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The nature of the documents +quoted precluded earlier publication, +which might have embarrassed the Allied +Governments. No such embarrassment will +be caused at this late stage. The march of +events has removed the need, which existed +during the War and during the peace-making, +for withholding from public knowledge particulars +of the organisation and work directed +with such effect from Crewe House.</p> + +<p>Much that was interesting, and even<span class="pagenum" id="Page_viii">[viii]</span> +dramatic, can never be divulged. Otherwise, +many who did valuable and dangerous service +might, by a breach of faith, be exposed to +reprisals.</p> + +<p>The activities of Crewe House will stand +the test of judgment by results. German +comments on Viscount Northcliffe’s department +leave no room for doubt as to the verdict +of enemy countries.</p> +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> + +<div class="chapter"> +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_ix">[ix]</span></p> + +<h2 class="nobreak" id="CONTENTS">CONTENTS</h2> +</div> + + + +<table class="tw60 autotable"> +<tr> +<td class="tdc" colspan="2">CHAPTER I</td> + +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdl fs80">PROPAGANDA: ITS USES AND ABUSES</td> +<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#Page_1">1</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdc" colspan="2">CHAPTER II</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdl fs80">CREWE HOUSE: ITS ORGANISATION AND <i>PERSONNEL</i></td> +<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#Page_8">8</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdc" colspan="2">CHAPTER III</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdl fs80">OPERATIONS AGAINST AUSTRIA-HUNGARY: PROPAGANDA’S MOST STRIKING SUCCESS</td> +<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#Page_20">20</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdc" colspan="2">CHAPTER IV</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdl fs80">OPERATIONS AGAINST GERMANY</td> +<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#Page_50">50</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdc" colspan="2">CHAPTER V</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdl fs80">TRIBUTES FROM THE ENEMY</td> +<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#Page_105">105</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdc" colspan="2">CHAPTER VI</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdl fs80">OPERATIONS AGAINST BULGARIA AND OTHER ACTIVITIES</td> +<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#Page_134">134</a><span class="pagenum" id="Page_x">[x]</span></td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdc" colspan="2">CHAPTER VII</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdl fs80">INTER-ALLIED CO-OPERATION</td> +<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#Page_146">146</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdc" colspan="2">CHAPTER VIII</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdl fs80">FROM WAR PROPAGANDA TO PEACE PROPAGANDA</td> +<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#Page_201">201</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdc" colspan="2">CHAPTER IX</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdl fs80"><i>VALE!</i></td> +<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#Page_233">233</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdl fs80">APPENDIX—Facsimile leaflets and translations</td> +<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#Page_237">237</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdl fs80">INDEX</td> +<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#Page_253">253</a></td> +</tr> +</table> + + + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> + +<div class="chapter"> +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_xi">[xi]</span></p> + +<h2 class="nobreak" id="LIST_OF_ILLUSTRATIONS">LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS</h2> +</div> + + + +<table class="tw80 autotable"> +<tr> +<td class="tdl hang2">Viscount Northcliffe</td> +<td class="tdrbot"><i><a href="#i_f004">Frontispiece</a></i></td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdl hang2"></td> +<td class="tdc fs50">BETWEEN PAGES</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdl hang2">Crewe House</td> +<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#i_p008a">8 and 9</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdl hang2">Rear-Admiral Sir Reginald Hall, K.C.M.G., C.B., M.P.</td> +<td class="tdr"><a href="#i_p008b">8 and 9</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdl hang2">Lieutenant-General Sir George Macdonogh, K.C.M.G., C.B.</td> +<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#i_p016a">16 and 17</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdl hang2">The Rt. Hon. Lord Beaverbrook</td> +<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#i_p016b">16 and 17</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdl hang2">Mr. H. Wickham Steed</td> +<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#i_p032a">32 and 33</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdl hang2">Dr. R. W. Seton-Watson</td> +<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#i_p032d">32 and 33</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdl hang2">News of Allied successes on Western Front for Jugo-Slav soldiers in the Austrian Armies</td> +<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#leaflet01">48 and 49</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdl hang2">A manifesto from Dr. Trumbitch distributed from aeroplanes among Jugo-Slav troops in the Austrian Army</td> +<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#leaflet02">48 and 49</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdl hang2">Mr. H. G. Wells</td> +<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#i_p064a">64 and 65</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdl hang2">Leaflet—probably the first—distributed by British aeroplanes among German troops in October, 1914. It announced a Russian victory in East Prussia</td> +<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#leaflet03">64 and 65</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdl hang2">Mr. Hamilton Fyfe</td> +<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#i_p064c">64 and 65</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdl hang2">Aeroplane distribution of copies of an early leaflet prepared for the German soldier</td> +<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#leaflet04">64 and 65</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdl hang2">Brigadier-General G. K. Cockerill, C.B.</td> +<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#i_p080a">80 and 81</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdl hang2">A typical news-sheet for German soldiers</td> +<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#leaflet05">80 and 81</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdl hang2">Captain Chalmers Mitchell</td> +<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#i_p096a">96 and 97</a><span class="pagenum" id="Page_xii">[xii]</span></td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdl hang2">“Reporting Progress”—Leaflet which gave particulars of Allied progress against the Germans</td> +<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#leaflet06">96 and 97</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdl hang2">Diagrammatic representation of the growth of the American Army in the Field</td> +<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#leaflet07">96 and 97</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdl hang2">Map-leaflet showing the breaking of the Hindenburg line</td> +<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#leaflet08">112 and 113</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdl hang2">News for German soldiers of the destruction of the Turkish Army in Palestine</td> +<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#leaflet09">112 and 113</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdl hang2">Some pointed quotations for German soldiers culled from German sources</td> +<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#leaflet10">112 and 113</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdl hang2">A medallion struck by the Germans in “dishonour” of Lord Northcliffe</td> +<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#i_p128a">128 and 129</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdl hang2">Leaflet with particulars of the fate of 150 German submarine commanders, which created great depression in German naval ports</td> +<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#leaflet11">128 and 129</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdl hang2">Leaflet warning the Germans that such places as Berlin and Hamburg had been brought within range of aerial attack and could be bombed if the war were prolonged</td> +<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#leaflet12">128 and 129</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdl hang2">A German dream and the result. A leaflet illustrating the collapse of the Mittel-Europa ambition of German militarism</td> +<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#leaflet13">144 and 145</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdl hang2">Front page of a “Trench Newspaper,” issued by Crewe House for German troops</td> +<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#leaflet14">144 and 145</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdl hang2">The late Sir Charles Nicholson, Bart., M.P.