One thing is certain: wherever the enemy lands,
+if once we can get to grips with him on the Continent, where we are
+not dependent on supplies from overseas, that ought to be, and will
+be, all right with us. On the whole, however, it is here in the East
+that the decision lies. The fortress of Europe with its frontiers must
+be held and will be held too, as long as is necessary. The decision,
+therefore, lies here in the East; here must the Russian enemy, this
+people numbering two hundred million Russians, be destroyed on the
+battle field and person by person, and made to bleed to death ...
+
+It is my opinion--and here, I believe, I am speaking to men [p. 3] who
+already understand this--that we must conduct the war and our campaign
+on these lines:--how can we take the most men from the Russians--dead
+or alive? We shall do it by killing them or taking them prisoner and
+[p. 4] really putting them to work, by endeavoring to gain as much
+control as possible over any territory we occupy, and by leaving
+empty of people any territory we dispose of, any areas we make over
+to the enemy. Either they must be deported and will be used as labour
+in Germany for Germany, or they will just die in battle. To hand
+people back again, giving the enemy workers once more and enabling
+him to recruit again,--that I think, taking the broad view, would be
+absolutely wrong. That could not be advocated * * *
+
+On the other side, one thing goes on the same as ever, the U-boat
+war, this dreadful stranglehold on the throat of the enemy. [p. 5] I
+have good reason to be convinced that this stranglehold will never
+be relaxed, but will tighten. I cannot help feeling that things are
+beginning to go worse with England these last few months in matters
+of supply. That by no means indicates that England will collapse
+today, tomorrow or the next day, but it does mean that we will just be
+approaching the time when one or other of our opponents, once Russia is
+conquered and eliminated as a factor, will come to the conclusion that
+it is not worth carrying on the war. The result--and I am convinced
+of this, I believe it and I know it--the result, the end of this war,
+regardless of however many months or even years it lasts, will be this:
+that the Reich, the German Reich or the Germanic Reich of the German
+nation, will with just title find confirmation of its evolution, that
+we have an outlet and a way open to us in the East, and that then
+centuries later, a politically Germany--a Germanic World Empire will
+be formed. That will be the result, that will be the fruit of all the
+many, many sacrifices, which have been made and which must still be
+made.
+
+We have,--I would say, as very consistent National Socialists, [p. 7]
+taken the question of blood as our starting point. We were the first
+really to solve the problem of blood by action, and in this connection,
+by problem of blood, we of course do not mean anti-semitism.
+Anti-semitism is exactly the same as delousing. Getting rid of lice is
+not a question of ideology. It is a matter of cleanliness. In just the
+same way, anti-semitism, for us, has not been a question of ideology,
+but a matter of cleanliness, which now will soon have been dealt with.
+We shall soon be deloused. We have only 20,000 lice left, and then
+the matter is finished within the whole of Germany. But for us the
+question of blood was a reminder of our own worth, a reminder of what
+is actually the basis holding this German people together. Just as is
+the case in the years between 1938 and 1943, in exactly the same way
+as now, the same ill-founded reproaches were made then: well, if you
+bring the Nordic man so much to the fore, you’re creating a new split,
+a new class-distinction,--it’s a new class hatred. We’re overcoming
+the social barriers, so I’ve been told by important party members, and
+now you’re setting up racial ones. My reply to these people has always
+been: If you want to look at things in a negative way, there is nothing
+in the world which you cannot see in a negative way. From the negative
+angle, of course, you can argue that way. I see it differently, for I
+see it on this plane: What is the binding factor which holds the man
+in East Prussia and the man in the Black Forest together, the man in
+Schleswig-Holstein and in Hamburg and the man in Munich, in Graz, in
+Pomerania, in Berlin [p. 8] and in the Rhineland? What is then the
+factor or the element which contains all that is dear and precious and
+valuable to us? It is in fact what we Germans call inherent Kultur, it
+is this Germanic, this Nordic component of our blood.
+
+In one operation those peoples must and will be incorporated in the
+Germanic Reich which, at one time, were part of Germany, part of the
+German Empire (the Roman Empire and the German nation) and belonged
+to us up to 1806 or only till 1648,--that is Flanders, Wallonia, and
+the Netherlands. They were a part of the Reich [p. 10]. Over and above
+this, we must have the power to bring into the fold, and make a part of
+our community in a second operation, those Germanic peoples and states
+too, which have never been part and parcel of the German Reich,--I mean
+Denmark and Norway, the Danish and Norwegian people.
+
+I very soon formed a Germanic SS in the various countries. We very soon
+got Germanic volunteers from them [p. 11]. It has not always been liked
+and is still not liked today by many of the political leaders in these
+countries. From the beginning, I have said to them, “You can do what
+you like and leave what you like. I leave everything entirely to you,
+but you may be sure, that an SS will be set up in your country, and
+there is but one SS in Europe, and that is the Germanic SS, led by the
+Reichsfuehrer-SS. You can resist, or you can offer no resistance, it’s
+all the same to me. We shall do it in any case!” We have told them that
+curtly and plainly and clearly from the beginning.
+
+I have said to the SS-men from the beginning too: We do not expect
+you to renounce your nation, or do anything which a proud and
+self-respecting fellow who loves his nation cannot do. We do not expect
+you to become German out of opportunism. But we do expect you to
+subordinate your national ideal to the greater racial and historical
+ideal, to the Germanic Reich.
+
+In addition, one thing is quite obvious. All of us, who are members of
+the Germanic peoples, can be happy and thankful that once in thousands
+of years fate has given us, from among the Germanic peoples, such a
+genius, a leader, our Fuehrer Adolf Hitler, and you should be happy to
+be allowed to work with us.
+
+Although I do not wish to discuss any individual official matters
+here, I would still like to mention in a slightly official way, in my
+capacity as a military man, what I said before about racial Germans. I
+beg you never to commit the psychological error of speaking of Germans
+who came from Roumania or Hungary or Croatia, as Croats, Roumanians
+or Hungarians. I also beg you never to make the mistake of letting a
+man who speaks [p. 12] German badly or cannot speak and read German,
+sense this, or let him sense the thought: “You are a second-rate
+German, for you can’t read or write German properly.” I beg you
+rather, (and here too I am stating a very sober opinion), to think in
+this case of these Germans in the whole of the Balkans, still more of
+those overseas, in America, when one day we must fetch over here in
+millions,--and we shall succeed in doing so--who have held out for
+centuries. I am certainly of the opinion that if a mighty German Reich
+with an incredible upward urge in its very being and a great German
+Fuehrer had not now come into being at this time and in the last few
+decades, it would have been the end of these Germans. A person with a
+very strong character can personally rise above his surroundings for
+years and perhaps for decades. A race, if it is in small groups, cannot
+in the long run hold out against its surroundings. And we must never
+forget this: these Germans do not usually live together in hundreds
+of thousands, but a thousand here in a few villages, and two thousand
+there, and 20 thousand at the most somewhere else. But they do not
+live together in large numbers. So they are always encircled by a
+foreign nation [Volkstum], and surrounded by its influence, but are
+above all surrounded by the influence of the people of the country.
+_They_ are not the people of the country, those are the others. They
+are subjects of a state of foreign nationality, which, in any moment
+of doubt, is their enemy, or at the very best, as, shall we say,
+Roumania, a tolerably neutral and impartial observer. But on the whole
+these Germans have lived, throughout the centuries of German weakness,
+from the Thirty Years’ War up till now, in surroundings calculated not
+to strengthen their consciousness of German race [Deutschtum] but to
+destroy it.
+
+There was something else besides this. If one of these Germans wanted
+to get anywhere he could only do so by entering the state system of the
+foreign people as an official or an officer. It is no mere chance--[p.
+13]. I am not making spiteful assertions now but merely stating the
+facts--that, for instance, among Hungarian generals there is such a
+considerable percentage of men of German origin, who of course had,
+in most cases, to alter their names if they wanted to get anywhere.
+In many cases, if they did not do so, and remained obdurate about
+it, they were subsequently removed from office. I quote here as an
+example the present Chief of the Hungarian General Staff, General
+Sombacke, who in his youth at the Austrian Military Academy still
+had the thoroughly good German name of Knaus. May I remind you of
+Feldmarschall or Feldmarschall-Lieutnant Raab, who as we all know, has
+now retired. Both are of German descent, and one could name countless
+hundreds of leading men in these South-Eastern States who are all of
+German origin, had to become part of the alien nation, and were then
+drained [eine Auslaugung bildeten] of their own most valuable national
+characteristics.
+
+If, then, we get sons of these racial Germans [Volksdeutschtum] who
+have still survived there--(some are genuine volunteers, and others
+come as a result of a levy, for we have organized the racial groups
+from within the Reich through the SS, so that without possessing
+political power we have in fact, morally such strength and power among
+these people that we can compel a man, compel him morally, to serve
+with us in Germany, due entirely to the power of the whole German
+national community)--if we therefore get these men, you must not make
+it difficult for them to enter our community by calling him by the
+name which you judge he will not wish to hear. A Saxon from Siebenburg
+will never let it be said that he is a Roumanian. It’s just against
+that that he and his fathers have fought for 700 years. And a German
+from Hungary will never let it be said that he is a Hungarian. If you
+know how he has been thrashed by many a Hungarian gendarme, before
+he came to us, how his mother was thrashed, and his parents driven
+from hearth and home, you can imagine how bitter it is for him if he
+now joins German service-men and they say: here comes a Hungarian. Or
+you can imagine how bitter it is for him when he is reproached for
+something which he cannot help. If we had not been to a German school
+we should not be able to read and write German either. If we had been
+forced, shall we say, to go to a Polish school, we should write Polish
+too, although we profess to be Germans. And that is often the case
+with these men. I must therefore expect of you understanding and human
+sympathy in this matter, and must expect that the leaders, in addition
+to their many other duties, will undertake to see that additional
+German instruction in reading, speaking and writing, be given to these
+men at every opportunity that is offered. I lay special emphasis on
+this matter, because by negotiations, we have now managed to make an
+arrangement enabling us in future to enlist even those Germans who up
+to now have been serving in the Roumanian army. So we can expect a
+great influx from the Germans of the South-East.
+
+We know that these clashes with Asia and Jewry are necessary [p. 16]
+for evolution. They give the cue [Auftakt] for the European Continent
+to unite. These clashes are the only evolutionary possibility which
+will enable us one day, now that Fate has given us the Fuehrer Adolf
+Hitler, to create the Germanic Reich. They are the necessary condition,
+for our race, and our blood to create for itself and put under
+cultivation, in the years of peace, (during which we must live and work
+austerely, frugally and like Spartans), that settlement area in which
+new blood can breed, as in a botanical garden so to speak. Only by this
+means can the Continent become a Germanic Continent, capable of daring
+to embark, in one or [p. 17] two or three or five or ten generations,
+on the conflict with this Continent of Asia which spews out hordes of
+humanity. Perhaps we shall also have to hold in check other coloured
+peoples who will soon be in their certain prime, and thus preserve
+the world, which is the world of our blood, of our children and of
+our grandchildren. Now it is just this world we like the best, the
+Germanic world, the world of Nordic life. We know that this conflict
+with the advancing pressure from Asia, with the 200 million Russians,
+is necessary. And we shall win as sure as I am speaking here in the
+University of Kharkow. We shall have to pass through many a valley,
+many a narrow defile. Many will grow tired on the way. Of course they
+will mostly be those who have no reason to do so. To put it vulgarly,
+many will do something in their trousers. Many people will get shaky
+at the knees. The only thing that matters is that we stand firm. This
+is what is important for us as SS-men, for our province of duty and
+our mission (it is a task additional to those of the whole German
+Armed Forces and the whole German people): That is what I would like
+to impress upon you, this is what I beg you, as Commanding Officers,
+as Chiefs, and as leaders to teach the young men again and again in
+their ideological instruction. That is what I demand and exact of
+you,--that you really concern yourselves with the man, the young fellow
+of 17 to 18 who comes to us, and with many who are in our ranks not as
+volunteers but as conscripts. I ask you to look after them, and guide
+them, and not let them go before they are really saturated with our
+spirit and are fighting as the old guard fought before us--that is what
+I request and demand of you.
+
+We have only one task, to stand firm and carry on the racial struggle
+without mercy. I will now say again something which I have already
+today said to the men elsewhere: we will never let that excellent
+weapon, the dread and terrible reputation which preceded us in the
+battles [p. 18] for Kharkow fade, but will constantly add new meaning
+to it. They can call us what they like in the world, the main thing is
+that we are the eternally loyal, obedient, steadfast and unconquerable
+fighting men of the Germanic people and of the Fuehrer, the SS of the
+Germanic Reich.
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1932-PS
+
+SS Main Economic Administrative office
+
+[SS-Wirtschafts-Verwaltungshauptamt]
+
+                                                 Oranienburg 7 June 1943
+
+Office group D, Concentrations Camps
+
+D I/ 1 Az: 14 c 2 / Ot / S.--Secret diary No. 743/43
+
+  Subject: Treatment of prisoners who fall under the night and fog
+    decree. [NN-Erlass].
+
+  Reference: Reich Security Main Office [Reichs-Sicherheitshauptamt] IV
+    c 2 General No. 103/42 g - issued 5 May, 1943
+
+  Annexes: None
+
+
+                                 SECRET
+
+To the Camp commanders of the Concentrations Camps
+
+  Dachau, Sachsenhausen, Buchenwald, Mauthausen, Flossenburg, Neumarkt,
+  Auschwitz, Gross-Rosen, Natzweiler, Stu., Ravensbruck, Herz., Riga,
+  Lublin and the Civilian Camp Bergen-Belsen.
+
+  [Da., Sah., Bu., Mau., Flo., Neu., Au., Gr.-Ro., Natz., Stu., Rav.,
+  Herz., Ri., Lub., und Zil Bergen-Belsen.]
+
+I send the following decree of the Reich Security Main Office
+[Reichssicherheitshauptamt] regarding treatment of Night and Fog [NN]
+prisoners for acknowledgement and strictest observation.
+
+The purpose of the NN decree is the elimination of all anti-German
+forces in the occupied territories and their being brought into the
+Reich.
+
+The relatives and the population are to be kept in uncertainty about
+the fate of these persons. In order to achieve this, the NN decree
+further provides that prisoners of this kind should be placed under
+prohibitions to write, to receive mail and parcels, to talk, or that
+information should be given about them. In this regard it is irrelevant
+whether it is the question of a NN-prisoner of the old or new type. By
+NN-prisoners of the old type are understood those whom the military
+courts have handed over to the disposing agencies for shipment to the
+Reich, while the so-called New-Type NN-prisoners have been brought
+directly by the arresting agencies of the Security-Police and of the SD
+to the concentration camps (KL) in the Reich without the participation
+of military courts.
+
+The Agencies of the security police and of the SD in question are
+instructed to submit to the Reich security Main Office and to the
+concentration camp in charge questionnaires on all prisoners who
+fall under the NN-decree. This questionnaire should contain detailed
+personal data, data on racial origin, the reason for arrest, the former
+place of custody and other incriminating elements. These questionnaires
+are to be marked by a seal “Night and Fog” [Nacht und Nebel].
+
+Upon the reports of the agencies of the Security Police and of the SD
+a collective order for protective custody will be issued here with the
+questionnaires attached and the agencies will be further instructed to
+transfer the arrestees to a concentration camp.
+
+Insofar as Germanic NN-prisoners are concerned, they will be
+transferred from here to the concentration camp of Natzweiler
+exclusively; in all other cases the NN-prisoners will be shipped to a
+concentration camp depending on the location of the transferring agency
+of the Security Police and of the SD with consideration of the echelon
+division and of capacity of the concentration camp.
+
+The camp commanders of concentration camps in which there are already
+NN-prisoners have to order immediately that the prisoners should
+be investigated according to racial points of view and that the
+_Germanic_ NN-prisoners should be transferred to the concentration
+camp of Natzweiler. Compliance with this order is to be reported on
+individual questionnaires for each prisoner. The camp commander of the
+concentration camp of Natzweiler has to take care that the NN-prisoners
+are to be kept separated from the other prisoners.
+
+In other respects the directives of the RSHA-Referat ND 4--which have
+been sent together with the secret letter No. 551/42, dated 18 Aug.
+1942, are referred to.
+
+Furthermore it is pointed out again as has been ordered already in the
+circular decree, issued 2 Feb. 1943, secret diary No. 111/43--that
+death notices of NN-prisoners are to be submitted _exclusively_ to the
+agency particular transferring agency of the Security Police and of the
+SD, to the RSHA and to this agency, in order to exclude divulgence of
+the place of custody of an NN-prisoner. Hereby the decrees regulating
+the procedure in cases of death, particularly any notification of
+the relatives are cancelled. The effects of deceased Night and Fog
+prisoners are to be sent in their entirety to the transferring agency
+in charge which will guard it until further notice.
+
+                                         The chief of the central office
+                                                   [signature illegible]
+                                                          SS Lt. Colonel
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1933-PS
+
+Main Bureau for SS Economic Administration
+
+  Bureau Group Chief D--Concentration Camp-- DI/l/Az: 14 f 13/L/S
+
+Secret order of the day--No. 612/43
+
+_Subject_: Action 14 f 13 in the concentration camps.
+
+_Reference_: Local directive DI/1/Az: 14 f 13/OT/S--Secret order of
+  the day No. 34/43 of S.1.43
+
+                              STATE SECRET
+
+To the Camp Commanders of the Concentration Camps
+
+  Da., Sah., Bu., Mau., Flo., Neu., Au., Gr.-Ro., Natz., Stu., Rav.,
+  Ri., Herz., Lubl., and Bergen-Belsen.
+
+Copy to: Chief of Bureau D II, III in the house
+
+The Reich Fuehrer-SS and Chief of German Police has decided, after
+consultation, that in the future only mentally sick [geisteskranke]
+prisoners may be selected for action 14 F 13 by the medical commissions
+appointed for this purpose.
+
+All other prisoners incapable of working (tubercular cases, bed-ridden
+cripples, etc.) are to be basically excepted from this action.
+Bedridden prisoners are to be drafted for suitable work which they can
+perform in bed.
+
+The order of the Reich Fuehrer SS is to be obeyed strictly in the
+future.
+
+Requests for fuel for this purpose therefore do not take place.
+
+                                                   [signature illegible]
+                    SS-Brigadefuehrer and Major General of the Waffen-SS
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1939-PS
+
+A “Proclamation to Workers” addressed to employees and employers by Dr.
+Robert Ley on 5 September 1939. Quoted from the chapter “The German
+Worker Has Recognized * * *” pp. 14-17, of “Forge of the Sword”, a
+collection in book form of speeches by, and articles about, Dr. Robert
+Ley, published in 1942 by the Central Publishing House of the NSDAP,
+Franz Eher Successor, Munich, with a foreword by Reichs Marshal Goering.
+
+The German people in its over-all attitude is what the Fuehrer has
+made of that people after the collapse. The poised and self-assured
+attitude of the German people in the current world crisis contrasts so
+enormously with the insecurity of the so-called democratic nations,
+that each thinking human being must ask himself about the cause of this
+state of affairs, which is so full of hope for us Germans.
+
+The achievement of the Fuehrer in the entire political sphere is
+a LARGE SCALE AND UNIQUE ACHIEVEMENT OF EDUCATION. The following
+principles have been taught by the Fuehrer and are decisive for the
+present strong attitude of Germany.
+
+The Fuehrer has taught the German people that its existence and its
+being is dependent upon the unqualified perception of all Germans that
+the battle for life of the German people cannot be fought in limited
+areas, but that this battle for life means wrestling and battling in
+all spheres of life. It is the teaching of the totality for the battle
+for life.
+
+We National Socialists say: social policy and economy are one
+and belong together. Progress and development are socialism. A
+socialist can never be a pacifist; on the contrary, he must ALWAYS
+STAND PREPARED AT THE HIGHEST PITCH OF MILITARY READINESS to attain
+the socialist objective. Peace and war are not separate, mutually
+exclusive conditions, but in each case they are only a different guise
+[Erscheinungsform] for one and the same struggle of the people to
+secure its living potentialities. We National Socialists do not hope
+for gifts and miracles, but we recognize that every thing must be
+fought and worked for honestly. We do not believe in chance, and we
+leave nothing to arbitrariness either. To us Fight is Life, and to us
+Life means Fight. We have no inclination to rest and restrict ourselves
+to watching, but we know that Life would simply pass us by were we to
+withhold ourselves from the Fight. We could never make up for what we
+neglect today.
+
+BECAUSE OF THAT THE FUEHRER HAS FURTHERMORE TAUGHT US THAT OUR GERMAN
+PEOPLE MUST COMMIT ALL THE STRENGTH AND ENERGY IT POSSESSES TO FIGHT
+THROUGH THE STRUGGLE OF LIFE AND DESTINY, SO AS TO ATTAIN VICTORY. We
+National Socialists REJECT HALF MEASURES AND COMPROMISES. They never
+lead to the goal, but lull people to sleep until they wake up one day
+in horror and dread. COWARDS PERISH!
+
+Because of that we National Socialists have mobilized all resources
+and all our energies during the past seven years, so as to be equipped
+for the supreme effort of battle. WE DO NOT THROW OURSELVES INTO
+ADVENTURES, AND WE ARE NOT SO UNSCRUPULOUS AS TO LEAVE ANYTHING TO
+ACCIDENT.
+
+True,--when according to human judgment and according to the state of
+our knowledge all preparations have been made, then we have never as
+yet hesitated to venture the ultimate.
+
+OBSERVE THE FUEHRER! Is he not the living model! His own career,
+his leadership of the NSDAP, the seizure of power, the conduct of
+the state, the regaining of Austria, the Sudeten area, Bohemia and
+Moravia and finally the Memel territory,--all great events demonstrate
+ever anew the fortunate fact that the Fuehrer prepares anything and
+everything to the last detail. He calculates, ponders, elucidates,--he
+acts. But when a decision has been arrived at, then there is no more
+going back. He holds fast. He is tenacious.
+
+Thus did the Fuehrer’s great successes come about, and thus new
+successes will be added.
+
+In conclusion the Fuehrer has taught a third principle: THE
+PREREQUISITE for any battle and THE PREREQUISITE for the mobilization
+of all our strength and energy is the _folk and fate community of
+all Germans_. [Volks und Schicksalsgemeinschaft]. Even though our
+professions may differ, even though our interests may clash, even
+though the individuality of the various tribes and provinces may reveal
+itself, one thing encompasses us, whether we are workers or soldiers:
+THE RECOGNITION, THAT WE GERMANS BELONG TOGETHER IN AN INDISSOLUBLE
+COMMUNITY OF FATE.
+
+For example, what a splendid example was the building of the West Wall,
+which revealed convincingly and unforgettably the cohesion of worker
+and soldier!
+
+THE COMMUNITY OF THE FACTORY IS NOT A MATTER OF PAPER VERBIAGE, BUT IT
+IS AN UNEQUIVOCAL FACT.
+
+The Great War 1914/1918 was not lost because the German soldier had
+become a coward, but because dissension and discord tore the people
+asunder.
+
+Destiny will test us anew. This time we will demonstrate what the
+National Socialist community can accomplish. This community is not a
+matter of paper verbiage, it is not a phrase! The first precautionary
+measure, the introduction of rationing certificates has proven how
+seriously the National Socialist state believes in the total people’s
+community.
+
+Thus you, German man and German woman workers, will understand that
+in this gigantic fight of Germany for justice and freedom, for living
+space and bread, THERE IS NO PLACE WHATEVER FOR EVERYDAY QUARRELS. YOU,
+working German, will learn to understand THAT THE LONG-RANGE PLANS OF
+THE FUEHRER AUTOMATICALLY PRECLUDE ALL DISSENSION.
+
+It will be impossible in future, too, to play the Home Front against
+the Fighting Front and Fighting Front against the Home Front. Not a
+front sector at some border is alone involved in battle, but the entire
+German people. The worker at his drill press, the merchant at his
+counter, the inventor in his laboratory, the soldier in the trenches,
+they are all equally determined to fight for Germany’s freedom.
+
+No one will be able to evade the question: “Do you believe in
+Germany?”, and no one will want to evade that question. And the answer
+to this question will resound audibly for the whole world: “Yes,
+indeed, we believe in Germany because we believe in the work of the
+Fuehrer.”
+
+
+                                 PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1940-PS
+
+ VOELKISCHER BEOBACHTER, Southern German Edition (Publisher Franz Eher,
+        Successor), issue 136, of 11 May 1933, Page 1, column 5.
+
+          THE GERMAN LEADERS OF LABOR AN EDICT BY ADOLF HITLER
+
+                                                          Berlin, 10 May
+
+The Fuehrer Adolf Hitler has issued the following edict:
+
+I appoint the Chief of Staff of the Political Organization [P.O.] of
+the NSDAP, Dr. Robert Ley, as leader of the German Labor Front.
+
+I appoint District Leader [Gauleiter] Forster Danzig, as leader of the
+Employees’ Associations [Angestelltenverbaende].
+
+I appoint the leader of the National Socialist Factory Cell
+Organization [N.S.B.O.], Schuhmann, as leader of the Workers’
+Associations [Arbeiterverbaende].
+
+                                                          Berlin, 10 May
+                                                           Adolf Hitler.
+
+
+                                 PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1942-PS
+
+          LEGAL REGULATIONS AND LEGAL PROBLEMS OF THE MOVEMENT
+
+   [Rechtseinrichtungen und Rechtsaufgaben der Bewegung] by Dr. Otto
+                   Gauweiler (Munich 1939), page 20.
+
+_a. Amendments in Reich Legislation_:
+
+By an order of the Fuehrer, dated 25 July 1934, his Deputy, as well as
+appointed reviewers, were given the power to take part in the editing
+of bills dealing with all the departments of the Reich. On the basis
+of this decree, the Deputy of the Fuehrer was to be invited to all
+discussions of the department heads, to which he could also send his
+representatives. Drafts of the laws had to be presented to the Deputy
+of the Fuehrer in the form of reviewer’s drafts [Referentenentwuerfe]
+and not as Cabinet bills. From a special order from the Fuehrer, 6
+April 35, this privilege of participation in government affairs by
+the Fuehrer’s Deputy was expanded to include all executive decisions
+and orders insofar as they were published in the Reichsgesetzblatt.
+The Deputy of the Fuehrer can on his own initiative introduce bills,
+etc. regardless in what field; insofar as the good of the party is
+concerned, he is the man in charge.
+
+Thus, the direct influence of the movement on the legislation and the
+executive branch was assured at a point where up to now the laws were
+an internal affair of the individual ministries. From now on, technical
+considerations or considerations of time cannot interfere with the
+requests and plans of the party.
+
+
+                                        PARTIAL COPY OF DOCUMENT 1947-PS
+
+From: Freiherr v. Fritsch.
+
+To: Baronin Margot v. Schutzbar.
+
+                                                  Achterberg, 11 Dec 38.
+
+My dear Baroness:
+
+Many thanks for your two letters. * * * It is really peculiar that so
+many people should look to the future with increasing fears, in spite
+of the Fuehrer’s indisputable successes during the past years. Herr
+von Wiegand’s letter interested me very much and I am returning it
+herewith. Unfortunately, I am afraid he is right when he speaks of the
+profound hate which is directed to us by a large part of the world.
+
+Soon after the war I came to the conclusion that we should have to be
+victorious in three battles, if Germany were to become powerful again:
+
+1. The battle against the working class--Hitler has won this.
+
+2. Against the Catholic Church, perhaps better expressed against
+Ultramontanism, and
+
+3. Against the Jews.
+
+We are in the midst of these battles and the one against the Jews is
+the most difficult. I hope everyone realizes the intricacies of this
+campaign.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+                                                       (signed): FRITSCH
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1948-PS
+
+The Reichsstatthalter in Vienna
+
+I a Pol.--VIII--136/40                            Vienna 7 November 1940
+
+Subject: Compulsory Labor of Able-bodied Jews.
+
+1. Notice:
+
+On 5 November 1940 telephone conversation with Colonel
+[Standartenfuehrer] Huber of the Gestapo. The Gestapo has received
+directions from the Reich Security Main Office [RSHA], as to how
+able-bodied Jews should be drafted for compulsory labor service.
+Investigations are being made at present by the Gestapo, to find out
+how many able-bodied Jews are still available in order to make plans
+for the contemplated mass projects. It is assumed that there are not
+many more Jews available. If some should still be available, however,
+the Gestapo has no scruples to use the Jews even for the removal of the
+destroyed synagogues.
+
+SS Colonel Huber will report personally to the “Regierungspraesident”
+in this matter.
+
+I have reported to the “Regierungspraesident” accordingly. The matter
+should further be kept in mind.
+
+2. Presented anew: 25 November 1940
+
+Presented anew: 20.12.40
+
+                                                             [Initialed]
+
+By order:
+
+                                              [Signed]      Dr. Fischer.
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1949-PS
+
+State Administration of Reich Gau Vienna
+
+Statistical Office for Reich Gau Ostmark
+
+Zl. 3305/I 39
+
+                                                Vienna, 15 December 1939
+                                               1. Heldenplatz, Neue Burg
+                                                          Tel. R 27-5-65
+
+  To the Reich Commissar for the Reunion of the Austrian Nation with
+    the German Reich
+
+  through channels via the Governor [Regierungspraesident] of Vienna
+
+The Statistical Office for Reich Gau Ostmark has the honor to submit
+herewith, in the enclosure, an initial compilation of early results
+of this year’s census relative to the number and reduction in number
+of Jews and part Jews in Reich Gau Ostmark, especially in the Vienna
+districts, together with a brief commentary.
+
+                                                   [Signature illegible]
+
+1 file of the Statistical Office for the Reich Districts (Gaue) of the
+Ostmark, together with a summary of 15 December 1939. Zl. 3305/I 39
+
+       #       #       #       #       #
+
+   _Jews and Part Jews in the Reich Districts [Gaue] of the Ostmark_
+
+In the census of 17 May 1939, the question was put for the first time
+whether one of an individual’s grandparents was full Jew by race.
+The declarations were to be made by the people on the “Supplementary
+Card for Data on Descent and Education” in full and to the best of
+their ability; this supplementary card was to be given to the honorary
+census taker in a sealed, opaque envelope, which was opened only
+when the statistical count was made. No check has yet been made as
+to the correctness of the information submitted. In the compiling
+of the statistics, everyone who reported that three or four of his
+grandparents were full Jews was counted as a full Jew himself,
+everyone with two Jewish grandparents as a part Jew, Grade I, and
+correspondingly everyone with only one Jewish grandparent as a part
+Jew, Grade II. The resulting slight deviation from the pertinent legal
+definitions of full Jew and part Jew was occasioned by formulation of
+the question in the simplest possible way.
+
+According to the initial results of this year’s census, there were
+91,480 full Jews and 22,344 part Jews of Grades I and II in Vienna as
+of 17 May 1939. In the remaining Reich Districts of the Ostmark there
+were 3,073 full Jews and 4,241 part Jews. According to this, there were
+altogether 121,138 Jews in the Ostmark, of whom 113,824, i.e. 94%,
+lived in Vienna, 3% in Niederdonau, 1% in the Steiermark, and less than
+1% in each of the remaining Gaus.
+
+While 80% of all the Jews in Vienna were full Jews and only 14% were
+part Jews, Grade I, and 6% part Jews, Grade II, in the other Reich Gaus
+the part Jews predominated, totaling 58%, as against 42% who were full
+Jews. Only in Niederdonau were the full Jews, with a total of almost
+2,000, approximately as numerous as the part Jews.
+
+These varying proportions of full Jews and part Jews are explained
+primarily by the emigration of Jews following the political change
+over. This emigration had reduced the number of _full Jews_ in the
+Reich Gaus of the Ostmark, excluding Vienna and Niederdonau, to a small
+remainder of 1,103 by the time of the census.
+
+The extent of the emigration of full Jews can be estimated
+approximately by comparison with the number of persons of Jewish faith
+reported in the census of 1934. It must be remembered, however, that in
+1934 the number of those of Jewish faith did not include all full Jews
+and that, on the other hand, a small number of those of Jewish faith
+were part Jews, Grades I and II.
+
+With this reservation, it can be stated that the number of Jews in
+the Ostmark (not including the annexed Sudeten-German regions) has
+diminished from 191,528 Jews by faith to 94,384 full Jews. At the
+same time the number of Jews in the Reich Districts (Gaus), excluding
+Vienna, decreased by 13,000 i.e. approximately 82% to 3,000. In Vienna
+alone, the decrease amounted to 84,000 persons, i.e. 48%.
+
+The ratio of the sexes among full Jews has become so greatly dislocated
+that there are 100 male full Jews to every 136 female full Jews in
+Vienna, which can probably be ascribed to the earlier emigration of
+the Jewish males. The ratio among the part Jews, comparatively few of
+whom are thought to have emigrated, is 100:112, more nearly the average
+surplus of women in the population of Vienna.
+
+According to data furnished by the Central Office for Jewish
+emigration, Vienna IV., about 100,000 Jews emigrated from the Ostmark
+in the period between the change over [Umbruch] and the census. This
+number is very close to the figure of 97,000 given above as the
+reduction in Jews since the census of 1934. Some 26,000 persons of
+Jewish faith emigrated from the Ostmark in the months succeeding the
+census.
+
+While the problem of full Jews is almost completely solved, therefore,
+in the Reich Districts of the Ostmark, with the exception of Vienna,
+from a numerical standpoint the problem of part Jews still plays a
+relatively large role. For example, almost half of the approximately
+1,000 Jews in Oberdonau are part Jews, Grade I, and more than one
+quarter are part Jews, Grade II. Similar conditions prevail in the
+remaining Reich Gaus, particularly in Salzburg, in Carinthia, and in
+the Tyrol.
+
+Nevertheless the problem of part Jews in the Ostmark is first and
+foremost a problem for the Reich District of Vienna, where there are
+86% of the part Jews Grade I and 80% of the part Jews Grade II. Gau
+Niederdonau takes second place, with a large interval, but has only 6%
+of the part Jews Grade I and 8% of the part Jews Grade II.
+
+Out of all the part Jews in the Ostmark, 68% had two Jewish
+grandparents and 32% had one Jewish grandparent. It is worth noting
+that 70% of all Jews in Vienna were half-Jews, whereas less than 60%
+were half-Jews in the remaining Gaus of the Ostmark.
+
+At the present time the problem of part Jews in Vienna is still
+numerically overshadowed by the large number of full Jews, of whom
+there are estimated in round figures to be 70,000, since approximately
+4,000 persons of Jewish faith have emigrated from the Ostmark every
+month since the census--with the exception of September.
+
+                                                   [Signature illegible]
+                                                               15.12.39.
+
+
+JEWS AND PART JEWS IN THE DISTRICT OF VIENNA
+
+Preliminary Results of 1939 Census * JEWS
+
+---------------------+--------------------------+--------------------------
+                     |       GRAND TOTAL        |        FULL JEWS
+  DISTRICTS          +--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------
+                     |  total |  male  | female |  total |  male  | female
+---------------------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------
+I. Innere Stadt      |  6,825 |  3,001 |  3,824 |  5,947 |  2,596 |  3,351
+II. Leopoldstadt     | 33,889 | 14,483 | 19,406 | 31,564 | 13,370 | 18,194
+III. Landstrasse     |  7,623 |  3,290 |  4,333 |  5,890 |  2,530 |  3,360
+IV. Wieden           |  3,166 |  1,365 |  1,801 |  2,121 |    901 |  1,220
+V. Margareten        |  2,712 |  1,229 |  1,483 |  1,769 |    788 |    981
+VI. Mariahilf        |  4,634 |  2,016 |  2,618 |  3,826 |  1,653 |  2,173
+VII. Neubau          |  5,187 |  2,263 |  2,924 |  4,181 |  1,786 |  2,395
+VIII. Josefstadt     |  3,699 |  1,668 |  2,031 |  2,958 |  1,314 |  1,644
+IX. Alsergrund       | 12,784 |  5,179 |  7,525 | 11,281 |  4,527 |  6,754
+X. Favoriten         |  2,307 |  1,057 |  1,250 |  1,393 |    609 |    784
+XI. Aimmering        |    447 |    218 |    229 |    265 |    134 |    131
+XII. Meidling        |  1,986 |    900 |  1,086 |  1,045 |    444 |    601
+XIII. Hietzing       |  2,008 |    851 |  1,157 |  1,310 |    524 |    786
+XIV. Penzing         |  1,729 |    759 |    970 |    933 |    403 |    530
+XV. Fanfhaus         |  3,667 |  1,572 |  2,095 |  2,573 |  1,051 |  1,522
+XVI. Ottakring       |  3,123 |  1,440 |  1,683 |  1,874 |    831 |  1,043
+XVII. Hernals        |  1,690 |    760 |    930 |    934 |    394 |    540
+XVIII. Wahlring      |  3,246 |  1,411 |  1,835 |  2,155 |    922 |  1,233
+XIX. Dobling         |  2,961 |  1,325 |  1,636 |  2,030 |    845 |  1,185
+XX. Brigittenau      |  7,082 |  3,020 |  4,063 |  6,025 |  2,519 |  3,506
+XXI. Floridsdorf     |  1,391 |    671 |    720 |    524 |    224 |    300
+XXII. Grossenzerdorf |    171 |     82 |     89 |     45 |     21 |     24
+XXIII. Schwechat     |    364 |    215 |    149 |    286 |    175 |    112
+XXIV. Modling        |    365 |    176 |    189 |    113 |     56 |     57
+XXV. Liesing         |    507 |    205 |    302 |    240 |     89 |    151
+XXVI. Klosternauburg |    340 |    161 |    179 |    198 |     93 |    105
+---------------------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------
+      Total          |113,824 | 49,317 | 64,507 | 91,480 | 38,798 | 52,682
+
+Table continued ...
+
+---------------------+-------------------------+-------------------------
+                     |     PART JEWS, GRADE I  |   PART JEWS, GRADE II
+  DISTRICTS          +--------+-------+--------+-------+--------+--------
+                     |  total |  male | female | total |  male  | female
+---------------------+--------+-------+--------+-------+--------+--------
+I. Innere Stadt      |    650 |   293 |    357 |   228 |   112  |  116
+II. Leopoldstadt     |  1,862 |   885 |    977 |   463 |   228  |  235
+III. Landstrasse     |  1,180 |   520 |    660 |   553 |   240  |  313
+IV. Wieden           |    698 |    31 |    388 |   348 |   154  |  193
+V. Margareten        |    632 |   293 |    339 |   311 |   148  |  163
+VI. Mariahilf        |    608 |   263 |    345 |   200 |   100  |  100
+VII. Neubau          |    740 |   356 |    384 |   266 |   121  |  145
+VIII. Josefstadt     |    534 |   256 |    278 |   207 |    98  |  109
+IX. Alsergrund       |  1,076 |   498 |    578 |   347 |   154  |  193
+X. Favoriten         |    609 |   292 |    317 |   305 |   156  |  149
+XI. Aimmering        |    127 |    57 |     70 |    55 |    27  |   28
+XII. Meidling        |    610 |   298 |    312 |   331 |   158  |  173
+XIII. Hietzing       |    457 |   210 |    247 |   241 |   117  |  124
+XIV. Penzing         |    506 |   230 |    278 |   290 |   126  |  164
+XV. Fanfhaus         |    758 |   368 |    390 |   336 |   153  |  383
+XVI. Ottakring       |    833 |   410 |    423 |   416 |   199  |  217
+XVII. Hernals        |    508 |   249 |    259 |   248 |   117  |  131
+XVIII. Wahlring      |    744 |   329 |    415 |   347 |   160  |  187
+XIX. Dobling         |    633 |   315 |    318 |   298 |   165  |  133
+XX. Brigittenau      |    754 |   339 |    415 |   304 |   162  |  142
+XXI. Floridsdorf     |    540 |   279 |    261 |   327 |   168  |  159
+XXII. Grossenzerdorf |     69 |    35 |     34 |    57 |    26  |   31
+XXIII. Schwechat     |     44 |    23 |     21 |    34 |    18  |   16
+XXIV. Modling        |    146 |    67 |     79 |   106 |    53  |   53
+XXV. Liesing         |    185 |    80 |    105 |    82 |    36  |   46
+XXVI. Klosternauburg |     88 |    41 |     47 |    54 |    27  |   27
+---------------------+--------+-------+--------+-------+--------+--------
+      Total          | 15,591 | 7,296 |  8,295 | 6,753 | 3,223  |3,530
+
+
+Decrease of Jews in the Reich Districts [Gaue] of the Ostmark[3] (Based
+on preliminary results of 1939 census)
+
+  -----------+----------+--------+-------------------+--------
+             |          |        |    Numbers less   |
+             |          |        |    in 1939 than   |
+    Reich    | Jews by  |  Full  |      in 1934      |
+     Gau     | religion |Jews by +--------+----------+  Jews
+             |  as of   | race,  |        |          |   by
+             |  22 Mar  | as of  |        |          |religion
+             |   1934   | 17 May |Absolute|In percent|  1934
+             |          |  1939  |        |          |
+  -----------+----------+--------+--------+----------+--------
+  Vienna     |  175,099 | 91,480 | 83,619 |   47.8   |   91.4
+  Niederdonau|   11,439 |  1,836 |  9,603 |   83.9   |    6.0
+  Oberdonau  |    1,257 |    216 |  1,041 |   82.8   |    0.7
+  Steiermark |    2,818 |    563 |  2,255 |   80.0   |    1.5
+  Karnten    |      273 |     60 |    213 |   78.0   |    0.1
+  Salzburg   |      239 |     67 |    172 |   72.0   |    0.1
+  Tirol      |      361 |    119 |    242 |   67.0   |    0.2
+  Vorarlbg.  |       42 |     43 |      1 |    ...   |    0.0
+  -----------+----------+--------+--------+----------+--------
+  OSTMARK    |  191,528 | 94,384 | 97,144 |   50.7   |  100.0
+  -----------+----------+--------+--------+----------+--------
+
+Table continued ...
+
+  -----------+-------------------
+             |Local distribution
+             +-------------------
+    Reich    |       1939
+     Gau     +-------------------
+             |      | Part Jews
+             + Full +-----+------
+             | Jews |Grade|Grade
+             |      |  I  | II
+  -----------+------+-----+------
+  Vienna     | 96.9 | 86.8| 80.3
+  Niederdonau|  2.0 |  5.6|  7.1
+  Oberdonau  |  0.2 |  2.4|  3.4
+  Steiermark |  0.6 |  2.9|  5.2
+  Karnten    |  0.1 |  0.7|  1.5
+  Salzburg   |  0.1 |  0.7|  1.0
+  Tirol      |  0.1 |  0.8|  1.1
+  Vorarlbg.  |  0.0 |  0.1|  0.4
+  -----------+------+-----+------
+  OSTMARK    |100.0 |100.0|100.0
+  -----------+----- +-----+------
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[3] Regional status as of Oct. 15, 1938, without the annexed
+Sudeten-German districts.
+
+       #       #       #       #       #
+
+Jews and Part Jews in the Reich Districts (Gaus) of the Ostmark
+(Preliminary results of the census of 17 May 1939)
+
+  -----------+----------+--------+-----------------+-------------------
+             |          |        |  These include  |  In percentages
+             |          +--------+-----------------+-------+-----------
+             |          |        |    Part Jews    |       |Part Jews
+    Reich    | Jews and |        +--------+--------+ Full  +-----+-----
+     Gau     |part Jews |  Full  | Grade  |  Grade | Jews  |Grade|Grade
+             | together |  Jews  |   I    |   II   |       |  I  | II
+  -----------+----------+--------+--------+--------+-------+-----+-----
+  Niederdonau|    3,737 |   1,970|   1,117|     650|   52.7| 29.9| 17.4
+  Oberdonau  |    1,015 |     251|     468|     296|   24.7| 46.1| 29.2
+  Steiermark |    1,512 |     563|     508|     441|   37.2| 33.6| 29.2
+  Karnten    |      313 |      60|     129|     124|   19.2| 41.2| 39.6
+  Salzburg   |      273 |      67|     123|      83|   24.5| 45.1| 30.4
+  Tirol      |      360 |     119|     147|      94|   33.1| 46.8| 26.1
+  Vorarlberg |      104 |      43|      23|      38|   41.4| 22.1| 36.5
+  -----------+----------+--------+--------+--------+-------+-----+-----
+  Total      |    7,314 |   3,073|   2,515|   1,726|  42.0 | 34.4| 23.6
+  -----------+----------+--------+--------+--------+-------+-----+-----
+  Vienna     |  113,824 |  91,480|  15,591|   6,753|  80.4 | 13.7|  5.9
+  Ostmark    |  121,138 |  94,553|  18,106|   8,479|  78.1 | 14.9|  7.0
+  -----------+----------+--------+--------+--------+-------+-----+-----
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1950-PS
+
+                                  COPY
+
+The Reichminister and Chief of the Reich Chancellory
+
+_RK. 789 B secret_
+
+                                                    Berlin, W8 3 Dec. 40
+                                                             Voss Str. 6
+
+                                 SECRET
+
+To the Reich Governor in Vienna Gauleiter von Schirach
+
+VIENNA
+
+Dear Mr. von Schirach,
+
+As Reichleiter Bormann informs me, the Fuehrer has decided after
+receipt of one of the reports made by you, that the 60,000 Jews, still
+residing in the Reichsgau Vienna, will be deported most rapidly, that
+is still during the war, to the General Gouvernement because of the
+housing shortage prevalent in Vienna. I have informed the Governor
+General in Cracow as well as the Reichsfuehrer-SS about this decision
+of the Fuehrer, and I request you also to take cognizance of it.
+
+                                                            HEIL HITLER!
+                                                          Yours Obedient
+                                                    /s/     Dr. LAMMERS.
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1954-PS
+
+               Deposition of Field-Marshal Wilhelm Keitel
+
+  Investigating Officer: Dr. Bohuslav Ecer, Colonel of the Czechoslovak
+    Judge-Advocate’s Department.
+
+Secretary: Elizabeth Radziejewska, WCB, USFET.
+
+Present: Dr. Schwartz, L. of Judge-Advocate’s Department
+
+Place: Ashcan--Time: 3rd August 1945, afternoon.
+
+On being interrogated Keitel deposes:
+
+I am Wilhelm Keitel, born 22 September 1882 at Helmscherode, district
+of Gandersheim, Brunswick. Married to Liza, born Fontaine, I have 5
+children. I have 3 sons, 30, 28, and 26 years old, the last one killed
+in action in the East in 1941, and 2 daughters; one of them 35 years
+old, married. The other one died at the age of 30. I saw my wife for
+the last time in middle of April 1945.
+
+_My functions._
+
+On 4 February 1938 I was appointed Chief of the Supreme Command of
+the Armed Forces by Adolf Hitler. Before I was appointed there was a
+Reich-Minister for War, who was at the same time Supreme Commander of
+the Armed Forces. It was von Blomberg. On 4 February 1938 Adolf Hitler
+ordered a change. He abolished the functions of the Minister for War,
+and himself took over the functions of Supreme Commander of the Armed
+Forces.
+
+At that time I became entrusted with certain functions of the Minister
+for War, and that from case to case. The three Supreme Commanders of
+the three formations of the Armed Forces--Air Force, Army, Navy--were
+under direct orders of the Fuehrer, and contrary to Blomberg, I had no
+command authority with respect to them. Therefore I was not entitled to
+give orders independently, but only by order of Adolf Hitler and after
+reporting to him. I had no authority of command, my role was really
+that of a Chief of Staff. I was, however, able to submit proposals in
+military matters to the Fuehrer in his capacity as Supreme Commander of
+the Armed Forces on my own initiative, if the three Supreme Commanders
+of the formations of the Armed Forces had not done so themselves; and
+generally the Fuehrer asked for my opinion in military matters. The
+decision was made by the Fuehrer alone.
+
+On 1 September 1939 a Ministerial Council for the Defense of the Reich
+was created under the chairmanship of Hermann Goering. I was a member
+of this board only in so far as it dealt with military matters. I was
+never made a member of the Reich Government and I never had seat or
+vote in the Cabinet. For seat and vote in the Cabinet was never granted
+to me.
+
+_Relations to the Party._
+
+In spring 1939 I was awarded the Golden Badge of Honor of the Party as
+a decoration. I never applied formally for admission to the Party. The
+Party considered me a member after the alteration of the law concerning
+the Armed Forces as from autumn 1944, because I held the Golden Party
+Badge; they asked me to pay a voluntary contribution to the Party.
+To begin with I sent them 1000 marks at that time. Personally I was
+a faithful follower of Adolf Hitler and my political conviction was
+National-Socialist. But when the Fuehrer granted me his confidence, I
+developed into National-Socialist under the influence of this personal
+contact. Even today I am a convinced adherent of Adolf Hitler; this
+does not exclude that I do not identify myself with some items of the
+Party programme and of the Party policy.
+
+_The German rearmament._
+
+The German rearmament began approximately in the year 1935; at first to
+a modest extent, after we had withdrawn from the League of Nations and
+had reestablished the German sovereignty of arms.
+
+Question: How much was the total expenditure for the German Armament up
+to 1 September 1939?
+
+Answer: For the Armed Forces about 30 and not more than 40,000,000,000.
+
+Q. Do you know about the speech of Adolf Hitler, delivered at the
+Sport Palace on 1 September 1939, in which he admitted to have spent
+90,000,000,000 marks for German rearmament?
+
+A. Yes. I know of his speech and also of the figure mentioned. I was
+utterly surprised by this figure and I nearly fainted when I heard this
+figure. As far as my knowledge went, this figure was exaggerated by
+about two thirds.
+
+Q. Was it the purpose of German rearmament to prepare for a war of
+aggression?
+
+A. Even during the years 1938 and 1939 none of us soldiers gave thought
+to a war of aggression. I knew that we were not at all prepared for a
+war of aggression, and even less for a world war.
+
+Q. Did you ever advocate a German war of aggression in your official
+capacity?
+
+A. I was in favor of a war of aggression under certain conditions,
+e.g. if by such a war of aggression a certainly impending attack of an
+adversary was to be prevented.
+
+Q. What were the reasons for the German attack on the Soviet Union?
+
+A. Because we had sure knowledge of the preparations of the Soviet
+Union for an attack and wished to prevent it.
+
+Q. Did you know that some individuals in Germany, both military and
+civilian, advocated a total war?
+
+A. No.
+
+Q. Did you yourself favor total war, i.e. a war disregarding
+international law of warfare?
+
+A. No.
+
+Q. Was Germany prepared for a world war at the time of the Munich
+crisis?
+
+A. No, for at that time no preparations had been made on our side,
+neither strategically nor operationally.
+
+Q. Would Germany have begun the military attack if France and Gt.
+Britain had not agreed to the Munich Treaty?
+
+A. Hardly, in my opinion, because as I said before, we were not
+prepared for a war at that time, especially if France had fulfilled her
+obligation to help Czechoslovakia.
+
+Q. Had Adolf Hitler made up his mind firmly to get his political aims,
+even at the price of war of aggression waged by Germany or even of a
+world war?
+
+A. I do not know that, but I am firmly convinced that he did not want a
+world war.
+
+Q. Did you, in your capacity as Chief of the Supreme Command of the
+Armed Forces, never sign an ordinance which might have implied a
+violation of the International Law of Warfare?
+
+A. Not that I know of.
+
+The investigating officer submits at this instance an ordinance of the
+Fuehrer concerning a General Trustee for the Employment of Labor to
+Wilhelm Keitel, an ordinance dated 21 March 1941.
+
+Q. Were you one of the signatories of this ordinance?
+
+A. Yes.
+
+Q. Were you aware of the fact that a rule of International Law is
+violated by the employment of prisoners of war and the civilian
+population of the occupied countries in the German armament industry?
+
+A. No, as long as the ordinance is applied in accordance with
+International Law. I am not responsible for further ordinances issued
+later on the basis of this ordinance in order to carry it into effect.
+I add, that the Fuehrer would have issued the ordinance also without my
+counter-signature; or to put it better that he would not have made the
+ordinance of 21 March 1942 dependent on my counter-signature.
+
+_The Czechoslovakian Problem._
+
+Q. Who conceived the idea to solve the problem of the Sudeten-Germans
+by means of an occupation by German forces, and to solve the whole
+problem of Czechoslovakia forcibly by means of an occupation of the
+remainder of the Republic?
+
+A. That was exclusively the idea of the Fuehrer, although possibly
+political advisers cooperated; about this I know nothing, though.
+
+Q. Was there a part-mobilization or were there movements of German
+forces against Czechoslovakia during the second half of May 1938 with
+the purpose of solving the Sudeten-German problem by the use of force?
+
+A. No. The idea of military action was not yet discussed at that time,
+so far as I know.
+
+Q. Do you remember an order of Adolf Hitler’s of 28 May 1938, ordering
+the preparation of military action against Czechoslovakia for the 2
+October?
+
+A. I do not remember such an order, although I should have known about
+it.
+
+The investigating officer now reads to Wilhelm Keitel the following
+passage from the Reichstag speech of Adolf Hitler’s of 30 January 1939,
+page 453 of the book “Dokumente der deutschen Politik” (Documents of
+German Policy), vol. 7, part 2:
+
+  As Germany had not mobilized, let alone any intentions to attack
+  Czechoslovakia, the situation was bound--there is no doubt about
+  it--to lead to a grave loss of prestige of the Reich. This unbearable
+  provocation, made still worse by a really infamous prosecution and
+  terrorization of our Germans living there, has led me to the decision
+  to solve the Sudeten-German problem now finally and radically. On 28
+  May
+
+  (1) I ordered to prepare military interference against this state for
+  the 2 October.
+
+  (2) I ordered the enormous and speedy completion of our defensive
+  front in the West.
+
+Keitel declares thereto:
+
+  Such orders may have been given, although from my memory I do not
+  know anything about it; for according to my memory the respective
+  preparatory measures were ordered only later, during the summer. I
+  believe, though, that the declarations of Hitler’s are correct, but I
+  do not know where they come from.
+
+  I stress the fact that Germany was not prepared for military action
+  against Czechoslovakia in May 1938. I know, it is true, that the
+  Fuehrer had made up his mind to solve the Sudeten-German problem in
+  any case and within a reasonable space of time.
+
+Q. Was the danger of a Czechoslovakian mobilization discussed at the
+time of the invasion of Austria by German forces?
+
+A. I myself have drawn the attention of the Fuehrer to the fact that we
+were not prepared and could not occupy Austria if Czechoslovakia would
+mobilize. This indication was rejected by the Fuehrer.
+
+Q. Do you know that at the time of the Austrian crisis Goering and
+Neurath gave guarantees, both in their own names and that of the
+Fuehrer, to Czechoslovakia that Germany felt bound by the Treaty of
+Arbitration concluded with Czechoslovakia in 1925 and that Germany had
+no intentions of attacking Czechoslovakia?
+
+A. I do not know anything about such a guarantee.
+
+_Munich._
+
+I was present, I admit, in Berchtesgaden, Godesberg, and Munich when
+Neville Chamberlain visited the Fuehrer. But I did not participate in
+any of the discussions and was but passively present, ready for any
+military information required.
+
+Q. Did the Fuehrer consult you with regard to the military
+possibilities of Germany before the meetings with Chamberlain?
+
+A. No. He was well informed about the military possibilities proper,
+and he knew that we were not at all prepared for war at the time of the
+Munich crisis.
+
+Q. Was then Adolf Hitler in favor of war at that time?
+
+A. No, because Germany was not prepared for war, as I have to stress
+again.
+
+Q. What would have happened militarily, if Gt. Britain, France and
+the Soviet Union had taken the side of Czechoslovakia, and if they
+had declined the discussions with Germany and Italy, which led to the
+Munich Treaty?
+
+A. The military means of the German Reich were by no means sufficient
+against such a constellation. An action at such a time would have been
+madness.
+
+Q. Was it the political purpose of the Munich Treaty to eliminate the
+Soviet Union from the European affairs?
+
+A. That is correct, for Czechoslovakia was considered to be a virtual
+field of deployment of the Soviet Union which might have dangerous
+consequences for military operations.
+
+Q. Did the Armed Forces as a whole make their influence felt by means
+of an official representative with regard to the designation of the
+borderline in consequence of the so-called Munich Treaty?
+
+A. I personally did not, neither did an officer of my Staff to my
+knowledge; but it may be that a representative of the Army was given
+the duty to point out strategical points of view, when the borderline
+was discussed.
+
+  signed: Wilhelm KEITEL
+
+Wilhelm Keitel has signed this protocol consisting of 9 (nine) pages,
+on all copies and on every page in my presence.
+
+                                           signed: Guy A. Weill O-513470
+                                                              Capt, AUS.
+
+Signed Col. Dr. B. Ecer
+
+Signed Lt. Dr. P. Schwarz
+
+Signed Elisabeth Radziejewska.
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1956-PS
+
+            Das Archiv, Vol. 22-24, Page 1342 January 1936.
+
+             Meaning and tasks of the Secret State Police.
+
+In order to refute the malicious rumours spread abroad, the “Voelkische
+Beobachter” (V.B. of 22.1.36) published an article on the origin,
+meaning and tasks of the Secret State Police; extracts from this read
+as follows:
+
+The Secret State Police was created simultaneously in all German
+Provinces after the National Socialist Revolution owing to cogent
+political necessity. In Prussia its creator was Prime Minister Goering
+who is still the Chief of the Secret State Police today. In Bavaria the
+Bavarian Political Police was created by the Reichs Leader of the S.S.
+Himmler, who at the same time directed the building of the political
+police forces in the other provinces outside Prussia. The Political
+Police Forces became uniformly coordinated when, in the spring of
+1934, Prime Minister Goering appointed the Reichs Leader of the S.S.
+as deputy Chief of the Prussian Secret State Police--cf. Si P.38 (Vol.
+1). Thereby a unified leadership and a proportionate extension of the
+Political Police Forces of all provinces was assured.
+
+The Secret State Police is an official machinery on the lines of the
+criminal police, whose special task is the prosecution of crimes and
+offences against the State, above all the prosecution of high treason
+and treason. The task of the Secret State Police is to detect these
+crimes and offences, to ascertain the perpetrators and to bring them
+to judicial punishment. The number of criminal proceedings continually
+pending in the People’s Court on account of high treasonable actions
+and of treason is the result of this work. The next most important
+field of operations for the Secret State Police is the preventive
+combatting of all dangers threatening the State and the leadership
+of the State. As, since the National Socialist Revolution, all open
+struggle and all open opposition to the State and to the leadership of
+the State is forbidden, a State Police as a preventive instrument in
+the struggle against all dangers threatening the State, is indissolubly
+bound up with the National Socialist Leader State. The opponents
+of National Socialism were not removed by the prohibition of their
+organizations and their newspapers, but have withdrawn to other forms
+of struggle against the State. Therefore, the National Socialist State
+has to trace out, to watch over and to render harmless the underground
+opponents fighting against it in illegal organizations, in camouflaged
+associations, in the coalitions of well meaning fellow Germans and even
+in the organizations of party and state before they have succeeded
+in actually executing an action directed against the interest of the
+state. This task of fighting with all means the secret enemies of the
+state will be spared no Leader State, because powers hostile to the
+state, from their foreign headquarters, always make use of some persons
+in such a state and employ them in underground activity against the
+state.
+
+The preventive activity of the Secret State Police consists primarily
+in the thorough observation of all enemies of the state in the Reichs
+territory. As the Secret State Police can not carry out, in addition
+to its primary executive tasks, this observation of the enemies of the
+state, to the extent necessary, there steps alongside to supplement it
+the Security Service of the Reichs Leader of the S.S., set up by the
+Deputy Fuehrer as the political intelligence service of the movement,
+which puts a large part of the forces of the movement mobilized by
+it into the service of the security of the state. The Secret State
+Police takes the necessary police preventive measures against the
+enemies of the state on the basis of the results of the observation.
+The most effective preventive measure is without doubt the withdrawal
+of freedom, which is covered in the form of “protective custody”, if
+it is to be feared that the free activity of the persons in question
+might endanger the security of the state in any way. The employment
+of protective custody is so organized by directions of the Reichs and
+Prussian Minister of the Interior and by a special arrest examination
+procedure of the Secret State Police, that--as far as the preventive
+fight against the enemies of the state permits--copious guarantees
+against a misuse of protective custody are provided. While protective
+arrest of short duration is carried out in police and court prisons,
+the concentration camps under the Secret State Police admit those taken
+into protective custody, who have to be withdrawn from public life for
+a longer time. The majority of the inmates of the concentration camps
+is formed by those communist and other Marxist functionaries, who, by
+previous experiences, would if free immediately resume their struggle
+against the state. Further police preventive measures against efforts
+hostile to the state consist in the dissolution of associations, in
+the prohibition and dissolution of assemblies and congregations, in
+the prohibition of publications of all kinds and so on. As the NSDAP
+and its leaders are also provided with special protection by legal
+regulations, the prosecution of crimes against these laws and the
+protection of the party and its leaders are also incumbent upon the
+Secret State Police.
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1961-PS
+
+                1942 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 247
+
+       Decision of the Greater German Reichstag of 26 April 1942
+
+At the proposal of the president of the Reichstag, on its session of
+26 April 1942, the Greater German Reichstag has approved of the rights
+which the Fuehrer has postulated in his speech, with the following
+decision:
+
+  There can be no doubt, that in the present war, in which the German
+  people is faced with a struggle for its existence or annihilation,
+  the Fuehrer must have all the rights postulated by him which serve
+  to further or achieve victory. Therefore--without being bound
+  by existing legal regulations--in his capacity as leader of the
+  nation, Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, governmental chief
+  and supreme executive chief, as supreme justice and leader of the
+  party--the Fuehrer must be in a position to force with all means at
+  his disposal every German, if necessary, whether he be common soldier
+  or officer, low or high official or judge, leading or subordinate
+  official of the party, worker or employee--to fulfill his duties.
+  In case of violation of these duties, the Fuehrer is entitled after
+  conscientious examination, regardless of so-called well-deserved
+  rights, to mete out due punishment and to remove the offender from
+  his post, rank and position without introducing prescribed procedures.
+
+At the order of the Fuehrer this decision is hereby made public.
+
+  Berlin, 26 April 1942
+
+                   The Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery
+                                                              Dr Lammers
+
+
+                                 PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1962-PS
+
+                    1935 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PAGE 839
+
+               Law to change the Penal Code 28 June 1935
+
+The Reich government has ratified the following law which is herewith
+announced:
+
+
+                               Article 1
+
+Creation of Law by suitable application of the penal law.
+
+The sect. 2 and 2a of the penal code contain the following wording:
+
+
+                                sect. 2
+
+Any person who commits an act which the law declares to be punishable
+or which is deserving of penalty according to the fundamental
+conceptions of the penal law and sound popular feeling, shall be
+punished. If there is no penal law directly covering an act it shall
+be punished under that law which most closely fits, in regards to
+fundamental conception.
+
+
+                                sect. 2a
+
+The culpability of the act and the punishment are determined according
+to the law which is in force at the time of the act.
+
+Should a milder law be in force at the time of judgment than at the
+time of the act, then the milder law can be applied; should the act
+no longer be subjected to punishment at the time of judgment, then
+punishment may not take place.
+
+A law which is only valid for a designated time is also to be applied
+upon the acts which have been committed during its validity even if it
+has been rescinded.
+
+Decisions on disciplinary measures of security and improvement are to
+be made according to the law which is in force at the time of judgment.
+
+Berlin 28 June 1935
+
+                                        The Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor
+                                                            ADOLF HITLER
+
+                                           The Reich Minister of Justice
+                                                           DR. GUERTNER.
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1964-PS
+
+                    1942 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PAGE 535
+
+ Decree of the Fuehrer regarding special jurisdiction of Reich Minister
+                        of Justice 20 Aug 1942.
+
+A strong administration of Justice is necessary for the fulfillment
+of the tasks of the great German Reich. Therefore, I commission and
+empower the Reich Minister of Justice to establish a National Socialist
+Administration of Justice and to take all necessary measures in
+accordance with my directives and instructions made in agreement with
+the Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery and the Leader of
+the Party-Chancellery. He can hereby deviate from any existing law.
+
+  Fuehrer Supreme Headquarters 20 August 1942
+
+                                                             The Fuehrer
+                                                            ADOLF HITLER
+
+                           Reich Minister and Chief of Reich Chancellery
+                                                             Dr. Lammers
+
+
+                                 PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1965-PS
+
+              EXTRACT FROM “DER STURMER”, 4 November 1943
+
+“It is really the truth that the Jews ‘so to speak’ have disappeared
+from Europe and that the Jewish ‘reservoir’ of the East, from which
+the Jewish plague has for centuries beset the peoples of Europe, has
+ceased to exist * * * However, the Fuehrer of the German people at the
+beginning of the war prophesied what has now come to pass * * *”
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1969-PS
+
+                                  NOTE
+
+To the file.
+
+_Subject_: Ottilienheim Absberg.
+
+Dr. Hefelmann, Berlin, informed me by telephone that the transfer of
+the sick from the Ottilienheim was not carried out by the directive of
+Berlin, but by the directive from the Bavarian State Ministry, Munich,
+Regierungsrat Gaum.
+
+Furthermore, he told me, that the bearer of sovereignty
+[Hoheitstraeger] could not be included, since the regulation does not
+call for that.
+
+Nurnberg, 5 March 1941.
+
+                                                         /s/     Sellmer
+                                                         /t/     Sellmer
+                                                                  297/12
+
+[_Seal_]
+
+       #       #       #       #       #
+
+  Gau Staff Office Sel/Pf.                                  5 March 1941
+
+To the Kreisleiter Party Member Michael Gerstner
+
+  _Weissenburg/Bavaria_
+
+  Subject: Your letter of 24 Feb 1941
+
+           Alarm of the population of Absberg.
+
+The Reich Office [Reichsstelle], Berlin, informs me that the transfer
+of the sick from the Ottilienheim was not carried out by Berlin, but by
+Munich. Therefore, I have now turned to Munich. In the meantime, I have
+found from the Regierungspraesident that we also raised a complaint
+against the ways and means of the treatment of the sick. I therefore
+hope, that such cross mistakes will not occur in the future.
+
+                                                             Heil Hitler
+                                                                S 297/11
+                                                      [Initial: Semmler]
+                                                      Gaustabsamtsleiter
+
+NB: The specialist [Sachbearbeiter] for Bavaria is Regierungsrat
+Gaum in the Bavarian State Ministry in Munich. If possible we should
+get in touch with him. Regierungsrat Gaum will see to it, that the
+institutions will be cleared out as soon as possible.
+
+       #       #       #       #       #
+
+                           Berlin, 31 Dec 1940 NW 7, Unter den Linden 72
+                                                 Telephone: Local 120034
+                                                    Long Distance 120037
+                                                     Teletype: Local 517
+                                                    Long Distance K 1517
+                                      Cable Address: Reichsinnenminister
+                                     [Rubber Stamp] Kreisleiter Informed
+
+Reichministry of the Interior Ministerial Dr. Linden.
+
+Iog 7633/40/5100.
+
+It is requested, to mention this official designation and subject in
+any further correspondence.
+
+[Red pencil] S.6.I.41
+
+  To the Gaustabsamtsleiter, Heinrich Sellmer in Nurnberg, Gauleitung
+
+My dear party member Sellmer!
+
+I forward in the enclosure an incident, which deals with the affair
+about which you have been informed by party member Blanicenburg from
+the Fuehrer’s chancellery. As you can see in the application of Mrs.
+Marie Kehr, the latter would like to have information whether it is
+possible by a law of the Reich, to relieve people from their incurable
+sufferings. I request that you investigate, whether Kehr is politically
+reliable, especially whether she does not have church connections. In
+case this should not be so, from my side, there are no misgivings, if
+you give Kehr the desired information orally.
+
+                                                            Heil Hitler!
+                                                           /s/    Linden
+
+In Ink
+
+  _Ortsgruppenleiter Party member Popp_ is of the opinion, that one can
+    inform Mrs. Kehr. She is calm and circumspect.
+
+                                                            S 7 Jan 1941
+                                                             297/21 2 DM
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1972-PS
+
+                                 SECRET
+
+SS Fuehrungshauptamt [SS Main directorate office]
+
+Kommandoamt of the Waffen SS
+
+[Command Office]
+
+                                    Berlin--Wilmersdorf, 14 October 1941
+                                                         Kaiserallee 188
+
+Sect. Ia NR. 4116/41 geh.
+
+_SUBJ_: Intermediate report on the civilian state of emergency.
+
+_TO_: Reichsfuehrer SS
+
+I deliver the following report regarding the commitment of the Waffen
+SS in the Protectorate Bohemia and Moravia during the civilian state of
+emergency:
+
+In the mutual changes, all Battalions of the Waffen SS in the
+Protectorate Bohemia and Moravia will be brought forth for shootings,
+and relatively for the supervision of hangings.
+
+Up until now there occurred:
+
+  _in Prague_:
+         99 shootings
+         21 hangings
+
+  _in Bruenn_:
+         54 shootings
+         17 hangings
+       ----
+  Total 191 executions (including 16 Jews)
+
+A complete report regarding other measures and on the conduct of the
+officers, non-coms and men will be made following the termination of
+the civilian state of emergency.
+
+                                                        Signed: JUETTNER
+
+                                       SS Gruppenfuehrer [Maj. Gen.] and
+                                        Generalleutnant of the Waffen SS
+
+Official stamp of Personal Staff of Reichsfuehrer SS
+
+15 Oct 1941
+
+
+                                 PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1991-PS
+
+   6th Report on activities and final report of the German Armistice
+ Delegation for Economy and of the Delegate of the Reich Government for
+  Economic and Financial Questions with the French Government for the
+               period from 1 July 1943 to 17 August 1944.
+
+Salzburg. 15 December 1944.
+
+No. 000101.
+
+[Page 63, last paragraph].
+
+During the four years of the occupation of France the Armistice
+Delegation transferred approximately 121 Million Rmk. worth of
+investments from French into German possession, among them shares of
+war vital enterprises in third countries, in France and in Germany.
+For details see the former activity reports of the Delegation. About
+half of these transfers have been paid for by Germany with economic
+compensations by delivery of French foreign bonds, which were acquired
+in Holland or Belgium, whereas the balance was paid through Clearing
+and from occupation costs. From the difference in the value of the
+French foreign bonds, between the German purchasing price and the
+French rate of purchase, there have been realized profits amounting to
+Rmk. 7 Million which could be paid to the Reich.
+
+
+                                 PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1992-PS
+
+                Lecture by General [Obergebietsfuehrer]
+
+                        Dr. Hellmuth Stellrecht:
+
+              “The Military Education of the German Youth”
+
+  From: National Political Course for the Armed Force, from 15-23
+    January 1937
+
+[National-Politischer Lehrgang der Wehrmacht, vom 15.-23. January 1937]
+
+                    Restricted for the Armed Forces
+
+[Pages 163-166]
+
+All of you know already the words: Pre-military training, youth’s
+physical training or military education [Wehrerziehung].
+
+The first term “pre-military training” means, that the young person
+prior to his induction into the Army should acquire a certain amount
+of knowledge; the second term “youth’s physical training” means
+conditioning of the body to a certain degree of physical fitness will
+be reached. However, we are choosing of the three terms the last one
+which is “military education”. Because not only does it mean acquiring
+a certain amount of knowledge and reaching a certain degree of
+physical fitness, but what is more important, it will have a decisive
+influence on the soldier.
+
+One will ask: Why is it that there is such an endless debate going on
+in Germany today about the term “military education”? Why are attempts
+being made just at present to define clearly the term “military
+education” to carry out what is recognized as correct? Is it done for
+the sole purpose of trying to get the lead over foreign countries? Is
+it because of reasoning that we did this, or does it go much deeper
+than is noticeable on the surface?
+
+Gentlemen, I believe that it was not only because of the reasoning of
+individuals who inspired us that a change in our thinking unnoticeable
+for many is taking place and becomes visible to all in its effects.
+
+The term “military education” cannot be realized in a vacuum but it is
+closely connected with the symbol of the German soldier. Just like this
+symbol changes, the term “military education” also changes. Military
+education of the youth makes sense only under certain historical
+conditions. These in turn are closely connected with the ideology of
+state and society current at the time.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+The young Germany found herself again in a soldierly way of life.
+The great historic development which lasted over hundred years had
+finally reached its conclusion and consequently the German people had
+gained new possibilities. Under Frederic the Great the military and
+the bourgeoisie (middle class) as different estates [Staende] opposed
+each other without understanding as hopeless strangers; the reforms,
+the wars of independence brought about, had united again both terms.
+However, they could not overcome the bourgeois way of life permanently.
+
+Only within our time was this development concluded since life was
+again molded into one unit. No more the citizen of the sovereign ruler
+but each citizen of the New Reich is being born to bear arms. It is
+not a “cursed obligation” which puts him under military law but his
+own free will urges him to do it and makes him recognize the necessity
+of military service not only for one or two years but for a life-time,
+under a new unified system which begins in the earliest childhood and
+ends only when he is also unable to do service at home for the well
+being of all.
+
+Considering all this, it goes without saying that we are talking about
+the military education of the German youth and carrying it out. It is
+just as clear before our eyes that Friederich Ludwig Jahn with all
+his knowledge and the great effort put forward by him did not succeed
+in carrying it out. But now the time is ripe because the newly gained
+philosophy of life may be realized. It would only be self deception to
+believe that this task could be solved from the top only. German youth
+has been a movement since a generation.
+
+This movement started long before the war as a first proof of its
+coming great renovation protesting against the bourgeoise.
+
+The Youth Movement before the war was not yet soldierly but it was hard
+against itself and on long hiking tours it helped to lay the foundation
+for a real great Germany. The volunteer-spirit of the great war would
+be unthinkable without this youth movement--that volunteer-spirit which
+is the prerequisite of military duty! Of course, those who only came
+in order to fulfill their own duty did not spare themselves anything
+either in the great war. They were no less brave than the volunteers.
+The only difference was that the volunteer was willing to take
+responsibility for his fate, injury and death, while the other one felt
+more secure if the State and the Law were responsible for himself and
+the family when the misfortune arose.
+
+The voluntary service was contained in the free corps [Freikorps], in
+the military organizations [Wehrverbaenden], in the organizations of
+the NSDAP and in the Hitler Youth Movement.
+
+The German youth has formed its own Reich within this youth-movement
+in which it has the right and privilege of its own way of life. In a
+decree issued by the Fuehrer on 1 December 1936, pertaining to the
+Hitler Youth Movement this own Reich was approved by him. It might be
+said that its own way of life gives its own character to German youth
+but we are lucky in that the philosophy of life of National Socialism
+has become the philosophy of life of youth and that there are no
+political differences between the different generations of present
+day Germany. Only the way of life of German youth has its individual
+emphasis. This has hardly penetrated the older generations. The way
+of life could also not be changed by an order from above because it
+did not grow by order or by accident but through a movement that has
+grown through the decades. We have to observe the fact that in the
+youth organization and in other organizations different ways of life
+confront each other. For instance, the way of life of the Army which
+is based on the probably oldest tradition which we have. There is no
+doubt that a boy who changes from one organization to another feels
+that the different ways of life are different and that he tries to
+decide for himself if one or the other is the right one. He probably
+tries to compare youth hostel and barracks, comradeship leader
+[Kameradschaftsfuehrer] and sergeant, an evening in a youth hostel
+and military instruction, the comradely “thou” which bound him to all
+leaders up to the Reichs Youth Leader and the pronounced separation
+from his superior even the corporal, also, abstinence from nicotine and
+alcohol and the sudden abolition of this abstinence.
+
+It would, of course, be completely senseless for the individual to
+start to investigate if this or that way seems right to him. It goes
+without saying that an army which is to be trained for battle must be
+handled entirely different from a unit of boys. I believe that there
+is no organization in Germany which has gathered so much experience
+through its century old tradition in leading men as the army. Only
+at a later age one comes to see those things as a result of a deep
+psychological knowledge which, as a private, as a young sergeant or
+lieutenant, seemed obscure, or which one carried out without thinking,
+as and how it has always been done.
+
+It would be just as senseless to argue that the army, as the oldest
+organization, should demand that the way of life in the youth
+organization should be patterned after the army’s way and that this
+should be done at once by a system of orders and regulations. That
+would be completely wrong because the present youth movement is of a
+natural growth which cannot suddenly be sent by coercion but needs a
+certain amount of freedom to be able to grow further. And nothing would
+be more harmful than to substitute a system of orders, which developed
+under totally different conditions, for the free will of the present
+young generation. The forty years of German youth history cannot
+and shall not be erased because what has developed alive out of an
+idealistic motive shall never be extinguished.
+
+But, from a long range point of view, it is necessary that we do
+not allow the life of a German boy who has to pass through all the
+organizations, to go through as many breaking experiences as there are
+organizations. On the contrary, it is necessary to give to his life
+and his development actual stability. We do not only want to train our
+boys and through the difference of the organizations give them the
+opportunity to compare and to criticize but we want to lead them in
+an unbroken line of development from boy to man, a development which
+must be natural to them, which does not give them cause to investigate
+why they have been dealt with in this or that manner. The political
+education of the boy stops when he enters the service of the Armed
+Forces.
+
+We have to admit that the way of life in the youth organization is
+different from that in the Armed Forces. But our time gives us an
+opportunity to draw one line of development from the tenth year to
+the time of discharge from the Armed Forces; that is the line of
+development of military training and military education. Therefore,
+it is in general of tremendous educational value and not only for the
+training of a soldier. The boy should feel that he is part of a natural
+course of events and react to it by feeling a constant uninhibited
+enhancement of life.
+
+The young scout grows into the armour-bearer of the nation. Thus
+the natural course of events is again completed which has been
+characteristic of every natural warriordom. It always let the boy
+become a scout first, then gave him practice weapons and only then let
+him earn the deathly weapon of the man.
+
+All military training must thus be regarded a building of life without
+friction, following only the laws of life and supported by the one as
+well as the other organization and nothing to block it. Life itself
+knows no abrupt fundamental changes from one day to another. One is
+not a boy one day and a man the next one but every age period has
+educational and formative significance, which needs to be recognized
+and utilized.
+
+In case these laws are observed one will, a few decades from now, be
+incredulous before the achievements which will be made by development
+of physical potentialities and by technical knowledge and also before
+the high degree of ideological readiness which is inherent in the
+German soldier. The recognition of the laws of development will and
+must give us an incredible advantage over the achievements of other
+nations, especially in the present which is carried along by the
+impulse of national uprising. There is no question that even with
+several years of military training another nation cannot ever make
+up for that which was neglected in regard to development which we
+recognized and utilized in time.
+
+But that which will happen in the future in regard to this will not
+only mean the training to be a German soldier but training to be a
+German man, the decisive final finish of whom takes place in the
+service of the Armed Forces. In addition, an extensive exchange of
+experiences will come about on the broadest possible basis between the
+Armed Forces in the Youth Organization on all things so decisive for
+all future development in order to continue the one education in every
+respect at the exact point where the other one stopped.
+
+In regard to work with pure military education, this has already
+been done in years of collaboration and very extensively. The
+result has been put down in a book written by me which regulates
+future military education up to the last detail of training
+and which, on mutual consent, includes a preface by the Reichs
+minister of war [Reichskriegsminister] and the Reichs Youth Leader
+[Reichsjugendfuehrer].
+
+The basic idea of this work is to present to the boy what fits into the
+particular stage of his development. In doing this one quite naturally
+avoids to bring up something beforehand that belongs into the future
+training of the Armed Forces and does not fit the boy but only the
+man. For that reason no boy is given a military weapon, simply because
+it does not make sense from the point of view of development. But, on
+the other hand, it makes sense to give him practice guns of smaller
+caliber. Just as there are military exercises which fit only adult men
+there are exercises which are better tackled at the age of a boy. Among
+others, for instance, outdoor training.
+
+The young man of twenty who has become estranged to nature in
+the city--and two-thirds of the German population today live in
+cities--will find it very difficult to reestablish contact. Everything
+has become too foreign to him and he will never again be able to become
+a bush or woods runner [Busch- und Waldlaeufer] whose best friends are
+nature and terrain.
+
+It is different for the boy. At the age of 12 to 16 or 17 a boy is
+actually ideal for the terrain. It is exactly the age of wild west
+romanticism when he thinks only in terms of secret paths, ambush and
+surprise raids. If at that time nothing brings the boy into the terrain
+if he only continues the dull way of going to school something ingrown
+and crooked develops in him which can never again be straightened out.
+The right time to put him into the terrain has been missed.
+
+The same is true of the training of the senses. I am of the opinion
+that to the training for seeing even the most insignificant things
+in nature, for noticing the slightest change in the normal world
+around us, a very systematic training of the ear should be added.
+One has to learn again to distinguish from entire noise pictures the
+single important sound which has something to say. One has to learn
+direction hearing and distance hearing and one has to train the ear
+to be constantly on the alert and immediately register the slightest
+noise which shows danger. This kind of training belongs entirely to a
+youthful age. If the right time has been missed it can hardly be made
+up in later years.
+
+The boy starts to learn while he plays and in more and more systematic
+training becomes a young scout. He again acquires the incredible
+agility of primitive men to find cover and camouflage in the terrain,
+to use every indentation in the ground, every bit of vegetation to
+close in, to cover long distances without any noise also at night and,
+at the same time, to see everything, to hear everything and finally to
+appear out of nowhere before the baffled enemy; thus growing into the
+future battle technique through his full life of a boy.
+
+I ask you, gentlemen, to think back for a moment and remember
+Langemarck, the volunteers who, for the idea, offered their lives to
+the bullets while singing “Deutschland, Deutschland ueber alles”. And
+then think of the youth with the same ideological readiness of a few
+decades later which does not waste one drop of blood, which in defense
+and attack evades the enemy, against whom the best weapon becomes
+useless because it hardly any longer can find its aim. This is a
+picture of the goal of great education which starts with the playful
+training of the boy in the terrain and completes itself in the training
+in the Armed Forces.
+
+If we in Germany use only a fraction of the effort which is used in the
+school to prepare the boy for _that_ we will certainly get results.
+Because this service has one advantage: It meets the desires of the boy
+halfway while, thank heavens, sitting on a school bench never does.
+Because the fate of nations will also in the future not be determined
+by academicians but by politicians and finally by the soldier. Why
+shouldn’t it be possible to give back to German youth what is natural
+to primitive men? Our nation is healthy. The natural tendency for it
+still exists. They have not been lost, they are only obscured. First,
+they have to be forced so that they may grow again.
+
+What a boy between 10 and 14 does in his games, the older boy practices
+in systematic training. But nowhere is there a place for unnatural
+drilling, everything shall and must be part of the life of youth. But
+the effort made by the individual must be increased as he grows older.
+
+We Germans were given a great gift by providence. That is, that we are
+the only nation who knows how to hike. We are bound to nature not only
+by the necessity to exploit it but by the talent to understand nature
+emotionally. We experience nature when we hike because we add our own
+effort.
+
+We do not wish our youth to goose step in a column, but travel in a
+small group which must find its own way. The group learns, after it
+has been taught essentials, to orient itself, to read maps and to
+judge the terrain. It increases the joy of hiking if the leader gives
+definite problems, for instance, to find a certain point visible in the
+terrain on the map, or, to look up a road on the map and lead the group
+to it, etc., etc.
+
+The trip offers the great opportunity to fit in all that which belongs
+to the system: description and judgment of terrain; recognition and
+description of the aim; use of terrain, scouting; reporting; securing;
+and to end up in a terrain game which requires all the boy; initiative.
+
+The trip does not alone train the boy in the terrain but, as I like
+to call it, to self-help. During the war we found that the truly
+useful soldiers were not those who had completed their training but
+those guys who knew what to do in any situation and could take care
+of themselves when it came to the smallest details. Only the mastery
+of these thousands of skills makes a completely useful soldier. The
+idealist reaching for the stars is of little use if he cannot deal
+with all the unpleasant things which must be overcome. Of what use is
+the most enthusiastic man if he neglects his footwear and has to stay
+behind with bad feet. It is a useless comrade who does not know how to
+set up a tent, to dig a hole for cooking, to make a fire, to dress a
+wound. The many repulsive tasks in the world of war will soon cause him
+to stay behind as unfit, or he will remain a constant source of trouble
+to the sergeant, who will be unable to grasp how anybody could be born
+with so little common sense.
+
+We have no use for helpless professors but need agile, quick youths who
+can deal with every situation in life and have learned all that at a
+time when it was easiest to learn it. This is, to a large extent the
+purpose of the hiking trip and the camp.
+
+But the hiking trip has still another purpose. It is one of the best
+means of education at our disposal; because it is the only way in which
+the boy can get acquainted with his fatherland for which he will have
+to fight one day. From the perspective of the back alley he can never
+win it. But he who has not been completely satisfied will still find in
+sun and rain and in his own effort the meaning of trees and soil, of
+villages and old towns. He can carry it with him as his true possession
+and with this possession he ceases to be a proletarian. It is even a
+prerequisite for the possibility that the new state once again may
+give him a piece of land. Then again it would have a meaning to the
+individual.
+
+The systematic development of physical ability for all of us today
+has become something self-understood. We can hardly grasp the fact
+that the old state did so little for it with a few hours of gymnastic
+exercises up to the end of compulsory school and nothing up to the time
+of military service. And that at a time when the number of men fit for
+military service in the large cities decreased from year to year. It
+does not make sense to us to provide physical training only for those
+who desire it and, therefore, join sports clubs. Because he who does
+not do that is certainly much more in need of physical training. A
+definite program for physical training simultaneous with the physical
+development of the young person is a demand already made by the Fuehrer
+in his book “Mein Kampf” and which was therefore also demanded and
+carried out by the new state. The gap between school, labor and army
+service must finally be closed.
+
+What shall and must be done in particular is clear today and
+established. The natural is the best. General physical training is
+the beginning. Then follows athletics. Track comes first, followed by
+jumping, throwing and pushing. But not everything belongs to athletics
+but only the simplest: short and long distance running, high and broad
+jumping, shot put and instead of javelin, club-throwing. For building
+the body those are the most beneficial exercises which require a
+minimum of tools and at the same time not too much technique. Among
+those swimming is one of the exercises which develop the body in
+general. Why should a boy wait till he is 20 years old to learn how to
+swim? In the question itself lies the contradiction. Why should the
+army occupy itself by teaching 70 percent of the recruits how to swim.
+The boy of ten can learn to swim and should master it long before he
+becomes a soldier.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+Of special value for the development of the body is any fighting
+sport, especially boxing. Every boy first learns free wrestling and
+then boxing. There is no sport which educates better to hardiness and
+fighting spirit.
+
+One could not start it too early but only after the body has almost
+stopped growing, under no circumstances during the grooming periods.
+After that it shall be the main part of body training.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+[Pages 174-176]
+
+Every boy endures within the proper limits of his strength and
+resistance. It is the art of the educator not to go further and to
+go so far that through a new test new hardiness follows and in such
+a manner that the new test can be on a higher level and increase
+resistance by not giving beyond its limits.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+All that has been learned serves, from a military point of view,
+nothing but to get close to the enemy and to bring arms into effect.
+The entire education and training remains without value if it does not
+lead to the full effect of the weapon against the enemy. All training,
+therefore culminates in training in shooting. It cannot be emphasized
+enough and because shooting is a matter of practice one cannot start
+too early. In the course of years we want to achieve that a gun feels
+just as natural in the hands of a German boy as a pen. It is a strange
+state of mind in a nation if, through years many hours every day are
+spent in practicing penmanship and grammatical writing but not a single
+hour in practice-shooting. Liberalism put the following slogan above
+school doors “Knowledge is power”. We, on the other hand, have found
+out during the war and postwar period that the power of a nation, in
+the last analysis, always rests on its arms and on those who know how
+to handle them.
+
+Shooting meets with the desire of a boy. There is hardly ever a boy
+who does not experiment with it, if only with a bow and arrow he made
+himself. Let us put into his hand that which suits him that gives him
+real pleasure. First a new air rifle with which he can really learn
+how to shoot and let us teach him how to do it correctly. Later, the
+older boy gets a small caliber rifle with which all the fine points of
+shooting can be taught and in the service of the army finally, as the
+last stage, a weapon.
+
+In such a training course the art of shooting can be developed to a
+degree which, up to now, seemed not attainable.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+In addition to general training there is special training for the new
+replacement generation in the Air Force, Navy and motorized troops.
+The training course for this has been established with the competent
+authorities in the Armed Forces. In addition, there is training in
+communications on a broad basis and, in the country, cavalry training.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+With the law of 1 December 1936 on the Hitler-Youth, the Fuehrer
+made it possible to extend the principles which, so far, have been
+applied to the education of the Hitler-Youth to all German Youth.
+Military education is one of the most important tasks to be fulfilled
+by the future Hitler-Youth. Besides it, there are the other tasks
+which are inseparably connected with it. In our opinion it is not
+possible to divide the thinking of a human being into various sections
+which then are cultivated by various organizations. But man is an
+indivisible whole also in regard to education. Military education and
+philosophical education belong together. The latter is not to exhaust
+itself in lectures but always through ideological attitude has to draw
+the conclusion through action.
+
+During the years the boy lives in the youth organization we want to
+give him the knowledge of that for which he has to fight and be a
+soldier. The army of the new Reich is not only a community of men
+who know how to fight according to the laws of military honor, but a
+community of faith in the mission of the German people and in their own
+great task. The education of youth has to take care that the knowledge
+and the principles, according to which the state and the Armed Forces
+of our time have been organized and which support them, enters so
+thoroughly into the thoughts of the individual that they never again
+can be taken away and remain direction-giving principles all through
+life.
+
+But if faith should be shattered and the idea itself should no longer
+be firm enough then the German man must have been educated in such a
+manner that the laws of honor, which alone enable him to live in his
+community, still hold. And if even those should be shattered, there
+remains as the last resort the manly discipline, the iron habit to obey
+silently and to carry out, without a word that service by order of
+another for which the individual will does not suffice. He who cannot
+give orders to himself, must get used to obeying the orders of others
+and to feel the obligation so to do so strongly that even at the most
+dangerous moment it does not fail. It is a fine thing when a man of 20
+learns to obey unconditionally but it is much better when the boy of
+ten starts to put his own wishes aside, to renounce, to give in, and to
+serve the will of the community.
+
+Gentlemen, you can see for yourself that the tasks of present German
+youth education have gone far beyond the “playful”. Within the great
+order of the new Reich they have taken on a new and tremendous
+significance. In order to be able to solve these problems apart from
+everything old and inhibiting the Fuehrer has given its own realm to
+youth. But this problem can only be solved if the large educational
+organizations of the German people are coordinated in such a way that
+the life of the German boy constantly increases in physical skill as
+well as in ideological will. It would be a pleasure to know that I
+succeeded in showing you the great possibilities and in arousing your
+interest in the fact that the Armed Forces and the youth together, have
+to follow _one_ road.
+
+
+                                 PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1992-A-PS
+
+  National Political Course for the Armed Forces, from 15 to 23 Jan.
+    1937.
+
+  [National-Politischer Lehrgang der Wehrmacht, vom 15.-23. Januar 1937]
+
+                    Restricted for the Armed Forces.
+
+  HIMMLER: Organization and Obligations of the SS and the Police.
+
+[Pages 141-161]
+
+I shall speak first of all about the origin, organization, and the
+spheres of activity of the SS; secondly, about the organization and
+obligations of the Police; and thirdly, about the combined efforts of
+the SS and the Police, and about the important and vitally necessary
+question on the internal security of the Reich.
+
+The SS originated in 1923, very early in the history of the movement,
+as shock troop [Stosstrupp] Hitler, was prohibited and disbanded on
+November 9, 1923. When the party was reestablished in 1925, the SA as a
+protective organization for the meetings was at first prohibited. The
+Fuehrer was also denied the right of speech and assembly in Prussia as
+well as in Bavaria. Assembly was permitted only in Saxony and Thuringia
+which at that time were entirely red.
+
+In order to insure the success of these meetings, it was necessary to
+protect them from dispersal. Therefore in 1925 the Fuehrer ordered a
+small organization to be formed in order to protect these meetings,
+namely the SS [Schutzstaffeln, protective squadrons]--literally
+Staffeln at that time, namely small formations with the effective
+strength of one leader and 10 men in each location. Even as large a
+city as Berlin had a squadron of only 2 leaders and 20 men at that
+time. Throughout 1925 and 1926 we succeeded in carrying out and
+carrying through the meetings of the Fuehrer and also of other party
+speakers in Saxony and Thuringia with these squadrons.
+
+In 1926 the SA was again permitted to exist, and for a few years the SS
+withdrew more into the background.
+
+In the year 1929, eight years ago, I was ordered by the Fuehrer to take
+over the leadership of all SS units in the entire Reich, then totaling
+280 men, and to change them according to the order, into a reliable
+elite organization of the Party.
+
+I decided to tackle this problem--which I should like to discuss here
+to some extent--because I was a National Socialist, of course. I want
+to tell you also how this is to be interpreted. I am a strong believer
+in the doctrine that, in the end, only good blood can achieve the
+greatest, enduring things in the world. Strengthened by this conviction
+of mine, I began to work on this problem.
+
+Accordingly only good blood, blood which history has proved to be
+leading and creative and the foundation of every state and all military
+activities, only Nordic blood, can be considered. I said to myself
+that should I succeed to select from the German people for this
+organization as many people as possible a majority of whom possess
+this desired blood, to teach them military discipline and, in time,
+the understanding of the value of blood and the entire ideology which
+results from it, then it will be possible actually to create such an
+elite organization which would successfully hold its own in all cases
+of emergency.
+
+This form of selection of good blood has been very often theoretically
+recognized. Many books have been written on it from Chamberlain
+to Guenther of the years 1926/27, and many others which I shall
+not mention here. Now came the difficult question of the method of
+selecting these people. There are two kinds of selection procedures:
+first, the most severe selection procedure brought about by war, the
+struggle for life and death. In this procedure the value of blood is
+shown through achievement. In the year 1929, a great number of former
+soldiers still existed whose worth could be determined by their record
+during the war. Wars however, are exceptional circumstances, and a way
+had to be found to make selections in peace time as well, when courage
+could not be given this test. Thus, I could only draw conclusions from
+the appearance of the people in question. Of course, many will argue
+immediately: that is all very well but if you judge by height, blond
+hair and blue eyes and the dimensions of the skull then the matter is
+very problematical. That is known to me very well, too. One could never
+judge by that alone.
+
+I then went on to require a certain height. I did not accept people
+under 1,7 m--and here I ask you to understand the exact meaning to
+my words--because I know that people who have reached a certain
+height must possess the desired blood to some degree. Of course it is
+impossible to be too discriminating here as it cannot be said that
+people who are smaller should not possess the same blood. That is
+natural but by choosing from this pool of people having the desired
+height there exists a greater probability of obtaining satisfactory
+results.
+
+But we went further. It was not enough to go by height, but we began
+to obtain photographs at that time. That amounted to a hundred to
+two hundred people annually who were eligible for admission. I have
+personally seen each photograph and asked myself: Does the face of this
+man have distinct traits of foreign blood, excessive cheek bones, or as
+is the common way of asking: Does this one appear Mongolic or that one
+Slavic? Slavic, incidentally, is a faulty expression. It is merely a
+popular expression.
+
+Why have I done all this? I should like to call to your attention here
+the types of soldier councils of the years 1918 and 1919. Everyone of
+you who was an officer at that time knows a number of such people by
+personal experience. You will have to admit that on the whole they were
+people whose appearance affected our German eye as rather peculiar,
+whose features looked strange and who had some foreign blood in them.
+They were the type of people who could be disciplined, who are orderly
+in normal times, who would even be brave, bold and daring in time of
+war but who, because of their blood, would fail to pass the final great
+test of character and nerves.
+
+Since I knew these things I said to myself: I shall not accept people
+whom I expect to quit, to complain, to become disloyal and traitors,
+to have bad soldierly manners and the like at the moment of political
+tests, because of the nature of the composition of their blood. We had
+to be all the more careful because we had only voluntary discipline in
+the SS during the years of struggle, and therefore we were unable to
+compel a man to do something.
+
+It was only possible to deprive the man of his arm band for a period
+of three or four weeks or impose on him penal drills, and that only if
+he voluntarily accepted the punishment. If he was unwilling he could
+always say: “I resign, I don’t like it any longer.” We therefore have
+followed the above-mentioned principle of selection and been able to
+remove the principal causes of defect.
+
+With this outward screening however, no final selection had been
+attained, since it was always the performance of the person during the
+following months and years which was of importance. It was my point of
+view that we should always require difficult tasks and more than any
+other organization. Valuable personnel is never trained by means of
+easy service and conveniences, but by difficulties and added burdens.
+We therefore began by exacting from our men higher dues in spite of the
+widespread poverty of the times. At a time when no uniforms were issued
+to party organizations, we asked our people to acquire black trousers
+and boots from their own means--a tremendous expense for an unemployed
+person who had to pay the 40 marks of his own purse. If he failed to
+do so and declared: I cannot do that, then we explained to him: please
+go away, for you somehow failed to understand the matter for you do not
+possess the instinctive willingness to a sacrifice of your own accord,
+for we cannot use you. Thus we gradually arrived at our intended and
+desired picture.
+
+This briefly-mentioned theory of selection of people may be criticised,
+today after eight years I believe I can say with sincerity that its
+practical application has justified its existence, and that it has
+really been possible to effect a certain selection of people in the SS
+already during the time of fighting.
+
+I shall skip the next few periods and shall now occupy myself with
+the year 1933. This year was for the SS the hardest trial; for it was
+a time when all organizations flourished, a time of great assault
+and tidal waves of those who desired membership in the party and its
+organizations. A very difficult question confronted us at that time.
+It was a question of deciding whether to close the party and its
+organizations to further membership and thus remaining pure in quality
+but small in volume, or of opening them to further membership to
+increase their volume. This resulted in a dangerous situation, as was
+shown as a number of people poured in who were not entirely loyal and
+idealists, so that to a certain degree it became a menace of numbers,
+of the masses.
+
+The SS too was endangered by this menace. Therefore I closed it in
+April 1933 while some of the other organizations still accepted as
+great a number of people as possible. This way I had the SS again under
+my control in April and said: We shall accept no more people. From
+the end of 1933 to the end of 1935 we expelled all those of the newly
+accepted members who proved unsuitable. In these years I have expelled
+approximately 60,000 men. Today the strength of the SS consists of
+approximately 210,000 men. This has been of great benefit to the SS and
+all of its units as its quality has greatly improved whereas it would
+have suffered considerably through quantity.
+
+I shall close the question of selection by stating that today we accept
+young men of 18 years of age. We know them already from the Hitler
+Youth, have studied them already a few years, so that we are sure to
+get only the best. With 18 years they come to us as candidates.
+
+They are extremely thoroughly examined and checked. Of 100 men we
+can use on the average 10 or 15, no more. We ask for the political
+reputation record of his parents, brothers and sisters, the record
+of his ancestry as far back as 1750 and naturally the physical
+examination and his records of the Hitler youth. Further we ask for a
+record of hereditary health showing that no hereditary diseases exist
+in his parents and in his family. Last, but perhaps most important, is
+a certification of the race commission. This examining commission is
+composed of SS leaders, anthropologists and physicians.
+
+The behavior of this young man in front of this commission is now what
+is decisive: Not only the way he stands at attention but also his manly
+disciplined bearing, the ease and composition with which he answers the
+questions posed to him in the course of conversation, his gait, his
+hands, in fact all that which we have come to regard in the course of
+our eight years of experience as ideal. This is the way we determine
+whether to accept the man or not. The first years the company has been
+very unhappy in many cases. It asked: Why is this man refused us?
+We have just located in this or that village a man who has in every
+respect an orderly appearance and now when this man confronts the race
+commission he is being refused at a time when it is so difficult to
+obtain people. In such cases we have always remained and still remain
+severe and that is the right thing. That is the proper way to conduct a
+veritable selection.
+
+I now come to the organization of the SS. It is necessary to
+distinguish among the following organizations of the SS. First the
+General SS which consists of about 190,000 men. This General SS is
+entirely civilian in nature except for the higher officer corps, which
+performs its duties on the higher levels, that is from Sturmbannfuehrer
+up. I am very proud of the fact that only 0.4 percent of the General
+SS are unemployed. These 0.4 percent come from Upper Silesia where
+it is really very difficult to obtain work. We have almost only
+professionals, and it is my opinion that it should be so. For a really
+capable man is of little value to me if he only excels in arts, he
+must also be otherwise honest and of good character, and accomplish
+something in his field, in his profession. A man who changes his
+position three times without satisfactory reason is expelled as we
+have no further interest in him. People who stand around idle are of
+no use to us. The General SS, therefore, is entirely professional
+in its nature and character and performs its duties nights and
+Sundays just like in war time. Besides the General SS there is the
+Verfuegungstruppe; also the Death Head Units, the SD, and the race and
+population system. I shall now discuss individual units in some detail.
+
+The General SS is divided into 13 subdivisions which on the whole are
+exactly adapted to the present corps districts and one corps district
+being planned. Under these subdivisions headed by Oberabschnittsfuehrer
+who are Gruppenfuehrer or Obergruppenfuehrer, there are those which
+are headed by an Oberfuehrer or Brigadefuehrer. These subdivisions, in
+their turn, are subdivided into SS regiments [Standarten]. A regiment,
+if in its entire force, is made up of 1600 men. Under the regiments we
+have the battalions [Sturmbanne] and companies [Stuerme], and under the
+companies the platoons.
+
+A great many SS men live very far apart. Of course, it would be much
+more convenient to set up a Sturmbanne in some town and in this way
+have all the people always together. That would facilitate considerably
+the exercises which always take place in the evening hours, instruction
+and sport, and require much less effort. However, that would inevitably
+result in a decreasing quality because not enough people possessing the
+desired qualities could be obtained in a town of approximately 20 to
+25 thousand inhabitants. We have, therefore, extended our organization
+considerably and have many platoons in the country side. These platoons
+are then divided up between the villages, so that in a typical village
+only the two best young men are SS members. We have meetings over the
+week ends when the farmer is not too occupied, or one entire afternoon
+in the winter, while in summer we only have monthly roll calls. That is
+the outline of the organization of the General SS.
+
+The age groups in the SS are as follows: With 18 years the young man
+enters the SS. He is first an applicant, after three months he takes
+the oath on the Fuehrer and thus becomes a candidate [Anwaerter].
+As a candidate during the first year he takes examinations for his
+SA sport insignia and his bronze sport insignia. At the age of 19
+or 19½, according to the time of his acceptance, he is conscripted
+for the labor service and subsequently for the Wehrmacht. After
+two more years he comes back from the Wehrmacht unless he remains
+there as a prospective non-commissioned officer or reenlists. If he
+returns to us he is still candidate. In these weeks he is especially
+thoroughly instructed in ideology. The first year is for him a period
+of elementary ideological indoctrination. In these weeks following
+his return from the Wehrmacht he receives special instruction about
+the marriage law and all other laws pertaining to the family, and the
+honor laws. On the 9th of November, following his return from the
+Wehrmacht, he becomes an SS man in the true sense. The Reichsfuehrer of
+the SS is just as much an SS man in the sense of the SS organization
+as the common man at the front. On this 9th of November he is being
+awarded the dagger, and at this occasion he promises to abide by the
+marriage law and the disciplinary laws of the SS, since the family is
+also subject to these laws. From this day on he has the right and the
+duty to defend his honor with a weapon as laid down by the honor laws
+of the SS. The applicants and candidates do not yet have this right.
+The SS man remains in the so called active general SS until his 35th
+year. From his 35th to his 45th year he is in the SS reserve, and after
+his 45th year in the Stammabteilung of the SS, identified by the grey
+color patch. Between the ages of 21 and 35 the SS man has to perform
+a great many duties, especially up to his 25th year. In these first
+four years there are a lot of marches, tournaments, i.e., sports of
+all kinds which take the form of contests that take place each year
+between Easter and Summer solstice so that we are able to select the
+best men of every company by these demonstrations of physical ability.
+Every SS man is being asked to pass some kind of annual test until his
+50th year. And the reason for that? These men are for the most part
+professionals. In the SS perhaps anywhere from ½ to ⅗ live in cities.
+The workman in the cities is often engaged in occupations requiring him
+to stand or the intellectual worker to sit for a considerable amount of
+time. To that is added the misery of big cities which in my opinion is
+also a very serious military question.
+
+People of the 20th Century no longer walk but travel in the subway,
+railroad or cars. Nobody is accustomed to marching in all the years
+of his civilian life. Or take those who hold leading positions as an
+example, all the professional State and Ministry leaders. These people
+are condemned to sit. Everybody is so pressed for time he has to take
+an automobile because there is no other way to keep up with the rush.
+The result of this is that people grow pale and fat and in some cases
+phlegmatic which is never good for the State. If we desire to remain
+young we have to be sportsmen. But all that would remain on paper if I
+did not hold annual checkups or arouse to a certain degree the ambition
+of the men so that they really become sportsmen and pass their annual
+tests. * * *
+
+The performance insignia of the SA have the following meaning: every
+form of sport which requires the use of arms is being executed with
+both arms. Shot put is done with both arms; the same holds true for
+stone putting. Pistols and rifles are fired left and right. That
+appears terribly awkward and unaccustomed in the beginning, but it
+is an excellent form of exercise and very successful. Hand grenades
+and clubs are hurled left and right. In the beginning no record
+performances can be expected of course of people past their twentieth
+year, since the left arm or in the case of a left-handed person the
+right arm, are completely untrained, so that at a distance of 10 m the
+target is often missed by three or five meters. It will be, however, a
+very good development and application of all physical strength if we
+require such performances of youths in the ages of 13 to 14 from the
+very beginning. I believe that in this way we shall be very successful.
+Every year the performance insignia differ. Of course, I do not expect
+the conditions and time from a 40 year old for a 100 meter race as I do
+expect them from a man of 21, but I do require of the man of 40 greater
+endurance in marching than I do of the man of 21. I expect a 30 year
+old man to shoot calmer and better than a 19 or 20 year old with few
+examples. They are also graded to the extent that a wounded war veteran
+who e.g. cannot swim need not, for that reason, refuse every sport.
+But I want to help him by grading the conditions so that one who lost
+an arm can perform the exercise with the other arm. Such are the sport
+activities of the SS from the ages of 18 to 50. Aside from the sport
+activity, those between the ages of 21 and 35 receive complete training
+in street patrolling and barricading for cases of internal security.
+
+Hand in hand with physical exercise is mental and ideological training.
+Weekly periods of instruction are held during which pages from Hitler’s
+“Mein Kampf” are read. The older a person, the more steadfast must he
+be in his ideology and the more training must he get in ideology.
+
+I now come to the Verfuegungstruppe [Forerunner of Armed Forces SS].
+The Verfuegungstruppe is divided into the following units: SS Regiment
+“Adolf Hitler,” with three battalions, which is motorized and at the
+same time contains infantrymen and additional companies; SS Regiment
+“Deutschland” with 4 battalions with the usual motorcycle riflemen and
+infantry howitzer companies; SS Regiment “Germania” with 3 battalions
+also with motorcycle riflemen and infantry howitzer companies; the SS
+battalion “Nurnberg,” an infantry battalion; the SS engineer battalion
+today in Leisnig; later in Dresden; and the SS signal battalion today
+in Berlin, later in Unna, upon completion of the barracks. The Regiment
+“Adolf Hitler” is in Berlin. The Regiment “Deutschland” has three
+battalions in Munich and one battalion in Ellwangen, the Regiment
+“Germania” has now one battalion and two companies in Hamburg, and one
+battalion in Arolsen and up to now one other battalion in Soltau. The
+final garrison is not yet stationary. The time of service is 4 years.
+No other form of conscription exists. The annual need for replacement
+will be approximately 2200 men, not a great number.
+
+I now come to the Death Head Units. The employment and obligations of
+the Verfuegungstruppe I shall discuss later in connection with the
+police. The Death Head Units originated from the guard units of the
+concentration camps. In connection with these concentration camps, I
+should like to give a few data. We have in Germany today the following
+concentration camps which, in my opinion, should not decrease but
+increase in number for certain reasons:
+
+(1) Dachau near Munich; (2) Sachsenhausen near Berlin, which is the
+former camp Esterwege in Emsland. I have dissolved this camp in
+Emsland upon the suggestion of Reich Labor Leader, Hierl, and the
+judiciary, who declared it was wrong to tell one person that the
+service in the swamps to make land arable is an honor, and another,
+by sending him there as a prisoner: “I’ll teach you people what it
+means to get sent to the swamps.” This indeed is illogical, and after
+half or three quarters of a year, I dissolved the camp in Esterwege
+and transferred it to Sachsenhausen near Oranienburg. Then there is a
+camp in Lichtenburg near Torgau, one in Sachsenburg near Chemnitz and
+besides a few smaller ones. The number of prisoners is about 8000. I
+shall explain to you why we must have so many and still more. We once
+had a very efficiently organized German Communist Party [KPD]. This
+KPD has been crushed in the year 1933. A part of the functionaries
+went to foreign countries. Another part was comprised in the very high
+number of protective custody prisoners in the year 1933. Because of my
+extensive knowledge of Bolshevism, I have always opposed the release
+of these people from the camps. It must be clear to us that the great
+mass of workmen are absolutely susceptible to National Socialism and
+the contemporary form of state as long as their way of thought has not
+been changed by the specifically indoctrinated, trained and financially
+backed functionaries. * * *
+
+It would be extremely instructive for everyone--some members of the
+Wehrmacht were already able to do so--to inspect such a concentration
+camp. Once they have seen it, they are convinced of the fact that no
+one had been sent there unjustly; that it is the offal of criminals
+and freaks. No better demonstration of the laws of inheritance and
+race, as set forth by Doctor Guett, exists than such a concentration
+camp. There you can find people with hydrocephalus, people who are
+cross-eyed, deformed, half-Jewish, and a number of racially inferior
+products. All that is assembled there. Of course we distinguish
+between those inmates who are only there for a few months for the
+purpose of education, and those who are to stay for a very long time.
+On the whole, education consists of discipline, never of any kind of
+instruction on an ideological basis, for the prisoners have, for the
+most part, slave-like souls; and only very few people of real character
+can be found there. They would pretend to do all that would be asked
+of them, repeat all that is said in the “Voelkischer Beobachter” but
+in reality, stay the same. The discipline thus preens order. The order
+begins with these people living in clean barracks. Such a thing can
+really only be accomplished by us Germans, hardly another nation would
+be as humane as we are. The laundry is frequently changed. The people
+are taught to wash themselves twice daily, and the use of a toothbrush
+with which most of them have been unfamiliar. * * *
+
+The concentration camps are guarded by these Death Head Units. It
+is impossible to use exclusively married people for guard duty as
+has been suggested once, for no state can afford to do so. It is
+further necessary to keep the number of such guards for concentration
+camps--there are 3,500 men in Germany--at a relatively high level,
+for no form of service is as exacting and strenuous for troops as the
+guarding of crooks and criminals. * * *
+
+In case of war, it must become clear to us that a considerable number
+of unreliable persons will have to be put here if we are to assure
+ourselves of the absence of highly disagreeable developments in case of
+war.
+
+The prisoner guards were formerly members of the general SS. We
+gradually collected them into the so-called Death Head Units. They
+are not arranged in companies, but in centuries (groups of 100) and
+have naturally also machine guns. In such camps there are two or three
+control towers, manned day and night with fully loaded machine guns, so
+that any attempt of a general uprising--a possibility for which we must
+always be prepared--can be immediately suppressed. The entire camp can
+be strafed from three towers.
+
+The time of service in these Death Head Units is also four years.
+They consist today mainly of people who have served their time in
+the Wehrmacht and then enlisted with us for a period of four years.
+The Death Head Units have the additional purpose of being the cadre
+centuries for approximately 30 Death Head special battalions of the SS
+in case of war, for 25,000 men with whom we shall guarantee the safety
+in the interior. I shall come back to this subject later.
+
+I now come to the Security Service [SD]; it is the great ideological
+intelligence service of the party and, in the long run, also that
+of the state. During the time of struggle for power it was only the
+intelligence service of the SS. At that time we had, for quite natural
+reasons, an intelligence service with the regiments, battalions and
+companies. We had to know what was going on on the opponent’s side,
+whether the Communists intended to hold a meeting today or not, whether
+our people were to be suddenly attacked or not and similar things.
+I separated this service already in 1931 from the troops, from the
+units of the general SS, because I considered it to be wrong. For one
+thing, the secrecy is endangered, then the individual men or even the
+companies are too likely to discuss every day problems.
+
+That was indeed the principle of the SS from the beginning. Every day
+problems do not interest us; every leader appointed by the Fuehrer will
+be backed by us, every leader dismissed by the Fuehrer will be removed
+by us, if necessary by force, because only the command of the Fuehrer
+counts. Besides that we are only interested in ideological questions of
+importance for decades or centuries, so that the man is really above
+the concern of every day and knows that he is working for a great task,
+which occurs but once in 2000 years. The SS man is not interested in
+daily problems of the kind whether perhaps the local group is correctly
+manned, whether everything is done properly in the labor front, no
+matter what it is, he is not interested.
+
+The Security Service was already separated from the troops in 1931 and
+separately organized. Its higher headquarters coincide today with the
+Oberabschnitte and Abschnitte (sectors), and it has also field offices,
+an own organization of officials with a great many Command Posts,
+approximately 3-4000 men strong, at least when it is built up. The
+spheres which it handles are above all Communism, Judaism, Freemasonry,
+ultra-mundane activities, the activity of political religion, and
+reaction. Here, too, the details of the work are not of interest. You
+will perhaps see that during your visit; I can, therefore, be short.
+The security service is only interested in the great ideological
+problems.
+
+For example: Let us say that it is attempted on the part of
+ultra-mundane people to effect gradually for the territory of Austria
+a change into a Swiss like state by means of scientific exploitation
+of the theory of the Austrian man. Just as it happened to us in our
+history 700 or 800 years ago with Switzerland which, although it
+still speaks the German language today, does not consider itself
+inwardly as belonging to Germany; or as we had to suffer the loss
+of Holland with its entire lower German territory a few centuries
+ago; the attempt is now being made to point at this problem of the
+South-East German people, of the Austrian people, with propaganda, by
+scientific underrunning and scientific work at the universities, until
+spiritual separation is also possible. We are furthermore interested:
+Which German professors support this theory or are connected with any
+wire-pulling abroad or elsewhere?
+
+These are spheres which interest us. To us as a security service it
+is of no interest whether, for instance, the cell organization of the
+German Communist party at Berlin-Wedding has been broken up or not.
+This is a question for the executive power. One day it will be broken
+up, or it is broken up already, and if it is reorganized, it will be
+broken up again. Therefore, this is of no interest to us, on account
+of that Germany will not perish. We are interested: What are the
+Communists’ large-scale plans for the next years, in which country do
+they intend to begin, which influences of Bolshevism are noticeable in
+foreign Freemasonry circles, what are their plans, where do the big
+emissaries go now? Recently, e.g. 800 emissaries went to Austria. They
+arrived there 3 or 4 months ago, and now we are extremely interested
+to know: How is this going to affect Austria? Or what plans do they
+have, what great organizational plans for Germany, from which angle do
+they start, how does Bolshevism make common cause, for instance, with
+the religious coalition [Bekenntnisfront], and suddenly supports as an
+atheist movement these religious parsons, how is that possible all of a
+sudden? Or we are furthermore interested in this:
+
+What economic influence do the Jews exercise--again considered on a
+large scale--to suffocate business, to commit sabotage and to transfer
+foreign currency illegally? These are things which are being studied
+there scientifically and--in this case the word really fits--by a
+general staff, which may sometimes last for years, tasks which in many
+or in most cases are only in the beginning stage.
+
+After the Security Service follows the last pillar, the race- and
+settlement organization. We thus have the general SS, which represents
+the majority of the SS, of the order, the Verfuegungs troops with
+a certain task in the country for the protection of the interior,
+the Death Head Units, also for the protection of the interior, the
+Security Service, the intelligence service of the party and the
+state, and finally the race--and settlement organization whose task
+of ideological training is of a positive nature, as contrasted with
+the Security Service which has the negative task to seek information
+about the opponent. In this race- and settlement office the marriage
+applications are being handled. In the last 4 or 5 years we have the
+order concerning marriages: No SS men can get married without the
+approval of the SS Reich leader. A physical examination of the bride
+and guarantees for the bride’s ideological and human character are
+required. We are not interested whether the woman has a fortune or not.
+We request only a statement whether or not she has defects. We prefer
+it if the rich girls take along only what they have earned themselves,
+or their dowry. In addition, the genealogical table up to 1750 is
+required, the hereditary physical report of both, and several police
+and other reports. This results in tremendous work, especially now that
+people are getting married in an unusually great number; because it is
+our concern, that our men get married. We desire that they get married
+at 26 years, if possible, so that there will be really young marriages
+which are also able to have children. * * *
+
+I now turn to the Police and its structure. Today the Police is divided
+into two branches, namely civil and security police; the civil police
+wears a uniform. The security police is composed of the criminal police
+and of the Secret State Police [Gestapo]. We can certainly state
+without exaggeration that in 1933 we took over a wild confusion, a
+Police the decent elements of which were humiliated; for the sword had
+been taken away from the officers and a rubber truncheon had been given
+to the men. The police was permeated by persons with criminal records
+and by absolute Marxists; it did not care to actually take a stand
+against any crime because at once the League for Human Rights, the
+Peace Society and similar societies intervened, and because absolute
+glorification of crime was in vogue. This was the method of planned
+intellectual Bolshevization.
+
+In Prussia, Goering took over the Police, put the uniformed police in
+order, and created a Landespolizei (gendarmerie) which in 1935-1936
+was absorbed by the army; the same occurred in Bavaria. From my SS
+position, I first of all concerned myself only with the Secret State
+Police, with the political Police of the countries and with the Secret
+State Police in Prussia. Through the fact that I personally was
+political police commander of all German countries, and at the same
+time deputy of the Gestapo in Prussia, the Gestapo gradually came
+under the control of one person.
+
+I may skip the whole further development. On the 17th of June of the
+previous year I became head of the German police, that is, of all the
+German Police together with its auxiliary organizations. I shall review
+for you my conception of my task as I have seen and still see it.
+
+First:--I shall ultimately form one true Reich police out of these 16
+different gendarmeries, for the Reich police is one of the strongest
+binding elements that a state can have. We now have for the first
+time in German history a Reich Police. Outwardly, I am eliminating
+the various uniforms, the laws and regulations which were still in
+force until six or nine months ago. When a Hamburg police official was
+pursuing a criminal who was bold enough to go into Prussian territory,
+he could not pursue him farther without the consent of the Prussian
+Police. This naturally was to the great advantage of the criminal, for
+he could very easily escape. The same was the case between the other
+states of the federation. These things were still on such a firm legal
+basis that one could not do away with them without legal revision.
+
+For the creation of the Reich police, not only outwardly but also
+inwardly, I have already made a beginning in the officers’ corps and
+with the officials, by shifting the people somewhat, through transfers,
+etc., in this way showing Germany to them; thus my dear Bavarians may
+come North for a change, and the people from the North go South. If
+that is not done they all groan a little about it at first, as was the
+case with the SS a few years ago. Now a telegram arrives suddenly,
+the man is to be at his new post in two days. Transfers are effected
+on principle only by telegram, that keeps people young and fresh. As
+stated, this is only the beginning of our work with the Reich police.
+
+The effective strength of officers and men is very low. That is quite
+understandable, for the police has given up much of its good or even
+best personnel for setting up the Landespolizei. The Landespolizei
+was absorbed by the Wehrmacht, and what is left in many places is the
+poorest not only of equipment, trucks, autos and other things, but
+sometimes the poorest of officers and men. All of this must now be
+painfully built up and brought into order. * * *
+
+As far as I can, I am now bringing the police up to full strength
+with men leaving the Verfuegungstruppe (reserve unit) and the Death
+Head Units; I am bringing the police officers’ corps up to full
+strength with SS leaders who come into the police from the Toelz
+and Brunswick Fuehrerschulen [Leader Training schools] by way of
+the Verfuegungstruppe. This brings me to an important problem; I am
+fighting to prevent the police officers’ corps from becoming a second
+class officers’ corps. This happens very easily just as it did in the
+past.
+
+In connection with this whole matter, I now come to the main problem:
+internal security and obligations of the police during war. In a future
+war we shall have not only an army front on land, a navy front at sea,
+and an air force front in the air over Germany, but we shall also have
+a fourth theater of war, namely internal Germany. This is the basis
+which must be kept sound, at all costs, lest the three combat branches
+of Germany be stabbed in the back again.
+
+We must clearly recognize that an opponent in war is an opponent not
+only in a military but also in an ideological sense. When I speak here
+of opponents, I obviously mean our natural opponent, international
+Bolshevism, under Jewish-Masonic leadership. This Bolshevism, of
+course, has its supreme citadel in Russia. But this does not mean
+that there is danger of Bolshevist attack from Russia only. One must
+always reckon with this danger from wherever this Jewish Bolshevism
+has gained decisive influence for itself. The states or people under
+Jewish-Masonic-Bolshevist leadership, or at least strong influence,
+will of necessity be unfriendly toward Germany and will constitute a
+danger.
+
+Thus we must constantly ask ourselves, “Who is, or would be an opponent
+in case of war? Who is an ideological opponent, that is, who is under
+Jewish-Masonic-Bolshevist influence”? We must clearly realize, that
+Bolshevism is the organization of the sub-humans, it is the absolute
+foundation of Jewish sovereignty, it is the exact contrary of all that
+is dear to an Aryan people. It is a diabolical teaching, for it appeals
+to the meanest and lowest instincts of mankind and makes a religion of
+this. Do not be deceived: Bolshevism, with its Lenin entombed in the
+Kremlin, will take only a few decades to become the diabolical religion
+of destruction, a religion native to Asia for the destruction of the
+whole world. Furthermore, remember that this Bolshevism is working
+according to plan for the Bolshevization of other peoples, and the
+destruction is aimed at the white race. One of the first institutions
+founded under Jewish leadership, as early as 1918, was an Asiatic
+university as I shall call it. It has a kind of department for each
+Asiatic population, whether numerous or not. The functionaries for
+these populations are instructed not only in their language, but also
+as to the customs, as to the religious and class quarrels, and the
+economic circumstances, etc. They are instructed whether these people
+are mostly rich or poor, whether the poorer class is particularly
+oppressed, etc. All of this is studied down to the smallest sects.
+The people who have finished their education there, then go out in a
+constant stream to all of these people and exploit their wishes and
+longings as their religious differences and their fanaticism, taking
+advantage of social misery, to draw them into a whirlpool and thus
+gradually convince them that the only ones who can really help them are
+the people in Moscow.
+
+This general movement is also directed against the white race, and
+is today directed primarily against resurrected Germany, which was
+generally considered to have been ruined, because of having been
+subdued. If we wish to be immune to the poison of destruction in our
+people, our lives must again be founded on social well-being, order
+and cleanliness. We are in the process of creating both. The first
+four years have passed; unemployment has almost vanished, much has
+been accomplished, much more remains to be done by us. But the most
+important thing is the thorough ideological permeation of all our
+people with the profound realization that our people, a minority of
+70 million in the heart of Europe, could stand only because we are
+qualitatively more valuable than the others.
+
+And this brings me back to what I said about the race question at the
+beginning.
+
+We are more valuable than the others who do now and always will surpass
+us in numbers. We are more valuable because our blood enables us to
+invent more than others, to lead our people better than the others;
+because it enables us to have better soldiers, better statesmen, higher
+culture, better characters. We also have better quality, speaking of
+your profession, because the German soldier is more devoted to duty,
+more decent, and more intelligent than the soldiers of other countries.
+And we shall maintain this quality as long as we keep our blood and
+people healthy, so long as this people recognizes and obeys the ancient
+laws for preservation of a people which National Socialism, thanks
+to Adolf Hitler, restored to it. We shall remain healthy and immune
+as long as we do not slide back into democracy, into a hereditary or
+legitimate imperialism which did not develop from the people. Let us
+realize clearly that we shall weather the next decades only if we are
+a people that has a profound conviction of itself, believes in its own
+strength, and proves this strength.
+
+I spoke of the ideological permeation of the whole people in case of
+war. If this war should come sooner than any of us believe or wish,
+that is, if war will come at all, we must clearly realize that there
+will always be a residue among the German people who will form a
+nucleus for the Comintern. The Comintern have an easy time of it, for
+they have a political agitator and at the same time a military spy who
+sells. Every communist is also a military spy who reveals any military
+and industrial secret out of loyalty to his imaginary fatherland,
+Moscow, the native land of the proletarians. Because of his conviction,
+he engages in political agitation and sedition in exactly the same
+way in order to start the revolution. The sooner war would come, the
+greater would be the danger. The later it comes, the more generations
+of youth have grown up, year after year, the less is the danger. The
+danger would arise again only if the German people would deviate from
+today’s path. In any case, we must prepare for this danger, for this
+internal theater of war, and always realize clearly that any war
+brought about by neglect of this internal theater of war would lead to
+damage.
+
+I picture the scope of obligations in case of war as follows: The
+police of course would, according to their duty as I see it, be able to
+give up a maximum of 15,000 to 20,000 men (not more) to the Wehrmacht
+as soldiers. I have a total of 80,000 to 90,000 uniformed police. It
+must be taken into consideration that a large part of this uniformed
+police is over or at least over 40, so that if I should give up 15,000
+to 20,000, I really would give up the backbone of this police. I can
+substitute men over 55 or 60 whom I may reactivate. That could be done
+if unavoidable. However, it is possible only if I assure myself of an
+attack unit [Eingreiftruppe] which I can use for large scale projects.
+These are the Death Head Units. By and large, I can get along with
+this old Police force. I can carry out all the former tasks of the
+Landsturm, i.e. guarding munition factories, railroad crossings, etc.,
+with civilians over 45, who would be drafted as auxiliary police as
+planned provided I have as a backbone a troop that is young. For this
+the Death Head Units are provided, ranging in age from 25 to 35, not
+older and not younger.
+
+I do not wish to have any very young nor any old persons, for the
+sabotage and terror troops consist of young, very lively persons with
+the most modern equipment. This opponent cannot be fought with old
+Landsturm personnel.
+
+The Death Head Units will enter every government district of Germany.
+The following measures have been provided: firstly, no unit is to go
+to its native province, thus a Pomeranian troop would never serve
+in Pomerania. Secondly, each unit will change after three months.
+Thirdly, the unit will never be assigned to street duty singly. An
+individual with the death head insignia will never be used as a
+policeman for street service, that must not be. Fourth, if such use
+is made relentless measures are to be taken. Anything else is out of
+the question. Otherwise we would have to reckon in Germany with such
+possibilities as parachute jumps, use of saboteurs, use of bold groups
+of 16 or 20 men who might, with the support of Communist personnel,
+entrench themselves in a munitions factory. If these measures are not
+provided for one could not get along with such a limited personnel. * *
+*
+
+In closing, I may say one thing: I can manage with the officers’ corps
+of the civil police and with the men of the Security Service, whom I
+naturally cannot release even in war, and with the men and leaders of
+the Death Head Units, only if I have valuable and decent people in
+them. I must make it possible by way of the Verfuegungstruppe which
+will be in combat, to have a constant exchange of wounded or those who
+have been at the front a long time, in return for officers and men of
+the police and the Death Head Units. Otherwise, I either would get no
+decent characters for these home formations, and then obviously could
+not fulfill the obligations; or else there would appear in the home
+formations manifestations of disturbances as happened with the fleet
+during the war, because it didn’t get out. This must be avoided, and
+for this reason rotation is planned within the organization. Every SS
+leader of the Verfuegungstruppe--we have about 300 SS leaders yearly
+coming from the Toelz and Brunswick SS schools--is placed with the
+civil police once every half year, in order to become a reserve officer
+of the police. I can make good use of these people. If, for instance,
+one of them is wounded and has only one arm, he can still render
+excellent service at home.
+
+An appreciation of this completely new kind of organization must
+penetrate everywhere, as well as an understanding of this internal
+theater of war which will mean the difference between the existence or
+nonexistence of our people if we ever would have to stand a trial. It
+is the obligation of the SS and of the police to solve positively the
+problem of internal security. That is the assignment given to us by the
+Fuehrer. We are tackling it in all seriousness and are really convinced
+that it is no second-rate task, and we are further convinced that only
+the best ideological training of our men and a racial selection will
+enable us to solve this problem some day.
+
+In this short outline I have depicted for you the task of the SS and
+police. Just as I do in every address to Wehrmacht officers, I ask you
+in your circle to think yourselves into these somewhat novel channels
+of thought, and create understanding for it wherever you can.
+
+Let us all clearly realize, the next decades do not signify any foreign
+political argument which Germany either can or cannot overcome, but
+they signify a fight of extermination of the above-mentioned subhuman
+opponents in the whole world who fight Germany, as the nuclear people
+of the Northern race, Germany as nucleus of the German people, Germany
+as bearer of the culture of mankind; they signify the existence or
+nonexistence of the white race of which we are the leading people. We
+have, of course, one conviction: we are lucky enough to be alive just
+at the time when once in 2,000 years an Adolf Hitler has been born, and
+we are convinced that we shall survive every danger in both good and
+bad times because we all hold together and because each one approaches
+his work with his conviction.
+
+
+                                 PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1997-PS
+
+_Copy of RK. 10714 B._
+
+       Decree of the Fuehrer concerning the administration of the
+      newly-occupied Eastern territories, dated the 17 July 1941.
+
+In order to restore and maintain public order and public life in the
+newly-occupied Eastern territories I decree that:
+
+
+                               Article 1
+
+As soon as the military operations in the newly-occupied territories
+are over, the administration of these territories shall be transferred
+from the military establishments to the civil-administration
+establishments. I shall from time to time determine by special decree,
+the territories which according to this are to be transferred to the
+civil administration, and the time when this is to take place.
+
+
+                               Article 2
+
+The Civil Administration in the newly-occupied Eastern territories,
+where these territories are not included in the administration of
+the territories bordering on the Reich or the General government, is
+subject to the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern territories.
+
+
+                               Article 3
+
+Military sovereign rights and powers are exercised by the commanders
+of the Armed Forces in the newly-occupied Eastern territories in
+accordance with my decree of 25 June 1941.
+
+The powers of the Commissioner for the 4-year plan in the
+newly-occupied Eastern territories, according to my decree of 29 June
+1941, and those of the Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police
+according to my decree of 17 July 1941, are subject to special ruling,
+and are not effected by the following regulations.
+
+
+                                                               Article 4
+
+I appoint Reichsleiter Alfred Rosenberg as Reich Minister for the
+Occupied Eastern Territories. He will hold office in Berlin.
+
+
+                               Article 5
+
+The parts of the newly-occupied Eastern territories which are subject
+to the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories are to
+be divided into Reich Commissariats, which are to be divided into
+General Regions [Generalbezirke] and these again into District Areas
+[Kreisgebiete]. Several “Kreisgebiete” can be joined into a Main Region
+[Hauptbezirk]. The Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories
+will issue more detailed instructions on this subject.
+
+
+                               Article 6
+
+At the head of each Reich Commissariat will be a Reich Commissar; at
+the head of each General Region a Commissar-General and at the head of
+every District Area an Area Commissar [Gebietskommissar]. Where a Main
+Region is formed, there will be a Head-Commissar [Hauptkommissar] in
+charge.
