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diff --git a/77798-0.txt b/77798-0.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..bf45cc9 --- /dev/null +++ b/77798-0.txt @@ -0,0 +1,6614 @@ +*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 77798 *** + + + + +[Illustration: VISCOUNT NORTHCLIFFE. + +DIRECTOR OF PROPAGANDA IN ENEMY COUNTRIES. + +_Photo: Hoppé._] + + + + + SECRETS OF CREWE HOUSE + + + _The Story of a Famous Campaign_ + + BY + + SIR CAMPBELL STUART, K.B.E. + + + HODDER AND STOUGHTON + LONDON NEW YORK TORONTO + MCMXXI + + + + + _First Edition printed September, 1920._ + _Second Edition printed October, 1920._ + _Third Edition printed November, 1920._ + _Fourth Edition printed March, 1921._ + + + + + TO + VISCOUNT NORTHCLIFFE + IN + GRATEFUL AND AFFECTIONATE + APPRECIATION + + + + +AUTHOR’S FOREWORD + + +Some courage is required to add to the already too swollen list of +war books, of the making of which there seems to be no end. The +justification for the present volume, which tells the remarkable story +of British propaganda in enemy countries during 1918, lies in the fact +that it records historic activities, some of which were of a pioneer +character. + +Necessarily its publication had to be postponed until the main +principles of the Peace had been decided. The nature of the documents +quoted precluded earlier publication, which might have embarrassed +the Allied Governments. No such embarrassment will be caused at this +late stage. The march of events has removed the need, which existed +during the War and during the peace-making, for withholding from public +knowledge particulars of the organisation and work directed with such +effect from Crewe House. + +Much that was interesting, and even dramatic, can never be divulged. +Otherwise, many who did valuable and dangerous service might, by a +breach of faith, be exposed to reprisals. + +The activities of Crewe House will stand the test of judgment by +results. German comments on Viscount Northcliffe’s department leave no +room for doubt as to the verdict of enemy countries. + + + + + CONTENTS + + + CHAPTER I + + PROPAGANDA: ITS USES AND ABUSES 1 + + + CHAPTER II + + CREWE HOUSE: ITS ORGANISATION AND _PERSONNEL_ 8 + + + CHAPTER III + + OPERATIONS AGAINST AUSTRIA-HUNGARY: PROPAGANDA’S + MOST STRIKING SUCCESS 20 + + + CHAPTER IV + + OPERATIONS AGAINST GERMANY 50 + + + CHAPTER V + + TRIBUTES FROM THE ENEMY 105 + + + CHAPTER VI + + OPERATIONS AGAINST BULGARIA AND OTHER ACTIVITIES 134 + + + CHAPTER VII + + INTER-ALLIED CO-OPERATION 146 + + + CHAPTER VIII + + FROM WAR PROPAGANDA TO PEACE PROPAGANDA 201 + + + CHAPTER IX + + _VALE!_ 233 + + + APPENDIX--Facsimile leaflets and translations 237 + + INDEX 253 + + + + + LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS + + + Viscount Northcliffe _Frontispiece_ + + BETWEEN PAGES + + Crewe House 8 and 9 + + Rear-Admiral Sir Reginald Hall, K.C.M.G., + C.B., M.P. 8 and 9 + + Lieutenant-General Sir George Macdonogh, + K.C.M.G., C.B. 16 and 17 + + The Rt. Hon. Lord Beaverbrook 16 and 17 + + Mr. H. Wickham Steed 32 and 33 + + Dr. R. W. Seton-Watson 32 and 33 + + News of Allied successes on Western Front for + Jugo-Slav soldiers in the Austrian Armies 48 and 49 + + A manifesto from Dr. Trumbitch distributed + from aeroplanes among Jugo-Slav troops + in the Austrian Army 48 and 49 + + Mr. H. G. Wells 64 and 65 + + Leaflet--probably the first--distributed by + British aeroplanes among German troops + in October, 1914. It announced a Russian + victory in East Prussia 64 and 65 + + Mr. Hamilton Fyfe 64 and 65 + + Aeroplane distribution of copies of an early + leaflet prepared for the German soldier 64 and 65 + + Brigadier-General G. K. Cockerill, C.B. 80 and 81 + + A typical news-sheet for German soldiers 80 and 81 + + Captain Chalmers Mitchell 96 and 97 + + “Reporting Progress”--Leaflet which gave + particulars of Allied progress against the + Germans 96 and 97 + + Diagrammatic representation of the growth of + the American Army in the Field 96 and 97 + + Map-leaflet showing the breaking of the + Hindenburg line 112 and 113 + + News for German soldiers of the destruction + of the Turkish Army in Palestine 112 and 113 + + Some pointed quotations for German soldiers + culled from German sources 112 and 113 + + A medallion struck by the Germans in “dishonour” + of Lord Northcliffe 128 and 129 + + Leaflet with particulars of the fate of 150 + German submarine commanders, which + created great depression in German naval + ports 128 and 129 + + Leaflet warning the Germans that such places + as Berlin and Hamburg had been brought + within range of aerial attack and could be + bombed if the war were prolonged 128 and 129 + + A German dream and the result. A leaflet + illustrating the collapse of the Mittel-Europa + ambition of German militarism 144 and 145 + + Front page of a “Trench Newspaper,” issued + by Crewe House for German troops 144 and 145 + + The late Sir Charles Nicholson, Bart., M.P. 144 and 145 + + Sir Roderick Jones, K.B.E. 160 and 161 + + Illustrated leaflet portraying contentment of + German prisoners in British hands 160 and 161 + + Colonel the Earl of Denbigh, C.V.O. 160 and 161 + + Leaflet showing how the Allies had + shattered the great Berlin-Bagdad plan 160 and 161 + + Mr. Robert Donald 176 and 177 + + Manifesto to Magyar Troops 176 and 177 + + “Drifting down in white showers”: Leaflets, + from Italian aeroplane squadron, + dropping on Vienna 176 and 177 + + Manifesto, signed by Professor (now President) + Masaryk, to Czecho-Slovak soldiers 176 and 177 + + Sir Sidney Low 192 and 193 + + Rapidly-distributed leaflets for German troops + telling of Allied successes in the Balkans + and in Syria 192 and 193 + + Mr. James O’Grady, M.P. 192 and 193 + + Inflating the balloons and attaching the + truth-telling leaflets 208 and 209 + + Registering the direction and velocity of the + wind, in order to judge where the leaflets + would fall 208 and 209 + + How leaflets were attached to the balloons 208 and 209 + + Dispatching the balloons 208 and 209 + + Testing the lifting power of balloons used for + propaganda purposes 224 and 225 + + + LIST OF MAPS. + + Ethnographic map of Austria-Hungary 32 and 38 + + The partition of Austria-Hungary: Showing + the boundaries as defined in the Peace + Treaties 48 and 49 + + Germany’s new boundaries as fixed by the + Treaty of Peace 80 and 81 + + Bulgaria as delimited by the Peace treaty 144 and 145 + + + + +CHAPTER I + +PROPAGANDA: ITS USES AND ABUSES + +Definition and Axioms: Why German Propaganda Failed: Ludendorff’s +Lament and Tribute. + + +Propaganda in war is a comparatively modern activity. Certainly, in +the stage of development to which it attained in the closing phases of +the Great War, it is a new weapon of warfare and a powerful weapon. +Therefore it requires skilful and careful handling. Otherwise it +destroys rather than creates, and alienates whom it should conciliate. + +What is propaganda? It is the presentation of a case in such a way +that others may be influenced. In so far as its use against an enemy +is concerned, the subject matter employed must not be self-evidently +propagandist. Except in special circumstances, its origin should be +completely concealed. As a general rule, too, it is desirable to hide +the channels of communication. + +Creation of a favourable “atmosphere” is the first object of +propaganda. Until this psychological effect is produced (as the result +of military events, of propagandist activity or of internal political +disaffection) the mentality of enemy troops and civil population--and +both are equally important in modern warfare--will be naturally +unsympathetic and unresponsive to influence. In order to produce +this “atmosphere” of receptivity and susceptibility, continuity of +propaganda policy is indispensable. This presupposes definition of +sound policy, based upon comprehensive knowledge of the facts and of +the developments of the political, military, and economic situation, +and also of the enemy psychology. + +When a line of policy has been laid down, actual propaganda operations +may be begun, but not before. First of all axioms of propaganda +is that only truthful statements be made. Secondly, there must be +no conflicting arguments, and this can only be ensured by close +co-operation of all propagandists and by strict adherence to the policy +defined. A false step may possibly be irretrievable. + +Owing to inattention to these cardinal principles of propaganda +against an enemy--inattention due to lack of appreciation of their +importance--the Germans’ very energetic propaganda effort miscarried. +Wrongly assuming that the war would be of short duration, they made use +of untruths and half-truths, mis-statements and over-statements. These +produced a temporary effect, but the protraction of the war brought its +own refutation of their misrepresentation, and, instead of operating +to the good of the Central Empires, the campaign wrought harm to their +cause. + +Moreover, as they afterwards realised, the Germans did not agree among +themselves in their misrepresentations. There was, as a well-known +British authority on German propaganda has pointed out, a chaotic +exuberance of different points of view. And they were incapable of +understanding other nations. Dr. Karl Lamprecht, the distinguished +German professor, deplored this in the course of a lecture at the end +of 1914, when the Germans regarded their victory as assured. “When the +war came,” he said, “everyone who could write obtained the largest +possible goose quill and wrote to all his foreign friends, telling +them that they did not realise what splendid fellows the Germans were, +and not infrequently adding that in many cases their conduct required +some excuse. The effect was stupendous.” “I can speak with the most +open heart on the subject,” he added, “for amongst the whole crowd +it was the professors who were most erratic. The consequences were +gruesome. Probably much more harm came to our cause in this way than +from all the efforts of the enemy. None the less, it was done with the +best intentions. The self-confidence was superb, but the knowledge +was lacking. People thought that they could explain the German cause +without preparation. What was wanted was organisation.” + +Before coming to Allied methods and matter, it will be interesting to +examine the scope of German propaganda. In the early stages of the war, +Germany loudly proclaimed that she was winning. As the progress of +events belied such words, she changed her theme. The Allies could not +win, she averred, and the longer they took to realise this the greater +would be their suffering and losses. She continually endeavoured to +sow discord between the Allies. Great Britain was not taking her fair +share of the Allied burden; Great Britain intended to retain Belgium +and the northern part of France; Great Britain was using France and +Russia for her own selfish ends; the interests of the Balkan Powers +could not be reconciled. These were some of the foolish falsehoods in +which she indulged. They were ineffective, as were her many attempts to +stir up disaffection within Allied countries. Ireland, South Africa, +India, Egypt and Mohammedan countries were examples in the case of +Great Britain, and Algeria in that of France. She spared no effort to +encourage Pacifism among the Allied peoples. + +Their lack of success became evident even to the Germans themselves. +Government agencies and Press became more reticent as the war went +on and the propaganda was found to be doing more harm than good. +The military leaders became apprehensive of the effectiveness and +superiority of British propaganda. Soldiers and writers made bitter +complaints of the lack of any German organisation to maintain an +adequate counter-campaign. + +General Ludendorff (“My War Memories,” pp. 360 _et seq._) is pathetic +in his laments at the non-success of German efforts. “The German +propaganda,” he writes, “was only kept going with difficulty. In spite +of all our efforts, its achievements, in comparison to the magnitude +of the task, were inadequate. We produced no real effect on the +enemy peoples.” He admits failure, too, in propaganda efforts on the +fighting fronts. In the East, he says, the Russians were the authors +of their own collapse. In the West, “the fronts of our enemies had not +been made susceptible by the state of public opinion in their home +countries, and the propaganda we gradually introduced had no success.” +He records his efforts to induce the Imperial Chancellor to create a +great organisation, as it had become “undeniably essential to establish +an Imperial Ministry of Propaganda,” and he was convinced that no +adequate counter-campaign to Allied propaganda could be organised +except by an Imperial department possessing special powers. “At last +a feeble step in this direction was taken in August, 1918. A totally +inadequate organisation was set up; besides, it was then too late. +In these circumstances it was quite impossible to achieve uniformity +in propaganda work between Germany and Austria-Hungary, as was +conspicuously the case with our enemies. The Army found no ally in a +strong propaganda directed from home. While her Army was victorious on +the field of battle, Germany failed in the fight against the _moral_ of +the enemy peoples.” + +Ludendorff’s _apologia_ shows that he understood the principles which +should govern a propaganda campaign; but he did not understand that +the German case was bad. He has the doubtful consolation of knowing he +was right in his theories; for they coincided in large degree with the +principles upon which Viscount Northcliffe based his famous intensive +campaign from Crewe House. No other German has exhibited such a grasp +of the fundamentals of propaganda as Ludendorff, and he had excellent +opportunity of judging the efficacy of the action into which these +theoretical principles were translated. His verdict is an unqualified +tribute, as the extracts from his writings quoted in another chapter +show. + +How this success was attained it is the purpose of this book to reveal. + +[Illustration: CREWE HOUSE.] + + + + +CHAPTER II + +CREWE HOUSE: ITS ORGANISATION AND _PERSONNEL_ + +Viscount Northcliffe’s appointment: The Formation of an Advisory +Committee: Other Government Departments’ Co-operation. + + +In February, 1918, Viscount Northcliffe accepted the Prime Minister’s +invitation to become Director of Propaganda in Enemy Countries. Only +a few weeks earlier, Lord Northcliffe had concluded his mission to +the United States, where he had undertaken the co-ordination and +supervision of the multiplex British missions engaged in purchasing +food and munitions and in other vitally important operations. Upon his +return to England, he had become Chairman of the London headquarters +of the British War Mission to the United States of America, after +having declined a seat in the Cabinet. Despite the importance of his +new duties, he elected to retain his connection with the British War +Mission to the United States. + +Lord Northcliffe’s name bore in itself a propaganda value in enemy +countries. None knew better than the Germans with what assiduity and +tenacity he had striven to awaken the British nation to the extent and +significance of the war preparations of German militarism. From the +time of his entry into this office he and his work were the subjects of +continual reference in the German Press. The vehemence of their attacks +showed the depth of their apprehension. + +The direction and organisation of propaganda abroad, and especially +against enemy countries, required a _personnel_ deeply versed in +foreign politics, with an intimate understanding of enemy psychology, +and with professional knowledge of the art of presenting facts plainly +and forcefully. The work was of a highly specialised character, +designed to reveal to the enemy the hopelessness of their cause +and case and the inevitability of Allied victory. This called for +continuity of policy and persevering effort. But the problems of the +penetration of propaganda into enemy countries were as exacting as the +definition of policy and the presentation of the facts of the situation. + +In order to bring as wide a knowledge as possible to bear upon the +conduct of this campaign of education and enlightenment of enemy +peoples, Lord Northcliffe invited and obtained the enthusiastic +co-operation of a committee of well-known men of affairs and +publicists. Each had won distinction in some sphere of public service +which rendered his aid in this work valuable. + +Lord Northcliffe appointed me as Deputy-Director of the department and +Deputy-Chairman of the Committee. + +The members of the Committee were:-- + + Colonel the Earl of Denbigh, C.V.O. + + Mr. Robert Donald (then Editor of the _Daily Chronicle_). + + Sir Roderick Jones, K.B.E. (Managing Director of Reuters Agency). + + Sir Sidney Low. + + Sir Charles Nicholson, Bt., M.P. + + Mr. James O’Grady, M.P. + + Mr. H. Wickham Steed (Foreign Editor and later Editor-in-Chief of + _The Times_). + + Mr. H. G. Wells. + + Secretary, Mr. H. K. Hudson, C.B.E. + +It was an advisory committee of wide knowledge and many talents, with +a strong representation of authors and journalists of distinction. +Regular fortnightly meetings were held, at which each section of +the department reported progress and submitted programmes of future +activities for approval. + +The headquarters of the department were established at Crewe House, +the town mansion of the Marquis of Crewe, who had, with characteristic +public spirit, placed it at the disposal of the Government for war +purposes. + +The department was divided into two main branches, the one for +production, and the other for distribution, of propaganda material. +In its turn the production branch was divided into German, +Austro-Hungarian, and Bulgarian sections. + +For reasons which will be given in the next chapter, the +Austro-Hungarian section was the first to begin operations. Mr. Steed +and Dr. R. W. Seton-Watson were co-directors of this section. They +were an admirable choice. As Foreign Editor (as he then was) of _The +Times_, author of “The Hapsburg Monarchy,” and with experience from +1902 to 1913 as correspondent of _The Times_ at Vienna, Mr. Steed had +intimate and authoritative knowledge of the peoples and conditions of +the Dual Monarchy. Dr. Seton-Watson was also a distinguished authority +on Austro-Hungarian and Balkan history and politics, to which he had +devoted many years of study. + +After determination of the policy to be pursued against +Austria-Hungary, Lord Northcliffe entrusted to them the important +mission to Italy which initiated the campaign against the Dual +Monarchy, resulting in such far-reaching and remarkable consequences. +In the course of this mission they attended the historic Rome Congress +of the Oppressed Hapsburg Nationalities and they took a prominent +part in the establishment of the inter-Allied commission which waged +propaganda warfare against Austria-Hungary. The subsequent conduct of +this campaign necessitated keeping in close touch with the different +national organisations of the oppressed Hapsburg races--Poles, +Czecho-Slovaks, Southern Slavs, Rumanes--throughout 1918, and they +were able to render signal services to these peoples as well as to the +Allies. + +When operations began against Germany, Mr. H. G. Wells accepted Lord +Northcliffe’s invitation to take charge of the German Section. Mr. +Wells made an exhaustive study of the conditions affecting Germany +from a propaganda point of view, with the co-operation of Dr. J. W. +Headlam-Morley, and his memorandum (which is published in Chapter IV +of this book) is a noteworthy document of exceptional interest. When, +in July, 1918, he found himself unable to continue the direction of +the German Section (although retaining membership of the Committee) he +had collected a mass of valuable data for the use of his successor, +Mr. Hamilton Fyfe, the well-known journalist. To Mr. Fyfe and his +colleagues of the German Section fell the organisation of the +“intensive” propaganda activities of the last three months of the war. + +There thus remained the work against Turkey and Bulgaria. By +arrangement between Lord Northcliffe and Lord Beaverbrook, propaganda +against Turkey was ably conducted by the Near East section of the +Ministry of Information, in charge of Mr. (now Sir Hugo) Cunliffe-Owen. +This was obviously wise in the interests of economy and efficiency. +Propaganda in Bulgaria, however, was directed from Crewe House. + +The production of propaganda literature and its distribution were +different functions and were performed by separate sections of the +department, but, of course, in the closest co-operation. So far +as enemy troops were concerned, the distribution for Germans and +Bulgarians was undertaken by the British military authorities. For +Austro-Hungarian troops, the work was placed on an inter-Allied basis, +distribution being organised by the Italian Army. + +Distribution through civil channels, a difficult task, was in the hands +of Mr. S. A. Guest, who, alone of British propagandists against the +enemy, had been constantly engaged in that work since the early days +of the war. He built up a series of organisations in different parts +of Europe by which news and views could be introduced into all the +enemy countries. Great ingenuity and perseverance were required, but no +little measure of success crowned his efforts. + +Co-ordination of these activities was a vital necessity, and this +was effectively ensured by a daily meeting of those in charge of the +different sections, the liaison officers between Crewe House and other +departments, and the heads of the administrative branches of Crewe +House. At this meeting, held usually under my chairmanship, the general +details of policy and operations of all sections were systematically +discussed. Each section knew what the other was doing, and uniformity +of policy and action was secured. In addition, the consideration of +the problems which arose, whether in the general work of Crewe House or +in the work of one particular section, benefited from the collective +attention of a combination of enthusiastic minds. Mr. Hudson, the able +secretary of the advisory committee, also acted as secretary of these +daily meetings. + +All at Crewe House were profoundly grateful for the cordiality with +which the many other Government departments, with whom they were +brought into contact, lent their co-operation. In this respect +the Foreign Office, War Office, Admiralty, Treasury, Ministry of +Information, and Stationery Office, all contributed materially to +the success attained, although this list by no means exhausts the +departments which willingly placed their resources at the disposal of +Crewe House. It is pleasing to be able to record this as a recollection +of and tribute to the service rendered by these departments in this +phase of war activity. + +The liaison officers’ duties were extremely important. Mr. C. J. +Phillips, a distinguished Civil Servant, who had been transferred from +the Board of Education for special work in the Foreign Office, was the +connecting link between the latter department and Crewe House. To him +fell the task of keeping Crewe House informed of foreign developments +which affected the work of propaganda in enemy countries and of +keeping the Foreign Office _au courant_ with Crewe House activities. +His assistance and judgment were of immense value in dealing with the +questions affecting foreign affairs which were constantly arising. + +For a few months after Lord Northcliffe’s appointment, the Military +Intelligence Directorate of the War Office continued the production +of literature for propaganda work against the Germans, and during +this period Major the Earl of Kerry, M.P., acted as liaison officer +between the two departments. Each department was able to complement +and supplement the other’s work with good effect, and the co-operation +was carried out most harmoniously. When production was subsequently +centralised at Crewe House, Captain Chalmers Mitchell became liaison +officer with the War Office and with the Air Ministry. No greater +tribute can be paid to his work than the record in the pages that +follow. + +Most cordial, too, were the relations maintained with the Admiralty, +and especially with Rear-Admiral Sir Reginald Hall (Director +of Naval Intelligence), through Commander (now Sir Guy) Standing, +R.N.V.R. Crewe House was rightly grateful for constant co-operation of +a confidential character through the exercise on its behalf of naval +resources. + +Most valuable assistance was readily given to Crewe House by the +Ministry of Information, so efficiently organised by Lord Beaverbrook. +Close consultation was maintained between heads of sections of the +two departments wherever co-operation could be advantageous. In +certain European countries, for instance, the same agents acted for +both departments--an arrangement which proved effective as well as +economical. Invaluable service for Crewe House was performed by one +agent of the Ministry in regard to Bulgarian affairs in which he +displayed high competence and discretion. Crewe House was also indebted +to the Ministry for the use of its wireless service in sending out +matter for the enlightenment of the enemy by that means, and for many +similar facilities, too numerous to mention, willingly offered and +gladly accepted. + +With the Treasury--_bête noire_ to so many temporary war +departments--Crewe House had the smoothest working arrangements +through Mr. C. S. Kent, who acted as Financial Controller and +Accounting Officer in addition to other duties connected with the +general administration of Crewe House. At no time was Treasury sanction +withheld or delayed in regard to any expenditure proposed in connection +with enemy propaganda. + +The enemy leaders frequently alleged that Lord Northcliffe expended +huge sums of money on his propaganda work. According to the report +of the Comptroller and Auditor-General, the expenditure for the four +months from September 1 to December 31, 1918--which was the period +of the “intensive” campaign and consequently the most expensive--was +£31,360 4s. 9d., which included expenses borne by the Office of +Works, the Stationery Office, and the War Office on behalf of Crewe +House. Only £7,946 2s. 7d. of this amount was incurred directly by +Crewe House, one reason for the smallness of the amount being that +many members of the department worked without remuneration for their +services. The Auditor-General made a complimentary reference to the +manner in which the accounts were rendered. + +Last, but not least, the Stationery Office which undertook all +the printing arrangements for the millions of leaflets and other +publications required in German, Croat, Bulgarian, and other languages, +rendered great assistance by the promptness and efficiency with which +they met Crewe House requirements which, from their very nature, +generally necessitated working against time. + +It is particularly pleasing to look back and remember all the help +so willingly given by other Government departments and to record the +unfailing courtesy with which it was proffered and the zeal displayed. +Crewe House gladly recognised the value of such loyal co-operation, +of which those who were concerned in its work still retain grateful +memories. + +[Illustration: REAR-ADMIRAL SIR REGINALD HALL, K.C.M.G., C.B., M.P. + +[DIRECTOR OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE, 1918.] + +_Photo: Russell, London._] + +[Illustration: LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SIR GEORGE MACDONOGH, K.C.M.G., C.B. + +[DIRECTOR OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, 1918]. + +_Photo: Russell, London._] + +[Illustration: RT. HON. LORD BEAVERBROOK, MINISTER OF INFORMATION, 1918. + +_Photo: M. S. Kay, Bolton._] + + + + +CHAPTER III + +OPERATIONS AGAINST AUSTRIA-HUNGARY: PROPAGANDA’S MOST STRIKING SUCCESS + +Anti-German Hapsburg Races: The Secret Treaty of London: Problem of +the Adriatic: Importance of the Rome Congress: Lord Northcliffe’s +Policy against Austria-Hungary: Formation of an Inter-Allied Propaganda +Commission and its Effective Operations: The Final Triumph. + + +Little time was spent in deciding that, of all enemy countries, +Austria-Hungary would be most susceptible to propaganda. With +the assistance of such authorities as Mr. Wickham Steed and Dr. +Seton-Watson, Lord Northcliffe was soon able to propose a line of sound +policy for the sanction of the Foreign Office. + +It is strange that determined action on some such lines had not been +initiated previously by the Allied Governments. They had failed +to profit from the anti-Hapsburg and anti-German sentiment of the +oppressed subject races of the Dual Monarchy. Three-fifths of the +Hapsburg peoples were actually or potentially well disposed to the +Allies, and it was towards this majority that Lord Northcliffe decided +that propaganda must be directed with two objectives, one constructive +and one destructive:-- + + (1) The moral and active support of the national desires of these + races for independence, with the ultimate aim of forming a strong + non-German chain of Central European and Danubian States. + + (2) The encouragement of their disinclination to fight on behalf of + the Central Empires, thus greatly handicapping the Austro-Hungarian + Armies as a fighting force, and seriously embarrassing the German + military leaders. + +It will be seen with what success each object was secured. + +The nationalities chiefly affected were the Czechs and the Southern +Slavs. There were also lesser numbers of Italians, Poles and Rumanes, +whom it was intended to place under their own national Governments of +Italy, the State of Poland (then projected and now established), and +Rumania, which countries marched with the districts of Austria-Hungary +inhabited by their respective races. + +Operations were comparatively straightforward in every case except +that of the Southern Slavs, in which the secret Treaty of London of +April, 1915, presented a serious obstacle. At the beginning of 1918 +few people realised the difficulties thus created, but since the +cessation of hostilities the “Adriatic question” has loomed largely in +the public view of international relations and is rightly regarded as +one of the most troublesome problems of world politics. Its bearing on +propaganda lay in the fact that by this treaty Great Britain, France +and Russia had promised to Italy certain Austrian territories inhabited +by Southern Slavs. These territories, moreover, provided trading access +to the sea and were of the highest economic value to any Southern Slav +state which might be formed. So long as that treaty was regarded by +the Southern Slavs as representing Allied policy, it was difficult +to persuade them that Allied sympathies were with them or that the +Allies would secure for them the economic interests necessary to the +establishment of the united Southern Slav state peopled by the Serbs, +Croats, and Slovenes. + +With the object of creating a counterpoise to the secret pact, +representatives of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, had assembled +in Corfu, under the leadership of Dr. Trumbitch (president of the +Southern Slav Committee) and M. Pashitch (Prime Minister of Serbia), +and had issued the Southern Slav Unitary Declaration on June 20, 1917, +proclaiming the union of the three peoples and claiming all territory +compactly inhabited by them, which (said the Declaration) “cannot be +mutilated without attaint to the vital interests of the community. +Our nation demands nothing that belongs to others, but only what is +its own.” On the one hand, this was an important counter-step to the +partition of Dalmatia proposed in the Treaty of London; while on +the other, it was a definite advance towards the solidification of +the three peoples into nationhood. Consequently it was not without +effect upon the German military leaders, who foresaw its influence +upon the Southern Slav regiments of the Austro-Hungarian armies, and +it undoubtedly hastened their decision to take direct control of the +forces of the Dual Monarchy. + +The next move was made after the Italian armies had recovered from the +disaster of Caporetto and had re-established their line on the Piave. +On the initiative of Mr. Wickham Steed, Dr. Seton-Watson, and other +members of the Serbian Society of Great Britain, conferences took place +in London between leading Italians and Southern Slavs, with the aim of +outlining a solution of the question which would be acceptable to the +two nations. A memorandum of the discussions was given to the Prime +Minister of Italy (Signor Orlando), who was then (January, 1918) in +London. At Mr. Steed’s suggestion, Signor Orlando met Dr. Trumbitch and +they discussed the question at great length, with the result that Dr. +Trumbitch accepted an invitation from the Italian Premier to go to Rome. + +Before that visit took place, Dr. Torre, a prominent member of the +Italian Parliament, was sent to London, as representative of an +influential joint committee of the two Italian Houses of Parliament, +to endeavour to establish a definite basis of agreement. After much +negotiation the representatives of the two nations engaged themselves +to settle amicably the various territorial controversies in the +interest of the future good and sincere relations between the two +peoples, on the basis of the principles of nationality and of the right +of peoples to decide their own destiny. The linguistic and economic +interests of such minorities as might have to be included in the +national territory of either party were also guaranteed. + +This agreement of principle, made under the stress of war, coincided +approximately with Lord Northcliffe’s entry into office. One of his +first official acts was to dispatch Mr. Steed and Dr. Seton-Watson as a +special mission to Italy. While there, they represented his department +at the Congress of the Oppressed Hapsburg Nationalities which met with +the consent of the Italian Government at Rome on April 7, 8, and 9, +1918. The holding of this Congress was, in itself, an important act of +propaganda. This unprecedented assembly, representing Italians, Poles, +Czecho-Slovaks, Southern Slavs, and Rumanes, resolved upon common +action in the proclamation of the right of national unity of these +peoples and also confirmed, in striking fashion, the decisions arrived +at between Italians and Southern Slavs in London. Signor Orlando, +Signor Bissolati and other Italian Ministers expressed publicly their +adhesion to the resolutions, which were as follows:-- + + “The representatives of the nationalities subjected in whole or in + part to the rule of Austria-Hungary--the Italians, Poles, Rumanes, + Czechs, and Southern Slavs--join in affirming their principles of + common action as follows:-- + + “(1) _Each of these peoples proclaims its right to constitute its own + nationality and State unity, or to complete it, and to attain full + political and economic independence._ + + “(2) _Each of these peoples recognises in the Austro-Hungarian + Monarchy the instrument of German domination and the fundamental + obstacle to the realisation of its aspirations and rights._ + + “(3) _The assembly recognises the necessity of a common struggle + against the common oppressors, in order that each people may attain + complete liberation and national unity within a free State unit._ + + “The representatives of the Italian people and of the Jugo-Slav + people in particular, agree as follows:-- + + “(1) _In the relations of the Italian nation and the nation of + the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes--known also under the name of the + Jugo-Slav nation--the representatives of the two peoples recognise + that the unity and independence of the Jugo-Slav nation is a vital + interest of Italy, just as the completion of Italian national unity + is a vital interest of the Jugo-Slav nation. And therefore the + representatives of the two peoples pledge themselves to employ every + effort in order that during the war and at the moment of peace, these + ends of the two nations may be completely attained._ + + “(2) _They declare that the liberation of the Adriatic Sea and its + defence against every present and future enemy is a vital interest of + the two peoples._ + + “(3) _They pledge themselves also, in the interest of good and + sincere relations between the two peoples in the future to solve + amicably the various territorial controversies on the basis of the + principles of nationality and of the right of peoples to decide their + own fate, and in such a way as not to injure the vital interests of + the two nations, as they shall be defined at the moment of peace._ + + “(4) _To such racial groups_ (nuclei) _of one people as it may be + found necessary to include within the frontiers of the other, there + shall be recognised and guaranteed the right of their language, + culture, and moral and economic interests._” + +Meanwhile, Lord Northcliffe and his experts had, in accordance with the +principle consistently followed by Crewe House, determined the broad +lines of policy upon which propaganda against Austria-Hungary was to +be based. A memorandum on the subject was prepared and forwarded by +Lord Northcliffe on February 24, 1918, to the Secretary of State for +Foreign Affairs for his consideration and approval. The following are +the principal points of the memorandum: + + “I have long been of opinion that it would be well to concentrate on + Propaganda in Austria. + + “I have made a point of seeing every available person who has come + out of Austria, including many Americans who returned to the United + States when I was there. All shared the same view--that the Dual + Monarchy entered the greater war in a halfhearted spirit; is weary of + the war; has endured hardships approaching starvation; and realises + that there is no benefit for Austria arising out of the war. + + “The control of the Presses of the various nationalities composing + the Dual Monarchy is so absolute that the real facts of the war are + unknown to the multitude. Germany is not idle in Austria or elsewhere. + + “For example, the entrance of the United States into the war has been + belittled, and described as mere American ‘bluff.’ Many subjects of + Austrian nationalities had, before the war, considerable knowledge + of the United States, owing to the great emigration to that country. + They would realise the power of the United States if explained to + them. + + “It is submitted with respect, therefore, that one of the first steps + to be taken is to spread, through all available channels, accurate + facts about the American preparations. + + “But, before making any beginning in that direction, or any others, I + feel that I must be placed in possession of knowledge of the policy + of the Allies as to the Dual Monarchy. + + “I should be greatly obliged if you would give me your opinion on + the following suggestions, which are made after consultation with + those well acquainted with Austria. If they merit your approval, it + is suggested that they be submitted to the United States, France, and + Italy. + + “It is suggested that there are two policies for the Department + of Propaganda in Enemy Countries. In order that there may be no + misunderstanding I have recapitulated elementary facts generally + known. + + “These two policies are as follows: + + “(_a_) To work for a separate peace with the Emperor, the Court, + and the aristocracy, on the principle of not interfering with the + domestic affairs of the Hapsburg Monarchy, and of leaving its + territory almost or quite intact; or + + “(_b_) To try to break the power of Austria-Hungary, as the weakest + link in the chain of enemy States, by supporting and encouraging all + anti-German and pro-Ally peoples and tendencies. + + “The (_a_) policy has been tried without success. The Hapsburgs are + not free agents. They have not the power, even though they may wish, + to break away from Germany, because-- + + “(1) They are controlled by the internal structure of their dominions + (the Dual System), which gives Germany decisive leverage over them + through the Germans of Austria and the Magyars of Hungary; and + + “(2) Because the Allies cannot offer them acceptable terms without + breaking with Italy. + + “It remains to try the (_b_) policy. + + “This policy is not primarily, or even, in the last resort, + necessarily anti-Hapsburgian; it is not opposed to the interests of + the Roman Catholic religion; and it is in harmony with the declared + aims of the Allies. + + “The Empire of Austria contains some 31,000,000 inhabitants. Of these + less than one-third, _i.e._, the 9,000,000 or 10,000,000 Germans of + Austria, are pro-German. The other two-thirds (including the Poles, + Czecho-Slovaks, Rumanes, Italians, and Southern Slavs) are actively + or passively anti-German. + + “The Kingdom of Hungary, including the ‘autonomous’ kingdom of + Croatia-Slavonia has a population of approximately 21,000,000 + of which one-half (Magyars, Jews, Saxons, and Swabians) may be + considered pro-German, and the rest (Slovaks, Rumanes, and Southern + Slavs) actively or passively anti-German. + + “There are thus in Austria-Hungary, as a whole, some 31,000,000 + anti-Germans, and some 21,000,000 pro-Germans. The pro-German + minority rules the anti-German majority. Apart from questions of + democratic principle, the policy of the Allies should evidently be to + help and encourage the anti-Germans. + + “The chief means of helping them may be specified thus: + + “(1) The Allied Governments and the President of the United States + should insist upon their determination to secure democratic freedom + for the races of Austria-Hungary on the principle of ‘government by + consent of the governed.’ Expressions such as ‘self-government,’ + or ‘autonomous development’ should be avoided, because they have + a sinister meaning in Austria-Hungary and tend to discourage the + friends of the Allies. + + “(2) For the same reason, statements that the Allies do not wish to + ‘dismember Austria’ should be avoided. The war cannot be won without + so radical a transformation of Austria-Hungary as to remove its + peoples from German control. The Hapsburgs may be driven to help + in this transformation if Allied encouragement of the anti-German + Hapsburg peoples is effective. By themselves the Hapsburgs cannot + effect a transformation except in an increasingly pro-German sense. + + “(3) For propaganda among the anti-German peoples the agencies + already existing should be utilised. These agencies are chiefly + the Bohemian (Czecho-Slovak) National Alliance, the Southern Slav + Committee, and various Polish organisations. + + “(4) The present tendency of the Italian Government to shelve + the policy embodied in the London Convention of April 26, 1915, + and to adopt a policy of agreement with the anti-German races of + Austria-Hungary should be encouraged and stimulated. + + “(5) The ultimate aim of Allied policy should be, not to form a + number of small, disjointed States, but to create a non-German + Confederation of Central European and Danubian States. + + “(6) The Germans of Austria should be free to join the Confederated + States of Germany. They would, in any case, tend to secede from a + transformed Austria, in which they would no longer be able to rule + over non-German peoples. + + “In view of the great amount of cabling that will be necessary + to achieve unity, may I ask you to let me have either your own + suggestions, or your approval of those above mentioned, as speedily + as possible?” + +In his reply, Mr. Balfour wrote on February 26, 1918:-- + + “Your very lucid memorandum raises in one shape or another the + fundamental problem of the Hapsburg Empire. A final and authoritative + answer to the question you put to me can only be given (if given at + all) by the Cabinet, speaking in the name of the Government. But I + offer the following observations on the subject, in the hope that + they may help you in the immediate task for which you have been made + responsible. + + “If the two alternative policies of dealing with the Dual Monarchy + set forth in your paper were mutually exclusive, and if they involved + distinct and even opposite methods of propaganda, our position would + be even more difficult than it is. For what we can do with the + Austrian Empire does not wholly depend upon our wishes, but upon + the success of our arms and the views of our Allies, and, as these + elements in our calculations cannot be estimated with certainty, we + should inevitably remain in doubt as to which of the two mutually + exclusive methods of propaganda it would be judicious to adopt. + + “Fortunately, however, our position is not quite so embarrassing. As + you point out with unanswerable force, everything which encourages + the anti-German elements in the Hapsburg dominions really helps + to compel the Emperor and the Court to a separate peace, and also + diminishes the efficiency of Austria-Hungary as a member of the + Middle-Europe combination. The Emperor, by these means, might be + induced, or compelled, fundamentally to modify the constitution + of his own State. If he refused to lend himself to such a policy, + the strengthening of the non-German elements might bring about + the same end even more effectually than if he lent his assistance + to the process. But in either case the earlier stages of that + process are the same, and a propaganda which aids the struggle of + the nationalities now subject either to Austrian Germans or to + Magyar Hungarians towards freedom and self-determination, must be + right, whether the complete break-up of the Austrian Empire or + its de-Germanisation under Hapsburg rule be the final goal of our + efforts.” + +When acknowledging this prompt reply, Lord Northcliffe pointed out that +his anxiety to move as rapidly as possible was due to the belief of +the Italians that a strong Austrian or Austro-German offensive against +Italy would be launched within the next two months. “If our propaganda +in Austria is to help to weaken this offensive, or to turn it into +a defeat, it ought, in my judgment, to begin at once, and all the +agencies we can command ought to be hard at work within a fortnight. + +“The representative of the American Propaganda Department is in London. +The Italian will be here next week, and we could no doubt have a French +representative at the same time. + +“As to the memorandum, I am very pleased that you are in substantial +agreement with the policy outlined. The two policies may not be +mutually exclusive in the last resort, but it is very important that +one or the other of them should be given absolute precedence. It would +place me in an awkward predicament if, after basing vigorous propaganda +on the (_b_) policy, I were confronted with some manifestation of the +(_a_) policy on the part of the British or other Allied Government. +For this reason I hope that the War Cabinet will not delay its own +decision, and that it will try to get a decision from France, Italy, +and the United States as quickly as possible. + +“It goes without saying that public declarations on behalf of the +British, French, and Allied Governments, and, if possible, on the +part of President Wilson, in the sense of the (_b_) policy would, if +promptly made, greatly facilitate my efforts.” + +Obviously the wise course was to place action in carrying out this +policy on an Inter-Allied basis. Lord Northcliffe, therefore, convened +meetings in London which were attended by Italian, French and American +representatives. It was decided to organise a committee to arrange with +France and Italy for united operations on the Italian front against +the Austro-Hungarian armies. + +Accordingly, the special mission which Lord Northcliffe had sent +to Italy, and of which Mr. Steed and Dr. Seton-Watson were the +principal members, was entrusted with this task. With the willing +support and co-operation of the Italian Prime Minister, the Italian +Commander-in-Chief, and the British and French Commanders on the +Italian Front, a permanent Inter-Allied Propaganda Commission was +organised at the Italian General Headquarters. Italy provided the +President (Colonel Siciliani) and one commissioner (Captain Ojetti) +and Great Britain and France one commissioner each (Lieutenant-Colonel +B. Granville Baker and Major Gruss respectively). To the Commission +were attached, as a result of representations from Mr. Steed, +representatives of committees of each of the oppressed nationalities. +Mr. Steed, speaking on behalf of Lord Northcliffe, urged that only +representatives of these races were fully qualified to speak to their +co-nationals on the vital subjects which would form the theme of their +propagandist productions. + +The Commission began work on April 18, 1918. It acquired a polyglot +printing press at Reggio Emilia. A weekly journal was published +containing news (collected by a special Italian office ably organised +by Professor Borgese at Berne) quadruplicated in the Czech, Polish, +Southern Slav, and Rumanian languages. The assistance of the national +representatives was valuable to the point of indispensability in +ensuring accuracy of translation and suitability of contents. +These representatives also composed leaflet manifestoes. Coloured +reproductions of pictures of a patriotic, or religious, nature which +appealed to the nationalist aspirations and piety of the races, +were made. All this literary matter was dispatched straight to the +front-line armies from the printing press, and distributed by means of +aeroplanes (one per army being detailed for this purpose), rockets, +which were constructed to hold about 30 pamphlets, and grenades, and +also by contact patrols. These patrols were originally formed by +bodies of troops raised on the responsibility of the various Italian +armies, and were composed of deserters of Czecho-Slovak, Southern Slav, +Polish, or Rumanian nationalities who had volunteered for this service +against their hereditary enemy. They were wonderfully successful. The +total number of leaflets and other productions thus distributed ran +into many millions. But this by no means exhausted the channels of +propagandist effort. Gramophone records of Czecho-Slovak and Southern +Slav songs were secured by the British Commissioner and effectively +used for the awakening of the nationalist sentiment among the troops of +these races in the Austrian armies. The instruments were placed in “No +Man’s Land,” and so close to each other were the front trenches of the +opposing armies that the words and music could easily be heard. + +The Austro-Hungarian section of Crewe House, of which section Mr. +Steed and Dr. Seton-Watson were the directors, maintained the closest +touch with the Commission. Specimens of literature were exchanged +between the Commission and other sections of Crewe House, and it was +not uncommon for one news leaflet to appear in eight or ten different +languages, with a total circulation of several millions of copies. The +Austro-Hungarian section also necessarily kept in the closest touch +with the Czecho-Slovak, Southern Slav, Polish, and Rumanian leaders and +organisations in Allied and neutral countries. It also co-operated with +Mr. S. A. Guest in the organisation of civil and secret channels in +neutral countries by which propaganda literature could be introduced +into Austria-Hungary. + +The effect of the launching of the propaganda leaflet campaign was soon +apparent. Unrest became manifest among the Austro-Hungarian forces. +Deserters belonging to the subject races came over to the Allied lines. +This was one of the chief causes contributory to the postponements of +the Austrian offensive carefully planned for April. When this attack +was eventually made--in June--the Italian commanders, and their Allied +colleagues, had full information concerning enemy plans and positions. + +But, unhappily, the propaganda, and, consequently, the military, +campaigns were impaired by reactionary tendencies within the Italian +Government. Had the Italian Government been prepared in May, 1918, +to join with their Allies and Associates in making a joint public +declaration in strong and unmistakable language in favour of the +creation of a united and independent Southern Slav State and in +recognising the Czecho-Slovaks as an Allied and belligerent nation, the +result would undoubtedly have precipitated the collapse of Austria in +the early part of the summer of 1918. + +Instead of seizing the opportunity for this united and strong +pronouncement which presented itself at a meeting of the Prime +Ministers of Great Britain, France, and Italy, held at Versailles, on +June 3, 1918, the following declarations were made:-- + + (1) The creation of a united and independent Polish State with free + access to the sea constitutes one of the conditions of a solid and + just peace and of the rule of right in Europe. + + (2) The Allied Governments have noted with pleasure the declaration + made by the Secretary of State of the United States Government (in + referring to the resolutions of the Rome Congress of Austro-Hungarian + nationalities), and desire to associate themselves in an expression + of earnest sympathy for the nationalistic aspirations towards freedom + of the Czecho-Slovak and Jugo (Southern)-Slav peoples. + +The regrettable weakness of the second declaration, which followed very +closely the wording of Mr. Lansing’s earlier announcement on behalf of +the United States Government, was entirely due to the opposition of +Baron Sonnino (Italian Foreign Minister), who rejected the stronger +declarations prepared by Mr. Balfour and the French Foreign Minister, +M. Pichon. It was a retrogressive step by Italy from the position +she had taken at the Rome Congress, at which her Prime Minister had +expressly associated himself with the terms of the Italo-Southern Slav +agreement that recognised the “unity and independence of the Jugo-Slav +nation as a vital Italian interest.” In regard to the Czecho-Slovaks, +the British, French, and Italian Governments had already recognised the +Czecho-Slovak Army, under the Bohemian National Council, as an Allied +force. + +Towards the end of June, Mr. Lansing made considerable advance with +a definite statement that the United States aimed at the complete +liberation of all Slav peoples from Austro-German domination. + +While Lord Northcliffe and his associates were striving hard in London +to retrieve the opportunities thus wasted, the propaganda organisation +in Italy was making remarkable progress despite the vacillations of +the politicians. Undoubtedly the reactionary attitude of Baron Sonnino +at Versailles influenced adversely the response of the Southern Slav +troops in the Austrian ranks to the appeals made by the propaganda +leaflets. Nevertheless, there was a considerable amount of desertion +from the Austro-Hungarian Army. Among the deserters were numbers of +junior officers, not professional soldiers, but men who in private life +were lawyers, merchants, and so on. These men were all led to come over +by the prospect of liberation which the propaganda held out to them. +Men of other ranks were induced to desert, either in order to join +relatives among their co-nationals fighting in the Italian Army, of +whom news had reached them through the propaganda agency, or else by +the more elementary considerations of food, comfort, and safety. It was +noticeable that nearly all the deserters brought with them copies of +the leaflets distributed by the Allied Commission. + +That the propaganda had seriously alarmed the Austro-Hungarian +authorities was made evident by reference to it in Army Orders and +in the Austrian and German Press, which even reproduced some of the +literary efforts, and vilified Lord Northcliffe in their most fervent +manner. It even affected the minor tactics of the Austro-Hungarian +Army, for it necessitated the detachment of machine-gun sections to +deal with attempts at desertion _en masse_ during the Piave offensive, +which was eventually launched by the Austrians at the end of June. +There was at least one authenticated account of a mutiny among Czech +troops being suppressed by Germans and Magyars during that offensive. +Desertions of single men or small parties were frequent before and +during the action, and one case is known of a whole unit having come +over. This was a company composed entirely of Jugo-Slavs. The Company +Commander (Jugo-Slav and strongly Nationalist), on going his rounds +a couple of hours before the attack began, gathered from his men’s +conversation that they had no intention of fighting. He was able to +bring his whole company over. + +The delay of the offensive, mainly on account of Allied propaganda, +proved to be very important, because, when it came the Piave rose +behind the Austrian army and converted the attack into something like a +disaster. There is reason to believe that many ammunition dumps behind +the enemy lines were blown up by the Czechs. A rumour was spread in the +Press that the Southern Slavs had been fighting desperately against +Italy, but this was officially denied. The divisions in question were a +mixture of Germans, Magyars, Poles, and Ruthenes. It appeared that the +Southern Slav divisions had been divided up and mixed with “reliable” +troops, which showed that the Austrians were afraid of them. The +prisoners taken, as a rule, expressed willingness to volunteer at once. +Dalmatian prisoners showed great enthusiasm for Jugo-Slavia and the +Allies. + +After the Piave battle, members of the Inter-Allied Propaganda +Commission were received and thanked by the Italian Commander-in-Chief. +General Diaz said that the victory was due in considerable measure to +their efforts. + +In August the Inter-Allied Conference on Enemy Propaganda, convoked by +Lord Northcliffe, met at Crewe House. In regard to propaganda against +Austria-Hungary, the Committee formed to consider questions of policy +found itself in complete agreement with the scheme of policy sanctioned +by the British Government for purposes of Propaganda, and amplified +by the decisions of the British, French, and Italian Governments at +the time of, or in connection with, the Rome Congress of Oppressed +Austro-Hungarian Nationalities. It recognised that such extensions +of policy, while springing from considerations of Allied principles, +had, in part, corresponded to the real demands of the propaganda +situation, which, in their turn, had sprung from the exigencies of the +military situation and, in particular, from the necessity of utilising +the established principles of the alliance for the purpose of impeding +or hampering the Austro-Hungarian offensive against Italy. Subsequent +acts and declarations on the part of Allied Governments and of the +Government of the United States made it clear that the joint policy of +the Allies was tending increasingly towards the constructive liberation +of the subject Austro-Hungarian races. The main task of the Committee +in relation to propaganda in Austria-Hungary seemed, therefore, to +be one of unifying for propaganda purposes these various acts and +declarations, and of preparing, if possible, the way for a joint +Allied declaration that might complete and render more effective the +work of Allied propaganda both in the interior of Austria-Hungary and +among Austro-Hungarian troops at the front. The Committee resolved to +suggest that the Italian Government take the initiative in promoting +a joint and unanimous public declaration that all the Allies regard +the establishment of a free and united Jugo-Slav State, embracing +Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, as one of the conditions of a just and +lasting peace, and of the rule of right in Europe. Such a declaration +was actually made by the Italian Government, but so tardily that its +propaganda effect was reduced to a minimum. + +Reports from the British Commissioner at Padua chronicled the +uninterrupted continuance of the preparation and distribution of +leaflets. The work was so developed that a distributing capacity of +almost a million leaflets a day was obtained. Proof of the value of +the work was afforded by the arrival of deserters, belonging to the +subject races, in the Italian lines bringing with them the manifestoes +and saying, “I have come because you invited me.” A special leaflet was +prepared in London, with the co-operation of a member of the Southern +Slav Committee, for distribution by aeroplane at various points on the +Dalmatian coast, where Southern Slav insurgents were ascertained to +be gathered in considerable numbers. A detailed description, compiled +from official sources, of the overwhelming character of American +war preparations (which the enemy was constantly belittling) was +telegraphed to Padua for translation into Austro-Hungarian languages, +and for distribution in leaflet form among Austro-Hungarian troops. + +Progress was even made among the Magyars who had fought with remarkable +ferocity on the Montello. The agrarian question that had troubled +Hungary for some time was used for propaganda purposes and many Magyar +desertions ensued. The constant efforts exerted an ever-increasing +and cumulative influence on the enemy. The collapse of Bulgaria +opened a new front for operations against Austria-Hungary and a +Propaganda Commission under Lieutenant-Colonel Granville Baker was +quickly organised on the lines of the Padua Commission and dispatched +to Salonika. Operations were promptly started, but it soon became +evident that the end was near. As the Allied armies on the Western +fronts advanced, news of their progress and of Bulgaria’s defection +was continually and promptly sent over the Austrian lines. There is +no doubt that this contributed to the increased amount of desertion +and disorder among the Austrian forces, culminating in the _débâcle_ +produced by the final Allied attack in October, which brought down the +military and political organisations of the Dual Monarchy. + + Crewe House had every reason to be proud of the success of its +work against Austria-Hungary. The conception of the whole propaganda +campaign--its policy, its scope, its application--was due to Lord +Northcliffe and the co-directors of the Austrian Section of his +department, Mr. Wickham Steed and Dr. Seton-Watson. The results fully +vindicated every basic principle of their propaganda strategy. There +were difficulties to be overcome at every turn, of which political and +personal ambitions abroad were not the least. To keep the work on the +straight metals of uninterrupted progress necessitated unremitting +vigilance and ceaseless consultation with the numerous interests +concerned. The result was the greatest victory achieved by war +propaganda--the culmination of a constructive campaign, which, could +it have been extended to its logical conclusions, would have achieved +a just and lasting peace, liberating millions of our fellow-men from a +tyrannous yoke to the enjoyment of that political freedom which is the +inalienable right of civilised mankind. + +[Illustration: MR. H. WICKHAM STEED. + +MEMBER OF THE ENEMY PROPAGANDA COMMITTEE, AND ONE OF THE DIRECTORS OF +THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN SECTION. + +_Photo: Russell, London._] + +[Illustration: DR. R. W. SETON-WATSON. + +CO-DIRECTOR OF THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN SECTION OF CREWE HOUSE.] + +[Illustration: MR. H. G. WELLS. + +MEMBER OF THE ENEMY PROPAGANDA COMMITTEE, AND FIRST DIRECTOR OF GERMAN +SECTION. + +_“Daily Mirror” Photograph._] + + + + +CHAPTER IV + +OPERATIONS AGAINST GERMANY + +Early British neglect of propaganda--War Office establishes a +department--Lord Northcliffe takes office--Mr. H. G. Wells’s and Mr. +Hamilton Fyfe’s work--The final “intensive” campaign--Ways and means. + + +The successful launch of the “propaganda offensive” against +Austria-Hungary raised high hopes for the success of the corresponding +campaign against the Germans on the Western Front. These hopes were +shared by the Prime Minister, who wrote to Lord Northcliffe on May 16, +1918:--“It seems to me that you have organised admirable work in your +Austrian propaganda.... I trust that you will soon turn your attention +towards German propaganda along the French and British Fronts. I feel +sure that much can be done to disintegrate the _moral_ of the German +army along the same lines as we appear to have adopted with great +success in the Austro-Hungarian army.” + +For the first eighteen months of the war all propaganda had been +sadly neglected by the British Government. Few realised its value, and +officially it was regarded as an unimportant “side-line.” That it might +be a weapon of warfare, equal in effect to several army corps, would at +that time have been ridiculed. Money for such purposes was grudgingly +spent, while the whole-hearted endeavours of a few enthusiasts were +disparaged as the exuberances of harmless “cranks.” + +In October, 1914, Lieutenant-Colonel (now Major-General) Swinton, who +was then acting as “Eye-Witness” with the British Army, prepared a +propaganda leaflet, a reproduction of which appears in this book. To +enable him to produce it, Lord Northcliffe lent the aid of his Paris +organisation, and a large number of copies were printed and distributed +by aeroplane among the German troops. But the Army chiefs at that time +did not show any enthusiasm for the innovation, and Colonel Swinton was +unable to proceed with the project. + +Propaganda against the enemy was, during a long period, almost a +single-handed campaign by Mr. S. A. Guest. He struggled on, despite +official discouragement or lack of encouragement, undeterred by all +the vicissitudes through which British propaganda passed. Indeed, +the early direction of British propaganda was like an epidemic; it +occasionally took strange forms and occurred in unexpected places. Mr. +Guest’s work was the institution and maintenance of those agencies by +which propagandist literature was produced and smuggled into Germany +and Austria-Hungary. + +Within the War Office, there were some in favour of propagandist +activity, but for a long time they were in a minority. Early in 1916, +Major-General (now Lieutenant-General) Sir George Macdonogh, K.C.M.G., +C.B., returned from France to become Director of Military Intelligence, +and mainly owing to his efforts and those of Brigadier-General G. K. +Cockerill, C.B. (then Director of Special Intelligence), a propaganda +branch of the Military Intelligence Department of the War Office was +established. From small beginnings, the activities of this branch grew. + +It was in the spring of 1916 that a sub-section of this branch began +the preparation of leaflets in German for distribution among enemy +troops. One use of the leaflets was to disprove the false beliefs +spread among German soldiers that the British and French treated their +prisoners with great severity. To counteract this, reproductions of +letters actually written by German prisoners of war, photographs and +descriptions of prisoners and their camps, and similar material, were +prepared and distributed. As the political and social discontent in +Germany increased it was thought useful that the German soldiers should +be provided with more evidence of the internal conditions in their own +country than their officers would allow them to have, and leaflets +prepared from German sources, as, for instance, from suppressed +editions of German pamphlets and newspapers, were scattered on the +lines and rest billets. + +It then undertook the publication of an excellent weekly news-sheet, +entitled _Le Courrier de l’Air_, containing news in French for +circulation among the French and Belgian inhabitants of occupied +districts. This newspaper, save for one short break, was regularly +distributed by air until November, 1918, and naturally was greatly +valued by those who otherwise would only have received “news” from +German sources. + +During 1917 reports obtained by the examination of prisoners and +information derived from more secret sources showed that the propaganda +campaign was achieving useful results, and the Directorate of Military +Intelligence, in co-operation with the G.H.Q. in France, made +arrangements for the work to be extended, until by the spring of 1918 +about a million leaflets monthly were being issued. + +The task of distribution of propaganda literature by air would have +been simpler but for an extraordinary military decision. When this work +was started by the military authorities the leaflets were dropped from +aeroplanes. This method had the widest limits, and, at the same time, +was the best means of carrying a large bulk and of distributing with +accuracy. Perturbed by the success attained, the Germans threatened +to inflict severe penalties upon airmen captured when performing +such duties, and, on capturing two British airmen, followed their +threats by action. Instead of instituting immediate reprisals, the +British authorities tamely submitted and gave instructions for the +discontinuance of the use of aeroplanes for the purpose. + +In consequence of this weak action, experiments had to be undertaken +to find a substitute for the aeroplane. There were a number of +possible, although inferior, methods. Hand and rifle grenades were +devised to burst and shower leaflets over a limited area among enemy +troops. Trench mortars would serve a similar purpose. But thanks +to the progress of military meteorological science during the war +and to several months’ patient experimenting with various devices, +it was found possible to utilise specially adapted balloons. The +Air Inventions Committee, the Munitions Inventions Department, the +Inspectorate of H.M. Stores, Woolwich, Army Intelligence officers +experienced in the use of silk balloons for other military purposes, +and the manufacturers, all assisted the War Office in arriving at +a result which proved to be effective and as nearly as possible +“fool-proof.” Designs and apparatus were tested in the workshop and +laboratory, at experimental stations near London, and on Salisbury +Plain. They were taken out to France and tried under the actual +conditions of war, and gradually each difficulty was overcome and each +detail reduced to its simplest form. + +In its standard form in which it was being manufactured at the rate of +nearly 2,000 a week the propaganda balloon was made of paper, cut in 10 +longitudinal panels, with a neck of oiled silk about 12 inches long. +The circumference was about 20 feet and the height, when inflated, over +eight feet. The absolute capacity was approximately 100 cubic feet, +but the balloons were liberated when not quite taut, containing 90 +to 95 cubic feet of hydrogen. Hydrogen readily passes through paper, +and the part of the experimental work that caused most trouble was +the discovery of a suitable varnish, or “dope,” to make the paper +gas-tight. After many disappointments, a formula was arrived at, the +application of which prevented appreciable evaporation of the gas for +two or three hours, and which left a balloon with some lifting capacity +after thirty-six hours. + +The lifting power of a balloon is the difference between the weight +of the hydrogen and the weight of the same bulk of air, _less_ the +weight of the balloon itself. The weight of the paper balloon was +just over one pound; the available lifting power varied with the +degree of tautness to which the balloon was filled, the height of the +barometer and the temperature, but on the average, at ground level, +the balloon as inflated would just support five and a half pounds. +After a good deal of experiment the load of propaganda and releasing +apparatus was fixed at four pounds and a few ounces, this allowing +from 500 to 1,000 leaflets, according to their size, to be carried by +each balloon, the balance of lifting power being sufficient to take +the balloon sharply into the air to a height of five or six thousand +feet. As a balloon rises the pressure of the air decreases and the +contained hydrogen expands. In the earlier experiments the neck of the +balloon was tied after inflation, and, to allow for expansion, the +balloon was filled only to a little over two-thirds of its capacity. +This was unsatisfactory; it reduced the load of propaganda and led to +many failures from bursting and to great uncertainty as to where the +load would fall. It was found more satisfactory to inflate the balloon +nearly to its full capacity and to liberate it with the neck open, or +with a large slit cut at the base of the neck, to allow the gas to +escape as it expanded. At a height of, on the average, from 4,000 to +6,000 feet the escape of gas had reduced the free lift to a negative +quantity, and the balloon would begin to drop slowly, but for the +liberation of ballast. + +After several ingenious mechanical devices had been tested, a +method of releasing leaflets by the burning of a fuse was adopted. +A suitable length of prepared cotton wick, similar to that used in +flint pipe-lighters, and burning evenly at the rate of five minutes +to the inch, was securely threaded to a wire by which it was attached +to the neck of the balloon. Several inches of the upper end were +left free, and the load of leaflets was strung in small packets by +cotton threads along the length of the fuse. As soon as a balloon was +inflated and the loaded release attached, the free end of the fuse was +cut to the required length, so as to burn for five, ten, or so many +minutes, before the first packet was reached, the cut end was lighted, +usually from the pipe or cigarette the soldier was smoking, and the +balloon sent off on its journey. The release of each packet acted as +a discharge of ballast, and the balloon, although continually losing +gas, kept in the air until the end of its course. The arrangement used +most frequently was designed for liberating the balloons a few miles +behind the front lines and for distributing the leaflets from the enemy +lines to a few miles behind them. The total length of fuse was twelve +inches, giving an hour’s run. The first six inches were left free to +be cut before lighting according to the position of the station and +the strength of the wind; the load of propaganda was arranged over +the second half-hour at intervals of two and a half minutes. Much +longer fuses, with the load distributed at greater intervals, were +used for longer runs. Experiment showed that the lateral scattering +of the leaflets, dropped from a height of 4,000 feet and upwards, was +considerable. The length of the track varied with the strength of the +wind. + +The unit for distribution consisted of two motor lorries, which took +the men, the cylinders of hydrogen, and the propaganda loaded on +releases to a sheltered position selected in the morning by the officer +in charge after consultation with the meteorological experts. The vans +were drawn up end to end, separated by a distance of about ten feet, +and a curtain of canvas was then stretched on the windward side between +the vans, thus forming a three-sided chamber. The balloon was laid on +the ground, rapidly filled, the release attached and lighted, and the +balloon liberated, the whole operation taking only a few minutes. + +The load of the balloons was chosen according to the direction of +the wind. If it was blowing towards Belgium, copies of _Le Courrier +de l’Air_ were attached; if towards Germany, propaganda leaflets for +enemy troops. The experimental improvement of the “dope” with which +the paper was treated in order to prevent loss of gas by diffusion, +and the manufacture of balloons of double the standard capacity, had +placed runs of upwards of 150 miles well within the capacity of the +method before the Armistice suspended operations, but the bulk of the +propaganda was distributed over an area of from 10 to 50 miles behind +the enemy lines. Fortunately, during the late summer and autumn of 1918 +the wind was blowing almost consistently favourable for their dispatch. + +When Lord Northcliffe took office in February, 1918, Austria-Hungary +was the most urgent field for his operations, as has been explained. +While Crewe House was concentrating upon that work he desired the +War Office to continue on his behalf the admirable and assiduous +work carried on since 1916. Early in May, 1918, Mr. H. G. Wells +accepted Lord Northcliffe’s invitation to direct the preparation of +propaganda literature against Germany, with the co-operation of Dr. +J. W. Headlam-Morley. The first need was felt to be the definition +of a policy to be followed against Germany, in order to prevent +dissipation of energy and diversity of treatment. It was obvious that +this propaganda policy must be in accord with the general policy of the +Allies. In some points it followed the declared aims of the Allies; in +others, it preceded the general policy as a pathmaker and pacemaker. +Mr. Wells undertook to prepare a memorandum on the position of Germany +at that time from the point of view of propaganda. This was submitted +by Mr. Wells to the Enemy Propaganda Committee and fully discussed. A +preface was prepared and upon the two statements was based a letter +to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, as in the case of the +propaganda policy against Austria-Hungary, asking for the assent of the +British Government to the policy therein contained. + +Mr. Wells’s memorandum was of the highest interest as a contemporary +study of Germany, by a master of psychology, at that juncture when +Germany was making her great (and, fortunately, her final) bid for +world-mastery. The document possesses no little historical value; much +that was prophetic has been forged into history by the rapid march of +events; and the non-fulfilment of much of what has not attained to its +consummation is due to lack of political wisdom in the chancelleries. +Following is the text of preface and memorandum:-- + + _Preface._ + + “Propaganda in Germany, as in other enemy countries, must obviously + be based upon a clear Allied policy. Hitherto Allied policy and + Allied war aims have been defined too loosely to be comprehensible to + the Germans. + + “The real war aim of the Allies is not only to beat the enemy, but to + establish a world peace that shall preclude the resumption of war. + Successful propaganda in Germany presupposes the clear definition + of the kind of world-settlement which the Allies are determined to + secure and the place of Germany in it. + + “The points to be brought home to the Germans are:-- + + “1. _The determination of the Allies to continue the war until + Germany accepts the Allied peace settlement._ + + “2. _The existing alliance as a Fighting League of Free Nations + will be deepened and extended, and the military, naval, financial + and economic resources of its members will be pooled until_-- + + “(_a_) _Its military purpose is achieved, and_ + + “(_b_) _Peace is established on lasting foundations._ + + “German minds are particularly susceptible to systematic statements. + They are accustomed to discuss and understand co-ordinate + projects. The ideas represented by the phrase ‘Berlin-Baghdad’ and + ‘Mittel-Europa’ have been fully explained to them and now form the + bases of German political thought. Other projects, represented by + ‘Berlin-Teheran’ and ‘Berlin-Tokyo’ are becoming familiar to them. + Against these ideas the Allies have not yet set up any comprehensive + and comprehensible scheme of world organisation. There is no Allied + counterpart of Naumann’s ‘Mittel-Europa’ which the neutral and + the German Press could discuss as a practical proposition. This + counterpart should be created without delay by competent Allied + writers. It would form an effective basis for propaganda, and would + work automatically. + + “It follows that one of the first requisites is to study and to lay + down the lines of a practical League of Free Nations. The present + alliance must be taken as the nucleus of any such League. Its control + of raw materials, of shipping, and its power to exclude for an + indefinite period enemy or even neutral peoples until they subscribe + to and give pledges of their acceptance of its principles should be + emphasised. It should be pointed out that nothing stands between + enemy peoples and a lasting peace except the predatory designs of + their ruling dynasties and military and economic castes; that the + design of the Allies is not to crush any people, but to assure the + freedom of all on a basis of self-determination to be exercised under + definite guarantees of justice and fair play; that, unless enemy + peoples accept the Allied conception of a world peace settlement, it + will be impossible for them to repair the havoc of the present war, + to avert utter financial ruin, and to save themselves from prolonged + misery; and that the longer the struggle lasts the deeper will + become the hatred of everything German in the non-German world, and + the heavier the social and economic handicap under which the enemy + peoples will labour, even after their admission into a League of + Nations. + + “The primary war aim of the Allies thus becomes the changing + of Germany, not only in the interest of the Allied League, but in + that of the German people itself. Without the honest co-operation + of Germany, disarmament on a large scale would be impossible, and, + without disarmament, social and economic reconstruction would be + impracticable. Germany has, therefore, to choose between her own + permanent ruin by adhering to her present system of government and + policy and the prospect of economic and political redemption by + overthrowing her militarist system so as to be able to join honestly + in the Allied scheme of world organisation.” + + + _Memorandum._ + + “It has become manifest that for the purposes of an efficient + pro-Ally propaganda in neutral and enemy countries a clear and full + statement of the war aims of the Allies is vitally necessary. What + is wanted is something in the nature of an authoritative text to + which propagandists may refer with confidence and which can be made + the standard of their activities. It is not sufficient to recount + the sins of Germany and to assert that the defeat of Germany is the + Allied war aim. What all the world desires to know is what is to + happen _after_ the war. The real war aim of a belligerent, it is more + and more understood, is not merely victory, but a peace of a certain + character which that belligerent desires shall arise out of that + victory. What, therefore, is the peace sought by the Allies? + + “It would be superfluous even to summarise here the primary case + of the Allies, that the war is on their part a war to resist the + military aggression of Germany, assisted by the landowning Magyars + of Hungary, the Turks, and the King of Bulgaria, upon the rest of + mankind. It is a war against belligerence, against aggressive war, + and the preparation for aggressive war. Such it was in its beginning, + and such it remains. But it would be idle to pretend that the ideas + of the Governments and peoples allied against Germany have not + developed very greatly during the years of the war. There has been a + deepening realisation of the danger to mankind of existing political + divisions and separations, a great experience in the suffering, + destruction, and waste of war; a quickening of consciences against + conquests, annexations, and subjugations; and a general clearing up + of ideas that have hitherto stood in the way of an organised world + peace. While German Imperialism, to judge by the utterances of its + accredited heads, and by the behaviour of Germany in the temporarily + disorganised States on her Eastern Front, is still as truculent, + aggressive, and treacherous as ever, the mind of her antagonists has + learnt and has matured. There has arisen in the great world outside + the inner lives of the Central Powers a will that grows to gigantic + proportions, that altogether overshadows the boasted _will to power_ + of the German junker and exploiter, _the will to a world peace_. It + is like the will of an experienced man set against the will of an + obstinate and selfish youth. The war aims of the anti-German Allies + take more and more definitely the form of a world of States leagued + together to maintain a common law, to submit their mutual differences + to a conclusive tribunal, to protect weak communities, to restrain + and suppress war threats and war preparations throughout the earth. + + “Steadfastly the great peoples of the world outside the shadow of + German Imperial domination have been working their way to unanimity, + while the ruling intelligences of Germany have been scheming for + the base advantages of conquest; while they have been undermining, + confusing, and demoralising the mentality of Russia, crushing + down the subject peoples of the Austro-Hungarian Imperialism, and + threatening and cajoling neutrals there has been a wide, free + movement in the minds of their antagonists towards the restraint and + wisdom of a greater and nobler phase in human affairs. The thought + of the world crystallises now about a phrase, the phrase ‘The League + of Free Nations.’ The war aims of the Allies become more and more + explicitly associated with the spirit and implications of that. + + “Like all such phrases, ‘The League of Free Nations’ is subject + to a great variety of detailed interpretation, but its broad + intentions can now be stated without much risk of dissent. The ideal + would, of course, include all the nations of the earth, including + a Germany purged of her military aggressiveness; it involves some + sort of INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS that can revise, codify, amend and + extend international law, a supreme Court of Law in which States + may sue and be sued, and whose decision the League will be pledged + to enforce, and the supervision, limitation, and use of armaments + under the direction of the international congress. It is also + felt very widely that such a congress must set a restraint upon + competitive and unsanctioned ‘expansionist’ movements into unsettled + and disordered regions, must act as the guardian of feeble races and + communities, and must be empowered to make conclusive decisions upon + questions of transport, tariffs, access to raw material, migration, + and international intercourse generally. The constitution of this + congress remains indefinite; it is the crucial matter upon which the + best thought of the world is working at the present time. But given + the prospect of a suitable congress there can be little dispute that + the great Imperial Powers among the Allies are now prepared for + great and generous limitations of their sovereignty in the matter of + armaments, of tropical possessions and of subject peoples, in the + common interest of mankind. The spectacle of German Imperialism, + boastful, selfish, narrow, and altogether hateful, in its terrible + blood-dance through Europe, has been an object-lesson to humanity + against excesses of national vanity and national egotism and against + Imperial pride. Among the Allies, the two chief Imperial Powers, + measured by the extent of territory they control, are Britain and + France, and each of these is more completely prepared to-day than + ever it has been before to consider its imperial possessions as a + trust for their inhabitants and for mankind, and its position in + the more fertile and less settled regions of the world as that of a + mandatory and trustee. These admissions involve a plain prospect and + promise of the ultimate release and liberation of all the peoples in + these great and variegated Empires to complete world-citizenship. + + “But in using the phrase ‘The League of Nations,’ it may be well + to dispel certain misconceptions that have arisen through the + experimental preparation by more or less irresponsible persons and + societies of elaborate schemes and constitutions of such a league. + Proposals have been printed and published, for example, of a Court of + World Conciliation, in which each sovereign State will be represented + by one member--Montenegro, for example, by one, and the British + Empire by one--and other proposals have been mooted of a Congress + of the League of Nations, in which such States as Hayti, Abyssinia, + and the like will be represented by one or two representatives, and + France and Great Britain by five or six. All such projects should + be put out of mind when the phrase ‘League of Free Nations’ is used + by responsible speakers for the Allied Powers. Certain most obvious + considerations have evidently been overlooked by the framers of such + proposals. It will, for example, be a manifest disadvantage to the + smaller Powers to be at all over-represented upon the Congress of any + such League; it may even be desirable that certain of them should not + have a _voting_ representative at all, for this reason, that a great + Power still cherishing an aggressive spirit would certainly attempt, + as the beginning of its aggression, to compel adjacent small Powers + to send representatives practically chosen by itself. The coarse + fact of the case in regard to an immediate world peace is this, that + only five or six great Powers possess sufficient economic resources + to make war under modern conditions at the present time, namely, the + United States of America, Great Britain, France, Germany, Japan, and, + doubtfully, Austria-Hungary. Italy suffers under the disadvantage + that she has no coal supply. These five or six Powers we may say, + therefore, permit war and can prevent it. They are at present + necessarily the custodians of the peace of the world, and it is mere + pedantry not to admit that this gives them a practical claim to + preponderance in the opening Congress of the World League. It may be + pointed out that a small State with a voice in the discussions, but + no vote in the decisions of the League, would logically be excused + from the liability to assist in enforcing those decisions. + + “But this question of the constitution of a world Congress is + not to be solved by making a coarse classification of States into + large and war-capable Powers, and small and weak Powers. Take + the case of Italy, for example: though she is almost incapable + of sustaining a war against the world by herself because of her + weakness in the matter of coal, she can as an ally be at once of + enormous importance. Take the case of Spain again, a very similar + case. And whatever the war ability of Latin-America may be to-day, + there can be no question that this great constellation of States + must count very heavily in the framing of the world of to-morrow. + Then, again, we have to consider the vast future possibilities of + the Chinese Republic, with coal, steel, and a magnificent industrial + population, and the probable reconstruction of Eastern Europe and + a renascence of Russia which may give the world a loose-knit but + collectively-important Slavonic confederation. While an isolated + small Power within the orbit of attraction of a large Power, a State + of 5,000,000 people or less, must always remain a difficult problem + in the world representation, it is clear that something like an + adequate representation of small and weak Powers becomes possible + so soon as they develop a disposition towards aggregation, for the + purposes of world politics, into associations with States racially, + linguistically, and historically akin to them. The trend of Allied + opinion is to place not Peru or Ukrainia, nor Norway, nor Finland on + a level with the United States of America or the British Empire at + the League of Nations Congress, but to prepare the way for adequate + representation through a preliminary Latin-American or a Slavonic or + a Scandinavian Confederation, which could speak with a common idea at + the World Congress. + + “It should be manifest that there is one Power whose splendid + achievement in this war, and whose particular needs, justify her + over-representation (as measured by material wealth, and millions + of population) upon the Congress of the League, and that is + France. It is open to question whether Italy should not also be + disproportionately over-represented, seeing that she will not have, + as Spain will have, the moral reinforcement of kindred nations over + seas. And with regard to the British Empire, seeing that there exists + no real Imperial legislature, it is open to consideration whether + Canada, South Africa, and Australasia should come into the Council + as separate nationalities. The Asiatic and African possessions of + Britain and France, Belgium and Italy, possessions, that is, which + have no self-government, might possibly for a time be represented + by members appointed by the governing power in each case. These are + merely suggestions here, indications of a disposition of mind, but + they are suggestions upon which it is necessary for the Allied Powers + to decide as speedily as possible. The effective working out of this + problem of the League of Nations Congress by the Allies without + undue delay is as vital a part of the Allied policy as the effective + conduct of the war. + + “It has to be recognised that the institution of a League of Nations + precludes any annexations or any military interference with any + peoples whatever, without a mandate from the Congress of the League. + The League must directly or indirectly become the guardian of all + unsettled regions and order must be kept and development promoted + by it in such derelict regions as Mesopotamia and Armenia, for + example, have now become. In these latter instances it is open to + consideration whether the League should operate through some single + power acting as a mandatory of the League, or else by international + forces under the control of the League as a whole. Theoretically the + latter course is to be preferred, but there are enormous practical + advantages in many cases to be urged for the former. The Allies + have indeed had a considerable experience during the war of joint + controls and joint expeditions; there has been a great education + in internationalism since August, 1914; but nevertheless the end + of the war is likely to come long before any real international + forces have been evolved. It is, however, towards the ultimate use + of international forces in such cases that the joint policy of the + Allies is plainly and openly directed. + + “The bringing of the League into practical politics profoundly + affects the question of territorial adjustment after the war. The + Allies are bound in honour to follow the will of France in the matter + of Alsace-Lorraine, and the rectification of the Italian frontier + and the bringing of the bulk of the Italian-speaking population, + now under Austrian dominion, into one ring-fence with Italy, also + seem a necessary part of a world pacification. It is, however, of + far less importance in the war aims of the Allies that this and that + particular scrap of territory should change hands from the control of + one group of combatants to that of the other, than that the present + practical ascendency of German Imperialism over the resources of the + Polish, Russian, Ukrainian, Czech, Jugo-Slav, Finnish, and Roumanian + peoples should cease. The war aim of the Allies in Eastern Europe + is to create in the place of the present Austro-Hungarian Empire a + larger synthesis of associated States, something in the nature of + an ‘East Central European League,’ within the League of Nations, a + confederation that might possibly reach from Poland to the Black + and Adriatic Seas, and have also access to, if not a port upon, the + Baltic at Danzig. The Allies are necessarily obliged to wait upon + the development of affairs in Russia, but the hopes and efforts of + the Allies are towards a reconciliation of at least Great Russia, + Siberia, and Ukrainia into a workable association within the League. + It is premature to speculate upon the grouping of Finland at the + present time. Relieved of the feverish and impossible ambitions the + political weaknesses of these peoples have stimulated, a free and + united Germany could then become one of the predominant partners + in the World League of Free Nations. The Allies do not propose an + unconditional return of the former African possessions of Germany, + but they contemplate an over-ruling international _régime_ in + Africa between the Sahara and the Zambesi, restraining armament, + reorganising native education, and giving absolute equality of trade + to all the nations in the League. Such an international _régime_ + under the League may not be incompatible with the retention of + national flags in the former ‘possessions’ of the leagued Powers. + + “Exact territorial definition does not appear to the Allies to be + of nearly such importance as the establishment of a common system of + disarmament and a common effort to restore the ravages of the war. + The full effect of the war is still not realised by the mass of the + belligerent peoples, more especially in America and Western Europe, + where life is still fairly comfortable. There has already been a + destruction not merely of the political, but of the social order over + great areas of the world, especially in Eastern Europe, and it is + doubtful whether any peace can restore these disorganised areas to + anything like their former productivity for many years. A universal + shortage not merely of man-power, but of transport and machinery + available for the purposes of peace cannot be avoided. It is + doubtful, moreover, if social discipline in the ports of the British + Empire and America will be strong enough to restrain an organised + resistance to the use of German shipping after the war for any + purpose and to the use of Allied shipping for the transport of goods + to and from Germany on the part of Allied and neutral seamen and + transport workers indignant at the U-boat campaign; moreover, there + is a world-wide cry for a vindictive trade after the war against + Germany, and for organised boycotts that may further restrict the + process of economic world recovery. It is doubtful if the menace of + these ‘revenge’ movements and the difficulty of controlling them in + democratic States is properly appreciated in Germany. The militarist + Government of Germany, fighting now for bare existence, is concealing + from its people this world-wide disposition to boycott German trade + and industry at any cost to the boycotting populations, and buoying + them up with preposterous hopes of ‘business as usual’ as soon as + peace is made. The fact has to be faced that while the present + German Government remains no such economic resumption is possible. + The ‘War after the War’ possibility has to be added to the economic + destruction in Russia, Belgium, and elsewhere in any estimate of the + situation after the war. + + “The plain prospect of material disorganisation thus opened + should alone suffice to establish the absolute necessity for peace + now of such a nature as will permit a world-wide concentration upon + reconstruction, in good faith and without any complications of enmity + and hostility. But in addition to the material destruction and + dislocation, and to the ‘hatred’ disorganisation already noted, the + financial transactions of the last few years have created a monetary + inflation which, _without the concerted action of all the Powers_, + may mean a collapse of world credit. Add now the plain necessity + for continued armament if a real League of Nations is not attained. + Without any exaggeration the prospect of the nations facing these + economic difficulties in an atmosphere of continuing hostility, + intrigue, and conflict, under a continuing weight of armaments, and + with a continuing distrust, is a hopeless one. The consequences stare + us in the face; Russia is only the first instance of what must happen + generally. The alternative to a real League of Nations is the steady + descent of our civilisation towards a condition of political and + social fragmentation such as the world has not seen since the fall of + the Roman Empire. The honest co-operation of Germany in the League of + Nations, in disarmament, and in world reconstruction is, therefore, + fundamentally necessary. There is now no other rational policy. And + since it is impossible to hope for any such help or co-operation + from the Germany of the Belgian outrage, the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, + the betrayal of Ukrainia, THE CHANGING OF GERMANY becomes a primary + war aim, _the_ primary war aim for the Allies. How Germany is to be + changed is a complex question. The word _Revolution_ is, perhaps, to + be deprecated. We do not, for instance, desire a Bolshevik breakdown + in Germany, which would make her economically useless to mankind. We + look, therefore, not so much to the German peasant and labourer as to + the ordinary, fairly well-educated mediocre German for co-operation + in the reinstatement of civilisation. Change there _must_ be in + Germany; in the spirit in which the Government is conducted, in the + persons who exercise the control, and in the relative influence + of different classes in the country. The sharpest distinction, + therefore, has to be drawn between Germany and its present Government + in all our propaganda and public utterances; and a constant appeal + has to be made by the statesmen of the Alliance, and by a frank and + open propaganda through the Germans of the United States of America + and of Switzerland, through neutral countries and by every possible + means, from Germany Junker to Germany sober. We may be inclined + to believe that every German is something of a Junker, we have to + remember he is also potentially a reasonable man. + + “And meanwhile, the Allies must continue with haste and diligence to + fight and defeat Junker Germany, which cannot possibly conquer but + which may nevertheless succeed in ruining the world. They must fight + the German armies upon the fronts, they must fight an unregenerate + Germany economically and politically, and they must bring home to the + German reason and conscience at home, by an intensive air war and + by propaganda alike, the real impossibility of these conceptions of + national pride and aggressiveness in which the German population has + been bred.” + +These documents were used as a basis for the policy of Crewe House, +which was summarised into seven parts in Lord Northcliffe’s subsequent +letter to Mr. Balfour, extracts from which follow:-- + + “I wish to submit to you the following general scheme of policy as + a basis for British--and eventually Allied--propaganda in Germany. + Propaganda, as an active form of policy, must be in harmony with the + settled war aims of the Allies:-- + + “1. The object of all propaganda is to weaken the will of the enemy + to war and victory. For this purpose it is necessary to put in the + forefront the ultimate object of the Allies, and the use which they + would make of victory, for this is the matter with which the Germans + are most concerned. We cannot, of course, expect that the war aims of + the Allies should be determined solely by the effect which they may + have upon the German people, but, on the other hand, it is clearly + undesirable to put forward for propaganda purposes objects which it + is not really intended to secure. It appears to me, however, that + our war aims, as I understand them, are such as could, if presented + in a suitable form, be made to do something to strengthen whatever + ‘opposition’ exists in Germany. + + “2. From such information as is available as to the internal + condition of Germany two points emerge which are of the greatest + importance for immediate purposes:-- + + “(_a_) There is much evidence that the German people as a whole + desire above all a cessation of the war. They are suffering more + than their opponents, and war weariness has advanced further with + them than it has with us. They acquiesce in the continuance of the + present offensive chiefly because they are assured by their leaders + that this is the only way in which a speedy peace can be achieved. + It is, therefore, necessary to impress upon them that they are face + to face with a determined and immutable will on the part of Allied + nations to continue the war at whatever cost, notwithstanding + German military successes, and that for this reason military + success is not the way to bring about the peace they desire. It + must be made plain that we are prepared to continue a ruthless + policy of commercial blockade. + + “(_b_) Side by side with this we have another motive of the + highest importance. One of the chief instruments of the German + Government is the belief which they foster that any peace that the + Allies would, if they had their way, impose would mean the internal + ruin of Germany, and this again would mean that each individual + German family would find itself without work, without money, and + without food. As against this it is necessary to impress on the + German nation that these results might happen, but that they can be + avoided. They will happen if the Government of Germany continues + to carry out its openly avowed design of subjecting the other free + nations of Europe to its domination. They can be avoided if the + German nation will resign these projects of domination and consent + to accept the Allied scheme for a new organisation of the world. + + “These two points (_a_) and (_b_) must be kept in close connection; + the first provides the element of fear, the second provides the + element of hope. + + “3. The first point presents no difficulty to us; we can go ahead + in full confidence that we are in harmony with both the nation and + the Government. As to the second, on the other hand, I must ask for + your guidance and support. Hitherto Allied policy and war aims have + been defined too loosely to be comprehensible to the Germans, and + there have been apparent inconsistencies, of which they have quickly + taken advantage. Moreover, it has been possible for German writers + to misrepresent our war aims as dictated by Imperialistic ambitions, + similar in kind to those by which they are themselves actuated, and + involving ‘annexations and indemnities,’ such as have in the past + been too often the result of victory in war. I take it that the + real object of the Allies is, after defeating Germany, to establish + such a world peace as shall, within the limits of human foresight, + preclude another conflagration. It seems necessary, therefore, that + the separate aims which would, of course, be maintained, such as + the restoration of Belgium, the liberation of Alsace-Lorraine, the + establishment of civilised government in Mesopotamia and Palestine, + should be put forward in their proper places as individual but + essential points in the general scheme for the settlement of world + politics on a basis which would go far to remove the causes of future + wars. + + “4. Any such scheme would, in effect, amount to the constitution of + a ‘League of Free Nations.’ It is, I presume, generally understood + that eventually Germany would be invited to take her place in such + a League on condition that she accepted the principles of its + foundation. Her admission to the League would be in itself her + guarantee against the establishment of, _e.g._, a hostile monopoly of + raw materials. Our terms of peace, therefore, can be represented as + the conditions on which Germany should be invited to take her part + in such a League. In order to secure the economic benefits she would + have to accept the political conditions. If this is so, the task of + propaganda is greatly lightened, for it would be easier to put our + aims in such a form as to make them to some extent acceptable to the + moderate elements in Germany than if they were put forward merely as + terms to be imposed on a defeated enemy. + + “5. It is, however, obvious that propaganda conducted on these + lines will be of little use unless it is supported by public and + authoritative statements from the Allied Governments. Otherwise, + it would be represented that the real object is to beguile Germany + into accepting a peace of renunciation, and that, as soon as this + object has been achieved, these schemes will be repudiated, and a + weakened Germany will find herself face to face with an Anglo-Saxon + combination which aims at dominating the world, and keeping Germany + permanently in a position of political inferiority. + + “6. No such statement has yet been made, so far as I am aware, by + the British Government or by the Allies. What, therefore, I should + venture to ask is for such support from you as will enable us to + carry on our work with the full consciousness that we have behind us + the support of His Majesty’s Government. If it were known that the + Government itself, in conjunction with the Allies, was investigating + the problem with a view to speedy action, this knowledge would give a + great and needed incentive to the more popular work which we should + be doing. + + “7. I am well aware of the very great practical difficulties which + are bound to arise so soon as an attempt is made to give formal + expression to the general idea of a ‘League of Free Nations.’ But for + the purposes of our work, it is of the most urgent importance that + some statement of this kind should be put forward at the earliest + possible date. Such a statement would in effect be an offer to the + Germans of peace on stated conditions. If it were accepted, Germany + would be able shortly after the conclusion of the war to come into + the new society of nations; if it were refused, the war would have + to continue. But it should also be made clear to the German people + that the privilege of admission to this society would inevitably be + postponed for a period proportional to the length of time that they + continued the war.” + +In answer to an inquiry, Lord Northcliffe wrote a supplementary letter, +dealing with propaganda policy as to the German colonies. The following +is an extract:-- + + “I have no settled views as to the future of what were the German + colonies, beyond a very strong conviction that they must never again + be allowed to fall, for any military or naval purpose, under German + control. But, broadly, my feeling is this: The whole situation of + the Allies in regard to Germany is governed by the fact that Germany + is responsible for the war. The Allies are, therefore, entitled + to demand from her restitution, reparation, and guarantees as + preliminary conditions of any peace settlement. The territories which + the Allies have taken from Germany in the course of their legitimate + self-defence do not come into the same category as the territories + seized by Germany, and the allies of Germany, in the course of their + predatory aggression. To contemplate barter or exchange between + one set of territories and the other would be to assimilate, by + implication, the moral situation of the Allies to that of Germany. + Therefore, however closely we may study the question, or rather the + questions--for there are several--of the German colonies, we ought to + make it clear that the ultimate settlement of those questions will + be reserved for treatment by the Allies as a fighting league of free + nations, or by the general League of Nations should the behaviour of + Germany entitle her to admission to it in time to take part in any + scheme of world reorganisation.” + +The policy laid down in these letters was approved by the Government as +a basis for propaganda, and Mr. Wells was able to develop his work in +many directions. + +He kept in close touch with the different organisations at home and +abroad which were endeavouring to promote the League of Nations. In +conjunction with Mr. Steed, Mr. Wells assisted in the drawing up of +a restatement of the aims of the League of Nations Society in Great +Britain and in the formation of a new association for the study of the +problems arising out of the League proposal. This movement was always +kept prominently before the German mind, for it was a threat of future +isolation, with its resultant economic disabilities, and yet was an +invitation to national repentance. + +A second line of action was designed to appeal to the German workers. +For this purpose Mr. Wells arranged, among other things, for the +preparation and issue of a short and compact summary of the British +Labour War Aims, which was subsequently used with much effectiveness +not only in Germany but also in Austria. + +Economic conditions, both during and after the war, were made by Mr. +Wells and his co-workers the subject of systematic and scientific study +with the object of undertaking a propaganda of economic discouragement +and persuasion in Germany. Signs were not lacking of the existence +of misgivings among the commercial communities in that country at +the prospect of loss of commerce, ships, and colonies in the case +of defeat. Here was an opportunity to bring home to the Germans the +conviction that the longer they persisted in continuing the war, so +would their loss and sufferings increase. + +Unfortunately, in July, Mr. Wells found himself unable to continue +the direction of the German Section and, at his request, the Enemy +Propaganda Committee accepted his resignation of that office, although +he retained his membership of the Committee. Mr. Hamilton Fyfe was +appointed to succeed him and continued in the important post until the +end. Mr. Fyfe developed the work along the lines already laid down. + +From the time of Mr. Wells’s appointment, Crewe House and the enemy +propaganda section of the Military Intelligence Department maintained +close touch with each other, but in July, 1918, Lord Northcliffe wrote +to the Secretary of State for War expressing his considered view +that it would be advisable that British propaganda agencies against +the enemy should, both for technical reasons and in order to preclude +possible differences of statement in propaganda literature, as far as +possible be closely co-ordinated. While gladly recognising the most +friendly relations which had been cultivated between his department and +the enemy propaganda branch of the War Office, through Major the Earl +of Kerry, Lord Northcliffe thought that the time had come for the whole +of the work of production to be centralised at Crewe House. This did +not alter the arrangements for distribution through military channels +which were always admirably organised and carried out by the military +authorities. And, as a matter of fact, a large proportion of the +literature, apart from the “priority” leaflets referred to hereinafter, +was produced by the War Office on Lord Northcliffe’s behalf. Lord +Northcliffe asked for urgent consideration of the matter, in view of +the necessity for the intensification and extension of propaganda on +the Western Front. On Lord Milner’s agreeing to this reorganisation, it +was arranged that the services of Captain P. Chalmers Mitchell, who, +well-known in civil life as a distinguished man of science, had been +the officer immediately in charge of this enemy propaganda branch, +should be transferred to Crewe House. He was a valuable acquisition, +and his experience, knowledge, and counsel were of great practical +service. Captain Chalmers Mitchell also acted as liaison officer +with the War Office (in succession to Lord Kerry) and with the Royal +Air Force, and, in conjunction with Mr. Hamilton Fyfe, co-ordinated +production and distribution. + +This centralisation soon bore fruit. One of the earliest developments +aimed at abolishing the delays which might have caused the contents +of leaflets to become stale owing to the time which elapsed between +their composition and their distribution. This defect was obviated by +dividing the leaflets into two classes, namely, “priority” leaflets for +those of a news character and “stock” leaflets with matter of a less +urgent nature. + +A time-table was prepared for the “priority” leaflets in which the +time allotted for the different processes of composition, translation, +printing, transport to France, and distribution, was cut down to an +absolute minimum. With the willing aid of Messrs. Harrison and Son, the +printers, and of Messrs. Gamage, who undertook the work of attaching +the leaflets to the “releases,” it was found possible to arrange +for these news bulletins to be in the hands of the Germans within +approximately forty-eight hours of their being written. Three times a +week a consignment of not fewer than 100,000 leaflets of this character +was rushed over to France for prompt dispatch to the Germans. This +“speeding-up” became a factor of the highest importance when military +events moved so rapidly in the closing months of the war. + +In June and July the number of leaflets dropped over the German lines +and behind them totalled 1,689,457 and 2,172,794 respectively. During +August an average of over 100,000 a day was attained, the actual number +of leaflets issued by the Enemy Propaganda Department in that month +being 3,958,116, in September 3,715,000, and in October 5,360,000, +while in the first ten days of November, before the Armistice put an +end to such activities, 1,400,000 were sent out. The Germans were +greatly disturbed. One of their writers described the flood of leaflets +picturesquely as “English poison raining down from God’s clear sky.” +Marshal von Hindenburg, in his autobiography, “Out of My Life” (Cassell +& Co.), admits that this propaganda intensified the process of German +demoralisation. “This was a new weapon,” he continues, “or rather a +weapon which had never been employed on such a scale and so ruthlessly +in the past.” + +The leaflets were written in simple language, and aimed at letting +the Germans know the truth which was being concealed from them by +their leaders. They gave information as to the progress of the war in +all theatres, and showed at a glance, by means of shaded maps, the +territory gained by the Associated Nations. Great stress was laid upon +the large number of troops arriving daily from the United States. +While, by the use of diagrams, the steadily progressive increase of +the American forces was strikingly illustrated, German losses and the +consequent futility of making further sacrifices in a losing cause +were strongly emphasised. We have again the testimony of Hindenburg’s +autobiography as to the effect on the German troops: “Ill-humour and +disappointment that the war seemed to have no end, in spite of all our +victories, had” (he writes) “ruined the character of many of our brave +men. Dangers and hardships in the field, battle and turmoil, on top of +which came the complaints from home about many real and some imaginary +privations! All this gradually had a demoralising effect, especially +as no end seemed to be in sight. In the shower of pamphlets which was +scattered by enemy airmen our adversaries said and wrote that they did +not think so badly of us; that we must only be reasonable and perhaps +here and there renounce something we had conquered. Then everything +would be soon right again and we could live together in peace, in +perpetual international peace. As regards peace within our own borders, +new men and new Governments would see to that. What a blessing peace +would be after all the fighting! There was, therefore, no point in +continuing the struggle. Such was the purport of what our men read and +said. The soldier thought it could not be all enemy lies, allowed it to +poison his mind, and proceeded to poison the minds of others.” + +Despite such compliments as to the effectiveness of the distribution, +this branch of the work provided the thorn in the Crewe House flesh. +Distribution by aeroplane was the ideal method, and the decision +to discontinue the use of aeroplanes for the purpose was a serious +handicap to Lord Northcliffe’s work. Balloon distribution was dependent +upon favourable winds, and could only be performed in one direction, +whereas aeroplanes could cover a much more extensive area at great +speed. On several occasions Lord Northcliffe pressed for the resumption +of their use. Lord Milner replied to the first request, early in May, +to the effect that the British authorities were disputing the German +contention that the distribution of literature from aeroplanes was +contrary to the laws of war, and had given notice that they intended +to institute prompt reprisals if they received information that any +British airmen were undergoing punishment for similar action. Although +distribution by aeroplane on the Western Front had been temporarily +suspended, they held themselves free at any moment to resume it, and +stated that meanwhile literature would be distributed by other and, as +they thought, more effective means. _Yet it was admitted that there +had been no stoppage of the use of aeroplanes for the purpose on the +Italian Front._ + +A month later, Lord Northcliffe again wrote, asking if anything had +been done to cancel the temporary suspension of the distribution of +leaflets by aeroplane on the Western Front. He and his co-workers +felt strongly that propaganda work against Germany was being severely +handicapped by disuse of this method of distribution, especially as, +according to his information, the Germans themselves continued to drop +leaflets over the British lines from aeroplanes. He could not believe +that distribution by balloon was as accurate or as effective. It was a +curious commentary on the British attitude that the French continued to +use aeroplanes for the purpose on the Western Front. + +Many weeks passed before the War Cabinet agreed to the resumption of +the use of aeroplanes, and even then the Air Ministry raised further +objection. Finally, all obstacles were overcome, but not until the +end of October. In one week 3,000,000 leaflets were prepared for the +interior of Germany, and the distribution of these was begun just +before the Armistice. + +With the turn of the tide of military events in the summer of 1918, +propaganda had assumed greater importance than ever. Military defeat +rendered the German soldier more amenable to propagandist influences, +to which in victory he could afford to turn a blind eye and deaf +ear. Moreover, the Allied successes seriously disturbed the German +nation, and as the news was disseminated by the various agencies +carefully organised by Crewe House the spirit of the people became +generally depressed. The commercial classes exhibited great fear at +the threatened economic war. Thus the soil became fertilised for the +reception of propagandist views. One obvious but important way of +spreading such views was by ensuring that important speeches of leading +British statesmen should be adequately and promptly reported in enemy +countries. Means were found of accomplishing this object. When occasion +arose, publication in neutral newspapers of interviews with British +public men on important subjects was arranged for, and these were +widely quoted in the enemy Press. + +The valuable material collected by Mr. Wells on British progress in +those lines of industry in which Germany had excelled was used by Mr. +Fyfe in many ways. Articles on the subject were sent to, and published +by, German-Swiss papers, which were known to be much read in Germany. +Pamphlets were written in German in tones of serious warning and +distributed through channels prepared by the perseverance and ingenuity +of Mr. S. A. Guest. By these means, also, a large number of descriptive +catalogues of an exhibition in London of British scientific products +were introduced into Germany and were snapped up and read with +avidity. Treatment of these issues was found to influence enlightened +German opinion more than any other kind of propaganda. + +From time to time special topics were selected. For instance, a +series of “London Letters” was sent to Swiss and Scandinavian papers +purporting to be written with a pro-German flavour, but containing, +under this disguise, a true picture of food and other conditions in +Great Britain. It was gratifying to find these reprinted in enemy +papers, for the German reader was thus led to institute mental +comparisons with the much worse conditions prevalent in Germany. +Secret means, too, were found to circulate in German naval ports, as +a deterrent to men picked for service in submarines, leaflets (of +which a reproduction appears in this volume) containing a long list of +U-boat commanders, dead or captured, with description of their rank. +Particulars so easy of verification proved the mastery of the British +Navy over the U-boat campaigners and created great depression in the +German ports. + +In addition to the “priority” leaflets containing news of Allied +successes, illustrated with shaded maps and diagrams, a “trench +newspaper” was prepared in a style which exactly resembled a German +publication. The propaganda pill was coated to make it attractive. +The newspaper was homely in appearance--its title-decoration included +a head of the Kaiser--and it provided excellent reading matter which +would appeal to the German soldier, while revealing facts hitherto +carefully hidden from him. As many as from 250,000 to 500,000 copies +of each weekly issue were distributed. Some leaflets, on the other +hand, were in religious vein, for there is a deep religious strain in +the German character. These leaflets pointed out that their military +defeats were a just retribution for the crimes of their Government. One +was a little sermon on the text “Be sure your sin will find you out.” + +With knowledge of the dwindling of their own reserves, the Germans +became increasingly anxious about the supply of American troops, +artillery, and munitions. No opportunity was lost by Crewe House of +keeping the enemy armies and civil populations fully aware of the +wonderful extent of the American effort. A series of leaflets was +prepared which gave in succinct and vigorous form the latest details +about that effort, both in the field and at home in the factory, the +shipyard and the farm. + +British propagandist work against Germany was both positive and +negative. Its aim was to give the German people something to hope +for in an early peace and much to fear from the prolongation of the +war--that is, to make it clear to them that the only way to escape +complete ruin would be to break with the system that brought the war +upon Europe, and to qualify for admission eventually into the League +of Nations on the Allied terms. In addition to these very necessary +educative efforts, the enemy armies were supplied with constant and +_invariably truthful_ information about the actual military position. +Its veracity was a more essential factor to its success than its +quantity. The news withheld by the German authorities was supplied by +us. Hence the cries of alarm from Marshal von Hindenburg and General +von Hutier, to which fuller reference is made in the next chapter. + +In the “intensive propaganda” of the last few weeks of hostilities the +Hohenzollern Government was denounced. It was pointed out that all +Germany’s sufferings and tribulations were due to its “Old Gang,” of +which a clean sweep would have to be made before the world would make +friends or do business with Germans again. Chapter and verse were given +to prove that the German Government could not be trusted, and that it +was a great obstacle to peace. Attention, too, was drawn to the changes +then taking place in Germany, to the cries raised for the abdication +of the Emperor, and to the growing demand for the punishment of all +who had brought Germany to her disastrous situation. German soldiers +were urged to consider whether it was worth while to risk being killed +when they had nothing left to fight for, and it was suggested that +their best course was to make off to their homes and ensure the safety +of their families. The consequences to Germans of the continuation of +the war were plainly indicated. Maps and diagrams showed at a glance +how Allied air raids over Germany had increased in number, how larger +and larger Allied air squadrons and more powerful bombs were being +provided and how easily it would be possible to attack Berlin, Hamburg, +Hanover, and other places which had previously escaped. A map was also +prepared showing all the steamship routes by which food, munitions, +and raw materials were being brought to Great Britain and France, and +demonstrating the falsity of the German leaders’ assurance that we +could be starved into submission. + +By the courtesy of the Admiralty and of the Ministry of Information, +use was regularly made of wireless telegraphy as a means of +disseminating information, combating false German statements, and +influencing German opinion through neutral newspapers and public +opinion. + +Many other agencies for introducing propagandist material into +enemy countries were organised by Mr. Guest, whose work demanded +extraordinary patience and perseverance. He experimented with many +methods, and, despite the vigilance of the Germans, the inflow into +Germany increased. Some of the methods can never be revealed, but it +is permissible to hint that, for instance, among foreign workmen of a +certain nationality who went into Germany each morning and returned +each evening there might be some to whom propagandist work was not +uncongenial. And, of course, all secret agents were not necessarily +Allies or neutrals. Somehow, huge masses of literature were posted in +Germany to selected addresses from which the German postal revenues +derived no benefit. Easiest of all were certain obvious channels left +wholly or partially open in most incredible fashion, as, for instance, +the book trade, which was by no means as closely supervised as might +have been expected. None were more amazed at the facility with which +such valuable propaganda material as Prince Lichnowsky’s pamphlet +achieved clandestine circulation in Germany and Austria than were +British propagandists. Perhaps, as a gratuitous hint to the curious, it +may be added that the outside covers with titles of works by revered +German authors did not always correspond to the contents of the books, +but, oft-times, as the poet said, “things are not what they seem.” + +Personal propaganda among enemy subjects resident in neutral +countries--and especially those unsympathetic to the perverted +ideals of their respective nations--was tactfully pursued. Neutrals +in prominent positions in any walk of life whose views were likely +to react on enemy opinion were brought within the orbit of salutary +personal intercourse. Enemy newspaper correspondents were carefully +“nursed.” No avenue of approach into enemy countries was considered too +insignificant, for each had its particular use. + +[Illustration: MR. HAMILTON FYFE. + +SUCCEEDED MR. H. G. WELLS AS DIRECTOR OF THE GERMAN SECTION. + +_Photo: Elliott & Fry, Ltd._] + +[Illustration: CAPTAIN CHALMERS MITCHELL.] + +[Illustration: BRIGADIER-GENERAL G. K. COCKERILL, C.B. + +[DEPUTY-DIRECTOR OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, 1918.] + +_Photo: Russell, London._] + + + + +CHAPTER V + +TRIBUTES FROM THE ENEMY + +Hindenburg’s outburst: German Press Comments: Ludendorff on the conduct +and effect of British Propaganda against the Central Powers. + + +The Press of the enemy countries was closely watched for references +to British propaganda in editorial articles or in the reports of +utterances of political and military leaders. During August, 1918, +the misgivings engendered by the trend of events, as revealed by our +propaganda, found expression in print. Then, as if a pent-up stream +had at last carried away the dam, came a flood of wails from many +quarters, generals vying with editors in hurling imprecations at the +British Enemy Propaganda Department, with blackest vilifications of +Lord Northcliffe, and in beseeching German troops and people not to be +affected by the leaflets which had by this time found their way into +even the remotest corner of rural Germany. + +These outbursts were symptomatic of the fear of defeat which had laid +hold of the Germans, and were correctly interpreted in England as +foreshadowing the end which came so dramatically in November, 1918. It +was obvious that even the German Government felt it unwise to restrain, +by use of the censorship, the publication of such damaging admissions +of the deadliness of British propaganda. It was impossible to stop the +rising tide of truth which was covering Germany. + +To attempt to quote even a small proportion of these unintentional +tributes to the work of Sir George Macdonogh’s department of the War +Office and of Crewe House would be wearisome. Perhaps the best specimen +of all came in the form of a manifesto from no less a person than Field +Marshal von Hindenburg, the war idol and personification of German +militarism. This is the text of the remarkable document: + + We are engaged in a hard struggle with our enemies. If numerical + superiority alone guaranteed victory, Germany would long since have + lain shattered on the ground. The enemy knows, however, that Germany + and her Allies cannot be conquered by arms alone. The enemy knows + that the spirit which dwells within our troops and our people makes + us unconquerable. Therefore, together with the struggle against the + German arms, he has undertaken a struggle against the German spirit; + he seeks to poison our spirit and believes that German arms will also + become blunted if the German spirit is eaten away. + + We should not take this plan of the enemy lightly. The enemy conducts + his campaign against our spirit by various means. He bombards our + Front, not only with a drumfire of artillery, but also with a + drumfire of printed paper. Besides bombs which kill the body, his + airmen throw down leaflets which are intended to kill the soul. + + Of these enemy leaflets our field-grey men delivered up: + + In May 84,000 + In June 120,000 + In July 300,000 + + A gigantic increase! Ten thousand poisoned arrows daily in July; + 10,000 times daily the attempt to deprive the individual and the + whole body of belief in the justice of our cause and of the strength + and confidence for ultimate victory! We can reckon, in addition, that + a great part of the enemy leaflets will not have been found by us. + + POISONING THE HOME SPIRIT. + + But the enemy is not merely satisfied in attacking the spirit of + our Front, he wishes above all also to poison the spirit of our + home. He knows what sources of strength for the Front rest in the + home. True, his aeroplanes and balloons do not carry these leaflets + far into our homeland; they lie far from it in the lines in which + the enemy vainly struggles for victory by arms. But the enemy hopes + that many a field-grey soldier will send home the leaflet which has + innocently fluttered down from the air. At home it will pass from + hand to hand and be discussed at the beer-table, in families, in the + sewing-room, in factories, and in the street. Unsuspectingly many + thousands consume the poison. For thousands the burden the war in + any case imposes upon them is increased, and the will and hope for a + victorious issue of the war is taken from them. All these again write + their doubts to the Front, and Wilson, Lloyd George and Clemenceau + rub their hands. + + The enemy attacks the spirit of the home in another way besides. The + silliest rumours, designed to break our inner power of resistance, + are put into circulation. We find them simultaneously in Switzerland, + in Holland, and in Denmark. Thence they spread like a wave over the + whole of Germany. Or they emerge simultaneously, agreeing in silly + details, in the remotest regions of our country--in Silesia, in + East Prussia, in the Rhineland--and wend their way thence over the + remainder of the home territory. This poison works on the men on + leave and flows in letters to the Front. Again the enemy rubs his + hands. + + The enemy is ingenious. He knows how to mix the little powder for + everyone. He decoys the fighters at the Front. One leaflet runs: + + “German soldiers! It is a shameful lie that the French ill-treat + German prisoners. We are not brutes; only come over to us without + fear; here you will find a most considerate reception, good food, and + a peaceful refuge.” + + Ask brave men who have succeeded with unspeakable difficulty in + escaping from the enemy captivity about this. Plundered to the + utmost in wire compounds, roofless, goaded by hunger and thirst into + treasonable utterances, forced by blows and threats of death to + betray their comrades, spat upon, pelted with filth by the French + populace while being driven to hard labour, that is what the paradise + that the enemy conjures up really looks like. + + Reproductions of original letters written by prisoners are also + thrown down, in which these men describe how well it goes with them. + God be praised, there are still also decent and humane commandants of + prisoners’ camps in England and France; but these are the exception, + and the letters the enemy throws down are only of three or four + different kinds. But he sends these multiplied by many thousands of + copies. The enemy intimidates the faint-hearted by saying: + + “Your struggle is hopeless; America will settle you; your + submarines are no good; we are building more ships than they sink; + after the war we shall debar you from getting raw materials, then + Germany’s industry must starve. You will never see your colonies + again.” + + That is the tone of the leaflets; now enticement, now threat. + + + GERMAN FACTS AND FANCIES. + + What is the real situation? We have enforced peace in the East + and are strong enough to do it in the West, notwithstanding the + Americans; but we must be strong and united; that is what the enemy + is fighting against with these leaflets and rumours. He wishes to + deprive us of faith and confidence, will and force. + + Why is the enemy continually seeking new allies in the struggle + against us? Why does he try to press nations still neutral into the + struggle against us? Because in strength we are his equals. + + Why does he incite black and other coloured men against German + soldiers? Because his will is to destroy us. + + Again, the enemy says another thing: + + “You Germans, your form of government is wrong. Fight against the + Hohenzollerns, against capitalism; help us, the Entente, to give you + a better form of State.” + + The enemy knows perfectly what strength resides in our State and + Empire; but that is precisely why he combats it. The enemy also seeks + to tear open old wounds in the German body politic. With his leaflets + and by rumours he attempts to sow division and distrust among the + Federal States. At Lake Constance we confiscated many thousands of + leaflets conveyed to Bavaria and intended to excite anger against + the North Germans. They wish to destroy the German Empire, which for + centuries was the dream of Germans and which our fathers won for us, + and to condemn Germany to the impotence of the Thirty Years’ War. + + The enemy also wishes to shake our loyalty to our allies. He does + not know the German way and the word of a German man. He himself + sacrifices his allies; he who is England’s ally dies of it. + + + TRAITORS TO THE FATHERLAND. + + And finally the enemy sends not the least dangerous of his poisoned + arrows dipped in printers’ ink when he throws down the utterances of + German men and German newspapers. The utterances of German newspapers + are torn from their context. Regarding the utterances of Germans + which are reproduced, remember that at every time there have been + conscious and unconscious traitors to the Fatherland. Most of them + reside abroad in neutral countries, in order not to be obliged to + share our struggle and our privations, or to be condemned by our + Judges as guilty of high treason. Nor have champions of extreme party + tendencies any right to claim to speak for the generality of the + German people. + + It is our strength, but also our weakness that even in war we + allow unrestricted utterance to every opinion. We still tolerate the + reproduction in our newspapers of enemy Army reports and the speeches + of enemy statesmen which are weapons of attack directed against the + spirit of the German Army and people. This is a sign of strength, + because it proves a consciousness of might. But it is a weakness + because it allows the enemy’s poison to find an entrance among us. + + Therefore, German Army, German Homeland, if one of these thrown-out + pieces of poison in the form of leaflet or rumour comes before your + eyes and ears, remember that its originates with the enemy. Remember + nothing comes from the enemy which is not harmful to Germany. Every + one must be mindful of this, whatever his position or party. If you + meet anyone whose name and origin indeed are German, but who by + nature stands in the enemy’s camp, keep him at a distance, despise + him, put him publicly in the pillory in order that every other true + German may despise him. + + Defend yourself, German Army, German Homeland! + +Hindenburg’s fear that only a small part of the leaflets was given up +was fully justified. The numbers which he quotes suggest that hundreds +of thousands must have been carried to their homes by the “field-grey +men.” + +The whole manifesto is an interesting study in psychology. Hope had +slipped away; dismay had ripened into despair and despair had sown +wild anger and hatred. The dissemination of the unwelcome facts of +the position caused him to burst out in vituperation and so to give a +valuable clue as to the effect which Allied propaganda was producing on +the German troops and public. + +After such a mighty oracle, it is not surprising that others took up +the cry. Not long after, the following noteworthy message, signed by +General von Hutier of the Sixth German Army, was captured: + + The enemy begins to realise that we cannot be crushed by blockade, + superiority of numbers, or force of arms. He is, therefore, trying + a last resource. While engaging to the utmost of his military + force he is racking his imagination for ruses, trickery, and other + underhand methods of which he is a past master, to induce in the + minds of the German people a doubt of their invincibility. He has + founded for this purpose a special Ministry (“The Ministry for the + Destruction of German Confidence”), at the head of which he has put + the most thoroughgoing rascal of all the Entente--Lord Northcliffe, + who has been given billions for use in influencing opinion in the + interior of the country and at the Front by means of paid agents, the + assassination of Ambassadors, and all the other ways in favour with + the Entente. + + The method of Northcliffe at the Front is to distribute through + airmen a constantly increasing number of leaflets and pamphlets; the + letters of German prisoners are falsified in the most outrageous + way; tracts and pamphlets are concocted, to which the names of + German poets, writers, and statesmen are forged, or which present + the appearance of having been printed in Germany, and bear, for + example, the title of the Reclam series, when they really come from + the Northcliffe Press, which is working day and night for this same + purpose. His thought and aim are that these forgeries, however + obvious they may appear to the man who thinks twice, may suggest a + doubt, even for a moment, in the minds of those who do not think for + themselves, and that their confidence in their leaders, in their + own strength, and in the inexhaustible resources of Germany may be + shattered. + + Fortunately, Northcliffe, the Minister for the Destruction + of German Confidence, forgets that German soldiers are neither + Negroes nor Hindus, nor illiterate French, English, and Americans, + incapable of seeing through such machinations. Explain these infamous + attempts to your young and inexperienced comrades, and tell them + what our mortal enemy expects of them, and what is at stake. Pick + up the leaflets and pamphlets and give them to our commanders for + transmission to the High Command, which may be able to make valuable + deductions from them as to the aims of our enemies. You will thus + help the Command, and you will also help to hasten the hour of + victory. + +The allegation that huge sums of money were expended by Lord +Northcliffe is comic. As will have been seen already, the total cost +of the operations conducted by Lord Northcliffe during his tenure +of office was considerably less than a one-hundredth part of Great +Britain’s _daily_ war bill. + +German Army orders, which fell into Allied hands, showed plainly how +widespread was the effect produced among the enemy troops by the +leaflets. Officers and men were threatened with severe punishment if +they neglected to hand the leaflets in immediately. On the other hand, +bonuses for the delivery of unknown specimens of pamphlets, books, +leaflets, and pictures were offered as follows:-- + + 3 marks (nominally 3_s._) for the first copy. + 30 pfgs. (nominally 4_d._) for other copies. + 5 marks (nominally 5_s._) for a book. + +An order issued by Ludendorff showed that the influence of the +propaganda extended beyond the troops to the population of Germany. +This read: + + “There has been an increase in the number of complaints received from + home that men on leave from the front create a very unfavourable + impression by making statements actually bordering on high treason + and incitement to disobedience. Instances such as these drag through + the mud the honour and respect of the individual as well as of the + whole Army, and have a disastrous effect upon the _moral_ of the + people at home.” + +A “high officer at the front” describing, in the _Kölnische Zeitung_ of +October 31, 1918, the demoralisation of the German Army as a result of +the retreat, wrote: + + What damaged us most of all was the paper war carried on by the + enemy, who dropped daily among us 100,000 leaflets, which were + extraordinarily well distributed and well edited. + +This strikingly confirmed a report received by the Foreign Office the +previous month which stated: + + Leaflets thrown by Allied airmen have much more effect now. Instead + of being thrown away or laughed at, as was often the case in the + past, they are eagerly picked up and read. There is no doubt that + recent events have seriously shaken the _moral_ of the German people + and Army. One of the returned officers mentioned above said that if + the Entente knew what poison these leaflets, etc., were working in + the minds of the German soldiers they would give up lead and bombard + with paper only in future. + +That neither threats nor bribes was inducing the surrender of the +leaflets to German Headquarters was plainly shown by the statements +of prisoners captured during the last four months of hostilities, +and by the fact that most of them had British leaflets in their +possession. Among the subjects which seemed to have attracted special +attention were the German responsibility for starting the war, for the +adoption of poison gas attacks, and for the bombing of open towns; the +ineffectiveness of Zeppelin attacks and of the U-boats preventing the +transport of food and troops; the arrival of the American armies; the +Allied war aims; comparison of food conditions in Germany with those +in Great Britain; and the extracts from German Socialist newspapers. +Inhabitants of the recaptured territory testified to the effect of the +propaganda on the German troops, remarking on the lowering of _moral_ +and the increasing number of deserters which they attributed to it. + +Politicians and newspapers were also greatly excited, and raised loud +cries for the creation of an organisation for counter-propaganda. Herr +F. Stossinger described British propaganda in the _Frankfurter Zeitung_ +as “the most complicated and dangerous of all,” and commented on its +“countless” activities. The Minister of War, General von Stein was +complimentary enough to say “In propaganda the enemy is undoubtedly our +superior.” (Berlin _Morgenpost_, August 25, 1918.) Other tributes were: + + _Rheinische-Westfälische-Zeitung_: “At any rate, the British + Propaganda Department has worked hard. Had we shown the same activity + in our Propaganda perhaps many a thing would have been different now. + But in this, we regret to say, we were absolutely unprepared, but we + hope that by now we have learned differently.” + + _Deutsche Tageszeitung_: “We Germans have a right to be proud of our + General Staff. We have a feeling that our enemies’ General Staff + cannot hold a candle to it, but we also have the feeling that our + enemies have a brilliant Propaganda General Staff, whereas we have + none.” + +Violent and bitter attacks were repeatedly made. The revelations of the +British propaganda created great nervousness, which in turn gave rise +to all kinds of wild rumours, which spread all over Germany. These were +attributed to Lord Northcliffe’s department. Speaking in the Bavarian +Lower House of Parliament during August, 1918, General von Hellingrath, +the Bavarian Minister of War, said:-- + + “These rumours are nothing but the result of the industrious and + determined agitation which our enemies carry on in the interior + through their agents.” + +Herr von Kupffer, the editor of the Berlin _Lokal-Anzeiger_, referred +to them as “a carnival of soul-storms, idiotic terror, and criminal +irresponsibility,” and he continued: + + “The main thing is to remember the source of such rumours and to bear + in mind what their object is. Their object is to demoralise us and, + by so doing, turn into realities what otherwise would remain merely + nightmares. One would have to be really blind not to see that these + things radiate from that organisation in England formed to shatter + the German nervous system by means of shameful and impudent lies. Is + not the figure of Lord Northcliffe, the great Propaganda Chief of the + English Home Army, pilloried in world-history for all time? + + “Is anybody in doubt as to the purpose of this propaganda? Does not + everybody know that the generalissimo of this campaign of mendacity + has unlimited funds at his disposal in order to circulate streams + of lies through neutral channels with devilish cunning and almost + impressive skill? Does not everybody realise that the Northcliffe + Propaganda is too shrewd to work by means of mere newspaper tales + that could easily be disproved, and therefore resorts to the much + more subtle method of carrying unrest, disloyalty, and alarm into + our country and into the lands of our allies by means of verbal + communications of all sorts? Paid rascals are systematically employed + for this purpose. It is this sort of person who propagates these wild + stories in Germany and upsets our sense of proportion in connection + with war events. These are the facts. Let people bear them in mind + before they promote the Northcliffe Propaganda by repeating every + bit of washerwoman’s gossip as gospel, even though it be without the + slightest foundation in fact.” + +In the Hamburg district matters were much the same, for the influential +shipping journal _Hansa_ printed the following on September 14:-- + + “God be thanked! At last we are just beginning to recognise what + the hour of war demands; what is our duty as Germans and as citizens. + Despondency, discontent, depression, hanging heads, grumbling! We + meet them at every step and turn, but we did not know their origin, + these growths of evil fantasy. We did not understand what meant these + secret whispers about alleged unfavourable news from the front, + these exaggerated reports, fraught with misfortune, which passed so + glibly from mouth to mouth. One had heard this, another that, but + always it was something bad in regard to our military situation. + Nothing definite was ever mentioned. There were only suggestions, + which proved to be chimeras as soon as ever they could be run to + earth. They were the birth of ignoble defeatism. Yet there they were, + invisibly surrounding us, disturbing our spiritual balance, darkening + our temper; like an epidemic, like poisonous bacilli, they flew + hither and thither in all directions through our German air. + + “Whence came they? Who brought them to us? To-day we know. To-day + we can recognise the origin of this depression of German will-power. + It was the long-advertised publicity offensive of the Entente + directed against us under England’s lead, and under the special + direction of that unprincipled, unscrupulous rascal, Northcliffe.” + +In the _Kölnische Volkszeitung_ for September 11, a letter from the +front said: + + “Leaflets destined to cause low spirits and despair, or to send + deserters to the enemy, are being showered down in thousands in + certain places and their surroundings. It is this combat, waged + openly or secretly, which, particularly at home, produces low spirits + and despair. Here you find statements that Hindenburg was once + regarded as a Divinity, but that his laurels are beginning to fade, + which is quite evident from the way the enemy advance daily; that our + troops have lost courage, whole companies are deserting to the enemy, + and such like things.” + +In another letter to the same newspaper, published on August 20, the +writer said: + + “Our enemies have recently been very busy distributing leaflets + from the air. I have had two of these leaflets in my hands, and it is + not to be doubted that our enemies are in that, also, our masters, + for the pamphlets are so well produced that anyone who is not on the + lookout is very likely to fall a victim to them.” + +That such Propaganda might have had an effect if it had been tried +earlier was evident from the admissions of war correspondents as +well as of generals. Herr W. Scheurmann wrote in the _Norddeutsche +Allgemeine Zeitung_ (October 30): + + “We Germans have learnt _for the first time this autumn_ that the + moral resistance of the fighter at the front is a power with which + the Command must reckon, all the more cautiously inasmuch as it is + difficult to estimate.” + +All charges of the mendacity of British propaganda were unfounded, for +the greatest care was unremittingly exercised to tell only the truth. +One effect of this was to make the Germans distrust their official +_communiqués_. “We have in our dear Fatherland to-day,” wrote the +_Kölnische Zeitung_ on September 11, “great numbers of innocent and +ingenuous minds who doubt the plain statements of the German Army +reports, but _believe the false reports and omissions of the enemy_. +To prove constantly the contrary to them is a rather thankless task, +but of which one should never tire.” + +It was, indeed, a thankless task to try to keep the truth from the +whole German nation. “Warn your brothers, your sons, your husbands, +not to believe the enemy’s leaflets,” was one of “Ten Commandments for +German Women,” published by the _Kölnische Volkszeitung_ on October 20, +but it was then too late to maintain the lie-system by which the German +resistance had been stimulated for so long. + +Writing in July, 1919, Herr Arnold Rechberg said in the _Tägliche +Rundschau_: “It cannot be doubted that Lord Northcliffe very +substantially contributed to England’s victory in the world war. +His conduct of English propaganda during the war will some day find +its place in history as a performance hardly to be surpassed. The +Northcliffe propaganda during the war correctly estimated ... the +character and intellectual peculiarities of the Germans.” + +Praise from an enemy, when there is no underlying motive, can usually +be accepted as sincere. Most of the foregoing quotations were primarily +warnings and exhortations to their own people issued during the war, +and compliments to Allied propaganda only indirectly. + +When, however, hostilities had ceased disastrously for Germany and +her allies, passions of hatred and pride began to give place to the +cold logic of reason. Ludendorff, who, as First Quartermaster-General +from 1916 to the end of the war, was regarded as one of the cleverest +of Germany’s military leaders, sat down to write his “War Memories” +(Hutchinson and Co., London). His reputation entitles him to respect, +and he has much to say of value regarding propaganda. + +He learned one important lesson. “Good propaganda,” he wrote, “must +keep well ahead of actual political events. It must act as pacemaker +to policy and mould public opinion without appearing to do so.” This +was the great basic principle upon which was built the success of Lord +Northcliffe’s department. To try to make propaganda shape policy is as +fatal as endeavouring to conduct propaganda campaigns without policy +or with conflicting policies. Illuminating volumes could be written +on failures from all these causes. But whoever follows the history of +the operations conducted from Crewe House will find that painstaking +study was made of the factors governing the political, economic, and +military position of each of the enemy countries concerned before +action was taken. As _The Times_ observed in a leading article (October +31, 1919) Lord Northcliffe’s work “differed from the praiseworthy +and painstaking efforts that had preceded it mainly by adopting as +its guiding principle the very maxim which Ludendorff lays down. The +consideration that, without a definite policy in regard to each enemy +country, propaganda must be at best a hand-to-mouth business was, from +the first, regarded as self-evident by Lord Northcliffe and the handful +of experts who advised him.” + +Ludendorff compared the work of the British and German propaganda +departments, to the great disparagement of the latter. Indeed he +attributed the moral collapse of the German soldier--and consequently +the military defeat--in part to British propaganda and in part to +the demoralisation of the German home population, which, in turn, he +ascribed to British propaganda and to the feebleness of the German +Government in counteracting it. Of British propaganda he wrote:-- + + [1]Lloyd George knew what he was doing when, after the close of + the war, he gave Lord Northcliffe the thanks of England for the + propaganda he had carried out. Lord Northcliffe was a master of + mass-suggestion. The enemy’s propaganda attacked us by transmitting + reports and print from the neutral States on our frontier, especially + Holland and Switzerland. It assailed us in the same way from Austria, + and finally in our own country by using the air. It did this with + such method and on such a scale that many people were no longer able + to distinguish their own impressions from what the enemy propaganda + had told them. This propaganda was all the more effective in our + case as we had to rely, not on the numbers, but on the quality of + our battalions in prosecuting the war. The importance of numbers + in war is incontestable. Without soldiers there can be no war. But + numbers count only according to the spirit which animates them. As + it is in the life of peoples, so it is also on the battlefield. We + had fought against the world, and could continue to do so with good + conscience so long as we were spiritually ready to endure the burden + of war. So long as we were this, we had hope of victory and refused + to bow to the enemy’s determination to annihilate us. But with the + disappearance of our moral readiness to fight everything changed + completely. We no longer battled to the last drop of our blood. Many + Germans were no longer willing to die for their country. + + The shattering of public confidence at home affected our moral + readiness to fight. The attack on our home front and on the spirit + of the Army was the chief weapon with which the Entente intended to + conquer us, after it had lost all hope of a military victory. + +[1] This passage is a translation from the German edition. + +His references to German enemy propaganda are generally in terms of +disgust. He considered it rendered Germany no service. “Our political +aims and decisions, issued to the world as sudden surprises, often +seemed to be merely brutal and violent. This could have been skilfully +avoided by broad and far-sighted propaganda.... The German propaganda +was only kept going with difficulty. In spite of all our efforts, +its achievements, in comparison to the magnitude of the task, were +inadequate. We produced no real effect on the enemy peoples.... We +also attempted to carry on propaganda on the enemy fronts. In the +East, the Russians were the authors of their own collapse, and our +work there was of secondary importance. In the West, the fronts of our +enemies had not been made susceptible by the state of public opinion in +their home countries, and the propaganda we gradually introduced had +no success.... Germany failed in the fight against the _moral_ of the +enemy peoples.” + +Again and again Ludendorff quotes instances of the effect of +propaganda. For example, just before the last German offensive of July +15, 1918: + + “The Army complained of the enemy propaganda. It was the more + effective because the Army was rendered impressionable by the + attitude at home.... The enemy propaganda had seized on Prince + Lichnowsky’s pamphlet, which, in a way that I myself could not + explain, placed on the German Government the responsibility for the + outbreak of war. And this, though his Majesty and the Chancellor + again and again asserted that the Entente was responsible.... + + “The Army was literally drenched with enemy propaganda + publications. Their great danger to us was clearly recognised. The + Supreme Command offered rewards for such as were handed over to + us, but we could not prevent them from poisoning the heart of our + soldiers.” + +No greater effect could have been desired by the British authorities +than that described by Ludendorff, and such an acknowledgment of the +results produced gave the highest satisfaction. + +[Illustration: A MEDALLION STRUCK BY THE GERMANS IN “DISHONOUR” OF LORD +NORTHCLIFFE.] + + + + +CHAPTER VI + +OPERATIONS AGAINST BULGARIA AND OTHER ACTIVITIES + +Peculiar difficulties of propaganda against Bulgaria--Educative work +among prisoners of war. + + +Operations against Bulgaria--the other objective of Crewe House +activities--were somewhat dissimilar to those against either +Austria-Hungary or Germany. There were complications due to the general +state of Balkan affairs and politics, and to the fact that technically +the United States was not at war with Bulgaria. The definition of +propaganda policy against Bulgaria called for most delicate expression, +lest any offence should be given to Serbia, Roumania, or Greece. + +Lord Northcliffe, in submitting to the Foreign Office a statement of +policy proposed for use against Bulgaria, pointed out that he and his +advisers felt that there was need for a definite Allied policy in +regard to the Jugo-Slav and Roumanian questions. These, in their turn, +were dependent upon Allied policy in regard to Austria-Hungary. On May +25, 1918, Lord Northcliffe wrote to the Secretary of State for Foreign +Affairs: + + “After careful consideration, and with the advice of our most + competent authorities on Bulgarian and Balkan affairs, I beg to + submit to you the following scheme of Allied policy in regard to + Balkan countries as the framework within which any propaganda in + Bulgaria should be carried out. I would especially direct your + attention to the need for a Government decision in regard to the + Southern Slav, Greek, and Roumanian questions before any definite + proposals from Bulgaria are entertained: + + “The adoption of a clear and comprehensive Balkan policy by the + British and Allied Governments is an essential condition of any + propaganda in Bulgaria. + + “Without such a policy any propaganda in Bulgaria would resolve + itself into competitive bargaining between the Allies on the one + hand and the Austro-Germans on the other. + + “This bargaining would tend to estrange and to dishearten the + Serbians and the Greeks. In attempting it the Allies would be, + moreover, at a disadvantage, inasmuch as Bulgaria already occupies, + as a member of the enemy Alliance, considerably more than all the + territories that would be the subject of the bargaining. + + “The aim of Allied policy in the Balkans should be a lasting + territorial and political settlement, framed as nearly as possible + on lines of ethnography, with the object of paving the way for a + permanent League of the Balkan Nations. + + “Bulgaria cannot possess all the territories ethnographically + Bulgarian unless she retain at the peace districts held by Serbia, + Greece, and Roumania before the war. Serbia, Greece, and Roumania, + on the other hand, cannot fairly be asked or compelled to abandon + those districts unless they, in their turn, be united with + territories ethnographically Serbo-Croatian (Jugo-Slav), Greek, and + Roumanian. + + “Allied policy should therefore deliberately aim at the solution + of the Southern Slav, Hellenic, and Roumanian questions in the + sense of the fullest possible racial unity and independence. + + “The chief difficulty in defining the just claims of Bulgaria lies + in the