</td> +<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#i_p144d">144 and 145</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdl hang2">Sir Roderick Jones, K.B.E.</td> +<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#i_p160a">160 and 161</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdl hang2">Illustrated leaflet portraying contentment of German prisoners in British hands</td> +<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#leaflet15">160 and 161</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdl hang2">Colonel the Earl of Denbigh, C.V.O.</td> +<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#i_p160c">160 and 161</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdl hang2">Leaflet showing how the Allies had shattered the great Berlin-Bagdad plan</td> +<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#leaflet16">160 and 161</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdl hang2">Mr. Robert Donald</td> +<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#i_p176a">176 and 177</a><span class="pagenum" id="Page_xiii">[xiii]</span></td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdl hang2">Manifesto to Magyar Troops</td> +<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#leaflet17">176 and 177</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdl hang2">“Drifting down in white showers”: Leaflets, from Italian aeroplane squadron, dropping on Vienna</td> +<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#i_p176c">176 and 177</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdl hang2">Manifesto, signed by Professor (now President) Masaryk, to Czecho-Slovak soldiers</td> +<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#leaflet18">176 and 177</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdl hang2">Sir Sidney Low</td> +<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#i_p192a">192 and 193</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdl hang2">Rapidly-distributed leaflets for German troops telling of Allied successes in the Balkans and in Syria</td> +<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#leaflet19">192 and 193</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdl hang2">Mr. James O’Grady, M.P.</td> +<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#i_p192d">192 and 193</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdl hang2">Inflating the balloons and attaching the truth-telling leaflets</td> +<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#i_p208a">208 and 209</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdl hang2">Registering the direction and velocity of the wind, in order to judge where the leaflets would fall</td> +<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#i_p208b">208 and 209</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdl hang2">How leaflets were attached to the balloons</td> +<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#i_p208c">208 and 209</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdl hang2">Dispatching the balloons</td> +<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#i_p208d">208 and 209</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdl hang2">Testing the lifting power of balloons used for propaganda purposes</td> +<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#i_p224a">224 and 225</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdc" colspan="2">LIST OF MAPS.</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdl hang2">Ethnographic map of Austria-Hungary</td> +<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#map1">32 and 38</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdl hang2">The partition of Austria-Hungary: Showing the boundaries as defined in the Peace Treaties</td> +<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#map2">48 and 49</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdl hang2">Germany’s new boundaries as fixed by the Treaty of Peace</td> +<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#map3">80 and 81</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdl hang2">Bulgaria as delimited by the Peace treaty</td> +<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#map4">144 and 145</a></td> +</tr> +</table> + + + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> + +<div class="chapter"> +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_1">[1]</span></p> + +<h2 class="nobreak" id="CHAPTER_I">CHAPTER I<br> +<span class="fs80">PROPAGANDA: ITS USES AND ABUSES</span> +</h2> +</div> + + + +<p class="sub">Definition and Axioms: Why German Propaganda Failed: +Ludendorff’s Lament and Tribute.</p> + + +<p>Propaganda in war is a comparatively +modern activity. Certainly, in the stage +of development to which it attained in the +closing phases of the Great War, it is a new +weapon of warfare and a powerful weapon. +Therefore it requires skilful and careful +handling. Otherwise it destroys rather than +creates, and alienates whom it should conciliate.</p> + +<p>What is propaganda? It is the presentation +of a case in such a way that others may +be influenced. In so far as its use against +an enemy is concerned, the subject matter +employed must not be self-evidently propagandist. +Except in special circumstances, +its origin should be completely concealed. +As a general rule, too, it is desirable to hide +the channels of communication.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_2">[2]</span></p> + +<p>Creation of a favourable “atmosphere” +is the first object of propaganda. Until this +psychological effect is produced (as the result +of military events, of propagandist activity +or of internal political disaffection) the mentality +of enemy troops and civil population—and +both are equally important in modern +warfare—will be naturally unsympathetic +and unresponsive to influence. In order to +produce this “atmosphere” of receptivity +and susceptibility, continuity of propaganda +policy is indispensable. This presupposes +definition of sound policy, based upon comprehensive +knowledge of the facts and of the +developments of the political, military, and +economic situation, and also of the enemy +psychology.</p> + +<p>When a line of policy has been laid down, +actual propaganda operations may be begun, +but not before. First of all axioms of propaganda +is that only truthful statements be +made. Secondly, there must be no conflicting +arguments, and this can only be +ensured by close co-operation of all propagandists +and by strict adherence to the +policy defined. A false step may possibly be +irretrievable.</p> + +<p>Owing to inattention to these cardinal +principles of propaganda against an enemy—inattention<span class="pagenum" id="Page_3">[3]</span> +due to lack of appreciation of +their importance—the Germans’ very energetic +propaganda effort miscarried. Wrongly +assuming that the war would be of short +duration, they made use of untruths and half-truths, +mis-statements and over-statements. +These produced a temporary effect, but the +protraction of the war brought its own refutation +of their misrepresentation, and, instead +of operating to the good of the Central +Empires, the campaign wrought harm to their +cause.</p> + +<p>Moreover, as they afterwards realised, the +Germans did not agree among themselves +in their misrepresentations. There was, as a +well-known British authority on German +propaganda has pointed out, a chaotic +exuberance of different points of view. And +they were incapable of understanding other +nations. Dr. Karl Lamprecht, the distinguished +German professor, deplored this in +the course of a lecture at the end of 1914, +when the Germans regarded their victory as +assured. “When the war came,” he said, +“everyone who could write obtained the +largest possible goose quill and wrote to all +his foreign friends, telling them that they did +not realise what splendid fellows the Germans +were, and not infrequently adding that in<span class="pagenum" id="Page_4">[4]</span> +many cases their conduct required some +excuse. The effect was stupendous.” “I +can speak with the most open heart on the +subject,” he added, “for amongst the whole +crowd it was the professors who were most +erratic. The consequences were gruesome. +Probably much more harm came to our +cause in this way than from all the efforts +of the enemy. None the less, it was done +with the best intentions. The self-confidence +was superb, but the knowledge was +lacking. People thought that they could +explain the German cause without preparation. +What was wanted was organisation.”