path: root/77798-0.txt

*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 77798 ***




[Illustration: VISCOUNT NORTHCLIFFE.

DIRECTOR OF PROPAGANDA IN ENEMY COUNTRIES.

_Photo: Hoppé._]




                        SECRETS OF CREWE HOUSE


                   _The Story of a Famous Campaign_

                                  BY

                      SIR CAMPBELL STUART, K.B.E.


                         HODDER AND STOUGHTON
                     LONDON    NEW YORK    TORONTO
                                MCMXXI




                 _First Edition printed September, 1920._
                 _Second Edition printed October, 1920._
                 _Third Edition printed November, 1920._
                  _Fourth Edition printed March, 1921._




                                  TO
                         VISCOUNT NORTHCLIFFE
                                  IN
                       GRATEFUL AND AFFECTIONATE
                             APPRECIATION




AUTHOR’S FOREWORD


Some courage is required to add to the already too swollen list of
war books, of the making of which there seems to be no end. The
justification for the present volume, which tells the remarkable story
of British propaganda in enemy countries during 1918, lies in the fact
that it records historic activities, some of which were of a pioneer
character.

Necessarily its publication had to be postponed until the main
principles of the Peace had been decided. The nature of the documents
quoted precluded earlier publication, which might have embarrassed
the Allied Governments. No such embarrassment will be caused at this
late stage. The march of events has removed the need, which existed
during the War and during the peace-making, for withholding from public
knowledge particulars of the organisation and work directed with such
effect from Crewe House.

Much that was interesting, and even dramatic, can never be divulged.
Otherwise, many who did valuable and dangerous service might, by a
breach of faith, be exposed to reprisals.

The activities of Crewe House will stand the test of judgment by
results. German comments on Viscount Northcliffe’s department leave no
room for doubt as to the verdict of enemy countries.




  CONTENTS


  CHAPTER I

  PROPAGANDA: ITS USES AND ABUSES                             1


  CHAPTER II

  CREWE HOUSE: ITS ORGANISATION AND _PERSONNEL_               8


  CHAPTER III

  OPERATIONS AGAINST AUSTRIA-HUNGARY: PROPAGANDA’S
  MOST STRIKING SUCCESS                                      20


  CHAPTER IV

  OPERATIONS AGAINST GERMANY                                 50


  CHAPTER V

  TRIBUTES FROM THE ENEMY                                   105


  CHAPTER VI

  OPERATIONS AGAINST BULGARIA AND OTHER ACTIVITIES          134


  CHAPTER VII

  INTER-ALLIED CO-OPERATION                                 146


  CHAPTER VIII

  FROM WAR PROPAGANDA TO PEACE PROPAGANDA                   201


  CHAPTER IX

  _VALE!_                                                   233


  APPENDIX--Facsimile leaflets and translations             237

  INDEX                                                     253




  LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS


  Viscount Northcliffe                          _Frontispiece_

                                                   BETWEEN PAGES

  Crewe House                                          8 and 9

  Rear-Admiral Sir Reginald Hall, K.C.M.G.,
  C.B., M.P.                                           8 and 9

  Lieutenant-General Sir George Macdonogh,
  K.C.M.G., C.B.                                      16 and 17

  The Rt. Hon. Lord Beaverbrook                       16 and 17

  Mr. H. Wickham Steed                                32 and 33

  Dr. R. W. Seton-Watson                              32 and 33

  News of Allied successes on Western Front for
  Jugo-Slav soldiers in the Austrian Armies           48 and 49

  A manifesto from Dr. Trumbitch distributed
  from aeroplanes among Jugo-Slav troops
  in the Austrian Army                                48 and 49

  Mr. H. G. Wells                                     64 and 65

  Leaflet--probably the first--distributed by
  British aeroplanes among German troops
  in October, 1914. It announced a Russian
  victory in East Prussia                             64 and 65

  Mr. Hamilton Fyfe                                   64 and 65

  Aeroplane distribution of copies of an early
  leaflet prepared for the German soldier             64 and 65

  Brigadier-General G. K. Cockerill, C.B.             80 and 81

  A typical news-sheet for German soldiers            80 and 81

  Captain Chalmers Mitchell                           96 and 97

  “Reporting Progress”--Leaflet which gave
  particulars of Allied progress against the
  Germans                                             96 and 97

  Diagrammatic representation of the growth of
  the American Army in the Field                      96 and 97

  Map-leaflet showing the breaking of the
  Hindenburg line                                   112 and 113

  News for German soldiers of the destruction
  of the Turkish Army in Palestine                  112 and 113

  Some pointed quotations for German soldiers
  culled from German sources                        112 and 113

  A medallion struck by the Germans in “dishonour”
  of Lord Northcliffe                               128 and 129

  Leaflet with particulars of the fate of 150
  German submarine commanders, which
  created great depression in German naval
  ports                                             128 and 129

  Leaflet warning the Germans that such places
  as Berlin and Hamburg had been brought
  within range of aerial attack and could be
  bombed if the war were prolonged                  128 and 129

  A German dream and the result. A leaflet
  illustrating the collapse of the Mittel-Europa
  ambition of German militarism                     144 and 145

  Front page of a “Trench Newspaper,” issued
  by Crewe House for German troops                  144 and 145

  The late Sir Charles Nicholson, Bart., M.P.       144 and 145

  Sir Roderick Jones, K.B.E.                        160 and 161

  Illustrated leaflet portraying contentment of
  German prisoners in British hands                 160 and 161

  Colonel the Earl of Denbigh, C.V.O.               160 and 161

  Leaflet showing how the Allies had
  shattered the great Berlin-Bagdad plan            160 and 161

  Mr. Robert Donald                                 176 and 177

  Manifesto to Magyar Troops                        176 and 177

  “Drifting down in white showers”: Leaflets,
  from Italian aeroplane squadron,
  dropping on Vienna                                176 and 177

  Manifesto, signed by Professor (now President)
  Masaryk, to Czecho-Slovak soldiers                176 and 177

  Sir Sidney Low                                    192 and 193

  Rapidly-distributed leaflets for German troops
  telling of Allied successes in the Balkans
  and in Syria                                      192 and 193

  Mr. James O’Grady, M.P.                           192 and 193

  Inflating the balloons and attaching the
  truth-telling leaflets                            208 and 209

  Registering the direction and velocity of the
  wind, in order to judge where the leaflets
  would fall                                        208 and 209

  How leaflets were attached to the balloons        208 and 209

  Dispatching the balloons                          208 and 209

  Testing the lifting power of balloons used for
  propaganda purposes                               224 and 225


  LIST OF MAPS.

  Ethnographic map of Austria-Hungary                 32 and 38

  The partition of Austria-Hungary: Showing
  the boundaries as defined in the Peace
  Treaties                                            48 and 49

  Germany’s new boundaries as fixed by the
  Treaty of Peace                                     80 and 81

  Bulgaria as delimited by the Peace treaty         144 and 145




CHAPTER I

PROPAGANDA: ITS USES AND ABUSES

Definition and Axioms: Why German Propaganda Failed: Ludendorff’s
Lament and Tribute.


Propaganda in war is a comparatively modern activity. Certainly, in
the stage of development to which it attained in the closing phases of
the Great War, it is a new weapon of warfare and a powerful weapon.
Therefore it requires skilful and careful handling. Otherwise it
destroys rather than creates, and alienates whom it should conciliate.

What is propaganda? It is the presentation of a case in such a way
that others may be influenced. In so far as its use against an enemy
is concerned, the subject matter employed must not be self-evidently
propagandist. Except in special circumstances, its origin should be
completely concealed. As a general rule, too, it is desirable to hide
the channels of communication.

Creation of a favourable “atmosphere” is the first object of
propaganda. Until this psychological effect is produced (as the result
of military events, of propagandist activity or of internal political
disaffection) the mentality of enemy troops and civil population--and
both are equally important in modern warfare--will be naturally
unsympathetic and unresponsive to influence. In order to produce
this “atmosphere” of receptivity and susceptibility, continuity of
propaganda policy is indispensable. This presupposes definition of
sound policy, based upon comprehensive knowledge of the facts and of
the developments of the political, military, and economic situation,
and also of the enemy psychology.

When a line of policy has been laid down, actual propaganda operations
may be begun, but not before. First of all axioms of propaganda
is that only truthful statements be made. Secondly, there must be
no conflicting arguments, and this can only be ensured by close
co-operation of all propagandists and by strict adherence to the policy
defined. A false step may possibly be irretrievable.

Owing to inattention to these cardinal principles of propaganda
against an enemy--inattention due to lack of appreciation of their
importance--the Germans’ very energetic propaganda effort miscarried.
Wrongly assuming that the war would be of short duration, they made use
of untruths and half-truths, mis-statements and over-statements. These
produced a temporary effect, but the protraction of the war brought its
own refutation of their misrepresentation, and, instead of operating
to the good of the Central Empires, the campaign wrought harm to their
cause.

Moreover, as they afterwards realised, the Germans did not agree among
themselves in their misrepresentations. There was, as a well-known
British authority on German propaganda has pointed out, a chaotic
exuberance of different points of view. And they were incapable of
understanding other nations. Dr. Karl Lamprecht, the distinguished
German professor, deplored this in the course of a lecture at the end
of 1914, when the Germans regarded their victory as assured. “When the
war came,” he said, “everyone who could write obtained the largest
possible goose quill and wrote to all his foreign friends, telling
them that they did not realise what splendid fellows the Germans were,
and not infrequently adding that in many cases their conduct required
some excuse. The effect was stupendous.” “I can speak with the most
open heart on the subject,” he added, “for amongst the whole crowd
it was the professors who were most erratic. The consequences were
gruesome. Probably much more harm came to our cause in this way than
from all the efforts of the enemy. None the less, it was done with the
best intentions. The self-confidence was superb, but the knowledge
was lacking. People thought that they could explain the German cause
without preparation. What was wanted was organisation.”

Before coming to Allied methods and matter, it will be interesting to
examine the scope of German propaganda. In the early stages of the war,
Germany loudly proclaimed that she was winning. As the progress of
events belied such words, she changed her theme. The Allies could not
win, she averred, and the longer they took to realise this the greater
would be their suffering and losses. She continually endeavoured to
sow discord between the Allies. Great Britain was not taking her fair
share of the Allied burden; Great Britain intended to retain Belgium
and the northern part of France; Great Britain was using France and
Russia for her own selfish ends; the interests of the Balkan Powers
could not be reconciled. These were some of the foolish falsehoods in
which she indulged. They were ineffective, as were her many attempts to
stir up disaffection within Allied countries. Ireland, South Africa,
India, Egypt and Mohammedan countries were examples in the case of
Great Britain, and Algeria in that of France. She spared no effort to
encourage Pacifism among the Allied peoples.

Their lack of success became evident even to the Germans themselves.
Government agencies and Press became more reticent as the war went
on and the propaganda was found to be doing more harm than good.
The military leaders became apprehensive of the effectiveness and
superiority of British propaganda. Soldiers and writers made bitter
complaints of the lack of any German organisation to maintain an
adequate counter-campaign.

General Ludendorff (“My War Memories,” pp. 360 _et seq._) is pathetic
in his laments at the non-success of German efforts. “The German
propaganda,” he writes, “was only kept going with difficulty. In spite
of all our efforts, its achievements, in comparison to the magnitude
of the task, were inadequate. We produced no real effect on the
enemy peoples.” He admits failure, too, in propaganda efforts on the
fighting fronts. In the East, he says, the Russians were the authors
of their own collapse. In the West, “the fronts of our enemies had not
been made susceptible by the state of public opinion in their home
countries, and the propaganda we gradually introduced had no success.”
He records his efforts to induce the Imperial Chancellor to create a
great organisation, as it had become “undeniably essential to establish
an Imperial Ministry of Propaganda,” and he was convinced that no
adequate counter-campaign to Allied propaganda could be organised
except by an Imperial department possessing special powers. “At last
a feeble step in this direction was taken in August, 1918. A totally
inadequate organisation was set up; besides, it was then too late.
In these circumstances it was quite impossible to achieve uniformity
in propaganda work between Germany and Austria-Hungary, as was
conspicuously the case with our enemies. The Army found no ally in a
strong propaganda directed from home. While her Army was victorious on
the field of battle, Germany failed in the fight against the _moral_ of
the enemy peoples.”

Ludendorff’s _apologia_ shows that he understood the principles which
should govern a propaganda campaign; but he did not understand that
the German case was bad. He has the doubtful consolation of knowing he
was right in his theories; for they coincided in large degree with the
principles upon which Viscount Northcliffe based his famous intensive
campaign from Crewe House. No other German has exhibited such a grasp
of the fundamentals of propaganda as Ludendorff, and he had excellent
opportunity of judging the efficacy of the action into which these
theoretical principles were translated. His verdict is an unqualified
tribute, as the extracts from his writings quoted in another chapter
show.

How this success was attained it is the purpose of this book to reveal.

[Illustration: CREWE HOUSE.]




CHAPTER II

CREWE HOUSE: ITS ORGANISATION AND _PERSONNEL_

Viscount Northcliffe’s appointment: The Formation of an Advisory
Committee: Other Government Departments’ Co-operation.


In February, 1918, Viscount Northcliffe accepted the Prime Minister’s
invitation to become Director of Propaganda in Enemy Countries. Only
a few weeks earlier, Lord Northcliffe had concluded his mission to
the United States, where he had undertaken the co-ordination and
supervision of the multiplex British missions engaged in purchasing
food and munitions and in other vitally important operations. Upon his
return to England, he had become Chairman of the London headquarters
of the British War Mission to the United States of America, after
having declined a seat in the Cabinet. Despite the importance of his
new duties, he elected to retain his connection with the British War
Mission to the United States.

Lord Northcliffe’s name bore in itself a propaganda value in enemy
countries. None knew better than the Germans with what assiduity and
tenacity he had striven to awaken the British nation to the extent and
significance of the war preparations of German militarism. From the
time of his entry into this office he and his work were the subjects of
continual reference in the German Press. The vehemence of their attacks
showed the depth of their apprehension.

The direction and organisation of propaganda abroad, and especially
against enemy countries, required a _personnel_ deeply versed in
foreign politics, with an intimate understanding of enemy psychology,
and with professional knowledge of the art of presenting facts plainly
and forcefully. The work was of a highly specialised character,
designed to reveal to the enemy the hopelessness of their cause
and case and the inevitability of Allied victory. This called for
continuity of policy and persevering effort. But the problems of the
penetration of propaganda into enemy countries were as exacting as the
definition of policy and the presentation of the facts of the situation.

In order to bring as wide a knowledge as possible to bear upon the
conduct of this campaign of education and enlightenment of enemy
peoples, Lord Northcliffe invited and obtained the enthusiastic
co-operation of a committee of well-known men of affairs and
publicists. Each had won distinction in some sphere of public service
which rendered his aid in this work valuable.

Lord Northcliffe appointed me as Deputy-Director of the department and
Deputy-Chairman of the Committee.

The members of the Committee were:--

  Colonel the Earl of Denbigh, C.V.O.

  Mr. Robert Donald (then Editor of the _Daily Chronicle_).

  Sir Roderick Jones, K.B.E. (Managing Director of Reuters Agency).

  Sir Sidney Low.

  Sir Charles Nicholson, Bt., M.P.

  Mr. James O’Grady, M.P.

  Mr. H. Wickham Steed (Foreign Editor and later Editor-in-Chief of
  _The Times_).

  Mr. H. G. Wells.

  Secretary, Mr. H. K. Hudson, C.B.E.

It was an advisory committee of wide knowledge and many talents, with
a strong representation of authors and journalists of distinction.
Regular fortnightly meetings were held, at which each section of
the department reported progress and submitted programmes of future
activities for approval.

The headquarters of the department were established at Crewe House,
the town mansion of the Marquis of Crewe, who had, with characteristic
public spirit, placed it at the disposal of the Government for war
purposes.

The department was divided into two main branches, the one for
production, and the other for distribution, of propaganda material.
In its turn the production branch was divided into German,
Austro-Hungarian, and Bulgarian sections.

For reasons which will be given in the next chapter, the
Austro-Hungarian section was the first to begin operations. Mr. Steed
and Dr. R. W. Seton-Watson were co-directors of this section. They
were an admirable choice. As Foreign Editor (as he then was) of _The
Times_, author of “The Hapsburg Monarchy,” and with experience from
1902 to 1913 as correspondent of _The Times_ at Vienna, Mr. Steed had
intimate and authoritative knowledge of the peoples and conditions of
the Dual Monarchy. Dr. Seton-Watson was also a distinguished authority
on Austro-Hungarian and Balkan history and politics, to which he had
devoted many years of study.

After determination of the policy to be pursued against
Austria-Hungary, Lord Northcliffe entrusted to them the important
mission to Italy which initiated the campaign against the Dual
Monarchy, resulting in such far-reaching and remarkable consequences.
In the course of this mission they attended the historic Rome Congress
of the Oppressed Hapsburg Nationalities and they took a prominent
part in the establishment of the inter-Allied commission which waged
propaganda warfare against Austria-Hungary. The subsequent conduct of
this campaign necessitated keeping in close touch with the different
national organisations of the oppressed Hapsburg races--Poles,
Czecho-Slovaks, Southern Slavs, Rumanes--throughout 1918, and they
were able to render signal services to these peoples as well as to the
Allies.

When operations began against Germany, Mr. H. G. Wells accepted Lord
Northcliffe’s invitation to take charge of the German Section. Mr.
Wells made an exhaustive study of the conditions affecting Germany
from a propaganda point of view, with the co-operation of Dr. J. W.
Headlam-Morley, and his memorandum (which is published in Chapter IV
of this book) is a noteworthy document of exceptional interest. When,
in July, 1918, he found himself unable to continue the direction of
the German Section (although retaining membership of the Committee) he
had collected a mass of valuable data for the use of his successor,
Mr. Hamilton Fyfe, the well-known journalist. To Mr. Fyfe and his
colleagues of the German Section fell the organisation of the
“intensive” propaganda activities of the last three months of the war.

There thus remained the work against Turkey and Bulgaria. By
arrangement between Lord Northcliffe and Lord Beaverbrook, propaganda
against Turkey was ably conducted by the Near East section of the
Ministry of Information, in charge of Mr. (now Sir Hugo) Cunliffe-Owen.
This was obviously wise in the interests of economy and efficiency.
Propaganda in Bulgaria, however, was directed from Crewe House.

The production of propaganda literature and its distribution were
different functions and were performed by separate sections of the
department, but, of course, in the closest co-operation. So far
as enemy troops were concerned, the distribution for Germans and
Bulgarians was undertaken by the British military authorities. For
Austro-Hungarian troops, the work was placed on an inter-Allied basis,
distribution being organised by the Italian Army.

Distribution through civil channels, a difficult task, was in the hands
of Mr. S. A. Guest, who, alone of British propagandists against the
enemy, had been constantly engaged in that work since the early days
of the war. He built up a series of organisations in different parts
of Europe by which news and views could be introduced into all the
enemy countries. Great ingenuity and perseverance were required, but no
little measure of success crowned his efforts.

Co-ordination of these activities was a vital necessity, and this
was effectively ensured by a daily meeting of those in charge of the
different sections, the liaison officers between Crewe House and other
departments, and the heads of the administrative branches of Crewe
House. At this meeting, held usually under my chairmanship, the general
details of policy and operations of all sections were systematically
discussed. Each section knew what the other was doing, and uniformity
of policy and action was secured. In addition, the consideration of
the problems which arose, whether in the general work of Crewe House or
in the work of one particular section, benefited from the collective
attention of a combination of enthusiastic minds. Mr. Hudson, the able
secretary of the advisory committee, also acted as secretary of these
daily meetings.

All at Crewe House were profoundly grateful for the cordiality with
which the many other Government departments, with whom they were
brought into contact, lent their co-operation. In this respect
the Foreign Office, War Office, Admiralty, Treasury, Ministry of
Information, and Stationery Office, all contributed materially to
the success attained, although this list by no means exhausts the
departments which willingly placed their resources at the disposal of
Crewe House. It is pleasing to be able to record this as a recollection
of and tribute to the service rendered by these departments in this
phase of war activity.

The liaison officers’ duties were extremely important. Mr. C. J.
Phillips, a distinguished Civil Servant, who had been transferred from
the Board of Education for special work in the Foreign Office, was the
connecting link between the latter department and Crewe House. To him
fell the task of keeping Crewe House informed of foreign developments
which affected the work of propaganda in enemy countries and of
keeping the Foreign Office _au courant_ with Crewe House activities.
His assistance and judgment were of immense value in dealing with the
questions affecting foreign affairs which were constantly arising.

For a few months after Lord Northcliffe’s appointment, the Military
Intelligence Directorate of the War Office continued the production
of literature for propaganda work against the Germans, and during
this period Major the Earl of Kerry, M.P., acted as liaison officer
between the two departments. Each department was able to complement
and supplement the other’s work with good effect, and the co-operation
was carried out most harmoniously. When production was subsequently
centralised at Crewe House, Captain Chalmers Mitchell became liaison
officer with the War Office and with the Air Ministry. No greater
tribute can be paid to his work than the record in the pages that
follow.

Most cordial, too, were the relations maintained with the Admiralty,
and especially with Rear-Admiral Sir Reginald Hall (Director
of Naval Intelligence), through Commander (now Sir Guy) Standing,
R.N.V.R. Crewe House was rightly grateful for constant co-operation of
a confidential character through the exercise on its behalf of naval
resources.

Most valuable assistance was readily given to Crewe House by the
Ministry of Information, so efficiently organised by Lord Beaverbrook.
Close consultation was maintained between heads of sections of the
two departments wherever co-operation could be advantageous. In
certain European countries, for instance, the same agents acted for
both departments--an arrangement which proved effective as well as
economical. Invaluable service for Crewe House was performed by one
agent of the Ministry in regard to Bulgarian affairs in which he
displayed high competence and discretion. Crewe House was also indebted
to the Ministry for the use of its wireless service in sending out
matter for the enlightenment of the enemy by that means, and for many
similar facilities, too numerous to mention, willingly offered and
gladly accepted.

With the Treasury--_bête noire_ to so many temporary war
departments--Crewe House had the smoothest working arrangements
through Mr. C. S. Kent, who acted as Financial Controller and
Accounting Officer in addition to other duties connected with the
general administration of Crewe House. At no time was Treasury sanction
withheld or delayed in regard to any expenditure proposed in connection
with enemy propaganda.

The enemy leaders frequently alleged that Lord Northcliffe expended
huge sums of money on his propaganda work. According to the report
of the Comptroller and Auditor-General, the expenditure for the four
months from September 1 to December 31, 1918--which was the period
of the “intensive” campaign and consequently the most expensive--was
£31,360 4s. 9d., which included expenses borne by the Office of
Works, the Stationery Office, and the War Office on behalf of Crewe
House. Only £7,946 2s. 7d. of this amount was incurred directly by
Crewe House, one reason for the smallness of the amount being that
many members of the department worked without remuneration for their
services. The Auditor-General made a complimentary reference to the
manner in which the accounts were rendered.

Last, but not least, the Stationery Office which undertook all
the printing arrangements for the millions of leaflets and other
publications required in German, Croat, Bulgarian, and other languages,
rendered great assistance by the promptness and efficiency with which
they met Crewe House requirements which, from their very nature,
generally necessitated working against time.

It is particularly pleasing to look back and remember all the help
so willingly given by other Government departments and to record the
unfailing courtesy with which it was proffered and the zeal displayed.
Crewe House gladly recognised the value of such loyal co-operation,
of which those who were concerned in its work still retain grateful
memories.

[Illustration: REAR-ADMIRAL SIR REGINALD HALL, K.C.M.G., C.B., M.P.

[DIRECTOR OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE, 1918.]

_Photo: Russell, London._]

[Illustration: LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SIR GEORGE MACDONOGH, K.C.M.G., C.B.

[DIRECTOR OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, 1918].

_Photo: Russell, London._]

[Illustration: RT. HON. LORD BEAVERBROOK, MINISTER OF INFORMATION, 1918.

_Photo: M. S. Kay, Bolton._]




CHAPTER III

OPERATIONS AGAINST AUSTRIA-HUNGARY: PROPAGANDA’S MOST STRIKING SUCCESS

Anti-German Hapsburg Races: The Secret Treaty of London: Problem of
the Adriatic: Importance of the Rome Congress: Lord Northcliffe’s
Policy against Austria-Hungary: Formation of an Inter-Allied Propaganda
Commission and its Effective Operations: The Final Triumph.


Little time was spent in deciding that, of all enemy countries,
Austria-Hungary would be most susceptible to propaganda. With
the assistance of such authorities as Mr. Wickham Steed and Dr.
Seton-Watson, Lord Northcliffe was soon able to propose a line of sound
policy for the sanction of the Foreign Office.

It is strange that determined action on some such lines had not been
initiated previously by the Allied Governments. They had failed
to profit from the anti-Hapsburg and anti-German sentiment of the
oppressed subject races of the Dual Monarchy. Three-fifths of the
Hapsburg peoples were actually or potentially well disposed to the
Allies, and it was towards this majority that Lord Northcliffe decided
that propaganda must be directed with two objectives, one constructive
and one destructive:--

  (1) The moral and active support of the national desires of these
  races for independence, with the ultimate aim of forming a strong
  non-German chain of Central European and Danubian States.

  (2) The encouragement of their disinclination to fight on behalf of
  the Central Empires, thus greatly handicapping the Austro-Hungarian
  Armies as a fighting force, and seriously embarrassing the German
  military leaders.

It will be seen with what success each object was secured.

The nationalities chiefly affected were the Czechs and the Southern
Slavs. There were also lesser numbers of Italians, Poles and Rumanes,
whom it was intended to place under their own national Governments of
Italy, the State of Poland (then projected and now established), and
Rumania, which countries marched with the districts of Austria-Hungary
inhabited by their respective races.

Operations were comparatively straightforward in every case except
that of the Southern Slavs, in which the secret Treaty of London of
April, 1915, presented a serious obstacle. At the beginning of 1918
few people realised the difficulties thus created, but since the
cessation of hostilities the “Adriatic question” has loomed largely in
the public view of international relations and is rightly regarded as
one of the most troublesome problems of world politics. Its bearing on
propaganda lay in the fact that by this treaty Great Britain, France
and Russia had promised to Italy certain Austrian territories inhabited
by Southern Slavs. These territories, moreover, provided trading access
to the sea and were of the highest economic value to any Southern Slav
state which might be formed. So long as that treaty was regarded by
the Southern Slavs as representing Allied policy, it was difficult
to persuade them that Allied sympathies were with them or that the
Allies would secure for them the economic interests necessary to the
establishment of the united Southern Slav state peopled by the Serbs,
Croats, and Slovenes.

With the object of creating a counterpoise to the secret pact,
representatives of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, had assembled
in Corfu, under the leadership of Dr. Trumbitch (president of the
Southern Slav Committee) and M. Pashitch (Prime Minister of Serbia),
and had issued the Southern Slav Unitary Declaration on June 20, 1917,
proclaiming the union of the three peoples and claiming all territory
compactly inhabited by them, which (said the Declaration) “cannot be
mutilated without attaint to the vital interests of the community.
Our nation demands nothing that belongs to others, but only what is
its own.” On the one hand, this was an important counter-step to the
partition of Dalmatia proposed in the Treaty of London; while on
the other, it was a definite advance towards the solidification of
the three peoples into nationhood. Consequently it was not without
effect upon the German military leaders, who foresaw its influence
upon the Southern Slav regiments of the Austro-Hungarian armies, and
it undoubtedly hastened their decision to take direct control of the
forces of the Dual Monarchy.

The next move was made after the Italian armies had recovered from the
disaster of Caporetto and had re-established their line on the Piave.
On the initiative of Mr. Wickham Steed, Dr. Seton-Watson, and other
members of the Serbian Society of Great Britain, conferences took place
in London between leading Italians and Southern Slavs, with the aim of
outlining a solution of the question which would be acceptable to the
two nations. A memorandum of the discussions was given to the Prime
Minister of Italy (Signor Orlando), who was then (January, 1918) in
London. At Mr. Steed’s suggestion, Signor Orlando met Dr. Trumbitch and
they discussed the question at great length, with the result that Dr.
Trumbitch accepted an invitation from the Italian Premier to go to Rome.

Before that visit took place, Dr. Torre, a prominent member of the
Italian Parliament, was sent to London, as representative of an
influential joint committee of the two Italian Houses of Parliament,
to endeavour to establish a definite basis of agreement. After much
negotiation the representatives of the two nations engaged themselves
to settle amicably the various territorial controversies in the
interest of the future good and sincere relations between the two
peoples, on the basis of the principles of nationality and of the right
of peoples to decide their own destiny. The linguistic and economic
interests of such minorities as might have to be included in the
national territory of either party were also guaranteed.

This agreement of principle, made under the stress of war, coincided
approximately with Lord Northcliffe’s entry into office. One of his
first official acts was to dispatch Mr. Steed and Dr. Seton-Watson as a
special mission to Italy. While there, they represented his department
at the Congress of the Oppressed Hapsburg Nationalities which met with
the consent of the Italian Government at Rome on April 7, 8, and 9,
1918. The holding of this Congress was, in itself, an important act of
propaganda. This unprecedented assembly, representing Italians, Poles,
Czecho-Slovaks, Southern Slavs, and Rumanes, resolved upon common
action in the proclamation of the right of national unity of these
peoples and also confirmed, in striking fashion, the decisions arrived
at between Italians and Southern Slavs in London. Signor Orlando,
Signor Bissolati and other Italian Ministers expressed publicly their
adhesion to the resolutions, which were as follows:--

   “The representatives of the nationalities subjected in whole or in
  part to the rule of Austria-Hungary--the Italians, Poles, Rumanes,
  Czechs, and Southern Slavs--join in affirming their principles of
  common action as follows:--

  “(1) _Each of these peoples proclaims its right to constitute its own
  nationality and State unity, or to complete it, and to attain full
  political and economic independence._

  “(2) _Each of these peoples recognises in the Austro-Hungarian
  Monarchy the instrument of German domination and the fundamental
  obstacle to the realisation of its aspirations and rights._

  “(3) _The assembly recognises the necessity of a common struggle
  against the common oppressors, in order that each people may attain
  complete liberation and national unity within a free State unit._

  “The representatives of the Italian people and of the Jugo-Slav
  people in particular, agree as follows:--

   “(1) _In the relations of the Italian nation and the nation of
  the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes--known also under the name of the
  Jugo-Slav nation--the representatives of the two peoples recognise
  that the unity and independence of the Jugo-Slav nation is a vital
  interest of Italy, just as the completion of Italian national unity
  is a vital interest of the Jugo-Slav nation. And therefore the
  representatives of the two peoples pledge themselves to employ every
  effort in order that during the war and at the moment of peace, these
  ends of the two nations may be completely attained._

  “(2) _They declare that the liberation of the Adriatic Sea and its
  defence against every present and future enemy is a vital interest of
  the two peoples._

  “(3) _They pledge themselves also, in the interest of good and
  sincere relations between the two peoples in the future to solve
  amicably the various territorial controversies on the basis of the
  principles of nationality and of the right of peoples to decide their
  own fate, and in such a way as not to injure the vital interests of
  the two nations, as they shall be defined at the moment of peace._

   “(4) _To such racial groups_ (nuclei) _of one people as it may be
  found necessary to include within the frontiers of the other, there
  shall be recognised and guaranteed the right of their language,
  culture, and moral and economic interests._”

Meanwhile, Lord Northcliffe and his experts had, in accordance with the
principle consistently followed by Crewe House, determined the broad
lines of policy upon which propaganda against Austria-Hungary was to
be based. A memorandum on the subject was prepared and forwarded by
Lord Northcliffe on February 24, 1918, to the Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs for his consideration and approval. The following are
the principal points of the memorandum:

  “I have long been of opinion that it would be well to concentrate on
  Propaganda in Austria.

  “I have made a point of seeing every available person who has come
  out of Austria, including many Americans who returned to the United
  States when I was there. All shared the same view--that the Dual
  Monarchy entered the greater war in a halfhearted spirit; is weary of
  the war; has endured hardships approaching starvation; and realises
  that there is no benefit for Austria arising out of the war.

  “The control of the Presses of the various nationalities composing
  the Dual Monarchy is so absolute that the real facts of the war are
  unknown to the multitude. Germany is not idle in Austria or elsewhere.

  “For example, the entrance of the United States into the war has been
  belittled, and described as mere American ‘bluff.’ Many subjects of
  Austrian nationalities had, before the war, considerable knowledge
  of the United States, owing to the great emigration to that country.
  They would realise the power of the United States if explained to
  them.

  “It is submitted with respect, therefore, that one of the first steps
  to be taken is to spread, through all available channels, accurate
  facts about the American preparations.

  “But, before making any beginning in that direction, or any others, I
  feel that I must be placed in possession of knowledge of the policy
  of the Allies as to the Dual Monarchy.

  “I should be greatly obliged if you would give me your opinion on
  the following suggestions, which are made after consultation with
  those well acquainted with Austria. If they merit your approval, it
  is suggested that they be submitted to the United States, France, and
  Italy.

  “It is suggested that there are two policies for the Department
  of Propaganda in Enemy Countries. In order that there may be no
  misunderstanding I have recapitulated elementary facts generally
  known.

  “These two policies are as follows:

  “(_a_) To work for a separate peace with the Emperor, the Court,
  and the aristocracy, on the principle of not interfering with the
  domestic affairs of the Hapsburg Monarchy, and of leaving its
  territory almost or quite intact; or

  “(_b_) To try to break the power of Austria-Hungary, as the weakest
  link in the chain of enemy States, by supporting and encouraging all
  anti-German and pro-Ally peoples and tendencies.

  “The (_a_) policy has been tried without success. The Hapsburgs are
  not free agents. They have not the power, even though they may wish,
  to break away from Germany, because--

  “(1) They are controlled by the internal structure of their dominions
  (the Dual System), which gives Germany decisive leverage over them
  through the Germans of Austria and the Magyars of Hungary; and

  “(2) Because the Allies cannot offer them acceptable terms without
  breaking with Italy.