+
+The Reich Commissars and the Commissar-Generals will be appointed
+by me, the heads of the main sections in the bureaux of the Reich
+Commissars, as well as the Head Commissars and District Commissars will
+be appointed by the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories.
+
+
+                               Article 7
+
+In cases where Article 3 is not applicable, the Reich Commissars will
+be responsible to the Reich Minister for Occupied Eastern Territories,
+and will receive instructions exclusively from him.
+
+
+                               Article 8
+
+It is the responsibility of the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern
+Territories to legislate for the newly occupied territories under
+his jurisdiction. He can delegate the legislative power to the Reich
+Commissars.
+
+
+                               Article 9
+
+As regards civil affairs, the Reich Commissars are responsible for the
+whole administration of their territory.
+
+As long as military operations are in progress, it is the duty of the
+highest competent authorities of the Reich to guarantee railway and
+postal services in accordance with the instructions of the Chief of
+Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. Further ruling will remain pending
+until the time the military operations cease.
+
+
+                               Article 10
+
+In order that the measures taken by the Reich Minister for the Occupied
+Eastern Territories or by the Reich Commissars in their areas may
+be brought into harmony with the over-all [uebergeordnete] aspects
+of the interests of the Reich, the Reich Minister for the Occupied
+Eastern Territories will maintain close liaison with the highest Reich
+authorities. In differences of opinion which cannot be settled by
+direct negotiations, my decision is to be obtained through the Reich
+Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellory.
+
+
+                               Article 11
+
+The necessary regulations for carrying out and supplementing this
+decree will be issued by the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern
+Territories in agreement with the Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich
+Chancellory.
+
+                                    Fuehrer’s Headquarters, 17 July 1941
+
+                                                             The Fuehrer
+                                                    Signed: Adolf Hitler
+
+                                                Chief of Supreme Command
+                                                     of the Armed Forces
+                                                          Signed: Keitel
+
+                          Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancery
+                                                    Signed: Dr. Lammers.
+
+[L.S.]
+
+
+                                 PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2000-PS
+
+          1935 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, NO. 100, PAGE 1146.
+
+Law for the Protection of German Blood and German Honor of 15 September
+                                  1935
+
+Thoroughly convinced by the knowledge that the purity of German blood
+is essential for the further existence of the German people and
+animated by the inflexible will to safeguard the German nation for
+the entire future, the Reichstag has resolved upon the following law
+unanimously, which is promulgated herewith:
+
+
+                               Section 1
+
+1. Marriages between Jews and nationals of German or kindred blood are
+forbidden. Marriages concluded in defiance of this law are void, even
+if, for the purpose of evading this law, they are concluded abroad.
+
+2. Proceedings for annulment may be initiated only by the Public
+Prosecutor.
+
+
+                               Section 2
+
+Relations outside marriage between Jews and nationals of German or
+kindred blood are forbidden.
+
+
+                               Section 3
+
+Jews will not be permitted to employ female nationals of German or
+kindred blood in their household.
+
+
+                               Section 4
+
+1. Jews are forbidden to hoist the Reichs and national flag and to
+present the colors of the Reich.
+
+2. On the other hand they are permitted to present the Jewish colors.
+The exercise of this authority is protected by the State.
+
+
+                               Section 5
+
+1. A person who acts contrary to the prohibition of section 1 will be
+punished with hard labor.
+
+2. A person who acts contrary to the prohibition of section 2 will be
+punished with imprisonment or with hard labor.
+
+3. A person who acts contrary to the provisions of sections 3 or 4 will
+be punished with imprisonment up to a year and with a fine or with one
+of these penalties.
+
+
+                               Section 6
+
+The Reich Minister of the Interior in agreement with the Deputy of the
+Fuehrer and the Reich Minister of Justice will issue the legal and
+administrative regulations which are required for the implementation
+and supplementation of this law.
+
+
+                               Section 7
+
+The law will become effective on the day after the promulgation,
+section 3 however only on 1 January 1936.
+
+Nurnberg, the 15 September 1935 at the Reich Party Rally of freedom.
+
+                                        The Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor
+                                                            Adolf Hitler
+
+                                          The Reich Minister of Interior
+                                                                   Frick
+
+                                           The Reich Minister of Justice
+                                                            Dr. Guertner
+
+                                               The Deputy of the Fuehrer
+                                                                 R. Hess
+                                        Reich Minister without portfolio
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2001-PS
+
+                1933 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 141
+
+    Law to remove the distress of people and State of 24 March 1933
+
+The Reichstag has resolved upon the following law which is promulgated
+herewith with approval of the Reichsrat after it has been established
+that all the requirements of legislation for changing the constitution
+have been complied with.
+
+
+                              _Section 1_
+
+Laws for the Reich can be resolved upon also by the Reich Cabinet
+besides the procedure provided by the constitution of the Reich. This
+also applies to the laws pursuant to sections 85 subsection 2 and 87 of
+the Reich-Constitution.
+
+
+                              _Section 2_
+
+The laws for the Reich resolved upon by the Reich Cabinet may deviate
+from the Reich-Constitution so far as they do not deal with the
+institution of the Reichstag or the Reichsrat as such. The powers of
+the Reich-President will remain intact.
+
+
+                              _Section 3_
+
+The laws for the Reich resolved upon by the Reich-Cabinet are issued
+by the Reich-Chancellor and promulgated in the Reichsgesetzblatt.
+They will become effective, so far as they do not determine otherwise
+on the day following their promulgation. Section 68 to 77 of the
+Reich-Constitution are not applicable to the laws resolved upon by the
+Reich-Cabinet.
+
+
+                              _Section 4_
+
+Treaties of the Reich with foreign countries relating to matters of
+the legislation of the Reich do not require the approval of the bodies
+participating in the legislation. The Reich-Cabinet issues the rules
+necessary for the execution of such treaties.
+
+
+                              _Section 5_
+
+This law will become effective on the day of its promulgation. It
+becomes ineffective on 1 April 1937. Moreover it becomes ineffective if
+the present Reich-Cabinet should be replaced by another.
+
+Berlin, 24 March 1933
+
+                                                     The Reich-President
+                                                          von Hindenburg
+
+                                                    The Reich-Chancellor
+                                                            Adolf Hitler
+
+                                     The Reich-Minister for the Interior
+                                                                   Frick
+
+                                  The Reich-Minister for Foreign Affairs
+                                                    Freiherr von Neurath
+
+                                         The Reich-Minister for Finances
+                                              Count Schwerin von Krosigk
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2003-PS
+
+                1934 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 747
+
+      Law re the Sovereign Head of the German Reich 1 August 1934
+
+The Reich Government has enacted the following law which is hereby
+promulgated:
+
+
+                               Section 1
+
+The office of the Reichspraesident will be consolidated with that of
+the Reich Chancellor. The existing authority of the Reichspraesident
+shall consequently be transferred to the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor,
+Adolph Hitler. He shall select his representative.
+
+
+                               Section 2
+
+This law is effective as of the time of the death of Reichspraesident
+von Hindenburg.
+
+  The Reich Chancellor
+  Adolf Hitler
+
+  The Reich Deputy Chancellor
+  von Papen
+
+  The Reich Minister of Foreign Affairs
+    Freiherr von Neurath
+
+  The Reich Minister of Interior
+    Frick
+
+  The Reich Minister of Finance
+    Graf Schwerin von Krosigk
+
+  The Reich Minister of Labor
+    Franz Seldte
+
+  The Reich Minister of Justice
+    Dr. Guertner
+
+  The Reich Minister for Defense
+    von Blomberg
+
+  The Reich Postal Minister and Transportation Minister
+    Freiherr von Eltz
+
+  The Reich Minister for Nutrition and Agriculture
+    R. Walther Darre
+
+  The Reich Minister for Enlightenment and Propaganda
+    Dr. Goebbels
+
+  The Reich Minister for Air Travel
+    Hermann Goering
+
+  The Reich Minister for Science, Training and Education
+    Bernhard Rust
+
+  The Reich Minister without Portfolio
+    Rudolf Hess
+
+  The Reich Minister without Portfolio
+    Hanns Kerrl
+
+
+                                 PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2004-PS
+
+                1933 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 153
+
+  Preliminary Law for the Coordination of the Federal States under the
+                         Reich, 31 March 1933.
+
+
+                               Article 4
+
+(1) The popular representation of the federal states (diets [Landtage],
+citizens’ assemblies [Burgerschuften]) is hereby dissolved with the
+exception of the Prussian diet [Preussischer Landtag] elected 5 March
+1933, so far as this has not already happened according to the law of
+the state.
+
+(2) They will be newly constituted according to the number of votes
+which in the election to the German Reichstag were given to the
+electoral lists within each federal state. In this connection, seats
+falling to the Communist Party will not be given out. The same will be
+true for electoral lists of electoral groups which are to be regarded
+as a substitute for the electoral lists of the Communist Party.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+Berlin, 31 March 1933.
+
+                                                    The Reich Chancellor
+                                                            ADOLF HITLER
+
+                                          The Reich Minister of Interior
+                                                                   FRICK
+
+
+                                 PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2005-PS
+
+                1933 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 173
+
+     Second Law Integrating the Laender with the Reich 7 April 1933
+
+The Reich Government has enacted the following law which is hereby
+promulgated:
+
+
+                                   1
+
+(1) In the German “Laender”, with the exception of Prussia, the Reich
+President, upon the proposal of the Reich Chancellor, shall appoint the
+Reich governor, the Reich governor shall require the observance of the
+general policy laid down by the Reich Chancellor. The following powers
+of “Land” authority belong to him:
+
+  1. Appointment and removal of the head of the “Land” Government, and
+     upon his proposal, the other members of the “Land” Government.
+
+  2. Dissolution of the legislature and designation of the new election
+     subject to the rule of section 8 of the Provisional Law of March
+     31, 1933, Integrating the German “Laender” with the Reich.
+
+  3. Preparations and publication of “Land” laws, including the laws
+     which are determined upon by the “Land” Government according to
+     section I of the Provisional Law of March 31, 1933, Integrating the
+     German “Laender” with the Reich. Article 70 of the Constitution of
+     August 11, 1919, applies accordingly.
+
+  4. Upon the proposal of the “Land” Government, appointment and
+     dismissal of the higher “Land” officials and judges, so far as this
+     formerly was accomplished by the highest “Land” officials.
+
+  5. The power of pardon.
+
+(2) The Reich governor may preside over the meetings of the “Land”
+Government.
+
+(3) Article 63 of the German Constitution of August 11, 1919 remains
+unaltered.
+
+
+                                   2
+
+(1) A Reich governor may not simultaneously be a member of a “Land”
+Government. He shall belong to the “Land” whose sovereign powers
+he exercises. His official residence is at the seat of the “Land”
+Government.
+
+(2) For several “Lands” in each of which there are less than 2 million
+inhabitants, a common “Lands” governor who must be a resident of one of
+these “Lands”, may be appointed. The Reich President shall designate
+the governor’s official residence.
+
+
+                                   3
+
+(1) The Reich governor is appointed for the duration of a “Land”
+Legislative period. He can be recalled at any time by the Reich
+President on the proposal of the Reich Chancellor.
+
+(2) The provisions of the Reich Ministry Law of March 27, 1930,
+find appropriate application to the office of Reich governor. His
+remuneration is borne by the Reich; the establishment of its size
+remains unsettled.
+
+
+                                   4
+
+Votes of no confidence of the “Land” legislature against the head and
+the members of the “Land” Government are not permissible. * * *
+
+                          The Reich Chancellor
+                              Adolf Hitler
+
+                   The Reich Minister of the Interior
+                                 Frick
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2006-PS
+
+                1934 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 75
+
+        Law for the Reconstruction of the Reich 30 January 1934
+
+The popular referendum and the Reichstag election of November 12, 1933
+have proven that the German people have attained an indestructible
+internal unity superior to all internal subdivisions of political
+character.
+
+Consequently, the Reichstag has enacted the following law which is
+hereby promulgated with the unanimous vote of the Reichstag after
+ascertaining that the requirements of the Reich Constitution have been
+met:
+
+
+                               ARTICLE I
+
+Popular assemblies [Volksvertretungen] of the “Laender” shall be
+abolished.
+
+
+                               ARTICLE II
+
+(1) The sovereign powers [Hoheitsrechte] of the “Laender” are
+transferred to the Reich.
+
+(2) The “Laender” governments are placed under the Reich government.
+
+
+                              ARTICLE III
+
+The Reich governors are placed under the administrative supervision of
+the Reich Minister of Interior.
+
+
+                               ARTICLE IV
+
+The Reich Government may issue new constitutional laws.
+
+
+                               ARTICLE V
+
+The Reich Minister of Interior may administer the necessary legal and
+administrative regulations for the execution of the law.
+
+
+                               ARTICLE VI
+
+This law shall be effective on the day of its promulgation.
+
+Berlin, 30 January 1934.
+
+                                                     The Reich President
+                                                          von Hindenburg
+
+                                                    The Reich Chancellor
+                                                            Adolf Hitler
+
+                                      The Reich Minister of the Interior
+                                                                   Frick
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2008-PS
+
+                1935 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 49
+
+               German Communal Ordinance 30 January 1935
+
+The German Communal Ordinance [Deutsche Gemeindeordnung] aims at
+qualifying the communes for the highest achievements in close
+cooperation with Party and State, affording them full opportunities
+for helping to accomplish--in the true spirit of Baron von Stein, the
+creator of communal home rule--the purpose of the State: to restore
+the priority of the common weal over the individual in a united people
+permeated by one national will; to place the public interest before
+selfish ends and to bring about the true national community under
+the leadership of the best of the people, in which every willing
+fellow-citizen finds the feeling of mutual solidarity.
+
+The German Communal Ordinance is a basic law of the National Socialist
+State. The reconstruction of the Reich will be completed on the
+foundations laid by the act.
+
+The Reich Government has therefore enacted the following law which is
+hereby promulgated. * * *
+
+
+                               Section 6
+
+(1) The mayor [Burgermeister] is the head of the commune. He is
+represented by the executive officers [Beigeordnete].
+
+(2) The mayor and the executive officers receive their appointments
+through the confidence of Party and State. In order to insure harmony
+between the communal administration and the Party, the delegate of the
+National Socialist Workers’ Party participates in certain matters.
+Continuous contacts between the communal administration and the
+citizens is guaranteed by the councillors [Gemeinderaete], who as
+meritorious and experienced men assist the mayor through their advice.
+* * *
+
+
+                               Section 33
+
+(1) In order to insure harmony between the communal administration and
+the Party, the delegates of the National Socialist German Workers’
+Party participate, apart from the appointment and recall of the mayor,
+the executive officers, and the councillors (Secs. 41, 45, 51, 54), in
+the following decisions of the mayor:
+
+  1. The issuance of the basic ordinance requires the approval of the
+       Party delegate;
+
+  2. Honorary citizenship and honorary titles may be granted or revoked
+       only with his consent.
+
+(2) When the Party delegate [NSDAP] refuses to concur with the mayor
+he must give his reasons in writing within two weeks after the
+mayor has requested his decision. If the matter concerns the basic
+ordinance, the Party delegate must state the provisions disapproved
+by him, otherwise his approval is considered granted. Should further
+conferences or correspondence between the Party delegate and the mayor
+fail to bring about an agreement, the mayor must request the decision
+of the supervisory authority, in urban counties that of the Reich
+governor. In the case of the basic ordinance, the Reich governor must
+have the approval of the Reich Minister of the Interior for any final
+decision overruling the recommendation of the supervisory authority.
+The decision of the Reich governor is binding upon the supervisory
+authority. * * *
+
+
+                               Section 41
+
+(1) Vacant full-time positions of mayor and executive officer must be
+advertised before they are filled by the commune. All applications
+received are to be sent to the Party delegate, who after secretly
+conferring with the councillors, nominates up to three candidates. In
+the case of an executive officer, he must give the mayor an opportunity
+to express his opinion of the candidate.
+
+(2) In submitting his nominations together with all the applications,
+the Party delegate proceeds as follows:
+
+  1. If the vacancy concerns the position of mayor, senior executive
+       officer or chamberlain in cities of more than 100,000
+       inhabitants, the folder is sent through the supervisory authority
+       to the Reich Minister of the Interior.
+
+  2. In the case of the position of another executive officer in cities
+       of the above class and in the case of the position of mayor and
+       executive officer in other urban counties, the folder is sent
+       through the supervisory authority to the Reich governor;
+
+  3. In the case of the position of mayor and executive officer in
+       cities belonging to a rural county, the folder is sent through
+       the supervisory authority to the higher supervisory authority,
+       and for all remaining communes to the supervisory authority.
+
+(3) If the proper authority concerned with the matter approves of
+a nomination, the commune appoints the candidate. Otherwise new
+nominations must be submitted. If no new nomination finds the approval
+of the proper authority, the latter selects a candidate, whom the
+commune must appoint. The same applies if nominations are not made
+within the period of time specified by the proper authority.
+
+(4) Vacancies in the position of unpaid mayor or executive officer need
+not be advertised. The proper authority may permit a commune to proceed
+without advertising a vacancy in a position mentioned under (2).
+Otherwise the regulations given in (1) to (3) apply accordingly.
+
+(5) Nominations are to be kept confidential until the proper authority
+according to (2) has made its decision. * * *
+
+
+                               Section 45
+
+(1) The proper authority according to Sec. 41 (2) may revoke the
+appointment of a mayor or executive officer until the close of their
+first year of office. For positions of the first category under
+Sec. 41(2) the Reich governor must be invited to express himself on
+the matter. The same applies to the Party delegate for position of
+the third category under Sec. 41(2); cases of disagreement require a
+decision of the Reich governor. * * *
+
+
+                                Title 2
+
+                          Communal Councillors
+
+                               Section 48
+
+(1) It is the duty of the councillors to keep the communal
+administration in close touch with all groups of the citizenry. They
+must advise the mayor on their own responsibility and uphold his
+measures among the population. In their activities they are to be
+guided solely by the thought of preserving and promoting the common
+weal.
+
+(2) In cities the councillors have the title of “Ratsherr.”
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+
+                               Section 51
+
+(1) The Party delegate selects the councillors in agreement with
+the mayor. In making the appointment, he is to take into account
+national reliability, qualifications, and reputation, and must
+consider personalities whose activities give the commune its special
+significance or who exert an important influence upon the life of the
+community.
+
+(2) Civil servants, employees and workers of the commune and civil
+servants of the supervisory authority may not be appointed councillors.
+The supervisory authority may grant exceptions from this rule.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+
+                                PART VII
+
+                              SUPERVISION
+
+                              Section 106
+
+The State supervises the communes in order to insure that their
+activities conform with the laws and the aims of national leadership.
+The supervision shall be exercised in such a way that the initiative
+and the sense of responsibility of the communal administration are
+strengthened and not diminished.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+
+                              Section 123
+
+The provisions of this act take effect on April 1, 1935.
+
+Berlin, 30 January 1935.
+
+                                        The Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor
+                                                            Adolf Hitler
+
+                                      The Reich Minister of the Interior
+                                                                   Frick
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2012-PS
+
+                1933 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 195
+
+ First Regulation for Administration of the Law for the Restoration of
+            the Professional Civil Service of 11 April 1933
+
+On the basis of Article 17 of the Law for the Restoration of the
+Professional Civil Service of 7 April 1933 (RGBl I, 175), the following
+regulation is issued:
+
+
+                                   1
+
+_To Article 2_:
+
+Unfit, are all civil servants who belong to the communist party or
+communist aid- or supplementary organization. They are, therefore, to
+be discharged.
+
+
+                                   2
+
+_To Article 3_:
+
+1. A person is to be regarded as non-Aryan, who is descended from
+non-Aryans, especially Jewish parents or grandparents. This holds true
+even if only one parent or grandparent is of non-Aryan descent. This
+premise especially obtains if one parent or grandparent was of Jewish
+faith.
+
+2. If a civil servant was not already a civil servant on 1 August
+1914, he must prove that he is of Aryan descent, or that he fought at
+the front, or that he is the son or the father of a man killed during
+the World War. Proof must be given by submitting documents (birth
+certificate and marriage certificate of the parents, military papers).
+
+3. If Aryan descent is doubtful, an opinion must be obtained from the
+expert on racial research commissioned by the Reich Minister of the
+Interior (Sachverstaendiger fuer Rasseforschung).
+
+
+                                   3
+
+_To Article 4_:
+
+1. In determining whether the suppositions of Article 4, sentence
+(1) are given, the whole political career of the official is to be
+considered, particularly from 9 November 1918 on.
+
+2. Every official is required on request to attest to the highest Reich
+or country authority (Article 7) as to what political party he has been
+a member of until the present. As political parties in the sense of
+this definition reference is made to the Reichsbanner, Black-Red-Gold,
+the Republican Judges’ Union and the League for the Rights of Man.
+
+
+                                   4
+
+All negotiations, documents and official certificates which are
+requisite for the fulfillment of this law, are free of duty and
+stamping (gebuehren- und stempelfrei).
+
+Berlin, 11 April 1933
+
+                                      The Reich Minister of the Interior
+                                                                   Frick
+
+                                           The Reich Minister of Finance
+                                              Count Schwerin von Krosigk
+
+
+                                 PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2014-PS
+
+                1934 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 341
+
+ Law About Changing the Rules of Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure of
+                             24 April 1934
+
+
+                              CHAPTER III
+
+
+                               Article 1
+
+(1) A People’s Court is formed as a trial court in cases of high
+treason and treason.
+
+(2) When the People’s Court sits for trial, the decisions are made by
+five members; otherwise by three members, including the President. The
+President and one other member must have the qualifications of judges.
+Several Senates may be formed.
+
+(3) The Supreme Reich Prosecutor [Oberreichsanwalt] is the prosecuting
+authority.
+
+
+                               Article 2
+
+On the suggestion of the Reich Minister of Justice, the Reich
+Chancellor appoints the members of the People’s Court and their
+deputies for a period of five years.
+
+
+                               Article 3
+
+(1) The People’s Court has jurisdiction over the investigations and
+has the power to make the sole and final decision in cases of high
+treason according to Articles 80-84--, treason according to Articles
+89-92--, attacks against the Reich President according to Article 94,
+paragraph 1 of the Reich Criminal Code: and crimes according to Article
+5, paragraph 2, No. 1 of the Decree of the Reich President for the
+Protection of People and State of February 28, 1933 (Reichsgesetzblatt
+I, p. 83). In these cases the People’s Court also makes the decisions
+enumerated in Article 73, paragraph 1 of the Law of the Organization of
+the German Courts.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+
+                               Article 5
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+(2) There is no appeal from the decisions of the People’s Court.
+
+
+                               CHAPTER IV
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+
+                               Article 3
+
+The appointment of a Council of Defense must be approved by the
+President of the People’s Court.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+Berlin, April 24, 1934
+
+                                                    The Reich Chancellor
+                                                            Adolf Hitler
+
+                                  The Reich Minister of Justice also for
+                                      the Reich Minister of the Interior
+                                                            Dr. Guertner
+
+                                           The Reich Minister of Defense
+                                                            von Blomberg
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2016-PS
+
+                                1942 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 475
+
+ Order concerning the Jurisdiction of SS Courts and Police Courts in the
+                         Protectorate Bohemia and Moravia. July 15, 1942
+
+In pursuance of the decree of the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor
+concerning the Protectorate Bohemia and Moravia, dated March 16, 1939
+(RGBl I, p. 485) and in agreement with the Reich Protector of Bohemia
+and Moravia, the following order is issued:
+
+
+                               Section 1
+
+In case of direct attack by a non-German citizen against the SS or the
+German Police or against any of their members, the Reich Leader of the
+SS and Chief of the German Police in the Reich Ministry of the Interior
+may establish the jurisdiction of a combined SS Court and Police Court,
+by declaring that special interests of parts of the SS or of the Police
+require that judgment be given by an SS and Police Court.
+
+This declaration shall be sent to the Reich Protector of Bohemia and
+Moravia. The SS and Police Court, which shall have jurisdiction in
+individual cases, shall be specified by the Reich Leader of the SS and
+Chief of the German Police in the Reich Ministry of the Interior.
+
+
+                               Section 2
+
+If the offense directly injures the interests of the Armed Forces, the
+Reich Leader of the SS and Chief of the German Police in the Reich
+Ministry of the Interior, and the Chief of the Supreme Command of the
+Armed Forces shall reach an agreement as to whether the case shall be
+prosecuted by an SS and Police Court or by a Military Court.
+
+
+                               Section 3
+
+This order shall become effective one week after its publication.
+
+Berlin, July 15, 1942.
+
+                                      The Reich Minister of the Interior
+                                                By deputy: Dr. Stuckart.
+
+                                        The Chief of the Supreme Command
+                                                     of the Armed Forces
+                                                                 Keitel.
+
+                                           The Reich Minister of Justice
+                                          Dr. Schlegelberger (in charge)
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2018-PS
+
+               1939 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 1539
+
+Fuehrer Decree Establishing a Ministerial Council For Reich Defense, 30
+                              August 1939
+
+For the period of the present foreign political tension, I decree the
+following for the uniform leadership of administration and economy:
+
+
+                                    I
+
+(1) A Ministerial Council for Reich Defense shall be established as a
+standing committee out of the Reich Defense Council.
+
+(2) The standing members of the Ministerial Council for Reich Defense
+shall include: General Field Marshall Goering as chairman, Fuehrer’s
+Deputy, Commissioner General for Reich Administration, Commissioner
+General for the Economy, Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich
+Chancellory, Chief of the High Command for the Armed Forces.
+
+(3) The chairman may draw on other members of the Reich Defense Council
+including further personalities for advice.
+
+
+                                   II
+
+The Ministerial Council for Reich Defense may issue decrees with
+statutory effect, in so far as I have not provided for the passing of a
+law by the Reich Government or the Reichstag.
+
+
+                                  III
+
+The authority of General Field Marshall Goering under the Decree for
+the Administration of the Four-Year Plan of October 13, 1936 (RGBl I,
+887) including his power to issue instructions shall remain unaffected.
+
+
+                                   IV
+
+The Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellory shall supervise
+the business of the Ministerial Council for Reich Defense.
+
+
+                                    V
+
+I shall determine the period for the expiration date of this decree.
+
+Berlin, 30 August 1939.
+
+                                                             The Fuehrer
+                                                            Adolf Hitler
+
+                                                  General Field Marshall
+                                                                 Goering
+
+                             The Reichs Minister and Chief of the Reichs
+                                                             Chancellory
+                                                             Dr. Lammers
+
+
+                                 PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2022-PS
+
+                1933 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 225
+
+ Law against overcrowding of German Schools and Higher Institutions of
+                             25 April 1933
+
+The Reich Government has enacted the following law that is promulgated
+herewith:
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+
+                               Article 3
+
+In those special schools and faculties where the number of pupils and
+students is greatly disproportionate to professional demand, the number
+of registered students must be reduced during the school year 1933
+as far as it is, without excessive rigor, consistent with a proper
+proportion.
+
+
+                               Article 4
+
+The number of non-Aryan Germans, within the meaning of the Law for the
+Restoration of the Professional Civil Service, of 7 April 1933 (RGBl I,
+p 175), who may be admitted to schools, colleges and universities, must
+not exceed a number proportionate to the Aryan students in each school,
+college or university compared to the percentage of non-Aryans within
+the entire German population. This proportion is fixed uniformly for
+the whole Reich.
+
+If, in accordance with Article 3, the number of pupils and students is
+to be reduced, there is likewise a proper proportion to be established
+between the total number of students and the number of non-Aryans. In
+doing so a somewhat higher proportion may be fixed.
+
+Clauses 1 and 2 do not apply in the case of non-Aryans, whose fathers
+have fought at the front during the World War for Germany or her
+allies, or to children whose parents were married before the enactment
+of this law, if the father or mother or two of the grandparents are of
+Aryan origin. The number of these students is not to be included when
+calculating the quota of non-Aryans.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+
+                               Article 7
+
+The decree is valid upon promulgation.
+
+Berlin, 25 April 1933
+
+                                                    The Reich Chancellor
+                                                            Adolf Hitler
+
+                                      The Reich Minister of the Interior
+                                                                   Frick
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2029-PS
+
+1933 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 104
+
+   Decree Establishing The Reich Minister of Public Enlightenment and
+                      Propaganda of 13 March 1933
+
+A Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda is herewith
+established for the purpose of enlightening and propagandizing the
+population with regard to the policies of the Reich Cabinet and the
+national reconstruction of the German fatherland.
+
+The chief of this agency has the title “Reichsminister of Public
+Enlightenment and Propaganda.”
+
+The Reichschancellor defines in detail the duties of the Reich Minister
+for Public Enlightenment and Propaganda.
+
+In agreement with the other Reich Ministers concerned, he defines the
+duties which are transferred from their jurisdiction to that of the new
+Ministry. This will be done even in cases where the jurisdiction of the
+Ministries concerned is affected fundamentally.
+
+                                                  Berlin, March 13, 1933
+                                      The Reich President VON HINDENBURG
+                                       The Reich Chancellor ADOLF HITLER
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2030-PS
+
+                1933 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 449
+
+     Decree Concerning the Duties of the Reich Ministry for Public
+              Enlightenment and Propaganda of 30 June 1933
+
+Based upon the order of the Reich President of 13 March 1933
+(Reichsgesetzblatt I, Page 104), I decree in agreement with the Reich
+Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Reich Minister of the Interior,
+the Reich Minister of Economics, the Reich Minister of Nutrition
+and Agriculture, the Reich Post Minister, the Reich Minister of
+Transportation, and the Reich Minister of Public Enlightenment and
+Propaganda, as follows:
+
+The Reich Minister of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda has
+jurisdiction over the whole field of spiritual indoctrination of
+the nation, of propagandizing the State, of cultural and economic
+propaganda, of enlightenment of the public at home and abroad;
+furthermore, he is in charge of the administration of all institutions
+serving these purposes.
+
+Therefore, the Reich Minister of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda
+takes over the following jurisdictions:
+
+  1. From the jurisdiction of the Foreign Office:
+
+     News services and enlightenment in foreign countries; art; art
+       exhibitions; moving pictures and sport abroad.
+
+
+  2. From the jurisdiction of the Reich Ministry of the Interior:
+
+     General domestic enlightenment;
+
+     Academy of Politics;
+
+     Establishment and celebration of national holidays and of state
+       celebrations in conjunction with the Reich Minister of Interior;
+
+     Press, (including the Institute for Journalism);
+
+     Radio;
+
+     National anthem;
+
+     German Library in Leipzig;
+
+     Art (however, with the exclusion of: the Institute for the History
+       of Art in Florence; of protection of rights in literature and
+       art; the catalogue of works of art of national value;
+       German-Austrian agreement on export of art; protection of art
+       and monuments; protection and care of landscape and natural
+       monuments; national parks, maintenance of buildings of
+       historical importance; for the Science of Folkdom; Reich Honor
+       Monument).
+
+     Music, including the Philharmonic Orchestra;
+
+     Theater;
+
+     Moving Pictures;
+
+     Campaign against dirty and obscene literature.
+
+3. From the jurisdiction of the Reich Minister of Economics and of the
+Reich Ministry for Nutrition and Agriculture; Propaganda in the field
+of business, exhibitions, fairs, and commercial publicity.
+
+4. From the jurisdiction of the Reich Post Ministry and of the Reich
+Ministry of Transportation:
+
+  Propaganda for tourism.
+
+Furthermore, there are transferred from the Reich Post Ministry all
+radio matters with the exclusion of the technical administration; the
+administration of the buildings of the Reich Radio Corporation and the
+Radio Corporation is not included in that exception. However, the Reich
+Minister of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda must participate in the
+technical administration to the extent necessary for the execution of
+his own duties, especially in fixing the conditions for renting radio
+installations and the regulation of fees.
+
+The representation of the Reich in the Reich Radio Corporation and the
+Radio Corporation is entirely transferred to the Reich Ministry of
+Public Enlightenment and Propaganda.
+
+In the areas designated, the Reich Minister for Public Enlightenment
+and Propaganda has the predominant jurisdiction, including legislation.
+The general regulations are valid so far as the other Ministers of the
+Reich have to participate.
+
+Berlin, 30 June 1933
+
+                                                    The Reich Chancellor
+                                                            ADOLF HITLER
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2031-PS
+
+                1938 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 112
+
+Decree Concerning the Establishment of a Secret Cabinet Council dated 4
+                               Feb. 1938
+
+To advise me in conducting the foreign policy I am setting up a secret
+cabinet council.
+
+  As president of the secret cabinet council, I nominate:
+    Reichsminister Freiherr von Neurath
+
+  As members of the secret cabinet council I nominate: Reichsminister
+    of the Exterior Joachim von Ribbentrop
+
+  Prussian Prime Minister, Reichsminister of the Air, Supreme Commander
+    of the Air Forces, General Field Marshall Hermann Goering
+
+  The Fuehrer’s Deputy, Reichsminister Rudolf Hess
+
+  Reichsminister for the enlightenment of the people and of propaganda,
+    Dr. Joseph Goebbels
+
+  Reichsminister and Chief of the Reichs Chancellory, Dr. Hans-Heinrich
+    Lammers
+
+  The Supreme Commander of the Army, General Walther von Brauchitsch
+
+  The Supreme Commander of the Navy, Grand Admiral Dr. (honorary) Erich
+    Raeder
+
+  The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, Lt. Gen.
+    Wilhelm Keitel
+
+The current affairs of the secret cabinet council are handled by the
+Reichsminister and Chief of the Reichs Chancellery.
+
+Berlin, 4 February 1938
+
+                                       The Fuehrer and Reichs Chancellor
+                                                            Adolf Hitler
+
+                                         The Reichsminister and Chief of
+                                                  the Reichs Chancellery
+                                                             Dr. Lammers
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2039-PS
+
+                1942 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 419
+
+Decree concerning the conditions of Employment of Eastern Workers of 30
+                               June 1942
+
+The Ministerial Council for Defense of the Reich orders with force of
+law:
+
+
+                               Chapter I
+
+                     _Definition of Eastern Worker_
+
+
+                               Article 1
+
+Eastern workers are those laborers of non-German national origin
+who inhabited the Reich Commissariat for the Ukraine, the General
+Commissariat for White Russia, or territories bordering on these
+territories to the east or on the former free states of Lithuania and
+Estonia, and who were brought into the German Reich, including the
+Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, and employed there after the
+occupation by the German armed forces.
+
+
+                               Chapter II
+
+                       _Conditions of Employment_
+
+
+                               Article 2
+
+                           General Conditions
+
+The eastern workers employed in the Reich have an employment
+relationship of a special type. German labor code and labor protection
+provisions shall be applicable to them only insofar as specifically
+stated.
+
+
+                               Article 3
+
+                              Compensation
+
+1. The eastern workers employed in the Reich shall receive compensation
+graded according to their work.
+
+2. The amount of this compensation shall be determined from the tables
+which are attached as an appendix to this decree.
+
+3. In determining the compensation which is to be paid individual
+eastern workers under the appended tables, the point of departure shall
+be the wage-rate (hourly, piece and premium wage-rates) of comparable
+German workers.
+
+If a part of the reference wage consists of payment in goods, such
+payment shall be considered equivalent, in determining this wage, to
+the rate calculated for it for German workers in the enterprise in
+event of payment in cash.
+
+Social security deductions and payments of all kinds to which the
+German workers are subject shall not be included in the determination
+of the reference wage.
+
+With respect to incentive payments, these shall be computed, in
+determining the reference wage, at the same rate at which they are made
+to German workers in the enterprise for the same work. If the eastern
+worker’s production falls behind the average production of a German
+worker, a correspondingly reduced reference wage will be the point of
+departure in determining the compensation to be paid him.
+
+Extra pay for difficult work, dirty work, etc. shall be included in
+determining the proper reference wage for calculating the individual
+eastern worker’s compensation.
+
+4. The eastern worker shall receive compensation only for work actually
+performed; but the regulations on idleness resulting from bad weather
+may be applied in his case.
+
+5. Higher compensation than that determined under those provisions may
+not be paid to eastern workers.
+
+
+                               Article 4
+
+                     Extra Rates and other Payments
+
+Except as otherwise provided by the General Manpower Authority, eastern
+workers shall have no claim to extra compensation for overtime or
+Sunday, holiday, and night work. Per diem and maintenance payments, as
+well as travel and board expense payments, may not be made.
+
+
+                               Article 5
+
+                            Payment in Goods
+
+1. The compensation due the individual eastern worker according to the
+tables appended to this decree shall be paid in cash at the end of the
+regular pay period for the enterprise after deduction of the equivalent
+of payments made in goods. The board and room furnished by the employer
+shall be computed according to the rates specified by the tables
+appended to this decree. Other payment in goods, such as clothing,
+shoes, etc., shall be computed at proportionate prices.
+
+2. Employers may cover the commutation cost of eastern workers to and
+from the place of work for the entirety of eastern workers employed by
+them and make deductions for this expense from the amounts to be paid
+in cash according to the tables.
+
+
+                               Article 6
+
+                    Compensation in Case of Illness
+
+For days on which the eastern worker is unable to work on account of
+sickness or accident, free board and room only shall be furnished by
+the employer, unless hospital care is given. In other respects the sick
+care of these workers shall be regulated by prescriptions issued by the
+Reich Minister of Labor.
+
+
+                               Article 7
+
+                        Leave and Family Visits
+
+Leave and family visits will not be granted for the present. Detailed
+regulations concerning the institution of leave and family visits will
+be issued by the General Manpower Authority.
+
+
+                               Article 8
+
+                              Pay Invoices
+
+Pay invoices shall not be issued to eastern workers.
+
+
+                               Article 9
+
+                               Exceptions
+
+The Reich Trustee or Special Trustee of Labor may permit exceptions
+from the provisions of this decree in regard to the calculation of
+compensations.
+
+
+                              Chapter III
+
+                         _Eastern Workers Tax_
+
+
+                               Article 10
+
+                             Tax Obligation
+
+1. Employers who use eastern workers within the German Reich, including
+the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, are subject to a tax in
+amounts specified by the tables appended to this decree (Eastern
+Workers Tax).
+
+2. Agricultural employers must pay only one half of this tax.
+
+
+                               Article 11
+
+                         Accruement of the Tax
+
+The Eastern Workers Tax accrues exclusively to the German Reich.
+
+
+                               Article 12
+
+                    Tax Exemption of Eastern Workers
+
+Eastern workers must pay no wage tax nor citizen tax during their
+employment in the German Reich.
+
+
+                               Chapter IV
+
+                               _Savings_
+
+
+                               Article 13
+
+Eastern workers may lay up their compensation in whole or in part as
+savings with interest: the sum saved is transferred to the saver’s
+homeland, and is there available to him or to members of his family
+according to detailed regulations issued by the Reich Minister for the
+Occupied Eastern Territories or by the Commander in Chief of the Armed
+Forces.
+
+
+                               Chapter V
+
+                           _Grant of Powers_
+
+
+                               Article 14
+
+1. The General Manpower Authority shall be empowered to issue, in
+consultation with the interested Reich Ministers, regulations for the
+execution, implementation, and revision of Chapters I and II of this
+decree.
+
+2. The Reich Minister of Finance shall be empowered to issue, in
+consultation with the General Manpower Authority, the Reich Minister
+of the Interior, the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern
+Territories and, so far as eastern workers employed in agriculture
+are in question, with the Reich Minister for Food and Agriculture,
+regulations for the execution, implementation and revision of Chapter
+III of this decree.
+
+3. The Reich Minister of Finance, in consultation with the General
+Manpower Authority, may change by executive order the amounts of the
+Eastern Workers Tax as specified in the appended tables.
+
+4. The Reich Minister of Economic Affairs, the Reich Minister for the
+Occupied Eastern Territories, and the Commander in Chief of the Armed
+Forces shall be empowered to issue, in consultation with the General
+Manpower Authority, regulations for the execution and implementation of
+Chapter IV of this decree.
+
+
+                               Chapter VI
+
+                  _Effective Date, Sphere of Validity_
+
+
+                               Article 15
+
+1. This decree shall become effective 15 June 1942. The provisions of
+Chapters II and III shall be first applicable to compensation paid
+after 15 June 1942.
+
+2. Articles 1 to 5 and Article 7, subsection 1, of the decree
+concerning taxing and treatment under the labor code for workers form
+the newly occupied eastern territories [StVAOst] of 20 January 1942
+(RGBl I, p. 41), as well as the regulation of the Reich Minister of
+Labor concerning treatment under the labor code for workers from the
+newly occupied eastern territories of 9 February 1942 (Deutscher
+Reichsanz. No. 37 of 13 February 1942), shall become invalid on the
+effective date of this decree.
+
+3. This decree shall be valid also in the Protectorate of Bohemia and
+Moravia and in the incorporated Eastern Territories.
+
+Berlin, 30 June 1942
+
+                     The Chairman of the Ministerial Council for Defense
+                    of the Reich and Commissioner for the Four Year Plan
+                                                  Goering, Reich Marshal
+
+                                          The General Manpower Authority
+                                                 By Deputy: Dr. Stuckart
+
+                   The Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellory
+                                                             Dr. Lammers
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2047-PS
+
+                1937 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 105
+
+ Law for the Extension of the Law Concerning the Removal of the Misery
+             of the People and the Reich of 30 January 1937
+
+The Reichstag has decided unanimously to enact the following law which
+is hereby published:
+
+(1) The validity of the law for the removal of the misery of the people
+and the Reich of 24 March 1933 (RGBl I, p. 141) is being extended to 1
+April 1941.
+
+(2) The law on the reconstruction of the Reich of 30 January 1934 (RGBl
+p. 75) remains unchanged.
+
+Berlin, 30 January 1937
+
+                                 The Fuehrer and Chancellor of the Reich
+                                                            Adolf Hitler
+
+                                     The Reichs Minister of the Interior
+                                                                   Frick
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2048-PS
+
+                1939 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 95
+
+ Law for the Extension of the Law Concerning the Removal of the Misery
+             of the People and the Reich of 30 January 1939
+
+In completion of the law of 30 January 1937 (RGBl I, p. 105), the
+Reichstag has decided unanimously to enact the following law which is
+hereby published:
+
+1. The validity of the law on the removal of the misery of the people
+and the Reich of 24 March 1933 (RGBl I, p. 141) is being extended to 10
+May 1943.
+
+2. The law on the reconstruction of the Reich of 30 January 1934 (RGBl
+I, p. 75) remains unchanged.
+
+Berlin, 30 January 1939.
+
+                                 The Fuehrer and Chancellor of the Reich
+                                                            Adolf Hitler
+
+                                     The Reichs Minister of the Interior
+                                                                   Frick
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2049-PS
+
+               1934 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 1189
+
+Second Edict concerning the Reconstruction of the Reich of November 27,
+                                 1934.
+
+On the basis of Article 5 of the law concerning the reconstruction
+of the Reich of January 30, 1934 (Reichsgesetzblatt I page 75) it is
+ordered in agreement with the Prussian Minister-President:
+
+
+                               Article 1
+
+Up to the execution of the reorganization of the Reich, the Prussian
+Provincial governors [Oberpraesidenten] are, in the Provinces over
+which they have jurisdiction, simultaneously representatives of the
+Reich government.
+
+
+                               Article 2
+
+The provincial governors [Oberpraesidenten] are empowered to receive
+instructions from all Reich and federal state authorities as well
+as from offices supervised by permanent Reich or State public-legal
+corporations, within the Province, and to call their attention to the
+authoritative viewpoints and the consequently necessary measures as
+well as effect temporary regulations in case of danger in delay. These
+rights they may not transfer to their supplementary officials; their
+representatives may only practice those rights, when the provincial
+governors are hindered not merely for a short time in the observation
+of their business.
+
+
+                               Article 3
+
+The Reich ministers may in the execution of Reich missions furnish
+directly with instructions the Prussian provincial governors and
+council heads without prejudice to the supervision of the Civil Service
+of the Reich and Prussian Ministers of the Interior.
+
+Berlin, November 27, 1934.
+
+                                            The Minister of Interior for
+                                                  the Reich and Prussia.
+                                                                   Frick
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2050-PS
+
+               1919 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 1383
+
+                  THE CONSTITUTION OF THE GERMAN REICH
+
+                           _August 11, 1919_
+
+The German people, united in their racial elements and impelled by the
+will to renew and strengthen their Reich in freedom and justice, to
+serve the ends of peace at home and abroad and further social progress,
+have established this Constitution.
+
+
+                               FIRST PART
+
+                  STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION OF THE REICH
+
+
+                            _First Chapter_
+
+                            Reich and Lands
+
+
+                              _Article 1_
+
+The German Reich is a Republic. The state power is derived from the
+people.
+
+
+                              _Article 2_
+
+The territory of the Reich consists of the territories of the German
+Member States [Lands]. Other territories may be incorporated in the
+Reich by Reich statute if the inhabitants of such territory, in
+exercises of the right of self-determination, so desire.
+
+
+                              _Article 3_
+
+The Reich colors are black, red and gold. The merchant flag is black,
+white and red, with the Reich colors in the upper inside corner.
+
+
+                              _Article 4_
+
+The generally accepted rules of international law are to be considered
+as binding integral parts of the law of the German Reich.
+
+
+                              _Article 5_
+
+The state power in respect to matters within the competence of the
+Reich shall be exercised by the authorities of the Reich on the basis
+of the Constitution of the Reich; in respect to matters within the
+competence of the Member States by the authorities of the Lands, on the
+basis of their respective constitutions.
+
+
+                              _Article 6_
+
+The Reich shall have exclusive legislative competence for:
+
+1. Foreign affairs.
+
+2. colonial matters.
+
+3. questions relating to nationality, freedom of travel and residence,
+immigration, emigration and extradition.
+
+4. the organization of defense forces.
+
+5. coinage.
+
+6. customs, as well as the unity of customs and trading areas and
+freedom of commerce.
+
+7. post and telegraph, including the telephone.
+
+
+                              _Article 7_
+
+1. civil law.
+
+2. penal law.
+
+3. judicial procedure, including the execution of penalties and legal
+aid between authorities.
+
+4. matters relating to passports and police supervision of aliens.
+
+5. poor relief and the care of vagrants.
+
+6. matters relating to the press, associations and assemblies.
+
+7. policies relating to population, maternity relief, welfare of
+infants, children and youth.
+
+8. public health, veterinary matters and the protection of plants
+against disease and pests.
+
+9. labor laws, insurance, and the protection of laborers and employees,
+and employment bureaus.
+
+10. the establishment of Reich organs of vocational representation.
+
+11. provision for war veterans and the surviving dependents of deceased
+soldiers.
+
+12. laws relating to expropriation.
+
+13. the socialization of natural resources and economic undertakings,
+and also the production, manufacture, distribution and price regulation
+of economic wares for the benefit of the general economy.
+
+14. trade and commerce, weights and measures, the issue of paper money,
+banks and banking and the stock exchanges.
+
+15. traffic in foodstuffs, articles for consumption and luxury, and
+necessaries of daily life.
+
+16. industries and mining.
+
+17. matters relating to insurance.
+
+18. ocean navigation, deep-sea fishing and coastal fishing.
+
+19. railways, inland navigation, automatic traffic on land, water,
+and in the air; the construction of highways, insofar as general
+communication and national defense are concerned.
+
+20. theaters and cinemas.
+
+
+                              _Article 8_
+
+The Reich shall further legislate in regard to taxation and other
+revenues, insofar as they are partially or wholly utilized for its own
+purposes. If the Reich claims such taxes or other revenues for its own
+purposes as have hitherto been available for the Member States (Lands),
+the Reich shall take into consideration the preservation of the life of
+the Member States.
+
+
+                              _Article 9_
+
+Insofar as it is necessary to issue uniform rules, the Reich shall
+legislate for:
+
+1. public welfare.
+
+2. the protection of public order and safety.
+
+
+                              _Article 10_
+
+The Reich may by legislation, establish fundamental principles for:
+
+1. the rights and duties of religious associations.
+
+2. educational matters including high schools and scientific libraries.
+
+3. laws relating to officers of all public corporations.
+
+4. matters relating to the real-estate laws, distribution of the soil,
+settlements and homesteads, restrictions attached to landed property,
+housing and the distribution of the population.
+
+5. matters relating to burial.
+
+
+                              _Article 11_
+
+The Reich may by means of legislation establish fundamental principles
+concerning the admissibility and mode of:
+
+1. injury to the revenues or commercial relations of the Reich.
+
+2. double taxation.
+
+3. excessive or obstructional fees for the use of public means of
+communication, highways, and other facilities.
+
+4. tax discrimination against imported goods in favor of domestic
+products in interstate or inter-district commerce, or
+
+5. export premiums,
+
+or in order to preserve important social interests.
+
+
+                              _Article 12_
+
+So long as and so far as the Reich refrains from exercising the right
+of legislation, the Lands shall retain the right of legislation. This
+does not apply to matters for which the Reich has exclusive competence
+of legislation.
+
+The government of the Reich has the right of veto in regard to Lands
+laws relating to matters within the scope of Article 7, Number 13, so
+far as the general welfare of the Reich is thereby affected.
+
+
+                              _Article 13_
+
+Reich law takes precedence over Lands law.
+
+Where there are doubts or differences of opinion as to whether a legal
+provision of a Land is compatible with Reich law, the competent Reich
+or central authorities of a Land may, in accordance with particulars
+prescribed by the Reich law, appeal for decision to a Supreme Court of
+the Reich.
+
+
+                              _Article 14_
+
+The laws enacted by the Lands shall be executed by the authorities of
+the States, unless the laws of the Reich determine otherwise.
+
+
+                              _Article 15_
+
+The government of the Reich exercises supervision in such matters as
+are within the legislative competence of the Reich.
+
+So far as the laws of the Reich are to be executed by the authorities
+of the Lands, the government of the Reich may issue general
+instructions. The government is empowered to send commissioners to the
+central authorities of the Lands, and with their permission, to the
+lower state authorities, to supervise the execution of the laws of the
+Reich.
+
+It is the duty of the government of the Lands, at the request of the
+government of the Reich, to rectify defects which have become manifest
+in the execution of Reich laws. Where differences of opinion arise both
+the government of the Reich and the government of the Land may appeal
+for decision to the Constitutional Court, unless a different court is
+prescribed by Reich law.
+
+
+                              _Article 16_
+
+The officers entrusted with direct Reich administration in any Land
+shall, as a rule, be citizens of that Land. The officers, employees
+and laborers of the Reich administration shall be employed in their
+home districts if they so desire, whenever this is possible and not
+inconsistent with the requirements of their training or the service.
+
+
+                              _Article 17_
+
+Each Land must have a republican constitution. The people’s
+representatives must be elected by universal, equal, direct and secret
+ballot by all German men and women in conformity with the principles of
+proportional representation. The government of the Land must enjoy the
+confidence of the people’s representatives.
+
+The principles for the elections of the people’s representatives apply
+equally to communal elections. A Land law, however, may make the right
+to vote dependent on residence in the communal district for a period
+not exceeding one year.
+
+
+                              _Article 18_
+
+The division of the Reich into Lands shall be such as to serve the
+people to the highest possible economic and cultural attainment,
+whereby the will of the population affected shall be taken into
+consideration as far as possible. The alteration of territory of the
+Lands and the creation of new Lands within the Reich may be effected by
+means of a Reich law amending the Constitution.
+
+If the Lands directly affected give their consent, an ordinary Reich
+law is sufficient.
+
+An ordinary Reich law is also sufficient, if one of the Lands affected
+refuses consent, but the territorial alteration or the creation of a
+new Land is demanded by the will of the population and the paramount
+interests of the Reich.
+
+The will of the population shall be ascertained by plebiscite. The
+Government of the Reich orders the plebiscite if, in the territory to
+be separated, one-third of the inhabitants qualified to vote for the
+Reichstag so demand.
+
+Three-fifths of the votes taken, but at least a majority of the
+enfranchised voters, are necessary for a resolution to alter a
+boundary or create a new Land. Even if it is only a question of the
+disconnection of a part of a Prussian administrative district, a
+Bavarian “county” or a corresponding administrative division in other
+Lands, the will of the population in the whole district affected must
+be ascertained. If the territory to be disconnected nowhere adjoins the
+rest of the district, a specific Reich law may declare that the will of
+the population in the said district is sufficient.
+
+The consent of the population having been ascertained, the government
+of the Reich shall introduce an appropriate bill for enactment in the
+Reichstag.
+
+If the unification or disconnection should give rise to a dispute
+concerning the distribution of property, the Constitutional Court of
+the German Reich shall decide the same on the application of one party.
+
+
+                              _Article 19_
+
+Constitutional disputes arising within any Land in which there is no
+court competent to settle the same, of disputes not governed by private
+law, arising between different Lands or between the Reich and any Land
+shall be decided by the Constitutional Court of the German Reich on
+the application of one party, unless some other court of the Reich is
+competent to decide such dispute.
+
+The President of the Reich executes the judgment of the Constitutional
+Court of the Reich.
+
+
+                            _Second Chapter_
+
+                             The Reichstag
+
+
+                              _Article 20_
+
+The Reichstag is composed of the delegates of the German people.
+
+
+                              _Article 21_
+
+The delegates represent the whole people. They are subject only to
+their own conscience and are not bound by instructions.
+
+
+                              _Article 22_
+
+The delegates are elected by universal, equal, direct and secret ballot
+by men and women over twenty years of age, according to the principles
+of proportional representation. The election day must be a Sunday, or a
+public holiday.
+
+The Reich Election Law will regulate details.
+
+
+                              _Article 23_
+
+The Reichstag is elected for four years. New elections must take place
+at the latest on the sixtieth day after this term has run its course.
+
+The Reichstag assembles for the first time at the latest on the
+thirtieth day following the election.
+
+
+                              _Article 24_
+
+The Reichstag meets every year on the first Wednesday in November at
+the seat of the government of the Reich. The President of the Reichstag
+must summon it earlier if the President of the Reich or at least
+one-third of the members of the Reichstag so demand.
+
+The Reichstag determines the close of its session and the date of
+reassembly.
+
+
+                              _Article 25_
+
+The President of the Reich may dissolve the Reichstag, but not more
+than once for the same cause.
+
+The new election takes place not later than the sixtieth day after
+dissolution.
+
+
+                              _Article 26_
+
+The Reichstag chooses its president, his substitutes and its
+secretaries. It sets up its own rules of procedure.
+
+
+                              _Article 27_
+
+Between two sessions or terms the President and his substitutes of the
+preceding session continue in their duties.
+
+
+                              _Article 28_
+
+The President has domiciliary and police authority within the Reichstag
+building. He controls the house administration; he manages the revenues
+and expenditure of the house in accordance with the budget of the
+Reich, and represents the Reich in all legal transactions and disputes
+arising within his administration.
+
+
+                              _Article 29_
+
+The Reichstag proceedings are public. They may be held in camera, if,
+on the motion of fifty members, a two-thirds majority so decides.
+
+
+                              _Article 30_
+
+Accurate reports of the proceedings of the public meetings of the
+Reichstag, the State Diets, and of their committees remain free from
+all responsibility.
+
+
+                              _Article 31_
+
+An Election Investigation Court shall be established in connection with
+the Reichstag. It shall also be competent to decide whether a delegate
+has forfeited his seat.
+
+The Election Investigation Court consists of members of the Reichstag,
+elected by the latter for the election period and of members of the
+Reich Court of Administration, appointed by the President of the Reich
+on the proposal of the presidency of the said court.
+
+The decisions of the Election Investigation Court shall be taken
+after a public oral hearing by three members of the Reichstag and two
+judicial members.
+
+Outside of the oral proceedings before the Election Investigation Court
+such affairs shall be managed by a commission of the Reich, nominated
+by the President of the Reich. In other respects the procedure is
+regulated by the Election Investigation Court.
+
+
+                              _Article 32_
+
+A simple majority vote is necessary for decisions of the Reichstag,
+unless the Constitution prescribes a different proportion of votes. The
+rules of procedure may make exceptions in the case of elections by the
+Reichstag.
+
+The rules of procedure regulate the question of a quorum.
+
+
+                              _Article 33_
+
+The Reichstag and its committees may demand the presence of the
+Chancellor of the Reich and of any Minister of the Reich.
+
+The Chancellor and Ministers of the Reich and the commissioners
+appointed by them have access to the sittings of the Reichstag and its
+committees. The Lands are entitled to send delegates to these meetings
+to state the views of their governments on the subject under discussion.
+
+At their request the governmental delegates must be heard during the
+deliberations, in the case of the representatives of the government of
+the Reich, even irrespective of the agenda.
+
+They are subject to the authority of the chairman as regards questions
+of orders.
+
+
+                              _Article 34_
+
+The Reichstag has the right and--on the application of one-fifth of
+its members--the duty, of appointing investigation committees. These
+committees hear such evidence in public sittings as they or the
+applicants consider necessary. The public may be excluded from the
+proceedings by a two-thirds majority of the investigation committee.
+The rules of procedure determine the proceedings of the committee and
+determine the number of its members.
+
+It is the duty of the judicial and administrative authorities to
+accede to the requests of the said committees in regard to the taking
+of evidence; the files of the authorities must be submitted to the
+committees on request.
+
+The provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure are applicable as
+far as is appropriate to the investigations of the committees and the
+authorities approached by them; nevertheless, the secrecy of letters,
+post, telegraph and telephone remains inviolate.
+
+
+                              _Article 35_
+
+The Reichstag appoints a standing committee for foreign affairs,
+which may also act when the Reichstag is in recess, and after the
+parliamentary term has expired, or after the dissolution of the
+Reichstag, until the new Reichstag meets. The meetings of this
+committee are not public, unless the committee decides otherwise by a
+two-thirds vote.
+
+The Reichstag also appoints a standing committee for the maintenance of
+the right of the people’s representation towards the government of the
+Reich during the periods of recess, and after the term has expired or
+the Reichstag is dissolved, until the new Reichstag meets.
+
+These committees have the rights of investigation committees.
+
+
+                              _Article 36_
+
+No member of the Reichstag or of a Land’s Diet may at any time be
+subjected to criminal or disciplinary prosecution or otherwise held
+responsible outside the house on account of his vote or of remarks made
+by him in the execution of his functions.
+
+
+                              _Article 37_
+
+During a session no member of the Reichstag or of a Land’s Diet may be
+subjected to investigation or arrested on account of any punishable
+offense, without the consent of the house to which such a delegate
+belongs, unless he is arrested in the act of committal or at the latest
+in the course of the following day.
+
+Similar consent must be obtained for every other curtailment of
+personal freedom which hinders a delegate in the execution of his
+functions as representative.
+
+Any criminal proceeding against a member of the Reichstag or a Land’s
+Diet, any detention or other curtailment of his personal liberty must
+be suspended for the duration of the session at the request of the
+house to which the delegate belongs.
+
+
+                              _Article 38_
+
+Members of the Reichstag and the Land’s Diets are entitled to refuse
+to give evidence in respect to persons who have confided matters to
+them in their capacity as delegates or to whom they have given such
+confidences in the execution of their functions as delegates, as
+well as in respect to such facts. In respect also to the seizure of
+documents they have the same status as persons who are entitled by law
+to refuse to give evidence.
+
+Any search or seizure may only be carried out within the precincts of
+the Reichstag or a Land’s Diet with the consent of their President.
+
+
+                              _Article 39_
+
+Public officials and members of the defense forces need no leave for
+the performance of their functions as members of the Reichstag or a
+Land’s Diet.
+
+If they are candidates for a seat in one of these bodies, the necessary
+leave must be extended to them to enable them to prepare for their
+election.
+
+
+                              _Article 40_
+
+Members of the Reichstag shall have free passes for all German railways
+and receive a compensation for expenses to be fixed by Reich law.
+
+
+                            _Third Chapter_
+
+              The Reich President and the Reich Government
+
+
+                              _Article 41_
+
+The Reich President is elected by the whole German people.
+
+Every German who has completed his thirty-fifth year is eligible for
+election.
+
+Details will be regulated by a Reich law.
+
+
+                              _Article 42_
+
+The Reich President shall, on assuming office, take the following oath
+before the Reichstag.
+
+I swear to devote my energies to the well-being of the German people,
+to further their interests, to protect them from injury, to keep
+the Constitution and the laws of the Reich, to fulfill my duties
+conscientiously and to administer justice to all.
+
+It is permissible to add a religious asseveration.
+
+
+                              _Article 43_
+
+The Reich President’s term of office shall last seven years.
+Re-election is permissible.
+
+At the request of the Reichstag the President may be deposed from
+office by plebiscite before his term has expired. A two-thirds majority
+vote is necessary for such a resolution by the Reichstag.
+
+The resolution has the effect of suspending the Reich President from
+the further exercise of his office. If the deposition is rejected by
+the plebiscite, this is regarded as a new election and entails the
+dissolution of the Reichstag.
+
+The Reich President cannot be prosecuted criminally without the consent
+of the Reichstag.
+
+
+                              _Article 44_
+
+The Reich President may not at the same time be a member of the
+Reichstag.
+
+
+                              _Article 45_
+
+The Reich President represents the Reich in the sphere of international
+law. He concludes alliances and other treaties with foreign powers in
+the name of the Reich. He accredits and receives Ministers.
+
+War is declared and peace concluded by Reich law.
+
+Alliances and treaties with foreign States which relate to matters
+within the legislative competence of the Reich, require the consent of
+the Reichstag.
+
+
+                              _Article 46_
+
+The Reich President appoints and dismisses the public officials of the
+Reich and officers of the defense forces, unless otherwise provided
+by law. He may allow the right of appointment and dismissal to be
+exercised by other authorities.
+
+
+                              _Article 47_
+
+The Reich President has supreme command over all the defense forces of
+the Reich.
+
+
+                              _Article 48_
+
+If a Land fails to fulfill the duties incumbent upon it according to
+the Constitution or the laws of the Reich, the Reich President can
+force it to do so with the help of the armed forces.
+
+The Reich President may, if the public safety and order in the German
+Reich are considerably disturbed or endangered, take such measures as
+are necessary to restore public safety and order. If necessary he may
+intervene with the help of the armed forces. For this purpose he may
+temporarily suspend, either partially or wholly, the Fundamental Rights
+established in Articles 114, 115, 117, 118, 123, 124 and 153.
+
+The Reich President shall inform the Reichstag without delay of all
+measures taken under Paragraph 1 or Paragraph 2 of this Article. On
+demand by the Reichstag the measures shall be repealed.
+
+In case of imminent danger, the government of any Land may take
+preliminary measures of the nature described in Paragraph 2 for its own
+territory. The measures are to be revoked upon the demand of the Reich
+President or the Reichstag.
+
+Details will be regulated by a Reich law.
+
+
+                              _Article 49_
+
+The Reich President exercises the right of pardon for the Reich.
+
+Reich amnesties require a Reich law.
+
+
+                              _Article 50_
+
+All orders and decrees of the Reich President, including those
+concerning the defense forces, require for their validity the
+counter-signature of the Chancellor of the Reich or the competent
+Minister of the Reich. By counter-signature responsibility is assumed.
+
+
+                              _Article 51_
+
+The Reich President shall, when prevented from functioning, be
+represented in the first place by the Reich Chancellor. When such
+disability is likely to be of long duration, a Reich law shall regulate
+the question of representation.
+
+The same applies in the case of a premature termination of the
+Presidency until the new election takes place.
+
+
+                              _Article 52_
+
+The government of the Reich shall consist of the Chancellor and the
+Reich Ministers.
+
+
+                              _Article 53_
+
+The Reich Chancellor and at his proposal the Reich Ministers shall be
+appointed and dismissed by the Reich President.
+
+
+                              _Article 54_
+
+The Chancellor and the Reich Ministers require for the exercise of
+their office the confidence of the Reichstag. Any of them must retire
+if the Reichstag by express resolution withdraws its confidence.
+
+
+                              _Article 55_
+
+The Reich Chancellor presides over the government of the Reich and
+conducts its affairs according to rules of procedure laid down by the
+government of the Reich and approved by the Reich President.
+
+
+                              _Article 56_
+
+The Reich Chancellor determines the outlines of the policy of the State
+and is responsible to the Reichstag for the same. Within these outlines
+each Reich Minister conducts the office entrusted to him independently
+and on his own responsibility towards the Reichstag.
+
+
+                              _Article 57_
+
+The Reich Ministers shall lay before the Reichstag for deliberation
+and enactment all bills and all matters for which such a course is
+prescribed in the Constitution or by law, as well as all differences of
+opinion in regard to questions within the competence of more than one
+Minister.
+
+
+                              _Article 58_
+
+The government of the Reich passes its resolutions by majority vote. In
+the case of tie votes the chairman has a casting vote.
+
+
+                              _Article 59_
+
+The Reichstag is entitled to impeach the Reich President, the
+Chancellor and Reich Ministers for having culpably violated the
+Constitution or a statute of the Reich before the Constitutional Court.
+The motion for impeachment must be signed by at least one hundred
+members of the Reichstag and be approved by the majority prescribed for
+amending the Constitution.
+
+Details will be regulated by the Reich statute concerning the
+Constitutional Court.
+
+
+                            _Fourth Chapter_
+
+                           The Reich Council
+
+
+                              _Article 60_
+
+A Reich Council shall be constituted to represent the German Lands in
+the legislature and administration of the Reich.
+
+
+                              _Article 61_
+
+Each Land has at least one vote in the Reich Council. In the case of
+larger Lands there shall be one vote for every 1,000,000 inhabitants.
+A surplus, which is equal to at least the population of the smallest
+Land, will be reckoned equal to 1,000,000. No Land may be represented
+by more than two-fifths of the total number of votes.
+
+German-Austria, after its union with the German Reich, shall be
+entitled to participate in the Reich Council with the number of votes
+proportionate to its population. Until then the representatives of
+German-Austria may take part in the deliberations.
+
+The number of votes shall be fixed anew by the Reich Council after
+every general census.
+
+
+                              _Article 62_
+
+No Land shall have more than one vote on the committees formed by the
+Reich Council from its own members.
+
+
+                              _Article 63_
+
+The Lands shall be represented on the Reich Council by members of their
+governments. But half the Prussian votes shall belong to the Prussian
+provincial administrations in accordance with a Land law.
+
+The Lands are entitled to send as many representatives to the Reich
+Council as they have votes.
+
+
+                              _Article 64_
+
+The government of the Reich must convene the Reich Council on the
+demand of one-third of its members.
+
+
+                              _Article 65_
+
+A member of the government of the Reich shall preside over the Reich
+Council and its committees. The members of the government of the
+Reich have the right and--if so demanded--the duty of attending the
+deliberations of the Reich Council and its committees. On their own
+request they must be heard at any time during the proceedings.
+
+
+                              _Article 66_
+
+The government of the Reich and each member of the Reich Council are
+entitled to lay proposals before the Reich Council.
+
+The Reich Council regulates its procedure by rules of procedure.
+
+The plenary sittings of the Reich Council are public. In compliance
+with the rules of procedure the public may be excluded for specific
+subjects of deliberation.
+
+Decisions are taken by a simple majority of those voting.
+
+
+                              _Article 67_
+
+The Reich Council shall be kept informed by the Reich ministries of the
+conduct of affairs of the Reich. The competent committees of the Reich
+Council shall be consulted by the ministries of the Reich with regard
+to important affairs.
+
+
+                            _Fifth Chapter_
+
+                           Reich Legislation
+
+
+                              _Article 68_
+
+Bills are introduced by the government of the Reich or by members of
+the Reichstag.
+
+Reich laws shall be enacted by the Reichstag.
+
+
+                              _Article 69_
+
+The introduction of bills by the government of the Reich requires
+the consent of the Reich Council. If no agreement is reached between
+the Reich government and the Reich Council, the Reich government may
+introduce the bill notwithstanding, but must state the contrary opinion
+of the Reich Council.
+
+If the Reich Council resolves on a bill not assented to by the
+government of the Reich, the latter must introduce the bill to the
+Reichstag, stating its own point of view.
+
+
+                              _Article 70_
+
+The Reich President shall promulgate all constitutionally enacted laws
+and proclaim them in the Reich’s Legal Gazette within one month.
+
+
+                              _Article 71_
+
+Reich laws, unless they provide otherwise, come into force on the
+fourteenth day after the date on which the Reich’s Legal Gazette is
+published in the capital of the Reich.
+
+
+                              _Article 72_
+
+The proclamation of a Reich law shall be postponed for two months on
+the demand of one-third of the Reichstag. Laws stated to be urgent by
+the Reichstag and the Reich Council may be proclaimed by the Reich
+President notwithstanding such demand.
+
+
+                              _Article 73_
+
+A law enacted by the Reichstag shall be made the subject of a
+referendum, if the Reich President so determines within a month.
+
+A law, the proclamation of which has been postponed on the application
+of at least one-third of the members of the Reichstag, shall be
+subjected to a referendum, if one-twentieth of the persons qualified to
+vote so submit.
+
+A referendum shall further be instituted if one-tenth of the persons
+qualified to vote initiate by petition the introduction of a bill.
+An elaborated bill must underlie such people’s initiative. The bill
+shall be submitted to the Reichstag by the government together with a
+statement of its own point of view. No referendum shall take place if
+the petitional bill is passed unaltered by the Reichstag.
+
+In regard to the budget, taxation laws and laws relating to pay and
+salaries, only the Reich President may inaugurate a referendum.
+
+A Reich law shall regulate the procedure for referendum and initiative.
+
+
+                              _Article 74_
+
+The Reich Council is entitled to raise an objection to laws passed by
+the Reichstag.
+
+The objection must be submitted to the Reich government within two
+weeks following the final vote in the Reichstag and sustained by
+reasons at the latest within two further weeks.
+
+When such objection has been raised, the law is again submitted to the
+Reichstag for redecision. If by this means no agreement is reached
+between the Reichstag and the Reich Council, the President may,
+within three months, order that a referendum be taken on the matter
+in dispute. If the President does not exercise this right, the law is
+considered not to have been passed. If the Reichstag has passed the
+law in spite of the objection by the Reich Council by a two-thirds
+majority, then the President must either proclaim the same within three
+months in the form approved by the Reichstag or order a referendum to
+be taken.
+
+
+                              _Article 75_
+
+A referendum can nullify an enactment of the Reichstag only if a
+majority of those qualified to vote take part in the vote.
+
+
+                              _Article 76_
+
+The Constitution may be amended by law. But acts of the Reichstag
+amending the Constitution can only take effect if two-thirds of the
+legal number of members are present and at least two-thirds of those
+present consent. Resolutions of the Reich Council also require a
+two-thirds majority of the votes taken, when an amendment to the
+Constitution is in question. If on a popular initiative an amendment
+to the Constitution is to be decided by referendum the consent of a
+majority of those qualified to vote is required.
+
+If the Reichstag has passed an amendment to the Constitution in spite
+of an objection on the part of the Reich Council, the President may
+not proclaim such law, if within two weeks the Reich Council demands a
+referendum.
+
+
+                              _Article 77_
+
+Unless otherwise provided by law the Reich government shall issue the
+general administrative provisions necessary for putting into execution
+the laws of the Reich. The approval of the Reich Council is required
+when the execution of the Reich laws is within the competence of the
+authorities of the Lands.
+
+
+                            _Sixth Chapter_
+
+                          Reich Administration
+
+
+                              _Article 78_
+
+The cultivation of the relations with foreign States is exclusively a
+function of the Reich.
+
+With regard to matters the regulation of which is within the competence
+of the Lands’ legislatures, the Lands may conclude treaties with
+foreign States; such treaties require the approval of the Reich.
+
+Agreements with foreign States relating to any alteration of the
+boundaries of the Reich are concluded by the Reich, after the consent
+of the Lands concerned has been obtained. Such boundary alterations may
+only be undertaken on the basis of a Reich law, unless it is simply a
+case of adjusting the boundaries of uninhabited districts.
+
+All arrangements and measures necessary for safeguarding the interests
+of individual Lands arising out of their particular economic relations
+with or their proximity to foreign States shall be undertaken by the
+Reich in agreement with the Lands concerned.
+
+
+                              _Article 79_
+
+The defense of the Reich is a function of the Reich. The defense
+organization of the German people shall be uniformly regulated by Reich
+law with due regard to special peculiarities of the inhabitants of the
+different Lands.
+
+
+                              _Article 80_
+
+Colonial matters belong exclusively to the competence of the Reich.
+
+
+                              _Article 81_
+
+All German commercial vessels constitute one single merchant marine.
+
+
+                              _Article 82_
+
+Germany constitutes one single customs and trading area surrounded by a
+customs frontier.
+
+The customs frontier coincides with Germany’s foreign frontier line.
+At the sea the shore of the mainland and of the islands belonging to
+the territory of the Reich form the customs boundary. Deviations may
+be ordered for the course of the boundary line along the sea and other
+waters.
+
+Foreign territories or parts of territories may be joined to the
+customs area by means of international treaties or agreements.
+
+Portions may be excluded from the customs area to meet particular
+necessities. In the case of free ports such exclusion can only be
+repealed by a law amending the Constitution.
+
+Districts excluded from the customs area may be joined to a foreign
+customs area by means of international treaties or agreements.
+
+All products of nature and industry and art which are freely traded
+within the Reich may be transported over the boundaries of the Lands
+and Communes into, out of, and through them. Exceptions may be allowed
+by Reich law.
+
+
+                              _Article 83_
+
+Customs duties and consumption taxes are administered by the
+authorities of the Reich.
+
+The authorities of the Reich, when administering taxes of the Reich,
+shall take steps to enable the individual Lands to safeguard their own
+particular interests in regard to agriculture, trade, commerce and
+industry.
+
+
+                              _Article 84_
+
+The Reich shall provide by law for:
+
+1. the institution of a tax administration of the Lands, so far as is
+necessary for the uniform and equal execution of the Reich taxation laws
+
+2. the institution and powers of the authorities entrusted with the
+supervision of the execution of the Reich taxation laws
+
+3. the accounting with the Lands
+
+4. the reimbursement of the costs of administration in executing the
+Reich taxation laws.
+
+
+                              _Article 85_
+
+All revenues and expenditures of the Reich must be estimated for every
+fiscal year and entered in the budget.
+
+The budget shall be passed by law before the beginning of the fiscal
+year.
+
+Appropriations are as a rule made for one year; in special cases they
+may be granted for a longer period. Other provisions in the budget law
+which legislate for a period beyond the fiscal year, or which have no
+reference to the revenues or expenditures of the Reich, may not be
+incorporated in the budget law.
+
+The Reichstag may not increase existing or incorporate new
+appropriations in the budget bill without the consent of the Reich
+Council.
+
+The consent of the Reich Council may be replaced as provided in Article
+74.
+
+
+                              _Article 86_
+
+The Reich Minister of Finance shall, in the course of the year, account
+to the Reich Council and the Reichstag for the expenditure of all the
+revenues of the Reich for the preceding year in order to release the
+government of the Reich from its responsibility. The auditing of this
+account shall be regulated by Reich law.
+
+
+                              _Article 87_
+
+Funds may only be obtained by loans in the case of extraordinary
+requirements and, as a rule, only for the purpose of productive outlay.
+A Reich law is required for this method of procuring funds as well as
+for the creation of a charge on the Reich by way of security.
+
+
+                              _Article 88_
+
+The post and telegraph as well as the whole telephone system are
+exclusive functions of the Reich.
+
+Postage stamps are uniform for the whole Reich.
+
+Treaties relating to communications with foreign countries may only be
+concluded by the Reich.
+
+
+                              _Article 89_
+
+It is a function of the Reich to take over the ownership of railways
+serving as means of general traffic and to operate them as a uniform
+system of communications.
+
+The rights of the Lands to acquire private railways shall be
+transferred to the Reich on demand.
+
+
+                              _Article 90_
+
+With the transfer of the railways the Reich acquires the right of
+expropriation and the sovereign state rights of the Lands over the
+railway systems. The extent of these rights shall be decided in the
+case of conflict by the Constitutional Court.
+
+
+                              _Article 91_
+
+With the approval of the Reich Council, the government of the Reich
+shall issue all decrees relating to the construction of railways, their
+operation and traffic. With the consent of the Reich Council, the
+government may transfer this right to the competent Reich Minister.
+
+
+                              _Article 92_
+
+The railways of the Reich, although their budget and accounts are
+incorporated in the general budget and accounts of the Reich, shall
+be operated as an independent economic enterprise, with the duty of
+defraying its own expenditure including interest on and amortization
+of the railway reserve fund. The amount of the amortization and the
+reserve fund, and the purposes for which the latter is to be utilized
+shall be regulated by special law.
+
+
+                              _Article 93_
+
+The government of the Reich with the consent of the Reich Council shall
+establish advisory councils for the railways of the Reich to assist in
+an advisory capacity in matters relating to railway traffic and rates.
+
+
+                              _Article 94_
+
+Once the Reich has taken over the administration of the railroads
+serving the general traffic of a particular district, new railroads
+serving general traffic may not be constructed within such district
+except by or with the consent of the Reich. When new railroad systems
+or alterations in those already existing are so projected as to
+fall within the police competence of any Land, the Reich railroad
+administration shall consult the Land authorities before the decision
+is taken.
+
+Whenever the Reich has not yet taken over the administration of the
+railroads, it may construct such railroads on its own account as are
+deemed necessary for general traffic or for national defense by virtue
+of a Reich law, even against the protest of the Lands whose territory
+is to be traversed, but without prejudice to the sovereign rights of
+the Lands; or the Reich may entrust another with the execution of such
+construction, together with the right of expropriation, if necessary.
+
+All railroad administrations must permit the junction of other lines at
+the latter’s expense.
+
+
+                              _Article 95_
+
+Railways of general traffic not administered by the Reich shall be
+supervised by the Reich.
+
+Railways under the supervision of the Reich shall be constructed and
+equipped according to uniform principles determined by the Reich.
+They must be kept in safe working order and developed as traffic
+requirements dictate. Service and equipment for passenger and freight
+traffic shall be maintained in accordance with their requirements.
+
+The supervision of railway rates shall be directed to securing
+nondiscriminatory and moderate charges.
+
+
+                              _Article 96_
+
+All railways, including those not serving as means of general traffic,
+must comply with any demands of the Reich for their utilization for the
+purpose of national defense.
+
+
+                              _Article 97_
+
+It is the duty of the Reich to take over the ownership and
+administration of waterways serving the general traffic.
+
+After they have been taken over, waterways serving the general traffic
+may only be constructed or developed by the Reich or with its consent.
+
+In the administration, development or construction of waterways,
+the requirements of land and water economy must be safeguarded in
+agreement with the Lands. Their improvement shall also be taken into
+consideration.
+
+Every administration of waterways must permit the connection of their
+own with other inland waterways at the expense of the promoter. The
+same obligation holds for the construction of a connection between
+inland waterways and railways.
+
+With the transfer of waterways the Reich acquires the right of
+expropriation, the control of rates and the police survey over the
+waterways and navigation.
+
+The duties of the river conservancies in respect to the development of
+the natural waterways in the Rhine, Weser, and Elbe districts shall be
+taken over by the Reich.
+
+
+                              _Article 98_
+
+Advisory councils to cooperate in matters concerning Reich waterways
+shall be formed in compliance with detailed provisions to be issued by
+the Reich government with the approval of the Reich Council.
+
+
+                              _Article 99_
+
+On natural waterways charges may only be collected for such works,
+plants and other institutions as are designed to facilitate traffic.
+In the case of Lands and communal institutions they may not exceed
+the necessary costs, for construction and upkeep. The construction
+and maintenance costs of institutions not exclusively devoted to the
+facilitation of traffic but also destined for the furtherance of other
+purposes, may only be raised in a proportionate degree by shipping
+charges. Interest and sinking funds on the invested capital are
+included as costs of construction.
+
+The provisions of the foregoing paragraph apply also to charges
+collected for artificial waterways and to works erected thereon and in
+harbors.
+
+Within the sphere of inland navigation the entire cost of a waterway,
+a river basin or a system of waterways may be utilized for calculating
+the shipping charges.
+
+These provisions apply equally to the floating of timber on navigable
+waterways.
+
+It is within the exclusive competence of the Reich to exact from
+foreign ships and their cargoes other or higher charges than from
+German ships and their cargoes.
+
+
+                             _Article 100_
+
+In order to cover the cost of the maintenance and construction of
+inland navigation routes, contributions may also be levied by virtue
+of a Reich law from persons enjoying benefits from the construction
+of dams in other ways than by navigation, if more than one Land is
+involved, or the Reich bears the costs of construction.
+
+
+                             _Article 101_
+
+It is the duty of the Reich to take over the ownership and
+administration of all marine signal stations, particularly lighthouses,
+lightships, buoys, floats, and beacons. After the Reich has taken them
+over, marine signal stations may only be constructed or developed by
+the Reich or with its consent.
+
+
+                           _Seventh Chapter_
+
+                             The Judiciary
+
+
+                             _Article 102_
+
+Judges are independent and subject only to the law.
+
+
+                             _Article 103_
+
+The ordinary judiciary consists of the Reich Supreme Court and the
+courts of the Lands.
+
+
+                             _Article 104_
+
+The judges of the ordinary judiciary are appointed for life. Against
+their will they may only be permanently or temporarily suspended from
+office or transferred to another position or retired by virtue of a
+judicial decision and only for the reasons and in the form prescribed
+by law. The legislature may fix an age limit, on reaching which judges
+shall retire.
+
+A temporary suspension from office as provided by law is not affected
+hereby.
+
+If a change is effected in the organization of the courts or their
+districts the judicial administrative authorities of the Lands may
+order involuntary transfers to another court or removal from office,
+but only on full pay.
+
+These provisions do not apply to commercial judges, lay judges, and
+jurors.
+
+
+                             _Article 105_
+
+Exceptional courts are prohibited. No one may be deprived of the right
+to be heard by his legally prescribed judge. The legal provisions
+concerning military courts and courts martial are not affected hereby.
+Military courts of honor are abolished.
+
+
+                             _Article 106_
+
+Military jurisdiction shall be abolished except in time of war and on
+men-of-war. Details shall be regulated by a Reich law.
+
+
+                             _Article 107_
+
+Both in the Reich and in the Lands, administrative courts shall be
+established under the laws for the protection of individuals against
+decrees and orders of the administrative authorities.
+
+
+                             _Article 108_
+
+A Constitutional Court shall be established for the German Reich in
+accordance with a Reich law.
+
+
+                              SECOND PART
+
+              FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF THE GERMANS
+
+
+                            _First Chapter_
+
+                         The Individual Person
+
+
+                             _Article 109_
+
+All Germans are equal before the law.
+
+In principle men and women have the same civil rights and duties.
+
+Public-legal privileges or disadvantages of birth or of rank are to be
+abolished.
+
+Titles of nobility shall be regarded merely as part of the name, and
+may no longer be bestowed.
+
+Titles may only be bestowed when they indicate an office or profession;
+academic degrees are not affected hereby.
+
+Orders and decorations may not be conferred by the State.
+
+No German may accept titles or orders from a foreign government.
+
+
+                             _Article 110_
+
+Citizenship of the Reich and the Lands is acquired and lost in
+accordance with the provisions of a Reich law. Every citizen of a Land
+is at the same time a citizen of the Reich.
+
+Every German has in every Land of the Reich the same rights and duties
+as the citizens of that Land.
+
+
+                             _Article 111_
+
+All Germans enjoy liberty of travel and residence throughout the whole
+Reich. Everyone has the right to sojourn and settle in any place
+within the Reich, to acquire real estate and to pursue any means of
+livelihood. Restrictions require a Reich law.
+
+
+                             _Article 112_
+
+Every German is permitted to emigrate to a foreign country. Emigration
+may only be restricted by a Reich law.
+
+All citizens of the Reich within and without the territory of the Reich
+are entitled to the protection of the Reich in relation to foreign
+countries.
+
+No German may be surrendered to a foreign government for prosecution or
+punishment.
+
+
+                             _Article 113_
+
+No laws or administrative orders may prejudice in their free and
+characteristic development the elements of the population of the
+Reich whose mother tongue is other than German, especially in regard
+to the use of their mother tongue in schools, in matters of internal
+administration, and the administration of justice.
+
+
+                             _Article 114_
+
+The freedom of the person is inviolable. Curtailment or deprivation of
+personal freedom by a public authority is only permissible on a legal
+basis.
+
+Persons who have been deprived of their freedom must be informed at the
+latest on the following day by whose authority and for what reasons the
+deprivation of freedom was ordered; opportunity shall be afforded them
+without delay of submitting objections to their deprivation of freedom.
+
+
+                             _Article 115_
+
+Every German’s home is his sanctuary and is inviolable. Exceptions may
+only be made as provided by law.
+
+
+                             _Article 116_
+
+An act can only be punishable if its penalty was fixed by law before
+the act was committed.
+
+
+                             _Article 117_
+
+The secrecy of letters and all postal, telegraphic and telephone
+communications is inviolable. Exceptions are inadmissible except by
+Reich law.
+
+
+                             _Article 118_
+
+Every German has the right, within the limits of the general laws, to
+express his opinions freely in speech, in writing, in print, in picture
+form or in any other way. No conditions of work or employment may
+detract from this right and no disadvantage may accrue to him from any
+person for making use of this right.
+
+Censorship is forbidden, but in the case of moving pictures deviations
+from this rule may be established by law. Legal provisions are also
+admissible for combatting pornography and obscene publications and for
+the protection of young persons at public plays and entertainment.
+
+
+                            _Second Chapter_
+
+                          The General Welfare
+
+
+                             _Article 119_
+
+Marriage as the cornerstone of family life and the preservation and
+increase of the nation is placed under the special protection of the
+Constitution. It is based on the equal rights of both sexes.
+
+It is the duty of the State and the Communes to foster the purity,
+health, and social advancement of the family. Families with numerous
+children have a claim to proportionate assistance.
+
+Motherhood has a claim to the protection and care of the State.
+
+
+                             _Article 120_
+
+To provide their children with a thorough physical, spiritual, and
+social education is the supreme duty and natural right of parents,
+whose activities shall be supervised by the State.
+
+
+                             _Article 121_
+
+The same conditions shall be created by law for the physical, spiritual
+and social development of illegitimate as for legitimate children.
+
+
+                             _Article 122_
+
+Youth shall be protected against exploitation and also against neglect
+of their moral, mental or physical well-being. The States and Communes
+shall make the necessary arrangements.
+
+Compulsory measures for their welfare may only be ordered on the basis
+of law.
+
+
+                             _Article 123_
+
+All Germans have the right to assemble peacefully and unarmed without
+giving notice and without special permission.
+
+A Reich law may make previous notification obligatory for assemblies in
+the open air, and may prohibit them in the case of immediate danger to
+the public safety.
+
+
+                             _Article 124_
+
+All the Germans have the right to form associations or societies for
+purposes not contrary to criminal law. This right may not be curtailed
+by preventive measures. The same provisions apply to religious
+associations and societies.
+
+Every association may become incorporated according to the provisions
+of the civil law. The right may not be refused to any association on
+the grounds that its aims are political, social-political or religious.
+
+
+                             _Article 125_
+
+The liberty and secrecy of the vote is guaranteed. Details shall be
+regulated by election laws.
+
+
+                             _Article 126_
+
+Every German has the right to address requests or complaints in writing
+to the competent authorities or to the people’s representatives. This
+right may be exercised individually or by several persons collectively.
+
+
+                             _Article 127_
+
+Communes and communal unions have the right of self-administration
+within the limits of the law.
+
+
+                             _Article 128_
+
+All citizens without distinction shall be eligible for public office
+in accordance with the laws and according to their capabilities and
+achievements.
+
+All provisions discriminating against women are abolished.
+
+The principles governing the legal status of the public officials shall
+be regulated by Reich law.
+
+
+                             _Article 129_
+
+Public officials shall be appointed for life, unless otherwise provided
+by law. Pensions for retired officials or the surviving dependents of
+deceased officials shall be regulated by law. The vested rights of
+public officials are inviolable. Legal steps may be taken by public
+officials for pecuniary claims.
+
+Public officials may be only temporarily suspended from office,
+temporarily or permanently relieved or transferred to a different
+office with a lower salary on the conditions and in the form provided
+by law.
+
+In every case where a disciplinary sentence is pronounced, the way must
+be open for appeal and a new trial. Entries unfavorable to a public
+official may not be made in his official record until opportunity has
+been afforded him of expressing his own view of the facts. Public
+officials shall be permitted to inspect their official records.
+
+The inviolability of vested rights and the competence of the civil
+courts to adjudicate pecuniary claims are also assured particularly
+to the regular soldiers. In other respects their position shall be
+regulated by Reich law.
+
+
+                             _Article 130_
+
+Public officials are servants of the whole community, and not of a
+party.
+
+Liberty of political opinion and freedom to form associations is
+guaranteed to all public officials.
+
+A Reich law shall provide in detail for the special representation of
+public officials.
+
+
+                             _Article 131_
+
+If a public official in the execution of the official authority vested
+in him transgresses his official duty towards a third person, the State
+or the public body in whose service the officer is, is in principle
+held responsible. The right of recovery from the officer is reserved.
+Recourse to the ordinary civil courts may not be excluded.
+
+Details shall be regulated by the competent legislature.
+
+
+                             _Article 132_
+
+It is the duty of every German to accept honorary offices in accordance
+with the laws.
+
+
+                             _Article 133_
+
+It is the duty of all citizens to render personal services to the State
+and the Commune in accordance with the laws.
+
+The duty of military service is determined by the provisions of the
+Reich Defense Law. This shall also stipulate how far single Fundamental
+Rights of the Constitution shall be restricted in respect to members of
+the defense forces, in the interest of the fulfillment of their tasks
+and the maintenance of discipline.
+
+
+                             _Article 134_
+
+All citizens without distinction contribute to all public burdens in
+proportion to their means and in accordance with the laws.
+
+
+                            _Third Chapter_
+
+                  Religion and Religious Associations
+
+
+                             _Article 135_
+
+All inhabitants of the Reich enjoy full religious and conscientious
+freedom. The undisturbed exercise of religion is guaranteed by the
+Constitution and is under state protection. The general state laws are
+unaffected hereby.
+
+
+                             _Article 136_
+
+Civil and civic rights and duties are neither contingent upon nor
+limited by the exercise of religious freedom.
+
+The enjoyment of civil and civic rights and the eligibility for public
+office are independent of religious belief.
+
+Nobody is obliged to reveal his religious conviction. The authorities
+are only entitled to ask questions concerning adherence to a religious
+body so far as rights and duties are dependent thereon or in pursuance
+of statistical inquiries prescribed by law.
+
+No one may be compelled to attend any church service or ceremony or to
+participate in religious exercises, or to take oath in religious form.
+
+
+                             _Article 137_
+
+There is no State Church.
+
+Freedom to form religious societies is guaranteed. The combination of
+religious societies within the territory of the Reich is subject to no
+restrictions.
+
+Every religious society regulates and administers its affairs
+independently within the limits of the law, applicable to all. It
+appoints its officers without the cooperation of the State or the civil
+community.
+
+Religious societies become incorporated in accordance with the general
+provisions of civil law.
+
+Religious societies remain bodies of public law if this has been their
+status hitherto. Similar rights shall be granted to other religious
+societies on their application, if their constitution and the number
+of their members offer a guarantee of permanency. If several such
+religious societies are united as public bodies, this union is also a
+public body.
+
+Such religious societies as are public bodies are entitled to levy
+taxes on the basis of the civil tax-roll in accordance with the laws of
+the respective Lands.
+
+Associations devoted to the common cultivation of a philosophy of life
+are placed on the same footing as religious societies.
+
+So far as the execution of these provisions requires more detailed
+regulation, this is within the competence of the Lands’ legislatures.
+
+
+                             _Article 138_
+
+State contributions to religious societies based on laws, contract or
+special legal titles shall be commuted by Lands legislation. The Reich
+shall establish the principles therefor.
+
+Property and other rights of religious societies and associations in
+their institutions, foundations, and other properties for cultural,
+educational, and charitable purposes are guaranteed.
+
+
+                             _Article 139_
+
+Sundays and public holidays recognized by the State remain under legal
+protection as days of rest and spiritual edification.
+
+
+                             _Article 140_
+
+Members of the defense forces shall be allowed the necessary free time
+for performing their religious duties.
+
+
+                             _Article 141_
+
+So far as there is need for divine service and spiritual consolation
+in the army, in hospitals, prisons or other public institutions,
+the religious societies shall be permitted to perform the religious
+offices, but all compulsion shall be avoided.
+
+
+                            _Fourth Chapter_
+
+                       Education and the Schools
+
+
+                             _Article 142_
+
+Art and science and the teaching thereof are free. The State guarantees
+them protection and takes part in their cultivation.
+
+
+                             _Article 143_
+
+The education of young persons shall be provided for by means of public
+institutions. The Reich, Lands and Communes shall cooperate in their
+establishment.
+
+The training of teachers shall be regulated uniformly for the whole
+Reich according to the generally recognized principles of higher
+education.
+
+Teachers in public schools have the rights and duties of state
+officials.
+
+
+                             _Article 144_
+
+The whole school system is under the supervision of the State, which
+may cause the Communes to participate therein. The supervision
+of schools is exercised by trained expert officials as their
+occupation-in-chief.
+
+
+                             _Article 145_
+
+Attendance at school is universally obligatory.
+
+In principle this duty is fulfilled by attending an elementary school
+for at least eight school years and a connected continuation school
+until the completion of the eighteenth year. Instruction and school
+supplies are supplied free of charge in the elementary and continuation
+schools.
+
+
+                             _Article 146_
+
+The system of public schools shall be organically developed. The
+intermediate and secondary school system shall be built upon the basis
+of common elementary schools. This system shall be determined by the
+needs of all kinds of vocations, and for the reception of a child
+into a particular school, his abilities and inclination shall be the
+deciding factor, not the economic and social status or the religious
+confession of his parents.
+
+Within the Communes, however, on the petition of parents and guardians,
+popular schools professing their own faith or philosophy of life shall
+be established, so far as this does not interfere with an organized
+school system in the sense, also, of Paragraph 1, supra. As far
+as possible the will of parents and guardians shall be taken into
+consideration. Details shall be regulated by Lands legislation based on
+principles prescribed by a Reich law.
+
+Public funds shall be provided by the Reich, Lands and Communes to make
+the intermediate and secondary schools available for those possessed
+of restricted means; in particular shall there be educational grants
+for the parents of children looked upon as suitable subjects for
+instruction in intermediate and secondary schools until their schooling
+is completed.
+
+
+                             _Article 147_
+
+Private schools as substitutes for public schools require the approval
+of the State and are subject to the laws of the Lands. Approval shall
+be granted when the private schools are not inferior to the public
+schools as regards their instructional aims and equipment and the
+scientific training of the teachers, and a separation of the pupils
+according to the wealth of their parents is not encouraged. The
+approval shall be refused if the economic and legal position of the
+teachers is not sufficiently assured.
+
+Private elementary schools shall only be admitted when for those
+parents or guardians whose wishes are to be regarded under Article
+146, Paragraph 2, no public elementary school of their faith or
+philosophical persuasion exists in their Commune, or if the educational
+administrative authorities recognize the existence of a particular
+educational need.
+
+Private preparatory schools shall be abolished.
+
+The existing law shall continue to apply to private schools not serving
+as substitutes for public schools.
+
+
+                             _Article 148_
+
+In all schools moral training, a sense of civic responsibility,
+personal and vocational efficiency in a spirit of national German
+feeling and international conciliation shall be aimed at.
+
+Care shall be taken that instruction in public schools shall not hurt
+the feelings of those who differ in opinion.
+
+Civics and manual training form part of the school curriculum. On
+completing his obligatory schooling every pupil shall receive a copy of
+the Constitution.
+
+Popular education including popular universities shall be developed by
+the Reich, Lands and Communes.
+
+
+                             _Article 149_
+
+Religious instruction forms part of the ordinary school curriculum
+except in the nonconfessional (secular) schools; its form will be
+regulated by the laws relating to schools. Religious instruction shall
+be given in conformity with the principles of the religious society
+concerned, without prejudice to the State’s right of supervision.
+
+The imparting of religious instruction and the performance of religious
+acts is left to the decision of the teacher, while the participation in
+religious lessons, acts, and ceremonies is a matter for the decision of
+those who have the right to determine the religious education of the
+child.
+
+The theological faculties in the universities shall be maintained.
+
+
+                             _Article 150_
+
+Artistic, historical, and natural monuments and scenery enjoy the
+protection and care of the State.
+
+It is a function of the Reich to prevent German art treasures from
+passing to foreign countries.
+
+
+                            _Fifth Chapter_
+
+                           The Economic Life
+
+
+                             _Article 151_
+
+The regulation of economic life must be compatible with the principles
+of justice, aiming at the attainment of humane conditions of existence
+for all. Within these limits the economic liberty of the individual
+shall be assured.
+
+Legal compulsion is only admissible for the realization of threatened
+rights or in the service of preponderant requirements of the common
+welfare.
+
+Freedom of trade and commerce is guaranteed on the basis of the Reich
+laws.
+
+
+                             _Article 152_
+
+As far as the laws allow, there shall be freedom of contract in
+business intercourse. Usury is prohibited. Legal transactions contra
+bonos mores are invalid.
+
+
+                             _Article 153_
+
+Property is guaranteed by the Constitution. Its content and limits are
+defined by the laws.
+
+Expropriation can only take place for the public benefit and on a
+legal basis. Adequate compensation shall be granted, unless a Reich
+law orders otherwise. In the case of dispute concerning the amount of
+compensation, it shall be possible to submit the matter to the ordinary
+civil courts, unless Reich laws determine otherwise. Compensation must
+be paid if the Reich expropriates property belonging to the Lands,
+Communes, or public utility associations.
+
+Property carries obligations. Its use shall also serve the common good.
+
+
+                             _Article 154_
+
+The right of inheritance is guaranteed according to the civil code.
+
+The share of the State in inherited property is determined by the laws.
+
+
+                             _Article 155_
+
+The distribution and utilization of the land shall be supervised by
+state authorities in a manner to prevent abuse and with the object of
+ensuring a healthy dwelling to every German and to all German families,
+especially those with numerous children, living and working quarters
+in accordance with their needs. War veterans shall be particularly
+considered in the enactment of homestead laws.
+
+Real estate, the acquisition of which is necessary for housing
+purposes, for the promotion of settlements and land cultivation or
+to improve agriculture, may be expropriated. All entails shall be
+dissolved.
+
+The cultivation and utilization of the soil is a duty owed by the
+landowner to the community. An increase in the value of land, which
+arises without the expenditure of work or capital on the property,
+shall be utilized for the common benefit.
+
+All treasures of the soil and all natural forces of economic utility
+are under the supervision of the State. Private mining rights shall be
+transferred to the State by legislation.
+
+
+                             _Article 156_
+
+The Reich may, without prejudice to the right of compensation, by law
+transfer to public ownership private economic enterprises suitable for
+socialization, applying thereby analogously the regulations relating to
+expropriation. The Reich may allot to itself, the Lands or the Communes
+a share in the administration of economic enterprises and associations
+or secure to itself a controlling influence therein in some other way.
+
+The Reich may also in case of urgent necessity for socioeconomic
+interests, by law effect a combination of economic enterprises and
+associations on the basis of self-administration with the object of
+securing the cooperation of all working elements of the population,
+of allowing employers and employees a share in the management and
+regulating the production, fabrication, distribution, utilization,
+price fixing, and the importation and exportation of economic goods
+according to the principles of national economy.
+
+The cooperative industrial and economic associations and their unions
+shall at their request be incorporated in the socialized economic
+system, their constitution and peculiarities being thereby taken into
+consideration.
+
+
+                             _Article 157_
+
+The ability to work is under the special protection of the Reich. The
+Reich shall create a uniform labor law.
+
+
+                             _Article 158_
+
+Intellectual labor, the rights of the author, the inventor, and the
+artist enjoy the protection and care of the Reich.
+
+Recognition and protection in foreign countries also shall be secured
+to German science, art and technic by means of international agreements.
+
+
+                             _Article 159_
+
+Freedom of association for the preservation and promotion of labor
+and economic conditions is assured to everyone and to all vocations.
+All agreements and measures attempting to restrict or restrain such
+freedom, are unlawful.
+
+
+                             _Article 160_
+
+Persons working as employees or laborers are entitled to the leave
+necessary for the exercise of their civic rights and, so far as the
+enterprise is not materially damaged thereby, for performing the duties
+attached to public honorary offices entrusted to them. The law shall
+determine to what extent they retain their right to remuneration.
+
+
+                             _Article 161_
+
+For the maintenance of health and capacity to work, for the protection
+of maternity, and for provision against the economic consequences of
+age, infirmity, and the vicissitudes of life, the Reich shall organize
+a comprehensive system of insurance, in which the insured persons shall
+cooperate to a considerable extent.
+
+
+                             _Article 162_
+
+The Reich shall endeavor to obtain an interstate regulation of
+the legal status of laborers which shall have as its object the
+establishment of a general minimum standard of social rights for all
+working classes of mankind.
+
+
+                             _Article 163_
+
+Every German has, without prejudice to his personal liberty, the moral
+duty to utilize his intellectual and physical powers in the interest of
+the general welfare.
+
+The opportunity of earning his living by economic work shall be
+afforded to every German. So far as suitable work cannot be found for
+him, he shall be provided with the necessary support. Details shall be
+regulated by special Reich laws.
+
+
+                             _Article 164_
+
+The interests of the independent middle classes in agriculture,
+industry and commerce shall be promoted by legislation and
+administration and protected from oppression and absorption.
+
+
+                             _Article 165_
+
+Laborers and employees are called upon to take part on equal terms and
+together with the employers in regulating conditions of work and wages
+and also in the general economic development of productive forces.
+The organizations on both sides and agreements between them shall be
+recognized.
+
+Laborers and employees shall be legally represented on the Workmen’s
+Councils of the Enterprise, as well as in the District Workmen’s
+Councils organized for each economic area and on a Reich Workmen’s
+Council.
+
+The District Workmen’s Councils and the Reich Workmen’s Council shall
+combine with the representatives of the employees and other interested
+elements of the population to form District Economic Councils and a
+Reich Economic Council for the purpose of performing all economic
+tasks and of cooperating in carrying out the socialization laws. The
+District Economic Councils and the Reich Economic Council shall be
+so constituted that all important vocational groups are represented
+thereon in accordance with their economic and social importance.
+
+Social-political and political-economic bills of basic importance
+shall be submitted to the opinion of the Reich Economic Council by the
+government of the Reich before being introduced. The Reich Economic
+Council has itself the right to propose the introduction of such
+bills. If the government of the Reich does not approve them, it must
+nevertheless introduce such bills to the Reichstag, stating its own
+point of view. The Reich Economic Council may have the bill supported
+in the Reichstag by one of its own members.
+
+Supervision and administrative powers may be conferred on the Workmen’s
+and the Economic Councils within their own spheres of work.
+
+The regulation of the organization and tasks of the Workmen’s and
+the Economic Councils as well as their relation to other social
+self-governing bodies is exclusively a function of the Reich.
+
+
+                _Transitional and Concluding Provisions_
+
+
+                             _Article 166_
+
+Until the establishment of the Reich Administrative Court the Reich
+Supreme Court shall take its place in the formation of the Election
+Investigation Court.
+
+
+                             _Article 167_
+
+Article 18, sect. 3 to 6 are valid 2 years after announcement of the
+Reichs Constitution.
+
+
+                             _Article 168_
+
+Until--but only for a year--the Landlaw, considered in Article 63 is
+issued, all Prussian votes in the Reichsrat can be given by the members
+of the Cabinet.
+
+
+                             _Article 169_
+
+The Reichs Cabinet, will set the date, when Article 83, sect. 1,
+becomes valid.
+
+
+                             _Article 170_
+
+The postal--and telegraph agencies of Bavaria and Wuertenberg, will be
+taken over by the Reich on 1 April 1921 the latest.
+
+If, on 1 Oct 1920, no agreement on the points of the taking over has
+been reached, the supreme constitutional court will decide.
+
+Until the taking over, the present rights and duties of Bavaria and
+Wuertenberg are in force. The postal and telegraph traffic with
+neighboring states of foreign countries, will be regulated by the Reich.
+
+
+                             _Article 171_
+
+The State Railroads, Waterways and sea-marks will be taken over by the
+Reich on April 1, 1921, the latest.
+
+If on 1 Oct 1920 no agreement on the points of the taking over, has
+been reached, the Supreme Constitutional Court will decide.
+
+
+                             _Article 172_
+
+Until the Reich law concerning the Supreme Constitutional Court comes
+into force, a Senate shall exercise its powers; this Senate shall
+consist of seven members of which four are chosen by the Reichstag from
+its own members and three by the Supreme Court of the Reich from its
+own members. The Senate shall regulate its own procedure.
+
+
+                             _Article 173_
+
+Until the enactment of a Reich law according to Article 138 the present
+state contributions to religious societies based on laws, contracts or
+special legal claims shall be continued.
+
+
+                             _Article 174_
+
+Until the enactment of the Reich law provided in Article 146, Paragraph
+2, the present legal situation shall continue. The law shall take into
+particular consideration those districts of the Reich in which a school
+where no distinction of creeds is made is established by law.
+
+
+                             _Article 175_
+
+The provision of Article 109 does not apply to orders and decorations
+to be conferred for merit in the war years 1914-1919.
+
+
+                             _Article 176_
+
+All public officers and members of the defense forces shall take the
+oath upon the Constitution. Details shall be regulated by an order of
+the Reich President.
+
+
+                             _Article 177_
+
+Where in the existing laws the oath is prescribed in religious form,
+the oath shall be legally binding if the person taking the same,
+leaving out the religious formula, declares: “I swear.” The content of
+the oath as prescribed in the laws remains otherwise unaltered.
+
+
+                             _Article 178_
+
+The Constitution of the German Reich of April 16, 1871, and the laws of
+February 10, 1918, concerning the provisional government of the Reich,
+are repealed.
+
+All other laws and orders of the Reich remain in force, so far as this
+Constitution is not incompatible with them. The provisions of the
+Peace Treaty signed at Versailles on June 28, 1919, are not affected
+by the Constitution. With respect to the negotiations concerning the
+acquisition of the island of Heligoland a regulation in favor of its
+inhabitants may be made differing from that of Article 117, Paragraph 2.
+
+Orders by the authorities which have been legally issued in conformity
+with the present laws, retain their validity until they are repealed by
+new orders of legislation.
+
+
+                             _Article 179_
+
+So far as laws or orders refer to provisions and institutions which
+are repealed by this Constitution, the appropriate provisions
+and institutions of this Constitution shall take their place. In
+particular, the Reichstag shall take the place of the National
+Assembly, the Reich Council that of the State Committee, the Reich
+President elected on the basis of this Constitution that of the Reich
+President elected on the basis of the law concerning the provisional
+government of the Reich.
+
+The power, hitherto pertaining to the State Committee, of issuing
+executive orders is transferred to the government of the Reich, which
+requires therefor the approbation of the Reich Council in accordance
+with this Constitution.
+
+
+                             _Article 180_
+
+Until the meeting of the first Reichstag, the National Assembly shall
+function as Reichstag. The President of the Reich chosen by the
+National Assembly shall retain his office till 30 June 1925.
+
+
+                             _Article 181_
+
+The German people have passed and adopted this Constitution by means
+of their National Assembly. It comes into force with the date of its
+proclamation.
+
+Schwarzburg, 11 August 1919.
+
+                         _The Reich President_
+
+                                 EBERT
+
+                          _The Reich Cabinet_
+
+                                 BAUER
+
+              ERZBERGER HERMAN MUELLER    DR. DAVID NOSKE
+                    SCHMIDT    SCHLICKE    GIESBERTS
+                         DR. MAYER     DR. BELL
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2056-PS
+
+               1938 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 1632
+
+   Decree concerning the Extension of the Jurisdiction of the Special
+                       Courts of 20 November 1938
+
+On authority of Chapter II of the Sixth Section of the decree of 6
+October 1931 (RGBl I, page 537), Article II of the law regarding
+the reunification of Austria with the German Reich of 13 March 1938
+(RGBl I, page 237) and Article 7 of the decree of the Fuehrer and
+Reich Chancellor regarding the administration of the Sudeten German
+territories of 1 October 1938 (RGBl I, page 1331), the following order
+is promulgated:
+
+
+                               Article I
+
+In cases of criminal acts which belong to the jurisdiction of the
+Assizes or of a lower court, the prosecuting authorities can bring the
+charge before the Special Court, if they believe that in consideration
+of the gravity or the wickedness of the deed, or the possible arousing
+of popular excitement, an immediate verdict by the Special Court is
+advisable.
+
+
+                               Article II
+
+(1) Under the same supposition in the state of Austria and in the
+Sudeten German territories the prosecuting authorities can bring the
+charge before the Court of Appeal in cases of criminal acts which,
+according to the existing legal procedure in those areas, belongs to
+the jurisdiction of the Jury Court or of a lower court. This is decided
+by the appointment of three professional judges.
+
+(2) For the legal procedure the decree of 21 March 1933 (RGBl I, page
+136) is applicable. The Reich Minister for Justice is to be consulted
+for more precise definitions.
+
+
+                              Article III
+
+In the proceedings before the Special Court (Court of Appeals) the
+period of time for summons is limited to 24 hours.
+
+
+                               Article IV
+
+As long as the main deliberation has not yet begun in cases of Articles
+I and II, proceedings which are pending in the Assizes (Jury Court)
+or a lower court at the time this decree enters into effect, are to
+be referred to the Special Court of the prosecuting authorities so
+proposed.
+
+
+                               Article V
+
+This decree becomes effective on the date of publication.
+
+Berlin, 20 November 1938
+
+                                          The Reich Minister for Justice
+                                                            Dr. Guertner
+
+                                      The Reich Minister of the Interior
+                                                                   Frick
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2057-PS
+
+                1934 REICHSGESETZBLATT PART I, PAGE 529
+
+   Law Relating to National Emergency Defense Measures of 3 July 1934
+
+The Reich Government has enacted the following law, which is hereby
+promulgated:
+
+
+                              ONLY ARTICLE
+
+The measures taken on 30 June and 1 and 2 July 1934 to counteract
+attempt at treason and high treason shall be considered as national
+emergency defense.
+
+Berlin, 3 July 1934.
+
+                          The Reich Chancellor
+                              Adolf Hitler
+
+                   The Reich Minister of the Interior
+                                 Frick
+
+                     The Reich Minister of Justice
+                              Dr. Guertner
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2058-PS
+
+                1933 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 462
+
+     Decree for the securing of the State Leadership of 7 July 1933
+
+Based on paragraph 18 of the provisional law about the coordination of
+the states [Laender] with the Reich of 31 March 1933 (Reichsgesetzblatt
+I, page 183), I decree:
+
+
+         _The Reichstag and houses of delegates of the states_
+
+                               Article 1
+
+The distribution of seats, according to the electoral suggestion of the
+Social Democratic Party, for the Reichstag and the provincial diets
+(citizens’ committee), based on the election results of 5 March 1933
+or on the results of the coordination action, according to Article 4,
+Section 2 of the provisional law for the coordination of the states
+with the Reich of 31 July 1933, is void. An alternate distribution will
+not take place.
+
+
+                 _Community self-administrative bodies_
+
+                               Article 2
+
+The distribution of seats, according to the elective suggestion of
+the Social Democratic Party, for the community self-administrative
+bodies (county diets, district diets, district councils, council of
+officials, city councils, city councils of representatives, community
+councils, etc.) in Prussia based on the results of the election of
+12 March 1933, in the other German states based on the results of
+the coordination action according to article 12, Section 2 of the
+provisional law for the coordination of the states with the Reich of 31
+March 1933 is void.
+
+
+                               Article 3
+
+In as much as it may be necessary for the maintenance of a
+self-administration of the community to fill the seats whose
+distribution has been nullified, the state supervisory authority can
+fill these seats again according to the will of the people after the
+conquering of the republic [Parteienstaat].
+
+
+                               Article 4
+
+The members of the community self-administrative bodies will be
+appointed by the state supervisory authority according to the will
+of the people after the conquering of the republic in the following
+additional cases.
+
+1. if a community body of representatives is dissolved, by the state
+supervisory authority, or if their election or coordination has been
+declared void in the examination of the election,
+
+2. if a community or an association of communities is newly formed by
+way of organization,
+
+3. if a regular filling of the community body of representatives is not
+possible, because, according to the elections, a sufficient number of
+acceptable alternates is no longer available,
+
+4. if in Prussia, a new election of the community body of
+representatives has not taken place on 12 March 1933.
+
+
+                       _Civic honorary positions_
+
+                               Article 5
+
+(1) The elections of honorary members of national administrative
+resolution authorities, committees and of bearers of national,
+individual honorary positions, who themselves belong to the Social
+Democratic Party, or who were elected because of the electoral
+suggestion of representatives of the Social Democratic Party, are void.
+
+(2) The same applies to the election of honorary chairmen or members
+of boards of direction of communities and association of communities,
+deputations, commissions, community councils, as well as bearers of
+honorary individual positions, who are themselves members of the Social
+Democratic Party, or who have been elected by bodies of representatives
+or other organs, entitled to vote, of the community or of the community
+associations based on electoral suggestion, which have been submitted
+by the representatives of the Social Democratic Party.
+
+(3) In as much as it is necessary for the maintenance of the national
+administration or of the community self-administration to fill civic
+honorary positions, the election of which are void (Section 1 and 2),
+the alternates will be appointed by the state supervisory authority or
+by its deputized officials according to the will of the people after
+the conquering of the republic.
+
+Berlin, 7 July 1933.
+
+                                      The Reich Minister of the Interior
+                                                                   Frick
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2059-PS
+
+                1933 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 134
+
+Decree of the Reich-President relating to the granting of amnesty of 21
+                               March 1933
+
+Pursuant to Section 48, subsection 2 of the Constitution of the Reich
+the following is ordered:
+
+
+                               Section 1
+
+Amnesty is granted for penal acts committed in the national revolution
+of the German People, in its preparation or in the fight for the German
+soil pursuant to the following provisions:
+
+
+                               Section 2
+
+Penalties imposed by final judgment at the time this law becomes
+effective and which have not yet been served, are annulled.
+
+The amnesty applies to additional fines and security measures as long
+as they have not been executed, to subsidiary legal consequences as
+well as outstanding fines payable to the Treasury of the Reich or the
+Landes and to outstanding expenses.
+
+If a sentence has been passed to the effect that something should be
+confiscated or made unusable it will remain as such.
+
+
+                               Section 3
+
+Pending proceedings will be discontinued if the offense has been
+committed before the 21 March 1933 and further proceedings are not to
+be instituted.
+
+
+                               Section 4
+
+Should a penalty which has not yet been served at the time when this
+decree becomes effective, include one or several penalties for offences
+for which amnesty is granted, such part of the entire penalty which is
+proportionally meted out for the offences mentioned has to be deducted.
+
+If a penalty constituting imprisonment has been transformed into one
+of penal servitude only on account of simultaneous offences for one
+of which amnesty is granted, the entire penalty which will be reduced
+pursuant to subsection 1, has to be commuted into imprisonment of the
+same length of time.
+
+Judicial findings (Section 458 of Code of Criminal Procedure) relating
+to whether and to what extent a penalty is to be extenuated pursuant
+to the provisions of subsections 1 and 2 will be decided upon by the
+court which has the jurisdiction to impose penalties for the offence
+mentioned in subsection 1.
+
+
+                               Section 5
+
+The Court decides upon the discontinuance of pending proceedings upon
+application of the parties.
+
+If the proceedings have been instituted upon a private complaint
+the costs of such proceedings are quashed. The Court may divide
+the necessary expense of the private complaint and the accused
+appropriately or may impose the expenses on any one of them.
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2061-PS
+
+                1934 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 785
+
+  _Oath of Reich Officials and of German Soldiers, of 20 August 1934._
+
+Law on attestation of officials and of soldiers of the Armed Forces, of
+20 August 1934.
+
+The Reich’s government has enacted the following law which is hereby
+proclaimed:
+
+
+                                 Art. 1
+
+The Public officials and the soldiers of the armed forces have to take
+an oath of service on entering service.
+
+
+                                 Art. 2
+
+1. The oath of service of public officials will be:
+
+  “I swear: I shall be loyal and obedient to Adolf Hitler, the Fuehrer
+    of the German Reich and people; respect the laws, and fulfill my
+    official duties conscientiously, so help me God.”
+
+2. The oath of service of the soldiers of the armed forces will be:
+
+  “I swear by God this sacred oath, that I will render unconditional
+    obedience to Adolf Hitler, the Fuehrer of the German Reich and
+    people, supreme commander of the armed forces, and will be ready as
+    a brave soldier to risk my life at any time for this oath.”
+
+
+                                 Art. 3
+
+Officials already in service are to be given the oath without delay
+according to Art. 2, number 1.
+
+
+                                 Art. 4
+
+The law on attestation of officials and of soldiers of the armed forces
+of 1 Dec. 1933 (RGBl I. P. 1016) and the decree of the second of the
+same month (RGBl I. P. 1017) are rescinded.
+
+                        Berlin, 20 August 1934.
+
+                    The Fuehrer and Reichschancellor
+                              Adolf Hitler
+
+                   The Reichsminister of the Interior
+                                 Frick
+
+                     The Reichsminister of Defense
+                             von Blomberg.
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2073-PS
+
+1936 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 487
+
+Decree concerning the Appointment of a Chief of German Police in the
+Reich Ministry of the Interior of 17 June 1936
+
+
+                                    I
+
+For the unification of police duties in the Reich, a Chief of German
+Police is instituted for the German Ministry of the Interior, to whom
+is assigned the direction and conduct of all police affairs within
+the jurisdiction of the Reich and of the Prussian Ministries of the
+Interior.
+
+
+                                   II
+
+(1) For the Chief of German Police in the Reich Ministry of the
+Interior, the Deputy Chief of the Secret State Police of Prussia is
+declared to be Reichsfuehrer SS Heinrich HIMMLER.
+
+(2) He is subordinated individually and directly to the Reich and the
+Prussian Ministries of the Interior.
+
+(3) In their absence he represents for his jurisdiction the Reich and
+the Prussian Ministries of the Interior.
+
+(4) He bears the service title: Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the
+German Police in the Reich Ministry of the Interior.
+
+
+                                  III
+
+The Chief of the German Police in the Reich Ministry of the Interior
+shares in the sessions of the Reich Cabinet, so far as his jurisdiction
+is concerned.
+
+
+                                   IV
+
+I commission the Reich and the Prussian Ministries of the Interior with
+the conduct of this decree.
+
+Berlin, 17 June 1936
+
+                The Fuehrer and Chancellor of the Reich
+                              Adolf Hitler
+
+                   The Reich Minister of the Interior
+                                 Frick
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2075-PS
+
+                1937 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 187
+
+                                 Decree
+
+for appointment of a chief of the organization of Germans abroad within
+                          the Foreign Office.
+
+                            30 January 1937.
+
+
+                                    I
+
+For uniform care for German Nationals abroad a Chief of the
+Organization of Germans abroad is appointed within the Foreign Office
+and to whom, at the same time, the leadership and processing of all
+affairs of German Nationals abroad within the jurisdiction of the
+Foreign Office will be given over.
+
+
+                                   II
+
+(1) As chief of the Organization for Germans abroad within the Foreign
+Office Gauleiter Ernst Wilhelm Bohle, director of the Organization for
+Germans abroad of the Nazi Party is appointed.
+
+(2) His is a personal appointment and immediately subordinate to the
+Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs. His field of activity, as chief of
+the organization of German nationals abroad of the Nazi Party and his
+subordination to the deputy of the Fuehrer are not affected.
+
+(3) His official title is: Chief of Organization of Germans abroad
+within the Foreign Office.
+
+
+                                  III
+
+The Chief of Organization of Germans abroad of the Foreign Office
+participates in the sessions of the Reich Cabinet so far as his field
+is concerned.
+
+
+                                   IV
+
+The Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs in agreement with the deputy of
+the Fuehrer will issue the implementative regulations of this decree.
+
+Berlin, 30 January 1937.
+
+                                        The Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor
+                                                            Adolf Hitler
+
+                                              The Reich Foreign Minister
+                                                    Freiherr von Neurath
+
+
+                                 PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2076-PS
+
+             1933 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGES 136-137
+
+Decree of the Reich Cabinet relating to the formation of special courts
+                           of March 21, 1933
+
+On the basis of Chapter II, Part 6 of the third decree of the Reich
+President to safeguard economy and finances and to combat political
+excesses, of 6 October 1931 (Reichsgesetzblatt I pp. 537, 565) the
+following is decreed.
+
+
+                               Section 1
+
+(1) A special court will be created for the district of each court of
+appeals.
+
+(2) The special courts are courts of the State [Land].
+
+(3) The legal administration of the State [Land] determines the seats
+of the special courts.
+
+
+                               Section 2
+
+The special courts have jurisdiction over crimes and felonies
+enumerated in the decree of the President of the Reich for the defense
+of people and state, of 28 February 1933 (Reichsgesetzblatt I, p. 83)
+and in the decree relating to the defense against insidious attacks
+against the government of the national revolution provided that such
+offenses are not within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court or court
+of appeals.
+
+
+                               Section 3
+
+(1) The special courts also have jurisdiction when a crime or felony
+which is under their jurisdiction fulfills at the same time the
+specifications of another offense.
+
+(2) If another offense is directly connected with the crime or felony
+which comes under the jurisdiction of the Special Courts, then the
+proceedings against the offenders and accessories of the other offense
+may be instituted in the Special Courts.
+
+(3) The extended jurisdiction pursuant to Paragraphs 1 and 2 does not
+apply to offenses for which the Supreme Court or Courts of Appeals have
+jurisdiction.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+
+                               Section 7
+
+Proceedings may be instituted also before the Special Court in the
+district of which the defendant was caught or where he is in custody.
+The release of the defendant does not affect this jurisdiction once it
+has been established.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+
+                               Section 9
+
+(1) No hearings relating to the warrant of arrest shall be held.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+
+                               Section 11
+
+A preliminary court investigation will not take place. If a preliminary
+investigation is pending at the time this decree becomes effective, the
+records are to be transferred at once to the prosecuting official with
+the Special Court.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+
+                               Section 16
+
+(1) No legal remedy is admissible against the decisions of the Special
+Courts.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+Berlin, March 24, 1933
+
+  The Reich Chancellor
+    Adolph Hitler
+
+  For the Reich Minister of Justice
+  The Deputy of the Reich Chancellor
+      von Papen.
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2078-PS
+
+                1934 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 365
+
+ Decree concerning the establishment of the Reichs Ministry of Science,
+              Education, and Popular Culture of 1 May 1934
+
+(1) For the entire system of education, training, and instruction of
+the Reich, as well as for the tasks of science, a Reich Ministry for
+Science, education, and popular culture is established.
+
+(2) The director of this office bears the title “Reich Minister for
+Science, Education and Popular Culture.”
+
+(3) The Chancellor of the Reich will determine the various duties of
+the Reich Ministry for Science, Education, and Popular Culture. He
+will also determine the duties which are transferred from the sphere
+of activity of the Reich Ministries affected to the new Ministry and
+also even if the sphere of activity of the ministries concerned is
+fundamentally affected hereby.
+
+Berlin, 1 May 1934
+
+                                              The President of the Reich
+                                                          von Hindenburg
+
+                                             The Chancellor of the Reich
+                                                            Adolf Hitler
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2079-PS
+
+               1935 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 1145
+
+                    Reich Flag Law 15 September 1935
+
+The Reichstag has unanimously ratified the following law which is
+hereby announced:
+
+
+                               Article 1
+
+The colors of the Reich are black, white, and red.
+
+
+                               Article 2
+
+The Reich and national flag is the swastika flag. It is also the
+merchant flag.
+
+
+                               Article 3
+
+The Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor designates the design of the Reich War
+Flag and the Reich Service Flag.
+
+
+                               Article 4
+
+The Reich Minister of the Interior releases the necessary legal and
+administrative regulations for the execution and completion of this law
+as long as it does not interfere with the jurisdiction of the Reich
+Minister of War.
+
+
+                               Article 5
+
+This law becomes valid on the day of announcement.
+
+  Nurnberg 15 September 1935
+  on the Reichparteitag of Freedom
+
+                                        The Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor
+                                                            ADOLF HITLER
+
+                                      The Reich Minister of the Interior
+                                                                   FRICK
+
+                                           The Reich Minister of War and
+                                      Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht
+                                                            VON BLOMBERG
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2082-PS
+
+                1933 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 661
+
+ Law relating to the Reich Chamber of Culture of September 22nd, 1933.
+
+The Reich Government has decreed the following law which is hereby
+promulgated:
+
+
+                               Section 1
+
+The Reich Minister for Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda is ordered
+and authorized to organize the functions under his jurisdiction into
+public corporations.
+
+
+                               Section 2
+
+Pursuant to section 1, the following chambers are established:
+
+  1. a Reich Chamber of Archives,
+  2. a Reich Press Chamber,
+  3. a Reich Radio Chamber,
+  4. a Reich Theater Chamber,
+  5. a Reich Music Chamber,
+  6. a Reich Chamber of Creative Arts.
+
+
+                               Section 3
+
+In establishing the Chambers mentioned in section 2, the provisions
+relating to the film industry contained in the Law relating to
+the Establishment of a Provisional Film Chamber of 14 July 1933
+(Reichsgesetzblatt, page 483) and supplementary executive provisions
+thereunder are to receive corresponding application.
+
+
+                               Section 4
+
+The organization of these Chambers must be kept within the framework
+of the policies laid down by the Reich Government in connection with
+professional advancement.
+
+
+                               Section 5
+
+The corporate bodies listed in Section 2, together with the provisional
+film Chamber, referred to as the Reich Film Chamber, are united into
+a Reich Chamber of Culture. The Reich Chamber of Culture is under
+the supervision of the Reich Minister for Popular Enlightenment and
+Propaganda. It has its seat in Berlin.
+
+
+                               Section 6
+
+The Reich Minister for Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda and the
+Reich Minister of Economics are authorized to coordinate the provisions
+of the Trade Laws with the provisions of this law by means of a
+combined decree.
+
+
+                               Section 7
+
+The Reich Minister for Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda is
+authorized to decree laws and general administrative regulations as
+well as amendments for the purpose of implementing this law. The
+laws and general administrative regulations affecting financial or
+trade interests of the Reich require consent of the Reich Minister of
+Finance, in agreement with the Reich Minister of Economics.
+
+Berlin, 22 September 1933.
+
+                                                    The Reich Chancellor
+                                                            Adolf Hitler
+
+                                                  The Reich Minister for
+                       Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda Dr. Goebbels
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2083-PS
+
+                1933 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 713
+
+                             Editorial Law
+                             4 October 1933
+
+The Reich Government has resolved upon the following law, which is
+hereby published:
+
+
+                                Part One
+
+                        The Editorial Profession
+
+
+                               Section 1
+
+The cooperative work carried on as main employment or based upon
+appointment to the position of chief editor in the shaping of the
+intellectual contents by written word, dissemination of news or
+pictures of the newspapers or political periodicals, which are
+published within the area of the Reich, is a public task, which is
+regulated as to its professional duties and rights by the state through
+this law. Its bearers are called editors. Nobody may call himself an
+editor who is not entitled to do so, according to this law.
+
+
+                               Section 2
+
+(1) Newspapers and periodicals are printed matters which appear in
+regular sequence at intervals of at most 3 months, without limiting
+their circulation to a certain group of persons.
+
+(2) All reproductions of writings or illustrations, destined for
+dissemination, which are produced by means of a mass reproduction
+process are to be considered as printed matter.
+
+
+                               Section 3
+
+(1) The provisions of this law relating to newspapers are valid also
+for political periodicals.
+
+(2) This law does not apply to newspapers and periodicals which are
+published by official order.
+
+(3) The Reich Minister of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda will
+determine which periodicals are to be considered as political within
+the meaning of the law. In case the periodical affects a certain
+vocational field, he will make the decision in agreement with the
+highest Reich or State agency concerned.
+
+
+                               Section 4
+
+Cooperation in the shaping of the intellectual contents of the German
+newspapers is also considered as such, if it does not take place in
+the management of a newspaper, but in an establishment, which is to
+supply newspapers with intellectual contents, (written word, news, or
+pictures).
+
+
+                                Part Two
+
+                 Admission to the Profession of Editor
+
+
+                               Section 5
+
+Persons who can be editors are only those who:
+
+1. possess the German citizenship,
+
+2. have not lost the civic rights [buergerliche Ehrenrechte] and the
+qualification for the tenure of public offices,
+
+3. are of Aryan descent, and are not married to a person of non-Aryan
+descent,
+
+4. have completed the 21st year of age,
+
+5. are capable of handling business,
+
+6. have been trained in the profession,
+
+7. have the qualities which the task of exerting intellectual influence
+upon the public requires.
+
+
+                               Section 6
+
+For the requirement of the Aryan descent and the Aryan marriage,
+section 1a of the Reich Law for Officials [Reichsbeamtengesetz] and the
+provisions issued for its implementation will be applied.
+
+
+                               Section 7
+
+(1) Whoever has acquired the knowledge of an editor by training for at
+least one year (editor in apprenticeship) with the editorial staff of a
+German newspaper or an establishment of the kind mentioned in Section
+4 and can prove this by certificate to the editorial staff will be
+considered as professionally trained. The apprenticeship served with a
+foreign newspaper may be made equivalent to the apprenticeship served
+with a German paper by means of the implementation order.
+
+(2) The provisions of this law also pertain to the editors in
+apprenticeship with the exception of Section 5, Subsections 4, 5, and 6.
+
+
+                               Section 8
+
+The admission to the editorial profession will be affected by entry
+upon request in the professional editors’ list. The professional
+rosters are kept by the offices of the regional associations
+[Landesverbaende] of the German press (Section 24, Subsection 2). The
+registration will be passed upon by the head of Regional association.
+He must decree the registration, if the requirements which are
+set forth in Section 5 are fulfilled. He has to reject it if the
+Reichsminister for Public Enlightenment and Propaganda protests.
+
+
+                               Section 9
+
+(1) Upon application by the head of the regional association the head
+of the Reich Association of the German Press (Section 23) with the
+approval of Reich Minister of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda may
+permit exceptions from the requirements set forth (Section 5, Nos.
+1, 3, and 6). This exception can be limited to certain branches of
+the activity of an editor. In this case the Reich Minister of Public
+Enlightenment and Propaganda grants the permission in accordance with
+the highest competent Reich or State authority.
+
+(2) Exemption from the requirement of German [Reich] citizenship is to
+be granted to those of German origin if no special objections exist.
+
+
+                               Section 10
+
+The nominator must be notified in writing together with a statement
+of reasons of a decision by the head of the Land Association
+[Landesverband] rejecting an entry into the professional roster. The
+nominator may call for a decision by the professional court within
+four weeks after the notice. The appeal is not permitted if the
+circumstances fall within the purview of Section 8, 5th sentence.
+
+
+                               Section 11
+
+The head of the Land Association is required to decree the deletion
+of an entry in the professional roster if the requirements set forth
+in Section 5, Nos. 1, 2, 5, are not present, or the data furnished
+under Nos. 1-6 has been found incorrect, or the editor has given up
+his profession. Section 10, sentences 1 and 2 are correspondingly
+applicable.
+
+
+                               Part Three
+
+                Exercise of the Profession of an Editor
+
+
+                               Section 12
+
+By registration in the professional roster, the editor becomes entitled
+to execute his profession with German newspapers or with German
+enterprises of the kind described in Section 4. If he moves into the
+district of a different Land Association, he will be transferred to the
+respective professional roster without further examination.