</p> + +<p>Before coming to Allied methods and +matter, it will be interesting to examine the +scope of German propaganda. In the early +stages of the war, Germany loudly proclaimed +that she was winning. As the progress of +events belied such words, she changed her +theme. The Allies could not win, she averred, +and the longer they took to realise this the +greater would be their suffering and losses. +She continually endeavoured to sow discord +between the Allies. Great Britain was not +taking her fair share of the Allied burden; +Great Britain intended to retain Belgium +and the northern part of France; Great +Britain was using France and Russia for her<span class="pagenum" id="Page_5">[5]</span> +own selfish ends; the interests of the Balkan +Powers could not be reconciled. These were +some of the foolish falsehoods in which she +indulged. They were ineffective, as were her +many attempts to stir up disaffection within +Allied countries. Ireland, South Africa, +India, Egypt and Mohammedan countries +were examples in the case of Great Britain, +and Algeria in that of France. She spared +no effort to encourage Pacifism among the +Allied peoples.</p> + +<p>Their lack of success became evident even +to the Germans themselves. Government +agencies and Press became more reticent as +the war went on and the propaganda was +found to be doing more harm than good. +The military leaders became apprehensive of +the effectiveness and superiority of British +propaganda. Soldiers and writers made +bitter complaints of the lack of any German +organisation to maintain an adequate counter-campaign.</p> + +<p>General Ludendorff (“My War Memories,” +pp. 360 <i>et seq.</i>) is pathetic in his laments +at the non-success of German efforts. “The +German propaganda,” he writes, “was only +kept going with difficulty. In spite of all our +efforts, its achievements, in comparison to the +magnitude of the task, were inadequate. We<span class="pagenum" id="Page_6">[6]</span> +produced no real effect on the enemy +peoples.” He admits failure, too, in propaganda +efforts on the fighting fronts. In the +East, he says, the Russians were the authors of +their own collapse. In the West, “the +fronts of our enemies had not been made +susceptible by the state of public opinion in +their home countries, and the propaganda +we gradually introduced had no success.” +He records his efforts to induce the Imperial +Chancellor to create a great organisation, as +it had become “undeniably essential to +establish an Imperial Ministry of Propaganda,” +and he was convinced that no adequate +counter-campaign to Allied propaganda +could be organised except by an Imperial +department possessing special powers. “At +last a feeble step in this direction was taken +in August, 1918. A totally inadequate organisation +was set up; besides, it was then too +late. In these circumstances it was quite +impossible to achieve uniformity in propaganda +work between Germany and Austria-Hungary, +as was conspicuously the case with +our enemies. The Army found no ally in a +strong propaganda directed from home. While +her Army was victorious on the field of +battle, Germany failed in the fight against +the <i>moral</i> of the enemy peoples.”</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_7">[7]</span></p> + +<p>Ludendorff’s <i>apologia</i> shows that he understood +the principles which should govern a +propaganda campaign; but he did not +understand that the German case was bad. +He has the doubtful consolation of knowing +he was right in his theories; for they coincided +in large degree with the principles +upon which Viscount Northcliffe based his +famous intensive campaign from Crewe House. +No other German has exhibited such a grasp +of the fundamentals of propaganda as +Ludendorff, and he had excellent opportunity +of judging the efficacy of the action into which +these theoretical principles were translated. +His verdict is an unqualified tribute, as the +extracts from his writings quoted in another +chapter show.</p> + +<p>How this success was attained it is the +purpose of this book to reveal.</p> + + +<figure class="figcenter illowp80" id="i_p008a" style="max-width: 125.4375em;"> + <img class="w100" src="images/i_p008a.jpg" alt=""> + <figcaption class="caption">CREWE HOUSE.</figcaption> +</figure> + + + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> +<div class="chapter"> +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_8">[8]</span></p> + +<h2 class="nobreak" id="CHAPTER_II">CHAPTER II<br> +<span class="fs80">CREWE HOUSE: ITS ORGANISATION AND +<i>PERSONNEL</i></span> +</h2> +</div> + + + +<p class="sub">Viscount Northcliffe’s appointment: The Formation of an +Advisory Committee: Other Government Departments’ +Co-operation.</p> + + + +<p>In February, 1918, Viscount Northcliffe +accepted the Prime Minister’s invitation to +become Director of Propaganda in Enemy +Countries. Only a few weeks earlier, Lord +Northcliffe had concluded his mission to the +United States, where he had undertaken the +co-ordination and supervision of the multiplex +British missions engaged in purchasing +food and munitions and in other vitally +important operations. Upon his return to +England, he had become Chairman of the +London headquarters of the British War +Mission to the United States of America, +after having declined a seat in the Cabinet. +Despite the importance of his new duties, +he elected to retain his connection with the +British War Mission to the United States.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_9">[9]</span></p> + +<p>Lord Northcliffe’s name bore in itself a +propaganda value in enemy countries. None +knew better than the Germans with what +assiduity and tenacity he had striven to +awaken the British nation to the extent and +significance of the war preparations of +German militarism. From the time of his +entry into this office he and his work were +the subjects of continual reference in the +German Press. The vehemence of their +attacks showed the depth of their apprehension.</p> + +<p>The direction and organisation of propaganda +abroad, and especially against enemy +countries, required a <i>personnel</i> deeply versed +in foreign politics, with an intimate understanding +of enemy psychology, and with +professional knowledge of the art of presenting +facts plainly and forcefully. The work +was of a highly specialised character, +designed to reveal to the enemy the hopelessness +of their cause and case and the inevitability +of Allied victory. This called +for continuity of policy and persevering +effort. But the problems of the penetration +of propaganda into enemy countries were as +exacting as the definition of policy and the +presentation of the facts of the situation.</p> + +<p>In order to bring as wide a knowledge as<span class="pagenum" id="Page_10">[10]</span> +possible to bear upon the conduct of this +campaign of education and enlightenment of +enemy peoples, Lord Northcliffe invited and +obtained the enthusiastic co-operation of a +committee of well-known men of affairs and +publicists. Each had won distinction in +some sphere of public service which rendered +his aid in this work valuable.</p> + +<p>Lord Northcliffe appointed me as Deputy-Director +of the department and Deputy-Chairman +of the Committee.</p> + +<p>The members of the Committee were:—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"> + +<p>Colonel the Earl of Denbigh, C.V.O.</p> + +<p>Mr. Robert Donald (then Editor of the +<i>Daily Chronicle</i>).</p> + +<p>Sir Roderick Jones, K.B.E. (Managing +Director of Reuters Agency).</p> + +<p>Sir Sidney Low.</p> + +<p>Sir Charles Nicholson, Bt., M.P.</p> + +<p>Mr. James O’Grady, M.P.</p> + +<p>Mr. H. Wickham Steed (Foreign Editor +and later Editor-in-Chief of <i>The +Times</i>).</p> + +<p>Mr. H. G. Wells.</p> + +<p>Secretary, Mr. H. K. Hudson, C.B.E.</p> +</div> + +<p>It was an advisory committee of wide +knowledge and many talents, with a strong<span class="pagenum" id="Page_11">[11]</span> +representation of authors and journalists +of distinction. Regular fortnightly meetings +were held, at which each section of the +department reported progress and submitted +programmes of future activities for approval.</p> + +<p>The headquarters of the department were +established at Crewe House, the town mansion +of the Marquis of Crewe, who had, with +characteristic public spirit, placed it at the +disposal of the Government for war purposes.</p> + +<p>The department was divided into two main +branches, the one for production, and the +other for distribution, of propaganda material. +In its turn the production branch was divided +into German, Austro-Hungarian, and Bulgarian +sections.</p> + +<p>For reasons which will be given in the next +chapter, the Austro-Hungarian section was +the first to begin operations. Mr. Steed +and Dr. R. W. Seton-Watson were co-directors +of this section. They were an +admirable choice. As Foreign Editor (as he +then was) of <i>The Times</i>, author of “The +Hapsburg Monarchy,” and with experience +from 1902 to 1913 as correspondent of <i>The +Times</i> at Vienna, Mr. Steed had intimate +and authoritative knowledge of the peoples +and conditions of the Dual Monarchy. Dr. +Seton-Watson was also a distinguished<span class="pagenum" id="Page_12">[12]</span> +authority on Austro-Hungarian and Balkan +history and politics, to which he had devoted +many years of study.