  “It remains to try the (_b_) policy.

  “This policy is not primarily, or even, in the last resort,
  necessarily anti-Hapsburgian; it is not opposed to the interests of
  the Roman Catholic religion; and it is in harmony with the declared
  aims of the Allies.

  “The Empire of Austria contains some 31,000,000 inhabitants. Of these
  less than one-third, _i.e._, the 9,000,000 or 10,000,000 Germans of
  Austria, are pro-German. The other two-thirds (including the Poles,
  Czecho-Slovaks, Rumanes, Italians, and Southern Slavs) are actively
  or passively anti-German.

  “The Kingdom of Hungary, including the ‘autonomous’ kingdom of
  Croatia-Slavonia has a population of approximately 21,000,000
  of which one-half (Magyars, Jews, Saxons, and Swabians) may be
  considered pro-German, and the rest (Slovaks, Rumanes, and Southern
  Slavs) actively or passively anti-German.

  “There are thus in Austria-Hungary, as a whole, some 31,000,000
  anti-Germans, and some 21,000,000 pro-Germans. The pro-German
  minority rules the anti-German majority. Apart from questions of
  democratic principle, the policy of the Allies should evidently be to
  help and encourage the anti-Germans.

  “The chief means of helping them may be specified thus:

  “(1) The Allied Governments and the President of the United States
  should insist upon their determination to secure democratic freedom
  for the races of Austria-Hungary on the principle of ‘government by
  consent of the governed.’ Expressions such as ‘self-government,’
  or ‘autonomous development’ should be avoided, because they have
  a sinister meaning in Austria-Hungary and tend to discourage the
  friends of the Allies.

  “(2) For the same reason, statements that the Allies do not wish to
  ‘dismember Austria’ should be avoided. The war cannot be won without
  so radical a transformation of Austria-Hungary as to remove its
  peoples from German control. The Hapsburgs may be driven to help
  in this transformation if Allied encouragement of the anti-German
  Hapsburg peoples is effective. By themselves the Hapsburgs cannot
  effect a transformation except in an increasingly pro-German sense.

  “(3) For propaganda among the anti-German peoples the agencies
  already existing should be utilised. These agencies are chiefly
  the Bohemian (Czecho-Slovak) National Alliance, the Southern Slav
  Committee, and various Polish organisations.

  “(4) The present tendency of the Italian Government to shelve
  the policy embodied in the London Convention of April 26, 1915,
  and to adopt a policy of agreement with the anti-German races of
  Austria-Hungary should be encouraged and stimulated.

  “(5) The ultimate aim of Allied policy should be, not to form a
  number of small, disjointed States, but to create a non-German
  Confederation of Central European and Danubian States.

  “(6) The Germans of Austria should be free to join the Confederated
  States of Germany. They would, in any case, tend to secede from a
  transformed Austria, in which they would no longer be able to rule
  over non-German peoples.

  “In view of the great amount of cabling that will be necessary
  to achieve unity, may I ask you to let me have either your own
  suggestions, or your approval of those above mentioned, as speedily
  as possible?”

In his reply, Mr. Balfour wrote on February 26, 1918:--

  “Your very lucid memorandum raises in one shape or another the
  fundamental problem of the Hapsburg Empire. A final and authoritative
  answer to the question you put to me can only be given (if given at
  all) by the Cabinet, speaking in the name of the Government. But I
  offer the following observations on the subject, in the hope that
  they may help you in the immediate task for which you have been made
  responsible.

  “If the two alternative policies of dealing with the Dual Monarchy
  set forth in your paper were mutually exclusive, and if they involved
  distinct and even opposite methods of propaganda, our position would
  be even more difficult than it is. For what we can do with the
  Austrian Empire does not wholly depend upon our wishes, but upon
  the success of our arms and the views of our Allies, and, as these
  elements in our calculations cannot be estimated with certainty, we
  should inevitably remain in doubt as to which of the two mutually
  exclusive methods of propaganda it would be judicious to adopt.

  “Fortunately, however, our position is not quite so embarrassing. As
  you point out with unanswerable force, everything which encourages
  the anti-German elements in the Hapsburg dominions really helps
  to compel the Emperor and the Court to a separate peace, and also
  diminishes the efficiency of Austria-Hungary as a member of the
  Middle-Europe combination. The Emperor, by these means, might be
  induced, or compelled, fundamentally to modify the constitution
  of his own State. If he refused to lend himself to such a policy,
  the strengthening of the non-German elements might bring about
  the same end even more effectually than if he lent his assistance
  to the process. But in either case the earlier stages of that
  process are the same, and a propaganda which aids the struggle of
  the nationalities now subject either to Austrian Germans or to
  Magyar Hungarians towards freedom and self-determination, must be
  right, whether the complete break-up of the Austrian Empire or
  its de-Germanisation under Hapsburg rule be the final goal of our
  efforts.”

When acknowledging this prompt reply, Lord Northcliffe pointed out that
his anxiety to move as rapidly as possible was due to the belief of
the Italians that a strong Austrian or Austro-German offensive against
Italy would be launched within the next two months. “If our propaganda
in Austria is to help to weaken this offensive, or to turn it into
a defeat, it ought, in my judgment, to begin at once, and all the
agencies we can command ought to be hard at work within a fortnight.

“The representative of the American Propaganda Department is in London.
The Italian will be here next week, and we could no doubt have a French
representative at the same time.

“As to the memorandum, I am very pleased that you are in substantial
agreement with the policy outlined. The two policies may not be
mutually exclusive in the last resort, but it is very important that
one or the other of them should be given absolute precedence. It would
place me in an awkward predicament if, after basing vigorous propaganda
on the (_b_) policy, I were confronted with some manifestation of the
(_a_) policy on the part of the British or other Allied Government.
For this reason I hope that the War Cabinet will not delay its own
decision, and that it will try to get a decision from France, Italy,
and the United States as quickly as possible.

“It goes without saying that public declarations on behalf of the
British, French, and Allied Governments, and, if possible, on the
part of President Wilson, in the sense of the (_b_) policy would, if
promptly made, greatly facilitate my efforts.”

Obviously the wise course was to place action in carrying out this
policy on an Inter-Allied basis. Lord Northcliffe, therefore, convened
meetings in London which were attended by Italian, French and American
representatives. It was decided to organise a committee to arrange with
France and Italy for united operations on the Italian front against
the Austro-Hungarian armies.

Accordingly, the special mission which Lord Northcliffe had sent
to Italy, and of which Mr. Steed and Dr. Seton-Watson were the
principal members, was entrusted with this task. With the willing
support and co-operation of the Italian Prime Minister, the Italian
Commander-in-Chief, and the British and French Commanders on the
Italian Front, a permanent Inter-Allied Propaganda Commission was
organised at the Italian General Headquarters. Italy provided the
President (Colonel Siciliani) and one commissioner (Captain Ojetti)
and Great Britain and France one commissioner each (Lieutenant-Colonel
B. Granville Baker and Major Gruss respectively). To the Commission
were attached, as a result of representations from Mr. Steed,
representatives of committees of each of the oppressed nationalities.
Mr. Steed, speaking on behalf of Lord Northcliffe, urged that only
representatives of these races were fully qualified to speak to their
co-nationals on the vital subjects which would form the theme of their
propagandist productions.

The Commission began work on April 18, 1918. It acquired a polyglot
printing press at Reggio Emilia. A weekly journal was published
containing news (collected by a special Italian office ably organised
by Professor Borgese at Berne) quadruplicated in the Czech, Polish,
Southern Slav, and Rumanian languages. The assistance of the national
representatives was valuable to the point of indispensability in
ensuring accuracy of translation and suitability of contents.
These representatives also composed leaflet manifestoes. Coloured
reproductions of pictures of a patriotic, or religious, nature which
appealed to the nationalist aspirations and piety of the races,
were made. All this literary matter was dispatched straight to the
front-line armies from the printing press, and distributed by means of
aeroplanes (one per army being detailed for this purpose), rockets,
which were constructed to hold about 30 pamphlets, and grenades, and
also by contact patrols. These patrols were originally formed by
bodies of troops raised on the responsibility of the various Italian
armies, and were composed of deserters of Czecho-Slovak, Southern Slav,
Polish, or Rumanian nationalities who had volunteered for this service
against their hereditary enemy. They were wonderfully successful. The
total number of leaflets and other productions thus distributed ran
into many millions. But this by no means exhausted the channels of
propagandist effort. Gramophone records of Czecho-Slovak and Southern
Slav songs were secured by the British Commissioner and effectively
used for the awakening of the nationalist sentiment among the troops of
these races in the Austrian armies. The instruments were placed in “No
Man’s Land,” and so close to each other were the front trenches of the
opposing armies that the words and music could easily be heard.

The Austro-Hungarian section of Crewe House, of which section Mr.
Steed and Dr. Seton-Watson were the directors, maintained the closest
touch with the Commission. Specimens of literature were exchanged
between the Commission and other sections of Crewe House, and it was
not uncommon for one news leaflet to appear in eight or ten different
languages, with a total circulation of several millions of copies. The
Austro-Hungarian section also necessarily kept in the closest touch
with the Czecho-Slovak, Southern Slav, Polish, and Rumanian leaders and
organisations in Allied and neutral countries. It also co-operated with
Mr. S. A. Guest in the organisation of civil and secret channels in
neutral countries by which propaganda literature could be introduced
into Austria-Hungary.

The effect of the launching of the propaganda leaflet campaign was soon
apparent. Unrest became manifest among the Austro-Hungarian forces.
Deserters belonging to the subject races came over to the Allied lines.
This was one of the chief causes contributory to the postponements of
the Austrian offensive carefully planned for April. When this attack
was eventually made--in June--the Italian commanders, and their Allied
colleagues, had full information concerning enemy plans and positions.

But, unhappily, the propaganda, and, consequently, the military,
campaigns were impaired by reactionary tendencies within the Italian
Government. Had the Italian Government been prepared in May, 1918,
to join with their Allies and Associates in making a joint public
declaration in strong and unmistakable language in favour of the
creation of a united and independent Southern Slav State and in
recognising the Czecho-Slovaks as an Allied and belligerent nation, the
result would undoubtedly have precipitated the collapse of Austria in
the early part of the summer of 1918.

Instead of seizing the opportunity for this united and strong
pronouncement which presented itself at a meeting of the Prime
Ministers of Great Britain, France, and Italy, held at Versailles, on
June 3, 1918, the following declarations were made:--

  (1) The creation of a united and independent Polish State with free
  access to the sea constitutes one of the conditions of a solid and
  just peace and of the rule of right in Europe.

  (2) The Allied Governments have noted with pleasure the declaration
  made by the Secretary of State of the United States Government (in
  referring to the resolutions of the Rome Congress of Austro-Hungarian
  nationalities), and desire to associate themselves in an expression
  of earnest sympathy for the nationalistic aspirations towards freedom
  of the Czecho-Slovak and Jugo (Southern)-Slav peoples.

The regrettable weakness of the second declaration, which followed very
closely the wording of Mr. Lansing’s earlier announcement on behalf of
the United States Government, was entirely due to the opposition of
Baron Sonnino (Italian Foreign Minister), who rejected the stronger
declarations prepared by Mr. Balfour and the French Foreign Minister,
M. Pichon. It was a retrogressive step by Italy from the position
she had taken at the Rome Congress, at which her Prime Minister had
expressly associated himself with the terms of the Italo-Southern Slav
agreement that recognised the “unity and independence of the Jugo-Slav
nation as a vital Italian interest.” In regard to the Czecho-Slovaks,
the British, French, and Italian Governments had already recognised the
Czecho-Slovak Army, under the Bohemian National Council, as an Allied
force.

Towards the end of June, Mr. Lansing made considerable advance with
a definite statement that the United States aimed at the complete
liberation of all Slav peoples from Austro-German domination.

While Lord Northcliffe and his associates were striving hard in London
to retrieve the opportunities thus wasted, the propaganda organisation
in Italy was making remarkable progress despite the vacillations of
the politicians. Undoubtedly the reactionary attitude of Baron Sonnino
at Versailles influenced adversely the response of the Southern Slav
troops in the Austrian ranks to the appeals made by the propaganda
leaflets. Nevertheless, there was a considerable amount of desertion
from the Austro-Hungarian Army. Among the deserters were numbers of
junior officers, not professional soldiers, but men who in private life
were lawyers, merchants, and so on. These men were all led to come over
by the prospect of liberation which the propaganda held out to them.
Men of other ranks were induced to desert, either in order to join
relatives among their co-nationals fighting in the Italian Army, of
whom news had reached them through the propaganda agency, or else by
the more elementary considerations of food, comfort, and safety. It was
noticeable that nearly all the deserters brought with them copies of
the leaflets distributed by the Allied Commission.

That the propaganda had seriously alarmed the Austro-Hungarian
authorities was made evident by reference to it in Army Orders and
in the Austrian and German Press, which even reproduced some of the
literary efforts, and vilified Lord Northcliffe in their most fervent
manner. It even affected the minor tactics of the Austro-Hungarian
Army, for it necessitated the detachment of machine-gun sections to
deal with attempts at desertion _en masse_ during the Piave offensive,
which was eventually launched by the Austrians at the end of June.
There was at least one authenticated account of a mutiny among Czech
troops being suppressed by Germans and Magyars during that offensive.
Desertions of single men or small parties were frequent before and
during the action, and one case is known of a whole unit having come
over. This was a company composed entirely of Jugo-Slavs. The Company
Commander (Jugo-Slav and strongly Nationalist), on going his rounds
a couple of hours before the attack began, gathered from his men’s
conversation that they had no intention of fighting. He was able to
bring his whole company over.

The delay of the offensive, mainly on account of Allied propaganda,
proved to be very important, because, when it came the Piave rose
behind the Austrian army and converted the attack into something like a
disaster. There is reason to believe that many ammunition dumps behind
the enemy lines were blown up by the Czechs. A rumour was spread in the
Press that the Southern Slavs had been fighting desperately against
Italy, but this was officially denied. The divisions in question were a
mixture of Germans, Magyars, Poles, and Ruthenes. It appeared that the
Southern Slav divisions had been divided up and mixed with “reliable”
troops, which showed that the Austrians were afraid of them. The
prisoners taken, as a rule, expressed willingness to volunteer at once.
Dalmatian prisoners showed great enthusiasm for Jugo-Slavia and the
Allies.

After the Piave battle, members of the Inter-Allied Propaganda
Commission were received and thanked by the Italian Commander-in-Chief.
General Diaz said that the victory was due in considerable measure to
their efforts.

In August the Inter-Allied Conference on Enemy Propaganda, convoked by
Lord Northcliffe, met at Crewe House. In regard to propaganda against
Austria-Hungary, the Committee formed to consider questions of policy
found itself in complete agreement with the scheme of policy sanctioned
by the British Government for purposes of Propaganda, and amplified
by the decisions of the British, French, and Italian Governments at
the time of, or in connection with, the Rome Congress of Oppressed
Austro-Hungarian Nationalities. It recognised that such extensions
of policy, while springing from considerations of Allied principles,
had, in part, corresponded to the real demands of the propaganda
situation, which, in their turn, had sprung from the exigencies of the
military situation and, in particular, from the necessity of utilising
the established principles of the alliance for the purpose of impeding
or hampering the Austro-Hungarian offensive against Italy. Subsequent
acts and declarations on the part of Allied Governments and of the
Government of the United States made it clear that the joint policy of
the Allies was tending increasingly towards the constructive liberation
of the subject Austro-Hungarian races. The main task of the Committee
in relation to propaganda in Austria-Hungary seemed, therefore, to
be one of unifying for propaganda purposes these various acts and
declarations, and of preparing, if possible, the way for a joint
Allied declaration that might complete and render more effective the
work of Allied propaganda both in the interior of Austria-Hungary and
among Austro-Hungarian troops at the front. The Committee resolved to
suggest that the Italian Government take the initiative in promoting
a joint and unanimous public declaration that all the Allies regard
the establishment of a free and united Jugo-Slav State, embracing
Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, as one of the conditions of a just and
lasting peace, and of the rule of right in Europe. Such a declaration
was actually made by the Italian Government, but so tardily that its
propaganda effect was reduced to a minimum.

Reports from the British Commissioner at Padua chronicled the
uninterrupted continuance of the preparation and distribution of
leaflets. The work was so developed that a distributing capacity of
almost a million leaflets a day was obtained. Proof of the value of
the work was afforded by the arrival of deserters, belonging to the
subject races, in the Italian lines bringing with them the manifestoes
and saying, “I have come because you invited me.” A special leaflet was
prepared in London, with the co-operation of a member of the Southern
Slav Committee, for distribution by aeroplane at various points on the
Dalmatian coast, where Southern Slav insurgents were ascertained to
be gathered in considerable numbers. A detailed description, compiled
from official sources, of the overwhelming character of American
war preparations (which the enemy was constantly belittling) was
telegraphed to Padua for translation into Austro-Hungarian languages,
and for distribution in leaflet form among Austro-Hungarian troops.

Progress was even made among the Magyars who had fought with remarkable
ferocity on the Montello. The agrarian question that had troubled
Hungary for some time was used for propaganda purposes and many Magyar
desertions ensued. The constant efforts exerted an ever-increasing
and cumulative influence on the enemy. The collapse of Bulgaria
opened a new front for operations against Austria-Hungary and a
Propaganda Commission under Lieutenant-Colonel Granville Baker was
quickly organised on the lines of the Padua Commission and dispatched
to Salonika. Operations were promptly started, but it soon became
evident that the end was near. As the Allied armies on the Western
fronts advanced, news of their progress and of Bulgaria’s defection
was continually and promptly sent over the Austrian lines. There is
no doubt that this contributed to the increased amount of desertion
and disorder among the Austrian forces, culminating in the _débâcle_
produced by the final Allied attack in October, which brought down the
military and political organisations of the Dual Monarchy.

 Crewe House had every reason to be proud of the success of its
work against Austria-Hungary. The conception of the whole propaganda
campaign--its policy, its scope, its application--was due to Lord
Northcliffe and the co-directors of the Austrian Section of his
department, Mr. Wickham Steed and Dr. Seton-Watson. The results fully
vindicated every basic principle of their propaganda strategy. There
were difficulties to be overcome at every turn, of which political and
personal ambitions abroad were not the least. To keep the work on the
straight metals of uninterrupted progress necessitated unremitting
vigilance and ceaseless consultation with the numerous interests
concerned. The result was the greatest victory achieved by war
propaganda--the culmination of a constructive campaign, which, could
it have been extended to its logical conclusions, would have achieved
a just and lasting peace, liberating millions of our fellow-men from a
tyrannous yoke to the enjoyment of that political freedom which is the
inalienable right of civilised mankind.

[Illustration: MR. H. WICKHAM STEED.

MEMBER OF THE ENEMY PROPAGANDA COMMITTEE, AND ONE OF THE DIRECTORS OF
THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN SECTION.

_Photo: Russell, London._]

[Illustration: DR. R. W. SETON-WATSON.

CO-DIRECTOR OF THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN SECTION OF CREWE HOUSE.]

[Illustration: MR. H. G. WELLS.

MEMBER OF THE ENEMY PROPAGANDA COMMITTEE, AND FIRST DIRECTOR OF GERMAN
SECTION.

_“Daily Mirror” Photograph._]




CHAPTER IV

OPERATIONS AGAINST GERMANY

Early British neglect of propaganda--War Office establishes a
department--Lord Northcliffe takes office--Mr. H. G. Wells’s and Mr.
Hamilton Fyfe’s work--The final “intensive” campaign--Ways and means.


The successful launch of the “propaganda offensive” against
Austria-Hungary raised high hopes for the success of the corresponding
campaign against the Germans on the Western Front. These hopes were
shared by the Prime Minister, who wrote to Lord Northcliffe on May 16,
1918:--“It seems to me that you have organised admirable work in your
Austrian propaganda.... I trust that you will soon turn your attention
towards German propaganda along the French and British Fronts. I feel
sure that much can be done to disintegrate the _moral_ of the German
army along the same lines as we appear to have adopted with great
success in the Austro-Hungarian army.”

For the first eighteen months of the war all propaganda had been
sadly neglected by the British Government. Few realised its value, and
officially it was regarded as an unimportant “side-line.” That it might
be a weapon of warfare, equal in effect to several army corps, would at
that time have been ridiculed. Money for such purposes was grudgingly
spent, while the whole-hearted endeavours of a few enthusiasts were
disparaged as the exuberances of harmless “cranks.”

In October, 1914, Lieutenant-Colonel (now Major-General) Swinton, who
was then acting as “Eye-Witness” with the British Army, prepared a
propaganda leaflet, a reproduction of which appears in this book. To
enable him to produce it, Lord Northcliffe lent the aid of his Paris
organisation, and a large number of copies were printed and distributed
by aeroplane among the German troops. But the Army chiefs at that time
did not show any enthusiasm for the innovation, and Colonel Swinton was
unable to proceed with the project.

Propaganda against the enemy was, during a long period, almost a
single-handed campaign by Mr. S. A. Guest. He struggled on, despite
official discouragement or lack of encouragement, undeterred by all
the vicissitudes through which British propaganda passed. Indeed,
the early direction of British propaganda was like an epidemic; it
occasionally took strange forms and occurred in unexpected places. Mr.
Guest’s work was the institution and maintenance of those agencies by
which propagandist literature was produced and smuggled into Germany
and Austria-Hungary.

Within the War Office, there were some in favour of propagandist
activity, but for a long time they were in a minority. Early in 1916,
Major-General (now Lieutenant-General) Sir George Macdonogh, K.C.M.G.,
C.B., returned from France to become Director of Military Intelligence,
and mainly owing to his efforts and those of Brigadier-General G. K.
Cockerill, C.B. (then Director of Special Intelligence), a propaganda
branch of the Military Intelligence Department of the War Office was
established. From small beginnings, the activities of this branch grew.

It was in the spring of 1916 that a sub-section of this branch began
the preparation of leaflets in German for distribution among enemy
troops. One use of the leaflets was to disprove the false beliefs
spread among German soldiers that the British and French treated their
prisoners with great severity. To counteract this, reproductions of
letters actually written by German prisoners of war, photographs and
descriptions of prisoners and their camps, and similar material, were
prepared and distributed. As the political and social discontent in
Germany increased it was thought useful that the German soldiers should
be provided with more evidence of the internal conditions in their own
country than their officers would allow them to have, and leaflets
prepared from German sources, as, for instance, from suppressed
editions of German pamphlets and newspapers, were scattered on the
lines and rest billets.

It then undertook the publication of an excellent weekly news-sheet,
entitled _Le Courrier de l’Air_, containing news in French for
circulation among the French and Belgian inhabitants of occupied
districts. This newspaper, save for one short break, was regularly
distributed by air until November, 1918, and naturally was greatly
valued by those who otherwise would only have received “news” from
German sources.

During 1917 reports obtained by the examination of prisoners and
information derived from more secret sources showed that the propaganda
campaign was achieving useful results, and the Directorate of Military
Intelligence, in co-operation with the G.H.Q. in France, made
arrangements for the work to be extended, until by the spring of 1918
about a million leaflets monthly were being issued.

The task of distribution of propaganda literature by air would have
been simpler but for an extraordinary military decision. When this work
was started by the military authorities the leaflets were dropped from
aeroplanes. This method had the widest limits, and, at the same time,
was the best means of carrying a large bulk and of distributing with
accuracy. Perturbed by the success attained, the Germans threatened
to inflict severe penalties upon airmen captured when performing
such duties, and, on capturing two British airmen, followed their
threats by action. Instead of instituting immediate reprisals, the
British authorities tamely submitted and gave instructions for the
discontinuance of the use of aeroplanes for the purpose.

In consequence of this weak action, experiments had to be undertaken
to find a substitute for the aeroplane. There were a number of
possible, although inferior, methods. Hand and rifle grenades were
devised to burst and shower leaflets over a limited area among enemy
troops. Trench mortars would serve a similar purpose. But thanks
to the progress of military meteorological science during the war
and to several months’ patient experimenting with various devices,
it was found possible to utilise specially adapted balloons. The
Air Inventions Committee, the Munitions Inventions Department, the
Inspectorate of H.M. Stores, Woolwich, Army Intelligence officers
experienced in the use of silk balloons for other military purposes,
and the manufacturers, all assisted the War Office in arriving at
a result which proved to be effective and as nearly as possible
“fool-proof.” Designs and apparatus were tested in the workshop and
laboratory, at experimental stations near London, and on Salisbury
Plain. They were taken out to France and tried under the actual
conditions of war, and gradually each difficulty was overcome and each
detail reduced to its simplest form.

In its standard form in which it was being manufactured at the rate of
nearly 2,000 a week the propaganda balloon was made of paper, cut in 10
longitudinal panels, with a neck of oiled silk about 12 inches long.
The circumference was about 20 feet and the height, when inflated, over
eight feet. The absolute capacity was approximately 100 cubic feet,
but the balloons were liberated when not quite taut, containing 90
to 95 cubic feet of hydrogen. Hydrogen readily passes through paper,
and the part of the experimental work that caused most trouble was
the discovery of a suitable varnish, or “dope,” to make the paper
gas-tight. After many disappointments, a formula was arrived at, the
application of which prevented appreciable evaporation of the gas for
two or three hours, and which left a balloon with some lifting capacity
after thirty-six hours.

The lifting power of a balloon is the difference between the weight
of the hydrogen and the weight of the same bulk of air, _less_ the
weight of the balloon itself. The weight of the paper balloon was
just over one pound; the available lifting power varied with the
degree of tautness to which the balloon was filled, the height of the
barometer and the temperature, but on the average, at ground level,
the balloon as inflated would just support five and a half pounds.
After a good deal of experiment the load of propaganda and releasing
apparatus was fixed at four pounds and a few ounces, this allowing
from 500 to 1,000 leaflets, according to their size, to be carried by
each balloon, the balance of lifting power being sufficient to take
the balloon sharply into the air to a height of five or six thousand
feet. As a balloon rises the pressure of the air decreases and the
contained hydrogen expands. In the earlier experiments the neck of the
balloon was tied after inflation, and, to allow for expansion, the
balloon was filled only to a little over two-thirds of its capacity.
This was unsatisfactory; it reduced the load of propaganda and led to
many failures from bursting and to great uncertainty as to where the
load would fall. It was found more satisfactory to inflate the balloon
nearly to its full capacity and to liberate it with the neck open, or
with a large slit cut at the base of the neck, to allow the gas to
escape as it expanded. At a height of, on the average, from 4,000 to
6,000 feet the escape of gas had reduced the free lift to a negative
quantity, and the balloon would begin to drop slowly, but for the
liberation of ballast.

After several ingenious mechanical devices had been tested, a
method of releasing leaflets by the burning of a fuse was adopted.
A suitable length of prepared cotton wick, similar to that used in
flint pipe-lighters, and burning evenly at the rate of five minutes
to the inch, was securely threaded to a wire by which it was attached
to the neck of the balloon. Several inches of the upper end were
left free, and the load of leaflets was strung in small packets by
cotton threads along the length of the fuse. As soon as a balloon was
inflated and the loaded release attached, the free end of the fuse was
cut to the required length, so as to burn for five, ten, or so many
minutes, before the first packet was reached, the cut end was lighted,
usually from the pipe or cigarette the soldier was smoking, and the
balloon sent off on its journey. The release of each packet acted as
a discharge of ballast, and the balloon, although continually losing
gas, kept in the air until the end of its course. The arrangement used
most frequently was designed for liberating the balloons a few miles
behind the front lines and for distributing the leaflets from the enemy
lines to a few miles behind them. The total length of fuse was twelve
inches, giving an hour’s run. The first six inches were left free to
be cut before lighting according to the position of the station and
the strength of the wind; the load of propaganda was arranged over
the second half-hour at intervals of two and a half minutes. Much
longer fuses, with the load distributed at greater intervals, were
used for longer runs. Experiment showed that the lateral scattering
of the leaflets, dropped from a height of 4,000 feet and upwards, was
considerable. The length of the track varied with the strength of the
wind.

The unit for distribution consisted of two motor lorries, which took
the men, the cylinders of hydrogen, and the propaganda loaded on
releases to a sheltered position selected in the morning by the officer
in charge after consultation with the meteorological experts. The vans
were drawn up end to end, separated by a distance of about ten feet,
and a curtain of canvas was then stretched on the windward side between
the vans, thus forming a three-sided chamber. The balloon was laid on
the ground, rapidly filled, the release attached and lighted, and the
balloon liberated, the whole operation taking only a few minutes.

The load of the balloons was chosen according to the direction of
the wind. If it was blowing towards Belgium, copies of _Le Courrier
de l’Air_ were attached; if towards Germany, propaganda leaflets for
enemy troops. The experimental improvement of the “dope” with which
the paper was treated in order to prevent loss of gas by diffusion,
and the manufacture of balloons of double the standard capacity, had
placed runs of upwards of 150 miles well within the capacity of the
method before the Armistice suspended operations, but the bulk of the
propaganda was distributed over an area of from 10 to 50 miles behind
the enemy lines. Fortunately, during the late summer and autumn of 1918
the wind was blowing almost consistently favourable for their dispatch.

When Lord Northcliffe took office in February, 1918, Austria-Hungary
was the most urgent field for his operations, as has been explained.
While Crewe House was concentrating upon that work he desired the
War Office to continue on his behalf the admirable and assiduous
work carried on since 1916. Early in May, 1918, Mr. H. G. Wells
accepted Lord Northcliffe’s invitation to direct the preparation of
propaganda literature against Germany, with the co-operation of Dr.
J. W. Headlam-Morley. The first need was felt to be the definition
of a policy to be followed against Germany, in order to prevent
dissipation of energy and diversity of treatment. It was obvious that
this propaganda policy must be in accord with the general policy of the
Allies. In some points it followed the declared aims of the Allies; in
others, it preceded the general policy as a pathmaker and pacemaker.
Mr. Wells undertook to prepare a memorandum on the position of Germany
at that time from the point of view of propaganda. This was submitted
by Mr. Wells to the Enemy Propaganda Committee and fully discussed. A
preface was prepared and upon the two statements was based a letter
to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, as in the case of the
propaganda policy against Austria-Hungary, asking for the assent of the
British Government to the policy therein contained.

Mr. Wells’s memorandum was of the highest interest as a contemporary
study of Germany, by a master of psychology, at that juncture when
Germany was making her great (and, fortunately, her final) bid for
world-mastery. The document possesses no little historical value; much
that was prophetic has been forged into history by the rapid march of
events; and the non-fulfilment of much of what has not attained to its
consummation is due to lack of political wisdom in the chancelleries.
Following is the text of preface and memorandum:--

  _Preface._

  “Propaganda in Germany, as in other enemy countries, must obviously
  be based upon a clear Allied policy. Hitherto Allied policy and
  Allied war aims have been defined too loosely to be comprehensible to
  the Germans.

  “The real war aim of the Allies is not only to beat the enemy, but to
  establish a world peace that shall preclude the resumption of war.
  Successful propaganda in Germany presupposes the clear definition
  of the kind of world-settlement which the Allies are determined to
  secure and the place of Germany in it.

  “The points to be brought home to the Germans are:--

    “1. _The determination of the Allies to continue the war until
    Germany accepts the Allied peace settlement._

    “2. _The existing alliance as a Fighting League of Free Nations
    will be deepened and extended, and the military, naval, financial
    and economic resources of its members will be pooled until_--

    “(_a_) _Its military purpose is achieved, and_

    “(_b_) _Peace is established on lasting foundations._

  “German minds are particularly susceptible to systematic statements.
  They are accustomed to discuss and understand co-ordinate
  projects. The ideas represented by the phrase ‘Berlin-Baghdad’ and
  ‘Mittel-Europa’ have been fully explained to them and now form the
  bases of German political thought. Other projects, represented by
  ‘Berlin-Teheran’ and ‘Berlin-Tokyo’ are becoming familiar to them.
  Against these ideas the Allies have not yet set up any comprehensive
  and comprehensible scheme of world organisation. There is no Allied
  counterpart of Naumann’s ‘Mittel-Europa’ which the neutral and
  the German Press could discuss as a practical proposition. This
  counterpart should be created without delay by competent Allied
  writers. It would form an effective basis for propaganda, and would
  work automatically.

  “It follows that one of the first requisites is to study and to lay
  down the lines of a practical League of Free Nations. The present
  alliance must be taken as the nucleus of any such League. Its control
  of raw materials, of shipping, and its power to exclude for an
  indefinite period enemy or even neutral peoples until they subscribe
  to and give pledges of their acceptance of its principles should be
  emphasised. It should be pointed out that nothing stands between
  enemy peoples and a lasting peace except the predatory designs of
  their ruling dynasties and military and economic castes; that the
  design of the Allies is not to crush any people, but to assure the
  freedom of all on a basis of self-determination to be exercised under
  definite guarantees of justice and fair play; that, unless enemy
  peoples accept the Allied conception of a world peace settlement, it
  will be impossible for them to repair the havoc of the present war,
  to avert utter financial ruin, and to save themselves from prolonged
  misery; and that the longer the struggle lasts the deeper will
  become the hatred of everything German in the non-German world, and
  the heavier the social and economic handicap under which the enemy
  peoples will labour, even after their admission into a League of
  Nations.

  “The primary war aim of the Allies thus becomes the changing
  of Germany, not only in the interest of the Allied League, but in
  that of the German people itself. Without the honest co-operation
  of Germany, disarmament on a large scale would be impossible, and,
  without disarmament, social and economic reconstruction would be
  impracticable. Germany has, therefore, to choose between her own
  permanent ruin by adhering to her present system of government and
  policy and the prospect of economic and political redemption by
  overthrowing her militarist system so as to be able to join honestly
  in the Allied scheme of world organisation.”