uncertainty as to the proper delimitation of Bulgarian + Macedonia. A purely ethnographical delimitation might involve + economic and strategical injustice to Serbia and Greece, unless + it were accompanied by due provision, internationally guaranteed, + for Serbian and Greek rights of way. Similarly, the retention of + ports like Salonika and Kavalla by Greece would involve hardship + to Bulgaria unless adequate provision, internationally guaranteed, + were made for a Bulgarian right of way to those ports. + + “Should it prove impossible to obtain, by persuasion or pressure, + the assent of Serbia and Greece to the retention of ethnographical + Macedonia by Bulgaria, an autonomous Macedonia might be set up, + proper provision being made for the maintenance of order and for + the repression of armed Serbian and Greek or Bulgarian ‘propaganda’ + by an international force of _gendarmerie_. One advantage of an + autonomous Macedonia would be that it would meet the wishes of + the Macedonian Bulgars themselves, who would prefer autonomy to + annexation outright by Bulgaria. + + “The Allied policy in the Balkans should be made known to the + Bulgarians by the Allies and by the United States. The necessary + ethnographical delimitation of Bulgarian, or of autonomous + Macedonian territory should be undertaken by a competent Allied + Commission, possibly under the presidency of the United States. + The announcement of Allied policy should be accompanied by an + intimation that only by accepting it can Bulgaria hope to escape + economic and political ostracism for an indefinite period; but that + acceptance of the Allied policy would, on the contrary, carry with + it a claim to financial and economic support. + + “Bulgaria should at the same time be told that the Allies would + guarantee to her the Enos-Midia line as her minimum frontier on the + east, provided that she refrained from further active co-operation + with the enemies of the Allies. Active co-operation on the side of + the Allies should be rewarded by a frontier yet more favourable to + her aspirations, _e.g._ by the line Midia-Rodosto. The inclusion of + Silistria in the future Bulgarian territory should likewise be made + contingent upon the behaviour of Bulgaria before the conclusion of + peace. + + “May I ask you to give me your views on this scheme of policy as + early as possible? + + “I wish to send to Salonika, without delay, a competent mission to + begin propaganda on this, or some similar basis, but cannot authorise + its departure unless the ideas it would propagate have the explicit + approval of His Majesty’s Government.” + +Mr. Balfour replied on June 6, 1918: + + “I have carefully considered your letter of May 25, in which you were + so kind as to furnish me with your ideas as to the lines on which we + should conduct our propaganda in the Balkans. + + “I fully agree with the general ideas underlying your policy. + + “I feel, indeed, that it will be of value if our own efforts in this + direction, which, for obvious reasons, can at present be only of + the most tentative nature, are preceded by discreet and intelligent + propaganda, such as will not only appeal to our enemies but enlighten + our friends.” + +It was well-known that influential Bulgarians realised the meaning +of the trend of events in the main theatres of war and would have +welcomed the opening of negotiations with the Allies. But it was +obviously impossible to begin territorial bargaining with Bulgarian +representatives of any party, because Bulgaria already possessed more +territory than that to which she was ethnographically entitled. On +the other hand, strictly to follow the ethnographic principle would +raise difficulties to which Lord Northcliffe referred in the foregoing +letter. As it would obviously require long and patient negotiations +with our Allies to establish a just basis, it was deemed to be strongly +advisable to restrict immediate propaganda to telling the Bulgarians +the fate which must inevitably befall them and that unless they made a +complete and effective reversal of their policy, the Allies would do +nothing to save them from that fate or to alleviate their position. + +Four preliminary conditions were laid down as essential to the +establishment of relations with Bulgaria: + + “(_a_) The expulsion of King Ferdinand and his family; + + “(_b_) A complete rupture with Germany; + + “(_c_) Establishment of a democratic Government; + + “(_d_) The orientation of Bulgarian policy in the direction of a + Balkan Confederation under the _ægis_ of the Allied Powers and of the + United States.” + +These lines were suggested as the suitable basis for a reply to secret +overtures which had been made by Bulgarian emissaries claiming to speak +for the new Premier, M. Malinof. + +In due course, Crewe House was authorised to convey an informal message +to the effect “that until Bulgaria had given proof that a complete +reversal of her policy had actually been brought about, we are not +prepared to entertain any suggestions from her.” The Bulgarian agents +were duly notified in this sense, and it is to be presumed that so firm +a message was not without its effect upon the Malinof Government. + +Meanwhile propaganda material in this sense was prepared, reinforced +by pamphlets, such as, for example, that by Lichnowsky, and another +giving full particulars of American preparations. These were translated +into Bulgarian, and this was a matter of some difficulty, as was the +subsequent arrangement for printing. Distribution was principally +arranged through naval and military channels and through secret +agencies of the character operating against other enemy countries. + +Most painstaking work was undertaken to prepare for the publication of +a newspaper in Bulgarian to be smuggled into Bulgaria. When a series +of perplexing difficulties had been surmounted and all arrangements +were in train for an immediate start, the news came that Bulgaria had +surrendered. + +In this connection, too, Ludendorff pays tribute to the effect of +propaganda. “A few days after the 15th (September, 1918), a secret +report of the French General fell into my hands which made it +evident that the French no longer expected any resistance from the +Bulgarian army. Entente propaganda and money, and the United States +representatives who had remained in Sofia, had done their work. In this +instance again the Entente had made a thoroughly good job of it.” (“My +War Memories.”) + +Besides the work in enemy countries, Crewe House also undertook the +enlightenment of prisoners of war in the camps of Great Britain. The +first necessity was the eradication of innate ideas of militarism, +if it had left them with any illusions which their own experience +had failed to shatter. Then the advantages of democratic government +would be inculcated. Rightly it was thought that if these men could +be taught that government of a country must be by the free will and +assent of the governed, a small step at least would have been taken in +the right direction. Such beneficent influences as could be brought +to bear upon them would affect their compatriots on their return home +and might fructify in the expression of changed views in their letters +to their friends. There were several Prisoners of War camps scattered +about Great Britain, each of them being in charge of a Commandant +responsible to the War Office. The late Sir Charles Nicholson, Bt., +a valued member of the Enemy Propaganda Committee, took charge of +this section of Crewe House work, his usual procedure being to have a +personal interview with each of the Commandants, in order to ascertain +from them what newspapers and books were allowed inside the camps, +and what were the English and German newspapers which were most read +by the prisoners. He then submitted to the Commandant a list of books +and newspapers which were approved for such purposes, and suggested to +them that these should be circulated among the prisoners and added to +the library which existed in each of the camps. Among the newspapers +in German which were found to be useful for this purpose were the +_Arbeiterzeitung_ of Vienna, the _Vorwärts_, the _Frankfurter Zeitung_, +the _Berliner Tageszeitung_, and the _Volkstimme_, and such pamphlets +as Prince Lichnowsky’s “_Meine Londoner Mission_,” Hermann Fernau’s +“_Gerade weil ich Deutscher bin_,” Dr. Karl Liebknecht’s “_Brief an +das Kommandanturgericht_,” Dr. Muehlon’s “_Die Schuld der Deutschen +Regierung am Kriege_” and “_Die Verheerung Europas_,” Dr. Anton +Nystroem’s “_Vor dem Tribunale_,” and, in addition, German translations +of Mr. H. G. Wells’s “Mr. Britling Sees it Through,” and copies of Mr. +James W. Gerard’s “My Four Years in Germany.” + +Letters which were sent out by the prisoners of war to their friends +at home were, of course, examined by the postal censor. Sometimes +this examination indicated that certain of the prisoners would prove +susceptible to influence, and a point was made of seeing that such +prisoners were specially supplied with literature. The examination of +prisoners of war was useful, too, in ascertaining what were the ideas +prevalent in the minds of the Germans as to the cause of the war, the +progress of events, and the prospect of ultimate success or failure. + +[Illustration: THE LATE SIR CHARLES NICHOLSON, BART., M.P. MEMBER OF +ENEMY PROPAGANDA COMMITTEE, AND DIRECTOR OF PRISONERS OF WAR SECTION. + +_Photo: Russell & Sons._] + +[Illustration: SIR RODERICK JONES, K.B.E. + +MEMBER OF THE ENEMY PROPAGANDA COMMITTEE. + +_Photo: Elliott & Fry, Ltd._] + +[Illustration: COLONEL THE EARL OF DENBIGH, C.V.O. + +MEMBER OF THE ENEMY PROPAGANDA COMMITTEE. + +_Photo: Speight_] + + + + +CHAPTER VII + +INTER-ALLIED CO-OPERATION + +An axiom for propaganda--Results of a successful conference--Policy, +Means and Methods. + + +Experience gained at Crewe House proved that it is as necessary for +Allies to co-ordinate propaganda against a common enemy as to unify +military command. To conduct propaganda without a policy is bad enough; +but to shut up sets of propagandists working independently of each +other in a number of water-tight compartments, each set representative +of a different nationality, is to court ridicule instead of attracting +serious attention from an intelligent enemy, and to result in the +production of contradictory thoughts and confusion in the minds of +unintelligent adversaries. + +An axiom for propaganda of allies in future wars is that a clear +common policy must be defined, based upon such a foundation of fact +and justice that it need not be altered in its essential principles, +but can be, _and must be_, rigidly adhered to. It will doubtless be +necessary to lay down such a policy for each nation of an opposing +alliance, in the event of the enemy not being a single nation. + +Clearly, too, it should be recognised that propaganda policy, or +policies, must accord with the policy of the diplomatic, military, and +naval authorities. Possessing no administrative function, propaganda +is dependent upon them to make policy operative. Here, again, lack of +co-ordination would involve the risk of confusion, contradiction, and +consequent inefficiency. Propaganda may well and rightly be in advance +of these other departments as a forerunner (with what success other +chapters of this book record) or it may follow, but it must be in +agreement with them. + +Lord Northcliffe had always conceived it to be a fundamental +principle of propaganda against enemy countries that when a line +of policy had been laid by him before the British Government and +sanctioned as a basis for propaganda, the Allied Governments should +be asked for their assent to it, so that their propaganda departments +might act in conformity. In practice it was found that most rapid +co-ordination could be attained by representatives of the Allied +propaganda departments meeting together. One of Lord Northcliffe’s +earliest acts was to convene an inter-Allied gathering at Crewe House +which was attended by Lord Beaverbrook (Minister of Information), M. +Franklin-Bouillon (France), and Signor Gallenga-Stuart (Italy), as well +as by a number of other British, French, Italian, and United States +representatives. + +To some extent this gathering paved the way for the close Allied +co-operation in Italy. Lord Northcliffe would have desired the +immediate establishment of an inter-Allied body for propaganda in +enemy countries, but difficulties were encountered which postponed +the formation of such a body until a later date. Meanwhile, as close +touch as possible was kept with the French and Italian departments +concerned. But the course of events in the summer made it obvious to +Lord Northcliffe and his advisers that an inter-Allied conference on +Enemy Propaganda was indispensable to success. With the assent of the +British War Cabinet, therefore, he issued invitations to the French, +Italian, and United States Governments to send delegates to an official +conference in London. These invitations were cordially accepted and the +Conference assembled at Crewe House on August 14, 1918. + +In addition to representatives of Lord Northcliffe’s department, +and of the Allied propaganda departments, there were also present +representatives of the British Foreign Office, War Office, Admiralty, +Air Ministry, and Ministry of Information. + +The full list of delegates was: + + Great Britain: + + Viscount Northcliffe (Chairman). } Department + Lieutenant-Colonel Sir } of Propaganda + Campbell Stuart. } in Enemy + Sir Charles Nicholson, Bart, M.P. } Countries. + Mr. Wickham Steed. } + + Rear-Admiral Sir Reginald } + Hall (Director of Naval } + Intelligence). } Admiralty. + Captain Guy Gaunt. } + Commander G. Standing. } + + Brigadier-General G. K. } + Cockerill (Deputy-Director } + of Military Intelligence). } War Office. + Major The Earl of Kerry, M.P. } + Captain P. Chalmers Mitchell. } + + Colonel E. H. Davidson. Air Ministry. + + Mr. C. J. Phillips. Foreign Office. + + Sir Roderick Jones (representing } + the Minister of Information). } Ministry of + } Information. + Mr. Cunliffe-Owen (Controller } + of Propaganda against Turkey). } + + France: + + M. Klobukowski. + M. Haguenin. + M. Sabatier D’Espeyran. + Major-General le Vicomte de la Panouse. + M. le Capitaine Prince Pierre d’Arenberg. + Lieutenant le Comte Stanislas de Montebello. + M. Comert. + Lieutenant P. Mantoux. + + Italy: + + Professor Borgese. + Signor G. Emanuel. + Captain Count Vicino-Pallavicino. + Lieutenant R. Cajrati-Crivello. + + United States of America: + + Mr. James Keeley. + Captain Walter Lippmann. } + Captain Heber Blankenhorn. } Present as + Lieutenant Charles Merz. } observers. + Lieutenant Ludlow Griscom. } + +In the speech with which, as Chairman, Lord Northcliffe opened the +Conference, he pointed out that the organisation of British Propaganda +in Enemy Countries had reached a stage at which greater co-ordination +of Allied purpose and effort was required if its objects were to be +achieved in full measure. Propaganda in enemy countries presupposed: + + _a._ The definition, for propaganda purposes at least, of Allied + policy in regard to our enemies; + + _b._ The public manifestation of this policy; and + + _c._ The study of technical means of bringing its main features to + the knowledge of the enemy. + +He suggested that the Conference should resolve itself into a number of +Committees to examine and to report upon these and other matters. Such +Committees would be concerned with: + + 1. The great subject of the policy of propaganda; + + 2. The difficult question of means of distribution: + + (_a_) Military. + (_b_) Civil. + + 3. Propaganda material; + + 4. Educative work among prisoners of war who might return to Germany + to tell their compatriots the real facts. + +Unless based on a definite policy, propaganda could only be +fragmentary and superficial. On the basis of a clear policy it might +become destructive of enemy _moral_, a valuable adjunct to military +operations, and constructive of the necessary conditions of a lasting +peace. + +The three enemy countries with which his Department was mainly +concerned were Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Germany. He cited +Austria-Hungary first, because, of all our enemies, the Hapsburg +Monarchy was the field where positive results were most readily +attainable. + +In the early months of 1918, when he began that work, Germany was +too flushed with her facile triumphs in Russia to be susceptible to +propaganda, and the attitude of Bulgaria was too closely bound up with +German fortunes to be at that moment easily affected by propaganda. +Allied policy in regard to Bulgaria was, moreover, closely connected +with the general Balkan policy of the Allies, the formulation of which +necessarily depended, in its turn, upon the adoption of a definite +policy towards Austria-Hungary. All these considerations pointed to +Austria-Hungary as the foremost object of attack, and therefore as the +country in regard to which a clear propaganda policy was most urgently +required. + +Lord Northcliffe then outlined the steps taken in regard to +Austria-Hungary, described fully in Chapter III. He went on to state +that there was abundant evidence that the work thus begun had helped +to prevent an Austrian offensive in April, and to check it when it +was finally launched in June. There was also strong reason to believe +that, had action on these lines been taken earlier, far greater results +might have been obtained. This was an aspect of the vital connection +between propaganda policy and military operations to which he earnestly +directed attention. He trusted that the Policy Committee of the +Conference might be able to make valuable recommendations in this +respect. + +One important aspect of propaganda against Austria-Hungary and, indeed, +against all our enemies, was the dissemination of knowledge of the +greatness of the war effort of the American people. With that effort +he had had personal acquaintance; and on that very day he had received +a secret report that the Germans had little idea of the supreme effort +which the Americans were making. To this aspect he attributed great and +growing significance. + +In regard to Bulgaria, he had also ventured to lay before the British +Government an outline of propaganda policy, which had received general +approval. Its main features were the necessity of a definite Allied +decision in regard to the Jugo-Slav and Rumanian questions, before any +direct attempt could be made to influence Bulgaria by propaganda. A +definite Jugo-Slav and Rumanian policy presupposed, however, a definite +Allied policy in regard to Austria-Hungary. Upon the details of this +important subject the Policy Committee would be fully informed. Broadly +speaking, he considered it at once inexpedient and dangerous to enter +into any direct or indirect negotiations with Bulgaria or to make to +her proposals even as propaganda until a complete change of attitude +had actually taken place in Bulgaria itself. Until then, propaganda +could consist only in conveying information to the Bulgarian troops +and people as to the fate that inevitably awaited them unless they +reversed completely their attitude; and in preparing by agreement +among the Allied Governments an outline of Balkan policy, aiming at +a solution of the various Balkan questions as nearly as possible on +ethnographical lines. In this way, Allied propaganda might eventually +help to prepare the way for a League of Balkan States. + +Though for many reasons it had not thereto been possible to develop +British propaganda in Germany as fully or as efficiently as it had been +developed in Austria-Hungary, Lord Northcliffe said his department had, +in co-operation with the military authorities, and by the utilisation +of secret channels, been able to introduce into Germany a certain +amount of propaganda literature. The decision of the British military +authorities not to allow the use of aeroplanes on the British Front +in France for the distribution of propaganda had naturally retarded +and hampered the necessary extension of his work. He trusted that this +question of the use of aeroplanes for propaganda purposes would be most +carefully considered by the committee on military distribution. In +the meantime, balloons had been employed, though they were manifestly +far inferior to aeroplanes as instruments of distribution. The view +seemed to prevail that propaganda was not worth casualties. Were this +view well-founded it would be hard to understand why the Germans +should have taken such drastic measures against British airmen accused +of dropping propaganda leaflets. The Germans, who ought to be good +judges, evidently feared our leaflets more than they feared our bombs. +But the main issue was the determination of an Allied propaganda +policy in regard to Germany--a matter of no little difficulty. As he +had said in relation to Austria-Hungary, one of the chief features +of Allied propaganda--apart from questions of policy--would be the +constant dissemination of knowledge of the immensity and of the growing +efficiency of American effort. This feature he had endeavoured to +develop, and he intended to develop it increasingly. On the subject of +policy, however, he had submitted to the British Government an outline +comprising the following points, which it was necessary to bring home +to the Germans. + + 1. The determination of the Allies to continue the war until Germany + accepted the Allied peace terms. + + 2. The existing alliance as a fighting league of free nations would + be deepened and extended and the military, naval, financial, and + economic resources of its members would be pooled until its military + purpose was achieved and peace could be established on lasting + foundations. He had suggested further that, as German minds were + peculiarly susceptible to systematic statement, the Allies should + prepare a comprehensive scheme of world organisation as a counterpart + to the German schemes represented by the phrases “Berlin-Baghdad” and + “Mittel-Europa.” As a preliminary to the drafting of such a scheme, + he had urged that the lines of a practical League of Free Nations + should be studied and laid down. + +Pending the formulation of this scheme, he thought that Allied +propaganda should insist upon Allied control of raw materials, of +shipping, and on the Allies’ power to ostracise for an indefinite +period enemy peoples, until the terms of the Allied peace settlement +were fully accepted. At the same time it should be pointed out that +nothing stood between enemy people and a lasting peace except the +designs of their ruling dynasties and of their military and economic +castes. The primary war aim of the Allies was the changing of Germany, +not only in their own interest, but also in that of the German +people itself, since, without the honest co-operation of a reformed +Germany, disarmament on a large scale might be impossible, and without +disarmament social and economic reconstruction would be impracticable. +He trusted that this question of Allied propaganda policy in regard to +Germany would be carefully weighed by the Policy Committee. + +There remained the extremely important question of the co-ordination of +Allied propaganda effort. It was obvious, he said, that if each Ally +carried on its propaganda in enemy countries without reference to what +the other Allies were doing, there must result great dispersion of +effort, overlapping, and, possibly, some conflict of statement if not +of aims. In order to secure the greatest possible military efficiency, +the Allied Governments had established the Versailles Council, and +had agreed to the appointment of an Allied Commander-in-Chief. Up +till then the only Inter-Allied propaganda institution set up was +the Inter-Allied Propaganda Commission at Padua. The working of this +Commission had revealed the great advantages of concerted effort, +but it had also revealed certain defects which only fuller Allied +co-ordination in matters of propaganda seemed likely to overcome. He +would therefore submit a proposal, definite in aim, though variable +in detail, that there be created a central body for the conduct of +propaganda in enemy countries. By such a step it seemed to him many +delays might be avoided, great economy of energy and expense might +be secured, and progress be made towards the unification of Allied +propaganda policy and of the means for carrying it into effect. + +In conclusion, he asked pardon for reverting once more to the great +importance of a true conception of propaganda in enemy countries, not +only as a means of winning the war, but also and especially as a means +of winning the peace. It was a work that demanded all the intelligence +of the best minds in Allied countries, and the sustained support of +responsible Allied statesmen. + +M. Klobukowski, the head of the French delegation, who followed Lord +Northcliffe with an eloquent speech in French, which Lieutenant Mantoux +interpreted, concurred in all that Lord Northcliffe had said. The +French Government, he said, answered willingly to the invitation sent +to them by the British Government to send their representatives to the +Inter-Allied Conference on Propaganda in Enemy Countries. It seemed to +them necessary to call it to intensify by methodical co-operation and +concerted direction the powerful means of action at the disposal of +the Allies. To see exactly what could be done; to know exactly where +they meant to go--that was the principal aim which must inspire their +propaganda. + +The campaign of systematic untruth which was being waged by the enemy +need not for one moment divert the Allies from their line. Honesty had +never seemed to the Allies to be an inferior policy. In the second +place, French propaganda had taken care to put in a strong light the +responsibility for the war. The war, on the part of our enemies, was +a war of aggression and the service of a policy of conquest and the +enslavement of nationalities. On the Allied side it was a purely +defensive war, for the defence not only of territories, but also of the +great cause of Right violated in Belgium, as in Alsace-Lorraine, in +Poland, in the Ukraine, in Serbia, in Rumania, and in all the Balkan +countries. “We try,” said M. Klobukowski, “to reach in enemy countries +consciences which have hitherto shut out free examination and which +cannot yet control themselves. We try to open eyes and ears now shut by +the most extraordinary education of discipline which has at any time +dominated men. And this with the help not only of arguments taken from +facts which might be considered as arbitrary in practice and intention, +but also with the help of what is admitted by our enemies themselves +in declarations (the sincerity of which is incontestable for they come +from their own agents) from those who dared write what they know, like +Prince Lichnowsky and Dr. Muehlon.” + +Co-operation in the work of liberating the oppressed nationalities +(continued M. Klobukowski) defined clearly one of the ends of our +action against Austria-Hungary; but although we cannot speak of +immediate results, Allied propaganda was not least indispensable +in Germany. If Austria was guilty towards her peoples, Germany was +guilty towards the whole of mankind. Since the war began, the French +Government had been constantly preoccupied with the propaganda to be +effected in Germany. Faced with the monstrous distortion of facts which +the Imperial Government tried to force upon the world, the first French +Yellow Book, in December, 1914, gave the full list of responsibilities +for the war, and showed, by going back to its origin, that Germany +prepared and finally launched the war. + +One of the essential objects of Allied propagandists, therefore, must +be to come back frequently to the origin of the war, in the hope that +such effort will not be in vain. The experience of the publication of +the Lichnowsky memorandum was very encouraging from that point of view, +but that was not enough, as the majority of the German nation had still +confidence in the official versions of the causes of the world conflict +such as had been given to them by the Imperial Government. The Germans +must not be allowed to lower the Allies’ defensive war to the level of +a war of conquest. The Allies must never be tired of insisting that +they were victims of a deliberate aggression. + +On the other hand, it was their interest to insist more and more upon +the character of the struggle in which they were engaged. They were +upon the defensive; they were defending themselves, they were defending +right and humanity; that was their war aim, and all other war aims +were only consequences of it. Deeply imbued as the German nation might +be with doctrines of historical realism, hostile as their Government +might be to the notion of a policy founded upon the respect of right, +the day nevertheless must come when their ideas would triumph over +their resistance, when gradually on one hand the revelations (daily +becoming more definite) would show the criminal complicities which were +the cause of the war. On the other hand the gradual failure of that +bid for domination would oblige the Germans themselves to look for the +culprits. The anxiety about the injustice of their own cause would +finally penetrate into the German nation. + +It was also important clearly to show how useless was the effort made +by the enemy to sever the link between the Powers of the Entente. +The enemy Press was never tired of giving its readers the imaginary +spectacle of divisions between their enemies. After their tales about +France being conquered by the British Army, they proceeded to announce +that the Americans were going to get hold of France. + +Every peace offensive undertaken by the German Government in the hour +of military difficulty gave evidence of the naïve confidence which the +best-informed among them employed in such an attempt to divide us. To +show that the Allied front was indissolubly united, to show that the +Alliance extends still further than the war, that it will extend from +the military to the economic field--that would be the efficient answer +of the Allies. + +It must be said above all that the Allies would conquer and that they +had the means to conquer. They must not let themselves be led towards +discussions. There was always a danger of seeing the enemy get hold +of Allied formulæ, after having emptied them of what they contained. +The German mind, so complex and treacherous, had great ability in the +art of turning to its own account the principles laid down by others. +Germany might attempt once more to mislead the peoples by writing +on her own flag their mottoes while they reserved to themselves the +possibility of giving to those mottoes later on an interpretation +diametrically opposed to the real one. + +Nothing was more important than to defend Allied public opinions +against such enterprises, which would certainly be undertaken by +Germany. The liberation of the peoples, affirmation of the justice of +the Allied cause, demonstration of the violation of right perpetrated +by the Central Empires--such must be the basis of Allied propaganda. + +That was in full harmony with the general policy of principles and +tended to assure to all the peoples the right freely to develop, as +the constitutions of the Allied States had given the same right to +every individual. So Allied victory would have that character of moral +elevation which was the character of the great Allied nations during +their history. But until they reached that victory of liberty and +right, according to the strong words of M. Clemenceau, “let us make +war!” + +Signor Borgese, the representative of Italy, said that he agreed +generally with all the ideas and proposals that had been made by Lord +Northcliffe. + +The Italians had of late been particularly active on the field of +anti-enemy propaganda. For example, they had one office in Rome whose +chief duty it was to spread news arriving from the enemy in order +that his position in the world, and his internal resistance, might +be weakened. They had also in Switzerland a large organisation, the +principal aim of which was to secure daily knowledge of what was going +on in enemy countries, and to utilise to the full every possible means +of securing information about their internal condition. + +The first act of Allied joint propaganda against the enemy was the +Rome Congress in April, which was due largely to the concord and the +friendship of the most enlightened and intelligent elements of public +opinion in England and in Italy. As a result of that Congress, great +consequences had followed in Austria-Hungary, and generally in the +world of the enemy; and the principal task was to pursue the way that +had thus been opened by the Rome Congress. The peculiar position +of Italy as the enemy of Austria naturally entered largely into +the motives that inspired Italian action. The declarations of Lord +Northcliffe--whose influence upon the question of enemy propaganda +was immense--and the declaration of M. Klobukowski were entirely +anti-Austrian in tendency. + +As regards the Italians, they had been enemies of Austria not only +because Austria was their enemy, but also because they felt that it was +the most direct and sure way of being the enemies of Germany and of +Germanism. Those Italians who had understood the true position since +the beginning of the war had always been enemies of Austria in this +sense, and had sought the best means of attacking and annihilating +German militarism through Austria. Although German militarism was not +completely invulnerable, and although the vulnerability of Germany +was not so certain as that of Austria, Austria was the Achilles’ heel +of Germany. Two important conditions that had rendered possible such +action against Austria, were that the necessity of disintegrating +Austria had become generally realised throughout the world, and that +Austria’s responsibility for the war had been generally acknowledged +not only by the Allies, but also by the enemy. Lichnowsky and Muehlon +had acknowledged that the chief and immediate responsibility for the +war rested with Austria. The question of guilt was certainly one of +the chief questions with which propaganda had to deal; and it would +be examined by the committees, because he believed that it might be +possible to accelerate movements of opinion in Germany and in Austria +if a confession of guilt as to the origin of the war were made widely +known. + +As to what had been done by Italian propaganda during the last few +months, he had mentioned the offices at Rome and at Berne, to which he +would refer in more detail in the committees. As to the work of the +Padua Inter-Allied Commission, it was assuredly a very great work, +if one were to judge of its activity not only by personal convictions +but by the convictions of the foe, who had publicly acknowledged +that the defeat on the Piave was partly caused by the efforts of the +Padua Commission, and by information that had been brought to them +by the Jugo-Slavs and Czecho-Slovaks. Allied propaganda must be a +propaganda of truth. The chief difficulty lay in making a distinction +between copying the enemy’s system of actual military operations +and imitating his methods in the war of ideas. It was true that the +military technique of war must be dependent upon that of the adversary, +unless we were to be at a disadvantage; but there was a danger that we +might imitate methods adopted by the enemy in the war of ideas--that +is to say, that we might copy German methods of propaganda. Although +there were people who thought that the Allies should copy lies and +hypocritical statements of German propaganda, he was convinced that +their real arm in the propaganda war was the truth. The Allies could +tell the truth because they were persuaded that they were right. It +was easy for them to have a system of ideas, because they believed +in them as in a kind of religion. Germany and Austria-Hungary would +listen intently to the words that we should say--not necessarily in +that Conference, but to the words of our Governments. Political action +and propaganda would have very great importance at the end of this +campaign, and therefore he hoped that Italians would be able to make +their contribution to the shortening and to the victorious decision of +the war. + +One circumstance that gave them absolute certainty of victory, and was +a certificate of the moral purity of the Allied cause, was the action +of the United States, whom no one--not even the enemy--could accuse +of any selfish motive or interest. While it was conceivable that the +European Allies might be charged, however unjustly, with having some +thought of their direct interests, the United States could not by any +stretch of imagination be regarded as having intervened for any issue +save that of high principle. Therefore, he agreed entirely with Lord +Northcliffe and M. Klobukowski that the more the significance of the +American effort, both in its material and its moral aspects, were +brought to the knowledge of enemy peoples, the more rapid would be the +decline of their _moral_, and the surer the attainment of the just +peace which was the great common aim of the Allies and the purpose of +their action, both military and propagandist. + +Mr. James Keeley, the representative of the United States, said that he +received his appointment through the Committee on Public Information +of the United States Government. Four U.S. military officers were +present, from the Military Intelligence Branch of the General Staff, as +observers. They all met the Conference as pupils, having a most earnest +desire to learn so that they might do their part as whole-heartedly in +this as in all other phases of Allied effort. + +Learning from those who have had experience, they would be enabled to +devote whatever resources they had to the common purpose. They would +report to the American Government what men of experience in this work +had to recommend, and on the basis of that report it was hoped that an +American organisation could be created as quickly as possible, which +should work in the fullest, frankest, and most effective co-operation +with the corresponding organisations of the Allied nations. It would +not be amiss, perhaps, to suggest that, in addition to material +equipment, the United States could contribute one element that might +possibly be of peculiar importance in this work. Its population +contained a large representation of all the peoples of Central Europe. +These peoples were well organised in the United States, and, with a +few exceptions perfectly well-known, were loyal to the Allied cause. +Those peoples, of course, had intimate connections with the peoples of +Central Europe, and it was more than possible that they might be, in +various ways, of great use in carrying messages across the frontiers. +On this point, particularly, they would be glad of the advice of the +Conference. + +After these speeches the four Committees referred to by Lord +Northcliffe were appointed to deliberate on policy, distribution, +material, and prisoners of war. The members of the Conference were +suitably distributed among the different committees, which accomplished +most invaluable work in a business-like manner, and presented their +reports to the full Conference for consideration at its sitting on the +third day. + +The Policy Committee, presided over by M. Klobukowski, considered +exhaustively the problems of propaganda policy in all its fields +and phases of action. Its discussion crystallised into a series +of resolutions and recommendations for sanction, modification +or rejection by the Allied Governments. It was, of course, fully +understood that such resolutions could be only _ad referendum_ and not +binding on the respective Governments. + +In regard to propaganda against Austria-Hungary, the Committee found +itself in complete agreement with the scheme of policy sanctioned +by the British Government for purposes of propaganda, and amplified +by the decisions of the British, French and Italian Governments at +the time of, or in connection with, the Rome Congress of Oppressed +Austro-Hungarian Nationalities. It recognised that such extensions of +policy, while springing from considerations of Allied principles, had, +in part, corresponded to the real demands of the propaganda situation, +which, in their turn, had sprung from the exigencies of the military +situation and, in particular, from the necessity of utilising the +established principles of the alliance for the purpose of impeding or +hampering the Austro-Hungarian offensive against Italy. Subsequent +acts and declarations on the part of Allied Governments and of the +Government of the United States made it clear that the joint policy of +the Allies was tending increasingly towards the constructive liberation +of the subject Austro-Hungarian races. The main task of the Committee +in relation to propaganda in Austria-Hungary seemed, therefore, to +be one of unifying for propaganda purposes these various acts and +declarations, and of preparing, if possible, the way for a joint Allied +declaration that might complete and render more effective the work of +Allied propaganda both in the interior of Austria-Hungary and among +Austro-Hungarian