</p> + +<p>After determination of the policy to be +pursued against Austria-Hungary, Lord +Northcliffe entrusted to them the important +mission to Italy which initiated the campaign +against the Dual Monarchy, resulting in such +far-reaching and remarkable consequences. +In the course of this mission they attended +the historic Rome Congress of the Oppressed +Hapsburg Nationalities and they took a +prominent part in the establishment of the +inter-Allied commission which waged propaganda +warfare against Austria-Hungary. +The subsequent conduct of this campaign +necessitated keeping in close touch with the +different national organisations of the oppressed +Hapsburg races—Poles, Czecho-Slovaks, +Southern Slavs, Rumanes—throughout +1918, and they were able to render signal +services to these peoples as well as to the +Allies.</p> + +<p>When operations began against Germany, +Mr. H. G. Wells accepted Lord Northcliffe’s +invitation to take charge of the German +Section. Mr. Wells made an exhaustive +study of the conditions affecting Germany +from a propaganda point of view, with the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_13">[13]</span> +co-operation of Dr. J. W. Headlam-Morley, +and his memorandum (which is published +in Chapter IV of this book) is a noteworthy +document of exceptional interest. When, in +July, 1918, he found himself unable to continue +the direction of the German Section +(although retaining membership of the Committee) +he had collected a mass of valuable +data for the use of his successor, Mr. Hamilton +Fyfe, the well-known journalist. To Mr. +Fyfe and his colleagues of the German Section +fell the organisation of the “intensive” +propaganda activities of the last three months +of the war.</p> + +<p>There thus remained the work against +Turkey and Bulgaria. By arrangement +between Lord Northcliffe and Lord Beaverbrook, +propaganda against Turkey was ably +conducted by the Near East section of the +Ministry of Information, in charge of Mr. +(now Sir Hugo) Cunliffe-Owen. This was +obviously wise in the interests of economy +and efficiency. Propaganda in Bulgaria, +however, was directed from Crewe House.</p> + +<p>The production of propaganda literature +and its distribution were different functions +and were performed by separate sections of +the department, but, of course, in the closest +co-operation. So far as enemy troops were<span class="pagenum" id="Page_14">[14]</span> +concerned, the distribution for Germans and +Bulgarians was undertaken by the British +military authorities. For Austro-Hungarian +troops, the work was placed on an inter-Allied +basis, distribution being organised by the +Italian Army.</p> + +<p>Distribution through civil channels, a +difficult task, was in the hands of Mr. S. A. +Guest, who, alone of British propagandists +against the enemy, had been constantly +engaged in that work since the early days of +the war. He built up a series of organisations +in different parts of Europe by which +news and views could be introduced into all +the enemy countries. Great ingenuity and +perseverance were required, but no little +measure of success crowned his efforts.</p> + +<p>Co-ordination of these activities was a +vital necessity, and this was effectively +ensured by a daily meeting of those in charge +of the different sections, the liaison officers +between Crewe House and other departments, +and the heads of the administrative branches +of Crewe House. At this meeting, held +usually under my chairmanship, the general +details of policy and operations of all sections +were systematically discussed. Each +section knew what the other was doing, +and uniformity of policy and action was<span class="pagenum" id="Page_15">[15]</span> +secured. In addition, the consideration of +the problems which arose, whether in the +general work of Crewe House or in the +work of one particular section, benefited +from the collective attention of a combination +of enthusiastic minds. Mr. Hudson, +the able secretary of the advisory committee, +also acted as secretary of these daily +meetings.</p> + +<p>All at Crewe House were profoundly grateful +for the cordiality with which the many +other Government departments, with whom +they were brought into contact, lent their +co-operation. In this respect the Foreign +Office, War Office, Admiralty, Treasury, +Ministry of Information, and Stationery +Office, all contributed materially to the success +attained, although this list by no means +exhausts the departments which willingly +placed their resources at the disposal of +Crewe House. It is pleasing to be able to +record this as a recollection of and tribute to +the service rendered by these departments in +this phase of war activity.</p> + +<p>The liaison officers’ duties were extremely +important. Mr. C. J. Phillips, a distinguished +Civil Servant, who had been transferred from +the Board of Education for special work in +the Foreign Office, was the connecting link<span class="pagenum" id="Page_16">[16]</span> +between the latter department and Crewe +House. To him fell the task of keeping +Crewe House informed of foreign developments +which affected the work of propaganda +in enemy countries and of keeping +the Foreign Office <i>au courant</i> with Crewe +House activities. His assistance and judgment +were of immense value in dealing with +the questions affecting foreign affairs which +were constantly arising.</p> + +<p>For a few months after Lord Northcliffe’s +appointment, the Military Intelligence +Directorate of the War Office continued the +production of literature for propaganda work +against the Germans, and during this period +Major the Earl of Kerry, M.P., acted as +liaison officer between the two departments. +Each department was able to complement +and supplement the other’s work with good +effect, and the co-operation was carried out +most harmoniously. When production was +subsequently centralised at Crewe House, +Captain Chalmers Mitchell became liaison +officer with the War Office and with the Air +Ministry. No greater tribute can be paid to +his work than the record in the pages that +follow.</p> + + +<p>Most cordial, too, were the relations maintained +with the Admiralty, and especially<span class="pagenum" id="Page_17">[17]</span> +with Rear-Admiral Sir Reginald Hall (Director +of Naval Intelligence), through Commander +(now Sir Guy) Standing, R.N.V.R. Crewe +House was rightly grateful for constant +co-operation of a confidential character +through the exercise on its behalf of naval +resources.</p> + +<p>Most valuable assistance was readily given +to Crewe House by the Ministry of Information, +so efficiently organised by Lord +Beaverbrook. Close consultation was maintained +between heads of sections of the +two departments wherever co-operation could +be advantageous. In certain European +countries, for instance, the same agents +acted for both departments—an arrangement +which proved effective as well as +economical. Invaluable service for Crewe +House was performed by one agent of the +Ministry in regard to Bulgarian affairs in +which he displayed high competence and +discretion. Crewe House was also indebted +to the Ministry for the use of its wireless +service in sending out matter for the enlightenment +of the enemy by that means, and for +many similar facilities, too numerous to +mention, willingly offered and gladly accepted.</p> + +<p>With the Treasury—<i>bête noire</i> to so many +temporary war departments—Crewe House<span class="pagenum" id="Page_18">[18]</span> +had the smoothest working arrangements +through Mr. C. S. Kent, who acted as Financial +Controller and Accounting Officer in +addition to other duties connected with the +general administration of Crewe House. At +no time was Treasury sanction withheld or +delayed in regard to any expenditure proposed +in connection with enemy propaganda.</p> + +<p>The enemy leaders frequently alleged +that Lord Northcliffe expended huge sums +of money on his propaganda work. According +to the report of the Comptroller and +Auditor-General, the expenditure for the +four months from September 1 to December +31, 1918—which was the period of the +“intensive” campaign and consequently the +most expensive—was £31,360 4s. 9d., which +included expenses borne by the Office of +Works, the Stationery Office, and the War +Office on behalf of Crewe House. Only +£7,946 2s. 7d. of this amount was incurred +directly by Crewe House, one reason for +the smallness of the amount being that +many members of the department worked +without remuneration for their services. +The Auditor-General made a complimentary +reference to the manner in which the +accounts were rendered.</p> + +<p>Last, but not least, the Stationery Office<span class="pagenum" id="Page_19">[19]</span> +which undertook all the printing arrangements +for the millions of leaflets and other +publications required in German, Croat, +Bulgarian, and other languages, rendered +great assistance by the promptness and +efficiency with which they met Crewe House +requirements which, from their very nature, +generally necessitated working against time.</p> + +<p>It is particularly pleasing to look back and +remember all the help so willingly given by +other Government departments and to record +the unfailing courtesy with which it was +proffered and the zeal displayed. Crewe +House gladly recognised the value of such +loyal co-operation, of which those who were +concerned in its work still retain grateful +memories.</p> + + + <div class="column"> + <figure class="figcenter illowp80" id="i_p008b"> + <img class="w100" src="images/i_p008b.jpg" alt="" style="width:100%"> + <figcaption class="caption">REAR-ADMIRAL SIR REGINALD HALL, K.C.M.G., C.B., M.P.<br> +[DIRECTOR OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE, 1918.]