  _Memorandum._

  “It has become manifest that for the purposes of an efficient
  pro-Ally propaganda in neutral and enemy countries a clear and full
  statement of the war aims of the Allies is vitally necessary. What
  is wanted is something in the nature of an authoritative text to
  which propagandists may refer with confidence and which can be made
  the standard of their activities. It is not sufficient to recount
  the sins of Germany and to assert that the defeat of Germany is the
  Allied war aim. What all the world desires to know is what is to
  happen _after_ the war. The real war aim of a belligerent, it is more
  and more understood, is not merely victory, but a peace of a certain
  character which that belligerent desires shall arise out of that
  victory. What, therefore, is the peace sought by the Allies?

  “It would be superfluous even to summarise here the primary case
  of the Allies, that the war is on their part a war to resist the
  military aggression of Germany, assisted by the landowning Magyars
  of Hungary, the Turks, and the King of Bulgaria, upon the rest of
  mankind. It is a war against belligerence, against aggressive war,
  and the preparation for aggressive war. Such it was in its beginning,
  and such it remains. But it would be idle to pretend that the ideas
  of the Governments and peoples allied against Germany have not
  developed very greatly during the years of the war. There has been a
  deepening realisation of the danger to mankind of existing political
  divisions and separations, a great experience in the suffering,
  destruction, and waste of war; a quickening of consciences against
  conquests, annexations, and subjugations; and a general clearing up
  of ideas that have hitherto stood in the way of an organised world
  peace. While German Imperialism, to judge by the utterances of its
  accredited heads, and by the behaviour of Germany in the temporarily
  disorganised States on her Eastern Front, is still as truculent,
  aggressive, and treacherous as ever, the mind of her antagonists has
  learnt and has matured. There has arisen in the great world outside
  the inner lives of the Central Powers a will that grows to gigantic
  proportions, that altogether overshadows the boasted _will to power_
  of the German junker and exploiter, _the will to a world peace_. It
  is like the will of an experienced man set against the will of an
  obstinate and selfish youth. The war aims of the anti-German Allies
  take more and more definitely the form of a world of States leagued
  together to maintain a common law, to submit their mutual differences
  to a conclusive tribunal, to protect weak communities, to restrain
  and suppress war threats and war preparations throughout the earth.

  “Steadfastly the great peoples of the world outside the shadow of
  German Imperial domination have been working their way to unanimity,
  while the ruling intelligences of Germany have been scheming for
  the base advantages of conquest; while they have been undermining,
  confusing, and demoralising the mentality of Russia, crushing
  down the subject peoples of the Austro-Hungarian Imperialism, and
  threatening and cajoling neutrals there has been a wide, free
  movement in the minds of their antagonists towards the restraint and
  wisdom of a greater and nobler phase in human affairs. The thought
  of the world crystallises now about a phrase, the phrase ‘The League
  of Free Nations.’ The war aims of the Allies become more and more
  explicitly associated with the spirit and implications of that.

  “Like all such phrases, ‘The League of Free Nations’ is subject
  to a great variety of detailed interpretation, but its broad
  intentions can now be stated without much risk of dissent. The ideal
  would, of course, include all the nations of the earth, including
  a Germany purged of her military aggressiveness; it involves some
  sort of INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS that can revise, codify, amend and
  extend international law, a supreme Court of Law in which States
  may sue and be sued, and whose decision the League will be pledged
  to enforce, and the supervision, limitation, and use of armaments
  under the direction of the international congress. It is also
  felt very widely that such a congress must set a restraint upon
  competitive and unsanctioned ‘expansionist’ movements into unsettled
  and disordered regions, must act as the guardian of feeble races and
  communities, and must be empowered to make conclusive decisions upon
  questions of transport, tariffs, access to raw material, migration,
  and international intercourse generally. The constitution of this
  congress remains indefinite; it is the crucial matter upon which the
  best thought of the world is working at the present time. But given
  the prospect of a suitable congress there can be little dispute that
  the great Imperial Powers among the Allies are now prepared for
  great and generous limitations of their sovereignty in the matter of
  armaments, of tropical possessions and of subject peoples, in the
  common interest of mankind. The spectacle of German Imperialism,
  boastful, selfish, narrow, and altogether hateful, in its terrible
  blood-dance through Europe, has been an object-lesson to humanity
  against excesses of national vanity and national egotism and against
  Imperial pride. Among the Allies, the two chief Imperial Powers,
  measured by the extent of territory they control, are Britain and
  France, and each of these is more completely prepared to-day than
  ever it has been before to consider its imperial possessions as a
  trust for their inhabitants and for mankind, and its position in
  the more fertile and less settled regions of the world as that of a
  mandatory and trustee. These admissions involve a plain prospect and
  promise of the ultimate release and liberation of all the peoples in
  these great and variegated Empires to complete world-citizenship.

  “But in using the phrase ‘The League of Nations,’ it may be well
  to dispel certain misconceptions that have arisen through the
  experimental preparation by more or less irresponsible persons and
  societies of elaborate schemes and constitutions of such a league.
  Proposals have been printed and published, for example, of a Court of
  World Conciliation, in which each sovereign State will be represented
  by one member--Montenegro, for example, by one, and the British
  Empire by one--and other proposals have been mooted of a Congress
  of the League of Nations, in which such States as Hayti, Abyssinia,
  and the like will be represented by one or two representatives, and
  France and Great Britain by five or six. All such projects should
  be put out of mind when the phrase ‘League of Free Nations’ is used
  by responsible speakers for the Allied Powers. Certain most obvious
  considerations have evidently been overlooked by the framers of such
  proposals. It will, for example, be a manifest disadvantage to the
  smaller Powers to be at all over-represented upon the Congress of any
  such League; it may even be desirable that certain of them should not
  have a _voting_ representative at all, for this reason, that a great
  Power still cherishing an aggressive spirit would certainly attempt,
  as the beginning of its aggression, to compel adjacent small Powers
  to send representatives practically chosen by itself. The coarse
  fact of the case in regard to an immediate world peace is this, that
  only five or six great Powers possess sufficient economic resources
  to make war under modern conditions at the present time, namely, the
  United States of America, Great Britain, France, Germany, Japan, and,
  doubtfully, Austria-Hungary. Italy suffers under the disadvantage
  that she has no coal supply. These five or six Powers we may say,
  therefore, permit war and can prevent it. They are at present
  necessarily the custodians of the peace of the world, and it is mere
  pedantry not to admit that this gives them a practical claim to
  preponderance in the opening Congress of the World League. It may be
  pointed out that a small State with a voice in the discussions, but
  no vote in the decisions of the League, would logically be excused
  from the liability to assist in enforcing those decisions.

  “But this question of the constitution of a world Congress is
  not to be solved by making a coarse classification of States into
  large and war-capable Powers, and small and weak Powers. Take
  the case of Italy, for example: though she is almost incapable
  of sustaining a war against the world by herself because of her
  weakness in the matter of coal, she can as an ally be at once of
  enormous importance. Take the case of Spain again, a very similar
  case. And whatever the war ability of Latin-America may be to-day,
  there can be no question that this great constellation of States
  must count very heavily in the framing of the world of to-morrow.
  Then, again, we have to consider the vast future possibilities of
  the Chinese Republic, with coal, steel, and a magnificent industrial
  population, and the probable reconstruction of Eastern Europe and
  a renascence of Russia which may give the world a loose-knit but
  collectively-important Slavonic confederation. While an isolated
  small Power within the orbit of attraction of a large Power, a State
  of 5,000,000 people or less, must always remain a difficult problem
  in the world representation, it is clear that something like an
  adequate representation of small and weak Powers becomes possible
  so soon as they develop a disposition towards aggregation, for the
  purposes of world politics, into associations with States racially,
  linguistically, and historically akin to them. The trend of Allied
  opinion is to place not Peru or Ukrainia, nor Norway, nor Finland on
  a level with the United States of America or the British Empire at
  the League of Nations Congress, but to prepare the way for adequate
  representation through a preliminary Latin-American or a Slavonic or
  a Scandinavian Confederation, which could speak with a common idea at
  the World Congress.

  “It should be manifest that there is one Power whose splendid
  achievement in this war, and whose particular needs, justify her
  over-representation (as measured by material wealth, and millions
  of population) upon the Congress of the League, and that is
  France. It is open to question whether Italy should not also be
  disproportionately over-represented, seeing that she will not have,
  as Spain will have, the moral reinforcement of kindred nations over
  seas. And with regard to the British Empire, seeing that there exists
  no real Imperial legislature, it is open to consideration whether
  Canada, South Africa, and Australasia should come into the Council
  as separate nationalities. The Asiatic and African possessions of
  Britain and France, Belgium and Italy, possessions, that is, which
  have no self-government, might possibly for a time be represented
  by members appointed by the governing power in each case. These are
  merely suggestions here, indications of a disposition of mind, but
  they are suggestions upon which it is necessary for the Allied Powers
  to decide as speedily as possible. The effective working out of this
  problem of the League of Nations Congress by the Allies without
  undue delay is as vital a part of the Allied policy as the effective
  conduct of the war.

  “It has to be recognised that the institution of a League of Nations
  precludes any annexations or any military interference with any
  peoples whatever, without a mandate from the Congress of the League.
  The League must directly or indirectly become the guardian of all
  unsettled regions and order must be kept and development promoted
  by it in such derelict regions as Mesopotamia and Armenia, for
  example, have now become. In these latter instances it is open to
  consideration whether the League should operate through some single
  power acting as a mandatory of the League, or else by international
  forces under the control of the League as a whole. Theoretically the
  latter course is to be preferred, but there are enormous practical
  advantages in many cases to be urged for the former. The Allies
  have indeed had a considerable experience during the war of joint
  controls and joint expeditions; there has been a great education
  in internationalism since August, 1914; but nevertheless the end
  of the war is likely to come long before any real international
  forces have been evolved. It is, however, towards the ultimate use
  of international forces in such cases that the joint policy of the
  Allies is plainly and openly directed.

  “The bringing of the League into practical politics profoundly
  affects the question of territorial adjustment after the war. The
  Allies are bound in honour to follow the will of France in the matter
  of Alsace-Lorraine, and the rectification of the Italian frontier
  and the bringing of the bulk of the Italian-speaking population,
  now under Austrian dominion, into one ring-fence with Italy, also
  seem a necessary part of a world pacification. It is, however, of
  far less importance in the war aims of the Allies that this and that
  particular scrap of territory should change hands from the control of
  one group of combatants to that of the other, than that the present
  practical ascendency of German Imperialism over the resources of the
  Polish, Russian, Ukrainian, Czech, Jugo-Slav, Finnish, and Roumanian
  peoples should cease. The war aim of the Allies in Eastern Europe
  is to create in the place of the present Austro-Hungarian Empire a
  larger synthesis of associated States, something in the nature of
  an ‘East Central European League,’ within the League of Nations, a
  confederation that might possibly reach from Poland to the Black
  and Adriatic Seas, and have also access to, if not a port upon, the
  Baltic at Danzig. The Allies are necessarily obliged to wait upon
  the development of affairs in Russia, but the hopes and efforts of
  the Allies are towards a reconciliation of at least Great Russia,
  Siberia, and Ukrainia into a workable association within the League.
  It is premature to speculate upon the grouping of Finland at the
  present time. Relieved of the feverish and impossible ambitions the
  political weaknesses of these peoples have stimulated, a free and
  united Germany could then become one of the predominant partners
  in the World League of Free Nations. The Allies do not propose an
  unconditional return of the former African possessions of Germany,
  but they contemplate an over-ruling international _régime_ in
  Africa between the Sahara and the Zambesi, restraining armament,
  reorganising native education, and giving absolute equality of trade
  to all the nations in the League. Such an international _régime_
  under the League may not be incompatible with the retention of
  national flags in the former ‘possessions’ of the leagued Powers.

  “Exact territorial definition does not appear to the Allies to be
  of nearly such importance as the establishment of a common system of
  disarmament and a common effort to restore the ravages of the war.
  The full effect of the war is still not realised by the mass of the
  belligerent peoples, more especially in America and Western Europe,
  where life is still fairly comfortable. There has already been a
  destruction not merely of the political, but of the social order over
  great areas of the world, especially in Eastern Europe, and it is
  doubtful whether any peace can restore these disorganised areas to
  anything like their former productivity for many years. A universal
  shortage not merely of man-power, but of transport and machinery
  available for the purposes of peace cannot be avoided. It is
  doubtful, moreover, if social discipline in the ports of the British
  Empire and America will be strong enough to restrain an organised
  resistance to the use of German shipping after the war for any
  purpose and to the use of Allied shipping for the transport of goods
  to and from Germany on the part of Allied and neutral seamen and
  transport workers indignant at the U-boat campaign; moreover, there
  is a world-wide cry for a vindictive trade after the war against
  Germany, and for organised boycotts that may further restrict the
  process of economic world recovery. It is doubtful if the menace of
  these ‘revenge’ movements and the difficulty of controlling them in
  democratic States is properly appreciated in Germany. The militarist
  Government of Germany, fighting now for bare existence, is concealing
  from its people this world-wide disposition to boycott German trade
  and industry at any cost to the boycotting populations, and buoying
  them up with preposterous hopes of ‘business as usual’ as soon as
  peace is made. The fact has to be faced that while the present
  German Government remains no such economic resumption is possible.
  The ‘War after the War’ possibility has to be added to the economic
  destruction in Russia, Belgium, and elsewhere in any estimate of the
  situation after the war.

  “The plain prospect of material disorganisation thus opened
  should alone suffice to establish the absolute necessity for peace
  now of such a nature as will permit a world-wide concentration upon
  reconstruction, in good faith and without any complications of enmity
  and hostility. But in addition to the material destruction and
  dislocation, and to the ‘hatred’ disorganisation already noted, the
  financial transactions of the last few years have created a monetary
  inflation which, _without the concerted action of all the Powers_,
  may mean a collapse of world credit. Add now the plain necessity
  for continued armament if a real League of Nations is not attained.
  Without any exaggeration the prospect of the nations facing these
  economic difficulties in an atmosphere of continuing hostility,
  intrigue, and conflict, under a continuing weight of armaments, and
  with a continuing distrust, is a hopeless one. The consequences stare
  us in the face; Russia is only the first instance of what must happen
  generally. The alternative to a real League of Nations is the steady
  descent of our civilisation towards a condition of political and
  social fragmentation such as the world has not seen since the fall of
  the Roman Empire. The honest co-operation of Germany in the League of
  Nations, in disarmament, and in world reconstruction is, therefore,
  fundamentally necessary. There is now no other rational policy. And
  since it is impossible to hope for any such help or co-operation
  from the Germany of the Belgian outrage, the Brest-Litovsk Treaty,
  the betrayal of Ukrainia, THE CHANGING OF GERMANY becomes a primary
  war aim, _the_ primary war aim for the Allies. How Germany is to be
  changed is a complex question. The word _Revolution_ is, perhaps, to
  be deprecated. We do not, for instance, desire a Bolshevik breakdown
  in Germany, which would make her economically useless to mankind. We
  look, therefore, not so much to the German peasant and labourer as to
  the ordinary, fairly well-educated mediocre German for co-operation
  in the reinstatement of civilisation. Change there _must_ be in
  Germany; in the spirit in which the Government is conducted, in the
  persons who exercise the control, and in the relative influence
  of different classes in the country. The sharpest distinction,
  therefore, has to be drawn between Germany and its present Government
  in all our propaganda and public utterances; and a constant appeal
  has to be made by the statesmen of the Alliance, and by a frank and
  open propaganda through the Germans of the United States of America
  and of Switzerland, through neutral countries and by every possible
  means, from Germany Junker to Germany sober. We may be inclined
  to believe that every German is something of a Junker, we have to
  remember he is also potentially a reasonable man.

  “And meanwhile, the Allies must continue with haste and diligence to
  fight and defeat Junker Germany, which cannot possibly conquer but
  which may nevertheless succeed in ruining the world. They must fight
  the German armies upon the fronts, they must fight an unregenerate
  Germany economically and politically, and they must bring home to the
  German reason and conscience at home, by an intensive air war and
  by propaganda alike, the real impossibility of these conceptions of
  national pride and aggressiveness in which the German population has
  been bred.”

These documents were used as a basis for the policy of Crewe House,
which was summarised into seven parts in Lord Northcliffe’s subsequent
letter to Mr. Balfour, extracts from which follow:--

  “I wish to submit to you the following general scheme of policy as
  a basis for British--and eventually Allied--propaganda in Germany.
  Propaganda, as an active form of policy, must be in harmony with the
  settled war aims of the Allies:--

  “1. The object of all propaganda is to weaken the will of the enemy
  to war and victory. For this purpose it is necessary to put in the
  forefront the ultimate object of the Allies, and the use which they
  would make of victory, for this is the matter with which the Germans
  are most concerned. We cannot, of course, expect that the war aims of
  the Allies should be determined solely by the effect which they may
  have upon the German people, but, on the other hand, it is clearly
  undesirable to put forward for propaganda purposes objects which it
  is not really intended to secure. It appears to me, however, that
  our war aims, as I understand them, are such as could, if presented
  in a suitable form, be made to do something to strengthen whatever
  ‘opposition’ exists in Germany.

  “2. From such information as is available as to the internal
  condition of Germany two points emerge which are of the greatest
  importance for immediate purposes:--

      “(_a_) There is much evidence that the German people as a whole
    desire above all a cessation of the war. They are suffering more
    than their opponents, and war weariness has advanced further with
    them than it has with us. They acquiesce in the continuance of the
    present offensive chiefly because they are assured by their leaders
    that this is the only way in which a speedy peace can be achieved.
    It is, therefore, necessary to impress upon them that they are face
    to face with a determined and immutable will on the part of Allied
    nations to continue the war at whatever cost, notwithstanding
    German military successes, and that for this reason military
    success is not the way to bring about the peace they desire. It
    must be made plain that we are prepared to continue a ruthless
    policy of commercial blockade.

     “(_b_) Side by side with this we have another motive of the
    highest importance. One of the chief instruments of the German
    Government is the belief which they foster that any peace that the
    Allies would, if they had their way, impose would mean the internal
    ruin of Germany, and this again would mean that each individual
    German family would find itself without work, without money, and
    without food. As against this it is necessary to impress on the
    German nation that these results might happen, but that they can be
    avoided. They will happen if the Government of Germany continues
    to carry out its openly avowed design of subjecting the other free
    nations of Europe to its domination. They can be avoided if the
    German nation will resign these projects of domination and consent
    to accept the Allied scheme for a new organisation of the world.

  “These two points (_a_) and (_b_) must be kept in close connection;
  the first provides the element of fear, the second provides the
  element of hope.

  “3. The first point presents no difficulty to us; we can go ahead
  in full confidence that we are in harmony with both the nation and
  the Government. As to the second, on the other hand, I must ask for
  your guidance and support. Hitherto Allied policy and war aims have
  been defined too loosely to be comprehensible to the Germans, and
  there have been apparent inconsistencies, of which they have quickly
  taken advantage. Moreover, it has been possible for German writers
  to misrepresent our war aims as dictated by Imperialistic ambitions,
  similar in kind to those by which they are themselves actuated, and
  involving ‘annexations and indemnities,’ such as have in the past
  been too often the result of victory in war. I take it that the
  real object of the Allies is, after defeating Germany, to establish
  such a world peace as shall, within the limits of human foresight,
  preclude another conflagration. It seems necessary, therefore, that
  the separate aims which would, of course, be maintained, such as
  the restoration of Belgium, the liberation of Alsace-Lorraine, the
  establishment of civilised government in Mesopotamia and Palestine,
  should be put forward in their proper places as individual but
  essential points in the general scheme for the settlement of world
  politics on a basis which would go far to remove the causes of future
  wars.

  “4. Any such scheme would, in effect, amount to the constitution of
  a ‘League of Free Nations.’ It is, I presume, generally understood
  that eventually Germany would be invited to take her place in such
  a League on condition that she accepted the principles of its
  foundation. Her admission to the League would be in itself her
  guarantee against the establishment of, _e.g._, a hostile monopoly of
  raw materials. Our terms of peace, therefore, can be represented as
  the conditions on which Germany should be invited to take her part
  in such a League. In order to secure the economic benefits she would
  have to accept the political conditions. If this is so, the task of
  propaganda is greatly lightened, for it would be easier to put our
  aims in such a form as to make them to some extent acceptable to the
  moderate elements in Germany than if they were put forward merely as
  terms to be imposed on a defeated enemy.

  “5. It is, however, obvious that propaganda conducted on these
  lines will be of little use unless it is supported by public and
  authoritative statements from the Allied Governments. Otherwise,
  it would be represented that the real object is to beguile Germany
  into accepting a peace of renunciation, and that, as soon as this
  object has been achieved, these schemes will be repudiated, and a
  weakened Germany will find herself face to face with an Anglo-Saxon
  combination which aims at dominating the world, and keeping Germany
  permanently in a position of political inferiority.

  “6. No such statement has yet been made, so far as I am aware, by
  the British Government or by the Allies. What, therefore, I should
  venture to ask is for such support from you as will enable us to
  carry on our work with the full consciousness that we have behind us
  the support of His Majesty’s Government. If it were known that the
  Government itself, in conjunction with the Allies, was investigating
  the problem with a view to speedy action, this knowledge would give a
  great and needed incentive to the more popular work which we should
  be doing.

  “7. I am well aware of the very great practical difficulties which
  are bound to arise so soon as an attempt is made to give formal
  expression to the general idea of a ‘League of Free Nations.’ But for
  the purposes of our work, it is of the most urgent importance that
  some statement of this kind should be put forward at the earliest
  possible date. Such a statement would in effect be an offer to the
  Germans of peace on stated conditions. If it were accepted, Germany
  would be able shortly after the conclusion of the war to come into
  the new society of nations; if it were refused, the war would have
  to continue. But it should also be made clear to the German people
  that the privilege of admission to this society would inevitably be
  postponed for a period proportional to the length of time that they
  continued the war.”

In answer to an inquiry, Lord Northcliffe wrote a supplementary letter,
dealing with propaganda policy as to the German colonies. The following
is an extract:--

  “I have no settled views as to the future of what were the German
  colonies, beyond a very strong conviction that they must never again
  be allowed to fall, for any military or naval purpose, under German
  control. But, broadly, my feeling is this: The whole situation of
  the Allies in regard to Germany is governed by the fact that Germany
  is responsible for the war. The Allies are, therefore, entitled
  to demand from her restitution, reparation, and guarantees as
  preliminary conditions of any peace settlement. The territories which
  the Allies have taken from Germany in the course of their legitimate
  self-defence do not come into the same category as the territories
  seized by Germany, and the allies of Germany, in the course of their
  predatory aggression. To contemplate barter or exchange between
  one set of territories and the other would be to assimilate, by
  implication, the moral situation of the Allies to that of Germany.
  Therefore, however closely we may study the question, or rather the
  questions--for there are several--of the German colonies, we ought to
  make it clear that the ultimate settlement of those questions will
  be reserved for treatment by the Allies as a fighting league of free
  nations, or by the general League of Nations should the behaviour of
  Germany entitle her to admission to it in time to take part in any
  scheme of world reorganisation.”

The policy laid down in these letters was approved by the Government as
a basis for propaganda, and Mr. Wells was able to develop his work in
many directions.

He kept in close touch with the different organisations at home and
abroad which were endeavouring to promote the League of Nations. In
conjunction with Mr. Steed, Mr. Wells assisted in the drawing up of
a restatement of the aims of the League of Nations Society in Great
Britain and in the formation of a new association for the study of the
problems arising out of the League proposal. This movement was always
kept prominently before the German mind, for it was a threat of future
isolation, with its resultant economic disabilities, and yet was an
invitation to national repentance.

A second line of action was designed to appeal to the German workers.
For this purpose Mr. Wells arranged, among other things, for the
preparation and issue of a short and compact summary of the British
Labour War Aims, which was subsequently used with much effectiveness
not only in Germany but also in Austria.

Economic conditions, both during and after the war, were made by Mr.
Wells and his co-workers the subject of systematic and scientific study
with the object of undertaking a propaganda of economic discouragement
and persuasion in Germany. Signs were not lacking of the existence
of misgivings among the commercial communities in that country at
the prospect of loss of commerce, ships, and colonies in the case
of defeat. Here was an opportunity to bring home to the Germans the
conviction that the longer they persisted in continuing the war, so
would their loss and sufferings increase.

Unfortunately, in July, Mr. Wells found himself unable to continue
the direction of the German Section and, at his request, the Enemy
Propaganda Committee accepted his resignation of that office, although
he retained his membership of the Committee. Mr. Hamilton Fyfe was
appointed to succeed him and continued in the important post until the
end. Mr. Fyfe developed the work along the lines already laid down.

From the time of Mr. Wells’s appointment, Crewe House and the enemy
propaganda section of the Military Intelligence Department maintained
close touch with each other, but in July, 1918, Lord Northcliffe wrote
to the Secretary of State for War expressing his considered view
that it would be advisable that British propaganda agencies against
the enemy should, both for technical reasons and in order to preclude
possible differences of statement in propaganda literature, as far as
possible be closely co-ordinated. While gladly recognising the most
friendly relations which had been cultivated between his department and
the enemy propaganda branch of the War Office, through Major the Earl
of Kerry, Lord Northcliffe thought that the time had come for the whole
of the work of production to be centralised at Crewe House. This did
not alter the arrangements for distribution through military channels
which were always admirably organised and carried out by the military
authorities. And, as a matter of fact, a large proportion of the
literature, apart from the “priority” leaflets referred to hereinafter,
was produced by the War Office on Lord Northcliffe’s behalf. Lord
Northcliffe asked for urgent consideration of the matter, in view of
the necessity for the intensification and extension of propaganda on
the Western Front. On Lord Milner’s agreeing to this reorganisation, it
was arranged that the services of Captain P. Chalmers Mitchell, who,
well-known in civil life as a distinguished man of science, had been
the officer immediately in charge of this enemy propaganda branch,
should be transferred to Crewe House. He was a valuable acquisition,
and his experience, knowledge, and counsel were of great practical
service. Captain Chalmers Mitchell also acted as liaison officer
with the War Office (in succession to Lord Kerry) and with the Royal
Air Force, and, in conjunction with Mr. Hamilton Fyfe, co-ordinated
production and distribution.

This centralisation soon bore fruit. One of the earliest developments
aimed at abolishing the delays which might have caused the contents
of leaflets to become stale owing to the time which elapsed between
their composition and their distribution. This defect was obviated by
dividing the leaflets into two classes, namely, “priority” leaflets for
those of a news character and “stock” leaflets with matter of a less
urgent nature.

A time-table was prepared for the “priority” leaflets in which the
time allotted for the different processes of composition, translation,
printing, transport to France, and distribution, was cut down to an
absolute minimum. With the willing aid of Messrs. Harrison and Son, the
printers, and of Messrs. Gamage, who undertook the work of attaching
the leaflets to the “releases,” it was found possible to arrange
for these news bulletins to be in the hands of the Germans within
approximately forty-eight hours of their being written. Three times a
week a consignment of not fewer than 100,000 leaflets of this character
was rushed over to France for prompt dispatch to the Germans. This
“speeding-up” became a factor of the highest importance when military
events moved so rapidly in the closing months of the war.

In June and July the number of leaflets dropped over the German lines
and behind them totalled 1,689,457 and 2,172,794 respectively. During
August an average of over 100,000 a day was attained, the actual number
of leaflets issued by the Enemy Propaganda Department in that month
being 3,958,116, in September 3,715,000, and in October 5,360,000,
while in the first ten days of November, before the Armistice put an
end to such activities, 1,400,000 were sent out. The Germans were
greatly disturbed. One of their writers described the flood of leaflets
picturesquely as “English poison raining down from God’s clear sky.”
Marshal von Hindenburg, in his autobiography, “Out of My Life” (Cassell
& Co.), admits that this propaganda intensified the process of German
demoralisation. “This was a new weapon,” he continues, “or rather a
weapon which had never been employed on such a scale and so ruthlessly
in the past.”

The leaflets were written in simple language, and aimed at letting
the Germans know the truth which was being concealed from them by
their leaders. They gave information as to the progress of the war in
all theatres, and showed at a glance, by means of shaded maps, the
territory gained by the Associated Nations. Great stress was laid upon
the large number of troops arriving daily from the United States.
While, by the use of diagrams, the steadily progressive increase of
the American forces was strikingly illustrated, German losses and the
consequent futility of making further sacrifices in a losing cause
were strongly emphasised. We have again the testimony of Hindenburg’s
autobiography as to the effect on the German troops: “Ill-humour and
disappointment that the war seemed to have no end, in spite of all our
victories, had” (he writes) “ruined the character of many of our brave
men. Dangers and hardships in the field, battle and turmoil, on top of
which came the complaints from home about many real and some imaginary
privations! All this gradually had a demoralising effect, especially
as no end seemed to be in sight. In the shower of pamphlets which was
scattered by enemy airmen our adversaries said and wrote that they did
not think so badly of us; that we must only be reasonable and perhaps
here and there renounce something we had conquered. Then everything
would be soon right again and we could live together in peace, in
perpetual international peace. As regards peace within our own borders,
new men and new Governments would see to that. What a blessing peace
would be after all the fighting! There was, therefore, no point in
continuing the struggle. Such was the purport of what our men read and
said. The soldier thought it could not be all enemy lies, allowed it to
poison his mind, and proceeded to poison the minds of others.”

Despite such compliments as to the effectiveness of the distribution,
this branch of the work provided the thorn in the Crewe House flesh.
Distribution by aeroplane was the ideal method, and the decision
to discontinue the use of aeroplanes for the purpose was a serious
handicap to Lord Northcliffe’s work. Balloon distribution was dependent
upon favourable winds, and could only be performed in one direction,
whereas aeroplanes could cover a much more extensive area at great
speed. On several occasions Lord Northcliffe pressed for the resumption
of their use. Lord Milner replied to the first request, early in May,
to the effect that the British authorities were disputing the German
contention that the distribution of literature from aeroplanes was
contrary to the laws of war, and had given notice that they intended
to institute prompt reprisals if they received information that any
British airmen were undergoing punishment for similar action. Although
distribution by aeroplane on the Western Front had been temporarily
suspended, they held themselves free at any moment to resume it, and
stated that meanwhile literature would be distributed by other and, as
they thought, more effective means. _Yet it was admitted that there
had been no stoppage of the use of aeroplanes for the purpose on the
Italian Front._

A month later, Lord Northcliffe again wrote, asking if anything had
been done to cancel the temporary suspension of the distribution of
leaflets by aeroplane on the Western Front. He and his co-workers
felt strongly that propaganda work against Germany was being severely
handicapped by disuse of this method of distribution, especially as,
according to his information, the Germans themselves continued to drop
leaflets over the British lines from aeroplanes. He could not believe
that distribution by balloon was as accurate or as effective. It was a
curious commentary on the British attitude that the French continued to
use aeroplanes for the purpose on the Western Front.

Many weeks passed before the War Cabinet agreed to the resumption of
the use of aeroplanes, and even then the Air Ministry raised further
objection. Finally, all obstacles were overcome, but not until the
end of October. In one week 3,000,000 leaflets were prepared for the
interior of Germany, and the distribution of these was begun just
before the Armistice.

With the turn of the tide of military events in the summer of 1918,
propaganda had assumed greater importance than ever. Military defeat
rendered the German soldier more amenable to propagandist influences,
to which in victory he could afford to turn a blind eye and deaf
ear. Moreover, the Allied successes seriously disturbed the German
nation, and as the news was disseminated by the various agencies
carefully organised by Crewe House the spirit of the people became
generally depressed. The commercial classes exhibited great fear at
the threatened economic war. Thus the soil became fertilised for the
reception of propagandist views. One obvious but important way of
spreading such views was by ensuring that important speeches of leading
British statesmen should be adequately and promptly reported in enemy
countries. Means were found of accomplishing this object. When occasion
arose, publication in neutral newspapers of interviews with British
public men on important subjects was arranged for, and these were
widely quoted in the enemy Press.

The valuable material collected by Mr. Wells on British progress in
those lines of industry in which Germany had excelled was used by Mr.
Fyfe in many ways. Articles on the subject were sent to, and published
by, German-Swiss papers, which were known to be much read in Germany.
Pamphlets were written in German in tones of serious warning and
distributed through channels prepared by the perseverance and ingenuity
of Mr. S. A. Guest. By these means, also, a large number of descriptive
catalogues of an exhibition in London of British scientific products
were introduced into Germany and were snapped up and read with
avidity. Treatment of these issues was found to influence enlightened
German opinion more than any other kind of propaganda.

From time to time special topics were selected. For instance, a
series of “London Letters” was sent to Swiss and Scandinavian papers
purporting to be written with a pro-German flavour, but containing,
under this disguise, a true picture of food and other conditions in
Great Britain. It was gratifying to find these reprinted in enemy
papers, for the German reader was thus led to institute mental
comparisons with the much worse conditions prevalent in Germany.
Secret means, too, were found to circulate in German naval ports, as
a deterrent to men picked for service in submarines, leaflets (of
which a reproduction appears in this volume) containing a long list of
U-boat commanders, dead or captured, with description of their rank.
Particulars so easy of verification proved the mastery of the British
Navy over the U-boat campaigners and created great depression in the
German ports.

In addition to the “priority” leaflets containing news of Allied
successes, illustrated with shaded maps and diagrams, a “trench
newspaper” was prepared in a style which exactly resembled a German
publication. The propaganda pill was coated to make it attractive.
The newspaper was homely in appearance--its title-decoration included
a head of the Kaiser--and it provided excellent reading matter which
would appeal to the German soldier, while revealing facts hitherto
carefully hidden from him. As many as from 250,000 to 500,000 copies
of each weekly issue were distributed. Some leaflets, on the other
hand, were in religious vein, for there is a deep religious strain in
the German character. These leaflets pointed out that their military
defeats were a just retribution for the crimes of their Government. One
was a little sermon on the text “Be sure your sin will find you out.”