troops at the Front. + +The discussion upon the expediency and the possibility of such a joint +Allied declaration was exhaustive and illuminating. In view of the +position already taken up by the Allied Governments and by the United +States in regard to the Czecho-Slovaks, the Poles, and the Rumanians, +it appeared that the main issue awaiting definition concerned the +question of Jugo-Slav unity and independence, and of the attitude of +Italy towards them. The Committee adopted the following recommendation: + + “With reference to the best means of aiding Allied Propaganda in + favour of the freedom of the Austro-Hungarian subject races, the + Committee expresses a strong hope that all controversial discussions + of the frontiers between Italy and the future Jugo-Slav State will be + avoided by the Jugo-Slav Press and the Jugo-Slav leaders both outside + and, as far as the Jugo-Slav leaders may be able to exert their + influence, also inside the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, just as they + have been avoided of late by the most important organs of the Italian + Press and in the public speeches of influential Italian leaders.” + +During the debate upon this recommendation it became clearly apparent +that the Committee regarded, and was confident that the Conference +would regard, the Italian national claims to the union with Italy +of the cities and regions of Trent, Trieste, and the other regions +of Italian character as not only entirely justified, but also as +an elementary dictate of the Allies’ respect for the principles of +nationality and of ethnical justice. Precisely because the Committee +supported the principles formulated in the Italo-Jugo-Slav Agreement of +last March and saw in them the basis of fruitful co-ordination between +Italy, Jugo-Slavia, and the other nationalities then oppressed of the +Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, it held the Italian national rights above +mentioned to be imprescriptible and not open to discussion. + +The Committee also felt that both for reason of propaganda and from +the point of view of the future independence and moral and political +security of the Italian nation a foremost part in the work of creating +a free and united Jugo-Slav State naturally fell to Italy. Therefore, +after the most careful consideration, it unanimously adopted--and +recommended to the Conference--the following resolution: + + “Considering the adhesion of the Italian Government, by the Prime + Minister’s speech of April, 1918, to the resolutions of the Rome + Congress of Austro-Hungarian subject races (which embodied the + agreement between the Jugo-Slavs and the Italian Committee) and by + his recent telegram to the Prime Minister of Serbia, M. Pashitch; + + “Considering the exemplifications of Allied Policy towards + Austria-Hungary in the French and Italian Convention with the + Czecho-Slovak National Council, the British declaration recognising + the Czecho-Slovaks as an Allied Nation, the Allied declaration at the + Versailles Conference of June 3rd, 1918 in favour of the unity and + independence of Poland and Mr. Lansing’s statement of the 28th June, + that all branches of the Slav races should be completely freed from + German and Austrian rule; + + “Considering further the extreme expediency, especially in view + of possible military developments on the Italian front, that the + Allied policy of liberating the oppressed Hapsburg peoples should + be represented, in the first place, by Italy, on whose front Allied + propaganda against Austria-Hungary is principally located; + + “The Policy Committee of the Inter-Allied Propaganda Conference + resolves to suggest that the Italian Government take the initiative + in promoting a joint and unanimous public declaration that all the + Allies regard the establishment of a free and united Jugo-Slav State, + embracing Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, as one of the conditions of a + just and lasting peace, and of the rule of right in Europe.” + +Passing to the consideration of propaganda against Bulgaria, the +Committee recognised the essential connection between Allied propaganda +policy towards Austria-Hungary and Allied propaganda policy in the +Balkans. Without the adoption by the Allied Governments of a definite +policy in regard to Jugo-Slav and Rumanian unity and independence, it +was impossible to formulate any effective propaganda policy in regard +to Bulgaria. Upon the merits of propaganda in Bulgaria, the Committee +unanimously adhered to the principles laid down in Lord Northcliffe’s +opening statement, that is to say, that an essential preliminary to +any conversations or negotiations with Bulgaria must be a complete +and effective reversal of the policy hitherto pursued by Bulgaria as +the enemy of the Allies; and until this reversal had taken place, +the objects of the Allied propaganda should be to bring home to the +Bulgarian people a sense of the dangers that threatened them unless +they could convince the Allies by their conduct of their sincere +repentance. The Committee was also of the opinion that pending this +necessary change, their Serbian and Greek Allies should not be left in +ignorance of the propaganda policy which the chief Allied Powers might +adopt. + +With reference to Poland, the Chairman of the Committee made a brief +but pregnant statement, declaring the policy of propaganda in regard +to the Poles to be identical with that laid down by President Wilson +and President Poincaré and formulated by the Allied Prime Ministers on +June 3 in the words: “The creation of a united and independent Polish +State, with free access to the sea, constitutes one of the conditions +of a solid and just peace and of the rule of right in Europe.” He added +that the growth of Prussian power for evil, and the present position +of Prussia in the world, had their origin in the partition of Poland. +Consequently he urged that the reunion of the various parts of Poland +would be not only the reparation of an historical injustice, but would +constitute a strong guarantee against any revival of the Prussian +system. He claimed that the greater the strength of Poland, the firmer +would be the security of Europe and the world against any renewal of +aggressive Prussian militarism. + +In the discussion which followed, general agreement was expressed with +this view; but it was pointed out that a reunited Poland might be +stronger in proportion as its territory was ethnographically compact +and did not include other neighbouring racial elements with whom Poland +would have every interest to live in concord, but which, were they +included against their will within her frontiers, might become sources +of disturbance and weakness. It was also considered desirable that the +Polish National Committee, in order to become not less valuable to +the Allies as an adjunct and agency of propaganda in enemy countries +than were the Czech and Jugo-Slav Committees, might extend the basis +of its representation, so as to secure more unanimous support from +the various sections of Polish opinion. The Committee adopted, and +submitted to the approval of the Conference, the following resolution +and recommendation. It proposed to communicate the recommendation to +the Polish National Committee: + + “The Conference records its conviction that the creation of a united + and independent Polish State, with free access to the sea, is an + essential requirement of lasting peace in Europe, and expresses the + belief that the more closely the frontiers of this future Polish + State follow ethnographical lines, the stronger will it be to play + its part in safeguarding that peace, and the more harmonious will be + its relations with neighbouring peoples which, like the Poles, are + striving to secure a free existence. + + “The Conference, anxious that Allied propaganda may truly express + the desires of the Polish people, as a whole, and may tend to promote + its welfare, expresses the hope that the Polish National Council may + extend the basis of its representation so as to be in a position to + lend still further aid to Allied Propaganda in enemy countries.” + +On the question of Alsace-Lorraine, the Committee found itself in +entire agreement with its Chairman’s declaration that the return of +the two provinces to France was an imperative demand of international +justice and not a concession to be made by the Allies to French +national feeling. The undoing of the flagrant wrong done by Germany in +1871 was so clearly a condition of any just peace that it required no +further demonstration; quite apart from the historical justification +of the French claim to the reincorporation of these provinces in +France by their disannexation from Germany, the title of the people of +Alsace-Lorraine to determine their own allegiance proceeded from their +voluntary adhesion to France in 1790, no less than from the protests +of their elected representatives against the Treaty of Frankfurt in +the French National Assembly at Bordeaux in 1871, and in the German +Reichstag in 1874. In regard to Alsace-Lorraine, the Committee was +convinced that Allied Propaganda in Germany should make known to +the German people the determination of the Allies to insist in all +circumstances upon this vindication of rights. + +Consequently it adopted the following resolutions: + + 1. Propaganda on the subject of Alsace-Lorraine should be unified and + conducted on general lines indicated by France. + + 2. The argument to which first place should always be given is that + of outraged right and of the will of the inhabitants as expressed in + their solemn and repeated protests. + + 3. The question of Alsace-Lorraine is a question of international + right, the solution of which interests the whole world. + +As to propaganda addressed to the German people themselves in regard +to the future position of Germany, the Committee was in full agreement +with the policy recommended by Lord Northcliffe with the approval of +the British Government and summarised in his opening statements. It +believed that Allied propaganda should make it clear that the chief +object of the Allies was the changing of Germany, not the destruction +of the German people; and that the German people could hope for +an adequate position in the world, and for admission into a future +society of nations, when they had qualified themselves for partnership +with civilised communities by making the necessary reparations and +restorations (primarily in the case of Belgium) by overthrowing the +system known as Prussian militarism, and when they had effectively +abandoned all designs of mastery over Europe. At the same time, the +Committee laid stress upon the importance of bringing home to the +German people a sense of the economic pressure which the Allies, and +above all the United States of America, were in a position to exercise, +and would exercise, until the conditions of a just peace were accepted. + +To this end the Committee strongly urged that, in the various Allied +countries and in the United States, a comprehensive scheme of world +organisation be studied and worked out, and that, in particular, +the steps already taken to co-ordinate the economic policy of the +Allies and of the United States be publicly explained and brought to +the knowledge of the Germans. The Committee, therefore, adopted and +recommended to the Conference the following resolution: + + “In consideration of the fact that the Allied Governments have in + their own respective fields of action and by their joint action begun + to give effect to economic co-operation, which is to-day a powerful + instrument of war, and which may, after the war, serve as a basis for + the systematic organisation of the resources of the world: + + “The Conference expresses its satisfaction with the results already + attained and believes that it would be expedient to make plain to + enemy public opinion, by means of a service of information, which + would set forth both the principles of Allied economic action and + their results as worked out in daily practice, the gravity of the + danger by which the enemy is threatened, and the advantages assured + to those who are admitted to co-operation with the Allies.” + +The Committee adopted the following resolution: + + “That in view of the great importance of co-ordinating the Allies’ + policies and organisations for the conduct of propaganda in enemy + countries, a permanent body be constituted for this purpose; + + “That this body consist of four members, representing respectively + the four propaganda departments which have taken part in this + Conference; each member having the power to nominate an assistant or + a substitute, or both, if necessary; + + “That the provisional headquarters of the body shall be at Crewe + House, London, until permanent headquarters be determined; + + “That the establishment expenses be shared equally between the four + Governments; and that a permanent secretariat be appointed thereto.” + +In adhering to this resolution, and in deciding that it be recommended +for adoption by the Allied Governments and by the United States, +the Policy Committee had been influenced especially by the hope +that the proposed arrangement might expedite the co-ordination of +Allied propaganda policy, facilitate the preparation of concordant +declarations by the Allied Governments at suitable moments, and assist +in the proper organisation of congresses. + +The discussions of the Distribution Committee were exceedingly +interesting and fruitful. They ranged over the whole field of +propaganda effort, and the Committee’s report summarised the means +of distribution of propaganda in use and assessed their respective +values. So far as military means were concerned, it was found that +the Italians employed aeroplanes, projectiles, and contact patrols; +the French, aeroplanes, projectiles, and balloons; the British, +only balloons on the Western Front, but aeroplanes in the East; and +that seaplanes might be employed to reach special objectives in the +Mediterranean. Each country gave favourable reports on the methods they +employed, but all were agreed that a constant exchange of information +as to results was required. In certain cases, such as the mountainous +Italian Front, where very limited targets had to be reached, the +dropping of propaganda in bulk was necessary; but in most cases methods +that secured a wide scattering of the leaflets, so that those might +be secured and hidden by individuals, were necessary. The French +explained a device, in its experimental stage, to secure an automatic +scattering from aeroplanes. The “releases” of English balloons were +agreed to produce a most adequate scattering. Various devices employed +in projectiles were successful in the case of leaflets when the angle +of projection was high and the wind was favourable, but hitherto had +not been successful with pamphlets. It was recognised that aeroplanes +were the best means of reaching distant targets with accuracy; that +for shorter distances, from a few hundred yards up to ten miles, +projectiles would secure great accuracy. + +With regard to range, it was recognised that aeroplanes had the widest +limits, and the scattering of literature in Berlin by the French and +in Vienna by the Italians was considered an accomplishment of great +brilliancy and promise of usefulness, and that the types of paper +balloons in use were thoroughly effective for ranges up to twenty or +thirty miles, and with less certainty of aim up to 100 or 150 miles; +but that with larger balloons (such as the fabric balloons in the +possession of the English, or the new larger “doped” paper balloons +then being prepared in England, or the reinforced paper balloons being +experimented with in France) the distances could be increased to +several hundred miles. + +As to the bulk that could be distributed, it was stated that each of +the standard balloons, then used by the English and French, carried +4 lb. 2 oz. of literature, and that projectiles could take from a few +ounces up to 8 or 9 lb. The large fabric balloons then available at +G.H.Q. could carry up to 15 lb. + +It was recognised that there were no objections to the use of balloons, +as the operations did not interfere with other work and did not excite +retaliation from the enemy. The use of projectiles was apt to provoke +retaliation unless it were carried out at night or to a limited extent. +There was difference of experience and opinion with regard to the use +of aeroplanes. The Italians and French stated that no action had been +taken by the enemy in the case of their airmen who had been captured, +and that they found no difficulty in imposing this duty on their +airmen. The British, however, stated that the Germans had taken strong +measures, and had threatened their continuance, against airmen captured +after distributing leaflets. The representative of the British Air +Ministry stated that, after giving full consideration to the matter, +and notwithstanding their appreciation of the value of propaganda, +they were opposed to the use of aeroplanes for this purpose, partly +on the ground of the bad psychological effect of such work on young +pilots and aviators and partly because the supply of trained men and of +machines was no more than sufficient for the direct purposes of this +arm of the Forces. The representative of G.H.Q., France, said that the +British Army had accepted this view. He added that balloons could be +employed on the Western Front three days a week on the average, and +that there was no mechanical reason why the method by balloons could +not be increased to meet every reasonable requirement. + +A French representative in the course of a discussion as to the utility +of throwing some leaflets in bombing expeditions, reported the opinion +of a well-known pro-ally German citizen that in the case of the Rhine +towns and rich cities of Germany the propaganda of fear, that is to +say, the actual dropping of bombs, was more useful than the dropping of +literature. + +It was agreed that the suggested use of aeroplanes to scatter leaflets +at great heights parallel with the enemy lines encountered most of the +objections to, and none of the dangers of, their direct use by crossing +the lines. A device which had been worked out experimentally in +England, but was not employed because of the danger it might occasion +to aeroplanes, was explained and the apparatus shown. It consisted in +sending up leaflets to be liberated at the necessary height for wind +driftage by means of a messenger travelling up and down the cable of +a box kite. This means was recognised to be cheap and efficient for +employment where it would not be dangerous to aeroplanes. + +The Committee agreed that the regular exchange of information as to +methods employed by the Allies, and as to the results actually obtained +by these, would be of great value, and recommended that a permanent +bureau should be established to collect and exchange such information +and reports. + +As regards civil means of distribution, the Committee recommended that +increased attention be paid to the insertion of news and articles in +neutral organs which were either read or quoted in the enemy countries. +Special stress was laid on the importance of establishing effective +relations with organs which had a reputation for strict neutrality or +pro-enemy bias. + +The Committee also recommended that each Power should seek through +its agencies to establish channels through which enemy newspaper +correspondents could be influenced or provided with information. The +task of approaching all sufficiently important correspondents with +whom contact had not been established should be apportioned among the +agencies of the Powers according to the opportunities of approach +available. Channels created under a scheme of this kind should be made +mutually available to the respective Allied agents in the localities +concerned. + +Having regard to the extent to which the ordinary book trade channels +into Germany were still operating, the Committee recommended the +publication in neutral countries of works which, though not directly +bearing on the issues of the war, were expressly calculated to educate +enemy opinion in a democratic sense. The Committee held that, in view +of its great utility, clandestine circulation in the enemy countries of +carefully-chosen literature, especially if actually written by enemy +subjects of pro-Ally or revolutionary tendencies, should be secured +through every available channel. In view of the precarious and delicate +nature of this work, the Committee desired specially to emphasise the +necessity of seeking out and developing new channels for distribution +of this kind. + +The main part of the time which the Committee on Material gave to the +discussion of its subject was devoted to the question of the most +effective forms of propaganda and to the special methods desirable +for putting these forms into practice. There was general agreement +that the best way to depress the _moral_ of the German troops and the +German population was to show them that it was against their interest +to continue the war; that the longer they went on the worse they +would fare both during the war and after; and that their only hope of +regaining their place in the community of nations lay in throwing over +the bad advisers who had led them into the war, and whose repeated +promises of success had been one after the other falsified. Thereto the +Germans had always had a hope before them. They were taught to hope +for great advantage from the downfall of Russia, from the unrestricted +U-boat warfare, from the last offensive on the Western Front. For the +first time their leaders did not know what hope to dangle before them. +Therefore, the moment was one peculiarly favourable for propaganda if +undertaken upon the right lines. + +It appeared to the Committee that the best lines upon which to work +would be to emphasise as much as possible the great American effort, +both in the field and at home in the factory, the shipyard, and the +farm. At the same time the dark commercial outlook for Germans, the +dangers lying latent for them in the control of raw materials by +the Allies, the discovery of so many of their trade secrets, and +the building up in France, Italy, England, and the United States of +industries in which they had almost a monopoly before the war ought +also to be brought as vividly as possible before them. They should +be told the truth about the food situation in France and England, +which so far had been kept from them. They should be given news as +quickly as possible of Allied successes. They should be depressed as +much as possible, yet at the same time care should be taken not to +let them think they were for ever excluded from relations of business +and friendship with the peoples then fighting against them. If they +were made to believe this, their backs would be stiffened to fight +on desperately as long as possible. A sound line of propaganda, the +Committee considered, would be to leave open a doorway through which +if they got rid of Pan-Germanism and renounced its theories of world +domination by blood and iron they would in time be admitted again to +the same intercourse as before. It was agreed that for soldiers the +most elementary propaganda was the best. More elaborate arguments +and demonstrations should be kept for pamphlets to be smuggled into +Germany and for articles in neutral papers. Use should be made wherever +possible of diagrams appealing instantly to the eye. + +A long discussion took place on the question of revolutionary +propaganda. The opinion was expressed that it was better to denounce +the Pan-German party generally and throw upon them the responsibility +for the war and for all the misfortunes which Germany had suffered +and would still further suffer from it, rather than to attack the +Emperor. On the other hand, it was pointed out that attacks on an +individual are always more effective than attacks on a party. Finally, +it was agreed that anything said against the Hohenzollern dynasty +should be taken, either in reality or in appearance, from German +sources, so as to avoid the risk that attacks clearly emanating from +Allied sources might strengthen rather than weaken the Emperor’s +hold upon the people of Germany. While a good deal of material was +available from German anti-Imperial sources, it was suggested that +the advantage of circulating, for example, speeches of Socialists, +might be counterbalanced by the disadvantage that it would make such +speakers less inclined to talk. Some Socialists had appealed to the +French Government not to use their speeches for propaganda, because +this weakened their efforts. It was agreed that incitements to German +soldiers to desert were legitimate and might be useful. The sending +into Germany of photographs of prisoners of war taken immediately after +their capture, when they were usually in a deplorable condition, and +after two months of captivity, when their physical condition was good, +was recommended. + +With regard to Austria-Hungary, the Committee discussed whether it was +illegitimate to exploit the land hunger among the Magyar peasants and +the discontent among the German proletariat. It was agreed that it +would do no harm to support the agrarian agitators in Hungary, but, as +regards Bolshevik propaganda among the Austro-German working classes, +that the Allies ought only to circulate their own literature. It was +suggested that the United States, in mobilising its Slav elements, +might spare members of each of the Slav nationalities for propaganda +work in England and in France. + +Propaganda in Bulgaria depended on the policy which the Entente Powers +and the United States decided to follow with regard to that country. +Until such a policy was settled little could be done in a large way. It +was useful, however, to make the Bulgarians acquainted with a number +of facts of which they were ignorant, as for example, the failure of +U-boats to reduce England to the verge of starvation, the large number +of American troops already in France, and so on. Leaflets on these and +other topics were being dropped regularly by aeroplanes on the Salonica +front in considerable quantities. A good deal, it was suggested, could +be done through Bulgars in Switzerland. But so long as the Bulgarians +believed that the United States was their friend and would see them +through whatever happened, little impression could be made upon them. + +With regard to co-operation between the various bodies engaged in +propaganda, it was proposed that closer relations should be established +between the local agents of the Allied Powers in neutral countries; +that they should meet from time to time to exchange ideas and to give +each other full information as to their activities. Special stress +was laid upon the necessity of these local agents working in union +with the diplomatic and military representatives and with any other +agencies engaged in the same kind of work. The Committee unanimously +accepted this suggestion, with the proviso that the local agents +should, if possible, be under the direction of the Central Committee, +to which they could refer for instructions and advice. Pending the +establishment of such a central body, arrangements were made for the +various Propaganda Departments to begin at once to exchange information +about all that they were doing and that each should send out copies of +all the material produced by it to the other departments. It was, of +course, agreed that such circulation of material produced would be one +of the chief activities of the proposed central body, which would do it +with greater rapidity and effect. + +It was also agreed that such a central body could be most useful +in employing methods for testing the effectiveness of propaganda. +The means of doing this were generally admitted to be defective. +Only by co-ordinating effort and by comparing information could +they be improved. It was decided that the existing system of +examining prisoners of war for purposes of military information +ought to be supplemented by a special further examination for the +purposes of propaganda information, and it was suggested that special +representatives of the Enemy Propaganda Departments should be allowed +to conduct such examinations. + +Some important points connected with propaganda brought to bear upon +Germany through neutral countries were raised, and it was agreed +that the work of controlling and distributing films for moving +picture theatres, which was to be done by an Inter-Allied Commission +in Switzerland, ought to be extended to other neutral countries, +especially Sweden. Information before the Committee bore testimony that +German-owned picture theatres had of late increased very much in number +both in Switzerland and in Scandinavia, and that these relied for the +lighter part of their entertainments upon films from Allied countries, +Germany supplying special propaganda films. By controlling the supply +of films from Allied countries, the activity of these theatres could be +very much diminished and possibly brought to an end. + +It was also agreed that it would be advisable to invite a number of +neutral editors and newspaper writers to pay a visit to the United +States. It was considered that articles describing what they saw and +what they were able to judge of the feeling of the American nation +would have a very useful effect upon German opinion. + +With a view to influencing German opinion, it was agreed that more news +agencies, to all appearance independent and self-supporting, might well +be established in other neutral countries; that more efforts should be +made to get articles inserted in enemy newspapers, not controversial +articles, but statements of what the Allies were doing, especially +in the economic field, written as a German might write them who was +anxious about the future of his country; and that dispatch of Allied +newspapers to neutral countries should be improved and extended so that +there might be more chance of their finding their way into Germany. + +The discussions of the Prisoners of War Committee showed that agreement +existed as to the soundness of the methods adopted by Crewe House for +this particular work, and the report took the form of a recommendation +that they should be generally adopted by the Allies. + +At the final plenary session of the Conference, on August 17, 1918, +it was unanimously resolved that the Committees’ reports should be +accepted, and submitted by the heads of the four Missions to their +respective Governments for their approval and adoption. The Conference +resolved to constitute (as suggested by the Policy Committee) a +permanent inter-Allied body for the conduct of propaganda in enemy +countries and by so doing made a great advance. In order to maintain +close touch with the French propaganda authorities, Lord Northcliffe +appointed Colonel Lord Onslow as resident representative of Crewe +House in Paris. By the time the Armistice was signed the different +Governments had nominated their delegates to the permanent Inter-Allied +body and all the necessary preliminary arrangements had been +satisfactorily made. This organisation would have opened a new chapter +in the history of war propaganda but for the conclusion of hostilities. +As Lord Northcliffe said in his final speech to the Conference, the +constitution of a permanent Inter-Allied body was a step towards that +general co-ordination of Allied purpose and organisation which the +experience of the war had proved to be a postulate of rapidity and +efficiency of action. The work of the Conference itself, however, was +invaluable as it surveyed the policy and organisation of propaganda +against the enemy in all its phases and from many points of view at +a time when propaganda had just passed into the intensive stage. Its +reports in themselves form a text-book in the science and art of +propaganda. + +[Illustration: “DRIFTING DOWN IN WHITE SHOWERS”: LEAFLETS (INSTEAD OF +BOMBS), FROM ITALIAN AEROPLANE SQUADRON, DROPPING ON VIENNA--AN AIR +PHOTOGRAPH. + +_Photograph supplied by the Photographic Studios of the Italian Air +Service. By kind permission of the “Illustrated London News.”_] + +[Illustration: MR. ROBERT DONALD. + +MEMBER OF THE ENEMY PROPAGANDA COMMITTEE. + +_Photo: Elliott & Fry, Ltd._] + +[Illustration: SIR SIDNEY LOW. + +MEMBER OF THE ENEMY PROPAGANDA COMMITTEE + +_Photo: Elliott & Fry. Ltd_] + +[Illustration: MR. JAMES O’GRADY, M.P. + +MEMBER OF THE ENEMY PROPAGANDA COMMITTEE.] + + + + +CHAPTER VIII + +FROM WAR PROPAGANDA TO PEACE PROPAGANDA + +The Co-ordination of British Policy--A representative committee--Lord +Northcliffe’s Article: “From War to Peace.” + + +In addition to its success in its practical bearing and direct +influence on the work of spreading the truth concerning the war in +the enemy countries, the Inter-Allied Conference at Crewe House +in August, 1918, was a distinctly useful act of propaganda in two +other directions. First, it led to a mutual appreciation, among the +influential representatives of the four countries, of the effort and +determination of each nation and of their willingness to combine to +achieve victory--in other words, to a better understanding of each +other’s will to conquer and readiness to subordinate self-interest to +the larger object of Allied accomplishment of purpose. + +In the second place, the Conference was an object-lesson to the British +Government Departments which participated in it as to the value of +concerted and co-ordinated action in propaganda matters. Shortly +afterwards, a suggestion was made by an influential representative +of one of these Departments that a committee should be formed to +represent all British departments concerned in any way with propaganda. +Moreover, it gradually became evident to all concerned that the +collapse of Bulgaria was the beginning of the end, and that “war +propaganda” must by a process of steady evolution become “peace-terms +propaganda,” by which public opinion in enemy countries as well as at +home, in the Dominions, and in Allied and neutral countries, might be +made accustomed to the peace which the Allies intended to make. The +maintenance of British prestige demanded that our position in regard +to the peace should be explained and justified by the widespread +dissemination of news and views, both before and during the Peace +Conference. + +Thus it was more than ever imperative that all British propagandists +should speak with one voice. Here then was work ready to be done by +the suggested inter-departmental committee, for the formation of which +invitations had already been issued to the departments concerned to +send as delegates to this Committee responsible officials able to give +decisions for their departments on such matters as would be discussed +by such a committee. These invitations were accepted by: + + The War Cabinet, + The Admiralty, + The War Office, + The Foreign Office, + The Treasury, + The Ministry of Information, + The Air Ministry, + The Colonial Office, + The India Office, + The War Aims Committee, and + The Official Press Bureau. + +Representatives of these departments and of Lord Northcliffe’s +department, which, for official purposes, had been renamed The British +War Mission, thus formed what was known as the Policy Committee of the +British War Mission. + +While this Committee was in process of formation, Crewe House had been +studying the problems of “peace-terms propaganda” and had, as a result +of a series of conferences, prepared a memorandum outlining a basis +upon which such propaganda could be developed. + +The first meeting of the Policy Committee was held at Crewe House on +October 4, 1918, and I presided in the absence, through indisposition, +of Lord Northcliffe. After giving a summarised account of the work +carried on from Crewe House, I said that whatever results it had been +possible to achieve had proceeded mainly from the circumstance that it +had in each case been based upon definite policies in regard to the +countries concerned. These policies had all been submitted to, and +had received the approval of, the British Government. The advantages +of this procedure were obvious. It enabled propagandists to work on +consistent lines without fear that the representations they made to +the enemy would be contradicted by actual occurrences. In this way, +propaganda representations had a cumulative effect. If, for instance, +enemy troops were at first inclined to regard representations with +scepticism, they were gradually convinced by the force of events that +they had been told the truth from the outset, and that consequently +subsequent representations deserved serious attention. Another +advantage had proceeded from the obvious circumstance that as Allied +policy must correspond to the aims which the Allies were determined to +secure at the peace, the representation of that policy to propaganda +was in harmony with the war aims of the Allies, and was strengthened +by every successive declaration by Allied statesmen of the objects for +which they were fighting. A third advantage was that the propaganda +of the enemy could not destroy the effects of our propaganda without +having gained such military successes as to render the Allied war aims +themselves unattainable. Consequently every Allied victory that brought +the war aims nearer attainment enhanced also the efficacy of propaganda. + +At the outset, the efforts made by Crewe House were naturally tentative +and experimental. Their real value could only be proved by the test of +experience. This test had been applied in Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, +and Germany. As against Austria-Hungary, Crewe House propaganda +contributed to the defeat of the Austrians on the Piave in June, and +had its efforts not been thwarted by political short-sightedness and +some personal intrigue on the part of various Italian authorities, it +was certain that much greater headway would have been made and that the +Italian armies would have been in a much more favourable position. As +it was, the policy of liberating the Austro-Hungarian subject races, +upon which propaganda had been based, had already had a marked effect +in the interior of the Dual Monarchy, and had brought large sections +of the inhabitants to the point of revolt. This would be clear when +it was said that the Italo-Jugo-Slav Agreement of March, 1918, the +Rome Congress of the Hapsburg Subject Races of April, with its sequel +in the declarations by the Allies and the United States to the Poles, +Czecho-Slovaks and Southern Slavs, as well as the actual recognition of +the Czecho-Slovaks and the prospective recognition of the Jugo-Slavs +as Allied and belligerent nations, had all been influenced, if not +directly promoted, by the efforts of Crewe House. + +As regards Bulgaria, Crewe House definitely rejected Bulgarian +overtures until there should be a complete reversal of Bulgarian +policy. That reversal had taken place, and had opened up further +prospects of propaganda against Austria-Hungary of which speedy +advantage was being taken. + +The work in Germany had been positive and negative. Its aim had been to +give the German people something to hope for and much to fear--in other +words, to make it clear to them that the only way to escape complete +ruin would be to break with the system that brought the war upon +Europe, and to qualify for admission into a League of Nations on the +Allied terms. In addition to these educative efforts, we had supplied +the enemy armies with constant and invariably truthful information +about the actual military position. The news which the German military +authorities were withholding from their troops had been supplied by +us. Hence their cries of alarm. Nevertheless, much remained to be done +in the co-ordination of the efforts of all Government Departments so +as to make the general work of propaganda as rapid and as efficient as +possible. Much use had unfortunately deprived the term “propaganda” +of its real meaning. In its true sense it meant the education of the +enemy to a knowledge of what kind of world the Allies meant to create, +and of the place reserved in it for enemy peoples according as they +assisted in, or continued to resist, its creation. It implied also +the dissemination of this knowledge among the Allied peoples, so that +there might be full popular support for Allied policy and no tendency +at the critical moment of peace to sacrifice any essential feature of +the settlement because its importance might not have been explained +or understood in time. Next to the actual work of fighting the enemy +on land and sea, there was no more important work than this; and the +joint intelligence and energy of all Departments of the Government were +required to accomplish it successfully. For this reason the suggestion +that this council of representatives of the Government Departments +chiefly concerned should be formed had been warmly welcomed, in order +that there might be less dispersion of effort, less overlapping, and +greater mutual comprehension of the work which each Department was +striving to do, and fuller co-ordination in the direction of all those +efforts to one single end. + +As the war approached its end, enemy propaganda