<br> +<i>Photo: Russell, London.</i></figcaption> +</figure> + </div> + + <div class="column"> + <figure class="figcenter illowp80" id="i_p016a" > + <img class="w100" src="images/i_p016a.jpg" alt="" style="width:100%"> + <figcaption class="caption">LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SIR GEORGE MACDONOGH, K.C.M.G., C.B.<br> +[DIRECTOR OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, 1918.]<br> +<i>Photo: Russell, London.</i></figcaption> +</figure> + </div> + + <div class="column"> +<figure class="figcenter illowp80" id="i_p016b" > + <img class="w100" src="images/i_p016b.jpg" alt="" style="width:100%"> + <figcaption class="caption">RT. HON. LORD BEAVERBROOK, MINISTER OF INFORMATION, 1918.<br> +<i>Photo: M. S. Kay, Bolton.</i></figcaption> +</figure> + </div> + + + + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> + +<div class="chapter"> +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_20">[20]</span></p> + +<h2 class="nobreak" id="CHAPTER_III">CHAPTER III<br> +<span class="fs80">OPERATIONS AGAINST AUSTRIA-HUNGARY: +PROPAGANDA’S MOST STRIKING SUCCESS</span> +</h2> +</div> + +<p class="sub">Anti-German Hapsburg Races: The Secret Treaty of London: +Problem of the Adriatic: Importance of the Rome Congress: +Lord Northcliffe’s Policy against Austria-Hungary: +Formation of an Inter-Allied Propaganda Commission and +its Effective Operations: The Final Triumph.</p> + + + +<p>Little time was spent in deciding that, of +all enemy countries, Austria-Hungary would +be most susceptible to propaganda. With +the assistance of such authorities as Mr. +Wickham Steed and Dr. Seton-Watson, Lord +Northcliffe was soon able to propose a line +of sound policy for the sanction of the +Foreign Office.</p> + +<p>It is strange that determined action on +some such lines had not been initiated +previously by the Allied Governments. They +had failed to profit from the anti-Hapsburg +and anti-German sentiment of the oppressed +subject races of the Dual Monarchy. Three-fifths<span class="pagenum" id="Page_21">[21]</span> +of the Hapsburg peoples were actually +or potentially well disposed to the Allies, +and it was towards this majority that Lord +Northcliffe decided that propaganda must be +directed with two objectives, one constructive +and one destructive:—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"> + +<p>(1) The moral and active support of +the national desires of these races +for independence, with the ultimate aim +of forming a strong non-German chain +of Central European and Danubian +States.</p> + +<p>(2) The encouragement of their disinclination +to fight on behalf of the +Central Empires, thus greatly handicapping +the Austro-Hungarian Armies +as a fighting force, and seriously embarrassing +the German military leaders.</p> +</div> + +<p>It will be seen with what success each +object was secured.</p> + +<p>The nationalities chiefly affected were the +Czechs and the Southern Slavs. There were +also lesser numbers of Italians, Poles and +Rumanes, whom it was intended to place +under their own national Governments of +Italy, the State of Poland (then projected +and now established), and Rumania, which +countries marched with the districts of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_22">[22]</span> +Austria-Hungary inhabited by their respective +races.</p> + +<p>Operations were comparatively straightforward +in every case except that of the +Southern Slavs, in which the secret Treaty +of London of April, 1915, presented a serious +obstacle. At the beginning of 1918 few +people realised the difficulties thus created, +but since the cessation of hostilities the +“Adriatic question” has loomed largely in +the public view of international relations +and is rightly regarded as one of the most +troublesome problems of world politics. Its +bearing on propaganda lay in the fact that by +this treaty Great Britain, France and Russia +had promised to Italy certain Austrian territories +inhabited by Southern Slavs. These territories, +moreover, provided trading access to +the sea and were of the highest economic value +to any Southern Slav state which might be +formed. So long as that treaty was regarded +by the Southern Slavs as representing Allied +policy, it was difficult to persuade them that +Allied sympathies were with them or that the +Allies would secure for them the economic +interests necessary to the establishment of +the united Southern Slav state peopled by +the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes.</p> + +<p>With the object of creating a counterpoise<span class="pagenum" id="Page_23">[23]</span> +to the secret pact, representatives of the +Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, had assembled +in Corfu, under the leadership of Dr. Trumbitch +(president of the Southern Slav Committee) +and M. Pashitch (Prime Minister of +Serbia), and had issued the Southern Slav +Unitary Declaration on June 20, 1917, proclaiming +the union of the three peoples and +claiming all territory compactly inhabited by +them, which (said the Declaration) “cannot +be mutilated without attaint to the vital +interests of the community. Our nation +demands nothing that belongs to others, but +only what is its own.” On the one hand, +this was an important counter-step to the +partition of Dalmatia proposed in the Treaty +of London; while on the other, it was a +definite advance towards the solidification +of the three peoples into nationhood. Consequently +it was not without effect upon the +German military leaders, who foresaw its +influence upon the Southern Slav regiments +of the Austro-Hungarian armies, and it undoubtedly +hastened their decision to take +direct control of the forces of the Dual +Monarchy.</p> + +<p>The next move was made after the Italian +armies had recovered from the disaster of +Caporetto and had re-established their line<span class="pagenum" id="Page_24">[24]</span> +on the Piave. On the initiative of Mr. +Wickham Steed, Dr. Seton-Watson, and other +members of the Serbian Society of Great +Britain, conferences took place in London +between leading Italians and Southern Slavs, +with the aim of outlining a solution of the +question which would be acceptable to the +two nations. A memorandum of the discussions +was given to the Prime Minister of +Italy (Signor Orlando), who was then +(January, 1918) in London. At Mr. Steed’s +suggestion, Signor Orlando met Dr. Trumbitch +and they discussed the question at +great length, with the result that Dr. Trumbitch +accepted an invitation from the Italian +Premier to go to Rome.</p> + +<p>Before that visit took place, Dr. Torre, a +prominent member of the Italian Parliament, +was sent to London, as representative of an +influential joint committee of the two Italian +Houses of Parliament, to endeavour to +establish a definite basis of agreement. After +much negotiation the representatives of the +two nations engaged themselves to settle +amicably the various territorial controversies +in the interest of the future good and sincere +relations between the two peoples, on the +basis of the principles of nationality and of +the right of peoples to decide their own<span class="pagenum" id="Page_25">[25]</span> +destiny. The linguistic and economic interests +of such minorities as might have to +be included in the national territory of either +party were also guaranteed.</p> + +<p>This agreement of principle, made under the +stress of war, coincided approximately with +Lord Northcliffe’s entry into office. One +of his first official acts was to dispatch Mr. +Steed and Dr. Seton-Watson as a special +mission to Italy. While there, they represented +his department at the Congress of the +Oppressed Hapsburg Nationalities which met +with the consent of the Italian Government +at Rome on April 7, 8, and 9, 1918. The +holding of this Congress was, in itself, +an important act of propaganda. This +unprecedented assembly, representing +Italians, Poles, Czecho-Slovaks, Southern +Slavs, and Rumanes, resolved upon common +action in the proclamation of the right of +national unity of these peoples and also +confirmed, in striking fashion, the decisions +arrived at between Italians and Southern +Slavs in London. Signor Orlando, Signor +Bissolati and other Italian Ministers +expressed publicly their adhesion to the +resolutions, which were as follows:—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"> + +<p>“The representatives of the nationalities +subjected in whole or in part to the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_26">[26]</span> +rule of Austria-Hungary—the Italians, +Poles, Rumanes, Czechs, and Southern +Slavs—join in affirming their principles +of common action as follows:—</p> + +<div class="blockquot2"><p>“(1) <i>Each of these peoples proclaims +its right to constitute its own nationality +and State unity, or to complete it, and to +attain full political and economic independence.</i></p> + +<p>“(2) <i>Each of these peoples recognises in +the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy the instrument +of German domination and the +fundamental obstacle to the realisation of +its aspirations and rights.</i></p> + +<p>“(3) <i>The assembly recognises the +necessity of a common struggle against +the common oppressors, in order that each +people may attain complete liberation +and national unity within a free State +unit.