With knowledge of the dwindling of their own reserves, the Germans
became increasingly anxious about the supply of American troops,
artillery, and munitions. No opportunity was lost by Crewe House of
keeping the enemy armies and civil populations fully aware of the
wonderful extent of the American effort. A series of leaflets was
prepared which gave in succinct and vigorous form the latest details
about that effort, both in the field and at home in the factory, the
shipyard and the farm.

British propagandist work against Germany was both positive and
negative. Its aim was to give the German people something to hope
for in an early peace and much to fear from the prolongation of the
war--that is, to make it clear to them that the only way to escape
complete ruin would be to break with the system that brought the war
upon Europe, and to qualify for admission eventually into the League
of Nations on the Allied terms. In addition to these very necessary
educative efforts, the enemy armies were supplied with constant and
_invariably truthful_ information about the actual military position.
Its veracity was a more essential factor to its success than its
quantity. The news withheld by the German authorities was supplied by
us. Hence the cries of alarm from Marshal von Hindenburg and General
von Hutier, to which fuller reference is made in the next chapter.

In the “intensive propaganda” of the last few weeks of hostilities the
Hohenzollern Government was denounced. It was pointed out that all
Germany’s sufferings and tribulations were due to its “Old Gang,” of
which a clean sweep would have to be made before the world would make
friends or do business with Germans again. Chapter and verse were given
to prove that the German Government could not be trusted, and that it
was a great obstacle to peace. Attention, too, was drawn to the changes
then taking place in Germany, to the cries raised for the abdication
of the Emperor, and to the growing demand for the punishment of all
who had brought Germany to her disastrous situation. German soldiers
were urged to consider whether it was worth while to risk being killed
when they had nothing left to fight for, and it was suggested that
their best course was to make off to their homes and ensure the safety
of their families. The consequences to Germans of the continuation of
the war were plainly indicated. Maps and diagrams showed at a glance
how Allied air raids over Germany had increased in number, how larger
and larger Allied air squadrons and more powerful bombs were being
provided and how easily it would be possible to attack Berlin, Hamburg,
Hanover, and other places which had previously escaped. A map was also
prepared showing all the steamship routes by which food, munitions,
and raw materials were being brought to Great Britain and France, and
demonstrating the falsity of the German leaders’ assurance that we
could be starved into submission.

By the courtesy of the Admiralty and of the Ministry of Information,
use was regularly made of wireless telegraphy as a means of
disseminating information, combating false German statements, and
influencing German opinion through neutral newspapers and public
opinion.

Many other agencies for introducing propagandist material into
enemy countries were organised by Mr. Guest, whose work demanded
extraordinary patience and perseverance. He experimented with many
methods, and, despite the vigilance of the Germans, the inflow into
Germany increased. Some of the methods can never be revealed, but it
is permissible to hint that, for instance, among foreign workmen of a
certain nationality who went into Germany each morning and returned
each evening there might be some to whom propagandist work was not
uncongenial. And, of course, all secret agents were not necessarily
Allies or neutrals. Somehow, huge masses of literature were posted in
Germany to selected addresses from which the German postal revenues
derived no benefit. Easiest of all were certain obvious channels left
wholly or partially open in most incredible fashion, as, for instance,
the book trade, which was by no means as closely supervised as might
have been expected. None were more amazed at the facility with which
such valuable propaganda material as Prince Lichnowsky’s pamphlet
achieved clandestine circulation in Germany and Austria than were
British propagandists. Perhaps, as a gratuitous hint to the curious, it
may be added that the outside covers with titles of works by revered
German authors did not always correspond to the contents of the books,
but, oft-times, as the poet said, “things are not what they seem.”

Personal propaganda among enemy subjects resident in neutral
countries--and especially those unsympathetic to the perverted
ideals of their respective nations--was tactfully pursued. Neutrals
in prominent positions in any walk of life whose views were likely
to react on enemy opinion were brought within the orbit of salutary
personal intercourse. Enemy newspaper correspondents were carefully
“nursed.” No avenue of approach into enemy countries was considered too
insignificant, for each had its particular use.

[Illustration: MR. HAMILTON FYFE.

SUCCEEDED MR. H. G. WELLS AS DIRECTOR OF THE GERMAN SECTION.

_Photo: Elliott & Fry, Ltd._]

[Illustration: CAPTAIN CHALMERS MITCHELL.]

[Illustration: BRIGADIER-GENERAL G. K. COCKERILL, C.B.

[DEPUTY-DIRECTOR OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, 1918.]

_Photo: Russell, London._]




CHAPTER V

TRIBUTES FROM THE ENEMY

Hindenburg’s outburst: German Press Comments: Ludendorff on the conduct
and effect of British Propaganda against the Central Powers.


The Press of the enemy countries was closely watched for references
to British propaganda in editorial articles or in the reports of
utterances of political and military leaders. During August, 1918,
the misgivings engendered by the trend of events, as revealed by our
propaganda, found expression in print. Then, as if a pent-up stream
had at last carried away the dam, came a flood of wails from many
quarters, generals vying with editors in hurling imprecations at the
British Enemy Propaganda Department, with blackest vilifications of
Lord Northcliffe, and in beseeching German troops and people not to be
affected by the leaflets which had by this time found their way into
even the remotest corner of rural Germany.

These outbursts were symptomatic of the fear of defeat which had laid
hold of the Germans, and were correctly interpreted in England as
foreshadowing the end which came so dramatically in November, 1918. It
was obvious that even the German Government felt it unwise to restrain,
by use of the censorship, the publication of such damaging admissions
of the deadliness of British propaganda. It was impossible to stop the
rising tide of truth which was covering Germany.

To attempt to quote even a small proportion of these unintentional
tributes to the work of Sir George Macdonogh’s department of the War
Office and of Crewe House would be wearisome. Perhaps the best specimen
of all came in the form of a manifesto from no less a person than Field
Marshal von Hindenburg, the war idol and personification of German
militarism. This is the text of the remarkable document:

   We are engaged in a hard struggle with our enemies. If numerical
  superiority alone guaranteed victory, Germany would long since have
  lain shattered on the ground. The enemy knows, however, that Germany
  and her Allies cannot be conquered by arms alone. The enemy knows
  that the spirit which dwells within our troops and our people makes
  us unconquerable. Therefore, together with the struggle against the
  German arms, he has undertaken a struggle against the German spirit;
  he seeks to poison our spirit and believes that German arms will also
  become blunted if the German spirit is eaten away.

  We should not take this plan of the enemy lightly. The enemy conducts
  his campaign against our spirit by various means. He bombards our
  Front, not only with a drumfire of artillery, but also with a
  drumfire of printed paper. Besides bombs which kill the body, his
  airmen throw down leaflets which are intended to kill the soul.

  Of these enemy leaflets our field-grey men delivered up:

  In May 84,000
  In June 120,000
  In July 300,000

   A gigantic increase! Ten thousand poisoned arrows daily in July;
  10,000 times daily the attempt to deprive the individual and the
  whole body of belief in the justice of our cause and of the strength
  and confidence for ultimate victory! We can reckon, in addition, that
  a great part of the enemy leaflets will not have been found by us.

  POISONING THE HOME SPIRIT.

   But the enemy is not merely satisfied in attacking the spirit of
  our Front, he wishes above all also to poison the spirit of our
  home. He knows what sources of strength for the Front rest in the
  home. True, his aeroplanes and balloons do not carry these leaflets
  far into our homeland; they lie far from it in the lines in which
  the enemy vainly struggles for victory by arms. But the enemy hopes
  that many a field-grey soldier will send home the leaflet which has
  innocently fluttered down from the air. At home it will pass from
  hand to hand and be discussed at the beer-table, in families, in the
  sewing-room, in factories, and in the street. Unsuspectingly many
  thousands consume the poison. For thousands the burden the war in
  any case imposes upon them is increased, and the will and hope for a
  victorious issue of the war is taken from them. All these again write
  their doubts to the Front, and Wilson, Lloyd George and Clemenceau
  rub their hands.

  The enemy attacks the spirit of the home in another way besides. The
  silliest rumours, designed to break our inner power of resistance,
  are put into circulation. We find them simultaneously in Switzerland,
  in Holland, and in Denmark. Thence they spread like a wave over the
  whole of Germany. Or they emerge simultaneously, agreeing in silly
  details, in the remotest regions of our country--in Silesia, in
  East Prussia, in the Rhineland--and wend their way thence over the
  remainder of the home territory. This poison works on the men on
  leave and flows in letters to the Front. Again the enemy rubs his
  hands.

  The enemy is ingenious. He knows how to mix the little powder for
  everyone. He decoys the fighters at the Front. One leaflet runs:

   “German soldiers! It is a shameful lie that the French ill-treat
  German prisoners. We are not brutes; only come over to us without
  fear; here you will find a most considerate reception, good food, and
  a peaceful refuge.”

  Ask brave men who have succeeded with unspeakable difficulty in
  escaping from the enemy captivity about this. Plundered to the
  utmost in wire compounds, roofless, goaded by hunger and thirst into
  treasonable utterances, forced by blows and threats of death to
  betray their comrades, spat upon, pelted with filth by the French
  populace while being driven to hard labour, that is what the paradise
  that the enemy conjures up really looks like.

  Reproductions of original letters written by prisoners are also
  thrown down, in which these men describe how well it goes with them.
  God be praised, there are still also decent and humane commandants of
  prisoners’ camps in England and France; but these are the exception,
  and the letters the enemy throws down are only of three or four
  different kinds. But he sends these multiplied by many thousands of
  copies. The enemy intimidates the faint-hearted by saying:

   “Your struggle is hopeless; America will settle you; your
  submarines are no good; we are building more ships than they sink;
  after the war we shall debar you from getting raw materials, then
  Germany’s industry must starve. You will never see your colonies
  again.”

  That is the tone of the leaflets; now enticement, now threat.


  GERMAN FACTS AND FANCIES.

  What is the real situation? We have enforced peace in the East
  and are strong enough to do it in the West, notwithstanding the
  Americans; but we must be strong and united; that is what the enemy
  is fighting against with these leaflets and rumours. He wishes to
  deprive us of faith and confidence, will and force.

  Why is the enemy continually seeking new allies in the struggle
  against us? Why does he try to press nations still neutral into the
  struggle against us? Because in strength we are his equals.

  Why does he incite black and other coloured men against German
  soldiers? Because his will is to destroy us.

  Again, the enemy says another thing:

   “You Germans, your form of government is wrong. Fight against the
  Hohenzollerns, against capitalism; help us, the Entente, to give you
  a better form of State.”

  The enemy knows perfectly what strength resides in our State and
  Empire; but that is precisely why he combats it. The enemy also seeks
  to tear open old wounds in the German body politic. With his leaflets
  and by rumours he attempts to sow division and distrust among the
  Federal States. At Lake Constance we confiscated many thousands of
  leaflets conveyed to Bavaria and intended to excite anger against
  the North Germans. They wish to destroy the German Empire, which for
  centuries was the dream of Germans and which our fathers won for us,
  and to condemn Germany to the impotence of the Thirty Years’ War.

   The enemy also wishes to shake our loyalty to our allies. He does
  not know the German way and the word of a German man. He himself
  sacrifices his allies; he who is England’s ally dies of it.


  TRAITORS TO THE FATHERLAND.

  And finally the enemy sends not the least dangerous of his poisoned
  arrows dipped in printers’ ink when he throws down the utterances of
  German men and German newspapers. The utterances of German newspapers
  are torn from their context. Regarding the utterances of Germans
  which are reproduced, remember that at every time there have been
  conscious and unconscious traitors to the Fatherland. Most of them
  reside abroad in neutral countries, in order not to be obliged to
  share our struggle and our privations, or to be condemned by our
  Judges as guilty of high treason. Nor have champions of extreme party
  tendencies any right to claim to speak for the generality of the
  German people.

   It is our strength, but also our weakness that even in war we
  allow unrestricted utterance to every opinion. We still tolerate the
  reproduction in our newspapers of enemy Army reports and the speeches
  of enemy statesmen which are weapons of attack directed against the
  spirit of the German Army and people. This is a sign of strength,
  because it proves a consciousness of might. But it is a weakness
  because it allows the enemy’s poison to find an entrance among us.

  Therefore, German Army, German Homeland, if one of these thrown-out
  pieces of poison in the form of leaflet or rumour comes before your
  eyes and ears, remember that its originates with the enemy. Remember
  nothing comes from the enemy which is not harmful to Germany. Every
  one must be mindful of this, whatever his position or party. If you
  meet anyone whose name and origin indeed are German, but who by
  nature stands in the enemy’s camp, keep him at a distance, despise
  him, put him publicly in the pillory in order that every other true
  German may despise him.

  Defend yourself, German Army, German Homeland!

Hindenburg’s fear that only a small part of the leaflets was given up
was fully justified. The numbers which he quotes suggest that hundreds
of thousands must have been carried to their homes by the “field-grey
men.”

The whole manifesto is an interesting study in psychology. Hope had
slipped away; dismay had ripened into despair and despair had sown
wild anger and hatred. The dissemination of the unwelcome facts of
the position caused him to burst out in vituperation and so to give a
valuable clue as to the effect which Allied propaganda was producing on
the German troops and public.

After such a mighty oracle, it is not surprising that others took up
the cry. Not long after, the following noteworthy message, signed by
General von Hutier of the Sixth German Army, was captured:

   The enemy begins to realise that we cannot be crushed by blockade,
  superiority of numbers, or force of arms. He is, therefore, trying
  a last resource. While engaging to the utmost of his military
  force he is racking his imagination for ruses, trickery, and other
  underhand methods of which he is a past master, to induce in the
  minds of the German people a doubt of their invincibility. He has
  founded for this purpose a special Ministry (“The Ministry for the
  Destruction of German Confidence”), at the head of which he has put
  the most thoroughgoing rascal of all the Entente--Lord Northcliffe,
  who has been given billions for use in influencing opinion in the
  interior of the country and at the Front by means of paid agents, the
  assassination of Ambassadors, and all the other ways in favour with
  the Entente.

  The method of Northcliffe at the Front is to distribute through
  airmen a constantly increasing number of leaflets and pamphlets; the
  letters of German prisoners are falsified in the most outrageous
  way; tracts and pamphlets are concocted, to which the names of
  German poets, writers, and statesmen are forged, or which present
  the appearance of having been printed in Germany, and bear, for
  example, the title of the Reclam series, when they really come from
  the Northcliffe Press, which is working day and night for this same
  purpose. His thought and aim are that these forgeries, however
  obvious they may appear to the man who thinks twice, may suggest a
  doubt, even for a moment, in the minds of those who do not think for
  themselves, and that their confidence in their leaders, in their
  own strength, and in the inexhaustible resources of Germany may be
  shattered.

   Fortunately, Northcliffe, the Minister for the Destruction
  of German Confidence, forgets that German soldiers are neither
  Negroes nor Hindus, nor illiterate French, English, and Americans,
  incapable of seeing through such machinations. Explain these infamous
  attempts to your young and inexperienced comrades, and tell them
  what our mortal enemy expects of them, and what is at stake. Pick
  up the leaflets and pamphlets and give them to our commanders for
  transmission to the High Command, which may be able to make valuable
  deductions from them as to the aims of our enemies. You will thus
  help the Command, and you will also help to hasten the hour of
  victory.

The allegation that huge sums of money were expended by Lord
Northcliffe is comic. As will have been seen already, the total cost
of the operations conducted by Lord Northcliffe during his tenure
of office was considerably less than a one-hundredth part of Great
Britain’s _daily_ war bill.

German Army orders, which fell into Allied hands, showed plainly how
widespread was the effect produced among the enemy troops by the
leaflets. Officers and men were threatened with severe punishment if
they neglected to hand the leaflets in immediately. On the other hand,
bonuses for the delivery of unknown specimens of pamphlets, books,
leaflets, and pictures were offered as follows:--

    3 marks (nominally 3_s._) for the first copy.
    30 pfgs. (nominally 4_d._) for other copies.
    5 marks (nominally 5_s._) for a book.

An order issued by Ludendorff showed that the influence of the
propaganda extended beyond the troops to the population of Germany.
This read:

  “There has been an increase in the number of complaints received from
  home that men on leave from the front create a very unfavourable
  impression by making statements actually bordering on high treason
  and incitement to disobedience. Instances such as these drag through
  the mud the honour and respect of the individual as well as of the
  whole Army, and have a disastrous effect upon the _moral_ of the
  people at home.”

A “high officer at the front” describing, in the _Kölnische Zeitung_ of
October 31, 1918, the demoralisation of the German Army as a result of
the retreat, wrote:

   What damaged us most of all was the paper war carried on by the
  enemy, who dropped daily among us 100,000 leaflets, which were
  extraordinarily well distributed and well edited.

This strikingly confirmed a report received by the Foreign Office the
previous month which stated:

  Leaflets thrown by Allied airmen have much more effect now. Instead
  of being thrown away or laughed at, as was often the case in the
  past, they are eagerly picked up and read. There is no doubt that
  recent events have seriously shaken the _moral_ of the German people
  and Army. One of the returned officers mentioned above said that if
  the Entente knew what poison these leaflets, etc., were working in
  the minds of the German soldiers they would give up lead and bombard
  with paper only in future.

That neither threats nor bribes was inducing the surrender of the
leaflets to German Headquarters was plainly shown by the statements
of prisoners captured during the last four months of hostilities,
and by the fact that most of them had British leaflets in their
possession. Among the subjects which seemed to have attracted special
attention were the German responsibility for starting the war, for the
adoption of poison gas attacks, and for the bombing of open towns; the
ineffectiveness of Zeppelin attacks and of the U-boats preventing the
transport of food and troops; the arrival of the American armies; the
Allied war aims; comparison of food conditions in Germany with those
in Great Britain; and the extracts from German Socialist newspapers.
Inhabitants of the recaptured territory testified to the effect of the
propaganda on the German troops, remarking on the lowering of _moral_
and the increasing number of deserters which they attributed to it.

Politicians and newspapers were also greatly excited, and raised loud
cries for the creation of an organisation for counter-propaganda. Herr
F. Stossinger described British propaganda in the _Frankfurter Zeitung_
as “the most complicated and dangerous of all,” and commented on its
“countless” activities. The Minister of War, General von Stein was
complimentary enough to say “In propaganda the enemy is undoubtedly our
superior.” (Berlin _Morgenpost_, August 25, 1918.) Other tributes were:

   _Rheinische-Westfälische-Zeitung_: “At any rate, the British
  Propaganda Department has worked hard. Had we shown the same activity
  in our Propaganda perhaps many a thing would have been different now.
  But in this, we regret to say, we were absolutely unprepared, but we
  hope that by now we have learned differently.”

  _Deutsche Tageszeitung_: “We Germans have a right to be proud of our
  General Staff. We have a feeling that our enemies’ General Staff
  cannot hold a candle to it, but we also have the feeling that our
  enemies have a brilliant Propaganda General Staff, whereas we have
  none.”

Violent and bitter attacks were repeatedly made. The revelations of the
British propaganda created great nervousness, which in turn gave rise
to all kinds of wild rumours, which spread all over Germany. These were
attributed to Lord Northcliffe’s department. Speaking in the Bavarian
Lower House of Parliament during August, 1918, General von Hellingrath,
the Bavarian Minister of War, said:--

   “These rumours are nothing but the result of the industrious and
  determined agitation which our enemies carry on in the interior
  through their agents.”

Herr von Kupffer, the editor of the Berlin _Lokal-Anzeiger_, referred
to them as “a carnival of soul-storms, idiotic terror, and criminal
irresponsibility,” and he continued:

  “The main thing is to remember the source of such rumours and to bear
  in mind what their object is. Their object is to demoralise us and,
  by so doing, turn into realities what otherwise would remain merely
  nightmares. One would have to be really blind not to see that these
  things radiate from that organisation in England formed to shatter
  the German nervous system by means of shameful and impudent lies. Is
  not the figure of Lord Northcliffe, the great Propaganda Chief of the
  English Home Army, pilloried in world-history for all time?

   “Is anybody in doubt as to the purpose of this propaganda? Does not
  everybody know that the generalissimo of this campaign of mendacity
  has unlimited funds at his disposal in order to circulate streams
  of lies through neutral channels with devilish cunning and almost
  impressive skill? Does not everybody realise that the Northcliffe
  Propaganda is too shrewd to work by means of mere newspaper tales
  that could easily be disproved, and therefore resorts to the much
  more subtle method of carrying unrest, disloyalty, and alarm into
  our country and into the lands of our allies by means of verbal
  communications of all sorts? Paid rascals are systematically employed
  for this purpose. It is this sort of person who propagates these wild
  stories in Germany and upsets our sense of proportion in connection
  with war events. These are the facts. Let people bear them in mind
  before they promote the Northcliffe Propaganda by repeating every
  bit of washerwoman’s gossip as gospel, even though it be without the
  slightest foundation in fact.”

In the Hamburg district matters were much the same, for the influential
shipping journal _Hansa_ printed the following on September 14:--

   “God be thanked! At last we are just beginning to recognise what
  the hour of war demands; what is our duty as Germans and as citizens.
  Despondency, discontent, depression, hanging heads, grumbling! We
  meet them at every step and turn, but we did not know their origin,
  these growths of evil fantasy. We did not understand what meant these
  secret whispers about alleged unfavourable news from the front,
  these exaggerated reports, fraught with misfortune, which passed so
  glibly from mouth to mouth. One had heard this, another that, but
  always it was something bad in regard to our military situation.
  Nothing definite was ever mentioned. There were only suggestions,
  which proved to be chimeras as soon as ever they could be run to
  earth. They were the birth of ignoble defeatism. Yet there they were,
  invisibly surrounding us, disturbing our spiritual balance, darkening
  our temper; like an epidemic, like poisonous bacilli, they flew
  hither and thither in all directions through our German air.

   “Whence came they? Who brought them to us? To-day we know. To-day
  we can recognise the origin of this depression of German will-power.
  It was the long-advertised publicity offensive of the Entente
  directed against us under England’s lead, and under the special
  direction of that unprincipled, unscrupulous rascal, Northcliffe.”

In the _Kölnische Volkszeitung_ for September 11, a letter from the
front said:

  “Leaflets destined to cause low spirits and despair, or to send
  deserters to the enemy, are being showered down in thousands in
  certain places and their surroundings. It is this combat, waged
  openly or secretly, which, particularly at home, produces low spirits
  and despair. Here you find statements that Hindenburg was once
  regarded as a Divinity, but that his laurels are beginning to fade,
  which is quite evident from the way the enemy advance daily; that our
  troops have lost courage, whole companies are deserting to the enemy,
  and such like things.”

In another letter to the same newspaper, published on August 20, the
writer said:

   “Our enemies have recently been very busy distributing leaflets
  from the air. I have had two of these leaflets in my hands, and it is
  not to be doubted that our enemies are in that, also, our masters,
  for the pamphlets are so well produced that anyone who is not on the
  lookout is very likely to fall a victim to them.”

That such Propaganda might have had an effect if it had been tried
earlier was evident from the admissions of war correspondents as
well as of generals. Herr W. Scheurmann wrote in the _Norddeutsche
Allgemeine Zeitung_ (October 30):

  “We Germans have learnt _for the first time this autumn_ that the
  moral resistance of the fighter at the front is a power with which
  the Command must reckon, all the more cautiously inasmuch as it is
  difficult to estimate.”

All charges of the mendacity of British propaganda were unfounded, for
the greatest care was unremittingly exercised to tell only the truth.
One effect of this was to make the Germans distrust their official
_communiqués_. “We have in our dear Fatherland to-day,” wrote the
_Kölnische Zeitung_ on September 11, “great numbers of innocent and
ingenuous minds who doubt the plain statements of the German Army
reports, but _believe the false reports and omissions of the enemy_.
To prove constantly the contrary to them is a rather thankless task,
but of which one should never tire.”

It was, indeed, a thankless task to try to keep the truth from the
whole German nation. “Warn your brothers, your sons, your husbands,
not to believe the enemy’s leaflets,” was one of “Ten Commandments for
German Women,” published by the _Kölnische Volkszeitung_ on October 20,
but it was then too late to maintain the lie-system by which the German
resistance had been stimulated for so long.

Writing in July, 1919, Herr Arnold Rechberg said in the _Tägliche
Rundschau_: “It cannot be doubted that Lord Northcliffe very
substantially contributed to England’s victory in the world war.
His conduct of English propaganda during the war will some day find
its place in history as a performance hardly to be surpassed. The
Northcliffe propaganda during the war correctly estimated ... the
character and intellectual peculiarities of the Germans.”

Praise from an enemy, when there is no underlying motive, can usually
be accepted as sincere. Most of the foregoing quotations were primarily
warnings and exhortations to their own people issued during the war,
and compliments to Allied propaganda only indirectly.

When, however, hostilities had ceased disastrously for Germany and
her allies, passions of hatred and pride began to give place to the
cold logic of reason. Ludendorff, who, as First Quartermaster-General
from 1916 to the end of the war, was regarded as one of the cleverest
of Germany’s military leaders, sat down to write his “War Memories”
(Hutchinson and Co., London). His reputation entitles him to respect,
and he has much to say of value regarding propaganda.

He learned one important lesson. “Good propaganda,” he wrote, “must
keep well ahead of actual political events. It must act as pacemaker
to policy and mould public opinion without appearing to do so.” This
was the great basic principle upon which was built the success of Lord
Northcliffe’s department. To try to make propaganda shape policy is as
fatal as endeavouring to conduct propaganda campaigns without policy
or with conflicting policies. Illuminating volumes could be written
on failures from all these causes. But whoever follows the history of
the operations conducted from Crewe House will find that painstaking
study was made of the factors governing the political, economic, and
military position of each of the enemy countries concerned before
action was taken. As _The Times_ observed in a leading article (October
31, 1919) Lord Northcliffe’s work “differed from the praiseworthy
and painstaking efforts that had preceded it mainly by adopting as
its guiding principle the very maxim which Ludendorff lays down. The
consideration that, without a definite policy in regard to each enemy
country, propaganda must be at best a hand-to-mouth business was, from
the first, regarded as self-evident by Lord Northcliffe and the handful
of experts who advised him.”

Ludendorff compared the work of the British and German propaganda
departments, to the great disparagement of the latter. Indeed he
attributed the moral collapse of the German soldier--and consequently
the military defeat--in part to British propaganda and in part to
the demoralisation of the German home population, which, in turn, he
ascribed to British propaganda and to the feebleness of the German
Government in counteracting it. Of British propaganda he wrote:--

   [1]Lloyd George knew what he was doing when, after the close of
  the war, he gave Lord Northcliffe the thanks of England for the
  propaganda he had carried out. Lord Northcliffe was a master of
  mass-suggestion. The enemy’s propaganda attacked us by transmitting
  reports and print from the neutral States on our frontier, especially
  Holland and Switzerland. It assailed us in the same way from Austria,
  and finally in our own country by using the air. It did this with
  such method and on such a scale that many people were no longer able
  to distinguish their own impressions from what the enemy propaganda
  had told them. This propaganda was all the more effective in our
  case as we had to rely, not on the numbers, but on the quality of
  our battalions in prosecuting the war. The importance of numbers
  in war is incontestable. Without soldiers there can be no war. But
  numbers count only according to the spirit which animates them. As
  it is in the life of peoples, so it is also on the battlefield. We
  had fought against the world, and could continue to do so with good
  conscience so long as we were spiritually ready to endure the burden
  of war. So long as we were this, we had hope of victory and refused
  to bow to the enemy’s determination to annihilate us. But with the
  disappearance of our moral readiness to fight everything changed
  completely. We no longer battled to the last drop of our blood. Many
  Germans were no longer willing to die for their country.

  The shattering of public confidence at home affected our moral
  readiness to fight. The attack on our home front and on the spirit
  of the Army was the chief weapon with which the Entente intended to
  conquer us, after it had lost all hope of a military victory.

[1] This passage is a translation from the German edition.

His references to German enemy propaganda are generally in terms of
disgust. He considered it rendered Germany no service. “Our political
aims and decisions, issued to the world as sudden surprises, often
seemed to be merely brutal and violent. This could have been skilfully
avoided by broad and far-sighted propaganda.... The German propaganda
was only kept going with difficulty. In spite of all our efforts,
its achievements, in comparison to the magnitude of the task, were
inadequate. We produced no real effect on the enemy peoples.... We
also attempted to carry on propaganda on the enemy fronts. In the
East, the Russians were the authors of their own collapse, and our
work there was of secondary importance. In the West, the fronts of our
enemies had not been made susceptible by the state of public opinion in
their home countries, and the propaganda we gradually introduced had
no success.... Germany failed in the fight against the _moral_ of the
enemy peoples.”

Again and again Ludendorff quotes instances of the effect of
propaganda. For example, just before the last German offensive of July
15, 1918:

  “The Army complained of the enemy propaganda. It was the more
  effective because the Army was rendered impressionable by the
  attitude at home.... The enemy propaganda had seized on Prince
  Lichnowsky’s pamphlet, which, in a way that I myself could not
  explain, placed on the German Government the responsibility for the
  outbreak of war. And this, though his Majesty and the Chancellor
  again and again asserted that the Entente was responsible....

   “The Army was literally drenched with enemy propaganda
  publications. Their great danger to us was clearly recognised. The
  Supreme Command offered rewards for such as were handed over to
  us, but we could not prevent them from poisoning the heart of our
  soldiers.”

No greater effect could have been desired by the British authorities
than that described by Ludendorff, and such an acknowledgment of the
results produced gave the highest satisfaction.

[Illustration: A MEDALLION STRUCK BY THE GERMANS IN “DISHONOUR” OF LORD
NORTHCLIFFE.]




CHAPTER VI

OPERATIONS AGAINST BULGARIA AND OTHER ACTIVITIES

Peculiar difficulties of propaganda against Bulgaria--Educative work
among prisoners of war.


Operations against Bulgaria--the other objective of Crewe House
activities--were somewhat dissimilar to those against either
Austria-Hungary or Germany. There were complications due to the general
state of Balkan affairs and politics, and to the fact that technically
the United States was not at war with Bulgaria. The definition of
propaganda policy against Bulgaria called for most delicate expression,
lest any offence should be given to Serbia, Roumania, or Greece.

Lord Northcliffe, in submitting to the Foreign Office a statement of
policy proposed for use against Bulgaria, pointed out that he and his
advisers felt that there was need for a definite Allied policy in
regard to the Jugo-Slav and Roumanian questions. These, in their turn,
were dependent upon Allied policy in regard to Austria-Hungary. On May
25, 1918, Lord Northcliffe wrote to the Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs:

  “After careful consideration, and with the advice of our most
  competent authorities on Bulgarian and Balkan affairs, I beg to
  submit to you the following scheme of Allied policy in regard to
  Balkan countries as the framework within which any propaganda in
  Bulgaria should be carried out. I would especially direct your
  attention to the need for a Government decision in regard to the
  Southern Slav, Greek, and Roumanian questions before any definite
  proposals from Bulgaria are entertained:

    “The adoption of a clear and comprehensive Balkan policy by the
    British and Allied Governments is an essential condition of any
    propaganda in Bulgaria.

    “Without such a policy any propaganda in Bulgaria would resolve
    itself into competitive bargaining between the Allies on the one
    hand and the Austro-Germans on the other.

     “This bargaining would tend to estrange and to dishearten the
    Serbians and the Greeks. In attempting it the Allies would be,
    moreover, at a disadvantage, inasmuch as Bulgaria already occupies,
    as a member of the enemy Alliance, considerably more than all the
    territories that would be the subject of the bargaining.

    “The aim of Allied policy in the Balkans should be a lasting
    territorial and political settlement, framed as nearly as possible
    on lines of ethnography, with the object of paving the way for a
    permanent League of the Balkan Nations.

    “Bulgaria cannot possess all the territories ethnographically
    Bulgarian unless she retain at the peace districts held by Serbia,
    Greece, and Roumania before the war. Serbia, Greece, and Roumania,
    on the other hand, cannot fairly be asked or compelled to abandon
    those districts unless they, in their turn, be united with
    territories ethnographically Serbo-Croatian (Jugo-Slav), Greek, and
    Roumanian.

     “Allied policy should therefore deliberately aim at the solution
    of the Southern Slav, Hellenic, and Roumanian questions in the
    sense of the fullest possible racial unity and independence.

    “The chief difficulty in defining the just claims of Bulgaria lies
    in the uncertainty as to the proper delimitation of Bulgarian
    Macedonia. A purely ethnographical delimitation might involve
    economic and strategical injustice to Serbia and Greece, unless
    it were accompanied by due provision, internationally guaranteed,
    for Serbian and Greek rights of way. Similarly, the retention of
    ports like Salonika and Kavalla by Greece would involve hardship
    to Bulgaria unless adequate provision, internationally guaranteed,
    were made for a Bulgarian right of way to those ports.

     “Should it prove impossible to obtain, by persuasion or pressure,
    the assent of Serbia and Greece to the retention of ethnographical
    Macedonia by Bulgaria, an autonomous Macedonia might be set up,
    proper provision being made for the maintenance of order and for
    the repression of armed Serbian and Greek or Bulgarian ‘propaganda’
    by an international force of _gendarmerie_. One advantage of an
    autonomous Macedonia would be that it would meet the wishes of
    the Macedonian Bulgars themselves, who would prefer autonomy to
    annexation outright by Bulgaria.

    “The Allied policy in the Balkans should be made known to the
    Bulgarians by the Allies and by the United States. The necessary
    ethnographical delimitation of Bulgarian, or of autonomous
    Macedonian territory should be undertaken by a competent Allied
    Commission, possibly under the presidency of the United States.
    The announcement of Allied policy should be accompanied by an
    intimation that only by accepting it can Bulgaria hope to escape
    economic and political ostracism for an indefinite period; but that
    acceptance of the Allied policy would, on the contrary, carry with
    it a claim to financial and economic support.

     “Bulgaria should at the same time be told that the Allies would
    guarantee to her the Enos-Midia line as her minimum frontier on the
    east, provided that she refrained from further active co-operation
    with the enemies of the Allies. Active co-operation on the side of
    the Allies should be rewarded by a frontier yet more favourable to
    her aspirations, _e.g._ by the line Midia-Rodosto. The inclusion of
    Silistria in the future Bulgarian territory should likewise be made
    contingent upon the behaviour of Bulgaria before the conclusion of
    peace.