must gradually pass +into peace offensives and counter-offensives. The British War Mission +therefore had already in existence an organisation to collect and +collate various suggestions, territorial, political, economic, and so +forth, that had been made by the different sections and parties in +Allied, neutral, and enemy countries. A step in this direction was the +report on the Propaganda Library, issued by the War Office early in +1917, by Captain Chalmers Mitchell, who had since become the liaison +officer between the British War Mission and the War Office, and who +had been asked to act as Secretary of the Policy Committee. Captain +Chalmers Mitchell was in charge of the aforesaid organisation at Crewe +House, and although its immediate function was to collect information +useful for propaganda, it was clear that it would also obtain material +useful to those who had to shape peace policy. For propaganda to the +enemy was in a sense a forecast of policy; it must be inspired by +policy, but at the same time its varying needs also suggested policy. + +It was hoped, therefore, that this Policy Committee might assist +in furnishing materials for the compilation of the various peace +proposals, in revising the collation of them, in drawing inferences +from them and in discussing the action and reaction of peace propaganda +and peace policy that the inferences suggested. + +The Committee decided to undertake the following immediate activities: + + Study of Peace Terms. + + Study of utterances by important enemy representatives to form + decisions as to what credence should be given them and what response + should be made to them. + + Suggestion of statements to be made by Allied representatives, and + consideration of their phraseology and substance. + + Special consideration of the reception to be given to German + statements as to the course of democratisation in Germany. + +At an emergency meeting of the Committee summoned a few days later to +draft a statement of propaganda policy with reference to the German +Peace Note, Lord Northcliffe said his department had prepared for +submission to the Committee a draft statement, based on a consideration +of President Wilson’s pronouncements. After various slight +modifications had been made, the statement was adopted in principle. + +In its final form it read: + + “In order to stop further bloodshed, the German Government requests + the immediate conclusion of an armistice on land and water and in the + air. + + “The Note accepts the programme set forth by the President of the + United States in his message to Congress of January 8th, 1918, and in + his later pronouncements, especially his speech of September 27th, as + a basis for peace negotiations. + + “In point of fact, the pronouncements of President Wilson were a + statement of attitude made before the Brest-Litovsk treaty, and + enforcement of the peace of Bucharest on Rumania, and the German + statement of their intentions at the outset of the Spring offensive. + They cannot, therefore, be understood as a full recitation of the + conditions of peace. + + “The phrasing of the German acceptance of them as a ‘basis for + peace negotiations’ covers every variety of interpretation from + sincere acceptance to that mere desire for negotiations which is the + inevitable consequence of the existing military situation. It is, + therefore, impossible to grant any armistice to Germany which does + not give the Entente full and acceptable guarantees that the terms + arranged will be complied with. There must be a clear understanding + that Germany accepts certain principles as indisputable, and + reserves for negotiation only such details as, in the opinion of the + Associated Powers, are negotiable. + + “In the full conviction of the power and the will of the Associated + Powers to enforce a peace that shall be just and lasting, we shall + thankfully accept conclusive evidence that the peoples of our present + enemies are willing to co-operate in the establishment of such a + peace. With the object of making the conditions of such co-operation + clear, we take the opportunity, presented by the German peace note, + of exploring more fully the ground covered by President Wilson’s + pronouncements and of distinguishing explicitly between principles + and conditions that must be accepted as indisputable, and terms and + details that may be the subject of negotiation. + + “The following conditions are indisputable:-- + + “_In no sense whatever shall restoration or reparation in the case of + Belgium be taken into consideration when adjusting any other claims + arising from the war._ + + “1. The complete restoration, territorial and political, of + Belgium. The assumption by Germany of the full financial burden + involved in material restoration and reconstruction, including + the replacement of machinery, the provision of war pensions and + adequate compensation for all civilian losses and injuries, and the + liquidation of all Belgian war debts. In view of the circumstances in + which Germany invaded Belgium, no allegations that Belgian civilians + acted against military law or imposed authority shall be taken into + consideration. The future international status of Belgium shall be + settled in accordance with the wishes of the Belgian nation. + + “2. The freeing of French territory, reconstruction of the invaded + provinces, compensation for all civilian losses and injuries. + + “3. The restoration to France of Alsace-Lorraine, not as a + territorial acquisition or part of a war indemnity, but as reparation + for the wrong done in 1871, when the inhabitants of the two + Provinces, whose ancestors voluntarily chose French allegiance, were + incorporated in Germany against their will. + + “4. Readjustment of the Northern frontiers of Italy as nearly as + possible along the lines of nationality. + + “5. The assurance to all the peoples of Austria-Hungary of their + place amongst the free nations of the world and of their right to + enter into union with their kindred beyond the present boundaries of + Austria-Hungary. + + “6. The evacuation of all Territory formerly included in + the boundaries of the Russian Empire, the annulment of all + treaties, contracts, or agreements made with subjects, agents, or + representatives of Enemy Powers since the Revolution and affecting + territory or interests formerly Russian, and co-operation of the + Associated Powers in securing conditions under which the various + nationalities of the former Empire of Russia shall determine their + own form of Government. + + “7. The formation of an independent Polish State with access to + the Sea, which State shall include the territories inhabited by + predominantly Polish populations, and the indemnification of Poland + by the Powers responsible for the havoc wrought. + + “8. The abrogation of the Treaty of Bucharest, the evacuation and + restoration of Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro, the Associated Powers + to aid the Balkan States in settling finally the Balkan question on + an equitable basis. + + “9. The removal, so far as is practicable, of Turkish dominion over + all non-Turkish peoples. + + “10. The people of Schleswig shall be free to determine their own + allegiance. + + “11. As reparation for the illegal submarine warfare waged by + Germany and Austria-Hungary, these Powers shall be held liable to + replace the merchant tonnage belonging to the Associated and Neutral + nations illegally damaged or destroyed. + + “12. The appointment of a tribunal before which there shall be + brought for impartial justice individuals of any of the belligerents + accused of offences against the laws of war or of humanity. + + “13. The former Colonial possessions of Germany lost by her in + consequence of her illegal aggression against Belgium shall in no + case be returned to Germany. + + “The following conditions of Peace are negotiable: + + “1. The adjustment of claims for damage necessarily arising from + the operations of war, and not included amongst the indisputable + conditions. + + “2. The establishment, constitution, and conditions of Membership of + a League of Free Nations for the purpose of preventing future wars, + and improving international relations. + + “3. The League of Free Nations shall be inspired by the resolve of + the Associated Powers to create a world in which, when the conditions + of the Peace have been carried out, there shall be opportunity and + security for the legitimate development of all the Peoples.” + +This was approved by a representative of the Government, designated _ad +hoc_, for unofficial use as propaganda policy. Each department adapted +it to its own needs. So far as Crewe House was concerned, effective use +was made of it on two occasions--the first being when Lord Northcliffe, +at the suggestion of the Enemy Propaganda Committee, dealt with the +subject of peace terms in an address to United States officers at the +“Washington Inn,” London, on October 22, 1918. + +At a meeting of the Policy Committee at Crewe House on October 28, the +action of the various departments on the memorandum was stated and +approved. + +The Crewe House Committee reported first as to Lord Northcliffe’s +address at the Washington Inn; next that the production department of +the Enemy Propaganda Committee was engaged on a series of pamphlets +and leaflets dealing with different points of the terms; third, that +a reasoned statement covering the whole ground, and showing what +Germany had to gain in the end, was being drafted for publication, +the idea being that it should appear as an article or as a speech to +which wide circulation would be given; and lastly that the secretary +of the permanent Inter-Allied Body for Propaganda in Enemy Countries +had written to the French, Italian, and American members of that body +enclosing a copy of the Peace Policy Memorandum and suggesting that +they should take action similar to that of the British Policy Committee +and bring the subject up for discussion at the next meeting of the +Inter-Allied Body. (It may be mentioned here that the rapid course of +events prevented the contemplated meeting of the Inter-Allied Body.) + +That was the last meeting of the Policy Committee. There remains to +be set forth the final result of its work. Crewe House, as explained +above, had stated its intention of publishing an article covering the +whole ground of the memorandum in such a way that the policy could be +presented in the same terms to our own people, to our Allies, and to +the enemy. It was found impracticable to get such an article published +quickly enough in a high-class magazine, or to get an immediate +occasion for making it the text of a speech. In these circumstances +the Committee asked their chairman, Viscount Northcliffe, to give the +Peace Policy the wide publicity possible by the use of his name and +by the sources of distribution which he was able to command. Lord +Northcliffe agreed, and accordingly produced the article which follows +and which was a full statement of the agreed policy. He arranged for +its simultaneous publication in the London Press and, at his own +expense, had it cabled to the remotest parts of the world. As stated +in the House of Commons by the Financial Secretary to the Treasury, +the document was unofficial. Its purpose was to form the basis of a +policy of publicity and the fact that it was proposed to elaborate it +for publication was announced beforehand, and approved by the Policy +Committee. This is the text of the article from _The Times_ of November +4, 1918: + + FROM WAR TO PEACE + + By LORD NORTHCLIFFE + + _This article is appearing to-day in the leading papers in Canada, + Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Newfoundland, India, the + British Dependencies, United States, South America, France, Italy, + Spain, Switzerland, Holland, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Japan and + elsewhere._ + + _It will be circulated in Germany during the present week._ + + Now that peace is at last in sight, I hear the question being + asked on all sides: “How are we to pass from war conditions to peace + conditions?” This cannot be done by a sudden and dramatic declaration + like the declaration which in August, 1914, changed peace into war. + It must be a slow and laborious process--a process with, as it seems + to me, at least three distinct and successive stages. Out of these + stages will be formed the organic whole which will constitute the + machinery for replacing war conditions by peace conditions. + + It is important to get these three stages clearly outlined in our + imaginations, and it is important also to bear in mind that each + stage will smooth the path for its successor precisely in proportion + to the sincerity and thoroughness with which it has been completed. + There is but one goal for those who are honest and far-seeing. That + goal is to create a condition of the world in which there shall + be opportunity and security for the legitimate development of all + Peoples. The road is long and difficult, but I believe that its + course is already clear enough to be described, in the same words, to + those who are our friends and to those who are now our enemies. + + I + + The first stage is the cessation of hostilities. Here, whether they + cease on account of an armistice or by reason of surrender, there can + be no question as to the “Honour” of the German people, or as to any + adjustment of the conditions to any supposed strategical or actual + strength of the Central Powers. + + If they feel humiliated, they must blame those who brought + humiliation upon them; and as to military strength, the semi-official + organ of the German Government, the _Norddeutsche Allgemeine + Zeitung_, has admitted that our reserves are such as Germany cannot + compete with. + + It is clear [said this newspaper on October 12] that if we + systematically continued the war in this way, fighting might go on + for a long time. The annihilation of the German Army is still a long + way from attainment; we still have a quantity of unspent forces at + our command in the recruit depôts behind the front, in the reserve + battalions, and at home. But _doubtless there are certain limits to + all this on our side, whereas our enemies--chiefly America--are in a + position to replace men and materials on an ever-increasing scale_. + + Another equally important admission I found in the _Münchner Neueste + Nachrichten_, the leading South-German organ, on October 25. + + A German retreat beyond the frontier [this journal said] and + especially an advance by the enemy to the frontier, would render the + German situation much worse, as it would expose Germany’s industrial + territory to the Entente’s artillery fire, and particularly their air + attacks, while the danger to the enemy’s industrial districts would + be correspondingly removed. _This condition alone would not only + secure the enemy’s military preponderance, but would increase it._ + + Thus it is clear that Germany, deprived now of the help of her + allies, recognises her hopeless situation. The conditions upon which + hostilities can cease must be laid down by the military and naval + leaders of the Associated Powers and accepted by the Central Powers + in such form that no resumption of hostilities is possible. + + And this I will say: The spirit in which Germany accepts these + stern and necessary conditions will do much to determine the course + of future events. If she haggles over the conditions, or is sullen + and obstructive in her mode of carrying them out, then our profound + distrust of her spirit and motives will survive into the subsequent + stages and still further delay that re-establishment of tolerable + relations which must be our object. But if Germany by word and deed + makes plain her abandonment of that belief in Might which her rulers, + supported until recently by the majority of her people, have used as + a menace to the power of Right, the greatest obstacle in the path of + equal justice will have been removed. + + By a stroke of the pen, in accepting the conditions of armistice, + or by a mere gesture of unconditional surrender, Germany can cause + fighting to cease. Naturally, the business of evacuation and of + reoccupation will have to be conducted by concert between the + military and naval leaders. The first governing condition in these + operations and detailed arrangements will be the safety of the + peace. The second condition will be the security of civilian life + and property. The emotional background to all this will be a daily + increasing desire on the part of all to get back to normal conditions + of life. Co-operation and agreement will be required, not so much to + secure that demobilisation and disarmament shall be forced sternly + on those who have surrendered as to secure that each side takes its + fair share in the burden of maintaining order and in facilitating the + change from military to civilian organisation. + + II + + The second stage of the passage from war conditions to peace + conditions will begin as soon as it is certain that security has + been obtained for the permanence of the first stage. It will consist + in the acceptance by Germany of certain principles as indisputable. + The security provided in the first stage ought to be sufficient to + enable us to pass through the second stage quickly. With sufficient + guarantees there need be no waiting to see whether the transformation + of the German Government from irresponsible autocracy to responsible + democracy is as genuine as it is represented to be, or whether the + changed professions of those who speak for the People represent a + change of heart. + + The indisputable principles which Germany must accept in this second + stage have been stated in different forms at different times, but the + consensus of opinion amongst all classes of the Associated Powers + seems to me to be so clear that it is not difficult to state them + objectively in a form very close to that which they are likely to + assume in their final enunciation. + + The first is the complete restoration, territorial, economic, and + political, of Belgium. In this there can be no reservation, no + bargaining, no attempt to raise counter-claims or offsets of any + kind. By her initial violation of International Law, and by her + subsequent treatment of Belgium, Germany has forfeited all right + to discussion. Reparation is impossible, but she must undertake + restoration in such form and measure as shall be indicated to her. + + 2. The freeing of French territory, reconstruction of the invaded + provinces, compensation for all civilian losses and injuries. Here + again reparation in any full sense of the word is beyond human power, + but Germany must accept the full burden of material reconstruction, + replacement, and compensation, again in such form and measure as + shall be laid down. + + 3. The restoration to France of Alsace-Lorraine, not as a + territorial acquisition or part of a war indemnity, but as reparation + for the wrong done in 1871, when the inhabitants of the two + provinces, whose ancestors voluntarily chose French allegiance, were + incorporated in Germany against their will. + + 4. Readjustment of the Northern Frontiers of Italy as nearly as + possible along the lines of nationality; the Eastern and Adriatic + frontiers to be determined in accordance with the principles embodied + in the Italo-Jugo-Slav Agreement and ratified by the Rome Congress of + April, 1918. + + 5. The assurance to all the peoples of Austria-Hungary of their + place amongst the free nations of the world and of their right to + enter into union with their kindred beyond the present boundaries + of Austria-Hungary. This involves the creation of independent + Czecho-Slovak and Jugo-Slav States, the reduction of Hungary to + the ethnographic limits of the Magyar race, and the union of all + Rumanians with the present kingdom of Rumania. In the same way the + Poles and Ukrainians of the Dual Monarchy must be free to unite with + their co-nationals across existing frontiers, and it is obvious + that the same right of self-determination cannot be denied to the + German provinces of Austria, should they desire to enter Germany as a + federal unit. + + 6. The evacuation of all territory formerly included in the + boundaries of the Russian Empire; the annulment of all Russian + treaties, contracts, or agreements made with subjects, agents, or + representatives of Enemy Powers since the Revolution and affecting + territory or interests formerly Russian; and the unimpeded + co-operation of the Associated Powers in securing conditions under + which the various nationalities of the former Empire of Russia shall + determine their own forms of government. + + When Russia offered a peace of reconciliation without annexations + or indemnities, the Central Powers, taking advantage of the military + position, rejected all considerations of justice and imposed terms + that were brutal and selfish. Thus they forfeited the right to aid + Russia and the various nationalities of the former Empire of Russia + in their efforts to establish self-determination and their own form + of government. + + The seventh indisputable principle concerns (_a_) the formation of + an independent Polish State with access to the sea, which State + shall include the territories inhabited by predominantly Polish + populations; and (_b_) the indemnification of Poland by the Powers + responsible for the havoc wrought. + + This condition is indispensable for the reign of justice in Europe. + Germany has ruthlessly oppressed the Poles within her Empire. Justice + and stability demand the restoration of the predominantly Polish + parts of the present German Empire to the new Polish State. + + 8. The abrogation of the Treaty of Bucharest; the evacuation and + restoration of Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro; the Associated Powers + to aid the Balkan States in settling finally the Balkan question on + an equitable basis. + + The Balkan question must be settled, and it follows from that + principle of self-determination to which the Associated Powers adhere + that the Balkan States must be encouraged to agree among themselves + and give what advice or assistance they may ask in coming to an + agreement. + + 9. The removal, as far as is practicable, of Turkish dominion + over all non-Turkish peoples. + + The complexity of the distribution of nationalities in the present + Empire of Turkey makes the details of the problem difficult, but the + failure of the Turks, in act and in intention, to rule justly has + been so disastrous, and the acquiescence of the Central Powers in + Turkish misdeeds so complete, that no departure from this principle + can be considered. + + 10. The people of Schleswig to be free to determine their own + allegiance. + + The case of Schleswig is a fundamental instance of the fashion in + which Prussia and Austria used their might to override the principle + of self-determination. The wrong done must be redressed. + + 11. As reparation for the illegal submarine warfare waged by Germany + and Austria-Hungary, these Powers shall be held liable to replace the + merchant tonnage, belonging to the associated and neutral nations, + illegally damaged or destroyed. + + In spite of repeated warnings, and in defiance of the pledges which + they had given to the Government of the United States, then a neutral + Power, the Central Powers have persisted in operations which, by + their nature and by the fashion in which they were conducted, + outraged both International Law and common humanity. The question of + punishment must be dealt with separately; that of restoring the ships + or their equivalents, and of material compensation to the victims and + their families, cannot be subject to discussion or negotiation. + + 12. The appointment of tribunals before which there shall be brought + for impartial justice as soon as possible individuals of any of + the belligerents accused of offences against the laws of war or of + humanity. + + While I regard this condition as an essential preliminary to + peace, as a just concession to the outraged conscience of humanity, + I admit freely that its practical application is full of difficulty. + I foresee the extraordinary difficulty of assigning responsibility; + I recognise that during the actual conduct of war there are reasons + why belligerents should hesitate to punish adequately those whom + in normal times they would unhesitatingly condemn. I offer my own + solution of the difficulty. It is that the appointed tribunals + should act as Courts of First Instance. They would hear the evidence + brought against the accused, and, if they found a _prima facie_ case + established against them, would refer them to their own countries for + ultimate trial, judgment, and sentence. I believe that more stern + justice will be done if nations which desire to purge themselves + condemn their own criminals than if the punishment were left to other + nations which might hesitate to be severe lest they should invest the + individuals punished with the halo of martyrdom. + + 13. The former colonial possessions of Germany, lost by her in + consequence of her illegal aggression against Belgium, shall in no + case be returned to Germany. + + Germany’s possession of her colonies would have been inviolate but + for her illegal aggression against Belgium, which brought England + into the war. She has proclaimed that the fate of her colonies would + be decided on the Western front; it has been so decided. She has + proclaimed the uses to which, if victorious, she would have put her + colonies; such uses must be prevented for ever in the interest of the + peace of the world. Furthermore, there is this consideration that, + after what has happened, it would be as intolerable for Australasia + to have New Guinea in German hands as it would be for the United + States to have Germany in possession of Cuba. The colonies therefore + cannot be returned to Germany, but their assignment as possessions, + or in trusteeship, together with the fashion in which they shall be + administered in the interests of their inhabitants and of the world + generally, are matters for future decisions. + + These are the indisputable conditions of peace which must be accepted + in the second stage of the negotiations. + + I have dealt with the first two stages as logically separate and + successive. In actual fact agreement on them might be coincident in + time. In any event, acceptance of the indisputable conditions would + be made before the guarantees required under the terms of surrender + or of armistice had become accomplished facts. + + The conclusion of the first two stages, whether concurrent or + consecutive, will be the end of dictation. They form the preliminary + to co-operation. They will be an earnest of a complete break with the + past on the part of Germany. They will go far to satisfy the natural + desire of those who demand that the guilty should be punished, and + yet I believe that they contain nothing that is not imperative for + a just and lasting peace. And I hope that their imposition and + acceptance will, in the subsequent stages, make it possible to + take advantage, for the benefit of the world, of those powers of + discipline and organisation which Germany has perverted to the great + harm of the world. + + III + + The third stage, should I consider, consist in the appointment of + a large number of Commissions to study and work out the details of + the principles which I have enumerated. These will report ultimately, + some of them quickly, some of them after months or years, to the + Central Peace Conference. For my part I see no reason why the members + of the Commissions, if the principles on which they shall act are + settled beforehand, should not be selected chiefly from among + those who have the greatest interest in the matters to be settled. + I do not see, for instance, why a Commission consisting largely + of Poles and Prussians should not be asked to work out the future + frontier of Prussia and Poland. This may be thought the suggestion + of an idealist. But I claim that in this instance the idealist is + the realist. If our goal be lasting peace, then let us give every + opportunity for arrangement and mutual accommodation before we resort + to compulsion. + + So far I have said nothing of the future government of Germany. The + Germans assure us that the transformation of autocratic government + to responsible government is taking place. I should like to believe + them. I am certain that its accomplishment is necessary to Germany + itself and to the final attainment of a just and lasting peace. I + frankly admit that the perfect form of government does not exist, and + that the genius of Germany may evolve some form as good as, or even + better than, existing constitutions. + + But Germany must understand that it will take time to convince the + world, which has so much reason to distrust her, that this sudden + change is to be a permanent reality. Fortunately the stages which + I have described do not require for their accomplishment more than + the hope that Germany has set out on the right path. Whilst the last + stage is in progress there will be time, and more than time, to see + whether Germany realises our hopes and what I believe to be now the + wishes of the majority of her own people. + + For the last stage will mean nothing less than reconstructing the + organisation of the world, and establishing a new policy in which a + League of Free Nations shall replace the old system of the balance of + rival Powers. + + The accomplishment of a change so gigantic as the adjusting of + national organisations to fit into new super-national machinery must + be difficult and slow. Fortunately the very steps necessary to make + it possible are steps that will slowly make it actual. Let me select + a few simple examples. The cessation of hostilities will leave the + world short of food, short of transport, short of raw materials. The + machinery that has regulated these during war will have to be kept in + action beyond the war. Food will have to be rationed, transport will + have to be rationed, raw material will have to be rationed. It is a + world problem that can be settled only on a world basis, and there + will be every opportunity, in the years of transition, to transform + those economic relations which are forced upon us by necessity into a + system which will meet with free and general acceptance. + + Intimately connected with these matters will be the problem of + the returned soldier, whether wounded or otherwise, the problem of + pensions, the problems of wages, housing, hours and conditions of + work, regulation of child labour, female labour, and so forth. The + equalisation of those in different countries will be necessary to + fair rationing, and from this necessity will arise international + conferences of workers which may be able to settle some of the most + difficult questions of super-national organisation. When the question + of disarmament arises, some will demand as a fundamental necessity + that their nation must have a large army or a large navy. Some will + advocate, as an act of punishment or of justice, the disarmament + of other nations. In the consequent negotiations it will soon be + found that to insist on an unduly large army or navy is to saddle + one’s country with a huge expense; to insist on the disarmament of + another country may be to present that country with a huge annual + income that can be used in commercial rivalry. And so we may come to + a condition in which, if there be international security, there will + be a contest, not as to which country shall maintain the largest navy + and the largest army, but as to which country shall most completely + disarm. + + I foresee international Commissions at work for a long time, trying + to establish frontiers, conditions of Parliamentary responsibility, + canons of international law, rules of international commerce, laws + even of religious freedom, and a thousand other conditions of + national organisation. In the very act of seeking the foundation for + a League of Free Nations, and in slowly building up the fabric, we + shall get rid of the passions and fears of war. By the mere endeavour + to find the way to a better condition of the world, we shall bring + this better condition about. + +This article created the desired interest and public discussion in the +enemy countries. It was widely reproduced by German newspapers and it +had the effect of producing a state of mind which culminated in the +complete collapse of German resistance. It was a fitting wind-up to +the work of propaganda in enemy countries. The article gave rise to a +great deal of comment at home and elsewhere abroad also, and did much +to form a public opinion favourable to the conditions of peace which +were in the minds of Allied statesmen but which they had themselves +refrained from declaring in public. + +Thus the Policy Committee, although it existed so short a time, had +useful achievement to its credit. Had it been possible to constitute +such a Committee early in the war the results might have been +incalculable in the effect on British propaganda. + +On November 15, 1918, Lord Northcliffe sent the following valedictory +letter to each of the members of the Committee:-- + + “I am sending you herewith a copy of the minutes of the last meeting + of the Policy Committee, and feel that it is unnecessary under the + changed circumstances to call another meeting. + + “May I remind you that this Committee was formed under my + chairmanship by the British War Mission at a time when it seemed + urgent to correlate propaganda addressed to the enemy, to Allies, + and to Neutrals? In the opening remarks by the Chairman at the first + meeting it was pointed out that as the war approached its end, war + propaganda would change into peace propaganda. This change took + place with even greater rapidity than was at the moment anticipated, + and the Committee had at once to undertake the task of devising a + propaganda policy with regard to peace. You are acquainted with + the steps that the Committee took and with the large measure of + success that their efforts achieved. All questions of policy have + now, however, passed from the hands of the Committee to those of the + Council of the Nations, and there seems to me no immediate sphere + for our action, especially as by arrangement with the Government the + British War Mission is being wound up. + + “May I take this opportunity of thanking you for your co-operation, + and of stating my belief that, had the war continued, the Policy + Committee would have developed into an organ of ever-increasing value? + + Yours very truly, + (Signed) “NORTHCLIFFE.” + +[Illustration: INFLATING THE BALLOONS AND ATTACHING THE TRUTH-TELLING +LEAFLETS. + +_Official Photograph._] + +[Illustration: HOW LEAFLETS WERE ATTACHED TO THE BALLOONS. + +_Official Photograph._] + +[Illustration: REGISTERING THE DIRECTION AND VELOCITY OF THE WIND, IN +ORDER TO JUDGE WHERE THE LEAFLETS WOULD FALL.] + +[Illustration: DISPATCHING THE BALLOONS.] + +[Illustration: TESTING THE LIFTING POWER OF BALLOONS USED FOR +PROPAGANDA PURPOSES + +_“Daily Mirror” Photograph._] + + + + +CHAPTER IX + +_VALE!_ + + +With the foundations well and truly laid and with increasing and +widening avenues of approach into enemy countries, the work of the +British War Mission was always expanding. Had the war continued, the +gathering momentum of Crewe House activities would have dealt many +other blows which, even in November, 1918, were in an advanced state of +preparation. But, happily for the Allies, one enemy collapsed quickly +after another. When the following letter was received from the War +Office on November 9, and was followed by the signing of the Armistice +with Germany--the last of our enemies--on November 11, the work of +Crewe House as the headquarters of Propaganda in Enemy Countries was +finished:-- + + “SIR, + + “I am commanded by the Army Council to inform you that, in view of + the armistices which have been concluded with Austria, Turkey, and + Bulgaria, the Council has decided that the distribution of propaganda + in those countries by military means should cease during the period + of the armistice. + + “I am to say that, in the event of the conclusion of an armistice + with Germany, distribution of propaganda by military means in that + country will also cease during the existence of the armistice. + + “I am further to inform you that the Commanders-in-Chief in the + various theatres of war have been notified in the above sense. + + “I am, Sir, + “Your obedient servant, + “B. B. CUBITT. + + “The Secretary, + “The British War Mission, + “Crewe House.” + +On the day following the signing of the Armistice with Germany Lord +Northcliffe wrote to the Prime Minister: + + “DEAR PRIME MINISTER, + + “The signing of the last armistice with our enemies has necessarily + brought the labours upon which I have been engaged for the past year + to a close. The very nature of the armistices themselves necessitates + the termination of enemy propaganda, and I beg, therefore, to request + you to accept my resignation of my post as Director of Propaganda in + Enemy Countries. + + “I wish to thank you for the confidence you have reposed in me in + appointing me to this office. I have endeavoured, with the assistance + of a most able Committee and of an untiring staff of experts, to + render the very best possible services to the Government and to the + country. + + “Believe me, dear Prime Minister, + “Yours sincerely, + “NORTHCLIFFE.” + +In reply, the Prime Minister wrote on the same day: + + “MY DEAR NORTHCLIFFE, + + “I have received your letter, and I agree with you that the office of + Director of Propaganda in Enemy Countries is rendered unnecessary by + recent events. + + “In accepting your resignation, I wish to assure you how grateful I + am for the great services you have rendered to the Allied Cause while + holding this important post. I have had many direct evidences of the + success of your invaluable work and of the extent to which it has + contributed to the dramatic collapse of the enemy strength in Austria + and Germany. + + “I shall be glad if Sir Campbell Stuart, the present Vice-Chairman of + the Mission, will remain in office as Acting-Chairman of the Mission + until December 31st, 1918, in order to wind up its activities. + + “Ever sincerely, + “D. LLOYD GEORGE.” + +When the year 1918 came to its close the affairs of the Mission had +been wound up, and Crewe House as a propaganda force ceased to exist. +The building was handed over to another Government department, but +by those who had even a remote connection with the work carried on +within its walls in 1918 Crewe House will always be remembered for +its propaganda politics for which, as has been truly said, it became +as well-known in the Chancelleries of Europe as it had been in Great +Britain for so long as a social centre for national politics. + + + + +APPENDIX + +Facsimile Leaflets and Translations. + + +[Illustration: _Leaflet No. 1._ + +NEWS OF ALLIED SUCCESSES ON WESTERN FRONT FOR JUGO-SLAV SOLDIERS IN THE +AUSTRIAN ARMIES.] + +Map representing the great offensive of the Allies, with the results +achieved from August 9th to September 1st:-- + +[MAP] + +In the offensive from July 15th to August 31st the Allies captured +140,000 Germans (2,674 of whom were officers), 2,500 guns, 1,734 +Flamethrowers, 13,783 machine guns, together with a huge amount of +other war material. + + THE JUGOSLAV COMMITTEE. + + +[Illustration: _Leaflet No. 2._ + +A MANIFESTO FROM DR. TRUMBITCH DISTRIBUTED FROM AEROPLANES AMONG +JUGO-SLAV TROOPS IN THE AUSTRIAN ARMY.] + +SERBOCROATS AND SLOVENES. + +The “Agenzia Stefani” announces officially:-- + +“By a decree of the Ministerial Council on September 8th the Home +(Italian) Government has informed the Allied Governments that it +regards the Jugoslav movement for obtaining independence and the +formation of a free State as a principle for which the Allies are +fighting, and as a condition of a just and lasting peace.” + +The Governments of the Allied States have replied that they have +received with satisfaction this declaration of the Italian Government. + +JUGOSLAVS! + +By this historic and fateful declaration Italy has set up the following +war aim: The destruction of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy such as it is +to-day, and upon its ruins the establishment of an independent State of +Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. + +This noble decree of hers is accepted by all our Allies. + +SOLDIERS! + +The part which Italy has been assigned by history has been manifested +to-day more strongly than ever. She is the protector of the weak, the +bearer of freedom and of the ideal for which the Allies have been +fighting for four years. The aim of the fighting is not the peace of +Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest, but the freedom of the weak and oppressed. + +Therefore open your eyes. Remember that by fighting against it you are +fighting against yourselves, against our posterity, against our freedom +and unity. + +Long live Italy, long live the united and free Jugoslavia, long live +our Allies! + + DR. ANTE TRUMBIC, + Chairman of the Jugoslav Council. + + +[Illustration: _Leaflet No. 3._ + +LEAFLET--PROBABLY THE FIRST--DISTRIBUTED BY BRITISH AEROPLANES AMONG +GERMAN TROOPS IN OCTOBER 1914. IT ANNOUNCED A RUSSIAN VICTORY IN EAST +PRUSSIA.] + +[_Note.