+
+
+                               Section 13
+
+Editors are charged to treat their subjects truthfully and to judge
+them according to the best of their knowledge.
+
+
+                               Section 14
+
+Editors are especially bound to keep out of the newspapers anything
+which:
+
+1. in any manner is misleading to the public, mixes selfish aims with
+community aims,
+
+2. tends to weaken the strength of the German Reich, outwardly or
+inwardly, the common will of the German people, the German defense
+ability, culture or economy, or offends the religious sentiments of
+others,
+
+3. offends the honor and dignity of Germany,
+
+4. illegally offends the honor or the welfare of another, hurts his
+reputation, makes him ridiculous or contemptible,
+
+5. is immoral for other reasons.
+
+
+                               Section 15
+
+Editors are bound to exercise their profession conscientiously and by
+their behavior inside or outside their professional activities prove
+themselves worthy of the respect which this profession demands.
+
+
+                               Section 16
+
+The publisher of a newspaper may compel an editor by means of a
+contract to observe the fundamental policies of a newspaper. The public
+duties and rights of the editor which derive from Sections 13 to 15,
+cannot be affected by policies.
+
+
+                               Section 17
+
+Contracts for the hiring of an editor must be in writing.
+
+
+                               Section 18
+
+The publisher of a newspaper must appoint an editor-in-chief and
+is required to report his name in writing to the Land Association
+concerned.
+
+
+                               Section 19
+
+The editor-in-chief is required to draw up in writing a plan for
+distribution of work, from which must be evident what part of the tasks
+of editing are to be taken by each editor and to what extent he has the
+authority to issue directions to other editors, in accordance with the
+terms of the contracts of employment and the supplementary directives
+of the publisher.
+
+
+                               Section 20
+
+(1) Editors of a newspaper are responsible under professional, criminal
+and civil law, for its intellectual content so far as they themselves
+wrote or selected it. The responsibility under criminal or civil law of
+other persons is not thereby excluded.
+
+(2) The chief editor is responsible for the over-all editorial policy
+of the newspaper.
+
+(3) The editor-in-chief is required:
+
+(_a_) to take care that only such contributions are accepted as have
+been written or selected for acceptance by an editor.
+
+(_b_) to take care that the first and last names as well as the
+residence of the editor-in-chief and his deputies, as well as that of
+each editor to whom a specific part of the direction of a newspaper is
+delegated, is reported.
+
+(_c_) upon request to give information to anyone establishing a legal
+interest therein, as to which editor bears the responsibility for
+a contribution, so far as this is not evident from the data under
+subdivision b.
+
+
+                               Section 21
+
+Editors who cooperate in the shaping of the intellectual contents of a
+newspaper by their activity with an enterprise of the kind mentioned
+in Section 4, are responsible for the contents to the extent of their
+cooperation.
+
+
+                               Part Four
+
+Protection of the Editorial Profession Afforded by the Laws Relating to
+                              Association.
+
+
+                               Section 22
+
+The editorial group as a whole will watch over the fulfillment of duty
+on the part of individual professional colleagues and will look after
+their rights and their welfare.
+
+
+                               Section 23
+
+Editors are legally united to the Reich Association of the German Press
+[Reichsverband der Deutschen Presse]. By virtue of his registration on
+the professional roster every editor belongs to it. By virtue of this
+law the Reich Association becomes a public corporation. It has its seat
+in Berlin.
+
+
+                               Section 24
+
+(1) The Reich Minister for Public Enlightenment and Propaganda will
+appoint the head of the Reich Association who will issue a charter for
+the Reich Association, which will require the approval of the Minister.
+The head of the Reich Association will appoint an advisory councilor.
+
+(2) The Reich Association is organized in Land Associations. Further
+details are regulated by the charter. Editors who live abroad must
+belong to a Land Association in whose district there is a newspaper or
+an establishment of the kind outlined in Section 4, by which they are
+employed.
+
+
+                               Section 25
+
+(1) The Reich Association is required:
+
+  1. to establish educational, advanced training and welfare
+  institutions for the editors,
+
+  2. to give expert advice to Reich and Land authorities,
+
+  3. to cooperate in the making of stipulations for employment of
+  editors,
+
+  4. upon request of one party, to negotiate among editors, and to
+  settle differences in case both parties agree.
+
+  5. to maintain professional courts for the press.
+
+(2) The Reich Association may assume additional duties for the
+achievement of the purposes provided for in Section 22.
+
+(3) The Reich Association is authorized to impose dues on its members
+in order to meet its expenses. The regulations governing this must have
+the approval of Reich Minister for Public Enlightenment and Propaganda.
+The dues are to be collected like public taxes.
+
+
+                               Section 26
+
+The Reich Minister for Public Enlightenment and Propaganda will
+exercise supervision to ensure that the Reich Association fulfills
+tasks which have been assigned to it.
+
+
+                               Section 27
+
+(1) Professional Courts [Berufsgerichte] will be established for the
+protection of the editorial profession.
+
+(2) Professional Courts of the first instance are the District Courts
+[Bezirksgerichte] of the Press. Professional Courts of the second
+instance is the Press Court [Pressegerichtshof] in Berlin.
+
+
+                               Section 28
+
+The Professional Courts have jurisdiction:
+
+1. to try and to decide whether the registration in the professional
+roster for cases set forth in Section 10 is to be decreed.
+
+2. to try and to decide upon removals under Section 11.
+
+3. to interpret termination clauses in editors’ contracts of employment
+[Anstellungsverhaeltnisses] under Section 30.
+
+4. to try and to decide offenses of a professional nature on the part
+of editors (proceedings of an honor court).
+
+
+                               Section 29
+
+The termination of employment must be in writing and must contain a
+statement of reasons.
+
+
+                               Section 30
+
+A publisher may dismiss an editor because of the views expressed by
+him in the newspaper only if they are in conflict with the public
+professional duties of an editor or if they contravene the agreed
+policies. The Professional Court will, at the request of the editor,
+state whether the dismissal, in its opinion, has been contrary to
+the provisions of the preceding sentence or amounts to an evasion of
+them. Legal proceedings before the regular courts, if any have been
+initiated, are to be deferred until the requested opinion has been
+obtained.
+
+
+                               Section 31
+
+(1) An editor who fails in his public professional duties, as set forth
+in Sections 13 to 15, 19, 20, subsection 3, commits a professional
+misdemeanor. In such case the Professional Court may:
+
+1. warn the editor,
+
+2. punish him with a fine not exceeding the sum of one month’s
+professional earning,
+
+3. decree the removal of his name from the professional roster.
+
+(2) His license to exercise the editorial profession and to call
+himself an editor is terminated with such removal.
+
+(3) The Professional Court may temporarily deny an editor, against whom
+proceedings in an honorary court have been instituted, the right to
+exercise his profession.
+
+
+                               Section 32
+
+Professional Courts shall consist of the President and the lay judges
+[Beisitzer]. Alternates are to be appointed for the President and the
+lay judges. The President and the lay judges must be eligible for
+the office of judge or for higher administrative offices. They must
+possess judicial independence. The lay judges and their alternates
+have to be editors and publishers in equal numbers. All members of the
+Professional Courts are appointed by the Reich Minister for Public
+Enlightenment and Propaganda. The head of the Reich Association will
+nominate the editors, while the head of the Organization of Publishers
+in the Reich Press Chamber will nominate the publishers.
+
+
+                               Section 33
+
+The District Press Courts with five members, the Press Court
+[Pressegerichtshof] with 7 members, the President being included in
+both cases.
+
+
+                               Section 34
+
+The procedure before the Professional Courts will be regulated by a
+code of procedure which is decreed by the Reich Minister for Public
+Enlightenment and Propaganda in agreement with the Reich Minister
+for Justice after obtaining the opinion of the head of the Reich
+Association.
+
+
+                               Section 35
+
+The Reich Minister for Public Enlightenment and Propaganda may decree
+the removal of an editor from the professional list independent of the
+proceedings of the Professional Court, if he deems it necessary for
+pressing reasons of public welfare.
+
+
+                               Part Five
+
+   Protection of the Editorial Profession Afforded by the Penal Laws
+
+
+                               Section 36
+
+Whosoever works as an editor despite the fact he is not registered in
+the professional rosters, or despite the fact that the exercise of
+his profession has been prohibited temporarily, will be punished with
+imprisonment up to one year, or fined.
+
+
+                               Section 37
+
+A publisher who entrusts a person who is not registered in the
+professional rosters or an editor who has been temporarily suspended
+from the exercise of his profession with the work of an editor as
+a main profession, or who maintains a newspaper without having
+appointed a chief editor, according to Section 18, will be punished by
+imprisonment of up to 3 months or by a fine.
+
+
+                               Section 38
+
+An editor who demands, accepts a promise of, or accepts a remuneration
+or any other advantage for an action which violates Sections 13 or 14,
+will be punished with imprisonment or fined.
+
+
+                               Section 39
+
+Whosoever attempts to induce an editor or a publisher or his deputy, by
+an office, promise or granting an advantage, to undertake, bring about
+or tolerate the shaping of the intellectual content of a newspaper, in
+violation of Sections 13 or 14, will be punished with imprisonment or
+fined for bribery of the press.
+
+
+                               Section 40
+
+(1) Whosoever attempts to induce an editor or a publisher or his deputy
+by means of threats to undertake, bring about or tolerate the shaping
+of the intellectual content of a newspaper in violation of Sections
+13 or 14 will be punished with imprisonment or fined for unlawful
+interference with the press.
+
+(2) If the unlawful interference with the press is exerted by misuse of
+the dependent employee-status of the editor, then the punishment must
+be not less than 3 months imprisonment.
+
+
+                               Section 41
+
+In cases under Sections 38 to 40 the judgment may include less of civil
+rights in addition to imprisonment.
+
+
+                               Section 42
+
+Whosoever assumes the title of an editor, despite the fact he is not
+registered in the professional roster, will be punished by fine of up
+to 150 Reichsmark or by imprisonment [haeft].
+
+
+                               Section 43
+
+The license of a publisher against whom there is a final judgment for
+violation of provisions contained in Sections 37, 39 and 40, may be
+revoked by the administrative authority having jurisdiction in such
+matters under the laws of the State.
+
+
+                                Part Six
+
+                         Concluding Provisions
+
+
+                               Section 44
+
+Regulations enabling delegates of a law-making body to limit
+prosecutions are not applicable to cases under sections 31 to 35 of
+this law.
+
+
+                               Section 45
+
+(1) Sections 7, 8, of the Reich Law relating to the Press of 7 May
+1874 (RGBl I page 65) are not applicable to newspapers and political
+periodicals.
+
+(2) Otherwise the provisions of the Reich Press Law relating to
+the responsible Editor in charge [Redakteur] are applicable to the
+responsible editor [Schriftleiter or Hauptschriftleiter] of newspapers
+and political periodicals, insofar as Section 20, subsection 1 and
+Section 21 of this law are concerned.
+
+
+                               Section 46
+
+The Reich Minister for Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda in
+agreement with the other Reich Ministers concerned may issue directives
+for the execution of these laws and for conversion from the old legal
+basis to the new one.
+
+
+                               Section 47
+
+The Reich Minister for Public Enlightenment and Propaganda will set the
+date on which this law becomes valid.
+
+Berlin, 4 October 1933
+
+                          The Reich Chancellor
+                              Adolf Hitler
+
+                     The Reich Minister for Public
+                      Enlightenment and Propaganda
+                              Dr. Goebbels
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2084-PS
+
+                1933 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 215
+
+Law on the Formation of Student Organizations at Scientific Universities
+
+                             22 April 1933.
+
+The Government of the Reich has decreed the following law which is
+promulgated herewith:
+
+
+                              _Section 1_
+
+Students of German descent and mother tongue, fully registered with
+a scientific University shall constitute the Student-body of such
+University, regardless of their citizenship.
+
+
+                              _Section 2_
+
+The Student-body is a part of the University and represents the
+students as a whole. It shall be instrumental in ensuring that students
+fulfill their duties towards the people, the State, and the University.
+
+
+                              _Section 3_
+
+Details relating to organization and work of the student-bodies will be
+determined by Land governments’ Student Regulations and by the by-laws
+of the Universities and the Student-bodies.
+
+                                                  Berlin, 22 April 1933.
+
+                                                    The Reich Chancellor
+                                                            ADOLF HITLER
+
+                                      The Reich Minister of the Interior
+                                                                   FRICK
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2088-PS
+
+                1934 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 375
+
+ Decree Relating to Tasks of the Reich Ministry for Education of 11 May
+                                  1934
+
+Pursuant to the decree of the Reich President of 1 May 1934 (RGBl I, p.
+365) I determine that the following affairs are transferred from the
+jurisdiction of the Reich Ministry of Interior to the Reich Ministry of
+Education:
+
+1. Science
+
+  German scientific matters, also in their relation to foreign
+    countries,
+
+  Physical-Technical Institute,
+
+  Chemical-Technical Institute,
+
+  Seismographical Institute,
+
+  Important Scientific Institutes inside and outside Germany,
+
+  Scientific Libraries,
+
+  Folklore,
+
+  Archeological Institute.
+
+2. Education and Instruction:
+
+  High School-matters,
+
+  Support of students, “Reichsschaft” leaders of the students in German
+    High Schools and
+
+  Craft Schools,
+
+  General School matters,
+
+  Elementary schools,
+
+  Private schools,
+
+  Craft and Technical Schools,
+
+  German school affairs in foreign countries,
+
+  Schools in foreign countries.
+
+3. Youth Organizations.
+
+4. Education of Adults.
+
+The Reich Minister for Education is the authority in the outlined
+fields for the tasks including legislation. The participation of other
+Reich-Ministers is governed by general principles.
+
+Berlin, 11 May 1934.
+
+                                                    The Reich Chancellor
+                                                            ADOLF HITLER
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2089-PS
+
+                1933 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 241
+
+        Decree relating to the Reich Air Ministry of 5 May 1933.
+
+A Reich Air Ministry is established as the highest Reich authority for
+Aviation. The Chief of this office shall have the title “Reich Air
+Minister.”
+
+Jurisdiction will include the functions of the Reich in Aviation; the
+functions and authority of the now abolished Reichskommissar [Reich
+Commissioner] for Aviation are transferred to the “Reich Air Minister.”
+
+This decree is effective from 1 May 1933.
+
+Berlin, 5 May 1933.
+
+                           The Reichpresident
+                             von Hindenburg
+
+                          The Reich Chancellor
+                              Adolf Hitler
+
+                  The Reich Commissioner for Aviation
+                                Goering
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2090-PS
+
+               1935 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 1029
+
+  Decree relating to the Coordination of the Jurisdiction of the Reich
+       and Prussia in relation to Church Affairs of 16 July 1935
+
+Those church affairs, which have hitherto come within the jurisdiction
+of the Reich and Prussian Ministry of the Interior as well as by
+the Reich and Prussian Ministry for Science, Education and National
+Culture, are transferred to the Reich Minister without Portfolio KERRL.
+
+The Reich and Prussian Ministers concerned will issue more specific
+regulations for the execution of this decree.
+
+Berlin, 16 July 1935.
+
+                    The Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor
+                              Adolf Hitler
+
+                   The Reich Minister of the Interior
+                                 Frick
+
+     The Reich Minister for Science, Education and National Culture
+                                  Rust
+
+                    The Prussian Minister President
+                                By order
+                                Koerner
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2091-PS
+
+                1940 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 513
+
+ Decree of the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor Appointing a Reich Minister
+                      for Armaments and Munitions
+
+                             17 April 1940
+
+In order to consolidate the highest leadership of all offices engaged
+in the production of armaments and munitions in the Greater German
+Reich including the German Government for occupied Polish territories,
+I am appointing a Reich Minister for Armaments and Munitions. I appoint
+as Reich Minister for Armaments and Munitions the General Inspector of
+the German Highways Dr. Engineer Todt. The issuance of administrative
+regulations are reserved by me.
+
+Berlin, 17 March 1940.
+
+                    The Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor
+                              Adolf Hitler
+
+                             The President
+      for the Council of the Ministry for the Defense of the Reich
+
+                                Goering
+                         General Field Marshal
+
+          The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
+                                 Keitel
+
+         The Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery
+                              Dr. Lammers
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2092-PS
+
+                1943 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 529
+
+    Decree of the Fuehrer for the Concentration of the War Economy 2
+                             September 1943
+
+Considering the closer coordination and the unified employment of all
+economic forces, demanded by the necessities of war, I order for the
+duration of the war:
+
+
+                               Article 1
+
+The Reich Minister of Economy is competent for the basic
+economic-political questions of German economy.
+
+
+                               Article 2
+
+The competence of the Reich Minister for Economy in the realm of raw
+materials and production in industry and the trades are transferred
+to the Reich Minister for Armament and Munitions. The Reich Minister
+for Armament and Munitions will carry the designation, because of his
+enlarged realm of activity, of
+
+           “Reich Minister for Armament and War Production.”
+
+
+                               Article 3
+
+(1) The Reich Minister for Economy remains competent for the supply of
+civilian population with consumer goods and for their rationing.
+
+(2) The Reich Minister for Economy is competent in the realm of raw
+materials and of the production in industry and trades and in the
+realm of commerce for the treatment of foreign commerce questions
+within the frame of the foreign trade policy of the Reich.
+
+(3) Furthermore, he is responsible within the realm of the entire
+foreign trade, for the maintenance of the general economic viewpoints
+in the framework of the active German economic planning, and to direct
+German economy accordingly.
+
+(4) The competence of the Reich Minister of Foreign Affairs in regard
+to the foreign trade policy of the Reich, and in regard to the
+preparation and execution of foreign trade policy conferences, remains
+untouched.
+
+
+                               Article 4
+
+(1) The Reich Minister for Economy is charged with the topmost
+supervision over the credit institutes, the supervisory and
+administrative rights, which belong, according to law or constitution,
+to the subordinated Reich or state authorities, are transferred to
+him. He delegates the supervisory or administrative rights to the
+subordinated officials, so far as he is not required to take care of
+them himself for special reasons.
+
+(2) He is competent for the financial questions of the German economy.
+
+
+                               Article 5
+
+The authorities of the Reichsmarshal of the greater German Reich as
+Commissioner for the Four-Year Plan, remain untouched.
+
+
+                               Article 6
+
+This proclamation applies to the area of the greater German Reich
+including the incorporated Eastern territories and the Protectorate.
+In the protectorate also, the Reich Minister for Armament and War
+Production is competent in the realm of raw materials and the
+production in industry and the trades.
+
+
+                               Article 7
+
+The legal and administrative regulations, necessary for the execution
+and completion of articles 2, 3, and 4, will be issued: For Article 2
+by the Reich Minister for Armament and War Production together with the
+Reich Minister for economy. For Articles 3 and 4 by the Reich Minister
+for Economy in agreement with the Reich Ministers concerned.
+
+Fuehrer Headquarters, 2 September 1943.
+
+                              The Fuehrer
+                              Adolf Hitler
+
+           The Reich Minister and Chief of Reich Chancellery
+                              Dr. Lammers
+
+
+                                 PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2093-PS
+
+                1934 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 617
+
+ First Executive Order relating to the transfer of Forestry and Hunting
+                  Matters to the Reich of 12 July 1934
+
+
+                               Article 1
+
+                              Section (2)
+
+The Reich Conservator of Forests [Reichsforestmeister] has as Chief of
+the Reich Board of Woods and Forests the position and the authority of
+a Reichminister.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+Berlin, 12 July 1934.
+
+                   The Reichminister of the Interior
+                                 Frick
+
+                           The Reich Forester
+                                Goering
+
+              The Reich Minister for Food and Agriculture
+                            R. Walther Darre
+
+
+                                 PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2094-PS
+
+                1937 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 95
+
+ Decree of the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor Concerning the Reich Labor
+    Leader in the Reich Ministry of the Interior of 30 January 1937
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+
+                               ARTICLE 3
+
+The Reich Labor leader in the Reich Ministry of the Interior will
+participate in sessions of the Reich Cabinet, in so far as matters
+under his jurisdiction are concerned.
+
+Berlin, 30 Jan 1934.
+
+                   The Fuehrer and Reichs Chancellor
+                              Adolf Hitler
+
+                   The Reich Minister of the Interior
+                                 Frick
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2095-PS
+
+                1943 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 495
+
+     Decree of the Fuehrer on the Establishment of a Supreme Reich
+        Authority-- “The Reich Labor Leader” of 20 August 1943.
+
+In Amendment of the Reich Labor Service Law, in the form of the
+proclamation of 9 September 1939 (RGBl I, p. 1747), and of my decree of
+30 January 1937 (RGBl I, p. 95), I ordain:
+
+
+                                    I
+
+Under the title “The Reich Labor Leader,” a Supreme Reich Authority
+will be established, with a seat in Berlin.
+
+
+                                   II
+
+(1) The Reich Labor Service is under the jurisdiction of the Reich
+Labor Leader.
+
+(2) The powers of the Reichminister of the Interior derived from
+laws, decrees and orders concerning the Reich Labor Service will be
+transferred to the Reich Labor Leader. The processing of matters
+concerning the Reich Labor Service will no longer fall under the
+competence of the Reichminister of the Interior.
+
+(3) The Reich Labor Leader is under my immediate jurisdiction.
+
+Fuehrer Headquarters, 20 August 1943.
+
+                              The Fuehrer
+                              Adolf Hitler
+
+          The Reichminister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery
+                              Dr. Lammers
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2097-PS
+
+               1937 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 1317
+
+ Decree of the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor relating to Designation of
+         the Chief of the Praesidialkanzlei of 1 December 1937
+
+The State secretary and chief of the Praesidialkanzlei will carry in
+the future the official designation “State Minister and chief of the
+Praesidialkanzlei of the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor.” He will be
+equal in rank to a Reich Minister.
+
+Berlin, 1 Dec 1937
+
+                    The Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor
+                              Adolf Hitler
+
+                  The State Secretary and Chief of the
+                           Praesidialkanzlei
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2098-PS
+
+                1938 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 215
+
+Decree relating to the Status of the Supreme Commanders of the Army and
+                          Navy of 25 Feb 1938
+
+The Supreme Commander of the Army, General von Brauchitsch, carries the
+equivalent rank of a Minister of the Reich--as has already been the
+case with the Supreme Commander of the Navy, Admiral Dr. h.c. Raeder.
+
+Following my orders, the Supreme Commanders of the Army and Navy shall
+participate in the meetings of the Reich Cabinet.
+
+Order No. 461 of April 20, 1936 (Heeresverordnungsblatt page 163) is
+rescinded.
+
+Munich, 25 Feb 1938
+
+                    The Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor
+                              Adolf Hitler
+
+                  The Reich Minister and Chief of the
+                           Reich Chancellery
+                              Dr. Lammers
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2099-PS
+
+                1941 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 295
+
+Fuehrer Decree Relating to the Chief of the Party Chancellery of 29 May
+                                  1941
+
+By order of May 12, 1941, I decree for the National Socialist German
+Labor Party that the hitherto existing office of Deputy Fuehrer should
+be designated from then on as Party Chancellery under my personal
+jurisdiction. In order to guarantee closest collaboration of the
+Party Chancellery with the Supreme Reich Authorities, I order in this
+connection:
+
+The Chief of the Party Chancellery, Reich Leader Martin Bormann, has
+the powers of a Reich Minister; he is member of the Reich Government
+and the Ministerial Council for Reich Defense. Wherever in connection
+with laws, orders, decrees, ordinances, and other regulations the
+term “Deputy Fuehrer” is used, it will be replaced by “Chief of the
+Party Chancellery.” The instructions necessary for the execution and
+supplementing of this decree will be given by the Reich Minister and
+Chief of the Reich Chancellery in agreement with the Chief of the Party
+Chancellery.
+
+                Headquarters of the Fuehrer, 29 May 1941
+                              The Fuehrer
+                              Adolf Hitler
+
+         The Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery
+                              Dr. Lammers
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2100-PS
+
+                1942 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 35
+
+                               Directive
+
+ About the application of the Fuehrer decree regarding the position of
+       the chief of the Party Chancellery, dated 16 January 1942.
+
+Based on the Fuehrer decree about the position of the chief of the
+Party Chancellery, dated 29 May 1941, (RGBl I, page 295) the following
+is decreed:
+
+
+                                 Par. 1
+
+(1) The participation of the Party in legislation is handled
+exclusively through the chief of the Party Chancellery unless otherwise
+directed by the Fuehrer. Proposals and suggestions for legislation
+coming from the Party, its organizations and affiliated associations,
+may be submitted to the competent supreme Reich authorities only
+through the chief of the Party Chancellery.
+
+(2) The same procedure regarding collaboration of the Party in
+personnel questions of civil servants will be used exclusively through
+the chief of the Party Chancellery.
+
+
+                                 Par. 2
+
+In legislative functions the position of the chief of the Party
+Chancellery will be that of a participating Reich Minister in all
+cases. The supreme Reich authority will therefore include him in
+the preparations for Reich laws, for decrees and directives of the
+Fuehrer, for directives of the Counsels of Ministers for the Defense
+of the Reich, as well as directives of the supreme Reich authorities
+to include executive directives and general directives. The same
+applies to his concurrence with laws and directives of the states and
+directives of the Reich deputies [Reichsstadthalter].
+
+
+                                 Par. 3
+
+In fundamental and political questions, in particular those which serve
+to prepare, change or put into effect laws, decrees and directives,
+the channels between the supreme Reich authorities and the supreme
+authorities of the states which include several Gaue on the one
+hand, and the offices of the Party, its organizations and affiliated
+associates on the other hand, go through the chief of the Party
+Chancellery. Direct communication between the supreme Reich authorities
+and the supreme State authorities with other offices of the Party is
+not permissible in these cases. This applies to personnel matters
+regarding civil servants in as far as there are no special regulations.
+
+  Fuehrer Headquarters, 16 January 1942.
+
+         The Reichs Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery
+                              Dr. Lammers
+
+                   The Chief of the Party Chancellery
+                               M. Bormann
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2101-PS
+
+                1941 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 192
+
+  Decree of the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor concerning the Inspector
+General of the German Highways Administration of the 3rd of April 1941.
+
+The Inspector General of the German Highways Administration has the
+power of a Reich Minister.
+
+Berlin, April 3, 1941
+
+                    The Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor
+                              Adolf Hitler
+
+          The Reichminister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery
+                              Dr. Lammers
+
+
+                                 PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2102-PS
+
+                1941 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 467
+
+  Decree of the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor concerning the Inspector
+              General for Water and Power of 29 July 1941
+
+In consideration of the special needs of the war and the necessity
+of unified planning in the Greater German Territory I appoint for
+the administration and reconstitution of the power development and
+the Power and Water administration an Inspector General for Water
+and Power. He has within the field for his activity the position and
+authority of a Reichminister and a Prussian Minister. His office is the
+highest Reich authority and the highest Provincial authority in Prussia.
+
+To the office of Inspector General for Water and Power I nominate the
+Inspector General for the German Highways, Reichsminister Dr. Todt.
+
+
+                        I. Power Administration
+
+(1) The responsibilities of the Reichsminister for Economics in the
+realm of power administration especially according to the law for the
+advancement of the power administration (Power administration law) of
+December 13, 1935 (Reichsgesetzblatt I, Page 1451) are transferred to
+the Inspector General for Water and Power.
+
+(2) Art. 1 Sect. 2 of the power administration law receives the
+following interpretation:
+
+“(2) The supervision is done by the Inspector General for Water and
+Power.”
+
+(3) The Reichsminister for Economics remains responsible for
+
+_a._ the determination of the electrical current demands of the
+industry and the requesting of the necessary amounts of power;
+
+_b._ the preparation of the materials and coal required by the power
+industry;
+
+_c._ the approval for the use of the stock market for the purpose of
+the power industry in accordance with the generally valid regulations
+and the adjustment of the claims of the power industry on the money and
+stock market with regards to the requirements of the entire industrial
+economy;
+
+_d._ the approval for the rearrangement of the legal constitution
+of enterprises of the power industry especially for registered
+corporations, and for the introduction of new legal constitution in the
+field of the registered trade corporation.
+
+
+                        II. Water Administration
+
+(1) The responsibilities of the Reichminister and Prussian Minister for
+Food and Agriculture and of the Reichminister and Prussian Minister for
+Transportation in the field of Water Administration and the waterways
+are transferred to the Inspector General for Water and Power.
+
+(2) The Reich--and Prussian Minister for Food and Agriculture remains
+responsible for the Agricultural matters in the Water Administration,
+namely for the carrying out of the agricultural accommodations
+[Folgoeinrichtungen]. The Inspector General for Water and Power
+decides, in agreement with the Reichminister for Food and Agriculture,
+concerning the carrying out of improvements in Agriculture and in the
+Fisheries as well as concerning the bearable burdens of the land owners.
+
+(3) The Reich--and Prussian Minister for Transportation remains
+responsible for the traffic on the waterways.
+
+(4) The Inspector General for Water and Power may transfer the
+technical supervision concerning the planning and the carrying out of
+Water Administrative measures and harbor constructions, to the water
+construction agencies, in so far as the execution does not lie in the
+hands of official agencies.
+
+
+                        III. Mutual Regulations
+
+(1) The Inspector General for Water and Power takes over at the very
+latest by April 1, 1942 the personnel of the Reich and of Prussia,
+which are occupied with the assignments now transferred to him. The
+Reichminister for Economics, the Reichminister for Food and Agriculture
+and the Reichminister for Transportation will immediately make
+available to him the pertinent business groups. Also included in this
+transfer are the furnishings and office material belonging thereto.
+The details of the transfer will be agreed upon by the participating
+Reichministers.
+
+(2) For the execution of his missions the Inspector General for Water
+and Power may create corporations, institutions of a public legal
+nature or commercial legal companies, or other institutions in using
+new legal procedures.
+
+(3) The Reichminister for the Interior and the Inspector for the field
+of responsibility transferred to them under inclusion of the road
+administration to prepare the development of a uniform administration
+within the framework of the general administration
+
+                                        The Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor
+                                                            Adolf Hitler
+
+                                             The Reichminister and Chief
+                                                of the Party Chancellory
+                                                             Dr. Lammers
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2103-PS
+
+                1943 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 295
+
+    Decree of the Fuehrer on the Cabinet Legislation of 10 May 1943
+
+Considering that the law of 24 March 1933 (RGBl I, p. 141) expires
+formally on 10 May 1943, I ordain:
+
+The Reich Cabinet has to continue to exercise the powers entrusted to
+it by the law of 24 March 1933.
+
+I reserve it to myself, to bring about the confirmation of these powers
+of the Reich Cabinet by the Greater German Reichstag.
+
+Headquarters of the Fuehrer, 10 May 1943.
+
+                                                             The Fuehrer
+                                                            Adolf Hitler
+
+                                         The Reich Minister and Chief of
+                                                  the Reich Chancellory.
+                                                            Dr. Lammers.
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2104-PS
+
+                               1933 PREUSSISCHE GESETZSAMMLUNG, PAGE 122
+
+                 Law on the organization of a Secret State Police Office
+
+The State Ministry has resolved on the following law:
+
+
+                               Article 1
+
+(1) The Secret State Police, with headquarters in Berlin, is organized
+in order to carry out the duties of political police with or in place
+of the ordinary police authorities (Article 2, paragraph 1 of the Code
+of Police Administration of June 1, 1931, Gesetzsammlung p. 77). The
+Secret State Police Office has the rank of a higher police authority
+and is subordinate only to the Minister of the Interior.
+
+(2) The Minister of the Interior determines the functional and
+territorial jurisdiction of the Secret State Police Office.
+
+(3) The regulations of the Code of Police Administration of June 1,
+1931 concerning appeals against orders of the higher police authorities
+are applicable in so far as the Administrative Court in Berlin has
+exclusive jurisdiction over court appeals against orders of the Secret
+State Police Office.
+
+
+                               Article 2
+
+Within its jurisdiction, the Secret State Police Office can make
+requests for police action to all police authorities.
+
+
+                               Article 3
+
+The Minister of the Interior is entitled to issue administrative orders
+for the execution of this law. He acts in agreement with the Minister
+of Finance in regard to the number and type of officials and employees
+who should be employed by the Secret State Police Office.
+
+
+                               Article 4
+
+The law goes into effect on the day of its promulgation.
+
+Berlin 24 April, 1933
+
+                                          The Prussian Ministry of State
+                                              /ss/ Goering and by Popitz
+                                    and for the Minister of the Interior
+
+The above law, resolved by the Prussian State Ministry, is herewith
+promulgated.
+
+                                                    Berlin 26 April 1933
+                                      /ss/     For the Reich Chancellor:
+                                             The Prussian Prime Minister
+                                                                 Goering
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2105-PS
+
+               1933 PREUSSISCHE GESETZSAMMLUNG, PAGE 413
+
+          Law on the Secret State Police of November 30, 1933
+
+The State Ministry has resolved the following law:
+
+
+                               Article 1
+
+(1) The Secret State Police is an independent branch of the
+Administration of the Interior. The Prime Minister is its chief. He
+appoints an Inspector of the Secret State Police as acting manager of
+the affairs.
+
+(2) In case of absence, the State Secretary of the State Ministry acts
+as deputy of the Prime Minister in his capacity as Chief of the Secret
+State Police.
+
+(3) The Inspector of the Secret State Police is also chief of the
+Secret State Office.
+
+
+                               Article 2
+
+The jurisdiction of the Secret State Police covers all political police
+matters of the general and interior administration. The Prime Minister
+as Chief of the Secret State Police, will issue the regulations
+regarding the matters which must be transferred to the Secret State
+Police.
+
+
+                               Article 3
+
+(1) With the enactment of this law the Secret State Police Office takes
+over matters of a political nature which were previously handled by the
+Ministry of the Interior.
+
+(2) The district, county and local police authorities [Landes Kreis und
+Ortspolizeibehoerden] are subject to the directives of the Secret State
+Police Office.
+
+
+                               Article 4
+
+The Minister of Finance is empowered to make changes in the budget of
+the State in order to carry out this law.
+
+
+                               Article 5
+
+Provisions of the law of April 26, 1933 (Gesetzsammlung 1933, p. 122)
+which conflict with this law are superseded by this law.
+
+
+                               Article 6
+
+This law goes into effect with its promulgation.
+
+Berlin, November 30, 1933
+
+                                            The Prussian State Ministry,
+                                                /ss/ Goering      Popitz
+                                             and as Minister of Interior
+
+The above law, as resolved by the Prussian State Ministry, is herewith
+promulgated.
+
+                                               For the Reich Chancellor:
+                                         For the Prussian Prime Minister
+                                                                 Goering
+
+
+                                 PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2107-PS
+
+             1936 PREUSSISCHE GESETZSAMMLUNG, PAGES 21-22.
+
+     (No. 14308) Law on the Secret State Police of 10 February 1936
+
+
+                              Section VII
+
+Orders in matters of the Secret State Police are not subject to the
+review of the Administrative Courts.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+Berlin, 10 February 1936
+
+  THE PRUSSIAN STATE MINISTRY
+  GOERING       FRICK
+
+
+                                 PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2108-PS
+
+1936 PREUSSISCHE GESETZSAMMLUNG, PAGES 22-24
+
+       Issue No. 5 distributed in Berlin, 12 Feb 1936. No. 14309
+
+    Decree for execution of the Law on the Secret State Police of 10
+                             February 1936
+
+On the basis of Articles 1 and 8 of the Law on the Secret State Police
+of the 10 February 1936 (Prussian Legal Gazette, page 21) is decreed:
+
+
+                                 Art. 1
+
+The Gestapo is authorized to carry out the police investigations in
+high treason, treason and explosive cases, as well as other punishable
+aggressive actions against Party and State.
+
+
+                                 Art. 2
+
+(1) In the proper competence of the Secret State Police, the Secret
+State Police Bureau is authorized to undertake measures in the entire
+territory of Prussia and measures effective for the entire territory.
+
+(2) The Secret State Police Bureau assumes the competence of the
+Supreme Federal State Authorities in cases of the Law on guns and
+munitions of the 13 July 1928 (Reichs Legal Gazette I, page 198).
+
+(3) The Secret State Police Bureau is a central collecting agency for
+political police information.
+
+(4) The Secret State Police Bureau administers the state concentration
+camps.
+
+(5) In Berlin the Secret State Police Bureau assumes the competence of
+the Secret State Police for the Federal-State-County and local police
+affairs. Whether, and to what extent these tasks will be transferred to
+the State Police office in Berlin--will be determined by the Chief of
+the Secret State Police.
+
+
+                                 Art. 3
+
+The State Police offices may, within the framework of the competence
+of the Secret State Police, take all the measures incumbent upon
+the Secret State Police with the exception of the prohibition of
+periodicals in their district.
+
+
+                                 Art. 4
+
+(1) Insofar as it is necessary for the detection and fighting of
+aspirations which are directed against the State, the authorities of
+the county and local police in towns of more than 5000 inhabitants may
+decree the confiscation of printed material and restrictions regarding
+the rights of association and assembly for the support of the Secret
+State Police. The county and local police authorities have to obey
+within this realm the instructions of the responsible office of the
+State Police.
+
+(2) The State Police office at its location executes also the functions
+of the local police within the framework of responsibility of the
+Secret State Police.
+
+
+                                 Art. 5
+
+The Secret State Police is an independent branch of the interior
+administration. Its officials, employees and paid personnel belong to
+the interior administration. Its highest superior is the Chief of the
+Secret State Police.
+
+
+                                 Art. 6
+
+The head of the Secret State Police office will represent the Deputy
+Chief of the Secret State Police in all official business functions.
+
+
+                                 Art. 7
+
+The Secret State Police office may, within the framework of
+responsibility resting upon the Secret State Police, make requests
+to the heads of provincial and county governments [Ober--und
+Regierungspraesidenten], as well as to all police agencies. The heads
+of the provincial and county governments have to obey the instructions
+of the Secret State Police office with respect to affairs concerning
+the Secret State Police.
+
+
+                                 Art. 8
+
+(1) The State Police offices are located at the seat of the government.
+The chief of the Secret State Police can, in agreement with the
+Minister of Interior, make exceptions from this principle.
+
+(2) An index of the State Police offices is added in the appendix.
+
+
+                                 Art. 9
+
+(1) The heads of the State Police offices and political specialists
+[Sachbearbeiter] of the provincial governors will be determined by the
+Chief of the Secret State Police in agreement with the Minister of the
+Interior.
+
+(2) In case the head of the State Police Office is prevented from
+doing so, the functions of the political specialist of the provincial
+governor will be taken care of by the official who is destined as
+permanent deputy of the head of the State Police Office. He will be
+designated by the Chief of the Secret State Police in agreement with
+the Minister of Interior.
+
+
+                                Art. 10
+
+The State Police offices may make their requests to all police
+authorities of their district. In counties, the request has, as a
+matter of principle to be directed to the County Governor [Landrat];
+in the urgent cases it will suffice to inform the County Council. The
+reports of the authorities subordinated to the County Governor have
+to be sent to the State Police offices through the County Council; in
+urgent cases it will suffice to inform the County Council at the same
+time.
+
+
+                                Art. 11
+
+The authorities of the County Police have to report directly to the
+responsible state police office on all important political occurrences
+and observations.
+
+
+                                Art. 12
+
+Insofar as officials of the Secret State Police within the framework of
+the authority of the Secret State Police, take over the tasks incumbent
+upon the authorities and officials of the police--and security services
+according to the regulations of the code for criminal proceedings, they
+are acting as auxiliary officials of the Chief Prosecutor of the Reich
+[Oberreichsanwalt] or of the State Prosecutor for the District Court
+[Oberstaatsanwalt] who is locally responsible.
+
+
+                                Art. 13
+
+The Chief of the Secret State Police disposes of the funds set
+aside for the Secret State Police in the budget of the interior
+administration.
+
+
+                                Art. 14
+
+The Ministerialblatt of the Reich--and Prussian Ministry of the
+Interior is the official gazette for the Chief and Deputy Chief of the
+Secret State Police.
+
+
+                                Art. 15
+
+This decree will be effective on the day after its publication.
+
+Berlin, 10 February 1936
+
+  The Prussian Prime Minister
+      GOERING
+
+      The Reich--and Prussian Minister of the Interior
+                                                  FRICK
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2111-PS
+
+                    1941 VERORDNUNGSBLATT, PAGE 190
+
+      Order of the Reich Commissioner for the Occupied Netherlands
+   Territories concerning the Establishment of Administrative Courts
+                                Martial
+
+Pursuant to Section 5 of the decree of the Fuehrer concerning the
+exercise of governmental authority in the Netherlands, of May 18, 1940
+(RGBl I, p. 778) I hereby order as follows:
+
+
+                               Section 1
+
+(1) The Reich Commissioner for the occupied Netherlands territories
+may, if he shall deem it necessary for the maintenance or restoration
+of public order and security, establish administrative courts martial
+for these territories or for certain areas within these territories.
+
+(2) The establishment of administrative courts martial shall become
+effective as soon as it is announced. Such announcement shall be made
+by posters along public roads, streets and squares, by radio, by the
+press, or according to local custom. The abolition of administrative
+courts martial shall be made public the same manner.
+
+(3) Simultaneously with the establishment of administrative courts
+martial, shall be decreed that everyone shall refrain from all
+activities which might disturb or endanger public order and security,
+and that everyone must comply with special orders issued by the
+Reich Commissioner, in which he shall make particular reference to
+the strictness of the administrative courts martial. Any person
+acting contrary hereto shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the
+administrative courts martial.
+
+
+                               Section 2
+
+Unless the Reich Commissioner shall order otherwise, the provisions
+of Sections 3 to 8 shall be effective for the areas in which
+administrative courts martial have been established, so long as these
+courts are maintained.
+
+
+                               Section 3
+
+(1) The Higher S.S. and the Police Leader shall take all measures
+deemed necessary by him for the maintenance or restoration of public
+order and security.
+
+(2) He may promulgate rules and regulations, having the force and
+effect of laws, which are necessary for the fulfillment of his
+functions. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 7, such rules and
+regulations may contain penal clauses subjecting a defendant to fines
+of unlimited amount, imprisonment or jail. They shall be published in
+accordance with the provisions of Section 1, paragraph 2, sentence 2.
+
+(3) In the fulfillment of his duties, the Higher S.S. and the Police
+Leader may deviate from existing law.
+
+
+                               Section 4
+
+(1) The Reich Commissioner shall appoint a Special Agent for the entire
+area for which an administrative court martial has been decreed.
+
+(2) The Special Agent shall be the head of the entire public
+administration, excluding the police administration, unless the Higher
+S.S. and the Police Leader assumes administrative tasks in accordance
+with Section 3, paragraph 1.
+
+(3) The Special Agent shall promulgate rules and regulations necessary
+for the fulfillment of his functions. Notwithstanding the provisions
+contained in Section 7, they may contain penal clauses subjecting a
+defendant to fines of unlimited amount, imprisonment, or jail. They
+shall be published in accordance with the provisions of Section 1,
+paragraph 2, sentence 2.
+
+(4) In the fulfillment of his duties, the Special Agent may deviate
+from existing law.
+
+(5) The Reich Commissioner shall have the right to appoint Special
+Agents, even for certain parts of the area in which administrative
+courts martial have been established.
+
+
+                               Section 5
+
+The activities of all public representative committees which made
+decisions as a body, shall be suspended. Their powers and duties shall
+be transferred to the chief administrative authority concerned with
+the subject matter (for example, commissioner of the province, major,
+overseer of dikes, etc.).
+
+
+                               Section 6
+
+The validity of regulations issued by the Secretaries General in the
+Netherlands Ministries in accordance with Section 3, paragraph 2,
+sentence 2, of Order No. 3/1940, or by virtue of Order No. 23/1940,
+shall be dependent upon prior consent by the Special Agent (Section 4).
+
+
+                               Section 7
+
+Any person shall be subject to court martial who, after the
+establishment of an administrative court martial, shall intentionally
+participate in activities likely to disturb or to endanger public order
+and security, or who intentionally violates special orders of the Reich
+Commissioner issued in accordance with Section 1, paragraph 3. Such
+person shall be punishable by death or, in less serious cases, by hard
+labor either for life or for a period of not less than ten years.
+
+
+                               Section 8
+
+(1) The German Superior Court shall operate as a court martial in
+accordance with the procedure established in the Old Reich for
+proceedings before Special Courts.
+
+(2) The provisions regarding judicial procedure for the German Armed
+Forces and the jurisdiction of Special Courts in criminal cases
+concerning members of the S.S. and of the police forces assigned to
+special duty, shall not be affected by this order; Section 11 of Order
+No. 52/1940, regarding the possibility of referring certain criminal
+cases to the jurisdiction of Special Courts, shall likewise remain
+unaffected.
+
+(3) The judges of the court martial shall be appointed by the
+Reich Commissioner. The Court Martial shall be considered lawfully
+constituted even if only one judge has the educational qualifications
+required for judicial tenure.
+
+(4) Death sentences shall be executed by shooting.
+
+
+                               Section 9
+
+This order becomes effective on the day of publication.
+
+
+  The Hague, March 19, 1941                                SEYSS-INQUART
+
+   Reich Commissioner for the Occupied Netherlands Territories. 2 7 2
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2112-PS
+
+                    1941 VERORDNUNGSBLATT, PAGE 655
+
+      Order of the Reich Commissioner for the Occupied Netherlands
+       Territories concerning Jewish Real Estate--11 August 1941
+
+By virtue of article 5 of the decree of the Fuehrer concerning the
+exercise of Governmental authority in the Netherlands, of May 18, 1940
+(RGBl I, p. 778) I order as follows:
+
+
+                                 Part I
+
+                               DEFINITION
+
+
+                               Section 1
+
+(1) Jewish real estate, as defined in this order is any real estate
+which belongs in whole or in part:
+
+  1. To a Jew, as defined in Section 4 of Order No. 189/1940,
+  concerning the registration of enterprises;
+
+  2. To an enterprise which is required to register by virtue of Order
+  No. 189/1940;
+
+  3. To a private corporation, an association, an institution,
+  a foundation or any other endowment, if one of the conditions
+  of Section 2 of Order No. 189/1940 is fulfilled, although the
+  organization in question is not an enterprise within the meaning of
+  that order.
+
+(2) Jewish real estate for the purpose of this order is, further, any
+right in real estate, as well as any mortgage, to which a person, an
+enterprise, an association, an institution, a foundation or any other
+endowment, as defined in paragraph (1), is entitled in its entirety or
+in part.
+
+(3) The owner or beneficiary, for the purpose of this order, is the
+holder of title to the property, the possessor of a right in the real
+estate, or the mortgage creditor.
+
+
+                               Section 2
+
+The provisions of this order shall not apply to real estate covered by
+the provisions of Order No. 102/1941, concerning the registration and
+treatment of agricultural real estate in Jewish hands (Order for the
+Exclusion of Jews from Agriculture).
+
+
+                                Part II
+
+                      REQUIREMENT OF REGISTRATION
+
+
+                               Section 3
+
+(1) Jewish real estate must be registered in writing with the
+Netherlands Real Estate Administration, The Hague, Juliana van
+Stolberglaan 45, by the use of a form which may be obtained from the
+Chambers of Industry and Commerce.
+
+(2) Registration must be made before September 15, 1941. Any real
+estate acquired only after this order has become effective, must be
+registered within one month after such acquisition.
+
+(3) The owner or beneficiary of real estate must register it. Any
+person who is entitled to represent the owner or beneficiary, or who is
+entitled to administrate such real estate, must also register it.
+
+
+                               Section 4
+
+(1) A person required to register must fill out the registration form
+completely and truthfully.
+
+(2) Copies of the following documents must be filed with registration
+form, if they are in the possession of the person registering:
+
+  1. Excerpts from the Land-Register and the Mortgage-Register;
+
+  2. Contracts of sale and other documents concerning the acquisition
+  of the real estate;
+
+  3. Contracts of lease or tenancy, or other documents showing an
+  existing use.
+
+(3) The Netherlands Real Estate Administration is empowered to require
+further information and the production of books, vouchers, and any
+other documents.
+
+
+                               Section 5
+
+(1) Every parcel of real estate, every right in real estate and
+every mortgage which on or before May 9, 1940, belonged to a person,
+an enterprise, an association, an institution, a foundation or any
+other endowment, as defined in Section 1, paragraph 1, or to which
+such person, enterprise, association, institution, foundation or
+other endowment was entitled, and which, before this order has become
+effective, has been transferred to any other person, must likewise be
+registered.
+
+(2) The owner or beneficiary as defined in paragraph 1, and his
+representative, as well as his immediate successor in title and the
+representative of the latter, are required to perform this registration.
+
+(3) Registration must be filed in writing before September 15, 1941,
+with the Netherlands Real Estate Administration. The registration
+must be accompanied by excerpts from the Land-Register and the
+Mortgage-Register, as well as by the contracts of sale and other
+documents concerning the legal transfer to which reference was made in
+paragraph 1. Section 4, paragraph 3, shall not be applicable.
+
+
+                               Section 6
+
+The registration requirements shall not apply to real estate:
+
+  1. Which has been registered pursuant to Order No. 26/1940,
+  concerning the handling of enemy property;
+
+  2. Which belongs or did belong to an association or foundation which
+  has been registered by virtue of Order No. 145/1940, concerning the
+  registration of non-commercial associations and endowments;
+
+  3. Which has been reported in the registration of an enterprise,
+  pursuant to Section 6 of Order No. 189/1940.
+
+
+                                Part III
+
+                             ADMINISTRATION
+
+
+                               Section 7
+
+(1) The Netherlands Real Estate Administration shall be empowered to
+take over Jewish real estate for administration.
+
+(2) It shall be empowered to appoint third persons for such
+administration.
+
+
+                               Section 8
+
+(1) As soon as real estate has been taken over for administration, the
+Netherlands Real Estate Administration shall be empowered to execute
+all transactions, by court procedure or otherwise, which are necessary
+in the regular course of administration; it may alienate real estate in
+its entirety or in part, and may also mortgage it. The Netherlands Real
+Estate Administration shall be empowered to transfer these powers in
+their entirety or in part to the persons whom it has appointed for the
+administration of the real estate.
+
+(2) Dispositions by the owner or beneficiary of the real estate
+shall be void during the period in which such real estate is being
+administered by the Netherlands Real Estate Administration. During such
+period payments by a mortgage debtor to the owner or beneficiary shall
+have no releasing effect.
+
+
+                               Section 9
+
+(1) The taking over of administration by the Netherlands Real Estate
+Administration shall be recorded in the public register without payment
+of a fee.
+
+(2) It shall become legally effective on the date on which the request
+for recording was received by the agency competent to keep the register.
+
+
+                                Part IV
+
+                              PERMISSIONS
+
+
+                               Section 10
+
+(1) Persons, enterprises, associations, institutions, foundations or
+other endowments, as defined in Section 1, paragraph 1, may acquire
+real estate by legal transfer, only with the permission of the Reich
+Commissioner for the occupied Netherlands Territories (Commissioner
+General for Finance and Economic Affairs).
+
+(2) Acquisition at an execution sale shall also be considered
+acquisition by legal transfer.
+
+
+                               Section 11
+
+(1) Jewish real estate can be alienated, mortgaged, leased, or made
+subject to other changes in ownership or possession, in part or in its
+entirety, only with the permission of the Reich Commissioner for the
+Occupied Netherlands Territories (Commissioner General for Finance and
+Economic Affairs); mortgages in particular can be paid off entirely or
+in part only with such permission.
+
+(2) Paragraph 1 shall not apply, if real estate:
+
+  1. Is being administered by the Netherlands Real Estate
+  Administration;
+
+  2. Is being administered by an administrator appointed pursuant to
+  Order No. 26/1940;
+
+  3. Is being administered by a trustee appointed pursuant to Order
+  No. 48/1941 (Order concerning the Exclusion of Jews from Economic
+  Affairs);
+
+  4. Belongs to an association or foundation registered pursuant to
+  Order No. 145/1940.
+
+(3) The incurring of an obligation to execute any of the legal acts
+mentioned in paragraph 1, sentence 1, is also subject to the granting
+of permission. If permission is granted to incur such obligation,
+said permission shall also extend to legal acts in performance of the
+obligation.
+
+
+                               Section 12
+
+The request for permission shall be made by the person who intends to
+conclude a contract subject to permission, or to carry out any legal
+act subject to such permission.
+
+
+                               Section 13
+
+The permission may be made dependent upon the fulfillment of certain
+conditions or may be connected with certain requirements.
+
+
+                                 Part V
+
+                                 COSTS
+
+
+                               Section 14
+
+(1) The procedure pursuant to this order may be subject to costs.
+
+(2) Action on applications may be made dependent on advance payment of
+such costs in part or in their entirety.
+
+
+                                Part VI
+
+                               PROVISIONS
+
+
+                               Section 15
+
+(1) Any person who maliciously violates or circumvents the provisions
+of this order, or of any order, condition or requirement issued or made
+by virtue of this order, shall be subject to imprisonment or fine,
+unlimited as to the amount, or to both of these penalties.
+
+(2) If the act has been committed negligently, the punishment shall be
+imprisonment not exceeding one year, or a fine not exceeding 100,000
+guilders.
+
+
+                               Section 16
+
+(1) In addition to such penalty, the confiscation of the property to
+which the criminal act referred may be ordered.
+
+(2) If no particular person can be prosecuted or convicted,
+confiscation may be ordered independently.
+
+
+                               Section 17
+
+(1) Prosecution shall be initiated only upon request of the Reich
+Commissioner for the Occupied Netherlands Territories (Commissioner
+General of Finance and Economic Affairs).
+
+(2) The request for prosecution can be withdrawn until sentence has
+been pronounced in the court of last resort.
+
+
+                               Section 18
+
+Acts punishable pursuant to Section 15 shall be considered criminal
+acts as defined in Section II, paragraph 2, of Order No. 52/1940,
+concerning German jurisdiction in Criminal Cases, as revised in Order
+No. 123/1941.
+
+
+                               Section 19
+
+(1) Property involved in the punishable act pursuant to Section 15 may
+also be confiscated by administrative procedure.
+
+(2) In this case, confiscation takes place upon order of the Reich
+Commissioner for the Occupied Netherlands Territories (Commissioner
+General for Security); it becomes effective upon general publication
+or upon notice to the person concerned. If such confiscation involves
+property or rights which by virtue of a legal provision have been
+recorded in a public register, such confiscation shall be immediately
+recorded free of cost in such register, upon request of the Reich
+Commissioner (Commissioner General for Security).
+
+(3) The Reich Commissioner for the Occupied Netherlands Territories
+(Commissioner General for Finances and Economic Affairs) shall decide
+as to the disposition of confiscated property.
+
+
+                                Part VII
+
+                            FINAL PROVISIONS
+
+
+                               Section 20
+
+(1) The Reich Commissioner for the Occupied Netherlands Territories
+(Commissioner General for Finance and Economic Affairs) shall carry
+out all measures necessary for the enforcement of this order. He is
+authorized to delegate his powers.
+
+(2) The Reich Commissioner for the Occupied Netherlands Territories
+(Commissioner General for Finance and Economic Affairs) shall have
+general power to make legally binding final decisions, in doubtful
+cases arising from the application of the provisions of this order.
+
+
+                               Section 21
+
+This order shall become effective on the day of publication.
+
+  THE HAGUE
+    August 11, 1941
+
+                                     Reich Commissioner for the Occupied
+                                                 Netherlands Territories
+                                                           SEYSS-INQUART
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2113-PS
+
+               1934 PREUSSISCHE GESETZSAMMLUNG, PAGE 143
+
+ Secret State Police Department Decree for Application of the Law of 30
+   November 1933, Concerning the Secret State Police of 8 March 1934
+
+
+                               ARTICLE 1
+
+(1) The tasks of the Secret State Police will be effected
+
+  _a._ by the Secret State Police Department in Berlin (Art. 1 of
+       the law of the 26th April 1933--L.R. p. 122) for the entire State
+       territory,
+
+  _b._ by the State Police Offices for the Provincial Police Districts
+       [Landes Polizei Bezirke].
+
+(2) The “Inspecteur” (Head of the Police) conducts the general
+supervision of the State Police Offices, on the order and according to
+the instructions of the “Ministerpraesident” (Chief of the Secret State
+Police).
+
+(3) In so far as the Minister President does not otherwise order, the
+State Police Offices are subordinate to the Regional President and in
+Berlin to the Police President with whom they are in immediate working
+connection. The control of the State Police Offices will be effected by
+officials to be designated by the Minister President.
+
+(4) In places where there is no State Police Office, subsidiary offices
+can be established on the proposal of the “Inspecteur”.
+
+(5) The competence of the State Police Offices will cover
+
+  _a._ matters limited in their inferences to the Provincial Police
+       Districts,
+
+  _b._ matters assigned to them by the “Inspecteur” of the Secret State
+       Police without regard to the limitations of the Provincial Police
+       District.
+
+(6) The local or district police matters within the sphere of the
+Secret State Police will be conducted at the seat of the State Police
+Office by the latter, in places where there are subsidiary offices of
+the State Police by these, and for the rest by the Local and District
+Police authorities as auxiliaries to the Secret State Police.
+
+
+                               ARTICLE 2
+
+The receipts and expenditure of the Secret State Police will be treated
+separately in the Budget of the Ministry of the Interior. The task of
+the preparation of the Budget and the disposition of these funds belong
+to the Minister President.
+
+
+                               ARTICLE 3
+
+(1) The officers of the Secret State Police are officials of the
+general internal Administration. On the request of the Minister
+President, they will be placed at the disposal of the Secret State
+Police by the Minister of the Interior. The appointments of the higher
+administrative officials of the Secret State Police and of the Superior
+officials of the Criminal Police, from the Criminal Commissar upwards,
+will be made by the Minister President and the appointments of the
+other officials will be made by the “Inspecteur”.
+
+(2) The “Inspecteur” has disciplinary powers over the officials of the
+Secret State Police in accordance with Art. 16, Art. 17, para. 1, No.
+2 of the Officers’ Disciplinary Code of the 27th January 1932 (L.R. p.
+59).
+
+
+                               ARTICLE 4
+
+(1) Art. 2 of the Second Decree of Application of the 26th April 1933,
+by the Minister of the Interior (L.R. p. 126), to the Decree of the
+President of the Reich concerning the protection of the German People,
+dated 4th February 1933, is hereby abolished.
+
+(2) Art. 1, of the Decree of the Minister of the Interior of the 26th
+April 1933 (L.R. p. 127) reads as follows:
+
+
+                               “Article 1
+
+  Besides the Police President in Berlin, in his capacity as Provincial
+  and District Police Authority (Art. 1 and 2 of the Decree of the
+  2nd March 1933--L.R. p. 33), the Secret State Police Department in
+  Berlin is also competent for the prohibition of periodicals, for the
+  imposition of restrictions on property, on personal liberty, and on
+  the right of union and assembly, as well as limitations on letter,
+  post, telegraph and telephone secrecy, in accordance with Art. 1 of
+  the Decree of the Reich President for the Protection of the People
+  and State of 28th February 1935 (Reichs Law Register p. 83).”
+
+
+                               ARTICLE 5
+
+Art. 2 of the Decree of the Minister of the Interior of the 2nd March
+1933 (L.R. p. 33), concerning the supplement to the Decree of 1st
+October 1931 (L.R. p. 213), for the regulation of the competence of the
+Provincial and District Police Authorities, will be altered in such
+wise that, for the ordering of restrictions on personal freedom and the
+rights of union and assembly, as well as on limitations on letter, post
+and telegraph secrecy, the authorities of the Secret State Police (Art.
+1, para. 1) shall also be competent, in so far as concerns their sphere
+of office, but that, for the regulation of restrictions on telephone
+secrecy, only the latter shall be competent.
+
+
+                               ARTICLE 6
+
+This Decree comes into force on the day of its proclamation.
+
+                                        THE PRUSSIAN MINISTER PRESIDENT.
+  Berlin, 8 March 1934                                          Goering.
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2115-PS
+
+                1939 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 710
+
+  Second Execution Order to the Law of the Hitler Youth (Youth Service
+                      Regulation) of 25 March 1939
+
+On the basis of Article 4 of the law for the Hitler Youth of 1 December
+1936 (RGBl I, page 993), I order:
+
+
+                               Article 1
+
+                          _Length of Service_
+
+(1) Service in the Hitler Youth is honorary service to the German
+people.
+
+(2) All juveniles from the 10th to the end of the 18th year of age are
+obliged to serve in the Hitler Youth, and namely:
+
+  1. Boys between the ages of 10 and 14 in the Junior Hitler Youth (DJ),
+
+  2. Boys between the ages of 14 and 18 in the Hitler Youth (HJ),
+
+  3. Girls between the ages of 10 and 14 in the Junior Hitler Youth
+     (JM),
+
+  4. Girls between the ages of 14 and 18 in the German Girls League
+     (BDM).
+
+(3) Pupils of elementary schools, who have already completed their 10th
+year of age, are deferred from the service in the Hitler Youth until
+they leave the classes of the elementary schools.
+
+(4) Pupils of elementary schools, who have already completed their 14th
+year of age, remain, until their discharge from school, members of the
+Junior Hitler Youth (DJ and JM).
+
+
+                               Article 2
+
+                        _Educational Authority_
+
+All boys and girls of the Hitler Youth are subject to a public-legal
+educational authority according to the provisions of regulations,
+decreed by the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor.
+
+
+                               Article 3
+
+                             _Unworthiness_
+
+(1) Those juveniles are unworthy of membership in the Hitler Youth, and
+thus are excluded from the community of the Hitler Youth, who
+
+  1. Commit dishonorable acts,
+
+  2. Were dismissed from the Hitler Youth, before this law came into
+     effect, because of dishonorable acts,
+
+  3. Who cause offense by their moral behavior in the Hitler Youth or
+     in public, and thus injure the Hitler Youth.
+
+(2) Furthermore, juveniles are excluded from membership in the Hitler
+Youth, as long as they are in official custody.
+
+(3) The youth leader of the German Reich can permit exceptions.
+
+
+                               Article 4
+
+                              _Unfitness_
+
+(1) Juveniles, who have been found, in the opinion of a medical officer
+of the HJ or of a physician, commissioned by the HJ, to be unfit or
+only partially fit for service in the Hitler Youth, must be relieved
+altogether or partially from service in the Hitler Youth according to
+the medical decision.
+
+(2) The cooperation between health offices and the execution of other
+hygienic measures will be regulated by the youth leaders of the German
+Reich in agreement with the Fuehrer’s Deputy and the Reich Minister of
+the Interior.
+
+
+                               Article 5
+
+                       _Deferment and Exemption_
+
+(1) On request of the legal guardian or the HJ leader concerned,
+juveniles can in each case be deferred or exempted from service in the
+Hitler Youth up to the duration of one year, if they:
+
+  1. Are retarded considerably in their physical development,
+
+  2. In the judgment of the school principal cannot fulfill the demands
+  of school without the exemption.
+
+(2) In individual cases, a request for deferment or exemption from
+service in the Hitler Youth can also be granted, when the conditions
+of Part 1 do not exist, but if there are other urgent reasons, which
+justify the temporary or permanent absence of a juvenile from service
+in the Hitler Youth.
+
+(3) The youth leader of the German Reich will issue further regulations.
+
+
+                               Article 6
+
+            _German Subjects of non-German National Origin_
+
+(1) Juveniles of German citizenship, whose both parents or father
+belong according to their own statement to the Danish or Polish ethnic
+groups, are to be exempted from membership in the Hitler Youth on
+request of those who are charged with their care. If several persons
+have the right and duty to care for the juvenile person, and not
+everyone of them makes the request, the juvenile may be exempted.
+Illegitimate juveniles may be exempted from membership in the Hitler
+Youth on request of those who are charged with their care, if the
+mother belongs according to her own statement to the Danish or Polish
+racial groups; they are to be exempted if the guardian agrees to the
+request.
+
+(2) The request is to be made to the lower administrative authorities.
+The higher administrative authority will investigate whether there is
+an acknowledgment of membership in the Danish or Polish ethnic group.
+More specific administrative rules will be issued by the Reich Minister
+of the Interior in agreement with the youth leader of the German Reich.
+
+(3) The Reich Minister of the Interior exercises the supervision
+over youth organizations of the Danish or Polish ethnic groups. New
+foundations need his permission.
+
+(4) No compulsion may be exercised by anyone toward the joining of a
+youth organization of the Danish or Polish ethnic groups.
+
+
+                               Article 7
+
+                         _Racial Requirements_
+
+Jews (Article 5 of the 1st proclamation to the law of Reich citizenship
+of 14 November 1935, RGBl I, page 1333) are excluded from the
+membership of the Hitler Youth.
+
+
+                               Article 8
+
+                   _German Subjects residing Abroad_
+
+Juveniles of German citizenship, who reside abroad, and who are only
+temporarily in the German Reich, are not obliged to serve in the Hitler
+Youth.
+
+
+                               Article 9
+
+                      _Registration and Induction_
+
+(1) All juveniles are to be registered with the respective Hitler
+Youth, leader for induction into the Hitler Youth before 15 March
+of the calendar year during which they complete their 10th year of
+age. If a juvenile fulfills the conditions for acceptance into the
+Hitler Youth (for instance release from official custody, receipt of
+citizenship, permanent residence in the German Reich) after this time,
+the juvenile is to be registered within one month after fulfillment of
+the conditions named.
+
+(2) The legal representative of the juvenile is liable for the
+registration.
+
+(3) Induction into the Hitler Youth takes place on 20 April of every
+year.
+
+(4) The youth leader of the German Reich will issue more specific
+regulations about registration and induction into the Hitler Youth.
+
+
+                               Article 10
+
+                              _Discharge_
+
+(1) The following will be discharged from the Hitler Youth:
+
+  1. Juveniles after the expiration of the period, fixed in Article 1,
+  and girls who marry,
+
+  2. Juveniles concerning whom it is established that they are excluded
+  from membership in the community of the Hitler Youth according to the
+  regulations of this law.
+
+(2) Article 3, part 3 apply accordingly to No. 2 and 3.
+
+(3) Male and female leaders remain members of the Hitler Youth after
+the period fixed in Article 1 has expired. Their discharge will take
+place by special regulations. They are to be discharged on their
+request.
+
+
+                               Article 11
+
+             _Leaves during Membership in the Hitler Youth_
+
+(1) The membership in the Hitler Youth becomes inactive for the
+duration of active military service.
+
+(2) Members of the Reich labor service may not be active in the service
+of the Hitler Youth.
+
+
+                               Article 12
+
+                         _Punitive Regulation_
+
+(1) A legal guardian will be punished with a fine up to 150 marks or
+with confinement if he intentionally acts against the provisions of
+Article 9 of this law.
+
+(2) Whoever malevolently prevents or attempts to prevent a juvenile
+from serving in the Hitler Youth, will be punished with prison and
+fine, or with one of these punishments.
+
+(3) Legal punitive action will only be taken on request of the youth
+leader of the German Reich. The request can be withdrawn.
+
+(4) Juveniles can be forced by the respective local authorities, to
+fulfill the duties with which they are charged on the basis of this
+law, and of the implementative regulations issued for it.
+
+
+                               Article 13
+
+                          _Final Regulations_
+
+For juveniles of the age classes 1921 to 1929, who have not belonged to
+the Hitler Youth up to now, the youth leader of the German Reich will
+fix the time of their registration and induction into the Hitler Youth.
+
+Berlin, 25 March 1939
+
+                                        The Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor
+                                                            Adolf Hitler
+
+                                               The Deputy of the Fuehrer
+                                                                 R. Hess
+
+                   The Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery
+                                                             Dr. Lammers
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2118-PS
+
+                1941 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 547
+
+        Police Decree on Identification of Jews 1 September 1941
+
+In agreement with the Reichs-Protector for Bohemia and Moravia the
+following law based on the regulations regarding the Police-decrees of
+the Ministers of the Reich from 14 November 1938 (Reichsgesetzblatt I,
+page 1582) and on the decree regarding the right of establishing of law
+[Rechtsetzungsrecht] in the protectorate Bohemia and Moravia from 7
+June 1939 (Reichsgesetzblatt I, page 1039) is herewith published:
+
+
+                               Article 1
+
+(1) Jews (article 5 of the first decree regarding the law on German
+citizenship of 14 November 1935--Reichsgesetzblatt I, page 1333) who
+have completed their sixth year of life shall be prohibited to appear
+in public without wearing a Jewish star.
+
+(2) The Jewish star is a yellow piece of cloth with a black border,
+in the form of a six pointed star of the size of a hand with the
+inscription “Jew”. It shall be worn visible, sewed on the left side of
+the chest of the garment.
+
+
+                               Article 2
+
+Jews are prohibited to:
+
+_a._ leave the area of the community in which they live without written
+permission of the local police;
+
+_b._ to wear medals, ribbons and other insignia.
+
+
+                               Article 3
+
+Article 1 & 2 shall not apply to:
+
+_a._ a husband living in a Jewish mixed marriage if children, born from
+this marriage who are not considered as Jews exist. This also applies
+if the marriage is dissolved or if the only son was killed in the
+present war.
+
+_b._ to a Jewish wife in a childless mixed marriage, for the duration
+of the marriage.
+
+
+                               Article 4
+
+(1) He who violates articles 1 & 2 willingly or carelessly shall be
+punished with a fine up to 150 Reichsmark or with imprisonment not to
+exceed 6 weeks.
+
+(2) Further protective measures on the part of the police as well as
+rules according to which a more severe punishment is permitted remain
+unaffected.
+
+
+                               Article 5
+
+This decree shall also be valid within the borders of the
+protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia with the specifications that the
+Reichs-Protector in Bohemia and Moravia shall adopt the rules of
+article 2 _a_, to the local situation in the protectorate of Bohemia
+and Moravia.
+
+
+                               Article 6
+
+This Police-law shall be valid two weeks after publication.
+
+Berlin, 1 September 1941.
+
+                                 For the Reich Minister of the Interior.
+                                                                Heydrich
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2119-PS
+
+                1939 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 485
+
+ Decree of the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor concerning the Protectorate
+                 of Bohemia and Moravia, March 16, 1939
+
+The Bohemian-Moravian countries belonged for a millennium to the
+living space of the German people. Violence and want of judgment
+have torn them arbitrarily from their old, historic environment and
+finally created, through their inclusion in the artificial structure
+of Czechoslovakia, a center of continuous unrest. Year after year
+the danger increased that out of this area--as once before in the
+past--would arise a new, stupendous menace to European peace. For the
+Czechoslovak State and its rulers had not succeeded in organizing in a
+reasonable manner the coexistence of the national groups arbitrarily
+comprised within it, and thus they failed to awaken and to preserve
+the interest of all concerned in the maintenance of the state common
+to them. Thereby this state has demonstrated its inherent inability to
+exist and therefore now has fallen into actual dissolution.
+
+The German Reich cannot tolerate everlasting disturbances in these
+areas, areas so decisively essential not only to its own peace and
+security but also to the general welfare and the general peace.
+Sooner or later the German Reich would have had to suffer the most
+serious consequences because it is the power which is the most vitally
+interested and concerned by history as well as by geographical
+position. It is therefore only an act of compliance with the law of
+self-preservation if the German Reich is resolved to take decisive
+action for the reestablishment of the foundations of a Central European
+Order based on reason and to resort to measures impelled by this aim.
+For the millennial this historic past of the German Reich has proven
+that it alone is chosen by virtue of its greatness and the qualities of
+the German people to solve this problem.
+
+Imbued with the earnest desire to serve the true interests of the
+nations settled in this living space, to safeguard the national life
+of the German and Czech nations, to promote peace and the social
+welfare of all, I therefore order, in the name of the German Reich, the
+following as foundations on which the inhabitants of these areas can
+live side by side in the future:
+
+Article 1. (1) The territories of the erstwhile Czechoslovak Republic,
+occupied by the German Armies in March, 1939, are hereby incorporated
+into the territory of the Greater German Reich and are placed under its
+protection as the “Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia.”
+
+(2) In so far as the defense of the Reich requires it, the Fuehrer and
+Reich Chancellor may issue, for specified areas of these territories,
+orders at variance with these articles.
+
+Article 2. (1) The residents of the Protectorate of German origin
+are hereby declared to be German nationals and German citizens,
+in accordance with the provisions of the Reich Nationality Code
+[Reichsburgergesetz] of September 15, 1935 (RGBl I, p. 1146).
+Therefore, the provisions for the protection of German blood and German
+honor shall apply to them. They shall be subject to the jurisdiction of
+German courts.
+
+(2) The other residents of Bohemia and Moravia are hereby declared to
+be citizens of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia.
+
+Article 3. (1) The Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia is declared to
+be autonomous and shall govern itself.
+
+(2) It shall exercise the sovereign rights to which it is entitled
+within the framework of the Protectorate in conformity with the
+political, military, and economic interests of the Reich.
+
+(3) The Protectorate shall exercise these sovereign rights through its
+own political agencies, authorities, and officials.
+
+Article 4. The head of the autonomous administration of the
+Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia shall be entitled to the protection
+and the full honors of the head of a sovereign government. The head of
+the Protectorate must enjoy, in the exercise of his high office, the
+confidence of the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor.
+
+Article 5. (1) The Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor will appoint as a
+guardian of the interests of the Reich a “Reich Protector of Bohemia
+and Moravia.” His official residence shall be in Prague.
+
+(2) It shall be the duty of the Reich Protector, as representative of
+the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor and as the agent of the Government of
+the Reich, to assure compliance with the political instructions issued
+by the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor.
+
+(3) The members of the government of the Protectorate shall hold office
+subject to confirmation of the Reich Protector. A confirmation may be
+later revoked.
+
+(4) The Reich Protector may demand information concerning all acts of
+the government of the Protectorate and may offer his counsel to the
+government. He may protest against measures which may be harmful to the
+Reich, and, in cases of emergency, may take all steps necessary to the
+common welfare.
+
+(5) The publication of statutes, orders, and other general rules
+and regulations, and the enforcement of administrative measures and
+execution of judicial decisions which have become final, shall be
+suspended upon notice of protest given by the Reich Protector.
+
+Article 6. (1) The foreign affairs of the Protectorate, especially the
+protection of its citizens abroad, shall be entrusted to the Reich.
+The Reich shall take charge of the foreign affairs in such a manner as
+shall conform with the common interest of both countries.
+
+(2) The Protectorate shall have a representative with the Government of
+the Reich officially designated as Minister.
+
+Article 7. (1) The Reich shall extend military protection to the
+Protectorate.
+
+(2) For the purpose of extending such protection the Reich shall
+maintain garrisons and military establishments in the Protectorate.
+
+(3) The Protectorate may establish its own units for the maintenance
+of home security and protection. The Government of the Reich shall
+determine the form of organization, the number of the forces, and the
+armament to be employed.
+
+Article 8. The Reich shall directly supervise all traffic, posts, and
+telegraphs.
+
+Article 9. The Protectorate shall form part of the German customs area
+and shall be subject to its customs authority.
+
+Article 10. (1) In addition to the Reichsmark the Krone shall
+constitute legal tender until further notice.
+
+(2) The rate of exchange for the two currencies shall be determined by
+the government of the Reich.
+
+Article 11. (1) The Reich may issue orders having the force of statutes
+for the Protectorate, in so far as required by the common welfare of
+both of them.
+
+(2) In so far as there is a common need, the Reich may take over
+branches of the administrative services and may establish the necessary
+Reich agencies in their stead.
+
+(3) The Government of the Reich may take all measures necessary for the
+maintenance of security and order.
+
+Article 12. The laws and statutes presently in effect in Bohemia and
+Moravia shall remain in effect unless incompatible with the purposes of
+protection by the German Reich.
+
+Article 13. The Reich Minister of the Interior shall, in agreement with
+the Reich ministers concerned, issue all rules and regulations, general
+and administrative, required for the enforcement and implementation of
+this decree.
+
+Prague, March 16, 1939.
+
+                              Adolf Hitler, Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor
+                                   Frick, Reich Minister of the Interior
+
+                       von Ribbentrop, Reich Minister of Foreign Affairs
+                                   Dr. Lammers, Reich Minister and Chief
+                                                of the Reich Chancellery
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2120-PS
+
+               1938 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 1342
+
+               Law on Passports of Jews on 5 October 1938
+
+Based on the law on passport, alien police and registration affairs as
+well as on identification affairs of 11 May 1934 (Reichsgesetzblatt I,
+Page 589) the following is ordered in agreement with the Reich Minister
+of Justice:
+
+
+                               Article 1
+
+(1) All German passports of Jews (Article 5 of the first law to the
+Reich citizenship of 14 November 1935--Reichsgesetzblatt I Page 1333),
+who reside in the Reich area, become invalid.
+
+(2) The holders of the passports, mentioned in Section (1), are obliged
+to hand in these passports to the passport authority within Germany, in
+whose district the holder of the passport has his permanent residence
+or in lieu of such sojourns temporarily, within 2 weeks after this
+law becomes effective. For Jews who are staying abroad at the time of
+publication of this law, this period of two weeks begins with the day
+of their re-entry into the Reich area.
+
+(3) The passports, made out to be valid abroad, will become valid again
+if they are marked with a sign designated by the Reich Minister of the
+Interior, which will mark the holder as a Jew.
+
+
+                               Article 2
+
+Whoever carelessly or willfully does not comply with the obligation
+described in article 1, section 2 will be punished with prison and
+fined up to 150 marks or with either one of them.
+
+
+                               Article 3
+
+The law becomes effective with its promulgation.
+
+Berlin, 5 October 1938.
+
+                                      The Reich Minister of the Interior
+                                                                By order
+                                                               Dr. Best.
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2124-PS
+
+                1938 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 594
+
+Decree Introducing the Nurnberg Racial Laws into the Land of Austria 20
+                                May 1938
+
+Pursuant to Article II of the law relating to the reunion of Austria
+with the German Reich, 13 March 1938 (Reichsgesetz Bl. I, p. 237), the
+following is ordered:
+
+
+                               ARTICLE I
+
+                LAW RELATING TO CITIZENSHIP OF THE REICH
+
+
+                               Section 1
+
+The following are applicable to the Land of Austria:
+
+1. The Law Relating to Citizenship of the Reich of 15 September 1935
+(Reichsgesetz Bl. I, p. 1146).
+
+2. Section 2, Sub-Section 2, Section 4, Sub-Sections 1, 3 and 4,
+Sections 5 and 6, Sub-Section 1, and Section 7 of the First Decree
+under the Law Relating to Citizenship of the Reich of 14 November 1935
+(Reichsgesetz Bl. I, p. 1333).
+
+
+                               Section 2
+
+The effective date of Section 1, Sub-Section 2, of the Reich
+Citizenship Law will be determined by the Reich Minister of the
+Interior.
+
+
+                               Section 3
+
+The elimination of Jews from public offices which they hold on the
+effective date of this decree will be specially regulated.
+
+
+                               Section 4
+
+For the application of Section 5, Sub-Section 2, of the First Decree
+under the Reich Citizenship Law, 16 September 1935 will be considered
+the effective date of the Reich Citizenship Law in Austria also, and
+17 September 1935 will be considered the day on which the law for the
+Protection of German Blood and Honor came into effect.
+
+
+                               ARTICLE II
+
+                THE LAW FOR THE PROTECTION OF THE BLOOD
+
+
+                               Section 5
+
+The Law for the Protection of German Blood and Honor of 15 September
+1935 (Reichsgesetz Bl. I, p. 1146) and the First Decree for the
+implementation of this Law of 14 November 1935 (Reichsgesetz Bl. I, p.
+1334) are applicable to the Land of Austria.
+
+
+                               Section 6
+
+Section 3 of the Law for the Protection of the Blood will become
+effective on 1 August 1938.
+
+
+                               Section 7
+
+For the application of Section 12, paragraph 3, of the First Decree for
+the implementation of the Law for the Protection of the Blood, the 16
+September 1935 is also to be considered the effective date of the Law
+for the Protection of the Blood in Austria.
+
+
+                               Section 8
+
+1. A marriage cannot be entered into unless it is proved by the
+testimony of the local Burgermeister of the bride’s permanent residence
+that there is no obstacle to the marriage according to the provisions
+of the Law for the Protection of the Blood and of the First Decree for
+the implementation of this law. If the bride has no permanent residence
+in Austria, the competence of the Burgermeister is determined by the
+further Provisions of Section 3 of the General Administrative Procedure
+Law (Austrian BG. BL. #274/1925).
+
+2. If the Burgermeister has any doubt about the existence of a
+marriage obstacle in the sense of Section 6 of the First Decree for
+the implementation of the Law for the Protection of the Blood, he must
+demand a Marriage Fitness Certificate from the bride and groom of the
+official physician.
+
+
+                               Section 9
+
+In the application of Section 15, sentence 2, of the First Decree for
+the implementation of the Law for the Protection of the Blood, the
+former possession of Austrian citizenship is equivalent to the former
+possession of German citizenship.
+
+
+                              ARTICLE III
+
+                         PROCEDURE REGULATIONS
+
+
+                               Section 10
+
+In annulment proceedings, the provisions of the Austrian Law relating
+to the jurisdiction and the procedure of the courts in lawsuits
+relating to the annulment of marriages are applicable, subject to the
+following limitations:
+
+1. The suit is to be made against both spouses. If the public
+prosecutor or one of the spouses files an appeal, then in the first
+case both spouses and in the second case the public prosecutor and the
+other spouse are to be considered as adverse parties.
+
+2. The regulations relating to compulsory representation by counsel are
+not applicable to the public prosecutor.
+
+3. If the public prosecutor is defeated, the Treasury is obliged to
+refund the expenses incurred by the spouses, according to Sections 40
+et seq., of the Austrian Civil Law.
+
+4. No counsel for the defense of the marriage bond will be appointed.
+
+5. The suit can only be filed, if both spouses are alive. If one of the
+spouses should die before the sentence is executed, the case is to be
+considered in the main as closed.
+
+
+                               Section 11
+
+The court of first instance has jurisdiction over violations of Section
+5, Sub-Sections 1 and 2, of the Law for the Protection of the Blood.
+
+
+                               ARTICLE IV
+
+                         CONCLUDING PROVISIONS
+
+
+                               Section 12
+
+If regulations introduced into Austria by this decree cannot be applied
+according to the letter, they are to be applied according to the spirit.
+
+
+                               Section 13
+
+This decree comes into effect on the day after its promulgation.
+
+Berlin, 20 May 1938.
+
+                                      The Reichsminister of the Interior
+                                                                   Frick
+
+                                               The Deputy of the Fuehrer
+                                                                    Hess
+
+                                          The Reich Minister for Justice
+                                                 per Dr. Schlegelberger.
+
+
+                                 PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2149-PS
+
+                                 SECRET
+
+                                                                [STAMP:]
+                                             German Armistice Delegation
+                                                        14 December 1942
+                                                            Del. W. 7903
+                                                Berlin, 11 December 1942
+
+  Foreign Office,
+  No. Ha Pol 7563 g
+
+The enclosed statement of the Reichsbank, Department for National
+Economy [Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung], of the capability of France
+is submitted for your information.
+
+  To this the Reichsbank remarks as follows:
+
+  “The statement deals solely with the effect of an increase of the
+  occupation expenses through levying on the French budget in regard to
+  economy and currency.
+
+  “It is an entirely different question, however, how to act in
+  practice in the face of the imperative military necessities.
+
+  * * * * * * *
+
+  “The Armed Forces’ money requirements must be supplied in any
+  case--either through the budget of the French Government or in the
+  form of an advance from the issuing bank or in any other form of
+  financing; otherwise it would be necessary to issue Reich Credit
+  Bills [Reichskredit Kassenscheine], which is undesirable.”
+
+  To:
+    The German Armistice Delegation for Economy in Paris
+
+                                                                     per
+                                                     (signed:)    DUMONT
+                                                      [pencil notation:]
+
+The German Embassy _in Paris_
+
+                                                           Occup. SECRET
+
+--each separate--
+
+       #       #       #       #       #
+
+Copy to be attached to Ha Pol. 7563/42 g
+
+                                                Berlin, 7, December 1942
+
+                                SECRET:
+
+German Reichsbank
+
+Department for National Economy
+
+ Concerning the question of an increase of French contributions to the
+                          Occupation expenses.
+
+Altogether the burden for France hitherto as an effect of the Armistice
+is nearly 18.5 billion marks or 370 billion francs.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+France therefore has transferred the greatest part of her payments
+(17.6 billion marks) in the form of goods and labor.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+Anyhow the conclusion is obvious that the French National Economy has
+been taxed more heavily since the Armistice in June 1940 than Germany
+was after the World War.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+Since the French contributions for the occupation expenses could not be
+covered by taxes, they had to be financed in part from the proceeds of
+the issuing of treasury bills, but mostly by credit from the bank of
+issue.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+Whether the economic exploitation of France could be intensified by
+raising the daily contributions to the occupation expenses from 15 to
+25 million marks for the rest of the War seems to us--as far as we can
+judge from here--rather doubtful for the following reasons:
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+Under these circumstances the French Government would be obliged to
+utilize the credit of the bank of issue to still greater extent than
+hitherto in order to finance the demands for increased occupation
+expenses.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+Inflationary rises in prices and wages in France would cause very grave
+disadvantages for Germany.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+Such a measure also seems very problematical in regard to the goods
+[gueterseite] in French national economy.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+With the loss of a large part of French imports, industrial production
+as well as the capacity of France to supply us with food will have to
+be further reduced in the future. Such a great weakening of French
+economic power is to be reckoned with that it does not seem to make
+much sense to raise the expenses of the occupation.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+An increase in French contributions to the occupation expenses could
+be advocated, however, only if there were a corresponding chance of
+raising her production ability [Sachleistungen].
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2153-PS
+
+                NATIONAL SOCIALIST PARTY CORRESPONDENCE
+
+NSK No. 358
+
+                                                           30 March 1933
+
+                     Defeat the Enemy of the World!
+
+ By Julius Streicher, head of the Central Committee for defense against
+                  Jewish horror and boycott agitation.
+
+All Judah wanted the battle, it shall have it! It shall have it until
+it realizes that the Germany of the Brown Battalions is not the Germany
+of cowardice and of surrender: All Judah shall have the battle until
+victory is ours.
+
+
+                          National Socialists!
+
+Defeat the enemy of the World! And if the World were full of devils, we
+must still succeed!
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2154-PS
+
+                NATIONAL SOCIALIST PARTY CORRESPONDENCE
+
+  NSK No. 359                                              31 March 1933
+
+ Additional orders of the Central Committee for defense against Jewish
+                     horror and boycott agitation.
+
+NSK. The following additional orders are issued by the Central
+Committee for defense against Jewish horror and boycott agitation:
+
+
+                              Order No. 3
+
+In enforcing the defensive boycott, the closing of Jewish business or
+the use of violence against their customers is to be avoided under all
+circumstances.
+
+If such an establishment closes its doors voluntarily, no higher power
+is involved, and the proprietors have no excuse for discharges without
+notice or for the refusal to pay wages and salaries or for reductions.
+
+
+                              Order No. 4
+
+Numerous reports are received by the Central Committee saying that
+Jewish proprietors are transferring their establishments to German
+figureheads in order to avoid the effects of the defensive propaganda.
+
+Therefore it is decreed that: Establishments transferred to German
+figureheads by the Jewish proprietors after 28 March 1933 will be
+considered as Jewish establishments for the duration of the defensive
+boycott.
+
+                                                       Signed: Streicher
+
+
+                              Order No. 5
+
+Concerning the defensive action against the Jewish horror and boycott
+agitation beginning Saturday, 1 April at 10 AM, the local action
+committees are again reminded to see to it most strictly:
+
+1. That any use of force is to be avoided, establishments cannot be
+closed by the committee or by its agents. On the other hand, closing by
+the proprietor himself is not to be prevented.
+
+Entering of Jewish establishments is strictly forbidden to SA or SS
+members or other agents of the action committee.
+
+The only duty of the defensive guards is to inform the public that the
+proprietor of the establishment is a Jew.
+
+2. That boycotting of establishments is refrained from if it has not
+been definitely proved that the proprietor is a Jew.
+
+3. That provocateurs cause no property damage which is counter to the
+purpose of the defensive action.
+
+4. That the action committee be kept informed of all details of the
+course of the defensive action by the SA and SS controllers so as to be
+constantly well posted.
+
+5. Posters with provocative contents are forbidden.
+
+                                   Central Committee for defense against
+                                the Jewish horror and boycott agitation.
+                                                              Streicher.
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2156-PS
+
+                NATIONAL SOCIALIST PARTY CORRESPONDENCE
+
+  NSK No. 357                                              29 March 1933
+
+  The central committee for defense against Jewish horror and boycott
+                               agitation
+
+NSK. The central committee for defense against Jewish horror and
+boycott agitation announces:
+
+Julius Streicher, member of the Reichstag, commissioned with the task
+of creating and directing the central committee for defense against
+Jewish horror and boycott agitation, began his work on Wednesday, 29
+March. As presiding deputy of the central committee he appointed Karl
+HOLZ (Nurnberg), the editor of the anti-Semitic weekly “Der Stuermer”.
+The other members of the central committee are:
+
+  Robert Ley, Reichstag member, staff leader of the Fuehrer, in the
+    supreme leadership of the party organization.
+
+  Adolf Huehnlein, Major, Reichstag member, deputy chief of staff of
+    the S. A.
+
+  Heinrich Himmler, Reichstag member, Reich Fuehrer of the S. S.
+
+  Reinhold Muchow, deputy head of the National Socialist factory cell
+    leadership [Nationalsozialistische Betriebszellenleitung].
+
+  Hans Oberlindober, Reichstag member, head of the National Socialist
+    list organization for the care of war victims.
+
+  Jakob Sprenger, Reichstag member, head of the National Socialist
+    league of public officials.
+
+  Walter Darre, Reichstag member, head of the agrarian-political Dept.
+    of the N. S. D. A. P.
+
+  Dr. von Renteln, Reichstag Fuehrer of the fighting league [Kampfbund]
+    of the trade middle class.
+
+  Dr. Hans Frank II, Reichstag member, head of the National Socialist
+    jurist’s league.
+
+  Dr. Gerhard Wagner, head of the National Socialist league of
+    physicians.
+
+  Willy Koerber, deputy of the Reich youth leader.
+
+  Dr. Achim Gercke, head of the National Socialist information
+    department of the Nazi party executive board [Reichsleitung].
+
+The office of the central committee for defense against Jewish horror
+and boycott agitation is located in Munich, Hotel “Reichsadler”, 32
+Herzog Wilhelm Street, Room 56. (Telephone Munich 90-0-12.)
+
+
+                                 PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2163-PS
+
+                    NATIONAL SOCIALIST YEARBOOK 1941
+
+                [Nationalsozialistisches Jahrbuch 1941]
+
+  Editor: Party Director for Organization of the NSDAP Dr. Robert Ley
+
+                  The SS During the War-Year 1939/40.
+
+In the foreground of the work and the battle of the SS during the war
+year 1939/40 stands the fight of the Waffen-SS in the Poland-Campaign
+and in the West, the matter-of-fact-employment of the leaders and men
+of the General-SS in all sections of the Armed Forces and the enormous
+performances of SS-Leaders and SS-men in the course of the work, which
+the Fuehrer imposed on the Reichsfuehrer-SS in his capacity as “Reich
+Commissioner for the Consolidation of German Nationality” by order of
+7th October 1939.
+
+As the Reichsfuehrer-SS said: “Everyone of us knows that he is
+a representative of the Black Corps and has to do honor to this
+community by the best possible performance of his station, whether he
+is employed on the field of battle in the divisions of the Armed-SS,
+or whether he fights as an officer or soldier of the Army, whether he
+has been detailed as unit or part of the police, and serves the inner
+order of the Reich, or whether he fights against the enemies of the
+State as a member of the Security Service, or whether he labors in
+the framework of the historic mission, which has been carried over
+to the Reichsfuehrer as Reich-Commissioner for the Consolidation
+of German Nationality, or whether he is professionally with the
+home-front. The revolutionary spirit of fighting and sacrifice of this
+National-Socialist formation, its daily employment and hereby the
+best and most severe selection have determined its direction and its
+constant unique way.
+
+The firm believing tie to the great blood stream of the people, the
+knowledge of the fulfillment of the deepest German longing by service
+to the people, this welding for a firm inner unity of solidarity which
+the SS could accomplish in the course of hard and fully filled years
+were the suppositions for the now following, largely increased missions
+of the Black Corps.” [Gunter d’Alquen].
+
+The Armed-SS-divisions, a garrisoned organization, which have been
+constructed in accordance with the experiences of the SS and with the
+National-Socialist principles of selection, education, and formation of
+the will and leadership have been fully materialized during the winter
+1938/39. They are at the exclusive disposal of the Fuehrer.
+
+Already in March 1939 the SS-Emergency Force was required in this new
+form for the pacification of the Protectorate Bohemia-Moravia.
+
+By decree of the Fuehrer they were committed in the framework of the
+Army.
+
+Parts of the SS-Emergency Force crossed the German-Czech border
+together with units of the Army Groups 3 and 5, in the early hours
+of 15th March 1939. During the preceding night Army-units and the
+Leibstandarte “Adolf Hitler” had occupied Maehrisch-Ostrau and
+Wirkowitz. The German population in these localities was seriously
+threatened by Chauvinist Czechs. In the early morning of the same day 3
+trucks with SS-leaders arrived at the Police Head Office in Prague and
+contacted the local security-officials.
+
+The commitment of the SS-Emergency-Force in restoring order within
+collapsing Czechoslovakia, was their trial of efficiency in the new
+motorized form. After their return from this action a new order
+of the Fuehrer requested the immediate enlargement of the present
+SS-Emergency-Force into a motorized division. At once, new units
+were formed. As speedily as possible the SS-Artillery Regiments, the
+SS-Anti-Tank Battalions, the SS-Anti-Aircraft Machinegun Battalion and
+the SS-Reconnaissance Squadrons were formed.
+
+The training of future leaders was undertaken by the Junker schools at
+Tolz and Braunschweig in which the selected SS men were trained for
+a soldierly and politically perfect Fuehrer Corps under the harshest
+conditions.
+
+The aim of the summer training 1939 was the training of the new groups
+to make a troop which had grown to cope with any situation.
+
+On 22nd March 1939 the Memel-land returned to the Reich, on the basis
+of an agreement with Lithuania. Also the SS had taken part in the
+liberation of the old German province, especially the Eastern-Prussian
+SS.
+
+In the liberation of Danzig in August 1939 the SS-Home-Guard especially
+excelled.
+
+When in August 1939 the Polish despotism grew and acts of violence
+increased day by day, the quickly formed SS-Home-Guard entered the
+scene.
+
+The SS-Home-Guard formed for the first time in Danzig on 18th August
+1939, at which time they received their colors from District Leader
+[Gauleiter] Forester. The commitment of the SS-Home-Guard made
+Danzig ready for defense and it became possible to proclaim the
+District-Leader of Danzig to become Head of the State of the Free
+City of Danzig in opposition to the Polish threats. This was done in
+accordance with the “Law for the Lifting of Distress from the People
+and State” to be effective as of 23rd August 1939. The political
+department of the Danzig President of the Police was at the same time
+placed under the Senate under the title “Secret State Police Danzig”,
+as an independent department. A further ordinance created the authority
+to appoint State-Commissioners for essential concerns.
+
+When the Fuehrer gave the order that on 1st September the German sword
+should be wielded against Polish despotism, in order to break force by
+force, the SS-Home-Guard was employed in this battle.
+
+They have proved their courage especially in the fighting for Dirschau
+and Gdynia and in defeating the Polish Army of the Corridor.
+
+During the Polish Campaign, formations of the SS-Emergency-Force
+attached to the Army often fought shoulder to shoulder with units of
+the Army at decisive places. The report which the High Command of the
+Wehrmacht made public on the 23rd September 1939 regarding the Polish
+Campaign pays special tribute to this fact.
+
+How much courage and daring commitment the leaders and men have shown
+during the Polish Campaign, is proven by the great number of Iron
+Crosses awarded to officers and men of the Waffen-SS in the Polish
+Campaign for gallantry in action.
+
+Iron Crosses First Class were awarded to 26 officers and 1
+non-commissioned officer, the Iron Cross Second Class to 241 officers,
+227 non-coms, and 203 men.
+
+Numerous reports contain the heroic actions of the Waffen-SS in the war
+against the Allied Western Powers, especially the most daring advance
+of the SS-Regiment “Der Fuehrer”. Reports about the actions of the
+Waffen-SS in this war shall be rendered when final victory has been won.
+
+By decree of 1st August 1939 (RGBl I. p. 1335) the Fuehrer amplified
+the provisions of the Law concerning the Care and Welfare of
+former Members of the Armed Forces, dated 26th August 1938, making
+them applicable to former members of the SS-Junker schools, the
+SS-Death-Head-Units and the strengthening of the SS-Death-Head-Units
+and their bereaved.
+
+The provisions of the Law concerning the Care and Welfare of Members of
+the Armed Forces are therefore applicable to all armed units of the SS.
+
+The Reich-Minister for the Interior issued, in agreement with the
+Reich-Finance-Minister and the Chief of the High Command Armed Forces,
+an executionary decree to the decree of the Fuehrer, dated 3rd August
+1939 (RGBl I. p. 1342). By this decree the Care and Welfare Office of
+the SS, created originally for the SS-Emergency-Force, was commissioned
+to carry out the care and welfare of all remaining armed units of
+the SS. A further Care-and-Welfare-Office-SS was created, which is
+subordinate to the Main-Welfare-Office-SS.
+
+On the basis of an agreement between the Reichs-Fuehrer-SS and
+Chief of the German Police and the Chief of the High Command of the
+Wehrmacht--the Reich-Finance-Minister consenting--the whole care and
+welfare of former members of the Sudeten-German Free Corps and their
+bereaved has been designated to the Care and Welfare authorities of the
+SS to become effective immediately.
+
+On 7th October 1939 the Reichsfuehrer-SS and Chief of the German Police
+was, by decree of the Fuehrer, appointed “Reich-Commissioner for the
+Consolidation of German Nationality” with the duty to evacuate the
+persons of German race from the Baltic countries and from the former
+Polish territories of the Western Ukraine and White Russia. This is
+to be done in accordance with the National-Socialist ideology stating
+that common blood and race should have a common home as living space.
+It was to be his further duty to begin the racial consolidation and
+resettlement of the reclaimed German Eastern territories.
+
+The SS takes a decisive part in this historic task and its solution.
+
+The persons of German race from Galizia, Wolhynia, and the Narew area
+have been settled without loss or friction in full agreement with the
+Russian authorities.
+
+For some time now the Reichsfuehrer-SS has had at his disposal an
+office under the management of SS-Obergruppenfuehrer Lorenz, the
+“National German Central Office” [Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle-VM]. This
+office has the task of dealing with National German questions and the
+raising of required support.
+
+In addition to the VM the Immigration Center Offices
+[Einwanderungszentralen, EWZ.] with the Chief of the Security
+Police and the Security Service of the SS (under the management of
+SS-Obersturmbannfuehrer Dr. Sandberger) and the Settlement Staff of
+the Reich-Commissioner were created, which, in cooperation with the
+NSV [National Socialist Welfare Organization] and the Reich-Railroad
+Agency, took charge of the Migration of National Germans.
+
+Numerous SS-leaders and SS-men helped with untiring effort in bringing
+about this systematic migration of peoples, which has no parallel in
+history.
+
+There were many authoritative and administrative difficulties which,
+however, were immediately overcome due to the unbureaucratic working
+procedure. This was especially guaranteed above all by the employment
+of SS leaders.
+
+The procedure called “Durchschluesung” [literally passing through the
+lock] takes 3 to 4 hours as a rule. The resettler is being passed
+through 8 to 9 offices, following each other in organic order:
+registration office, card-index office, certificate and photo-office,
+property office, and biological hereditary and sanitary test office.
+The latter was entrusted to doctors and medical personnel of the SS
+and of the Armed Forces. The SS-Corps Areas [Oberabschnitte] Alpenland,
+North-West, Baltic Sea, Fulda-Werra, South and South-East, the
+SS-Main Office [SS-Hauptamt], the NPEA [National Political Education
+Institution] Vienna, and the SS-Cavalry-School in Hamburg provided
+most of the SS-Officer and SS-Non-Coms who worked at this job of
+resettlement.
+
+Up to 30th April 1940, the Immigration Center dealt with 149,513
+persons. Of these 56,777 were Germans from the Baltic countries, 92,736
+Germans from Galizia, Wolhynia and the Narew-provinces.
+
+While the resettlement of the Germans from Galizia and Wolhynia is now
+in full swing, the resettlement of the Germans from Esthonia and Latvia
+has nearly been finished. Of these resettling Baltic Germans, 37,134
+persons have been resettled in the Warthe-district, a small number in
+the district Danzig-Western Prussia, and in the Reich proper.
+
+The statistics office of the Immigration Center dealt with 107,882
+migraters from Galizia, Wolhynia and the Narew-area up to 23rd March
+1940.
+
+The settlement, establishment and care of the newly-won peasantry in
+the liberated Eastern territory will be one of the most cherished tasks
+of the SS in the whole future.
+
+The Security Service [SD] of the SS is a thorough political
+intelligence service, created in accordance with the principles of
+racial and ideological selection as required by the SS; it became the
+real security service for the SS, the Party and the Reich. It has
+proved its significance during the war year of 1939/40.
+
+The Security Service is organized in Corps Areas and division areas
+in close similarity to the General-SS; its Chief is SS-Gruppenfuehrer
+Heydrich, who is at the same time Chief of the Security Police. Part
+of the duties of the Security Service is to watch for any changes in
+the manner of working and the tactics of the enemy and to protect the
+people against any kind of sedition. Leaders and men of the Security
+Service work in close cooperation with the German Security Police,
+whose members have the duty also to investigate and to fight against
+any nationally hostile intentions in the provinces of the Protectorate
+and the newly won Eastern territory, to evaluate and to gather the
+results of the uprisings.
+
+The Fuehrer also assigned missions of police nature during the war
+year to the SS aside from those on military matters. Because of its
+ideological and political education the spirit of the SS is alive in
+the German Police.
+
+Thus a front has been created in which the State and the Party, the
+official and the soldier not only cooperate in the defense against
+political and criminal enemies of the Nation, but also as protectors
+of the people. The Police, whose new members are recruited out of the
+ranks of the SS, has become friend and helper of the community of the
+people.
+
+The Chief of the SS-Main Office SS-Obergruppenfuehrer Heissmeyer, was
+appointed Inspector of the National-Political Education Office. Thereby
+it has been ensured that the selected men of the SS-NPEA (National
+Political Education Office) are being educated exactly in the spirit
+of the SS. The educators and teachers of the NPEA are exclusively SS
+officers and non-coms.
+
+The SS takes its share in the work in every sphere of racial life,
+according to the motto given to us by the Fuehrer as our obligation:
+“Our Honor means Faithfulness”.
+
+Our work and fight continues in the spirit of the proclamation of the
+Reichsfuehrer SS: “Thus we have fallen in and are marching forward, in
+accordance with unchangeable laws, as a National Socialist soldierly
+order of men of Nordic designation and as a sworn community of their
+tribes, towards a far future. We wish and believe that we are not only
+the grandchildren fighting better to the end, but that we shall be,
+further, the ancestors of yet unborn generations, which are necessary
+for the eternal life of the German and Germanic People.”
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2164-PS
+
+NATIONAL SOCIALIST YEARBOOK 1940 [Nationalsozialistisches Jahrbuch 1940]
+
+                  Editor: Dr. Robert Ley, Pp. 365-371
+
+                The SS (The Schutzstaffeln of the NSDAP)
+
+                  The SS since the Reichparteitag 1938
+
+Between today and the Reichsparteitag 1938 there is a span of time
+which, saturated with important political events, was rich in missions
+and commitments for the SS as a whole. Only three of those occurrences
+of special significance are mentioned:
+
+  the incorporation of the Sudetenland into the Reich,
+  the founding of the Protectorate Bohemia-Moravia,
+  the return of Memel to the greater Germany.
+
+When the march into the liberated provinces of the Sudetenland began on
+that memorable 1 October 1938, the Emergency Force [Verfuegungstruppen]
+as well as the Death Head units [Totenkopfverbaende] were along with
+those in the lead. Already previously they have proven themselves in
+the fulfillment of their assigned missions in every respect and thereby
+contributed to the results. However, not only the garrisoned parts of
+the SS were employed. Also the General SS [Allgemeine SS] were brought
+forth for special missions. Thousands of younger and older SS comrades
+were employed for the strengthening of the Police and for the guarding
+of Concentration Camps and have faithfully fulfilled their duty
+throughout the weeks.
+
+The 15th of March 1939 brought a similar utilization of the SS when it
+served to establish order in the collapsing Czechoslovakia. This action
+ended with the founding of the protectorate Bohemia-Moravia.
+
+Only a week later, on the 29th March 1939, Memel also returned to the
+Reich upon basis of an agreement with Lithuania. Again it was the SS,
+here above all, the East Prussian SS, which played a prominent part in
+the liberation of this province.
+
+Aside from these illustrated commitments, the cordon-service
+[Absperrdienst], which is included among the well known missions of the
+SS, goes on. It placed increased requirements on the Berlin SS as a
+result of visits by the Italian Foreign Minister, Count Ciano, (21 to
+23 May 1939), the Prince regent Paul of Yugoslavia (1 to 5 June 1939),
+and the return of the Condar Legion (6 June 1939). Also these missions
+were readily fulfilled in cooperation with other formations of the
+movement.
+
+It is here especially emphasized that the SS did justice to the demand
+required of it in all cases and have proven themselves worthy of the
+confidence of the Fuehrer.
+
+Naturally the territorial expansion of the Reich also brought along a
+further expansion of the SS.
+
+The return of Austria already resulted in the creation of the
+SS-Regiment “Der Fuehrer” in the SS-V.T. [Verfuegungstruppen] and the
+creation of the SS-Regiment “Austria” in the SS-T. [Totenkopfverbaende]
+and the formation of the SS Corps area “Donau” in the General
+[Allgemeine] SS. Likewise, the incorporation of the Sudeten-German
+provinces necessitates the organization of new units by the Allgemeinen
+SS.
+
+The founding of the protectorate Bohemia-Moravia also brought the
+possibility to construct an SS here which consists out of the
+independent SS division XXXIX in Prague with the 107th SS Regiment in
+Iglau and 108th in Prague, which are under the command of the higher SS
+and Police-fuehrer Bohemia-Moravia, SS-Brigadier General Frank.
+
+Upon the return of Memel, the whole Memel Ordnungsdienst was taken over
+in the SS by the Reichsfuehrer SS. The members of the new Regiment
+retained the right to wear the native insignia of Memel, the elk
+antlers, as collar insignia.
+
+
+              The SS-Emergency Force [Verfuegungstruppen]
+
+The SS-Emergency Force [Verfuegungstruppen]. The SS-Verfuegungstruppe
+is a standing armed force although it belongs to the SS in its
+entirety. It is neither a part of the Police nor a part of the
+Wehrmacht and stands at the exclusive disposal of the Fuehrer.
+
+The construction of the individual groups of the SS-Verfuegungstruppe
+is similar to the corresponding units of the Army for organizational
+reasons. The Truppe was recruited out of volunteers from the number who
+are conscripted [Wehrpflichtigen]; these however are still subjected
+to special selective laws of the SS in addition to their usefulness
+determined by the Wehrmacht.
+
+In the SS-Verfuegungstruppe, in which they must obligate themselves to
+four years service, they fulfill the first two years of their active
+lawful Army conscription.
+
+In the year 1938 after the reincorporation of Austria into the Reich,
+new SS-Regiment “Der Fuehrer” was formed in Austria by Fuehrer
+decree. It appeared for the first time in public as a group on the
+Reichsparteitag 1938.
+
+During the September crisis of the year 1938, the SS-Verfuegungstruppe
+was placed under the Army by special decree of the Fuehrer in order to
+solve the mission of the liberation of the Sudeten provinces with this
+combination.
+
+In all parts of the newly returned German Sudeten provinces, units
+of the SS-Verfuegungstruppen marched over the border, along with the
+first formations of the Army. All the tasks assigned to the Truppe were
+entirely fulfilled in every case. Hereby, the Truppe showed excellent
+accomplishments.
+
+Following the completion of this employment the order came to
+completely motorize the Truppe during the course of the winter.
+This brought a huge amount of work for all officers and men of the
+SS-Verfuegungstruppe for the winter.
+
+In addition to the organizational measures which were required by
+this rearrangement, the training of a large number of drivers for
+the various types of vehicles had to take place in this short time.
+Specialists had to be schooled. Aside from that, the leadership
+principles of offices and men had to be retaught. While everyone still
+worked with all their might in the fulfillment of this task, already
+the March of 1939 saw the new employment for the pacification of the
+protectorate Bohemia-Moravia.
+
+By decree of the Fuehrer the SS-Verfuegungstruppe again was committed
+into the framework of the Army. This commitment offered an excellent
+test of efficiency for the employability of the SS Verfuegungstruppe.
+Hardly was the work of motorization completed when a new employment
+in this new form had to follow without any apparent large preparatory
+practices.
+
+The return from this commitment however in no way signified the
+continuation of the uninterrupted training period. A new decree by
+the Fuehrer demanded the immediate conversion of the existing units
+of the SS-Verfuegungstruppen into a motorized division. And so the
+organizational preparations for the construction of new groups already
+began on the military training grounds following their commitment
+in the protectorate. The SS Artillery Regiment, the SS Anti-tank
+Battalion, the SS Anti-aircraft machine gun Battalion and the SS
+Reconnaissance Squadrons were created.
+
+The training of these new formations to a battle-ready, employable unit
+was the goal of the so short summer training of the year 1939.
+
+
+              The SS-Death Head Units [Totenkopfverbaende]
+
+Once a year the SS-Totenkopfverbaende step forth into the open on a
+large scale: on the Reichparteitag. The participation on this day is
+a reward for the officers and men for the heavy services accomplished
+during the preceding year. At the same time it should bear testimony of
+the exclusiveness and of the soldierly discipline of this Armed part of
+the SS.
+
+If the work of construction and the commitment during the preceding
+years should be quickly summarized then it must be said beforehand that
+hardly a young German goes through a tougher school of self-training
+and self-discipline as the men of the SS-Totenkopf regiments. The
+service in the concentration camps, the guarding of State enemies and
+of criminal sub-humanity requires unheard of demands of the man in
+physical as well as in psychological respects; the man who fulfills
+his duty day by day for the community in his unselfish commitment and
+in his exemplary trustworthiness. Here it does not only mean to be
+a soldier, but also beyond that, to be a character who remains hard
+despite all enmities and who remains hard toward any temptations which
+may approach him. Only the best human material, selected according to
+character and heredity, grew in this organization for service.
+
+During the last year, as in all of the years of its existence, the
+spiritual tools for their daily employment were given by schooling
+and instruction in the quiet work of the troop while the military
+training provided for the increased striking power of the troop. This
+systematic training made it possible for the SS Totenkopf regiments
+[Standarte] to do justice to all their missions which were assigned
+to them outside of the sphere of their daily service. Was it the
+employment during the reincorporation of the Sudeten district into the
+Reich in which especially the men of the SS Totenkopf regiments were
+placed in the front lines and where it served to execute the quickest
+and most reliable commitment capabilities under orders; or was it
+the reception of foreign State officials which required the troop to
+serve as parade troops in public--always the SS Totenkopf regiments
+immaculately fulfilled their duties. Therefore, they can look back
+with justifiable pride upon all their achievements, in which they were
+employed and where they served to represent the SS. This also goes for
+their employment on district and county days [Kreistag] of the Party or
+on other occasions, as the Reich Warriors day in Kassel for example.
+Everywhere the men happily and unselfishly served according to their
+motto: “Be more than appears.”
+
+One of the main missions in the past year was the continued
+construction of Special Units [Sondereinheiten], for example, all
+matters concerning transportation, communication and medical affairs.
+In addition, there also was the establishment of E-Battalions
+(Educational), the task of which is the training, in courses of 3
+months each, of those comrades of the General [Allgemeinen] SS who are
+not inducted for service in the Wehrmacht. They were trained in weapons
+and terrain.
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2168-PS
+
+         Writings of the Hochschule for Politics Edited by Paul
+                          Meier-Beneckenstein
+
+           II The organizational structure of the Third Reich
+
+                               Number 21
+
+“The German laborer of brain and fist, who marches in the SA, has long
+ago grown out of the bourgeoise notion of duty behind which stands
+‘I must’ and has grown into the sublime feeling of the soldierly
+conception of duty which culminates in the absolute voluntariness of ‘I
+want to’.
+
+We SA men want to live as men, to fight as men, and to die as men with
+the consciousness that we have done our utmost for and devoted our
+utmost to Fuehrer and Folk.”
+
+                                                     /s/    VICTOR LUTZE
+
+
+                                CONTENTS
+
+I. History of the SA. The Path of the Struggle--The SA in the Third
+Reich.
+
+II. Organization. The Branches of the SA--The Operational Staff of
+the Supreme SA Headquarters--The Operational Main Office--The Main
+Office for Education--The Main Office for Health--The Main Office for
+Personal Affairs--The Main Administrative Office--The Main Office
+for NS Tournaments--The Adjutant’s Office of the Chief of Staff--The
+Special Units of the SA--Engineer and Signal SA--The Mounted SA--The
+Naval SA--The SA Sanitation Men--The “Feldherrnhalle” Regiment--The
+Reichfuehrer School.
+
+III. PROSPECTUS. The Law of Willingness to Volunteer.
+
+
+                                 THE SA
+
+History, Work, Aim, and Organization of the Storm Troops of the Fuehrer
+                    and the Supreme SA Headquarters.
+
+           Compiled on order of the Supreme SA Headquarters.
+
+                          By SA--Sturmfuehrer
+
+                            Dr. Ernst Bayer
+
+                                  1938
+
+Junker and Luennhaupt Publishing House, Berlin
+
+
+                          I. HISTORY OF THE SA
+
+                        The Path of the Struggle
+
+Germany experienced in the year 1918 a revolution whose spiritual
+bearers were people to whom morals, honor, and love of the Fatherland
+were unknown conceptions, who ridiculed soldierly virtues and fighting
+behavior and laughed at the performance of the German Army. Their
+example and their propaganda found followers because the man of that
+time had not learned to think clear politically, because he was tossed
+here and there between political, economic, and religious directions
+and interests, and because he did not have the power, to decide for
+himself, out of a deep anchorage and belief, in a great ideological
+idea, and to hold himself firm against a breakdown. That which the
+Reich of the Kaiser had failed to do, which was the internal shaping of
+the human being into a knowing and convinced fighter for the nation,
+avenged itself in 1918 bitterly.
+
+At this time of the complete breakdown of Germany, the Fuehrer with his
+Idea began the march among the people. And beside and with him marched
+men, embodiment of soldierly spirit, who perceived their highest
+mission in life to be in service for a new greater Germany, ready to
+enter upon and to sacrifice everything for the victory of National
+Socialism. They are the first political soldiers of the Fuehrer, the
+original cell of the SA.
+
+Are we able today to write a history of the SA? Scarcely, for this
+history is still too much the present and we stand too close yet to
+the experiences of a great period in order to be able to measure and
+evaluate correctly the immense performance of the fighting period and
+of the upheaval in its forcible measures.
+
+Numbers are distinctive of the picture of history. And, indeed, if we
+would give an historical presentation of the fight and the performance
+of the SA, we must not only name the dates of great events, which
+are apparent to all the world, but also we must go out into everyday
+affairs and experience there the path, spirit, and struggle of the SA
+as an historical performance of the unfolding power of a nation. Dates
+and numbers, however, win meaning and become valuable only if they come
+alive as the expression of a great deed, of an offered sacrifice or
+of an historical performance for the nation. And the SA has produced
+innumerable of such dates and figures which distinguish the path of
+the SA as the sacrificial way of the best of a nation. Along this
+path stand the eternal monuments of over 400 blood witnesses of the
+Movement, who gave their lives for the resurrection of Germany.
+
+The SA was not founded as one forms just any sort of club. It was born
+in midst of strife and received from the Fuehrer himself the name
+“Storm Troops” after that memorable hall battle in the Hofbrauhaus
+at Munich on the 4th of November 1921. Forty-six National Socialist
+regulars stood against a thousand Marxists on this memorable day. The
+Fuehrer had spoken to his men before the meeting: “Today for the first
+time you will have to preserve the faith of the Movement come what may.
+Not one of us leaves the hall unless they bear us out as dead men.
+He who cowardly yields, from him I will personally tear off his arm
+band and take away his badge. Think about the fact that attack at the
+slightest attempt to make an explosion is the best defense.”
+
+In a bitter struggle 46 German men, who were determined to carry
+through to the end even at the sacrifice of their lives, beat out
+of the hall and put to flight a thousand Marxists. It was a baptism
+of fire and a test of the willingness to bear a burden which this
+young shocktroop of the Movement had masterfully undergone and which
+secured for the Party peaceful meetings up to 9 November 1925, for no
+Marxist dared to raise his fist again in National Socialist meetings.
+Outside, however, on the streets the dissembling strife continued in
+strengthened extent.
+
+Blood and sacrifice were the most faithful companions of the young SA
+on its hard path to power. The Storm Troops were and still are today
+the fist and propaganda arm of the Movement. The SA was not only
+messenger, but also pattern for the Idea, the spiritual and physical
+armament of the Party and the assembly basin for the fanatical fighters
+of the National Socialist ideology. So the SA became the school for
+practical National Socialism for all German men; it has so remained up
+to the present day and it will be so forever in the future.
+
+It is one of the greatest historical services of the SA that at the
+time when the German People’s Army had to undergo a dissolution, it
+held high those virtues which marked the German soldier: personal
+courage, idealism, willingness to sacrifice, consciousness of
+responsibility, power to decide, and leadership. Thus, the SA became
+among the people the messenger and bearer of German armed strength and
+German armed spirit.
+
+The 4th of November 1921 was not only the birth hour of the SA by
+itself, but was the day from which the young fighting troop of the
+Movement took its stand at the focal point of political events. With
+the clear recognition that now the unity of a troop led to victory,
+the SA was systematically reorganized and so-called “Centuries” were
+established. The year 1922 saw the SA variously in action. On the 16th
+of August the first marching columns demonstrated along with patriotic
+associations against the protective law of the Republic. The Marxists
+appeared but the SA struck destructively and by fighting gained for
+itself the liberty and right of the streets. The flow into the SA grew
+so, that in September 1922 eight Hundertschaften could be raised in
+Munich. These quickly grew further. On the 23rd of November the 11th
+Hundertschaft was formed, which was composed almost exclusively of
+students. The present deputy of the Fuehrer, Rudolf Hess, took over the
+leadership of this Century.
+
+“We have to teach the Marxists that the master of the streets in the
+future is National Socialism, exactly as it will once be the master of
+the State”; thus, Adolf Hitler sketched the outlines of the task of
+the SA. And sooner perhaps than one supposed, the opportunity came to
+let deeds speak. The march in Coburg on the 14th and 15th of October
+1922 became a beacon of the Germany which was awakening. It was to be
+a “German Day” set up by the citizens and it became a break-through
+battle for National Socialism. It became the day of the SA on which
+800 SA men under the leadership of Adolf Hitler and Naval Lieutenant
+retired, Klintzsch, broke completely the Red Terror.
+
+This mighty success and its linking danger for the system of government
+led to a step by the Berlin government which was often repeated in
+the following years: prohibition of the NSDAP for Prussia and other
+states. The more lively the activity became in Bavaria. For the first
+time, on 28 January 1923, the Reich Party Day of the NSDAP was held
+in Munich, where the four standards designed by Adolf Hitler himself
+were handed over to the SA as campaign symbols. And here, too, the
+11th Hundertschaft appeared for the first time in uniform: grey cap,
+wind-breaker, swastika band, and knotted stick.
+
+The Ruhr invasion by the French caused the conversion of the SA, which
+up to then had been only a political fighting troop, into an armed
+association for the purpose of employing these battle-tested men in
+a desired active resistance against foreign domination. All pressed
+for a decision. And in the matter the Storm Troops of the Fuehrer did
+not want to be inactive. They joined themselves with other fighting
+Bavarian bands and formed the “Labor group of patriotic fighting
+associations” under the leadership of retired First Lieutenant Kriebel.
+In March 1923 the last commandant of the Richthofen Squadron, Hermann
+Goering, took command of the entire SA. Activity and readiness is
+the password. Out at Forstenrieder Park and on the Froettmaninger
+heath near Munich the Labor group held great exercises, at which on
+May 1st an armed parade of the whole Bavarian SA and other fighting
+associations ensues on the Oberwiesen field. This day was supposed to
+bring the final reckoning with the Marxists. Only the employment of the
+Reichswehr and police prevented this intention.
+
+The decision is pressing; the collapse of the Ruhr resistance and
+its consequences threaten the unity of the Reich and seem to bring
+about chaos. The 8th of November comes around. That evening, full of
+hope and certainty of success; the betrayal of that night, base and
+unbelievable. No one believes yet that men in the fateful and difficult
+hour have betrayed the struggle for Germany. On the morning of November
+9th, Adolf Hitler casts his young Movement, his faithful and upright
+fighters, onto the scales of decision; the march to the Hall of the
+Field Generals through jubilant Munich. Betrayal causes this March of
+Triumph to become a Death March for the best of the nation.
+
+The Fuehrer is in custody. The Head of the Movement is missing in
+the most difficult hours after the miscarriage of the revolution.
+Everything appears beaten and lost. But one thing is not: that spirit
+of the Storm Troops which has fought for the new Reich and which has
+become, under the concept “Spirit of the SA”, the pattern for voluntary
+and ceaseless preparedness for sacrifice and initiative for German men.
+And it was victorious over betrayal.
+
+The faithful collaborators and comrades of the Fuehrer rescue what
+is to be rescued. The Illegal SA continues and waits for the return
+of the Fuehrer from the prison in Landsberg. He returns in 1925, and
+the men of the Storm Troops, with the same spirit of readiness for
+sacrifice and use, come to him and are strongest support to him at
+the Party refounding, which occurs on February 27, 1925. In his basic
+directions for the reestablishment of the National Socialist German
+Labor Party, Adolf Hitler ordered the refounding of the SA as a pure
+Party organization for meeting hall protection and propaganda, without
+having the character of an armed association.
+
+And now a fight for Germany began of such a sort as was never before
+fought. What are names, what are words or figures which are not indeed
+able to express the magnitude of belief and of idealism on one side and
+the magnitude of hate on the other side.
+
+1925: The Party lives again, and its iron spearhead is the SA. With it
+the power and meaning of the National Socialist movement grows. Around
+the central events of the whole Movement, the Reich Party Days, dates,
+decisions, fights, and victory roll themselves into a long list of
+German men of undenying willingness to sacrifice.
+
+One cannot count up all of this at one time. However, we wish to
+present the sense and meaning as we tell what the SA was: the political
+strong arm, the visible representation of the idealism and daily
+initiative of the Party. Generally, it stopped the breaches. As an
+example of a seemingly impossible deed, the 11th of February 1927
+should be firmly preserved. It is the day on which the SA broke the Red
+Terror, with heavy sacrifice, in the hall battle at the Pharaoh’s Hall
+in Berlin, the stronghold of the Communists, and thereby established
+itself decisively in the capital city of the Reich. In considering the
+badly wounded SA men, Dr. Goebbels coined the phrase “Unknown SA man”,
+who silently fights and bleeds, obeying only his duty.
+
+Possession of the streets is the key to power in the state--for this
+reason the SA marched and fought. The public would have never received
+knowledge from the agitative speeches of the little Reichstag faction
+and its propaganda or from the desires and aims of the Party, if the
+martial tread and battle song of the SA companies had not beat the
+measure for the truth of a relentless criticism of the state of
+affairs in the governmental system. They wanted the young Movement to
+keep silent. Nothing was to be read in the press about the labor of the
+National Socialists, not to mention the basic aims of its platform.
+They simply did not want to awake any interest in it. However, the
+martial tread of SA took care that even the drowsiest citizens had to
+see at least the existence of a fighting troop.
+
+The SA conquered for itself a place in public opinion and the
+leadership of the National Socialist Movement dictated to its opponents
+the law for quarrels. The SA was already a state within a state; a part
+of the future in a sad present.
+
+In this period there was only one thing: discretionless use of the
+person and genuine spirit of offensive. This became more essential from
+year to year for sudden attacks on individual National Socialists and
+whole columns piled up in frightful quantity. The death roster of the
+Movement grew. However, the greater the losses became, the more tightly
+the SA men closed themselves into a sworn fighting partnership. Its
+exemplary employment did not remain without effect. The best from the
+ranks of the Reds came to the “Nazis”, because they were convinced by
+their deeds. When at the very end of 1926 the volunteer-corps fighters
+of the various Rossbach groups joined themselves to the SA, the SA
+received not only strengthening alone through that but also strong
+buoyancy.
+
+With the end of 1926 there begins a new phase of development in the
+history of the SA. The Storm Troops until now had stood in loose
+connection with the political organization. A Reich branch or central
+command office was not yet in existence. Both were created with the
+ensuing founding of the Supreme SA Leadership Headquarters, on November
+1st, 1926. With that a central control originated to which the SA, as
+well as the SS and the HJ, were subordinate. Adolf Hitler appointed the
+Gau leader and SA Fuehrer of the Gau of the Ruhr, Franz von Pfeffer as
+the highest SA Leader. In the course of the years 1926 and 1927 the
+SA was uniformly reorganized and divided into divisions [Gruppen],
+Gau areas [Gaustuerme], brigades [Brigaden], regiments [Standarten],
+battalions [Sturme], and platoons [Trupps] and at the same time a sharp
+separation from the political organization was achieved. That which had
+been established in practice became now the clear internal orientation
+for the SA: the Storm Troop men should be educated into political
+soldiers, politically dependable, spiritually motivated, physically
+steeled, disciplined and devoted to the Fuehrer in unconditioned
+fidelity and obedience. Thus the SA became the mightiest instrument in
+the hands of the Fuehrer.
+
+1927: The first huge demonstration in Nurnberg of National Socialism
+which can no longer be dead silent. 30,000 SA men march a bloc of will
+and strength. The System becomes nervous. Up to then the Executive has
+looked on inactively for the most part. From then on it directed all
+measures against National Socialism and allowed thereby more and more
+liberty to Communism and Marxism. The word “Forbidden” was all too
+well known to SA men. The Berlin SA, which had been forbidden with the
+Party in May 1927, coined the password: In spite of prohibition, not
+dead. And this slogan, to the discomfort of the System, became an all
+too living reality when it issued like hail prohibitions of all shades
+and shapes in the following years. One of the old veterans coined the
+phrase once: the history of the SA and of the NSDAP generally has been
+a single, almost uninterrupted succession of prohibitions. Something
+was always prohibited. There was never a period in which the SA was
+granted nearly the same liberty in all Germany as was granted to the
+Reichbanner or certain patriotic associations.
+
+Brown trousers and boots in themselves were dangerous for the State.
+The white shirt had to substitute for the brown shirt for a long time.
+Often the SA men came to meetings and parades with naked upper parts of
+the body and with bare feet, and many in their underwear, because along
+the way the pieces of clothes which were dangerous to the State were
+taken off of them. Chicanery after Chicanery. But all of this had to be
+borne. However, murder and terror governed this year of the strife. And
+always it was National Socialists who were stamped as the attackers.
+
+Emergency orders and measures for the protection of the Republic
+aided the waves of prohibition. They promised themselves results from
+this because they believed they dealt with factionists and did not
+recognize that these National Socialists were bearers and heralds of an
+ideology. They themselves were conscious that they were the last levy
+of the German Folk. Thus the SA grew to be the troop which fought most
+strongly against the decaying Republic. It was spared no sacrifice but
+also no prohibition, no trickery, and no item could stem its march.
+
+Almost 300 dead comrades marched with the ranks of the SA, foremost
+among them the songster of the Movement, Horst Wessel. His sacrificial
+death became a new beacon of the struggle for Germany. The labor and
+the struggle of the SA was not in vain. They stood at the foremost
+front of election fights. Adolf Hitler himself on the 2nd of September
+1930 took over the leadership of the SA as the Supreme SA Fuehrer. He
+himself guided his SA in the fateful election fight of the year 1930.
+On the evening of the 14th of September the first battle was won. 107
+representatives of the NSDAP took their seats in the German Reichstag.
+A huge victory was earned through the fight, but, the System took no
+reckoning of it.
+
+1931: It was to be the year of decision. The Movement grew steadily;
+everywhere the election results were great. The burden which tested the
+SA was enormous, and only an iron discipline and internal union helped
+it to bear all the difficulties.
+
+SA, SS and HJ were newly articulated. On April the 1st the National
+Socialist Automobile Corps as an auxiliary organization of the SA,
+which performed valuable service at election time, was founded. The
+17th and 18th of October brought the SA meeting in Brunswick at which
+104,000 SA and SS men passed in review before Adolf Hitler. Here before
+these faithful fighters the Fuehrer raised before all the world claim
+to the total state leadership by National Socialism. The men returned
+to every day affairs with enormous enthusiasm and new courage which
+could not be dampened by the announcement on December 8 prohibiting the
+uniform in all regions of the Reich.
+
+The fateful year 1932 brings a heavy blow to the Movement. On April
+13 the SA and SS are prohibited within the entire regions of the
+Reich, even after the vote of unprecedented activity in the second
+election for Reich president on April 10, 1932, had been 13,400,000
+for the National Socialists. They wanted to beat an organization by
+the most brutal means. The wearers of the brown shirt were treated
+like criminals. Everything attainable was confiscated. SA homes and
+SA kitchens which gave protection and meals to needy and jobless SA
+men were pitilessly closed. Nevertheless, with exemplary discipline
+the SA and SS carries on and does not allow themselves to be enticed
+into rashness. As simple party partners the SA men fulfill their duty
+now. Finally on June 14th the uniform and demonstration prohibition is
+raised. Communism and Marxism raise themselves and want to stop the
+victory parade with bloody force. Not less than 32 National Socialists
+among whom were SA and SS men and Hitler Youths, fall as sacrifices to
+the Red Terror in a short six weeks. The Bloody Sunday of Altona was
+a terrible indictment against the governmental system. Eighteen Folk
+comrades are killed and 50 badly hurt. Nevertheless, the SA remains
+disciplined and unshaken. It is not the least of its meritorious
+services that the Reichstag election of 31 July 1932 brings the NSDAP
+a huge victory and makes the Movement the strongest Party in the
+Reichstag. And in spite of all, the SA men are still unprotected game,
+having nothing for their protection but their own strength and the
+fidelity of their comrades. It is difficult to clothe in words what
+lies and slanders were poured out over the SA during this period; it is
+also difficult to tell with what incomparable discipline and devotion
+these men have fought. “Bullies and beaters” they were called by the
+satiated citizenry, and yet it was they who protected the security of
+the citizenry from Bolshevism. “There can be no thanks for anyone when
+considering this greatest success of our Movement, but there is only
+the duty of all of us to take up and continue the fight again with
+renewed and increased strength”--thus Adolf Hitler recalled to mind on
+the night of the victory of his Movement, and that was a command for
+the SA.
+
+The time of the most difficult trials arrives. The SA knows it is for
+the ultimate. Victory, already within grasp, must be finally gained
+by fighting. Comrades fall but unswervingly the columns march. The
+Fuehrer told them: “Victory belongs to him who in this fight brings the
+last levy and the last battalion onto the battlefield.” And the SA was
+prepared to enter its last battalion.