</i></p></div> + +<p>“The representatives of the Italian +people and of the Jugo-Slav people in +particular, agree as follows:—</p> + +<div class="blockquot2"><p>“(1) <i>In the relations of the Italian +nation and the nation of the Serbs, Croats +and Slovenes—known also under the name +of the Jugo-Slav nation—the representatives +of the two peoples recognise that the +unity and independence of the Jugo-Slav<span class="pagenum" id="Page_27">[27]</span> +nation is a vital interest of Italy, just as +the completion of Italian national unity +is a vital interest of the Jugo-Slav nation. +And therefore the representatives of the +two peoples pledge themselves to employ +every effort in order that during the war +and at the moment of peace, these ends +of the two nations may be completely +attained.</i></p> + +<p>“(2) <i>They declare that the liberation +of the Adriatic Sea and its defence against +every present and future enemy is a vital +interest of the two peoples.</i></p> + +<p>“(3) <i>They pledge themselves also, in +the interest of good and sincere relations +between the two peoples in the future to +solve amicably the various territorial controversies +on the basis of the principles of +nationality and of the right of peoples to +decide their own fate, and in such a way +as not to injure the vital interests of the +two nations, as they shall be defined at the +moment of peace.</i></p> + +<p>“(4) <i>To such racial groups</i> (nuclei) +<i>of one people as it may be found necessary +to include within the frontiers of the other, +there shall be recognised and guaranteed +the right of their language, culture, and +moral and economic interests.</i>”</p> +</div></div> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_28">[28]</span></p> + +<p>Meanwhile, Lord Northcliffe and his experts +had, in accordance with the principle +consistently followed by Crewe House, +determined the broad lines of policy upon +which propaganda against Austria-Hungary +was to be based. A memorandum on the +subject was prepared and forwarded by Lord +Northcliffe on February 24, 1918, to the +Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs for his +consideration and approval. The following +are the principal points of the memorandum:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>“I have long been of opinion that it would +be well to concentrate on Propaganda in +Austria.</p> + +<p>“I have made a point of seeing every +available person who has come out of Austria, +including many Americans who returned to +the United States when I was there. All +shared the same view—that the Dual +Monarchy entered the greater war in a halfhearted +spirit; is weary of the war; has +endured hardships approaching starvation; +and realises that there is no benefit for Austria +arising out of the war.</p> + +<p>“The control of the Presses of the various +nationalities composing the Dual Monarchy +is so absolute that the real facts of the war +are unknown to the multitude. Germany is +not idle in Austria or elsewhere.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_29">[29]</span></p> + +<p>“For example, the entrance of the United +States into the war has been belittled, and +described as mere American ‘bluff.’ Many +subjects of Austrian nationalities had, before +the war, considerable knowledge of the United +States, owing to the great emigration to that +country. They would realise the power of +the United States if explained to them.</p> + +<p>“It is submitted with respect, therefore, +that one of the first steps to be taken is to +spread, through all available channels, accurate +facts about the American preparations.</p> + +<p>“But, before making any beginning in +that direction, or any others, I feel that I +must be placed in possession of knowledge +of the policy of the Allies as to the Dual +Monarchy.</p> + +<p>“I should be greatly obliged if you would +give me your opinion on the following suggestions, +which are made after consultation +with those well acquainted with Austria. +If they merit your approval, it is suggested +that they be submitted to the United States, +France, and Italy.</p> + +<p>“It is suggested that there are two +policies for the Department of Propaganda in +Enemy Countries. In order that there may +be no misunderstanding I have recapitulated +elementary facts generally known.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_30">[30]</span></p> + +<p>“These two policies are as follows:</p> + +<div class="blockquot2"><p>“(<i>a</i>) To work for a separate peace with +the Emperor, the Court, and the aristocracy, +on the principle of not interfering with the +domestic affairs of the Hapsburg Monarchy, +and of leaving its territory almost or quite +intact; or</p> + +<p>“(<i>b</i>) To try to break the power of Austria-Hungary, +as the weakest link in the chain of +enemy States, by supporting and encouraging +all anti-German and pro-Ally peoples +and tendencies.</p></div> + +<p>“The (<i>a</i>) policy has been tried without +success. The Hapsburgs are not free agents. +They have not the power, even though they +may wish, to break away from Germany, +because—</p> + +<div class="blockquot2"><p>“(1) They are controlled by the internal +structure of their dominions (the Dual System), +which gives Germany decisive leverage +over them through the Germans of Austria +and the Magyars of Hungary; and</p> + +<p>“(2) Because the Allies cannot offer them +acceptable terms without breaking with +Italy.</p></div> + +<p>“It remains to try the (<i>b</i>) policy.</p> + +<p>“This policy is not primarily, or even, in +the last resort, necessarily anti-Hapsburgian; +it is not opposed to the interests of the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_31">[31]</span> +Roman Catholic religion; and it is in harmony +with the declared aims of the Allies.</p> + +<p>“The Empire of Austria contains some +31,000,000 inhabitants. Of these less than +one-third, <i>i.e.</i>, the 9,000,000 or 10,000,000 +Germans of Austria, are pro-German. The +other two-thirds (including the Poles, Czecho-Slovaks, +Rumanes, Italians, and Southern +Slavs) are actively or passively anti-German.</p> + +<p>“The Kingdom of Hungary, including the +‘autonomous’ kingdom of Croatia-Slavonia +has a population of approximately 21,000,000 +of which one-half (Magyars, Jews, Saxons, +and Swabians) may be considered pro-German, +and the rest (Slovaks, Rumanes, +and Southern Slavs) actively or passively +anti-German.</p> + +<p>“There are thus in Austria-Hungary, as a +whole, some 31,000,000 anti-Germans, and +some 21,000,000 pro-Germans. The pro-German +minority rules the anti-German +majority. Apart from questions of democratic +principle, the policy of the Allies should +evidently be to help and encourage the anti-Germans.</p> + +<p>“The chief means of helping them may be +specified thus:</p> + +<p>“(1) The Allied Governments and the +President of the United States should insist<span class="pagenum" id="Page_32">[32]</span> +upon their determination to secure democratic +freedom for the races of Austria-Hungary +on the principle of ‘government by consent of +the governed.’ Expressions such as ‘self-government,’ +or ‘autonomous development’ +should be avoided, because they have a +sinister meaning in Austria-Hungary and +tend to discourage the friends of the +Allies.</p> + +<p>“(2) For the same reason, statements that +the Allies do not wish to ‘dismember Austria’ +should be avoided. The war cannot be won +without so radical a transformation of Austria-Hungary +as to remove its peoples from German +control. The Hapsburgs may be driven +to help in this transformation if Allied encouragement +of the anti-German Hapsburg +peoples is effective. By themselves the +Hapsburgs cannot effect a transformation +except in an increasingly pro-German sense.</p> + +<p>“(3) For propaganda among the anti-German +peoples the agencies already existing +should be utilised. These agencies are +chiefly the Bohemian (Czecho-Slovak) +National Alliance, the Southern Slav Committee, +and various Polish organisations.</p> + + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_33">[33]</span></p> + +<p>“(4) The present tendency of the Italian +Government to shelve the policy embodied +in the London Convention of April 26, 1915, +and to adopt a policy of agreement with +the anti-German races of Austria-Hungary +should be encouraged and stimulated.</p> + +<p>“(5) The ultimate aim of Allied policy +should be, not to form a number of small, +disjointed States, but to create a non-German +Confederation of Central European +and Danubian States.</p> + +<p>“(6) The Germans of Austria should be +free to join the Confederated States of +Germany. They would, in any case, tend to +secede from a transformed Austria, in which +they would no longer be able to rule over +non-German peoples.</p> + +<p>“In view of the great amount of cabling +that will be necessary to achieve unity, may +I ask you to let me have either your own +suggestions, or your approval of those above +mentioned, as speedily as possible?”</p> +</div> + +<p>In his reply, Mr. Balfour wrote on February +26, 1918:—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"> +<p>“Your very lucid memorandum raises in +one shape or another the fundamental problem +of the Hapsburg Empire. A final and +authoritative answer to the question you +put to me can only be given (if given at all) +by the Cabinet, speaking in the name of the +Government. But I offer the following observations +on the subject, in the hope that<span class="pagenum" id="Page_34">[34]</span> +they may help you in the immediate task for +which you have been made responsible.