  “May I ask you to give me your views on this scheme of policy as
  early as possible?

  “I wish to send to Salonika, without delay, a competent mission to
  begin propaganda on this, or some similar basis, but cannot authorise
  its departure unless the ideas it would propagate have the explicit
  approval of His Majesty’s Government.”

Mr. Balfour replied on June 6, 1918:

  “I have carefully considered your letter of May 25, in which you were
  so kind as to furnish me with your ideas as to the lines on which we
  should conduct our propaganda in the Balkans.

   “I fully agree with the general ideas underlying your policy.

  “I feel, indeed, that it will be of value if our own efforts in this
  direction, which, for obvious reasons, can at present be only of
  the most tentative nature, are preceded by discreet and intelligent
  propaganda, such as will not only appeal to our enemies but enlighten
  our friends.”

It was well-known that influential Bulgarians realised the meaning
of the trend of events in the main theatres of war and would have
welcomed the opening of negotiations with the Allies. But it was
obviously impossible to begin territorial bargaining with Bulgarian
representatives of any party, because Bulgaria already possessed more
territory than that to which she was ethnographically entitled. On
the other hand, strictly to follow the ethnographic principle would
raise difficulties to which Lord Northcliffe referred in the foregoing
letter. As it would obviously require long and patient negotiations
with our Allies to establish a just basis, it was deemed to be strongly
advisable to restrict immediate propaganda to telling the Bulgarians
the fate which must inevitably befall them and that unless they made a
complete and effective reversal of their policy, the Allies would do
nothing to save them from that fate or to alleviate their position.

Four preliminary conditions were laid down as essential to the
establishment of relations with Bulgaria:

  “(_a_) The expulsion of King Ferdinand and his family;

  “(_b_) A complete rupture with Germany;

  “(_c_) Establishment of a democratic Government;

  “(_d_) The orientation of Bulgarian policy in the direction of a
  Balkan Confederation under the _ægis_ of the Allied Powers and of the
  United States.”

These lines were suggested as the suitable basis for a reply to secret
overtures which had been made by Bulgarian emissaries claiming to speak
for the new Premier, M. Malinof.

In due course, Crewe House was authorised to convey an informal message
to the effect “that until Bulgaria had given proof that a complete
reversal of her policy had actually been brought about, we are not
prepared to entertain any suggestions from her.” The Bulgarian agents
were duly notified in this sense, and it is to be presumed that so firm
a message was not without its effect upon the Malinof Government.

Meanwhile propaganda material in this sense was prepared, reinforced
by pamphlets, such as, for example, that by Lichnowsky, and another
giving full particulars of American preparations. These were translated
into Bulgarian, and this was a matter of some difficulty, as was the
subsequent arrangement for printing. Distribution was principally
arranged through naval and military channels and through secret
agencies of the character operating against other enemy countries.

Most painstaking work was undertaken to prepare for the publication of
a newspaper in Bulgarian to be smuggled into Bulgaria. When a series
of perplexing difficulties had been surmounted and all arrangements
were in train for an immediate start, the news came that Bulgaria had
surrendered.

In this connection, too, Ludendorff pays tribute to the effect of
propaganda. “A few days after the 15th (September, 1918), a secret
report of the French General fell into my hands which made it
evident that the French no longer expected any resistance from the
Bulgarian army. Entente propaganda and money, and the United States
representatives who had remained in Sofia, had done their work. In this
instance again the Entente had made a thoroughly good job of it.” (“My
War Memories.”)

Besides the work in enemy countries, Crewe House also undertook the
enlightenment of prisoners of war in the camps of Great Britain. The
first necessity was the eradication of innate ideas of militarism,
if it had left them with any illusions which their own experience
had failed to shatter. Then the advantages of democratic government
would be inculcated. Rightly it was thought that if these men could
be taught that government of a country must be by the free will and
assent of the governed, a small step at least would have been taken in
the right direction. Such beneficent influences as could be brought
to bear upon them would affect their compatriots on their return home
and might fructify in the expression of changed views in their letters
to their friends. There were several Prisoners of War camps scattered
about Great Britain, each of them being in charge of a Commandant
responsible to the War Office. The late Sir Charles Nicholson, Bt.,
a valued member of the Enemy Propaganda Committee, took charge of
this section of Crewe House work, his usual procedure being to have a
personal interview with each of the Commandants, in order to ascertain
from them what newspapers and books were allowed inside the camps,
and what were the English and German newspapers which were most read
by the prisoners. He then submitted to the Commandant a list of books
and newspapers which were approved for such purposes, and suggested to
them that these should be circulated among the prisoners and added to
the library which existed in each of the camps. Among the newspapers
in German which were found to be useful for this purpose were the
_Arbeiterzeitung_ of Vienna, the _Vorwärts_, the _Frankfurter Zeitung_,
the _Berliner Tageszeitung_, and the _Volkstimme_, and such pamphlets
as Prince Lichnowsky’s “_Meine Londoner Mission_,” Hermann Fernau’s
“_Gerade weil ich Deutscher bin_,” Dr. Karl Liebknecht’s “_Brief an
das Kommandanturgericht_,” Dr. Muehlon’s “_Die Schuld der Deutschen
Regierung am Kriege_” and “_Die Verheerung Europas_,” Dr. Anton
Nystroem’s “_Vor dem Tribunale_,” and, in addition, German translations
of Mr. H. G. Wells’s “Mr. Britling Sees it Through,” and copies of Mr.
James W. Gerard’s “My Four Years in Germany.”

Letters which were sent out by the prisoners of war to their friends
at home were, of course, examined by the postal censor. Sometimes
this examination indicated that certain of the prisoners would prove
susceptible to influence, and a point was made of seeing that such
prisoners were specially supplied with literature. The examination of
prisoners of war was useful, too, in ascertaining what were the ideas
prevalent in the minds of the Germans as to the cause of the war, the
progress of events, and the prospect of ultimate success or failure.

[Illustration: THE LATE SIR CHARLES NICHOLSON, BART., M.P. MEMBER OF
ENEMY PROPAGANDA COMMITTEE, AND DIRECTOR OF PRISONERS OF WAR SECTION.

_Photo: Russell & Sons._]

[Illustration: SIR RODERICK JONES, K.B.E.

MEMBER OF THE ENEMY PROPAGANDA COMMITTEE.

_Photo: Elliott & Fry, Ltd._]

[Illustration: COLONEL THE EARL OF DENBIGH, C.V.O.

MEMBER OF THE ENEMY PROPAGANDA COMMITTEE.

_Photo: Speight_]




CHAPTER VII

INTER-ALLIED CO-OPERATION

An axiom for propaganda--Results of a successful conference--Policy,
Means and Methods.


Experience gained at Crewe House proved that it is as necessary for
Allies to co-ordinate propaganda against a common enemy as to unify
military command. To conduct propaganda without a policy is bad enough;
but to shut up sets of propagandists working independently of each
other in a number of water-tight compartments, each set representative
of a different nationality, is to court ridicule instead of attracting
serious attention from an intelligent enemy, and to result in the
production of contradictory thoughts and confusion in the minds of
unintelligent adversaries.

An axiom for propaganda of allies in future wars is that a clear
common policy must be defined, based upon such a foundation of fact
and justice that it need not be altered in its essential principles,
but can be, _and must be_, rigidly adhered to. It will doubtless be
necessary to lay down such a policy for each nation of an opposing
alliance, in the event of the enemy not being a single nation.

Clearly, too, it should be recognised that propaganda policy, or
policies, must accord with the policy of the diplomatic, military, and
naval authorities. Possessing no administrative function, propaganda
is dependent upon them to make policy operative. Here, again, lack of
co-ordination would involve the risk of confusion, contradiction, and
consequent inefficiency. Propaganda may well and rightly be in advance
of these other departments as a forerunner (with what success other
chapters of this book record) or it may follow, but it must be in
agreement with them.

Lord Northcliffe had always conceived it to be a fundamental
principle of propaganda against enemy countries that when a line
of policy had been laid by him before the British Government and
sanctioned as a basis for propaganda, the Allied Governments should
be asked for their assent to it, so that their propaganda departments
might act in conformity. In practice it was found that most rapid
co-ordination could be attained by representatives of the Allied
propaganda departments meeting together. One of Lord Northcliffe’s
earliest acts was to convene an inter-Allied gathering at Crewe House
which was attended by Lord Beaverbrook (Minister of Information), M.
Franklin-Bouillon (France), and Signor Gallenga-Stuart (Italy), as well
as by a number of other British, French, Italian, and United States
representatives.

To some extent this gathering paved the way for the close Allied
co-operation in Italy. Lord Northcliffe would have desired the
immediate establishment of an inter-Allied body for propaganda in
enemy countries, but difficulties were encountered which postponed
the formation of such a body until a later date. Meanwhile, as close
touch as possible was kept with the French and Italian departments
concerned. But the course of events in the summer made it obvious to
Lord Northcliffe and his advisers that an inter-Allied conference on
Enemy Propaganda was indispensable to success. With the assent of the
British War Cabinet, therefore, he issued invitations to the French,
Italian, and United States Governments to send delegates to an official
conference in London. These invitations were cordially accepted and the
Conference assembled at Crewe House on August 14, 1918.

In addition to representatives of Lord Northcliffe’s department,
and of the Allied propaganda departments, there were also present
representatives of the British Foreign Office, War Office, Admiralty,
Air Ministry, and Ministry of Information.

The full list of delegates was:

  Great Britain:

  Viscount Northcliffe (Chairman).    } Department
  Lieutenant-Colonel Sir              }   of Propaganda
    Campbell Stuart.                  }   in Enemy
  Sir Charles Nicholson, Bart, M.P.   }   Countries.
  Mr. Wickham Steed.                  }

  Rear-Admiral Sir Reginald           }
    Hall (Director of Naval           }
    Intelligence).                    } Admiralty.
  Captain Guy Gaunt.                  }
  Commander G. Standing.              }

  Brigadier-General G. K.             }
    Cockerill (Deputy-Director        }
    of Military Intelligence).        } War Office.
  Major The Earl of Kerry, M.P.       }
  Captain P. Chalmers Mitchell.       }

  Colonel E. H. Davidson.               Air Ministry.

  Mr. C. J. Phillips.                   Foreign Office.

  Sir Roderick Jones (representing    }
    the Minister of Information).     } Ministry of
                                      }   Information.
  Mr. Cunliffe-Owen (Controller       }
    of Propaganda against Turkey).    }

  France:

  M. Klobukowski.
  M. Haguenin.
  M. Sabatier D’Espeyran.
  Major-General le Vicomte de la Panouse.
  M. le Capitaine Prince Pierre d’Arenberg.
  Lieutenant le Comte Stanislas de Montebello.
  M. Comert.
  Lieutenant P. Mantoux.

  Italy:

  Professor Borgese.
  Signor G. Emanuel.
  Captain Count Vicino-Pallavicino.
  Lieutenant R. Cajrati-Crivello.

  United States of America:

  Mr. James Keeley.
  Captain Walter Lippmann.    }
  Captain Heber Blankenhorn.  } Present as
  Lieutenant Charles Merz.    }   observers.
  Lieutenant Ludlow Griscom.  }

In the speech with which, as Chairman, Lord Northcliffe opened the
Conference, he pointed out that the organisation of British Propaganda
in Enemy Countries had reached a stage at which greater co-ordination
of Allied purpose and effort was required if its objects were to be
achieved in full measure. Propaganda in enemy countries presupposed:

  _a._ The definition, for propaganda purposes at least, of Allied
  policy in regard to our enemies;

  _b._ The public manifestation of this policy; and

  _c._ The study of technical means of bringing its main features to
  the knowledge of the enemy.

He suggested that the Conference should resolve itself into a number of
Committees to examine and to report upon these and other matters. Such
Committees would be concerned with:

  1. The great subject of the policy of propaganda;

  2. The difficult question of means of distribution:

      (_a_) Military.
      (_b_) Civil.

  3. Propaganda material;

  4. Educative work among prisoners of war who might return to Germany
  to tell their compatriots the real facts.

Unless based on a definite policy, propaganda could only be
fragmentary and superficial. On the basis of a clear policy it might
become destructive of enemy _moral_, a valuable adjunct to military
operations, and constructive of the necessary conditions of a lasting
peace.

The three enemy countries with which his Department was mainly
concerned were Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Germany. He cited
Austria-Hungary first, because, of all our enemies, the Hapsburg
Monarchy was the field where positive results were most readily
attainable.

In the early months of 1918, when he began that work, Germany was
too flushed with her facile triumphs in Russia to be susceptible to
propaganda, and the attitude of Bulgaria was too closely bound up with
German fortunes to be at that moment easily affected by propaganda.
Allied policy in regard to Bulgaria was, moreover, closely connected
with the general Balkan policy of the Allies, the formulation of which
necessarily depended, in its turn, upon the adoption of a definite
policy towards Austria-Hungary. All these considerations pointed to
Austria-Hungary as the foremost object of attack, and therefore as the
country in regard to which a clear propaganda policy was most urgently
required.

Lord Northcliffe then outlined the steps taken in regard to
Austria-Hungary, described fully in Chapter III. He went on to state
that there was abundant evidence that the work thus begun had helped
to prevent an Austrian offensive in April, and to check it when it
was finally launched in June. There was also strong reason to believe
that, had action on these lines been taken earlier, far greater results
might have been obtained. This was an aspect of the vital connection
between propaganda policy and military operations to which he earnestly
directed attention. He trusted that the Policy Committee of the
Conference might be able to make valuable recommendations in this
respect.

One important aspect of propaganda against Austria-Hungary and, indeed,
against all our enemies, was the dissemination of knowledge of the
greatness of the war effort of the American people. With that effort
he had had personal acquaintance; and on that very day he had received
a secret report that the Germans had little idea of the supreme effort
which the Americans were making. To this aspect he attributed great and
growing significance.

In regard to Bulgaria, he had also ventured to lay before the British
Government an outline of propaganda policy, which had received general
approval. Its main features were the necessity of a definite Allied
decision in regard to the Jugo-Slav and Rumanian questions, before any
direct attempt could be made to influence Bulgaria by propaganda. A
definite Jugo-Slav and Rumanian policy presupposed, however, a definite
Allied policy in regard to Austria-Hungary. Upon the details of this
important subject the Policy Committee would be fully informed. Broadly
speaking, he considered it at once inexpedient and dangerous to enter
into any direct or indirect negotiations with Bulgaria or to make to
her proposals even as propaganda until a complete change of attitude
had actually taken place in Bulgaria itself. Until then, propaganda
could consist only in conveying information to the Bulgarian troops
and people as to the fate that inevitably awaited them unless they
reversed completely their attitude; and in preparing by agreement
among the Allied Governments an outline of Balkan policy, aiming at
a solution of the various Balkan questions as nearly as possible on
ethnographical lines. In this way, Allied propaganda might eventually
help to prepare the way for a League of Balkan States.

Though for many reasons it had not thereto been possible to develop
British propaganda in Germany as fully or as efficiently as it had been
developed in Austria-Hungary, Lord Northcliffe said his department had,
in co-operation with the military authorities, and by the utilisation
of secret channels, been able to introduce into Germany a certain
amount of propaganda literature. The decision of the British military
authorities not to allow the use of aeroplanes on the British Front
in France for the distribution of propaganda had naturally retarded
and hampered the necessary extension of his work. He trusted that this
question of the use of aeroplanes for propaganda purposes would be most
carefully considered by the committee on military distribution. In
the meantime, balloons had been employed, though they were manifestly
far inferior to aeroplanes as instruments of distribution. The view
seemed to prevail that propaganda was not worth casualties. Were this
view well-founded it would be hard to understand why the Germans
should have taken such drastic measures against British airmen accused
of dropping propaganda leaflets. The Germans, who ought to be good
judges, evidently feared our leaflets more than they feared our bombs.
But the main issue was the determination of an Allied propaganda
policy in regard to Germany--a matter of no little difficulty. As he
had said in relation to Austria-Hungary, one of the chief features
of Allied propaganda--apart from questions of policy--would be the
constant dissemination of knowledge of the immensity and of the growing
efficiency of American effort. This feature he had endeavoured to
develop, and he intended to develop it increasingly. On the subject of
policy, however, he had submitted to the British Government an outline
comprising the following points, which it was necessary to bring home
to the Germans.

  1. The determination of the Allies to continue the war until Germany
  accepted the Allied peace terms.

   2. The existing alliance as a fighting league of free nations would
  be deepened and extended and the military, naval, financial, and
  economic resources of its members would be pooled until its military
  purpose was achieved and peace could be established on lasting
  foundations. He had suggested further that, as German minds were
  peculiarly susceptible to systematic statement, the Allies should
  prepare a comprehensive scheme of world organisation as a counterpart
  to the German schemes represented by the phrases “Berlin-Baghdad” and
  “Mittel-Europa.” As a preliminary to the drafting of such a scheme,
  he had urged that the lines of a practical League of Free Nations
  should be studied and laid down.

Pending the formulation of this scheme, he thought that Allied
propaganda should insist upon Allied control of raw materials, of
shipping, and on the Allies’ power to ostracise for an indefinite
period enemy peoples, until the terms of the Allied peace settlement
were fully accepted. At the same time it should be pointed out that
nothing stood between enemy people and a lasting peace except the
designs of their ruling dynasties and of their military and economic
castes. The primary war aim of the Allies was the changing of Germany,
not only in their own interest, but also in that of the German
people itself, since, without the honest co-operation of a reformed
Germany, disarmament on a large scale might be impossible, and without
disarmament social and economic reconstruction would be impracticable.
He trusted that this question of Allied propaganda policy in regard to
Germany would be carefully weighed by the Policy Committee.

There remained the extremely important question of the co-ordination of
Allied propaganda effort. It was obvious, he said, that if each Ally
carried on its propaganda in enemy countries without reference to what
the other Allies were doing, there must result great dispersion of
effort, overlapping, and, possibly, some conflict of statement if not
of aims. In order to secure the greatest possible military efficiency,
the Allied Governments had established the Versailles Council, and
had agreed to the appointment of an Allied Commander-in-Chief. Up
till then the only Inter-Allied propaganda institution set up was
the Inter-Allied Propaganda Commission at Padua. The working of this
Commission had revealed the great advantages of concerted effort,
but it had also revealed certain defects which only fuller Allied
co-ordination in matters of propaganda seemed likely to overcome. He
would therefore submit a proposal, definite in aim, though variable
in detail, that there be created a central body for the conduct of
propaganda in enemy countries. By such a step it seemed to him many
delays might be avoided, great economy of energy and expense might
be secured, and progress be made towards the unification of Allied
propaganda policy and of the means for carrying it into effect.

In conclusion, he asked pardon for reverting once more to the great
importance of a true conception of propaganda in enemy countries, not
only as a means of winning the war, but also and especially as a means
of winning the peace. It was a work that demanded all the intelligence
of the best minds in Allied countries, and the sustained support of
responsible Allied statesmen.

M. Klobukowski, the head of the French delegation, who followed Lord
Northcliffe with an eloquent speech in French, which Lieutenant Mantoux
interpreted, concurred in all that Lord Northcliffe had said. The
French Government, he said, answered willingly to the invitation sent
to them by the British Government to send their representatives to the
Inter-Allied Conference on Propaganda in Enemy Countries. It seemed to
them necessary to call it to intensify by methodical co-operation and
concerted direction the powerful means of action at the disposal of
the Allies. To see exactly what could be done; to know exactly where
they meant to go--that was the principal aim which must inspire their
propaganda.

The campaign of systematic untruth which was being waged by the enemy
need not for one moment divert the Allies from their line. Honesty had
never seemed to the Allies to be an inferior policy. In the second
place, French propaganda had taken care to put in a strong light the
responsibility for the war. The war, on the part of our enemies, was
a war of aggression and the service of a policy of conquest and the
enslavement of nationalities. On the Allied side it was a purely
defensive war, for the defence not only of territories, but also of the
great cause of Right violated in Belgium, as in Alsace-Lorraine, in
Poland, in the Ukraine, in Serbia, in Rumania, and in all the Balkan
countries. “We try,” said M. Klobukowski, “to reach in enemy countries
consciences which have hitherto shut out free examination and which
cannot yet control themselves. We try to open eyes and ears now shut by
the most extraordinary education of discipline which has at any time
dominated men. And this with the help not only of arguments taken from
facts which might be considered as arbitrary in practice and intention,
but also with the help of what is admitted by our enemies themselves
in declarations (the sincerity of which is incontestable for they come
from their own agents) from those who dared write what they know, like
Prince Lichnowsky and Dr. Muehlon.”

Co-operation in the work of liberating the oppressed nationalities
(continued M. Klobukowski) defined clearly one of the ends of our
action against Austria-Hungary; but although we cannot speak of
immediate results, Allied propaganda was not least indispensable
in Germany. If Austria was guilty towards her peoples, Germany was
guilty towards the whole of mankind. Since the war began, the French
Government had been constantly preoccupied with the propaganda to be
effected in Germany. Faced with the monstrous distortion of facts which
the Imperial Government tried to force upon the world, the first French
Yellow Book, in December, 1914, gave the full list of responsibilities
for the war, and showed, by going back to its origin, that Germany
prepared and finally launched the war.

One of the essential objects of Allied propagandists, therefore, must
be to come back frequently to the origin of the war, in the hope that
such effort will not be in vain. The experience of the publication of
the Lichnowsky memorandum was very encouraging from that point of view,
but that was not enough, as the majority of the German nation had still
confidence in the official versions of the causes of the world conflict
such as had been given to them by the Imperial Government. The Germans
must not be allowed to lower the Allies’ defensive war to the level of
a war of conquest. The Allies must never be tired of insisting that
they were victims of a deliberate aggression.

On the other hand, it was their interest to insist more and more upon
the character of the struggle in which they were engaged. They were
upon the defensive; they were defending themselves, they were defending
right and humanity; that was their war aim, and all other war aims
were only consequences of it. Deeply imbued as the German nation might
be with doctrines of historical realism, hostile as their Government
might be to the notion of a policy founded upon the respect of right,
the day nevertheless must come when their ideas would triumph over
their resistance, when gradually on one hand the revelations (daily
becoming more definite) would show the criminal complicities which were
the cause of the war. On the other hand the gradual failure of that
bid for domination would oblige the Germans themselves to look for the
culprits. The anxiety about the injustice of their own cause would
finally penetrate into the German nation.

It was also important clearly to show how useless was the effort made
by the enemy to sever the link between the Powers of the Entente.
The enemy Press was never tired of giving its readers the imaginary
spectacle of divisions between their enemies. After their tales about
France being conquered by the British Army, they proceeded to announce
that the Americans were going to get hold of France.

Every peace offensive undertaken by the German Government in the hour
of military difficulty gave evidence of the naïve confidence which the
best-informed among them employed in such an attempt to divide us. To
show that the Allied front was indissolubly united, to show that the
Alliance extends still further than the war, that it will extend from
the military to the economic field--that would be the efficient answer
of the Allies.

It must be said above all that the Allies would conquer and that they
had the means to conquer. They must not let themselves be led towards
discussions. There was always a danger of seeing the enemy get hold
of Allied formulæ, after having emptied them of what they contained.
The German mind, so complex and treacherous, had great ability in the
art of turning to its own account the principles laid down by others.
Germany might attempt once more to mislead the peoples by writing
on her own flag their mottoes while they reserved to themselves the
possibility of giving to those mottoes later on an interpretation
diametrically opposed to the real one.

Nothing was more important than to defend Allied public opinions
against such enterprises, which would certainly be undertaken by
Germany. The liberation of the peoples, affirmation of the justice of
the Allied cause, demonstration of the violation of right perpetrated
by the Central Empires--such must be the basis of Allied propaganda.

That was in full harmony with the general policy of principles and
tended to assure to all the peoples the right freely to develop, as
the constitutions of the Allied States had given the same right to
every individual. So Allied victory would have that character of moral
elevation which was the character of the great Allied nations during
their history. But until they reached that victory of liberty and
right, according to the strong words of M. Clemenceau, “let us make
war!”

Signor Borgese, the representative of Italy, said that he agreed
generally with all the ideas and proposals that had been made by Lord
Northcliffe.

The Italians had of late been particularly active on the field of
anti-enemy propaganda. For example, they had one office in Rome whose
chief duty it was to spread news arriving from the enemy in order
that his position in the world, and his internal resistance, might
be weakened. They had also in Switzerland a large organisation, the
principal aim of which was to secure daily knowledge of what was going
on in enemy countries, and to utilise to the full every possible means
of securing information about their internal condition.

The first act of Allied joint propaganda against the enemy was the
Rome Congress in April, which was due largely to the concord and the
friendship of the most enlightened and intelligent elements of public
opinion in England and in Italy. As a result of that Congress, great
consequences had followed in Austria-Hungary, and generally in the
world of the enemy; and the principal task was to pursue the way that
had thus been opened by the Rome Congress. The peculiar position
of Italy as the enemy of Austria naturally entered largely into
the motives that inspired Italian action. The declarations of Lord
Northcliffe--whose influence upon the question of enemy propaganda
was immense--and the declaration of M. Klobukowski were entirely
anti-Austrian in tendency.

As regards the Italians, they had been enemies of Austria not only
because Austria was their enemy, but also because they felt that it was
the most direct and sure way of being the enemies of Germany and of
Germanism. Those Italians who had understood the true position since
the beginning of the war had always been enemies of Austria in this
sense, and had sought the best means of attacking and annihilating
German militarism through Austria. Although German militarism was not
completely invulnerable, and although the vulnerability of Germany
was not so certain as that of Austria, Austria was the Achilles’ heel
of Germany. Two important conditions that had rendered possible such
action against Austria, were that the necessity of disintegrating
Austria had become generally realised throughout the world, and that
Austria’s responsibility for the war had been generally acknowledged
not only by the Allies, but also by the enemy. Lichnowsky and Muehlon
had acknowledged that the chief and immediate responsibility for the
war rested with Austria. The question of guilt was certainly one of
the chief questions with which propaganda had to deal; and it would
be examined by the committees, because he believed that it might be
possible to accelerate movements of opinion in Germany and in Austria
if a confession of guilt as to the origin of the war were made widely
known.

As to what had been done by Italian propaganda during the last few
months, he had mentioned the offices at Rome and at Berne, to which he
would refer in more detail in the committees. As to the work of the
Padua Inter-Allied Commission, it was assuredly a very great work,
if one were to judge of its activity not only by personal convictions
but by the convictions of the foe, who had publicly acknowledged
that the defeat on the Piave was partly caused by the efforts of the
Padua Commission, and by information that had been brought to them
by the Jugo-Slavs and Czecho-Slovaks. Allied propaganda must be a
propaganda of truth. The chief difficulty lay in making a distinction
between copying the enemy’s system of actual military operations
and imitating his methods in the war of ideas. It was true that the
military technique of war must be dependent upon that of the adversary,
unless we were to be at a disadvantage; but there was a danger that we
might imitate methods adopted by the enemy in the war of ideas--that
is to say, that we might copy German methods of propaganda. Although
there were people who thought that the Allies should copy lies and
hypocritical statements of German propaganda, he was convinced that
their real arm in the propaganda war was the truth. The Allies could
tell the truth because they were persuaded that they were right. It
was easy for them to have a system of ideas, because they believed
in them as in a kind of religion. Germany and Austria-Hungary would
listen intently to the words that we should say--not necessarily in
that Conference, but to the words of our Governments. Political action
and propaganda would have very great importance at the end of this
campaign, and therefore he hoped that Italians would be able to make
their contribution to the shortening and to the victorious decision of
the war.

One circumstance that gave them absolute certainty of victory, and was
a certificate of the moral purity of the Allied cause, was the action
of the United States, whom no one--not even the enemy--could accuse
of any selfish motive or interest. While it was conceivable that the
European Allies might be charged, however unjustly, with having some
thought of their direct interests, the United States could not by any
stretch of imagination be regarded as having intervened for any issue
save that of high principle. Therefore, he agreed entirely with Lord
Northcliffe and M. Klobukowski that the more the significance of the
American effort, both in its material and its moral aspects, were
brought to the knowledge of enemy peoples, the more rapid would be the
decline of their _moral_, and the surer the attainment of the just
peace which was the great common aim of the Allies and the purpose of
their action, both military and propagandist.

Mr. James Keeley, the representative of the United States, said that he
received his appointment through the Committee on Public Information
of the United States Government. Four U.S. military officers were
present, from the Military Intelligence Branch of the General Staff, as
observers. They all met the Conference as pupils, having a most earnest
desire to learn so that they might do their part as whole-heartedly in
this as in all other phases of Allied effort.

Learning from those who have had experience, they would be enabled to
devote whatever resources they had to the common purpose. They would
report to the American Government what men of experience in this work
had to recommend, and on the basis of that report it was hoped that an
American organisation could be created as quickly as possible, which
should work in the fullest, frankest, and most effective co-operation
with the corresponding organisations of the Allied nations. It would
not be amiss, perhaps, to suggest that, in addition to material
equipment, the United States could contribute one element that might
possibly be of peculiar importance in this work. Its population
contained a large representation of all the peoples of Central Europe.
These peoples were well organised in the United States, and, with a
few exceptions perfectly well-known, were loyal to the Allied cause.
Those peoples, of course, had intimate connections with the peoples of
Central Europe, and it was more than possible that they might be, in
various ways, of great use in carrying messages across the frontiers.
On this point, particularly, they would be glad of the advice of the
Conference.

After these speeches the four Committees referred to by Lord
Northcliffe were appointed to deliberate on policy, distribution,
material, and prisoners of war. The members of the Conference were
suitably distributed among the different committees, which accomplished
most invaluable work in a business-like manner, and presented their
reports to the full Conference for consideration at its sitting on the
third day.

The Policy Committee, presided over by M. Klobukowski, considered
exhaustively the problems of propaganda policy in all its fields
and phases of action. Its discussion crystallised into a series
of resolutions and recommendations for sanction, modification
or rejection by the Allied Governments. It was, of course, fully
understood that such resolutions could be only _ad referendum_ and not
binding on the respective Governments.

In regard to propaganda against Austria-Hungary, the Committee found
itself in complete agreement with the scheme of policy sanctioned
by the British Government for purposes of propaganda, and amplified
by the decisions of the British, French and Italian Governments at
the time of, or in connection with, the Rome Congress of Oppressed
Austro-Hungarian Nationalities. It recognised that such extensions of
policy, while springing from considerations of Allied principles, had,
in part, corresponded to the real demands of the propaganda situation,
which, in their turn, had sprung from the exigencies of the military
situation and, in particular, from the necessity of utilising the
established principles of the alliance for the purpose of impeding or
hampering the Austro-Hungarian offensive against Italy. Subsequent
acts and declarations on the part of Allied Governments and of the
Government of the United States made it clear that the joint policy of
the Allies was tending increasingly towards the constructive liberation
of the subject Austro-Hungarian races. The main task of the Committee
in relation to propaganda in Austria-Hungary seemed, therefore, to
be one of unifying for propaganda purposes these various acts and
declarations, and of preparing, if possible, the way for a joint Allied
declaration that might complete and render more effective the work of
Allied propaganda both in the interior of Austria-Hungary and among
Austro-Hungarian troops at the Front.

The discussion upon the expediency and the possibility of such a joint
Allied declaration was exhaustive and illuminating. In view of the
position already taken up by the Allied Governments and by the United
States in regard to the Czecho-Slovaks, the Poles, and the Rumanians,
it appeared that the main issue awaiting definition concerned the
question of Jugo-Slav unity and independence, and of the attitude of
Italy towards them. The Committee adopted the following recommendation:

   “With reference to the best means of aiding Allied Propaganda in
  favour of the freedom of the Austro-Hungarian subject races, the
  Committee expresses a strong hope that all controversial discussions
  of the frontiers between Italy and the future Jugo-Slav State will be
  avoided by the Jugo-Slav Press and the Jugo-Slav leaders both outside
  and, as far as the Jugo-Slav leaders may be able to exert their
  influence, also inside the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, just as they
  have been avoided of late by the most important organs of the Italian
  Press and in the public speeches of influential Italian leaders.”

During the debate upon this recommendation it became clearly apparent
that the Committee regarded, and was confident that the Conference
would regard, the Italian national claims to the union with Italy
of the cities and regions of Trent, Trieste, and the other regions
of Italian character as not only entirely justified, but also as
an elementary dictate of the Allies’ respect for the principles of
nationality and of ethnical justice. Precisely because the Committee
supported the principles formulated in the Italo-Jugo-Slav Agreement of
last March and saw in them the basis of fruitful co-ordination between
Italy, Jugo-Slavia, and the other nationalities then oppressed of the
Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, it held the Italian national rights above
mentioned to be imprescriptible and not open to discussion.

The Committee also felt that both for reason of propaganda and from
the point of view of the future independence and moral and political
security of the Italian nation a foremost part in the work of creating
a free and united Jugo-Slav State naturally fell to Italy. Therefore,
after the most careful consideration, it unanimously adopted--and
recommended to the Conference--the following resolution:

  “Considering the adhesion of the Italian Government, by the Prime
  Minister’s speech of April, 1918, to the resolutions of the Rome
  Congress of Austro-Hungarian subject races (which embodied the
  agreement between the Jugo-Slavs and the Italian Committee) and by
  his recent telegram to the Prime Minister of Serbia, M. Pashitch;

   “Considering the exemplifications of Allied Policy towards
  Austria-Hungary in the French and Italian Convention with the
  Czecho-Slovak National Council, the British declaration recognising
  the Czecho-Slovaks as an Allied Nation, the Allied declaration at the
  Versailles Conference of June 3rd, 1918 in favour of the unity and
  independence of Poland and Mr. Lansing’s statement of the 28th June,
  that all branches of the Slav races should be completely freed from
  German and Austrian rule;

  “Considering further the extreme expediency, especially in view
  of possible military developments on the Italian front, that the
  Allied policy of liberating the oppressed Hapsburg peoples should
  be represented, in the first place, by Italy, on whose front Allied
  propaganda against Austria-Hungary is principally located;

   “The Policy Committee of the Inter-Allied Propaganda Conference
  resolves to suggest that the Italian Government take the initiative
  in promoting a joint and unanimous public declaration that all the
  Allies regard the establishment of a free and united Jugo-Slav State,
  embracing Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, as one of the conditions of a
  just and lasting peace, and of the rule of right in Europe.”