+
+On the 22nd of January 1933 the decision, morally, comes. At the
+Bulowplatz before the Karl-Liebknecht House in Berlin, the Moscow
+Center in Germany, the Berlin SA parades. Before this collected
+strength of the Party the hirelings of Moscow crept cowardly into their
+lurking holes. Hour after hour the SA men passed in review before the
+bulwark of Communism and none of the Moscow disciples dared to raise a
+fist. It was a victory for the SA, the significance of which could only
+be measured later.
+
+Then the day dawns which meant victory and fulfillment of the struggle
+of the SA: the 30th of January 1933. No command was given on this day,
+and yet ten thousands of SA men and National Socialists stood ready
+in the evening, in their old tattered brown shirts in which they had
+marched through murder and terror, to greet the Fuehrer, their Highest
+SA-Fuehrer, as Chancellor of the German Reich. In these SA men the
+young Germany marched through the Brandenburg Gate into a Reich which
+they had fought for at the foremost front and which to form and to
+carry today is the highest commandment of their lives.
+
+
+                       THE SA IN THE THIRD REICH
+
+Just as there was no celebration of victory by Adolf Hitler and his
+fighting comrades after the seizure of power, so was there no moment
+of rest for the SA men. What was worth cleaning up, was cleaned up.
+Whether as auxiliary police or with special orders, whether as a
+propagandist or as helper, the SA man in general was there and labored
+silently as the shining example of the Idea in the structure of the
+new State. Even after victory the SA had heavy losses to lament. It
+was generally employed where elements of the government foreign to the
+people had not yet understood the signs of the time or where Communism
+and elements hostile to the State still insolently dared to rebel. And
+not the last the fight against disguised opponents was a difficult
+labor of the SA. But it is proud, then and now, to be the tool for
+strengthening the structure of the new State and of the Community of
+Folk.
+
+For the first time, on April 8, 1933, the entire SA in the regions of
+the Reich and of Austria, stands drawn up at the same hour to avow
+their immutable fidelity and willingness to follow to the Fuehrer, who
+addressed his men over the radio from the Berlin Sports Palace. The
+young Steel Helmets and the Steel Helmets during the year 1933 placed
+themselves under the SA and became members of it. The SA during the
+year experiences several changes which finally result in the present
+form of the organization as will be described in the following chapter.
+
+With the consolidation of inner political perceptions within Germany
+the type of strife of the SA changed. Just as the SA man during the
+fighting period was not a companion along the way to great decisions,
+but was the one who prepared the way, so the SA retained in the
+Third Reich its original task, namely: to be the Shock Troops for
+Ideology and as the practical school of National Socialism. The SA
+trained no specialists in any form for its area of labor was among the
+entire German Folk. To carry to the Folk, through things previously
+experienced and by acts, the revolutionary spirit of the fighting
+period, the initiative and willingness to sacrifice and to keep
+awake among them those virtues which are the fundamentals for the
+preparedness of National Socialists, is one of the huge tasks of the
+SA. “All that you are, you are through me; and all that I am, I am
+through you alone”. These words of the Fuehrer, spoken to his SA on the
+30th of January 1936, are a recognition as well as an obligation. It is
+a short formula of the platform of the SA: Germany.
+
+The deeds and achievements of the SA are not carried upon huge rosters
+but are every day undertakings which will continue to live in the
+hearts of the people. And that is more valuable than the written word.
+
+Several things out of the manifold labor sphere of the SA should be
+named in collective concepts: use at times of catastrophe, prevention
+of damage, thanksgiving of the Nation, cultural work, colonization,
+educational encampments, officer training schools, scholarships and
+many more. Over all of this is the eternal charge: shaping of human
+beings. The guiding motif of this labor to educate the German people in
+this powerful entity: strong soul, sound spirit, steel-like body.
+
+National Socialism has never demanded a new state form but has always
+demanded the reformation of the individual German into a fighter who
+has intelligence, who has conviction, who is politically dependable,
+who is spiritually motivated, and physically hardened. Thus it was
+only the consistent continuation of a labor already begun to win the
+individual German when the Fuehrer handed over to the SA the execution
+of protective and aggressive training and education of the individual
+German. SA sports and SA sports badges, the latter established by
+the Fuehrer himself on the 15th of February, 1933, “in order to lend
+a conscious expression in all sections of the German people to the
+cultivation of a warlike spirit”, are essentially the new shape of
+the physical and spiritual training of the individual German within
+the meaning of the National Socialist Ideology. Therewith, the SA was
+commissioned to obtain an increase of and preservation of a warlike
+power and a warlike spirit as the expression of an aggressive attitude.
+The creation of the NS Contest Games on November 27, 1936, as a yearly
+spectacle of accomplishments of physical prowess and of a warlike
+spirit, and the order of March 18, 1937, that possession of the SA
+sports badge is made dependent upon yearly repetitive performance of
+the tests in order to maintain the warlike fitness of its bearers up to
+old age, are milestones along the way to attainment of the great goal
+of the SA.
+
+The SA is aware of the magnitude of its task. But it is able to master
+the tasks given by the Fuehrer only because it emanates from the Folk
+and is a part of the Folk.
+
+
+                            II. ORGANIZATION
+
+                         The Branches of the SA
+
+The Fuehrer himself has designated the SA as the guarantor of the
+National Socialist Movement and the National Socialist Revolution. The
+SA is the political soldiery. In this concept “political soldiery”,
+which was coined and found its animated shape during the fighting
+period, are contained all these tasks of the SA whose affairs represent
+still today the educational work of the Storm Troops. Tasks of this
+proportion are only completed by voluntary performance of service;
+however, they require, too, an organization which branches out
+widely and yet guarantees as much as possible, by a concentration of
+individual supervisory offices and their work sphere, a central, clear
+and united management.
+
+The Supreme SA Fuehrer is Adolf Hitler, who gives his oldest fighting
+formation its tasks, determines its direction of work, and commands its
+uses. By order of the Fuehrer the Chief of Staff represents the SA in
+its totality. A high measure of recognition and trust of the Fuehrer
+lies in this charge, for to the Chief of Staff of the SA is entrusted,
+for ideological and physical education and for further development, the
+best and most valuable young strength of the German people.
+
+The Supreme SA Headquarters in Munich and the Office of the Adjutant in
+Berlin are both bureaus of the Chief of Staff; the SA Fuehrers who head
+these are directly responsible to the Chief of Staff for their work.
+
+The Supreme SA Headquarters is subdivided into the operational staff,
+main offices, offices, and divisions. The Stabsfuehrer of the Supreme
+SA Headquarters determines its employment as representative of the
+Chief of Staff.
+
+The Storm Troops of the Fuehrer himself, which exist in all the regions
+of the Reich and in the free city of Danzig, are divided according to
+political and territorial considerations.
+
+The entire SA is composed of 24 groups which are subordinate to the
+Chief of Staff. These are: SA Group Alpenland, Bavarian Eastern March,
+Berlin-Brandenburg, Danube, Franken, Hanseatic, Hessian, Hochland,
+Kurpfalz, Middle, Lower Rhine, Lower Saxony, North March, North Sea,
+Eastland, Eastern March, Pomerania, Saxony, Silesia, Southern March,
+Southwest, Thuringia, Westfalia, and Western March.
+
+The next subordinate branch is the SA Brigade, which is composed of
+several regiments. A regiment consists of three to five battalions,
+which is formed from three to five companies. The SA Company is
+organized generally into three platoons, each of which is further
+subdivided into three squads.
+
+The multilateral demands which are made of the SA formations
+require, above all, in the use of the SA for preparations, parades,
+catastrophes, accidents and all other acts of assistance, the
+incorporation of special or technical units. Therefore, the following
+special branches were established: signal, engineer, mounted, naval,
+bicycle, and sanitary units. Local considerations and geographical
+situations determine their incorporation into companies and battalions
+and govern the consideration of subordinate positions.
+
+
+          THE OPERATIONAL STAFF OF THE SUPREME SA HEADQUARTERS
+
+The Stabsfuehrer is the permanent deputy of the Chief of Staff. As such
+he is the highest authority for the collective main offices of the
+Supreme SA Headquarters and of the SA groups. All decisions of a basic
+nature for the SA, as long as they are not reserved for the Chief of
+Staff himself, are made by the Stabsfuehrer. Immediately subordinate to
+him are the liaison office of the Supreme SA Headquarters, the central
+division, the staff for military affairs, the press and propaganda
+division, the legal division, and the architectural division. The
+liaison office keeps in continuous touch with all important bureaus of
+the Party and State in order to handle all the questions which are of
+importance to the SA.
+
+The treatment of occurrences of a fundamental sort, which require rapid
+settlement and touch on the spheres of the various main offices so
+that the closest cooperation with these main offices becomes a matter
+of course, is the function of the central division with its two main
+departments. The Staff commandant’s office bears the responsibility for
+the total, internal operational service of the Supreme SA Headquarters.
+
+The entire press and propaganda preparations or exploitations of all
+important events within the SA emanate from the press and propaganda
+division to which is also joined publication of the fighting sheet of
+the Supreme SA Headquarters, the SA-Man. Following the directions given
+by this division, the group press departments, whose function is the
+trusteeship of the local press, work through the individual SA groups.
+The activity is above all of an informative nature; for the SA lays no
+value on the quantitative nature of the things written about it, but is
+only concerned with the fact that the German editor may be trusted with
+the character and task of the SA.
+
+The legal division is still in process of being formed. On the other
+hand the architectural division, which likewise was newly formed, is
+working on plans and projects for new building designs in which the
+creative genius of the SA will be expressed.
+
+
+                      THE OPERATIONAL MAIN OFFICE
+
+The chief of the operational main office is responsible for the entire
+organization and branches of the SA, for the education and suitable
+equipment of units, and, not last, for the employment of the SA.
+
+The operational main office is subdivided into the office for
+organization and employment and the office for physical fitness.
+The latter, on the basis of the SA sports badges must prepare the
+fighting training of the bodies of all Germans capable of bearing arms
+and as preparation therefor must organize the execution of corporal
+exercises (basic physical training) and sports performances, so that
+the widest stratum of the population is laid hold upon and will be kept
+in condition to bear arms, both physically and spiritual, as well as
+ideologically in character up to the greatest old age.
+
+The tasks of the organization and employment office are given in its
+title. Besides this it is entrusted with the special units of the SA:
+signal, engineer, naval, and mounted units; it treats with the air and
+gas protection of the SA; it carries on the education of the SA in the
+sphere of catastrophe protection and prevention of damage; and as well
+as keeping liaison with all Party and public offices which come into
+consideration for these questions.
+
+In addition there arises the treatment of details of clothing and
+equipping the SA and the regulations for office plans for SA offices as
+well as the perfection of suggestions for investing certain SA units
+with standards and names of heroic champions of the Movement.
+
+
+                     THE MAIN OFFICE FOR EDUCATION
+
+The office of education is responsible for the entire education and
+orientation of the SA Officers’ Corps. Upon this office devolves one of
+the tasks of greatest significance for the people, the Reichsfuehrer
+School, which consists of the Reichsfuehrer School in Munich and
+the Officers’ School of the Supreme SA Headquarters in Dresden. The
+curricula and community of work at these officers’ schools, as well
+as at the 21 group schools and special schools, serves the purpose of
+creating an SA officers’ corps which bears the highest responsibility
+and great capability.
+
+The comparatively young officers’ school of the Supreme SA headquarters
+in Dresden, above all, serves for the education of the intermediate
+SA officers’ corps which has earned its qualification to attend at
+one of the group schools. In this school the training for those who
+want to try out for the SA sports badge stands in the foreground. The
+spiritual and physical training on the fundamentals of the National
+Socialist’s ideology pursues the purpose of making the SA Fuehrer into
+a real educator of his troop. The threefold harmony: Soul, Spirit, and
+Body, which sets in unison for the common group capability, knowledge,
+and accomplishment, is an essential prerequisite here. Military sport,
+as an SA expression of sports activity, is just as much a means to
+accomplish our purpose as is instruction about the history of the
+Party and the Folk, about racial teaching, or training as speakers.
+The directions for this training hold good for the group schools, too,
+which are subordinate to the same office. The work is performed in
+close understanding with the leader of the group in whose territory
+the school lies, because he himself possesses the best possibility
+of choosing his future officers. This division, which is immediately
+subordinate to the main office, maintains liaison with the offices of
+Party and State, for which the experience won in the educational labor
+of the SA are significant. Thereby it is achieved that the educational
+labor of the SA stands in full and complete unison with the labor of
+the Party and all its branches.
+
+The third office, ideology and culture, counts as its assigned sphere
+cultural forms of service, the cultivation of SA and Folk songs, and
+music. Directly and strictly avoided is publication of any sort of
+service plan for festive formations, for form is not the deciding
+factor, but the spirit with which that form is accomplished.
+
+The division for scientific exploitation, finally, contains a
+voluminous library. It has the task of giving to every SA Fuehrer who
+desires to train himself further, information about the most important
+literature at hand on the subject.
+
+
+                       THE MAIN OFFICE FOR HEALTH
+
+The main health office is responsible for all questions of health
+and sanitary service of the SA. Since health forms the basis and
+prerequisite for physical fitness, the main health office inserts
+itself quite particularly into this branch of the SA service. Not
+only care of and looking after the sick and injured belong to the
+accomplishments of health service but, above all, preventive health
+care.
+
+In the fighting period only the sanitation service existed. It is being
+organized and changed in some particulars at present. Ten thousand
+sanitation officers are trained and perfected in the best manner to be
+able to perform first aid at any time. The Reich Sanitation School of
+the SA in Tuebingen represents the ground floor for entire training
+activity in the essentials of sanitation. In all regiments in the
+whole Reich there are sanitation units ready for immediate employment
+in catastrophe and great accidents. The sanitation man accompanies
+his comrades everywhere in the SA service, whether it be employment
+in preparations, construction of barriers, parades, marches with full
+pack, or in the fields of sports contest.
+
+Training, equipment, and organization of the sanitation service are
+gathered together in one office, the main office for health. Next to
+it is a second office with the task of health operations and fostering
+of race. The men of the SA have recognized the value of the health
+of a Folk, and bear the conviction that only a sound Folk can be an
+eternal Folk. With this conviction they fight for accomplishment of
+the directions and orders which emanate from the main office for Folk
+health and from the Reich Surgeon. In the foremost place are the
+sanitation men of the SA who use themselves for that great goal: Purity
+of blood and Purity of Race.
+
+
+                  THE MAIN OFFICE FOR PERSONAL AFFAIRS
+
+The trusteeship of the SA Officers’ Corps, just as the care for future
+SA officers, is a problem not only for the members themselves but, far
+and above, is also of the greatest significance for the Party and for
+the entire Nation.
+
+The personal affairs main office, which is divided into three offices:
+personnel, social welfare courts and justice office, works in
+permanent, animated touch with the SA front, where the capabilities and
+suitabilities of the SA officers show themselves in daily employment.
+A continuous exchange between this front of staff work and application
+to educational spheres marks the future path of the SA officers.
+His evaluation results from consideration of the suitability of the
+character, of his ability and knowledge, and, above all, of his service
+to the Movement. The oldest veterans and champions of the SA also
+receive leading positions within the branches in so far as they prove
+their capability to do the job.
+
+If there exists in one way a reward for the old tested fighters in
+the assignment to fulfill a great obligation and a more responsible
+mission, then the office for social welfare takes care that those SA
+comrades who were wounded in the fight for the new Germany or who
+find themselves in need, are looked out for. If it was imperative in
+the first years after the seizure of power to provide a job generally
+for these men, then, the problem of retraining stepped into the
+foreground. In the camps of Lockstedt and Falkenstein the SA gives
+unskilled manpower the possibility of earning, in about 40 weeks, the
+journeyman’s certificate, and, thereby, the prerequisites for an
+appointment as a skilled laborer in industry, or, in fact, in any of
+those places which suffer because of lack of such laborers. In addition
+to that men are retrained for mercantile professions and for work in
+administrative offices.
+
+The same is true for the choice of settlers for those home sites which
+arise everywhere in the Reich by way of thanks offerings. Also here are
+old veterans who find a new home in the thanks-offering settlements
+alongside of the war victims.
+
+To this office come officially the personal welfare matters of the men
+and their families. Comrades who have suffered injury at sports or in
+the service receive a cure or recuperation stay in the SA homes at Wyk
+in Foehr, Hohenlychen, or Trillup bei Hamburg. The needy are permitted
+support, and, in fact, in an understanding with the Reich treasurer,
+the means of the Adolf Hitler Thanks and the Adolf Hitler Foundation
+are placed at this office’s disposal. Above all, however, this office
+interests itself in those who were injured in the fighting period by
+political adversaries, so that a permanent personal touch gives to
+these men the certainty that one will never forget their sacrifice.
+
+As third within the main personal affairs office the courts and justice
+office is mentioned. One task of this office lies in the fostering
+of honor and of clean behavior of the SA and the SA Officer’s Corps.
+For the clean behavior of the leadership two chambers of discipline
+serve. The personal rights of SA men are taken care of in a particular
+division.
+
+Incumbent upon the justice division, composed of professional lawyers,
+is legal counsel to the main offices of the Supreme SA Headquarters and
+groups, cooperation with the remaining justice offices of the Movement,
+and, thirdly, official traffic with the Chancellory of the Fuehrer and
+treatment of pardon petitions of criminally convicted SA men as well as
+former SA members. This proceeds from the viewpoint that the SA man, it
+is true, on the one side has an enhanced duty to the Community of the
+Folk; on the other side, however, there comes into discussion manifold
+economics and mental after-effects of the period of the wrestling for
+power in the case of old tested veterans of the SA in which their
+significance can be fully adjudicated only by the SA.
+
+
+                     THE MAIN ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE
+
+The administration of the SA, in its present standard organization and
+proper economic operations, represents the tool which the Chief of
+Staff uses for the solution of great tasks given to him by the Fuehrer.
+Clarity is the distinguishing feature of SA administration in all its
+many spheres.
+
+The matters pertaining to the property right of the NSDAP and,
+therefore, of concern to the SA, are placed under the Reich treasurer
+as Plenipotentiary of the Fuehrer. The deputy of the Reich treasurer
+for the entire SA administration is the Reich cashier administrator
+of the SA, who, without prejudice to his responsibility to the Reich
+treasurer, is at the same time in his quality as Chief of the main
+administrative office, the specialist of the Chief of Staff for all
+matters which touch upon the administration of the entire SA.
+
+The large sphere of the tasks of the main administrative office is
+divided into three offices: _a._ money economy, budget bookkeeping,
+control of finances, and economics; _b._ things of value, procurement,
+insurance and contracts; _c._ construction and settlement office.
+
+The salary of SA officers and men who are on the staffs which are
+essential to the main offices is regulated uniformly on the basis of
+an office plan. It is composed of base pay, quarters allowance, and
+increase for marriage and children. Considering it from the political
+standpoint of population, the increase for children in this ideal
+echelon of society was settled upon.
+
+Great frugality which is pointed to particularly at every opportunity,
+is understood as a matter of course in the SA. A splendidly working
+accounting and control system makes possible an exact review of the
+economic operation of all units and makes easier the immediate remedy
+of a shortage of any kind. The examination reports, which are requested
+by the Deputy of the Reich treasurer of the units are treated and made
+use of in one special division of the Main Administrative Office.
+
+The great property values of the SA, which is a consistent part
+of the total fortune of the NSDAP, is laid hold upon according to
+number and value and carefully administered. Many millions flow into
+economy through the settlement work called into being by the Supreme
+SA Headquarters with the aid of the thanks-offering of the Nation.
+The settlement work should offer to many thousands of needy people
+and to families, sound in heredity and rich in children, their own
+homes. Aside from settlements on the edge of town the construction
+and settlement office in the neighborhood of Aurich erected farm
+settlements with 60 to 80 acres of land, which, above all, are managed
+by former farm laborers. Here, too, they put cattle and even crops at
+their disposal gratuitously.
+
+The many sided tasks of SA Administration are united closely with
+those of the headquarters. Parades and other arrangements, training,
+equipping, procurement, etc., cannot be accomplished without standard
+cooperation of the administration.
+
+
+                   THE MAIN OFFICE FOR NS-TOURNAMENTS
+
+On the 27th of November 1936 the Fuehrer decreed the following order:
+In pursuance of my proclamation at the Reich Party Day of Honor I
+hereby create for future Reich Party Days the NS-Tournament. The SA is
+charged with the preparation and execution of this tournament. I decree
+that the determinations necessary for execution be left up to the
+suggestions of the Chief of Staff of the SA. The Reich Sports Fuehrer
+is directed to cooperate with the sports department of the Supreme SA
+Headquarters. The Chief of Staff will keep me continually informed
+about the measures planned.
+
+In order to solve organizationally the tasks sketched in this order
+of the Fuehrer, the main tournament office was created in February
+1937. As the chief of this main tournament office, the Chief of Staff
+appointed the Reich Sports Fuehrer von Tschammer und Osten. By this
+appointment the guarantee is given that, in comradely cooperation with
+the Reichsbund for physical training, the tasks set by the Fuehrer in
+respect to the military fitness of the entire nation and the formation
+of a Folk will be solved by physical training.
+
+Therewith, SA Obergruppenfuehrer von Tschammer und Osten holds in his
+hand responsibility for the organization and accomplishment of the NS
+Tournaments, which are to be held each year in Nurnberg during the
+Reich Party Day as an exhibition of the achievement of the whole German
+people.
+
+Incumbent upon the office simultaneously is direction of the NS
+Winter Tournaments and Reich Contests of the SA which also experience
+continuous enlargement.
+
+The main office for the NS Tournaments is divided into three offices:
+organization, military sports, and sports which from their titles alone
+indicate the limits of their spheres of work.
+
+
+              THE ADJUTANT’S OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
+
+In the Adjutant’s Office of the Chief of Staff are treated all
+questions which are proposed directly to the Chief of Staff by the
+offices of the Party and of the State, as well as by others. Next to
+the very voluminous labor of dealing with those questions and lectures
+of the Chief of Staff on important matters, the Adjutant’s Office, as
+the personal office of the Chief of Staff, has to take care of the
+preparation for and smooth execution of travel of the Chief of Staff.
+Continuously the Chief of Staff visits the individual Groups, using
+in the first place airplane, then rail transportation and automobile.
+All of the troublesome details, which these official trips demand,
+require thorough discharge so that appointments shall be kept and the
+entire program developed as foreseen. As a matter of course many SA
+Fuehrers, spending a while in the Reich capital, come in person to the
+Adjutant’s Office to speak with the Chief of Staff. Various wishes are
+attended to here and many worthwhile suggestions come from the ranks of
+the visitors. The men in the Adjutant’s Office whose task it is to do
+their duties in the personal service of the Chief of Staff endeavor,
+in order to facilitate for him his difficult and responsible task,
+take care of at least the pressing questions or help their fellows
+with professional advice. Next to that this office has value in that
+it fixes appointments for various official conferences of the Chief of
+Staff with leading men of the Party and State and in that it divides up
+the daily program according to current demands, so that all work can be
+executed smoothly. It is not easy work which the men in the Adjutant’s
+Office have to perform; only the consciousness of helping their fellows
+in the broad Front everywhere in the Reich and of supporting their
+fight gives to their work a valuable substance.
+
+
+                        SPECIAL UNITS OF THE SA
+
+Engineers and Signal SA
+
+In the same measure that the little Shocktroop of the National
+Socialist Idea grew up into an organization in whose hands the Fuehrer
+has laid the whole physical and ideological education of our people,
+so in the same measure the sphere of the tasks of the brown Army of
+Adolf Hitler grew and received a multiformity which made necessary the
+special training of units which were capable of continuous employment
+and highest performance within their special areas.
+
+First it was engineer companies, then further, it was signal companies.
+Since the time they were established, both units, when put to the test
+have proved that the men with “Pi” and “Na” on the lapels of their
+service uniform are found where German humanity needs their help. If
+storms whip the waves of the seas, and masses of water threaten the
+coasts of the Reich; if downpours and melting snows swell the mountain
+streams so that fields, plains, and farms are in danger; if fire is on
+the point of destroying the property of German people; or if anywhere
+a natural catastrophe happens, one finds, in all the Gaus of the Reich
+and at all times, the engineers and signal men among the first helpers
+who strike with cheer and with readiness to sacrifice. Very few have a
+suspicion of what takes place in the hour of bitterest wrestle with the
+might of Nature, but they scarcely think about the fact that these very
+same men, who perhaps gave their utmost during the entire night, are a
+few hours later going about their callings; and only the least number
+have a clear understanding of what basic and careful training and what
+untiring practice was necessary in order to achieve a complete success
+in time of serious accident. And in these practices we see how a bridge
+is made at the turn of a hand, how blasting is executed, and can
+alongside the performances of the engineers, who work hand in hand with
+the signal units, see with amazement how the latter lay their field
+cables, set up their telephones, let the blinker apparatus speak, and
+relay reports by bicycle riders, messenger dogs or carrier pigeons, in
+short, how they establish connection between the front and the staffs
+and thereby secure smooth cooperation. The status of training of the
+men of the signal units is kept under constant control by the signal
+certificate. This certificate is proof for its holder that his status
+of training is complete and excellent. It must be won by examinations
+for three consecutive years before it is finally the possession of the
+signal man.
+
+Thus there originates in these technical units of the SA a trained
+crew whose capabilities and knowledge are not the last things of
+extraordinary value in the service for defense of the country. On one
+side the young SA man, who enters the Army from his branch, comes
+prepared with a multitude of prerequisites which facilitate and speed
+up his training in technical respects; while on the other side those
+very soldiers, having served, who return out of the Army into the
+SA, keep themselves, by constant practice, in a trained condition
+physically and spiritually and impart their knowledge to their fellows.
+
+Thus they contribute a considerable portion to the enhancement of
+military strength and military spirit of the German people. As
+everywhere, the soldier of the army finds here, too, his closest
+confederates in political soldiers.
+
+The Mounted SA
+
+If today in Germany the sport of riding is not as it was in past
+decades, the prerogative and affair of a propertied class, but a thing
+for all of those who from enthusiasm and love of horses profess to
+ride, then it is just something else for which to thank the SA which
+has interested itself in the sport of riding as a means of fitting
+the people physically. The Fuehrer himself by his order about the
+establishment of the NS cavalry Corps on March 17, 1936, created the
+basis upon which first the SA Cavalry itself and then the German youth
+and above all the compulsory military duty classes could be led to the
+sport of riding. This order soon created the necessary organizational
+prerequisites, so that at present the SA each year is able to furnish
+many thousands of young trained cavalrymen to our Wehrmacht. All those
+who are 18 to 20 years of age must join the NSKK and even those in
+younger and older year groups, may join it, who come up for cavalry
+and motor training and want to earn a cavalry certificate before their
+period of service in order to be able to serve with a mounted or
+motorized troop.
+
+The organization of the NSKK has its apex in the Reich Inspectorate
+for mounted and mobile units who is directly subordinate to the
+Chief of Staff and who at the same time presides over the recently
+created main office for mounted and mobile training within the Supreme
+SA Headquarters. In this way a conceivably close liaison has been
+established between both organizations, and in it at the same time
+lies the foundation for fruitful exchange between the SA cavalry and
+the NSKK. In each S.A. group was created the office of Group Cavalry
+Fuehrer, who is responsible to the Reich Inspectorate as his deputy
+for training and organization. At present the S.A. cavalry has at its
+disposition 101 cavalry regiments in whose schools, year in and year
+out, young Germans who are obligated for service receive the training
+which fits them for entrance into a section of troops which is of their
+own choosing.
+
+The NSKK has discovered, by creation of the cavalry certificate,
+a means of fostering and requiring cavalry fitness. The cavalry
+certificate is granted only after careful testing and fulfilling
+essential conditions successfully; it requires an all-embracing
+quantity of riding ability. Thus the cavalry certificate is a way to
+select and require real talent. The NSKK is still young, but two years
+of serious labor have already proven the correctness of its objective.
+
+The Naval S.A.
+
+The men of the water’s edge, the navigators and fishermen, for the most
+part do their duty in the naval SA, since they are concerned in their
+daily professions with all sorts of things having to do with navigation
+and water. Nevertheless, there are not only naval S.A. regiments
+along the ocean but also in the interior. If there is no big ship at
+their disposal for training, a ship built on land often suffices for
+the accomplishment of the careful training of the men about masts,
+shrouds, and deck structure. The service of the naval S.A. operates as
+preparation and development for the Navy. Semaphore, radio, Morse Code,
+and flags as signal service, navigation, cutter operation, astronomy,
+professional use of sailing craft, rescue service--to mention only a
+few spheres of its tasks--complete its curriculum.
+
+For the seafaring S.A. men however, who pass the greater portion of
+their lives on the seas of the world, there is, in the first place,
+ideological use as a border troop who make their appearance in foreign
+countries at celebrations, parades, and similar events. The naval S.A.
+furnishes yearly to the German merchant marine and navy splendidly
+prepared material and is, therefore, practically and theoretically, a
+valuable support of German seafaring and German navigating.
+
+The SA Sanitation Men
+
+The “Sani” men, the sanitation men of the S.A., were already at hand
+in the fighting period if it was necessary to bring help to injured
+comrades. Endless numbers thanked the S.A. for these S.A. sanitation
+men of the fighting period. And from these simple men came physicians
+for body and soul, who continuously struck the correct note and whom
+one knew could be depended upon in every situation of life. If security
+and peace rule internally at present, the S.A. sanitation men have not
+indeed become superfluous. The Service in the S.A. which is continually
+prepared for use, brings with it physical danger, and many injuries
+can be avoided or lessened by speedy aid. Be it hot weather or frost,
+mischance or sudden sickness, the “sani-men” are at their post. Highest
+demands, however, are placed on them if, at time of catastrophe medical
+assistance is not sufficient and the life of many depends upon the
+success of appropriate initial treatment. Then the S.A. sanitation men
+fall to the task and give their utmost. Unnamed and unknown they do
+their duty in the spirit and tradition demanded by the organization to
+which they belong.
+
+The “Feldherrnhalle” Regiment
+
+Under the symbol, which for us National Socialists is the embodiment of
+supreme preparedness to sacrifice, the sacrificial runic symbol, the
+S.A. has created a troop which is set up to symbolize the political
+soldiery of our time: The Feldherrnhalle Regiment. The fact that the
+Supreme S.A. Fuehrer, Adolf Hitler, has appointed his tested comrade,
+S.A. Obergruppenfuehrer Hermann Goering, as its chief, proves the high
+calling which falls to the lot of this regiment today and tomorrow.
+As the elite troop of the S.A. it seeks to be the shining example in
+service and in obedience.
+
+The measures are very strict which have been laid upon this young body
+of men who have assigned their lives to this regiment. Yearly young men
+from all callings and skills of the people thrust themselves into this
+original body. Differences of heredity or property are unknown. Here it
+is only the man, his performance and his obligation to obey as an ever
+ready S.A. man the commands of his leader, which has worth.
+
+Every possibility stands open to him who proves himself true in this
+regiment. He who has performed his year of service may decide to
+remain or return to his calling. Likewise it is possible to work his
+way up into the main offices of the S.A. headquarters or to enter the
+administrative service; the decisive factors for that, frankly, are the
+capabilities of the candidate and the possibilities for their use in
+the political life of the people.
+
+In six great camps, which lie scattered in the whole Reich, a valuable
+work of education is consummated for many hundreds of apt persons.
+The political value of this work cannot be grasped by bare numbers
+and dry statistics. These are not decisive factors; it seems to us to
+be much more essential and for the justification of this information
+of political soldiery, that out of the training of the Feldherrnhalle
+Regiment, National Socialists go forth who shall do their part to
+assure the continuation of that work begun by Adolf Hitler. For this
+reason there belongs in the Feldherrnhalle regiment the concepts of
+discipline, voluntary subordination, and leading a soldierly life as
+first prerequisites and basic conditions for the acceptance of future
+members.
+
+Out of the apparent forms of political life developed by the present
+emulating in their behavior the proven example of the old S.A., the
+Feldherrnhalle regiment professes itself to the concept of a soldierly
+life. It unites in its ranks young, consciously political individuals
+who voluntarily wish to live their lives in hardiness and soldierly
+strictness.
+
+The Reichsfuehrer School
+
+Selection of officers and planned education of officers was the
+innovation drawn into the circle of political work of the Party after
+the seizure of power. An effective instrument for such officer training
+is the Reichsfuehrer School in Munich created in 1931 by the Fuehrer.
+Many thousands of S.A. officers are oriented here in accordance with
+the perceptions of the fighting period in their new form and have been
+trained and then, supplied with knowledge and ideological learning,
+have gone out into their units where they impart to those whom they
+have to lead, the Front of the political struggle of the present and
+their experiences and recently gained insights.
+
+The work of the Reichsfuehrer School today is set aside to bring the
+synthesis of body and mind very near to the ideal form. All technical
+means are employed to do that. In a nine months course of study the
+future S.A. officers are introduced into all spheres of political
+life. The Reichsfuehrer School desires to stimulate self-created
+labor, to teach meditation, and to shape the young S.A. officer
+into a consciously strong charactered, political personality. Body,
+mind, soul--one cannot be thought of without the other. A hardy
+physical training, strict measures about health and racial values and
+continued supervision of the life being led are valuable, but are also
+indispensable expedients for strict and serious work.
+
+A second task has been given to the Reichsfuehrer School with the
+comprehensive two weeks labor conference which takes place yearly in
+the time after the Reich Party Day, and is for the older unit officers
+from regimental commanders up to, and including, staff divisions. At
+these labor conferences the political balance sheet of the year is
+reckoned. Consequently, the Reichsfuehrer School has an outstanding
+part in the political training work of the Party. The success of the
+education of future officers will perhaps become apparent only in later
+decades, but even today the goal stands out in a clearly recognizable
+fashion: the individual German trained in National Socialism, hardened
+in mind and strength, and firm in character.
+
+The Reichsfuehrer School of the S.A. in Dresden is guided according to
+similar directions. For special training of particular units there is
+at the disposal of the S.A. the Reich Sanitation School in Tuebingen
+and the Reich Cavalry School in Zehlendorf.
+
+
+                            III. PROSPECTUS
+
+                  The Law of Willingness to Volunteer.
+
+In the beginning of the fight there was the Party and the S.A. The
+goal, tasks and changing requirements of the fight have led to the
+establishment of the branches of the Party out of the great collecting
+basin of the S.A. The strong impulses which emanated from the S.A. have
+been carried over into the labor of all branches of the Party. All
+branches fulfill their work at present according to their own laws and
+responsibilities. Most of their officers, however, and many of the men
+have marched in the ranks of the Storm Troops, and, thus at present
+there lives and works in these branches the further quality which we
+call the S.A. spirit.
+
+“The fight continues”--that was from the start the password of the S.A.
+and will continue to be for all time. Never has the S.A. man fought
+just to be fighting, and never to be destructive, but he has fought
+only to be constructive. And only for that reason can the Fuehrer
+extend tasks to the S.A. in the new State, which have a decisive
+significance.
+
+Our comrades in the past years in Austria have demonstrated with
+what spirit the S.A. is blessed. They were unshaken in avowal to
+the Fuehrer, in belief in the strength of blood, and in fidelity to
+their native place. They have fixed for themselves a monument to the
+S.A. spirit which will always renew itself. Their sacrifice was a
+cornerstone of liberty. They were proud to be permitted to suffer for
+Germany. Fate has let these men and their families go along a path
+whose milestones were need, hate, suffering, terror, and pursuit. Many
+have sacrificed their lives, and for many, who sat behind dungeon and
+prison walls, the hope of liberty had sunk away to nothing, and, yet
+not one word of bitterness came past their lips. He who fought thus is
+worthy of being called a German and an S.A. man.
+
+A few months ago the S.A. men of Austria still stood in the midst of
+bloody fighting, and yet now they work in peaceful construction. Thus
+the S.A. in German Austria became the peace army of the people in the
+National Socialist State. The S.A. was only able to master this task
+because the goal always remained the same and they marched along all
+paths which the Fuehrer commanded, and because the voluntary will to
+serve is the supreme law of National Socialism.
+
+Today the S.A. stands before the great task of being guardian and
+fashioner of the armed desire and armed strength of the German people.
+Its devotion, its preparedness to sacrifice, its belief in the idea,
+and its soldierly, combatant attitude will create and preserve in the
+German people that physical fitness and armed preparedness which the
+Fuehrer and the Reich need and without which a people cannot live.
+
+Great achievements are only produced with unheard of personal
+application based upon voluntary will. And this law of voluntary
+service is the key to preparedness and successful labor of the S.A. Not
+spectator, but active participant is the password of the S.A. in all
+things it takes hold of.
+
+The Storm Troops have made their way through most difficult trials.
+They have withstood them because this nucleus troop bears in it
+unshakeably the spirit of unconditional fidelity and unconditional
+obedience to the Fuehrer. The S.A. exists today stronger and firmer
+now and forever. It knows that the Fuehrer will also assign to it in
+the future new work spheres. The Storm Troops are ready to fulfil the
+commands of the Fuehrer and his charges with complete application
+because they desire in all things to be nothing other than the bearers
+of the Idea, the strong arm of the Movement, the secure support of the
+people and the German people’s infantry, prepared to sacrifice and
+happy to attack.
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2169-PS
+
+                                  Copy
+
+  SS Garrison-doctor                                     Hmb. Neuengamme
+  Kl. Hmb.-Neuengamme                                      29 March 1945
+  _Az.: 14 h (Kl) 3.45/Tr./Um._--
+
+  Subject: Quarterly Sickreport on Internees of Concentration Camp
+    Hmb.-Neuengamme
+
+  Re: Circular from there dated 27-12-1944 No. 242/Az.:14 h
+  (Kl.)
+  Attachments: 2 Diagrams
+  Date: 1-4-1945
+
+To the Head of the Medical-Service at SS Chief office of Economic
+Administration [Wirtschafts-Verwaltungshauptamt] and Chief of Bureau D
+III
+
+Oranienburg
+
+
+                         I. Concentration Camp
+
+1. The average number of internees in the Concentration Camp
+Hmb.-Neuengamme during the quarter of the year reported on amounted to
+_40,393_ (including the affiliated working camps).
+
+In addition there is an average of 11,768 female internees.
+
+2. There were _6,224_ death cases during the quarter of the year
+reported on (from 26-12-1944 to 25-3-1945), among them _95_ female
+internees. Of this number the following deaths have occurred in the
+affiliated camps:
+
+  Base-Camp Hamburg                944 deaths
+      ”     Bremen                 515   ”
+      ”     Druette                102   ”
+      ”     Watenstedt             298   ”
+      ”     Reimstedt                9   ”
+      ”     Porta                   89   ”
+      ”     Hannover               453   ”
+      ”     Braunschweig           198   ”
+  Affiliated Camp Meppen-Versen    379   ”
+      ”           Woebbelin         53   ”
+                                 ------------
+        Total                    3,040 deaths
+  at concentration camp
+  Hmb.-Neuengamme                3,089  ”
+                                 ------------
+         Total deaths            6,129
+  In addition of the female internees: 95 deaths
+                                 ------------
+
+3. The average number of internees in the hospital buildings I, II,
+III, IV, and V during the quarter of the year reported on amounted to
+_1711_ daily.
+
+4. During the period of time reported on _815_ internees daily were
+treated without being hospitalized.
+
+                                  SS Garrison doctor Kl. Hmb.-Neuengamme
+                                                              SS Captain
+
+
+                                                COPY OF DOCUMENT 2171-PS
+
+                                                           Report B-2833
+
+THE NUMERICAL EXPANSION OF THE CONCENTRATION CAMP BUCHENWALD DURING THE
+                            YEARS 1937-1945
+
+     (Based on the complete records of the competent service units)
+
+
+                                PREFACE
+
+The following figures are compiled from authentic material that the
+SS in their flight from the camp were unable to destroy. Particular
+attention is called to the fact that every number can be substantiated
+by the personal records of the prisoners in question.
+
+
+                                    I
+
+In July 1937 the first advance headquarters of the so-called
+professional criminals arrived on the completely unimproved, untouched
+wooded terrain of the Ettersberg near Weimar for the construction of
+a new large concentration camp. At the time the SS had not yet named
+the future camp and called it KL Ettersberg. The first roll call was
+made on 19 July 1937 and recorded 149 prisoners. On the following
+day 70 prophylactic prisoners, that is to say so-called professional
+criminals from the KL Sachsenburg, arrived. On the 27th of July the
+first 91 political prisoners, among them 7 Bible research students
+also arrived from the KL Sachsenburg. On the 29 July 1937 the name “KL
+Buchenwald” appeared for the first time in the official correspondence.
+At that time the number in the camp had increased to 327 persons. On 30
+July 1937 600 prisoners from the KL Lichtenburg were added and another
+convoy from the Lichte [Lichtenburg] arrived on 6 August 1937.
+
+On the lists of the Reich’s German nationals the name of Hermann
+Kempek appears as the first deceased, who died on 13 August 1937 in
+Buchenwald. The two next dead persons are already reported on 15 August
+1937.
+
+Additional convoys followed from Sachsenburg and the Lichte individual
+arrivals were also recorded. The total number of arrivals in the year
+1937 amounted to 2,912 persons. By 1 January 1938 already 48 or 1.65%
+of them had died.
+
+The last roll call made by the SS took place on 3 April 1945. At the
+time the number of prisoners in the camp amounted to 80,011 persons. On
+11 April 1945 the victorious Allied troops liberated the concentration
+camp.
+
+The expansion of the concentration camp is shown in Table 1, which
+gives the total number of arrivals and the deceased for each year.
+
+
+                               _Table 1_
+
+  ---------------+--------------+----------------
+        Year     |   Arrivals   |   Deceased
+  ---------------+--------------+----------------
+  1937           |    2,912     |       48
+  1938           |   20,122     |      771
+  1939           |    9,553     |    1,235
+  1940           |    2,525     |    1,772
+  1941           |    5,890     |    1,522
+  1942           |   14,111     |    2,898
+  1943           |   42,177     |    3,516
+  1944           |   97,866     |    8,644
+  1945 (3 month) |   43,823     |   13,056
+                 +--------------+----------------
+      Total      |  238,980     |   33,462
+  ---------------+--------------+----------------
+
+It is self-evident that under normal living conditions only a minor
+fraction of these 33,462 persons would have died. Most of them had
+reached the best years of their manhood. The living and working
+conditions in Buchenwald were such that every one could easily contract
+a serious illness, especially during the first months, owing to the
+sudden and violent change in their daily habits of life. In Buchenwald
+a serious illness resulted nearly always in death, because during the
+first years no medical help was dispensed or was so inefficient that
+the hope of a recovery was perforce without any prospects.
+
+The number of unnatural deaths also reached a shocking figure. In
+desperation many chose voluntary death by hanging themselves or
+touching the electrically charged wire fence. In addition in the
+KL Buchenwald, like everywhere else where the SS and the Gestapo
+were in charge, numerous prisoners were shot “in flight”. This
+“shooting-in-flight” was often conducted after a certain pattern by
+forcing the prisoners in the labor units to cross the line of guards.
+This happened especially in the stone quarries, where they were
+maltreated to such a degree that in desperation they could find no
+other way of escape. The nearest SS guard would shoot them down only a
+few yards beyond the line. In the following Table 2 are not included
+those who were wounded by rifle fire or those who died in the camp area
+from the results of the maltreatment they received.
+
+
+                               _Table 2_
+
+  ----------+--------------------+------------------
+            | Number shot while  | Number who chose
+     Year   |     in flight      | voluntary death
+  ----------+--------------------+------------------
+  1937      |          7         |        --
+  1938      |         34         |        11
+  1939      |          9         |         3
+  1940      |         89         |        11
+  1941      |         16         |        17
+  1942      |         48         |         3
+  1943      |         46         |         2
+  1944      | no accurate record |        46
+  1945      | no accurate record |        16
+  ----------+--------------------+------------------
+
+A satanical asphyxiation installation equal to the one in the KL
+Auschwitz was not erected in the KL Buchenwald. The SS probably feared
+that they would not be able to keep the secret in the most densely
+settled part of Germany. But this does not mean that we were spared
+such installation in Buchenwald. Already on 13 July 1941 a convoy was
+formed consisting of 94 “invalide”, German Reich nationals and Poles,
+for the greater part but not exclusively Jews, and taken to Hohenstein
+near Dresden, guarded by heavily armed SS troopers. On the following
+day 93 more were dispatched. Several days later their clothes,
+including their personal effects, false teeth, etc., were returned to
+Buchenwald. In so far it became known at that time these persons were
+poisoned by gas at the place of their destination. It is probable that
+the SS had already at that time perfected its asphyxiation chambers
+and tested them. On 2, 11 and 12 March 1942 further convoys followed
+containing 285 prisoners, exclusively Jews.
+
+Beginning Fall 1942 increasingly larger mass transports and individual
+transports of Jews, who had already been a long time in the camp, to KL
+Auschwitz took place, where unquestionably they were murdered. For this
+reason these prisoners were probably not entered on the records of the
+KL Auschwitz. In detail it concerns the following transports:
+
+  27 July  1942     163 prisoners, among them 119 Soviet PWs.
+  26 Sept. 1942     200 gypsies.
+   6 Oct.  1944   1,183 Jews.
+
+It can no longer be determined today how high the number of the
+individual transports ran, but it is definite that these individual
+transports were carried out on special instructions from Berlin.
+
+Since the beginning of the war a continually rising number of
+executions were carried out in the KL Buchenwald. The shooting or
+hanging of individual persons or of certain categories of prisoners
+took place on the basis of the orders issued by the SS Reich Management
+without any judicial verdict. Three executions in the KL Buchenwald by
+hanging were performed in public, that is to say, before the entire
+assembled camp inmates on the roll call grounds. The first prisoner
+was hung on 4 June 1938, the second on 21 December 1938, both of
+whom had beaten down their SS guards in their flight from an advance
+headquarters on 8 May 1938. The victim of the third execution on 13
+September 1944 was a recaptured fugitive.
+
+When other prisoners in the camp were to be executed they were called
+to the entrance and taken away. Exact figures can only be given
+with certainty for the years 1944 and 1945, because until then such
+prisoners were recorded as being turned over to the Gestapo and it is
+no longer possible to determine now which were actually turned over
+and which only allegedly. In the year 1944 at least 177 and in 1945 at
+least 54 prisoners of the camp were executed.
+
+The mass executions of Soviet prisoners of war, officers, political
+officers and troops were introduced. However, Polish officers, German
+officials and higher ranking officers as well as German and foreign
+women were executed in Buchenwald. At that time the execution places
+were installed in the DAW terrain and in the horse stable and the
+crematory was considerably enlarged. Upon arrival, those destined to be
+executed were not entered on the camp records, but were separated from
+those arriving simultaneously in the normal course of procedure and
+handed over to the Court of Justice Division for “special treatment”,
+which in official language meant, for execution. Unfortunately the SS
+had already destroyed on 1 and 2 April 1945 all the relating documents
+therefore no figures of any kind can be quoted.
+
+Based on the observations of the prisoners it would seem that
+approximately 7,000 persons were executed.
+
+Furthermore to the total number of those who died in the concentration
+camp Buchenwald must be added the others who were killed in April 1945
+during the retransport from the advance headquarters to the camp,
+in the advance headquarters itself and on the march. In addition
+innumerable others must be added, who during the evacuation of the camp
+died in other camps en route.
+
+If on the whole the number of the victims of death is set at 50,000
+this frightful figure will not be estimated too high.
+
+
+                                   II
+
+The development of the camp shall now be followed in all its details.
+
+The camp strength rose gradually after 1 January 1938 until it reached
+the figure of 3,000 on 1 May 1938. Then the phase “Arbeitsscheu Reich”
+(shirking to work for the Reich) set in. The first “asocials” 5 May
+1938. Larger transports of a total of 1,000 “asocial” Jews arrived
+on 14 and 15 June 1938. With this event the camp strength jumped and
+reached its first high point of 7,968 on 7 August 1938. The number of
+the dead also jumped. Whereas the number of dead prisoners amounted to
+4 in April 1938 it amounted to 16 in May, 62 in June and 105 in July.
+
+In the following months the camp strength slowly decreased through
+deaths and discharges and only amounted to 7,791 persons on 1 September
+1938. The first foreigners arrived in September 1938, namely, in round
+figures, 2,200 Austrian Jews from the KL Dachau. This influx increased
+the camp strength to 10,471 on 1 October 1938.
+
+In November 1938 the notorious great movement against the Jews in the
+Third Reich was carried through, which Hitler tried to justify by
+referring to the attempt on the life of the official of the German
+Embassy in Paris, von Rath. In a very short time the camp strength
+doubled itself. Whereas on 9 November 1938 it still amounted to 9,842,
+it had grown to 19,676 on 13 November 1938. No lodging facilities
+were available for such an increase. Temporarily the new arrivals
+were camped on the roll call ground and in the half completed sheep
+stable, until very primitive wooden barracks without any sanitary
+installations were erected alongside the roll call grounds, which later
+became famous as the Blocks 1a-5a. During the first few days the SS
+had no clear survey that the keeper of the records would announce over
+the loudspeaker, “If another Jew hangs himself, will he kindly stick a
+piece of paper with his name on it in his pocket, so that one knows who
+he is.”
+
+Where the Jews came from is given in the survey in Table 3.
+
+
+                               _Table 3_
+
+  -----------------------------------+--------
+  Place of Origin                    | Number
+  -----------------------------------+--------
+  Giessen                            |   138
+  Mainz                              |    97
+  Kassel                             |   693
+  Breslau                            | 2,471
+  Dresden                            |   151
+  Magdeburg                          |   375
+  Chemnitz                           |   171
+  Leipzig                            |   270
+  Oppeln                             |   703
+  Bielefeld                          |   406
+  Meiningen                          |    91
+  Dessau                             |    85
+  Darmstadt                          |   169
+  Frankfurt a/M                      | 2,621
+  Friedberg                          |    99
+  Erfurt                             |   197
+  Halle/Saale                        |   124
+  Hannover                           |   316
+  Nordhausen                         |    89
+  Aachen                             |   135
+  Wuerzburg                          |   103
+  Eisenach-Gotha                     |   112
+  Offenbach                          |    82
+  Worms                              |    87
+  Various small places in Thueringen |   689
+
+This increase in the camp strength not only resulted in a definite but
+also in a greater percentage number of death cases, as indicated in
+Table 4.
+
+
+                               _Table 4_
+
+  ---------------------+------------+---------------+---------------
+                       |  Number of |    Average    |  Deaths in %
+         Period        |   deaths   | Camp Strength | Camp Strength
+  ---------------------+------------+---------------+---------------
+  Oct. 10-Nov. 9, ’38  |     53     |    10 156     |    0.52%
+  Nov. 10-Dec. 12, ’38 |    244[4]  |    17 262     |    1.41%
+  ---------------------+------------+---------------+---------------
+
+  FOOTNOTES:
+
+  [4] Among them 3 unknown dead and 3 suicides.
+
+At that time the first construction work of the concentration camp
+and the necessary troop billets were finished in the rough. The SS
+sent their prophylactic prisoners to new places for the erection of
+other camps and SS barracks. The first professional criminals were
+sent to Camps Mauthausen and Flossenburg on 3 November 1938. Other
+Transports followed shortly. The “Actions-Juden” (Jews arrested during
+the movement or campaign against them) were also discharged after a
+comparatively short time, that is to say, after plundering them and
+requisitioning their property, they were for the greater part expelled
+from the Third Reich and upon leaving the camp had to immediately
+board a ship or cross the frontier. Through these proceedings and the
+inclusion of death cases the camp strength went down to 8,650 in round
+figures by the end of February 1939 and stayed at this level, for the
+time being.
+
+
+                                  III
+
+Immediately after the beginning of the war the camp strength rose
+anew. At that time the “Aktions” prisoners, Reich nationals and
+Austrians unfit to carry arms, arrived. Also the Czech hostages from
+the Protectorate were delivered as the next batch of foreigners in
+September 1939 amounting to a total number of 756, some of them
+coming from the KL Dachau. At the start of the war the KL Dachau was
+completely evacuated and on 26 September 1939 no less than 2,200
+prisoners were transferred to Buchenwald.
+
+On 5 October 1939 members of the Polish minority in Germany numbering
+181 persons followed.
+
+After the conclusion of the Polish campaign Buchenwald experienced
+a grim and tragic sequel in the action taken against the so-called
+Polish snipers and other Poles coming from those parts of Poland which
+belonged to Germany before 1918.
+
+On 15 October 1939 and 16 October no less than 1,000 and 1,098 Poles
+arrived and were put in tents under the most primitive and barbaric
+conditions on the half-finished roll call grounds, where they received
+only half of the amount of the food furnished to the other prisoners.
+The terrible results of this annihilation process is reflected in the
+comparison of the death cases. In the period 16 September to 15 October
+1939--44 prisoners died in the KL Buchenwald, and from 16 October to 15
+November 1939, therefore in the same space of time, 6.4 times as many,
+or 283 prisoners.
+
+After the attempt on Hitler’s life in the Buergerbraeu in Munich on
+9 November 1939 a new terror deed by the SS filled the camp with a
+shuddering and paralyzing fright. The 9 November was a holiday and
+no work was being done. In the morning under the command of the SS
+Staff Sergeant Blanck heavily armed SS soldiers appeared and without
+any list or records selected at random 7 men from each block of Jews,
+mostly young ones. Thereupon, without any further explanation, they
+were marched to the stone quarry and shot down. The particulars of the
+records of these 21 victims are known.
+
+The unbelievable bad conditions, especially the sanitary ones, in
+the special camp of the Poles, spread to the rest of the camp. The
+epidemics in the camp and the fear of contagion on the part of the
+troops forced the SS to quarantine the camp. Individual additions
+arrived only in exceptional cases. From 1 November 1939 to 30 June
+1940, i.e. in 8 months, only a total of 131 additions arrived.
+Correspondingly the discharges from the camp were almost completely
+discontinued. Therefore, it was in the main the death cases which in
+this first winter of the war, owing to the miserable nourishment,
+hunger and dysentery, caused a decrease in the number of prisoners
+from 12,841 on 24 October 1939 to 7,986 on 1 May 1940. Death took an
+especially high toll among the Burgenland gypsies confined in the camp.
+In the aforementioned figures showing the decrease, a transport of
+1,000 prisoners on 6 March 1940 and one of 3,000 on 14 April 1940 sent
+to the KL Mauthausen, is included. Who ever knows the reputation of
+this newly erected camp in Mauthausen must also know that not many of
+these prisoners remained alive.
+
+A larger number of additions to the camp only began to arrive again in
+August 1940, namely again 1,100 Poles in two transports from Posen.
+In the following winter the camp strength remained about the same and
+averaged in round numbers about 7,500 prisoners.
+
+(Hitler had promised a very generous pardon decree for his 50th
+birthday. It consisted in discharging in round figures 2,300 mostly
+“asocial” prisoners. Later delayed pardon act reduced the camp strength
+from 6,363 on 1 May 1939 to a low figure of 5,376 on 21 August 1939.)
+
+
+                                   IV
+
+The first results of the Western Campaign soon manifested themselves
+in Buchenwald. Already on 2 July 1940 delivery of 216 Hollanders was
+made to the KL Buchenwald, mostly high-ranking officials and officers
+as hostages, and was followed by an additional 111 on 8 and 9 October
+1940. The last Dutch hostages arrived on 23 August 1941. They were
+isolated in a block from the other camp inmates like the preceding
+ones, and were conceded certain modest facilities. A selected few of
+them were discharged during the year. The main body, however, remained
+in Buchenwald until 15 November 1941 and were then transported to the
+vicinity of Herzogenbusch.
+
+In the beginning of 1941 the German security police raided the
+Amsterdam Jewish quarter after a strike and abducted for transfer to
+Buchenwald 389 Dutch Jews on 28 February 1941. They were immediately
+employed in the hardest physical work and in this manner destroyed. The
+balance of them, 341, with 350 other prisoners were transferred to the
+KL Mauthausen on 22 May 1941.
+
+Finally it should be mentioned, that a large transport of 2,000
+prisoners arrived from the KL Dachau at the beginning of the Summer of
+1941. In contrast to Buchenwald the construction regarded as a sort of
+recreation camp to which invalids and sick prisoners were sent. When
+they had recuperated they were again sent to other camps for heavy
+enforced labor. More will be told later about these “transfers”, as
+they were officially termed, from one camp to another.
+
+The aforementioned addition and transports, augmented by the regular
+additions which were delivered two or three a week from the police
+prisons, caused the camp strength to rise from the low figure of 6,705
+on 1 June 1941 to 8,370 prisoners on 1 October 1941.
+
+
+                                   V
+
+On June 22 1941 Hitler invaded the Soviet Union. The delivery of 2,000
+Soviet prisoners of war was the first direct effect on the camp on 18
+October 1941. The SS troopers could not prevent the joyful reception
+of these prisoners of war by the camp inmates who provided them
+with additional bread, food, tobacco and other articles. The whole
+camp was punished and especially certain individuals who attracted
+most attention. The prisoners were also strictly isolated from the
+others and their barracks provided with a sign having the inscription
+“prisoners of war”.
+
+Probably Soviet reprisals were feared and they did not want to give
+the impression that the prisoners of war had been turned over to a
+concentration camp. Nevertheless they were subjected to the same
+strict camp discipline as the other prisoners and in the first months
+especially the quality of their food was considerably inferior. They
+were compelled to do the hardest physical work. Details of the future
+fate of the prisoners of war will be reported later. A transfer of
+1,000 of them to the KL Mauthausen was made on 19 May 1942. In the
+following months and years more Soviet prisoners of war were delivered.
+At the end there were 821 prisoners of war in the camp which were
+evacuated in one group, when during the last days before the liberation
+the SS began to clean out the camp.
+
+The camp strength rose to 10,342 persons with the arrival of the
+prisoners of war on 16 October 1941. During the winter of 1941/42
+the figure slowly decreased and on 12 March 1942 amounted to 9,770
+prisoners. On that day and the following one two large transports
+departed from the camp one on 12 March 1942 of 400 to the KL Natzweiler
+and one of 800 to the KL Ravensbrueck. The SS apparently tried to
+break the anti-fascist character of the camp by these transfers, which
+had manifested itself especially in its attitude toward the Soviet
+prisoners of war. Many long term political prisoners were sent away
+without any consideration. Undernourished and badly billeted they were
+forced to the hardest kind of physical labor in the new camps, so
+that the majority of them died and only a few were able to return to
+Buchenwald after a long time with other transports. After the departure
+of the transports the camp was again strictly searched for German
+political prisoners and a number of them isolated in a special company
+for hard physical labor. This matter will also be treated by another
+source in a special report, therefore, it will not be necessary to go
+into details at this time. These transports and the aforementioned
+transport of 1,000 Soviet prisoners of war to the KL Mauthausen reduced
+the camp strength on 1 June 1942 to the figure of 7,601, due to the
+relatively minor additions.
+
+About this time, Sauckel, the Gauleiter of Thuringia and Hitler’s
+General Deputy for labor Employment, began to abduct on a large scale
+the population of the occupied eastern territories for forced labor
+in Germany. Partly voluntary, with a naive belief in the promises of
+the Nazis, and partly concerned they came in large mass transports
+to Germany for employment. Already at the beginning the Germans must
+have recognized that many undisciplined and politically undesirable
+“elements” were to be found among them, which threatened to endanger
+peace and order.
+
+They were harshly treated and locked up for minor infraction in the
+punishment and concentration camps for “commitment to labor”, which in
+other words meant life-long slavery. No trouble was taken to determine
+in the individual cases the question of guilt. No one felt responsible
+for the fate of the abducted. The SS demanded and received their share
+of the booty derived from this unpaid labor and exploited it without
+any consideration and brutally for their own selfish purposes.
+
+Beginning 1 June rapidly increasing numbers of Ukrainian, Russian,
+Tartar civilian workers and former prisoners of war arrived in the
+camp. In addition the normal collecting transports abducted people of
+all the various nations and of every age to the Ettersberg. Within a
+very short space of time the camp was inhabited by persons from 25
+countries from all over Europe and overseas, one might say, shortly
+from nearly all the countries in the world. At the end for 1944
+nationals from 36 different countries were imprisoned in the camp. If
+the influx let up, the Reich leader of the SS would issue new decrees
+on the basis of which new raids and actions were carried out causing
+the inflow to increase again by leaps and bounds.
+
+The SS also understood how to procure slave labor from inside Germany.
+Beginning December 1942 the judicial authorities had to turn over in
+part their cheap labor employees to the concentration camps. A decree
+was issued which ordered the transfer of the prisoners of the courts
+of justice to the concentration camps for labor commitment. Committees
+visited the penal prisons and shortly thereafter pronounced criminals
+(murderers, persons guilty of manslaughter, persons guilty of moral
+turpitude) sentenced to long and life-long penal imprisonment were sent
+from the penal prisons Saxony, Thuringia, Hessen, the Rhineland and
+Westphalia, as well as from the Province of Brandenburg, (were sent)
+to the KL Buchenwald. Many of them were used as “guinea pigs” in the
+spotted fever barracks, while many others, accustomed to living for
+years in confined quarters, died, because they could not endure the
+sudden transition to a life in the open during the winter and in the
+spring.
+
+If some of the concentration camps were overcrowded or workmen were
+needed at certain points, whether for the construction of airdromes,
+defense fortifications or barracks, or even for the completion
+of castles, country houses and homes of individual high-ranking
+SS officials and their staffs, the private slaves of the SS were
+dragged, without any consideration from one camp to another. Further
+developments are shown in Table 5, in which the camp strength and the
+number of the addition for the 12 months from 1 June 1942 to 31 May
+1943 are given.
+
+
+                               _Table 5_
+
+  -----------+---------------+--------------+------------------------------
+             | Camp Strength |   Additions  |
+     Month   | beg. of month | during month |       Special Transport
+  -----------+---------------+--------------+------------------------------
+  June ’42   |      7,601    |     1,019    | On 5 July--300 invalids
+  July ’42   |      8,000    |     1,996    | and 51 clergymen to Dachau.
+  Aug. ’42   |      8,849    |     1,715    |
+  Sept. ’42  |      9,886    |     1,709    | 500 from KL Dachau
+  Oct. ’42   |     10,075    |       984    | 13 Oct.--619 to KL
+             |               |              |   Sachsenhausen.
+             |               |              | 17 Oct.--405 to KL Auschwitz.
+  Nov. ’42   |      8,831    |       794    |
+  Dec. ’42   |      9,092    |     1,044    |
+  Jan. ’43   |      9,517    |     2,500    | On 23 Jan. 43--843 foreign
+             |               |              |   workers from Duesseldorf.
+  Feb. ’43   |     11,275    |     1,291    |
+  Mar. ’43   |     11,920    |     2,474    | The first in the small camp.
+  Apr. ’43   |     12,461    |     2,773    | On 5 Mar.--500 to KL Dachau.
+  May  ’43   |     13,326    |     2,939    | On 23 Mar. to Riga.
+  31 May ’43 |     14,441    |              | On 3 Apr.--933 Poles from
+             |               |              |   Lublin.
+             |               |              | On 12 Apr.--339 from KL
+             |               |              |   Wewelsberg.
+  -----------+---------------+--------------+------------------------------
+
+In what manner the terrible conditions in the overcrowded German
+concentration camps and the pitiless exploitation of the prisoners
+crossed the plans of the higher authorities of an increased production,
+is revealed in a communication of the SS Main Office of the Economic
+Administration. According to this letter, the total number of additions
+in all the German concentration camps in the 6 months from June to
+November 1942 amounted to 136,780, whereas 70,610 died in the same
+period. (See copy of the document in Annex IV.)
+
+
+                                   VI
+
+The Germans had to leave the Soviet Union after the decisive defeat
+at Stalingrad. During the retreat all the still available manpower
+reserves were combed out everywhere. Men and women, children and old
+men were dragged off to Germany. A great number of them were not even
+employed as foreign workers, but instead immediately delivered to the
+concentration camps. In the Fall of 1943 the following transports from
+the still occupied parts of the Soviet Union arrived in Buchenwald.
+
+
+                               _Table 6_
+
+  -------------+-----------------+---------
+      Date     |     Origin      | Number
+  -------------+-----------------+---------
+  26 Aug.  ’43 | Dnjepropetrowsk |   998
+  29 Aug.  ’43 | Dnjepropetrowsk |   781
+  19 Sept. ’43 | Dnjepropetrowsk | 1,362
+   5 Oct.  ’43 | Nikolajew       |   604
+  10 Oct.  ’43 | Kiriwograd      |   529
+  31 Oct.  ’43 | Kiew            |   233
+   1 Nov.  ’43 | Kiriwograd      |   318
+  28 Nov.  ’43 | Nikolajew       |   192
+  24 Mar.  ’44 | Nikolajew       |   377
+               |                 +--------
+               |                 | 5,394
+  -------------+-----------------+---------
+
+Women and children also arrived with these men here. They were not
+allowed to enter the camp, but were passed on directly to the women’s
+concentration camp, or an exception was made, and they were temporarily
+billeted for one or two days until they were transported to other
+places.
+
+At the same time conditions in France also took an unfavorable turn
+for the Third Reich. After the defeat on the East Front the lack and
+in correlation the want of manpower rose in Germany. Sauckel went to
+Paris and negotiated with Laval for the delivery of forced labor.
+This development reflected itself in the KL Buchenwald by deliveries
+of French prisoners of war from the German concentration camp in
+Compiegne. The poetical talents of the German Security Service and
+its sneering attitude toward these victims expressed themselves in
+designating this action as the “Meerschaum Operation”, which was
+followed in 1944 by another operation termed the “Spring Zephyr”. The
+large mass transports which arrived in KL Buchenwald from the West are
+compiled in Table 7.
+
+
+                               _Table 7_
+
+  --------------+---------+-----------------------------
+       Date     |  Number |           Origin
+  --------------+---------+-----------------------------
+  21 May   ’43  |     50  | Compiegne via KL Mauthausen
+  27 June  ’43  |    962  | Compiegne
+   4 Sept. ’43  |    896  | Compiegne
+  18 Sept. ’43  |    926  | Compiegne
+  30 Oct.  ’43  |    911  | Compiegne
+  16 Dec.  ’43  |    921  | Compiegne
+  19 Jan.  ’44  |  1,940  | Compiegne
+  24 Jan.  ’44  |  1,991  | Compiegne
+  29 Jan.  ’44  |  1,580  | Compiegne
+   8 May   ’44  |    967  | Brussels
+  14 May   ’44  |  2,052  | Compiegne
+  14 May   ’44  |  1,667  | Compiegne via KL Auschwitz
+  22 May   ’44  |    891  | Brussels
+  19 June  ’44  |    574  | Brussels
+   3 July  ’44  |    435  | Compiegne
+   6 Aug.  ’44  |  1,080  | Compiegne
+  10 Aug.  ’44  |    827  | Compiegne
+  20 Aug.  ’44  |  1,650  | Compiegne
+  21 Aug.  ’44  |  1,246  | Compiegne
+   5 Febr. ’45  |    285  | Penal Prison Gross-Strehlitz
+  --------------+---------+-----------------------------
+      Total     | 21,851  |
+  --------------+---------+-----------------------------
+
+Frenchmen and Belgians formed the bulk of these transports. However,
+all these transports also contained nationals of other countries,
+who were living temporarily or permanently in France, and were also
+delivered to Buchenwald.
+
+The stream of mass transports stopped after the Red Army had
+reconquered the greater part of the Ukraine. However, many “normal”
+additions continued to arrive, i.e. prisoners from the Germany
+prisons, but also 90% foreigners, who were sent to the concentration
+camps on the orders of Himmler. Nevertheless, these additions could
+not have covered the disastrously increased demand, brought about by
+the inconsiderate waste of manpower, if the SS had not uncovered new
+sources.
+
+Beginning in the early summer of 1944 Hungarian Jews were dragged into
+German slavery in undiscernible masses. They were followed in August by
+the civilian Polish population evacuated from Warsaw.
+
+It is characteristic of the continually increasing catastrophic shaping
+of the conditions in the Third Reich, that the services conducting
+the arrests were no longer in a position to properly register the
+prisoners. Whereas the transport directing services sent lists along
+containing the records of the prisoners in the first mass transports
+from the Soviet Union, France and Belgium, such lists did not accompany
+the Hungarians and Poles coming from Warsaw.
+
+Most of these transports passed through the KL Auschwitz where the
+prisoners probably were subjected to a first examination. Whoever
+appeared fit for work was provided with some scant clothing and after
+a few days sent on. In Auschwitz they were designated as “Transport
+Jews”, and no one took the trouble anymore to review their records.
+That work was left to the concentration camps to which the individuals
+were finally committed. The SS regarded the labor commitment as their
+first duty, and the prisoners engaged with the reception of the
+additions were faced with the greatest to determine the records of
+the additions so that the SS would not simply use them up as numbers.
+Only the fact that we insisted on carrying out the still existing
+order regarding the reception of the additions and did not ignore the
+regulations, which would have greatly pleased the SS it is now possible
+to report--who passed through the camp, who died in the camp--and in
+the near future it will be possible to give information to the brutally
+torn apart family members, relatives and acquaintances on the fate of
+their relatives.
+
+The same applies to the Hungarian Jews, the Poles evacuated from
+Warsaw, the Polish Jews, Poles, Estonians and the Lithuanians, who had
+been interned in the labor camps in the East. They had been committed
+as foreign workers and in part had lived together with their families.
+When the demand for labor arose and with the approach of the Red Army
+in spite of the fact that they were not guilty of any transgressions,
+they were dragged off to the German concentration camps. In many cases
+these separations only took place here upon their arrival at the
+railroad station; where the families were ruthlessly torn asunder,
+parents from their children, husbands from their wives, brothers from
+brothers and sisters from sisters.
+
+During the Summer and the Fall of 1944 the following transports from
+the East arrived in the KL Buchenwald.
+
+
+                               _Table 8_
+
+  -----------+------+-----------------+--------------------
+     Date    |Number|Type of Prisoners|      Origin
+  -----------+------+-----------------+--------------------
+  24  May ’44| 1,000| Hungarian Jews  |Auschwitz
+   2 June ’44| 1,000| Hungarian Jews  |Budapest
+  18 June ’44| 1,000| Hungarian Jews  |Auschwitz
+  16 July ’44| 2,500| Hungarian Jews  |Auschwitz
+   5 Aug. ’44| 1,459| Polish Jews     |
+  13 Aug. ’44| 2,651| Evacuated Poles |Warsaw
+  15 Aug. ’44| 1,999| Evacuated Poles |Warsaw via Auschwitz
+   9 Nov. ’44|   615| Hungarian Jews  |Graz
+  18 Jan. ’45| 2,840| Polish Jews     |
+  20 Jan. ’45| 1,446| Polish Jews     |
+  -----------+------+-----------------+--------------------
+
+Also other domestic political events reflected themselves in new
+additions for the KL Buchenwald. After the disturbances at the
+University of Oslo 349 Norwegian students arrived at Buchenwald on 13
+January 1944. Due to the intervention of the Swedish government they
+were better treated than the other prisoners. They were housed apart
+from the others, kept their civilian clothes, received the same food
+as the troops and for several months were given instruction courses
+and political education by SS instructors. Evidently they were to be
+converted to Nazism. The efforts of the SS, however, were in vain. Not
+one volunteered for the SS. Therefore 117 of them were first sent to a
+SS camp on 7 July 1944 and the rest of them on 23 October 1944, where
+they had to do heavy work on the field fortifications. When the Front
+moved closer they were evacuated from the SS camp and on 12 December
+1944, with other Norwegian students who had not yet been in Buchenwald,
+making a total of 492 men, they were again delivered to Buchenwald. On
+1 March 1945 they were evacuated to the KL Neuengamme.
+
+In 1942 a change swept over the German concentration camps--instead
+of being detention camps for political opponents they became labor
+camps for the German war industries. Early in 1942 the high-ranking
+SS leaders organized the DAW [Deutsche Ausruestungs-Werke-German
+Equipment Works]. The DAW paid the camp administration a modest sum for
+the services of a prisoner with the result that the camps soon became
+self-supporting and the stockholders, having friendly relations with
+the military authorities and cheap labor at their disposal, were soon
+counted amongst the greatest war profiteers. Thusly, they had found
+a new means for garnering profits for the SS and its leaders out of
+state monies. For example, the Camp Commander Pister of Buchenwald was
+elected a director of the DAW-Buchenwald at a considerable monthly
+salary.
+
+A further development plants were constructed and installed with
+machinery in the concentration camps. A railroad between Buchenwald
+and Weimar was built in record time, and the so-called Gustloff Works,
+consisting of 13 immense workshops were erected in the immediate
+vicinity of the camp. In addition increasing numbers of prisoners
+were employed in existing equipment plants. Sauckel himself obtained
+the first prisoners for the Sauckel Works in Weimar. At first they
+were only employed there and transported back and forth daily in
+automobiles. At a later date an equipment headquarters with shelters
+for the prisoners was installed close to the factory. Further outside
+headquarters soon followed in pronounced Nazi plants such as the
+Hasag-Leipzig, and at other points.
+
+The largest and the most terrible of the outside headquarters was
+soon provided with the cover name of “_Dora_” and mentioned only
+with fear and fright by the prisoners. What at first had been only
+an assumption very soon became a certainty. The senseless and cruel
+V-weapons were a specialty of the SS. Their satanical plan provided for
+the construction of these weapons by those foreigners whose countries
+were to be totally destroyed by them. Possibly they also thought that
+the employment of prisoners isolated from the rest of the world would
+help to better guard their secret coupled with the hope that the Allied
+air power would not bomb the plants out of consideration for their
+countrymen. Everything in connection with the production was treated as
+a top-secret. Prisoners who were in the respective headquarters were
+designated as “secret carriers.” In so far as it concerned the Reich
+nationals and the Czechs, they had to be reported specially to the Main
+Office of the Reich Security, the Central Office of the Gestapo, to
+prevent the possibility of a premature discharge.
+
+The most important centers of production were the outside headquarters
+“Dora” near Nordhausen/Harz, and “Laura” near Saalfeld/Thuringia. In
+the workshops Nos. 4-7 of the tremendous Gustloff Works separate parts
+for the V-weapons were also manufactured. At the “Dora” and “Laura”
+plants underground, bomb safe factories were constructed without any
+regard for the waste of manpower or the living requirements of the
+prisoners as regards air, sleep or nourishment. One transport after
+another of unfortunates went to these outside headquarters from
+Buchenwald--never to return. The number of the victims of death soon
+reached record heights and was increased by the victims of explosions
+and plant accidents. Those who became unfit for work were sent to such
+isolated camps as Lublin and Bergen-Belsen, where they were for the
+greater part liquidated by gas poisoning or injections.
+
+The civilian additions were not in sufficient numbers to fill the
+gaps, therefore new transports arrived continuously from other camps
+which after a few days in Buchenwald for the necessary recording
+photographing and physical examination, were passed to the notorious
+outside headquarters.
+
+The Service Group Command D of the Economic Administration Main Office
+in Berlin-Oranienburg was the Central Office for the distribution
+of the labor forces to the German concentration camps. Orders were
+issued from there as to how many and what type of prisoners were to
+be transported to other camps, that is, how many prisoners were to be
+committed to labor by the various outside headquarters. At first this
+Service Command issued a strict order that no political Reich nationals
+were to be shipped in these mass transports. The administrations of
+the various concentration camps strictly observed this rule in their
+own interests, not because they wanted to spare these Germans but
+because they were needed to perform the administration and disciplinary
+duties which the SS really should have handled had it not been for
+their lack of capability and ambition. We prisoners, therefore, had
+the great advantage of regulating many things ourselves, which by
+direct intervention of the SS would have aggravated considerably the
+already insupportable living conditions of all the inmates of the camp.
+Furthermore it is evident that every SS commander endeavored to keep
+his trained people because the new prisoners would only have meant
+trouble and work. In addition, regulations from the Reich Security
+Main Office forbade sending certain prisoners with the transports
+to assure a degree of isolation. Except for a few individual cases,
+this regulation applied in particular to the half-jews. On orders
+of the Reich Security Main Office all these as in Germany arrested
+“half-breeds”, Grade 1, as they were officially designated, were sent
+to Buchenwald and were not allowed to be transferred to another camp.
+Thusly it came about, that when larger transports were assembled,
+especially for the notorious outside headquarters or camps, the least
+capable and the latest additions were selected from the blocks and
+commands and sent away again. At the new places these persons were just
+as unfit for labor as at the previous ones, in other words, they were
+undesirable. After their arrival they very often had to be quarantined
+for some time. The attempted regulation of the distribution from
+one central office and the increasing impossibility to control this
+manpower, resulted in thousands of prisoners being continually on the
+move. They therefore, could not be committed to labor as the paper
+records seem to indicate.
+
+From the Fall of 1943 to the Fall of 1944 the transports compiled in
+Table 9 arrived in Buchenwald from other concentration camps, which for
+the greater part had already been destined for shipment to “Dora” and
+other outside headquarters.
+
+
+                               _Table 9_
+
+  -------------+--------+----------------------------+----------------
+     Date      | Number |     Type of Prisoner       |    From KL
+  -------------+--------+----------------------------+----------------
+  22 Sept. ’43 |   300  | Mostly Russians            | Gross Rosen
+  22 Sept. ’43 |   210  | 149 Russians and oth.      | Natzweiler
+  14 Oct. ’43  |   650  | 373 Frenchmen              | Ravensbrueck
+               |        | 144 Russians and oth.      |
+  17 Oct. ’43  |   849  | Mostly Russians            | Mauthausen
+  19 Oct. ’43  |   311  | Mostly Russians and Poles  | Stutthof
+  21 Oct. ’43  |   300  | Mostly Russians and Poles  | Auschwitz
+  21 Oct. ’43  |   200  | Mostly Russians and Poles  | Natzweiler
+  21 Oct. ’43  |   506  | Mostly Jugoslavs           | Flossenburg
+  23 Oct. ’43  | 1,539  | Mostly Poles               | Auschwitz
+  30 Oct. ’43  | 1,025  | Mostly Jugoslavs and       |
+               |        |   Russians                 | Dachau
+  20 Nov. ’43  |   375  | Mostly French and Poles    | Mauthausen
+  21 Nov. ’43  |   417  | Mostly French and Russians | Dachau
+  12 Dec. ’43  |   200  | Russians and Poles         | Auschwitz
+  25 Jan. ’44  |   400  | Germans and Russians       | Sachsenhausen
+   3 Mar. ’44  |   421  | Mostly Czechs              | Auschwitz
+  11 Mar. ’44  |   413  | Mostly Poles               | Gross Rosen
+   2 Apr. ’44  |   202  | Czechs                     | Auschwitz
+   7 Apr. ’44  |   883  | Gypsies                    | Auschwitz
+  28 May ’44   |   350  | Mostly Poles and Russians  | Stutthof
+  24 June ’44  | 2,000  | Mostly Poles and Russians  | Auschwitz
+  29 July ’44  |   200  | Russians and Poles         | Bergen-Belsen
+   3 Aug. ’44  |   510  | Gypsies                    | Auschwitz
+   3 Aug. ’44  |   400  | Russians and Poles         | Neuengamme
+  16 Aug. ’44  | 1,350  | Jews various nations       | Stutthof
+  27 Sept. ’44 | 1,085  |                            | Natzweiler near
+               |        |                            |  Dora
+   1 Oct. ’44  | 1,500  | Poles and Russians         | Auschwitz
+  -------------+--------+----------------------------+----------------
+
+In this table transports of less 200 prisoners from other camps and
+transports which went directly to the outside headquarters without
+passing through the main camp, are not listed.
+
+The greater number of these additions, as well as the afore mentioned
+additions from the East and West proceeded quickly and intact to the
+outside headquarters of the equipment industry and only the completely
+emaciated in the camps until they died of old age or decrepitude. After
+months of the severest physical labor in those headquarters under the
+worst living conditions (bad food, no rest even during their free
+time, with out any sanitary installations, during months no thorough
+bodily cleansing and no change of underwear) they either perished
+[or were sent to] miserable concentration camps Lublin, Auschwitz or
+Belsen-Bergen not for recreation--but for final liquidation. This
+exploitation of the work potential of their slaves to the last gasp was
+termed by the SS “shredding”. In this manner they reduced every one
+they could lay their hands on to shreds--Russians, Poles, Hungarians,
+Jugoslavs, Frenchmen, Jews and Christians--they would have annihilated
+the population of a whole continent, if the Allied armies had not put a
+stop to matters by their victorious advance.
+
+By reason of all these transports from the West and the East and from
+the other concentration camps the number of the additions, the camp
+strength and the number of death cases rose as shown in Table 10.
+
+
+                               _Table 10_
+
+  ----------+-----------+----------+---------------
+            |           |          | Camp Strength
+     Month  | Additions |  Deaths  |  end of month
+  ----------+-----------+----------+---------------
+  July  ’43 |    1,725  |   191    |   15,796
+  Aug.  ’43 |    4,537  |   118    |   19,641
+  Sept. ’43 |    5,444  |   123    |   24,688
+  Oct.  ’43 |    9,048  |   109    |   33,377
+  Nov.  ’43 |    4,454  |   314    |   35,112
+  Dec.  ’43 |    3,734  |   967    |   37,319
+  Jan.  ’44 |    8,017  | 1,000    |   42,833
+  Feb.  ’44 |    1,979  |   880    |   41,240
+  Mar.  ’44 |    5,065  | 1,311    |   43,371
+  April ’44 |    4,788  |   560    |   45,830
+  May   ’44 |    9,655  |   390    |   54,287
+  June  ’44 |    9,986  |   460    |   61,156
+  July  ’44 |    7,398  |   347    |   66,609
+  Aug.  ’44 |   17,170  |   742    |   82,391
+  Sept. ’44 |    4,251  |   497    |   84,505
+  Oct.  ’44 |    6,728  |   770    |   55,473
+  ----------+-----------+----------+---------------
+
+On the 6 October 1944 the camp strength reached its highest figure
+amounting to 89,134 prisoners. On 29 October 1944 the auxiliary
+headquarters “Dora” became an independent concentration camp with the
+name of KL Mittelbau containing 32,532 prisoners who were at that
+time attached to the various auxiliary headquarters. The names of
+these prisoners were removed from the Buchenwald records and the camp
+strength reduced accordingly.
+
+On 24 August 1944 at noon the equipment plants belonging to the
+concentration camp were bombarded and completely destroyed. Not a
+single high-explosive bomb fell into the prisoners camp but a few
+incendiary bombs, diverted by the wind, set fire to the prisoners
+tailor shop, shoemaker shop, laundry and the disinfection station
+without injuring a single prisoner. The SS had not provided air raid
+shelters for the prisoners, in fact they did not even allow the
+prisoners to go into the camp during an air raid alarm. The prisoners
+were compelled to remain in the workshops or in their immediate
+vicinity. Bomb proof shelters or trenches for protection against
+bomb fragment had not been constructed for the prisoners. During an
+attack the water supply was shut off in the entire camp. Prisoners who
+attempted to escape from the high-explosive and the incendiary bombs by
+running into the open were shot down by the SS guards without mercy.
+Consequently, the air bombardment caused the death of 364 prisoners.
+It is not possible to determine now how many were shot down by the SS
+troopers. It is a fact however that Thaelmann, who allegedly was killed
+during the attack was an inmate of the Buchenwald camp. The prisoners
+had reason to be grateful that the pinpoint bombing of the Allied Air
+Force greatly reduced the number of victims.
+
+The bombardment not only destroyed the factory buildings but also the
+important administration offices of the SS in Buchenwald, especially
+the so-called “Political Section,” in which the personal records of
+the prisoners were kept. Therefore no new prisoners were allowed to be
+shipped to the camp for a while. Those additions which were recorded in
+September 1944 were sent directly to the auxiliary headquarters, and in
+particular to “Dora”.
+
+After the failure of the attempt on the life of Hitler on 20 July 1944
+Himmler took over command of the Home Front Army. The concentration
+camp Buchenwald soon reflected the results of this event. On 22 August
+1944 the operation, given by the code name of “Gitter” [trellis], was
+conducted throughout the entire territory of the Reich, by which the
+remainder of the former functionaries of the Anti-Fascist Parties, who
+were still at liberty, were arrested and sent directly to the nearest
+concentration camp. On the 22 or 23 August 1944 about 750 “trellis”
+prisoners arrived from the immediate surroundings of Weimar within
+a few hours. Further transport from Saxony, the Rhineland and from
+Westphalia were anticipated. However, after the attack of the Allied
+Air Forces on the 24 August 1944 these transports could no longer be
+made. In other Fascist circles this “trellis” action must also have met
+with some opposition. The details and the reasons were not known at
+that time. In any case, the Weimar Gestapo arrived in the camp a few
+days later briefly examined the arrested persons and then set most of
+them free.
+
+If this was merely a police measure to use the camp temporarily as a
+lodging place for arrested persons, Himmler soon found other ways and
+means to increase the number of the slaves of the SS by new additions.
+
+In November 1944 the first prisoners of a new category arrived which
+was termed “Zwischenhaft II” (intermediate custody II). This category
+included members of the Wehrmacht who had been condemned by the
+military courts to severe penal prison sentences for desertion and
+absence without official leave from their units. These soldiers were
+sent to the concentration camp for “intermediate custody” and to be
+set to work. It was Himmler’s plan to have these soldiers finish the
+balance of their penal prison sentence after the end of the war.
+According to orders from the highest authorities in Berlin they all
+had to be sent to the KL “_Mittelbau_” or in other words to “Dora.” At
+“Dora” they were probably put to work on the dangerous manufacture of
+the secret weapons, because being long term prisoners they were not
+to be spared. Furthermore, no difficulties could arise in the future
+because they could not be given a discharge on account of the secret
+nature of their work.
+
+These intermediate prisoners were by no means only German Reich
+nationals, but among them were also members of all the European nations
+who had joined the German Wehrmacht as volunteers. In these months,
+even Himmler delivered members of his own SS units who were guilty of
+misdemeanors, to the concentration camps. In December 1944, January and
+February 1945 several small transports of Croatians, Turka (members of
+a Mohammedan SS formation) and Frenchmen, at the time in SS uniforms
+arrived in the camp as prisoners.
+
+Other political events in occupied Europe brought new additions to
+the concentration camps. In September 1944 a large raid was carried
+out in Denmark, against the Danish police, especially in Copenhagen.
+On 30 September 1944, 1,480 Danish police functionaries arrived in
+the KL “Buchenwald,” after having been detained a few days in the KL
+“Neuengamme.” They were followed by 473 men on 5 October 1944. They
+were soon put to work and long columns of them had to carry building
+materials. However, they did not stay very long in the camp. The first
+200, mostly high-ranking police officers, were removed by the Danish
+Red Cross on 8 December 1944, and as far as it was known here, taken to
+an internment camp in Schleswig Holstein. The next transport of 1,604
+Danes left on 17 December 1944 and the balance followed during January
+and February 1945. The unaccustomed severe climate of Buchenwald,
+to which they had been transported at the beginning of the winter,
+demanded a relatively high total of victims. In the few months of their
+sojourn, approximately 90 Danes died.
+
+
+                                   X.
+
+When the Auxiliary Headquarters “Dora” was declared an independent
+concentration camp in October 1944, the construction work had been
+completed and the production of V-weapons was running at full speed. In
+connection therewith the demand for unskilled labor had diminished a
+little.
+
+The establishment of a new and even more notorious auxiliary
+headquarters near Ohrdruf in Thuringia with the designation “S III”,
+soon caused Buchenwald to experience a new increase in mass transports.
+In all haste an underground factory was to be built there, without any
+regard for any wastage of manpower. Again mass transports from all
+concentration camps either passed through Buchenwald or went directly
+to their point of destination. Again mass transports left Buchenwald
+itself for the new auxiliary headquarters. The SS found the SS ordered
+all the prisoners to fall in on the roll-call grounds, the latter were
+then closed off and the SS selected 1,000 prisoners for “S III”, who
+were shipped off that same night. The first large transport of 1,000
+men arrived in the new headquarters on 20 November 1944. Already within
+a month the strength of the headquarters rose to 7,500 men and reached
+a maximum figure of 13,726 prisoners on 27 March 1945.
+
+The increasing inefficiency of the administrative machine in the higher
+offices soon manifested itself very clearly. The new headquarters were
+put under the command of the Wehrmacht. The prisoners were struck
+off the records of the camp strength of the various concentration
+camps and were to be incorporated into the new headquarters. This soon
+proved itself impossible on account of the enormous inflow and the
+lack of experienced help. Therefore the whole headquarters had to be
+taken over again into the camp strength of the KL Buchenwald. It was
+absolutely unknown which prisoners were in “S III” and the SS had it
+compiled with the help of prisoners, a complete record of all the camp
+inmates. At that time the rolls disclosed a strength of 7,648 men of
+which about 2,000 were in the so-called North Camp and approximately
+5,500 in the South Camp. Before the lists sent to the KL Buchenwald
+could be checked, 1,400 completely exhausted prisoners arrived at
+Buchenwald from “S III” on 12 December 1944. They gave the camp its
+first shocking impression of the horrible conditions in Ohrdruf. On
+their arrival at the Buchenwald railroad station more than 200 of the
+1,400 prisoners had already died or were well spent and exhausted that
+they were unable to give their names or numbers. The transport lists,
+sloppily compiled by the SS, did not check. Prisoners were listed that
+did not come with the transport and vice-versa, consequently it was
+impossible to accurately identify later the dead. The SS management did
+not send the next transport of “shredded” workers to Buchenwald but to
+the concentration camp Bergen-Belsen, where their final liquidation in
+the remoteness of the Lueneburger Heide, presumably, could be carried
+out less openly and more expeditiously.
+
+The tragic end of the exterior headquarters is probably known by this
+time. At the approach of the victorious Allied troops the headquarters
+set out on foot in the direction of Buchenwald. Anyone who could not
+keep up with the marching column was shot. From 4 to 7 April 1945 about
+9,300 prisoners (in view of the chaotic conditions which also existed
+here, an accurate count could not be made) arrived in Buchenwald. On
+the 9 and 10 April 1945 the SS evacuated the majority of them from
+Buchenwald. From all that has been learned so far about them it is
+probable that this transport was annihilated completely. At the end of
+March, according to the local reports, about 12,000 prisoners were in
+“S III”. The prisoners who did not arrive in Buchenwald, by the SS in
+the “S III” camp or on the road.
+
+
+                               _Table 11_
+
+  --------------+--------+------------------------------+----------------
+       Date     | Number |             Type             | From KL--All
+                |        |                              |   to S III
+  --------------+--------+------------------------------+----------------
+  19 Nov. ’44   |   778  | Hung. Jews                   | Sachsenhausen
+  24 Nov. ’44   |   500  | Hung. Jews                   | Sachsenhausen
+  26 Nov. ’44   | 1,000  | Jews                         | Stutthof
+  27 Nov. ’44   |   500  | Jews                         | Sachsenhausen
+  29 Nov. ’44   |   500  | Lithuanians, Poles, Russians | Stutthof
+   2 Dec. ’44   |   353  | Polish jews                  | Camp Plaszow
+   5 Dec. ’44   | 1,997  | Various                      | Dachau
+   7 Dec. ’44   |   500  | Poles                        | Auschwitz
+  13 Dec. ’44   | 2,496  | Various                      | Dachau
+  18 Dec. ’44   |   425  | Mostly Poles                 | Auschwitz
+  26 Dec. ’44   |   394  | Mostly Poles                 | Natzweiler
+  --------------+--------+------------------------------+----------------
+
+In the following Table 12 transports are listed, consisting of
+prisoners from “S III” no longer capable of working, which were
+transferred to other camps. It is to be assumed, that at least a
+portion of these prisoners were not recorded as additions in the camps
+of their destination, because they were condemned to be liquidated and
+therefore, not booked on the rolls of the camp strength.
+
+
+                               _Table 12_
+
+  -------------+--------+---------+--------------
+      Date     | Number |   Type  | Destination
+  -------------+--------+---------+--------------
+  14 Febr. ’45 |   500  | Various | Bergen-Belsen
+  24 Febr. ’45 | 1,884  | Various | Bergen-Belsen
+  25 Febr. ’45 |   500  | Various | Bergen-Belsen
+  -------------+--------+---------+--------------
+
+In addition to the above there was one transport of 1,002 “invalids”,
+the greater number of which had also been in “S III”, or had keen
+destined for “S III”, but were sent directly from Buchenwald to the KL
+Bergen-Belsen.
+
+Of the new arrivals booked by “S III” in the period of 24 December 1944
+to 26 February 1945, the records indicate that 1,460 prisoners died in
+Ohrdruf.
+
+
+                                  XI.
+
+The advance of the Red Army compelled the evacuation of the large
+concentration camps in the East. The result was a maddening increase in
+arrivals and a horrible, almost inconceivable increase of unnecessary
+suffering and senseless sacrifices. The offensive on the Vistula River
+began 13 January 1945. Within a short time the Red Army reached a
+menacing position close to the concentration camp Auschwitz, where
+there must have been about 80,000 prisoners. Auschwitz had to be
+evacuated. Shortly thereafter, the concentration camp Gross Rosen near
+Breslau had to be cleared. The first transports of evacuated Jews from
+the KL Auschwitz on open railroad cars arrived here on 22 January 1945,
+which were soon followed by others. In those days it was bitterly
+cold. These human beings had been traveling for days, insufficiently
+clad and underfed. In the overcrowded railroad cars their comrades had
+died from weakness and exhaustion, and to save themselves the living
+had to throw the dead bodies from the moving train. The commandant of
+the camp received complaints from the regions through which the trains
+had passed, that corpses had been found on the railway embankments.
+The arrivals very often dragged themselves from the railroad station
+to the camp with their last ounce of strength. Prisoners, the camp
+guards and the fire department had to proceed with two-wheeled carts
+and handcarts, usually, and for transporting building materials to the
+station to load up the collapsed persons and the dead bodies. The camp
+streets were littered with lost blankets, caps, overcoats, mess kits
+and collapsed human beings, who had not been able to drag themselves
+any further.
+
+An accurate count of the additions was no longer possible. A check
+on the number of those leaving the point of departure and on how
+many had died on the way, escaped, or had simply remained behind
+also was no longer possible. Likewise the administrations of the
+dissolved camps did not know which prisoners had been transported to
+Buchenwald. The Reich Security Service sent a teletype letter to all
+the concentration camps, who had received additions from Auschwitz and
+Gross-Rosen, requesting that lists of the newly arrived prisoners with
+their old prisoner’s number be forwarded as soon as possible to the
+administration of the Auschwitz concentration camp, which latter in the
+meantime had been transferred to the KL Mittelbau. The concentration
+camps Auschwitz and Gross-Rosen, as well as other camps and prisons in
+the East and the West had to be evacuated in great haste and many of
+the inmates came to Buchenwald.
+
+The transport which came here will be listed in detail in Table 13 and
+Table 14 will show the increases in the camp strength in the additions
+and the death cases.
+
+
+                               _Table 13_
+
+  -------------+----------+--------------------+---------------------------
+      Date     | Number   |  Type of Prisoner  |           Origin
+  -------------+----------+--------------------+---------------------------
+  24 Dec.  ’44 |    916   | Polish Jews        | Budapest via Vienna
+  25 Dec.  ’44 |  1,913   | Hungarian Jews     |
+  17 Jan.  ’45 |    263   | Various            | Cologne and
+               |          |                    |   Aix-la-Chapelle.
+  17 Jan.  ’45 |  2,740   | Polish Jews        | Tschenstochau.
+  20 Jan.  ’45 |  1,446   | Polish Jews        | Tschenstochau.
+  22 Jan.  ’45 |  2,224   | Jews diff. nations | Auschwitz.
+  23 Jan.  ’45 |    917   | Jews diff. nations | Auschwitz.
+  26 Jan.  ’45 |  3,987   | Various            | Auschwitz.
+   3 Febr. ’45 |    291   | Various            | Kuestrin.
+   5 Febr. ’45 |    285   | French a. Belgians | Prison Gr. Strehlitz.
+   7 Febr. ’45 |    250   | Various            | Kuestrin.
+  10 Febr. ’45 |  6,805   | Various            | Gross-Rosen.
+  24 Febr. ’45 |    464   | Russians           | Gross-Rosen.
+  26 Febr. ’45 |    290   | Various            | Exterior Hdg. Gross-Rosen.
+               |          | Various            | { Gross-Rosen to Exterior.
+   5 Mar.  ’45 |    580   |                    | { Hdqtrs. Leipzig.
+   7 Mar.  ’45 |    905   | Mostly Jews        | Gross-Rosen.
+  12 Mar.  ’45 |    399   | Mostly Poles       | Gross-Rosen.
+  30 Mar.  ’45 |    280   | Various            | Natzweiler.
+  -------------+----------+--------------------+---------------------------
+
+
+                               _Table 14_
+
+  ----------+-----------+-----------+-------------------
+    Date    | Additions |   Deaths  | Camp Strength End
+            |           |           |    of month
+  ----------+-----------+-----------+-------------------
+  Nov.  ’44 |    10,305 |     612   |    59,261
+  Dec.  ’44 |    12,555 |   1,113   |    63,048
+  Jan.  ’45 |    24,197 |   2,002   |    80,297
+  Febr. ’45 |    13,066 |   5,523   |    86,232
+  March ’45 |     6,560 |   5,531   |    80,436
+  ----------+-----------+-----------+-------------------
+
+The further expansion in the last 11 days of the existence of the
+National Socialistic concentration camp Buchenwald was influenced by
+the ever closer approaching Allied Armies. The last of the exterior
+headquarters located in the West returned to the camp of origin
+Buchenwald. On 6 April the number of the prisoners amounted to about
+47,700 men. The balance of 31,598, mostly employed in exterior
+headquarters east of Buchenwald, did not return to the camp. At this
+time nothing is known of their fate.
+
+The SS began to evacuate the camp on April 6, 1945. It succeeded in
+transferring 28,285 prisoners to other camps. The transports in detail
+are given in Table 15.
+
+
+                               _Table 15_
+
+  -------------+----------+-------------------+----------------
+      Date     | Number   | Type of Prisoners |  Destination
+  -------------+----------+-------------------+----------------
+   6 Apr. ’45  |  3,105   | Jews              | KL Flossenbuerg
+   7 Apr. ’45  |  1,500   | Various           | Leitmeritz
+   7 Apr. ’45  |  4,800   | Mostly Jews       | KL Flossenbuerg
+   9 Apr. ’45  |  9,600   | Various           | Dachau
+  10 Apr. ’45  |  9,280   | Various           | Unknown
+               | ------   |                   |
+     Total     | 28,285   |                   |
+  -------------+----------+-------------------+----------------
+
+When the KL Buchenwald was liberated by the Allied Armies on 11 April
+1945 there were still about 21,000 prisoners on the Ettersberg.
+
+       #       #       #       #       #
+
+                               _Annex I_
+
+Tabular Survey of the Numerical Expansion at the Buchenwald
+Concentration Camp
+
+  ----------+----------+----------------------------------+---------
+            |          |              Decrease            |  Camp
+            |          +---------+--------+------+--------+ strength
+    Month   | Increase |  Disch. | Trans. | Died | Total  |  end of
+            |          |         |        |      |        |  month
+  ----------+----------+---------+--------+------+--------+---------
+  July  ’37 |    930   |         |        |      |     1  |    929
+  Aug.  ’37 |  1,414   |         |        |   8  |    48  |  2,295
+  Sept. ’37 |    180   |         |        |   7  |    55  |  2,420
+  Oct.  ’37 |    109   |         |        |   2  |    60  |  2,469
+  Nov.  ’37 |    133   |         |        |   9  |    75  |  2,527
+  Dec.  ’37 |    146   |         |        |  22  |   112  |  2,561
+            +----------+---------+--------+------+--------+---------
+    Total   |  2,912   |         |        |  48  |   351  |
+  ----------+----------+---------+--------+------+--------+---------
+
+  ----------+----------+---------+--------+------+--------+---------
+  Jan.  ’38 |    139   |         |        |      |    67  |  2,633
+  Febr. ’38 |    140   |         |        |      |    45  |  2,728
+  Mar.  ’38 |    138   |         |        |      |    60  |  2,806
+  April ’38 |    236   |         |        |      |    42  |  3,000
+  May   ’38 |  1,785   |         |        |      |    54  |  4,731
+  June  ’38 |  3,103   |         |        |      |   111  |  7,723
+  July  ’38 |    463   |         |        |      |   258  |  7,928
+  Aug.  ’38 |    348   |         |        |      |   485  |  7,791
+  Sept. ’38 |  3,059   |         |        |      |   379  | 10,471
+  Oct.  ’38 |    428   |         |        |      |   711  | 10,188
+  Nov.  ’38 | 10,098   |         |        |      | 2,181  | 18,105
+  Dec.  ’38 |    185   |         |        |      | 7,262  | 11,028
+            +----------+---------+--------+------+--------+---------
+    Total   | 20,122   |         |        | 771  |11,655  |
+  ----------+----------+---------+--------+------+--------+---------
+
+  ----------+----------+---------+--------+------+--------+---------
+  Jan.  ’39 |    184   |         |        |      |  1,727 |  9,485
+  Febr. ’39 |    113   |         |        |      |    949 |  8,649
+  Mar.  ’39 |     45   |         |        |      |     30 |  8,664
+  Apr.  ’39 |     13   |         |        |      |  2,314 |  6,363
+  May   ’39 |     20   |         |        |      |    713 |  5,670
+  June  ’39 |    103   |         |        |      |    250 |  5,523
+  July  ’39 |    166   |         |        |      |    297 |  5,392
+  Aug.  ’39 |    155   |         |        |      |    165 |  5,392
+  Sept. ’39 |  3,314   |         |        |      |     62 |  8,634
+  Oct.  ’39 |  5,373   |         |        |      |  1,232 | 12,775
+  Nov.  ’39 |     50   |         |        |      |    448 | 12,377
+  Dec.  ’39 |     17   |         |        |      |    587 | 11,807
+            +----------+---------+--------+------+--------+---------
+    Total   |  9,553   |         |        | 1,235|  8,774 |
+  ----------+----------+---------+--------+------+--------+---------
+
+  ----------+----------+---------+--------+------+--------+---------
+  Jan.  ’40 |     24   |         |        |      |    875 | 10,956
+  Feb.  ’40 |     21   |         |        |      |    654 | 10,323
+  Mar.  ’40 |     14   |         |        |      |  1,518 |  8,819
+  Apr.  ’40 |     67   |         |        |      |    900 |  7,986
+  May   ’40 |     19   |         |        |      |    372 |  7,633
+  June  ’40 |     26   |         |        |      |    321 |  7,338
+  July  ’40 |    250   |         |        |      |    318 |  7,270
+  Aug.  ’40 |  1,168   |         |        |      |    239 |  8,199
+  Sept. ’40 |     52   |         |        |      |    144 |  8,107
+  Oct.  ’40 |    196   |         |        |      |    502 |  7,801
+  Nov.  ’40 |     96   |         |        |      |    286 |  7,611
+  Dec.  ’40 |    592   |         |        |      |    763 |  7,440
+            +----------+---------+--------+------+--------+---------
+    Total   |  2,525   |         | 1,772  |      |  6,892 |
+  ----------+----------+---------+--------+------+--------+---------
+
+  ----------+----------+---------+--------+------+--------+---------
+  Jan.  ’41 |     50   |         |        |      |    128 |  7,362
+  Feb.  ’41 |    452   |         |        |      |    217 |  7,597
+  Mar.  ’41 |    236   |         |        |      |    513 |  7,320
+  Apr.  ’41 |    505   |         |        |      |    336 |  7,489
+  May   ’41 |    288   |         |        |      |    992 |  6,785
+  June  ’41 |    231   |         |        |      |    209 |  6,807
+  July  ’41 |  2,695   |         |        |      |    920 |  8,582
+  Aug.  ’41 |    396   |         |        |      |    496 |  8,482
+  Sept. ’41 |    251   |         |        |      |    363 |  8,370
+  Oct.  ’41 |    251   |         |        |      |    468 |  8,153
+  Nov.  ’41 |    277   |         |        |      |    520 |  7,910
+  Dec.  ’41 |    258   |         |        |      |    257 |  7,911
+            +----------+---------+--------+------+--------+---------
+    Total   |  5,890   |         |  1,522 |      |  5,419 |
+  ----------+----------+---------+--------+------+--------+---------
+
+  ----------+----------+---------+--------+------+--------+---------
+  Jan.  ’42 |     554  |         |        |      |    479 |  7,986
+  Febr. ’42 |     480  |         |        |      |    349 |  8,117
+  Mar.  ’42 |   2,843  |         |        |      |  2,154 |  8,806
+  Apr.  ’42 |     521  |         |        |      |    673 |  8,654
+  May   ’42 |     452  |         |        |      |  1,505 |  7,601
+  June  ’42 |   1,019  |         |        |      |    620 |  8,000
+  July  ’42 |   1,996  |         |        |      |  1,147 |  8,849
+  Aug.  ’42 |   1,715  |         |        |      |    678 |  9,886
+  Sept. ’42 |   1,709  |         |        |      |  1,520 | 10,075
+  Oct.  ’42 |     984  |         |        |      |  2,228 |  8,831
+  Nov.  ’42 |     794  |         |        |      |    533 |  9,092
+  Dec.  ’42 |   1,044  |         |        |      |    619 |  9,517
+            +----------+---------+--------+------+--------+---------
+   Total    |  14,111  |         |  2,898 |      | 12,505 |
+  ----------+----------+---------+--------+------+--------+---------
+
+  ----------+----------+---------+--------+------+--------+---------
+  Jan.  ’43 |  2,500   |         |        |  111 |    742 | 11,275
+  Febr. ’43 |  1,291   |     94  |    377 |  175 |    646 | 11,920
+  Mar.  ’43 |  2,474   |     40  |  1,582 |  311 |  1,933 | 12,461
+  Apr.  ’43 |  2,773   |  1,102  |    299 |  507 |  1,908 | 13,326
+  May   ’43 |  2,339   |     38  |    807 |  379 |  1,224 | 14,441
+  June  ’43 |  1,858   |    122  |    348 |  211 |    681 | 15,618
+  July  ’43 |  1,727   |     39  |  1,317 |  191 |  1,547 | 15,796
+  Aug.  ’43 |  4,537   |     57  |    517 |  118 |    692 | 19,641
+  Sept. ’43 |  5,444   |     41  |    233 |  123 |    397 | 24,688
+  Oct.  ’43 |  9,048   |     41  |    209 |  109 |    359 | 33,377
+  Nov.  ’43 |  4,454   |     27  |  2,378 |  314 |  2,719 | 35,112
+  Dec.  ’43 |  3,734   |     35  |    525 |  967 |  1,527 | 37,319
+            +----------+---------+--------+------+--------+---------
+      Total | 42,177   |  1,636  |  8,592 |3,516 | 14,375 |
+  ----------+----------+---------+--------+------+--------+---------
+
+  ----------+----------+---------+--------+------+--------+---------
+  Jan.  ’44 |  8,017   |     49  |  1,454 |1,000 |  2,503 | 42,833
+  Febr. ’44 |  1,979   |     44  |  2,648 |  880 |  3,572 | 41,240
+  Mar.  ’44 |  5,065   |     96  |  1,527 |1,311 |  2,934 | 43,371
+  Apr.  ’44 |  4,788   |    120  |  1,649 |  560 |  2,329 | 45,830
+  May   ’44 |  9,655   |    133  |    675 |  390 |  1,198 | 54,287
+  June  ’44 |  9,986   |    464  |  2,193 |  460 |  3,117 | 61,156
+  July  ’44 |  7,398   |    311  |  1,287 |  347 |  1,945 | 66,609
+  Aug.  ’44 | 17,170   |    217  |    429 |  742 |  1,388 | 82,391
+  Sept. ’44 |  4,221   |  1,139  |    471 |  497 |  2,107 | 84,505
+  Oct.  ’44 |  6,728   |    981  |  34,047|  732 | 35,760 | 55,473
+  Nov.  ’44 | 10,305   |    698  |  5,207 |  612 |  6,517 | 59,261
+  Dec.  ’44 | 12,555   |  2,076  |  5,579 |1,113 |  8,768 | 63,048
+            +----------+---------+--------+------+--------+---------
+      Total | 97,867   |  6,328  | 57,166 |8,644 | 72,138 |
+  ----------+----------+---------+--------+------+--------+---------
+
+  ----------+----------+---------+--------+------+--------+---------
+  Jan.  ’45 |  24,197  |    190  | 4,756  | 2,002|  6,948 | 80,297
+  Febr. ’45 |  13,066  |    257  | 1,351  | 5,523|  7,131 | 86,232
+  Mar.  ’45 |   6,560  |    488  | 6,337  | 5,531| 12,356 | 80,436
+            +----------+---------+--------+------+--------+---------
+    Total   |  43,823  |    935  |12,444  |13,056| 26,435 |
+  ==========+==========+=========+========+======+========+=========
+  TOTAL 1937|          |         |        |      |        |
+    to 31   |          |         |        |      |        |
+    MARCH   |          |         |        |      |        |
+    1945:   | 238,980  |         |        |33,462|158,544 |
+  ----------+----------+---------+--------+------+--------+---------
+
+
+                               _Annex II_
+
+Copy of a letter from the SS Main Office of Economic Administration to
+all concentration camps.
+
+  SS Main Office of Economic Administration
+  Service Group D Concentration Camp
+  D III/Az.: 14 h (KL) 12.42 Lg/Wy
+
+                                                             Oranienburg
+                                                        28 December 1942
+
+  Regarding: Medical Activities in the Concentration Camps
+  Reference: without
+  Enclosure: 1
+
+                                 SECRET
+
+TO the 1. Camp Doctors of the Concentration Camps Da., Sh., Bu., Neu.,
+Au., Rav., Flo., Lu., Stu., Gr-Ro., Nied., Natz., Hinz., Mor., Herzog.,
+Mau.,
+
+Copy to the Camp Commandants.
+
+In the inclosed a compilation of the current arrivals and departures
+in all the concentration camps is sent to you for your information. It
+discloses that out of 136,000 arrivals about 70,000 died. With such a
+high rate of death the number of the prisoners can never be brought
+up to the figure as has been ordered by the Reichsfuehrer of the SS.
+The 1. camp doctors must use all means at their disposal to reduce
+essentially this death rate in the various camps. The best doctor in a
+concentration camp is not the one, who believes that he must stand out
+for uncalled severity, but the one who by his supervision and exchange
+keeps the working capacity at the various labor commands at the highest
+possible level. The camp doctors must supervise more often than in
+the past the food of the prisoners and, with the approval of the
+administration, submit improvement proposals to the camp commandants.
+These, however, must not only appear on paper, but must be controlled
+regularly by the camp doctors. Furthermore, the camp doctors are to
+see to it that the working conditions at the various labor places are
+improved as much as possible. To this purpose it will be necessary that
+the camp doctors inspect the labor places on the ground and convince
+themselves about the conditions of work.
+
+The SS Reichsfuehrer has ordered that the death rate absolutely must
+be reduced. For this reason the aforementioned has been ordered and a
+monthly report on this matter is to be submitted to the Chief of the
+Department D III. The first report to be submitted on 1 February 1943.
+
+                                                   [Signature illegible]
+
+                                                              Klueder[?]
+
+                         SS Brigadefuehrer and Major General of the Arms
+
+
+                                _Survey_
+
+                  For the month of June-November 1942
+
+  ------+------------------------------------
+  Month |            Arrivals
+  ------+------------------------------------
+        |     Deliveries Uberst [?] Total
+  ------+---------+--------+---------+-------
+  June  |  10,322 |  1,575 |  11,897 |   873
+  July  |  25,716 |  6,254 |  31,970 |   907
+  Aug.  |  25,407 |  2,742 |  28,149 |   581
+  Sept. |  16,763 |  6,438 |  23,201 |   652
+  Oct.  |  13,873 |  5,345 |  19,218 | 1,089
+  Nov.  |  17,780 |  4,565 |  22,345 |   809
+        +---------+--------+---------+-------
+   Total| 109,861 | 26,919 | 136,870 | 4,711
+  ------+---------+--------+---------+-------
+
+Table continued ...
+
+  ------+--------------------------------------
+  Month |              Departures
+  ------+--------------------------------------
+        | Dischrg, Uberst [?] Dead Exek. Total
+  ------+---------+--------+-------+-----------
+  June  |   1,903 |  4,080 |   243 |   6,899
+  July  |   4,340 |  8,536 |   477 |  12,260
+  Aug.  |   2,950 | 12,733 |    99 |  16,363
+  Sept. |   6,805 | 22,598 |   144 |  30,199
+  Oct.  |   6,334 | 11,858 | 5,945 |  25,235
+  Nov.  |   5,514 | 10,805 | 2,350 |  19,478
+        +---------+--------+-------+-----------
+   Total|  27,846 | 70,610 | 9,267 | 112,434
+  ------+---------+--------+-------+-----------
+
+
+                                                COPY OF DOCUMENT 2176-PS
+
+                              CONFIDENTIAL
+
+ REPORT OF INVESTIGATING OFFICER HEADQUARTERS THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
+
+                      Office of the Judge Advocate
+
+                                                                 APO 403
+  AG 092 (3 JA-132) GNMCJ                                   17 June 1945
+
+  SUBJECT: Report of Investigation of Alleged War Crimes.
+
+  TO:      Commanding General, Twelfth Army Group, APO
+  655, U. S. Army.
+
+
+I. _AUTHORITY_
+
+1. This investigation was conducted in conformity with Letter, European
+Theater of Operations, 24 February 1945, by Eugene S. Cohen, ASN
+O-1573121, Major, 514th Quartermaster Group, APO 403, United States
+Army, Investigator-Examiner, during the period 6 May 1945 to 15 June
+1945, and pursuant to directive of Commanding General, Third United
+States Army, a copy of which is attached as Exhibit 1.
+
+
+II. _MATTERS INVESTIGATED_
+
+2. Murder by shooting, beating, use of poison gas, drowning, starving,
+injections, stoning, exposure, burning, and choking of nationals of
+twenty-three (23) nations, including members of the United States armed
+forces, of the German civilian population working under the German
+armed forces and of other nationals under the orders of said German
+armed forces, in violation of Article 2 of the Geneva Prisoner of War
+Convention (Par 73, Rules of Land Warfare, Article 2 of same, Par 25,
+26, 30, and 31, Rules of Land Warfare).
+
+
+III. _PROCEEDINGS_
+
+3. _a._ The testimony of all witnesses examined in the course of this
+investigation and which is attached and made a part hereof was secured
+through the use of interpreters where requisite, after the witness
+had been sworn by me, through the interpreter, under the authority of
+Article of War 114, in the following form: “You swear (or affirm) that
+the evidence you shall give in this investigation now being conducted
+by me shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the
+truth. So help you God.” Where practicable, the witness was given an
+opportunity to sign his testimony in my presence and, in all cases, it
+was signed after such testimony had been read back to the witness in
+his own language by the interpreter. The use of a stenographic reporter
+was impracticable under existing conditions.
+
+The interpreter was sworn in the following form: “You swear (or affirm)
+that you will truly interpret this investigation now being conducted by
+me. So help you God.”
+
+_b._ The transcribed testimony of each such witness whose name is
+below listed is hereto attached as an Exhibit--the number of which
+is indicated immediately following the witness’ name. As a further
+aid, the name of each camp in the chain at which the said Exhibit was
+prepared is listed alongside the name of the witness:
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+  _c._ Other Exhibits:
+       _Description_
+
+(_a_) (Exhibit 4 is a report by an International Committee set up
+by this Investigation, and same is sworn to in due form by the two
+witnesses named. The report is further documented with the names of
+others who helped compile the facts and figures).
+
+(_b_) Journal Record of victims between certain dates, including
+information as to name, nationality, residence, date of birth, date of
+death, manner of death, and the names of guards performing the actual
+execution. (Ex. #214)
+
+(_c_) “Totenbuch,” or Book of the Dead, representing names of victims,
+nationality, residence, date of birth, date of death, and manner of
+death, between certain dates. This is a sample of small journals which
+were later incorporated in the permanent records which number sixteen
+(16) volumes and which will be submitted in a supplemental report. (Ex.
+#215)
+
+(_d_) Specimen of poisonous gas used in gas chamber at Mauthausen and
+Gusen No. 1 and No. 2. (Ex. #216)
+
+(_e_) Rubber hose used by SS Guards to beat prisoners in the Mauthausen
+Chain of Camps. (Ex. #217)
+
+(_f_) Heavy whip used by SS Guards to beat prisoners in the Mauthausen
+Chain of Camps. (Ex. #218)
+
+(_g_) Cat of Nine Tails Whip used by SS guards. (Ex. #219)
+
+
+IV. SUMMARY OF FACTS
+
+4. A certificate by the Investigator-Examiner is attached hereto in
+separate form, summarizing the camp and methods of working them in the
+present investigation.
+
+_a._ Between 1,500,000 and 2,000,000 political prisoners are known to
+have been incarcerated and labeled for extermination at the Mauthausen
+system of concentration camps from available records. The Chain
+consisted of between 23 and 30 individual camps between the years 1941
+and 1945, the number varying as the smaller of these were occasionally
+evacuated when certain jobs had been finished (see Exhibits 4, 81, and
+213).
+
+_b._ Of the camps affiliated with Mauthausen, the present investigation
+covered 13 of them of which the largest were Mauthausen, Gusen, Number
+1 and Number 2, Ebensee, Steyr, and Gunskirchen. Others in the list
+situated in Third Army Territory were Linz, Numbers 1, 2 and 3, Wells,
+Lenzing, Schlier, and Enns. The victims of this Chain of camps were
+murdered by the SS Guards working in these camps under the command of
+Franz Ziereis, Commandant and George Bachmayer, Assistant Commandant,
+both now deceased, whose headquarters were at the fortress in
+Mauthausen (see Exhibits 209, 210, and 212).
+
+_c._ Evidence reveals that the orders for the systemic decimation of
+these prisoners originated in Berlin under the direct orders of SS
+Fuehrer Heinrich Himmler (see Exhibit 4).
+
+_d._ American Forces liberated this camp on 5 May 1945 and this
+Investigator-Examiner and his team commenced this investigation on 6
+May 1945.
+
+_e._ The victims of the Mauthausen Chain of concentration camps are in
+the process of compilation and will be submitted in a supplementary
+report.
+
+5. It may be added that one of the functions of the International
+Committee formed by this investigator to assist in the investigation of
+these camps was to arrange for each nation to copy the names of each
+of its dead from the available records in order to notify the next
+of kin. Therefore, it is confidently concluded that each such nation
+already has a list of its own dead with all information regarding
+their manner of death and the statistics thereupon. This International
+Committee was selected from the inmates by the team and consisted of
+the most distinguished members selected by the prisoners themselves.
+The Committee numbered six men as principals and many assistants have
+greatly helped the investigation in securing the best witnesses and
+covering all phases in the preparation of this case for trial (see
+Exhibit 4).
+
+6. _Enemy Individuals_
+
+_a._ See Exhibit 2.
+
+_b._ Wanted notices for all perpetrators are in the process of
+preparation.
+
+
+V. _CONCLUSIONS_
+
+The evidence collected in this case shows very clearly that the
+whole purpose of the Mauthausen Chain of concentration camps was
+extermination of human beings for no other reason than their opposition
+to the Nazi way of thinking. There is no doubt that Mauthausen was the
+basis for long term planning. It was constructed as a gigantic stone
+fortress on top of a mountain flanked by small barracks.
+
+Mauthausen, in addition to its permanency of construction, had
+facilities for a large garrison of officers and men, and had large
+dining rooms and toilet facilities for the staff. It was conducted with
+the sole purpose in mind of exterminating any so-called prisoner who
+entered within its walls.
+
+The so-called branches of Mauthausen were under direct command of the
+SS officials located there. All records, orders, and administrative
+facilities were handled for these branches through Mauthausen. The
+other camps, including Gusen and Ebensee, its two most notorious and
+largest branches, were not exclusively used for extermination but
+prisoners were used as tools in construction and production until
+they were beaten or starved into uselessness, whereupon they were
+customarily sent to Mauthausen for final disposal.
+
+The responsibility for the deaths of these victims lies definitely
+with the Nazi Party and with the SS men who executed its commands.
+Men like Himmler, Ziereis, Bachmayer, Schulz, Giesler, Pelzer, and
+other names in Exhibit 2 are but the arch criminals. However, although
+direct evidence is not established against all the members of the SS
+Guards in this disreputable Chain, the inescapable presumption is
+that all of them are prima facie guilty of these mass murders and the
+burden of proof is upon them individually to prove his innocence. In
+this connection the SS organization was purely a voluntary one and its
+purposes were obviously criminal, in violation of the Hague and Geneva
+Conventions, and the rights of humanity.
+
+It is the belief of the Investigator-Examiner that the theory of
+“Association des Malfaiteurs” should be employed most stringently in
+a case as virulent and as atrocious as the Mauthausen set-up (see
+Certificate attached hereto).
+
+                                                      /s/Eugene S. Cohen
+                                            EUGENE S. COHEN, Major, QMC,
+                       JA Section, Third US Army, Investigator-Examiner.
+                                                                3 JA-132
+
+       #       #       #       #       #
+
+  CERTIFICATE OF OFFICER INVESTIGATING MAUTHAUSEN CONCENTRATION CAMP.
+
+I hereby certify as follows:
+
+1. The Mauthausen Chain of Concentration Camps varied in number from
+twenty to thirty or more, depending on the needs of any specific work
+assignment.
+
+2. As shown in Exhibits 21, 22, and 201, the captured records indicated
+the names of most of these camps, which varied in size from the huge
+fortress of Mauthausen itself, to a small detached lager similar to
+Steyr or Lenzing. Lenzing for example, like Steyr (See Exhibits 86, 194
+and 195) were detachments from Mauthausen sent and billeted in barracks
+to run two large factories.
+
+3. The map herein included as Exhibit 201 shows the locations of these
+named camps with most important route number leading to them. It is
+thus seen that the majority of these camps were located East of the
+River Enns (which flows into the Danube and passes through Steyr and
+Enns-Township, Austria), and, therefore, are of Russian concern, since
+this river is the present International Occupation Boundary between
+ourselves and the Soviet Union.
+
+4. However, the remainder of the camps (as shown in Exhibit 201),
+amounting roughly to about 13, have been accounted for in this present
+investigation. (See list of Exhibits.) The so-called most notorious of
+these camps are, of course, first Mauthausen (ranked with Auschwitz
+as by far the largest and worst of all Concentration Camps); Ebensee
+(ranked by many as worse than Dachau yet only an inferior Aussenlager
+(Branch to Mauthausen)); Gusen, divided into two large branches named
+Numbers one and two and of large size in themselves; Gunskirchen and
+Steyr, (see Exhibit 84), numbering at capacity five-thousand people.
+(See Exhibit 195.)
+
+5. Many of these camps were evacuated almost immediately upon
+liberation, even so large a one as Gunskirchen. (See Exhibit 84.) This
+camp was said to have numbered as many as 20,000 prisoners at one time,
+but however, Gunskirchen, like Steyr and Lenzing and the Linz Group
+(Exhibit 22), and even Ebensee, were not equipped for Mass Murder
+(Extermination), like Mauthausen and the Gusens, and when deaths were
+“required” other than through starving, beatings, exposure, or lack of
+hygienic treatment, the prisoners were dispatched either to Mauthausen
+or the Gusens where _all_ were labelled for eventual annihilation. (See
+Exhibit 4 as a conclusive Exhibit which in itself, makes a complete
+case against the perpetrators involved.)
+
+6. The total count of victims is impossible to estimate, but with
+Hartheim Castle (a building used for mysterious disposal of people),
+(see Exhibit 213) almost 2,000,000 are counted from the German Records
+themselves. (Also see again Exhibit 4).
+
+7. As to the perpetrators or murderers, a complete list of leaders
+and some 10,000 (approximately) other SS names are included in this
+investigation. Descriptions are included whenever possible and at all
+events, Name, Rank, Date of Birth, Last Residence, and Residence of
+Next of Kin (to whom they might return) are given. (See Exhibit 2, and
+valuable Exhibit 213 which lists the victims between certain dates,
+giving their names, nationalities, Dates of Birth, Day of Death, Method
+of Death, and Names of Guards doing the killing).
+
+8. All Camps presently investigated are as follows:
+
+Mauthausen, Gusen (Nos. 1 and 2), Linz (Nos. 1, 2, and 3), and Ebensee.
+Wels, Gunskirchen, Lenzing, Steyr, and Schlier are also taken care
+of as part of the chain and as indicated heretofore. All others were
+either in Russian or British areas. All these camps have been treated
+as one case. However, a Supplemental Report is now being prepared to
+follow the present one in a short time. It should be noted that Franz
+Ziereis, Commandant of the Mauthausen Chain and Georg Bachmayer,
+Assistant Commandant, are now dead. (See Exhibits 181, 182, 183, 184,
+185, 209 and 210.)
+
+9. Besides the books made Exhibits in this present report, sixteen
+Totenbucher (Books of the dead, as described in Exhibit 4) have been
+photographed in micro-film and although ready cannot be received in
+time to submit in this present report.
+
+Additional still photographs and more than 1000 feet of motion pictures
+have been taken by an official Signal Corps Team and will also be
+submitted in the Supplemental Report.
+
+                                                     /s/ Eugene S. Cohen
+                                                        EUGENE S. COHEN,
+                                  Major, QMCorps, Investigating Officer.
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2187-PS
+
+Main SS economic administration office Office group chief D
+
+--concentration camps--D I/Az : 14 e 3/Ot/S;--
+
+                                               Oranienburg, 14 July 1943
+
+Re: Beating of female prisoners
+
+  Ref: Reichsfuehrer-SS B. Nz. I/1891/41 Ads.Sk/Fe.--of 7 July 1943
+
+Enclosures / none
+
+
+                               REGISTERED
+
+  To the camp commandants of concentration camps, Au., Rav., Herz.,
+    Lub. and Stutthof.
+
+The Reichsfuehrer-SS and Chief of the German Police has ordered that
+the execution of sentence on Russian women has to be done by Polish
+women and on Polish and Ukrainian women by Russian women.
+
+As a reward the prisoners inflicting the punishment may be given a few
+cigarettes.
+
+Under no circumstances may German prisoners be employed to inflict
+punishment. Also other prisoners due for punishment themselves are not
+to be employed for this purpose.
+
+                                                  per sig. Liebehenschel
+                                                 SS-Obersturmbannfuehrer
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2189-PS
+
+  SS Economic Administrative Main Office
+  Office Group Chief D
+  Concentration Camps, D 1/Az: 14e 3/L/Ot.
+
+                                              Oranienburg, 11 Aug. 1942.
+
+  _Re_:   Punishment by Beating.
+  _Ref_:  none
+  _Encl_: none
+
+To the camp commandants of concentration camps. Da, Sah, Bu, Mau, Flo,
+Neu, Au, Gr-Ro, Natz, _Nie_, _Stu_, _Arb_, _Rav_, _and prisoner of war
+camp Lublin_.
+
+The Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police has ordered that
+punishment by beating will be executed in concentration camps for women
+by _prisoners_--under the ordered supervision.
+
+In order to coordinate this order the main office chief of the main SS
+Economic Administration Office, SS-Obergruppenfuehrer and General of
+the Waffen-SS Pohl, has ordered, effective immediately, that punishment
+by beating will also be executed by prisoners in concentration camps
+for men.
+
+It is forbidden to have foreign prisoners execute the punishment on
+German prisoners.
+
+The order for punishment will read on page 2 under “executors”.
+
+The following prisoners have executed physical punishment on the--
+
+  1. __________________________________ prison number
+  2. __________________________________ prison number
+                              [signature illegible]
+  SS-Brigadefuehrer and Major General of the Waffen-SS
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2194-PS
+
+                           REICH DEFENSE LAW
+
+  G-300
+  Top Secret
+
+               The Ministry for Economy and Labor Saxony
+                    Dresden and 6 for September 1939
+                     Tel: 52151/Long Distance 52051
+
+                                                           Ref: Wbv:407g
+
+  To The Reich Protector in Bohemia and Moravia, Transportation Section,
+
+  Attention of Construction Chief, Counselor Hirches or Representative
+    in the Office.
+
+_Prag_
+
+                                                                 [STAMP]
+                              The Reich Protector in Bohemia and Moravia
+                                  received, Prag, 5 Sept. 1939. No. 274.
+
+Enclosed please find a copy of the Reich Defense Law of 4 Sept. 1938
+and a copy each of the decrees of the Reichsminister of Transportation
+dated 7 October 1938--RL/W10.2212/38, Top Secret--and of 17 July
+1939--RL/LV 1.2173/39, Top Secret, for your information and observance.
+
+  By order--
+  3 Encl.:                                          SIGNED: Kretzschmar.
+  Completed at Dresden 4 September 1939
+  3 Enclosures.                                       SIGNED: Schneider.
+
+Receipt for the letter of 4 September 1939, wbv:407g with 3 enclosures
+signed 5 September 1939 and returned to Construction Counselor
+Kretzschmar.
+
+  File: Wbv                                                  Signed: HI.
+
+       #       #       #       #       #
+
+Top Secret
+
+  Enclosure 2. RL/LV 1.2861/39G
+  The Reichsminister for Transportation.
+  RL/V 1.2173/39
+
+                                                     Berlin 17 July 1939
+                                                       44 plus 2 copies.
+                                                                 No. 45.
+
+To the Subordinate Authority of the Reich and the States as well as the
+  General Authority of the States to whom are attached:
+
+  (_a_) Waterways Deputies (Wbv).
+  (_b_) Deputies for Local Transportation (Nbv).
+  (_c_) Deputies for ocean traffic. (Sbv).
+
+                       To each one individually:
+
+  Subject: Protection of the secrecy of the law for the Reich
+  Defense. (RV--Gesetz).
+           Ref: Decree of 7 October 1938 RL/W 10.2212/38,
+           Top Secret.
+
+The leader has agreed to the tacit omission of the secrecy protection
+of the Reich defense law of 4 September 1938 transmitted with the
+corresponding decree. In spite of the greater ease in business
+correspondence thus created, the following limitations, which are
+herewith brought to your attention for compliance, have been ordered by
+the competent office.
+
+1. _It remains prohibited_ to cite the Reich Defense law in public or
+in connection with laws to be promulgated, as well as publication of
+the contents of the law in its entirety.
+
+2. _It is permitted_
+
+  _a._ the mention of all installations founded on the Reich Defense
+         Law and their functions in public without referring to the law;
+
+  _b._ the co-signature of laws which are prepared and announced in
+         peace time for war.
+
+                                                                  Deputy
+                                                           Signed: Baur.
+
+       #       #       #       #       #
+
+                          SECRET STATE MATTER!
+
+  To GRS Nr. 10/39
+  Enclosure for RL/LV. I.2861/39 g.
+  The Reich Traffic Minister
+  RL/W 10. 2212/38 secret state matter
+
+                     Berlin, W8, Wilhelmstrasse 80, the 7th October 1938
+                                                         47 and 3 copies
+                                                      Examination Nr. 49
+
+  To the following Reich and State authorities from whom have been
+    ordered
+
+  (_a_) deputies for water ways,
+  (_b_) deputies for the local traffic,
+  (_c_) deputies for ocean traffic
+
+                           --but especially--
+
+Subject: Reich Defense Law [Reichsverteidigungsgesetz].