</p> + +<p>“If the two alternative policies of dealing +with the Dual Monarchy set forth in your +paper were mutually exclusive, and if they involved +distinct and even opposite methods of +propaganda, our position would be even more +difficult than it is. For what we can do with +the Austrian Empire does not wholly depend +upon our wishes, but upon the success of our +arms and the views of our Allies, and, as +these elements in our calculations cannot +be estimated with certainty, we should inevitably +remain in doubt as to which of the +two mutually exclusive methods of propaganda +it would be judicious to adopt.</p> + +<p>“Fortunately, however, our position is +not quite so embarrassing. As you point +out with unanswerable force, everything +which encourages the anti-German elements +in the Hapsburg dominions really helps +to compel the Emperor and the Court to a +separate peace, and also diminishes the +efficiency of Austria-Hungary as a member +of the Middle-Europe combination. The +Emperor, by these means, might be induced, +or compelled, fundamentally to modify the +constitution of his own State. If he refused +to lend himself to such a policy, the strengthening<span class="pagenum" id="Page_35">[35]</span> +of the non-German elements might +bring about the same end even more effectually +than if he lent his assistance to the +process. But in either case the earlier stages +of that process are the same, and a propaganda +which aids the struggle of the nationalities +now subject either to Austrian Germans +or to Magyar Hungarians towards freedom +and self-determination, must be right, whether +the complete break-up of the Austrian Empire +or its de-Germanisation under Hapsburg +rule be the final goal of our efforts.”</p> + +<p>When acknowledging this prompt reply, +Lord Northcliffe pointed out that his anxiety +to move as rapidly as possible was due to +the belief of the Italians that a strong +Austrian or Austro-German offensive against +Italy would be launched within the next +two months. “If our propaganda in Austria +is to help to weaken this offensive, or to turn +it into a defeat, it ought, in my judgment, +to begin at once, and all the agencies we can +command ought to be hard at work within a +fortnight.</p> + +<p>“The representative of the American +Propaganda Department is in London. The +Italian will be here next week, and we could +no doubt have a French representative at +the same time.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_36">[36]</span></p> + +<p>“As to the memorandum, I am very +pleased that you are in substantial agreement +with the policy outlined. The two policies +may not be mutually exclusive in the last +resort, but it is very important that one or +the other of them should be given absolute +precedence. It would place me in an +awkward predicament if, after basing +vigorous propaganda on the (<i>b</i>) policy, I +were confronted with some manifestation of +the (<i>a</i>) policy on the part of the British or +other Allied Government. For this reason +I hope that the War Cabinet will not delay +its own decision, and that it will try to get +a decision from France, Italy, and the United +States as quickly as possible.</p> + +<p>“It goes without saying that public +declarations on behalf of the British, French, +and Allied Governments, and, if possible, on +the part of President Wilson, in the sense of +the (<i>b</i>) policy would, if promptly made, +greatly facilitate my efforts.”</p> +</div> +<p>Obviously the wise course was to place +action in carrying out this policy on an Inter-Allied +basis. Lord Northcliffe, therefore, +convened meetings in London which were +attended by Italian, French and American +representatives. It was decided to organise +a committee to arrange with France and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_37">[37]</span> +Italy for united operations on the Italian +front against the Austro-Hungarian armies.</p> + +<p>Accordingly, the special mission which +Lord Northcliffe had sent to Italy, and of +which Mr. Steed and Dr. Seton-Watson were +the principal members, was entrusted with +this task. With the willing support and co-operation +of the Italian Prime Minister, +the Italian Commander-in-Chief, and the +British and French Commanders on the +Italian Front, a permanent Inter-Allied +Propaganda Commission was organised at +the Italian General Headquarters. Italy +provided the President (Colonel Siciliani) and +one commissioner (Captain Ojetti) and Great +Britain and France one commissioner each +(Lieutenant-Colonel B. Granville Baker and +Major Gruss respectively). To the Commission +were attached, as a result of representations +from Mr. Steed, representatives +of committees of each of the oppressed +nationalities. Mr. Steed, speaking on behalf +of Lord Northcliffe, urged that only representatives +of these races were fully qualified +to speak to their co-nationals on the vital +subjects which would form the theme of +their propagandist productions.</p> + +<p>The Commission began work on April 18, +1918. It acquired a polyglot printing press<span class="pagenum" id="Page_38">[38]</span> +at Reggio Emilia. A weekly journal was +published containing news (collected by a +special Italian office ably organised by Professor +Borgese at Berne) quadruplicated in +the Czech, Polish, Southern Slav, and +Rumanian languages. The assistance of the +national representatives was valuable to the +point of indispensability in ensuring accuracy +of translation and suitability of contents. +These representatives also composed leaflet +manifestoes. Coloured reproductions of +pictures of a patriotic, or religious, nature +which appealed to the nationalist aspirations +and piety of the races, were made. All this +literary matter was dispatched straight to +the front-line armies from the printing press, +and distributed by means of aeroplanes (one +per army being detailed for this purpose), +rockets, which were constructed to hold +about 30 pamphlets, and grenades, and also +by contact patrols. These patrols were +originally formed by bodies of troops raised +on the responsibility of the various Italian +armies, and were composed of deserters of +Czecho-Slovak, Southern Slav, Polish, or +Rumanian nationalities who had volunteered +for this service against their hereditary +enemy. They were wonderfully successful. +The total number of leaflets and other<span class="pagenum" id="Page_39">[39]</span> +productions thus distributed ran into many +millions. But this by no means exhausted +the channels of propagandist effort. Gramophone +records of Czecho-Slovak and Southern +Slav songs were secured by the British +Commissioner and effectively used for the +awakening of the nationalist sentiment among +the troops of these races in the Austrian +armies. The instruments were placed in +“No Man’s Land,” and so close to each +other were the front trenches of the opposing +armies that the words and music could easily +be heard.</p> + +<p>The Austro-Hungarian section of Crewe +House, of which section Mr. Steed and Dr. +Seton-Watson were the directors, maintained +the closest touch with the Commission. +Specimens of literature were exchanged +between the Commission and other sections +of Crewe House, and it was not uncommon +for one news leaflet to appear in eight or ten +different languages, with a total circulation +of several millions of copies. The Austro-Hungarian +section also necessarily kept in +the closest touch with the Czecho-Slovak, +Southern Slav, Polish, and Rumanian leaders +and organisations in Allied and neutral +countries. It also co-operated with Mr. +S. A. Guest in the organisation of civil and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_40">[40]</span> +secret channels in neutral countries by which +propaganda literature could be introduced +into Austria-Hungary.</p> + +<p>The effect of the launching of the propaganda +leaflet campaign was soon apparent. +Unrest became manifest among the Austro-Hungarian +forces. Deserters belonging to +the subject races came over to the Allied +lines. This was one of the chief causes +contributory to the postponements of the +Austrian offensive carefully planned for April. +When this attack was eventually made—in +June—the Italian commanders, and their +Allied colleagues, had full information concerning +enemy plans and positions.</p> + +<p>But, unhappily, the propaganda, and, +consequently, the military, campaigns were +impaired by reactionary tendencies within +the Italian Government. Had the Italian +Government been prepared in May, 1918, to +join with their Allies and Associates in making +a joint public declaration in strong and unmistakable +language in favour of the creation +of a united and independent Southern Slav +State and in recognising the Czecho-Slovaks +as an Allied and belligerent nation, the result +would undoubtedly have precipitated the +collapse of Austria in the early part of the +summer of 1918.