Passing to the consideration of propaganda against Bulgaria, the
Committee recognised the essential connection between Allied propaganda
policy towards Austria-Hungary and Allied propaganda policy in the
Balkans. Without the adoption by the Allied Governments of a definite
policy in regard to Jugo-Slav and Rumanian unity and independence, it
was impossible to formulate any effective propaganda policy in regard
to Bulgaria. Upon the merits of propaganda in Bulgaria, the Committee
unanimously adhered to the principles laid down in Lord Northcliffe’s
opening statement, that is to say, that an essential preliminary to
any conversations or negotiations with Bulgaria must be a complete
and effective reversal of the policy hitherto pursued by Bulgaria as
the enemy of the Allies; and until this reversal had taken place,
the objects of the Allied propaganda should be to bring home to the
Bulgarian people a sense of the dangers that threatened them unless
they could convince the Allies by their conduct of their sincere
repentance. The Committee was also of the opinion that pending this
necessary change, their Serbian and Greek Allies should not be left in
ignorance of the propaganda policy which the chief Allied Powers might
adopt.

With reference to Poland, the Chairman of the Committee made a brief
but pregnant statement, declaring the policy of propaganda in regard
to the Poles to be identical with that laid down by President Wilson
and President Poincaré and formulated by the Allied Prime Ministers on
June 3 in the words: “The creation of a united and independent Polish
State, with free access to the sea, constitutes one of the conditions
of a solid and just peace and of the rule of right in Europe.” He added
that the growth of Prussian power for evil, and the present position
of Prussia in the world, had their origin in the partition of Poland.
Consequently he urged that the reunion of the various parts of Poland
would be not only the reparation of an historical injustice, but would
constitute a strong guarantee against any revival of the Prussian
system. He claimed that the greater the strength of Poland, the firmer
would be the security of Europe and the world against any renewal of
aggressive Prussian militarism.

In the discussion which followed, general agreement was expressed with
this view; but it was pointed out that a reunited Poland might be
stronger in proportion as its territory was ethnographically compact
and did not include other neighbouring racial elements with whom Poland
would have every interest to live in concord, but which, were they
included against their will within her frontiers, might become sources
of disturbance and weakness. It was also considered desirable that the
Polish National Committee, in order to become not less valuable to
the Allies as an adjunct and agency of propaganda in enemy countries
than were the Czech and Jugo-Slav Committees, might extend the basis
of its representation, so as to secure more unanimous support from
the various sections of Polish opinion. The Committee adopted, and
submitted to the approval of the Conference, the following resolution
and recommendation. It proposed to communicate the recommendation to
the Polish National Committee:

  “The Conference records its conviction that the creation of a united
  and independent Polish State, with free access to the sea, is an
  essential requirement of lasting peace in Europe, and expresses the
  belief that the more closely the frontiers of this future Polish
  State follow ethnographical lines, the stronger will it be to play
  its part in safeguarding that peace, and the more harmonious will be
  its relations with neighbouring peoples which, like the Poles, are
  striving to secure a free existence.

   “The Conference, anxious that Allied propaganda may truly express
  the desires of the Polish people, as a whole, and may tend to promote
  its welfare, expresses the hope that the Polish National Council may
  extend the basis of its representation so as to be in a position to
  lend still further aid to Allied Propaganda in enemy countries.”

On the question of Alsace-Lorraine, the Committee found itself in
entire agreement with its Chairman’s declaration that the return of
the two provinces to France was an imperative demand of international
justice and not a concession to be made by the Allies to French
national feeling. The undoing of the flagrant wrong done by Germany in
1871 was so clearly a condition of any just peace that it required no
further demonstration; quite apart from the historical justification
of the French claim to the reincorporation of these provinces in
France by their disannexation from Germany, the title of the people of
Alsace-Lorraine to determine their own allegiance proceeded from their
voluntary adhesion to France in 1790, no less than from the protests
of their elected representatives against the Treaty of Frankfurt in
the French National Assembly at Bordeaux in 1871, and in the German
Reichstag in 1874. In regard to Alsace-Lorraine, the Committee was
convinced that Allied Propaganda in Germany should make known to
the German people the determination of the Allies to insist in all
circumstances upon this vindication of rights.

Consequently it adopted the following resolutions:

  1. Propaganda on the subject of Alsace-Lorraine should be unified and
  conducted on general lines indicated by France.

  2. The argument to which first place should always be given is that
  of outraged right and of the will of the inhabitants as expressed in
  their solemn and repeated protests.

  3. The question of Alsace-Lorraine is a question of international
  right, the solution of which interests the whole world.

As to propaganda addressed to the German people themselves in regard
to the future position of Germany, the Committee was in full agreement
with the policy recommended by Lord Northcliffe with the approval of
the British Government and summarised in his opening statements. It
believed that Allied propaganda should make it clear that the chief
object of the Allies was the changing of Germany, not the destruction
of the German people; and that the German people could hope for
an adequate position in the world, and for admission into a future
society of nations, when they had qualified themselves for partnership
with civilised communities by making the necessary reparations and
restorations (primarily in the case of Belgium) by overthrowing the
system known as Prussian militarism, and when they had effectively
abandoned all designs of mastery over Europe. At the same time, the
Committee laid stress upon the importance of bringing home to the
German people a sense of the economic pressure which the Allies, and
above all the United States of America, were in a position to exercise,
and would exercise, until the conditions of a just peace were accepted.

To this end the Committee strongly urged that, in the various Allied
countries and in the United States, a comprehensive scheme of world
organisation be studied and worked out, and that, in particular,
the steps already taken to co-ordinate the economic policy of the
Allies and of the United States be publicly explained and brought to
the knowledge of the Germans. The Committee, therefore, adopted and
recommended to the Conference the following resolution:

  “In consideration of the fact that the Allied Governments have in
  their own respective fields of action and by their joint action begun
  to give effect to economic co-operation, which is to-day a powerful
  instrument of war, and which may, after the war, serve as a basis for
  the systematic organisation of the resources of the world:

  “The Conference expresses its satisfaction with the results already
  attained and believes that it would be expedient to make plain to
  enemy public opinion, by means of a service of information, which
  would set forth both the principles of Allied economic action and
  their results as worked out in daily practice, the gravity of the
  danger by which the enemy is threatened, and the advantages assured
  to those who are admitted to co-operation with the Allies.”

The Committee adopted the following resolution:

   “That in view of the great importance of co-ordinating the Allies’
  policies and organisations for the conduct of propaganda in enemy
  countries, a permanent body be constituted for this purpose;

  “That this body consist of four members, representing respectively
  the four propaganda departments which have taken part in this
  Conference; each member having the power to nominate an assistant or
  a substitute, or both, if necessary;

  “That the provisional headquarters of the body shall be at Crewe
  House, London, until permanent headquarters be determined;

  “That the establishment expenses be shared equally between the four
  Governments; and that a permanent secretariat be appointed thereto.”

In adhering to this resolution, and in deciding that it be recommended
for adoption by the Allied Governments and by the United States,
the Policy Committee had been influenced especially by the hope
that the proposed arrangement might expedite the co-ordination of
Allied propaganda policy, facilitate the preparation of concordant
declarations by the Allied Governments at suitable moments, and assist
in the proper organisation of congresses.

The discussions of the Distribution Committee were exceedingly
interesting and fruitful. They ranged over the whole field of
propaganda effort, and the Committee’s report summarised the means
of distribution of propaganda in use and assessed their respective
values. So far as military means were concerned, it was found that
the Italians employed aeroplanes, projectiles, and contact patrols;
the French, aeroplanes, projectiles, and balloons; the British,
only balloons on the Western Front, but aeroplanes in the East; and
that seaplanes might be employed to reach special objectives in the
Mediterranean. Each country gave favourable reports on the methods they
employed, but all were agreed that a constant exchange of information
as to results was required. In certain cases, such as the mountainous
Italian Front, where very limited targets had to be reached, the
dropping of propaganda in bulk was necessary; but in most cases methods
that secured a wide scattering of the leaflets, so that those might
be secured and hidden by individuals, were necessary. The French
explained a device, in its experimental stage, to secure an automatic
scattering from aeroplanes. The “releases” of English balloons were
agreed to produce a most adequate scattering. Various devices employed
in projectiles were successful in the case of leaflets when the angle
of projection was high and the wind was favourable, but hitherto had
not been successful with pamphlets. It was recognised that aeroplanes
were the best means of reaching distant targets with accuracy; that
for shorter distances, from a few hundred yards up to ten miles,
projectiles would secure great accuracy.

With regard to range, it was recognised that aeroplanes had the widest
limits, and the scattering of literature in Berlin by the French and
in Vienna by the Italians was considered an accomplishment of great
brilliancy and promise of usefulness, and that the types of paper
balloons in use were thoroughly effective for ranges up to twenty or
thirty miles, and with less certainty of aim up to 100 or 150 miles;
but that with larger balloons (such as the fabric balloons in the
possession of the English, or the new larger “doped” paper balloons
then being prepared in England, or the reinforced paper balloons being
experimented with in France) the distances could be increased to
several hundred miles.

As to the bulk that could be distributed, it was stated that each of
the standard balloons, then used by the English and French, carried
4 lb. 2 oz. of literature, and that projectiles could take from a few
ounces up to 8 or 9 lb. The large fabric balloons then available at
G.H.Q. could carry up to 15 lb.

It was recognised that there were no objections to the use of balloons,
as the operations did not interfere with other work and did not excite
retaliation from the enemy. The use of projectiles was apt to provoke
retaliation unless it were carried out at night or to a limited extent.
There was difference of experience and opinion with regard to the use
of aeroplanes. The Italians and French stated that no action had been
taken by the enemy in the case of their airmen who had been captured,
and that they found no difficulty in imposing this duty on their
airmen. The British, however, stated that the Germans had taken strong
measures, and had threatened their continuance, against airmen captured
after distributing leaflets. The representative of the British Air
Ministry stated that, after giving full consideration to the matter,
and notwithstanding their appreciation of the value of propaganda,
they were opposed to the use of aeroplanes for this purpose, partly
on the ground of the bad psychological effect of such work on young
pilots and aviators and partly because the supply of trained men and of
machines was no more than sufficient for the direct purposes of this
arm of the Forces. The representative of G.H.Q., France, said that the
British Army had accepted this view. He added that balloons could be
employed on the Western Front three days a week on the average, and
that there was no mechanical reason why the method by balloons could
not be increased to meet every reasonable requirement.

A French representative in the course of a discussion as to the utility
of throwing some leaflets in bombing expeditions, reported the opinion
of a well-known pro-ally German citizen that in the case of the Rhine
towns and rich cities of Germany the propaganda of fear, that is to
say, the actual dropping of bombs, was more useful than the dropping of
literature.

It was agreed that the suggested use of aeroplanes to scatter leaflets
at great heights parallel with the enemy lines encountered most of the
objections to, and none of the dangers of, their direct use by crossing
the lines. A device which had been worked out experimentally in
England, but was not employed because of the danger it might occasion
to aeroplanes, was explained and the apparatus shown. It consisted in
sending up leaflets to be liberated at the necessary height for wind
driftage by means of a messenger travelling up and down the cable of
a box kite. This means was recognised to be cheap and efficient for
employment where it would not be dangerous to aeroplanes.

The Committee agreed that the regular exchange of information as to
methods employed by the Allies, and as to the results actually obtained
by these, would be of great value, and recommended that a permanent
bureau should be established to collect and exchange such information
and reports.

As regards civil means of distribution, the Committee recommended that
increased attention be paid to the insertion of news and articles in
neutral organs which were either read or quoted in the enemy countries.
Special stress was laid on the importance of establishing effective
relations with organs which had a reputation for strict neutrality or
pro-enemy bias.

The Committee also recommended that each Power should seek through
its agencies to establish channels through which enemy newspaper
correspondents could be influenced or provided with information. The
task of approaching all sufficiently important correspondents with
whom contact had not been established should be apportioned among the
agencies of the Powers according to the opportunities of approach
available. Channels created under a scheme of this kind should be made
mutually available to the respective Allied agents in the localities
concerned.

Having regard to the extent to which the ordinary book trade channels
into Germany were still operating, the Committee recommended the
publication in neutral countries of works which, though not directly
bearing on the issues of the war, were expressly calculated to educate
enemy opinion in a democratic sense. The Committee held that, in view
of its great utility, clandestine circulation in the enemy countries of
carefully-chosen literature, especially if actually written by enemy
subjects of pro-Ally or revolutionary tendencies, should be secured
through every available channel. In view of the precarious and delicate
nature of this work, the Committee desired specially to emphasise the
necessity of seeking out and developing new channels for distribution
of this kind.

The main part of the time which the Committee on Material gave to the
discussion of its subject was devoted to the question of the most
effective forms of propaganda and to the special methods desirable
for putting these forms into practice. There was general agreement
that the best way to depress the _moral_ of the German troops and the
German population was to show them that it was against their interest
to continue the war; that the longer they went on the worse they
would fare both during the war and after; and that their only hope of
regaining their place in the community of nations lay in throwing over
the bad advisers who had led them into the war, and whose repeated
promises of success had been one after the other falsified. Thereto the
Germans had always had a hope before them. They were taught to hope
for great advantage from the downfall of Russia, from the unrestricted
U-boat warfare, from the last offensive on the Western Front. For the
first time their leaders did not know what hope to dangle before them.
Therefore, the moment was one peculiarly favourable for propaganda if
undertaken upon the right lines.

It appeared to the Committee that the best lines upon which to work
would be to emphasise as much as possible the great American effort,
both in the field and at home in the factory, the shipyard, and the
farm. At the same time the dark commercial outlook for Germans, the
dangers lying latent for them in the control of raw materials by
the Allies, the discovery of so many of their trade secrets, and
the building up in France, Italy, England, and the United States of
industries in which they had almost a monopoly before the war ought
also to be brought as vividly as possible before them. They should
be told the truth about the food situation in France and England,
which so far had been kept from them. They should be given news as
quickly as possible of Allied successes. They should be depressed as
much as possible, yet at the same time care should be taken not to
let them think they were for ever excluded from relations of business
and friendship with the peoples then fighting against them. If they
were made to believe this, their backs would be stiffened to fight
on desperately as long as possible. A sound line of propaganda, the
Committee considered, would be to leave open a doorway through which
if they got rid of Pan-Germanism and renounced its theories of world
domination by blood and iron they would in time be admitted again to
the same intercourse as before. It was agreed that for soldiers the
most elementary propaganda was the best. More elaborate arguments
and demonstrations should be kept for pamphlets to be smuggled into
Germany and for articles in neutral papers. Use should be made wherever
possible of diagrams appealing instantly to the eye.

A long discussion took place on the question of revolutionary
propaganda. The opinion was expressed that it was better to denounce
the Pan-German party generally and throw upon them the responsibility
for the war and for all the misfortunes which Germany had suffered
and would still further suffer from it, rather than to attack the
Emperor. On the other hand, it was pointed out that attacks on an
individual are always more effective than attacks on a party. Finally,
it was agreed that anything said against the Hohenzollern dynasty
should be taken, either in reality or in appearance, from German
sources, so as to avoid the risk that attacks clearly emanating from
Allied sources might strengthen rather than weaken the Emperor’s
hold upon the people of Germany. While a good deal of material was
available from German anti-Imperial sources, it was suggested that
the advantage of circulating, for example, speeches of Socialists,
might be counterbalanced by the disadvantage that it would make such
speakers less inclined to talk. Some Socialists had appealed to the
French Government not to use their speeches for propaganda, because
this weakened their efforts. It was agreed that incitements to German
soldiers to desert were legitimate and might be useful. The sending
into Germany of photographs of prisoners of war taken immediately after
their capture, when they were usually in a deplorable condition, and
after two months of captivity, when their physical condition was good,
was recommended.

With regard to Austria-Hungary, the Committee discussed whether it was
illegitimate to exploit the land hunger among the Magyar peasants and
the discontent among the German proletariat. It was agreed that it
would do no harm to support the agrarian agitators in Hungary, but, as
regards Bolshevik propaganda among the Austro-German working classes,
that the Allies ought only to circulate their own literature. It was
suggested that the United States, in mobilising its Slav elements,
might spare members of each of the Slav nationalities for propaganda
work in England and in France.

Propaganda in Bulgaria depended on the policy which the Entente Powers
and the United States decided to follow with regard to that country.
Until such a policy was settled little could be done in a large way. It
was useful, however, to make the Bulgarians acquainted with a number
of facts of which they were ignorant, as for example, the failure of
U-boats to reduce England to the verge of starvation, the large number
of American troops already in France, and so on. Leaflets on these and
other topics were being dropped regularly by aeroplanes on the Salonica
front in considerable quantities. A good deal, it was suggested, could
be done through Bulgars in Switzerland. But so long as the Bulgarians
believed that the United States was their friend and would see them
through whatever happened, little impression could be made upon them.

With regard to co-operation between the various bodies engaged in
propaganda, it was proposed that closer relations should be established
between the local agents of the Allied Powers in neutral countries;
that they should meet from time to time to exchange ideas and to give
each other full information as to their activities. Special stress
was laid upon the necessity of these local agents working in union
with the diplomatic and military representatives and with any other
agencies engaged in the same kind of work. The Committee unanimously
accepted this suggestion, with the proviso that the local agents
should, if possible, be under the direction of the Central Committee,
to which they could refer for instructions and advice. Pending the
establishment of such a central body, arrangements were made for the
various Propaganda Departments to begin at once to exchange information
about all that they were doing and that each should send out copies of
all the material produced by it to the other departments. It was, of
course, agreed that such circulation of material produced would be one
of the chief activities of the proposed central body, which would do it
with greater rapidity and effect.

It was also agreed that such a central body could be most useful
in employing methods for testing the effectiveness of propaganda.
The means of doing this were generally admitted to be defective.
Only by co-ordinating effort and by comparing information could
they be improved. It was decided that the existing system of
examining prisoners of war for purposes of military information
ought to be supplemented by a special further examination for the
purposes of propaganda information, and it was suggested that special
representatives of the Enemy Propaganda Departments should be allowed
to conduct such examinations.

Some important points connected with propaganda brought to bear upon
Germany through neutral countries were raised, and it was agreed
that the work of controlling and distributing films for moving
picture theatres, which was to be done by an Inter-Allied Commission
in Switzerland, ought to be extended to other neutral countries,
especially Sweden. Information before the Committee bore testimony that
German-owned picture theatres had of late increased very much in number
both in Switzerland and in Scandinavia, and that these relied for the
lighter part of their entertainments upon films from Allied countries,
Germany supplying special propaganda films. By controlling the supply
of films from Allied countries, the activity of these theatres could be
very much diminished and possibly brought to an end.

It was also agreed that it would be advisable to invite a number of
neutral editors and newspaper writers to pay a visit to the United
States. It was considered that articles describing what they saw and
what they were able to judge of the feeling of the American nation
would have a very useful effect upon German opinion.

With a view to influencing German opinion, it was agreed that more news
agencies, to all appearance independent and self-supporting, might well
be established in other neutral countries; that more efforts should be
made to get articles inserted in enemy newspapers, not controversial
articles, but statements of what the Allies were doing, especially
in the economic field, written as a German might write them who was
anxious about the future of his country; and that dispatch of Allied
newspapers to neutral countries should be improved and extended so that
there might be more chance of their finding their way into Germany.

The discussions of the Prisoners of War Committee showed that agreement
existed as to the soundness of the methods adopted by Crewe House for
this particular work, and the report took the form of a recommendation
that they should be generally adopted by the Allies.

At the final plenary session of the Conference, on August 17, 1918,
it was unanimously resolved that the Committees’ reports should be
accepted, and submitted by the heads of the four Missions to their
respective Governments for their approval and adoption. The Conference
resolved to constitute (as suggested by the Policy Committee) a
permanent inter-Allied body for the conduct of propaganda in enemy
countries and by so doing made a great advance. In order to maintain
close touch with the French propaganda authorities, Lord Northcliffe
appointed Colonel Lord Onslow as resident representative of Crewe
House in Paris. By the time the Armistice was signed the different
Governments had nominated their delegates to the permanent Inter-Allied
body and all the necessary preliminary arrangements had been
satisfactorily made. This organisation would have opened a new chapter
in the history of war propaganda but for the conclusion of hostilities.
As Lord Northcliffe said in his final speech to the Conference, the
constitution of a permanent Inter-Allied body was a step towards that
general co-ordination of Allied purpose and organisation which the
experience of the war had proved to be a postulate of rapidity and
efficiency of action. The work of the Conference itself, however, was
invaluable as it surveyed the policy and organisation of propaganda
against the enemy in all its phases and from many points of view at
a time when propaganda had just passed into the intensive stage. Its
reports in themselves form a text-book in the science and art of
propaganda.

[Illustration: “DRIFTING DOWN IN WHITE SHOWERS”: LEAFLETS (INSTEAD OF
BOMBS), FROM ITALIAN AEROPLANE SQUADRON, DROPPING ON VIENNA--AN AIR
PHOTOGRAPH.

_Photograph supplied by the Photographic Studios of the Italian Air
Service. By kind permission of the “Illustrated London News.”_]

[Illustration: MR. ROBERT DONALD.

MEMBER OF THE ENEMY PROPAGANDA COMMITTEE.

_Photo: Elliott & Fry, Ltd._]

[Illustration: SIR SIDNEY LOW.

MEMBER OF THE ENEMY PROPAGANDA COMMITTEE

_Photo: Elliott & Fry. Ltd_]

[Illustration: MR. JAMES O’GRADY, M.P.

MEMBER OF THE ENEMY PROPAGANDA COMMITTEE.]




CHAPTER VIII

FROM WAR PROPAGANDA TO PEACE PROPAGANDA

The Co-ordination of British Policy--A representative committee--Lord
Northcliffe’s Article: “From War to Peace.”


In addition to its success in its practical bearing and direct
influence on the work of spreading the truth concerning the war in
the enemy countries, the Inter-Allied Conference at Crewe House
in August, 1918, was a distinctly useful act of propaganda in two
other directions. First, it led to a mutual appreciation, among the
influential representatives of the four countries, of the effort and
determination of each nation and of their willingness to combine to
achieve victory--in other words, to a better understanding of each
other’s will to conquer and readiness to subordinate self-interest to
the larger object of Allied accomplishment of purpose.

In the second place, the Conference was an object-lesson to the British
Government Departments which participated in it as to the value of
concerted and co-ordinated action in propaganda matters. Shortly
afterwards, a suggestion was made by an influential representative
of one of these Departments that a committee should be formed to
represent all British departments concerned in any way with propaganda.
Moreover, it gradually became evident to all concerned that the
collapse of Bulgaria was the beginning of the end, and that “war
propaganda” must by a process of steady evolution become “peace-terms
propaganda,” by which public opinion in enemy countries as well as at
home, in the Dominions, and in Allied and neutral countries, might be
made accustomed to the peace which the Allies intended to make. The
maintenance of British prestige demanded that our position in regard
to the peace should be explained and justified by the widespread
dissemination of news and views, both before and during the Peace
Conference.

Thus it was more than ever imperative that all British propagandists
should speak with one voice. Here then was work ready to be done by
the suggested inter-departmental committee, for the formation of which
invitations had already been issued to the departments concerned to
send as delegates to this Committee responsible officials able to give
decisions for their departments on such matters as would be discussed
by such a committee. These invitations were accepted by:

  The War Cabinet,
  The Admiralty,
  The War Office,
  The Foreign Office,
  The Treasury,
  The Ministry of Information,
  The Air Ministry,
  The Colonial Office,
  The India Office,
  The War Aims Committee, and
  The Official Press Bureau.

Representatives of these departments and of Lord Northcliffe’s
department, which, for official purposes, had been renamed The British
War Mission, thus formed what was known as the Policy Committee of the
British War Mission.

While this Committee was in process of formation, Crewe House had been
studying the problems of “peace-terms propaganda” and had, as a result
of a series of conferences, prepared a memorandum outlining a basis
upon which such propaganda could be developed.

The first meeting of the Policy Committee was held at Crewe House on
October 4, 1918, and I presided in the absence, through indisposition,
of Lord Northcliffe. After giving a summarised account of the work
carried on from Crewe House, I said that whatever results it had been
possible to achieve had proceeded mainly from the circumstance that it
had in each case been based upon definite policies in regard to the
countries concerned. These policies had all been submitted to, and
had received the approval of, the British Government. The advantages
of this procedure were obvious. It enabled propagandists to work on
consistent lines without fear that the representations they made to
the enemy would be contradicted by actual occurrences. In this way,
propaganda representations had a cumulative effect. If, for instance,
enemy troops were at first inclined to regard representations with
scepticism, they were gradually convinced by the force of events that
they had been told the truth from the outset, and that consequently
subsequent representations deserved serious attention. Another
advantage had proceeded from the obvious circumstance that as Allied
policy must correspond to the aims which the Allies were determined to
secure at the peace, the representation of that policy to propaganda
was in harmony with the war aims of the Allies, and was strengthened
by every successive declaration by Allied statesmen of the objects for
which they were fighting. A third advantage was that the propaganda
of the enemy could not destroy the effects of our propaganda without
having gained such military successes as to render the Allied war aims
themselves unattainable. Consequently every Allied victory that brought
the war aims nearer attainment enhanced also the efficacy of propaganda.

At the outset, the efforts made by Crewe House were naturally tentative
and experimental. Their real value could only be proved by the test of
experience. This test had been applied in Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria,
and Germany. As against Austria-Hungary, Crewe House propaganda
contributed to the defeat of the Austrians on the Piave in June, and
had its efforts not been thwarted by political short-sightedness and
some personal intrigue on the part of various Italian authorities, it
was certain that much greater headway would have been made and that the
Italian armies would have been in a much more favourable position. As
it was, the policy of liberating the Austro-Hungarian subject races,
upon which propaganda had been based, had already had a marked effect
in the interior of the Dual Monarchy, and had brought large sections
of the inhabitants to the point of revolt. This would be clear when
it was said that the Italo-Jugo-Slav Agreement of March, 1918, the
Rome Congress of the Hapsburg Subject Races of April, with its sequel
in the declarations by the Allies and the United States to the Poles,
Czecho-Slovaks and Southern Slavs, as well as the actual recognition of
the Czecho-Slovaks and the prospective recognition of the Jugo-Slavs
as Allied and belligerent nations, had all been influenced, if not
directly promoted, by the efforts of Crewe House.

As regards Bulgaria, Crewe House definitely rejected Bulgarian
overtures until there should be a complete reversal of Bulgarian
policy. That reversal had taken place, and had opened up further
prospects of propaganda against Austria-Hungary of which speedy
advantage was being taken.

The work in Germany had been positive and negative. Its aim had been to
give the German people something to hope for and much to fear--in other
words, to make it clear to them that the only way to escape complete
ruin would be to break with the system that brought the war upon
Europe, and to qualify for admission into a League of Nations on the
Allied terms. In addition to these educative efforts, we had supplied
the enemy armies with constant and invariably truthful information
about the actual military position. The news which the German military
authorities were withholding from their troops had been supplied by
us. Hence their cries of alarm. Nevertheless, much remained to be done
in the co-ordination of the efforts of all Government Departments so
as to make the general work of propaganda as rapid and as efficient as
possible. Much use had unfortunately deprived the term “propaganda”
of its real meaning. In its true sense it meant the education of the
enemy to a knowledge of what kind of world the Allies meant to create,
and of the place reserved in it for enemy peoples according as they
assisted in, or continued to resist, its creation. It implied also
the dissemination of this knowledge among the Allied peoples, so that
there might be full popular support for Allied policy and no tendency
at the critical moment of peace to sacrifice any essential feature of
the settlement because its importance might not have been explained
or understood in time. Next to the actual work of fighting the enemy
on land and sea, there was no more important work than this; and the
joint intelligence and energy of all Departments of the Government were
required to accomplish it successfully. For this reason the suggestion
that this council of representatives of the Government Departments
chiefly concerned should be formed had been warmly welcomed, in order
that there might be less dispersion of effort, less overlapping, and
greater mutual comprehension of the work which each Department was
striving to do, and fuller co-ordination in the direction of all those
efforts to one single end.

As the war approached its end, enemy propaganda must gradually pass
into peace offensives and counter-offensives. The British War Mission
therefore had already in existence an organisation to collect and
collate various suggestions, territorial, political, economic, and so
forth, that had been made by the different sections and parties in
Allied, neutral, and enemy countries. A step in this direction was the
report on the Propaganda Library, issued by the War Office early in
1917, by Captain Chalmers Mitchell, who had since become the liaison
officer between the British War Mission and the War Office, and who
had been asked to act as Secretary of the Policy Committee. Captain
Chalmers Mitchell was in charge of the aforesaid organisation at Crewe
House, and although its immediate function was to collect information
useful for propaganda, it was clear that it would also obtain material
useful to those who had to shape peace policy. For propaganda to the
enemy was in a sense a forecast of policy; it must be inspired by
policy, but at the same time its varying needs also suggested policy.

It was hoped, therefore, that this Policy Committee might assist
in furnishing materials for the compilation of the various peace
proposals, in revising the collation of them, in drawing inferences
from them and in discussing the action and reaction of peace propaganda
and peace policy that the inferences suggested.

The Committee decided to undertake the following immediate activities:

  Study of Peace Terms.

   Study of utterances by important enemy representatives to form
  decisions as to what credence should be given them and what response
  should be made to them.

  Suggestion of statements to be made by Allied representatives, and
  consideration of their phraseology and substance.

  Special consideration of the reception to be given to German
  statements as to the course of democratisation in Germany.

At an emergency meeting of the Committee summoned a few days later to
draft a statement of propaganda policy with reference to the German
Peace Note, Lord Northcliffe said his department had prepared for
submission to the Committee a draft statement, based on a consideration
of President Wilson’s pronouncements. After various slight
modifications had been made, the statement was adopted in principle.

In its final form it read:

  “In order to stop further bloodshed, the German Government requests
  the immediate conclusion of an armistice on land and water and in the
  air.

   “The Note accepts the programme set forth by the President of the
  United States in his message to Congress of January 8th, 1918, and in
  his later pronouncements, especially his speech of September 27th, as
  a basis for peace negotiations.

  “In point of fact, the pronouncements of President Wilson were a
  statement of attitude made before the Brest-Litovsk treaty, and
  enforcement of the peace of Bucharest on Rumania, and the German
  statement of their intentions at the outset of the Spring offensive.
  They cannot, therefore, be understood as a full recitation of the
  conditions of peace.

  “The phrasing of the German acceptance of them as a ‘basis for
  peace negotiations’ covers every variety of interpretation from
  sincere acceptance to that mere desire for negotiations which is the
  inevitable consequence of the existing military situation. It is,
  therefore, impossible to grant any armistice to Germany which does
  not give the Entente full and acceptable guarantees that the terms
  arranged will be complied with. There must be a clear understanding
  that Germany accepts certain principles as indisputable, and
  reserves for negotiation only such details as, in the opinion of the
  Associated Powers, are negotiable.

   “In the full conviction of the power and the will of the Associated
  Powers to enforce a peace that shall be just and lasting, we shall
  thankfully accept conclusive evidence that the peoples of our present
  enemies are willing to co-operate in the establishment of such a
  peace. With the object of making the conditions of such co-operation
  clear, we take the opportunity, presented by the German peace note,
  of exploring more fully the ground covered by President Wilson’s
  pronouncements and of distinguishing explicitly between principles
  and conditions that must be accepted as indisputable, and terms and
  details that may be the subject of negotiation.

  “The following conditions are indisputable:--

  “_In no sense whatever shall restoration or reparation in the case of
  Belgium be taken into consideration when adjusting any other claims
  arising from the war._

   “1. The complete restoration, territorial and political, of
  Belgium. The assumption by Germany of the full financial burden
  involved in material restoration and reconstruction, including
  the replacement of machinery, the provision of war pensions and
  adequate compensation for all civilian losses and injuries, and the
  liquidation of all Belgian war debts. In view of the circumstances in
  which Germany invaded Belgium, no allegations that Belgian civilians
  acted against military law or imposed authority shall be taken into
  consideration. The future international status of Belgium shall be
  settled in accordance with the wishes of the Belgian nation.

  “2. The freeing of French territory, reconstruction of the invaded
  provinces, compensation for all civilian losses and injuries.

  “3. The restoration to France of Alsace-Lorraine, not as a
  territorial acquisition or part of a war indemnity, but as reparation
  for the wrong done in 1871, when the inhabitants of the two
  Provinces, whose ancestors voluntarily chose French allegiance, were
  incorporated in Germany against their will.

  “4. Readjustment of the Northern frontiers of Italy as nearly as
  possible along the lines of nationality.

  “5. The assurance to all the peoples of Austria-Hungary of their
  place amongst the free nations of the world and of their right to
  enter into union with their kindred beyond the present boundaries of
  Austria-Hungary.

   “6. The evacuation of all Territory formerly included in
  the boundaries of the Russian Empire, the annulment of all
  treaties, contracts, or agreements made with subjects, agents, or
  representatives of Enemy Powers since the Revolution and affecting
  territory or interests formerly Russian, and co-operation of the
  Associated Powers in securing conditions under which the various
  nationalities of the former Empire of Russia shall determine their
  own form of Government.

  “7. The formation of an independent Polish State with access to
  the Sea, which State shall include the territories inhabited by
  predominantly Polish populations, and the indemnification of Poland
  by the Powers responsible for the havoc wrought.