+
+Enclosed is transmitted copy of the Reich Defense Law signed by the
+leader and Reich chancellor on 4 September 1938. The promulgation
+remains suspended.
+
+                                                                  Deputy
+                                                           Signed: Baur.
+
+To wbv.: 407 g.
+
+       #       #       #       #       #
+
+                          TOP MILITARY SECRET
+
+  To GRS Nr. 10/39                                                  1432
+
+                 Reich Defense Law of 4 September 1938.
+
+The Reich cabinet has decided on the following law which is announced
+herewith.
+
+
+                         I. _State of Defense_
+
+                                 par. 1
+
+(1) As possessor of the complete power of state, the leader and Reich
+chancellor can decree for the Reich territory or its parts a “State of
+Defense”.
+
+(2) If the political situation demands it, the leader and Reich
+chancellor decrees the “Mobilization”. The mobilization can be limited
+to a part of the Reich or of the armed forces.
+
+
+                                 par. 2
+
+(1) Once the territory of operation is determined the chief of the army
+and the commanders of the armies have upon declaration of the state of
+defense without further order the authority to exercise executive power
+in this operational territory.
+
+(2) The commanders exercising executive powers can, effective for the
+territory of operations, promulgate laws, institute special courts,
+and issue directives to the officials and offices competent in the
+territory of operations, with the exception of the supreme Reich
+officials, the supreme Prussian country officials, and the Reich
+leaders of the NSDAP. The lawfulness of directives precedes directives
+from otherwise superior offices.
+
+(3) The boundaries of the territory of operations are determined by the
+supreme commander of the armed forces.
+
+(4) Special directives for the case of a surprise threat to the Reich
+territory.
+
+If a part of the Reich territory is surprised by a military threat,
+and if special decrees for defense against this danger cannot be
+awaited, then the commanders of the imperiled service commands have
+the right to issue the directives which cannot be delayed and which
+are necessary for the protection of the imperiled territory to all
+non-military offices within their sphere of command. The same rights
+apply to the commanding admirals of the Navy in case of surprise
+threats against the coastal territory, and to the commanders of air
+districts in case of surprise attacks from the air within the framework
+of their war tasks. The execution of these directives has precedence
+over the other commitments and the directives of superior offices. The
+named commanders can transmit their right of issuing directives to
+subordinate officers down to the village counselor.
+
+
+                                 par. 3
+
+(1) With the declaration of the state of defense the plenipotentiaries
+for the Reich administration (GBV) named by the leader and Reich
+chancellor takes over the uniform leadership of the non-military
+administration with exception of the economic administration.
+
+To him are subordinate--
+
+  the Reich minister of the Interior
+  the Reich minister of Law
+  the Reich minister for science, education and popular education,
+  the Reich minister for religious matters,
+  the Reich office for regional order.
+
+(2) The GBV must comply with the demands of the supreme command of the
+armed forces (OKW) which are of considerable importance for the armed
+forces. If the demands cannot be brought in accord with the affairs
+of the Reich administration the leader and Reich chancellor makes the
+decision.
+
+(3) The GBV has the right within his sphere to issue laws with the
+accord of the OKW and GBW which differ from the existing laws.
+
+
+                                 par. 4
+
+(1) With the declaration of the state of defense the chief deputy for
+economics (GBW), appointed by the leader and Reich chancellor, takes
+over the direction of the economy except for the armament industry.
+
+(2) It is the task of the GBW to put all economic forces into the
+service of the Reich defense, and to safeguard economically the life of
+the German nation. To him are subordinate--
+
+  the Reich minister of economics,
+  the Reich minister of nutrition and agriculture,
+  the Reich minister of work,
+  the Reich chief of forestry,
+  the Reich commissar for price control.
+
+He is furthermore responsible for directing the financing of the Reich
+defense within the realm of the Reich finance ministry and the Reich
+bank.
+
+(3) The GBW must carry out the demands of the OKW which are of
+considerable importance for the armed forces; and he must insure
+the economic conditions for the production of the armament industry
+directed immediately by the OKW according to its demands. If the
+demands of the armed forces cannot be brought into accord with the
+affairs of economy, then the leader and Reich chancellor decides.
+
+(4) The GBW has the right within his sphere to issue laws with the
+consent of the OKW and GBV which differ from the existing laws.
+
+
+                                 par. 5
+
+(1) The Reich postal minister, the Reich transportation minister, and
+the general inspector for the German road net are, with the declaration
+of the state of defense, bound to the demands of the OKW for the
+immediate affairs of the armed forces.
+
+(2) The following will get orders from the OKW:
+
+(_a_) the _Reich transportation minister_ for the use of means of
+transportation,
+
+(_b_) the _Reich postal minister_ for the use and distribution of the
+complete communication connections to the armed forces and the other
+agencies.
+
+(3) The Reich transportation minister must comply, with the declaration
+of the state of defense, with the demands of the GBW according to
+the directions given to him by the OKW for the use of the means of
+transportation.
+
+(4) In the sphere of the Reich postal minister, of the Reich
+transportation minister, and of the general inspector for the German
+road net, the chief of the OKW has the right to promulgate laws in
+accord with the GBV and GBW which differ from the existing laws.
+
+
+                                 par. 6
+
+The Reich ministers and chief Reich offices carry out the tasks within
+their spheres on their own responsibility, regardless of the special
+competence of the chief of the OKW, of the GBV, and of the GBW,
+according to paragraphs 3, 4 and 5.
+
+
+                                 par. 7
+
+For the shaping of the political mill of the people the deputy of the
+leader of the NSDAP is responsible. He uses for that the NSDAP, its
+formations and coordinated units.
+
+
+                           II. _State of War_
+
+
+                                 par. 8
+
+(1) If the fight with an external enemy is forced upon the German
+people, the leader and Reich chancellor declares the state of war.
+
+(2) With declaration of the state of war, the war laws and war decrees
+come into force without further order. The legal consequences provided
+in other laws for the state of war become effective.
+
+
+                                 par. 9
+
+If the state of defense is not already declared beforehand, the decrees
+about the state of defense go into effect with declaration of the state
+of war.
+
+
+                      III. _Preparatory Measures_
+
+
+                                par. 10
+
+The Reich Defense Council (RVR).
+
+(1) The task of the Reich Defense Council consists in peace time in the
+decision on all measures for the preparation of the Reich defense and
+the gathering together of all forces and means of the nation according
+to the directions of the leader and Reich chancellor. The tasks of the
+RVR in war time will be specially determined by the leader and Reich
+chancellor.
+
+(2) The leader and Reich chancellor is chairman in the RVR. His
+permanent deputy is general field marshal Goering. He has the right to
+call conferences of the RVR. Permanent members of the RVR are--
+
+  the Reich minister of air and supreme commander of the air force,
+
+  the supreme commander of the army,
+
+  the supreme commander of the navy,
+
+  the chief of the OKW,
+
+  the deputy of the leader,
+
+  the Reich minister and chief of the Reich chancellery,
+
+  the president of the secret cabinet council,
+
+  the chief plenipotentiary for the Reich administration,
+
+  the chief plenipotentiary for economics,
+
+  the Reich minister of foreign affairs,
+
+  the Reich minister of the interior,
+
+  the Reich finance minister,
+
+  the Reich minister for popular enlightenment and propaganda,
+
+  the president of the Reich bank directory.
+
+The other Reich ministers and the Reich offices directly subordinate
+to the leader and Reich chancellor are consulted if necessary. Further
+personalities can be called as the case demands.
+
+
+                                par. 11
+
+The Reich Defense Committee (RVA).
+
+(1) The Reich defense committee is the working committee of the RVR. It
+prepares the decisions of the RVR, sees to their execution, and secures
+collaboration between armed forces, chief Reich offices, and party.
+
+(2) Presiding is the chief of the OKW. He regulates the activity of the
+committee and gives the directions to the GBV and GBW and to the Reich
+ministries not subordinated to them and to the chief Reich offices
+according to the decisions of the RVR, which directions are necessary
+for securing their uniform execution.
+
+(3) The RVA is composed of the OKW, deputy of the commissioner for the
+four year plan, the leader staffs of the GBV and GBW, and the Reich
+Defense officials.
+
+(4) Chief office officials for the Reich defense (RV-Referenten) and
+their deputies are commissioned by the deputy of the leader, by the
+Reich chancellery by each Reich Ministry, by the Reich leader of the
+SS and chief of the German police, by the Reich work leader, by the
+Reich forest master, by the chief inspector for the German road net,
+by the Reich office for regional order, by the Reich bank directory,
+and in the Prussian state ministry. The RV-Referent and his deputy are
+immediately subordinate to the minister or the state secretary, and to
+the chief of the Reich office, resp.
+
+
+                                par. 12
+
+The uniformity of the preparations for the start and the course of the
+mobilization is secured by the OKW.
+
+As regards the actual formulation of the preparations, the GBV and GBW
+make the arrangements for their sphere.
+
+
+                                par. 13
+
+The Chief Plenipotentiary for the Reich Administration (GBV):
+
+The GBV conducts the preparations for the Reich defense in the sphere
+of the ministries and Reich offices subordinate to him according to
+paragraph 3. They are bound by his directions already in peace time.
+
+
+                                par. 14
+
+The Chief Plenipotentiary for Economics (GBW):
+
+(1) The GBW conducts the economic preparations for the Reich defense
+as far as they do not come in the sphere of the OKW as regards the
+armament industry.
+
+(2) The GBW must secure the economic conditions for the production of
+the armament industry immediately directed by the OKW according to its
+demands.
+
+(3) The ministries and Reich offices named in paragraph 4 (2) are,
+within the framework of these directives, already bound for the
+preparation of the Reich defense to the directions of the GBW, the
+Reich transportation minister to his demands according to paragraph 5
+(3).
+
+
+                         IV. _Final Directions_
+
+
+                                par. 15
+
+Penal Directions.
+
+Whoever acts against the orders of a decree promulgated on the basis
+of this law, on purpose or negligently, will be punished with a jail
+sentence and money fine or with one of these punishments, if the act is
+not punishable with a heavier sentence according to other decrees.
+
+
+                                par. 16
+
+Execution and Completion Directives.
+
+The OKW promulgates in agreement with the GBV and GBW the law and
+administrative directives necessary for the execution and completion of
+this law.
+
+
+                                par. 17
+
+The law takes effect immediately.
+
+Berchtesgaden, the 4th September 1938.
+
+                                         The leader and Reich chancellor
+                                                     signed Adolf Hitler
+                                                          signed Goering
+
+                                                   General Field Marshal
+                                                The deputy of the leader
+                                                          signed R. Hess
+
+                                      The Reich Minister of the Interior
+                                                            signed Frick
+
+                                 The Chief Plenipotentiary for Economics
+                                                     signed Walther Funk
+
+                                              The Reich Foreign Minister
+                                                       signed Ribbentrop
+
+                                                    The Chief of the OKW
+                                                           signed Keitel
+
+                   The Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery
+                                                      signed Dr. Lammers
+
+       #       #       #       #       #
+
+                                     Berchtesgaden, the 4 September 1938
+
+                    _Note to the Reich Defense Law_
+
+1. The Publication of the Reich Defense Law of 4 Sept. 1938, remains
+suspended.
+
+2. The following laws and cabinet decisions are reputed effective
+immediately.
+
+A. Reich Defense Law of 21 May 1935.
+
+B. Decision of the Reich Cabinet of 4 April 1933 to form a Reich
+Defense Council.
+
+C. Rectification and completion of 13 Dec. 1934 of the decision of the
+Reich Cabinet of 4 Apr. 1933.
+
+D. Decision of the Reich Cabinet of 21 May 1935 on activity of the CB
+in peace times.
+
+                                      The Fuehrer and Reich Chancellery,
+                                                   (signed) Adolf Hitler
+
+                       The Reich Minister and Chief of Reich Chancellery
+                                                    (signed) Dr. Lammers
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2195-PS
+
+_File Memorandum_
+
+Today I visited General Oshima. The conversation ranged over the
+following subjects:
+
+1. The Fuehrer speech, which pleased him very much, especially because
+it had been spiritually warranted in all its features.
+
+2. We discussed conclusion of a treaty to consolidate the triangle
+Germany/Italy/Japan into an even firmer mold. He also told me that,
+together with German counter-espionage [Abwehr], he was undertaking
+long-range projects aimed at the disintegration of Russia and emanating
+from the Caucasus and the Ukraine. However, this organization was to
+become effective only in case of war.
+
+3. Furthermore he had succeeded up to now to send 10 Russians with
+bombs across the Caucasian frontier. These Russians had the mission to
+kill Stalin. A number of additional Russians, whom he had also sent
+across, had been shot at the frontier.
+
+4. We then discussed the Mohammedan movement. He told me that a
+Japanese officer had worked in Afghanistan, but he had been expelled
+later because of suspicion that he had attempted to overthrow the
+Afghan government. I told him that I had a police officer there and
+that the two could very well collaborate once he again had someone
+there.
+
+5. He told me confidentially that he had bought a piece of real estate
+in Falkensee under the name of a middleman. Six Russians were employed
+there, writing and printing leaflets, which were flown into Russia
+from Poland in small balloons, when the wind was favorable. He had
+reports and proofs from Russia that they had arrived in good condition
+and that they were obviously being passed around among the people very
+diligently.
+
+6. Also he had bought a motor boat in order to bring leaflets from
+Roumania to the Crimea via the Black Sea. However, this had miscarried
+in the fall, but he would repeat it once more in summer.
+
+Berlin, 31 January 1939
+
+                                                   The Reichsfuehrer-SS:
+
+                                                     (signed) H. Himmler
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2199-PS
+
+
+                                 SECRET
+
+                                  Copy
+
+  SS Economic-Administrative Main Office
+  District Group D--Concentration Camps--DI/1 Az.: 14 f 5/L/Ot.
+  Secret diary Nr. 645/42
+
+                                                 Oranienburg, 12 Sept 42
+
+  Concerns: Return of urns of inmates deceased in concentration camps.
+
+  Reference: Chief of Security Police [Sipo] and the SD-ND1a-838/42--of
+  7.9.42
+
+  Encl: None
+
+  To the Commanders of Concentration Camps, Da., Sa., Bu., Mau., Flo.,
+    Neu., Au., Gro.-Ro., Natz., Nie., Stu., Arb., Rav., and Prisoners of
+    War, Camp Lublin.
+
+According to a communication of the Chief of the Security Police and
+the SD and conforming to a report of the Chief of Security Police and
+SD in Prague, urns of deceased Czechs and Jews were sent for burial to
+the home-cemeteries within the Protectorate.
+
+Based on different events (demonstrations, erecting of posters inimical
+to the Reich on urns of deceased inmates in halls of cemeteries in the
+home-communities, pilgrimages to the graves of deceased inmates etc.)
+within the Protectorate, the delivery of urns with the ash remnants
+of deceased Nationals of the Protectorate and of Jews is henceforth
+prohibited. The urns shall be preserved within the Concentration Camps.
+In case of doubt about the preservation of the urns oral instructions
+shall be available at this agency.
+
+                                         The Chief of the Central Office
+                                                     sig: Liebehenschel,
+                                                SS-Obersturmbannfuehrer.
+
+  Correctness of Copy is certified:
+  Natzweiler, 16 September 1942
+  sig: [illegible signature]
+  SS Oscha. und Stabsscharf.
+
+       #       #       #       #       #
+
+                                 SECRET
+
+                                  Copy
+
+  SS Economic-Administrative Main Office
+  District Group D
+  Concentration Camps--D I/1/Az.: 14 e 3/Ot./U.
+
+                                                                     III
+                       Oranienburg, 4 April 1942
+
+_Concerns_: Lashing [Pruegelstrafen]
+
+  to the Concentration Camp Commanders of Da., Sah., Bu., Mau., Flo.,
+    Au., Gr. Ro., Natzw., Nie., Stu., Arb., Rav., and Commander of
+    Prisoner of War Camp Lublin.
+
+The Reich Fuehrer-SS and Chief of the German Police has decreed that
+when the word “more severe” [verschaerft] is added in his orders for
+lashings, the execution of the sentence must be undergone with bare
+seat [unbekleidetes Gesaess]. (This includes male as well as female
+prisoners in protective or preventative custody.)
+
+In all other cases the previously decreed punishment by Reichfuehrer-SS
+remains the same.
+
+                                         The Chief of the Central Office
+                                                      sig: Liebehenschel
+                                                 SS-Obersturmbannfuehrer
+
+  FdRda
+  sig: [illegible]
+  SS Oberscharfuehrer und Stabsscharfuehrer
+
+
+                                 PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2219-PS
+
+To the General Field Marshal
+
+                                      At Present in Vienna, 14 July 1939
+
+Sir:
+
+If I may add something about myself, it is the following: I know that
+I am not of an active fighting nature, unless final decisions are at
+stake. At this time of pronounced activism [aktivismus] this will
+certainly be regarded as a fault in my personality. Yet, I know that
+I cling with unconquerable tenacity to the goal in which I believe.
+That is Greater Germany [Grossdeutschland] and the Fuehrer. And if
+some people are already tired out from the struggle and some have been
+killed in the fight, I am still around somewhere and ready to go into
+action. This, after all, was also the development until the year 1938.
+Until July 1934 I conducted myself as a regular member of the party.
+And if I had quietly, in whatever form, paid my membership dues--the
+first one, according to a receipt, I paid in December 1931--I probably
+would have been an undisputed, comparatively old fighter and party
+member of Austria, but I would not have done any more for the union.
+I told myself in July 1934 that we must fight this clerical regime on
+its own ground in order to give the Fuehrer a chance to use whatever
+method he desires. I told myself that this Austria was worth a mass. I
+have stuck to this attitude with an iron determination because I and my
+friends had to fight against the whole political church, Freemasonry,
+Jewry, in short, against everything in Austria. The slightest weakness
+which we might have displayed would undoubtedly have led to our
+political annihilation; it would have deprived the Fuehrer of the means
+and tools to carry out his ingenious political solution for Austria, as
+became evident in the days of March 1938. I have been fully conscious
+of the fact that I am following a path which is not comprehensible to
+the masses and also not to my party comrades. I followed it calmly and
+would without hesitation follow it again because I am satisfied that
+at one point I could serve the Fuehrer as a tool in his work, even
+though my former attitude even now gives occasion to very worthy and
+honorable party comrades to doubt my trustworthiness. I have never paid
+attention to such things because I am satisfied with the opinion which
+the Fuehrer and the men close to him have of me.
+
+                                                         [Seyss-Inquart]
+
+
+                                 PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2220-PS
+
+                                 SECRET
+
+                               Letterhead
+
+THE REICH Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery
+
+RK.318D g III
+
+                                            Berlin W8, April 17th, 1943.
+                               Vosstrasse 6, at present: FIELD-quarters.
+                    Mail must exclusively be directed to Berlin address.
+
+  To the Reichsfuehrer-SS and Chief of the German Police. Herr Himmler
+
+  Ref: The situation in the Government General.
+
+Dear Mr. Reichleader,
+
+We had agreed at our conference on March 27th of this year that written
+texts should be worked out about the situation in the Government
+General, on which our intended, mutual report to the Fuehrer, could be
+based.
+
+The material gathered for this purpose by Lieutenant General Krueger
+was submitted to you immediately. Based on this material, I have had
+a sketch prepared, which sums up the most important points of this
+material, sub-divides them in a way quickly to grasp, and finally
+points out the kind of measurements to be taken.
+
+The memorandum was checked, together with SS Lieutenant General Krueger
+who agrees with it in full. Part of it I herewith submit to you.
+
+                                                   (signed) Dr. Lammers.
+
+       #       #       #       #       #
+
+  Copy to RK. 318 D g III.                         F.Q. April 12th, 1943
+
+                                SECRET!
+
+Ref: The situation in the Government General.
+
+A. _The task of the German Administration in the Government General._
+The German Administration in the Government General has to fulfill the
+following tasks:
+
+1. For the purpose of securing food for the German people, to increase
+agricultural production and utilize it to the fullest extent, to
+allot sufficient rations to the native population occupied with work
+essential for the war effort and to deliver the rest to the armed
+forces and the homeland.
+
+2. To employ the manpower of the native population in the Government
+General itself only for war important purposes, and to put at the
+homeland’s disposal such manpower which is not needed for the purpose
+mentioned above.
+
+3. To consolidate German folkdom in the Government General and by means
+of inland settlement in particular to create a stronghold of German
+folkdom in the eastern border districts, also by means of colonization
+with racial Germans, transferred from other places, thus safeguarding
+these very border districts.
+
+4. To safeguard the Government General as a transit zone for
+replacements and supplies to the East front.
+
+5. To obtain troops as far as possible from the native population for
+the fight against Bolshevism.
+
+B. _Wrong ways chosen for the fulfillment of these tasks._ The German
+administration in the Government General has failed by a wide margin
+in achieving the tasks listed under A. Although, in the year of 1942,
+one succeeded in meeting the delivery quota of agrarian products for
+the armed forces and the homeland at a relatively high percentage,
+namely over 90% and also met the demands of the homeland concerning
+the conscription of labor in general, one has to consider two things
+on the other hand: First, these accomplishments in the year of 1942
+were achieved for the first time, prior, f. i. only 40,000 German tons
+[Translator’s remark: 2206 lbs. avoir p. makes a ton] bread grain
+had been delivered to the Armed Forces. Secondly, and above all, one
+had failed to create for the bringing about of such achievements the
+necessary organizational, economic, and political basis, which is
+absolutely required, if such achievements shall not strongly affect
+the entire situation, may eventually cause chaotic conditions in the
+future. This failure of the German administration can for one thing be
+explained by the system of the German administrative and governmental
+activity in the Government General, personally represented by the
+Governor General, and secondly, by the wrong basic principles of policy
+in all those questions, which were decisive for conditions in the
+Government General.
+
+
+II. _The failure in basic principles of policy._
+
+1. The realization of the task, listed in A 1, necessitates in the
+first place a strict and clear-cut structure of economics, as well
+as a disciplined and clear-cut official economic policy, accompanied
+by an elimination as totally as possible of clandestine trading and
+black markets. This stipulates above all the fullest utilization of
+the harvest and its public management, the stopping of all trade
+enterprises, which are not essential to the war and the care to be
+taken for a clear-cut management in war essential enterprises.
+
+The German administration was in no respect capable of living up to
+these requirements. In the matter of raising food it took a request of
+a delivery contingent for the Reich and the Armed Forces amounting to
+750,000 metric tons of bread grain in the summer of 1942, in order to
+have the attempt made, of drawing up an inventory of food products.
+For this purpose a census was taken. The result however turned out to
+be unreliable. The utilization of the harvest [Ernte-erfassung] did
+not even permit the full delivery of the contingent for the Reich and
+the Armed Forces (instead of 750,000 metric tons only 690,000 tons)
+let alone the ample feeding of the native population working for
+German interests. While 1.4 million metric tons were demanded, only
+1.2 million metric tons of bread grain could be taken hold of, of
+which 690,000 m.t. were delivered to the Reich and the Armed Forces,
+so that for roughly 16 million natives only 510,000 m.t. were left.
+Accordingly, the weekly bread rations for the normal consumer had to
+be cut down to only 1050 g, compared with 1675 g in the Protectorate
+and 2600 g in the annexed Eastern territories. To make supplies
+available for the native population, black markets and clandestine
+trading were tolerated to the greatest extent, resulting in prices
+entirely unattainable for the population, working for German interests.
+A married Polish official, without children, with High school education
+f.i. has a net income of 234.27 Zloty per month. Compared with this,
+the prices in the clandestine trade are:
+
+  1 kg.  rye bread     11.00 Zloty
+  1  ”   potatoes       2.40 Zloty
+  1  ”   pork          80.00 Zloty
+  1  ”   bacon        160.00 Zloty
+  1  ”   butter       170.00 Zloty
+
+Under such conditions the foreign worker remains at his place of work
+for about 4 to 5 days per week only in order to purchase the missing
+provisions for himself and his family on the remaining other days.
+Daily ransackings, robberies, murders and other crimes are further
+consequences of these conditions.
+
+The farmer received, as an incitement for delivery of his
+agrar-products, premium certificates for the obtaining of commodities
+(articles needed for farming, household necessities, salt, cigarettes,
+brandy, etc.). These commodities very often could not be had, however,
+despite the fact that they were obtainable in any desired quantity in
+the clandestine trade, but at exorbitant prices.
+
+  (1 bricklayer’s brush      =    1 cow
+   1 dz. (Drusch) coal       =   30.00 Zloty
+   1 pair of boots           = 1500.00   ”
+   1 horse shoe nail         =    3.00   ”
+   1 pair of wooden slippers =    2 calves
+   1 dress                   =    1 cow)
+
+The consequences of this situation naturally lead to a severe curbing
+of the farmer’s willingness to produce. Instead of reducing prices in
+the trade section by means of taking the necessary measures in regard
+to the management, a decree of the Governor General recommended, to
+adjust the prices of agrar-products to the prices of commodities, which
+were as much as 300 to 4000% higher.
+
+The trade economics are entirely built up according to capitalistic
+viewpoints, with the aim of earning quickly and much and any planned
+leadership, which might take war requirements into consideration, is
+lacking. There is a lack of state supervision and of guidance in the
+line of production and in the line of trade. The German individual
+business man as a “trustee” on his own, of enterprises personally
+directed by him, is given a free hand to do what he wants, in the
+unrestricted play of forces. These trustees very often make use of
+former Polish and Jewish owners of enterprises as agents empowered
+to sign in their names. These trustees make tremendous profits in
+clandestine trading, tolerated by the Government, and make them
+within the shortest time. Prohibition of production and control of
+individual management, as requested by the Armament Inspection (Lt.
+Gen. Schindler), were not carried out. Part of the trade production
+is directed only at putting at the disposal of the native population
+objects for the trade-in of food; metals, materials for spinning,
+leather, etc., are thus being drained off from the war economy.
+
+2. _The Utilization of Manpower._ The most important presupposition for
+a proper and relatively frictionless regulation to utilize manpower
+taken from the native population within the Government General itself,
+as well as within the Reich, are normal conditions in the sphere of
+economics. Lack of this coordination influences the steering of labor
+employments unfavorably in many respects. If it would be possible
+to provide the population, working in the interest of Germany, with
+the minimum of food needed, and everyday objects, and to render
+impossible the access to other items by way of black market channels
+and clandestine trade, then the reserves of manpower at hand would
+volunteer for employment as planned, of their own volition. This
+would mean a basis for a sensible shaping of agrarian property-units.
+It is necessary in this respect that parts of the population thus
+available may then be employed in such work which will guarantee them
+a satisfactory standard of living. After failing to have created the
+necessary supposition for a well-planned and well-steered employment
+of manpower, the utilization of manpower is confronted with the
+greatest difficulties. It is clear that these difficulties have been
+increased by the elimination of Jewish manpower. But it is incorrect
+to consider this elimination as the cause of difficulties. If the
+necessary basis for proper management of manpower had been given, the
+elimination of Jewish manpower would not have caused any difficulties
+worth mentioning. As things were, the utilization of manpower had to
+be enforced by means of more or less forceful methods, such as the
+instances when certain groups appointed by the Labor Offices, caught
+Church and Movie-goers here and there and transported them into the
+Reich. That such methods not only undermine the people’s willingness
+to work and the people’s confidence to such a degree that it cannot be
+checked even with terror, is just as clear as the consequences brought
+about by a strengthening of the political resistance movement.
+
+3. _The Treatment of the Native Populations._ Can only be led into the
+right channels based on a foundation of a clear-cut and well-organized
+administration and management. Only such a foundation permits that the
+native population may be handled strictly if necessary, even severely.
+On the other hand, it can be dealt with in a big-hearted manner and
+may be granted certain liberties, especially in cultural respect,
+causing a certain amount of contentment. Without such a foundation,
+severity would only strengthen the resistance movement and meeting the
+native population half way would only undermine the German reputation.
+That this foundation is missing can be concluded from the facts
+mentioned above. Instead of trying to create this basis, the Governor
+General inaugurates a promotion of cultural life on the part of the
+Polish population, which knows no bounds in itself. Under prevailing
+circumstances however and last, but not least, in connection with our
+military situation last winter, this could only be explained as a
+weakness and thus had to bring about exactly the opposite results of
+the aspired aim.
+
+
+                                        PARTIAL COPY OF DOCUMENT 2222-PS
+
+   HEADQUARTERS 12TH ARMY GROUP OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE APO 655
+
+              REPORT OF INVESTIGATION of ALLEGED WAR CRIME
+
+                               _Summary_
+
+  Nature of violation: Mistreatment, torture and Murder of Allied
+    nationals.
+
+  Place and Date: 31 concentration camps all in vicinity of Nordhausen,
+    Germany from 23 August 1943 to 10 April 1945.
+
+  Victims: Approximately 52,000 nationals of 18 Allied countries.
+
+  Perpetrators: German SS troops and civilians.
+
+       #       #       #       #       #
+
+                              CONFIDENTIAL
+
+  Information to Establish Prima Facie Case Required by SHAEF Court of
+                                Inquiry
+
+                                                             25 May 1945
+
+  SUBJECT: Murder and maltreatment of Political Prisoners and Prisoners
+    of War in Mittelbau (Dora) Concentration Camps, near Nordhausen,
+    Germany.
+
+  TO: Commanding General, Ninth United States Army, APO 339, U. S. Army.
+
+  FROM: War Crimes Investigating Team 6822, U. S. Army.
+
+  Date and Time: 11 April 1945 to 14 May 1945. Own File Ref: 315.
+
+1. _Nature of violations._ Murder and maltreatment of political
+prisoners and prisoners of war in Mittelbau (Dora) concentration camps
+near Nordhausen, Germany. (Map Ref: GSGS 4346, M-52:D-12.)
+
+2. _Place, date, time._ 23 August 1943 to 10 April 1945.
+
+3. Brief resume of incident. Nordhausen, Germany, a city of
+approximately 39,000 peacetime population, is located eighteen
+miles east of the Harz Mountains. In August 1943 (Exhibit A), the
+construction of a V-bomb factory was undertaken in tunnels dug into the
+foothills of the Harz Mountains about two miles north of Nordhausen.
+The area was operated by a combination of commercial firms known as
+Mittelwark which was charged with the construction of V-bombs. The
+operating personnel was made up of forced laborers who were used in
+both the construction of the tunnels and manufacture of the V-bombs.
+These laborers were, with the exception of the German overseers,
+composed of a number of nationalities the majority of which were
+Russians, Poles, French, Belgians, and Czechs, in that order. There
+were also Norwegians, Danes, Hollanders, Spanish, Italians, Hungarians,
+Bulgarians, Latvians, Yugoslavians, Greeks, Albanians, Rumanians,
+Estonians, and the records also show (Exhibit 81) one American as
+having been in the camp (Exhibit A-1). There were thirty-one (31) camps
+which were utilized for housing the forced laborers and which were, in
+most cases, located in the vicinity of the area in which the laborers
+were utilized. These camps were known as:
+
+  Artern
+  Ballenstedt
+  Blankenburg
+  Bleicherode
+  Dora
+  Ellrich
+  Gross Werther
+  Harzungen
+  Hohlstedt
+  Ilfeld
+  Ilsenburg
+  Kelbra
+  Klein Bodungen
+  Kleissingen
+  Mackenrode
+  Nixei
+  Nordhausen (Boelcke-Kaserne)
+  Osterhagen
+  Osterode
+  Quedlinburg
+  Regenstein
+  Rossla
+  Rottleberode
+  Sollstedt
+  Sonderhausen
+  Tettenborn
+  Trautenstein
+  Walkenried
+  Wickerode
+  Wieda
+  Wolffleben
+
+The camps were guarded by SS troops (Exhibit A-1), and SS troop
+headquarters were located at Dora (Exhibit 86). The SS personnel were
+assisted in their guard duties by block leaders who, for the most
+part, were Kapos (Capos), which was the name given to German Civilian
+Criminals who had been released from imprisonment for the specific
+assignment as block leaders in the aforementioned camps.
+
+Between 75,000 and 80,000 forced laborers (Exhibit A-1) were shuttled
+into, and a few out of, these installations. A complete indifference
+to the welfare of the prisoners was exhibited by their guards and
+custodians. Drinking water and water for washing, in the first stages
+of the operation of Dora proper, was found only wherever the forced
+laborers could find a leak in the pipes (Exhibit EEE). At the time
+of the liberation hundreds of bodies to which death had come from
+starvation and bombings were strewn about Bolke Kaserne. These bodies
+were emaciated, and bony prominences of the skeletons were conspicuous
+under the skin. These bodies were laid in rows in various conditions
+of decomposition. A pile of naked bodies, the result of one day’s
+deaths, was found under the stairway at the Bolke Kaserne camp (Exhibit
+87). Small piles of bodies were about the building (Exhibits 89, 90,
+91, & 92). In their weakened condition the living were compelled to
+relieve themselves in their beds from which they were too weak to move.
+Deposits of human feces were frequent throughout. Both living and dead,
+in many cases, were in the same beds (Exhibits CC, DD, EE, & FF). The
+mental condition of the prisoners had degenerated with their physical
+condition, and due to a lack of water some were drinking their own
+urine (Exhibits A-1 & DD). Some effort had been made to burn some of
+the bodies, and the partially burned, blackened bodies of 100 children
+lay about the premises. No organized effort was made to bury the dead
+(Exhibits EE & FF).
+
+The diet at the camps varied. At Dora the daily diet consisted of one
+litre of very thin soup, 400 grams of bread, 50 grams of margarine, and
+three times a week one slice of horse (hard) sausage or beef jelly,
+the equivalent of 70 grams of meat. One spoonful of marmalade and one
+spoonful of cream cheese once a week, and irregularly one canteen cup
+of black, ersatz coffee (Exhibits GG, HH, RR, SS, TT, UU, & EEE). This
+diet contained 1100 calories per day per man (Exhibit O). Deaths from
+starvation were numerous (Exhibits MM, UU, & JJJ).
+
+During the period of construction of the camp at Dora no housing
+facilities were present. Prisoners for three months were required to
+sleep in the tunnels in which they worked. Many of them died from
+respiratory diseases contracted in the damp tunnels, and others died of
+heart ailments due to the under ground pressure (Exhibits A, A-1, TT,
+UU, CCC, & EEE). They were permitted to leave the tunnels during this
+period but once a week, and then only for roll call which lasted from
+one to three hours.
+
+Transport was the name given to movements, whether they were made by
+vehicle or on foot, to the transfer of prisoners from one installation
+to another. When travel was by rail, groups numbering as high as
+130 were placed in cattle and freight cars and during the inclement
+weather were given no extra clothing (Exhibits A, Q, GG, HH, and EEE).
+Of one group of 4,500 men and 500 women who were moved from Monowitz
+to Nordhausen in January 1945, a trip lasting approximately eight
+days, only twice were the passengers given food, at which times each
+was given one-half loaf of bread and 106 grams of meat. Upon arrival
+at Mittelbeau in the Nordhausen area, between 1,000 and 1,300 of the
+travelers were dead (Exhibits A-1, & Q). On the 8th, 9th, 10th, and
+11th of March 1945, 2,000 prisoners were taken from Nordhausen to a
+so-called Red Cross Camp near Bolkenberg. They travelled by wagon and
+on foot, and were given three days food for the ten day trip. 1,000 of
+the 2,000 died within three days (Exhibit A). Of 1,600 prisoners who
+came to Bolke Kaserene from Ellrich 250 died within three days (Exhibit
+A). Approximately 100 prisoners a day, suffering from malnutrition,
+tuberculosis, etc., were shipped from Dora to Bolke Kaserene to be
+“hospitalized” (Exhibit A-1). As the Allied troops neared the vicinity
+of the camps, evacuation of the prisoners was attempted by the use
+of the so-called transports, and as transportation by rail became
+impossible due to tactical operations, prisoners were in some instances
+released and in other instances removed from their transports and taken
+to areas, there to be murdered by their overseers (Exhibits DDD, FFF,
+GGG, HHH, & III).
+
+The SS guards shot laborers upon the slightest pretext. Six prisoners
+were shot one day because they had left their place of work to go
+to the water closet (Exhibits A, N, O, LL, QQ, & SS). Beatings were
+frequently administered upon the slightest provocation by SS guards
+and Kapos (Exhibits A, F, G, H, I, J, L, M, O, R, S, T, U, V, AA, PP,
+QQ, RR & TT). One instance of a prisoner’s failure to tip his hat to an
+SS man was sufficient justification for his being beaten (Exhibit V).
+
+Executions were often performed without apparent trial under the
+shallow guise of the condemned man having been a saboteur. 75
+prisoners were hanged on 10 March 1945 at Dora (Exhibit K). On 13
+March 1945 twelve others, including a Yugoslavian Doctor, who was
+accused of administering too carefully to the prisoner’s ailments
+and as being a saboteur were hanged (Exhibit K). 35 were hanged in
+one day (Exhibit JJ). 80 were hanged in February 1945 for having
+built a radio transmitter (Exhibits OO & SS). An engineer who was
+accused of tampering with a voltmeter was hanged (Exhibit TT). On many
+occasions the entire personnel of the camp were forced to witness the
+hangings (Exhibits O, JJ, & VV). This area was visited by many high
+Nazi officials, including Goebbels and Himmler. Himmler spoke to the
+personnel at Dora on one of his visits there (Exhibits A-1 & TT).
+
+10,000 (Exhibit A-1) forced laborers who died or were killed at Dora
+and auxiliary camps were cremated at Buchenwald and Dora. Medical
+attention was of the most meager type (Exhibit HH). Deaths at Dora and
+the Mittelbeau camps varied, and were caused by starvation and diseases
+contributed to thereby (Exhibit EEE). At Dora estimated deaths were as
+high as eighty (80) per day (Exhibit N).
+
+                                                /s/     Fulton C. Vowell
+                                                        FULTON C. VOWELL
+                         Signature P. 13 of Document        Major, JAGD,
+                               Commanding Officer, WCIT 6822, U. S. Army
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2224-PS
+
+                 THE END OF THE MARXIST CLASS STRUGGLE
+
+   Pages 1 and 2, Issue 381, 2 May 1933, of “NSK”. National Socialist
+   Party Press Agency [NSK, Pressedienst der NSDAP--the official news
+     agency of the NSDAP]. Edited by Wilhelm Weiss. Responsible for
+   communications of the Reich Press Office. Dr. Otto Dietrich, Reich
+       Press Chief. Published by Franz Eher’s Successor, Munich.
+
+  NSK. The Action Committee for the protection of German labor reports:
+
+On 1 May 1933 the entire German people has made a mighty profession
+of confidence to the new governmental leadership and to the German
+folk community. The greatest event of the day was the unanimous stand
+which the entire German working class in all its strata, in all levels
+and trades, has taken up, behind the government of Adolf Hitler. The
+flags of the new Reich, the symbols of the National Socialist uprising
+and of German socialism fluttered in the workers’ districts of the
+cities just as on the farms, on factory smokestacks and on trade union
+headquarters, on state buildings and on homes in all German cities.
+
+1 May 1933 was the death hour of the Marxist class struggle. Workers
+from the factories, manual and intellectual workers, clerical
+employees--they all marched behind the swastika banner. The folk
+community is here--the most splendid and exalted dream has become
+reality. The working masses have testified to their faith in National
+Socialism.
+
+But as yet the trade associations of the German working class, the
+representative bodies of workers and employees, were in the hands
+of Marxist leaders, who did not guide the German labor movement for
+the benefit of the working German people, but only considered it as
+the shock troop of their crazy international Marxist class-struggle
+ideology.
+
+National Socialism, which today has assumed leadership of the German
+working class, can no longer bear the responsibility for leaving
+the men and women of the German working class, the members of the
+largest trade organization in the world, the German Trade Union
+movement, in the hands of people who do not know a fatherland that is
+called Germany. Because of that, the National Socialist Factory Cell
+Organization [NSBO] has taken over the leadership of the trade unions.
+The NSBO has eliminated the old leadership of the Trade Unions of
+the AGDB [General German Trade Union League] and of the AFA [General
+Independent Employees’ Federation].
+
+New German labor leaders have replaced senile ward-heelers [verkalkte
+Bonzen]. The proven pioneers of the National Socialist Factory Cell
+Organization [NSBO], who have fought to the limit for the rights of
+German labor from the beginning, have taken over the leadership of the
+trade union associations. That proves that the struggle of National
+Socialism is not directed against the trade union idea as such, but
+only against the bureaucratized leaderships, because they are the foes
+of the German labor movement. The old, painstakingly attained rights of
+the workers’ and employees’ associations will not be touched. On the
+contrary, the new National Socialist trade union leadership will make
+good the harm inflicted on the German working class by class struggle
+and internationalism.
+
+On 2 May 1933 the National Socialist Factory Cell Organization took
+over the leadership of all trade unions, all trade union buildings were
+occupied and most stringent control has been organized over financial
+and personnel matters of the organizations.
+
+The leadership of the Action Committee for the Protection of German
+Labor has been assumed by Party Member Dr. Ley, Deputy: Schmeer.
+
+The leadership of the General German Trade Union League has been
+taken over by Party Member Schumann. Party Member Muchow takes care
+of the fundamental questions of organization. Party Member Biallas is
+responsible for press and propaganda.
+
+Party Member Peppler assumes leadership of the General Independent
+Employees’ Federation [AFA].
+
+Party Member Mueller assumes leadership of the “Bank for Workers,
+Employees and Civil Servants”.
+
+Auditing has been taken over by Party Member Brinkmann.
+
+German workers and employees! Help us to build a new Germany of
+national liberty and socialist justice. Help to transform the trade
+unions to the media of fruitful work. Maintain discipline, then your
+work will be accompanied by success, to the benefit of the entire
+German people, but primarily of German workers and employees.
+
+The new National Socialist trade union leadership will attempt to make
+good the damage done to the German working class by class struggle and
+internationalism. We appeal to the entire German people, to trade union
+members of all shades and associations.
+
+Have confidence in the proven fighters of the National Socialist
+Factory Cell Organization!
+
+Attempts at sabotage by unscrupulous mischief-makers will be avenged
+with the whole severity of the law. Comply with all future directives,
+it is a matter of your and your children’s future!
+
+                              Now to work!
+                          Long live Socialism!
+                           Long live Germany!
+
+       #       #       #       #       #
+
+                      WORKERS’ CONGRESS IN BERLIN
+
+                                                      NSK, Berlin, 2 May
+
+The “National Socialist Party Press Agency” is informed that a great
+Workers’ Congress will take place on Wednesday, 10 May, in the
+Prussian House of Lords in Berlin. The united front of German workers
+will be formed there. Adolf Hitler will be asked to assume the position
+of Honorary Patron.
+
+       #       #       #       #       #
+
+                 THE ACTION COMMITTEE WITH ADOLF HITLER
+
+NSK. On Tuesday noon, at about two o’clock, the gentlemen of the
+Action Committee for the Protection of German Labor visited the Reich
+Chancellery under the leadership of Dr. R. Ley, in order to inform the
+Reich Chancellor of the accomplished coordination [Gleichschaltung]
+of the Free Trade Unions in line with the general political situation
+in Germany. Dr. Ley informed the Chancellor of the smooth course
+encountered by the project, the necessity of which was based on the
+attitude of the German working class itself, which had demanded an end
+to Marxist activity in the trade unions. The Action Committee then
+asked Adolf Hitler to become Honorary Patron of the Great Workers’
+Congress to take place within the next few weeks.
+
+The Fuehrer declared his readiness to assume this position of Honorary
+Patron and emphasized especially that he expected smooth execution
+of the various measures, so that especially from a financial point
+of view, the Purge Project [Reinigungsaktion] would result not only
+in harm to the German worker, but exclusively in benefit. The Action
+Committee asserted that the settlement was taking place in complete
+peace and order, and could promise that as of tomorrow the payments of
+the institutions concerned would be resumed to their full extent.
+
+       #       #       #       #       #
+
+                             “ARBEITERTUM”
+
+                       OFFICIAL ORGAN OF THE ADGB
+
+                  [General German Trade Union League]
+
+                                                      NSK, Berlin, 2 May
+
+In consequence of the coordination [Gleichschaltung] of the Free Trade
+Unions, the organ of the National Socialist Factory Cell Organizations
+[Nationalsozialistische Betriebszellenorganisation], “Das Deutsche
+Arbeitertum”, has been designated as official organ of the ADGB. In
+future “Arbeitertum” will appear weekly (instead of bi-weekly, as up to
+now) with a total circulation of about 4 million copies.
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2225-PS
+
+             THE FRONT OF GERMAN WORKERS HAS BEEN ERECTED!
+
+   Page 1, Issue 382, 3 May 1933, of “NSK”. National Socialist Party
+     Press Agency, [NSK, Pressedienst der NSDAP--the official news
+     agency of the NSDAP]. Edited by Wilhelm Weiss. Responsible for
+   communications of the Reich Press Office. Dr. Otto Dietrich, Reich
+        Press Chief. Published by Franz Eher Successor, Munich.
+
+NSK. We have been informed by the leader of the Action Committee
+for the Protection of German Labor, Dr. Ley, that the following
+organizations have unconditionally subordinated themselves to the
+leadership of Adolf Hitler and the directives of the Action Committee
+for the Protection of German Labor: Central League of Christian
+Trade Unions [Gesamtverband der Christlichen Gewerkschaften]; Trade
+Union Circle of Associations of German Employees, Workers and Civil
+Servants [Gewerkschaftsring deutscher Angestellten, Arbeiter und
+Beamtenverbaende] [Hirsch-Duncker]; Trade Union League of Employees
+[GDA], the RDA; and other associations. Tomorrow negotiations will
+begin with the German National Clerks’ League [DHV] as the last
+association. It is to be hoped that this organization, too, will
+discern the spirit of the times and integrate itself into the great
+undertaking.
+
+For the first time in the German labor movement a concentration of all
+workers’ and employees’ associations would thus be reached and one of
+the greatest undertakings recorded in the history of the German working
+class brought to fruition.
+
+We have been further informed by the leader of the Action Committee
+for the Protection of German Labor, Dr. Ley, that he intends now,
+after these associations have unconditionally and without reservation
+submitted to the NSDAP, to draft the positive and expert forces from
+these organizations for cooperation. This intention will already find
+expression at the great Workers’ Congress, which will take place in
+Berlin next week.
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2226-PS
+
+                        THE LABOR FRONT STANDS!
+
+    From Page 2, Issue 383, 4 May 1933 of “NSK”. National Socialist
+  Party Press Agency, [NSK, Pressedienst der NSDAP--the official news
+     agency of the NSDAP]. Edited by Wilhelm Weiss. Responsible for
+   communications of the Reich Press Office. Dr. Otto Dietrich, Reich
+        Press Chief. Published by Franz Eher Successor, Munich.
+
+      THE GERMAN NATIONALIST CLERKS’ LEAGUE [DHV], TOO HAS JOINED
+
+NSK, Berlin, 4 May
+
+_All German trade union associations of all shades having
+recognized the leadership of the NSDAP in German trade union
+affairs, the German Nationalist Clerks’ League_ [_Deutschnationaler
+Handlungsgehilfenverband_] has now too joined Adolf Hitler; the last
+big association to do so.
+
+After a detailed conversation between the leader of the Action
+Committee for the Protection of German Labor, Dr. Ley, and the
+leadership of the German Nationalist Clerks’ League [DHV], integration
+of the DHV into the German Labor Front was decided upon.
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2228-PS
+
+                 ORDER ISSUED BY THE GERMAN LABOR FRONT
+
+   From Page 5, Issue 426, 26 June 1933, of “NSK”. National Socialist
+  Party Press Agency, [NSK, Pressedienst der NSDAP--the official news
+     agency of the NSDAP]. Edited by Wilhelm Weiss. Responsible for
+   communications of the Reich Press Office. Dr. Otto Dietrich, Reich
+        Press Chief. Published by Franz Eher Successor, Munich.
+
+NSK. The leader of the Organizational Office of the German Labor Front,
+Party Member Muchow, has issued the following proclamation:
+
+All associations and societies of workers and employees, which have
+not yet been concentrated [zusammengefasst] in the two big collective
+associations of workers and employees within the German Labor Front
+must report to the Organizational Office of the German Labor Front,
+Berlin SW 19, 34, Maerkisches Ufer, within 8 days. The requisite
+documents about membership figures and other pertinent data must be
+enclosed. They will then be notified by the Organizational Office,
+which Association they will have to join [eingliedern].
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2229-PS
+
+                     THE REICH YOUTH LEADER AT WORK
+
+   Issue 423, 22 June 1933, of “NSK”. National Socialist Party Press
+   Agency, [NSK, Pressedienst der NSDAP--the official news agency of
+  the NSDAP]. Edited by Wilhelm Weiss. Responsible for communications
+    of the Reich Press Office. Dr. Otto Dietrich, Reich Press Chief.
+               Published by Franz Eher Successor, Munich.
+
+                 IMPORTANT ORDER OF BALDUR VON SCHIRACH
+
+NSK Berlin, 22 June
+
+The Youth Leader of the German Reich, Baldur von Schirach, has
+published the following order:
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+
+                               _ORDER 2_
+
+1. The Greater German League [Grossdeutscher Bund], together with its
+sub- and member organizations, is dissolved as of 17 June 1933. The
+property of the Greater German League and of the affiliated sub- and
+member organizations is to be secured. Thus, along with the Greater
+German League the following have been dissolved:
+
+  1. Free Band of the Young Nation [Freischar Junger Nation].
+
+  2. German Free Band [Deutsche Freischar].
+
+  3. German Boy Scout League [Deutscher Pfadfinderbund].
+
+  4. The Geuses [Die Geusen].
+
+  5. Community Circle of German Boy Scouts [Ringgemeinschaft deutscher
+       Pfadfinder].
+
+  6. Circle of German Boy Scout Districts [Ring deutscher
+       Pfadfindergaue].
+
+  7. German Boy Scout Corps [Deutsches Pfadfinderkorps].
+
+  8. Free Band of Protestant Boy Scouts [Freischar evangelischer
+       Pfadfinder].
+
+2. The Reich Committee of German Youth Associations [Reichsausschuss
+der deutschen Jugendverbaende] is dissolved herewith. Previous tasks
+of the Reich Committee will be taken over into the expanded sphere of
+tasks of the Youth Leadership of the German Reich.
+
+3. All Youth Organizations in Germany are to be reported to the
+Youth Leader of the German Reich (Berlin NW 40, 10, Kronprinzenufer,
+Department for Organizations). Youth Organizations which have not
+reported, or reported only incompletely, by 15 July 1933, are to be
+considered as dissolved. It is expressly emphasized that the term
+“Youth Organizations” also comprises such organizations which are
+groups within adult organizations. The reports are to be submitted by
+the top leadership of individual youth organizations for the entire
+organization. Insofar as the youth groups of adult organizations do
+not have centralized youth leadership, the leadership of the adult
+organization is obligated to submit the report.
+
+It is mandatory that the report contain:
+
+  1. name of the society (with accurate information about the legal
+       status of the society);
+
+  2. board of directors of the society (accurate information about
+       name, residence, and telephone number (if applicable));
+
+  3. information relative to person authorized to represent the society;
+
+  4. office of the society (telephone);
+
+  5. banking and postal checking accounts of the society, with
+       indication who is authorized to sign for the society there;
+
+  6. accurate membership figures with indication when the figures were
+       ascertained;
+
+  7. statutes of the society;
+
+  8. information about the organizational structure of the society,
+       insofar as they are not contained in the statutes;
+
+  9. information about chairmen of districts, regions, states, or
+       similar subdivisions;
+
+4. The tasks of the Youth Leader of the German Reich must be
+accomplished partially with the help of contributions of affiliated
+organizations. The amount of contributions will be fixed in the very
+near future.
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2230-PS
+
+  AGREEMENT ENTERED INTO BETWEEN THE REICH LEADER OF THE GERMAN LABOR
+FRONT, PARTY MEMBER DR. LEY, AND THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE STORM TROOPS
+  [SA], VIKTOR LUTZE, WITH REGARD TO THE FACTORY TROOPS [WERKSCHAREN].
+
+                   THE ORGANIZATION BOOK OF THE NSDAP
+
+   [Organisations Buch der NSDAP] Edition of 1938, editor: The Reichs
+    Organization Leader of the NSDAP [Dr. Robert Ley]. Published by
+   the Central Publishing House of the NSDAP, Franz EHER, Successor,
+                   Muenchen. [Pages 484, 485b, 486c].
+
+1. The Factory Troop [Werkschar] is the National Socialist backbone
+of the factory. Its task is to permeate the factory with the National
+Socialist philosophy. The factory troop is the carrier of the factory
+community and incarnates community life within the factory; it bears
+witness to these facts by its factory celebrations and festivals. It
+is in the forefront in carrying through the tasks of the German Labor
+Front. It is the living incarnation of these tasks.
+
+2. The Storm Troops [SA] will promote the building-up of the factory
+troops with all means. Storm Troops [SA] units will maintain closest
+comradeship and connection with the factory troops, frequently visiting
+their meetings, and inviting the factory troops to their own meetings.
+
+3. Factory troops are formed on a voluntary basis by Storm Troopers
+[SA-Maenner] in a factory and by other workers in the factory. The
+latter simultaneously become Storm Troop candidates (insofar as they
+are not already members of another formation of the Party).
+
+4. Officers and men of the Storm Troops, who are working in the factory
+and are members of the German Labor Front, are to be made leaders
+of the Factory Troops. On the basis of previous agreements, the
+appointments take place in accordance with the ordinance of 10 January
+1936--Ch. Nr. 11150, as follows:
+
+_a._ in the case of the Reich Directorate of the German Labor Front,
+upon recommendation of the Supreme Storm Troop Command [Oberste
+SA-Fuehrung]
+
+_b._ in the case of Districts, upon recommendation of the SA-Group
+
+_c._ in the counties, [Kreisen] upon recommendation of the SA-Standards
+[Standarten]
+
+_d._ within the factory, the factory troop leader is appointed by
+the County Factory Troop Leader, after consultation with the factory
+representative of the German Labor Front.
+
+5. Special sections [Referate] for factory troops will be established
+at the headquarters of Storm Troop Groups, respectively Brigades, and
+of Standards. They are to be merged with the previous Special Sections
+for Social Work at Storm Troop Bureaus. The District respectively
+County Factory Troop Leaders are in charge of this Special Section.
+Simultaneously these Storm Troop leaders are to be charged by the
+regional commissioners with the leadership of the Department factory
+troops in the German Labor Front. For disciplinary and personnel
+purposes they remain subordinate to their unit commanders.
+
+The requisite financial means for the Special Sections are to be made
+available by the German Labor Front in accordance with agreements still
+to be reached.
+
+6. Directives and regulations for commitment, and for the tasks to be
+accomplished within the factory, will be issued by the Reich Leader of
+the German Labor Front through factory troop channels (Reich factory
+troop leader; District factory troop leader; County factory troop
+leader; Factory factory troop leader).
+
+7. 4 to 5 week days a month are available to the factory troop for
+carrying through their tasks.
+
+In the case of urgent tasks within the factory, and in the case of
+protective measures against natural catastrophes and preparatory
+service for large-scale political utilization of the German Labor
+Front, factory troop service has priority over Storm Troop [SA] service.
+
+8. Physical training will take place with Storm Troop [SA] cadre units.
+
+9. The service Uniform for factory troops remains customary factory
+troop uniform for meetings within the factory as well as in parades of
+the German Labor Front.
+
+Berlin, October 1936
+
+                                 The Chief of Staff of Storm Troops [SA]
+                                                          (signed) Lutze
+
+                                                 The Reich Leader of the
+                                                      German Labor Front
+                                                        (signed) Dr. Ley
+
+
+                                 PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2231-PS
+
+             “Die Reichskanzlei” by Hermann von Stutterheim
+
+                             [Pages 19-34]
+
+Nevertheless, there is still a “people’s legislation” even in the Third
+Reich, but this does not restrict the legislative power of the Reich
+Cabinet [Reichsregierung] in any way. According to the law on the
+plebiscite of 14th July 1933, the Reich Cabinet, which is, de facto and
+also, as we shall see later, de jure, nothing more nor less than the
+Fuehrer, can apply to the people for its approval or disapproval of a
+measure which is envisaged by the Reich Cabinet, whereby it is also a
+matter of an approval or disapproval of a planned law. It is therefore
+impossible for a people’s law to be passed without or even contrary to
+the will of the Fuehrer. Neither can drafts of laws put up for approval
+be passed if the content has been altered in any way. It must be either
+accepted or rejected just as it stands. Even should it be rejected,
+such a result of the vote does not oppose the will of the Fuehrer.
+For, in as much as the Fuehrer puts a law to the people’s vote, an
+action which he takes of his own free will, he shows that he is quite
+prepared for the law to be rejected.
+
+Within the Reich Cabinet, the Reich Chancellor was de jure at first
+also the president of the Reich Cabinet which was a body of people
+who made the decisions, in which the Reich Chancellor had only a
+seat and a vote. He could therefore be overruled. In practice, since
+the day of the assumption of power, this was no longer the case. The
+dominating personality of the Fuehrer and the actual power possessed
+by him made it obvious from the start that the Reich Cabinet could
+not make any decisions which did not coincide with the will of the
+Fuehrer. The Reich Cabinet accordingly was from the outset, nothing
+more than an advisory body to the Fuehrer which was to advise the head
+of the cabinet [Regierungschef]. Even if the result of this advice
+was still called “the decision of the Reich Cabinet” the decision in
+reality was that of the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor, which, after a
+previous conference, was passed by the Reich Cabinet. The same applied
+to administrative measures, political resolutions and legal decisions.
+Later, this situation also gained its legal semblance by the duty of
+obedience of the Reich Ministerate to the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor.
+This occurred at the time of the Reich Law of 16th October 1934, on the
+oath taken by Reich Ministers and members of the provincial governments
+[Landesregierungen], by which the Reich Ministers had to swear loyalty
+and obedience to the leader of the German Reich and people, Adolf
+Hitler. Thereby, the whole administrative power was concentrated in
+the person of the Fuehrer. From then on, he was also de jure head of
+the Reich, supreme legislator, Supreme Chief of all administration and
+supreme commander of the armed forces, without being restricted by any
+other factors or authorities when exercising the power with which he
+was endowed by virtue of the legal position. The cooperation of the
+members of the Cabinet [Regierungsmitglieder] in an advisory capacity
+in particular, is therefore no essential condition of the legality
+of the Cabinet Laws [Regierungsgesetze]. Even without the advisory
+cooperation of the Cabinet, the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor can issue
+decrees which are of course always in the form of a “Fuehrer Edict”
+or that of a Decree to differentiate between them and the designation
+“Reich Law” used for those laws issued with the formal cooperation of
+the Reich Cabinet.
+
+It is neither an essential of the Fuehrer State, nor does it conform to
+the personal characteristics of the Fuehrer, that all the difficulties
+described above must be submitted to the supreme Fuehrer for his
+decision. On the contrary: although the Reich Ministers are today
+basically subject to the unlimited authoritative power of the Fuehrer
+when making their decisions even in unimportant individual cases,
+they actually have an independence in carrying out their official
+functions such as was never enjoyed by Reich Ministers during the
+republic [Systemzeit]. Responsibility, powers of decision, a driving
+energy and real authority, these are the qualities required, first
+and foremost by the Fuehrer of his ministers. Therefore he allows
+them great freedom in carrying out their official functions. But,
+if the evolutionary New Order is not to give way to revolutionary
+conditions, it is essential that the legal order be respected by the
+Reich Ministers, and by all their subordinate departments. And so it is
+necessary, in the middle of the gigantic process of reorganization that
+we are now experiencing, that the Fuehrer himself should continually be
+taking steps to abolish obstacles of a legal or any other kind which
+could not be eliminated in any other way by apportioning certain full
+powers and issuing other orders which might not be legally binding or
+might lack the required authority if they were not issued as laws or
+Fuehrer Edicts. Anyone who has a certain amount of experience in the
+sphere of administration knows how extraordinarily difficult it is to
+gauge what retrospective effects interference with the traditional and
+established administrative system will have. Should such interference
+be unavoidable, if higher ends are to be gained, it is necessary to
+direct and restrict them so that unwanted repercussions are eliminated.
+Even with practical experience and a knowledgeable survey of the whole
+sphere of administration and legislation, it is however also necessary
+to give thorough consideration to the problem to be solved before it is
+submitted to the Fuehrer. Of course, the final decision can be made, to
+a certain extent, by the competent departmental Minister himself. Too
+often, however, he is unable to come to an agreement with those other
+ministers whose departments are affected by the measure intended, and
+he sometimes lacks any definite knowledge of the Fuehrer’s possible
+plans to which such measures must conform.
+
+Considered theoretically, the Reich Cabinet would be a suitable special
+committee to settle opposing points of view and make them fit in with
+the Fuehrer’s aims. In practice, however, this would mean that the
+cabinet would be in almost continuous session, a quite impossible
+demand on the Fuehrer. He has not the time to take part in long cabinet
+meetings [Kabinetsitzungen] to listen to detailed descriptions,
+justifications and counter-arguments which it is the duty of all
+ministers to make from the particular standpoint of their departments.
+The Fuehrer must be free and have the necessary time for those great
+decisions, which must be made in the field of state-leadership in
+interior-policy and also especially in foreign policy and which
+he alone must make. For he is not called to be the arbitrator in
+differences both of opinion and of other things, but purely a leader,
+an inspiration, a commander-in-chief--in short a creator. That causes
+the necessity of reducing cabinet meetings to the minimum and therefore
+only to those all-important questions, so that even drafts of laws,
+before they are handed to the Fuehrer are to be dealt with, not during
+cabinet deliberations, but by the so-called process of circulation,
+i.e. by obtaining the written statement of agreement from the
+individual members of the cabinet.
+
+Under these conditions, it is the duty, first and foremost of the
+Chief of the Reich Chancellery to submit the matters to the Fuehrer,
+for his decisions and orders, in a concentrated manner and a suitable
+chronological order. This saddles him with the necessity of keeping
+conversant the whole time with the most important matters in the
+sphere of administration, economy and politics and, at the same time,
+of concerning himself in the preliminary work of legislation. It
+falls to him in particular to see whether and in what form any direct
+interference is to be recommended to the Fuehrer in as much as he must
+in any case be informed of occurrences in public life.
+
+As they are so numerous, it is almost impossible to give an accurate
+individual picture of the extent and type of all the questions and
+concerns which, in this way, make up the substance of the reports made
+by the Chief of the Reich Chancellery to the Fuehrer. These questions
+and concerns are extremely numerous and affect all spheres of public
+life. Fundamentally, only those concerns can be separated which are the
+responsibility of the President’s Chancellery and of the Office of the
+head of the NSDAP and are laid before the Fuehrer by the heads of these
+departments, as well, particularly, as all military matters, which
+the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces has to report.
+Naturally even these matters could encroach on the sphere of activity
+of the Reich Chancellery on account of their connection with political
+and administrative questions and therefore require a special report by
+the Chief of the Reich Chancellery alone or together with the proper
+competent departmental heads.
+
+Taken as a whole, it may be said that the severe limitation in
+frequency of the cabinet deliberations has resulted in a corresponding
+increase of the duties and heightening of the responsibility of the
+Chief of the Reich Chancellery.
+
+However, the fact that cabinet meetings, under the pressure of
+circumstances, could take place only seldom, led to the necessity of
+setting up a special advisory body to the Fuehrer in the form of a
+Secret cabinet council [Kabinettsrat] to advise the Fuehrer on the
+direction of Foreign Policy. However, this fact meant a small reduction
+of the duties of the Reich Chancellery just as did the establishment of
+a cabinet council [Ministerrat] for the defence of the Reich later on.
+This subject will be dealt with anon. The “Secret Cabinet Council” was
+established by the Fuehrer Edict of 4th February 1938. The following
+persons are members: Reich Minister Baron von Neurath as president, as
+members, Reich Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop, General Field Marshall
+Goering, the deputy-Fuehrer, Reich Minister Hess, Reich Minister of
+Enlightenment and Propaganda, Dr. Goebbels, Reich Minister and Chief
+of the Reich Chancellery, Dr. Lammers, C-in-C of the Army, General von
+Brauchitsch, C-in-C of the Navy, Dr. H. C. Raeder and Chief of the
+Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, General Keitel. The Reich Minister
+and Chief of the Reich Chancellery is in charge of any affairs with
+which the Secret Cabinet Council has to deal.
+
+This is purely a deliberating body which is not called on or empowered
+to make orders or measures by itself. The special conditions of the
+war, especially the need to change the legal position and to meet
+the fast-arising wartime requirements however, made it vital to
+disembarrass the Fuehrer even in the sphere of legislation. This was
+accomplished by the Fuehrer Edict of 30th August 1939. Under this, a
+“Cabinet Council for the defence of the Reich” was formed with the
+power to issue decrees with a legal authority should the Fuehrer
+decide that a certain law was not to be issued by the Reich Cabinet
+or by the Reichstag. The following persons are members of the Cabinet
+council for the defence of the Reich: General Field Marshall Goering as
+president, the deputy-Fuehrer, the Plenipotentiary-General for Reich
+Administration, the Plenipotentiary-General for Economy, also the
+Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery and the Chief of the
+Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. The president can invite other
+persons to attend the deliberations of the Cabinet Council. The Reich
+Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery is in charge of the affairs
+of the Cabinet Council. Another legislative body, therefore, came
+into existence but here again, in accordance with the authoritarian
+principle of leadership, it was an organization of leadership in the
+hand of the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor, a legislative organization,
+whose authority to issue decrees is based on the supreme legislative
+power of the Fuehrer and which can be used in specific cases only if
+the Fuehrer has not decided on some other procedure. Actually, the
+cabinet council’s authority to issue decrees has been made use of to a
+great extent since the beginning of the war.
+
+The most important decrees issued by the Cabinet Council for the
+defence of the Reich are the following:
+
+  Decree on the appointment of Reich Defence Commissars dated
+  1st September 1939 (Reich Law Gazette I p 1565), Decree on the
+  compensation for personal damage (Personal damage decree) dated 1st
+  September 1939 (Reich Law Gazette I p 1623), Decree on measures
+  concerning civic disputes, compulsory execution, bankruptcy and civic
+  right dated 1st September 1939 (Reich Law Gazette I p 1656), Decree
+  on special radio measures dated 1st September 1939 (Reich Law Gazette
+  I p 1683), Decree on the restriction on changing the place of work
+  dated 1st September 1939 (Reich Law Gazette I p 1685), War-economy
+  decree dated 4th September 1939 (Reich Law Gazette I p 1609), Decree
+  against elements of the population, dated 5th September 1939 (Reich
+  Law Gazette I p 1679), Decree on the assessment of damage to property
+  (damage to property assessment decree) dated 8th September 1939
+  (Reich Law Gazette I p 1754), Decree on the concession of delayed
+  payment in legal disputes dated 7th October 1939 (Reich Law Gazette I
+  p 2004), Decree on the treatment of enemy capital dated 15th January
+  1940 (Reich Law Gazette I p 191).
+
+This short list of the most important Cabinet Council Decrees should
+suffice to make clear the extent and significance of the Cabinet
+Council legislation. It is obvious that this has lifted a quite
+exceptionally heavy burden from the Fuehrer’s shoulders. The Reich
+Chancellery, however, participates fully in the work of the Cabinet
+Council since the Chief of the Reich Chancellery is not only a member
+but also directs its affairs. The Chief of the Reich Chancellery was
+given the task of directing these affairs because it put him in a
+position to keep the Fuehrer conversant all the time with the work
+of the Cabinet Council. In this connection, the Chief of the Reich
+Chancellery, in cases where there is any doubt on the point, has to
+make sure that the Fuehrer has the opportunity in good time to make
+clear whether he is in favour at all of a measure planned by the
+Cabinet Council, or whether he would not prefer the form of a Cabinet
+or Reichstag law instead of a cabinet Council decree. Basically the
+right possessed by the Cabinet Council for the defence of the Reich to
+issue decrees is limited to legal matters directly connected with the
+defence of the Reich. However, in special cases and at times when the
+Fuehrer is on a visit to the front, this rule cannot always be kept.
+Should there be any doubt, whether and to what extent deviations from
+this rule can be made, it usually falls to the Reich Minister and Chief
+of Reich Chancellery to take steps to obtain the Fuehrer’s decision
+should the occasion arise.
+
+According to the assignment of duties in the Reich Cabinet the Chief
+of the Reich Chancellery is in charge of the affairs of the Reich
+Cabinet as well. In this capacity he has to arrange the meetings of
+the Reich Cabinet on the direct instructions of the Fuehrer and to
+issue summonses to these meetings together with the agenda and the
+subjects up for discussion. He must also see that the Reich Ministries
+concerned are in agreement beforehand on the subjects to be discussed,
+or if they are not unanimous, that a clear position has been reached
+about the incompatibility of the various opinions and about the
+reasons for the opposed points of view. Ministerial conferences among
+the Ministers concerned may be held prior to the cabinet meeting to
+clear up these differences of opinion. These Ministerial Conferences
+under the chairmanship of the Reich Chancellor, took place before the
+assumption of power. Apart from exceptional occasions, this no longer
+occurs. Summonses to Ministerial Conferences are sent out by the Chief
+of the Reich Chancellery at the request of one or more of the ministers
+concerned; he then as a rule presides at these conferences. Naturally,
+this does not apply to the numerous ministerial conferences arranged
+by the authoritative Reich Ministers of the day, in which the matters
+dealt with are such that it is not, or not yet, necessary that the
+Fuehrer be informed; therefore the Reich Minister and Chief of the
+Reich Chancellery need not be present at the conferences.
+
+The drafts of Cabinet laws [Regierungsgesetze] are first prepared by
+the authoritative ministry, that is the ministry most concerned, in
+agreement with any other ministry concerned, in the matter. There is
+sometimes a preliminary discussion of these in conferences between
+departmental heads [Chefbesprechungen] and then they are handed to the
+Chief of the Reich Chancellery who determines whether they are to be
+included in the agenda of a cabinet meeting or whether the agreement
+of all the members of the cabinet is to be obtained in writing by the
+so called process of circulation. Should there still be differences of
+opinion remaining unsolved when the cabinet deliberates on the drafts
+of the laws, the Fuehrer makes the final decision on the content of
+the law and its passing. This procedure is also followed when any
+opposition remains during the process of circulation and deliberation
+on the draft in a cabinet meeting seems impracticable for some reason
+or other.
+
+Cabinet laws [Regierungsgesetze] decided on are drawn up and issued by
+the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor. The finished law, the actual legal
+document, is signed first by the Fuehrer and then by the ministers
+concerned, who are thereby responsible to the Fuehrer for the law.
+Apart from the Reich Ministers concerned, the Reich Minister and
+Chief of the Reich Chancellery also appends his signature and, by
+this action, makes himself responsible that all Reich Ministers had
+the opportunity of stating their opinions. Furthermore, the president
+of the Cabinet Council for the defense of the Reich must append his
+signature to all Reich Laws and that under the signature of the Fuehrer
+and Reich Chancellor. Fuehrer Edicts with a legislative content are
+always signed also by the Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich
+Chancellery. This rule of signatures is based mainly on an internal
+regulation of the Fuehrer or on usage. It applies also to the Cabinet
+laws [Regierungsgesetze] which are issued as Reichstag laws or People’s
+laws.
+
+The Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery who, as we know,
+directs the affairs of the Cabinet Council plays a similar part in the
+work of the Cabinet Council for the defence of the Reich in issuing
+decrees which, as mentioned above, have the authority of laws, as he
+does with the Cabinet laws. It must be noted, that the peculiarity
+in this case is that the subjects dealt with by the Cabinet Council
+are distributed not merely among the members of the Cabinet Council,
+but also among all the members of the Cabinet who are thereby given
+the opportunity of guarding the interests of their spheres of office
+by adding their appropriate standpoints in the Cabinet Council
+legislation, even if they do not participate in making the decree.
+
+
+                                 PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2232-PS
+
+         GERMAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW [Deutsches Verwaltungsrecht]
+
+                           by Dr. Hans Frank.
+
+          Published by: Central Publishing House of the NSDAP
+
+                     Franz Eher Successor, Munich.
+
+                    [Pages 420, 421, 424, 425, 430]
+
+Task and Means of a Political Police.
+
+
+A. The Task
+
+The task of a political police in the sense of the National Socialist
+conception of this institution has been formulated best so far in
+Section 1 of the Prussian law concerning the Secret State Police of
+10 February 1936 (Prussian law collection, 1936, p. 21): “The Secret
+State Police has the task of investigating and fighting all attempts
+dangerous to the State, of collecting and evaluating the result of
+the inquiries, of informing the State Government and of keeping the
+other authorities currently informed on important facts pertaining to
+them and of supplying them with suggestions.” This formulation also
+outlines the task of Political Police Systems in other German countries
+for which this task assignment is to be concluded from the National
+Socialist conception of a Political Police, since a legal formulation
+is mostly missing.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+_b._ All attempts dangerous to the State are subject to the activity of
+the Political Police. “Dangerous to the State” is more than “hostile
+to the State” and includes not only undertakings with programs hostile
+to the State but also all attempts--no matter what their aim--which in
+their effects endanger the State.
+
+Not the State in its outward organic appearance but the tasks of the
+leadership in the sense of the National-Socialist idea is the object
+of protection. It is the task of the National Socialist leadership to
+preserve and to develop all national values. These being endangered,
+the Political Police is called upon for protection against the
+endangering attempts, e.g. if there is any danger:
+
+  to the State leadership and structure of the State by intentions of
+    terror and revolutionary plans,
+
+  to the Armed Forces and the forces of defense by espionage and
+    (intellectual and technical) sabotage,
+
+  to the people’s community and the state principles by disintegration
+    and instigation,
+
+  to the people’s health and blood purity by moral corruption (e.g.
+    offenses according to Section 175 of the Reich penal code) and racial
+    disgrace,
+
+  to the ideological unity of the people by intellectual poisoning and
+    distortion (e.g. by “Jehovah’s Witnesses” and other sects).
+
+A complete catalogue of “attempts dangerous to the State” can never be
+drawn up because it can never be foreseen what may endanger leadership
+and people sometime in the future. National Socialist recognition of
+threatening danger and National Socialist knowledge of responsibility
+will understand and fulfill the duties of the Political Police
+according to the real necessities in any political situation.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+_b._ The lawful means for _preventive police measures_ of the Political
+Police have not been regulated legally. They cannot be regulated, for
+the preventive police duties of the Political Police--and the means
+necessary for their performance--cannot be described and standardized
+for all time.
+
+The duties of the Political Police and the necessary means for their
+performance are not chosen freely but are prescribed by the foe. Just
+as the operations of an army against the outward enemy and the means
+to fight this enemy cannot be prescribed, so the Political Police also
+must have free hand in the choice of the means necessary at times to
+fight attempts dangerous to the State.
+
+Since the National Socialist revolution, the powers of the Political
+Police in a legally positive respect are derived immediately from
+the new conception of the State and the resulting conception of the
+duties of a police force. According to this conception the duty of
+the Political Police, due to its nature, is to fight all attempts
+dangerous to the State. And it thus has the right to take all necessary
+measures for this fight as long as there are not any expressly contrary
+regulations. This conception is confirmed by the decree of the
+Reichspresident for the Protection of People and State of 28 February
+1933 (RGBl I, p. 83) by which the so-called basic rights of the Weimar
+Constitution have been abrogated. This means that ever since, every
+State institution--particularly the Political Police--may take measures
+in the performance of its duties which were barred before by those
+basic rights.
+
+“The decree for the Protection of People and State of 28 February
+1933 has eliminated the negative law barriers of the State power. The
+positive competence of the police to restrict liberty of any kind,
+especially to order protective custody, results already from the
+character of the function which the Police in the National-Socialist
+State has to perform.” (Dr. Walter Hamel: “The Police in the
+National-Socialist State,” German lawyers’ newspaper of 15 March 1935,
+col. 326.)
+
+According to kind and purpose the measures taken by the Political
+Police can logically be subject to a check only by their own channels
+of administrative supervision. This is recognized for instance in
+Section 7 of the Prussian law concerning the Secret State Police of
+10 February 1936 by the stipulation: “Orders in matters of the Secret
+State Police are not subject to the check of the administrative
+courts.” In its decision of 2 May 1935 (III C 43/35) the Prussian
+High Court of Administration had already come to the same conclusion,
+before the decree of 10 February 1936 was issued, by reason of the
+legal situation in Prussia. Also for the other German countries--if not
+expressly settled to the contrary--and for a future Reich regulation
+the principle has to be maintained that measures of the Political
+Police can be checked only by their own channels of administrative
+supervision. In view of the tasks and means of the Political Police
+which cannot be standardized individually, there can be no legal
+backing for a court decision. Any agency outside of the Political
+Police must lack the necessary expert knowledge for a decision by way
+of administrative supervision.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+_f._ The Secret State Police administers the State Concentration Camps
+through the Inspector of the Concentration Camps who is affiliated with
+the Office of the Secret State Police.
+
+
+                                 PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2233-A-PS
+
+        FRANK DIARY, Meetings of Departmental Chiefs in 1939/40
+                  [Abteilungsleitersitzungen 1939/40]
+
+  Minutes of the 1st conference of the Departmental Chiefs on the 2nd
+                             December 1939.
+
+[Page 3, line 4-13]
+
+The condemning to death of an archbishop and bishop gives cause to the
+fundamental observation that a total war against any kind of resistance
+is being waged in the Government General. The two bishops have been
+condemned quite rightly, because arms were found in their possession.
+If, despite that, they were pardoned to hard labor, then certain other
+considerations were the cause for that. Reports by the press concerning
+the shooting of Jews are not desirable because such reports would
+intimidate the Jews.
+
+
+Minutes of the 2nd conference of the Departmental Chiefs on the 8th
+December 1939.
+
+[Page 4, par. 1 and 2]
+
+The question of forced labor for the Jews could not be solved
+satisfactorily from one day to the other. Prerequisite for this would
+be the card indexing of the male Jews from 14 to 50 years of age. In
+this it had to be ascertained which trade the Jews had so far carried
+on, because just in those territories the Jews had had various skilled
+trades, and it would be a loss if this manpower would not be usefully
+exploited. To do this, sweeping planning is necessary. For the time
+being the Jews had to be gathered in columns and had to be employed
+wherever there was a pressing need. It is the task of the chief of the
+district to determine these needs.
+
+The police was being reenforced by 4 police battalions. The commitment
+would be such that each government section was to receive one
+battalion. Moreover, it was ordered that the police battalions in the
+Government General would be relieved and interchanged from time to
+time with battalions from home. Already before Xmas the relief of 4
+battalions would take place. No insecurity would result.
+
+[Page 7, 2 last paragraphs]
+
+_Governor Dr. Lasch_ called attention to the fact that the order of the
+Governor General regarding the institution of compulsory work provided,
+that Poles from their 18th year upward were to be conscripted for
+compulsory labor. A regulation of the age groups from 14 to 18 would
+also be desirable. One should not neglect the danger that particularly
+the youth of this age group in high schools could become a source of
+national resistance.
+
+_Governor General Reich Minister Dr. Frank_ orders the preparation of a
+supplementary decree, according to which the compulsory labor was to be
+extended to the age groups from 14 to 18.
+
+
+Meeting of Departmental Chiefs at the Bergakademie (Academy for mines).
+
+                         Friday, 10th May 1940
+
+                           [Page 23, par. 1]
+
+Then the Governor General deals with the problem of the _Compulsory
+Labor Service_ of the Poles. Upon the demands from the Reich it has now
+been decreed that compulsion may be exercised in view of the fact that
+sufficient manpower was not voluntarily available for service inside
+the German Reich. This compulsion means the possibility of arrest of
+male and female Poles. Because of these measures a certain disquietude
+had developed which according to individual reports, was spreading
+very much, and which might produce difficulties everywhere. General
+Fieldmarshal Goering some time ago pointed out in his long speech the
+necessity to deport into the Reich a million workers. The supply so far
+was 160,000. However, great difficulties had to be overcome. Therefore
+it would be advisable to consult the district and town chiefs in the
+execution of the compulsion, so that one could be sure from the start
+that this action would be reasonably successful. The arrest of young
+Poles when leaving church service or the cinema would bring about
+an ever-increasing nervousness of the Poles. Generally speaking, he
+had no objections at all if the rubbish, capable of work yet often
+loitering about, would be snatched from the streets. The best method
+for this, however, would be the organization of a raid, and it would be
+absolutely justifiable to stop a Pole in the street and to question him
+what he was doing, where he was working, etc.
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2233-B-PS
+
+               FRANK DIARY, 1940 1st Vol., January-March.
+
+[Page 18, 3rd paragraph]
+
+Thursday, January 11th
+
+1520 Section Chief Dr. Frauendorfer reports to the Governor General
+on the possibilities and the extent of the transport of workers into
+the Reich. The German State Railway sends daily 10 transports, each
+carrying 1000 workers. Beginning with January 15, these transports,
+which were stopped temporarily--will be taken up again.
+
+In regard to the project of resettlement, it should be avoided, that
+it be carried out further in the brutal manner which has prevailed up
+till now, because otherwise it is to be feared that people will not
+volunteer any more to go into the Reich, and also because of the way in
+which the resettlement is carried out, the possibility of using these
+people in the Reich will be impaired. As an extra allowance for the
+unemployment pay the Reich Ministry for labor has held out the prospect
+of an additional sum of 3 million Reichmarks a month.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+[Pages 183-184]
+
+March 7th, 1940
+
+                           Citadel of Cracow
+
+  1645 Conference with SS Brigadier General Schreckenbach
+
+  1650 Attaché Dr. Albers is introduced by Councillor of Legation v.
+    Grolinan to the Governor General
+
+  1700 Conference with Brigadier General Buehrmann, Stabsleiter
+    Reichert, Reichhauptamtsleiter Dr. Frauendorfer, and 2 special
+    advisors.
+
+Subject of the discussion is the question of the shipment of Polish
+agricultural workers into the Reich.
+
+Brigadier General Buehrmann started by saying that Stabsleiter Reichert
+has been appointed by the Reich Food Ministry, to make sure, that
+Polish workers would be sent into the Reich under all circumstances,
+and--if necessary--a compulsory service should be enforced upon
+them. Brigadier General Buehrmann would like to recommend, that the
+Governor General--for the time being does not make any decision for the
+introduction of a compulsory service or employment of force against the
+Polish agricultural workers.
+
+Stabsleiter Reichert emphasizes that Berlin insists that the one
+million agricultural workers be sent into the Reich.
+
+Reichshauptamtsleiter Dr. Frauendorfer replies to a question of the
+Governor General, that so far 81,477 Polish agricultural workers were
+sent into the Reich--of which 56,721 were men, and 24,756 women.
+
+Since 12 February, 154 special trains have been sent off, that was
+the utmost that could have been accomplished in this time. To these
+figures--just mentioned--are to be added 42,000 workers, who had been
+already in the Reich so that the amount is increased to 130,000.
+
+The Governor General has the opinion, that the 480,000 prisoners of
+war should also be included in the sum of one million. On account
+of the railroad and the highway conditions, it is not at present
+possible to do anything by force, also there were not sufficient police
+forces there at disposal, to carry such measures out. If any force
+were exercised, then it would affect workers who were employed as
+specialized workers for the plants.
+
+Stabsleiter Reichert asks--if the occasion arises--that superior
+offices should make the decision in this question.
+
+                                                                  Cracow
+
+
+                       Wednesday, March 6th 1940
+
+  10:00 Conference with Ministerial-Director Dr. Buehler.
+  10:50 Conference with bank-director Dr. Paerscl.
+  11:00 Conference with Reichshauptamtsleiter Dr. Frauendorfer.
+
+Reichshauptamtsleiter Dr. Frauendorfer reports, that 73,000 Polish
+workers have been sent now into the Reich. At present 4,000 men
+are transferred daily. Further, Dr. Frauendorfer reports on the
+organization in the plants. It is as simple as possible. On Monday,
+he visited a few plants in Warsaw, and he could only say that they
+all were running excellently, this applies also to the machinery.
+Kitchens were also installed everywhere now and furthermore, the
+necessary quantities of soap had been provided. 5,000 sets of underwear
+and linen, 32,000 Kg. flour, 4,000 Kg. of beef and of pork and other
+merchandise had been distributed. The Governor-General ordered that
+the exact figures should be published in the press. Now, as before, he
+thinks that the soup given out daily was one of the best solutions, for
+the problem of the welfare for the working men.
+
+Reichshauptamtsleiter Dr. Frauendorfer remarks that this soup is being
+served daily now with one pound of bread.
+
+The Governor-General will not out of basic considerations give his
+consent to the proposal that an introductory note should be added to
+the 2nd decree for the regulation of social insurance, but he thinks
+it better to point out in a suitable way, that the chief of the labor
+section has given an explanation about it to the press chief.
+
+In this conference the question of the sending of Polish agricultural
+workers into the Reich was then discussed. Here, Dr. Frauendorfer
+points out that workmen from the Lublin area had never gone to the
+Reich before, from which naturally certain difficulties arise. Besides
+numerous letters from the agricultural workers to their families had
+already come from the Reich, in which the Polish agricultural workers
+expressed themselves very gratefully concerning their treatment in
+Germany. The Governor-General orders that some of these letters should
+be published in the press.
+
+
+[Page 216]
+
+15 March 1940
+
+Conference with ambassador v. Wuehlisch.
+
+18:30: Ambassador v. Wuehlisch reports that the preparations for the
+transport of the _Vert Stoss Altar_ to Nurnberg have been completed.
+The church really looked better, due to the space gained by the removal
+of the altar. Ambassador v. Wuehlisch reported furthermore, that the
+former ambassador Wysoski had asked again for an audience with the
+Governor-General. The Ambassador v. Ruemelin had been asked to make a
+request that he be taken into the service of the Government-General.
+
+[Page 216, last 12 lines.]
+
+The question of the Polish relief committee: the Security service wrote
+to Mr. Arlt, and pointed out, that the head of this organization Count
+Radziwill, participated in Silesian revolt, that he supported Korfanty
+and that he also was supposed to have disloyal remarks about the Reich.
+The ambassador v. Wuehlisch asked Arlt, to proceed very carefully in
+this matter, before expelling Count Radziwill from the relief committee
+because such a procedure might have disagreeable consequences.
+
+Under any circumstances, the consent of the Governor-General would be
+necessary for this.
+
+The so-called Polish Government in anger has completed a “White Book”
+which deals with the arch-diocese of Posen and Suesen. The Governor
+General said that he discussed this question with the Papal Nuncio in
+Berlin. He gathered from this conversation that a great deal was said
+about the treatment of the churches and apparently it was attempted to
+push many things off into the government general, for which it was not
+at all responsible.
+
+Ambassador v. Wuehlisch thinks it worth while that those and similar
+questions be discussed in Berlin. Such negotiations would have to be
+handled through the foreign office.
+
+The Governor General said that he had long conferences with the
+Ministry of Finance and with the representatives of the Reich Food
+Ministry. It was requested there very urgently, that the Polish
+agricultural workers be sent in greater quantities to the Reich. In
+Berlin he explained that if he were asked to do so, he could naturally
+exercise some compulsion in perhaps such a way, that he might have
+the police surround a village and bring out the men and women in
+question by force, and then send them to Germany. But besides these
+police measures one also could proceed by withholding unemployment
+relief for the workers in question. Ambassador v. Wuehlisch discussed
+then certain violations of the border which occurred at the Soviet
+frontier. By request of the Reich Minister of Finance and by request of
+the Armed Forces High Command representation had been made in Moscow
+evidently for the reason that the Soviet border guards always employed
+their firearms immediately. It was suggested that such incidents be
+straightened out right away on the spot.
+
+The deputy foreign commissar Potemkin suggested that liaison officers
+should be appointed by both sides for this purpose. The liaison staff
+Russia should serve as central office.
+
+The Governor General does not consider this method practicable and he
+feels that here also the Government General should be unhindered, he
+requested that the ambassador v. Wuehlisch confer on this question with
+the Secretary of state Dr. v. Wuehlisch. This question did not only
+concern the Wehrmacht but also for example the customs administration,
+for this reason representatives of the Ministry of Finance must also
+cooperate in this matter.
+
+Ambassador v. Wuehlisch draws attention to the fact that the customs
+officials are subordinated to the Wehrmacht.
+
+The Governor General points out, that a superior office would not make
+any decision. In this matter the decision would be up to him. For the
+time being one must try to reach the goal by employing different means.
+For instance letters might be published, that were sent from the Reich,
+written by Polish workers to their families. If the occasion arises,
+such compulsory decree should not be announced publicly.
+
+Reichshauptamtsleiter Dr. Frauendorfer confirms, on the basis of his
+experiences, that in many cases there was no possibility of employing
+recruiters from the Reich. On account of the snowfall, the passenger
+cars could not be used, and by using field sleighs, the recruiters
+could have travelled not more than 60 km. daily. Also, the Warsaw
+district was never really an emigration-area for Polish agricultural
+workers.
+
+It has to be observed, that unfortunately the agricultural workers have
+medical certificates or statements made out by the words, which purport
+to say that they are not fit for service. Other workers took refuge
+into the woods. Often complaints were expressed, that the words did not
+support the action sufficiently, and cases have been observed, where
+official labor measures, had been intentionally violated. Besides, the
+activity of the recruiter can not be without danger; just some time
+ago, one of these German officers was fired upon. Also the fact should
+be noted, that of 800 workers, which were already assigned, only 69
+reported to the station.
+
+All that could be traced back to the fact that the rural population is
+affected by a psychosis of anxiety, without mentioning the fact that
+the Poles might have organized themselves well in the meantime.
+
+The Governor General is not at all disinclined to take the most extreme
+measures. But then, the authority of the Reich would have to be fully
+utilized, but as long as there is snow on the ground, any change in
+this situation can not be contemplated. * * *
+
+[Page 198, lines 15-22]
+
+                                                           12 March 1940
+
+Governor General Dr. Frank:
+
+In view of the propaganda in the U.S.A. any use of force should if
+possible be avoided, but a light pressure could be exerted by stopping
+the payment of unemployment relief, for those categories which are
+concerned at all, at any rate agriculture should not send back young,
+strong workers, just because they were unskilled.
+
+Reichsobmann Behrendt: The Agriculture needs skilled as well as
+unskilled workers. One unskilled worker could be employed for each two
+skilled workers.
+
+
+                                 PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2233-C-PS
+
+                           FRANK DIARY, 1940.
+
+                       Vol. IV, October-December
+
+[Page 943, 4th-6th lines]
+
+10/7/40
+
+The Governor-General then addresses the assembly with the following
+words:
+
+My dear Comrades!
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+[Page 946, lines 1-3, 21-30]
+
+10/7/40
+
+* * * There are so few of us here that no one can actually really
+conceal himself. Everybody has to fear that the spotlight will now and
+then rest on him * * *
+
+* * * It is clear that education will perhaps still be necessary here
+and there; furthermore, it is clear that this open-minded comradeship,
+this common spirit of close contact finds its counter-part in the
+unstinted observation of authority in inner office relations. We cannot
+permit the offices to become 5 o’clock tea rooms. But, of course, our
+position as Germans here must be such that the lowest of us is still
+far above the highest Pole in this room * * *
+
+[Page 1158, 2nd par. to p. 1159 4th line]
+
+* * * And another thing was told me by the Fuehrer in all seriousness,
+a few days ago: that the old Japanese proverb:--after the war tighten
+your helmet strap--should retain its validity. Comrades, never again
+shall we be a weak Reich. The Armed Forces will represent the crown
+of community education. Just as the NSDAP is the crown of social,
+political and ideological leadership, so the Armed Forces will be the
+essence of military training, of the proud and immaculate bearing of
+our people. And you can say: you took part in it as soldiers. I am
+very happy about this hour of the Armed Forces, for it joins us all
+together. Some of you left your mothers, your parents at home, others
+their wives, their brides, their brothers, their children. In all
+these weeks, they will be thinking of you, saying to themselves: my
+God, there he sits in Poland where there are so many lice and Jews,
+perhaps he is hungry and cold, perhaps he is afraid to write. It would
+not be a bad idea then to send our dear ones back home a picture, and
+tell them: well now, there are not so many lice and Jews any more, and
+conditions here in the Government General have changed and improved
+somewhat already. Of course, I could not eliminate all lice and Jews in
+only one year’s time (public amused). But in the course of time, and
+above all, if you help me, this end will be attained. After all, it is
+not necessary for us to accomplish everything within a year and right
+away, for what would otherwise be left for those who follow us to do?
+
+
+                                 PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2233-D-PS
+
+                       FRANK DIARY, 1941 Oct-Dec.
+
+                            CABINET SESSION
+
+     Tuesday 16 December 1941 in the Government Building at Krakow
+
+           Speech of the Governor General Closing the Session
+
+[Page 76, line 10 to page 77 line 33]
+
+As far as the Jews are concerned, I want to tell you quite frankly,
+that they must be done away with in one way or another. The Fuehrer
+said once: should united Jewry again succeed in provoking a world-war,
+the blood of not only the nations, which have been forced into the
+war by them, will be shed, but the Jew will have found his end in
+Europe. I know, that many of the measures carried out against the Jews
+in the Reich, at present, are being criticized. It is being tried
+intentionally, as is obvious from the reports on the morale, to talk
+about cruelty, harshness, etc. Before I continue, I want to beg you
+to agree with me on the following formula: We will principally have
+pity on the German people only, and nobody else in the whole world.
+The others, too had no pity on us. As an old National-Socialist, I
+must say: This war would only be a partial success, if the whole lot
+of Jewry would survive it, while we would have shed our best blood in
+order to save Europe. My attitude towards the Jews will, therefore,
+be based only on the expectation that they must disappear. They must
+be done away with. I have entered negotiations to have them deported
+to the East. A great discussion concerning that question will take
+place in Berlin in January, to which I am going to delegate the
+State-Secretary Dr. Buehler. That discussion is to take place in the
+Reich-Security Main-Office with SS-Lt. General Heydrich. A great Jewish
+migration will begin, in any case.
+
+But what should be done with the Jews? Do you think they will be
+settled down in the “Ostland”, in villages [Siedlungdoerfer]? This is
+what we were told in Berlin: Why all this bother? We can do nothing
+with them either in the “Ostland” nor in the “Reichkommissariat”. So,
+liquidate them yourself.
+
+Gentlemen, I must ask you to rid yourself of all feeling of pity. We
+must annihilate the Jews, wherever we find them and wherever it is
+possible, in order to maintain there the structure of the Reich as a
+whole. This will, naturally, be achieved by other methods, than those
+pointed out by Bureau Chief Dr. Hummel. Nor can the judges of the
+Special Courts be made responsible for it, because of the limitations
+of the frame work of the legal procedure. Such outdated views cannot be
+applied to such gigantic and unique events. We must find at any rate,
+a way which leads to the goal, and my thoughts are working in that
+direction.
+
+The Jews represent for us also extraordinarily malignant gluttons. We
+have now approximately 2,500,000 of them in the general government,
+perhaps with the Jewish mixtures and everything that goes with it,
+3,500,000 Jews. We cannot shoot or poison those 3,500,000 Jews, but we
+shall nevertheless be able to take measures, which will lead, somehow,
+to their annihilation, and this in connection with the gigantic
+measures to be determined in discussions from the Reich. The general
+government must become free of Jews, the same as the Reich. Where and
+how this is to be achieved is a matter for the offices which we must
+appoint and create here. Their activities will be brought to your
+attention in due course.
+
+
+                                 PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2233-E-PS
+
+                    FRANK DIARY, Conference Volume,
+
+              Cabinet session in Cracow on 24 August 1942
+
+          Cabinet session in the Great Conference Room of the
+                     Government Building in Cracow
+
+                         Monday, 24 August 1942
+
+  Subject: A new Plan for seizure and for food [Ernaehrung] of the
+    General Gouvernement
+
+                                                    written in 3 Copies:
+
+                 1. Office of the Governor General
+                 2. State Secretary Dr. Boepple
+                 3. District Court Judge [Oberlandesgerichtsrat] Dr. Weh
+
+_List of those present at the session of 24 August 1942_
+
+  The Governor General
+  State Secretary Krueger
+  State Secretary Dr. Boepple
+  General Becker
+  Schoengarth
+  Kobusch
+  Dr. Wendler
+  Dr. Siebert
+  Dr. Radtke
+  Plodeck
+  Tetzner
+  Naumann
+  Dr. Eissfeldt
+  Dr. Gschliesser
+  Ohlenbusch
+  Watzke
+  Bauder
+  Gerteis
+  Dr. Breithaupt
+  Dr. Paersch
+  Dr. Weh
+  Dr. Schulte-Wissermann
+  Dr. Wohlrab
+  Neumann
+  Dr. Behr
+  Bette
+  Rauber
+  Eden
+  Neumann
+  Dr. Zeisner
+  Winkler
+  Grafmann
+  Gareis
+  Dr. Odenthal
+  Pietschmann
+  Krahmer
+  Schubert
+  Colonel Fischer
+  Reitz
+  Major Dr. Herrmann
+  Capt. Behringer
+  Verwaltungsrat Korff
+  Von Dazur
+  Vogel
+  Dr. Ness
+  Topf
+  Blauer
+
+
+                   Beginning of the Session at 4 p.m.
+
+  The _Governor General_ opens the meeting with the following words:
+
+Gentlemen,
+
+I have called you together today with special speed and emphasis in
+order to acquaint you with a measure which is unusually important and
+decisive for all the work in the General Government in the year to
+come. What I tell you, I tell you in strictest confidence. I call your
+attention to the fact that every word which leaks out of this meeting,
+unofficially, might mean a tremendous damage to our country.
+
+A few days ago a meeting with the Reich Marshal took place in Berlin.
+The Reich Marshal had the reports concerning the almost catastrophic
+developments in the _food situation in Germany_. According to all
+confidential reports of the police, as well as of the Gauleiter, which,
+as he expressed himself, also confirmed by his own experiences, the
+situation is as follows: unless a considerable improvement in the
+food situation in Germany can be achieved in a short time, serious
+consequences as to the health of the people, especially the German
+working people, would result. In hundreds of thousands of sick cases,
+one can already see the tragic consequences not only of this food
+shortage but also a deterioration of foodstuffs which endangers
+health. That is especially true of the quality of bread which has been
+distributed to the German people within the last few weeks: this leads
+to the most serious health disorders.
+
+A serious situation, therefore, has arisen since Germany not only has
+to feed herself but also a large proportion of other European people.
+We must also take care that in the months to come and during the coming
+winter sufficient food will be distributed to the German people that
+they will be able to withstand the great nervous strain of the coming
+months in every case.
+
+Under these circumstances you probably will not be surprised that the
+saying now has become true: Before the German people are to experience
+starvation, the occupied territories and their people shall be exposed
+to starvation. In this movement, therefore, we here in the General
+Government must also have the iron determination to help the Great
+German people, our fatherland.
+
+Germany had almost sufficient rye to tide them over until the new
+harvest, but not sufficient wheat. In large parts of Germany,
+therefore, no more wheat can be distributed in the near future. We
+therefore must aid the fatherland until the beginning of the new wheat
+harvest.
+
+The General Government therefore must do the following: The General
+Government has taken on the obligation to send 500,000 tons bread
+grains to the fatherland in addition to the foodstuffs already being
+delivered for the relief of Germany or consumed here by troops of the
+armed forces, Police or SS. If you compare this with our contributions
+of last year you can see that this means a six-fold increase over that
+of last year’s contribution of the General Government.
+
+The new demand will be fulfilled exclusively at _the expense of the
+foreign population_. It must be done cold-bloodedly and without
+pity; for this contribution of the General Government is still more
+important this year since the occupied Eastern territories--Ukraine and
+Ostland--will not yet be able to make an important contribution toward
+the relief of Germany’s food problem. Even if a million tons of bread
+grains could be delivered from Ostland and Ukraine, it would in the
+face of Germany’s food situation be only a “drop in the bucket”.
+
+For this reason I wanted to acquaint you, Gentlemen, here in this
+governmental session with the decisions which I have made known today
+to Party member Naumann. You will essentially find an additional
+_increase_ of the _quota_ of foodstuffs to be shipped to Germany
+and _new regulations for the feeding of the population_; especially
+of the Jews and of the Polish population, whereby, if possible, the
+provisioning of the working people, especially of those working for
+German interests, shall be maintained.
+
+The step which we are taking together today, is one of the most
+decisive ones, because it will surely have certain consequences as
+to the internal order of this country in January or February of next
+year. These consequences have to be accepted, because before the German
+people be starved, others, as a matter of course, must undergo the same.
+
+I first of all give the word to Party member Naumann, who will give you
+a general report about this problem.
+
+_Naumann_, President of the Main Department for Food and Agriculture:
+
+Governor General, Gentlemen!
+
+At the beginning of July during the last session of the government,
+I acquainted you with the _food budget_ of the year 42/43. I
+hoped that this budget would be adequate. The Governor General,
+in order to increase the high goal that was originally set in the
+General Government, had decreed martial law for the harvest time
+[Ernteausnahmezustand] in order to drain even the last possibilities
+for the execution of the seizure (of the harvest).
+
+Previously we concluded conferences with the Reich Food Ministry. We
+had included the shipments which, according to the then prevailing
+interpretation, were to be delivered by the General Government, in
+the food budget, and could hope to reach the harvest of 1943 without
+friction. Meanwhile a message from State Secretary Backe as well as
+a message from Reich Marshal Goering has arrived, and the Governor
+General has ordered that all requirements of the Reich are from now on
+to be fulfilled under all circumstances.
+
+Out of this situation the following needs arise:
+
+
+                               _1. Grain_
+
+After exact considerations the grain quota is raised 25%, that is,
+from 960,000 tons to 1.2 million tons. The dry measure [Metze] of
+_self-feeders_, which was 30 kg per head per year, will be raised to 50
+kg per head per year. This means: Self-feeder--there total 8.8 million
+persons in the General Government who heretofore could eat two bushels
+and 20 kg of bread grain per year--will in the future eat two bushels
+per year. By this means it will be possible to cause an increase in
+the dry measure from 160,000 tons to 264,000 tons. This is the burden
+which we shall place upon and must place upon Polish and Ukrainian
+agriculture.
+
+On the other hand, I gave an estimated total requirement of 670,000
+tons of _bread grain_ for the General Government in the food budget
+of early July. The requirements of the Reich make it necessary that
+exceptional savings be carried out in the interest of absolute
+fulfillment of Reich deliveries.
+
+The feeding of a _Jewish population_, estimated heretofore at 1.5
+million, drops off to an estimated total of 300,000 Jews, who still
+work for German interests as craftsmen or otherwise. For these the
+Jewish rations, including certain special allotments which have proved
+necessary for the maintenance of working capacity, will be retained.
+The other Jews, a total of 1.2 million, will no longer be provided with
+foodstuffs.
+
+_Non-German normal consumers_ will receive, from 1 January 1943 to 1
+March 1943, instead of 4.2 kg bread per month, 2.8 kg; from 1 March
+1943 to 30 July 1943 the total bread ration for these non-German normal
+consumers will be cancelled.
+
+Those _entitled to be supplied_ [Versorgungsberechtigten] are composed
+as follows. We estimate that 3 million persons come into consideration
+as war workers, the A- and B-card holders and their kin, and that
+somewhat more than 3 million persons are non-German normal consumers,
+who do not work directly or indirectly in the interests of Germany. The
+war workers, A- and B-card holders and their families, about 3 million
+persons, will however continue to be supplied, up to the harvest of
+1943, at the prevailing rates.
+
+Furthermore, savings will be brought about in the sphere of _seed
+grain_ in such a way that seed grain will be issued for general seed
+grain needs only when the farm [Betrieb] delivers for it, in excess of
+its quota, an equal amount of food grain.
+
+_Rations of oats for feed_ to those who own horses in their professions
+must be reduced to a great extent. Unfortunately a certain portion of
+oats will also fall away which heretofore was placed at the disposal
+of the main forestry department for the horses with which the urgent
+transport of wood was carried out. Extensive restrictions will be
+carried out in _Manufacturing and finishing plants_, which will take
+effect in the food sphere. Also special allotments, as we carried them
+out last year during the winter months in Warsaw, Radom, Cracow, etc.
+cannot be carried out this winter. By this measure a saving of 115,000
+tons of bread grain will be attained.
+
+When the above mentioned increased quota will be brought in 100%, it
+will be possible to maintain a new food balance in the grain sector.
+Every amount which is missing from a 100% achievement of the total
+quota takes the form of a further reduction, first of all for the 3
+million non-German normal consumers who do not work in the interest of
+Germany. In case the seizure and collection of the dry measure should
+even then create certain difficulties, this will have an effect on the
+family members of war workers working in the interests of Germany and
+on A- and B-card holders. The Main Department for Food and Agriculture
+will try, however, not to take these last measures if the acquisition
+to some extent brings about the result we all hope from it.
+
+
+                             _2. Potatoes_
+
+Also here the changed _potato quota_ must be raised 25 percent, that
+is, from 1.2 million to 1.5 million tons. It is planned that war
+workers and A- and B-card holders will again receive, as during last
+year, 3.5 double-bushels of potatoes which they can use for themselves
+and the members of their families. For Germans 2 double-bushels per
+head per year are planned, for the 7 main cities of the General
+Government, 1 double-bushel per person. Before supplying the main
+cities with potatoes, the requirements and quotas of factory potatoes
+must be primarily secured. Only then, when this securing has been made,
+will potatoes be issued to the main city population at the rate of a
+double-bushel per head. This precautionary measure has the purpose
+above all of seeing to it that enough alcohol can be produced, first of
+all to maintain equal quality amounts [Praemienmengen] and secondly to
+have enough alcohol available for other important purposes.
+
+
+                               _3. Meat_
+
+Also in the domain of meat a 25% _quota increase_ takes place, so that
+the new Reich contributions can be fulfilled. The now almost completely
+accomplished registry of cattle aids the seizure. We hope to be able to
+achieve, with what are considerable encroachments in themselves, that
+the 400 grams per month for non-German normal consumers can be issued.
+Nevertheless the situation can arise that at certain times here and
+there the 400 grams per month may for once not be issued, but less must
+be given, since here also the deliveries to the armed forces and the
+Reich contributions have priority.
+
+These drastic measures can only succeed when the following
+prerequisites can be created and/or maintained. Every _ration increase_
+for war workers, A- and B-card holders or members of their families
+must be refused. Just a short time ago the armament inspection
+requested from me an increase of rations. Furthermore requests have
+come in to raise the insufficient rations of the Drohobycz oil region.
+In the face of the serious food situation in which the General
+Government finds itself, ration quota increases for these groups of
+workers, and the members of their families as well, cannot be carried
+out.
+
+New _ration applicants_ can under no circumstances be accepted any
+more. This means: New industries, new construction projects or major
+enterprises cannot be satisfied with supplementary, insofar as a
+need is created by new masses of workers, unless the Reich makes
+available and allows an amount to be deflected which corresponds to the
+requirements of the additional masses of workers, from those supplies
+which we have to deliver to the Reich.
+
+The _Bonus amounts_ approved by the Main Department of Economies
+and Monopoly must be delivered without fail. Beyond that new bonus
+goods must be made available due to the raising of quotas of the main
+Department of Food and Agriculture. If it is not possible to secure
+cigarettes, liquor, textiles, and earlier bonus goods, I request that
+_salt_ be also fully counted into the bonus drive now, this means that,
+starting immediately, the total salt ration is to be provided in the
+cities through food cards and on farms through bonus certificates.
+
+Proposed _resettlement projects_, such as are planned, according to
+reports from the Department Leaders of Lemberg and Lublin, must in my
+opinion be postponed, for the sake of a frictionless procurement and
+effecting of the harvest for the coming year.
+
+The _securing of all depots and food processing plants_ as well as
+their transport facilities must be assured, as otherwise irreplaceable
+losses result which mean a further burdening of the food budget. I
+have had maps made of all districts [Kreise] on which the depots have
+all been drawn in. I request that the necessary measures be taken on
+the part of the police that these depots, which are in the eyes of the
+hungering masses above all at times when the restrictions are carried
+out, should be strictly guarded, so that the meager supplies which we
+have until the new harvest should not be destroyed by sabotage or arson.
+
+The still outstanding _price adjustment_ of various products in the
+district of Galicia to the price level of the old General Government
+must be carried out at once. Furthermore the strong inroads upon the
+substance of farm establishments caused by the raising of quotas
+undoubtedly involves damage which will have unfavorable results on the
+procurement of the 1943 harvest.
+
+Finally it must be determined at the beginning of November whether the
+_martial law for the harvest period_, which has been proclaimed up
+to 30 November, must be extended to 30 December. Martial law for the
+harvest period has been extended to all products which are to be reaped.
+
+The planned quota increase and reduction of ration quantities must
+be kept secret under all circumstances and may be published only at
+that time which the Main Department for Food and Agriculture considers
+proper. Should the reduction of ration quantities and the increase
+of quotas become known earlier, extremely noticeable disturbances in
+the seizure would take place. The mass of the Polish population would
+then go to the land and would become a supplementary competitor of
+our requisitioning agencies. Should the quota increase become known
+prematurely, the winter sowing and work of procurement would suffer
+noticeable damage. We have therefore decided first to have the winter
+planting in the ground and then to announce the quota increase.
+
+In the realm of food the General Government has lived through serious
+and difficult times during the last 3 years. However, I believe that
+the coming year 1942-43 will be the hardest in the food sector. My
+co-workers and I will do everything to master the situation under the
+given circumstances.
+
+The _Governor General_.
+
+Gentlemen! You have heard the very serious presentation of President
+Neumann. You will also derive therefrom that every debate about the
+figures or measures announced by him would be completely superfluous
+and actually entirely harmful to the matter. For every debate would
+give rise to the illusion that perhaps some other method would be
+possible.
+
+I must point out that some sectors of the administration will feel
+this very keenly. In the first place the _police_ will feel this, for
+it will have to deal, if I may say so, with an increased activity
+of the black market and a neglect of food customs. I will gladly
+give the police extraordinary powers so that they can overcome these
+difficulties.
+
+The _economy_ will feel it. The decrease of work rendered will become
+felt in all sectors, branches and regions. I also assume that our
+_transport system_ will feel it too. In view of the worsening living
+conditions an extraordinary hardship will set in for railroad workers
+and other categories; as the previous quantities of food were already
+not enough. The monopolies will feel it through a decrease of their
+incomes, as the amounts of potatoes available for the production of
+vodka will be less.
+
+The _Germans_ in this area shall not feel it. We wish in spite of this
+new plan to see to it that the supplies for Germans will be maintained.
+Also the Wehrmacht and other encamped units in this area shall not feel
+it. We hope that it will be possible for us to keep up the whole quotas
+here.
+
+To help in this necessity there is a corresponding measure, namely
+that the supervision of persons travelling from the General Government
+to the Reich, above all of military personnel, in order to see
+whether they are _taking food out_ of the General Government, should
+be suspended. This means that in addition to all that which we must
+now extract from the land economically, there must take place a
+complete removal of control over that which is dragged out of the
+land by thousands upon thousands--doubtless illegally and against our
+government measures.
+
+From this you realize how seriously the situation will develop. In this
+connection do not forget, however, that the food situation in the Reich
+is less favorable. In whatever difficulties you observe some place
+here, in the form of the sicknesses of your workers, the breakdown of
+your associations, etc., you must always think of the fact that it is
+still much better when a Pole breaks down than that a German succumb.
+That we sentence 1.2 million Jews to die of hunger should be noted only
+marginally. It is a matter, of course, that should the Jews not starve
+to death it would, we hope, result in a speeding up of anti-Jewish
+measures. [Page 15.]
+
+However, that on the other hand it is expected of all that they will
+show an understanding of these government measures is also to be noted
+only marginally. The original demand of the Reich from the General
+Government amounted to 1 million tons. However it was fortunately
+possible to reduce this demand by half.
+
+When you consider that a land like the Protectorate with a size of
+barely 50,000 square kilometers and a large industrial population was
+required to deliver over 200,000 tons of bread grain, that countries
+like France and Holland are forced to deliver up to the last remnant to
+the Reich, then you can estimate how the food situation of the Reich is
+regarded.
+
+I did not wish to fail to inform you of this decree, which I now put
+into effect.
+
+To a question by president _Gerteis_, the _Governor General_ explained
+that according to the coming new regulation the maintenance of members
+of the Eastern Railway [Ostbahn] will come under the categories of war
+workers, A- and B-card holders.
+
+The _Governor General_ then requested the representatives of the
+Wehrmacht, in view of the food situation in the General Government,
+to help the government more intensively to prevent a _buying up of
+foodstuffs_ for the other eastern territories. He directed the same
+request to State Secretary Krueger for the SS and police. It would be
+out of the question entirely that purchasers from some other regions
+should be active in the General Government. Army and police should take
+care, in their own representing a supply--or purchasing territory for
+other regions or troop units, unless it were within the compass of the
+quota obligations of the General Government of the Reich.
+
+Ministerialrat _Reis_ indicated that the Oberquartiermeister would
+introduce a command to that effect with the Generalquartiermeister.
+
+The _Governor General_ then declared that it was left to a coming
+conference of the authoritative factors of the government of the
+General Government to take measures against the results of the present
+decision. The results would, to be sure, first take effect at the
+beginning of next year, since the old rations were valid until the end
+of this year.
+
+In this connection the _Governor General_ declares the new
+decree in force and empowers Main Departmental President
+[Hauptabteilungspraesident] Naumann, in line with his proposal, to lead
+the nutritional policy of the General Government.
+
+State Secretary _Dr. Boepple_ points out that by reason of the
+attendance list the names of all who took part in the meeting were
+known. Should rumors about the measures decided on today eventually
+seep through to the public, he would, as representative of the
+government, have them traced to their source, and bring the responsible
+parties to account.
+
+                                            End of the meeting: 1640 hrs
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+Not unimportant manpower has been taken from us in form of our old
+proven Jewish communities. It is clear that the working program
+is made difficult when in the middle of this program, during the
+war, the order for complete annihilation of the Jews is given. The
+responsibility for this cannot be placed upon the government of the
+General Government. The directive for the annihilation of the Jews
+comes from higher quarters. We have to be content with the consequences
+and can only report that the Jew has caused tremendous difficulties
+with regard to the work-program. I was able to prove, the other day, to
+Staatssekretaer Ganzenmueller, who was complaining that a big building
+project in the General Government came to a halt, that this would not
+have happened if the many thousands of Jews working at it had not been
+deported. Now the order is given that the Jews will have to be removed
+from the armament projects. I hope that this order, if not already
+cancelled, will soon be cancelled, for then the situation will be still
+worse.
+
+
+                                 PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2233-F-PS
+
+                           FRANK DIARY, 1944.
+
+  Loose Leaf Volume covering period from 1 January 1944 to 28 February
+ 1944--speech delivered by Hans Frank in Berlin 25 January 1944 before
+                the Representatives of the German Press
+
+[Page 5]
+
+At the present time we still have in the General Government perhaps
+100,000 Jews.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+
+                                 PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2233-G-PS
+
+           FRANK DIARY, 1939, from 25 October to 15 December
+
+[Pages 6-7]
+
+1230 hours. The governor general received Captain Benninghoff. The
+latter reported about the extensive _reconstruction works_ on the
+_bridges blown up_ by the Poles and pointed out that _special engineer
+troops_ are occupied on rebuilding these bridges (at the present time
+still 25 units).
+
+The governor general received the president of the police of Lodsch,
+SS-Lieut. General Beckerle.
+
+Questions pertaining to the commitment of _Police_ and _civil service
+employees_ were discussed. Lieutenant General Beckerle pointed out that
+the former _fear psychology_ present among the people _had passed_ and
+that there were more _Jews_ in Lodsch than before. This is one of the
+reasons for the continued deterioration of the food situation.
+
+The Governor General received the district chief in Warsaw
+[Reichshauptamtsleiter] Dr. Fischer.
+
+He discussed with him current questions, especially on the subject
+of _finance_ and _monopoly_. Dr. Fischer was instructed to clear up
+the question of mayoralty in Warsaw, and to determine what amounts
+of _copper_ and _scrap metal_ are available. Dr. Fischer promises
+to secure 300 _fur coats_ for the main office. The Governor General
+requested information concerning the _diplomatic representation_, who
+were still _in Warsaw_, and concerning the shooting of Jews and other
+matters. Dr. Fischer reported also that there is a _cable connection_
+from Warsaw to _Krakau_ and moreover there is a large cable supply at
+hand. Dr. Fischer was requested to set up _border signs_ at the border
+of the general government * * *
+
+[Page 44].
+
+* * * By spring 1,000,000 Poles and Jews from East and West Posen,
+Danzig, Poland and Upper Silesia must be received by the general
+government. The resettlement of the ethnic Germans and the taking on of
+Poles and Jews (10,000 daily) must be accomplished according to plan.
+Especially urgent is the instituting of _forced labor for the Jews_.
+The Jewish population if possible must be extracted from the Jewish
+cities and be put to _work on roads_. The critical questions of housing
+and feeding are still to be cleared up * * *
+
+[Page 19]. 11:00 o’clock.
+
+* * * The Governor General received SS Lieutenant General Krueger,
+General Becker, SS Brigadier General Streckenbach, and Lieutenant
+Colonel Gudewill.
+
+Brigadier General Streckenbach reported:
+
+The Reichsfuehrer SS wishes that all _Jews_ be evacuated from the
+newly gained Reich territories. Up to February approximately 1,000,000
+people are to be brought in this way in to the general government.
+The families of good racial extraction present in the occupied Polish
+territory (approximately 4,000,000 people) should be transferred
+into the Reich and individually housed and thereby be uprooted as a
+people. The deadline provided for the migration transport is the 15th
+of November. The Governor General points out that better and greater
+transport ways be made ready for both the West-East as well as the
+East-West movements. SS Lieutenant General Krueger explained that,
+starting 15 November, the entire railroad net of the general government
+will be at the disposal of the resettlement transports. The general
+governor gave SS Lieutenant General Krueger the assignments to organize
+these refugee transports * * *
+
+
+                                 PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2233-H-PS
+
+                 FRANK DIARY, 1941, Vol. II, 19 April.
+
+[Page 313]
+
+8 PM Demonstration of the department of operations (Arbeitsbereich)
+“Generalgouvernement” of the NSDAP in the _Uraniol_ in Cracow.
+
+After a short welcome speech by the Chief Department leader
+(Oberbereichsleiter) _Schalk_, the _Governor General_
+(_Generalgouverneur_), Reichsleiter _Dr. Frank_ begins to deliver the
+following address:
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+[Pages 316-317]
+
+We are absolutely optimistic (Lively applause). I have the impression
+that the German Reich will always become greater and will keep growing
+ever more in the final fight against England. The Greater German Reich
+is by far not the greatest German Reich. The task we have here must
+move us to think always in terms of the greatest connections. Let us
+be on guard not to let enter here the petty currents and tendencies
+which are not yet completely overcome at times here and there in the
+Reich, in spite of all consciousness of unity. It would be senseless,
+if one would start to feel superior and arrogantly assume to be higher
+than the other one, in our Government General. There the value of the
+German as such is the yardstick. And here the NSDAP, the department of
+operations [Arbeitsbereich] in the Government General can set up a
+model. The revolution of National Socialism can gain the original power
+of its fighting energy again and again only from territories like the
+one which we organize here. I have to watch myself like a hawk that the
+finger of egoism do not get hold of me in a more or less hidden form. I
+have to watch like a hunter that those individual cases of departmental
+competence craze and self-styled glory do not develop here which we
+often felt were the most vicious evil in the Reich. (lively applause)
+
+It is therefore clear that I sit in my castle like an old rapacious
+knight and sometimes step out, in order to strike with my hammer all
+around the country. After all, it would be a nice state of affairs if I
+would not do that.
+
+                            (public amused)
+
+And, therefore, I believe it is always in order for us that we find the
+great line of direction remembering the personality of the Fuehrer,
+his own philosophy, and his conduct of life. We have all possibilities
+in the Government General, we have received full powers from the
+Fuehrer and can accomplish, by planning on a large scale, that has been
+assigned to us. Thanks to the heroic courage of our soldiers, this
+territory has become German, and the time will come when the valley of
+the Vistula, from its source to its mouth at the sea, will be as German
+as the valley of the Rhine.
+
+
+                                 PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2233-K-PS
+
+           FRANK DIARY, Department Heads Meetings, 1939-1940
+
+_Protocol re the Conference of Department Heads_, 2 December 1939.
+
+[Page 1, lines 14-25]
+
+Dr. Frank: * * * That which is stated in the Reichsgesetzblatt is not
+applicable in the General Government, except when applied on the basis
+of the Fuehrer Decree of 12.10.1939. This means that the authority
+rests with the Chairman of the Ministerial Council for the Defense of
+the Reich and he will only use this authority with the consent of the
+Governor General. The final structure of the General Government is not
+yet known, even less does one know whether it will remain permanently
+as the General Government. Decisive in the administrative activities of
+the General Government is the will of the Fuehrer that this area shall
+be the first colonial territory of the German nation.
+
+[Page 2, last 4 lines and page 3, lines 1-3]
+
+Dr. Frank: * * * Principally it can be said regarding the
+administration of the General Government: This territory in its
+entirety is booty of the German Reich, and it thus cannot be permitted
+that this territory shall be exploited in its individual parts, but
+that the territory in its entirety shall be economically used, and its
+entire economic worth redound to the benefit of the German people.
+
+
+                                 PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2233-L-PS
+
+     FRANK DIARY, Department Heads Meetings 1939-1940 Conference of
+                   Department Heads, 19 January 1940
+
+[Page 11, last line; page 12, lines 1-6 and 16-19]
+
+Dr. Frank: * * * My relationship with the Poles is like the
+relationship between ant and plant louse. When I treat the Poles in a
+helpful way, so to speak tickle them in a friendly manner, then I do it
+in the expectation that their work performance redounds to my benefit.
+This is not a political but a purely tactical-technical problem * * *
+In cases where in spite of all these measures the performance does not
+increase, or where the slightest act gives me occasion to step in, I
+would not even hesitate to take the most draconic action.
+
+
+                                 PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2233-M-PS
+
+FRANK DIARY, Department Head Meetings 1939-1940
+
+ Meeting of Department Heads in the Bergakademie, Friday 8 March 1940.
+
+[Page 5, lines 25-26; page 6, lines 1-8]
+
+Frank: One thing is certain. The authority of General Government as
+the representative of the Fuehrer and the will of the Reich in this
+territory is certainly strong, and I have always emphasized that I
+would not tolerate the misuse of this authority. I have allowed this
+to be known anew at every office in Berlin, especially after Herr
+Field Marshal Goering on 12.2.1940 from Karin Hall had forbidden all
+Administrative Offices of the Reich, including the Police and even
+the Wehrmacht, to interfere in administrative matters of the General
+Government * * *
+
+[Page 7, lines 22-28; page 8, lines 1-5].
+
+There is no authority here in General Government which is higher as
+to rank, influence, and authority than that of the Governor General.
+Even the Wehrmacht has no governmental or official functions of any
+kind in this connection; it has only security functions and general
+military duties--it has no political power whatsoever. The same applies
+here to the Police and SS. There is here no state within a state,
+but we are the representatives of the Fuehrer and of the Reich. In
+final conclusion, this applies also to the Party, which has here no
+far-reaching influence, except for the fact that very old members of
+the National Socialist Party and loyal veterans of the Fuehrer take
+care of the general matters * * *
+
+[Page 13, lines 28-30; page 14, lines 1-8].
+
+Wherever there is the least attempt by the Poles to start anything,
+an enormous campaign of destruction directed against the Poles will
+follow. Then I would not hesitate to set up a regime of terror with all
+its consequences. I have issued the order to place under arrest for
+three months several hundred members of such secret organizations, so
+that nothing can happen in the immediate future. The last word of the
+Fuehrer at my departure was: See to it that there is absolute peace
+over there, I cannot allow anything to disturb peace in the East. I
+will see to it.
+
+
+                                 PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2233-N-PS
+
+            FRANK DIARY, 1940, Second Volume, April to June
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+1245 Discussion with State Secretary _Dr. Buehler_, SS Lieutenant
+general _Krueger_ and Reichshauptamtsleiter _Dr. Frauendorfer_ in
+presence of Reich Minister _Dr. Seyss-Inquart_.
+
+Subject of the discussion is _the sending of workers, particularly
+agricultural workers into the Reich_.
+
+Reichshauptamtsleiter _Dr. Frauendorfer_ reports, that so far about
+160,000 agricultural workers and about 50,000 industrial workers have
+been sent to the Reich, however, in total there should be 500,000. It
+is to be hoped that there would yet be enough voluntary enlistments.
+
+The governor-general stated that the fact that all means in form of
+proclamations etc. did not bring success, leads to the conclusion that
+the Poles out of malevolence, and guided by the intention of harming
+Germany by not putting themselves at its disposal, refuse to enlist
+for working-duty. Therefore, he asks Dr. Frauendorfer if there are any
+other measures, not as yet employed, to win the Poles on a voluntary
+basis.
+
+Reichshauptamtsleiter _Dr. Frauendorfer_ answered this question
+negatively.
+
+The General Governor emphasized the fact that he now will be asked to
+take a definite attitude toward this question. Therefore the question
+will arise whether any form of _coercive measures_ should now be
+employed.
+
+The question put by the general governor to SS lieutenant general
+Krueger: does he see possibilities of calling Polish workers by
+coercive means, is answered in the affirmative by SS lieutenant general
+_Krueger_.
+
+So far as he knows another 300,000 Polish workers should be sent into
+the Reich, and it will be possible to fill this request once the
+working-duty decree has gone into effect.
+
+Reichshauptamtsleiter _Dr. Frauendorfer_ suggests to begin by issuing
+_orders to report for certain age_ groups and to wait for the result
+of this measure. However, some difficulties will be encountered as it
+is not known where to send these orders to report. There might be the
+possibility of getting the cooperation of the Woids. It is important,
+however, that the workers of large cities be recruited and there the
+difficulties will naturally be particularly great.
+
+The general governor is willing to agree to any practical measure,
+however, he wishes to be informed personally about the measures to be
+taken. One measure, which no doubt would be successful, would be the
+_discontinuance of unemployment compensation_ for unemployed workers
+and their _transfer to public welfare_. Therefore, he decrees that,
+beginning _1 May_, claim for unemployment compensation will cease to
+exist and only public welfare may be granted. For the time being only
+men are to report and above those men living in cities. There might be
+a possibility of combining the moving of the 120,000 Poles from the
+Warthe district with this measure.
+
+Reich Minister _Dr. Seyss-Inquart_ mentions that not many of the Polish
+workers are left in the Warthe district who would be qualified to be
+sent to the Reich. All those who are fit for work are already being
+sent to the Reich. Those capable of assimilation are going to the Reich
+with their families anyway. Of those not capable of assimilation only
+useful men are being chosen.
+
+The general governor closes the discussion by saying that guiding
+directions are now given. The officials involved must work out the
+details by themselves. Wherever the labor section does not succeed, the
+police must act.
+
+
+                                 PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2233-O-PS
+
+            FRANK DIARY, Department Heads Meetings 1939-1940
+
+Warsaw, 19 December 1940
+
+Present: Dr. Hans FRANK and others
+
+[Page 12, last 7 lines, and page 13, first 2 lines].
+
+Dr. Frank: * * * In this country the force of a determined leadership
+must rule. The Pole must feel here that we are not building him a legal
+state, but that for him there is only one duty, namely, to work and to
+behave himself. It is clear that this leads sometimes to difficulties,
+but you must in your own interest see, that all measures are ruthlessly
+carried out in order to become master of the situation. You can rely on
+me absolutely in this.
+
+
+                                 PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2233-P-PS
+
+                       FRANK DIARY 1941--Part III
+
+9th September 1941
+
+[Page 830, par. 1]
+
+Obermedizinalrat Dr. _Walbaum_ expresses his opinion of the _health
+condition_ of the Polish population. Investigations which were carried
+out by his department proved that the majority of Poles eat only about
+600 calories, whereas the normal requirement for a human being is 2,200
+calories. The Polish population was enfeebled to such an extent that
+it would fall an easy prey to _spotted fever_. The number of diseased
+Poles amounted today already to 40%. During the last week alone 1,000
+new spotted fever cases have been officially recorded. That represented
+so far the maximum number. This health situation represented a serious
+danger for the Reich and for the soldiers who were coming into the
+Government General. A spreading of the pestilence into the Reich is
+absolutely feasible. The increase in tuberculosis, too, was causing
+anxiety. If the food rations were to be diminished again, an enormous
+increase of the number of illnesses could be predicted.
+
+
+                                 PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2233-Q-PS
+
+           FRANK DIARY, Government Meetings, Oct.-Dec., 1941
+
+Meeting of the Government of General Government
+
+Cracow, in the Government Building, 16 December 1941
+
+[Page 35, lines 22-29]
+
+Dr. Frank: Severe measures must and will be adopted against Jews
+leaving the ghettos. Death sentences pending against Jews for this
+reason must be executed as quickly as possible. This order according
+to which every Jew found outside the ghetto is to be executed, must be
+carried out without fail. * * *
+
+[Page 66, lines 13-22].
+
+Chief of Office in Warsaw, Dr. Hummel: * * * In Warsaw, in spite of the
+setting up of a third court chamber, we have been able to decree only
+45 death sentences, only 8 of which have been carried out since in each
+individual case, the Pardon Commission [Gnadenkommission] in Cracow has
+to make the final decision. A further 600 sentences were demanded and
+are under consideration. An effective isolation of the ghetto is not
+possible by way of the Special Court Procedure. The procedure to be
+followed up to liquidation takes too much time. It is burdened with too
+many formalities and must be simplified.
+
+
+                                 PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2233-R-PS
+
+FRANK DIARY, 1942, Part I
+
+  Conference of the District Standartenfuehrer of the NSDAP in Cracow,
+  18 March 1942.
+
+[Pages 185-186]
+
+Dr. Frank: As you know, I am a fanatic as to unity in administration
+* * * It is therefore clear that the Higher SS and Police Leader is
+subordinated to me, that the Police is a component of the Government,
+that the SS and Police Leader in the district is subordinated to the
+Governor, and that the Kreis chief has the authority of command over
+the gendarmerie in his Kreis. This the Reichsfuehrer SS has recognized;
+in the written agreement all these points are mentioned word for word
+and signed. It is also self-evident that we cannot set up a closed shop
+here which can be treated in the traditional manner of small states. It
+would, for instance, be ridiculous if we would build up here a security
+policy of our own against our Poles in the country, while knowing that
+the Polacks in West Prussia, in Posen, in Wartheland and in Silesia
+have one and the same movement of resistance. The Reichsfuehrer SS and
+Chief of the German Police thus must be able to carry out with the aid
+of his agencies his police measures concerning the interests of the
+Reich as a whole. This, however, will be done in such a way that the
+measures to be adopted will first be submitted to me and carried out
+only when I give my consent. In the General Government, the Police is
+the armed forces. As a result of this, the Leader of this Police system
+will be called by me into the Government of the General Government;
+he is subordinate to me, or to my deputy, as a State Secretary for the
+Security System.