--This was distributed in October, 1914._] + +NOTICE. + +EXPLANATION FOR GERMAN SOLDIERS. + +It has become known that German soldiers have been told the British +treat their captives inhumanly. That is a lie. + +All German prisoners of war are well-treated and receive from the +British the same food as their own soldiers. + +The opportunity is now taken to enlighten the German soldier about some +facts which hitherto have been kept secret from him. + +The German Army never reached or occupied Paris and has been retiring +since September 5. + +The British Army has been neither made prisoner nor beaten. It +increases in strength every day. + +The French Army is not beaten. Quite on the contrary, for it inflicted +a heavy defeat on the Germans at MONTMIRAIL. + +Russia and Serbia have so decisively defeated Austria that she no +longer plays any part in the war. With the exception of a few cruisers, +German shipping, the merchant service as well as the fighting fleet, is +no longer to be seen upon the seas. + +The British and German Navies have both suffered casualties, but the +German the heaviest. + +Germany has already lost several colonies and will presently also lose +what now remains to her. Japan has declared war on Germany. Kiauchau is +now besieged by the British and the Japanese. + +The report circulated in the Press that the British Colonies and India +have rebelled against Great Britain is wholly untrue. Quite on the +contrary, these Colonies have sent to France large masses of troops and +many supplies to come to the help of the Fatherland. + +Ireland is one with England, and from North and South is sending her +soldiers who are fighting with enthusiasm alongside their English +comrades. + +The Kaiser and the Prussian War Party wanted this war against all +interests of the Fatherland. In secret they prepared for this war. +Germany alone was prepared, which explains her temporary successes. +Now we have succeeded in checking her victorious advance. Supported by +the sympathies of the whole civilised world, which regards with horror +an arbitrary war of conquest, Great Britain, France, Russia, Belgium, +Serbia, Montenegro, and Japan will carry on the war to the end. + +We bring these facts to general notice in order to throw light upon the +truth which has been hidden from you. You are not fighting to defend +your Fatherland, as no one ever thought of attacking Germany. You are +fighting to satisfy the ambitious war-lust of the military party at the +cost of the true interests of the Fatherland. The whole business is +blackguardly. + +At first sight these facts will seem improbable to you. But now it is +for you to compare the events of the past weeks with the information +manufactured by the military authorities. + +ON OCTOBER 4 THE RUSSIANS GAINED A TREMENDOUS VICTORY OVER THE GERMAN +ARMIES IN EAST PRUSSIA. GERMAN LOSSES 70,000. + + +[Illustration: _Leaflet No. 4._ + +AEROPLANE DISTRIBUTION OF COPIES OF AN EARLY LEAFLET PREPARED BY THE +FRENCH AUTHORITIES FOR THE GERMAN SOLDIER.] + +To the German Soldiers! + +IT IS NOT TRUE that we French shoot or ill-treat German prisoners. + +ON THE CONTRARY, our prisoners are well-treated and receive plenty to +eat and drink. + +All who are tired of this wretched life may report themselves unarmed, +without fear, to the French outposts. + +They will be well received there. + +After the war everyone can go home again. + + +[Illustration: _Leaflet No. 5._ + +A TYPICAL NEWS-SHEET FOR GERMAN SOLDIERS.] + +INFORMATION LEAFLET FOR THE TROOPS. + +IS PEACE AT THE DOOR? + +Our enemies reject negotiations until we have evacuated Belgium and +France. + +WHAT MUST WE DO NOW? + +Well, what does it all mean? + +“A few weeks ago,” says the _Frankfurter Zeitung_, “it appeared as if +our armies were very near their goal, the defeat of the enemy forces +and peace. But what a change!” + +In these few weeks the German armies have lost three-quarters of a +million men. More than a quarter of a million have given themselves up +and are now out of danger and have plenty to eat. + +In these few weeks Bulgaria has dropped out of the war and has been +compelled to surrender unconditionally. The best Turkish armies have +been destroyed and Turkey is about to follow Bulgaria’s example. + +And what is the result of all these events in the last few weeks? + +All hope of victory by the military Junker party in Germany abandoned: +an armistice demanded: the admission of the new Imperial Chancellor, +Prince Max von Baden, that Belgium was wrongfully attacked. + +The following is the text of the Note addressed to President Wilson +through the Swiss Government:-- + +“The German Government requests the President of the United States +to bring about the restoration of peace, to inform all belligerent +States of this request and to summon them to send plenipotentiaries +to open negotiations. Germany takes as a basis for peace negotiations +the programme set forth by the President of the United States in his +Message to Congress of January 8th, 1918, and particularly in his +speech of September 27th. + +“With a view to preventing further bloodshed the German Government +requests the immediate conclusion of an armistice on land, on water, +and in the air. + + (Signed) MAX, Prince von Baden, + Imperial Chancellor.” + + +Why was this Note addressed to President Wilson? + +Partly because he laid down certain conditions which he explained the +German Government must accept before he would enter into any discussion +whatever on peace terms. + +But also partly because the German Government at length became aware of +the United States’ military effort. + +In this, as in every other important matter dealing with the war, our +leaders deceived us in the most unheard-of way. They fed us with false +hopes. + +They have brought us to such a desperate pass that we are retiring on +every front and are now compelled to sue for peace. + +But will our enemies consent to discuss peace? + +Not as long as we are still in Belgium, which, as our Government +admits, was wrongfully attacked; not whilst we are still in Northern +France. + +Before our enemies will consent to negotiate with us we must retire to +Germany. For, they say, they will gladly conclude a just and honourable +peace with the German people if they can be sure that militarism and +medieval methods of statesmanship are abolished for good. + +What must we do to save ourselves? We must retire to our own country, +then we may hope for an end of all the horror and hardships we have +suffered for more than four years, only because our Government let +its policy be dictated by militarism and underestimated the forces +which had to be arrayed against us owing to the attempt to realise the +criminal ambition of the Pan-Germans. + +We have been miserably deceived. + + +[Illustration: _Leaflet No. 6._ + +“REPORTING PROGRESS”--LEAFLETS (SUCH AS THE ONE, BOTH SIDES OF WHICH +ARE REPRODUCED, ABOVE) GAVE PARTICULARS OF ALLIED PROGRESS AGAINST THE +GERMANS. CLEARLY-PRINTED MAPS DROVE THE TRUTH HOME. THE SHADED PORTION +SHOWS TERRITORY WON BY THE ALLIES.] + +WHAT THE ALLIES HAVE WON. Back on the Line of Last March. + +[MAP] + +The whole ground has been twice won and twice lost by the German +armies. How much blood has been spilled, and how much misery has been +caused? For what object? Think it over! + +_On the other side of the leaflet was the following_: + +FURTHER SUCCESSES OF THE ENTENTE; THE GERMAN RETREAT CONTINUES. + +During the last few weeks there has been fighting west of Cambrai and +St. Quentin. The battle reached a degree of vehemence fully equal to +any previously experienced in the course of the whole war. + +The Germans and British attacked simultaneously; both sides fought with +stubborn determination, but + +THE BRITISH GAINED THE VICTORY. + +They beat off the German attack, made many prisoners, and killed an +enormous number, thanks to the manner in which the German troops were +driven forward under murderous machine-gun fire. + +The British attack succeeded. The German front was pressed back closer +to St. Quentin. + +TEN THOUSAND PRISONERS + +were made and a number of guns were captured. The outer works of the +Siegfried Line are in British possession in spite of the determined and +plucky attempts of the German troops to hold them. The latter did not +retreat “according to plan,” but because in open honourable fight + +THEY GOT THE WORST OF IT. + +The operations of the Entente forces have in no way reached an end, as +reported in the German newspapers a week ago by military writers. The +German forces were unable to stand their ground. The French threaten +Laon and the Chemin des Dames and in these regions are driving the +Germans back. + +On the Balkan Front + +THE BULGARIANS ARE TOTALLY DEFEATED + +and are still retreating. The French and Serbian troops have advanced +20 kilometres. Many thousands of Bulgarians have surrendered. The +prisoners ascribe the blame for Bulgaria’s disastrous situation to +Germany. + +The Austrian proposal that representatives of the belligerent nations +should hold a secret conference in order to discuss + +THE POSSIBILITIES OF PEACE + +was described by the representatives of the Workmen’s and Socialist +parties assembled at the London Conference as inspired more by +the anxiety to strengthen the monarchy than by the desire to help +effectively to put an end to the world war. + +No voice was raised for the acceptance of the Austrian proposal. + + +[Illustration: _Leaflet No. 7._ + +DIAGRAMMATIC REPRESENTATION OF THE GROWTH OF THE AMERICAN ARMY IN THE +FIELD. THE IMMENSITY OF THE AMERICAN EFFORT WAS A STRONG POINT OF THE +CREWE HOUSE PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN.] + +TO-DAY WE ARE IN RETREAT. + +NEXT YEAR WE SHALL BE DESTROYED. + +America, which has now 1,750,000 men in France, had made arrangements +to send 3,500,000 troops by next year. + +But now, in view of the refusal of the German Government to make a +genuine peace proposal, America has decided to increase the number. + +By next year America will have 5,000,000 men on the Western Front. + +What do our leaders say to this--our leaders who declared that America +was not a danger to us because our U-boats would prevent them from +sending troops to Europe? + +What do we say to this, we who will be completely crushed by the huge +superiority of numbers? + +[DIAGRAM] + +The increase of the American Army on the Western Front. + + 1917. 1918. 1919. + 100,000 1,750,000 5,000,000 + + +[Illustration: _Leaflet No. 8._ + +MAP-LEAFLET SHOWING THE BREAKING OF THE HINDENBURG LINE.] + +WHERE THE HINDENBURG LINE IS BROKEN + +[MAP] + +This map shows exactly where the British troops have forced a way +through an important part of the Hindenburg defence line. The dotted +line from North to South indicates these defences. The black line shows +the positions reached by the British. Their advance continues. In +Flanders the German armies are in full retreat. Kemmel Hill has been +given up. “Our troops left it with heavy heart,” writes Karl Rosner, +war correspondent of the _Lokalanzeiger_. + + +[Illustration: _Leaflet No. 9._ + +NEWS FOR GERMAN SOLDIERS OF THE DESTRUCTION OF THE TURKISH ARMY IN +PALESTINE. TWO SIDES OF THE SAME LEAFLET.] + +TURKISH ARMY IN PALESTINE DESTROYED. + +NO FURTHER RESISTANCE AGAINST THE BRITISH TROOPS. BRILLIANT ENCIRCLING +MANŒUVRE. + +20,000 PRISONERS. + +TURKEY INCENSED AGAINST GERMANY FOR LEADING HER TO IRRETRIEVABLE +DISASTER. + +The Turkish Army in Palestine has ceased to exist. The British took +them unawares, broke through the front, sent through large masses of +cavalry, cut off all lines of retreat and completely surrounded the +Turks. + +Twenty thousand surrendered, a large number were killed, and only a few +stragglers succeeded in escaping. The Holy Land has been liberated from +the Mussulman suzerainty which the German Government did its best to +uphold. Turkey could not have received a harder blow. Her best troops +have been destroyed. The Turks’ feeling against Germany is extremely +bitter. They openly threaten to turn against the German Government. + +The Bulgarians are scarcely less embittered against Germany. They are +still pursued in the Balkan mountains by the French and Serbian troops, +who have driven them back 64 kilometres. Their defeat is a wholesale +disaster. + +On the Western Front the British and French troops are still gaining +ground, slowly but steadily, a little every day. + +Everywhere Germany and her allies are in retreat. + +Read no leaflets which you may find accidentally, say Field Marshal +Hindenburg and General von Hutier. + +WHY? + +Because they know that the leaflets contain the truth which they and +the Government want to conceal. + +They fear the truth. When the German people know it the Government and +militarism will be wiped out. + +Read overleaf of the successes of the Entente Powers and ask yourselves + +HOW LONG CAN IT GO ON LIKE THIS? + +Map illustrating the Turkish disasters. + +[MAP OF PALESTINE] + +The black lines and arrows show the position of the English forces. The +Turks were between Samaria and Nablus. They were wiped out. Their army +no longer exists. + + +[Illustration: _Leaflet No. 10._ + +SOME POINTED QUOTATIONS FOR GERMAN SOLDIERS CULLED FROM GERMAN SOURCES.] + +THE HIGH OFFICIAL. + +“We have no cause for anxiety.”--Dr. Wekerle, Hungarian Premier. + +THE PEOPLE. + +“The men must thoroughly understand that they must stand fast.”--Order +of the Day to 200th Infantry Division. + +THE GENERAL. + +“We have no reason to be downhearted.”--General von Wrisberg, War +Minister in the Reichstag. + +THE SOLDIER. + +“The principle that troops must continue fighting all day long, to the +last man, to the last cartridge, even when they are surrounded, appears +to have sunk into oblivion.”--General Army Order, signed by General +Ludendorff. + +PREPARATIONS FOR CIVIL WAR. + +Every precaution has been taken in Berlin and other places to suppress +an eventual attempt at revolution. + +Orders for the suppression of risings are issued under the heading +“Measures for the Suppression of Strikes.” Proof of this is furnished +by the order of German G.H.Q. to all Guards Infantry troops and to the +3rd, 4th, and 5th Corps. + +On receipt of the telegraphic order “Prepare for the suppression of +strikes,” all man-power must be mobilised. On receipt of the order +“Suppress strikes,” the commandant of the transport troops must be +immediately informed. The men must be equipped as for field service, +only without masks. On receipt of the telegraphic order “Make +preparations for surrounding,” all detachments of troops will be +marched to their allotted positions. Battalion commanders should place +themselves at the head of their units and direct all further movements. + +On receipt of the telegraphic order “Surround,” the troops selected +for this duty, the 3rd, 4th, and 5th Corps, will march on Berlin to +the Vorstadtbahn (Suburban Railway). The Guards will take the opposite +direction from the centre of the city to the Vorstadtbahn, driving +the populace before them. Headquarters will be Kaulsdorf. Then follow +detailed instructions for the employment of machine guns. The order is +strictly secret. + +WHAT SHALL WE DO WITH THE KAISER? + +Stockholm, 10th September.--The German Minister in Stockholm has +requested the Swedish Foreign Office to seize the copy of the “_New +York Herald_ Magazine of the War” of the 14th July because it publishes +on the first page a photograph of the German Emperor underneath which +are the words:-- + +“What shall we do with the Kaiser after the War?” + +The Minister of Justice is said to have ordered the copies in question +to be seized. + +ARREST OF SOCIALISTS. + +According to the _Neue Badische Landeszeitung_, wild scenes took place +last week at a meeting of Independent Socialists in Berlin. “In the +course of the meeting the Reichstag member Hoffmann was arrested by two +policemen because of provocative speeches. A scene of such excitement +ensued that in the general disturbance Hoffmann escaped, while the hall +rang with cries of ‘Down with the War!’ ‘Long live Liebknecht!’ + +“The following morning the officials arrived at Hoffmann’s house in +order to arrest him again, but the deputy was not to be found. Many +arrests were made among his adherents.” + +PORK IN BOTTLES. + +“The smugglers are still devising new tricks so as to prevent their +costly goods from falling into the clutches of the war contraband +officials. At the Schlesicher Station a man was stopped as he was +fetching away two carboys such as are used for the transport of +dangerous acids. A closer inspection showed that the carboys were +divided in two parts, a small receptacle at the top being filled with +vinegar, while the lower and larger part contained 55 kilos. of freshly +killed pork neatly packed. The expensive pork was seized.”--_Berliner +Tageblatt_, Sept. 19, 1918. + +THE VETO ON DANCING. + +“In the Hanover Command dancing lessons are only allowed for men +and women separately, and anyone who has already taken a course of +dancing is not allowed to learn again. A sensible regulation has been +issued at Essen. Only dancing instructors belonging to the two German +dancing instructors’ unions may hold dancing classes as in peace +time.”--_Berliner Tageblatt_, Sept. 19, 1918. + + +[Illustration: _Leaflet No. 11._ + +THIS LEAFLET WITH PARTICULARS OF THE FATE OF 150 GERMAN SUBMARINE +COMMANDERS CREATED GREAT DEPRESSION IN GERMAN NAVAL PORTS.] + +THE 150 LOST GERMAN U-BOATS. + +In the House of Commons the British Prime Minister, Mr. Lloyd George, +said, “Our British vessels are serving as convoys, patrolling, laying +mines, sweeping mines, protecting merchant ships and hunting U-boats +over vast and uncharted distances. They have destroyed at least 150 of +these ocean pests, the German U-boats--more than half that number in +the course of last year.” + +In reply to this, the following official Berlin telegram was sent out +to the German papers and to neutral countries: + +“We are in the position to state that the enemy’s war against the +U-boats does not show anything like so great a success as that claimed +by the British Prime Minister.” + +The Chief of the Naval General Staff in London has in his possession a +complete list of the names of the commanders of the 150 U-boats which +Germany has lost through sinking, capture, or internment. The greater +part of these officers are dead, a certain percentage are prisoners +of war, a few are interned in neutral countries. The truth of the +statement of the British Prime Minister is thus proved. It is also +proved that the statement contained in the official Berlin telegram is +untrue. Here is the list: + +[_List of U-boat commanders._] + + +[Illustration: _Leaflet No. 12._ + +LEAFLET WARNING THE GERMANS THAT SUCH PLACES AS BERLIN AND HAMBURG HAD +BEEN BROUGHT WITHIN RANGE OF AERIAL ATTACK AND COULD BE BOMBED IF THE +WAR WERE PROLONGED.] + +A MAP WHICH EXPLAINS ITSELF. + +In 1914 the English air squadrons which carried out reprisals for the +attacks made on English towns were small and carried small bombs. +In 1915 they grew larger and dropped larger bombs. In 1916 both had +doubled in size. In 1917 there was a further increase in the size of +the bombing squadrons and the bombs were 7½ times again as heavy. 1918 +saw further increases and throughout the period under review the range +of attacks steadily extended. In 1919 Berlin, Hamburg, Brunswick, and +Hanover will be easily within range of attack--if we do not make peace +in the meantime. + + +[Illustration: _Leaflet No. 13._ + +A GERMAN DREAM AND THE RESULT. A LEAFLET ILLUSTRATING THE COLLAPSE OF +THE MITTEL-EUROPA AMBITION OF GERMAN MILITARISM.] + +HOW THE THING WENT WRONG. + +_The upper map is entitled_ “PAN-GERMAN DREAM,” _the wording under it +being as follows_: + +“Our rulers went to war because they hoped to found a gigantic empire +for the Kaiser and the Junkers. All the territories shaded in on the +above map were to be their realm. It would have meant the subjection of +half the world under the German sword.”--_Vorwärts_, Oct. 11, 1918. + +_The lower map is entitled_ “THE AWAKENING OF THE GERMAN PEOPLE.” +_Under it is the following inscription_: + +This is how Germany looks to-day. Her allies can give no further aid. +What the Kaiser calls “his heritage from God” will soon be smaller than +it was at the beginning of the war. But the German people will be the +better for it. They will have escaped from autocracy and militarism. +Freedom at last! + + +[Illustration: _Leaflet No. 14._ + +FRONT PAGE OF A “TRENCH NEWSPAPER” ISSUED BY CREWE HOUSE FOR GERMAN +TROOPS.] + +WAR AND HOME. + +THE SUMMONS TO UNITY. + +_The picture on the left is headed_ “THE IDEAL” _and represents “The +Assembly.” On its right is the following parody, entitled_ “PARADISE +LOST,” _on Goethe’s “Faust”_: + +“PARADISE LOST.” + +“Gretchen, how different thou wast!”--(Goethe--“Faust.”) + + Germany, how different thou wast before the war + Brought about by thy lust of conquest. + With self-assurance thou wentst from triumph to triumph + And reached the summit of thy power + Untouched, with ample possessions + In earthly goods, in fame and world renown + Thou hadst all mankind can crave, + In high respect regarded, if not beloved. + + But now what disgust, what horror + The mere name of Germany excites! + There is deep mourning for thy vanished happiness, + Thy honour lost, thy peace of mind destroyed! + Thou liest parted by the iron wall + Which thy crime has built between us + Fast fettered to thy false ideal + And all thy former glory gone! + +_The lower picture is called_ “THE REALITY,” _the quotation from Moltke +underneath being “March separately, strike together.” On its left_: + +THE WAR WAS DECIDED AT POTSDAM. + +During a debate on the origin of the war in the Hungarian Parliament, +Count Tisza claimed that the ultimatum to Serbia was drawn up at a +conference at which no German representative was present. + +_A Deputy_: Not in Vienna but in Potsdam. + +_Count Tisza_: Neither in Potsdam nor anywhere else. + +_The Deputy_: The ultimatum was not drawn up at Potsdam, but the +outbreak of war was decided there. + +A PROPHECY. + +The Dutch newspaper, the _Handelsblad_, reports that a person who +has just returned from Germany saw this rhyme written up in gigantic +letters at an important factory: + + “If the war lasts another year, + William’s fate will be the Tsar’s!” + + +[Illustration: _Leaflet No. 15._ + +ILLUSTRATED LEAFLET PORTRAYING CONTENTMENT OF GERMAN PRISONERS IN +BRITISH HANDS. THIS WAS ISSUED TO COUNTERACT ENEMY ASSERTIONS OF SEVERE +TREATMENT.] + +German prisoners of war arriving behind the British lines are greeted +by their comrades, who assure them of good treatment. + + +[Illustration: _Leaflet No. 16._ + +THIS LEAFLET SHOWED HOW THE ALLIES HAD SHATTERED THE GREAT +BERLIN-BAGDAD PLAN.] + +WHY THE GOVERNMENT IS SUING FOR PEACE. + +The reason is clear. + +The Government undertook the war in the hope of realising the +Pan-German dream of a Middle Europe. + +This was the real cause of the war. + +If there remained any doubt on the subject it is clearly proved by the +fact that the moment the realisation of the Pan-German dream became +impossible the Government sues for peace. + +This was the plan of the Pan-Germans who led us into the war. + +The whole of the territory coloured black was to become German. + +Bulgaria and Turkey would become vassal States. + +The Kaiser and the Prussian Junker aristocracy, the bureaucrats and +the rich who exploit the rest of the people, should become the most +powerful class in the world. + +THIS IS WHAT HAS BECOME OF THE PAN-GERMAN PLAN. + +Bulgaria refuses to be a vassal State. + +Turkey is becoming anxious. + +The plan for the realisation of which the Pan-Germans persuaded Germany +to go to war and which has cost so many millions of lives and caused +such universal misery is completely frustrated. + +What reason remains why we should fight? + +The Government has no further reason for continuing the struggle and is +therefore suing our enemies for peace. + +Therefore all the talk about a defensive war proves to have been +absolutely untruthfully and dishonestly + +STARTED TO DECEIVE US. + + +[Illustration: _Leaflet No. 17._ + +MANIFESTO TO MAGYAR TROOPS.] + +HUNGARIAN SOLDIERS! + +What are you fighting for? + +For the Emperor of Austria and the King of Hungary! + +Or is it for the German Emperor? + +You are only fighting for the German Emperor. The Austrian Emperor has +given over to him the army and the State revenues for twenty-five years +by a formal treaty the contents of which are kept from you. + +But your newspapers also announce a “Waffenbund” which was entered upon +on May 12th, 1918, between your old and your new masters. + +But you Magyars, whose ancestors shed so much blood for freedom, you +are ignorant of the truth. + +For behold according to the Germans you are idle and slow. + +The _Frankfurter Zeitung_ says on May 13th, “=The new treaty should +finally seal the disappearance of Austria as an independent State and +the seizing of the Hapsburg Monarchy by Germany=.” + +The _Deutsche Zeitung_ of the 19th May remarks, “What the Mittel-Europa +Confederacy chiefly needs is strength, and never more so than at the +time the war broke out. Austria-Hungary was not sufficiently prepared. +According to the ‘Waffenbund’ =Austria-Hungary must arm its inhabitants +in exactly the same way as Germany=. It is no longer possible that it +should happen that the delegates should vote extraordinary credits +for military purposes, and that afterwards they should waste a long +time before they pass the amount because either the Hungarian or the +Austrian Minister of Finance says there is no money; or that the +delegates vote the guns but that the =Hungarian Parliament= refuses the +necessary calling up of the recruits, so that afterwards the guns are +there but there are not soldiers to man them.” + +Is this clear enough? The Germans struggle for a mad whim--they wish to +rule the whole world. To fight for years, to pour out Hungarian blood +for German glory for years and years. + +Naturally the _Neue Freie Presse_ should with triumph proclaim that +the new treaty is specially a triumph for the “upholders of Germany in +Austria.” + + +[Illustration: _Leaflet No. 18._ + +MANIFESTO, SIGNED BY PROFESSOR (NOW PRESIDENT) MASARYK, TO +CZECHO-SLOVAK SOLDIERS IN THE AUSTRIAN ARMIES.] + +MESSAGE OF PROFESSOR MASARYK TO THE CZECHO-SLOVAK ARMY IN ITALY. + +Through the agency of the Italian Legation, Professor T. G. Masaryk +has sent the following message from Washington to the autonomous +Czecho-Slovak army in Italy: + + “Brothers! Austria-Hungary, desiring to break the opposition at + home, has asserted that our army is a rabble which has no political + or military significance. She has even uttered the lie that our + army is composed of Russians and other nationalities, and that a + Czecho-Slovak army does not exist. Our nation does not believe this + dishonesty and has remained obdurate and proud of its army. Then + Austria-Hungary endeavoured to deal a decisive blow to our nation by + destroying you, and with you its army. She desired to gain possession + of our banners of resistance and independence, the symbol of trust + and aspiration cherished by our people. + + “Brothers! Your will, your far-reaching glance frustrated the enemy’s + plans. Our flag is still flying proudly upon the position entrusted + to you for defence. Our nation recognises your heroic deeds and all + hearts are stirred by profound gratitude to you. They extol you and + the proud memory of your fallen brothers. + + “As your Commander-in-Chief I send you my heartiest thanks for the + bravery by which you have contributed to the victory of our nation, + of Italy, the Allies and all mankind. + + “Greetings! + + “T. G. MASARYK.” + +We cannot help telling you how proud we are of the recognition by our +beloved leader, who will guide us and our nation to the goal of victory. + +We are convinced that you also, in concert with the whole nation, see +the salvation of our country and the realisation of our sacred rights +only in the destruction of Austria. + +When they drive you forward to protect the treacherous dynasty, to +which the nation has no obligations, you will certainly find an +opportunity of retaliating worthily for centuries of oppression and of +saving yourselves for a better future. + +Greetings! + +VOLUNTEERS OF THE CZECHO-SLOVAK ARMY IN ITALY. + +October 2nd, 1918. + + +[Illustration: _Leaflet No. 19._ + +RAPIDLY-DISTRIBUTED LEAFLETS FOR GERMAN TROOPS TELLING OF ALLIED +SUCCESSES IN THE BALKANS AND IN SYRIA.] + +INFORMATION LEAFLET FOR THE TROOPS. + +FLIGHT OF GERMAN GENERAL. + +THE TURKS MAKE LIMAN VON SANDERS RESPONSIBLE FOR THEIR MISERY. + +TWO ARMIES DESTROYED. + +BULGARIANS PURSUED ON AN EXTENDED FRONT IN THE BALKANS. + +COUNT HERTLING’S GLOOM. + +The victory of the British troops in Palestine over the Turkish troops +commanded by General Liman von Sanders has made further progress and +assumed much greater dimensions than was indicated by the first reports. + +Two Turkish armies, the 7th and 8th, have ceased to exist. The whole of +their baggage train, all their guns, and their entire material of war +have been captured. + +30,000 MEN SURRENDERED + +and the few who escaped death or captivity fled in small dispersed +bodies across the Jordan and are now wandering about the country. + +The British are now pursuing the 4th Turkish Army, which is also +in danger of destruction. In any case the Turkish resistance in +Palestine is definitely broken. General Liman von Sanders, the German +Commander-in-Chief, who was so completely surprised and so much +surpassed in leadership by the enemy headquarters, + +IS IN FLIGHT BEFORE THE BRITISH. + +The Turks claim that they have been betrayed and led into misfortune +by the German officers appointed to command their forces. Palestine is +now lost to them for ever. The Holy Places have been liberated from +the suzerainty of the Mussulman. The Entente has undertaken to restore +Palestine to the Jewish people. The victory of the French and Serbian +troops over the Bulgarians in the Balkan mountains has strikingly +developed. The Bulgarians are now + +WITHDRAWING ON A FRONT OF 160 KILOMETRES. + +They have made no strong opposition to the advance of the Entente +troops. The German defeats on the Western front have merely depressed +them and weakened their fighting ardour. We know it is useless to +continue the struggle. + +Count Hertling, the Imperial Chancellor, knows this too. He told the +Chief Commission of the Reichstag that deep discontent had seized wide +circles of the people. What does he recommend? That the German people +shall maintain its old and sure confidence in Hindenburg and Ludendorff +in the hope that they may improve the situation a little? But he knows, +we know, and the whole world knows that they cannot improve it. + +ONLY THE GERMAN PEOPLE ITSELF + +can bring about an improvement by putting an end to autocracy and +militarism, pan-Germanism, and the out-of-date absurdities which other +peoples have long since done away with. + +_On the other side of the leaflet_: + +The upper map shows the encircling movement of the British which +annihilated the Turkish forces under General Liman von Sanders. + +_Notes in the body of the map_: + + British cavalry. + Here 25,000 Turks surrendered. + Site of break-through on the Turkish front. + +The lower map shows the ground gained in the Balkans by the French and +Serbian troops which have inflicted on the Bulgarians the heaviest +defeat they have suffered in the war. + +[Illustration: ETHNOGRAPHIC MAP OF AUSTRIA-HUNGARY. + +OF AUSTRIA-HUNGARY’S PRE-WAR POPULATION OF 52,000,000, ONLY ABOUT +21,000,000 WERE GERMANS OR MAGYARS. THE REMAINING 31,000,000, +COMPRISING POLES, CZECHS, SLOVAKS, SOUTHERN SLAVS, RUMANES, ITALIANS, +ETC., WERE ACTIVELY OR PASSIVELY ANTI-GERMAN. THE ABOVE MAP SHOWS HOW +THESE OPPRESSED RACES WERE DISTRIBUTED OVER THE DUAL MONARCHY.] + +[Illustration: THE PARTITION OF AUSTRIA-HUNGARY: SHOWING THE BOUNDARIES +AS DEFINED IN THE PEACE TREATIES. IT IS INTERESTING TO COMPARE THIS +WITH THE ETHNOGRAPHIC MAP BETWEEN PAGES 32 AND 33.] + +[Illustration: GERMANY’S NEW BOUNDARIES AS FIXED BY THE TREATY OF +PEACE. THE DARK PORTIONS SHOW THE TERRITORY LOST TO GERMANY; THE SHADED +PORTIONS INDICATE TERRITORY WITHIN WHICH THE INHABITANTS WERE TO CHOOSE +BY PLEBISCITE UNDER WHOSE FLAG THEY WOULD LIVE. THE FREE TERRITORY OF +DANZIG IS ALSO MARKED.] + +[Illustration: BULGARIA, AS DELIMITED BY THE PEACE TREATY.] + + + + + INDEX + + + A + + Alsace-Lorraine, Propaganda policy, 180-1 + + Austria-Hungary--propaganda against, 20 _et seqq._; + Congress of the Oppressed Hapsburg Nationalities: resolutions, 25-7; + propaganda policy: memorandum to Foreign Office, 28; + policies outlined, 30-3; + Inter-Allied Propaganda Commission organised at Italian G.H.Q., 37; + publishes weekly journal, 38; + effect of leaflet campaign, 40; + work impaired by reactionary tendencies within Italian Government, + 40, 205; + weakness of declaration made at Versailles meeting of June 3, 1918, + 41; + effect of propaganda, desertions, 43-4; + recommendations of Inter-Allied Policy Committee, 173-6 + + + B + + Baker, Lieut.-Col. B. Granville, 37, 48 + + Balfour, Mr. A. J., reply to Lord Northcliffe’s memorandum on policy + to be adopted against Austria, 33; + against Bulgaria, 139 + + Beaverbrook, Lord, 17, 148 + + Bissolati, Signor, 25 + + Borgese, Professor, 38, 150; + on inter-Allied co-operation, 165 + + Bulgaria, propaganda against: + policy submitted to Foreign Office, 134-9; + Mr. Balfour’s reply, 139; + Ludendorff on effect of, 142 + + + C + + Cinematograph films, use for propaganda purposes, 197 + + Cockerill, Brig.-Gen. G. K., 52, 149 + + Comert, M., 150 + + Congress of the Oppressed Hapsburg Nationalities at Rome: + resolutions, 25-6 + + Cunliffe-Owen, Sir H., in charge of propaganda against Turkey, 13, 150 + + + D + + Denbigh, Col. the Earl of, 10 + + Department of Propaganda in Enemy Countries (Crewe House): + Lord Northcliffe appointed Director, 8; + personnel of advisory committee, 10; + two main branches, 11; + co-operation of other Government Departments, 15, 19; + expenditure during “intensive” campaign (Sept.-Dec. 1918), 18; + production work centralised at Crewe House, 91-2; + good effect of, 93; + inter-Allied Conference: list of delegates, 149; + propaganda to cease during period of Armistice, 234 + + Austro-Hungarian Section, 11, 12 + + German Section, 12, 13 + + Peace terms propaganda, 202 _et seqq._; + Lord Northcliffe’s article published in _The Times_ and circulated + throughout the World, 218-230. + + Work against Turkey, 13 + + _Deutsche Tageszeitung_, tribute to propaganda staff, 121 + + Diaz, General, on effect of propaganda work on Italian front, 45 + + Donald, Mr. Robert, 10 + + + F + + Franklin-Bouillon, M., 148 + + Fyfe, Mr. H., succeeds Mr. H. G. Wells as head of German Section, 13, + 90 + + + G + + Gallenga-Stuart, Signor, 148. + + Germany:-- + Allied propaganda against, early neglect of, 50-2; + use of leaflets, 52; + effect, 53; + suspension of distribution by aeroplane: reasons, 54: use of + balloons, 55-7; + Mr. H. G. Wells’s memorandum on policy, 61 _et seqq._; + Lord Northcliffe’s letter to Mr. Balfour, 81; + summary of British Labour War Aims distributed: effect, 89; + use of aeroplanes resumed, 97; + leaflets circulated among submarine crews: effect, 99; + use of “trench newspaper,” 100; + German press comments, 105 _et seqq._; + rewards offered for leaflets, 117-8; + admission of Allied superiority, 120; + basis for peace negotiations, 212 _et seqq._; + Lord Northcliffe’s article, 218 _et seqq._ + + German propaganda, methods, 3 _et seqq._; + reasons for failure, 4; + organisation set up, 6 + + Gramophone records of Czech and Slav songs used on Italian front, 39 + + Gruss, Major, 37 + + Guest, Mr. S. A., propaganda campaign, 14, 39, 51, 98; + methods, 103 + + + H + + Hall, Rear-Adm. Sir R., 17, 149 + + _Hansa_, article quoted, 123. + + Headlam-Morley, Dr. J. W., 13, 60 + + Hellingrath, General von, 121 + + Hindenburg, Marshal von, on effect of propaganda on German troops, + 93-4; + manifesto on, 106-15 + + Hudson, Mr. H. K., 10, 15 + + Hutier, General von, manifesto; attack on Lord Northcliffe, 115-7 + + + J + + Jones, Sir Roderick, 10, 150 + + + K + + Keeley, Mr. James, 150; + on need for inter-Allied co-operation, 170 + + Kent, Mr. C. S., financial controller of Crewe House, 18 + + Kerry, Major, the Earl of, 16, 91, 149 + + Klobukowski, M., 150, 160, 171 + + _Kölnische Zeitung_, letter describing effect of leaflets, 119; + “Ten Commandments for German Women,” 127 + + _Kölnische Volkszeitung_, letters quoted, 125 + + Kupffer, Herr von, article quoted, 122 + + + L + + Lamprecht, Dr. Karl, 3 + + Lansing, Mr., 41, 42 + + League of Nations, 67, _et seqq._ + + _Le Courrier de l’Air_, 53, 59 + + Lichnowsky, Prince, his pamphlet used by Allies for propaganda, 104, + 132, 142 + + Lloyd George, Mr. D., on success of propaganda against Austria, 50; + appreciation of Lord Northcliffe’s work, 235 + + Low, Sir Sidney, 10 + + Ludendorff, Gen., on failure of German propaganda, 5; + efforts to create organisation, 6; + order showing influence of propaganda on German population, 118; + value of good propaganda, 128; + comparison between British and German departments, 129-31; + on effect of propaganda on Bulgarian defeat, 142 + + + M + + Macdonogh, Lieut.-Gen. Sir George, 52, 106 + + Malinof, M., 141 + + Ministry of Information, 17 + + Mitchell, Capt. P. Chalmers, 16, 91, 92, 149, 209 + + + N + + Nicholson, Sir Charles, 10, 143, 149 + + Northcliffe, Lord, Mission to United States; + Chairman of London H.Q. of British War Mission; + declines seat in Cabinet; + appointed Director of Propaganda in Enemy Countries, 8; + anxiety to commence work against Austria, 35; + letter of appreciation from Mr. Lloyd George, 50; + on need for greater co-ordination, 151; + outline of policy, 156 + + Bulgaria, outlines policy against, 135-139 + + Enemy attacks on, 43, 105, 115-7, 125 + + Germany, outlines policy against, 81 + + Ludendorff, tribute, 130 + + Peace terms, article published in _The Times_ and circulated + throughout the world, 218-230 + + Rechberg, Herr A., tribute, 127 + + Resignation, letter to Mr. Lloyd George, 234; + Mr. Lloyd George’s reply, 235 + + _The Times_, leading article on propaganda work quoted, 129 + + + O + + O’Grady, Mr. James, 10 + + Ojetti, Capt., 37 + + Onslow, Col. Lord, 199 + + Orlando, Signor, meeting with Dr. Trumbitch, 24 + + + P + + Pashitch, M., 23 + + Phillips, Mr. C. J., 15, 150 + + Poland, propaganda policy in regard to, 178-180 + + Prisoners of War, information for, 143 + + Propaganda, objects, 2; + axioms: truthful statements only to be made, 2; + necessity of co-ordination, 146; + inter-Allied conference at Crewe House, list of delegates, 149; + distribution devices, 54-59; 184-190 + + + R + + Rechberg, Herr A., tribute to Lord Northcliffe’s work, 127 + + _Rheinische-Westfälische-Zeitung_, article quoted, 121 + + Rome Congress, 25 _et seqq._ + + + S + + Scheurmann, Herr W., letter quoted, 126 + + Seton-Watson, Dr. R. W., 11, 12, 20, 24, 37, 49 + + Siciliani, Col., 37 + + Sonnino, Baron, 41, 42 + + Standing, Sir Guy, 17, 149 + + Steed, Mr. H. Wickham, 10, 20, 24, 39, 49, 149; + Co-Director of Austro-Hungarian Section, 11; + mission to Italy, 37 + + Stein, Gen. von, admission of superiority of Allies’ propaganda, 120 + + Stossinger, Herr F., 120 + + Stuart, Lieut.-Col. Sir Campbell, 10, 149, 204, 236 + + Swinton, Maj.-Gen., 51 + + + T + + _The Times_, leading article on Lord Northcliffe’s work quoted, 129 + + Torre, Dr., 24 + + Trumbitch, Dr., 23, 24 + + + W + + Wells, Mr. H. G., 10, 12, 60, 89, 90; + memorandum on propaganda policy against Germany, 61 _et seqq._ + + Wireless Telegraphy, used as means of disseminating information, 17, + 103 + + +PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN BY THE CORNWALL PRESS, LTD., +PARIS GARDEN, STAMFORD STREET, LONDON, S.E.1. + + +Transcriber’s notes: + +Italic text is indicated with _underscores_, bold text with =equals=. +Small/mixed capitals have been replaced with ALL CAPITALS. + +Underlining in the translation of leaflet 17, where it is used for +emphasis, has been marked as bold, but ignored elsewhere. + +Evident typographical and punctuation errors have been corrected +silently. Inconsistent spelling/hyphenation has been normalised. + +The usage of both Roumania & Rumania is the author’s. + +A half-title page has been discarded. + +A single footnote has been relocated at the end of the quoted passage +to which it refers. + +To improve text flow, illustrations have been relocated as follows: + +Photographs have been grouped between chapters. + +Each “leaflet” has been moved to the appendix, to accompanying its +translation. + +Redundant cross-references and reiterations of the leaflet number have +been discarded. + +The explanatory text “Facsimile leaflets and translations” has been +appended to the appendix and table of contents. + +Maps follow immediately after the appendix. + +*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 77798 *** |