  “8. The abrogation of the Treaty of Bucharest, the evacuation and
  restoration of Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro, the Associated Powers
  to aid the Balkan States in settling finally the Balkan question on
  an equitable basis.

  “9. The removal, so far as is practicable, of Turkish dominion over
  all non-Turkish peoples.

  “10. The people of Schleswig shall be free to determine their own
  allegiance.

   “11. As reparation for the illegal submarine warfare waged by
  Germany and Austria-Hungary, these Powers shall be held liable to
  replace the merchant tonnage belonging to the Associated and Neutral
  nations illegally damaged or destroyed.

  “12. The appointment of a tribunal before which there shall be
  brought for impartial justice individuals of any of the belligerents
  accused of offences against the laws of war or of humanity.

  “13. The former Colonial possessions of Germany lost by her in
  consequence of her illegal aggression against Belgium shall in no
  case be returned to Germany.

  “The following conditions of Peace are negotiable:

  “1. The adjustment of claims for damage necessarily arising from
  the operations of war, and not included amongst the indisputable
  conditions.

  “2. The establishment, constitution, and conditions of Membership of
  a League of Free Nations for the purpose of preventing future wars,
  and improving international relations.

   “3. The League of Free Nations shall be inspired by the resolve of
  the Associated Powers to create a world in which, when the conditions
  of the Peace have been carried out, there shall be opportunity and
  security for the legitimate development of all the Peoples.”

This was approved by a representative of the Government, designated _ad
hoc_, for unofficial use as propaganda policy. Each department adapted
it to its own needs. So far as Crewe House was concerned, effective use
was made of it on two occasions--the first being when Lord Northcliffe,
at the suggestion of the Enemy Propaganda Committee, dealt with the
subject of peace terms in an address to United States officers at the
“Washington Inn,” London, on October 22, 1918.

At a meeting of the Policy Committee at Crewe House on October 28, the
action of the various departments on the memorandum was stated and
approved.

The Crewe House Committee reported first as to Lord Northcliffe’s
address at the Washington Inn; next that the production department of
the Enemy Propaganda Committee was engaged on a series of pamphlets
and leaflets dealing with different points of the terms; third, that
a reasoned statement covering the whole ground, and showing what
Germany had to gain in the end, was being drafted for publication,
the idea being that it should appear as an article or as a speech to
which wide circulation would be given; and lastly that the secretary
of the permanent Inter-Allied Body for Propaganda in Enemy Countries
had written to the French, Italian, and American members of that body
enclosing a copy of the Peace Policy Memorandum and suggesting that
they should take action similar to that of the British Policy Committee
and bring the subject up for discussion at the next meeting of the
Inter-Allied Body. (It may be mentioned here that the rapid course of
events prevented the contemplated meeting of the Inter-Allied Body.)

That was the last meeting of the Policy Committee. There remains to
be set forth the final result of its work. Crewe House, as explained
above, had stated its intention of publishing an article covering the
whole ground of the memorandum in such a way that the policy could be
presented in the same terms to our own people, to our Allies, and to
the enemy. It was found impracticable to get such an article published
quickly enough in a high-class magazine, or to get an immediate
occasion for making it the text of a speech. In these circumstances
the Committee asked their chairman, Viscount Northcliffe, to give the
Peace Policy the wide publicity possible by the use of his name and
by the sources of distribution which he was able to command. Lord
Northcliffe agreed, and accordingly produced the article which follows
and which was a full statement of the agreed policy. He arranged for
its simultaneous publication in the London Press and, at his own
expense, had it cabled to the remotest parts of the world. As stated
in the House of Commons by the Financial Secretary to the Treasury,
the document was unofficial. Its purpose was to form the basis of a
policy of publicity and the fact that it was proposed to elaborate it
for publication was announced beforehand, and approved by the Policy
Committee. This is the text of the article from _The Times_ of November
4, 1918:

  FROM WAR TO PEACE

  By LORD NORTHCLIFFE

  _This article is appearing to-day in the leading papers in Canada,
  Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Newfoundland, India, the
  British Dependencies, United States, South America, France, Italy,
  Spain, Switzerland, Holland, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Japan and
  elsewhere._

  _It will be circulated in Germany during the present week._

   Now that peace is at last in sight, I hear the question being
  asked on all sides: “How are we to pass from war conditions to peace
  conditions?” This cannot be done by a sudden and dramatic declaration
  like the declaration which in August, 1914, changed peace into war.
  It must be a slow and laborious process--a process with, as it seems
  to me, at least three distinct and successive stages. Out of these
  stages will be formed the organic whole which will constitute the
  machinery for replacing war conditions by peace conditions.

  It is important to get these three stages clearly outlined in our
  imaginations, and it is important also to bear in mind that each
  stage will smooth the path for its successor precisely in proportion
  to the sincerity and thoroughness with which it has been completed.
  There is but one goal for those who are honest and far-seeing. That
  goal is to create a condition of the world in which there shall
  be opportunity and security for the legitimate development of all
  Peoples. The road is long and difficult, but I believe that its
  course is already clear enough to be described, in the same words, to
  those who are our friends and to those who are now our enemies.

  I

  The first stage is the cessation of hostilities. Here, whether they
  cease on account of an armistice or by reason of surrender, there can
  be no question as to the “Honour” of the German people, or as to any
  adjustment of the conditions to any supposed strategical or actual
  strength of the Central Powers.

   If they feel humiliated, they must blame those who brought
  humiliation upon them; and as to military strength, the semi-official
  organ of the German Government, the _Norddeutsche Allgemeine
  Zeitung_, has admitted that our reserves are such as Germany cannot
  compete with.

  It is clear [said this newspaper on October 12] that if we
  systematically continued the war in this way, fighting might go on
  for a long time. The annihilation of the German Army is still a long
  way from attainment; we still have a quantity of unspent forces at
  our command in the recruit depôts behind the front, in the reserve
  battalions, and at home. But _doubtless there are certain limits to
  all this on our side, whereas our enemies--chiefly America--are in a
  position to replace men and materials on an ever-increasing scale_.

  Another equally important admission I found in the _Münchner Neueste
  Nachrichten_, the leading South-German organ, on October 25.

  A German retreat beyond the frontier [this journal said] and
  especially an advance by the enemy to the frontier, would render the
  German situation much worse, as it would expose Germany’s industrial
  territory to the Entente’s artillery fire, and particularly their air
  attacks, while the danger to the enemy’s industrial districts would
  be correspondingly removed. _This condition alone would not only
  secure the enemy’s military preponderance, but would increase it._

  Thus it is clear that Germany, deprived now of the help of her
  allies, recognises her hopeless situation. The conditions upon which
  hostilities can cease must be laid down by the military and naval
  leaders of the Associated Powers and accepted by the Central Powers
  in such form that no resumption of hostilities is possible.

   And this I will say: The spirit in which Germany accepts these
  stern and necessary conditions will do much to determine the course
  of future events. If she haggles over the conditions, or is sullen
  and obstructive in her mode of carrying them out, then our profound
  distrust of her spirit and motives will survive into the subsequent
  stages and still further delay that re-establishment of tolerable
  relations which must be our object. But if Germany by word and deed
  makes plain her abandonment of that belief in Might which her rulers,
  supported until recently by the majority of her people, have used as
  a menace to the power of Right, the greatest obstacle in the path of
  equal justice will have been removed.

  By a stroke of the pen, in accepting the conditions of armistice,
  or by a mere gesture of unconditional surrender, Germany can cause
  fighting to cease. Naturally, the business of evacuation and of
  reoccupation will have to be conducted by concert between the
  military and naval leaders. The first governing condition in these
  operations and detailed arrangements will be the safety of the
  peace. The second condition will be the security of civilian life
  and property. The emotional background to all this will be a daily
  increasing desire on the part of all to get back to normal conditions
  of life. Co-operation and agreement will be required, not so much to
  secure that demobilisation and disarmament shall be forced sternly
  on those who have surrendered as to secure that each side takes its
  fair share in the burden of maintaining order and in facilitating the
  change from military to civilian organisation.

  II

   The second stage of the passage from war conditions to peace
  conditions will begin as soon as it is certain that security has
  been obtained for the permanence of the first stage. It will consist
  in the acceptance by Germany of certain principles as indisputable.
  The security provided in the first stage ought to be sufficient to
  enable us to pass through the second stage quickly. With sufficient
  guarantees there need be no waiting to see whether the transformation
  of the German Government from irresponsible autocracy to responsible
  democracy is as genuine as it is represented to be, or whether the
  changed professions of those who speak for the People represent a
  change of heart.

  The indisputable principles which Germany must accept in this second
  stage have been stated in different forms at different times, but the
  consensus of opinion amongst all classes of the Associated Powers
  seems to me to be so clear that it is not difficult to state them
  objectively in a form very close to that which they are likely to
  assume in their final enunciation.

  The first is the complete restoration, territorial, economic, and
  political, of Belgium. In this there can be no reservation, no
  bargaining, no attempt to raise counter-claims or offsets of any
  kind. By her initial violation of International Law, and by her
  subsequent treatment of Belgium, Germany has forfeited all right
  to discussion. Reparation is impossible, but she must undertake
  restoration in such form and measure as shall be indicated to her.

  2. The freeing of French territory, reconstruction of the invaded
  provinces, compensation for all civilian losses and injuries. Here
  again reparation in any full sense of the word is beyond human power,
  but Germany must accept the full burden of material reconstruction,
  replacement, and compensation, again in such form and measure as
  shall be laid down.

   3. The restoration to France of Alsace-Lorraine, not as a
  territorial acquisition or part of a war indemnity, but as reparation
  for the wrong done in 1871, when the inhabitants of the two
  provinces, whose ancestors voluntarily chose French allegiance, were
  incorporated in Germany against their will.

  4. Readjustment of the Northern Frontiers of Italy as nearly as
  possible along the lines of nationality; the Eastern and Adriatic
  frontiers to be determined in accordance with the principles embodied
  in the Italo-Jugo-Slav Agreement and ratified by the Rome Congress of
  April, 1918.

  5. The assurance to all the peoples of Austria-Hungary of their
  place amongst the free nations of the world and of their right to
  enter into union with their kindred beyond the present boundaries
  of Austria-Hungary. This involves the creation of independent
  Czecho-Slovak and Jugo-Slav States, the reduction of Hungary to
  the ethnographic limits of the Magyar race, and the union of all
  Rumanians with the present kingdom of Rumania. In the same way the
  Poles and Ukrainians of the Dual Monarchy must be free to unite with
  their co-nationals across existing frontiers, and it is obvious
  that the same right of self-determination cannot be denied to the
  German provinces of Austria, should they desire to enter Germany as a
  federal unit.

  6. The evacuation of all territory formerly included in the
  boundaries of the Russian Empire; the annulment of all Russian
  treaties, contracts, or agreements made with subjects, agents, or
  representatives of Enemy Powers since the Revolution and affecting
  territory or interests formerly Russian; and the unimpeded
  co-operation of the Associated Powers in securing conditions under
  which the various nationalities of the former Empire of Russia shall
  determine their own forms of government.

   When Russia offered a peace of reconciliation without annexations
  or indemnities, the Central Powers, taking advantage of the military
  position, rejected all considerations of justice and imposed terms
  that were brutal and selfish. Thus they forfeited the right to aid
  Russia and the various nationalities of the former Empire of Russia
  in their efforts to establish self-determination and their own form
  of government.

  The seventh indisputable principle concerns (_a_) the formation of
  an independent Polish State with access to the sea, which State
  shall include the territories inhabited by predominantly Polish
  populations; and (_b_) the indemnification of Poland by the Powers
  responsible for the havoc wrought.

  This condition is indispensable for the reign of justice in Europe.
  Germany has ruthlessly oppressed the Poles within her Empire. Justice
  and stability demand the restoration of the predominantly Polish
  parts of the present German Empire to the new Polish State.

  8. The abrogation of the Treaty of Bucharest; the evacuation and
  restoration of Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro; the Associated Powers
  to aid the Balkan States in settling finally the Balkan question on
  an equitable basis.

  The Balkan question must be settled, and it follows from that
  principle of self-determination to which the Associated Powers adhere
  that the Balkan States must be encouraged to agree among themselves
  and give what advice or assistance they may ask in coming to an
  agreement.

   9. The removal, as far as is practicable, of Turkish dominion
  over all non-Turkish peoples.

  The complexity of the distribution of nationalities in the present
  Empire of Turkey makes the details of the problem difficult, but the
  failure of the Turks, in act and in intention, to rule justly has
  been so disastrous, and the acquiescence of the Central Powers in
  Turkish misdeeds so complete, that no departure from this principle
  can be considered.

  10. The people of Schleswig to be free to determine their own
  allegiance.

  The case of Schleswig is a fundamental instance of the fashion in
  which Prussia and Austria used their might to override the principle
  of self-determination. The wrong done must be redressed.

  11. As reparation for the illegal submarine warfare waged by Germany
  and Austria-Hungary, these Powers shall be held liable to replace the
  merchant tonnage, belonging to the associated and neutral nations,
  illegally damaged or destroyed.

  In spite of repeated warnings, and in defiance of the pledges which
  they had given to the Government of the United States, then a neutral
  Power, the Central Powers have persisted in operations which, by
  their nature and by the fashion in which they were conducted,
  outraged both International Law and common humanity. The question of
  punishment must be dealt with separately; that of restoring the ships
  or their equivalents, and of material compensation to the victims and
  their families, cannot be subject to discussion or negotiation.

  12. The appointment of tribunals before which there shall be brought
  for impartial justice as soon as possible individuals of any of
  the belligerents accused of offences against the laws of war or of
  humanity.

   While I regard this condition as an essential preliminary to
  peace, as a just concession to the outraged conscience of humanity,
  I admit freely that its practical application is full of difficulty.
  I foresee the extraordinary difficulty of assigning responsibility;
  I recognise that during the actual conduct of war there are reasons
  why belligerents should hesitate to punish adequately those whom
  in normal times they would unhesitatingly condemn. I offer my own
  solution of the difficulty. It is that the appointed tribunals
  should act as Courts of First Instance. They would hear the evidence
  brought against the accused, and, if they found a _prima facie_ case
  established against them, would refer them to their own countries for
  ultimate trial, judgment, and sentence. I believe that more stern
  justice will be done if nations which desire to purge themselves
  condemn their own criminals than if the punishment were left to other
  nations which might hesitate to be severe lest they should invest the
  individuals punished with the halo of martyrdom.

  13. The former colonial possessions of Germany, lost by her in
  consequence of her illegal aggression against Belgium, shall in no
  case be returned to Germany.

   Germany’s possession of her colonies would have been inviolate but
  for her illegal aggression against Belgium, which brought England
  into the war. She has proclaimed that the fate of her colonies would
  be decided on the Western front; it has been so decided. She has
  proclaimed the uses to which, if victorious, she would have put her
  colonies; such uses must be prevented for ever in the interest of the
  peace of the world. Furthermore, there is this consideration that,
  after what has happened, it would be as intolerable for Australasia
  to have New Guinea in German hands as it would be for the United
  States to have Germany in possession of Cuba. The colonies therefore
  cannot be returned to Germany, but their assignment as possessions,
  or in trusteeship, together with the fashion in which they shall be
  administered in the interests of their inhabitants and of the world
  generally, are matters for future decisions.

  These are the indisputable conditions of peace which must be accepted
  in the second stage of the negotiations.

  I have dealt with the first two stages as logically separate and
  successive. In actual fact agreement on them might be coincident in
  time. In any event, acceptance of the indisputable conditions would
  be made before the guarantees required under the terms of surrender
  or of armistice had become accomplished facts.

  The conclusion of the first two stages, whether concurrent or
  consecutive, will be the end of dictation. They form the preliminary
  to co-operation. They will be an earnest of a complete break with the
  past on the part of Germany. They will go far to satisfy the natural
  desire of those who demand that the guilty should be punished, and
  yet I believe that they contain nothing that is not imperative for
  a just and lasting peace. And I hope that their imposition and
  acceptance will, in the subsequent stages, make it possible to
  take advantage, for the benefit of the world, of those powers of
  discipline and organisation which Germany has perverted to the great
  harm of the world.

  III

   The third stage, should I consider, consist in the appointment of
  a large number of Commissions to study and work out the details of
  the principles which I have enumerated. These will report ultimately,
  some of them quickly, some of them after months or years, to the
  Central Peace Conference. For my part I see no reason why the members
  of the Commissions, if the principles on which they shall act are
  settled beforehand, should not be selected chiefly from among
  those who have the greatest interest in the matters to be settled.
  I do not see, for instance, why a Commission consisting largely
  of Poles and Prussians should not be asked to work out the future
  frontier of Prussia and Poland. This may be thought the suggestion
  of an idealist. But I claim that in this instance the idealist is
  the realist. If our goal be lasting peace, then let us give every
  opportunity for arrangement and mutual accommodation before we resort
  to compulsion.

  So far I have said nothing of the future government of Germany. The
  Germans assure us that the transformation of autocratic government
  to responsible government is taking place. I should like to believe
  them. I am certain that its accomplishment is necessary to Germany
  itself and to the final attainment of a just and lasting peace. I
  frankly admit that the perfect form of government does not exist, and
  that the genius of Germany may evolve some form as good as, or even
  better than, existing constitutions.

   But Germany must understand that it will take time to convince the
  world, which has so much reason to distrust her, that this sudden
  change is to be a permanent reality. Fortunately the stages which
  I have described do not require for their accomplishment more than
  the hope that Germany has set out on the right path. Whilst the last
  stage is in progress there will be time, and more than time, to see
  whether Germany realises our hopes and what I believe to be now the
  wishes of the majority of her own people.

  For the last stage will mean nothing less than reconstructing the
  organisation of the world, and establishing a new policy in which a
  League of Free Nations shall replace the old system of the balance of
  rival Powers.

  The accomplishment of a change so gigantic as the adjusting of
  national organisations to fit into new super-national machinery must
  be difficult and slow. Fortunately the very steps necessary to make
  it possible are steps that will slowly make it actual. Let me select
  a few simple examples. The cessation of hostilities will leave the
  world short of food, short of transport, short of raw materials. The
  machinery that has regulated these during war will have to be kept in
  action beyond the war. Food will have to be rationed, transport will
  have to be rationed, raw material will have to be rationed. It is a
  world problem that can be settled only on a world basis, and there
  will be every opportunity, in the years of transition, to transform
  those economic relations which are forced upon us by necessity into a
  system which will meet with free and general acceptance.

   Intimately connected with these matters will be the problem of
  the returned soldier, whether wounded or otherwise, the problem of
  pensions, the problems of wages, housing, hours and conditions of
  work, regulation of child labour, female labour, and so forth. The
  equalisation of those in different countries will be necessary to
  fair rationing, and from this necessity will arise international
  conferences of workers which may be able to settle some of the most
  difficult questions of super-national organisation. When the question
  of disarmament arises, some will demand as a fundamental necessity
  that their nation must have a large army or a large navy. Some will
  advocate, as an act of punishment or of justice, the disarmament
  of other nations. In the consequent negotiations it will soon be
  found that to insist on an unduly large army or navy is to saddle
  one’s country with a huge expense; to insist on the disarmament of
  another country may be to present that country with a huge annual
  income that can be used in commercial rivalry. And so we may come to
  a condition in which, if there be international security, there will
  be a contest, not as to which country shall maintain the largest navy
  and the largest army, but as to which country shall most completely
  disarm.

  I foresee international Commissions at work for a long time, trying
  to establish frontiers, conditions of Parliamentary responsibility,
  canons of international law, rules of international commerce, laws
  even of religious freedom, and a thousand other conditions of
  national organisation. In the very act of seeking the foundation for
  a League of Free Nations, and in slowly building up the fabric, we
  shall get rid of the passions and fears of war. By the mere endeavour
  to find the way to a better condition of the world, we shall bring
  this better condition about.

This article created the desired interest and public discussion in the
enemy countries. It was widely reproduced by German newspapers and it
had the effect of producing a state of mind which culminated in the
complete collapse of German resistance. It was a fitting wind-up to
the work of propaganda in enemy countries. The article gave rise to a
great deal of comment at home and elsewhere abroad also, and did much
to form a public opinion favourable to the conditions of peace which
were in the minds of Allied statesmen but which they had themselves
refrained from declaring in public.

Thus the Policy Committee, although it existed so short a time, had
useful achievement to its credit. Had it been possible to constitute
such a Committee early in the war the results might have been
incalculable in the effect on British propaganda.

On November 15, 1918, Lord Northcliffe sent the following valedictory
letter to each of the members of the Committee:--

  “I am sending you herewith a copy of the minutes of the last meeting
  of the Policy Committee, and feel that it is unnecessary under the
  changed circumstances to call another meeting.

   “May I remind you that this Committee was formed under my
  chairmanship by the British War Mission at a time when it seemed
  urgent to correlate propaganda addressed to the enemy, to Allies,
  and to Neutrals? In the opening remarks by the Chairman at the first
  meeting it was pointed out that as the war approached its end, war
  propaganda would change into peace propaganda. This change took
  place with even greater rapidity than was at the moment anticipated,
  and the Committee had at once to undertake the task of devising a
  propaganda policy with regard to peace. You are acquainted with
  the steps that the Committee took and with the large measure of
  success that their efforts achieved. All questions of policy have
  now, however, passed from the hands of the Committee to those of the
  Council of the Nations, and there seems to me no immediate sphere
  for our action, especially as by arrangement with the Government the
  British War Mission is being wound up.

  “May I take this opportunity of thanking you for your co-operation,
  and of stating my belief that, had the war continued, the Policy
  Committee would have developed into an organ of ever-increasing value?

                                         Yours very truly,
                                             (Signed) “NORTHCLIFFE.”

[Illustration: INFLATING THE BALLOONS AND ATTACHING THE TRUTH-TELLING
LEAFLETS.

_Official Photograph._]

[Illustration: HOW LEAFLETS WERE ATTACHED TO THE BALLOONS.

_Official Photograph._]

[Illustration: REGISTERING THE DIRECTION AND VELOCITY OF THE WIND, IN
ORDER TO JUDGE WHERE THE LEAFLETS WOULD FALL.]

[Illustration: DISPATCHING THE BALLOONS.]

[Illustration: TESTING THE LIFTING POWER OF BALLOONS USED FOR
PROPAGANDA PURPOSES

_“Daily Mirror” Photograph._]




CHAPTER IX

_VALE!_


With the foundations well and truly laid and with increasing and
widening avenues of approach into enemy countries, the work of the
British War Mission was always expanding. Had the war continued, the
gathering momentum of Crewe House activities would have dealt many
other blows which, even in November, 1918, were in an advanced state of
preparation. But, happily for the Allies, one enemy collapsed quickly
after another. When the following letter was received from the War
Office on November 9, and was followed by the signing of the Armistice
with Germany--the last of our enemies--on November 11, the work of
Crewe House as the headquarters of Propaganda in Enemy Countries was
finished:--

  “SIR,

   “I am commanded by the Army Council to inform you that, in view of
  the armistices which have been concluded with Austria, Turkey, and
  Bulgaria, the Council has decided that the distribution of propaganda
  in those countries by military means should cease during the period
  of the armistice.

  “I am to say that, in the event of the conclusion of an armistice
  with Germany, distribution of propaganda by military means in that
  country will also cease during the existence of the armistice.

  “I am further to inform you that the Commanders-in-Chief in the
  various theatres of war have been notified in the above sense.

                                         “I am, Sir,
                                             “Your obedient servant,
                                                 “B. B. CUBITT.

  “The Secretary,
    “The British War Mission,
      “Crewe House.”

On the day following the signing of the Armistice with Germany Lord
Northcliffe wrote to the Prime Minister:

  “DEAR PRIME MINISTER,

   “The signing of the last armistice with our enemies has necessarily
  brought the labours upon which I have been engaged for the past year
  to a close. The very nature of the armistices themselves necessitates
  the termination of enemy propaganda, and I beg, therefore, to request
  you to accept my resignation of my post as Director of Propaganda in
  Enemy Countries.

  “I wish to thank you for the confidence you have reposed in me in
  appointing me to this office. I have endeavoured, with the assistance
  of a most able Committee and of an untiring staff of experts, to
  render the very best possible services to the Government and to the
  country.

                                   “Believe me, dear Prime Minister,
                                       “Yours sincerely,
                                           “NORTHCLIFFE.”

In reply, the Prime Minister wrote on the same day:

  “MY DEAR NORTHCLIFFE,

  “I have received your letter, and I agree with you that the office of
  Director of Propaganda in Enemy Countries is rendered unnecessary by
  recent events.

   “In accepting your resignation, I wish to assure you how grateful I
  am for the great services you have rendered to the Allied Cause while
  holding this important post. I have had many direct evidences of the
  success of your invaluable work and of the extent to which it has
  contributed to the dramatic collapse of the enemy strength in Austria
  and Germany.

  “I shall be glad if Sir Campbell Stuart, the present Vice-Chairman of
  the Mission, will remain in office as Acting-Chairman of the Mission
  until December 31st, 1918, in order to wind up its activities.

                                              “Ever sincerely,
                                                  “D. LLOYD GEORGE.”

When the year 1918 came to its close the affairs of the Mission had
been wound up, and Crewe House as a propaganda force ceased to exist.
The building was handed over to another Government department, but
by those who had even a remote connection with the work carried on
within its walls in 1918 Crewe House will always be remembered for
its propaganda politics for which, as has been truly said, it became
as well-known in the Chancelleries of Europe as it had been in Great
Britain for so long as a social centre for national politics.




APPENDIX

Facsimile Leaflets and Translations.


[Illustration: _Leaflet No. 1._

NEWS OF ALLIED SUCCESSES ON WESTERN FRONT FOR JUGO-SLAV SOLDIERS IN THE
AUSTRIAN ARMIES.]

Map representing the great offensive of the Allies, with the results
achieved from August 9th to September 1st:--

[MAP]

In the offensive from July 15th to August 31st the Allies captured
140,000 Germans (2,674 of whom were officers), 2,500 guns, 1,734
Flamethrowers, 13,783 machine guns, together with a huge amount of
other war material.

                                                THE JUGOSLAV COMMITTEE.


[Illustration: _Leaflet No. 2._

A MANIFESTO FROM DR. TRUMBITCH DISTRIBUTED FROM AEROPLANES AMONG
JUGO-SLAV TROOPS IN THE AUSTRIAN ARMY.]

SERBOCROATS AND SLOVENES.

The “Agenzia Stefani” announces officially:--

“By a decree of the Ministerial Council on September 8th the Home
(Italian) Government has informed the Allied Governments that it
regards the Jugoslav movement for obtaining independence and the
formation of a free State as a principle for which the Allies are
fighting, and as a condition of a just and lasting peace.”

The Governments of the Allied States have replied that they have
received with satisfaction this declaration of the Italian Government.

JUGOSLAVS!

By this historic and fateful declaration Italy has set up the following
war aim: The destruction of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy such as it is
to-day, and upon its ruins the establishment of an independent State of
Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes.

This noble decree of hers is accepted by all our Allies.

SOLDIERS!

The part which Italy has been assigned by history has been manifested
to-day more strongly than ever. She is the protector of the weak, the
bearer of freedom and of the ideal for which the Allies have been
fighting for four years. The aim of the fighting is not the peace of
Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest, but the freedom of the weak and oppressed.

Therefore open your eyes. Remember that by fighting against it you are
fighting against yourselves, against our posterity, against our freedom
and unity.

Long live Italy, long live the united and free Jugoslavia, long live
our Allies!

                                                      DR. ANTE TRUMBIC,
                                      Chairman of the Jugoslav Council.


[Illustration: _Leaflet No. 3._

LEAFLET--PROBABLY THE FIRST--DISTRIBUTED BY BRITISH AEROPLANES AMONG
GERMAN TROOPS IN OCTOBER 1914. IT ANNOUNCED A RUSSIAN VICTORY IN EAST
PRUSSIA.]

[_Note.--This was distributed in October, 1914._]

NOTICE.

EXPLANATION FOR GERMAN SOLDIERS.

It has become known that German soldiers have been told the British
treat their captives inhumanly. That is a lie.

All German prisoners of war are well-treated and receive from the
British the same food as their own soldiers.

The opportunity is now taken to enlighten the German soldier about some
facts which hitherto have been kept secret from him.

The German Army never reached or occupied Paris and has been retiring
since September 5.

The British Army has been neither made prisoner nor beaten. It
increases in strength every day.

The French Army is not beaten. Quite on the contrary, for it inflicted
a heavy defeat on the Germans at MONTMIRAIL.

Russia and Serbia have so decisively defeated Austria that she no
longer plays any part in the war. With the exception of a few cruisers,
German shipping, the merchant service as well as the fighting fleet, is
no longer to be seen upon the seas.

The British and German Navies have both suffered casualties, but the
German the heaviest.

Germany has already lost several colonies and will presently also lose
what now remains to her. Japan has declared war on Germany. Kiauchau is
now besieged by the British and the Japanese.

The report circulated in the Press that the British Colonies and India
have rebelled against Great Britain is wholly untrue. Quite on the
contrary, these Colonies have sent to France large masses of troops and
many supplies to come to the help of the Fatherland.

Ireland is one with England, and from North and South is sending her
soldiers who are fighting with enthusiasm alongside their English
comrades.

The Kaiser and the Prussian War Party wanted this war against all
interests of the Fatherland. In secret they prepared for this war.
Germany alone was prepared, which explains her temporary successes.
Now we have succeeded in checking her victorious advance. Supported by
the sympathies of the whole civilised world, which regards with horror
an arbitrary war of conquest, Great Britain, France, Russia, Belgium,
Serbia, Montenegro, and Japan will carry on the war to the end.

We bring these facts to general notice in order to throw light upon the
truth which has been hidden from you. You are not fighting to defend
your Fatherland, as no one ever thought of attacking Germany. You are
fighting to satisfy the ambitious war-lust of the military party at the
cost of the true interests of the Fatherland. The whole business is
blackguardly.

At first sight these facts will seem improbable to you. But now it is
for you to compare the events of the past weeks with the information
manufactured by the military authorities.

ON OCTOBER 4 THE RUSSIANS GAINED A TREMENDOUS VICTORY OVER THE GERMAN
ARMIES IN EAST PRUSSIA. GERMAN LOSSES 70,000.


[Illustration: _Leaflet No. 4._

AEROPLANE DISTRIBUTION OF COPIES OF AN EARLY LEAFLET PREPARED BY THE
FRENCH AUTHORITIES FOR THE GERMAN SOLDIER.]

To the German Soldiers!

IT IS NOT TRUE that we French shoot or ill-treat German prisoners.

ON THE CONTRARY, our prisoners are well-treated and receive plenty to
eat and drink.

All who are tired of this wretched life may report themselves unarmed,
without fear, to the French outposts.

They will be well received there.

After the war everyone can go home again.


[Illustration: _Leaflet No. 5._

A TYPICAL NEWS-SHEET FOR GERMAN SOLDIERS.]

INFORMATION LEAFLET FOR THE TROOPS.

IS PEACE AT THE DOOR?

Our enemies reject negotiations until we have evacuated Belgium and
France.

WHAT MUST WE DO NOW?

Well, what does it all mean?

“A few weeks ago,” says the _Frankfurter Zeitung_, “it appeared as if
our armies were very near their goal, the defeat of the enemy forces
and peace. But what a change!”

In these few weeks the German armies have lost three-quarters of a
million men. More than a quarter of a million have given themselves up
and are now out of danger and have plenty to eat.

In these few weeks Bulgaria has dropped out of the war and has been
compelled to surrender unconditionally. The best Turkish armies have
been destroyed and Turkey is about to follow Bulgaria’s example.

And what is the result of all these events in the last few weeks?

All hope of victory by the military Junker party in Germany abandoned:
an armistice demanded: the admission of the new Imperial Chancellor,
Prince Max von Baden, that Belgium was wrongfully attacked.

The following is the text of the Note addressed to President Wilson
through the Swiss Government:--

“The German Government requests the President of the United States
to bring about the restoration of peace, to inform all belligerent
States of this request and to summon them to send plenipotentiaries
to open negotiations. Germany takes as a basis for peace negotiations
the programme set forth by the President of the United States in his
Message to Congress of January 8th, 1918, and particularly in his
speech of September 27th.

“With a view to preventing further bloodshed the German Government
requests the immediate conclusion of an armistice on land, on water,
and in the air.

                                        (Signed) MAX, Prince von Baden,
                                                  Imperial Chancellor.”


Why was this Note addressed to President Wilson?

Partly because he laid down certain conditions which he explained the
German Government must accept before he would enter into any discussion
whatever on peace terms.

But also partly because the German Government at length became aware of
the United States’ military effort.

In this, as in every other important matter dealing with the war, our
leaders deceived us in the most unheard-of way. They fed us with false
hopes.

They have brought us to such a desperate pass that we are retiring on
every front and are now compelled to sue for peace.

But will our enemies consent to discuss peace?

Not as long as we are still in Belgium, which, as our Government
admits, was wrongfully attacked; not whilst we are still in Northern
France.

Before our enemies will consent to negotiate with us we must retire to
Germany. For, they say, they will gladly conclude a just and honourable
peace with the German people if they can be sure that militarism and
medieval methods of statesmanship are abolished for good.

What must we do to save ourselves? We must retire to our own country,
then we may hope for an end of all the horror and hardships we have
suffered for more than four years, only because our Government let
its policy be dictated by militarism and underestimated the forces
which had to be arrayed against us owing to the attempt to realise the
criminal ambition of the Pan-Germans.

We have been miserably deceived.


[Illustration: _Leaflet No. 6._

“REPORTING PROGRESS”--LEAFLETS (SUCH AS THE ONE, BOTH SIDES OF WHICH
ARE REPRODUCED, ABOVE) GAVE PARTICULARS OF ALLIED PROGRESS AGAINST THE
GERMANS. CLEARLY-PRINTED MAPS DROVE THE TRUTH HOME. THE SHADED PORTION
SHOWS TERRITORY WON BY THE ALLIES.]