+
+[Pages 195-196]
+
+Incidentally, the struggle for the achievement of our aims will be
+pursued cold bloodedly. You see how the state agencies work. You see
+that we do not hesitate before anything, and stand whole dozens of
+people up against the wall. This is necessary because here simple
+consideration says that it cannot be our task at this period when the
+best German blood is being sacrificed to show regard for the blood
+of another race. For out of this one of the greatest dangers may
+arise. One already hears today in Germany that prisoners-of-war for
+instance with us in Bavaria or in Thuringia are administering large
+estates entirely independently, while all the men in a village fit for
+service are at the front. If this state of affairs continues then a
+gradual retrogression of Germanism will show itself. One should not
+underestimate this danger. Therefore, everything revealing itself as
+a Polish power of leadership must be destroyed again and again with
+ruthless energy. This does not have to be shouted abroad, it will
+happen silently.
+
+
+                                 PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2233-S-PS
+
+                      FRANK DIARY, 1942, Part III
+
+[Page 798, lines 26-28]
+
+  Mass Meeting of the NSDAP District Standartsfuehrung Galicia in
+  Lemberg. 1 August 1942.
+
+Dr. Frank: We have to understand that the purpose of this whole war is
+to expand the living space for our people in a natural manner.
+
+
+                                 PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2233-T-PS
+
+                      FRANK DIARY, 1942, Part III
+
+  Meeting to discuss Special Problems of the District Lublin Cracow, 4
+  August 1942.
+
+[Page 830, lines 23-32 and page 831, line 1]
+
+State Secretary Krueger then continues, saying that the Reichsfuehrer’s
+next immediate plan until the end of the following year would be to
+settle the following German racial groups in the two districts (Zamosc
+and Lublin): 1000 peasant settlements (1 settlement per family of
+about 6) for Bosnian Germans; 1200 other kinds of settlements; 1000
+settlements for Bessarabian Germans; 200 for Serbian Germans; 2000 for
+Leningrad Germans; 4000 for Baltic Germans; 500 for Wolhynia Germans
+and 200 settlements for Flemish, Danish and Dutch Germans, in all
+10,000 settlements for 50,000 to 60,000 persons.
+
+[Page 832, lines 15-23]
+
+The Governor General directs that the resettlement plan is to be
+discussed cooperatively by the competent authorities and declares his
+willingness to approve the final plan by the end of September after
+satisfactory arrangements had been made concerning all the questions
+appertaining thereto (in particular the guaranteeing of peace and
+order), so that by the middle of November, as the most favorable time,
+the resettlement can begin.
+
+
+                                 PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2233-V-PS
+
+                      FRANK DIARY, 1942, Part III
+
+  Official Meeting of Political Leaders of the NSDAP, Cracow, 5 August
+                                  1942
+
+[Page 866, lines 14-23]
+
+Dr. Frank: The situation in regard to Poland is unique insofar as on
+the one hand--I speak quite openly--we must expand Germanism in such
+a manner that the area of the General Government becomes pure German
+colonized land at some decades to come; and, on the other hand, under
+the present war conditions we have to allow foreign racial groups to
+perform here the work which must be carried out in the service of
+greater Germany * * *.
+
+[Page 896, lines 24-28]
+
+What a dirty people made up of Jews swaggered around here before 1939!
+And where are the Jews today? You scarcely see them. If you see them
+then they are working.
+
+
+                                 PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2233-W-PS
+
+                      FRANK DIARY, 1942, Part III
+
+       Discussion with Gauleiter Sauckel, Cracow, 18 August 1942
+
+[Page 918, lines 18-21]
+
+Dr. Frank: I am pleased to report to you officially, Party Comrade
+Sauckel, that we have up to now supplied 800,000 workers for the Reich.
+
+[Page 918, lines 28-34]
+
+Dr. Frank: Recently, they have requested us to supply them with a
+further 140,000. I have pleasure in informing you officially that in
+accordance with our agreement of yesterday 60% of the newly requested
+workers will be supplied to the Reich by the end of October, and the
+balance of 40% by the end of the year.
+
+[Page 920, lines 6-10]
+
+Dr. Frank: Beyond the present figure of 140,000 you can, however,
+next year reckon upon a higher number of workers from the General
+Government. For we shall employ the Police to conscript them.
+
+
+                                 PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2233-X-PS
+
+                      FRANK DIARY, 1942, Part III
+
+                                             Kressendorf, 28 August 1942
+
+Present: Dr. Hans FRANK and others
+
+[Page 968, 969, 983]
+
+Dr. Frank: I have since 1920 continually dedicated my work to the
+NSDAP. * * * As National Socialist I was a participant in the
+events of November 1923 for which I received the Bluorden. After
+the resurrection of the movement in the year 1925, my real greater
+activity in the movement began, which made me, first gradually, later
+almost exclusively, the legal adviser of the Fuehrer and of the Reich
+leadership of the NSDAP. I thus was the representative of legal
+interests of the growing Third Reich in a legal ideological as well as
+practical legal way * * * The culmination of this work I see in the big
+Leipzig Army Trial in which I succeeded in having the Fuehrer admitted
+to the famous oath of legality, a circumstance which gave the Movement
+the legal grounds to expand generously. The Fuehrer indeed recognized
+this achievement and in 1926 made me leader of the National Socialist
+Lawyer’s League; in 1929 Reich Leader of the Reich Legal office of the
+NSDAP; in 1933 Bavarian Minister of Justice; in the same year Reich
+Commissioner of Justice; in 1934 President of the Academy of German Law
+founded by me; in December 1934 Reich Minister without portfolio; and
+in 1939 I was finally appointed to Governor General for the occupied
+Polish territories.
+
+So I was, am and will remain the representative jurist of the struggle
+period of National Socialism * * *
+
+I profess myself now, and always, as a National Socialist and a
+faithful follower of the Fuehrer Adolf Hitler, whom I have now served
+since 1919.
+
+
+                                 PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2233-Y-PS
+
+              FRANK DIARY, 1942 Vol. IV [Pages 1212-1213]
+
+_Friday, 20 November 1942_:
+
+Of the total 180,000 head of cattle to be delivered, 159,000 have been
+delivered to the Reich up to now.
+
+360,000,000 eggs have been collected. 92,000,000 of those eggs were
+delivered for the Reich, and 85,000,000 are already in possession of
+the Reich; the remaining 7,000,000 eggs would be delivered within the
+next few days.
+
+The other deliveries were also being executed without friction on the
+whole, and it was hoped that the necessary achievements, for example in
+honey, poultry and sugar, would be completely fulfilled.
+
+The _Governor General_ expresses his satisfaction over those results
+and points out in that connection, that two thirds of the increase
+in the rations, carried out in the Reich were to be credited to the
+General Government, according to a statement of Ministerialdirektor
+Riche.
+
+President _Naumann_ then takes a position to the question concerning
+the distribution of the remaining stocks of food in the General
+Government. It was stated in the decree of 25 August 1942 that a
+decrease in the rations should occur, respectively that rations should
+be denied completely to the Polish population not working for the
+German interest.
+
+The following plan has now been taken into consideration:
+
+Starting 1 February 1942 the food ration cards should not be
+issued to the individual Pole or Ukrainian by the Nutrition Office
+[Ernaehrungsamt], but to the establishments working for the German
+interest. 2,000,000 people would thus be eliminated from the
+non-German, normal ration-consuming contingent. Now, if those ration
+cards are only distributed by the factories, part of those people will
+naturally rush into the factories. Labor could then be either procured
+for Germany from them or they could be used for the most important
+work in the factories of the General Government. This would also
+constitute a help for the main department of labor to a certain extent,
+enabling it to get a better control over the available labor potential
+within the Polish population. In the case of the eventual exclusion of
+2,000,000 Poles from the rationing system, the family members of the
+non-German, working population could be granted higher rations under
+circumstances, as for instance in the form of an increase of the bread
+ration to 1400 gr., the allotment of flour and larger meat rations.
+
+The Plant-manager [Betriebsfuehrer] must, of course, realize the
+responsibility conferred upon him by the distribution of those food
+ration cards, and statements about the number of workers employed by
+the establishment must be absolutely correct.
+
+Very harsh directives must, therefore, be issued in order to avoid
+eventual frauds; the plant-manager is personally responsible for the
+correctness of the number, which he must report every month.
+
+It is planned furthermore to put a certain amount of foodstuff at the
+disposal of the _Polish Central Committee_, for the purpose of taking
+adequate care of old and infirm people, who cannot work any longer.
+
+After having reached into the existing stocks, the main attention will
+have to be directed towards the greatest effort to _secure the harvest
+1943_.
+
+He has, therefore, already in September instructed his Department II to
+draft the necessary plans for it.
+
+
+                                 PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2233-Z-PS
+
+                      FRANK DIARY, 1942, Part IV.
+
+Official Meeting of Political Leaders of the NSDAP Area of Operation in
+                        the General Government.
+
+                                                    Cracow. 14 Dec. 1942
+
+[Page 1329, lines 11-15]
+
+Dr. Frank: You know that we have delivered over 940,000 Polish workers
+to the Reich. Thereby the General Government absolutely and relatively
+stands at the head of all the European countries. This achievement is
+enormous: it has also been recognized as such by Gauleiter Sauckel.
+
+[Page 1331, lines 5-7, 18-34]
+
+Dr. Frank: I will endeavor to get out of the reservoir of this
+territory everything that is yet to be got out of it.
+
+When you consider that it was possible for me to deliver to the Reich
+600,000 tons of bread grain, and in addition 180,000 tons to the Armed
+Forces stationed here; further an abundance amounting to many thousands
+of tons of other commodities such as seed, fats, vegetables, besides
+the delivery to the Reich of 300 million eggs, etc--you can estimate
+the significance this territory possesses for the Reich. In order to
+make clear to you the significance of the consignment from the General
+Government of 600,000 tons of bread grain, you are referred to the
+fact that the General Government by this achievement alone covers the
+raising of the bread ration in the Greater German Reich by two-thirds
+during the present rationing period. This enormous achievement can
+rightfully be claimed by us.
+
+
+                                 PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2233-AA-PS
+
+                  FRANK DIARY, Official Meetings, 1943
+
+                                                 Warsaw, 25 January 1943
+
+Present: Dr. Hans FRANK and others
+
+[Page 16]
+
+State Secretary Krueger: When we settled about the first 4,000 in Kreis
+Zamosc shortly before Christmas I had an opportunity to speak to these
+people.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+(State Secretary Krueger) It is understandable that in resettling this
+area * * * we did not make friends of the Poles.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+[Page 17]
+
+(State Secretary Krueger) In colonizing this territory with racial
+Germans, we are forced to chase out the Poles.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+(State Secretary Krueger) We are removing those who constitute a burden
+in this new colonization territory. Actually, they are the asocial
+and inferior elements. They are being deported, first brought to a
+concentration camp, and then sent as labor to the Reich. From a Polish
+propaganda standpoint this entire first action has had an unfavorable
+effect. For the Poles say: After the Jews have been destroyed then they
+will employ the same methods to get the Poles out of this territory and
+liquidate them just like the Jews.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+[Page 19]
+
+(State Secretary Krueger) As I have mentioned a great deal of unrest in
+Polish territory has resulted because of this resettlement.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+Dr. Frank: We will discuss each individual case of resettlement in the
+future exactly in the same manner as in the case of Zamosc, so that you
+will, Mr. State Secretary, appear before me and render a report.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+[Page 53]
+
+Dr. Frank: Gentlemen, be assured that this composite structure of
+General Government, on which all who are gathered around this table
+have worked so splendidly, really has the power to endure over this
+period. The great task which is given us will grow more difficult. No
+one will help us; we are fully and entirely dependent on ourselves.
+The Fuehrer can only help us as a kind of administrative island or
+administrative pill-box. We must defend ourselves from all sides.
+To all criticism of methods which we have heard--you know my basic
+principle, I don’t need to say it in this circle--I would like to
+stress one thing: we must not be squeamish when we learn that a total
+of 17,000 people have been shot. These persons who were shot were
+nothing more than war victims. If we compare this number against the
+irreplaceable blood sacrifices which the German people uninterruptedly
+day by day and every hour are making, then it weighs as nothing in the
+balance. We are now duty bound to hold together. Each must bring with
+him understanding for the other, he must be convinced that he is doing
+his best. The main thing is that we do not allow any personal slackness
+to arise. We must remember that we, who are gathered together here,
+figure on Mr. Roosevelt’s list of war criminals. I have the honour of
+being Number One. We have, so to speak, become accomplices in the world
+historic sense. Just because of this we must hold together, and be in
+agreement with one another, and it would be ridiculous if we were to
+let ourselves get involved in any squabbles over methods.
+
+
+                                 PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2233-BB-PS
+
+                              FRANK DIARY
+
+           Loose Leaf Bound File, 1 Jan. 1944--28 Feb. 1944.
+
+  Speech to Members of District Standortfuehrung to Political Leaders,
+          Conference Room of District Standortfuehrung Cracow.
+
+                                                        14 January 1944.
+
+[Page 24, lines 10-14]
+
+Frank: Once we have won the war, then, for all I care, mincemeat can be
+made of the Poles and the Ukrainians and all the others who run around
+here--it doesn’t matter what happens. * * *
+
+       #       #       #       #       #
+
+Meeting of the Political Leaders of the NSDAP in General Government
+Area, on 15 January 1944 in NSDAP House Cracow.
+
+[Page 13, lines 9-11]
+
+Frank: I have not been hesitant in declaring that when a German is
+shot, up to 100 Poles shall be shot too * * *
+
+       #       #       #       #       #
+
+Conference with Ambassador Counselor Dr. Schumburg, 8 February 1944, at
+the Castle, Cracow.
+
+[Page 7, lines 19-28]
+
+* * * Ambassador Counselor Dr. Schumburg then brought up the question
+of a possible amnesty of Poles who, because of trivial offences or
+trespass of the law, had been taken to the concentration camp Auschwitz
+and kept there for months.
+
+The Governor General will take under consideration an amnesty, probably
+for 1 May of this year. Nevertheless, one must not lose sight of the
+fact that the German leadership of the General Government must not show
+any kind of weakness.
+
+
+                                 PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2233-CC-PS
+
+                      FRANK DIARY, 1939, Page 99.
+
+                                                        14 December 1939
+
+The General Governor announces the following order of rank:
+
+  1.  General Governor
+  2.  Reich Minister Seyss-Inquart
+  3A. Ministerial Director Dr. Buehler
+  3B. The first SS and police leaders
+  4.  The district chiefs
+  5.  The department leaders of the Office of the General Governor
+  6.  Office Chief and first police leaders of the District Chief
+
+
+                                 PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2237-PS
+
+                                 SECRET
+
+           File on actions against the Jews in November 1938
+
+1120
+
+           Action against the Jews on 9 and 10 November 1938
+
+                           Legal Regulations
+
+  Reich Commissioner for the Re-Union of Austria with the German Reich
+
+                                              Vienna I, 18 November 1938
+                                                              Parliament
+                                                        phone R, 50-5-60
+
+  To the Minister President,
+  Generalfieldmarshal Goering
+  _Berlin_
+
+  Sir!
+
+The action in Vienna which took place during the night from 9 to 10
+November was finished up completely by Tuesday.
+
+The following is what happened substantially:
+
+A decree of Dr. Goebbels, the Reichsminister for Propaganda, but
+above all his speech which he delivered in Berlin on the evening of
+9 Oct 1938 as well as the contents of the speech he made in Munich
+were preludes for this so-called action. Though the hint was somehow
+indefinite, no different conclusion could be drawn since it said:
+“The fire-department has to be notified”. This order was not given
+in the first place to the district leaders, but the lower echelons
+[Gliederungen] were notified first so that the district-leader had no
+chance to possibly take counter-measures. Besides there existed a few
+orders which were farther reaching than the hint by Dr. Goebbels. Here
+in Vienna in many cases even the schools were closed in the morning
+so that the youth could participate--“according to the order” in
+the demonstrations. As always happens in such cases, the disorderly
+elements soon were leading and 40 different places were on fire. Around
+noontime the Major reported that the fire-department was no more in the
+position to control the situation. Simultaneously, the tumult against
+the Jewish stores began. That, one may say was the signal for the
+day and the night of the long fingers. How did the Party act in this
+situation, and especially the political leaders?
+
+Fieldmarshal, I assure you, that after thorough investigation I am able
+to state today that the political leaders, and that is the district
+leaders and their Kreis-leaders, are the ones who have prevented chaos
+in Vienna. Enormous quantities of stolen merchandise, above all jewelry
+and valuables were safeguarded immediately by the Kreis-leaders, and
+at this moment an inventory is being made. Gold, silver and valuables
+will be brought to a safe in a bank today. There is no question of
+returning the goods which were taken away from the Jews because one
+does not know their original owners and also because the Jews make the
+most outrageous and untruthful statements. Therefore I am forced, my
+Fieldmarshal, to safeguard an extremely high quantity of valuables. The
+rest of the goods will be checked, and shall be sold to retail-shops
+for the purchase-value, since we have to expect a scarcity of goods on
+account of the protective measures for our territory which we had to
+take [Gebietsschutzmassnahmen].
+
+Especially the enclosed orders will be necessary, for the restoration
+of normal conditions and of a legal status.
+
+Fieldmarshal, please do examine the enclosures. In case you have no
+objections, I would like to enforce them immediately.
+
+I may refer again to my request for support as for the introduction
+of the laws on organization and also for the execution of the
+Fuehrer-order.
+
+                                                            Heil Hitler!
+                                                      sign.: [illegible]
+
+       #       #       #       #       #
+
+                  Telephone-message of the Kripo D.D.
+
+State Police Vienna, Reg. Rat Dr. Pifrader gives the following
+information via phone at 07,30:
+
+Since the Kripo-agencies [Kripostellen] of the “POl.-Aemter” are
+constantly making inquiries at the state police (Stapo), they will have
+to be informed by phone of the following:
+
+Influential and rich male Jews of German nationality of not too high an
+age and who are healthy have to be arrested.
+
+The owners of the firearms are to be treated especially severely and a
+special notation has to be made about them.
+
+The police agencies [Po. Amtsdienststellen] have to be informed (as top
+secret) that the property of all native Jews has to be razed entirely.
+Therefore the police is not supposed to come to the aid of Jews in such
+cases.
+
+Fires may be started only where there is no danger that the fire may
+spread. Therefore, as a rule, not in narrowly built parts of the city.
+
+On a whole about 3,000 Jews are to be arrested.
+
+                                             Dr. Bayer D.D. of the Kripo
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2239-PS
+
+  Secret State Police / State Police Precinct WEIMAR.
+  Received March 12, 1945
+    [red stamp]
+  FS.-NR. 2470
+    [blue stamp]
+
+  PRAG NR. 8005 2.3.45 1730--KIL--
+  To State Police DARMSTADT
+
+  Subject: Protective prisoner ALEX MUUL, born Nov. 1, 1899 in KRIUSCH,
+    Russia Estonia.
+
+  Reference: Report of January 26, 1945--ROEM. 4-6 Kl.
+    B--2181/44--SCHM.--
+
+  Protective custody until further notice
+
+  Examination date May 19, 1945
+
+  Reason: Anti-German remarks
+
+  As prisoner of grade--11--to be left in concentration camp Buchenwald.
+
+  RSHA-ROEM. 4A 6 Kl. B--Nr. M 34 591--
+
+                                                       DR. KALTENBRUNNER
+
+       #       #       #       #       #
+
+          File of Orders for Commitment to Concentration Camps
+
+All issued by RSHA, Amt IV A 6, Prague to Stapo Darmstadt signed by Dr.
+                             KALTENBRUNNER.
+
+---------+--------------------+--------------+-----+-----------+-----------
+Date     |        Grounds     |       KL     |Class|    Name   |Nationality
+---------+--------------------+--------------+-----+-----------+-----------
+6.10.44  |Vagrancy, suspected |Lachrenhausen |   I | Vaculik   |Czech
+         | subversive         |              |     |           |
+         | activity           |              |     |           |
+         |                    |              |     |           |
+20.9.44  |Sex relations with  |Ravensbrueck  | --  | Hartmann  |German
+         | Pole               |              |     |           |
+         |                    |              |     |           |
+30.9.44  |Refusal to work     |Ravensbrueck  |  -- | Hilbert   |German
+         |                    |              |     |           |
+19.10.44 |Religious           |Dachau        |   I | Bruecher  |German
+         |  propaganda        |              |     |           |
+         |                    |              |     |           |
+2.11.44  |Association with    |Ravensbrueck  |  -- | Wetzel    |German
+         | Frenchmen and      |              |     |           |
+         | suggesting breach  |              |     |           |
+         | of labor contract  |              |     |           |
+         |                    |              |     |           |
+22.11.44 |Sex relations with  |Ravensbrueck  |  -- | Merz      |German
+         | PW’s.              |              |     |           |
+         |                    |              |     |           |
+2.12.44  |Work sabotage and   |Dachau        |   I | Meriadec  |French PW
+         | obstinacy          |              |     |           |
+         |                    |              |     |           |
+2.12.44  |Work sabotage       |Dachau        |   I | Selderyk  |Dutch
+         |                    |              |     |           |
+20.12.44 |Sexual intercourse  |Ravensbrueck  |  -- | Dillmann  |German
+         | with Pole          |              |     |           |
+         |                    |              |     |           |
+20.12.44 |Work sabotage       |Ravensbrueck  |  -- | Francurchi|[French?]
+         |                    |              |     |           | Corsican
+         |                    |              |     |           |
+27.12.44 |Vagrancy; escape    |Dachau        |   I | Garco     |Italian
+         | from transport;    |              |     |           |
+         | illegal use of RB. |              |     |           |
+         |                    |              |     |           |
+31.12.44 |Escape from         |Dachau        |   I | Dellominut|Italian
+         | transport,         |              |     |           |
+         | vagrancy           |              |     |           |
+         |                    |              |     |           |
+31.12.44 |Work sabotage and   |Ravensbrueck  |  -- |Buettner   |German
+         | association with   |              |     |           |
+         | foreigners         |              |     |           |
+         |                    |              |     |           |
+12.1.45  |Molestation and     |Hossenburg    |  II |Nomkin     |Lithuanian
+         | threatening of     |              |     |           |
+         | German woman;      |              |     |           |
+         | Communist          |              |     |           |
+         | statements         |              |     |           |
+         |                    |              |     |           |
+20.1.45  |Loafing on job      |Bergen-Belsen |  -- |Filber     |German
+         | repeatedly         |              |     |           |
+         |                    |              |     |           |
+1.2.45   |Conduct inimical to |Hossenburg    |  II |Leclair    |French
+         | Germany; spreading |              |     |           |
+         | of enemy           |              |     |           |
+         | propaganda;        |              |     |           |
+         | suspected          |              |     |           |
+         | membership in      |              |     |           |
+         | resistance         |              |     |           |
+         | movement           |              |     |           |
+         |                    |              |     |           |
+9. 2.45  |Working against     |Buchenwald    |   I |Etie       |French
+         | Reich              |              |     |           |
+         |                    |              |     |           |
+9. 2.45  |Spreading of rumors |Buchenwald    |   I |Farichon   |French
+         | detrimental to     |              |     |           |
+         | morale             |              |     |           |
+         |                    |              |     |           |
+9. 2.45  |Spreading of rumors |KL transfer   |     |Farichon   |French
+         | detrimental to     | later        |     |           |
+         | morale             |              |     |           |
+         |                    |              |     |           |
+2. 3.45  |“Aktion Gitter”     |Dachau        |   I |Laux       |German
+         |                    |              |     |           |
+2. 3.45  |“Aktion Gitter”     |Dachau        |   I |Appel      |German
+         |                    |              |     |           |
+2. 3.45  |Creating public     |(KL transfer  |     |Rauxloh    |German
+         | nuisance           |  later)      |     |           |
+         |                    |              |     |           |
+2. 3.45  |Black market        |Buchenwald    |   I |Cau        |French
+         |                    |              |     |           |
+2. 3.45  |Breach of work      |Buchenwald    |   I |Coudoning  |French
+         | contract           |              |     |           |
+         |                    |              |     |           |
+2. 3.45  |Sex relations with  |(Investigation|     |Meyer      |German
+         | French PW.         |  cont’d)     |     |           |
+         |                    |              |     |           |
+2. 3.45  |Black market        |Flossenburg   |  II |Biache     |French
+         | operator           |              |     |           |
+         |                    |              |     |           |
+2. 3.45  |Black marketing of  |Dachau        |   I |Fruche     |French
+         |  stolen goods      |              |     |           |
+         |                    |              |     |           |
+2. 3.45  |“Aktion Gitter”     |Dachau        |   I |Rueffer    |German
+         |                    |              |     |           |
+2. 3.45  |Work sabotage;      |Buchenwald    |   I |Revenranius|Greek
+         | suspected activity |              |     |           |
+         |                    |              |     |           |
+2. 3.45  |Loafing on job;     |(KL transfer  |     |Oberle     |German
+         | creating public    |  later)      |     |           |
+         | nuisance           |              |     |           |
+         |                    |              |     |           |
+2. 3.45  |Statements against  |Buchenwald    |   I |Agurini    |Italian
+         | Germany            |              |     |           |
+         |                    |              |     |           |
+2. 3.45  |Statements against  |Buchenwald    |  II |Muul       |[USSR?]
+         | Germany            |              |     |           |
+         |                    |              |     |           |
+2. 3.45  |Loafing on job      |Thurenanstadt |     |Lang       |Jew
+         |                    |              |     |           |
+2. 3.45  |{“Aktion Gitter”    |Ravensbrueck  |     |Maurer     |Jew
+         | Man and wife?      |              |     |           |
+         |                    |              |     |           |
+2. 3.45  |{“Aktion Gitter”    |Dachau        |   I |Maurer     |German
+         |                    |              |     |           |
+2. 3.45  |Assault on foreman  |Buchenwald    |   I |Toorn      |Dutch
+         |                    |              |     |           |
+2. 3.45  |Theft of foodstuffs;|Dachau        |  IA |Rouanet    |French
+         | resale at excess   |              |     |           |
+         | prices; or         |              |     |           |
+         | bartering          |              |     |           |
+         |                    |              |     |           |
+2. 3.45  |Defeatist statements|(KL transfer  |     |Ezrenlaub  |German
+         |                    |  later)      |     |           |
+         |                    |              |     |           |
+2. 3.45  |Working against     |Buchenwald    |  II |Bougoen    |  ?
+         | Reich              |              |     |           |
+         |                    |              |     |           |
+2. 3.45  |Attempted looting   |Buchenwald    |  II |Borge      |  ?
+         | after air raid     |              |     |           |
+         |                    |              |     |           |
+2. 3.45  |Theft and escape    |Buchenwald    |   I |Top        |Dutch
+         | from jail          |              |     |           |
+         |                    |              |     |           |
+2. 3.45  |Work sabotage       |(KL later)    |     |Eberhardt  |German
+---------+---------------------+--------------+-----+-----------+----------
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2241-PS
+
+           The employment of foreign labor forces in Germany.
+
+Decree of the Plenipotentiary General for Manpower on the execution of
+the transportation of workers, in this case: damage to and soiling of
+passenger coaches of the German Railways and their fittings.
+
+                                                           20 July 1942.
+
+In his letter of 10 August 1940--21 Bauer 106--the Reich Minister
+of Transport laid down that the management of the German Railway be
+directed that the costs of the repair of damage caused to railway
+coaches and their fittings by the careless or malicious behaviour of
+foreign workers in special labour trains be charged to the guilty
+persons, and where these are not determined, to the authorities
+responsible for the transportation. After the German Railway claimed
+again last winter considerable damage to and extraordinary soiling of
+railway coaches, it proposed to the management of the German Railway
+the demand of the costs of the repair of the damage and soiling
+from the Manpower Authorities. In this respect I direct, that it
+must definitely be left to the German Railway to pull up the guilty
+transport users. The writing off of the costs on the budget of the
+Reich stocks [Reichstocks] can only be considered exceptionally in
+the event of special circumstances. All cases are particularly to be
+refused in which the workers used normal trains or in which the damage
+was caused by deficiencies in the special trains provided.
+
+According to reports of transportation commanders [Transportleiters]
+presented to me, the special trains provided by the German Railway have
+frequently been in a really deficient condition. Numerous windowpanes
+have been missing in the coaches. Old French coaches without lavatories
+have been partly employed, so that the workers had to fit up an emptied
+compartment as a lavatory. In other cases the coaches were not heated
+in winter so that the lavatories quickly became unusable because the
+water system was frozen and the flushing apparatus was therefore
+without water.
+
+In order to obtain reliable records of the condition of special trains
+at the time of provision, in agreement with the Reich Minister of
+Transport, I beg to direct the transportation commanders, together with
+a representative of the station of departure, to determine in writing
+before the departure of a special train the deficiencies existing in
+the interior fittings of the railway coaches. The records are to be
+given up after completion of the transport operation to the labour
+reception office which has to present them to the competent state
+labour office. The transportation commanders will have to contact
+the office director of the station at least 1 to 2 hours before the
+departure of the train.
+
+Simultaneously, I beg to direct the transportation commanders to give
+particular attention during the journey to the exclusion of damage and
+soiling of the railway carriages.
+
+In view of the further tasks, involved in the winding up of the
+transport operation, incumbent on the transportation commander he
+will have to be relieved of the further mutual determination of the
+condition of railway carriages at the end of the journey.
+
+I transfer the discharge of claims of the German Railway in respect of
+repairs to the state labour offices in whose area the special train was
+dispersed.
+
+
+                                 PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2243-PS
+
+                1937 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 325
+
+     Law relating to Finance Measures in connection with the Police
+
+                                                           19 March 1937
+
+The government of the Reich has resolved upon the following law, which
+is hereby proclaimed:
+
+
+                                   1
+
+(1) The following are to become direct officials of the Reich:
+
+1. Officials in organizing posts of the establishment “Reichfuehrer
+of SS and Chief of the German Police in the Reich Ministry of the
+Interior.”
+
+2. Officials of the Security Police [Gestapo and Criminal Police], but
+not police officials serving in the State Police Administrations for
+the Criminal Police.
+
+3. Officials of the Civil Police, the Gendarmerie and the police
+medical and veterinary officers serving therein, professional police
+instructors and technical officials.
+
+(2) The employees and workers who:
+
+  serve in the establishment mentioned in paragraph 1. No. 1,
+
+  serve in the Security Police, the Civil Police, the Gendarmerie and
+    the auxiliary establishments belonging to them, such as schools,
+    hospitals, convalescent homes, supply offices and equipment offices
+    and persons who
+
+  serve in the State Police Administrations
+
+  enter into the service of the Reich.
+
+(3) The number of appointments of police administrative officials
+henceforth remaining dependent on the finances of the districts can
+be determined by the Reich Minister for Finance in agreement with the
+Reich Minister of the Interior.
+
+
+                                   2
+
+The Reich pays the personal allowances and bears the maintenance
+expenses of the officials, employees and workers of the Reich mentioned
+in (1) paragraphs 1 and 2 and the material expenditure of the whole of
+the State Police but not the personal allowances, maintenance expenses
+and costs of removal of the Police Administrative officials mentioned
+in (1) paragraph 3.
+
+
+                                   3
+
+(1) The revenues of the State Police are revenues of the Reich.
+
+(2) The only revenues to remain in the districts are those which are
+still to be booked for the Financial Year 1936, and all revenues from
+taxes and fines.
+
+
+                                   4
+
+(1) The Reich will assume all property dues and rights which are
+connected with the State Police of the districts, in so far as they
+are not left to the districts according to 2 and 3. When the law comes
+into force, the liability of the Reich is also extended to taking
+over maintenance allowances falling due to persons who were formerly
+entitled to them.
+
+(2) The Reich also assumes the responsibility, which, according to
+the instructions regarding the liability of officials, rests with
+the districts, for damage caused by police administrative officials,
+who according to (1) remain under the districts. The districts owe
+compensation to the Reich; their right to make claims against officials
+is untouched.
+
+
+                                   5
+
+The authorities who hitherto represented the districts (exchequer)
+in matters relating to the police, will now represent the Reich
+(exchequer) in these matters. The Reich Minister of the Interior can
+arrange the representation otherwise.
+
+
+                                   6
+
+(1) Premises and movable property belonging to the districts will
+become the property of the Reich if at the time of the proclamation of
+the law they are being used exclusively or mainly by the State Police
+or the establishments mentioned in (1) paragraph 2 or are intended for
+future use by these establishments.
+
+(2) The premises of the Reich and Prussian Ministry of the Interior in
+Berlin, Unter den Linden 70/72/74, and the premises of the Chief of
+Police in Berlin which are to be specially indicated in the executive
+orders, will remain exempt from transference to the Reich.
+
+(3) Due to the transference of property to the Reich, taxes, duties and
+other fees will not be levied. Cash payments remain out of account.
+
+(4) When this law comes into force, if any premises transferred to the
+Reich become dispensable or unfit to be employed for the purposes of
+the Reich police, without replacement being necessary, they are to be
+offered for use to the district without recompense, in their present
+state, before further use is made of them.
+
+
+                                   7
+
+(1) Where the Reich, the districts or the municipalities (municipal
+unions) have placed officials, employees and workers or property at
+the disposal of the State Police or of the establishments mentioned in
+(1) paragraph 2, or have carried out service transactions, no change
+will occur until a further ruling is made by the Reich Minister of
+the Interior. The same applies in cases where the State Police or the
+establishments mentioned in (1) paragraph 2 have placed their official
+employees and workers or property at the disposal of other authorities
+or have carried out service transactions, which have no connection with
+police duties.
+
+(2) No further compensations than hitherto may be claimed for the
+services mentioned in paragraph 1.
+
+
+                                   8
+
+The municipalities will pay their contributions to the Reich for the
+State Police according to the regulations hitherto in existence. The
+total contribution paid by the municipalities of a district during the
+Financial Year 1936 may not be exceeded. A special ruling may occur
+in cases of state control or regional change. The contributions of
+the municipalities can be reckoned on the shares in the Reich revenue
+remittances of the district.
+
+
+                                   9
+
+The shares of a district in the Reich revenue remittances are for each
+Financial Year, first of all for the Financial Year 1937, reduced by
+the balance between the expenditure and the revenues (deficit) of
+its police, who, by this law are taken over on the Reich budget. The
+deficit is calculated on the basis of the budget of the district for
+the Financial Year 1936. If a greater deficit should be evident in
+the average of the Financial Years 1925 to 1934, this deficit is the
+standard. The Reich Minister for Finance fixes the sum to be reduced.
+
+
+                                   10
+
+The districts must place at the disposal of the Reich the remaining
+expenses carried over into the Financial Year 1936 and not yet paid out
+at the end of that year. The districts must also place at the disposal
+of the Reich the additional sums not yet paid out at the end of the
+Financial Year 1936, which are made over by the Reich, and which are
+extra subsidies towards the material expenditure of the State Police.
+
+
+                                   11
+
+The Reich Ministers for Finance and for the Interior will determine
+whether and how financial compensation is to be carried out if, in
+the municipalities (municipal unions) municipal, uniformed police
+officials are replaced by State Police or if, in the state police
+administrations, the relative authorities of the State Police and the
+municipal (remaining) police are ruled otherwise.
+
+
+                                   12
+
+For the officials, employees and workers of the State Police or of the
+establishments mentioned in (1) paragraph 2, who are entering into the
+direct service of the Reich, the legal and administrative orders of the
+districts are to be applied temporarily. The Reich Minister for the
+Interior can make a further ruling in agreement with the Prussian Prime
+Minister.
+
+
+                                   13
+
+In so far as State contracts or other agreements between districts for
+matters concerning their police are not rendered inapplicable by this
+law, they will remain in force as Reich legal orders.
+
+
+                                   14
+
+The Reich Ministers of the Interior and for Finance will issue the
+necessary legal and administrative orders for the execution and the
+completion of this law and will decide upon all questions of doubt
+arising from the application of this law. If the functions of other
+ministers are thereby affected their approval is necessary.
+
+
+                                   15
+
+This law comes into force on 1st April 1937.
+
+Berlin, 19th March 1937.
+
+                                 The Fuehrer and Chancellor of the Reich
+                                                            Adolf Hitler
+
+                                      The Reich Minister of the Interior
+                                                                   Frick
+
+                                          The Reich Minister for Finance
+                                               Graf Schwerin von Krosigk
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2245-PS
+
+   1936 MINISTERIAL GAZETTE OF THE REICH AND PRUSSIAN MINISTER OF THE
+                                INTERIOR
+
+                        [Reichsministerialblatt]
+
+              The Employment of Security Police Inspectors
+
+                           [Pages 1343, 1344]
+
+   Circular Decree by the Reich and Prussian Minister of the Interior
+                            dated 20.9.1936.
+
+                     Police Special Order 1. 7/36 g
+
+                         (already promulgated)
+
+1. With effect from 1.10.1936 I am appointing Security Police
+Inspectors to the Prussian Provinces and the States of Baden, Bavaria,
+Wuerttemberg and Saxony. Detailed decrees to follow.
+
+2. The duties to be undertaken by these Inspectors and entailed by
+their appointment are laid down in the appended Service Directives for
+Security Police Inspectors.
+
+3. A special decree will be promulgated regarding the appointment of
+Security Police Inspectors to the remaining States.
+
+To the State Governments (for Prussia: to the Prussian
+Ministerpraesident), the Ober- & Regierungs-Praesidente, to the Gestapo
+Office in Berlin, to the State Political Head Offices, to the State
+Political Offices.
+
+       #       #       #       #       #
+
+Police Special Order 1.
+
+                                            Circular Decree of 20.9.1936
+
+                                                                  272/36
+
+
+_Appendix_
+
+            Service Directive for Security Police Inspectors
+
+1. The special duties of the Security Police necessitate the closest
+and most sympathetic cooperation with the Central Offices of the
+General and Interior Administrations of the Provinces and States
+as well as with the Gauleiters of the NSDAP and the Armed Forces
+Authorities.
+
+2. The Security Police Inspectors are to foster this cooperation.
+Especially are they to keep in the closest contact with the
+Oberpraesident and/or the Ministry of the Interior of their area and to
+keep them informed of all important occurrences, all essential reports
+and observations of the Security Police and where necessary stimulate
+the authorities of the Interior Administration and eliminate any
+difficulties which may arise.
+
+3. The Security Police Inspectors are personally and immediately
+subordinate to the Oberpraesident and/or Staatsminister of the Interior
+and are to follow his directives. Should these directives not be in
+accordance with the general and special Orders and Directions of the
+Chief of Security Police and should it be impossible to reach an
+agreement, then the Chief of Security Police is to be referred to for a
+decision.
+
+4. The inspectors are furthermore charged with the task of supervising
+the execution in their area of any Decrees issued by the Chief of
+Security Police. They are to ensure that the Gestapo and the Civil
+Police are organized on the same basis. Any difficulties arising are to
+be reported to the Chief of Security Police together with suggestions
+as to how they may be overcome.
+
+
+                                 PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2246-PS
+
+The Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Ambassador of the German Reich on
+Special Mission
+
+                                                Vienna, 1 September 1936
+
+To: The Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor, Berlin (by courier)
+
+Subject: Report on Danube situation.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+The progress of normalizing relations with Germany at the present time
+is obstructed by the continued persistence of the Ministry of Security,
+occupied by the old anti-National Socialist officials. Changes in
+personnel are therefore of utmost importance. But they are definitely
+not to be expected prior to the conference on the abolishing of the
+Control of Finances [Finanzkontrolle] at Geneva. The Chancellor of the
+League has informed Minister de Glaise-Horstenau, of his intention, to
+offer him the portfolio of the Ministry of the Interior.
+
+As a guiding principle [Marschroute], I recommend on the tactical side,
+continued, patient psychological treatment, with slowly intensified
+pressure directed at changing the regime. The proposed conference on
+economic relations, taking place at the end of October, will be a very
+useful tool for the realization of some of our projects. In discussion
+with government officials as well as with leaders of the illegal party
+(Leopold and Schattenfroh) who conform completely with the agreement
+of July 11, I am trying to direct the next developments in such a
+manner to aim at corporative representation of the movement in the
+fatherland front [Vaterlaendischen Front] but nevertheless refraining
+from putting National-socialists in important positions for the time
+being. However such positions are to be occupied only by personalities,
+having the support and the confidence of the movement. I have a willing
+collaborator in this respect in Minister Glaise-Horstenau.
+
+                                                       (Signature) Papen
+
+
+                                 PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2247-PS
+
+The Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary on Special Mission
+
+                         At present Berlin W.9, Lennestr. 9, 17 May 1935
+
+Mein Fuehrer:
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+The news, which I communicated to you the day before yesterday, that
+the Austrian Government would proclaim its intention to arm through
+an autonomous act and simultaneously on 2 June would announce a
+Starhemberg regency becomes more and more likely.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+I suggest that we take an active part in this game. The fundamental
+idea should be to pit Schuschnig and his Christian-social Forces,
+who are opposed to a home front dictatorship, against Starhemberg.
+The possibility of thwarting the measures arranged between Mussolini
+and Starhemberg should be afforded to him, in such way that he would
+submit the offer to the government of a definitive German-Austrian
+compromise of interests. According to the convincing opinion of the
+leader of the NSDAP in Austria, Capt. Leopold, the totalitarian
+principle of the NSDAP in Austria must be replaced in the beginning by
+a combination of that part of the Christian-elements which favors the
+Greater Germany idea and the NSDAP. If Germany recognizes the national
+independence of Austria and guarantees full freedom to the Austrian
+national opposition, then as a result of such a compromise the Austrian
+government would be formed in the beginning by a coalition of these
+forces.
+
+There should follow a gradual disintegration of the barriers erected
+between the two countries. The rearmament of the army would have to be
+effected in close cooperation with the German army even if material aid
+from Germany would be limited.
+
+A further consequence of this step would be the possibility of the
+participation of Germany in the Danube pact, which would take the sting
+out of its acuteness due to the settlement of relations between Germany
+and Austria. Such a measure would have a most beneficial influence on
+the European situation and especially on our relationship with England.
+
+One may object, that Mr. Schuschnig will hardly be determined to follow
+such a pattern, that he will rather in all probability immediately
+communicate our offer to our opponents.
+
+Of course, one should first of all explore the possibility of setting
+Schuschnig against Starhemberg through the use of “Go-betweens”. The
+possibility exists. If Mr. Schuschnig will finally say “no” and makes
+our offer known in Rome, then the situation would not be any worse by
+that; but, on the contrary, the efforts of the Reich government to
+make peace with Austria would be revealed--without prejudice to other
+interests. Therefore even in the case of refusal this last attempt
+would be an asset. I consider it completely possible, that in view
+of the far spread dislike of the Alpine countries of the pro-Italian
+course and in view of the sharp tensions within the federal government
+[Bundesregierung], Mr. Schuschnig will grasp this last straw--always
+under the supposition that the offer could not be interpreted as a
+trap by the opponents, but that it bears all the mark of an actually
+honest compromise with Austria.
+
+Assuming success of this step, we would again establish our active
+intervention in Central European politics, which, as opposed to the
+French-Czech and Russian political maneuvers, would be a tremendous
+success, both morally and practically.
+
+Since there are 2 weeks left to accomplish very much work in the way of
+explorations and Conferences, an immediate decision is necessary.
+
+The Reich Army Minister shares the opinion presented above and the
+Reich Foreign Minister wanted to discuss it with you, my Fuehrer.
+
+                                                         (signed) Papen.
+
+
+                                 PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2248-PS
+
+  The Extraordinary Emissary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the German
+    Reich in Special Mission.
+
+                                                  Vienna, July 27, 1935.
+
+  To the Fuehrer and Chancellor
+         _BERLIN_
+            by courier.
+
+  Contents:
+  One year after the death of the Bundeskanzler Dollfuss.
+  Review and Outlook.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+It seems to me to be expedient to use this incident ourselves also to
+draw the balance.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+National Socialism must and will overpower the new Austrian ideology.
+If today it is contended in Austria that the NSDAP is only a
+centralized Reich German party and therefore unable to transfer the
+spirit of thought of National Socialism to groups of people of a
+different political make-up, the answer must rightly be that the
+national revolution in Germany could not have been brought about in a
+different way. But when the creation of the people’s community in the
+Reich will be completed, National socialism could, in a much wider
+sense than this is possible through the present party organization--at
+least apparently--certainly become the rallying point for all racially
+German units beyond the borders. Spiritual progress in regard to
+Austria cannot be achieved today with any centralized tendency.
+If this recognition would once and for all be stated clearly from
+within the Reich, then it would easily become possible to effect a
+break-through into the front of the New Austria. A Nurnberg Party Day
+designated as “The German Day” as in old times and the proclamation of
+a national socialistic people’s front, would be a stirring event for
+all beyond the borders of the Reich. Such attacks would win us also the
+particularistic Austrian circles, whose spokesman, the legitimistic
+Count Dubsky wrote in his pamphlet about the “Anschluss”: The Third
+Reich will be with Austria, or it will not be at all. National
+Socialism must win it or it will perish, if it is unable to solve this
+task; * * *
+
+                                                         (signed) Papen.
+
+
+                                 PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2260-PS
+
+ SETTLEMENT OF RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NSDAP AND STAHLHELM (STEEL HELMETS)
+
+   From Page 1, Issue 422, 21 June 1933, of “NSK” National Socialist
+   Party Press Agency [NSK, Pressedienst der NSDAP, the official news
+     agency of the NSDAP]. Edited by Wilhelm Weiss. Responsible for
+   communications of the Reich Press Office Dr. Otto Dietrich, Reich
+        Press Chief. Published by Franz Eher Successor, Munich.
+
+NSK The Reich Press Office of the NSDAP informs us:
+
+The following agreement was reached in a conference that took place
+today between the Reich Chancellor, the Reich Labor Minister Seldte,
+the Reich War Minister and the Vice-Chancellor:
+
+To ensure the striking power of the National Socialist revolution the
+Stahlhelm, League of front-line Soldiers [Bund der Frontsoldaten],
+integrates itself into the National Socialist movement in the following
+manner:
+
+_a._ The Old-Guard Nucleus of the Stahlhelm [Kernstahlhelm] remains, as
+heretofore, under the leadership of the League Leader.
+
+_b._ The League Leader prohibits, as of now, any party membership
+except that in the NSDAP to members of the Old-Guard Nucleus of the
+Stahlhelm.
+
+_c._ The leader of the NSDAP, Adolf Hitler, thus permits membership in
+the Stahlhelm for the NSDAP.
+
+_d._ The Stahlhelm Youth [Jungstahlhelm] takes its place side by
+side with the SA and SS, and is subordinate to the Supreme SA Leader
+[Obersten SA-Fuehrer]. The “Scharnhorst” will be integrated into the
+Hitler Youth.
+
+_e._ The leader of the Stahlhelm Youth [Jungstahlhelm] von Morozowicz,
+joins the staff of the Supreme SA Leader.
+
+Berlin, 21 June 1933.
+
+                                                            Adolf Hitler
+                                                            Franz Seldte
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2261-PS
+
+                               TOP SECRET
+
+                                  Copy
+
+  The Reich Minister of War and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces
+
+No. 1820/35 Top Secret L. II a
+
+                                                    Berlin, 24 June 1935
+
+To
+
+  The Supreme Commander of the Army
+  The Supreme Commander of the Navy
+  The Supreme Commander of the Air Forces
+
+In the appendix I transmit one copy each of the law for the defense of
+the Reich of the 21 May 1935 and of a decision of the Reichs Cabinet
+of 21 May 1935 concerning the Reich’s defense council. The publication
+of the Reich’s defense law is temporarily suspended by order of the
+Fuehrer and Reichschancellor.
+
+The Fuehrer and Reichschancellor has nominated the President
+of the directorate of the Reichsbank Dr. Schacht to be
+“plenipotentiary-general for war economy”.
+
+I request that the copies of the Reich defense law needed within the
+units of the armed forces be ordered before 1 July 1935 at armed forces
+office (L) where it is to be established with the request that the law
+should only be distributed down to Corps Headquarters outside of the
+Reichministry of war.
+
+I point out the necessity of strictest secrecy once more.
+
+                                                  (signed) von Blomberg.
+
+       #       #       #       #       #
+
+  No. 1820/35 L Top Secret II a                      Berlin, 3 Sept 1935
+  To _Defense--Economic Group G-3_
+    transmitted (copy)
+         (signed) Jodl
+
+       #       #       #       #       #
+
+                                  Copy
+
+                    Reich Defense Law of 21 May 1935
+
+The Reich Cabinet has enacted the following law that is hereby made
+public:
+
+
+                        Part I State of Defense
+
+
+                               ARTICLE 1
+
+The Fuehrer and Reichschancellor can declare a state of defense for the
+area of the Reich in case danger of war threatens.
+
+
+                               ARTICLE 2
+
+(1) With the declaration of a state of defense the entire power
+of execution devolves upon the Fuehrer and Reichschancellor. The
+Reichsminister of war exercises it by his orders.
+
+(2) The Reichsminister is empowered in the carrying out of the power of
+execution to issue legal regulations which may deviate from existing
+laws. He can, in order to enforce his regulation, threaten punishments
+and set up special courts.
+
+
+                               ARTICLE 3
+
+(1) The Reichsministers are to observe the instructions of the
+Reichsminister of war. They remain the highest Reich authorities within
+their realm of activity.
+
+(2) The Reichsministers will in case of a state of defense effect the
+necessary measures and are empowered to issue legal regulations which
+may deviate from existing laws.
+
+
+                          Part II Mobilization
+
+
+                               ARTICLE 4
+
+(1) If conflict with an external enemy becomes unavoidable, the Fuehrer
+and Reichschancellor can order mobilization.
+
+(2) The ordering of mobilization includes in itself the declaration
+of a state of defense according to Part I, in case the latter is not
+already proclaimed, without prejudice to the directive of Article Six.
+
+(3) With the ordering of mobilization a state of war in the definition
+of this law begins.
+
+
+                               ARTICLE 5
+
+The Reichsministers will effect the necessary measures in case of
+mobilization and are empowered to issue legal regulations which may
+deviate from existing laws.
+
+
+                               ARTICLE 6
+
+(1) The Fuehrer and Reichschancellor will appoint a
+plenipotentiary-general for war economy to direct the entire war
+economy.
+
+(2) It is the task of the plenipotentiary-general for war-economy to
+put all economic forces in the service of carrying on the war and to
+secure the life of the German people economically.
+
+(3) Subordinate to him are:
+
+  The Reichsminister for economy
+
+  The Reichsminister for food and agriculture
+
+  The Reichs labor minister
+
+  The Reichs forest master and all Reichs’ agents immediately
+    subordinate to the Fuehrer and Reichschancellor.
+
+Furthermore the financing of the war effort (in the province of the
+Reichs finance ministry and of the Reichsbank) will be carried on under
+his responsibility.
+
+(4) The plenipotentiary-general for war economy is authorized, within
+his realm of responsibility, to issue legal regulations, which may
+deviate from the existing laws.
+
+
+              Part III Setting of penalties and Conclusion
+
+
+                               ARTICLE 7
+
+Whoever purposely or carelessly acts in violation of a decree issued by
+authority of this law will be, insofar as a more severe punishment is
+not stipulated according to other directives, punished with jail and
+with fine or with one of these penalties.
+
+
+                               ARTICLE 8
+
+The Fuehrer and Reichschancellor will issue the necessary legal and
+administrative directives for carrying out of this law.
+
+Berlin, 21 May 1935
+
+                                        The Fuehrer and Reichschancellor
+                                                   (signed) ADOLF HITLER
+
+                                               The Reichsminister of war
+                                                   (signed) VON BLOMBERG
+
+                                      The Reichsminister of the Interior
+                                                          (signed) FRICK
+
+       #       #       #       #       #
+
+Note on the law for the defense of the Reich of 21 May 1935
+
+The publication of the law for the defense of the Reich of 21 May 1935
+will be suspended. The law became effective 21 May 1935.
+
+                                        The Fuehrer and Reichschancellor
+                                                   (signed) ADOLF HITLER
+
+       #       #       #       #       #
+
+                                  Copy
+
+  Decision of the Reichscabinet of 21 May 1935 on the Council for the
+                          defense of the Reich
+
+Supplementing the decision of the Reichscabinet of 4 April 1933 and
+13 Dec 34 on formation of a council for defense of the Reich, the
+Reichscabinet has made the following decision:
+
+1. The plenipotentiary-general for war economy appointed by the Fuehrer
+and Reichschancellor will begin his work already in peacetime. At the
+suggestion of the chairman of the Council for the defense of the Reich,
+he will direct the economic preparations for war, insofar as they do
+not, in reference to the armament industry fall into the province of
+the Reichs’ Ministry of war. In case of mobilization the following are
+subordinate to him:
+
+  Reichministry of economic affairs
+
+  Reichministry for food and agriculture
+
+  Reichministry of Labor
+
+  Reich’s forest-master and all Reichoffices immediately subordinate to
+    the Fuehrer.
+
+In case of mobilization he will direct and be responsible for the
+financing of the war effort (in the province of the finance-ministry
+and the Reichsbank).
+
+Those ministries and the Reich’s authorities are bound already in time
+of peace to observe his recommendations for the preparation of a war
+economy and the financing of the war-effort.
+
+2. The Reichsminister of War and the plenipotentiary for war economy
+will effect the preparations for mobilization in closest cooperation on
+both sides.
+
+3. The plenipotentiary-general for war-economy will be a permanent
+working committee he represents through his leadership staff the
+interests of war economy. The department heads [Referenten] for the
+defense of the Reich of the Ministries mentioned in Point I are bound
+by the recommendations of this leadership staff.
+
+Foundation:
+
+The State of War, an institution of the old law, as it was established
+in the old Reichsconstitution of 1871, the Prussian law on the state
+of siege of 4 June 1861 and the Bavarian law on the state of war of
+5 Nov 1912, has been only incompletely replaced by Article 48 of the
+Reichsconstitution of 11 August 1919. Moreover, the provisions of
+Article 48 no longer correspond to the actual legal conditions.
+
+The new law for the defense of the Reich should create clear legal
+bases for the transfer of the whole machinery of state from a state of
+peace to one of war. In this connection it was to be noted that a state
+of war can begin unexpectedly or from a state of foreign political
+tension. Since the time of such tension must be utilized as far as
+foreign political relations will bear, in order to create a readiness
+for war in time, the law for the defense of the Reich provides two
+steps for the transfer from state of peace to state of war:
+
+  1. The state of defense
+  2. The mobilization
+
+For both steps of war preparation, the law gives the legal basis, upon
+which the individual measures of the Reichsdepartments can be built up
+as the council for the defense of the Reich instructs.
+
+It is to be mentioned in regard to the provisions of the law in detail:
+
+_To Article 2_
+
+The exercise of the power of execution by the Reichsminister of war
+under the Fuehrer and Reichschancellor should emphasize the pressing
+necessity of all demands of the immediate conduct of the war and should
+guarantee their fulfillment.
+
+_To Article 4, Section 3_
+
+In numerous laws special provisions for war are contained. It is
+therefore necessary, to establish the beginning of a state of war,
+in respect to times in order to create clear conditions for the
+administration of justice etc. Since, however, in a future war official
+declarations of war are not to be expected, as a result of which
+Article 42 Section 2 of the Reichsconstitution also is obsolete, the
+beginning of a state of war is to be considered as being at the same
+time as the beginning of the mobilization.
+
+_To Article 6_
+
+The experiences of the great war have demonstrated the necessity
+of including during a war the entire economy and the financing
+of the conduct of the war under unified leadership. The
+plenipotentiary-general for war-economy should according to the will of
+the Fuehrer and Reichschancellor take over the responsible leadership
+and stands thereby independently along side the Reichsminister of war,
+the possessor of the power of execution, and responsible for his realm
+of activity under the Fuehrer and Reichschancellor.
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2270-PS
+
+             COORDINATION [GLEICHSCHALTUNG] OF COOPERATIVES
+
+    Issue 393, 16 May 1933, of “NSK” National Socialist Party Press
+ Agency, [NSK, Pressedienst der NSDAP, the official news agency of the
+   NSDAP]. Edited by Wilhelm Weiss. Responsible for communications of
+ the Reich Press Office Dr Otto Dietrich, Reich Press Chief. Published
+             by Franz Eher, Successor, Munich. [Pages 1-2].
+
+NSK. The Executive Secretaries of the Reich League of German
+Cooperatives [Reichsverband Deutscher Konsumvereine] have issued the
+following statement:
+
+The undersigned, legally competent executive secretaries of the Reich
+League of German Cooperatives, Cologne, and of the Gepag hereby submit
+themselves and all cooperatives affiliated to their League irrevocably
+and unconditionally to the command and administrative authority of the
+leader of the German Labor Front, Dr. Robert Ley, and of Party Member
+Karl Mueller, the Commissioner for Cooperatives appointed by him.
+
+                                                   Signed: Peter SCHLACK
+                                                 Signed: Rob. SCHLOESSER
+                                                     Signed: Fritz KLEIN
+
+       #       #       #       #       #
+
+The Executive Secretaries of the Wholesale Purchasing League of German
+Cooperatives have issued the following statement:
+
+The undersigned, legally competent executive secretaries of the
+Wholesale Purchasing League of German Cooperatives, Inc., Hamburg,
+hereby submit themselves and all cooperatives affiliated to
+their League irrevocably and unconditionally to the command and
+administrative authority of the leader of the German Labor Front, Dr.
+Robert Ley, and of Party Member Karl Mueller, the Commissioner for
+Cooperatives appointed by him.
+
+                                                     Signed: H. EVERLING
+                                                        Signed: A. GRAHL
+
+       #       #       #       #       #
+
+Pursuant to these statements the leader of the German Labor Front has
+issued the following order:
+
+_As previously announced by Party Member Bank Director Mueller on my
+behalf, the German Labor Front has today taken over the leadership of
+the cooperatives. The legally competent executive secretaries of the
+Wholesale Purchasing League of German Cooperatives, Inc., Hamburg, and
+of the Reich League of German Cooperatives, Cologne, have submitted
+unconditionally and unreservedly._
+
+The Chief of the economic enterprises of the German Labor Front, Party
+Member Bank Director Mueller, also assumes the management of the
+cooperatives. This action is being taken for the benefit of the German
+worker, in order to safeguard the savings of the masses here also, and
+in order not to permit the decay of the assets which the cooperatives
+hold for the benefit of the people.
+
+The action in itself is a winding-up action, which means that their
+further extension will not be tolerated, that everything that is rotten
+and burdensome must be gotten rid of now in the shortest possible
+time, that in agreement with the representative organizations of the
+middle class an equitable settlement is being initiated now already.
+Offices of the NSDAP are requested to shed their hostile attitude
+towards cooperatives, because they can rest assured that everything is
+being done by the leadership which profits the benefit of the people
+and the benefit of Germany.
+
+Future organization of the cooperatives is as follows:
+
+_The two great Reich Leagues of cooperatives will become members
+of, and be merged into one Reich League. Great savings will thus be
+effected in administration._
+
+_As a matter of principle there will be no more voting in any
+organization, but the leader, Party Member Mueller, is appointed by me
+and he is authorized to appoint additional leaders of the individual
+regions and localities._
+
+_The Administrative Council, which is to help Party Member Mueller,
+will constitute the Executive Chamber_ [_Kleine Kammer_], _in addition
+a Plenary Chamber will be formed, so as to definitely clarify the
+relationship between the new corporate structure and the cooperatives,
+and to shape the winding-up more decisively and organically._
+
+                                    The leader of the German Labor Front
+                                                              Dr. R. Ley
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2271-PS
+
+                     ORGANIZATION BOOK OF THE NSDAP
+
+                     [Organisationsbuch der NSDAP]
+
+                  Editions of 1936, 1938, 1940, & 1943
+
+  Editor the Reich Organization Leader of the NSDAP (Dr. Robert Ley).
+
+   Published by the Central Publishing House of the NSDAP, Franz Eher
+                  Successor, Munich. [Pages 185-187].
+
+
+                                The NSBO
+
+          The National Socialistic Factory Cells Organization.
+
+        [Die Nationalsozialistische Betriebszellen-Organisation]
+
+The NSBO is a union of the political leaders of the NSDAP in the DAF
+[German Labor Front].
+
+The NSBO is the carrier of the organization [Organisationstraeger] of
+the DAF.
+
+The duties and responsibilities of the NSBO have passed over to the DAF.
+
+The political leaders who have been transferred from the NSBO to the
+DAF guarantee the ideological education of the DAF in the spirit of the
+National Socialistic idea.
+
+
+                         The German Labor Front
+
+                               Including
+       the NS Community Strength through Joy [Kraft Durch Freude]
+
+       Decree of the Fuehrer on the Nature and Goal of the German
+                   Labor Front, dated 24 October 1934
+
+
+                            Nature and Goal
+
+
+                               Article 1
+
+The German Labor Front is the organization of creative Germans of brain
+and fist.
+
+In the main, the members of the former unions, the former employee
+unions and the former employer unions are united in it as members with
+equal rights.
+
+Membership in the German Labor Front _cannot_ be substituted by
+memberships in professional, social, political, industrial or
+ideological organizations.
+
+The Chancellor of the Reich can decree that class-organizations which
+have been recognized by the law should belong corporatively to the
+German Labor Front.
+
+
+                               Article 2
+
+The aim of the German Labor Front is to create a true social and
+productive community of all Germans [Volks- und Leistungsgemeinschaft].
+
+Its task is to see that every single individual should be able to take
+his place in the industrial life of the nation in that intellectual or
+physical capacity which enables him to perform maximum work and thus
+guarantees a maximum of benefit for the community of the nation.
+
+
+                               Article 3
+
+The German Labor Front is a branch of the NSDAP according to the Law
+for Securing the Unity of Party and State, issued on 1 December 1933.
+(According to the law, issued 29 March 1935, the DAF will be designated
+as an affiliated organization [Verband] of the NSDAP. The editor.)
+
+
+                      Leadership and Organization
+
+
+                               Article 4
+
+The NSDAP has the leadership of the German Labor Front.
+
+The Staff leader of the Political Organization [PO] is the leader
+of the German Labor Front. He is assigned by the Fuehrer and Reich
+Chancellor.
+
+He assigns and dismisses the other leaders of the German Labor Front.
+
+These posts should be given in the first place to members of the
+existing branches of the NSBO and of the NS-Hago [NS Handelsund
+Gewerkbetreibenden Organization, or the National Socialist Organization
+of Tradesmen and Commercial Men] who are in the NSDAP, and further to
+members of the SA and SS.
+
+
+                               Article 5
+
+The regional organization of the German Labor Front corresponds to that
+of the NSDAP.
+
+The aim toward an organic order as laid down in the program of the
+NSDAP determines the professional organization of the German Labor
+Front.
+
+The staff leader of the Political Organization determines the regional
+and professional organization of the German Labor Front; they will be
+published in the service book of the German Labor Front. [In the 1943
+edition the following is added: “Organization Book of the NSDAP”].
+
+
+                               Article 6
+
+The accounts [Kassenfuehrung] of the German Labor Front are under
+the control of the treasurer of the NSDAP on the basis of the first
+executive decree to the law securing the unity of Party and State,
+issued 23 March 1934.
+
+
+                                 Tasks
+
+
+                               Article 7
+
+The German Labor Front has to secure the peace of labor by creating
+understanding among the enterprise leaders for the justified claims of
+their following [Gefolgschaft] understanding among the following for
+the situation and possibilities of their enterprise.
+
+The German Labor Front has the task of finding the common basis between
+the justified interests of all participants which is in accordance with
+the national socialistic basic principles and which reduces the number
+of the cases which are to be referred to the State agencies alone in
+charge on the basis of the law of 20 January 1934.
+
+It is the exclusive task of the German Labor Front to represent all the
+parties which are required for the conciliation. It is prohibited to
+create other organizations in this domain or to permit their activities
+in this field.
+
+
+                               Article 8
+
+The German Labor Front is the carrier of the National Socialist
+Organization “Strength Through Joy.”
+
+The German Labor Front has to provide for professional training.
+
+Furthermore, it has to fulfill the tasks which have been assigned to it
+by the law of 20 January 1934.
+
+
+                               Article 9
+
+The property of the former organizations as mentioned in Article 1
+of this decree, including their help and compensation organizations,
+property managements and industrial enterprises, constitutes the
+property of the German Labor Front. This property is the original
+capital for the self-help organization of the German Labor Front.
+
+The German Labor Front, through its self-help organization, should
+guarantee the existence of each of its members in emergency cases
+in order to facilitate the progress of the most qualified Germans
+[Volksgenossen] or to help them to secure an independent life, if
+possible, on their own ground and soil.
+
+
+                               Article 10
+
+This order becomes valid on the day of its publication.
+
+Berlin, 24 October 1934.
+
+                                            Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor
+                                                            Adolf Hitler
+
+
+My decree, issued 24 October 1934 about the German Labor Front will be
+changed so that Article 4 will read as follows:
+
+
+                      Leadership and Organization
+
+
+                               Article 4
+
+The NSDAP has the leadership of the German Labor Front. The Reich
+Organization Leader of the NSDAP is the leader of the German Labor
+Front. He is designated by the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor.
+
+He designates and dismisses the other leaders of the German Labor Front.
+
+These posts should be given in the first place to members of the
+branches NSBO and NS Hago who are in the NSDAP and further to members
+of the SA and SS.
+
+_Furthermore_: In Article 5, Par. 3, the word “Staff Leader of the PO”
+will be substituted by _“Reich Organization Leader” of the NSDAP_.
+
+Berlin, November 12, 1934.
+
+                                            Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor
+                                                            Adolf Hitler
+
+
+                                 PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2273-PS
+
+                                 Draft
+
+                               TOP SECRET
+
+                         [Geheime Reichssache]
+
+                       SPECIAL PURPOSE GROUP “A”
+
+                           [Einsatzgruppe A]
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+
+                                  III
+
+                                  Jews
+
+The systematic mopping up of the Eastern Territories embraced, in
+accordance with the basic orders, the complete removal if possible, of
+Jewry. This goal has been substantially attained--with the exception
+of White Russia--as a result of the execution up to the present time
+of 229,052 Jews (see Appendix). The remainder still left in the Baltic
+Provinces is urgently required as labour and housed in Ghettos.
+
+To attain this object various kinds of measures were necessary in the
+different areas of the [Ostland].
+
+In the three Baltic States of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, Jewry did
+not make itself decisively felt until the Bolsheviks had come into
+power there. But even before that the Jewish influence on the one hand
+and the anti-Jewish feeling of the population on the other hand, were
+very strong.
+
+In the following the various areas of the Eastern Territories will be
+dealt with separately:
+
+1. _Estonia_
+
+As Estonia, until the middle of the last century, was part of a
+closed zone of the Russian Empire, into which it was forbidden for
+Jews to immigrate, the number of Jews in the country has always been
+insignificant.
+
+At the beginning of 1940 there were living in Estonia about 4,500
+Jews out of a total population of 1.2 millions. Their influence on
+the economic life of the country was considerably stronger than the
+proportion of Jews to the whole population. For instance 11% of
+Estonian industry was in Jewish hands. During the Bolshevik time it
+is true Jewish private property was nationalized, but nevertheless
+the Jews themselves were almost everywhere left as Directors of their
+former enterprises. By means of connections with the NKWD the Jews got
+themselves into a very strong position. They controlled the Press,
+cultural institutions, forced their way into the open professions,
+and were the only minority besides the Germans to have the right to
+cultural autonomy.
+
+With the advance of the German troops the majority of the Jews,
+together with the Soviet-Russian authorities, left the country. Approx.
+2,000 Jews remained behind in the country. Out of these almost 1,000
+lived in Reval alone.
+
+The Estonian Self Protection Movement [Selbstschutz], formed as
+the Germans advanced, did begin to arrest Jews, but there were no
+spontaneous pogroms. Only by the Security Police and the SD were the
+Jews gradually executed as they became no longer required for work.
+
+Today there are no longer any Jews in Estonia.
+
+2. _Latvia_
+
+The total number of Jews in Latvia amounted in June 1935 to 93,479 or
+4.79% of the total population.
+
+When the Bolsheviks came into power in Latvia in June 1940, their
+Soviet-Russian racial comrades succeeded in obtaining authoritative
+influence for the Latvian Jews, who previously had been predominantly
+Zionist. Whereas before 1940 there were no Jews as State officials in
+Latvia, in fact were no Jews in the State Administration at all, in
+the Soviet Russian Republic all the influential State positions were
+quickly in the hands of the Jews. Half of the total number of Judges
+were Jewish. The number was up to 80% in the Higher Courts and in
+particular on the Tribunal. Equally strong was the influence of the
+Jews on the economy and cultural life.
+
+When the German troops marched in there were still 70,000 Jews in
+Latvia. The remainder had fled with the Bolsheviks. The Jews left
+behind were actively engaged in sabotage and setting fire to places. In
+Duenaburg so many fires of this kind were started by the Jews that a
+large part of the Town was destroyed.
+
+After the terror of the Jewish-Bolshevik rule--altogether 33,038 Letts
+were transported, imprisoned or murdered--an extensive pogrom carried
+out by the population might have been expected. In fact, however,
+only a few thousand Jews were eliminated by local forces on their
+own initiative. In Latvia it was necessary to carry out extensive
+mopping-up operations by means of Sonderkommandos with the help of
+forces picked from the Latvian Auxiliary Police (mostly relations of
+the Letts who had been carried off or murdered).
+
+Up to October 1941 approximately 30,000 Jews had been executed by
+these Sonderkommandos. The remaining Jews who were still indispensable
+from the economic point of view were collected in Ghettos, which were
+established in Riga, Duenaburg and Libau.
+
+As a result of punishments instituted for not wearing the Jewish
+star, black market, thieving, fraud, but also to prevent the danger
+of epidemics in the Ghettos, further executions were subsequently
+carried out. In this way 11,034 Jews were executed in Duenaburg on
+9.11.41, and, as the result of an action ordered and carried out by
+high authorities and Police chiefs, 27,800 were executed in Riga at the
+beginning of December 1941, and, in the middle of December 1941, 2,350
+were executed in Libau. At the moment there are in the Ghettos (other
+than Jews from the Reich) Latvian Jews in
+
+  Riga approximately 2,500
+  Duenaburg approximately 950
+  Libau approximately 300.
+
+These are indispensable at the moment as they are specialized workers
+necessary for maintaining the country’s economy.
+
+3. _Lithuania_
+
+Until the Bolsheviks marched in, according to a census taken in 1923
+there were 153,743 Jews living in Lithuania, forming 7.58% of the total
+population. Whereas their influence had previously for the greater
+part been restricted to the business world, the Lithuanian Jews, who
+had already been working illegally for Bolshevism, now quickly became
+a dominating influence in public life. In particular Jews of both
+sexes supported the activities of the NKWD. The transporting of 40,000
+Lithuanians to Siberia is traceable to the preliminary work done by the
+Jews.
+
+When the German troops marched in the Lithuanians expressed their
+hatred of the Jews in active pogroms, at the same time Jewish communist
+youths set fire to many towns, through which the German armoured units
+had passed leaving them little damaged, by means of tins of petrol
+which they had previously put ready.
+
+As a result of the pogroms carried out by the Lithuanians, who were
+nevertheless substantially assisted by Sipo and SD, 3,800 Jews in Kauen
+and 1,200 in the smaller towns were eliminated.
+
+Where Jews were able to escape they were not infrequently handed over
+to the authorities by the farmers.
+
+These spontaneous mopping-up actions were, however, insufficient to
+stabilize this rear section of the Front, and at the same time the
+enthusiasm of the local inhabitants waned.
+
+Therefore by means of selected units--mostly in the proportion of
+1:8--first of all the prisons, and then systematically district by
+district the Lithuanian sector was cleansed of Jews of both sexes.
+Altogether 136,421 people were liquidated in a great number of single
+actions. It is worthy of note that many of the Jews used force against
+the officials and Lithuanian auxiliaries who were carrying this out,
+and before their execution still expressed their Bolshevik convictions
+by cheering Stalin and abusing Germany.
+
+As the complete liquidation of the Jews was not feasible as they were
+needed for labour, Ghettos were formed which at the moment are occupied
+as follows:
+
+  Kauen    approximately 15,000 Jews.
+  Wilna    approximately 15,000 Jews.
+  Schaulen approximately  4,500 Jews.
+
+These Jews are used primarily for work of military importance. For
+example up to 5,000 Jews are employed in 3 shifts on the aerodrome near
+Kauen on earth-works and work of that sort.
+
+4. _White Russia_
+
+The White Russian Sector is more thickly populated by Jews than all the
+other States in the Ostland. In the year 1926, far more than 400,000
+Jews were counted in the then BSSR. The last Polish census showed more
+than 500,000 Jews in the provinces [Wojwodschaften] of Bialystock, Nowo
+Grodlek, Polesien and Wilna. These figures are however approximate and
+most certainly too low, which is further apparent from the fact that
+far more people have given “Yiddish” as their mother tongue than there
+were supposed to be Jews counted in the same area. Quite half of the
+Jews in the White Russian Settlement Area lived at the beginning of
+the war in the larger towns. Minsk was occupied to a very particular
+extent by Jews, in 1939 there were approximately 100,000 out of a total
+population of 238,000.
+
+The social structure of the Jews shows a broad lower stratum of very
+poor Jews, both in the area formerly Polish, and in the White Russian
+Sector which was Bolshevik before the Russo-Polish war.
+
+The proportionately thin upper stratum dominated simply every sphere
+of life in the former Polish sector, mainly as a result of its strong
+economic position, and in the former Soviet-Russian sector as a result
+of their influence in the leading party positions. The Jew in the area
+formerly Polish is a particularly dangerous element, because of his
+intelligence and activity. But even the Soviet-Russian Jew has during
+the 25 years of Bolshevik domination assumed a very self-sufficient and
+arrogant air, which he has even retained after the entry of the German
+troops.
+
+The final and fundamental elimination of the Jews remaining in the
+White Russian sector after the entry of the Germans is fraught with
+certain difficulties. Just in this place the Jews form an extremely
+high percentage of the specialized workers, who are indispensable
+because of the shortage in other reserves in this area.
+
+Furthermore Einsatzgruppe A did not take over this area until after the
+heavy frost had set in, which made mass executions much more difficult.
+A further difficulty is that the Jews live widely scattered over the
+whole country. In view of the enormous distances, the bad conditions
+of the roads, the shortage of vehicles and petrol and the small forces
+of Security Police and SD, it needs the utmost effort in order to be
+able to carry out shootings in the country. Nevertheless 41,000 Jews
+have been shot up to now. This number does not include those shot in
+operations by the former Einsatzkommandos. From estimated figures
+about 19,000 partisans and criminals, that is in the majority Jews,
+were shot by the Armed Forces [Wehrmacht] up to December 1941. At the
+moment approximately 128,000 Jews must still be reckoned with in the
+area of the Commissariat-General. In Minsk itself--exclusive of Reich
+Germans--there are about 1,800 Jews living, whose shooting must be
+postponed in consideration of their being used as labour.
+
+The Commander in White Russia is instructed to liquidate the Jewish
+question as soon as possible, despite the difficult situation. However
+a period of about 2 months is still required--according to the weather.
+
+The shutting up of all the remaining Jews in special Ghettos is also
+almost completed in the towns in White Russia too. They will be used
+for work to the fullest extent by the authorities of the Armed Forces,
+the Civil Administration and German Authorities.
+
+The feeding of the Jews in the Ghettos causes considerable difficulty,
+especially in White Russia but also in Lithuania. Together with the
+general decrease in working capacity, there is increased susceptibility
+to all contagious diseases.
+
+5. _Jews from the Reich._
+
+Since December 1940 transports containing Jews have arrived at short
+intervals from the Reich. Of these 20,000 Jews were directed to Riga
+and 7,000 Jews to Minsk. The first 10,000 Jews evacuated to Riga were
+housed partly in a provisionally erected reception camp and partly in
+a newly established hut encampment near Riga. The remaining transports
+have for the time being been directed into a separate part of the Riga
+Ghetto.
+
+The building of the hut encampment, as a result of the employment of
+all Jews fit for work, is so advanced that all evacuated Jews who
+survive the winter can be put into this camp in the spring.
+
+Only a small section of the Jews from the Reich is capable of
+working. About 70-80% are women and children or old people unfit for
+work. The death rate is rising continually, also as a result of the
+extraordinarily hard winter.
+
+The amount done by those few Jews from the Reich who are fit for work
+is satisfactory. They are preferred as labour to the Russian Jews,
+because they are German speaking and because of their _comparatively_
+greater cleanliness. Worthy of note is the adaptability of the Jews,
+with which they attempt to form their life in accordance with the
+circumstances.
+
+The crowding together of the Jews into the smallest space, which occurs
+in all the Ghettos, naturally causes greater danger of epidemics, which
+is being combatted as much as possible by the employment of Jewish
+doctors. In isolated instances sick Jews with contagious diseases were
+selected under the pretext of putting them into a home for the aged or
+a hospital and executed.
+
+       #       #       #       #       #
+
+CHART [See Chart _Number 4_ in the last volume of this publication.]
+
+                                                 Judenfrei--free of Jews
+
+       Jewish Executions carried out by Special Purpose Group A.
+
+           Estimated number of Jews still remaining--128,000.
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2275-PS
+
+               THE GERMAN LABOR FRONT. NATURE--AIM--MEANS
+
+[Die deutsche Arbeitsfront. Wesen--Ziel--Wege] Issued by the Scientific
+Labor Institute of the German Labor Front. Published by the Publishing
+House of the German Labor Front, 1943
+
+[Footnote, page 11].
+
+More than nine-tenths of all working Germans are members of the German
+Labor Front. Shortly before the outbreak of war the German Labor Front
+had 23 million individual members in the then Reich territory. In
+addition there were corporate members [Korporative Mitglieder], the
+number of which can be estimated at 10 millions after eliminating all
+multiple memberships.
+
+The members of such organizations are “corporatively” affiliated to
+the German Labor Front which have collectively joined the German Labor
+Front on the basis of special agreements. But the members of such
+organizations can nevertheless become individual members of the German
+Labor Front.
+
+Among others the members of the following organizations are
+“corporative” members of the German Labor Front: Reich Chamber
+of Culture; Reich Food Estate; Reich League of Graduate Farmers;
+Organization of Trade Economy; Experts’ Council on Public Health;
+Attorneys’ League; Reich League of German Civil Servants; National
+Socialist Teachers’ League; Reich Labor Service; Armed Forces; Nurses’
+Association. In other words, practically all important professional or
+economic organizations have led their members into the German Labor
+Front.
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2276-PS
+
+               THE GERMAN LABOR FRONT. NATURE--AIM--MEANS
+
+[Die deutsche Arbeitsfront. Wesen--Ziel--Wege] Issued by the Scientific
+Labor Institute of the German Labor Front. Published by the Publishing
+House of the German Labor Front, 1943
+
+[Page 55].
+
+During the years from 1933 to 1939 everything necessary had been done
+in secrecy [in aller Stille] that seemed necessary to the conservation
+of the nation in the anticipated clash with an envious surrounding
+world. As always, when taking precautionary defense measures in a
+newly-won field, it was not possible here either to plan in a way that
+would be satisfactory. It was necessary to check what was on hand, and
+build with that the most essential and the momentarily most useful. It
+could not be obviated that the result, measured with the yardstick of
+what had been planned for the future, would appear modest and perhaps
+even inadequate.
+
+It has not always been simple for those charged with practical social
+work to master satisfactorily the juxtaposition of old, scantily mended
+institutions and new ones. But certainly it was even more difficult
+for the biggest part of the people to see how the effort supported by
+it was, year after year, applied to tasks which initially necessitated
+renunciation after renunciation. After all, it seemed like a small
+matter to apply the energies released by the National Socialist
+revolution to the improvement of social conditions desired for so long.
+Instead the leadership chosen by the people and over again confirmed
+by it, channeled all its strength into armaments [Wehrhaftigkeit].
+And--won the consent especially of those sections of the people who had
+had to suffer most from social conditions prevailing up to then.
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2277-PS
+
+                               STATEMENT
+
+of Gustav Schiefer, born 17 July 1876, residence: Munich 9, No. 3
+Armanspergstrasse, about what happened to him when the Nazis came on 9
+March 1933.
+
+I was employed as part time worker [Hilfsarbeiter] by the former Trade
+Union Society, Munich, beginning 11 November 1911. During the years
+1914-1918, I was in the World War.
+
+After the revolution in November 1918 I was elected Executive Chairman
+of the General German Trade Union Association [Allgemeiner Deutcher
+Gewerkschaftsbund], Local Committee, Munich. I held this position
+without interruption until 9 March 1933.
+
+On that day the Nazis stormed the Munich Trade Union Headquarters
+Building, 40/42 Pestalozzistrasse. The offices remained closed until
+15 March. On 13 March my late colleague Erhard Kupfer, former District
+Secretary of the General German Trade Union Association [ADGB] and I
+had to report to the, then, State Commissar Wagner, and were ordered
+to reopen the Munich Trade Union Headquarters Building, and with it
+the offices, by 15 March, and to resume normal activity within the
+framework of the trade unions.
+
+Since I was at the same time chairman of the Munich Trade Union
+Headquarters Building, Inc., it became my task to take over the house
+in its entirety, and with it the individual offices of the trade unions.
+
+Because safes and strong-boxes, in fact everything that was locked,
+had been smashed open, and because safes and tills, in the main, were
+empty, I refused to take over the house and offices in their present
+condition. I stated that I would take over the house only in the
+condition in which it was when it was taken away from us on 9 March.
+
+The house had been taken over on 9 March 1933 by Herr Kurt Frey, and
+returned to us on 15 March by the former executive secretary of the
+Hotel, Restaurant, etc. Employees’ Association, Herr Reichart. This
+Nazi, with whom I did not get along too well because of his equivocal
+attitude, believed that the opportunity had arrived to wreak his
+vengeance on me.
+
+I was dragged to the great hall, paper and pencil put before me with
+the challenge to designate these Nazis who had committed thefts during
+the period of 9 to 15 March 1933. I could not do that, since I did
+not know the individuals. As I refused my signature about 10 Nazis
+beat me promiscuously and indiscriminately until I collapsed. Upon
+that they seized me and threw me into the bottom of the light shaft
+of the Trade Union Headquarters Building. After lying there for
+some time I summoned up my strength and tried to rouse myself. When
+the Nazis noted that, they again dragged me into the hall and beat
+me until I collapsed and fainted. My colleagues Josef Gessl, former
+executive secretary of the Cobblers’ Association, and Richard Moses,
+employee of the General Mutual Benefit Local Pay Office [Allgemeine
+Ortskrankenkasse], Munich, grabbed me and brought me in this condition
+to the Munich-Schwabing hospital. In addition to many other injuries,
+Professor Dr. Kerschensteiner, director of this institution, diagnosed
+serious concussion of the brain with hemorrhage into the brain. I
+remained from 15 March to 5 May 1933. On 5 May the Precinct Physician,
+at that time already a Nazi, certified that I was sufficiently fit for
+arrest. On 5 May I was transported to the Ettstrasse Police Prison, and
+from there to Stadelheim. I remained in Stadelheim until 25 August 1933.
+
+It is due to an extraordinarily fortunate circumstance that I was
+saved from Dachau in 1933. Medical Privy Councillor Dr. Geisendoerfer,
+who was chief physician in Stadelheim, knew me from the Cooperative
+Sickness Benefit movement (I had been on the Committee of the General
+Mutual Insurance Local Pay Office [Allgemeine Ortskrankenkasse],
+Munich, for 25 years). Through the many negotiations with the physician
+I had been in close touch with the above-named gentleman. During my
+stay in Stadelheim the Gestapo had me examined five times by the chief
+physician, who always held a protective hand over me, and to whom
+I am also indebted for my early release, due to a serious illness
+(intestinal gap of 15 cm depth and 7-8 cm length).
+
+I was then sick and unable to work until 24 December 1933. On that day
+I was sent away by the Trustee Physician of the General Mutual Benefit
+Local Pay Office, Munich (city), in spite of my request to allow me
+to draw sickness benefits until the eve of the New Year. He said that
+there was no reason to grant the request. As far as I know this Trustee
+Physician was Medical Councillor Dr. Plate.
+
+I was then unemployed until May/June 1934 and then accepted various
+jobs as representative. After my release from Stadelheim I had to
+report to the police every third day for almost 2 years. Constant
+police supervision was one of the simplest cases of chicanery.
+
+Upon the initiative of my colleague Wilhelm Leuschner, Berlin, I
+joined the movement against the Nazi system in good time; and it was
+exclusively due to the steadfastness of my colleague Leuschner that I,
+like many other friends, am still alive.
+
+After the assassination attempt on Hitler on 20 July 1944, I was again
+arrested and shipped to Dachau Concentration Camp. As is well known,
+that project was called “Gitter.”
+
+On 6 October 1944 I was released without any interrogation. I was
+extraordinarily fortunate. Since 2 May 1945 I am again active, in the
+trade union as well as the political movement and also in social work
+and life.
+
+As witnesses for the correctness of my statements I name the persons
+already mentioned above, who brought me to the Schwabing hospital
+(Josef Gessl and Richard Moses).
+
+And how decent were we once more in the year 1945. Not a hair on the
+head of any of these swine was harmed on behalf of the trade unions.
+We bore witness, and still bear witness today, for human dignity and
+justice.
+
+Other liberated colleagues of the Free Trade Unions got away with
+beatings in the cellar of the Trade Union Headquarters Building in the
+beginning. Among others my colleague, Anton Friebl, now living at 4
+Gabrielenstrasse, 2nd floor. Many deceased colleagues, such as Georg
+Kandlbinder, Josef Ertl, Heinrich Gassner and many others.
+
+                                                 Munich, 17 October 1945
+                                                    [signed] G. SCHIEFER
+
+Today on the 19th of November 1945, I have reread and signed every
+single page of the statement given by me on 17 October 1945. I declare
+hereby under oath that this statement is true.
+
+                                              [signed] _Gustav Schiefer_
+                                                         Gustav Schiefer
+
+  SWORN TO BEFORE ME this 19th day of November 1945, Munich, Germany.
+
+                                        [signed] Kurt A. Baer, 0-1041959
+                                                            Captain, CAC
+
+                                        3rd Military Government Regiment
+                                                     APO 403, U. S. Army
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2278-PS
+
+ Official tour of Reich Minister Dr. Seyss-Inquart to the districts of
+   Warsaw, Lublin, and Radom from 17th November to 22nd November 1939
+
+Those taking part were:
+
+1. Reich Minister Dr. Seyss-Inquart.
+
+2. Dr. Sild.
+
+3. Dr. Rahn, department of food and agriculture in the office of the
+General Governor.
+
+4. Legation Councillor [LGR] Dr. Goetze, economic department. 17.11.
+Departure at 7.0 a.m. from Burg Cracow in a car. To Warsaw via
+Mislowitz, Sosnowitz, Czestochau, Radomsko, Petrikau, Lodz, Tomaszow
+and Rawa. Arrival 1.0 p.m. Received by the governor, Dr. Fischer and
+the gentlemen of his staff, followed by a small luncheon party.
+
+At 3.0 p.m., Reich Minister Dr. Seyss-Inquart addressed the department
+heads of the District Chief and stated, among other things, that the
+chief guiding rule for carrying out the German administration in the
+General Government must be solely the interests of the German Reich. A
+stern and inflexible administration must make the area of use to German
+economy and so that excessive clemency may be guarded against, the
+results of the intrusion of the Polish race into German territory must
+be brought to mind.
+
+Following that the Reich Minister held conferences with the governor,
+Dr. Fischer, and Section Head, Dr. Barth, on administrative and
+economic questions; later on, experts and heads of departments were
+called into the conferences to make reports.
+
+Among other specifications, Dr. Fischer submitted to the Reich Minister
+the specification attached to the plan for the preliminary arrangement
+of the departments in the office of the District Chief and of the
+authorities in Warsaw.
+
+Dr. Fischer reported that, in particular, the number of personnel was
+still considerably too small. Three out of 14 Sub-Prefects [Landraete]
+were also missing. Of the departments in the District Office, only
+a few had their full complement; that was also the case with the
+department of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda and the Labour
+department. Of important experts, there were still none for taxes and
+monopolies. In the Health Service, one medical advisor was, at the
+same time, head of the Health Department and district physician. The
+accommodation of the authorities also left much still to be desired.
+
+Reich Minister Seyss-Inquart then stated that a large sum for the
+productive support of unemployed would be made available. This sum
+could be used for erecting or repairing any buildings required by the
+administration.
+
+The governor, Dr. F., reported that further German administrative
+and municipal officials were also required for the administration of
+the city of Warsaw. Then a discussion took place on the organization
+of the district authorities, the occupation of the rural districts
+[Landkreise] and on the question of transferring the remaining 5
+communities of the Gtojec district from the district of Radom, and a
+further 5 communities of the Garwolin district from the district of
+Lublin, to the district of Warsaw. Reich Minister S. I. promised to
+look into this affair. After that, general questions on the division
+and personnel to occupy the districts were discussed. Reich Minister
+S. I. agreed that should the District captain [Kreishauptmann]
+not be a lawyer the best arrangement for a district captaincy
+[Kreishauptmannschaft] was to assign to him a representative who was
+trained in legal matters. Dr. Fischer reported that, up to now, the
+German administration had been set up as essentially a supervising
+authority over a Polish administration. Questions arose from this as
+to what range of subjects should be included in the functions of the
+District chief. It was superfluous to draw up any building regulations,
+for should accommodation be had, it concerned only the Poles
+themselves. Then the question of using Polish employees at the German
+administrative courts was touched upon. There were some 300 Polish
+employees working at the office of the District Chief of Warsaw. The
+administration by the German authorities would have especially to serve
+for the utilization of the Government’s sphere for German economy, so
+the administration of agriculture, Labour, and Roads especially would
+have to be well-ordered, on the other hand, trade, settlements, or even
+the accountancy of the Polish communities are of less importance.
+
+Dr. Fischer then raised the question of prices. Price commissars were
+to be sent from the Reich and they would equalize the standard of
+prices with that in the Reich. Wages would then, however, have to be
+adapted to his standard and this might have unforeseen consequences.
+Reich Minister S. I., on the other hand, stated that Generaloberst v.
+Brauchitsch wished to place army orders for textiles cheaply in Lodz
+and suitable industrial centres. Dr. F. thought that higher prices had
+their good points as at Warsaw, for instance which had only been fed
+because of higher prices which gave the farmers an incentive to bring
+their goods into the city. Thereupon, Reich Minister S. I. put the
+question of how a definite influence could be obtained on the price
+system and on the system of distributing goods by setting up monopolies
+for essential goods such as salt, sugar, coal, petrol, and tobacco.
+If these goods are in one’s hands and if it be possible to make them
+available to the farmer for a definite price, he would also be prepared
+to sell his products for a corresponding price in order to obtain
+the goods he requires. Moreover for the time being it could not be
+a question of furnishing better living conditions for the Poles, but
+merely of securing the minimum of existence for them. However, it could
+not be regarded in that light when a forced laborer was paid nine Zloty
+per week.
+
+Hereupon Reichsminister Dr. S.I. received the report of the City
+President [Stadtpraesidenten] of Warsaw, Dr. Dengel. He declared the
+problem of the unemployed to be the most urgent one. Until now taxes
+to the amount of 150,000 RM had been received, but this would not be
+nearly sufficient, not even for the reconstruction of the most urgently
+needed public buildings. The city budget was now in preparation, but
+already it became apparent, that a loan to the amount of 50,000,000
+Zloty from the Reich Credit Bank [Reichskreditkasse], was needed.
+Sufficient city property was available as security, of which an
+inventory was being prepared. Later on the tax revenue would probably
+be sufficient for regular interest on the loan. Regarding the tax
+system, the City President reported that the cities received shares and
+additional payments over and above the remittances [Ueberweisungen] of
+State taxes, about the same as in the old Austria. The administration
+of property taxes would be partially difficult, since during this
+mix-up no status of persons or assets could be established.
+
+On the question being put by Reichsminister Dr. S.I. the City President
+reported that in Warsaw about 40% of the buildings would be again
+habitable, after part of them had been repaired. Dr. F. thought,
+one would leave one quarter of the destroyed city for inspection,
+but otherwise lay out grass plots in place of the debris. The City
+President then mentioned the question of the Polish City officials.
+For their necessities they have been receiving so far up to 250 Zlotys
+a month and those with higher salaries half of the surplus up to 1200
+Zloty. Dr. F. pointed to the decree of the Governor General, whereby
+100% of the basic salaries and not over 1,000 Zloty could be paid. The
+activity of the banks was then mentioned. Stocks in gold, precious
+metals, and foreign currencies had been delivered by them to the
+Reichsbank. The inhabitants were obliged to deposit all their money at
+the bank, withdrawals depending on the approval of the City President.
+Dr. F. explained that the banking system was now attached to the
+Department of Economic Affairs at the office of the District Chief.
+
+The City President now reported on welfare questions. Specific
+difficulties had arisen from the sudden departure, on higher authority,
+of the relief train Bavaria. Workers who could buy no food for
+themselves, were frequently unable to continue working. The welfare
+service of the NSV confined itself to the racial Germans, whereby
+certain difficulties were caused by the question of determining who
+were racial Germans, of which about nine to ten thousand were now
+living in Warsaw. Jews were not aided, even out of municipal funds.
+
+For the care of the Poles, the Polish social Self-Help was to be
+called into activity again, and was to be continued by the men who
+had formerly directed it. The supervisor was to be supplied, against
+payment, with motor cars and trucks with fuel, and permission was to be
+granted to the organization to accept voluntary contributions in the
+country. The confiscated bank accounts of about 9,000,000 Zloty are to
+be at the disposal of the organization.
+
+The City President then pointed to the absolute necessity of the
+speediest establishment of criminal justice officials as well as a
+civil court. An orderly continuation of economic life depended on the
+latter. He then also reported on the Court of Corporal Punishment
+[Pruegelstrafengericht], which had been established for the punishment
+of crimes amongst the Poles.
+
+Dr. F. pointed out that possibly greater treasures might be hidden in
+the Jewish quarter.
+
+Reichsminister S.I. commented then that the building up of the
+administration to be effected in Poland, was a good school for those
+participating in it.
+
+The ideal arrangement would be that a Party man with strong initiative
+should stand at the head of the administration, at whose side would be
+experts and an experienced administrator, in order to include the work
+in the general system.
+
+The head of the department, Labour Oberregierungsrat Dr. Espe then
+spoke. He expressed the hope that it would later on be possible to
+exchange forced labor by normal labor. There was a definite lack of
+tools; he had therefore started a small factory for the manufacture of
+tools, and now construction of the most primitive sort was going on at
+the airport and on the highways. The question of transport was the most
+important and would have to be tackled ahead of the clearing-up work.
+At present a survey was being made of all undertakings which were at
+all capable of production, and, after the Reich had decided what was to
+be manufactured, they were to begin operations. Possibly three shifts
+were to work in these factories to equalize the destruction.
+
+A difficult problem was the multitude of the new unemployed Polish
+intellectuals. The students could still be trained in handicraft, but
+for the 80,000 to 90,000 Polish officials, one must, if occasion
+arises, revert to reconstruction of the Polish Administration
+Departments.
+
+Reichminister S.I. then stated clearly that a second Polish
+subadministration would be considered by the German authorities solely
+in the form of a welfare organization.
+
+Oberregierungsrat Dr. Espe remarked that the activity of the sick fund
+and of social welfare would largely be dependent on the functionaries
+of the railroad and postal systems. Both welfare branches were
+controlled by a head institution for social security which was already
+again showing a certain profit. The administrative office could also be
+rebuilt with available materials. The property of the head institution
+is said to have been largely transferred to Russia in the form of
+securities. Fortunately, it was largely a question of mortgages, which
+could be declared invalid.
+
+As an added difficulty, Oberregierungsrat Dr. Espe then also mentioned
+that wages had been brought down below the former level, due to surplus
+labour.
+
+Reichsminister Dr. S.I. asked if the proclaimed tariffs were really
+to be enforced. In any case no official Polish State should be set
+up. Oberregierungsrat Dr. Espe thought that, on the basis of tax
+collection, this decree was advantageous, and one could naturally not
+suffer the obvious ignoring of regulations which we had promulgated.
+Reichsminister Dr. S.I. thought that this was no further problem east
+of the Reich border. One could, at an opportune moment, seize upon a
+case of border violation for corresponding exemplary and also otherwise
+useful action.
+
+Then the representative of the Reich Railways at the office of
+the District Chief, Oberreichs Bahnrat Prasch, appeared to give a
+report. He said now that military transport had come to an end,
+traffic from the west was going on well. Also trains to Cracow went
+through Kattowitz. The number of locomotives taken over was fairly
+satisfactory, the major part, however, had gone to Russia where they
+possibly would not even be needed because of the change in the railway
+gauge, which had already been started to great extent. Trains were
+already going to Lublin, also. Today, two railroad bridges were in
+operation. Reichsminister S.I. pointed out that, above all, the tracks
+to Cracow which do not go through Kattowitz, had to be restored in
+order that the necessary gasoline and petroleum could be brought
+from the oil field region to Warsaw. Admittedly, an increased amount
+of suitable freight cars was still necessary, but that could be
+accomplished by repairing the existing damaged tank cars.
+
+The director of the “Trade Economy” Department, Regierungsrat Dr.
+von Coelln now came forward to give a report. He stated that, in the
+district of Warsaw, almost all branches of industry were represented.
+French and Dutch capital was invested in the oil field enterprises. Dr.
+von Coelln then said that in the district of Warsaw still considerable
+supplies of raw materials were stored in soap factories. These soap
+factories should again be put into operation. The produced soap was
+made of a higher solution of fat acid than was at present stipulated
+in the Reich. Reichminister Dr. S. I. said the Order of the Governor
+General according to which the factories were permitted to produce
+one-third of their pre-war production, must be amended and the soap
+should be confiscated. Furthermore, it was agreed that war economic
+works, car factories, the chemical and optical industries, etc.,
+should be put quickly into operation. Dr. von Coelln then also raised
+the question of how the import and export between the Reich and the
+“Government” should be arranged, if the coal region with Sosnowic,
+Dabrowa, and Trzebinia also becomes German territory and, after the
+20th the control of foreign currencies and customs will be carried out.
+He then reported that the electrical plants in Warsaw were in working
+order. In spite of an order to the contrary, there were about 30 night
+clubs in Warsaw.
+
+Of primary importance was the question of safeguarding the still
+existing supplies of soap, tea, etc. The control of such goods as
+petroleum, light, salt, fertilizers, etc., by some method of monopoly,
+could best be accomplished through consumer cooperatives.
+
+Now appeared State Farmer Leader Koerner. He reported that the
+supplying of Warsaw with food from Lublin and Radom must be made to
+operate better. Up to now, Warsaw had been supplied in that respect by
+Posen. Five thousand tons of grain were now going to be supplied to
+Warsaw, 15,000 of which were already on the way. 20% of the grain in
+the “Government” was destroyed through military action. There was also
+a shortage of meat and similar commodities. In this case, however, as
+a matter of principle, nothing should be sent in from the Reich. Until
+the next harvest, the Polish population should be principally provided
+with sufficient amounts of grain and potatoes only. It would take about
+from 3 to 4 years to build up the stock of cattle again. The prices
+of grain should be kept on a level of from 25 to 30% above those of 1
+September 1939. Such prices were sufficient for the farmers.
+
+At 8.00 P. M. supper with the commanding officer of the city garrison.
+
+18. 11. 8 o’clock departure from Hotel Europejski in Warsaw for a drive
+of inspection within the Warsaw district accompanied by the Governor
+Dr. Fischer. Survey of the destroyed bridges over the Bug at Wyszkow,
+and then on via Lochow to Ostrow.
+
+At Ostrow visit to the Sub-Prefect [Landrat] von Boehnau, who reports
+on his work to Reichsminister Dr. Seyss-Inquart. Boehnau sees a
+special difficulty in the fact that the administrative services of the
+Wehrmacht will be recalled in the very near future. The Sub-Prefects
+[Landraete] have relied mainly on these units. After they have gone
+away they will be very short of labor.
+
+In the Ostrow district there are also special food difficulties to be
+noted, since the district on whose agricultural authorities Ostrow’s
+supplies depended was said to have come under the Russians. There was
+some talk that the Russians here would withdraw 5 kilometers.
+
+A particular nuisance also was the badly guarded frontier, due to the
+shortage of police, which made possible a continuous uncontrolled
+running backwards and forwards, and a considerable removal of property,
+particularly by the Jews.
+
+After Ostrow the refugee camp at Malkinia was visited in which there
+were no refugees at the time. It was reported that up to now about
+10,000 German nationals had crossed over the frontier there. Frequently
+displaced Germans from Posen and West Prussia were concerned. Near
+the frontier we saw the countless Jews and similar rabble that were
+on the 200 meters or so of no man’s land between the German and the
+Russian frontier posts waiting to cross over into Russian Territory
+in the darkness. Frequently it is said the Russians themselves bring
+such refugees back again after a few days. Recently 150 Tax collectors
+have arrived who will be installed in this section. Above all it is
+essential that when the administrative services of the Wehrmacht leave,
+replacements should be put in in good time.
+
+The police officer reported that when settling the frontier zone of
+interests the Russian officers made an excellent impression and were
+distinctly better informed than the Germans were.
+
+After lunch at the Landrat von Boehnau’s in Ostrow we set out at 1400
+hours on the drive via Siedlce, Sokolow to Biala-Podlaska, where we
+spent the night at the operations command of the Security Service there.
+
+On 19.11. At 7.30 A. M. departure in the direction of Brest-Litovsk to
+the Bug frontier. We drove past the airdrome of Terespol where we could
+see numbers of airplanes destroyed by German bombers. The land there is
+partly marshy, the villages produce a distinctly Russian impression. In
+the afternoon we drove on from Biala via Radzyn, Lubartow to Lublin. On
+the way, lunch at Major General von Courbiere’s the commander of the
+213th Division.
+
+1900 hours, arrival in Lublin, received by the Governor, SS.
+Brigadefuehrer Schmidt, at the town council building where the
+Sub-Prefects, the divisional leaders and the police leaders attached to
+the District chief were gathered together.
+
+SS. Brigadefuehrer Schmidt welcomed the Reich Minister “in the
+easternmost corner of the territory of German interests.” Dr.
+Seyss-Inquart, after having had the collaborators of the Governor’s
+introduced, conveyed the good wishes of the Governor General whose
+forthcoming visit to Lublin he announced. He then expounded the
+Principles in accordance with which the administration in the
+“Government” must be conducted. This administration would require above
+all the ability to pull through on its own strength without being a
+burden to the Reich. This could be attained especially by the firm
+comradeship of the men stationed there. The resources and inhabitants
+of this country would have to be made of service to the Reich, and only
+within these Limits could they prosper. Independent political thought
+should no longer be allowed to develop. The Vistula area might perhaps
+be still more important to German destiny than the Rhine. The Minister
+then gave us a guiding theme to the District Leaders: We will further
+everything which is of service to the Reich and will put an end to
+everything which may harm the Reich. Dr. Seyss-Inquart then added, that
+the General Governor wished that those men who were fulfilling a task
+for the Reich here should receive a material post in keeping with their
+responsibility and achievements.
+
+Reichsminister Seyss-Inquart then touched on the question of
+Ukrainians, who could be allowed a certain cultural life of their own,
+which must never, however, be allowed to lead to a national movement.
+In conclusion Dr. Seyss-Inquart invited the District Leaders to bring
+their troubles and questions at any time to the Governor, so that he
+can find the best solution in cooperation with them.
+
+District Chef Schmidt replied that these political directives
+should also be worked out in the course of the present conference.
+Personality was more necessary for the tasks before them than the
+knowledge required for a usual administration. The area embracing the
+district of Lublin required special consideration, for on account of
+the resettlement it was a collecting point for Germans, who were no
+longer allowed to live in Germany, and for other destructive elements.
+Here iron firmness must be brought to bear. It would be a good idea
+if the General Governor were personally to gain an insight into the
+particular conditions existing in this region. Here also, a guard of
+collaborators was being trained, who would carry out the most valuable
+work in German Eastern Politics.
+
+We had dinner with SS. Sturmbannfuehrer Hasselberger where we also
+spent the night (until the arrival of Brigadefuehrer Globocznik, police
+Assistant to the District Chief).
+
+Hasselberger is of the opinion, in answering to questions by Minister
+Dr. Seyss-Inquart, that the (racial German) individual protection is an
+encumbrance. He did not dream it possible to organize the Ukrainians as
+an auxiliary Police Force.
+
+Nov. 20, 1939. 08.30 Sight-seeing tour of Lublin, University, Cracow
+Gate and the part of the city, built by the Germans--Old Lublin--as
+well as the prison. Then a conference with the District Chief. At first
+questions were discussed concerning the division into districts and
+the supplying with personnel of the offices of the District Leaders.
+Here also the lack of staff again stood first. Especially after the
+withdrawal of the construction battalion the Sub-Prefects be left
+without police and without any office help. Here also Dr. Seyss-Inquart
+raised the question, as to what tasks should belong to the sphere
+of the German administration. On the question of the setting up of
+the councils of the District leaders, many District Leaders thought
+it necessary, to have a legal representative. Furthermore clerical
+staff and interpreters would be required. In the administrative
+services of the Wehrmacht were some people who, in case of need, were
+willing to remain on there as employees. Also the Wehrmacht might
+be willing to transfer certain people, for instance as trustees for
+agricultural estates, and so on. Also individual teachers badly needed
+for schools could be obtained in this way. After the departure of the
+administrative troops, there might also be a lack of motor vehicles, as
+they had very often brought their own vehicles with them.
+
+Governor Schmidt had learned that the petrol of the Government was
+to be included in the Reich Syndicate. Petrol here costs 8 Pfg. more
+than in the Reich. Therefore 8 Pfg. more will have to be paid to
+the German Petrol accounts for which the Government will be charged.
+Then questions were discussed concerning the general construction of
+the office of the District Chief in Lublin. As to taxes, it was to be
+confirmed, that the revenue offices had re-employed 80% of the Polish
+revenue officials, many of whom were to be in sole charge of the tax
+administration out in the country. Now inspectors are to be appointed
+for the supervision of these posts. The District Chief should handle
+the supervision of the revenue offices.
+
+The office work of the District Chief is much delayed by the lack of
+expert workers. Partly also there was no control over the work of the
+people who had already arrived. Thus Mr. Ziere, the veterinary surgeon,
+had gone to Cracow, and said he had to look after the wolhynian cattle
+there.
+
+Reich Minister Seyss-Inquart suggested that Junkers from Ordensburgen
+should be asked for as assistants for the administration of the General
+Government. This would be excellent training for them. Besides higher
+officials, the District Chief is still in need of a magistrate, four
+inspectors, and a larger number of clerical staff and typewriters.
+
+Of petrol the office of the District Chief would need 10,000 litres per
+month, and each Sub-Prefect’s Office would need 2,000 litres. But one
+of the greatest nuisances was the poor communications. One hardly could
+get any connection with Cracow by telephone, also the mail service was
+very poor. Till now no replies have been received to letters or orders
+sent to Cracow. The installation of a teleprinter was urgently needed.
+But above all, the telephone or police communication from Lublin to the
+frontier district should function.
+
+With regard to the necessary force of the police, that should be at the
+disposal of the Sub-Prefects. Governor Schmidt said, that 25 for each
+District Chief did not seem sufficient.
+
+In the afternoon, a sight-seeing tour was made to Wlodawa, Cycow. Cycow
+is a German village. About 300,000 German nationals, who made a very
+poor impression were gathered in the streets, and they sang national
+songs conducted by the German Travelling Teacher [Wanderlehrer] Lindner
+who is leader of the German nationals there. Reich Minister Dr.
+Seyss-Inquart made a speech, on which he pointed out that the fidelity
+of these Germans to their nationality now found its justification
+and reward through strength of Adolf Hitler. This district with its
+very marshy character could, according to District Governor Schmidt’s
+deliberations, serve as a reservation for the Jews, a measure which
+might possibly lead to heavy mortality among the Jews.
+
+35,000 German nationals are said to be living in the Lublin government
+district. As to the problem which concerns schools, the Landrat Kalmus
+in Oyew said he held the view that no salaries should be paid to the
+Polish teachers at all, as the Poles in his district represented a
+minority in comparison with the Jews.
+
+In the evening dinner with the Commissar of the city, Mr. Hagerer, in
+Cholm, where we spent the night.
+
+21.11.1939. 8 A.M. Sight-seeing tour of the city and visit to the
+camp for German refugees. For this purpose a big, newly-built house
+belonging to the Polish railways was reserved, which however is not
+ready yet to be occupied, as the heating especially cannot be brought
+into working order on account of the lack of parts, which cannot be
+procured in Lublin.
+
+Then followed a drive to the famous cathedral of Cholm that used to
+have a golden dome. After that, we drove off to Hrubieszow, where we
+found Ukrainian settlements, which are fine compared to the poor Polish
+huts. The soil also is better. Here also we visited the frontier of
+the Bug at Uszilug. The Jews are said to have removed much property
+here, also owing to the poor guarding of the frontier. In this vicinity
+too is the best soil for wheat in Poland. From this section, some
+time ago 4,000 refugees were taken over from the Russian side. But
+still thousands are beyond on the border, and many of them are dying,
+as they cannot be housed or fed. Dr. Seyss-Inquart pointed out the
+refugees could be allowed to enter if they, themselves, took measures
+to guarantee that only German nationals entered the district of the
+Government.
+
+According to the report of the District Chief the Ukrainians
+attempted to form a self-administration against or without the
+German administration. Further the District Chief criticized the
+Reich-Credit-Bank for not granting a credit, which is necessary for the
+starting of a sugar refinery, to make use of the harvested sugar beets.
+Then we continued our journey via Zamost, Tomaszow to the border near
+Belzek. Then there is a refugee camp with Jews. The staff-Surgeon there
+fears that an epidemic may break out in the camp, which then would
+endanger the whole neighborhood.
+
+These Jewish refugees who have crossed the frontier secretly, are often
+sent back again by the Russians days after.
+
+Also there is much concern in this district at the mustering of horses
+by the Wehrmacht. This mustering would affect the cultivation of the
+fields.
+
+Governor Schmidt also reported that, in his district, collaboration
+with the Wehrmacht was poor. Lieutenant General Buechs, Lublin, was
+giving the “Government”--administration and police all possible trouble.
+
+In the evening, supper, and night spent at Sturmbannfuehrer
+Hasselberger’s house.
+
+22.11.1939.
+
+
+                          Departure for Radom
+
+In Radom, reception by District Chief Dr. Lasch. The latter reported,
+that on his arrival in Radom, he had found a very unpleasant situation
+there. His predecessor, Regierungspraesident Ruediger, had _put himself
+into_ strongly opposed the Wehrmacht, and Dr. Lasch had first to bring
+about a better understanding. Dr. Lasch introduced SS-Oberfuehrer
+Katzmann to the Reichsminister as Senior SS and Police Chief attached
+to the District Chief of Radom. Brigadefuehrer Globocznik who had been
+nominated to that position in Lublin and was just travelling through,
+also reported to Dr. Seyss-Inquart.
+
+Dr. Seyss-Inquart and Dr. Lasch now discussed the plan to establish
+a messenger center in Radom in order to remedy the bad communication
+system between Cracow and Lublin and between Cracow and Warsaw.
+According to this plan, mail for all the three northern districts of
+Cracow should be taken in 5 hours to Radom by train and from there,
+according to the weather, to the respective places of destination
+either by NSKK [Nationalsozialistisches Kraftfahrer (Motorists) Korps]
+messenger or otherwise. The same procedure should be used for the
+return journey. The agency should be called, perhaps: “Messenger agency
+of the Governor General in Radom”.
+
+Next, Dr. Lasch gave a report on the work which had already been
+done and on that which should still have to be done in the work
+of reconstruction and improvement. Here also, lack of personnel
+and difficulties in transportation were particularly prominent.
+Furthermore, in the district of Radom, the Polish Squadron was said to
+be still roving about. The people in question were said to be men who,
+during the day, attend to their occupations in civilian clothes and,
+at night, commit excesses in uniform. An encounter with the Wehrmacht
+was said to have had no success. With the help of a map given the
+Reichsminister, Dr. Lasch then explained the consolidation of the
+existing 16 districts into 10. Dr. Lasch will not comply with Governor
+Dr. Fischer’s expressed wishes to hand over a few communities on the
+border of the northern district, as those were the most fertile ones of
+the district which, as a whole, was a shortage area.
+
+Regarding the economic question, it was reported that the gun and
+iron works in Stachachowitsche had already been taken over by the
+“Hermann-Goering-Werke”. Provision should also be made for the
+restarting of the whole economy, not only the war economy. In order to
+do that, it was particularly necessary that unemployment pay should
+no longer be at the rate of 7 Zloty per day or wages at the rate of
+3 Zloty. Such a margin offered insufficient incentive to earn one’s
+livelihood through work.
+
+The Governor urgently needed experts and other personnel. A medical
+officer was especially urgently needed. There was no German physician
+in the entire district. Individual cases of epidemics such as typhus
+and dysentery had occurred.
+
+Furthermore, a man for the press and propaganda was necessary. There
+were eight Polish newspapers in the district who were being attended to
+by the District Leaders, but with such a procedure a thorough check was
+not possible. The District Chief then stated his intention to submit to
+Cracow in the near future a detailed list of the personnel required.
+
+After that, the Governor reported on the set-up of his office which had
+several Departments:
+
+1. the Department of Internal Affairs: Supervision over the District
+Leaders, Supreme Supervision over the Polish Administration, Justice,
+School Affairs, Veterinary Affairs, Medical Affairs, and General
+Matters.
+
+2. Department of Forestry and Game Preservation: Preservation of
+Forests and Game, Control of the Entire Timber Industry which was here
+of particular importance.
+
+3. Department of Economic Affairs: Industry, Commerce, Handicrafts,
+Price Control, industrial Market Regulations, Collaboration with
+the Agencies of the Four-Year-Plan and the War Economy Inspection
+[Wehrwirtschaftsinspektion].
+
+4. Traffic Department: Highway System, Railroad System, Postal System,
+Waterways (shall the river Vistula be controlled), Control of the
+Biliecza, the boundary between the districts of Radom and Warsaw, which
+could have a favorable result upon agricultural productiveness.
+
+5. Department of Food and Agriculture: The district is an agricultural
+shortage area. Cultivation must therefore be intensified. For this
+purpose a good agricultural organization is necessary. The avoidance
+of difficulties in the food supply this winter is mainly a question of
+transport. In some areas there is still corn but it must be threshed.
+There is no coal for the working of the threshing machines. The salt
+mine at Wiliczka delivers salt only in compensation against natural
+products.
+
+6. Finance Department: Revenue and expenditure. Concerning “justice”
+the governor remarked that too many are being condemned to gaol and
+penal servitude, which hereby burdens the district with costs. The
+criminals found in the convict prisons were shot. The shootings,
+however, were no longer carried out in public but in isolated wooded
+regions.
+
+The majority of the intelligentsia have been imprisoned, one must be
+careful, however, because the cooperation of these people cannot be
+dispensed with, especially the doctors, as they are needed for the
+health of the people and as they also must treat the Germans in many
+instances. He asks that the governor general issue an order that
+caution and reserve be exercised when arresting doctors. Concerning the
+Polish jurisdiction the District Chief suggested an “organisation” in
+three legal administrative branches:
+
+  1. Baronial court [Burggericht]
+  2. District court [Bezirksgericht]
+  3. Court of appeals [Kassationsgericht]
+
+The question was then discussed as to in whose name sentences were to
+be pronounced and if the Polish authorities were to have some kind of
+official seal.
+
+In regard to the communal administration the appointment of Polish
+governors (Staros) to administer parts of the district as deputies of
+the District Chief with headquarters at his office was discussed. There
+are Polish majors in Radom and Czenstochau, and they would also be
+appointed to the towns subordinate to the districts. Reichsminister Dr.
+Seyss-Inquart pointed out that delegates of the District Chief must be
+associated with them. Dr. Lasch added, furthermore, that he intended
+to make the communities pay something towards the repair of roads and
+other work, executed by means of compulsory labour service or of forced
+labour, as expense was caused to districts by such work. The wages
+also for free work must be established uniformly for the whole General
+Government, as otherwise undesirable movement of workers seeking the
+highest salaries would result.
+
+At this point the question of the monopoly of important exchange goods
+for the acquiring of agricultural products was discussed. Dr. Lasch
+then declared that it was not possible to transport all scrap metal to
+the Reich. In the Government there was also a need of scrap metal for
+the existing foundries.
+
+Dr. Lasch stated furthermore that he had received a petition to send
+5,000 specialists to the Reich.
+
+Regarding the Polish police the opinion was expressed that arming in a
+modest way could be carried out and was necessary. The foresters needed
+at least a fowling piece to defend themselves against wood thieves and
+peasants.
+
+In the case of the founding of an “individual protection”
+(Selbstschutz) unit of racial Germans a careful selection and military
+training of those selected must take place. According to information
+given by Dr. Lasch the Ukrainians are said to be specially qualified to
+be policemen.
+
+Dr. Lasch brought up the question as to what should be done with the
+destroyed villages.
+
+The tax system could consist mainly of indirect taxes and
+contributions, which were to be borne by the communities. A
+contribution of 6 Million Zloty must be borne by the Jews in the
+district of Radom. In the district of Radom a cooperative buying and
+selling society will be founded in order to eliminate the entire Jewish
+Commission business.
+
+Reichsminister Dr. Seyss-Inquart then spoke of the regulation provided,
+according to which the government should not receive any more motor
+fuel from the Reich, but must be dependent on the production of Jaslo
+and Kresno the utilization of which, however, was to be determined in
+accordance with the principles of the Reich. In this connection the
+formation of a trading organization was also discussed.
+
+Dr. Lasch and Brigade-Leader Schmidt then spoke of the intention of
+the Wehrmacht to confiscate 54,000 horses. Two studs in the district
+he declared district studs. Dr. Seyss-Inquart pointed out that the
+possessions of the Polish government were confiscated by decree
+and therefore are out of the reach of the Wehrmacht. Finally Dr.
+Seyss-Inquart spoke of the plan to publish a general administration
+decree for the General Government after a period of development and
+elucidation.
+
+Cracow, 22nd November 1939.
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2280-PS
+
+  The Reich Commissioner for the Ostland [Baltic countries and White
+    Russia]
+
+Dept. III Labor policy and social Administration
+
+                                                        Riga, 3 May 1943
+
+Labor Group Labor Mobilization 2 F 1/4 b. 1 (O) Kue Ty
+
+To the Commissioner General in Riga
+
+  [stamp] Commissioner General Dept. Social Administration 8 May 1943
+           in Riga 2
+
+  _Re_: Recruiting of Manpower in the Baltic Countries for the Reich
+    territories; here: New quotas agreed upon with GBA Gauleiter Sauckel
+    on 21 April 1943.
+
+In reference to the basic statements of the Plenipotentiary General for
+manpower, Gauleiter Sauckel, on the occasion of his visit to Riga on
+21 April 1943, and in view of the critical situation and in disregard
+of all contrary considerations, it was decided that a total of 183,000
+workers have to be supplied from the Ostland for the Reich territory.
+This task must absolutely be accomplished within the next four months
+and at the latest must be completed by the end of August. The following
+sub-quotas have been established:
+
+  _White Ruthenia_: 30,000 youthful workers and 100,000 workers
+  including families.
+
+Of the families only members capable of productive work will be
+counted. All persons 10 years old and up are considered as productive
+manpower.
+
+  _Lithuania_:  15,000 female workers.
+                15,000 male workers.
+                10,000 productive workers from about 2 to 3,000
+                  families
+  _Latvia_:     10,000 female workers, no male workers
+  _Estonia_:     3,000 female workers, no male workers
+
+For the benefit of volunteers [Hilfswilligen] no male manpower will
+be recruited in Latvia and Estonia. For Estonia also in favor of the
+Legion.
+
+All permissible means shall be used to obtain the manpower from _White
+Ruthenia_. Do not hesitate to apply unusual measures.
+
+In Lithuania the 15,000 men shall be taken from the current recruitment
+of the year groups 19 to 24. The placement of the manpower for
+the Reich, excluding volunteers should be one half for the Baltic
+countries’ own requirements and one half for Reich requirements. In
+case the number of 15,000 workers cannot be thus obtained, the year
+groups 12 to 18 shall be recruited until this number has been reached.
+
+The 15,000 female workers shall be obtained from the year groups of 20
+to 25. For this purpose the release of 10% of the women from factories
+suitable for this purpose, even outside of the age limits set, has been
+contemplated. The recruitment of females of the year groups 20 to 25
+will follow the examination of males of the year groups 19 to 24.
+
+Furthermore, the recruitment of about 2 to 3,000 families from
+Lithuania is contemplated, which should contain a total of 10,000
+productive workers.
+
+In consideration of local requirements and the already accomplished
+recruiting for the Legion and volunteers and of those volunteers still
+to be provided by means of re-examining the year groups 19 to 24, the
+recruitment of male manpower in Latvia has been dispensed with.
+
+The 10,000 female workers will be recruited from the year groups 20 to
+25. Here also a release of 10% from factories is provided for, should
+the age limits fail to provide sufficient workers.
+
+Estonia will provide 3,000 women, also to be recruited from the year
+groups 20 to 25, or by release from factories. Otherwise the same
+applies as for Latvia.
+
+To these workers I have promised the following special social
+advantages:
+
+1. Limited engagement, generally 2 years’ duration.
+
+2. Granting of furloughs and return of families according to the
+general regulations for foreigners in the Reich.
+
+3. Appointment of special trustees of the same nationality for the
+female workers.
+
+4. Granting of special diplomas for services rendered in war work in
+the Reich.
+
+In order to accomplish these measures I have sent a decree, of which
+a copy is enclosed, to the President of the employment offices.
+Furthermore, I have asked the Labor Mobilization Office of the German
+Labor Front, in a letter of which a copy is also enclosed, to arrange
+for the appointment of special trustees of the same nationality.
+
+Please take notice of this, inform my special purpose staffs
+(Einsatzstaebe) accordingly, and take care of the immediate placing of
+the manpower.
+
+On this occasion I shall like to point out that in the past year the
+enclosed leaflet was used in hiring Lithuanian manpower. Since this
+pamphlet contains inaccuracies, please see to it that it is no longer
+used for recruiting purposes. In view of the explanations in my
+enclosed decree to the Presidents of provincial labor offices, I do not
+believe it necessary to provide a special leaflet for Plant-Managers.
+I refer to your report of 25 March 1943 and to my letter of 14
+April 1943--5783. 28/148--about which I should like to have your
+opinion soon. By reason of a suggestion of the German Labor Front, I
+should furthermore like to know whether you consider it necessary to
+conclude individual work--contracts for the workers from the districts
+(Generalbezirke) of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia.
+
+Copy sent to take notice with reference to the oral consultations in
+Riga.
+
+                                                         Signed: Sauckel
+  [seal]                                              Certified: Mueller
+                                                                   Clerk
+
+Certified:
+
+(sig:) Reinkmann
+
+19 June 1943
+
+
+                                 PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2283-PS
+
+                         VOELKISCHER BEOBACHTER
+
+ The Munich (Southern German) Edition Nr. 258, 14 September 1936, page
+                                  11.
+
+THE 5TH DAY OF THE PARTY CONGRESS ADOLF HITLER HAS CARRIED OUT THE TRUE
+ SOCIALISM REICH ORGANIZATION LEADER DR. LEY RENDERS AN ACCOUNT OF THE
+                 ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE GERMAN LABOR FRONT
+
+                                                 Nurnberg, 13 September.
+
+_Again 20,000 stirred people filled the big hall in the Luitpold Park
+on Saturday for the penultimate session of the Party Congress._
+
+_At this session, too, the Fuehrer was present from the beginning.
+Again enthusiastic shouts of exultation lasting for minutes roared
+around the Fuehrer when he strode through the long-stretched hall with
+his deputy, his constant retinue and several Reich Leaders and District
+Leaders._
+
+_On this evening Congress participants listened to grandly-conceived
+accounts by Reich Organization Leader Dr. Ley about the accomplishments
+of the German Labor Front, by Reich Leader Hierl about the Labor
+Service, and by Plenary Inspector for German Highways, Dr. Todt, about
+progress in building the highways of Adolf Hitler._
+
+After the parade of the Blood Banner and of the Party Standards the
+solemn prelude was the overture to “Oberon”, played by the Reich
+Symphony Orchestra. The Congress was opened by the Fuehrer’s Deputy,
+Rudolf _Hess_, who immediately introduced Reich Agency Leader
+[Reichsamtsleiter] _Dressler-Andress_ for reading of the account of
+Reich Organization Leader Dr. Ley.
+
+My Fuehrer!
+
+When you, my Fuehrer, ordered me in mid-April 1933 to take over the
+trade unions I could not understand why you gave this order to me,
+since I could not see any connection between my task as Organizational
+Leader of the Party and my new task. Very soon, however, your decision,
+my Fuehrer, became clear to me and I recognized that the organizational
+measures of the Party could only come to full fruition when
+supplemented by the organization of the people, that is to say by the
+mobilization of the energies of the people and by their concentration
+and alignment. If the _Party_ represents the _concentration of the
+political leaders_ of the people--as you, my Fuehrer, have taught us
+again and again--then the _people_ in the _retinue_ [Gefolgschaft] must
+be organized and trained according to the same principles. _Leader and
+retinue_, _elite and community at large_ [Fuehrer und Gefolgschaft,
+Orden und Gemeinde]--those words the clear directives for my work.
+These were the consequences:
+
+1. _My tasks as Organizational Leader of the Party and as Leader of the
+German Labor Front were a completely homogeneous task, in other words,
+in everything I did I acted as Reich Organization Leader of the NSDAP._
+
+2. _The German Labor Front was an institution of the Party and was led
+by it._
+
+3. _The German Labor Front had to be organized regionally and
+professionally according to the same principles as the Party._
+
+That is why trade union and employer associations had to be smashed
+unrelentingly, and the _basis of construction_ was formed, as in the
+Party, by the _cell_ and the _local section_.
+
+* * *
+
+The idea of the _Factory Troops_ [Werkschar] is making good progress
+in the plants, and I am able to report to you, my Fuehrer, that
+security and peace in the factories has been guaranteed, not only
+in normal times, but that also in times of the most serious crises,
+disturbances, such as the munition strikes of the traitors Ebert
+and his confederates, are out of the question. _National Socialism
+has conquered the factories. Factory troops [Die Werkschar] are the
+Nationalist Socialist shock troops within the factory, and their motto
+is_:
+
+                      THE FUEHRER IS ALWAYS RIGHT!
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2284-PS
+
+                WRITINGS OF THE HOCHSCHULE FOR POLITICS
+
+                  Edited by Paul Meier-Benneckenstein
+
+          II. The Organizational structure of the Third Reich
+
+                              Brochure 33
+
+                                 The SS
+
+ History, Mission, and Organization of the Schutzstaffeln of the NSDAP
+
+         Compiled on the Commission of the Reichsfuehrer-SS by
+                  SS-Standartenfuehrer Gunter d’Alquen
+
+                                  1939
+
+                  Junker and Duennhaupt Press, Berlin
+
+       #       #       #       #       #
+
+                   1. History and Structure of the SS
+
+                             Path of Proof
+
+The great National Socialist Movement, as a party, did not step into
+German or even world history as a complete framework at the time of its
+formal founding.
+
+Originating from the rebellion against the downfall, from a fervent
+belief in the German people, which was born in the trenches of the
+battle-fields in the whole world, Adolf Hitler began to conquer the new
+Reich, both in thought and through deeds, with a few comrades, upon the
+simple, strong fundamentals of his firm belief and to form it anew,
+stone upon stone.
+
+Decisive actions, like the outbreak of 9 November 1923 for which we
+today, in all its great tragedy and in all its pain, nevertheless have
+to thank a forcible fate, impressed the inner and external features
+into the power and into the structure of the Third Reich. Parts and
+powers of this living marching growing movement, components and men
+in it, acquired in proof faith, and reliability which was daily the
+positions, missions and powers which then determined in the powerful
+structural branch their course toward victory over external power.
+
+Therefore, he who wants to understand the growing mission and living
+essence of the SS must first glance over its history and pursue therein
+how it quite consequentially grew out of the smallest beginnings
+through tough, clear work into an ever-enlarging mission. Therefore
+the growth of the SS, as a firmly rooted member of the great Movement
+is in many respects symbolic of the development of National Socialism,
+as well as of a spiritual position and of the consequent practical
+application of this unmistakably clear position in the life of the folk
+and of its state.
+
+Not the chance incidents of the fighting years and also not the
+tactical eventualities rounded out the form and brought about the
+individual developments of this Black Corps, but from the beginning
+on, the National Socialist of this organization, man upon man, was
+quite consciously raised again and again above every day affairs which
+are often petty and full of compromise; thereby raised above his own
+weaknesses into the consciousness which is always new and living, that
+he serves a powerful mission which is quite unique in the lengthy
+annals of German history.
+
+The SS originated in the quite early time of the National Socialist
+Movement in the year 1923. Then later, as the “Stosstrupp Hitler
+[Shock Troop Hitler]” on the 8th of November 1923 it was forbidden and
+dissolved automatically along with the entire movement.
+
+When the Party was again set up in the year 1925, the SA, as the
+protective organization of the Movement, still remained forbidden.
+Furthermore, besides these limiting coercive measures, there still
+existed a prohibition against speeches as well as assemblies for
+the Fuehrer in Prussia and also in Bavaria. The National Socialist
+assemblies were at that time only allowed in Saxony and Thuringia which
+were at that time fully Red. And now in order at least here to hold
+the necessary assemblies with success, in order to gain a foothold, it
+was necessary to protect them under all circumstances from explosive
+missiles and premature disbandment.
+
+
+                        The Protective Echelons
+
+                          [Die Schutzstaffeln]
+
+For this reason, the Fuehrer ordered in January 1925 that a small
+mobile organization be constructed for the protection of these
+meetings: The Protective Echelons. They were in the best sense of
+the word at this time, therefore, echelons, which means, quite small
+formations, most of them only in strength of one leader and ten men,
+which had been set up in single places which at that time already were
+important for the first forward march of the Movement. Even such a
+large city as Berlin had only one “Schutzstaffel” of two leaders and
+twenty men in those days. With these Schutzstaffeln then in the years
+1925 and 1926, the Movement had held the assemblies of the Fuehrer
+and also of other champions of the Party in Saxony and Thuringia, and
+always held fast against each oppositional attempt in every case.
+
+The year 1926 brought the renewed permission to organize the SA and for
+this reason, the Schutzstaffeln stepped more into the background in the
+following years.
+
+This year 1926, however, is of great significance for the SS which
+at that time consisted of about 200 men in its entire strength, when
+namely Adolf Hitler gave the most sacred symbol of the Movement, the
+Blood Banner [Blutfahne] of 9 November 1923 into faithful hands at the
+Party Congress [Parteitag] in Weimar, the second Reichsparteitag of the
+NSDAP.
+
+On the 6th of January 1929, Adolf Hitler appointed his tested comrade
+of long standing, Heinrich Himmler, as Reichsfuehrer-SS. Heinrich
+Himmler assumed charge therewith, of the entire Schutzstaffeln,
+totaling at the time 280 men, with the express and particular
+commission of the Fuehrer to form of this organization an elite troop
+of the Party, a troop dependable in every circumstance.