WHAT THE ALLIES HAVE WON. Back on the Line of Last March.

[MAP]

The whole ground has been twice won and twice lost by the German
armies. How much blood has been spilled, and how much misery has been
caused? For what object? Think it over!

_On the other side of the leaflet was the following_:

FURTHER SUCCESSES OF THE ENTENTE; THE GERMAN RETREAT CONTINUES.

During the last few weeks there has been fighting west of Cambrai and
St. Quentin. The battle reached a degree of vehemence fully equal to
any previously experienced in the course of the whole war.

The Germans and British attacked simultaneously; both sides fought with
stubborn determination, but

THE BRITISH GAINED THE VICTORY.

They beat off the German attack, made many prisoners, and killed an
enormous number, thanks to the manner in which the German troops were
driven forward under murderous machine-gun fire.

The British attack succeeded. The German front was pressed back closer
to St. Quentin.

TEN THOUSAND PRISONERS

were made and a number of guns were captured. The outer works of the
Siegfried Line are in British possession in spite of the determined and
plucky attempts of the German troops to hold them. The latter did not
retreat “according to plan,” but because in open honourable fight

THEY GOT THE WORST OF IT.

The operations of the Entente forces have in no way reached an end, as
reported in the German newspapers a week ago by military writers. The
German forces were unable to stand their ground. The French threaten
Laon and the Chemin des Dames and in these regions are driving the
Germans back.

On the Balkan Front

THE BULGARIANS ARE TOTALLY DEFEATED

and are still retreating. The French and Serbian troops have advanced
20 kilometres. Many thousands of Bulgarians have surrendered. The
prisoners ascribe the blame for Bulgaria’s disastrous situation to
Germany.

The Austrian proposal that representatives of the belligerent nations
should hold a secret conference in order to discuss

THE POSSIBILITIES OF PEACE

was described by the representatives of the Workmen’s and Socialist
parties assembled at the London Conference as inspired more by
the anxiety to strengthen the monarchy than by the desire to help
effectively to put an end to the world war.

No voice was raised for the acceptance of the Austrian proposal.


[Illustration: _Leaflet No. 7._

DIAGRAMMATIC REPRESENTATION OF THE GROWTH OF THE AMERICAN ARMY IN THE
FIELD. THE IMMENSITY OF THE AMERICAN EFFORT WAS A STRONG POINT OF THE
CREWE HOUSE PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN.]

TO-DAY WE ARE IN RETREAT.

NEXT YEAR WE SHALL BE DESTROYED.

America, which has now 1,750,000 men in France, had made arrangements
to send 3,500,000 troops by next year.

But now, in view of the refusal of the German Government to make a
genuine peace proposal, America has decided to increase the number.

By next year America will have 5,000,000 men on the Western Front.

What do our leaders say to this--our leaders who declared that America
was not a danger to us because our U-boats would prevent them from
sending troops to Europe?

What do we say to this, we who will be completely crushed by the huge
superiority of numbers?

[DIAGRAM]

The increase of the American Army on the Western Front.

     1917.     1918.      1919.
    100,000  1,750,000  5,000,000


[Illustration: _Leaflet No. 8._

MAP-LEAFLET SHOWING THE BREAKING OF THE HINDENBURG LINE.]

WHERE THE HINDENBURG LINE IS BROKEN

[MAP]

This map shows exactly where the British troops have forced a way
through an important part of the Hindenburg defence line. The dotted
line from North to South indicates these defences. The black line shows
the positions reached by the British. Their advance continues. In
Flanders the German armies are in full retreat. Kemmel Hill has been
given up. “Our troops left it with heavy heart,” writes Karl Rosner,
war correspondent of the _Lokalanzeiger_.


[Illustration: _Leaflet No. 9._

NEWS FOR GERMAN SOLDIERS OF THE DESTRUCTION OF THE TURKISH ARMY IN
PALESTINE. TWO SIDES OF THE SAME LEAFLET.]

TURKISH ARMY IN PALESTINE DESTROYED.

NO FURTHER RESISTANCE AGAINST THE BRITISH TROOPS. BRILLIANT ENCIRCLING
MANŒUVRE.

20,000 PRISONERS.

TURKEY INCENSED AGAINST GERMANY FOR LEADING HER TO IRRETRIEVABLE
DISASTER.

The Turkish Army in Palestine has ceased to exist. The British took
them unawares, broke through the front, sent through large masses of
cavalry, cut off all lines of retreat and completely surrounded the
Turks.

Twenty thousand surrendered, a large number were killed, and only a few
stragglers succeeded in escaping. The Holy Land has been liberated from
the Mussulman suzerainty which the German Government did its best to
uphold. Turkey could not have received a harder blow. Her best troops
have been destroyed. The Turks’ feeling against Germany is extremely
bitter. They openly threaten to turn against the German Government.

The Bulgarians are scarcely less embittered against Germany. They are
still pursued in the Balkan mountains by the French and Serbian troops,
who have driven them back 64 kilometres. Their defeat is a wholesale
disaster.

On the Western Front the British and French troops are still gaining
ground, slowly but steadily, a little every day.

Everywhere Germany and her allies are in retreat.

Read no leaflets which you may find accidentally, say Field Marshal
Hindenburg and General von Hutier.

WHY?

Because they know that the leaflets contain the truth which they and
the Government want to conceal.

They fear the truth. When the German people know it the Government and
militarism will be wiped out.

Read overleaf of the successes of the Entente Powers and ask yourselves

HOW LONG CAN IT GO ON LIKE THIS?

Map illustrating the Turkish disasters.

[MAP OF PALESTINE]

The black lines and arrows show the position of the English forces. The
Turks were between Samaria and Nablus. They were wiped out. Their army
no longer exists.


[Illustration: _Leaflet No. 10._

SOME POINTED QUOTATIONS FOR GERMAN SOLDIERS CULLED FROM GERMAN SOURCES.]

THE HIGH OFFICIAL.

“We have no cause for anxiety.”--Dr. Wekerle, Hungarian Premier.

THE PEOPLE.

“The men must thoroughly understand that they must stand fast.”--Order
of the Day to 200th Infantry Division.

THE GENERAL.

“We have no reason to be downhearted.”--General von Wrisberg, War
Minister in the Reichstag.

THE SOLDIER.

“The principle that troops must continue fighting all day long, to the
last man, to the last cartridge, even when they are surrounded, appears
to have sunk into oblivion.”--General Army Order, signed by General
Ludendorff.

PREPARATIONS FOR CIVIL WAR.

Every precaution has been taken in Berlin and other places to suppress
an eventual attempt at revolution.

Orders for the suppression of risings are issued under the heading
“Measures for the Suppression of Strikes.” Proof of this is furnished
by the order of German G.H.Q. to all Guards Infantry troops and to the
3rd, 4th, and 5th Corps.

On receipt of the telegraphic order “Prepare for the suppression of
strikes,” all man-power must be mobilised. On receipt of the order
“Suppress strikes,” the commandant of the transport troops must be
immediately informed. The men must be equipped as for field service,
only without masks. On receipt of the telegraphic order “Make
preparations for surrounding,” all detachments of troops will be
marched to their allotted positions. Battalion commanders should place
themselves at the head of their units and direct all further movements.

On receipt of the telegraphic order “Surround,” the troops selected
for this duty, the 3rd, 4th, and 5th Corps, will march on Berlin to
the Vorstadtbahn (Suburban Railway). The Guards will take the opposite
direction from the centre of the city to the Vorstadtbahn, driving
the populace before them. Headquarters will be Kaulsdorf. Then follow
detailed instructions for the employment of machine guns. The order is
strictly secret.

WHAT SHALL WE DO WITH THE KAISER?

Stockholm, 10th September.--The German Minister in Stockholm has
requested the Swedish Foreign Office to seize the copy of the “_New
York Herald_ Magazine of the War” of the 14th July because it publishes
on the first page a photograph of the German Emperor underneath which
are the words:--

“What shall we do with the Kaiser after the War?”

The Minister of Justice is said to have ordered the copies in question
to be seized.

ARREST OF SOCIALISTS.

According to the _Neue Badische Landeszeitung_, wild scenes took place
last week at a meeting of Independent Socialists in Berlin. “In the
course of the meeting the Reichstag member Hoffmann was arrested by two
policemen because of provocative speeches. A scene of such excitement
ensued that in the general disturbance Hoffmann escaped, while the hall
rang with cries of ‘Down with the War!’ ‘Long live Liebknecht!’

“The following morning the officials arrived at Hoffmann’s house in
order to arrest him again, but the deputy was not to be found. Many
arrests were made among his adherents.”

PORK IN BOTTLES.

“The smugglers are still devising new tricks so as to prevent their
costly goods from falling into the clutches of the war contraband
officials. At the Schlesicher Station a man was stopped as he was
fetching away two carboys such as are used for the transport of
dangerous acids. A closer inspection showed that the carboys were
divided in two parts, a small receptacle at the top being filled with
vinegar, while the lower and larger part contained 55 kilos. of freshly
killed pork neatly packed. The expensive pork was seized.”--_Berliner
Tageblatt_, Sept. 19, 1918.

THE VETO ON DANCING.

“In the Hanover Command dancing lessons are only allowed for men
and women separately, and anyone who has already taken a course of
dancing is not allowed to learn again. A sensible regulation has been
issued at Essen. Only dancing instructors belonging to the two German
dancing instructors’ unions may hold dancing classes as in peace
time.”--_Berliner Tageblatt_, Sept. 19, 1918.


[Illustration: _Leaflet No. 11._

THIS LEAFLET WITH PARTICULARS OF THE FATE OF 150 GERMAN SUBMARINE
COMMANDERS CREATED GREAT DEPRESSION IN GERMAN NAVAL PORTS.]

THE 150 LOST GERMAN U-BOATS.

In the House of Commons the British Prime Minister, Mr. Lloyd George,
said, “Our British vessels are serving as convoys, patrolling, laying
mines, sweeping mines, protecting merchant ships and hunting U-boats
over vast and uncharted distances. They have destroyed at least 150 of
these ocean pests, the German U-boats--more than half that number in
the course of last year.”

In reply to this, the following official Berlin telegram was sent out
to the German papers and to neutral countries:

“We are in the position to state that the enemy’s war against the
U-boats does not show anything like so great a success as that claimed
by the British Prime Minister.”

The Chief of the Naval General Staff in London has in his possession a
complete list of the names of the commanders of the 150 U-boats which
Germany has lost through sinking, capture, or internment. The greater
part of these officers are dead, a certain percentage are prisoners
of war, a few are interned in neutral countries. The truth of the
statement of the British Prime Minister is thus proved. It is also
proved that the statement contained in the official Berlin telegram is
untrue. Here is the list:

[_List of U-boat commanders._]


[Illustration: _Leaflet No. 12._

LEAFLET WARNING THE GERMANS THAT SUCH PLACES AS BERLIN AND HAMBURG HAD
BEEN BROUGHT WITHIN RANGE OF AERIAL ATTACK AND COULD BE BOMBED IF THE
WAR WERE PROLONGED.]

A MAP WHICH EXPLAINS ITSELF.

In 1914 the English air squadrons which carried out reprisals for the
attacks made on English towns were small and carried small bombs.
In 1915 they grew larger and dropped larger bombs. In 1916 both had
doubled in size. In 1917 there was a further increase in the size of
the bombing squadrons and the bombs were 7½ times again as heavy. 1918
saw further increases and throughout the period under review the range
of attacks steadily extended. In 1919 Berlin, Hamburg, Brunswick, and
Hanover will be easily within range of attack--if we do not make peace
in the meantime.


[Illustration: _Leaflet No. 13._

A GERMAN DREAM AND THE RESULT. A LEAFLET ILLUSTRATING THE COLLAPSE OF
THE MITTEL-EUROPA AMBITION OF GERMAN MILITARISM.]

HOW THE THING WENT WRONG.

_The upper map is entitled_ “PAN-GERMAN DREAM,” _the wording under it
being as follows_:

“Our rulers went to war because they hoped to found a gigantic empire
for the Kaiser and the Junkers. All the territories shaded in on the
above map were to be their realm. It would have meant the subjection of
half the world under the German sword.”--_Vorwärts_, Oct. 11, 1918.

_The lower map is entitled_ “THE AWAKENING OF THE GERMAN PEOPLE.”
_Under it is the following inscription_:

This is how Germany looks to-day. Her allies can give no further aid.
What the Kaiser calls “his heritage from God” will soon be smaller than
it was at the beginning of the war. But the German people will be the
better for it. They will have escaped from autocracy and militarism.
Freedom at last!


[Illustration: _Leaflet No. 14._

FRONT PAGE OF A “TRENCH NEWSPAPER” ISSUED BY CREWE HOUSE FOR GERMAN
TROOPS.]

WAR AND HOME.

THE SUMMONS TO UNITY.

_The picture on the left is headed_ “THE IDEAL” _and represents “The
Assembly.” On its right is the following parody, entitled_ “PARADISE
LOST,” _on Goethe’s “Faust”_:

“PARADISE LOST.”

“Gretchen, how different thou wast!”--(Goethe--“Faust.”)

    Germany, how different thou wast before the war
    Brought about by thy lust of conquest.
    With self-assurance thou wentst from triumph to triumph
    And reached the summit of thy power
    Untouched, with ample possessions
    In earthly goods, in fame and world renown
    Thou hadst all mankind can crave,
    In high respect regarded, if not beloved.

    But now what disgust, what horror
    The mere name of Germany excites!
    There is deep mourning for thy vanished happiness,
    Thy honour lost, thy peace of mind destroyed!
    Thou liest parted by the iron wall
    Which thy crime has built between us
    Fast fettered to thy false ideal
    And all thy former glory gone!

_The lower picture is called_ “THE REALITY,” _the quotation from Moltke
underneath being “March separately, strike together.” On its left_:

THE WAR WAS DECIDED AT POTSDAM.

During a debate on the origin of the war in the Hungarian Parliament,
Count Tisza claimed that the ultimatum to Serbia was drawn up at a
conference at which no German representative was present.

_A Deputy_: Not in Vienna but in Potsdam.

_Count Tisza_: Neither in Potsdam nor anywhere else.

_The Deputy_: The ultimatum was not drawn up at Potsdam, but the
outbreak of war was decided there.

A PROPHECY.

The Dutch newspaper, the _Handelsblad_, reports that a person who
has just returned from Germany saw this rhyme written up in gigantic
letters at an important factory:

    “If the war lasts another year,
    William’s fate will be the Tsar’s!”


[Illustration: _Leaflet No. 15._

ILLUSTRATED LEAFLET PORTRAYING CONTENTMENT OF GERMAN PRISONERS IN
BRITISH HANDS. THIS WAS ISSUED TO COUNTERACT ENEMY ASSERTIONS OF SEVERE
TREATMENT.]

German prisoners of war arriving behind the British lines are greeted
by their comrades, who assure them of good treatment.


[Illustration: _Leaflet No. 16._

THIS LEAFLET SHOWED HOW THE ALLIES HAD SHATTERED THE GREAT
BERLIN-BAGDAD PLAN.]

WHY THE GOVERNMENT IS SUING FOR PEACE.

The reason is clear.

The Government undertook the war in the hope of realising the
Pan-German dream of a Middle Europe.

This was the real cause of the war.

If there remained any doubt on the subject it is clearly proved by the
fact that the moment the realisation of the Pan-German dream became
impossible the Government sues for peace.

This was the plan of the Pan-Germans who led us into the war.

The whole of the territory coloured black was to become German.

Bulgaria and Turkey would become vassal States.

The Kaiser and the Prussian Junker aristocracy, the bureaucrats and
the rich who exploit the rest of the people, should become the most
powerful class in the world.

THIS IS WHAT HAS BECOME OF THE PAN-GERMAN PLAN.

Bulgaria refuses to be a vassal State.

Turkey is becoming anxious.

The plan for the realisation of which the Pan-Germans persuaded Germany
to go to war and which has cost so many millions of lives and caused
such universal misery is completely frustrated.

What reason remains why we should fight?

The Government has no further reason for continuing the struggle and is
therefore suing our enemies for peace.

Therefore all the talk about a defensive war proves to have been
absolutely untruthfully and dishonestly

STARTED TO DECEIVE US.


[Illustration: _Leaflet No. 17._

MANIFESTO TO MAGYAR TROOPS.]

HUNGARIAN SOLDIERS!

What are you fighting for?

For the Emperor of Austria and the King of Hungary!

Or is it for the German Emperor?

You are only fighting for the German Emperor. The Austrian Emperor has
given over to him the army and the State revenues for twenty-five years
by a formal treaty the contents of which are kept from you.

But your newspapers also announce a “Waffenbund” which was entered upon
on May 12th, 1918, between your old and your new masters.

But you Magyars, whose ancestors shed so much blood for freedom, you
are ignorant of the truth.

For behold according to the Germans you are idle and slow.

The _Frankfurter Zeitung_ says on May 13th, “=The new treaty should
finally seal the disappearance of Austria as an independent State and
the seizing of the Hapsburg Monarchy by Germany=.”

The _Deutsche Zeitung_ of the 19th May remarks, “What the Mittel-Europa
Confederacy chiefly needs is strength, and never more so than at the
time the war broke out. Austria-Hungary was not sufficiently prepared.
According to the ‘Waffenbund’ =Austria-Hungary must arm its inhabitants
in exactly the same way as Germany=. It is no longer possible that it
should happen that the delegates should vote extraordinary credits
for military purposes, and that afterwards they should waste a long
time before they pass the amount because either the Hungarian or the
Austrian Minister of Finance says there is no money; or that the
delegates vote the guns but that the =Hungarian Parliament= refuses the
necessary calling up of the recruits, so that afterwards the guns are
there but there are not soldiers to man them.”

Is this clear enough? The Germans struggle for a mad whim--they wish to
rule the whole world. To fight for years, to pour out Hungarian blood
for German glory for years and years.

Naturally the _Neue Freie Presse_ should with triumph proclaim that
the new treaty is specially a triumph for the “upholders of Germany in
Austria.”


[Illustration: _Leaflet No. 18._

MANIFESTO, SIGNED BY PROFESSOR (NOW PRESIDENT) MASARYK, TO
CZECHO-SLOVAK SOLDIERS IN THE AUSTRIAN ARMIES.]

MESSAGE OF PROFESSOR MASARYK TO THE CZECHO-SLOVAK ARMY IN ITALY.

Through the agency of the Italian Legation, Professor T. G. Masaryk
has sent the following message from Washington to the autonomous
Czecho-Slovak army in Italy:

  “Brothers! Austria-Hungary, desiring to break the opposition at
  home, has asserted that our army is a rabble which has no political
  or military significance. She has even uttered the lie that our
  army is composed of Russians and other nationalities, and that a
  Czecho-Slovak army does not exist. Our nation does not believe this
  dishonesty and has remained obdurate and proud of its army. Then
  Austria-Hungary endeavoured to deal a decisive blow to our nation by
  destroying you, and with you its army. She desired to gain possession
  of our banners of resistance and independence, the symbol of trust
  and aspiration cherished by our people.

  “Brothers! Your will, your far-reaching glance frustrated the enemy’s
  plans. Our flag is still flying proudly upon the position entrusted
  to you for defence. Our nation recognises your heroic deeds and all
  hearts are stirred by profound gratitude to you. They extol you and
  the proud memory of your fallen brothers.

  “As your Commander-in-Chief I send you my heartiest thanks for the
  bravery by which you have contributed to the victory of our nation,
  of Italy, the Allies and all mankind.

  “Greetings!

                                                       “T. G. MASARYK.”

We cannot help telling you how proud we are of the recognition by our
beloved leader, who will guide us and our nation to the goal of victory.

We are convinced that you also, in concert with the whole nation, see
the salvation of our country and the realisation of our sacred rights
only in the destruction of Austria.

When they drive you forward to protect the treacherous dynasty, to
which the nation has no obligations, you will certainly find an
opportunity of retaliating worthily for centuries of oppression and of
saving yourselves for a better future.

Greetings!

VOLUNTEERS OF THE CZECHO-SLOVAK ARMY IN ITALY.

October 2nd, 1918.


[Illustration: _Leaflet No. 19._

RAPIDLY-DISTRIBUTED LEAFLETS FOR GERMAN TROOPS TELLING OF ALLIED
SUCCESSES IN THE BALKANS AND IN SYRIA.]

INFORMATION LEAFLET FOR THE TROOPS.

FLIGHT OF GERMAN GENERAL.

THE TURKS MAKE LIMAN VON SANDERS RESPONSIBLE FOR THEIR MISERY.

TWO ARMIES DESTROYED.

BULGARIANS PURSUED ON AN EXTENDED FRONT IN THE BALKANS.

COUNT HERTLING’S GLOOM.

The victory of the British troops in Palestine over the Turkish troops
commanded by General Liman von Sanders has made further progress and
assumed much greater dimensions than was indicated by the first reports.

Two Turkish armies, the 7th and 8th, have ceased to exist. The whole of
their baggage train, all their guns, and their entire material of war
have been captured.

30,000 MEN SURRENDERED

and the few who escaped death or captivity fled in small dispersed
bodies across the Jordan and are now wandering about the country.

The British are now pursuing the 4th Turkish Army, which is also
in danger of destruction. In any case the Turkish resistance in
Palestine is definitely broken. General Liman von Sanders, the German
Commander-in-Chief, who was so completely surprised and so much
surpassed in leadership by the enemy headquarters,

IS IN FLIGHT BEFORE THE BRITISH.

The Turks claim that they have been betrayed and led into misfortune
by the German officers appointed to command their forces. Palestine is
now lost to them for ever. The Holy Places have been liberated from
the suzerainty of the Mussulman. The Entente has undertaken to restore
Palestine to the Jewish people. The victory of the French and Serbian
troops over the Bulgarians in the Balkan mountains has strikingly
developed. The Bulgarians are now

WITHDRAWING ON A FRONT OF 160 KILOMETRES.

They have made no strong opposition to the advance of the Entente
troops. The German defeats on the Western front have merely depressed
them and weakened their fighting ardour. We know it is useless to
continue the struggle.

Count Hertling, the Imperial Chancellor, knows this too. He told the
Chief Commission of the Reichstag that deep discontent had seized wide
circles of the people. What does he recommend? That the German people
shall maintain its old and sure confidence in Hindenburg and Ludendorff
in the hope that they may improve the situation a little? But he knows,
we know, and the whole world knows that they cannot improve it.

ONLY THE GERMAN PEOPLE ITSELF

can bring about an improvement by putting an end to autocracy and
militarism, pan-Germanism, and the out-of-date absurdities which other
peoples have long since done away with.

_On the other side of the leaflet_:

The upper map shows the encircling movement of the British which
annihilated the Turkish forces under General Liman von Sanders.

_Notes in the body of the map_:

    British cavalry.
    Here 25,000 Turks surrendered.
    Site of break-through on the Turkish front.

The lower map shows the ground gained in the Balkans by the French and
Serbian troops which have inflicted on the Bulgarians the heaviest
defeat they have suffered in the war.

[Illustration: ETHNOGRAPHIC MAP OF AUSTRIA-HUNGARY.

OF AUSTRIA-HUNGARY’S PRE-WAR POPULATION OF 52,000,000, ONLY ABOUT
21,000,000 WERE GERMANS OR MAGYARS. THE REMAINING 31,000,000,
COMPRISING POLES, CZECHS, SLOVAKS, SOUTHERN SLAVS, RUMANES, ITALIANS,
ETC., WERE ACTIVELY OR PASSIVELY ANTI-GERMAN. THE ABOVE MAP SHOWS HOW
THESE OPPRESSED RACES WERE DISTRIBUTED OVER THE DUAL MONARCHY.]

[Illustration: THE PARTITION OF AUSTRIA-HUNGARY: SHOWING THE BOUNDARIES
AS DEFINED IN THE PEACE TREATIES. IT IS INTERESTING TO COMPARE THIS
WITH THE ETHNOGRAPHIC MAP BETWEEN PAGES 32 AND 33.]

[Illustration: GERMANY’S NEW BOUNDARIES AS FIXED BY THE TREATY OF
PEACE. THE DARK PORTIONS SHOW THE TERRITORY LOST TO GERMANY; THE SHADED
PORTIONS INDICATE TERRITORY WITHIN WHICH THE INHABITANTS WERE TO CHOOSE
BY PLEBISCITE UNDER WHOSE FLAG THEY WOULD LIVE. THE FREE TERRITORY OF
DANZIG IS ALSO MARKED.]

[Illustration: BULGARIA, AS DELIMITED BY THE PEACE TREATY.]




  INDEX


  A

  Alsace-Lorraine, Propaganda policy, 180-1

  Austria-Hungary--propaganda against, 20 _et seqq._;
    Congress of the Oppressed Hapsburg Nationalities: resolutions, 25-7;
    propaganda policy: memorandum to Foreign Office, 28;
    policies outlined, 30-3;
    Inter-Allied Propaganda Commission organised at Italian G.H.Q., 37;
    publishes weekly journal, 38;
    effect of leaflet campaign, 40;
    work impaired by reactionary tendencies within Italian Government,
    40, 205;
    weakness of declaration made at Versailles meeting of June 3, 1918,
    41;
    effect of propaganda, desertions, 43-4;
    recommendations of Inter-Allied Policy Committee, 173-6


  B

  Baker, Lieut.-Col. B. Granville, 37, 48

  Balfour, Mr. A. J., reply to Lord Northcliffe’s memorandum on policy
  to be adopted against Austria, 33;
    against Bulgaria, 139

  Beaverbrook, Lord, 17, 148

  Bissolati, Signor, 25

  Borgese, Professor, 38, 150;
    on inter-Allied co-operation, 165

  Bulgaria, propaganda against:
    policy submitted to Foreign Office, 134-9;
    Mr. Balfour’s reply, 139;
    Ludendorff on effect of, 142


  C

  Cinematograph films, use for propaganda purposes, 197

  Cockerill, Brig.-Gen. G. K., 52, 149

  Comert, M., 150

  Congress of the Oppressed Hapsburg Nationalities at Rome:
  resolutions, 25-6

  Cunliffe-Owen, Sir H., in charge of propaganda against Turkey, 13, 150


  D

  Denbigh, Col. the Earl of, 10

  Department of Propaganda in Enemy Countries (Crewe House):
    Lord Northcliffe appointed Director, 8;
    personnel of advisory committee, 10;
    two main branches, 11;
    co-operation of other Government Departments, 15, 19;
    expenditure during “intensive” campaign (Sept.-Dec. 1918), 18;
    production work centralised at Crewe House, 91-2;
    good effect of, 93;
    inter-Allied Conference: list of delegates, 149;
    propaganda to cease during period of Armistice, 234

    Austro-Hungarian Section, 11, 12

    German Section, 12, 13

    Peace terms propaganda, 202 _et seqq._;
      Lord Northcliffe’s article published in _The Times_ and circulated
      throughout the World, 218-230.

    Work against Turkey, 13

  _Deutsche Tageszeitung_, tribute to propaganda staff, 121

  Diaz, General, on effect of propaganda work on Italian front, 45

  Donald, Mr. Robert, 10


  F

  Franklin-Bouillon, M., 148

  Fyfe, Mr. H., succeeds Mr. H. G. Wells as head of German Section, 13,
  90


  G

  Gallenga-Stuart, Signor, 148.

  Germany:--
    Allied propaganda against, early neglect of, 50-2;
    use of leaflets, 52;
    effect, 53;
    suspension of distribution by aeroplane: reasons, 54: use of
    balloons, 55-7;
    Mr. H. G. Wells’s memorandum on policy, 61 _et seqq._;
    Lord Northcliffe’s letter to Mr. Balfour, 81;
    summary of British Labour War Aims distributed: effect, 89;
    use of aeroplanes resumed, 97;
    leaflets circulated among submarine crews: effect, 99;
    use of “trench newspaper,” 100;
    German press comments, 105 _et seqq._;
    rewards offered for leaflets, 117-8;
    admission of Allied superiority, 120;
    basis for peace negotiations, 212 _et seqq._;
    Lord Northcliffe’s article, 218 _et seqq._

    German propaganda, methods, 3 _et seqq._;
    reasons for failure, 4;
    organisation set up, 6

  Gramophone records of Czech and Slav songs used on Italian front, 39

  Gruss, Major, 37

  Guest, Mr. S. A., propaganda campaign, 14, 39, 51, 98;
    methods, 103


  H

  Hall, Rear-Adm. Sir R., 17, 149

  _Hansa_, article quoted, 123.

  Headlam-Morley, Dr. J. W., 13, 60

  Hellingrath, General von, 121

  Hindenburg, Marshal von, on effect of propaganda on German troops,
  93-4;
    manifesto on, 106-15

  Hudson, Mr. H. K., 10, 15

  Hutier, General von, manifesto; attack on Lord Northcliffe, 115-7


  J

  Jones, Sir Roderick, 10, 150


  K

  Keeley, Mr. James, 150;
    on need for inter-Allied co-operation, 170

  Kent, Mr. C. S., financial controller of Crewe House, 18

  Kerry, Major, the Earl of, 16, 91, 149

  Klobukowski, M., 150, 160, 171

  _Kölnische Zeitung_, letter describing effect of leaflets, 119;
    “Ten Commandments for German Women,” 127

  _Kölnische Volkszeitung_, letters quoted, 125

  Kupffer, Herr von, article quoted, 122


  L

  Lamprecht, Dr. Karl, 3

  Lansing, Mr., 41, 42

  League of Nations, 67, _et seqq._

  _Le Courrier de l’Air_, 53, 59

  Lichnowsky, Prince, his pamphlet used by Allies for propaganda, 104,
  132, 142

  Lloyd George, Mr. D., on success of propaganda against Austria, 50;
    appreciation of Lord Northcliffe’s work, 235

  Low, Sir Sidney, 10

  Ludendorff, Gen., on failure of German propaganda, 5;
    efforts to create organisation, 6;
    order showing influence of propaganda on German population, 118;
    value of good propaganda, 128;
    comparison between British and German departments, 129-31;
    on effect of propaganda on Bulgarian defeat, 142


  M

  Macdonogh, Lieut.-Gen. Sir George, 52, 106

  Malinof, M., 141

  Ministry of Information, 17

  Mitchell, Capt. P. Chalmers, 16, 91, 92, 149, 209


  N

  Nicholson, Sir Charles, 10, 143, 149

  Northcliffe, Lord, Mission to United States;
    Chairman of London H.Q. of British War Mission;
    declines seat in Cabinet;
    appointed Director of Propaganda in Enemy Countries, 8;
    anxiety to commence work against Austria, 35;
    letter of appreciation from Mr. Lloyd George, 50;
    on need for greater co-ordination, 151;
    outline of policy, 156

    Bulgaria, outlines policy against, 135-139

    Enemy attacks on, 43, 105, 115-7, 125

    Germany, outlines policy against, 81

    Ludendorff, tribute, 130

    Peace terms, article published in _The Times_ and circulated
    throughout the world, 218-230

    Rechberg, Herr A., tribute, 127

    Resignation, letter to Mr. Lloyd George, 234;
      Mr. Lloyd George’s reply, 235

    _The Times_, leading article on propaganda work quoted, 129


  O

  O’Grady, Mr. James, 10

  Ojetti, Capt., 37

  Onslow, Col. Lord, 199

  Orlando, Signor, meeting with Dr. Trumbitch, 24


  P

  Pashitch, M., 23

  Phillips, Mr. C. J., 15, 150

  Poland, propaganda policy in regard to, 178-180

  Prisoners of War, information for, 143

  Propaganda, objects, 2;
    axioms: truthful statements only to be made, 2;
    necessity of co-ordination, 146;
    inter-Allied conference at Crewe House, list of delegates, 149;
    distribution devices, 54-59; 184-190


  R

  Rechberg, Herr A., tribute to Lord Northcliffe’s work, 127

  _Rheinische-Westfälische-Zeitung_, article quoted, 121

  Rome Congress, 25 _et seqq._


  S

  Scheurmann, Herr W., letter quoted, 126

  Seton-Watson, Dr. R. W., 11, 12, 20, 24, 37, 49

  Siciliani, Col., 37

  Sonnino, Baron, 41, 42

  Standing, Sir Guy, 17, 149

  Steed, Mr. H. Wickham, 10, 20, 24, 39, 49, 149;
    Co-Director of Austro-Hungarian Section, 11;
    mission to Italy, 37

  Stein, Gen. von, admission of superiority of Allies’ propaganda, 120

  Stossinger, Herr F., 120

  Stuart, Lieut.-Col. Sir Campbell, 10, 149, 204, 236

  Swinton, Maj.-Gen., 51


  T

  _The Times_, leading article on Lord Northcliffe’s work quoted, 129

  Torre, Dr., 24

  Trumbitch, Dr., 23, 24


  W

  Wells, Mr. H. G., 10, 12, 60, 89, 90;
    memorandum on propaganda policy against Germany, 61 _et seqq._

  Wireless Telegraphy, used as means of disseminating information, 17,
  103


PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN BY THE CORNWALL PRESS, LTD.,
PARIS GARDEN, STAMFORD STREET, LONDON, S.E.1.


Transcriber’s notes:

Italic text is indicated with _underscores_, bold text with =equals=.
Small/mixed capitals have been replaced with ALL CAPITALS.

Underlining in the translation of leaflet 17, where it is used for
emphasis, has been marked as bold, but ignored elsewhere.

Evident typographical and punctuation errors have been corrected
silently. Inconsistent spelling/hyphenation has been normalised.

The usage of both Roumania & Rumania is the author’s.

A half-title page has been discarded.

A single footnote has been relocated at the end of the quoted passage
to which it refers.

To improve text flow, illustrations have been relocated as follows:

Photographs have been grouped between chapters.

Each “leaflet” has been moved to the appendix, to accompanying its
translation.

Redundant cross-references and reiterations of the leaflet number have
been discarded.

The explanatory text “Facsimile leaflets and translations” has been
appended to the appendix and table of contents.

Maps follow immediately after the appendix.

*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 77798 ***