+
+
+                            The New Division
+
+With this day, the real history of the SS begins as it stands before
+us today in all its deeper essential features, firmly anchored into
+the National Socialistic Movement. For the SS and its Reichsfuehrer,
+Heinrich Himmler, its first SS man, have both become inseparable in
+the course of these battle-filled years. When the command of the
+Fuehrer had been given for the organization on a greater scale of this
+component of the movement, it had to be clear from the beginning that
+this mission could only then be solved in the real significance of its
+occasion if, in pursuit of the last essentials, the directives given by
+Adolf Hitler to the movement were grasped and carried out.
+
+
+                             The Selection
+
+We National Socialists are firmly convinced of the ideology that in
+the final over-all objective only good blood, as seen in the long run,
+produces the best accomplishments. Sustained by this conviction, the
+Reichsfuehrer SS went at that time, beginning with this basic criterion
+of the National Socialist, into the execution of the command of the
+Fuehrer of the 6th of January 1929.
+
+One of the last soldiers of the old army and, at the same time, also
+one of the oldest co-champions of the Fuehrer began, as a tough and
+energetic organizer, to collect a troop, a troop of the best, not
+only the best physically, but also most dependable, most faithful,
+in the last analysis the most characteristically worthwhile men from
+all parts of the movement, in order in the first place to satisfy the
+fundamental demand made of this formation, namely: the greatest good of
+the movement, to protect the Fuehrer himself.
+
+It remains as one of the greatest and decisive services of the
+Reichsfuehrer SS that he inserted the theoretical concepts of the
+National Socialist ideology, courageously and consequentially
+especially in this field, into this, his own organizational mission of
+the construction of the SS and then clearly carried them out even at a
+time when the racial question was a negative concept deriving from a
+self-evident anti-semitism.
+
+
+                    The Marriage Law [Heiratsbefehl]
+
+It would naturally be meaningless and also, after a short time be
+worthless, to undertake the experiment to assemble a male racial
+elite and while so doing to by-pass present or, indeed, the future
+families of the men. Corresponding to this quite simple and clear
+perception, for which, moreover, German history affords sufficient
+menacing lessons in all of its periods, the SS has given itself its
+own appropriate fundamental laws. As the first and most important of
+these basic requirements, the Reichsfuehrer-SS in the year 1931 gave to
+the Schutzstaffeln the law which prescribes an engagement and marriage
+certificate for SS men.
+
+This order has the following wording:
+
+                                                Munich, 31 December 1931
+
+“Reichsfuehrer-SS
+
+  SS Command-A-No. 65
+
+1. The SS is a band of definitely Nordic German men chosen according to
+certain viewpoints.
+
+2. Corresponding to the National Socialist ideology and to the
+perception that the future of our folk rests in the selectiveness and
+preservation of the race and of the healthy inheritance of good blood,
+I install with effectiveness from the 1st of January 1932 the ‘Marriage
+Certificate’ for all unmarried members of the SS.
+
+3. The aim striven for is the hereditarily healthy clan of a definitely
+Nordic German sort.
+
+4. The marriage certificate will be distributed or denied solely and
+alone from a racial and hereditarily healthy viewpoint.
+
+5. Every SS man who has the object of getting married has to procure
+for this purpose the marriage certificate of the Reichsfuehrer-SS.
+
+6. SS members who though denied marriage certificates marry in spite
+of it, will be stricken from the SS; they will be given the choice of
+withdrawing.
+
+7. The working out of the details of marriage petitions is the task of
+the ‘Race Office’ of the SS.
+
+8. The Race Office of the SS directs the ‘Clan Book of the SS’ in which
+the families of SS members will be entered after distribution of the
+marriage certificate or acquiescence to the petition to enter into
+marriage.
+
+9. The Reichsfuehrer-SS, the manager of the Race Office, and the
+specialists (Referenten) of this office are duty bound on their word of
+honor to secrecy.
+
+10. It is clear to the SS that with this command it has taken a step of
+great significance. Derision, scorn, and failure to understand do not
+move us; the future belongs to us!
+
+                                                    The Reichsfuehrer-SS
+                                                             H. Himmler”
+
+This incisive command and the self-evidence of its execution
+demonstrate, even in the difficult years before the first victory,
+the self-confidence of this voluntary partnership for a determination
+which even at the time in which it was ordered must mean an eternal,
+inconceivable, encroachment on the so-called personal freedom of the
+individual.
+
+
+                     The Instrument of the Fuehrer
+
+Inside and outside of the movement, in these years, the SS had to
+intervene, repeatedly called upon for the protection of the National
+Socialist fundamental principles. From disunity over the attempt at
+a schism to the betrayal of the Fuehrer himself, under immeasurable
+difficulties and grave human sacrifices, the SS fulfilled its various
+missions as the instrument for unconditional preparedness for
+intervention for the Fuehrer. It earned for itself at this time the
+slogan of Adolf Hitler: “SS-man, your honor is faithfulness”.
+
+In the whole broad Reich, in village and city, the SS, in good and
+self-evident comradeship with the SA in the fighting years, broke the
+Red and Black Terror. Long and stirring is the list of all those brave
+soldiers of the Black Corps who gave their lives as a pledge of their
+faithfulness.
+
+They did not die in open battle, eye to eye with the opponent; they
+fell singly and deserted, pursued, hunted; harrassed, beaten, trampled
+to death, in dark alleys and courtyards, shot in the back, murdered
+by hostile superior forces; they gave their mortal life, and their
+names shine forth today, from banners and standards, their earthly
+immortality as a symbol of a great example which they fulfilled,
+completely and purely, everywhere, including those unforgettable heroes
+who fought against the choking gallows of an inhuman system, until even
+Austria returned home into the greater Reich through their sacrifice.
+
+
+                     Responsibility for the Future
+
+But not only the revolutionary fighting and sacrificial spirit of this
+National Socialist formation, its daily application and by this means
+the best and clear cut selectiveness, determined its existence and
+its ever clearer course. Far and beyond this, it was the penetrating
+feeling of responsibility of its leadership for a distant future which
+decisively determined its course.
+
+Here, in that difficult moment, those solutions were found for all
+necessary questions which, indeed in the first place must be justified
+for the day, far and above that, however, without compromise, bore
+complete responsibility at the same time in itself for the way of
+future development.
+
+Apart from the green table, not for the sake of momentary results,
+distinct from all dogma, a great eternal view of German history and a
+chaste consciousness of the inheritance of ancestry and the genesis of
+the future at the decisive point of the fighting period, and of the
+selectiveness of this partnership, have the peculiar and deep meaning
+for all missions and their execution.
+
+When the day of the grasping of power had finally come, there were
+52,000 SS men who in this spirit, bore the revolution in the van,
+marched into the new State which they began to help form, everywhere:
+in their stations and positions, in profession and in service, and in
+all their essential tasks.
+
+The firm, devout ties to this great blood stream of the nation [Volk],
+the perception of the fulfillment of the deepest German longing for
+service to the nation, this welding to the firm internal unity of the
+exclusiveness which the SS was able to achieve, in the course of hard
+and full years, was the presupposition for the succeeding further
+greater task of the Black Corps. Only the absolute understanding of
+the emptiness of all personnel objectives and the final recognition of
+this valuelessness of smaller interests gave this formation the right
+to be the protective corps in State and Party as the strong arm of the
+Fuehrer for the internal security of the Reich in all good and evil
+times.
+
+
+                  Protective Corps of Party and State
+
+The prerequisites for this mighty mission were severe discipline
+and the highest sort of self-confidence as the result of continuous
+selection within its own ranks, but were, as well, a fanatical and
+convinced consciousness of duty to coming generations. Here, the
+hardiness of the best soldierly traditions met a new and harmonious
+formation with the keenness of a crystal-clear political consciousness
+as well as the pure, devout heart of a revolutionary of the living
+German Movement.
+
+The missions which were given to the SS in the present day National
+Socialist State can be understood only in the knowledge of this
+evolution.
+
+The protective organization of the Movement became the internal
+protective organization of the State after the seizure of power and
+after the Schutzstaffel, by renewed proof of its essentiality and the
+testing of its dependability on the 20th of July 1934, was elevated to
+be an independent component of the Party directly subordinate to the
+Fuehrer.
+
+Out of the above evolution, all the latter events could fashion
+themselves in apparent self-evidence along these principles. With the
+acquisition of power within the Reich, the protective organization
+of the Party became, feature by feature, as a consequence of the
+broadening of its mission, the protective organization of the National
+Socialist State. In this capacity, it took over step by step the
+remaining usable and valuable parts of the old police. Out of the
+16 state police forces, a large and strong Reich police came into
+existence; and, that which even the old National Socialists themselves
+had hardly thought to expect: out of the jailer of the rubber cudgel
+regime there came in existence in the new police, an active friend
+of the people; and even more than that, in this slow and qualitative
+evolution the police itself has become, in the completion of National
+Socialism and in the leadership of National Socialism, through this
+Black Corps, a part of the proud formations of the Movement.
+
+
+            Reichsfuehrer-SS and Chief of the German Police
+
+The Reichsfuehrer-SS became Chief of the German Police and united
+its mission, as elastic as operative, with its formations into a
+comprehensive line of defense for fighting political as well as
+criminal enemies of the Nation; a line of defense in which State and
+Party, civil servant and political soldier labor in a complete and,
+therefore, for the first time in a positive manner hand in hand.
+
+For the first time the newly attained meaning of the Police, as
+representative, protector, and helper of the community of the people,
+and thereby as real soldiers of that community of the people and of the
+National Socialist ideology, impressed the new features of this clear,
+sober countenance. For out of this original police, employed with a
+negative aim, an active friend and helper of the people has come into
+being, a rejuvenated people’s troop, whose successors are provided
+from the SS, so that the civil servant, both within and outside of his
+service, is and remains an SS-man, a champion and protector of the new
+State, of the community of the people and of the movement.
+
+
+                         The Troops in Barracks
+
+The conceivable danger, that an organization destined only for internal
+employment sees itself hampered in the fulfilling of the large,
+all-embracing missions in difficult times which demand the employment
+of the whole nation toward the outside. The Fuehrer met this by the
+creation of an active troop of the SS lodged in barracks and chosen
+from the SS members of long military service and politically of the
+best training.
+
+Early in the year 1933 the Body Guard Regiment [Leibstandarte] of the
+SS, “Adolf Hitler”, arose and in the further enlargement of this SS
+Military Service Troop [SS-Verfuegungstruppe] there were added the
+active SS regiments: SS 1, “Deutschland”, in Munich; SS 2, “Germania”,
+in Hamburg; Aroken, Radolfszell. As well as these, there were the
+Technical Storm Unit [Sturmbanne], the SS Pioneer Storm Unit in Dresden
+and the SS Signal Corps Unit [Nachrichtensturmbanne] in Unna. The SS
+Junker schools in Toelz and Braunschweig provided for the training of
+those to become leaders of these SS Military Service Troops.
+
+In March 1938, after the return of Austria home into the Reich, the
+Fuehrer gave the order to establish a fourth active SS regiment of
+SS General Service Troops, SS 3, “The Fuehrer”, with its stations in
+Vienna, Graz, and Klagenfurt. All these troops have received the finest
+reward for their labor: they are allowed to cooperate prominently in
+the creation and protection of the Greater Germany.
+
+This chosen SS-Troop, trained during four years service under the
+severest conditions, offers, equally, the best rising generation for
+future leaders and subordinate leaders of the General SS, the Police,
+and the Security Service.
+
+
+                            II. Organization
+
+In addition to the General SS, so to speak the mother of all the other
+SS formations, there are the SS-militarized forces, the SS-Death
+Head regiments, and further, the Security Service and the Race and
+Settlement organizations.
+
+The supreme headquarters of the Reichsfuehrer SS for the General SS is
+the SS Main Office in Berlin.
+
+The supreme headquarters for the Security Service is the SS-Main
+Security Office in Berlin.
+
+The supreme headquarters for the Race and Settlement organization is
+the Main Race and Settlement agency SS in Berlin.
+
+Aside from these main offices there are the following offices which
+likewise are directly under the Reichsfuehrer SS and which have the
+same characteristics of a main office:
+
+  Personal Staff of the Reichsfuehrer SS.
+
+  Administration Chief of the SS.
+
+  Personnel Chief of the SS (these three in Berlin).
+
+  Head of the SS courts, Munich.
+
+  Chief of the Constabulary, SS-Lt. Gen. of the police Daluege, with
+    the rank of a Chief of a Main Office [Hauptamtschef].
+
+
+                           The SS Main Office
+
+The SS Main Office consists of the following 13 offices which have to
+fulfill the following missions:
+
+The central chancellery [ZK] is the headquarters of the Chief of the
+SS Main Office. It provides for the cooperation among all of its
+subordinate offices and examines the whole direction of management
+within the SS Main Office.
+
+The management office [Fuehrungsamt] (I) deals with all affairs which
+pertain to the training, organization, and deployment of units of the
+General SS.
+
+The personnel office (II) deals with the personnel affairs for all SS
+fuehrers of the General SS from SS-Second Lieutenants to SS-Captains
+inclusive.
+
+The SS Administrative Office (IV) handles all the administrative
+affairs of the SS Main Office. It is of the same level as the
+Administrative Office Security Service (SD) and the Administrative
+Office Race and Settlement (R and S) and just as these, it
+is subordinate to the SS Administrative Chief as the highest
+administrative court of the SS.
+
+The medical office (V) deals with all things concerned with hygienic
+conditions and accommodations for the SS.
+
+The SS-Recruiting Office (VI) handles the preliminary and final
+acceptance of SS applicants and SS candidates into the SS. Here also,
+the conviction and discharge of men and non-commissioned officers is
+regulated as well as re-enlistment measures among other things. Its
+missions further include the planning and execution of all recruiting
+methods, the systematic comprehension and compiling of personal data of
+all SS members as well as the compilation of the total strength of the
+SS and of corresponding statistics.
+
+The office for Security Missions (VII) handles the employment of SS
+units in special instances for example, at Fuehrer appearances and
+for visits of leading foreign government officials. In addition it
+is responsible for the mobilization preparations for the SS which it
+completes in collaboration with the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht.
+Among these also come the taking in of reserves of the SS Death Head
+regiments for special practices in peace and the liability of military
+service of SS members.
+
+The Reserve Office (VIII) is, as the name implies, responsible for the
+Reserve of all the SS units.
+
+The Procurement Office (IX) provides for the procurement of articles of
+equipment for the whole SS.
+
+The Office for Recreation (X) directs all measures for sport
+participation of the SS in all forms of sports and supervises the
+athletic training of the SS.
+
+The Office of Communication (XI), the Supply Office and the Public
+Welfare Office (XII) and also the Educational Office (XIII) fulfill
+their missions which are expressed by their title.
+
+Aside from the above named 13 offices, the following are also placed
+under the Chief of the SS Main Office.
+
+  The Inspector of the SS Militarized force.
+  The Fuehrer of the SS Death Head regiment.
+  The Inspector of the SS Border and Patrol units.
+  The Inspector of the SS Cavalry.
+  The Inspector of the SS Cavalry schools.
+
+In addition, the following are under the appropriate inspectors.
+
+  The Auxiliary Work Camp Schleissheim.
+  The SS-VT professional school St. George.
+  The SS-Training Camp Dachau.
+  The SS-Rest Home, Sasbachwalden.
+  The SS-Motor School Berne.
+  The SS-Main Cavalry school Munich.
+  The SS-Cavalry supply institution Hamburg.
+
+
+                 Formation structure of the General SS
+
+The strength of the General SS, 240,000 men, is subdivided today into
+14 corps, 38 divisions, 104 infantry regiments, 19 mounted regiments,
+14 communication battalions, and 9 Engineer battalions as well as
+motorized and medical units. This General SS stands fully and wholly
+on call as in the fighting years except for one small part of chief
+Fuehrers and men.
+
+The Corps which are presently lead by a Lt. Gen. or Maj. Gen. are
+subdivided into Divisions, Regiments, Battalions and Companies.
+
+
+                    The steps in becoming an SS-man
+
+The steps in becoming an SS man are the following:
+
+After confirming his SS suitability and SS worthiness, the Hitler
+Youth upon reaching 18 becomes an SS applicant. Then he is taken over
+into the SS as an SS candidate on the Reichsparteitag of the same year
+upon presentation of the SS certificate. Then after a short period of
+probation he is administered the Fuehrer oath on the 9th November.
+
+As SS candidate he earns his Army sport badge and the bronze Reich
+sport badge. Then he goes into the Labor service [Arbeitsdienst] and
+finally to the Wehrmacht either at the age of 19 or 19½--according to
+whichever way his age group is absorbed.
+
+After two years, he returns from the Wehrmacht in as far as he does not
+want to remain as non-commissioned candidate or reenlistee. Whoever
+returns to the SS is still, however, a candidate. In the following
+period up until his coming final acceptance he will be schooled again
+specially and ideologically at which time he will be thoroughly taught
+and instructed in the fundamentals of the SS, especially regarding the
+marriage law and the honor laws of the SS. The SS candidate will be
+recognized as SS man upon fulfillment of other requirements on the 9th
+of November following his return from the armed forces and thereby will
+be finally taken into the SS.
+
+At the same time, on this 9th of November, he has the right to wear
+the SS dagger and solemnly promises upon this occasion that he and his
+pin will always hold to the basic laws of the SS. From this day on he
+assumes the right and duty to defend his honor according to the honor
+laws of the Black Corps as is specified in the SS code.
+
+He then remains in the active General SS as SS man until he is 35. Upon
+request, he then will enter the SS Reserve and upon reaching 45 he will
+transfer into the SS inactive Corps.
+
+
+           The SS Militarized forces [Verfuegungstruppen, VT]
+
+Out of the General SS, the foundation of all SS, after the seizing of
+power the SS militarized forces appeared, on account of considerations
+which are indicated in another reference, in a slow and organizational
+development.
+
+Its garrison and construction are also described in another place.
+
+The militarized forces are constructed after the experiences of the
+SS upon the fundamental basis of National Socialist perception of
+selection, direction and education.
+
+The SS militarized forces, in their present day form which is clearly
+delineated, are an active garrisoned and armed part of the SS. Those
+men selected and tested according to the standards of the SS have
+obligated themselves to a period of service of at least four years. In
+addition to the indoctrination for the SS man, these troops receive a
+full military education. The service in the militarized force counts
+toward the fulfillment of military service.
+
+After termination of their obligations in the militarized forces, the
+SS men naturally go back into the General SS from which they came.
+
+
+                        The SS Death Head Units
+
+The SS Death Head units form one part of the garrisoned SS. They arose
+from volunteers of the General SS who were recruited for the guarding
+of concentration camps in 1933.
+
+Their mission, aside from the indoctrination of the armed political
+soldier, is the guarding of enemies of the State who are held in
+concentration camps.
+
+The SS Death Head units obligate their members to 12 years (service).
+It is composed mainly of men who already have fulfilled their duty to
+serve in the Wehrmacht. This time of service is counted completely.
+
+The Death Head units are fundamentally similar to the SS militarized
+forces in construction and equipment. They consist of four regiments.
+
+
+                       Personnel Chief of the SS
+
+The Office of the personnel Chief of the SS is the SS-Personnel
+Chancellery. It handles all personnel affairs of the Fuehrer Corps of
+the whole SS.
+
+Further, the Personnel Chief is Inspector of the SS Junker schools
+in Braunschweig and Toelz. He is responsible for the continuation of
+education of the forthcoming young Fuehrers from these schools.
+
+The Fuehrer school of the General SS Munich-Dachau is also placed under
+the Personnel Chief.
+
+
+                         Chief of the SS Courts
+
+The SS-Courts, directly under the Reichsfuehrer SS, is the highest
+office of the SS in all cases of disciplinary or honorary jurisdiction.
+Its activity therefore consists, above all, in the handling of
+disciplinary actions; in cases of less severe nature it acts as court
+of appeal.
+
+Further, the SS-Court is solely competent for the handling of cases of
+clemency as well as of disciplinary and also of punitive nature.
+
+As the highest office of disciplinary penal affairs of the SS, at
+the same time the SS-Court is the liaison office for all offices of
+the Party and Reich which are essentially connected with its area of
+jurisdiction.
+
+A penal jurisdiction will be introduced for the members of the SS
+militarized forces, the SS Death Head units, the main offices of the
+Security Service of the SS and for these main official members of
+the General SS who are placed over these units. Its construction is
+undertaken at present.
+
+
+                          The Security Service
+
+During the fighting years, the scope of jurisdiction of the SS had
+experienced an expansion in the course of time to such an extent that
+more and more the necessity for discovering and knowing of opposing
+tendencies developed as an absolute requirement for their operational
+campaign. Originally, the SS served as the personal protection for
+the Fuehrer and for leading personalities of the National Socialistic
+Movement.
+
+Beyond the steady growth of the Party, the original relatively simple
+mission of the protection of persons has further developed to a problem
+of the Security of the Party and its manifold functions. For this
+purpose, intelligence services were installed in the Party and all of
+its components with the mission: to counter the significance of the
+opposing aggressive and destructive intentions through exploration and
+judging of the threatening menaces.
+
+However, there was no uniform planning, and a central collaboration of
+intelligence services was hardly attempted.
+
+The SS had also acquired an intelligence service at this time
+for the fulfillment of its missions. Contrary to the rest of the
+intelligence services of the Party, a far-reaching systematic political
+intelligence service grew out of the so-called I.C. Service, the later
+P.I. Service [Press and Information] of the Reichsfuehrer SS.
+
+This intelligence service developed upon the fundamentals of racial
+selection and ideological rearing in conformity with the general
+fundamentals of the SS in deviation from all limitations of scope,
+of momentary or personal nature in connection with an all embracing
+positive setting of a goal, toward a true Security Service at first for
+the SS and the Party and later thereby, for the people and the Reich.
+
+This became clear after the taking over of power, as the “Security
+Service of the Reichsfuehrer SS” proved that it had seized all
+opponents and living provinces which were or could become significant
+for the new National Socialist State. This was done by a planned
+construction of the organization, which kept itself free from personal
+dependency.
+
+From this development, in the field of Party intelligence service, the
+Deputy of the Fuehrer drew the deduction which he made in his decree of
+9 June 1934 that “no intelligence or counterintelligence service of the
+Party may exist outside of the Security Service of the Reichsfuehrer
+SS.” From the promulgation of this decree on, the Security Service of
+the Reichsfuehrer SS is the only political intelligence service of the
+National Socialist German Workers’ Party.
+
+Since the Security Service of the Reichsfuehrer SS delivered
+information on the situation and its connection through constant
+observation of the open and secret enemies of the National Socialistic
+ideology, it more and more became an organ for protection of the State
+and of the people which stood in closest cooperation with the Secret
+State Police.
+
+The head of the organization of the Security Service Reichsfuehrer
+SS is the Main Security Office which stands next to the main offices
+of the Reichsfuehrer SS. The Chief of the Main Security Office is
+the present SS-Maj. Gen. Heydrich, who is at the same time Chief of
+the Security Police, and who was entrusted at that time with the
+construction of the I.C., as well as, the P.I. Service.
+
+The regional construction of the Security Service Reichsfuehrer SS
+is close to that of the General SS in its subdivision into Corps and
+sectors.
+
+The constant observation of the course of working methods of the
+opponent, and his technique in the alternate forms of appearance, his
+ideologies and methods of work compulsorily lead thereto, that the
+work of the Security Service Reichsfuehrer SS cannot only be intended
+for the hour but must be expansive and far-reaching.
+
+
+                    The Race and Settlement Affairs
+
+After the Main Security Office comes the Main Race and Settlement
+Agency as the next pillar of the Reichsfuehrer SS.
+
+In this Race and Settlement Agency the marriage applications of the
+SS men are handled in the Relations Office, because no SS man can
+openly marry without the permission of the Reichsfuehrer SS under
+the stipulations of the marriage law of 1931. For this, a medical
+examination is required for man and wife. Guarantees for ideological
+and personal rearing are to be brought for the bride. Further, the
+family tree is now required of man and wife--by officers [Fuehrers]
+back to 1750 and by non-coms [Unterfuehrer] back to 1800. A copy of the
+hereditary health certificate is likewise required.
+
+In order to make possible a rapid gathering of the necessary
+requirements, Relation Officers are established and provided in the
+infantry battalions of the General SS. They, like the Main Race and
+Settlement Agency, are to help the SS man in the gathering of all
+required papers.
+
+This naturally entails a gigantic work and extensive organizational
+preparations in order to meet quickly the requests which today are very
+pressing since people are being married in greater numbers.
+
+The Settlements Office within the Main Race and Settlement Agency
+handles and brings about the idea of blood and earth [Blut und Boden]
+by settling valuable SS families in connection with the new creation of
+German peasantry and homestead settlement.
+
+Further, the Race office in the Main Race and Settlement Agency watches
+over the uniformity of the racial acceptance examinations and over
+the schooling of these specialists who are to be employed for these
+acceptance examinations within SS units.
+
+
+                    Personal Staff Reichsfuehrer SS
+
+The “Personal Staff Reichsfuehrer SS” was formed as a central
+headquarters for the Reichsfuehrer SS and at the same time, as an
+essential main office.
+
+This office developed out of the Adjutants Office of the Reichsfuehrer
+SS in the course of increased missions. Today it is placed under
+the Chief Adjutants’ Office and the Police Adjutant’s Office of the
+Reichsfuehrer SS. The Personal Staff, through its business experts,
+handles the normal traffic, it administers the press section of the
+Reichsfuehrer SS as well as the cultural section. Among others, it also
+has the porcelain manufacture in Allach under its jurisdiction.
+
+In addition, the SS barracks, that is the summation of all SS men in
+the higher institutes of learning, are placed under the Personal Staff
+Reichsfuehrer SS.
+
+In addition, the following working areas are combined in the following
+divisions in the Personal Staff.
+
+The section of Economic Aid (it handles encumbrance problems which
+developed out of the fighting years).
+
+The section for cultural Research (prehistoric works, expeditions
+with the support of the Reichsfuehrer SS, excavations as well as
+foundations).
+
+The society “The Ancestral heritage” [Das Ahnenerbe].
+
+The society “The Well of Life” [Lebensborn]. This consists mainly of
+members of the SS. It makes possible to women with many children the
+best possible care in ideal homes before, during and after child birth.
+Furthermore, it makes possible the painless delivery for good racial,
+unmarried, and about-to-be married mothers.
+
+At present, several homes in Steinhoering Polzen, Klosterheide (Mark),
+Hoheharst bei Bremen and in Wiener Wald belong to the society “Well of
+Life.”
+
+The office “Four Year Plan” fulfills the mission of regulation of the
+labor employment which was assigned by the Director of the Four Year
+Plan.
+
+Finally, the liaison officers to the Ministries and Offices of the
+Party are assembled under the Personal Staff.
+
+
+                     The Motto [Kernsatz] of the SS
+
+There is no mission for its own sake. How can there, therefore, be
+missions for the sake of an organization. There is only one mission
+which everything in Germany serves and that is the life of this people
+through Adolf Hitler.
+
+“So we fell in and are marching, according to unchangeable laws as a
+national socialistic, soldierly order of men designated as Nordic and
+as an avowed association of their kindred, along the way into a distant
+future. We wish and believe that we should not only be the descendants,
+who have fought it out better, but especially the ancestors of those
+later generations necessary for the perpetual life of the German
+Teutonic people.”
+
+This motto of the SS which was given to it by the Reichsfuehrer SS
+Heinrich Himmler, is the direction for this troop within the framework
+of the movement. This is the sense by which everything which concerns
+the SS consequent, steadfast, and thrifty, today, maintains a happy and
+positive appearance.
+
+If the individual tasks in the framework of this great Protective
+Corps--often limited in nature by the tasks themselves--may
+occasionally be heavy and represent the harshest human requirements
+then the filling of all necessities with this consciousness of a great
+duty and a clean and concrete association of this concept gives every
+duty the gleam and happiness which the National Socialist heart needs
+and is continuously needing.
+
+
+                        III. The Inner Security
+
+After the outward conclusion of the revolution of our ideology,
+in possession of power and thereby in the continuous, unlimited
+responsibility for the fundamentals of the idea, there began the
+greater, although externally less heroic, phase of the penetration.
+
+All divisional fields in inner or outer positions of the State concept
+or of State presentation had now to be convincingly and continually
+filled with our new philosophy or newly indoctrinated by it. We had
+to carry the revolution, the vivaciousness of an extensive movement,
+into the stark hardened institutions and concepts with all means, with
+and against the law. We had to overthrow that which did not seem fit
+to live according to this process; we had to fill anew with a living
+spirit that which seemed to be useful and employable.
+
+Few divisional fields of the conquered State had to face from the
+beginning so much opposition in relation to the life and expression of
+the new Power as the Police.
+
+All our hate and all our rebellion had opposed it as the most outspoken
+symbol of the night of the system for us.
+
+Rubber hoses, house searchings, imprisonment, terror, persecutions, all
+the counter concepts of the harshness and gruesomeness of the period
+behind us seem to crystallize and assemble themselves under the term
+“Police.” Entirely necessarily the term “Police” was already at that
+time a term of the things hated and cursed. Therefore, at the beginning
+it seemed almost impossible to actuate the thought of reaching the
+identical presentation of National Socialist law, of National Socialist
+community authority with the term and institution “Police.” Also within
+the movement itself, it naturally necessitated considerable authority
+in order to allow the forceful wish to become an act.
+
+The SS as formation, the association made up of leader, men, and
+kindred of consequent National Socialists, possessed this authority in
+the course of the history and development of the Party. Out of its
+original mission within the Party it now obtained the same broadened
+mission within the whole people and State: the inner security, the
+inner protection of the National Socialist people, the consequent
+repulsion of its inner enemies in all phases of public life.
+
+Viewed from this standpoint, it seemed as if unsurmountable obstacles
+arose as the Reichsfuehrer SS, upon command of the Fuehrer, obtained
+the task, in addition to the SS, of concentrating the whole German
+Police into his hand and thereby into the real special meaning of the
+SS.
+
+This transfer proceeded under the sole valid law, the living right of
+the German Volk, not only against old ideas but often enough against
+still existing regulations.
+
+In few fields of State and People the solution of the big problem of
+Party and State has been so revolutionary and extensively thoroughly
+undertaken, and scarcely anywhere except for just this difficult ground
+was it demonstrated so successfully that, according to the Fuehrer’s
+will, it is the idea which must determine the State.
+
+The personal authority of the Reichsfuehrer SS and that of his men, who
+were of a single mind, carried the beginning of this new construction,
+while the success of the National Socialist measures taken guaranteed
+the further course.
+
+From the traditional concept of Police has arisen the new concept of
+a protective Corps of the German people. And just as the old idea was
+typically personified in the bailiff, the new idea also demands a new
+man.
+
+We do not need a mere official, just as we do not consider the
+unpolitical soldier suitable here. The new type shall be representative
+of the SS man, who grows out of the Principle of the indoctrination and
+out of the way of the SS and who already today has clearly developed
+himself before the people. Just in this post the people want and must
+possess a political soldier in the best meaning of this National
+Socialist conception.
+
+Instead of the duplicity of a liberal Police law the man of the Police
+was given the powerful living authority of clear fundamentals and
+removed from the hatred and mistrust of the best part of our people
+by means of the National Socialist authority of the SS. Thereby, the
+Police again was carried into the midst of the people as an important
+member for the protection and defense of the community.
+
+It is clear and naturally necessary that completely new judgment of
+the concept of enemy of the State would come from the new type of its
+(Police) man and its youthful clear idea. Out of the limitation in
+the general defense, a far-reaching prevention had to ensue from the
+clear grasping of the State concepts, a clarification of the concept
+of State enemies, a setting up of tasks which thereby assigns to the
+National Socialist Protective Corps a historical mission of unheard of
+proportions in the sound development of the people.
+
+The spirit of discipline and of companionship, the knowledge of the
+source of our being and its single teaching, this vast train of thought
+of the SS as expression of the developing factors of an inner National
+Socialist securing and safeguarding of all possibilities of coming
+events--all this is more and more the meaning and spirit of all great
+new formations in this section of inner security.
+
+To guarantee the intensive security of this new Reich, that is the
+great duty of the SS and with it, and within its scope, also of the
+Police in all its categories. That is the comprehensive mission
+the Fuehrer gave to the SS. It will attack this job anew every
+day, with the utmost seriousness, fully conscious that this is an
+immense National Socialist task and firmly convinced that only the
+ideologically best education of its men and its selection of members
+will enable it to solve this task completely.
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2285-PS
+
+Before me, Lieutenant Colonel Henry H. Mize, JAGD, personally appeared
+Lieutenant Colonel Guivante de Saint Gast and Lieutenant Jean Veith,
+both of the French army, who were made known to me, and who, being by
+me first duly sworn, made the following statement in the handwriting of
+Lieutenant Veith under oath:
+
+  The undersigned:
+
+Guivante de Saint Gast, Lt. Colonel, Chef de Mission de 1^{ere} Classe,
+Carte d’identite militaire BCRA MCPA Promontain No. 510, Immatricule
+FFC Londres RUl. Carte de Repatrie No. 72352 delivered in Annercy
+(France). Order of Mission of the Provisional Government of the French
+Republic, Ministry of Prisoners and Deportees dated May 4th, 1945, No.
+16772. Detained in the Concentration Camp of Mauthausen from March
+18th, 1944, till April 22nd, 1945, No. 57876, having been employed at
+the offices of distribution of work [Arbeitseinsatz] from August 16th,
+1944, till April 22nd, 1945, as auxiliary and as titulary.
+
+Veith, Jean, Lieutenant, Charge de Mission de 2^e Classe, Carte
+d’identite Repatrie No. 403927 delivered at Annercy. Order of Mission
+of the provisional government of the French Republic, Ministry of
+Prisoners and Deportees, dated May 4th, No. 16774. Detained in
+Mauthausen from April 22nd, 1943, till April 22nd, 1945, No. 28645,
+having been employed at the Politische Abteilung from June 2nd, 1943,
+to June 25th, 1943; at the Arbeitseinsatz from June 26th, 1943, to
+August 15th, 1944; as foreman of the cartography and mecausgraphy
+Hollerith services till their dissolution in February 1945; and
+from then on until his liberation at the Lagerschreibstube (night
+shift)--both residing in Paris (17a) 20, Rue de Sanssuse, relate and
+certify under oath the following facts:
+
+In Mauthausen existed several treatments of prisoners, among them the
+“Action K or Kugel” (Bullet Action). Upon the arrival of transports,
+prisoners marked “K” were not registered, got no numbers, and their
+names remained unknown except to the officials of the Politische
+Abteilung. (Lt. Veith had the opportunity of hearing, upon the
+arrival of a transport, the following conversation between the
+Untersturmfuehrer Streitwieser and the chief of the convoy: “How many
+prisoners?” “15, but two K.” “Well, that makes 13.”)
+
+The prisoners were taken directly to the prison where they were
+undressed and taken to the “Bathrooms.” This bathroom in the cellars
+of the prison building near the crematory was specially designed for
+execution (shooting and gassing).
+
+The shooting took place by means of a measuring apparatus. The
+prisoners were backed against a metric scale with an automatic
+contraption releasing a bullet in their neck as soon as the moving
+board determining their height touched the top of their heads.
+
+If a transport consisted of too many “K” prisoners, instead of wasting
+time on the measurements they were exterminated by gas which was sent
+into the bathrooms instead of water.
+
+During his time as foreman at the Hollerith section, Dr. Veith
+frequently received transfer sheets from other camps mentioning
+prisoners who did not appear on the entry list of Mauthausen. In such
+cases the Politische Abteilung very reluctantly used to give the
+information that the camp services had not to take into consideration
+such missing prisoners because they had been transferred “In geheimer
+Reichssache” (Secret affair of the Reich) and insisted upon the
+complete disappearance of all traces of the names. In many cases due
+to transmission errors, the fatal “K” indication was not immediately
+given with the transfer and followed several days or several weeks
+later. Lt. Col. de Saint Gast certifies having received in this service
+cancellation orders from the Politische Abteilung concerning such
+prisoners. As upon their arrival such “K” prisoners had, by mistake,
+received a camp number, they had to disappear in the numbers register
+of the camp, and from this unification order was made in the following
+hypocritical form: prisoner X Nr..... birth place, birth date is
+actually called [heisst richtig] prisoner Y, Nr...., different birth
+place and date.
+
+Such identification orders should be found in the documents of the
+Arbeitseinsatz as far as they have not been destroyed.
+
+This statement has been made voluntarily in the handwriting of Lt.
+Veith, who understands English and who has truly translated the same to
+Lt. Col. de Saint Gast prior to his signing the same.
+
+  /s/ Pf. de Saint Gast                                   /s/ Jean Veith
+
+Subscribed and sworn to before me this 13th day of May 1945.
+
+                                                       /s/ Henry H. MIZE
+                                                           HENRY H. MIZE
+                                                           Lt. Col. JAGD
+
+
+                                 PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2288-PS
+
+           ADOLF HITLER’S GREAT SPEECH BEFORE THE REICHSTAG.
+
+                                                     Berlin, 21 May 1935
+
+ Voelkischer Beobachter, Southern Germany Special Edition No. 142 a. of
+                      22 May 1935. [Pages 1, 3, 4]
+
+Deputies! Members of the German Reichstag!
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+Leaving these general conclusions now and arriving at a precise
+fixation of the present current problems for me the
+
+Position of the German Reich Government results as follows:
+
+1. The German Reich Government refuses to adhere to the Geneva
+Resolutions of 17 March.
+
+The treaty of Versailles was not broken by Germany unilaterally, but
+the well known paragraphs of the dictate of Versailles were violated
+and consequently invalidated by those Powers who could not make up
+their mind to follow the disarmament requested of Germany with their
+own disarmament as agreed upon by the treaty.
+
+2. Because the other powers did not live up to their obligations
+under the disarmament program, the Government of the German Reich no
+longer considers itself bound to those articles which are nothing but
+a discrimination against the German Nation for an unlimited period of
+time, since through them Germany is being nailed down in a unilateral
+manner, contrary to a the spirit of the agreement.
+
+But it solemnly declares that this measure is being taken only with
+regard to those well known paragraphs which are discriminating against
+the German people in a moral and factual way.
+
+Therefore, the Government of the German Reich shall absolutely respect
+all other articles pertaining to the cooperation [Zusammenleben] of the
+various nations including territorial agreements; revision which will
+be unavoidable as time goes by, it will carry out by way of a friendly
+understanding only.
+
+3. The Government of the German Reich has the intention not to sign
+any treaty which it believes not to be able to fulfill. However, it
+will live up to every treaty signed voluntarily even if it was composed
+before this Government took over. Therefore, it will in particular
+adhere to all the allegations under the Locarno pact as long as the
+other partners of the pact also adhere to it.
+
+The Government of the German Reich regards the fact that it has to
+respect the demilitarized zone, as an extremely difficult contribution
+by a sovereign power, to the pacification, and it believes to be
+compelled to call attention to the fact that the constant increase in
+the number of troops on the other side may not just be regarded to be
+of great comfort to these efforts.
+
+
+                                 PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2289-PS
+
+                         VOELKISCHER BEOBACHTER
+
+                         Berlin edition No. 68
+
+                      Berlin, Sunday, 8 March 1936
+
+The important speech of the Fuehrer in the Reichstag on 7 March reads
+as follows:
+
+Men of the German Reichstag! France has replied to the repeated
+friendly offers and peaceful assurances made by Germany by infringing
+on the Rhine Pact through a military alliance with the Soviet Union,
+exclusively directed against Germany. In this manner, however, the
+Locarno Rhine Pact has lost its inner meaning and ceased in practice
+to exist. Consequently, Germany regards herself for her part as no
+longer bound by this dissolved treaty. The German Government are
+now constrained to face the new situation created by this alliance,
+a situation which is rendered more acute by the fact that the
+Franco-Soviet Treaty has been supplemented by a Treaty of Alliance
+between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union, exactly parallel in
+form. In accordance with the fundamental right of a nation to secure
+its frontiers and insure its possibilities of defense, the German
+Government have today restored the full and unrestricted sovereignty of
+Germany in the demilitarized zone of the Rhineland.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+After a hard inner struggle I have, therefore, decided in the name of
+the German Reich Cabinet [Reichsregierung] to submit the following
+memorandum to the French Government and the other signatory powers of
+the Locarno Pact today.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+We have no territorial claims to make in Europe. We know above all that
+all the tensions resulting either from false territorial settlements or
+from the disproportion of the numbers of inhabitants to their living
+spaces cannot, in Europe, be solved by war.
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2292-PS
+
+            THE ARCHIVE [Das Archiv], March 1935, Page 1830.
+
+                          The German Air Force
+
+The Reich Minister for Aviation [Luftfahrt],                        10.3
+General of the Airmen, Goering, in his talk with the
+special correspondent of the Daily Mail, Ward Price,        S i
+expressed himself on the subject of the German Air-Force.             35
+
+General Goering said:
+
+In the extension of our national defense, [Sicherheit] it was
+necessary, as we repeatedly told the world, to take care of defense
+in the air. As far as that is concerned I restricted myself to those
+measures absolutely necessary. The guiding line of my actions was, not
+the creation of an aggressive force which would threaten other nations,
+but merely the completion of a military aviation [Luftfahrt] which
+would be strong enough to repel, at any time, attacks on Germany.
+
+Until the present moment, this has been accomplished on a general
+basis, as so far we have been discussing airmen in general only
+without making any definite distinction from the military point of
+view. The British government, among other proposals, asked Germany
+to join an Air-Pact, whose object is to take joint action in the air
+against an aggressor who disturbs the peace, i.e. to put our own Air
+Force at the disposal of the threatened country. This is the British
+demand. Germany, trying to do everything and trying to collaborate
+everywhere where peace can be ensured, replied by a Note expressing
+her agreement with such an effective protection as is represented by
+the air-convention.
+
+In this Note Germany expressed to Britain the view that Germany would
+be prepared to send her Air Force to the help of the threatened country.
+
+After the German government expressed willingness to help, it became
+necessary to make a clear demarcation within German aviation, namely in
+this respect: which air force will be able to be made available? This
+situation brought about the decision as to those of the German aviation
+who will in future belong to the Air Force and those who will in future
+remain in civil aviation or in sport aviation. It was necessary to mark
+this separation also outwardly, so that the members of the German Air
+Force became soldiers according to the law and their leaders became
+officers. This involves only a part of the persons who up to the
+present moment have worked in the common German aviation. Therefore
+the difference between our Air Force and our civilian aviation shows
+itself clearly and distinctly in the various badges of rank and in the
+designation of rank.
+
+I sum up: Our willingness to share in the effective defense of world
+peace, our assent to hasten with help to the hard pressed country, made
+the creation of a military aviation imperative, if our assent should
+not remain merely an empty phrase.
+
+Answering the correspondent’s question about the hierarchy in the new
+Air Force, its uniforms and its ranks the general said: “The Air Force
+is under the orders of the Reich Minister for Aviation who controls
+also civil aviation. His military rank is General of the Airmen
+[General der Flieger]. The uniform remains similar to the uniform of
+the sport aviation organization but outwardly it will be marked clearly
+by military badges of rank. Similarly the names of rank correspond with
+the military designation of rank from Lieutenant upwards to General
+of the Airmen.” To the question concerning the nomination of German
+Air-attaches in foreign missions General Goering replied that the
+preparations for it were pending. Also about the numerical strength
+of the Air Force he said that he could not yet give final figures.
+As far as the percentage ratio to the Air Forces of other powers is
+concerned, every sensible and decent man ought to realize that Germany,
+being particularly threatened, needed such figures as would guarantee
+the absolute safety of the German people. Asked about the role of the
+Air Force within the Armed Forces, General Goering stated that at the
+present moment, it was impossible to make a clear appreciation of the
+situation. But that it was definite that the Air Force must be an
+integral part of any defense and that without an Air Force the Army and
+Navy, no matter how strong, were useless.
+
+In conclusion, the correspondent asked whether the German Air Force
+will be capable of repelling attacks on Germany. General Goering
+replied to that exactly as follows: “The German Air Force is just as
+passionately permeated with the will to defend the Fatherland to the
+last as it is convinced, on the other hand, that it will never be
+employed to threaten the peace of other nations.”
+
+
+                                 PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2306-PS
+
+                        REVOLUTION OF EDUCATION
+
+                          Baldur von Schirach
+
+[Page 51]
+
+The struggle for the unification of the German youth is finished. I
+considered it as my duty to conduct it in a hard and uncompromising
+manner. Many might not have realized why we went through so much
+trouble for the sake of our youth. And yet: The National Socialist
+German Workers’ Party, whose trustee I felt I always was and always
+will be, this party considered the struggle for the youth as the
+decisive element for the future of the German nation.
+
+[Page 52]
+
+And I promise the German public that the youth of the German Reich, the
+youth of Adolf Hitler will accomplish its duty in the spirit of the man
+to whom alone their lives belong.
+
+[Page 63]
+
+I am responsible to the Reich that the entire youth of Germany will
+be educated physically, morally, and spiritually in the spirit of the
+National Socialist Idea of the State.
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2307-PS
+
+                1938 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 237
+
+ Law concerning the Reunion of Austria with the German Reich, March 13,
+                                  1938
+
+The Reich Government has ordained the following law, which is hereby
+proclaimed:
+
+ARTICLE I. The Federal Constitutional Law of March 13, 1938, ordained
+by the Austrian Federal Government, concerning the reunion of Austria
+with the German Reich, hereby becomes a law of the German Reich. It has
+the following text:
+
+By virtue of Article 3, Section 2, of the Federal Constitutional Law
+concerning extraordinary measures in the constitutional field (R.G.
+Blatt, I, No. 255, 1934), the Federal Government has ordained:
+
+Article 1. Austria is a province of the German Reich.
+
+Article 2. On Sunday, April 10, 1938, a free and secret plebiscite
+shall be held for German men and women of Austria over twenty years of
+age on the question of reunion with the German Reich.
+
+Article 3. In the plebiscite the majority of the votes cast shall
+decide the issue.
+
+Article 4. The necessary regulations for the implementation and
+supplementing of this Federal Constitutional Law shall be provided by
+decree.
+
+Article 5. This Federal Constitutional Law shall enter into force on
+the day of its proclamation.
+
+The Federal Government is entrusted with the execution of this Federal
+Constitutional Law.
+
+Vienna, March 13, 1938.
+
+ARTICLE II. The laws at present in force in Austria shall remain in
+force until further notice. The introduction of Reich law into Austria
+will be effected by the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor or by the Reich
+Minister to whom he may delegate this power.
+
+ARTICLE III. The Reich Minister of the Interior, in consultation with
+the other Reich Ministers concerned, is empowered to issue the legal
+and administrative regulations necessary for the implementation and
+supplementing of this law.
+
+ARTICLE IV. This law shall enter into force on the day of its
+proclamation.
+
+  Linz, March 13, 1938.
+
+  ADOLF HITLER, Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor; GOERING, General Field
+    Marshal, Reich Minister of Aviation; FRICK, Reich Minister of the
+    Interior; VON RIBBENTROP, Reich Minister of Foreign Affairs; R.
+    HESS, Deputy Fuehrer.
+
+
+                                                COPY OF DOCUMENT 2309-PS
+
+                              HEADQUARTERS
+
+                        THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
+
+                         JUDGE ADVOCATE SECTION
+
+                           WAR CRIMES BRANCH
+
+                                                                 APO 403
+  3 JA 122                                                  21 June 1945
+
+SUBJECT: Report of Investigation of War Crimes.
+
+TO: Commanding General, Third United States Army, APO 403.
+
+I. _AUTHORITY_
+
+1. This investigation was conducted in conformity with letter,
+Headquarters European Theater of Operations, file AG 000.5, OpJA.
+Subject: Establishment of War Crimes Branches, 24 February 1945, by 2d
+Lt. John J. Reid, AUS, Investigator-Examiner, from 25 April 1945 to 2
+May 1945 inclusive and pursuant to directive of Commanding General,
+Third United States Army, a copy of the order which is attached hereto
+as Exhibit A.
+
+II. _MATTERS INVESTIGATED--FLOSSENBURG CONC. CAMP (P-3338)_
+
+2. _a._ Killing of interned Allied National Civil population and
+Allied National PWs by various cruel and inhuman methods such as
+neck-shooting, hanging, poison injections, forced suicides, lack of
+medical treatment, starvation, beatings, and other numerous inhuman
+methods purposely inflicted to result in death, (Violation of Geneva
+Prisoners of War Convention, Rules of Land Warfare and the customary
+law as observed by Civilized Nations).
+
+_b._ Living and working conditions of internees which were beyond
+physical endurance and resulted in a systematic elimination of
+prisoners.
+
+_c._ Starvation rations of internees which resulted in death and
+permanent physical impairment of prisoners.
+
+_d._ Cruel and inhuman treatment and methods used by members of the
+German Armed Forces and/or persons under their immediate command
+against Allied National Civilians and Allied National Prisoners of
+War. (Violation of Article 2 of the Geneva Convention. Paragraphs 73,
+80, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 102, 105, 119, 127, 129, 132, 172,
+FM 27-10 Rules of Land Warfare and in violation of the customary law
+observed by Civilized Nations).
+
+_e._ Unlawful killing by shooting, hanging and other methods, of Allied
+National Civil population who had been interned and/or otherwise
+arrested by members of the German Armed Forces (Violation of the
+customary laws observed by civilized nations).
+
+III. _PROCEEDINGS_
+
+3. _a._ The testimony of all witnesses examined in the course of this
+investigation was secured through the use of an interpreter after the
+witness had been sworn under authority of Article of War 114, in the
+following form: “You swear that the evidence you shall give in this
+investigation now being conducted shall be the truth, the whole truth,
+and nothing but the truth. So help you God.” The examination of each
+such witness where practical was conducted in my presence.
+
+In the case at hand, it being impracticable to use a
+stenographic-reporter, the witness after having first been duly
+sworn was questioned regarding his knowledge of the matters under
+investigation. The witness then propounded his testimony in a narrative
+statement in his own handwriting, where practicable, and in his own
+native language. The witnesses then after being sworn signed the
+statement. The interpreter was also sworn in the following form: “You
+swear that you will truly interpret in this investigation now being
+conducted. So help you God.”
+
+_b._ The transcribed sworn testimony of each such witness whose name is
+listed below is hereto attached as an exhibit, the number of which is
+indicated in the lower right-hand corner of the paper preceded by the
+letter “B.”
+
+SWORN STATEMENTS OF WITNESSES: See Appendix (1) for index and exhibits.
+
+UNSWORN STATEMENTS, LETTERS, REPORTS, ETC.: See Appendix (2) for index
+and exhibits.
+
+_c._ PHOTOGRAPHS:
+
+1. Photographs of some of the SS personnel of Camp Flossenburg. See
+Appendix (3) for index and photographs.
+
+2. Atrocity scenes. See Appendix (4) for index and photographs.
+
+IV. _SUMMARY OF FACTS_
+
+4. Concentration Camp Flossenburg (Coord. P-3338), was founded in 1938
+as a camp for political prisoners. Construction was commenced on the
+camp in 1938 and it was not until April 1940 that the first transport
+of prisoners was received. From this time on the prisoners began to
+flow steadily into the camp (Exh. B-1). Flossenburg was the mother camp
+and under its direct control and jurisdiction were 47 satellite camps
+or outer-commandos for male prisoners and 27 camps for female workers.
+To these outer-commandos were supplied the necessary prisoners for the
+various work projects undertaken.
+
+Of all these outer-commandos Hersbruck and Leitmeritz (in
+Czechoslovakia), Oberstaubling, Mulsen and Sall, located on the Danube,
+were considered to be the worst. The work at these camps mainly
+consisted of underground labor, the purpose being the construction
+of large underground factories, storage rooms, etc. This labor was
+performed completely underground and as a result of the brutal
+treatment, working and living conditions, a daily average of 100
+prisoners died. To the one camp Oberstaubling, 700 prisoners were
+transported in February 1945 and on the 15th of April 1945 only 405
+of these men were living (Exh. B-1). During the 12 months preceding
+the liberation, Flossenburg and the branch camps under its control
+accounted for the death of 14,739 male inmates and 1,300 women. These
+figures represent the deaths as they were obtained from the available
+records in the camp, however, they are in no way complete as many
+secret mass executions and deaths took place. In 1941 an additional
+stockade was added to the Flossenburg Camp, to hold 2,000 Russian
+prisoners. From these 2,000 prisoners only 102 survived. (Exh. B-1)
+
+Flossenburg Concentration Camp can best be described as a factory
+dealing in death. Although this camp had in view the primary object of
+putting to work the mass slave labor, another of its primary objectives
+was the elimination of human lives by the methods employed in handling
+the prisoners. (Exh. B-2)
+
+Hunger and starvation rations, sadism, housing facilities, inadequate
+clothing, medical neglect, disease, beatings, hangings, freezing,
+hand hanging, forced suicides, shooting, etc., all played a major
+role in obtaining their objective. Prisoners were murdered at random,
+spite killings against Jews were common. Injections of poison and
+shooting in the neck were everyday occurrences. Epidemics of typhus and
+spotted fever were permitted to run rampant as a means of eliminating
+prisoners. Life in this camp meant nothing. Killing became a common
+thing, so common that a quick death was welcomed by the unfortunate
+ones.
+
+(See following List of Exhibits as References)
+
+  Hunger and Starvation      Exh. B-1, B-2, B-3, B-4
+  Freezing                   Exh. B-11
+  Medical Neglect            Exh. B-1, B-12
+  Torturous Beatings and     Exh. B-1, B-2, B-6, B-12, B-3,
+    Floggings                     B-11, B-13, C-2
+  Forced Suicides            Exh. B-2, B-13
+  Hangings                   Exh. B-1, B-2, B-4, B-5, B-6,
+                                  B-7, B-12, C-2
+  Hand Hangings              Exh. B-11
+  Poison Injections          Exh. B-1, B-8, C-1, C-2
+  Typhus and Spotted
+    Fever                    Exh. B-1, B-2, B-9, C-1, C-3
+  Shooting                   Exh. B-6, B-2, B-3, B-13, B-15
+
+The system set up at this camp seemed to be one of mass elimination
+of the prisoners caused by devious means. Starvation diets wilfully
+designed to produce death within a few months played a major role.
+Typhus and spotted fever were encouraged as a means of disposing of
+many. There were innumerable executions, mistreatments, beatings,
+flogging to death, which continued up until the time this camp was
+overrun by our forces. Mass hanging took place. Generally, the persons
+hanged were stripped naked. Oftimes they were beaten before hanging
+till the unfortunate victims begged for immediate hanging to ease the
+pain. At first the SS men in charge of the hangings were given extra
+rations for each hanging. Later on the hangings became so numerous that
+the extra rations were stopped. Hanging a person by his wrists with a
+heavy barrel suspended from his ankles was another method of execution.
+This caused the person’s insides to be torn up and he died. (Exh. B-11)
+On Christmas 1944 a number of prisoners were hung at one time. The
+prisoners were forced to view this hanging. By the side of the gallows
+was a decorated Christmas tree and as expressed by one prisoner “it was
+a terrible sight, that combination of prisoners hanging in the air with
+the glistening Christmas tree.” (Exh. B-12)
+
+In March or April, 13 American or British parachutists were hung. They
+had been delivered to this camp sometime before and had been captured
+while trying to blow up bridges. (Exh. B-7, B-8a&b)
+
+Many thousands were tortured and killed by every known method. New
+methods of brutal punishment and torture killing were devised by
+certain members of the camp who became particularly known for their
+sadistic methods.
+
+On April 20, 1945, approximately 15,000 prisoners were assembled to
+make a forced march in the direction of Concentration Camp Dachau. The
+evacuation of these prisoners was caused by the impending capture of
+the camp by the Allies. These 15,000 prisoners were lined up in three
+groups and started on this march. Only those prisoners who could walk
+were taken and before leaving Flossenburg, many were executed, as
+also were those who collapsed in rank awaiting the movement to start
+the trek. No provision was made for the feeding of these prisoners or
+sleeping on this trip. They marched in long columns guarded by SS
+guards. (Exh. C-2)
+
+Thousands were killed on the way and the paths which they took were
+littered with the dead. Groups of from 5 to 50 were taken out and
+forced to dig pits and then were shot. (Exh. B-14, B-15, C-4, C-5).
+Many graves were not even covered. As the already starved and weakened
+prisoners fell from exhaustion, a group of SS guards bringing up the
+rear would kill them by a shot in the back of the head. All who fell
+out of line were immediately executed in this manner. Death was also
+caused by beatings or bashings in the skulls. (Exh. B-1, B-3, B-13,
+E-17)
+
+The prisoners marched from Friday till Monday during which time they
+received only 100 grams of bread. They marched in the rain and slept
+in the fields in the mud and water. Many died from exhaustion. On the
+23rd day of April 1945, between the towns of Cham (U-5850) and Roding
+(U-4868), they were liberated by the American Troops. (Exh. B-3, B-13)
+(Photographs taken near Wetterfield (U-5070) of one of the graves on
+this march.) (Exh. E-1 to E-17)
+
+5. The victims of Flossenburg included among them, Russian civilians
+and prisoners of war, German nationals, Italians, Belgians, Poles,
+Czechs, Hungarians, British, and American prisoners of war. No
+practical means was available to complete a list of victims at this
+camp, however, since the foundation of the Camp in 1938 until the day
+of liberation it is estimated that more than 29,000 inmates died. (Exh.
+B-1)
+
+6. _PERPETRATORS_
+
+This camp was controlled and run by one class of people, SS troops. The
+list of perpetrators includes a few civilian prisoners, who managed to
+gain favor with the SS by carrying out orders of execution and beatings
+upon their fellow inmates. These prisoners who obtained their immunity
+and privilege at the cost of other men’s lives are deemed equally as
+guilty.
+
+The citations referred to in the list of perpetrators is by no means
+complete nor is the list of guilty persons complete. (See Appendix (5)
+for index and exhibits.)
+
+V. _CONCLUSIONS_
+
+7. That the exploitation, killing and atrocities committed upon
+prisoners was a part of a well regulated scheme or plan of the Nazi SS
+Group, is clearly indicated by the evidence presented here and resulted
+in the death of thousands.
+
+Flossenburg Concentration Camp, Germany, was the scene of every type
+and form of Nazi brutality and atrocity committed upon the unfortunate
+individuals who happened to be sent to this camp. Practically every
+nationality of Europe was at sometime or another represented in this
+camp. The majority of prisoners, however, were Russians and Poles. No
+line of demarkation was made between sexes. Men, women and children
+were executed in the most brutal fashions.
+
+The responsibility for this camp must be placed upon all personnel who
+held an active part as a member of the organizational set-up. Whether
+these persons were ones who actually inflicted the mortal punishment
+is of little consequence. They all at the least failed to lift a
+restraining hand in the punishments and atrocities committed upon the
+inmates therein.
+
+                                                            JOHN J. REID
+                                                              2d Lt, AUS
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2310-PS
+
+                1938 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 247
+
+    First Decree of the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor concerning the
+      Introduction of German Reich Law in Austria, March 15, 1938.
+
+By virtue of Article II of the law of March 13, 1938, concerning the
+reunion of Austria with the German Reich (RGBl I, p. 237), I order:
+
+SECTION 1. (1) The sphere of validity of the official gazettes of the
+Reich shall be extended to the province of Austria.
+
+(2) Reich laws which are proclaimed after the effective date of the law
+of March 13, 1938, concerning the reunion of Austria with the German
+Reich (RGBl I, p. 237), shall be valid for the province of Austria
+unless their application to the province of Austria is expressly held
+in abeyance.
+
+SECTION 2. From the effective date of this decree, the following shall
+be applied in substance in the province of Austria:
+
+1. The Reich flag law of September 15, 1935 (RGBl I, p. 1145), with the
+provision that Jews shall be forbidden to raise the Reich and National
+Flag and to display the Reich colors;
+
+2. The law against formation of new parties of July 14, 1933 (RGBl I,
+p. 479);
+
+3. The law for the preservation of unity of party and state of December
+1, 1933 (RGBl I, p. 1016), as amended by the law of July 3, 1934 (RGBl
+I, p. 529);
+
+4. The law concerning Reich governors of January 30, 1935 (RGBl I, p.
+65) with the provision that instructions of Reich ministers to the
+Reich Governor in Austria shall require, until further notice, the
+approval of the Reich Minister of the Interior;
+
+5. The order for implementation of the Four-Year Plan of October 18,
+1936 (RGBl I, p. 887);
+
+6. The Reich law concerning the compulsory registration of members of
+the German State abroad of February 3, 1938 (RGBl I, p. 113).
+
+SECTION 3. (1) Regulations for effecting the transition shall be issued
+by the Reich Minister of the Interior or by the Reich Governor in
+Austria with the approval of the Reich Minister of the Interior.
+
+2. By this means regulations of the Reich and regulations of the
+province of Austria can be assimilated in one another.
+
+3. Incompatible regulations of the province of Austria shall be
+invalidated.
+
+SECTION 4. This decree shall enter into force on the day of its
+proclamation.
+
+                                                 Vienna, March 15, 1938.
+                              ADOLF HITLER, Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor
+                                   FRICK, Reich Minister of the Interior
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2311-PS
+
+                1938 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 245
+
+       Decree of the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor concerning the
+Administration of the Oath to the Officials of the Province of Austria,
+                            March 15, 1938.
+
+By virtue of Article II of the law of March 13, 1938, concerning the
+reunion of Austria with the German Reich (RGBl I, p. 237), I issue the
+following order:
+
+SECTION 1. Public officials of the province of Austria shall take an
+oath of office upon entrance into service.
+
+SECTION 2. The oath of office of public officials reads: “I swear
+that I shall be loyal and obedient to Adolf Hitler, the Fuehrer of
+the German Reich and People, and that I shall observe the laws and
+conscientiously fulfill the duties of my office, so help me God.”
+
+SECTION 3. The officials at present in office shall be sworn in
+forthwith in accordance with Section 2.
+
+Jewish officials shall not be sworn in.
+
+SECTION 4. A person is Jewish if he is descended from at least
+three racially full-blooded Jewish grandparents. A grandparent is
+automatically considered a full-blooded Jew if he belonged to the
+Jewish congregation.
+
+A Jewish half-breed descended from two full-blooded Jewish grandparents
+is considered a Jew:
+
+_a._ If he belonged to the Jewish congregation on September 16, 1935,
+or became a member of it thereafter.
+
+_b._ If he was married to a Jew on September 16, 1935, or entered into
+marriage with one thereafter.
+
+SECTION 5. Anyone who refuses to take this oath shall be removed from
+office.
+
+SECTION 6. The legal and administrative regulations necessary for
+the implementation of this law shall be issued by the Reich Governor
+(Austrian Provincial Government).
+
+SECTION 7. This decree shall enter into force on the day of its
+proclamation.
+
+                                                 Vienna, March 15, 1938.
+                             ADOLF HITLER, Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor.
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2313-PS
+
+                1938 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 254
+
+Order for the Transfer of the Austrian National Bank to the Reichsbank,
+                             March 17, 1938
+
+By virtue of Article II of the law of March 13, 1938, concerning the
+reunion of Austria with the German Reich (RGBl I, p. 237), I order:
+
+Section 1. The administration of the Austrian National Bank shall be
+transferred to the Reichsbank.
+
+Section 2. The Austrian National Bank shall be liquidated, and its
+assets placed by the Reichsbank to the Account of the Reich.
+
+Section 3. In taking over operations, the Reichsbank shall transfer to
+its staff the entire personnel of the Austrian National Bank, with due
+regard for legal and contractual rights.
+
+Section 4. This order shall enter into force upon its proclamation.
+
+                                                 Berlin, March 17, 1938.
+
+                              ADOLF HITLER, Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor
+
+                                  FRICK, Reich Minister of the Interior.
+
+                                             Count SCHWERIN VON KROSIGK,
+                                              Reich Minister of Finance.
+
+                                     Dr. HJALMAR SCHACHT, Reich Minister
+                                         and President of the Reichsbank
+
+
+                                 PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2315-PS
+
+                THE LAW OF THE REICH CHAMBER OF CULTURE
+
+                   [Das Recht der Reichskulturkammer]
+
+                                           Edited by Karl Fr. Schrieber,
+                          Publ. by Junkor und Duennhaupt, Berlin. Vol. 2
+                                               (1 Jan. to 30 June 1935).
+
+Order concerning the Supervision of District Leaders of the Work of the
+                  Reich Chamber of Culture [Page 25].
+
+           Dated 12 Nov. 1934 (Published in the daily press).
+
+In the process of unification of Party and State, it must be put into
+effect that, in general, the same tasks of the Party and of the State
+will also be administered by the same people. The Gau propaganda
+chiefs of the Party are, according to that, also the district leaders
+[Landesstellenleiter] of the Reich Ministry for National Enlightenment
+and Propaganda. In compliance with this regulation, the Reich Chamber
+of Culture must also be incorporated in the union of the Party and
+State. Therefore, I order that the district leaders and the Gau
+propaganda chiefs [Gaupropagandaleiter], as district administrators of
+culture, exercise from now on supervision over the work of the Reich
+Chamber of Culture in their districts. The individual chambers and
+their district associations are instructed to adjust and to subordinate
+their district formations and organizations in the Reich to those of
+the district and of the Gau propaganda offices. The Gau leaders have
+the privilege to suggest and to reject the appointment of personnel for
+these offices. The appointment is then effected by the president of the
+chamber. Guiding rules for the execution of this order will soon be
+published in detail.
+
+                                                            Heil Hitler!
+                                                    Signed: Dr. Goebbels
+
+       #       #       #       #       #
+
+ Order Concerning Closure of Newspaper Publications for the Purpose of
+               Eliminating Unsound Competitive Conditions
+
+                            [Pages 121-122]
+
+                   Dated 24 April 1935 (V.B. 35/25.4)
+
+       #       #       #       #       #
+
+On the basis of paragraph 25 of the first decree concerning the
+execution of the law on the Reich Chamber of Culture, dated 1 November
+1933 (RGBl, I/1933, page 797ff), I decree the following:
+
+I. If a great number of newspaper publications exists in one locality,
+whose operation depends on the sale of a higher circulation than can
+altogether be disposed of according to local conditions and sound
+principles of publication, individual publications can be discontinued
+for the establishment of sound economic conditions.
+
+In order to obtain evidence, the publications may be subjected to an
+examination; all inside information is to be given to the agencies
+which I assign to undertake these examinations.
+
+II. For the execution of this order, the Reich Union of German
+Newspaper Publishers is instructed to report to me those localities
+in which, because of numerical overproduction, acute competitive
+conditions exist, and to name the publication which ought to be
+subjected to an examination. This union has, hereby, to act according
+to the principles laid down in my announcement concerning “The press
+in the second year of the National Socialistic State.” It is further
+instructed to ascertain whether the closing of establishments can be
+avoided by voluntary unifications. It will report to me until the 31st
+of July 1935.
+
+  Berlin, 24 April 1935.
+
+       #       #       #       #       #
+
+            The President of the Reich Chamber of the Press
+
+                                 AMANN
+
+The article of the President of the Reich Chamber of the Press in
+regard to “The Press in the second year of the National Socialistic
+State” is concerned, among other things, with the numerical
+overproduction that exists in newspaper publications. He demanded the
+removal of this condition. Proceeding from the fact that already before
+the 30th of January 1933, under the multiparty system at that time,
+there was an excess of newspapers at hand, he states that this fact
+stands out today even more strongly in the face of the subjugation
+of parties and other special interests. He emphasized further that,
+insofar as overproduction had been increased by the strong growth of
+the official Party Press, the affected publications of competitors
+would have to fall back behind the official Party Press. This point
+of view will be brought into effect in the execution of the order for
+the closing of newspaper publications for the purpose of eliminating
+unsound competitive conditions. In particular, the unsound competitive
+conditions are to be eliminated under which, newspapers with high
+circulation in the course of the developments fought each other as
+competitors. Considering the fact that in probably all these cases
+there were fewer newspapers with high circulation on 30 January
+1933 than at present, then the result, without doubt, is that the
+publications concerned require such circulations, in order to be
+profitable in relation to the size of their business, as cannot be
+attained or maintained by means of sound advertising and competitive
+measures under the competitive conditions prevailing at present. The
+order thus serves the elimination of economically poor conditions
+which, seen from a long-range view, must cause prejudice, far beyond
+the small circle of the publications immediately concerned, to the
+German Press and to its cultural missions. This order promotes the
+conciliation and the organic development of the entire German Press. In
+this way, the order assures the press the opportunity to fulfill its
+noble task which it has to accomplish for the benefit of the nation
+and the people. Of course, the execution of this order, as is already
+indicated by its purpose, will be guided by the endeavor to utilize
+the existing economical values in the future to the greatest possible
+degree. The President of the Reich Chamber of the Press will therefore
+endeavor at first in every individual case to effect agreements which
+will relieve him of the necessity to issue orders for the closing of
+establishments. In this sense, the instructions, given at the end of
+Number II of the regulation, to the Reich Union of the German Newspaper
+Publishers, are of special importance.
+
+
+                                 PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2319-PS
+
+                     ORGANIZATION BOOK OF THE NSDAP
+
+   Edited by The Reichsorganisationsleiter of the NSDAP (4th edition,
+  1937). Published by the Central Publishing House of the NSDAP, Franz
+                           Eher’s Successor.
+
+[Pages 143-144]
+
+The Organization of the NSDAP in Foreign Countries
+
+The organization of the NSDAP in foreign countries (AO) is regulated
+from the standpoint of organization along district lines. The Director
+of the AO (with the rank of Gauleiter) is immediately subordinated
+to the Fuehrer’s Deputy. The AO has its headquarters in Berlin. The
+Director of the organization in foreign countries is at the same
+time Chief of the Foreign Service Organization in the Foreign Office
+and directs the unified supervision of German nationals in foreign
+countries.
+
+_Duties and Authority_
+
+The duty of the AO is to win over the German nationals in foreign lands
+and in the shipping world to the National Socialist point of view
+and to keep alive the idea of a racial community over all classes,
+professions, and confessions in every single German, living in a
+foreign country.
+
+The AO will keep itself aloof from all non-German issues.
+
+The AO is the only competent party office for all Party Organizations
+abroad (with the exception of Danzig and Memel) and on board German
+ships. The Director of the AO is responsible for all measures,
+principles, and directives given in this sphere of activity. He is
+further responsible for seeing that the Special directives issued by
+all the competent offices of the Reich government are modified in such
+a way that they are suitable for conditions abroad in order that German
+interests are not under any circumstances endangered or damaged.
+
+All party members domiciled abroad, who take up permanent residence
+there or who are employed in seagoing ships, are subordinate to the
+AO and are not to be considered party members of districts within the
+Reich. Party members engaged in shipping, who leave their work afloat
+and are without work for at least six months, are to be transferred
+to the appropriate Gau within Germany, also party members abroad who
+return and take-up permanent residence in the fatherland.
+
+Members of the families of German seamen, residing at home and who
+belong to the NS Women’s Organization are administered by the NS
+Women’s group--shipping--of the organization of the NSDAP in foreign
+countries. This pertains to all districts in which the AO--shipping has
+divisions, subdivisions, and branches.
+
+_Organization_
+
+The Staff of the AO carries the designation “Supervision of the
+Organization of the NSDAP in Foreign Countries.”
+
+The AO of the NSDAP is subdivided into national groups, national
+districts, districts, local groups, and branches. The term “national
+group” is to be used only for those countries which are particularly
+important as far as German nationals abroad are concerned. To all other
+countries the term “national district” applies.
+
+The Party functionaries of the AO are:
+
+1. The Director with the rank of Gauleiter.
+
+2. The Deputy Director with the rank of Deputy Gauleiter.
+
+3. The heads of the national groups (on account of different
+conditions in all of the different countries of the world in which the
+organization is to be found) with the rank of a district office leader.
+
+4. The heads of national districts with the rank of a district leader.
+
+5. The district leaders.
+
+6. The leaders of local groups.
+
+7. The leaders of branches.
+
+The Office Chiefs in the Head Office of the AO, the commissioners for
+foreign countries, under whom are several national groups and national
+districts (partly in our part of the earth), and the leaders of the
+national groups have the rank of a Gauamtsleiter. Subordinate to the
+Director of the Office of AO Shipping Section of the NSDAP are:
+
+1. The divisional leaders in Bremen, Hamburg, Luebeck, and Stettin with
+the rank of a Gauhaupt Stellenleiter.
+
+2. Local group and branch leaders on board German ships.
+
+In order to identify the political leaders and party members of the
+AO, the leader has permitted the members of the AO to wear a special
+badge. (See picture.) It portrays a black diamond which, set up on
+its point, is worn on the left arm (lower end 2 centimeters above the
+cuff). Within the black diamond are the two letters AO, for the Party
+Functionaries in gold and for all others in silver. Party members wear
+the badge _on the brown shirt_. The badge may only be worn, as long as
+the party member in question belongs to the AO. It is to be discarded
+as soon as he returns home and is transferred to a local group.
+
+The graphical plan of organization serves to illustrate the
+organization in detail.
+
+The entire business of all party offices with the organizations of the
+NSDAP abroad and in the shipping service must be carried out through
+the Director of the AO. The associations belonging to the party, who
+in the course of their operations endeavor to enlist German nationals
+abroad may only do this within the framework of the AO.
+
+[Pages 295-312]
+
+
+     The Reichpropaganda Leader of the NSDAP and Propaganda Leader
+
+The propaganda of the NSDAP, its organizations and associate groups is
+the responsibility of the Reichpropaganda leader of the Reich:
+
+_Duties_
+
+1. He determines the entire propaganda aspect of the movement including
+its organizations and associate groups.
+
+2. He lays down the directions to be followed by the party including
+the organizations and associate groups as far as realizing the
+Fuehrer’s wishes as regards culture are concerned.
+
+3. He exercises control over the entire German radio system in regard
+to its interior organizational, cultural, and economic development.
+
+4. The saturating of the German nation with national socialist ideology
+is his concern.
+
+5. He enlightens the people concerning the Fuehrer’s accomplishments
+both as regards party and State.
+
+For propaganda purposes, the press, the radio, and films are put into
+use.
+
+The Chief of Staff and adjutant are subordinate to the Reich propaganda
+leader.
+
+The sphere of activity of the Reich propaganda leader can be divided
+into five groups, and each group is under the control of an office of
+its own.
+
+  1. Active propaganda.
+  2. Films.
+  3. Radio.
+  4. Culture.
+  5. Liaison Office.
+
+
+                             Chief of Staff
+
+Directly subordinate to the Chief of Staff are:
+
+1. The “Reich ring for national socialist propaganda and national
+enlightenment.”
+
+2. The “Reichsautozug Deutschland” and the “Hilfszug” Bavaria.
+
+3. The business center of the Reichpropaganda office.
+
+4. The main office of press propaganda.
+
+5. The main office for exhibitions and fairs.
+
+The duty of the Reich ring for National Socialist Propaganda and
+national enlightenment is to insure the uniform direction of the
+propaganda of all organizations and associated groups, through
+the party. Through the duly qualified party functionaries one
+representative from the propaganda offices of all organizations and
+groups is allotted to the Reich ring. To these representatives are
+added representatives of certain offices of the Reich government, etc.
+
+_Office of press propaganda._ The duty of the central office of the
+press propaganda is to revise, on the basis of newspaper technique,
+propaganda measures resulting from the general work of all offices
+of the Reichpropaganda leader and to submit them to the competent
+authorities of the national socialist party press as well as the rest
+of the press.
+
+_Central office for exhibitions and fairs._ The duty of the central
+office _for exhibitions_ and fairs is to supervise all exhibitions in
+which the party intends to participate, from a propaganda point of view.
+
+1. _The Office of active propaganda._ The duty of active propaganda
+is to effect the uniform execution of all active propaganda measures
+from the large scale organizations of gigantic size with their
+architectural-like structure down to the organizations of local groups,
+and branches.
+
+This means that the whole propaganda organization of the movement, its
+organizations and associated groups are combined.
+
+Parallel with the daily handling of current political questions, there
+is the supplying of the entire speakers’ staff with information and the
+provision of all propagandists of the Reich with the monthly magazine
+“Our Will and Way.”
+
+As a supplement to speaking, there must be the designing and
+distribution of appropriate placards and pamphlets as well as the
+careful examination of convention reports on the part of the speakers
+and the directors of propaganda.
+
+A complete picture of the propaganda can be seen from the statistical
+survey of all reports coming from districts and Gaus (in regard to
+propaganda).
+
+_Central office of speaker’s organization._ The central office of
+speaker’s organization comprises by way of its subordinate office
+“Speakers’ organization” all Reich, Gau, and district speakers of
+the NSDAP as well as all Specialist Speakers of the organizations
+and associated groups. This staff of speakers for the whole movement
+is constantly furnished with material by the office of “Speakers’
+information,” which counts as the only material for speeches and the
+only material for information by the party.
+
+The “Speakers’ Agency” of Reich speakers, shock troop speakers of the
+Reich propaganda Directorate and cadets for the Shock troops operates
+through the office of “Speakers’ Agency.” The “Speakers School”
+subordinate to the central office does not only provide for a further
+supply of political and specialized speakers but also for constantly
+enriching the knowledge of all actively engaged speakers. For this
+purpose a special “Reich School for Speakers” has been installed.
+
+
+                           The Party Speakers
+
+Speakers are classified as follows:
+
+  1. Reich speaker.
+  2. Speaker for the Shock troops and cadets.
+  3. Gau speaker.
+  4. District speaker.
+  5. Specialized speaker.
+
+(When announcing meetings, the speakers designations as they appear
+above are to be strictly adhered to).
+
+Their employment is decided as follows:
+
+_a._ The principle of capability.
+
+_b._ The merits of the veteran fighter.
+
+On principle, it is to be differentiated between political and
+technical speakers.
+
+2. _Central office of the film industry._ The duty of the central
+office of the film industry is to exhibit such films regularly as
+adequately serve to enlighten and educate the masses and strengthen
+national socialist ideology. Associated with the film division is the
+office of photography.
+
+The central office of the film industry is divided into:
+
+  Organization
+  Finance administration
+  Production and technique
+  Dramatic theory
+  Cultural films
+  Newsfilms
+  Photography
+
+3. _Central Radio office._ The radio organization of the NSDAP must
+exercise a constant control over the entire German radio system in
+order to synchronize the internal organization, cultural, technical,
+and economic development of the radio system with national socialist
+principles.
+
+The effects of radio propaganda are assured through the organization of
+radio technicians with the assistance of all technical possibilities
+as regards transmission, for the coordinating of the entire nation
+in every corner of the Reich--whether listening in at home, in a
+community, to a national broadcast.
+
+_Central bureau of Cultural Political Radio Activities and Radio
+Organization_: Transmitting and receiving system, cultural productions
+on the radio, broadcasts to schools, scientific radio work, radio for
+youth.
+
+Organization of the broadcasting personnel (Reich radio association,
+individual association of the Reich Kultur Association, associations of
+people interested in radio) radio exhibitions.
+
+Central office of radio technique, technical transmission service
+(loud speaker system), technical training in radio, short wave and
+amateur transmission, telegraphy and ultra-short wave system, technical
+production questions.
+
+_Central office of radio propaganda._ Propaganda operations by
+radio, the recruiting of listeners, radio news system, political
+Reichtransmissions.
+
+4. _Central office for culture._ The duty of the central office for
+culture is to stimulate, to preserve, to supervise artistic creation in
+the sense of the formal expression of the national socialist ideology
+and to incorporate into the Party Propaganda its organizations, and
+associate groups. The following serve this purpose among other things:
+
+_Central office of Architecture._ The issuing of general directions and
+regulations concerning questions as regards the architectural structure
+of monuments and such edifices which serve the public activity of the
+national socialist movement.
+
+_Central office for artistic designs._ The issuing of general
+directions and orders in regard to all other questions of the artistic
+designing of symbols, objects, etc., which are used in the public
+activities of the national socialist movement.
+
+The issuing of general directions and rules for the artistic setting
+for demonstration and the organizing of National Socialist celebrations
+making use of cultural means.
+
+_Central office of selection._ Part of the duties in this sphere of
+activity are the screening and selecting of musical and poetical works
+with the aim in view of using them at national socialist demonstrations
+and celebrations.
+
+_Central office of program organization._ The drawing up of model
+programs for celebrations of the national socialist movement and for
+organizing settings for national socialist demonstrations on the basis
+of the type of tradition formed in the fighting days [Kampfzeit].
+
+Elimination of unsuitable settings which may find their way into the
+movement through unauthorized agencies. War against trash, preservation
+of definite national socialist aspect in the settings for celebrations,
+the prevention of mystic and pseudoreligious falsification of our
+ideology, as a result of prodigious constructions by misguided
+cult devotees. Professional artists to be put to work following
+above-mentioned directives. Suitable persons will be chosen by the
+Reichpropaganda leader in the central office of culture, as permanent
+co-workers, especially for the purpose of operating in specialized
+fields. Practical courses for cultivation of folk songs for the purpose
+of finding the proper personnel for the planning of activities in
+all organizations of the movement. The “Proposals for the Planning
+of National Socialist Celebrations” issued monthly by the Central
+Office for Culture will furnish the leaders of propaganda and central
+offices for culture, with the necessary material. Therein are also
+found appropriate instructions for the planning of discussion evenings,
+membership meetings, evening meetings of the Hitler Youth, evening
+gatherings of SA and SS comrades, in a manner befitting our creed and
+to avoid monotony. The unity of the Party and legitimate cohesion
+within the cultural sphere is guaranteed through the coordination of
+the important offices. The Reich propaganda leader of the NSDAP is also
+president of the cultural association.
+
+The Director of the office for culture of the Reich propaganda
+Directorate is also the director of Reich culture in the Reich Cultural
+Association.
+
+5. _Liaison officer._ The duty of the liaison officer is to centralize
+all business with Reichministries, officials, and public bodies,
+etc. Thus it is assured that the general principles of propaganda
+are brought to the knowledge of the appropriate Reich officials. In
+reverse, the liaison office brings all problems and instructions, that
+emanate from the Reich propaganda ministry to the knowledge of the
+Reich propaganda Directorate.
+
+In order to coordinate the propaganda of both the party and the state,
+it is the duty of the liaison office to bring the general principles
+of the Reich propaganda directorate to the knowledge of the bodies
+subordinate to the Reichministry for national enlightenment and
+propaganda which are also associated with and administered by this
+Ministry.
+
+The Gau, Office of Propaganda, as commissioner of the Gauleiter for
+the entire propaganda aspect of the national socialist movement, the
+Gauleiter Propaganda takes precedence over the Gau Propaganda Office.
+
+For the purpose of carrying out the work of the district, the following
+leaders are under his jurisdiction as is the case with the Reich
+propaganda Directorate.
+
+1. Director of active propaganda.
+
+2. Director of films.
+
+3. Director of radio.
+
+4. Director of culture.
+
+5. Director of The Gauring for national socialist propaganda and
+popular enlightenment.
+
+6. Liaison officer.
+
+The duties technically correspond to those of the Reichpropaganda
+Directorate.
+
+The Gauleiter Propaganda is also director of national culture of the
+Reich cultural association. In this way it is assured that the cultural
+will of the national socialist movement is carried out even in the
+most insignificant parts of the Reich Cultural association (Reich
+Music Association, Reich Association of Fine Arts, Reich Literary
+Association, Reich Press Association, Reich Film Association, Reich
+Radio Association).
+
+The Gauleiter Propaganda is also, in most instances, Director of the
+National Office for enlightenment of the people and propaganda.
+
+_The District Propaganda Office._
+
+The Director of District propaganda is the commissioner of the
+Kreisleiter for the entire propaganda aspect of the party within this
+district.
+
+The following are the responsibility of the Director:
+
+1. Active propaganda.
+
+2. Films.
+
+3. Radio.
+
+4. Culture.
+
+5. Kreisring for national socialist propaganda and popular
+enlightenment.
+
+6. Liaison office.
+
+The liaison office maintains the connection between the Landrats and
+Regional [Bezirk] offices.
+
+The duties technically correspond to those of the Gau Propaganda Office
+(according to need).
+
+_The Director of the Local Group Propaganda._
+
+The Director of the Local Group Propaganda is responsible to the Party
+Functionary of the local group for the entire propaganda aspect of the
+movement.
+
+In order to execute his duties, specialists on culture, films and radio
+are subordinate to him. He solves all problems of active propaganda
+direct, and he must also remain in constant communication with the
+appropriate mayor and chairman of the district council, respectively.
+In addition to that he maintains contact with the organizations and
+associate groups.
+
+The duties technically correspond to those of the office of district
+propaganda as may be needed.
+
+_The Leader of the Branch [Stuetzpunkt] Propaganda_
+
+His sphere of activity corresponds with that of the leader of the local
+group propaganda.
+
+
+   The Chief of the Reich press of the NSDAP Offices of the Press and
+                             Commissioners
+
+In his decree of February 28, 1934, the Fuehrer formulated the sphere
+of activity reserved for the Chief of the Reich press of the NSDAP, the
+decree of the Fuehrer is as follows:
+
+I. The Chief of the Reich press of the NSDAP is vested with the
+following powers:
+
+1. He determines on my behalf the general policy of the entire
+editorial work within the party press. Moreover, he is as my Chief of
+press the final authority for all press releases of the party and all
+offices.
+
+2. The editorial Staff of the Party Press as well as Gau journalists
+of the NSDAP are subordinate to the Chief of the Reich press as far
+as work is concerned. He has the right to interfere in all personal
+questions.
+
+3. All existing press divisions, press bureaus, etc., existing within
+the party or within its subsidiary or subordinate organizations
+(political organization, SA and SS, Hitler Youth, German labor front),
+regardless of the particular organizational status of their work in the
+field of publishing, are subordinate to the Chief of the Reich press of
+the NSDAP and responsible to him.
+
+4. The Chief of the Reich press of the NSDAP approves all news services
+and correspondence, which are issued by one of the offices of the NSDAP
+or regarded as national socialist.
+
+The Chief of the Reich press of the NSDAP can take all necessary
+measures for the execution of his duties.
+
+  Berlin, February 28, 1934.
+
+                                                   Signed: Adolf Hitler.
+
+Corresponding with this order of the Fuehrer, the Office of the Chief
+of the Reich press of the NSDAP is the central office for all the
+political publishing activity of the party.
+
+II. The technical authorities directly subordinate are:
+
+1. _The Chief editors of the party press._ They are the responsible
+editorial leaders of the National Socialist party papers owned by the
+party and are directly responsible to the Chief of the Reich press as
+regards their editorial work. They have to be confirmed by the Chief of
+the Reich press and they can have the rank of a leader of a district
+office.
+
+2. _The press representatives of the individual offices of the Reich
+Government._ They take care of the press interests of the larger
+organizations and party offices within the framework of the editorial
+and political principles of the Chief of the Reich press.
+
+3. _The journalistic-political organ of the NSDAP._
+
+_a._ Editor-in-Chief of the Office of the District Press: The office of
+the district press is that office of the district which with the help
+of the party offices of the district, subordinate to it and associated
+with it as regards problems of journalism, represents the interests of
+the party through the medium of the papers and periodicals published in
+this district. This representation of interests involves particularly
+the progressive cooperation of the whole journalistic life of the
+district.
+
+The office of the district press has the following functions to perform:
+
+
+                     _News and Information Service_
+
+The office of the district press furnishes the newspapers, by means
+of the regularly appearing National Socialist Gau Service, with all
+the news material in regard to all Party arrangements and events in
+the district. Moreover, its news information service, based on records
+is at the disposal of all papers for dealing with all questions,
+concerning the party.
+
+
+                      _The Personal News Service_
+
+The office of the district press makes information accessible to
+editors through press conferences, receptions with functionaries of the
+individual party offices, etc. It informs the editorial boards of the
+district of the special journalist political wishes of the Gauleitungen.
+
+
+                _Information given to the party press_:
+
+The office of the district press, on the basis of reports of the
+political press organ, informs the editorial boards of the party press
+about the wishes of the readers in regard to newspaper technique.
+Moreover, it is in charge of local reporting of party affairs and
+educates the editorial board and press officials as regards newspaper
+technique.
+
+_b._ The editor of the district press and the head of the local group:
+
+The editor of the district press and the head of the local group
+respectively, have duties that are technically derived from those of
+the Head of the Office of the district press. Permission to publish
+must, however, in all cases be granted through the head of the office
+of the district press. Press representatives of the organizations and
+offices can also be requested here. In the hands of the press chiefs of
+the local groups, who can have the rank of a head of the office of a
+local group, there lies, above all, the reporting of local party news,
+namely, the journalistic evaluation of the entire social service work
+of the local group, formulated in accord with the directives of the
+political journalistic service.
+
+III. In order to carry out his duties, the Chief of the Reich press has
+established the following bureaus in Berlin, as well as in Munich:
+
+1. _The press personnel bureau with the office in Munich._ The press
+personnel bureau works out all personal questions, especially that
+concerning the conferring of the “party press armband” upon proved
+national socialist editors. (The armband is to be worn on the left
+forearm only on special occasions). Moreover in a special department
+the official gazette of the Reich Government is being prepared.
+
+2. _The political press bureau with its office in Berlin._ The
+political press bureau concerns itself with the general principles
+regarding the work of the party press as well as the entire use of the
+political press organ of the party.
+
+The head of the political press bureau has also been chosen by the
+chief of the Reich press as his commissioner for the entire press
+service system of the party and exercises the right of controlling and
+vetoing all press releases, which are issued by party bureaus or those
+which are regarded as national socialist.
+
+The head of the political press bureau is editor-in-chief of the
+national socialist party press service [N.S.K.] The NSK is the only
+official press service of the NSDAP and it alone is empowered to
+publish in the name of the party, for all Reich Government offices,
+including their subsidiary and subordinate organizations. The NSK as
+press service is at the disposal of all the editorial staffs of the
+whole German press.
+
+The political press bureau has its headquarters in the NS press House
+in Berlin. In the NS Press House all party papers are represented by
+their own Berlin editors.
+
+[Pages 307-310].
+
+
+                    The Reich Director of the Press
+
+_Duty_
+
+The Reich Director of the Press has to perform the duties of a
+publisher and politician [verlagspolitische Aufgaben].
+
+He is commissioned to furnish the German people with a press, which
+owes allegiance to them and is responsible to them and which is
+to reflect the life and the experiences of the German community.
+Furthermore, the Reich Director of the Press has the duty of taking the
+necessary measures to enforce the demands made on him as publisher and
+politician which are laid down in the program of the NSDAP under point
+23 and to see that they are carried out. The latter applies especially
+to the decree of April 25, 1935 relative to “the preservation of the
+independence of the newspaper publishing business” and to the “closing
+of newspaper publishing houses for the purpose of eliminating unhealthy
+conditions of competition.” Finally he is commissioned to publish all
+the standard literature for the national socialist movement.
+
+_Authority_
+
+The Reich Director of the Press is authorized by the Fuehrer to take
+all necessary measures for the execution of his duty and he has the
+following powers:
+
+1. The recognition of periodic publications as official party organs.
+
+2. The decision concerning the founding and the appearance of periodic
+publications, which are published by party members, even when they do
+not aspire to recognition as official party organs.
+
+3. _a._ The issue of general regulations for the whole publishing
+business to the entire press published by party members. The
+regulations are valid as orders, as long as nothing else is laid down
+by the Reich Director of the Press.
+
+_b._ The decision over all questions of publication whose significance
+is a matter of principle and extends beyond the individual publication,
+when he takes this decision upon himself. The publications in these
+instances are obliged to submit these questions to the final decision
+of the Reich Director of the Press.
+
+_c._ The inspection at any time of all official party publications and
+their economic organization and direction, as well as the right and
+power of exercising influence.
+
+The responsibility of the individual publishers for the direction of
+the publishing business is not affected thereby.
+
+4. The employment of responsible directors and their deputies only
+takes place by the Reich Director of the press, who has to decide
+the person and the contract. The Reich Director of the Press decides
+whether the existing contract is to be continued or dissolved. The
+Reich Director of the Press is also empowered to appoint commissioners
+for directing publication, and their directives are to be followed by
+the publishers’ staffs and by the entire firm. The right of appointing
+commissioners over the publishers’ staffs is reserved for the Reich
+Director.
+
+_Subordination_
+
+The following are subordinate to the Reich Director of the Press:
+
+1. The governing board of the Reich Director of the Press. The
+governing board sponsors and inspects the NS district publications.
+These are the ones recognized as party organs and as party newspapers
+which are exclusively party property. The directors of the NS
+district publications are political leaders on the staff of the
+district leader and are personally and officially subordinate to him.
+From a professional point of view the directors of the NS district
+publications are exclusively subordinate to the Reich Director of
+the Press. His approval is necessary for changes of personnel. Lower
+classifications in districts, etc., do not exist.
+
+2. The central publishing house of the NSDAP with its publications:
+Voelkischer Beobachter, Der Angriff, Illustrierter Beobachter,
+Der S.A.--Mann, das Schwarze Korps, N.S.--Funk und Bewegung,
+Funktechnischer Vorwaerts, Der Arbeitsmann, Die H.J., Die Bewegung, Die
+Brennessel, N.S.--Monatshefte, Die N.S.--Gemeinde, Der Schulungsbrief,
+Unser Wille und Weg, Aufklaerungs und Rednerinformations--Material,
+Reichsplanung, Deutsche Presse, Verordnungsblatt der Reichsleitung
+der NSDAP, Der Parteirichter, Mitteilungsblatt der Kommission fuer
+Wirtschaftspolitik, Das Parteiarchiv, Der S.A.--Fuehrer (as well as the
+entire literature of the movement.)
+
+The Reich director of the press is at the same time President of the
+Reich Press Association. In the following organizations, which are not
+party bureaus, the Reich Director of the Press is represented by a
+commissioner who has to direct the supervision of and the liaison with
+these organizations:
+
+  Reichassociation of German Newspaper Publishers.
+
+  Reichassociation of German Publishers of Periodicals.
+
+  Professional Association of the Radio-Press.
+
+  Professional Group of Student Publications.
+
+  Professional Group of the Youth Press.
+
+  Professional Staff of the Catholic Church Press.
+
+  Reich Association of the Evangelical Press.
+
+  Reich Association of the German Press and Information Bureau,
+    Incorporated.
+
+  Association of German Newspaper and Periodical Wholesalers.
+
+  Reich Association for the Recruiting of Periodical Trade.
+
+  Reich Professional Staff of the German Newspaper and Periodical Trade.
+
+  Reich Association of German Railway Station Booksellers.
+
+  Reich Association of German Reading Circle Proprietors.
+
+  Reich Association of German Newspaper Stenographers.
+
+  Reich Association of the German Press.
+
+  Professional Staff of Publishing House Employees.
+
+  German Book Publishers. (Organized Brokers’ Association and League of
+    Reich German Book Publishers).
+
+  Recruiting Office of German Economy.
+
+
+                     The Chief of the Foreign Press
+
+I. The Chief of the Foreign Press of the NSDAP is the highest party
+functionary for all matters affecting the foreign press. He is
+subordinate to the Fuehrer and his deputy. He is in charge of the
+governing body of all foreign Party Press Bureaus.
+
+II. The offices of the chief of the foreign press are at the disposal
+of all party offices, organizations, and associated groups in all
+matters affecting the foreign press. (For example, instruction
+concerning German and foreign papers and periodicals abroad as well as
+foreign press correspondents in Germany.)
+
+III. The Chief of the foreign press has offices in Berlin,
+corresponding to the office of the Fuehrer and his deputy in Berlin
+(with Referat: United States of North America) and Munich. The main
+office is in Berlin.
+
+
+                 Foreign Political Office of the NSDAP
+
+I. 1. The foreign political office (APA) of the NSDAP includes two
+different fields of operation: one domestic, the other foreign, in
+character.
+
+2. In the domestic field, the APA is entrusted with the task of
+introducing the foreign political aims and endeavors of the National
+Socialist State into all offices and organizations of the party.
+
+3. In the foreign field, the APA is entrusted with the task of
+enlightening those in foreign lands and especially the foreigners
+who visit Germany or remain there as foreign correspondents, of the
+nature and aims of National Socialism in order to arouse thereby the
+understanding of other people for the fundamental needs of the German
+people and to convince foreign nations that National Socialism in
+Germany desires peace for progress and peace with other nations without
+at the same time rejecting the defence of their right to existence.
+
+II. 1. The APA is divided into three main offices:
+
+A. Office for Foreign Referats with the Main Offices.
+
+_a._ England and Far East.
+
+_b._ Near East.
+
+_c._ South East.
+
+_d._ North.
+
+_e._ Old Orient.
+
+_f._ Controls, personnel questions, etc.
+
+B. Office of the German Academic Exchange Service.
+
+In order to effect as close cooperation as possible between the German
+academic exchange service and the party, the president of the German
+academic exchange service is chief official in the APA.
+
+C. Office of Foreign Commerce.
+
+2. Moreover, there is in the APA a main office for the press service
+and an educational office.
+
+[Page 312]
+
+The Commissioner of the Fuehrer for the Surveillance of the Whole
+Spiritual and Ideological Education of the NSDAP.
+
+In order to effect the surveillance of the whole spiritual and
+ideological education of the NSDAP the Commissioner makes use of the
+following offices:
+
+1. Chief of Staff.
+
+2. Office of artistic development.
+
+3. Philosophy and pedagogy.
+
+4. Central office of national and ancient history.
+
+5. Historical Referat.
+
+6. Referat for Aryan ideology.
+
+7. Referat for Nordic questions.
+
+8. Central office for educational questions.
+
+9. Referat for collection of material and curriculum (surveillance).
+
+10. Referat Organizations.
+
+11. Central office for the cultivation of literature.
+
+12. Referat ideological information.
+
+13. Organization and business administration.
+
+14. Press Office.
+
+15. Association for the Education of the whole movement.
+
+For the purpose of promulgating an ideological train of thought, the
+Commissioner publishes the periodical “NS Monthly Magazine.”
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+[Page 327]
+
+
+                        Colonialpolitical Office
+
+For the treatment of all colonialpolitical and colonial economic
+questions within the national socialist movement and its press,
+the colonialpolitical office only issues general principles and
+instructions (see point 2 of the decree of the Fuehrer’s Deputy 17/34,
+series 71).
+
+The colonialpolitical office is operated only as an office in the Reich
+Government of the NSDAP.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+[Page 337]
+
+
+ Official Party Board of Examiners for the Protection of NS Literature
+
+I. The official Party Board of Examiners is not a censorship office,
+but an office for the protection and defense against pseudo-national
+socialist literature and it insures that the National Socialist
+ideology is not misused by an unqualified man and commercially
+exploited in a way that deceives the public:
+
+II. The official Party Board of Examiners gives an opinion on:
+
+1. The NS literature in a narrower sense.
+
+To this belongs the NS literature that has come into existence by
+its immediate identification with the movement. This literature,
+corresponding with national socialist ideology, is exclusively
+political.
+
+2. Literature related to national socialism.
+
+From the point of view of time, this covers a very broad field and
+includes the literature dealing with political thoughts and demands
+that lie within the line of national socialist development.
+
+III. A reliable staff of lecturers is at the disposal of the official
+examining Party Board of Examiners in an advisory capacity. Writings
+which have been considered satisfactory by the examiners will be added
+to the NS Library [NSB]. The chairman of the PPK leaves the publishing
+to the decision of the report by the lecturers. It is stated in this:
+
+1. The work is unobjectionable from the standpoint of the political
+will represented by the party. The work will be marked unobjectionable
+in this case, i.e. the following sentence may be printed in the work.
+No objections are raised by the NSDAP against the publication of this
+writing.
+
+2. Against the contents of a work no objections are offered. However,
+it cannot be classified as belonging to national socialist literature
+in a more narrow sense.
+
+Here however, there is the possibility that the work will be added to
+the NSB under the category of literature related to national socialism.
+Such a work embodies in its text no notice that it has been examined.
+
+3. The work does not agree with the principles of the NSDAP; hence it
+is rejected. Here there are the following possibilities:
+
+_a._ The work may be put on sale but not brought into relationship with
+national socialism.
+
+_b._ The writing may no longer be distributed. More detailed
+instructions are given by the president of the Reich Chamber of
+Literature.
+
+4. Construction & Organization of PPK see Plan of Organization.
+
+
+                                 PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2320-B-PS
+
+                 ORGANIZATION BOOK OF THE NSDAP (1940)
+
+“The young driver who has received his training in the six-week courses
+of the NSKK will be well prepared in body and spirit when the time
+comes for his military service, and will wear with pride the dress of
+the Armed Forces of the Nation.”
+
+[Page 394].
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2322-PS
+
+                  HITLER’S SPEECH BEFORE THE REICHSTAG
+
+                            1 SEPTEMBER 1939
+
+Members of the German Reichstag:
+
+For months we have been tormented by a problem once imposed upon us
+by the Dictate of Versailles and which, in its deterioration and
+corruption, had now become utterly intolerable. Danzig is a German
+City. The Corridor was and is German. All these territories owe their
+cultural development exclusively to the German people, without whom
+absolute barbarism would reign in these Eastern territories. Danzig
+was separated from us. The Corridor was annexed by Poland. The German
+minorities living there were mistreated in the most appalling manner.
+Already during the years 1919/20 more than one million people of German
+blood were driven from their homes. As usual, I have tried to change
+this intolerable state of affairs through proposals for a peaceful
+revision. It is a lie if it is claimed throughout the world that we
+insure all our revisions only by applying pressure. There was ample
+opportunity for fifteen years before National Socialism assumed power
+to carry through revisions by means of a peaceful understanding. This
+was not done. In every single case did I then take the initiative, not
+once but many times, to bring forward proposals for the revision of
+absolutely intolerable conditions.
+
+As you know, all these proposals were rejected. I need not enumerate
+them in detail: proposals for a limitation of armaments, if necessary
+even for the abolition of armaments, proposals for restrictions on
+methods of warfare, proposals for eliminating methods of modern warfare
+which, in my opinion, are scarcely compatible with international
+law. You know my proposals for the necessity of the restoration of
+German sovereign rights over the territories of the German Reich, the
+countless attempts for a peaceful solution of the Austrian problem
+which I have made, and later, on the problem of the Sudetenland,
+Bohemia, and Moravia. It was all in vain. One thing, however, is
+impossible: to demand that a peaceful revision should be made of an
+intolerable state of affairs, and then obstinately refuse such a
+peaceful revision. It is equally impossible to assert that in such a
+situation to act on one’s own initiative in making a revision is to
+violate a law. For us Germans the Dictate of Versailles is not a law.
+It does not work to force somebody at the point of a pistol and by
+threatening to starve millions of people into signing a document and
+afterwards proclaim that this document with its forced signature was a
+solemn law.
+
+In the case of Danzig and the Corridor I have again tried to solve the
+problems by proposing peaceful discussions. It was obvious that they
+had to be solved! That the deadline for this solution may perhaps be of
+little interest to the Western Powers is conceivable. But for us this
+deadline is not a matter of indifference! First and foremost, it was
+not and could not be a matter of indifference to the suffering victims.
+In Conferences with Polish diplomats I have discussed the ideas which
+you have heard me express here in my last speech before the Reichstag.
+No one can say that this was an improper procedure or even unreasonable
+pressure.
+
+I then had the German proposals clearly stated and I feel bound to
+repeat once more that nothing could be fairer or more modest than those
+proposals submitted by me. And now I want to tell the world that only I
+could afford to make such proposals. Because I know very well that at
+that time I placed myself in a position contrary to the conception of
+millions of Germans by acting the way I did.
+
+Those proposals were rejected. But not only that! They were answered by
+mobilization, by increased terrorism, by intensified pressure on the
+people of German blood living in these territories, and by a gradual
+economic, political and, during the past few weeks, even military
+strangulation and blockade of the Free City of Danzig. Furthermore,
+Poland virtually began the war against the Free City of Danzig.
+Furthermore, she was not prepared to settle the problems of the
+Corridor in a fair manner satisfying the interests of both parties.
+And lastly, she did not even dream of fulfilling her obligations
+with regard to the minorities. I have to state here that Germany has
+fulfilled her obligations in this respect!
+
+Minorities living in Germany are not subject to persecution. Let any
+Frenchman get up and declare that French citizens living in the Saar
+territory are being oppressed, ill-treated, or deprived of their
+rights. No one can make such an assertion.
+
+For four months I have watched these developments without taking action
+but not without issuing repeated warnings. Recently I have made these
+warnings more and more emphatic. Over three weeks ago, the Polish
+ambassador was, at my request informed that if Poland persisted in
+sending further notes in the nature of an ultimatum to Danzig and in
+further oppressing the people of German blood, or if she should attempt
+to ruin Danzig economically through customs measures, Germany could no
+longer look on without taking action. I have left no room for doubt
+that in this respect the Germany of today is not to be confused with
+the Germany that existed before.
+
+Attempts have been made to justify the action against the German
+minorities by declaring that they had provoked them. I am wondering in
+what the “provocation” through the women and children who are being
+mistreated and deported, consisted, or the “provocations” of those who
+were tortured in the most beastly and most sadistic manner and finally
+killed! One thing, however, I do know: there is not one single great
+power with any honor who would tolerate such conditions for any length
+of time.
+
+In spite of it all I have made one last attempt. Although I am deeply
+convinced that the Polish Government--perhaps also because of its being
+dependent on an unrestraint, wild military rabble--is not seriously
+interested in a real understanding, I have nevertheless accepted a
+proposal by the British Government for mediation. The latter proposed
+that it would not carry on any negotiations but assured me that it
+would establish a direct contact between Poland and Germany in order to
+get the discussion going once more.
+
+I must here state the following: I accepted that proposal. For these
+discussions I had drawn up the fundamentals which are known to you.
+And then I and my Government were sitting for two whole days waiting
+for the Polish Government to make up its mind whether to finally
+dispatch a plenipotentiary or not! Until last night it had not sent any
+plenipotentiary but informed us through its ambassador that at present
+it was considering the question whether and to what extent it might be
+able to accept the British proposals; it would inform England of its
+decision.
+
+Members of the Reichstag! If such treatment is meted out to the German
+Reich and its Chief, and the German Reich and its Chief were to submit
+to such treatment, then the German Nation would deserve no better than
+to disappear from the political scene. My love of Peace and my endless
+patience must not be mistaken for weakness, much less for cowardice.
+Therefore, I have last night informed the British Government that
+things being as they are, I have found it impossible to detect any
+inclination on the part of the Polish Government to enter into a really
+serious discussion with us.
+
+Thus, these proposals for mediation are wrecked, for in the meantime
+the answer to these offers had been, firstly, the order for Polish
+general mobilization, and secondly new grave atrocities. Repetitions
+of the latter incidents occurred last night. Only recently twenty-one
+frontier incidents had occurred, there were fourteen last night. Three
+of them were very grave.
+
+For that reason, I have now decided to talk to Poland in the same
+language Poland has been using toward us for months.
+
+If there are statesmen in the West who declare that their interests
+are involved, I can only regret such a declaration; however, not for
+one single minute could that persuade me to deviate from the execution
+of my duties. I have solemnly declared and repeat once more that we
+have no claims at all on these Western powers, and shall never demand
+anything from them. I repeatedly offered Britain our friendship, and if
+necessary closest cooperation. Love, however, is not to be offered by
+one partner only; it’ll have to find response from the other. Germany
+has no interests in the West, our fortifications in the West shall be
+the frontiers of the Reich for all times. We have no other aims in the
+future, and this attitude of the Reich will remain unchanged.
+
+Some of the other European powers understand our attitude. First of
+all I’d like to thank Italy for having supported us all this time.
+But you’ll also understand that we do not want to make an appeal for
+any foreign help in this struggle. This task of ours we shall solve
+ourselves.
+
+The neutral powers have assured us of their neutrality just like we
+have previously guaranteed their neutrality. This assurance we consider
+a sacred obligation, and as long as nobody breaks their neutrality, we,
+too, shall observe it painstakingly. What could we desire or want from
+them?
+
+I am happy to be able to inform you here of an event of special
+importance. You are aware of it that Russia and Germany are governed
+by two different doctrines. There was only one single question to be
+cleared up: Germany has no intention of exporting her doctrine, and the
+minute Russia does not intend to export her own doctrine to Germany, I
+no longer see any reason why we should ever be opponents again. Both of
+us agreed on this one point: any struggle between our two people would
+only result in benefits for others. We have therefore resolved to enter
+into an agreement which will exclude any application of force between
+us in the future, which compels us to consult each other in certain
+European questions, which makes economic cooperation possible and above
+all makes sure that these two great powers don’t exhaust their energies
+in fighting each other.
+
+Any attempt on the part of the Western Powers to alter these facts will
+prove futile, and in that connection I should like to state one thing:
+this political decision signifies an enormous change for the future and
+is absolutely final.
+
+I believe that the whole German people will welcome this political
+attitude. In the World War, Russia and Germany fought each other and up
+to the end they both suffered. That shall not happen a second time! The
+non-aggression and consultation pact was yesterday finally ratified in
+Moscow and in Berlin.
+
+In Moscow, the pact was acclaimed just as you have acclaimed it here.
+I approve of every word in the speech made by Mr. Molotov, the Russian
+Commissar for Foreign Affairs.
+
+Our aims I am determined to solve:
+
+Firstly, the question of Danzig;
+
+Secondly, the question of the Corridor;
+
+Thirdly, to see to it that a change shall take place in Germany’s
+relations to Poland, which will insure a peaceful coexistence of the
+two powers.
+
+I am determined to fight until either the present Polish Government is
+willing to effect this change or another Poland Government is prepared
+to do so.
+
+I am determined to eliminate from the German frontiers the element of
+insecurity, the atmosphere which permanently resembles civil war. I
+shall see to it that peace on the Eastern frontier shall be the same as
+it is on our other frontiers.
+
+I shall carry out all necessary actions in such a manner that they
+shall not contradict the proposals which I have made known to you here,
+members of the Reichstag, as my proposals to the rest of the world.
+
+That is, I will not wage war against women and children! I have
+instructed my air force to limit their attacks to military objectives.
+However, if the enemy should conclude from this that he might get away
+with waging war in a different manner he will receive an answer that
+he’ll be knocked out of his wits!
+
+Last night for the first time regular soldiers of the Polish Army
+fired shots on our territory. Since 5.45 a.m. we have been returning
+their fire. From now on, every bomb will be answered by another bomb.
+Whoever fights with poison gas will be fought with poison gas. Whoever
+disregards the rules of human warfare can but expect us to do the same.
+
+I will carry on this fight, no matter against whom, until such time as
+the safety of the Reich and its rights are secured!
+
+For more than 6 years now I have been engaged in building up the German
+armed forces. During this period more than 90 billion Reichsmark were
+spent building up the Wehrmacht. Today, ours are the best equipped
+armed forces in the world and they are far superior to those of 1914.
+My confidence in them can never be shaken.
+
+If I call upon the Wehrmacht and if I ask sacrifices of the German
+people and, if necessary, unlimited sacrifices, then I am in the right
+to do so, for I myself am just as ready today as I was in the past to
+make every personal sacrifice. I don’t ask anything of any German which
+I myself was not prepared to do at any moment for more than four years.
+There shall not be any deprivations for Germans in which I myself shall
+not immediately share. From this moment on my whole life shall belong
+more than ever to my people. I now want to be nothing but the first
+soldier of the German Reich.
+
+Thus I have put on once again the coat which has always been the
+most sacred and dearest to me. I shall not put it aside until after
+victory--or I shall not live to see the end.
+
+Should anything happen to me in this war, my first successor shall be
+Party member Goering. Should anything happen to Party member Goering,
+his successor shall be Party member Hess. To these men as your leaders
+you would then owe the same absolute loyalty and obedience that you owe
+to me. In the event that something fatal should happen to Party Member
+Hess, I am about to make legal provisions for the convocation of a
+senate appointed by me, who shall then elect the worthiest, that is to
+say the most valiant among themselves.
+
+As a National Socialist and a German soldier I enter upon this fight
+with a stout heart! My whole life has been but one continuous struggle
+for my people, for its resurrection, for Germany, and this whole
+struggle has been inspired by one single conviction: faith in this
+people!
+
+One word I have never known: capitulation. And if there was anybody
+who’d think that hard times are ahead of us I’d like him not to forget
+the fact that at one time a Prussian king with a ridiculously small
+staff confronted one of the greatest coalitions ever known and came
+forth victoriously after three campaigns because he possessed that
+strong and firm faith which is required of us in these times.
+
+As for the rest of the world, I can only assure them that a November
+1918 shall never occur again in German history.
+
+I ask of every German what I myself am prepared to do at any moment: to
+be ready to pay with his life for his people and for his country.
+
+Whoever believes to have a chance to evade this patriotic duty directly
+or indirectly, shall perish. We will have nothing to do with traitors.
+We all are acting only in accordance with our old principle: our own
+life matters nothing, all that matters is that our people, that Germany
+shall live.
+
+I expect of you, as deputies of the Reich, that you will do your duty
+in whatever position you are called upon to fill. You must carry the
+banner of resistance, cost what may. Let no one report to me at any
+time that in his province, in his district or in his group or in his
+cell the morale is low. Bearers, responsible bearers of the morale
+are you! I am responsible for the province your district! None has
+the right to shun this responsibility. The sacrifice that is demanded
+of us is not greater than the sacrifice which has been made by many
+generations in the past. All those men who before us have traveled
+the most bitter and hardest road did nothing different from what we
+are called upon to do; the sacrifice they made was no less costly, no
+less painful, and therefore no easier than the sacrifice that may be
+demanded of us.
+
+I also expect every German woman to take her place with unflinching
+discipline in this great fighting community.
+
+German youth, needless to say, will do with heart and soul what is
+expected and demanded of it by the nation and by the National Socialist
+State.
+
+If we form this community, forged together, ready for everything,
+determined never to capitulate, then our strong will shall master every
+emergency.
+
+I conclude with the words with which I once started my fight for power
+in the Reich. At that time I said: “If our will is so strong that it
+cannot be broken through any distress, then our will and our German
+state will be able to master and subjugate distress.”
+
+                                                     Germany--Sieg Heil!
+
+
+                                 PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2324-PS
+
+                       RECONSTRUCTION OF A NATION
+
+              Hermann Goering, Aufbau Einer Nation (1934)
+
+[Pages 86-87]
+
+I declared at that time before thousands of fellow Germans, each bullet
+which leaves the barrel of a police pistol now, is my bullet. If one
+calls this murder, then I have murdered; I ordered all this, I back it
+up; I assume the responsibility, and I am not afraid to do so.
+
+Through a network of outer offices converging into the headquarters
+in Berlin, I am daily, one could almost say hourly, informed about
+everything that happens in widespread Prussia.
+
+[Page 89]
+
+We had to deal ruthlessly with these enemies of the state. It must not
+be forgotten that at the moment of our seizure of power over 6 million
+people officially voted for communism and about 8 million for marxism
+in the Reichstag elections in March.
+
+Thus the concentration camps were created, to which we had to send
+first all the thousands of functionaries of the Communist and Social
+Democratic parties.
+
+[Page 92]
+
+The Gestapo deserves a great deal of credit for the success of the
+revolution and for the consolidation of its achievements. Right in the
+middle of this constructive work, occurred the blaze that destroyed
+the high cupola and the auditorium of the Reichstag. Criminal hands
+had set this fire, had put the German Reichstag in flames, in order to
+give a last beacon to dying Communism, so that it could make one last
+desperate thrust before the Hitler government was consolidated. The
+blaze was to be the signal for the Communist party for general terror,
+for a general uprising and for civil war. That it did not have these
+consequences, Germany and the world owe not to the noble motives of
+Communism, but solely to the iron resolution and the hard fist of Adolf
+Hitler and his closest collaborators, who struck more quickly than the
+enemy had expected, and harder than he could imagine, and with the
+first blow suppressed Communism once and for all.
+
+That night, when I ordered the arrest of 4,000 Communist functionaries,
+I knew that by dawn Communism had lost a great battle.
+
+
+                                 PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2325-PS
+
+                1935 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 470
+
+ Decree on the Execution of Article 118 of the German Municipal Order,
+                             26 March 1935.
+
+On the basis of Article 118 of the German municipal order of 30
+January, 1935 (Reichsgesetzblatt I, p. 49) I decree:
+
+
+                               Article 1
+
+The Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor reserves for himself the duties of the
+commissioner for the NSDAP for the city of Munich.
+
+
+                               Article 2
+
+1. The gauleiter appoints as commissioner for the NSDAP:
+
+_a._ The Kreisleiter for communities belonging to a Kreis [“Kreis,” an
+administrative district].
+
+_b._ The Kreisleiter for Stadtkreise [city districts] or, one of the
+Kreisleiters, in case there are several party districts within one city
+district.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+Munich, 26 March 1935
+
+                                               The Deputy of the Fuehrer
+                                                                 R. HESS
+                                       Reich Minister without Portfolio.
+
+
+                                 PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2326-PS
+
+                1936 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 893
+
+  Reich Principles Regarding Recruiting, Appointment, and promotion of
+           Reich and Provincial Officials, October 14, 1936.
+
+* * *
+
+
+                               PROMOTION
+
+
+                               Article 8
+
+Only that official can be promoted who, besides absolutely fulfilling
+his general duties;
+
+_a._ In consideration of his former political attitude offers absolute
+guarantee therefor, and has proved since January 30, 1933, that he
+takes the part of the National Socialist State at all times and
+represents it effectively.
+
+_b._ Has given documentary proof that he and his spouse are of German
+or related blood (Article 1 a. paragraph 3 of the Reich officials law).
+
+_c._ In his official achievements and abilities, completely fulfills
+the demands of the higher office. Length of service alone does not
+justify promotion in any case.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+Berchtesgaden, 14 October 1936.
+
+                                        The Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor
+                                                            ADOLF HITLER
+
+                                          The Reich Minister of Interior
+                                                                   FRICK
+
+                                       For the Reich Minister of Finance
+                                                               REINHARDT
+
+                                               The Deputy of the Fuehrer
+                                                                 R. HESS
+                                              Minister without Portfolio
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2327-PS
+
+                              _TOP SECRET_
+
+  Third Army Group
+    Ia Nr. 150/39 g.K. Chiefs
+  Re: Fall Weiss
+  Top Secret (Chefsache)
+  “Only by officer”
+
+                                                       Dresden 6.14.1939
+
+
+                               20 Copies
+
+                             Control No. 8
+
+1. The commander-in-chief of the army has ordered the working out of a
+_plan of deployment against Poland_ which takes in account the demands
+of the political leadership for the opening of war by surprise and for
+quick success.
+
+2. The order of deployment by the High Command, “Fall Weiss” authorizes
+the Third Army Group (in Fall Weiss 8th Army Headquarters) to give
+necessary directions and orders to all commands subordinated to it for
+“Fall Weiss.”
+
+3. Enclosed are sent:
+
+  _a._ Aims of the operation (Enclosure 1).
+  _b._ Organization of the forces (Enclosure 2).
+  _c._ Survey of arrival (Enclosure 3).
+  _d._ Signal Communication (Enclosure 4).
+  _e._ Regulations for the supply (Enclosure 5 will follow).
+  _f._ Enemy situation (Enclosure 6).
+  _g._ Directions for execution (Enclosure 7).
+
+4. The order of deployment “Fall Weiss” will be put into operation on
+20 August 1939; all preparations have to be concluded by this date.
+
+The former deployments “Case West” and “Case East” are valid until 19
+August 1939.
+
+5. For the instruction on the tasks due to this order for deployment,
+the principles of order OKH Genstb d.H.--1 Division (Ib Nr. 2000/36 top
+secret of 12.19.36) are to be applied.
+
+The instruction can be carried down to the responsible officers of the
+corps commands to the Division Commanders (G-3 (Ia) and G-4 (Ib)) of
+the divisions and the commandants and staff officers of the Garrison
+Headquarters. Permission to inform further persons must be requested
+by names. Communication with the SS-Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler must be
+instituted only by special order. The order for their commitment is to
+be prepared.
+
+6. Tenth Corps Command (Gen KdX) and XIII Corps and lo. Div. can
+perform the necessary reconnaissance in Silesia while observing the
+appropriate precautionary measures (civilian clothes, motor vehicle,
+with civilian license number).
+
+7. The whole correspondence on “Fall Weiss” has to be conducted under
+the classification Top Secret [Chefsache]. This is to be disregarded
+only if the content of a document, in the judgment of the chief of the
+responsible command is harmless in every way--even in connection with
+other documents.
+
+8. For the middle of July a conference is planned where details on the
+execution will be discussed. Time and place will be ordered later on.
+Special requests are to be communicated to Third Army Group before 10
+July.
+
+9. I declare it the duty of the Commanding Generals, the divisional
+commanders and the commandants to limit as much as possible the number
+of persons who will be informed, and to limit the extent of the
+information, and ask that all suitable measures be taken to prevent
+persons not concerned from getting information.
+
+                                      Commander-in-Chief of Army Group 3
+                                                   Signed F. Blaskowitz.
+
+       #       #       #       #       #
+
+                               TOP SECRET
+
+                                           Enclosure 1 to 3rd Army Group
+                                                           Ia Nr. 150/39
+                                            g-Kdo. Chefs of 14 June 1939
+
+  TOP SECRET [GKdos]
+  “Only by officer”
+  Top Secret [Chefsache]
+
+                               20 Copies
+
+                             Control No. 8
+
+                     Aims of Operation “Fall Weiss”
+
+1. _a._ The operation, in order to forestall an orderly Polish
+mobilization and concentration, is to be opened by surprise with forces
+which are for the most part armored and motorized, placed on alert in
+the neighborhood of the border. The initial superiority over the Polish
+frontier-guards and surprise that can be expected with certainty are to
+be maintained by quickly bringing up other parts of the army as well to
+counteract the marching up of the Polish Army.
+
+_Accordingly all units have to keep the initiative against the foe by
+quick acting and ruthless attacks._
+
+_b._ If the development of the Political situation should show that a
+surprise at the beginning of the war is out of question, because of
+well advanced defense preparations on the part of the Polish Army,
+the Commander-in-Chief of the army will order the opening of the
+hostilities only after the assembling of sufficient additional forces.
+The basis of all preparations will be to surprise the enemy.
+
+Case b--is to be prepared in theory by the High Command only so that
+necessary changes can be quickly carried out.
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2329-PS
+
+                                 SECRET
+
+  [Stamp]
+  Top Secret
+  Through officers only
+  The Commander in Chief of the Army
+  Operations Section (Ia)
+  General Staff of the Army
+
+                                                   HQ, Army High Command
+
+No. 4402/39 Secret
+
+                                                        7, October 1939.
+                                                              11 copies,
+                                                                2nd copy
+
+General von Beck takes over command of the newly formed Army Group B on
+10th October 1939 at 12.00 hours.
+
+Task of Army Group B is the protection of the German boundary from the
+mouth of the Ems to the line of demarcation with Army Group C. For this
+task Army Group B holds the western fortifications; the resistance
+begins on the border.
+
+The Dutch border between Ems and Rhine is to be observed only.
+
+At the same time, Army Group B has to make all preparations according
+to special orders, for immediate invasion of Dutch and Belgian
+territory if the political situation so demands.
+
+The order for the occupation is given by the Army High Command; until
+then, any border isolation of Dutch or Belgian territory must be
+avoided most carefully.
+
+                                                  signed von Brauchitsch
+                                                    certified Hensinger.
+                                                    [signature] Jaiymyer
+
+  _Distribution_
+
+  Army Group B}  by telegraph
+  Army Group C}
+
+                                                     [Handwritten notes]
+                                                           Chief J. N. W
+                                                                 8-10-39
+
+  Supreme Hq
+
+  Chief of Army Signal Corps
+
+  Chief of Quartermaster IV
+
+  Org Department
+
+  Gen of Air Force with Commander in Chief of the Army operation
+
+                                           Insp F 9/10 Me 10oo2/39 g. K.
+                                                                 Ju 8-10
+
+  Department (1a, 11, 111)
+  [Hand written notes]
+  Archives of the Army.
+  21st Army Group 6623 (9) F A LIL
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2330-PS
+
+                                  COPY
+
+                                                                Nurnberg
+                                                         August 29, 1935
+
+Police Headquarters; Nurnberg-Fuerth
+
+Re: Protective Custody.
+
+
+                      Order for Protective Custody
+
+On the basis of Article 1 of the VI of the Reich President for the
+protection of people and state, of 28 Feb., 1933 (RGBl I, p. 83) the
+ministerial decree of May 2, 1934, No. 2186 a 39, herewith is taken
+into protective custody:
+
+Effective as of 3 August 35:
+
+First and last name: Josef Simon
+
+Place and date of birth: May 23, 1865 in Schneppenbach, B. A. Alzenan.
+
+Marital Status and Profession: Widowed, former Trade Union Secretary.
+
+Citizenship: Subject of the German Reich.
+
+Religion: Free thinker.
+
+Place of residence: Nurnberg-N. Ziegelsteinstr. 106
+
+The arrestee has no right to appeal against the decreed protective
+custody.
+
+
+                                Reasons:
+
+Simon was for many years a member of the Socialist Party and
+temporarily a member of the Union Socialiste Populaire. From 1907 to
+1918 he was Landtag deputy of the Socialist Party; from 1908 to 1930
+Social Democratic City Counsellor [Stadtrat] in Nurnberg. In view of
+the decisive role which Simon played in the international trade unions
+and in regard to his connection with international Marxist leaders and
+central agencies, which he continued after the national recovery, he
+was placed under protective custody on 3 May, 1933, and was kept, until
+25 January 1934, in the Dachau Concentration Camp. Simon is under the
+urgent suspicion that even after this date he played an active part
+in the illegal continuation of the Socialist Party. He took part in
+meetings which aimed at the illegal continuation of the Socialist Party
+and propagation of illegal marxist printed matter in Germany.
+
+Through this radical attitude which is hostile to the State, Simon
+directly endangers public security and order.
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2331-PS
+
+  Bavarian Political Police                   Nurnberg, 20 December 1935
+
+
+                             _Declaration_
+
+I have been informed that I shall be released from protective custody,
+and that I have to expect to be taken into protective custody again in
+case that I should behave in a manner inimical to the State, or if I
+should be active in this sense.
+
+I have been informed that, for my physical protection I may return into
+protective custody upon my own request.
+
+I have been informed that I have to report in person at the Gend.
+Station Ziegelstein, competent for my residence, on every second day of
+the week at the same hour.
+
+                                                    [signed] Josef Simon
+
+Simon Josef, residing Nurnberg-N, Ziegelstein St. 106, widower, trade
+union secretary; born 23 May 1865 at Schneppenbach.
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2332-PS
+
+Concentration Camp Flossenbuerg
+
+Az II. Political Department/Sch.
+
+                                         Flossenbuerg, 22 December 1941.
+
+To Frau Grete Staimer, Nurnberg.
+
+In reply to your letter of 12 December 1941, enclosed please find
+the desired death certificate. At the same time I certify that the
+cremation has taken place in the crematorium of Flossenbuerg.
+
+After the submission of a burial certificate from the competent
+cemetery officials the urn with the ashes can be sent to you free of
+charge.
+
+                                                      The Camp Commander
+                                                             By order of
+                                                     (Signed) Fassbinder
+                                                     Official Secretary.
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2333-PS
+
+Police Presidium, Nurnberg-Fuerth
+
+Protective Police [Schutzpolizei] 3rd Police District
+
+                                                  Nurnberg, 29 Dec. 1941
+
+To Frau Elise Herrmann, Nurnberg, Juvenllestr. No. 26
+
+Your husband, Paul Herrmann, died of an infection in the concentration
+camp, Flossenbuerg, on December 28, 1941.
+
+The corpse cannot be inspected because of the danger of infection.
+
+The cremation will take place in the crematory of Flossenbuerg.
+
+                                          The Secret State Police Office
+                                                         Nurnberg-Fuerth
+                                                         /s/     Mueller
+
+  Authenticated
+        [illegible]
+  District Police Lt.
+
+
+* * *
+
+
+                           Death-Certificate
+
+                                                              No. 7/1942
+
+The baker Karl Herrmann, Lutheran Religion
+
+Residence:
+
+  Flossenbuerg Concentration Camp
+  died on 28 December 1941 at 1400 hours
+  in Flossenbuerg Concentration Camp
+
+The deceased was born 24 November 1873 in Wassertruedingen.
+
+The deceased was married to Elise, nee Steiner, Nurnberg.
+
+                                            Flossenbuerg, 2 January 1942
+
+[Stamp of Registrar, Flossenbuerg/Oberpfalz]
+
+                                                          The Registrar:
+                                                             /s/    Jaum
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2334-PS
+
+                       Statement of Lorenz Hagen
+
+During the night of 17th to 18th March 1933, the offices of the ADGB
+[Allgemeiner Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund; German Trade Unions], which
+are located in Nurnberg, Breite Gasse 25/27, as well as the offices of
+the Builders’ Union and the Unions of the Bookbinders, Bookprinters,
+Lithographers, Textile Workers and Carpenters were completely destroyed
+by the SA under the leadership of SA-Brigadier General [SA-Oberfuehrer]
+Wurzbacher. All the office furniture was smashed and thrown into the
+courtyard, the safes overturned, forced open from the back and robbed.
+The typewriters, adding machines, mimeograph machines, etc., were
+stolen.
+
+The ADGB possessed a huge library of about 10,000 volumes for the
+use of its members. Every single book was torn and thrown into the
+courtyard.
+
+The Workers’ Secretariat, which was joined to the ADGB, had an
+extensive professional library of about 500 volumes, among them
+valuable works on literature of social security and labor legislation.
+These were also thrown out and torn to pieces. A similar fate met
+about 750 to 800 files covering the cases of beneficiaries of pensions
+(social, war and accident cases) whose claims for pensions were being
+worked on.
+
+The SA posted continuous guards in the office building and nobody was
+permitted to enter. When I made the attempt to enter in spite of it,
+Wurzbacher said: “The Red rascal will get in but will not come out
+alive.” When I got in later in spite of him, the SA tried to catch me,
+but I escaped.
+
+In order to guarantee the continued function of the trade union, which
+was most urgently needed at that time, I set up an emergency office
+in Nurnberg, Hummelsteinerweg. This was occupied on 2 May 1933 by SA,
+led by Pessler who was the District-leader [Gauobmann] of the NSBO
+[National Socialist Factory Cell Organization; Nationalsozialistische
+Betriebszellen Organisation later DAF; the German Labor Front]. Erhardt
+Kupfer, the district secretary of the ADGB, was arrested at that time,
+kicked with rifle butts and led away by the SA in shackles. As the
+deputy of NSBO, a certain Mueller was appointed. Three SA men guarded
+the office day and night. Upon seizure, Pessler’s first question to me
+was: “Where do you have your cars? I know you have three cars.” When I
+answered that I never had a personal car, he threatened to put me in
+jail until I would confess. When he finally realized that I did not
+have a car, he asked me what funds the Nurnberg local committee of the
+ADGB possessed. I said truthfully: “235,000 RM minus the sum stolen by
+the SA from the safes when they broke into the offices on the Breite
+Gasse and which amounted to about 4,000 RM.” Whereupon he threatened
+again to have me arrested but he did not do so, probably on the basis
+of the general order not to arrest the chairmen of the local committees
+[Ortsausschussvorsitzende]. I learned about this order only a few days
+ago.
+
+On 1 June 1933, the deputy Mueller came into the office and asked me
+whether I had not been arrested yet. I said no and indicated that the
+night before I had been in the apartment of my mother-in-law who was
+severely ill. I left the office without being noticed, hurried home,
+packed the most necessary things, and left by bicycle with my wife. We
+stayed away for about five weeks, traveling from one place to another.
+
+After returning, I was arrested towards the end of August 1933,
+under the charge that I had agitated against the National Government
+and had conducted illegal recruiting for the forbidden ADGB and
+the Socialdemocratic Party. When no proof could be produced, I was
+released, but arrested again after 3 days. This time I was accused
+of having had knowledge of the arsenal of the Reichsbanner (Militant
+Organization of German Social democrats), and that I had organized the
+arming of the members of the Trade Union Offices. In cross-examinations
+conducted over many weeks, they tried to force a confession out of
+me. When I did not confess anything, I was to go to the concentration
+camp in Dachau. However, my wife succeeded in preventing this. After
+3½ months, I was released again. After this release I tried to start
+a business, no matter of what kind. It was in vain. Similarly, it was
+impossible for me to find work in my former line as engine-builder.
+Reason: political unreliability. Thus I lived on a weekly unemployment
+benefit of 14.40 marks, with my wife, until my further arrest in
+August 1935. At this time I was charged with participation in the
+so-called middle-German insurrection of 1934, and with the smuggling
+of illegal writings from abroad. In spite of the greatest efforts and
+the application of the foulest methods, such as the poorest and most
+inadequate food, depriving me of fresh air, threatening me with being
+shot and beaten, again the Gestapo did not succeed in proving anything
+against me. I was again set free after 12½ weeks. During this period
+of confinement, Kriminalrat Otto, the Gestapo-chief, tried to persuade
+my wife to convert me to National Socialism. He told her: “If your
+husband comes to us, this will be of greater value for us than the
+adherence of 1,000 other people. Your husband would get a position in
+which he would earn 3 times as much as ever before.” My wife refused
+consistently.
+
+The same story as before: unemployment, occasional meagre earnings,
+until the next arrest on 26 January 1938. This time they did a
+fullsized job and arrested my wife too. We were accused of preparing
+high treason against the country [Hoch- und Landesverrat] as well
+as maintaining connections abroad. The interrogations lasted until
+the middle of April. The Gestapo agent Beetz had a predilection for
+interrogations at night. Five searchlights illuminated the spot where
+you were sitting. Behind and before me, and on both sides, four men
+sat a distance of a few meters, pointing their revolvers at me and
+clicking the triggers. The interrogations, which were of course always
+fruitless, were repeated sometimes two or three times in one night.
+Terms like “Greatest scoundrel,” “most common criminal,” and others
+were used. One morning at five o’clock, Beetz called me and said: “You
+know your wife has been arrested too. She had a complete breakdown and
+struggles with death in her cell. She expressed the wish to see you
+once more before her death. I am willing to grant her wish, but only
+if you make a full confession.” When I refused he had me taken back
+into my cell and in an indescribable psychic condition. Beetz asserted
+several times that the material at hand condemning me was sufficient
+for 5 years in the penitentiary. I then demanded to be taken before the
+investigating judge. This, however, was refused, and on 20 April 1938,
+I was shipped to Dachau Concentration Camp. There I came immediately
+into solitary confinement and had to undergo 32 days of severe bunker
+(strenger Bunker)-punishment. During this time I had to sleep on a
+wooden board without blankets, and received warm food only every 4th
+day. On 9 July, I was released from the bunker and taken into the
+camp. There I had to perform the heaviest work, in spite of my greatly
+weakened physical condition. One day I received from an SS guard a kick
+in the back which threw me against a lorry which was just passing by,
+and thus I broke my lower right rib. Once when a prisoner had escaped
+from the camp, all of the camp-inmates had to fall out after work and
+stand at attention in ranks throughout the night. There were 17 dead
+next morning. On 13 July 1939, on order of the Nurnberg-Gestapo, I was
+taken off work and again put into the bunker and received again 64 days
+of rigid bunker-arrest until 28 September 1939, and was then shipped to
+Buchenwald Concentration Camp. There I came into the bunker again and
+stayed there until my release. During the whole time in Buchenwald I
+had to sleep on a board without a blanket. The food in the Buchenwald
+camp was so inadequate and inferior that at the time of my release I
+was a skeleton with skin over it. I wish to add that during my transfer
+to Camp Buchenwald, I suffered an inguinal rupture on the left side
+when jumping from a railroad car.
+
+The release from the camp was accompanied by the express warning not
+to reveal anything about happenings in the camp. Otherwise, I would be
+returned there and never would have a chance to get out again. After
+my return to Nurnberg, I had to report daily at 10 o’clock sharp at
+the main office of the Gestapo. From July 1941, I had to report twice
+weekly to the police station in my district. After I was completely
+bombed out, on 9 March 1943, the order to report was rescinded.
+
+After this release from Camp Buchenwald, I again could not find a job
+anywhere, although the Gestapo had told me that if I could not show
+that I had a job within 6 weeks, I would be returned to the camp, since
+my release was tentative only. It was only due to the kindness of a
+textile shop owner who employed me in spite of the warnings of the
+Gestapo that I was not taken into protective custody again.
+
+On 22 August 1944, I was again taken to Dachau Concentration Camp
+because of the attempt against Hitler’s life, and I remained there for
+six weeks.
+
+I may add that I had to undergo 6 house-searches during which
+everything in my apartment was upset. In these instances, all books
+which seemed to be dangerous, magazines, pamphlets, etc., were taken
+away.
+
+I was chairman of the A.D.G.B., Local Committee of Nurnberg, 1930-33.
+
+                                                   (signed) Lorenz Hagen
+                                                       Chairman of ADGB,
+                                             Local Committee of Nurnberg
+                                        formerly: Karthaeusergassergasse
+                                             Residence: Furth, Ritter v.
+                                                         Aldebertstr. 3.
+
+Today on the 17th of November 1945, I have reread each single page of
+the statement given by me on 19 October 1945 and I have signed it. I
+declare hereby under oath that this statement is true.
+
+                                                    Signed: Lorenz Hagen
+
+Sworn to before me this 17th day of November 1945 at the Justice
+Building, Nurnberg, Germany.
+
+                                        Signed: D. A. Sprecher, O2055516
+                                                            Captain, AUS
+
+       #       #       #       #       #
+
+ Appendix to the Statement of the Chairman of the ADGB, Local Committee
+                              of Nurnberg
+
+When I arrived at the concentration camp at Dachau, the manager of the
+Stokers and Machinists Union, Josef Staimer, who had been active in the
+above organization until 1933, was still in the Dachau camp. He had
+been arrested in March 1933 and shipped to Dachau. He was released from
+there near the end of 1938 or the beginning of 1939.
+
+Karl Hermann, manager of the Union of Factory Workers, pay office
+[Zahlstelle] of Nurnberg, was for several weeks imprisoned in the same
+cell with me when I was taken into protective custody in 1935 in the
+prison of Nurnberg. The total period of his imprisonment was about 7
+weeks at that time. The reason for his arrest was to force him to give
+his approval of the notarial transfer of the house of the Factory Union
+to the DAF. As private owner of the house, Hermann had been appointed
+together with another colleague of his organization to be the trustee
+of this house by the organization. In 1943 the two above mentioned men
+were taken to the Concentration Camp Flensburg. In 1944 they died in
+the camp.
+
+During my stay in Dachau, we had Brigadier-General [Oberfuehrer]
+Loritz, who was the commander of the SS-Death Head-Unit
+[Totenkopfstandarte] and chief camp commandant. He was a violent,
+brutal man. Here is only one example for this:
+
+For a while I was occupied in an SS clothing camp with a
+prisoner-detachment. An SS 1st Lt. who was in the tailoring section,
+whose name I unfortunately do not recall, sent a prisoner to the gate
+of the building on which there was a clock to find out what time it
+was. Loritz caught sight of the man, struck at him with his riding-whip
+and had his name taken. When the detachment returned at noon, the man
+was led away and without being allowed to defend himself, he received
+25 lashings [stockhiebe] and 3 days arrest with water and bread. The
+rest of the detachment had to stand at attention during the noon recess
+and return to work without eating. The camp commander of Dachau at that
+time was Captain Koegel, who was transferred in September 1938 to the
+concentration camp for women in Lichtenburg, near Prettin, where my
+wife was at the time of this transfer.
+
+Captain Gruenewald followed him as camp commander. Gruenewald was
+transport commander when we were shipped to Buchenwald. I myself saw,
+during the unloading of the train at Weimar, how Gruenewald hit Czech
+arrestees, older people, in the face and neck with his fist. One of the
+men fell to the ground and could rise only with difficulty.
+
+In my time, the SS-First Sergeants [Rapportfuehrer; work
+detail-leaders] were Hofmann from Bamberg and Luedtkemeyer, from
+Northern Germany. These two were also very brutal fellows, with whom
+beating and smacking on the pettiest grounds were the order of the day
+for satisfying their sadistic inclinations.
+
+                                                   [signed] Lorenz Hagen
+                                             Residence: Furth, Ritter v.
+                                                         Aldebertstr. 3.
+                                              Office: Nurnberg, formerly
+                                                     Krathausergasse 12.
+
+Today, on the 17th of November 1945, I have reread a duplicate copy of
+the appendix, which is an exact copy of the appendix to my statement of
+19 October 1945. I have found that this statement is true. I declare
+this hereby under oath.
+
+                                                   [signed] Lorenz Hagen
+                                                            Lorenz Hagen
+
+Sworn to before me this 17th day of November 1945 at the Justice
+Building, Nurnberg, Germany.
+
+                                                D. A. Sprecher, O2055516
+                                                            Captain, AUS
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2335-PS
+
+                     Josef Simon, born May 23, 1865
+
+Since 1900, first chairman of the German shoemakers Union, located in
+Nurnberg.
+
+In April, 1933, Georg Pessler, Nurnberg, Guntherstr. 33/I, the deputy
+assigned by the Nazis for the trade unions, came into our office,
+Essenweinstrasse 1 and declared that trade union dues were embezzled
+there. When we asserted that no embezzlements had occurred in our
+office, he asked for the cash book which we submitted to him. After
+turning the pages for a short while, he declared: “25,000 Marks are
+missing”. He put the cash book into the safe, closed the safe and gave
+the key to the policeman, who had come with him.
+
+We asked for an official public accountant to examine the books. A
+few days later the accountant, who had been assigned by Pessler,
+arrived and after checking he ascertained that with a cash amount of
+4¼ millions there was a surplus of 13 pfennigs in the safe. In spite
+of this testimony, Pessler did not return the keys of the safe to us,
+closed our bank and checking accounts and asserted in meetings of
+factories that we had embezzled union dues. Only 3 weeks later could we
+get the keys of the safe again with the aid of the police.
+
+On 2 May 1933, our office in Nurnberg was occupied; I myself had
+gone to Berlin on 1 May, because a meeting of the ADGB [Allgemeiner
+Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund: German Trade Unions] was to take place
+there on 2 May. The trade union building there was occupied and the
+majority of the officials were arrested.
+
+I was arrested on 3 May at 6 a. m., in my apartment in Berlin at the
+request of the Criminal Police of Nurnberg. After being kept in police
+custody in Berlin until 9 May, I was taken to the prison in Nurnberg
+and was shipped to the Dachau concentration camp on 30 June together
+with other arrested people (the social-democratic City Counsellors
+[Stadtraete] of Nurnberg). In Dachau the SS Guards had stirred up the
+Communists who had been imprisoned there for quite some time with these
+words: “Today your tormentors [Bonzen] will arrive, give them a nice
+welcome”. It was only due to the insight of a few reasonable Communists
+that they kept their comrades from violent acts; nevertheless, we were
+greeted in the camp with the vilest invectives. If it had come to acts
+of violence, we would of course have defended ourselves and then the SS
+would have shot at the people, fighting with each other. That was the
+intention of the SS as we learned later.
+
+The Communist Scheberle from Roothenbach near Lauf was Camp Senior
+and was in charge of assigning work details. He made us who had come
+in on 30 June fall out early on 1 July; we had to form ranks and then
+he shouted: “Reichstag deputy Simon step forward!” In this way a
+considerable number, particularly those who had had some responsible
+job, were called up and then we were led by the SS to work. I was
+ordered to collect horse dung which was lying on the roads of the camp
+with my bare hands, without shovel or broom and to carry it to a nearby
+container. Since I did not bend down fast enough in the opinion of
+my guard, an SS man about 19-20 years, he yelled at me and demanded
+faster work. I answered: “When you will be 68 years old and have
+sciatica, you will not bend down so fast either”. By collecting the
+partly wet horse dung, my hands were soiled very much. When the work
+was finished, I asked the guard whether I could wash my hands at the
+water hydrant. He refused with the words: “No, you can go and eat with
+them”. In the afternoon we had to fall out again and were assigned for
+work. I was ordered together with 19 other prisoners (among them, the
+meanwhile deceased “Kupfer”, district leader of the ADGB) for work in
+the kitchen. There we had to clean the still very hot food-kettles.
+Since the circumference of the kettle was so big that we could not
+reach the other end, we had to crawl into the hot kettles which almost
+burnt our shoes. Bathed in sweat, we had to perform the work. When this
+was over, we had to line up in a group to have our photographs taken.
+I was in the center and a ready-made sign was hung around my neck
+which bore the inscription: “I am a class conscious Socialdemocratic
+tormentor [Bonze].” Twice I tore the sign off and left it hanging only
+after having been threatened with beatings. After the pictures were
+taken, the younger ones had to fall in line and after the command
+“Attention” was given, the commander went to the rear and commanded
+“Forward march”, then “halt”, and said: “Repeat the following words:
+Fuehrer, we thank you that today for the first time we were able to
+perform some honest work”. Then I was to go with the penal company to
+the gravel-pit. My son who was also in Dachau asked to go to the penal
+company instead of me. That was granted. Gradually, I was no longer
+assigned to work details. Anyhow there was a regulation that people
+over 65 should not be assigned to work any longer. In spite of this
+regulation, I, with my 68 years, was treated as mentioned above.
+
+I was not mistreated, but at each and every opportunity abused with
+vile invectives. After almost 9 months of protective custody, among
+them 7 months in Dachau, I was released on 25 January 1934. Though I
+had to report every other day in Nurnberg to the police and was watched
+by the Gestapo.
+
+At the beginning of August 1935, I was rearrested on the following
+grounds: “Simon was for many years a member of the Socialdemocratic
+Party and for a while of the Independent Socialdemocratic Party.
+From 1907 to 1918 he was Landtagdeputy of the Socialdemocratic Party
+and from 1908 to 1930 Social Democratic City Counsellor [Stadtrat]
+in Nurnberg. In view of the decisive role which Simon played in
+international trade unionism and in regard to his connections to
+international Marxist leaders and central agencies which he continued
+after the National Revolution, he was placed under protective
+custody on 3 May 1933 and was kept until 25 January 1934 in the
+Dachau Concentration Camp. Simon is under the grave suspicion that
+even after this date he worked for the illegal continuation of the
+Socialdemocratic. He took part in meetings which aimed at the illegal
+continuation of the Socialdemocratic Party and at the propagation of
+illegal Marxist printed matter in Germany.
+
+Through this radical attitude, hostile to the State, Simon directly
+endangers public order and safety.”
+
+I was released from this protective custody on 20 December 1935. But it
+was this protective custody which caused much psychic suffering to me
+and undermined my health.
+
+When in 1934 we were released from Dachau, the commander “Eicke”
+delivered an address, at the end of which he said: “Remember this,
+whoever returns here does not get out any more.” Now I was afraid every
+day to get to Dachau again, and I was repeatedly threatened with it.
+Therefore, I suffered strongly in body and soul. My heart and nerves
+were particularly affected and there was in addition the bad food. When
+I was released on 20 December, I was already sick. Nevertheless, I had
+to report to the police every other day. When on 27 December I wanted
+to fulfill again my obligation to report there, I collapsed and lost
+consciousness in the garden of the police building. The ambulance took
+me home and I was unconscious for almost 3 hours. I recovered only
+gradually but since that time I suffer from a weak heart.
+
+                                                    [signed] Josef Simon
+                                               Nurnberg, 18 October 1945
+
+I hereby declare under oath the correctness of the above statement
+which oath is given by me on this thirteenth day of November 1945 at
+Nurnberg, Justice Building, before Captain D. A. Sprecher, AUS.
+
+                                                    [signed] Josef Simon
+                                                             Josef Simon
+
+Sworn to before me, this 13th day of November 1945 in the Justice
+Building, in Nurnberg, Germany.
+
+                                                 [signed] D. A. Sprecher
+                                    D. A. Sprecher, O2055516, Capt., AUS
+
+       #       #       #       #       #
+
+               Josef Simon, Nurnberg, Ziegelsteinstr. 106
+
+As above already stated in my report on my arrest, my son Willi was
+also arrested on 29 June and taken to Dachau Concentration Camp.
+Nothing could be proved against him, except that he was my son. My son
+“Josef” was to be arrested also and taken to Dachau. He avoided being
+arrested by fleeing and going via Schleswig-Holstein to Denmark, where
+he lives and works at present as a refugee.
+
+My son Willi was asked by the SS guards in Dachau what sort of post he
+held. When he answered that he had had none, he was slapped in the face
+and ordered to confess, and at each declaration that he had no post he
+was slapped in the face again and again. Then the SS men poured water
+out in the basement of the washhouse and while my son had to wipe it
+off with a little rag he was beaten several times. After he had wiped
+up the water, the basement was drenched again with water and under
+further beatings he again had to wipe up the water.
+
+During bathings in the winter of 1933 the prisoners who in the opinion
+of the SS did not get ready soon enough in the cold washroom were
+sprayed with a hose while half-dressed and chased outside. Because of
+the wet clothing my son contracted a severe cold in the form of an
+arthritis of the hip. He came into the dispensary. The pains became
+worse all the time and finally he was taken to a clinic in Munich for
+examination. The physician declared that my son had to remain in the
+clinic for treatment. This, however, was refused by the accompanying
+SS and he was taken to Dachau again, where he was again taken to the
+dispensary. I visited him in the dispensary and asked the medic to put
+his bed near the stove, a request that was granted. Only after several
+weeks did the condition of my son improve, and on 18 January 1934 he
+was released from Dachau.
+
+For the truth of the above statements vouches.
+
+                                                    [signed] Josef Simon
+                                               Nurnberg, 23 October 1945
+
+I have again read carefully the report submitted by me on 23 October
+1945 and I hereby declare under oath that the content is true. This
+statement is herewith made by me today, the 13 November 1945 at
+Nurnberg, in the Justice Building before Captain D. A. Sprecher, AUS.
+
+                                                    [signed] Josef Simon
+                                                             Josef Simon
+
+Sworn to before me, this 13th day of November 1945 in the Justice
+Building, Nurnberg, Germany.
+
+                                                 [signed] D. A. Sprecher
+                                                 D. A. Sprecher O2055516
+                                      Captain, Army of the United States
+
+       #       #       #       #       #
+
+              Josef Simon, Nurnberg, Ziegelsteinstr. 106.
+
+Karl Hermann, official of the Union of the Factory Workers, was
+arrested together with Staimer, on the denunciation by his nephew that
+he had together with Staimer, listened to foreign radio stations; they
+were shipped to the concentration camp Flossenbuerg in the Oberpfalz.
+There he was slain and the ashes were sent to his family.
+
+I cannot name witnesses for this deed, but I attach a death certificate
+sent to his family. [See Document 2333-PS]
+
+I vouch for the truth of the above statements.
+
+                                                    [signed] Josef Simon
+                                               Nurnberg, 23 October 1945
+
+       #       #       #       #       #
+
+Josef Simon
+
+Nurnberg
+
+Ziegelsteinstr. 106
+
+When I was shipped on 30 June 1933 to the Dachau Concentration Camp,
+I met there Josef Staimer, an official of the Unions of Stokers and
+Machinists, who had already been arrested in April and sent to Dachau.
+As far as I remember, he was not released from Dachau until 1938.
+
+In 1940, Staimer together with Hermann was arrested again on the basis
+of a denunciation and came to Flossenbuerg Concentration Camp in the
+Oberpfalz. He was slain there after a few months and burned in the
+Crematorium. The ashes were sent to his family.
+
+I cannot name witnesses for this deed, but I attach a death certificate
+sent to his family. [See Document 2332-PS]
+
+For the truth of the above statements vouches.
+
+                                                    [signed] Josef Simon
+
+Nurnberg, 23 October 1945
+
+I have reread carefully both reports, as submitted by me on 23 October
+1945, and declare herewith under oath, that the content is true. This
+statement is herewith made by me today, the 13th of November 1945 at
+Nurnberg, in the Justice Building before Captain D. A. Sprecher, AUS.
+
+                                                    [signed] Josef Simon
+                                                             Josef Simon
+
+Sworn to before me, this 13th day of November 1945 in the Justice
+Building in Nurnberg, Germany.
+
+                                                 [signed] D. A. Sprecher
+                                 D. A. Sprecher, O2055516, Captain, AUS.
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2336-PS
+
+GERMAN LABOR FRONT
+
+_Organization Office_
+
+  Chief Directorate of the Political Organization [P.O.] National
+    Socialist Factory Cells Organization
+
+                                                 Berlin W., 27 June 1933
+                                                      Luetzowufer 18, II
+
+
+                            SPECIAL CIRCULAR
+
+  on the Securing of the Associations of the German Labor Front [DAF]
+                    Against Hidden Marxist Sabotage.
+
+To all:
+
+  Leaders of Worker and Employee Associations of the DAF Regional
+    [Bezirke],
+
+  District [Kreis] and Local Chapter Directorate [Ortsgruppenleitungen]
+    of the Worker and Employee Associations of the DAF,
+
+  Regional Leaders of the DAF,
+
+  Regional Leaders of German industry
+
+and
+
+  National Socialist Works Organization [N.S.B.O.] of
+
+  “Landes” Representatives of the NSDAP
+
+  “Gau” Factory Cell Leaders of the NSDAP
+
+  District Factory Cell Leaders of the NSDAP
+
+  Local Chapter Factory Workers [Ortsgruppenbetriebswarte] of the NSDAP
+    in Berlin and the Reich.
+
+  [Stamp]
+
+Main Archives of the NSDAP No.____
+
+                                                                 [Stamp]
+                                           Entered in the index of books
+                                                3 A/C current No. A-202.
+
+       #       #       #       #       #
+
+Dear Party comrades.
+
+
+                             The Situation
+
+Today the third SA-man from Berlin has died, following on the burial
+yesterday, with the greatest ceremony, of his two comrades. The
+murderer was _a Marxist trade union member_.--A few days ago SA-men
+were fired at by _Marxists_ in two other cities of the Reich.--Enemy
+aircraft dropped revolutionary _Marxist_ leaflets over Berlin.--Shortly
+before the final edition of today’s local newspapers came out, it
+became known that a gigantic new scandal of corruption has been
+discovered in a land settlement society. The former _Marxist_ “Gau”
+chairman of the Textile Workers’ Union [Textilarbeiter-Verbandes] has
+been arrested as the chief swine and money maker. In Silesia signs have
+been discovered of a secret _Marxist_ organization (Communist Party).
+
+This is a small selection of daily events, chosen at random. _Marxists
+as murderers, Marxists as inciters to corruption, Marxists as
+foreign agents, Marxists as conspirators against the state and its
+institutions._ The notorious enemies of the state are opposed by the
+great mass of honest German workers who fight for work and bread. For
+fourteen years the “labor leaders” of Prague, Paris, Amsterdam, Warsaw
+gave to the millions of German workers _stones_ instead of bread,
+_servitude to a foreign political system_ instead of liberty. The 30th
+January, 5th March, 2nd May, 22nd June finally struck one weapon after
+the other out of the hands of this “Fuehrer” mob [gesindel]. The force
+and thoroughness of the National Socialist coups [Aktionen] made those
+who did not disappear into concentration camps creep into every dark
+corner.
+
+
+                           They Played Dead.
+
+However, now the generosity of National Socialism towards its
+adversaries, which was rightly mentioned by party comrade Dr. Ley in
+one of the last decrees of the DAF leaders, seems to have encouraged
+them to new treasonable activities from the darkness. There is much to
+indicate this. Here is just a small sample from a report submitted by
+the Gestapo, Berlin:
+
+The functionaries of the free trade unions have received instructions
+to dismiss the assertions of the National Socialist Works Organization
+regarding the former embezzlement of union funds as slanderous. What is
+aimed at is permanent agitation on a considerable scale, particularly
+with the cooperation of the treasurers of the Social Democrat Party.
+All trade union members who have joined the National Socialist Works
+Organization so as not to lose their jobs are registered with full
+details and then visited by functionaries in their homes. An attempt is
+being made to group together all “class-conscious” workers who reject
+Fascism. The aim is to keep the trade unions as fighting organs in
+spite of National Socialist leadership. The old trade union leaders are
+convinced even today that there is no suitable soil in Germany for the
+plant of Fascism; nevertheless every effort should be made to shorten
+its existence.
+
+These new working methods are contrived on the instructions of the
+international association of trade unions with which the leading German
+trade unionists are, as ever, in close contact. In short, the activity
+of the functionaries of the Marxist parties and Trades Unions is
+becoming more and more effective [aktiv].
+
+They want again, although of course considerably weakened, to use as
+a spring board the countless millions of German workers who long for
+work and bread. They shoot their arrows from ambush, try to organize
+themselves illegally, and now and then even assume a cynical and
+impertinent attitude. _But they must have got a totally wrong idea
+of us! We are awake!_ As new and qualified leaders of the workers
+and employees of the DAF and as political officials [Amtswalter] of
+the victorious National Socialist Works Organization, the sword of
+the DAF, and finally also the old, confirmed National Socialists who
+are accustomed to persecution, in all the leading and authoritative
+positions of the DAF, are, thank God, guarantees that the doings of our
+enemies come to nought.
+
+Since we know that, we act accordingly. Our aim is:
+
+1. _Expulsion of the last leading Marxist from all units of the
+associations of the “German Labour Front”;_
+
+2. _Therefore no softness, no false belief that we can “convert” them,
+since they hate us from the very bottom of their hearts and because
+Marxist big-wigs [Bonzen] can never be converted;_
+
+3. _No more financial settlements, no respecting of all their
+dishonestly made agreements;_
+
+4. _Close observation and a close check on their private activities,
+for they carry on propaganda against the state under the cloak of
+honest citizens;_
+
+5. _See to it that they are regarded by the people as outlaws who
+really deserved to be hanged;_
+
+6. _Have close observation instituted in the factories;_
+
+7. _Finally do everything that helps the German workers and the German
+employees but cuts off the deposed Marxist big-wigs from every type of
+activity hostile to the state._
+
+_We_ have one aim only; to unite the whole of German labour in a mighty
+block of workers for the blessing of the people and state. _Adolf
+Hitler_ is the protector [Schirmheer] of the DAF--_that explains
+everything_.
+
+The _Marxists_, at home and abroad, have also one aim only; to
+annihilate National Socialism and thus create chaos in Germany, nay, in
+Europe. The fronts are thus clear. The law of the National Socialist
+revolution demands therefore not only unceasing toil, but _fast_ work
+at this very moment. Therefore the following orders are issued.
+
+
+                                   A
+
+_For the “General Association [Gesamtverband] of German Workers” of the
+DAF_
+
+1. _The organization office of the DAF is drawing up a “List of
+Outlaws” [Geaechteten]_
+
+_which is valid for the entire Reich and in which the names of all
+those Marxist trade union “big-wigs” [Bonze] will be included, who
+have carried on in the past and are still carrying on the most furious
+struggle against National Socialism and are continuing it in secret.
+Anyone on the “List of Outlaws”, will not be given work in the future.
+All organizations which have any vital connection with German industry
+are being sent this printed list, in order to prevent any of these
+traitors to the workers from returning to the factories by crooked
+means and possibly continuing their mutinous activity there._
+
+_In this connection, the Association leaders [Verbandsleiter] of the
+“General union [Gesamtverband] of German Workers” of the DAF will issue
+detailed executive instructions._
+
+2. _No treasurer (or person holding similar office) in the associations
+may be a Marxist because these persons have the greatest opportunity of
+forming illegal nucleus groups. It goes without saying that suspicious
+treasurers, who can of course continue their former activities in
+spite of the fact that they no longer have the right to collect
+subscriptions, should be constantly watched._
+
+3. _The local group associations [Verbandsortssgruppe] are to be filled
+up as soon as possible with the members of other associations or groups
+who have been brought into line (Christian, former yellow, Evangelic,
+and Catholic workers unions, etc.) so that the block of “free”
+association members which has up to now been a closed community, may
+be split up. Public places known to have been frequented by the Social
+Democrat, Reichsbanner, or Communist Party, may no longer be used as
+meeting places of the local group association [Verbandsortsgruppen]._
+
+
+                                   B
+
+_For the General Association [Gesamtverband] of German employees of the
+DAF._
+
+_It is above all the Catholic party leaders whom the Trade Unions have
+taken over who should be removed from the associations, those men
+who, it has been ascertained, are maintaining their connections with
+political Catholicism just as they always have. They are dangerous
+because they simulate submission and cheerful cooperation while in
+reality they wantonly hold up our work of reconstruction and make no
+secret of it among themselves. For example, here is one of many reports
+from our intelligence service_:
+
+“On Sunday, 23 April, at 11 A. M. in the Vincent-House at Breslau
+a meeting of the Christian trade unions was held to which all the
+representatives of the authorities were invited. The report was given
+by the Chief Editor of the “Deutsche”, Wiedfeld of Berlin. The meeting
+came to an end about 1:00 p. m. and closed with the National Anthem.
+In the afternoon the delegates from the province assembled to discuss
+the report in the absence of the representatives of the various
+authorities. No comment was permitted on Herr Wiedfeld’s report in
+the morning, in order to appear in a good light in the eyes of the
+representatives of the authorities, and this was expressly stated by
+the chairman of the afternoon meeting. The lively discussion showed
+immediately the methods followed and the goal aimed at by the Christian
+Trades Union. Violent attacks were launched against the present Reich
+Cabinet [Reichsregierung]. A representative of the Christian Trade
+Union attacked the Reich Chancellor, asserting that Adolf Hitler would
+never allow the leaders of the Christian Trade Unions to voice their
+opinions.
+
+Then they spoke of the National Socialist Works Organization and
+pulled it to pieces. Citing a number of examples they went on to
+make further attacks on the Reich Cabinet and the National Socialist
+Works Organization. First the Government was attacked; they said, for
+instance, that cars were left free of tax, while a great tax was levied
+on margarine and thus the standard of living of the poor was lowered.
+There had never been so much holiday work in upper Silesia as under the
+present Government. They declared that the NSDAP will have the surprise
+of its life in Autumn, when the people will have nothing to eat, they
+will then take to open fighting and destroy National Socialism in the
+same way as the Socialist Party has been destroyed today. We dealt with
+1918 (i.e. Christian trade union) and will deal with the Nazis too. One
+must be on one’s guard against Minister Goering, for this fellow is
+heading straight for Dictatorship. It is important to keep a good watch
+on the National Socialist Works Organization, inform the people of
+every mistake and explain to the people that the Nazis are completely
+unable to carry out what they say.”
+
+_This “Christian”, sabotage applies of course also to the Workers’
+Associations._
+
+
+                                   C
+
+_For the branches [Gliederungen] of the National Socialist Works
+Organizations_
+
+_1. The National Socialist Works Organization is above all the security
+organ of the entire German Labour Front, i.e. it has to protect day
+and night the great work of our slowly progressing unification of all
+German workers and prevent any kind of sabotage. This is carried out in
+two ways:_
+
+_a. Through the already National Socialist Works Organization officials
+[Amtswalter] in the associations themselves and_
+
+_b. By keeping a watch on factories, houses and public places
+which appear suspicious to us, by means of NS B. O. patrols
+drawn from the “Gau” and District [Kreis] factory cell-divisions
+[Betriebszellenabteilung] and the local group factory wardens
+[Ortsgruppenbietriebswarte] detailed instructions will be issued later
+to the Gau factory cell divisions direct._
+
+_2. However, the branches of the National Socialist Works Organization
+must themselves be subjected to a thorough purge of members because
+their rapid growth has brought us many unreliable elements._
+
+_It is only the man who pledges his life-time unreservedly,
+unselfishly, and devotedly to the fight for the rise of German labour
+(brain and manual workers), and thus for the whole people, who should
+be a member of the National Socialist Works Organization. But any man
+who has joined the National Socialist Works Organization on the chance
+of amassing wealth, or has regarded his membership as a safeguard
+against losing his job, etc., in short, any man who has joined this
+fighting body [Kampftruppe] for material reasons, must leave it. The
+man who was a Marxist only yesterday and fought openly against us, but
+today will have nothing more to do with it, must also leave. These
+are nothing but dangerous disruptive elements [Spaltpilze] who poison
+morale when it comes to tests of endurance._
+
+_It would be a definite benefit for the National Socialist Works
+Organization if quite 100,000 of our most recent members leave our
+ranks. The Gau factory cell leaders [Gau-Betriebszellenleiter] must
+therefore issue orders to this effect._
+
+_3. Herewith an order is issued effective until further notice,
+prohibiting National Socialist Works Organization officials
+[Amtswalter] and/or ordinary members beyond the N.S.W.O. membership
+number 450,000, from holding any positions whatever in the associations
+of the German Labour Front. The new members do not yet possess that
+degree of suitability for leadership which we must demand for the great
+tasks which have to be accomplished in these associations._
+
+_Care has been taken that those “freshmen” who are not needed as
+officials [Amtswalter] in the National Socialist Works Organization or
+in the associations, are thoroughly familiarized by rapid courses with
+National socialist ideas, so that they can then be employed._
+
+_4. All positions on factory and employee counselors’ councils in
+Germany must be filled by National Socialists. There must no longer
+be any factory in which Marxists or “Christians” hold the leading
+positions. Orders should therefore be given immediately that Communist
+and Catholic factory or employee councils who are still holding office
+should be dismissed. To prevent this being carried out in a wild and
+undisciplined manner, it is laid down that the responsible Regional
+leader of the German Labour Front, in conjunction with the Gau Director
+of factory cells should from time to time, decide on the necessary
+orders (in agreement with the Regional leader of German industry)._
+
+The above schemes [Ausfuehrungen] and orders are _to be put into effect
+immediately_ with proven National Socialist thoroughness. No pardon to
+the enemy but stake all for the victory of the National Socialistic
+revolution.
+
+                                                           Signed Muchow
+
+Director of the Office of the Organization of the German Labour Front
+and Deputy Director of the National Socialist Works Organization of the
+Political Organization of the N.S.D.A.P.
+
+
+                                 PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2340-PS
+
+                1937 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 41
+
+             German Public Officials Law of 27 January 1937
+
+A career as a public official, rooted in the German people and
+permeated by National Socialist ideology and loyalty bound to the
+Fuehrer of the German Reich and people, forms a foundation pillar
+of the National Socialist State. Therefore the Reich Government has
+enacted the following law, which is hereby promulgated.
+
+
+                               CHAPTER I
+
+               Official Relationship [Beamtenverhaeltnis]
+
+
+                               ARTICLE 1.
+
+(1) The German official stands in a public service and trust
+relationship to the Fuehrer and to the Reich.
+
+(2) He carries out the will of the state, which is based on the
+National Socialist German Labor Party.
+
+(3) The state demands of the official absolute obedience and complete
+fulfillment of duty; in return it guarantees him a position for life.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+
+                               CHAPTER II
+
+                          Duties of Officials
+
+                               1. General
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+
+                               ARTICLE 3.
+
+(1) A position in the public service is proof of confidence on the
+part of the state leadership, which the official must justify by being
+constantly aware of the increased duties which his position imposes
+upon him. Fuehrer and Reich demand of him true patriotism, a spirit
+of self-sacrifice, and complete dedication of his efforts, obedience
+to his superiors, and comradeship toward his colleagues. He must be a
+model of loyal fulfillment of duty to all his fellow citizens. He must
+be faithful to the death to the Fuehrer, who assures him his special
+protection.
+
+(2) The official must at all times support without reservation the
+National Socialist State and in all his behavior must be guided by the
+fact that the National Socialist German Labor Party, in indissoluble
+union with the people, is the basis of the German state concept. He
+must report to his superiors occurrences which might endanger the
+existence of the Reich or of the National Socialist German Labor Party,
+even when he has not learned of them in the course of his official
+duties.
+
+(3) The public official is responsible for conscientious fulfillment
+of his official duties. By his conduct, on or off duty, he must prove
+himself worthy of the respect and confidence which his profession
+enjoys. He must not permit any member of his household to engage in any
+dishonorable activity.
+
+
+                         2. Oath of Allegiance.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+
+                               ARTICLE 4.
+
+(1) The official confirms his special unity with the Fuehrer and the
+Reich with the following oath, which he must take upon entering upon
+his first duty:
+
+“I swear: I will be loyal and obedient to the Fuehrer of the German
+Reich and people, Adolf Hitler, obey the law, and conscientiously
+perform my official duties, so help me God.”
+
+(2) If a law permits members of a religious affiliation to use other
+forms of affirmation instead of the oath, the official who is a member
+of such a religious affiliation may use such form of affirmation.
+
+(3) If the official declares that he has objections to taking the oath
+in religious form, he can take it without the final words.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+
+                               CHAPTER IV
+
+                       Appointments and Transfers
+
+                            1. Appointments
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+
+                              ARTICLE 25.
+
+(1) Only a person who is of German or related blood and who, if he
+is married, has a spouse of German or related blood can become an
+official. If the spouse is a mixed-blood second degree, an exception
+may be made.
+
+(2) An official may marry only a person of German or related blood.
+If the betrothed is a mixed-blood, second degree the marriage may be
+approved.
+
+(3) For the admission of an exception under subdivision 1, 2nd
+sentence, and the approval under subdivision 2, 2nd sentence, the
+supreme office authority in agreement with the Reich Minister of the
+Interior and the Deputy of the Fuehrer are the competent authorities.
+The same authorities may also permit exceptions to subdivision 1, 1st
+sentence and subdivision 2, 1st sentence, in individual cases.
+
+
+                              ARTICLE 26.
+
+(1) Furthermore, only such person may assume public office, who--
+
+1. is a citizen of the Reich or is not a citizen yet only because he
+does not yet fulfill the requirements therefore because of his age,
+
+2. has the preliminary training prescribed for his career or, in the
+absence of such regulations, the customary preliminary training or
+other special requirements for the office to be entrusted to him, and
+
+3. offers guarantee that he will at all times support the National
+Socialist State without reservation.
+
+(2) Exceptions to subdivision 1, No. 1 require the approval of the
+Reich Minister of the Interior in agreement with the Deputy of the
+Fuehrer or the authorities appointed by them.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+
+                              CHAPTER VII
+
+                  Termination of Official Relationship
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+
+                        2. Dismissal from Office
+
+                      (a) Refusal to take the oath
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+
+                              ARTICLE 57.
+
+Whoever refuses to take the oath of allegiance prescribed by law is to
+be dismissed.
+
+
+                             3. Retirement
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+
+                         (d) Political Reasons
+
+(1) The Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor may retire a life-time or
+temporary official on the request of the supreme office authority in
+agreement with the Reich Minister of the Interior, if the official no
+longer offers guarantee that he will at all times support the National
+Socialist State.
+
+(2) The facts justifying this request are to be ascertained in an
+investigation in which the questioning of witnesses and excerpts on
+oath is permissible and in which the official is to be heard.
+
+Berlin, 26 Jan. 1937
+
+                                       The Fuehrer and Reichs Chancellor
+                                                            Adolf Hitler
+
+                                     The Reichs Minister of the Interior
+                                                                   Frick
+
+                                           The Reich Minister of Finance
+                                              Count Schwerin von Krosigk
+
+
+                                 PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2341-PS
+
+         1939 REICHSGESETZBLATT, No. 38, 2 MARCH 1939, PAGE 371
+
+ Decree on the education and careers of German officials of 28 February
+                                  1939
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+Par. 2.
+
+The applicants must belong or have belonged to the party or one of
+its formations. In the selection the personal aptitude and character
+are decisive. Honorably discharged workers and soldiers (cf. par. 16
+(1) and par. 17 of the decree on the care for soldiers and workers in
+the form of 29 Dec 1937--RGBl I, p. 1417) and children of child-rich
+families have preference. For pension applicants the special decrees
+apply.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2342-PS
+
+                1936 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 369
+
+ Law on the People’s Court and on the 25th amendment to the Salary Law
+                            of 18 April 1936
+
+The Reich Cabinet [Reichsregierung] has passed the following law which
+is hereby promulgated:
+
+
+                               CHAPTER I
+
+
+                               ARTICLE 1.
+
+The People’s Court is a regular Court in the sense of the law on
+judicial organizations.
+
+
+                               ARTICLE 2.
+
+The People’s Court is comprised of one president and the necessary
+numbers of presidents of the senate and councillors as main official
+members [hauptamtliche Mitglieder].
+
+
+                               ARTICLE 3.
+
+The president, the presidents of the senate and the councillors are
+appointed for life-time. They have to be qualified for the judge’s
+office and must have completed their 35th year of age.
+
+
+                               ARTICLE 4.
+
+The honorary members of the People’s Court are appointed by the Fuehrer
+and Reichs Chancellor for the duration of 5 years upon recommendation
+of the Reichsminister of Justice.
+
+
+                               ARTICLE 5.
+
+Senates are formed at the People’s Court, the number of which is
+determined by the Reichsminister of Justice.
+
+
+                               ARTICLE 6.
+
+If it is necessary for lawful course of affairs, permanently employed
+judges may be called in temporarily as assistant judges to the People’s
+Court in case of an accumulation of business. The delegation of an
+assistant judge may be called off before the end of the time, for which
+the assistant judge has been called in, only if the emergency, by which
+it was caused, does no longer exist.
+
+
+                               ARTICLE 7.
+
+The office of the public prosecutor at the People’s Court is filled
+by one or several Reich prosecutors or State prosecutors. They are
+nonjudicial officials, must however be qualified for the judge’s office.
+
+
+                               ARTICLE 8.
+
+At the People’s Court an office will be established which will be
+filled with the necessary number of recording officials.
+
+
+                               CHAPTER II
+
+
+                               ARTICLE 9.
+
+The Reich pay law of 10 December 1927 (RGBl I, p. 349) will be changed
+as follows:
+
+1. To the pay class A will be added:
+
+a. in pay group Ib after “directors of law courts”: “Chief State
+Prosecutors at the People’s Court”;
+
+b. in pay group 10a after “Sergeant of the German Supreme Court”
+[Reichsgerichtswachtmeister];
+
+2. To the pay class B will be added:
+
+a. in pay group 3b under Section “Reichministry of Justice” before
+“president of the highest court of Justice” [Kammergerichtspresident]:
+“President of the People’s Court”;
+
+b. in pay group e under section “Reichministry of Justice” after
+“Senate President at the German Supreme Court,”: “Senate president at
+the People’s Court, Reich Prosecutor as head of the State Prosecutor’s
+office at the People’s Court” and in note I after “German Supreme
+Court”: “and at the People’s Court as well as the Reich Prosecutor as
+head of the State Prosecutor’s office at the People’s Court”;
+
+c. in pay group 8 under Section “Reichministry of Justice” before
+“Presidents of District Courts at Courts with 30 or more organic
+[planmaessig] judges in the district”: “Councillors at People’s Courts”.
+
+
+                              ARTICLE 10.
+
+Of the positions printed in the budget of the Reichministry of Justice
+for the financial year of 1935 (individual plan IX) at Chapter 2
+(German Supreme Court) the following positions are transferred to
+Chapter 2a (People’s Court):
+
+  Group B 7: 1 Reich Prosecutor.
+
+  Group A 2b: 2 Chief State Prosecutors.
+
+  Group A 2d: 4 senior judges in law courts of justice (6 of whom to be
+    transformed in future).
+
+  Group A 4b: 6 Chief inspectors of the Government.
+
+  Group A 4c: 2 inspectors of the Government.
+
+  Group A 7: 6 Secretaries.
+
+  Group A10: 6 Sergeants of the German Supreme Court
+    [Reichsgerichtswachtmeister].
+
+(2) In the budget of the Reichministry of Justice (Individual Plan IX)
+the following organic positions will be newly created in Chapter 2a
+(People’s Court):
+
+  Group B 3b: President of the People’s Court.
+
+  Group B 6: 2 Senate presidents at the People’s Court, 1 Reich
+    Prosecutor (under transformation of the Reich Prosecutor’s position
+    of Group B 7 transferred from the German Supreme Court). They
+    receive an irrevocable extra pay of 1000 RM which can be added to
+    the base pay, for purpose of pension [pensionsfaehig].
+
+  Group B 8: 6 Councillors at the People’s Court.
+
+  Group A 1b: 2 Chief State Prosecutors at the People’s Court.
+
+  Group A 2b: 2 Chief State Prosecutors.
+
+  Group A 10a: 1 Chief Messenger’s supervisor.
+    He receives extra pay for this position of 300 RM which can be added
+      to the base pay for the purpose of pension [pensionsfaehig] and is
+      irrevocable.
+
+    5 Sergeants of the People’s Court under transformation of 5
+      positions of sergeants of the German Supreme Court taken over from
+      the German Supreme Court.
+
+
+                              CHAPTER III
+
+In as far as laws or other regulations refer to the Chief Reich
+Prosecutor as authority of indictment at the People’s Court, his place
+will be taken by the Reich Prosecutor at the People’s Court.
+
+
+                               CHAPTER IV
+
+The Reichministry of justice will issue the legal and administrative
+regulations necessary for the execution of this law.
+
+
+                               CHAPTER V
+
+(1) This law shall take effect as of 1st April 1936.
+
+(2) The honorary members of the People’s Court appointed on the basis
+the former regulations continue to remain in office according to their
+appointment hitherto. The same holds good with regard to members who
+have to be qualified for the judge’s office. On 31st October 1936
+however those are being eliminated who will not have been appointed up
+to this date to main official members of the People’s Court.
+
+(3) If members of the German Supreme Court and Reich Prosecutors are
+being transferred to the People’s Court up to 1st April 1937, they will
+receive in case of their being retired at least the pension to which
+they would have been entitled if they had remained in their former
+positions at the German Supreme Court.
+
+                                                  Berlin, 18. April 1936
+
+                                        The Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor
+                                                            Adolf Hitler
+
+                                            The Reichministry of Justice
+                                                            Dr. Guertner
+
+                                           The Reichministry of Finances
+                                              Count Schwerin von Krosigk
+
+                                      The Reich War Ministry and Supreme
+                                           Commander of the Armed Forces
+                                                            von Blomberg
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2344-PS
+
+                       RECONSTRUCTION OF A NATION
+
+                         [Aufbau Einer Nation]
+
+   by Hermann Goering, 2nd Edition, Published by E. S. Mittler & Son,
+                        Berlin 1934, [Page 89].
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+Against the enemies of the State, we must proceed ruthlessly. It cannot
+be forgotten that at the moment of our rise to power, according to
+the official election figures of March 1933, six million people still
+confess their sympathy for Communism and eight million for Marxism....
+_Therefore, the concentration camps have been created, where we
+have first confined thousands of Communists and Social Democrat_
+functionaries.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+
+                                 PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2347-PS
+
+ 1935 REICHSVERWALTUNGSBLATT, Vol. 56, No. 29, Pages 577-578, dated 20
+                               July 1935
+
+ (Editorial Board: A. Mirow, _Dr. H. H. Lammers_, H. Pfundtner, Dr. O.
+                    Koellreutter, Dr. F. A. Medicus)
+
+
+                          II. COURT DECISIONS
+
+Survey of decisions of the Supreme Administrative Court
+[Oberverwaltungsgericht]
+
+
+                           Police in General
+
+                             (Rush-reprint)
+
+Since the Law on the Secret State Police [Geheime Staatspolizei] of 30
+November 1933 (GS.S. 419) became effective, decisions of the Office of
+the Secret State Police [Geheimes Staats Polizeiamt] can no longer be
+contested according to the provisions of the Law on the Administration
+of Police. The only remedy against them is a complaint to the superior
+authority.
+
+Legal status of the Bureau of the Secret State Police according to the
+Law on the Secret State Police of 30 November 33.
+
+On September 4 1934 the Association Secretary filed a suit against the
+Secret State-Police at the District-Administrative Court in Berlin. The
+association asserted that on 23 August 1934 their president had been
+informed by two officials of the office of the Secret State-Police that
+the assets of the association would be sequestrated for the purpose of
+an eventual confiscation.
+
+With the decision of 1 November 1934 the District-Administrative Court
+decided to dismiss the suit.
+
+The appeal of the plaintiff against this decision could not have any
+success.
+
+The District-Administrative Court in this case dismissed the suit on
+the ground of the inadmissibility of such an action to this court.
+According to the principle of enumeration quoted by the judge of first
+instance a suit can be filed with the administrative courts only if
+legal provisions expressively rule to that effect. The right of legal
+redress as provided by the law relating to the Police-Administration
+applies according to the wording of this law only to the police orders
+issued by the ordinary police-authorities, i.e. the police-authorities
+of the community, the district, or the province. The sequestration
+order in question has not been issued by an ordinary police-authority;
+on the contrary it had been issued by the Office of Secret
+State-Police, the legal status of which has been provided by the Law of
+30 November 1933.
+
+With this law an authoritative status was given to the Secret
+State-Police which was basically different from the one at the
+time it was created, based on the Law of 26 April 1933. By virtue
+of this last-mentioned law, the Office of the Secret State-Police
+should act in political matters “at the side of or in the place of
+the ordinary police-authorities” and “should have the status of a
+Province-Police-Authority”....
+
+This legal status was changed, as the District-Administrative-Court
+properly recognized, when the “Secret State-Police” was created. An
+authoritative organization was created thus, the status of which
+is expressly determined by law to be exempt from the sphere of the
+Minister of Interior, otherwise competent in all Police matters.
+
+Section 1, subsection 1, sentence 1 and 2 of the Law of 30 November
+1933 quotes:
+
+“The Secret State Police is forming an independent branch of the
+interior administration. Its chief is the Prime Minister”. The
+conception “interior administration” here is not used in the usual
+meaning of today according to which this word designates the specified
+affairs within the sphere of the Minister of the Interior--as for
+instance in comparison with the administration of commerce or public
+instruction, etc....
+
+That the Secret State Police became an independent organization is
+clearly shown on one side by the fact that it is subordinated as a
+whole to the Prime Minister, and then by the creation of special
+authorities designated with specific names.
+
+Concluding from all this the legal status of the Office of the Secret
+State Police since the Law of 30 November 1933 became effective is the
+following: The office is part of a special authoritative organization,
+the “Secret State Police” which forms an independent branch of the
+Administration of the Prussian State. It has, like the Secret State
+Police as a whole, its special field as to the nature of its tasks:
+the management of affairs of the political police. Therewith the
+characteristic signs are given of a “Special Police Authority” within
+the purview of Section 2, subsection 2 and section 8 of the Law
+relating to the Administration of the Police, an authority detached
+from the organization of the ordinary police-authorities entrusted with
+a special police task. It cannot be considered part of the limited
+circle of police authorities, i.e. State [Landes] authorities, Kreis
+or local authorities, pursuant to Section 2, subsection 1 of the Law
+relating to Police-Administration, as in relation to them it figures
+rather as a central authority pursuant to the mentioned provisions of
+Section 3, subsection 2 of the law of 30 November 1933.
+
+From the thus signified character of the Office of the Secret State
+Police, which therefore doubtlessly forms a special-police-authority
+it can be concluded that its orders as mentioned before,
+are not subject to the provisions of the law relating to the
+Police-Administration in regard to means of redress. Neither does the
+Law of 30 November 1933 provide for the contesting of a decision by
+a suit (filing an appeal) at the administrative court. Therefore the
+party affected by such orders has only the general legal remedy of a
+complaint to the supervisory authority.
+
+                                      Decree of 2 May 1935 III. C. 43/35
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2348-PS
+
+Statement of Standarten Fuehrer Walther Rauff made on 19 October 1945:
+
+I hereby acknowledge the attached letters, written by Dr. Becker
+(Lieut.) on 16 May 1942 and received by me on 29 May 1942, as a genuine
+letter.
+
+I did on 18 October 1945 write on the side of this letter a statement
+to the effect that it was genuine.
+
+I do not know the number of death vans being operated and cannot even
+give an approximate figure.
+
+The vans were built by the Saurer Works, Germany, located, I believe,
+in Berlin. Some other firms built these vans also.
+
+In so far as I am aware these vans only operated in Russia.
+
+In so far as I can state these vans were probably operating in 1941,
+and I personally feel that they were operating up to the termination of
+the war.
+
+I do not personally know the number of persons killed in the death vans.
+
+I would like to state that the reason why Dr. Becker wrote this letter
+to me was due to the fact that I was the chief of the Section under
+which were included such divisions as
+
+  (1) Ammunition
+  (2) Telephone
+  (3) Telegraph
+  (4) Radio
+  (5) All Trucks.
+
+This group was known as II D.
+
+When this letter was received, I referred it to a Captain Pradl for
+appropriate action. The letter was discussed by Captain Pradl and
+myself, and I believe that Pradl was instructed by me to have the
+technical matters, of which the letters complained, remedied. I only
+saw Dr. Becker once or twice and had no part in the actual appointing
+of Dr. Becker to this position. I was never present when the death vans
+were operating with persons in them being killed, however I did see
+a death van as a sample and was interested merely from a technical
+viewpoint. I was chief of this technical section from February 1940
+until March 1940.
+
+From May 1940 to May 1941 I was in the German navy. From September 1941
+to May 1942 I was in Prague. I then became chief of the section again
+from May 1942 to June 1942.
+
+I wish to point out that my specific interest in these death vans was
+the lower part where the motor was located.
+
+I wish to state that my immediate superior was an individual of
+ministerial grade by the name of Standarten Fuehrer Siegert. He was
+chief of AMT II RSHA, and Siegert gave me orders to supply the chassis
+of these death vans. Insofar as I can recall I only supplied 5 or 6.
+
+The immediate superior of Standarten Fuehrer Siegert was Obergruppen
+Fuehrer Reinhardt Heydrich, chief of S. D.
+
+The immediate successor of Siegert was an individual by the name of
+Spacil who succeeded Siegert around July or August of 1942, taking over
+the same duties and same responsibilities as Siegert and remaining
+chief of the section until the termination of the war. I believe that
+Siegert returned to a position in the Ministry of Finance on being
+relieved by Spacil.
+
+I understand that this statement was made under oath and I hereby swear
+that all statements contained in this affidavit are the truth, the
+whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help me God.
+
+                                                Standarten Fuehrer Rauft
+
+  Witnessed by the following:--
+      Captain J. F. C. Bagshaw,
+      Captain G. K. Heller,
+      Captain C. A. Crowther.
+
+
+                                 PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2349-PS
+
+                      THE MYTH OF THE 20TH CENTURY
+
+                          by Alfred Rosenberg
+
+       Published by Hoheneichen Publishing House, Muenchen 1941.
+
+[Page 215]
+
+We recognize today that the central maximum values of the Roman and
+the Protestant Church as negative Christianity do not correspond to
+our soul, that they are in the way of the organic forces of the Nordic
+racially determined peoples, must give way to them (these forces),
+and must let themselves be re-evaluated in the sense of a Germanic
+Christianity. That is the thought behind today’s religious searching.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+[Page 514]
+
+The idea of honor--national honor--is for us the beginning and end of
+our entire thinking and doing. It does not admit of any equal-valued
+center of force alongside of it, no matter of what kind, neither
+Christian love, nor the Free-Masonic humanity, nor the Roman philosophy.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+[Page 608]
+
+A German religious movement which would like to develop into a
+folk-church will have to declare that the idea of neighborly love is
+unconditionally to be subordinated to the idea of national honor, that
+no act of a German church may be approved which does not primarily
+serve the safeguarding of the folkdom.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+[Page 616]
+
+A German religion will, bit by bit, present in the churches transferred
+to it, in place of the crucifixion the spirit of fire--the heroic--in
+the highest sense.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2351-PS
+
+                   THE ARCHIVE, Vol. 34-36, Page 1716
+
+                  compiled by Ernst Jaenicke, Berlin.
+
+                    Edited by Alfred-Ingomar Berndt.
+
+      Published by Otto Stollberg, publishers, Berlin, March 1937.
+
+[Rosenberg in a speech on 7 March 1937 stated:]
+
+The education of youth can only be carried out by those who have
+rescued Germany from disaster. It is therefore impossible to demand one
+Fuehrer, one Reich and one firmly united people as long as education is
+carried out by forces which are mutually exclusive of each other.
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2352-PS
+
+                   THE ARCHIVE, Vol. 43-45, Page 1029
+
+                  compiled by Ernst Jaenicke, Berlin,
+
+                    Edited by Alfred-Ingomar Berndt.
+
+     Published by Otto Stollberg, publishers, Berlin, November 1937
+
+[Kerrl said in a speech at Fulda, 27 November 1937:]
+
+We cannot recognize that the Church has a right to insure that the
+individual should be educated in all respects in the way in which it
+holds to be right; but we must leave it to the National Socialist State
+to educate the child in the way it regards as right.
+
+
+                                 PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2353-PS
+
+     BASIC FACTS FOR A HISTORY OF GERMAN WAR AND ARMAMENTS ECONOMY
+
+[Page 35]
+
+
+                                   IV
+
+The influence of central organization on development and activities of
+the war economy organization
+
+Centralization of the Supreme Reich authorities, ordered in case of
+war, has influenced the development and the activities of the war
+economy organization to such an extent, that it is necessary to discuss
+this matter in detail.
+
+The foundations had already been laid for the central organization of
+the Supreme Reich authorities in the event of a war, prior to 1933
+in many discussions and decrees, but it was radically altered when
+the national socialists came into power and especially by the decease
+of Reichpresident von Hindenburg. The latest orders were decreed
+in the Reich Defense law of May 21, 1935, supposed to be published
+only in case of war, but already declared valid for carrying out war
+preparations. As this law (see Appendix IV, 1) fixed the duties of the
+Armed Forces and the other Reich authorities in case of war, it was
+also the fundamental ruling for the development and activity of the war
+economy organization.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+
+                                   XV
+
+[Page 135]
+
+War and Armament Economic Measures from entry into Austria (1938 till
+mobilization 1939)
+
+The discussion between the Fuehrer and the Austrian Chancellor of State
+Schuschnigg on February 12, led to the military-political measures
+against Austria, which concluded with the entry into Austria on
+March 13. This action against Austria, disguised under the code name
+“Action Otto” prepared in a short time, has resulted in a wealth of
+experience of utmost importance, for the preparation of mobilization
+and especially for the economic preparations, and has in the course of
+the year led to changes in the regulations regarding mobilization.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+[Page 136]
+
+The action was prepared and started without the cooperation of the
+WStb. The result was, that the military measures created great
+confusion in the economic sphere leading to unpleasant conditions for
+the army and also for the economy for the time being.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+[Page 141]
+
+The experience gained during the action in Austria caused the OKW to
+issue new regulations, preparing the separating of the mobilization
+of the Armed Forces from the mobilization of the civilian elements.
+Mobilization of the Armed Forces without public announcement (X-case)
+was prepared; nevertheless there should be the possibility of
+proceeding at any time from the mobilization of the Armed Forces only,
+to a general mobilization of State, Nation and Economy. The basic idea
+is, that all actions and regulations in case-X are based on Civil law,
+a state of defense has not been declared and martial law has not been
+proclaimed. The appropriate measures were ordered on July 5 by the
+OKW. WStb and GBW expressed justifiable misgivings regarding these new
+regulations, as mobilization of the Armed Forces before mobilization
+of economy would create considerable confusion and endanger the smooth
+running of the economic mobilization. On the demand for a divided
+mobilization was necessary from a military-political point of view, it
+was accepted in spite of the objections of the WStb and GBW.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+[Pages 142-143]
+
+The first _planned_ action of the war economy organization during
+an actual operation was at the time of the entry into the Sudeten
+territory. Liaison officers of the OKW [WStb] were attached to the
+corps commandos, they were in charge of technical war economy units and
+finally, War Economy Offices for special missions were created to take
+over definite Economic departments. The military-political developments
+during the occupation of the Sudeten German territory evolved in
+such a manner, that the liaison officers as well as the technical
+war economy units and the offices of WWi were rarely in action. The
+planned preparation for action by these administrative units and their
+activities in the Sudeten German territory nevertheless provided
+experience which was also very valuable for the later Mob-preparations.
+Primarily it was admitted by all departments, that the installation of
+the liaison officers of the OKW [WStb] at the corps commandos is of
+great value not only to the troops but also for OKW, and is a necessity
+in modern warfare. This proved especially valuable insofar as the
+chiefs of the Civil government were as a rule not instructed in their
+duties and authority, and the offices for special missions, first had
+to give them the necessary directives for their task.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+[Page 146]
+
+At the beginning of the year 1939 a new level was reached as regards
+the military-political situation--the occupation of Bohemia and
+Moravia by the German army and the abrogation of the sovereignty of
+Czechoslovakia. These operations also were prepared “war economically”
+by the creation of war economy units, who had, as in the case
+Sudetenland, a very small scope for action. Immediately after the
+occupation, a war economy inspectorate for special missions was set
+up, which took over all the duties of the Czechoslovak secretaryship
+general for National Defense and which was transformed into the
+Inspectorate of War Economy Prague on March 30, 1939 already. The main
+duties of the Inspectorate are:
+
+  Utilization of the total industrial economy of the Protectorate for
+    the purpose of Reichdefense;
+
+  Control of manufacture of war material for at home and abroad and
+
+  Effect synchronization of demands to be made by military and civilian
+    Reich authorities and the industrial economy of the Protectorate.
+
+  Furthermore they are assigned:
+
+  The instruction of the Reichprotector on the economic demands to be
+    made in the interest of Reichdefense and to advise him concerning
+    legislation resulting therefrom;
+
+  Air raid precautions in industry and guarding of factories and the
+    Defence Measures [Abwehrmassnahmen] in the factories.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+
+                                 XVIII
+
+[Pages 181-184]
+
+                 Execution of the economic mobilization
+
+Before discussing the actual process of the economic mobilization
+I regard it as my duty, to give my opinion on the possibility of
+successful warfare as regards war economy, from my experience as
+Chief of the WStb gained during August 1939. During this time many
+conferences were held with the then Generaloberst Keitel discussing our
+readiness for war and conditions in regard to armaments as compared
+with that of the prospective enemy states. During all these discussions
+I maintained the point of view, that a war with Poland would present
+no problem for us, but that for a great world war of long duration,
+our economic structure would be too weak and that, in the case of a
+world war, decisive measures, conforming to a total war, would have to
+be carried out immediately. These objections and the resulting demands
+were nevertheless ignored.
+
+The process of German mobilization in 1939 was most intensively
+influenced by the progress of the military-political situation and
+was carried out with the idea of surprising the enemy, at the right
+moment. The experience gained during the operations against Austria,
+Sudetenland and Czechoslovakia, which led to separate and camouflaged
+mobilization, formed the basis for the measures to be taken. The
+tension, existing between Germany and Poland since July, was used to
+take all the measures, necessary for a surprise attack on Poland.
+Some of these preparations as far as war economy was concerned were
+the acceleration of the delivery of armaments, which in particular
+was carried out by the branches of the Armed Forces and, for the
+organization of War-economy, the forming of war economy units to be
+attached to the attacking armies.
+
+After August 1, the formation and distribution of VO of WStb took
+place, they were attached to the AOK; on August 24, formation of war
+economy units for the attacking armies concerned. On August 25, orders
+for the camouflaged mobilization were released, with Aug. 26, ordered
+as the first X-day. (see Appendix XVIII, 1 and Appendix XVIII, 2). In
+this manner the form of mobilization was ordered, which represented the
+most unfavorable form for the mobilization of war economy. Reiterated
+objections against divided mobilization, submitted by WStb as late
+as August 24, were overridden by the Chief of OKW, while the Supreme
+Command was of the opinion, that a war with Poland did not necessitate
+a General mobilization, and any other form of mobilization was out of
+question for political reasons.
+
+On August 25 18.30 a copy of case X was remitted to the inspectorates
+of War economy (copy, see Appendix XVIII, 3).
+
+The decree of August 25 orders expressly that case X shall not be
+extended in its entirety to civilian matters. Even though it was
+ordered that future proposed mob measures must not be endangered by
+unplanned demands, requisitions and commandeerings, there was still
+considerable danger in the mobilization being divided and carried out
+at different times. This was especially applicable as far as economy
+was concerned insofar as regulations for economy read that with the
+utmost consideration of economy in general only the most important war
+factories should be maintained at their former level and that only
+isolated war factories should be immediately speeded up to produce
+a large output. These regulations, in consideration of the Economic
+Policy which was to oppose every unnecessary change, and also of the
+kind of propaganda adopted were bound to endanger the planned process
+of economic mobilization.
+
+The preparations, covering many years of work, for the mobilization
+of Economy were consequently, for the most part, invalid. This
+regulation was unfortunately to become an inconvenience later on when
+starting up the Armaments Industry and the economy of war and was even
+noticeable for the first four years of the war up to the declaration
+of total war in 1943. A large number of the measures, contained in the
+preparation for mobilization of the WStb and invalidated by the above
+regulation, were not executed until 1943 as a result of demands by the
+Reichminister for Armaments and ammunition.
+
+On August 27, 1939, the regulation on the administration of economy was
+issued, whereby the Oberpraesidenten were charged with executing and
+directing all economic measures of the GBW. Included in this was the
+official founding of the District Economy offices, the Provincial Food
+offices [Landesernaehrungsaemter], Offices of forestry and economy of
+timber [Holzwirtschaftsaemter] forming finally the organization, that
+should have been in force long ago as a result of the mobilization
+order by GBW.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+[Pages 273-275]
+
+
+                             B. War Economy
+
+The year 1940 was the first acid test for the value and necessity
+of the War Economy organization. After it had proved its value at
+home by the measures taken to strengthen the war economy of Germany
+especially in reestablishing the German war industry and reconstructing
+the armament industry and had earned the constant appreciation of
+Field Marshal Goering and the Reichminister for War, it now remained
+to prove that the organization was also able to support the combat
+troops, to administer the economy of occupied countries and put it into
+operation again, and that there was an absolute necessity for such an
+organization in the present war. That this point of view is correct, is
+proved by the fact, that all allied as well as enemy states constructed
+similar organizations, imitating the German pattern.
+
+The operations against Denmark and Norway and the western campaign
+against Holland, Belgium and France brought full proof; the year 1942
+has more than confirmed this point of view.
+
+
+ _1. War Economy Measures during the occupation of Denmark and Norway_
+
+The occupation of Denmark and Norway brought for the German War Economy
+organization a gratifying and manifold task. The office Wi Rue was
+informed of the planned execution of these operations at the end of
+February, and thereupon ordered the preparation of the measures to be
+taken as regards war economy. It was decided, that a small staff under
+the direction of Major Neef (Group leader in the dept. of raw materials
+Wi Rue) should carry out the appropriate, preliminary preparations, for
+the organization which were to be carried out in accordance with the
+directives of OKW-WFA and the Oberquartiermeisters of group XXI charged
+with the operational preparations. Commander in chief of Group XXI was
+von Falkenhorst, General in the infantry; Colonel of General staff
+Baentsch, Oberquartiermeister. The war economy specialists, coordinated
+under Major Neef, was assimilated into the staff of group XXI on March
+20, under the title “Group War Economy” and VO of OKW/Wi Rue office.
+
+The first performance of the group was the compilation of material
+on the economic structure of Denmark and Norway. Then it worked on
+the war economy and armament part of the “Demands of OKW to the
+political plenipotentiaries of the Fuehrer in the Danish and Norwegian
+Governments”, and the economic measures in the “Special instructions on
+conduct during occupation of Denmark and Norway”.
+
+Furthermore, special tasks were given to the war economy officers
+concerned and their first duties defined as follows:
+
+a. Support of the military commanders in the utilization of the economy
+of the country in the interest of the armed forces;
+
+b. Identification and safeguarding of supplies against unauthorized
+seizure or transport;
+
+c. Starting or restarting of production plants; any further war economy
+and armament tasks should be undertaken only by special order of OKW.
+
+The working staff was able, during the four weeks available, to compile
+detailed material, providing the respective war economy departments
+with valuable material for their duties. All necessary orders,
+directives and so forth were issued in a special calendar in order of
+mobilization.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+[Pages 276-282]
+
+On April 2 it was decided to select April 9 as the day on which the
+operation should be carried out.
+
+The execution of the operation was on the whole carried out according
+to plan. Provision was made that the WO should reach their posts
+together with their respective staffs, namely, Major Neef by air,
+the WO Osbjerg and Aarhus over-land, the remaining gentlemen in the
+warships in which the staffs were transported, while all WO, though
+partly under heavy fighting, reached their objective on April 9,
+Major Neef was not able to reach Oslo until April 12, because of the
+opposition near Oslo.
+
+The unified War Economy Organization which had been prepared for Norway
+and Denmark depended upon the regulation that the Senior Command for
+special missions XXXI in Denmark was subordinate to group XXI in
+Norway. When it soon became evident that this arrangement did not work
+because of distances and because of the conflicting behavior of the
+Norwegian and Danish governments, it was decided on April 10 to make
+the Senior Command for Denmark directly subordinate to the Commander in
+Chief of the Army, while group XXI together with the forces operating
+in Norway was to remain subordinate to the OKW. As a result of this
+change it also became necessary to divide the War Economy organization.
+The War Economy Liaison Office Denmark was placed under the supervision
+of the administrator of Danish economy, on the staff of the political
+plenipotentiary of the Fuehrer in Copenhagen; the organization Norway
+under Major Neef remained attached to group XXI.
+
+In Norway as well as in Denmark the assignment of War Economy Offices
+to the military detachments has proved successful. The War Economy
+Offices were burdened with so many problems that their small staff
+barely sufficed; they were very quickly maids of all work.
+
+As soon as the offices were well established in their new districts and
+the most important military problems had been settled, they quickly
+attended to the construction of the War Economy Organization.
+
+In Norway for the first few days after the occupation, the German
+Ambassador Dr. Braeuer, remained the political plenipotentiary of
+the Fuehrer. As Foreign Office commissioner, dealing with economic
+problems, Min. Direktor Sarnow of the Reich Wi. M. was attached to him.
+Major Neef immediately tried to secure a definition of the fields of
+work. However, when this did not meet with any success, for the sake
+of the work, he arranged with Min. Dir. Sarnow that the office of WO
+Norway as should be incorporated into the Staff of the commissioner
+dealing with economic problems, as Main Division II. This measure,
+however, was never carried out, because both Dr. Braeuer and Min.
+Dir. Sarnow were recalled on April 22 and the Gauleiter of the NSDAP
+Terboven was named by the Fuehrer as Reichcommissioner of the occupied
+Norwegian territories. All attempts by Major Neef to clarify the status
+and spheres of activity with the 2nd in Command of the Reich Commissar
+Gauwirtschaftsberater Otte, were for the time being unsuccessful. On
+April 27 the former Liaison Office was changed to the War Economy Staff
+Norway. The WO as a branch office was subordinate to the latter.
+
+In Denmark, Commander Dr. Forstmann quickly succeeded in coming to
+an understanding with the German Ambassador von Renthe-Fink and his
+commercial attaché Dr. Krueger in regard to the spheres of activity. On
+May 27 the office was renamed “War Economy Staff Denmark.”
+
+The details concerning the establishing of the War Economy offices,
+their growth, and their manifold tasks have been thoroughly described
+in the accounts of the WStb Denmark and Norway. Hence, within the scope
+of this report the details will not come under discussion. In short,
+attention should only be drawn to the tasks as a whole, and the most
+important experiences during this first large-scale operation of the
+War Economy Organization.
+
+The problems which faced the war economy officers during the
+occupation of Denmark and Norway were very extensive and embraced
+both military as well as economic problems in all fields of economy.
+The military leaders were glad that officers trained in war economy
+were at their disposal, who were qualified to solve questions of an
+economic-organizational character and, as authorities, could negotiate
+with Danish and Norwegian Officials. At this moment the manner in which
+the War Economy Organization had been formed, proved its worth in that
+there was personnel trained in military as well as industrial and
+commercial fields. Thus it happened that problems were entrusted to the
+WO which really lay beyond the scope of their activities. The following
+may be named:
+
+  Supplying troops with food, Motor vehicles and fuel,
+
+  Procuring billeting possibilities for the troops,
+
+  Securing money and regulating the currency problem,
+
+  Procuring material (cement, wood, etc.),
+
+  Providing coal,
+
+  Regulating transportation,
+
+  Loading troops onto ships,
+
+  Procuring raw materials and finished products,
+
+  Putting the fishing industry into operation,
+
+  Rationing food for the armed forces and the civilian population,
+
+  Rationing of fuel,
+
+  Cooperating with the sailings of ships putting in and out,
+
+  Administering the loading of ships,
+
+  Checking over claims for compensation for war damage and requisitions,
+
+  Utilization of fish garbage and the manufacture of fish flour,
+
+  Price regulations for the purchase and renting of real estate for the
+    armed forces,
+
+  The loaning of horses and seed for agriculture.
+
+These and similar problems had to be taken over by the WO, because the
+competent offices of the Armed Forces Departments were not there or
+were not in the position to solve these problems.
+
+Only after these problems had been solved, was it possible for the
+WO to cope with the real problems affecting war economy, which dealt
+immediately with the seizing and securing of the most important
+agricultural supplies and the reestablishing of the means of
+subsistence.
+
+Then the problems in Denmark and Norway shaped themselves in different
+ways as a result of the war situation (see appendix XX, 6). As early as
+June 15 the order could be issued regarding Denmark that the country be
+treated as being in the domestic theatre of operations; and therefore
+it was possible to quickly begin to make full use of the Danish defense
+and armament industry. The exploitation of the armament industry in
+Norway could only follow at a slower pace and at a later period,
+because it was regarded as being enemy territory. The utilization of
+the Danish and Norwegian economy followed within the framework of
+the “Proposals by the armed forces for the regulating of the general
+questions in regard to war and armament economy.” (see appendix XX, 7).
+
+Very soon it was necessary for the Wi Rue department and the War
+Economy offices in Denmark and Norway to take sharp measures in order
+to avoid duplication of work and the overlapping of the WT in Danish
+and Norwegian concerns. Above all, it was important for the sake of
+currency stabilization to keep a firm hand over the buyers of the WT,
+because they were causing danger to the currencies of the countries
+by flooding them with fiduciary monetary tender. It very soon became
+finally necessary to adopt measures to make the raw material available
+for those orders placed with Denmark and Norway, because, in part, the
+raw materials needed for the purpose of filling these orders were not
+to be had there.
+
+In order to hasten the process of getting Norwegian industry into
+operation again, the Wi Rue Amt. sent German industrial and economic
+personnel to Norway, who, as middlemen, were to quickly establish
+confidential relationships and who on account of their expert knowledge
+were to accelerate the revival of Norwegian Economy.
+
+The experiences of the first months of the occupation show that it is
+absolutely necessary to provide units operating independently with War
+Economy Offices, since in a modern war economic problems are submitted
+to the commanders which can only be solved by trained personnel. It is
+self evident that, later on, a major portion of the problems must be
+transferred to the civilian Economic departments, which will be set
+up, and that the soldier confines himself to the solution of economic
+problems that serve the troops, as long as no solution is found, as
+later proved to be the case, in the Netherlands.
+
+The staffing of the WO for Denmark and Norway was in most cases
+too small, because the problems were too complex and the fields of
+operation allotted to them were too large.
+
+Yet it is an established fact that the War Economy Offices, in Denmark
+and Norway especially, rendered invaluable services to the troops
+during the first months and that an organization for the reopening of
+industrial operations and to carry out the commissions of the WT was an
+absolute necessity.
+
+Moreover, the outstanding work of the War Economy offices in Denmark
+and Norway was the main reason for the fact that, in 1941, it was
+possible to carry out, according to plan, the enormous work for the
+defense of the country, which was required of the Economies of Denmark
+and Norway by the Supreme Command.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+[Pages 283-284]
+
+
+                       _2. Campaign in the West_
+
+The operations against France, Holland and Belgium brought about the
+first real use of the war economy organization in enemy territory. It
+was accomplished in close cooperation with General Qu. of the Army.
+
+At the start of the war, the Armed Forces operating in the West were,
+by reason of the experience gained during the campaign in Poland,
+supplied with Army Economic Officers [Armeewirtschaftsfuehrer-A Wi Fue]
+who simultaneously were the liaison with the armament offices in the
+border territory.
+
+The primary duties of the A Wi Fue attached to the Western armies were
+the tasks of economic evacuation and immobilization and only at the
+end of 1939 did the preparations for the entry into Holland, Belgium
+and France come to the foreground. The process of economic evacuation
+in the homeland rested mainly with the competent Rue commandos of
+the homeland, who had arranged the necessary preparations by way
+of mobilization, in accordance with the clearance measures already
+prepared during peacetime.
+
+Especially in the Saar territory the VO had a complicated task to
+perform, and was able to demonstrate the value of its existence for
+defense also.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+[Pages 313-315]
+
+
+ _Negotiations with friendly and neutral states on war economy and also
+                       delivery of war material._
+
+The year 1940 brought special problems for the office of Wi Rue as far
+as trade in war material was concerned as a result of the deliveries,
+necessitated by the military political situation, to Russia, Finland,
+Roumania and Italy.
+
+As previously reported in 1939, according to the German-Russo treaty
+of August 19, 1939, the German deliveries on credit were to attain
+in the next two years the sum of 200 millions RM, 120 millions RM,
+thereof during the first year. It was indicated that German deliveries
+of material to the value of 500 millions RM were desired during the
+first year alone. As such quantities of machines, vehicles, apparatus,
+etc., could not be obtained from the production point of view in such a
+short time, and as the Russians had also included war material in their
+request, the preponderant desire, from the beginning, at the Foreign
+office and the Reichministry of economy was, to put at the disposal of
+the Russians as much finished war material as possible.
+
+As reported previously, the Russians had made ready for their first
+reciprocal delivery valuable foods and raw material (1 million tons
+cereals, 500,000 tons wheat, 900,000 tons of oil by-products, 100,000
+tons of cotton, 500,000 tons phosphates, 80 millions RM of timber,
+10,000 tons of flax, manganese, platinum, and the transit for 1 million
+tons of Soybeans), and in consideration of the importance of these
+quantities to the German war economy and the importance which the
+Supreme Command attached to the maintaining of pleasant relations with
+Soviet Russia, the question of immediate reciprocal deliveries became
+steadily more pressing.
+
+The desire to produce war material became stronger from week to week,
+so strong that OKW created a special Referat at Wi Rue charged with
+working on the Russian demands and arranging them in accordance with
+the German production program. Appendix XX, 21 and XX, 22 gives an idea
+of the progress of the arrangements.
+
+As the Russians delivered quickly and well, it was imperative to
+accelerate German deliveries. Consequently the German High Command
+decided to offer the Russians even more war material, that was already
+manufactured or under construction, and whose monetary value was
+great. The great cruiser Luetzow especially came into this category,
+other ordnance installations for ships, patterns for heavy artillery
+and tanks and important patents [lizenzen] for war material. As these
+contracts for this material did not satisfy the Russian requests, the
+Fuehrer ordered, on March 30, that--as far as necessary--the delivery
+of war material to the Russians should have priority over the delivery
+to the German Armed Forces.
+
+This order put some of the Army departments in a difficult position,
+as the High command also wanted production for the German requirements
+stepped up and demanded punctual delivery.
+
+On August 14, the Chief of Wi Rue, during a conference with
+Reichmarshal Goering, was informed, that the Fuehrer desired punctual
+delivery to the Russians only till spring 1941. Later on we would have
+no further interest in completely satisfying the Russian demands.
+This allusion moved the Chief of Wi Rue to give priority to matters
+concerning Russian War Economy.
+
+By the end of October 1940, Reichmarshal Goering insisted once more,
+on pressure being exerted for accelerated deliveries to the Russians
+according to plan, (file notice from Oct. 5, see Appendix XX, 23).
+
+Later on the urgency of the Russian deliveries diminished, as
+preparations for the campaign in the East were already under way.
+
+The Russians carried out their deliveries as planned, right up to the
+start of the attack; even during the last few days, transports of
+India-rubber from the Far East were completed by Express transit trains.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+[Pages 323-324]
+
+The production program ordered by decree of the Fuehrer on Aug. 20,
+and instituted by reason of urgency, on Sept. 20, was stepped up again
+on Sept. 27, and amended insofar as the equipment under the code word
+“Achse” (African campaign) was to be given priority over all other
+equipment, including the ones in the special category.
+
+As both the Army and Minister Todt were urging the high priority of the
+Panzer-and Achse-program, the Navy demanded its “Seeloewe”-measures
+accelerated and aerial armaments were being even more intensified,
+the Chief of Wi Rue office, at a conference of Chiefs of departments,
+presided over by Fieldmarshal Keitel, pointed to the difficulties
+of accelerating everything at the same time, with the bad situation
+as regards manpower. He demanded once more a clarification of the
+organization, which was really the most important thing. Resulting from
+this the following decision was made by the WFSt on Dec. 3.40, enclosed
+as Appendix XX, 35.
+
+This decision affected future measures as follows:
+
+1. there is no longer any mention of an Invasion of England but only of
+a siege of England.
+
+2. aerial defence of the homeland was placed at the top of the list for
+the first time.
+
+3. the prospective big action (Russia) mentioned for the first time,
+and its postponement to some later date admitted as possible.
+
+Shortly before--on Nov. 6, 1940--Reichmarshal Goering, for the first
+time made a statement to the effect, that we should prepare ourselves
+for a long war, and therefore planning of raw material should be
+considered in this perspective, (see file on Report at Beauvais on Nov.
+6.40, Appendix XX, 36).
+
+At the beginning of December, instructions were received, that for the
+time being there was no question of an Invasion of England, and that
+the “Seeloewe”-preparations should merely be concluded.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+[Pages 368-373]
+
+
+                             _War Economy_
+
+The year 1941 was, as far as war economy was concerned, mostly
+dominated by the preparations, respectively the execution of the action
+in the Balkans, the war in the East and the war in Africa.
+
+The respective preparations go back to the year 1940. The development
+of the Italo-Albanian-Greco war, the establishing of a German military
+mission in Roumania and the possibility of German participation in the
+Italian war in Africa had led as early as August 1940 to a War Economy
+Staff Roumania and in October a War Economy Staff Africa being created
+by the office of Wi Rue to deal with the problems connected with
+these theatres of war and charged with working out all the questions
+appertaining thereto. By the middle of November 1940 Colonel Gen. staff
+Spalcke was delegated to Roumania as member of the German military
+mission, and charged with the representation for war economy in the
+Balkan countries and in Africa and the completion of the necessary
+basis as regards war economy for an operation were intensively
+processed in the office of the Wi. Rue.
+
+In November 1940, the Chief of Wi Rue together with Secretaries of
+state Koerner, Neumann, Backe and General von Hanneken were informed by
+the Reichmarshal of the action planned in the East.
+
+By reason of these directives the preliminary preparations for the
+action in the East were commenced by the office of Wi Rue at the end of
+1940.
+
+The preliminary preparations for the action in the East included first
+of all the following tasks:
+
+1. Obtaining of a detailed survey of the Russian Armament industry, its
+location, its capacity and its associate industries.
+
+2. Investigation of the capacity of the different big armament centers
+and their dependency one on the other.
+
+3. Determine the power and transport system for the industry of the
+Soviet Union.
+
+4. Investigation of sources of raw materials and Petroleum (crude oil).
+
+5. Preparation of a survey of industries other than armament industries
+in the Soviet Union.
+
+These points were concentrated in one big compilation, “War Economy of
+the Soviet Union” and illustrated with detailed maps, etc.
+
+Furthermore a card index was made, containing all the important
+factories in Soviet-Russia, and a lexicon of economy in the
+German-Russian language for the use of the German War Economy
+Organization.
+
+For the processing of these problems a task staff, Russia, was created,
+first in charge of Lieutenant Colonel Luther and later on in charge of
+Brigadier General Schuberth. The work was carried out according to the
+directives from the Chief of the Office resp. the group of depts. for
+foreign territories with the cooperation of all departments, economy
+offices and any other persons, possessing information on Russia.
+Through these intensive preparative activities an excellent collection
+of material was made, which proved of the utmost value later on for
+carrying out the operations and for administering the territory.
+
+Simultaneously detailed investigations were made of the situation as
+regards fuel and rubber in the case of a major action in the East, on
+the basis of the demands made by the Chief of General Staff of the
+Armed Forces and the Gen. Qu. of the Airforce, which will be discussed
+later on.
+
+Included in the processing of the Russian problem were matters of war
+economic nature connected with the Balkans and Africa.
+
+
+                               _Balkans_
+
+While the preparations for the Russian Campaign could be completed
+as planned, the measures for the action in the Balkans had to be
+improvised on account of the unsuccessful revolutionary outbreak in
+Yugoslavia. Only Colonel Wendt, as VO was sent to AOK--12 in Roumania
+at the beginning of January as planned, and given charge of T. B. 13.
+The preparations were arranged for an entry into Greece only. When
+the revolt in Yugoslavia started, the preparations had to be altered.
+Department IV of VO AOK--12 was divided, the one half under Colonel
+Wendt to follow the assault of AOK--12, direction Belgrade, the other
+half under Captain v. Illberg to accompany the forces attacking towards
+Greece. Half a battalion each of T.B. 13 was put at the disposal of
+Colonel Wendt and Capt. v. Illberg, respectively.
+
+With the arrival of the second army Col. Fach was installed VO in
+charge of T. B. 6 and 8. Furthermore he had specialists at his
+disposal, familiar with the economy of Yugoslavia and Greece. Dr. Pook
+of the Wi Rue Office was dispatched to manage copper mines at Bor.
+
+Details of operations and results of the war economy units during the
+action in the Balkans; (see report of OKW (Wi Rue Bureau) No. 27438/41
+secret, of June 4, 1941, Appendix XXI, 10).
+
+Even during the operations, organization of a War Economy Staff Serbia
+with a Wi. Commando at Belgrade was ordered, the staff was closely
+connected with Consul General Neuhausen charged with the Economic
+Administration of Serbia, by the Reichmarshal.
+
+Also
+
+a. a war economy officer Agram for the territory of Croatia and
+
+b. a Rue-commando Klagerfurt for the Yugoslavian territories turned
+over to the Reich, were appointed (see Appendix XXI, 11).
+
+The war economy staff Serbia quickly became of great importance for
+supplying the troops operating in the Balkans, and later on deserved
+much credit for the utilization and securing of the Yugoslavian raw
+materials, important for German armaments and by organizing the
+transport of these raw materials. The seizing of the still usable
+factories in Serbia and Croatia for assimilation into the German
+Armament Industry had already been started in April (s. Wi Rue Bureau
+No. 22-261/62 of April 29, 41. Appendix XXI, 12 and XXI, 13) and
+represented useful support for the W. T. especially for repair work
+but also for the manufacture of material of all kinds. The concerns
+processing raw material could be built up in the course of time to
+form a valuable support for the German war economy, the deliveries of
+copper, bauxite, tin, chromium, asbestos and mica were of considerable
+importance.
+
+As the territory of Greece, by order of the Fuehrer (see appendix, Wi
+Rue Bureau No. 22-263/41 2 of May 29, Appendix XXI, 14) was ceded to
+the Italians for economic exploitation, war economy offices were only
+installed in Greece where needed by the Army or for the security of
+transportation.
+
+There was one Wi Kdo each established in Salonica and Athens. At
+the same time the confiscation and utilization was ordered of the
+factories, in the areas of Salonica and Athens occupied by German
+troops, necessary for war economy and armament (see Wi Rue Bureau, No.
+22-263/41 s. file XXI, 15). The factories in Athens were especially
+important as repair plants for the airforce. But also by the delivery
+of oil and tobacco to the army and to the homeland the war economy
+offices rendered considerable service.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+[Pages 380-381]
+
+The compilation was the result of the deliberations concerning
+the planned operation in the East, ordered by the Reich Marshall
+in November 1940. The Office of Economy and Armament [Wi Rue
+Amt] had taken pains to give a completely objective picture of
+the situation regarding Defense and armament economy [wehr--und
+Ruestungswirtschaftliche Lage] of the USSR and had held it necessary,
+to refer to the points which might cause difficulties for a military
+operation.
+
+The result of this work compiled carefully on the basis of safely
+proved facts is summed up at the end as follows:
+
+“Any operation leading to the occupation of the European part of USSR
+(without the Ural territory), will bring the following results:
+
+I. During the first months Germany will be relieved in the field of
+nutrition and raw materials, if a quick seizure should succeed in
+
+  a. _preventing the destruction of stocks_
+
+  b. _capturing the mineral oilfields of the Caucasus undestroyed and_
+
+  c. _solving the problem of transportation._
+
+II. _For longer duration_ of the war an _effective relief_ is dependent
+on the following prerequisites:
+
+a. _in all fields_:
+
+  1. _on the solution of the transportation problem,_
+
+  2. _On the staying_ [_verblieb; translator’s note: may also mean:
+  “whereabouts”_] _of the people (population) and winning them over to
+  collaborate._
+
+b. _in the field of agriculture_:
+
+  1. _on preventing destruction of the “M.T.S.” and the possibility of
+  replacing their pool of tractors and machines by taking up production
+  again in the USSR._
+
+  2. _on the possibility of fuel supply._
+
+c. _in the industrial field_:
+
+  1. _on the capture of powerworks undestroyed or on their fast
+  restoration._
+
+  2. _on securing the delivery of raw materials not existing in the
+  European part of the USSR to the industry._
+
+III. _The supplying of Germany with India-rubber, tungsten, copper,
+platinum, tin, asbestos and manila hemp remains unsolved_ until
+communication with the Far East will be established.
+
+IV. The territory south of the mouth of Volga and Don inclusive of the
+Caucasus must be included in the operation. _The Caucasian fuel supply
+is indispensable for the exploitation of the occupied territories._
+
+V. _In the field of just the armament-industry_ it will lead to taking
+possession of about 75% of the total _Russian armament industry and
+almost 100% of the precision tool-manufacturing and optical industry_.
+
+_The USSR will keep about 25% of the mere armament and scarcely 1% of
+the precision tool-manufacturing and optical industry._”
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+[Pages 404-406]
+
+In addition to the Italian negotiations, until June 1941 the
+negotiations with Russia were accorded a great deal of attention. The
+Fuehrer issued the directive that, in order to camouflage German troop
+movements, the orders Russia has placed in Germany must be filled as
+promptly as possible. Since the Russians only made grain deliveries,
+when the Germans delivered orders placed by the Russians, and since
+in the case of individual firms these deliveries to Russia made it
+impossible for them to fill orders for the German armed forces, it
+was necessary for the Wi Rue office to enter into numerous individual
+negotiations with German firms in order to coordinate Russian orders
+with those of the German from the standpoint of priority. In accordance
+with the wishes of the Foreign Office, German industry was instructed
+to accept all Russian orders, even if it were impossible to fill them
+within the limits of the time set for manufacture and delivery. Since,
+in May especially, large deliveries had to be made to the Navy, the
+firms were instructed to allow the equipment to go through the Russian
+Acceptance Commission, then, however, to make such a detour during its
+transportation as to make it impossible for it to be delivered over the
+frontier prior to the beginning of the German attack.
+
+As a result of the visit of the Hungarian Minister, Excellence Bartha,
+the trade in war material with Hungary came once more into the
+foreground. Above all, the Hungarians demanded German help in equipping
+their air force, as well as anti-aircraft guns, searchlights, and
+listening devices, tanks, artillery and communications equipment, and
+heavy guns. For this they offered free facilities for the manufacture
+of gauges and fuses, artillery equipment, trucks and tank trucks.
+The Hungarians were promised help in almost all fields, however, not
+until the summer of 1942, because it was thought that by this time the
+campaign in the East would have come to an end. Technical help for the
+saving of raw material with the issuing of licenses was offered them
+immediately. The shifting of German orders to Hungary was put into
+effect.
+
+The negotiations with Roumania and Finland covered more ground, because
+both states made considerable demands for the improvement of the
+equipment of their units designed to fight against Russia. First of
+all, the Roumanians asked for anti-aircraft equipment, prime movers,
+and trucks for the motorization and artillery equipment of all kind;
+moreover, they asked that the artillery and munition orders placed
+in France and with the Boehler works be executed. The Finns demanded
+long-range guns, anti-aircraft guns, fuses, airplanes and help in
+carrying out motorization. In accordance with the directive from the
+Fuehrer, the Roumanians were promised help as much as possible, while
+the Finns were to be put off until later.
+
+When the operations opened in the East, the demands became greater and
+more urgent; the Finns, especially, called for raw materials and fuel.
+These demands were met in the case of both these countries as much as
+possible.
+
+Bulgarian wishes lay, particularly, in the field of motorization and
+communications and in the delivery of armoured reconnaissance cars and
+tanks. Only small deliveries could be made; in general the Bulgarians
+were instructed that these states, which were actually in the battle,
+must receive first delivery.
+
+Moreover, the negotiations with Turkey were of special importance.
+The office of Wi Rue was instructed to specially cultivate these
+negotiations, and to offer as much war material to the Turks as
+possible, on the one hand for military-political reasons, on the other
+hand, in order to force the Turks to make deliveries of chromium. Since
+the Foreign Office wanted in full to assure the treaty for deliveries
+of Turkish chromium for the year 1942/43, more deliveries of war
+material, which partly constituted former Turkish orders, were promised
+for 1942.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+[Page 479] History will know only a few examples of cases where a
+country has directed even in peacetime all its economic forces so
+deliberately and systematically towards the requirements of war as
+Germany was compelled to do in the period between the two world wars.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+[Page 38] In the (Reich Defense) Law the appointment of a General
+Plenipotentiary for the Economy was provided for, a post for which
+Reichsbank President Dr. Schacht was contemplated. He was to have
+the right to give directions on economic questions to all ministries
+concerned with economic problems. He was charged with the preparation
+of all economic war measures with the exception of the armament
+industry which was to be handled by the Army High Command.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+[Page 59] If it is said for example, that “not the economy, but
+politics represents fate”, this principle should be recognized only
+with the reservation that politics may receive its decisive impulse
+from the economic necessities of a nation. The fundamental urge to
+expand a nation which does not find the basis for its food production
+in its own soil, is an imperative for the shaping of policy.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+[Page 84] If it was possible in a few years to develop the thirty-two
+monopoly factories of the Treaty of Versailles into an armament
+industry sufficient for our large army, this is due very largely to the
+work of the offices of the Military Economy Organization.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+[Page 127] In spite of the limitations in rearmament ordered by the
+Minister of War in 1937, the demands of the Army for steel remained so
+high that the Minister of Economics announced his misgivings regarding
+the economy as a whole. The War Minister stated that, in view of
+the existing foreign exchange situation, the condition of the whole
+economy, and thereby of rearmament, was jeopardized by a continuous
+fall of exports, and consequently he requested the introduction of raw
+material quotas, by means of which the management of rearmament and of
+other important programs was to be accomplished.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+[Page 145] Complaints about excessive loads of work at factories and
+about continuous modifications of order schedules were received all
+the time from industry. By means of the spreading of orders and the
+admission of new firms, the Military Economy Organization and the
+armament offices succeeded in carrying out the armament programs more
+or less according to plan and to fulfill the demands of the leaders.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+[Pages 173-174] The enlargement of gunpowder and explosives production
+was started as a large scale action. At the suggestion of the Economy
+Staff, Field Marshal Goering ordered the drafting of a plan for
+the manufacture of gunpowder and explosives in 1938 and charged
+General-Director Krauch of I. G. Farben with the execution of this
+plan. The plan was set up on July 12th, 1938, as the so-called
+“Karinhall” plan and scheduled the creation of a capacity of 12,000
+tons of gunpowder per month, 19,000 tons of explosives, and 4,000 tons
+of poison gas until October 1st, 1940. By October 1st the capacity was
+to be
+
+  Gunpowder  18,000 tons,
+  Explosives 24,000 tons,
+  Poison gas  8,000 tons, per month.
+
+In view of numerous difficulties, particularly due to the lack of
+foreign exchange for the purchase of machines, due further to a
+smaller allocation of raw materials and shortage of workers, the speed
+of production contemplated by Dr. Krauch could not be maintained;
+consequently the scheduled figures could not be reached by the time of
+the outbreak of war.
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+[Pages 181-182] The course of German mobilization in 1939 was greatly
+influenced by the development of the military-political situation and
+was guided by the idea of a surprise of the enemy. The experiences made
+during the operations against Austria, Sudetenland, and Czechoslovakia,
+which led to a partial and camouflaged mobilization, formed the basis
+of the measures to be taken. The tension existing between Germany and
+Poland since July was used in order to prepare all measures necessary
+for a surprise attack against Poland.
+
+
+                                 PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2354-PS
+
+                     ORGANIZATION BOOK OF THE NSDAP
+
+ [Organisationsbuch der NSDAP] 5th, 6th and 7th Edition, Central NSDAP
+                          Press, 1938, Munich
+
+[Fifth Edition, Pages 367-371a]
+
+
+                          Training of the S.A.
+
+In order to obtain uniform training, a systematical arrangement of
+three major groups is provided:
+
+_a_ ideological education and training
+
+_b_ general training
+
+_c_ active service
+
+These groups comprise essentially the following individual fields:
+
+_Group a_:
+
+1. Education and training according to the doctrines and aims of the
+Fuehrer as they are set forth in the “Kampf” and in the party program
+for all phases of our lives and our National Socialist ideology.
+
+2. The teachings of the history of the German people for the tasks of
+our time.
+
+3. Exercise of the National Socialist doctrine of duty.
+
+_Group b_:
+
+1. Security police service,
+
+2. Physical exercises,
+
+3. Marching exercises,
+
+4. Terrain service,
+
+5. Small-caliber shooting practice,
+
+6. Gas and air-raid protection,
+
+7. Service of special units, (Maritime, Communications, Engineers, and
+Cavalry units).
+
+_Group c_:
+
+1. Assemblies and demonstrations
+
+2. Contests and performance examinations for S.A. sport insignia
+
+3. Security service
+
+4. Home service (catastrophe service, etc.)
+
+The training of leaders is the prerequisite for the total training. The
+suitability of the SA leaders for their positions was first established
+through examinations.
+
+Leaders designated as suitable will be educated and trained step by
+step according to the previously mentioned points of view and according
+to the special educational guidance of the Office of the Chief of Storm
+Troops [Oberste SA-Fuehrung].
+
+
+                    The SA Sport Insignia [Page 369]
+
+The new state demands a resistant, hardened generation. In addition to
+the ideological education of the mind, a fighting training of the body
+must be required by means of simple, useful, and natural body exercises.
+
+In order to create increased incentive and aims for the endeavors of
+youth, I reestablish the
+
+
+                           SA Sport Insignia
+
+for the entire SA and for all its former branches, which is earned by
+means of a performance test after a conscientiously executed period of
+training.
+
+In order to give conscious expression to the fostering of a valiant
+spirit in all parts of the German people, I further decide that this
+SA Sport Insignia can also be earned and worn by persons who are
+not members of the movement, inasfar as they comply racially and
+ideologically with the National Socialist requirements.
+
+Enforcement regulations are decreed by the Chief of Staff.
+
+Berlin, 15 February 1935.
+
+                          Chief of Storm Troops [Der Oberste SA-Fuehrer]
+                                                    Signed: Adolf Hitler
+
+* * * * * * *
+
+The performance test includes three groups of exercises:
+
+  Body exercises,
+  Military sports,
+  Topographical (naval) services.
+
+  Group I   Body exercises:
+            100-meter race,
+            Broad jump,
+            Shot-put,
+            Throwing of hand grenades,
+            3000-meter race.
+
+  Group II  Military sports:
+            25-Kilometer march with pack,
+            Firing of small-caliber arms,
+            Aimed throwing of hand grenades,
+            200-meter cross-country race with gas masks over 4 obstacles,
+            Swimming or bicycle riding,
+            Basic knowledge of first aid in case of accidents.
+
+  Group III Terrain service:
+            Orientation,
+            Terrain observation,
+            Estimate of terrain,
+            Estimate of distance,
+            Camouflage,
+            Observing and reporting,
+            Utilization of terrain and general behavior in terrain service.
+
+Special regulations for SA naval units:
+
+  Group I   Body exercises:
+            unchanged
+
+  Group II  Military sports:
+            15-kilometer march with pack instead of 25-kilometer.
+
+  Group III Naval service:
+            25 minutes of long-distance rowing in cutter seamanship
+            in and on the boat, throwing of lines,
+            knotting and splicing,
+            signaling and transmitting of Morse code messages,
+            compass, designation of navigable water,
+            navigation lights, rules on turning aside,
+            general seamanlike behavior while in naval service.
+
+***
+
+[Sixth Edition, Pages 359, 364a, 364b, 365]
+
+
+Structure of the S. A.
+
+1. S.A. Units
+
+The S.A. extends over the whole Reich territory.
+
+It is organized according to political and local [Landsmannschaftlich]
+viewpoints into S.A. groups as follows:
+
+  S.A. Group--Alpenland
+
+  S.A. Group--Bavarian Ostmark (Govt. Dist. lower Bavaria, upper
+              Palatinate and upper Franconia)
+
+  S.A. Group--Berlin-Brandenburg (Province Mark Brandenburg and Greater
+              Berlin)
+
+  S.A. Group--Danube
+
+  S.A. Group--Franconia (Govt. Dist. central and lower Franconia)
+
+  S.A. Group--Hansa (Free City of Hamburg and Mecklenburg)
+
+  S.A. Group--Hesse (Parts of the Free State of Hesse, upper Hesse, the
+              Province of Hesse, and Hesse-Nassau)
+
+  S.A. Group--Highland (Hochland) (Govt. Dist. upper Bavaria and Swabia)
+
+  S.A. Group--Palatinate (Govt. Dist. Rhenish Palatinate, Saar, and
+              Rhenish Hesse)
+
+  S.A. Group--Middle (Province of Saxony and Free State of Anhalt)
+
+  S.A. Group--Lower Rhine (Parts of Rhine Province and the Ruhr
+              District)
+
+  S.A. Group--Lower Saxony (Parts of Province of Hannover and Free
+              State of Brunswick)
+
+  S.A. Group--Nordmark (Province of Schleswig-Holstein, Free City of
+              Luebeck)
+
+  S.A. Group--North Sea (parts of Province of Hannover and Westphalia,
+              Free State of Oldenburg, Free City of Bremen)
+
+  S.A. Group--Ostland (Province of East Prussia and Free State of
+              Danzig)
+
+  S.A. Group--Ostmark (Province of Grenzmark)
+
+  S.A. Group--Pomerania (Province of Pomerania and parts of Grenzmark)
+
+  S.A. Group--Saxony (Free State of Saxony)
+
+  S.A. Group--Silesia (Province of upper and lower Silesia)
+
+  S.A. Group--Sudeten
+
+  S.A. Group--Suedmark
+
+  S.A. Group--Southwest (Free State of Baden and Wurttemberg)
+
+  S.A. Group--Thuringia (Free State of Thuringia)
+
+  S.A. Group--Warthe
+
+  S.A. Group--Vistula
+
+  S.A. Group--Westphalia (Province of Westphalia)
+
+  S.A. Group--Westmark (Rhine Province and part of the Province of
+              Hesse-Nassau)
+
+2. Special Units [Identical with corresponding passage in 5th and 7th
+editions]
+
+In order to comply with the manifold demands on the services of the
+S.A. during demonstrations, assemblies, catastrophes, and accidents, as
+well as to preserve the efficiency of S.A. men, S.A. members have been
+organized into special and technical units. There are: Marine, Mounted,
+Communications, Engineer and Medical units.
+
+Their organization into companies, battalions, and so forth, and their
+subordination are variously regulated according to location and the
+given circumstances.
+
+_a._ Marine S.A.: The Marine S.A. includes all S.A. men who by
+occupation are or have been sailors of the merchant marine, the navy,
+or interior shipping, as well as men who are connected with shipping in
+any way or particularly interested in it.
+
+The seagoing S.A. men, who come into contact with the population of
+other countries, should represent National Socialist will and thought
+[Wollen and Denken].
+
+For this reason their ideological education and professional training
+is a main mission of the marine S.A.
+
+This schooling and training is given aboard ship in the board troops
+[Bordtrupps] and on land in the marine S.A. units.
+
+Further tasks are service in catastrophes and accidents, especially
+those caused by water. For this purpose thorough training in seamanship
+is given each marine S.A. man.
+
+_b._ Mounted S.A.: As the mainstay of the national socialist riding
+corps [NSRK], the S.A. cavalry is responsible for the training of
+German youth in riding and driving, before military service, as well as
+additional training in riding for men already in the service (compare
+discussion on Page 373 “National Socialist Riding Corps”). The S.A.
+cavalry further cultivates riding and driving activities within the S.A.
+
+_c._ Communications S.A.: The task of the Communications S.A.
+is to enable the responsible leader during assemblies and other
+demonstrations and in the catastrophe service to exercise control
+over subordinated or employed units. The training therefore
+extends primarily to telephone service. Beyond that, however, the
+communications S.A. men are also trained in sending and receiving
+Morse Code signals. The “Communications Certificate of the S.A.” is
+a certificate of merit for those S.A. men who wish to enlist in the
+signal corps of the armed forces.
+
+_d._ Engineers S.A.: The tasks of the S.A. engineers include
+catastrophe protective service during incidents capable of damaging the
+German national property.
+
+Every S.A. engineer has to prove in thorough technical examinations his
+degree of training and his initiative [Einsatzbereitschaft].
+
+The examinations are entered in a performance book, which also contains
+the “S.A. Engineers Certificate” as certificate of merit.
+
+_e._ Medical S.A.: The S.A. doctors and S.A. medical personnel
+organized into medical units will supervise and care for the bodily
+health and efficiency of the individual S.A. man as well as units under
+their jurisdiction.
+
+Schools of the S.A. for special units
+
+_a._ Marine S.A. Schools: The following schools are available for
+training the marine S.A.: Marine S.A. school “DUSTERNBROCK” and
+the training sailing ship “DUHNEN.” The school “DUSTERNBROCK” has
+to accomplish above all practical and theoretical training in boat
+service, in row, sail and power boat, according to the regulations of
+the navy.
+
+The continuation of seamanship training takes place on the seagoing
+training ship “DUHNEN.” Here one gets used to the ship and learns
+to know and serve it in all its parts and equipment, and here also
+knowledge of weather and steering is taught and applied.
+
+_b._ Reich Riding Leadership School. (See under
+REICHSREITERFUEHRERSCHULE on page 373).
+
+_c._ Reich Communications School of the S.A.: Here the S.A. leaders of
+communications units are trained in all particulars of communications.
+Here they also become eligible through examinations for the “S.A.
+Communications Certificate.”
+
+
+                   THE S.A. REGIMENT “FELDHERRNHALLE”
+
+The S.A. Regiment “Feldherrnhalle” has its seat in Berlin, Voss-Strasse
+1. It consists of six garrisoned battalions stationed in: Berlin,
+Munich, Hattingen, Krefeld, Stettin, and Stuttgart.
+
+S.A. General [Obergruppenfuehrer] Hermann Goering was appointed by
+the Fuehrer on 12 January, 1937, as Chief of the S.A. Regiment
+“Feldherrnhalle”. The S. A. regiment is directly subordinated to
+the chief of staff. Its mission, beyond regular S.A. service, is to
+supervise bureaus of the S.A., the party, and the state. It is to be
+ready at all times for any and all purposes.
+
+[Seventh Edition, page 359, 367]
+
+
+                          BRANCHES OF THE S.A.
+
+1. S.A. Units
+
+The S.A. embraces the entire territory of the Reich. It is divided
+according to political and local (LANDSMANNSCHAFTLICH) points of view
+into the following groups:
+
+  S.A. Group--Alpenland (District /Gau/ Upper Danube, Salzburg,
+              Tyrol-Vorarlberg)
+
+  S.A. Group--Bayernwald (Govt. Dist. Lower Bavaria, Upper Palatinate
+              and Upper Franconia)
+
+  S.A. Group--Berlin-Brandenburg (Province Mark Brandenburg and Greater
+              Berlin)
+
+  S.A. Group--Danube (Gau Lower Danube, Vienna)
+
+  S.A. Group--Elbe (Province of Saxony and Free State of Anhalt)
+
+  S.A. Group--Franconia (Govt. Dist. Central and Lower Franconia)
+
+  S.A. Group--Hansa (Free City of Hamburg and Mecklenburg)
+
+  S.A. Group--Hesse (Parts of the Free State of Hesse /Upper Hesse/,
+              the Province of Hesse, and Hesse-Nassau)
+
+  S.A. Group--Highland (Hochland) (Govt. Dist. Upper Bavaria and Swabia)
+
+  S.A. Group--Palatinate (Govt. Dist. Rhenish Palatinate, Saar
+              District, Rhenish Hesse, Lorraine)
+
+  S.A. Group--Central Rhine (Rhine Province, Part of the Province of
+              Hesse-Nassau, Luxemburg)
+
+  S.A. Group--Neckar (Part of the Free State of Baden and Wuerttenberg)
+
+  S.A. Group--Lower Rhine (Parts of the Rhine Province and of the Ruhr
+              District)
+
+  S.A. Group--Lower Saxony (Part of the Province of Hannover and Free
+              State of Brunswick)
+
+  S.A. Group--Nordmark (Province of Schleswig-Holstein, Free City of
+              Luebeck)
+
+  S.A. Group--North Sea (Parts of the Province of Hannover and
+              Westphalia, Free State of Oldenburg, Free City of Bremen)
+
+  S.A. Group--Upper Rhine (Parts of the Free State of Baden and Alsace)
+
+  S.A. Group--Oder (Province of Grenzmark)
+
+  S.A. Group--Pomerania (Province of Pomerania and parts of Granzmark)
+
+  S.A. Group--Saxony (Free State of Saxony)
+
+  S.A. Group--Silesia (Province of Upper and Lower Silesia)
+
+  S.A. Group--Sudeten (Reich Gau Sudetenland)
+
+  S.A. Group--Suedmark (Gau Styria and Carinthia)
+
+  S.A. Group--Tannenberg--(Province of East Prussia)
+
+  S.A. Group--Thuringia (Free State of Thuringia)
+
+  S.A. Group--Warthe (Reich Gau Wartheland)
+
+  S.A. Group--Vistula (Reich Gau Danzig--West Prussia)
+
+  S.A. Group--Westphalia (Province of Westphalia) * * *
+
+
+                        WITHDRAWAL FROM THE S.A.
+
+Service with the S.A. is and remains voluntary. As in recruitment for
+the S.A. no advantages may be promised and no pressure whatsoever may
+be exerted, the S.A. man should have the possibility to withdraw from
+the S.A. if he believes that he can no longer agree with S.A. views or
+if he is not in a position to fulfill completely the duties imposed
+on him as a member of the S.A. On presentation of honorable reasons
+in a corresponding written petition, the S.A. member can be “released
+from the S.A. by own request.” However, if he shows no interest or
+if he has joined the ranks of the S.A. merely because of a whim or
+for the sake of a good opportunity, there ensues a “discharge from
+the S.A. according to number 127_b_ of the SADV/1” (official measures
+for insuitability for service in the S.A.). If he is guilty of any
+disciplinary or political or possibly criminal offenses, the competent
+disciplinary officer can declare him as “punished with permanent
+discharge from the S.A.” In serious cases “exclusion from the S.A.” can
+be declared.
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2355-PS
+
+                1938 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 258
+
+   Second Law on the Right to Vote for the Reichstag, 18 March 1938.
+
+The government of the Reich has decided to pass the following law which
+is proclaimed herewith:
+
+
+                               Article 1
+
+The electoral list for the Reich shall replace the electoral list for
+the Kreise.
+
+
+                               Article 2
+
+One or more candidates may be nominated on the electoral list for the
+Reich.
+
+
+                               Article 3
+
+For the elections to the Reichstag in Austria, the same general rules
+which are valid for the elections to the Reichstag apply, inasmuch as
+the requirements of the plebiscite in Austria of 10 April 1938 do not
+necessitate different regulations.
+
+
+                               Article 4
+
+The Reich Minister of the Interior is authorized to change the orders
+on the procedure of the elections as much as may be necessary, in order
+to simplify this procedure.
+
+Berlin, 18 March 1938.
+
+                                        The Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor
+                                                            ADOLF HITLER
+
+                                      The Reich Minister of the Interior
+                                                                   FRICK
+
+
+                                 PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2357-PS
+
+          SPEECH BY HITLER BEFORE REICHSTAG, 20 February 1938
+
+  DOCUMENTS OF GERMAN POLITICS [Dokumente der deutschen Politik] Part
+    VI, 1, Pages 50-52.
+
+In the fifth year following the first great foreign political agreement
+of the Reich, it fills us with sincere gratification to be able to
+state that in our relations with the State with which we had had
+perhaps the greatest differences, not only has there been a detente,
+but in the course of these years there has been a constant improvement
+in relations, * * * This good work, which was regarded with suspicion
+by so many at the time, has stood the test, and I may say that, since
+the League of Nations finally gave up its continual attempts to
+unsettle Danzig and appointed a man of great personal attainments as
+the new commissioner, the most dangerous spot from the point of view
+of European peace has entirely lost its menacing character. The Polish
+State respects the national conditions by this State, and both the
+city of Danzig and Germany respect Polish rights. And so the way to a
+friendly understanding has been successfully paved, an understanding
+which, beginning with Danzig, has today, in spite of the attempts of
+certain mischief-makers, succeeded in finally taking the poison out of
+the relations between Germany and Poland and transforming them into a
+sincere, friendly cooperation.
+
+Relying on her friendships, Germany will not leave a stone unturned to
+save that ideal which provides the foundation for the task which is
+ahead of us--peace.
+
+
+                                 PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2358-PS
+
+     SPEECH DELIVERED BY HITLER IN THE SPORTSPALAST IN BERLIN ON 26
+                             SEPTEMBER 1938
+
+[Quoted from the Voelkischer Beobachter, Munich Edition, special
+edition for Tuesday, 27 September 1938.]
+
+“I have conducted really a practical peace-policy during these years.
+
+“I approached all apparently impossible problems with the firm
+determination to solve them in a peaceful manner even at the cost of
+more or less heavy German concessions. I am a front-line soldier myself
+and I know the hardships of a war. _I wanted to spare the German people
+from it._ I approached therefore problem after problem with the solid
+determination to try everything for a peaceful solution.
+
+“The most difficult problem with which I was confronted was that of our
+relations with Poland. There was a danger that Poles and Germans would
+regard each other as hereditary enemies. I wanted to prevent this. I
+know well enough that I would not have been successful if Poland had
+had a democratic Constitution. For these democracies which indulge
+in phrases about peace are the most blood-thirsty war agitators.
+In Poland there ruled not a democracy but _a man_; and with him I
+succeeded, in precisely one year, in coming to an agreement which, for
+10 years to begin with, entirely removed the danger of conflict. We
+are all convinced that this agreement will bring lasting pacification.
+We realize that there are two peoples which must live together, and
+neither of which can do away with the other. A people of 33 millions
+will always strive for an outlet to the sea. A way to understanding,
+then, had to be found. * * *”
+
+“And now we are confronted with the last problem which must be solved
+and which will be solved. It is the last territorial claim which I have
+to make in Europe, but it is a claim from which I will not swerve, and
+which I will satisfy, God willing.”
+
+* * *
+
+“I have little to explain. I am grateful to Mr. Chamberlain for all his
+efforts. I have assured him that the German people want nothing but
+peace; but I have also told him that I cannot go back beyond the limits
+of our patience.
+
+“I assured him, moreover, and I repeat it here, that when this
+problem is solved there will be no more territorial problems for
+Germany in Europe. And I further assured him that from the moment
+when Czechoslovakia solves its other problems, that is to say, when
+the Czechs have come to an arrangement with their other minorities,
+peacefully and without oppression, I will no longer be interested in
+the Czech State. And that, as far as I am concerned, I will guarantee.
+We don’t want any Czechs at all. But I must also declare before the
+German people that in the Sudeten German problem my patience is now
+at an end. I made an offer to Herr Benes which was no more than the
+realisation of what he had already promised. He now has peace or war
+in his hands. Either he will accept this offer and at length give the
+Germans their freedom, or we will get this freedom for ourselves.”
+
+
+                                 PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2360-PS
+
+         SPEECH BY HITLER BEFORE THE REICHSTAG, 30 January 1939
+
+[Quoted from the Voelkischer Beobachter, Munich Edition, Tuesday, 31
+Jan. 1939.]
+
+“On account of this intolerable provocation which had been aggravated
+by a truly infamous persecution and terrorization of our Germans there
+I had resolved to solve once and for all, and this time radically, the
+Sudetan German question. On May 28 I ordered (1) that preparations
+should be made for military action against this state by October 2.
+I ordered (2) the immense and accelerated expansion of our defensive
+front in the West.”
+
+
+                                 PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2367-PS
+
+              Voelkischer Beobachter, South German Edition
+
+            Nr. 123/124 Saturday and Sunday 2 and 3 May 1936
+
+The Fuehrer begins speaking now amid the cheers of the whole of Germany:
+
+“The lies that Germany will pounce upon Austria tomorrow or the day
+after are being spread again (jeers and laughter of the crowd). I
+ask myself: Who are these elements who do not want peace and mutual
+understanding, who must stir up and sow distrust continuously, who are
+they in reality?”
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2368-PS
+
+            EXTRACTS FROM SPEECH BY HITLER BEFORE REICHSTAG
+
+                            30 January 1937
+
+  DOCUMENTS OF GERMAN POLITICS [Dokumente der deutschen Politik] Part
+    VI, 2, Page 42.
+
+“By a series of agreements we have eliminated existing tensions and
+thereby contributed considerably to an improvement in the European
+atmosphere. I merely recall an agreement with Poland, which has worked
+out to the advantage of both sides. * * *
+
+“True statesmanship will not overlook realities, but consider them.
+The Italian nation and the new Italian State are realities. The German
+nation and the German Reich are equally realities. And to my own
+fellow-citizens, I would say that the Polish nation and the Polish
+State have also become a reality. * * *
+
+“The German Reich with its strong Army will protect her own security
+and her own honor. But, fully convinced that there is for Europe no
+greater good than peace, the German Reich will always be a responsible
+and conscious promoter of the European peace idea. * * *”
+
+
+                                 PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2371-PS
+
+   1933 MINISTERIAL GAZETTE FOR THE PRUSSIAN INTERNAL ADMINISTRATION
+
+   [Ministerialblatt fuer die Preussische Innere Verwaltung] Page 503
+
+   Execution of ordinance for security of people and state (national
+                               security)
+
+                 Dated: 28 Feb. 1933 (RGBl I, Page 83)
+
+        Rd. Erl. d. M.d. J. (KDR) 3.3.1933--II--1121 (Circular)
+
+As a defense against the criminal, communist activities and a means of
+ruthless suppression of this source of peril, whose extremely dangerous
+scope has been revealed at the last minute, the Reich president decided
+on 28 Feb. 1933 to proclaim the decree for the protection of the people
+and the state. Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, page 83.
+
+For the actual application of the measures authorized in this decree, I
+give the following directions:
+
+1. Sect. 1 of the decree not only suspends temporarily articles
+114, 115, 117, 118, 123, 124 and 153 of the constitution; it rather
+eliminates all other Reich and state limitations in this matter, as far
+as this is necessary or practical in order to reach the aims of this
+decree. Within this framework police officials thus may go beyond the
+restrictions laid down by the provisions of sections 14 and 41 of the
+Prussian police code, their orders still remain police ordinances of
+police warrants and thus as far as form is concerned remain subject to
+the applicable regulations. However, violations are punished according
+to sect. 4 of the decree which in this respect prevails, according
+to p. 4 of the preceding decree. Conforming to the aim and purpose
+of the decree, the additional permissible actions will be directed
+primarily against the communists, but also against all those working
+with the communists or even indirectly supporting or promoting their
+criminal aims. To avoid any blunder, I remind you that the decree for
+the protection of the people and state, dated 28 Feb. 1933, should be
+used against members or institutions other than communist, anarchist or
+social democratic parties or organizations, when such measures serve
+for the defense against such communist tendencies in their broadest
+meaning. In other cases the decree of 2 April 1933 shall be applied.
+Labor unions shall not be put on the same level with social-democratic
+organizations.
+
+2. The local police has principal jurisdiction for all those police
+measures, which are permissible after the legal limitations mentioned
+under 1. have been removed. The jurisdiction has been changed by my
+decree of 3 Feb. 1933, (G.S. page 33) based on section 3 par. 5 of
+the Prussian police Code. Consequently all regulations dealing with
+the suspension of a periodical or the restriction of property have
+to be issued from the state police offices. Regulations concerning
+personal liberty, the right to assemble and congregate, or restrictions
+concerning the secrecy of mails, communications, telegraph and cable
+may be ordered by the district police only, (Section 3, part 2, P.V.G.).
+
+3. All orders under Section 1 of the decree of 28 Feb. 1933 must be
+in writing and signed by the competent chief of police of his general
+appointed deputies or a deputy appointed for such a measure. In cases
+of restriction of personal liberty, freedom of speech including freedom
+of press and property rights the involved person is to be served at the
+latest at the beginning of the procedure with a certified copy of such
+an order statement. In cases of interferences with the secrecy of mail,
+postal service, telegraph and cable one certified copy of the order is
+to be sent immediately to the post office concerned, as well as to the
+regional postal office. This order does not affect the existing formal
+requirements and prerequisites under which restrictions of personal
+liberty, of free speech incl. free press, of the right to organize and
+assemble, interference in the secrecy of postal, telegraph, and cable
+services, orders of search and seizure, and limitations upon property
+rights, could be carried out in accordance with prevailing legal
+provisions.
+
+4. The state police departments have to keep themselves informed on all
+measures taken in their districts in accordance with sect. 1, of the
+decree of 28 Feb. 1933, and they have to report to me on the 5th and
+20th of each month on measures taken in the second, resp. first half
+of the preceding month. Unless specially ordered, individual measures,
+including the suspension of periodicals in accordance with section 1 of
+this decree need not be reported unless it concerns a very important
+case.
+
+5. If on principle (see figure 1, par. 2 of this circular) or for some
+special reason the application of the decree for the protection of
+the people and state (RGBl I, Page 83) dated 28 Feb., 1933, seems out
+of question or not advisable, the provisions of the decree for the
+protection of the German people (RGBl I, page 35) dated 4 February
+1933, and the applicable executive directions remain in effect
+unchanged.
+
+  To all police dept.                              M Bli v. 1, page 233.
+
+       #       #       #       #       #
+
+ Reorganization of the political police Circular decree of the Ministry
+             for the Interior of 26 April 1933--II 1000/53
+
+In order to guarantee effective counter-measures against all activities
+endangering the existence and security of the state, the state
+government has decided to reform the organization of the political
+police more severely than before and to create the necessary conditions
+for speedy and successful operations. For this purpose and for the
+benefit of a uniform supreme management of the political police the
+Office of Secret State Police (which is) directly subordinated to
+myself has been established in Berlin SW 11, Prinz Albrechtstrasse
+8 by the law of 26 April 1933 printed in annex 1 (Gesetz-Sammlung,
+Seite 122) (collection of laws, page 122). Its duty is to investigate
+all political activities endangering the state by special executors
+with the assistance of outside bureaus for the individual provincial
+police districts (State-Police-Bureaus) and with the support of the
+ordinary police authorities within the entire territory of the state,
+to collect and exploit the results of these investigations, to keep
+myself, the Minister for the Interior, permanently informed, to prepare
+and provide at all times the necessary proofs for my decisions, and
+finally to report all politically important observations and statements
+also to other police authorities and provide them with suggestions.
+Furthermore the Office of the Secret State Police is authorized within
+the sphere of its activity to request political measures from other
+police-authorities and to give them instructions.
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2372-PS
+
+      1936 REICH MINISTERIAL GAZETTE [RMBl]--Part V, Pages 1344-5
+
+  Unified designation of the Offices of the Secret State Police in the
+                                 Reich
+
+  (Decree of RF-SS and Chief of German Police in the Reich Ministry of
+                         Interior 28 August 36)
+
+After the Reichsfuehrer SS was installed as Chief of the German Police,
+the unified direction of all branches of the police and also the
+designation of the offices must become pronounced.
+
+The greatest differences existed previously among the individual states
+[Laender] in the field of the political police. At present there are
+17 different designations. The unified form of the credentials of the
+officials of the political police calls for a unified designation of
+their offices in order to eliminate confusion and misunderstanding
+among outsiders. Also the simplification of the business transactions
+calls for assimilation.
+
+1. Therefore the political police of the German states will carry the
+designation of Secret State Police [Geheime Staatspolizei] from 1
+October 1936 on.
+
+2. The state central authorities of the Secret State Police carry the
+designation
+
+_a._ in Prussia:
+
+  Secret State Police Bureau [Geheime Staatspolizeiamt]
+
+_b._ in the rest of the state:
+
+  State police main office [Staatspolizeileitstelle] or State police
+  office (Staatspolizeistelle)
+
+  and so
+
+  in Baden State police main office Karlsruhe
+
+  in Bayern State police main office Munich
+
+  in Wuerttenburg State police main office Stuttgart
+
+  in Sachsen State police main office Dresden
+
+  in Anhalt State police office Dessau
+
+  in Braunschweig State police office Braunschweig
+
+  in Bremen State police office Bremen
+
+  in Hamburg State police office, Hamburg
+
+  in Hessen State police office Darmstadt
+
+  in Luebeck State police office Luebeck
+
+  in Mecklenburg State police office Schwerin
+
+  in Oldenburg State police office Oldenburg
+
+  in Thueringen State police office Weimar
+
+The state police directive offices have the tasks of a state police
+office for the area of their jurisdiction, a final regulation hereon is
+withheld. * * *
+
+To the Prussian secret state police office in Berlin, the political
+police of the exterior Prussian states.--For information to the
+Prussian Ministry President as chief of the Prussian secret state
+police, the state cabinet of exterior Prussia, the main office
+Ordnungs-Police, the Prussian state criminal police office in Berlin,
+the Prussian Supreme and Government President.
+
+
+                                         TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2373-PS
+
+                   EXCERPTS FROM GERMAN PUBLICATIONS
+
+1. “The first chairman is responsible for the entire leadership of the
+movement. He divides the work among the committeemen, subordinated to
+him, as well as among the otherwise necessary collaborators. Each of
+these gentlemen is therefore fully responsible for the tasks that have
+been allotted to him. He is subordinate only to the first chairman, who
+has to concern himself with the cooperation of everyone responsible.
+Through selection of persons and issuance of general directives he must
+bring about this collaboration himself.
+
+“This law of essential responsibility has gradually become a matter of
+course within the movement, at least insofar as it concerned the party
+leadership.”
+
+           (MEIN KAMPF, Adolf Hitler, Munich, 1933, page 661)
+
+2. “How shall I give expression, my Fuehrer, to what is in our hearts?
+How shall I find words for your deeds? Has there ever been a mortal
+as beloved as you, my Fuehrer? Was there ever belief as strong as the
+belief in your mission? God sent you to us for Germany.”
+
+                   (Goering, Speeches and Writing, [Reden und Aufsaetze]
+                                                 Munich, 1938, page 326)
+
+3. “Above all was God’s hand which has visibly guided the Fuehrer and
+his Movement. Only those who have no faith, claim that chance has
+persecuted us. In reality Moltke’s word was proven to be true in regard
+to the Fuehrer and the Party; namely, that in the long run only the
+strong will have good luck. What had been prepared quietly and had
+grown organically during ten years, swept over all of Germany like a
+torrent on 30 January 1933 and during the time which followed. There
+was nobody in the country and in the world who could have escaped the
+powerful, resounding rhythm of these events. It was as if a whole
+people awoke from its sleep, threw off in one quick move the chains
+which oppressed it and rose like a Phenix out of the ashes of a fallen
+system. And out of the flame and enthusiasm with which the masses of
+millions of people yielded to Hitler and his idea, the cry which once
+before at the time of the crusades had made Germany rise, seemed to
+come again: ‘It is God’s will!’
+
+“And as he gave us his blessing, he denied it to the others. Although
+they called for him loudly from their pulpits and party-seats, their
+work was not his work, their faith was not his faith and their will not
+his will.
+
+“It is not mere chance that millions in Germany are of the holy
+conviction that National Socialism is more than politics, that in it
+the word and the will of God proclaim itself, that the bulwark it has
+created against Bolshevism was conceived on higher inspiration as the
+last salvation of Occidental culture before the threat of Asiatic
+atheism.”
+
+                  (Joseph Goebbels, From Kaiserhof to Reich Chancellery,
+                      [Vom Kaiserhof zur Reichskanzlei], 1934, page 12.)
+
+4. “It is with pride that we see that one man is kept above all
+criticism--that is the Fuehrer.
+
+“The reason is that everyone feels and knows: he was always right and
+will always be right. The National Socialism of us all is anchored in
+the uncritical loyalty, in the devotion to the Fuehrer that does not
+ask for the wherefore in the individual case, in the tacit performance
+of his commands. We believe that the Fuehrer is fulfilling a divine
+mission to German destiny! This belief is beyond challenge.”
+
+                          (Hess, Speeches [Reden] Munich, 1928, page 25;
+                                  Radio speech at Cologne, 25 June 1934)
+
+5. _The Technique of the State_--“Therefore the Fuehrer principle in
+administration means; instead of the results of a majority vote, to
+entrust in each case the decision to a definite person with clear-cut
+authority who will be solely responsible toward above and who will
+carry out the execution of the decision toward below.”
+
+                              (Hans Frank, German Law, [Deutsches Recht]
+                                           V. 11, Berlin, 1941, p. 2626;
+
+                      also Otto Koellreutter, German Administrative Law,
+                       [Deutsches Verwaltungsrecht], Berlin, 1938, p.8.)
+
+
+  * U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1946--693257
+
+       #       #       #       #       #
+
+
+
+
+Transcriber’s note
+
+
+Punctuation and spelling has been maintained except where obvious
+printer errors have occurred. Since these documents were written
+by different individuals there can be variants in spelling and
+capitalization between them.
+
+This volume has no German diacritics, only French diacritics. As a
+result, Goering and Fuehrer are spelled without umlauts throughout.
+
+Use of asterisks in text denote missing/illegible words. Separation of
+individual documents is indicated with
+
+       #       #       #       #       #
+
+Tables that were wider than the default margin were formatted to
+fit.
+
+A fact was corrected on Page 626: “I separated this service already in
+1941 from the troops.” It was changed to 1931.
+
+A couple of sentences had missing words. The following missing words
+were added:
+
+Page 399: “Jeschonnek shares the opinion we should to Bardufoss”
+“Jeschonnek shares the opinion we should =go= to Bardufoss”
+
+Page 433: “would then have a compartment all themselves” “would then
+have a compartment all =to= themselves”
+
+One sentence had an unclear adjective and was changed:
+
+Page 851: “laws and cabinet decisions are repeated effective
+immediately” “laws and cabinet decisions are =reputed= effective
+immediately”
+
+
+
+
+
+*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 78130 ***