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_41">[41]</span></p> + +<p>Instead of seizing the opportunity for this +united and strong pronouncement which +presented itself at a meeting of the Prime +Ministers of Great Britain, France, and Italy, +held at Versailles, on June 3, 1918, the following +declarations were made:—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"> + +<p>(1) The creation of a united and independent +Polish State with free access +to the sea constitutes one of the conditions +of a solid and just peace and of +the rule of right in Europe.</p> + +<p>(2) The Allied Governments have noted +with pleasure the declaration made by +the Secretary of State of the United +States Government (in referring to the +resolutions of the Rome Congress of +Austro-Hungarian nationalities), and +desire to associate themselves in an +expression of earnest sympathy for the +nationalistic aspirations towards freedom +of the Czecho-Slovak and Jugo +(Southern)-Slav peoples.</p> +</div> + +<p>The regrettable weakness of the second +declaration, which followed very closely the +wording of Mr. Lansing’s earlier announcement +on behalf of the United States Government, +was entirely due to the opposition of +Baron Sonnino (Italian Foreign Minister),<span class="pagenum" id="Page_42">[42]</span> +who rejected the stronger declarations prepared +by Mr. Balfour and the French Foreign +Minister, M. Pichon. It was a retrogressive +step by Italy from the position she had taken +at the Rome Congress, at which her Prime +Minister had expressly associated himself +with the terms of the Italo-Southern Slav +agreement that recognised the “unity and +independence of the Jugo-Slav nation as a +vital Italian interest.” In regard to the +Czecho-Slovaks, the British, French, and +Italian Governments had already recognised +the Czecho-Slovak Army, under the Bohemian +National Council, as an Allied force.</p> + +<p>Towards the end of June, Mr. Lansing made +considerable advance with a definite statement +that the United States aimed at the +complete liberation of all Slav peoples from +Austro-German domination.</p> + +<p>While Lord Northcliffe and his associates +were striving hard in London to retrieve the +opportunities thus wasted, the propaganda +organisation in Italy was making remarkable +progress despite the vacillations of the politicians. +Undoubtedly the reactionary attitude +of Baron Sonnino at Versailles influenced +adversely the response of the Southern Slav +troops in the Austrian ranks to the appeals +made by the propaganda leaflets. Nevertheless,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_43">[43]</span> +there was a considerable amount of +desertion from the Austro-Hungarian Army. +Among the deserters were numbers of junior +officers, not professional soldiers, but men who +in private life were lawyers, merchants, and +so on. These men were all led to come over +by the prospect of liberation which the propaganda +held out to them. Men of other ranks +were induced to desert, either in order to +join relatives among their co-nationals fighting +in the Italian Army, of whom news had +reached them through the propaganda agency, +or else by the more elementary considerations +of food, comfort, and safety. It was +noticeable that nearly all the deserters +brought with them copies of the leaflets +distributed by the Allied Commission.</p> + +<p>That the propaganda had seriously alarmed +the Austro-Hungarian authorities was made +evident by reference to it in Army Orders and +in the Austrian and German Press, which +even reproduced some of the literary efforts, +and vilified Lord Northcliffe in their most +fervent manner. It even affected the minor +tactics of the Austro-Hungarian Army, for +it necessitated the detachment of machine-gun +sections to deal with attempts at desertion +<i>en masse</i> during the Piave offensive, +which was eventually launched by the Austrians<span class="pagenum" id="Page_44">[44]</span> +at the end of June. There was at +least one authenticated account of a mutiny +among Czech troops being suppressed by +Germans and Magyars during that offensive. +Desertions of single men or small parties were +frequent before and during the action, and +one case is known of a whole unit having +come over. This was a company composed +entirely of Jugo-Slavs. The Company Commander +(Jugo-Slav and strongly Nationalist), +on going his rounds a couple of hours before +the attack began, gathered from his men’s +conversation that they had no intention of +fighting. He was able to bring his whole +company over.</p> + +<p>The delay of the offensive, mainly on +account of Allied propaganda, proved to be +very important, because, when it came the +Piave rose behind the Austrian army and +converted the attack into something like a +disaster. There is reason to believe that +many ammunition dumps behind the enemy +lines were blown up by the Czechs. A +rumour was spread in the Press that the +Southern Slavs had been fighting desperately +against Italy, but this was officially denied. +The divisions in question were a mixture of +Germans, Magyars, Poles, and Ruthenes. It +appeared that the Southern Slav divisions<span class="pagenum" id="Page_45">[45]</span> +had been divided up and mixed with “reliable” +troops, which showed that the +Austrians were afraid of them. The prisoners +taken, as a rule, expressed willingness +to volunteer at once. Dalmatian prisoners +showed great enthusiasm for Jugo-Slavia and +the Allies.</p> + +<p>After the Piave battle, members of the +Inter-Allied Propaganda Commission were +received and thanked by the Italian Commander-in-Chief. +General Diaz said that +the victory was due in considerable measure +to their efforts.</p> + +<p>In August the Inter-Allied Conference on +Enemy Propaganda, convoked by Lord +Northcliffe, met at Crewe House. In regard +to propaganda against Austria-Hungary, +the Committee formed to consider questions +of policy found itself in complete agreement +with the scheme of policy sanctioned by the +British Government for purposes of Propaganda, +and amplified by the decisions of the +British, French, and Italian Governments +at the time of, or in connection with, the +Rome Congress of Oppressed Austro-Hungarian +Nationalities. It recognised that such +extensions of policy, while springing from +considerations of Allied principles, had, in +part, corresponded to the real demands of the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_46">[46]</span> +propaganda situation, which, in their turn, +had sprung from the exigencies of the +military situation and, in particular, from +the necessity of utilising the established +principles of the alliance for the purpose of +impeding or hampering the Austro-Hungarian +offensive against Italy. Subsequent acts and +declarations on the part of Allied Governments +and of the Government of the United +States made it clear that the joint policy +of the Allies was tending increasingly towards +the constructive liberation of the subject +Austro-Hungarian races. The main task +of the Committee in relation to propaganda +in Austria-Hungary seemed, therefore, to be +one of unifying for propaganda purposes +these various acts and declarations, and of +preparing, if possible, the way for a joint +Allied declaration that might complete and +render more effective the work of Allied +propaganda both in the interior of Austria-Hungary +and among Austro-Hungarian +troops at the front. The Committee resolved +to suggest that the Italian Government take +the initiative in promoting a joint and unanimous +public declaration that all the Allies +regard the establishment of a free and united +Jugo-Slav State, embracing Serbs, Croats, and +Slovenes, as one of the conditions of a just<span class="pagenum" id="Page_47">[47]</span> +and lasting peace, and of the rule of right in +Europe. Such a declaration was actually +made by the Italian Government, but so +tardily that its propaganda effect was reduced +to a minimum.</p> + +<p>Reports from the British Commissioner at +Padua chronicled the uninterrupted continuance +of the preparation and distribution +of leaflets. The work was so developed that a +distributing capacity of almost a million +leaflets a day was obtained. Proof of the +value of the work was afforded by the arrival +of deserters, belonging to the subject races, +in the Italian lines bringing with them the +manifestoes and saying, “I have come because +you invited me.” A special leaflet +was prepared in London, with the co-operation +of a member of the Southern Slav +Committee, for distribution by aeroplane +at various points on the Dalmatian coast, +where Southern Slav insurgents were ascertained +to be gathered in considerable numbers. +A detailed description, compiled from official +sources, of the overwhelming character of +American war preparations (which the enemy +was constantly belittling) was telegraphed +to Padua for translation into Austro-Hungarian +languages, and for distribution in +leaflet form among Austro-Hungarian troops.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_48">[48]</span></p> + +<p>Progress was even made among the Magyars +who had fought with remarkable ferocity +on the Montello. The agrarian question +that had troubled Hungary for some time +was used for propaganda purposes and many +Magyar desertions ensued. The constant +efforts exerted an ever-increasing and cumulative +influence on the enemy. The collapse +of Bulgaria opened a new front for operations +against Austria-Hungary and a Propaganda +Commission under Lieutenant-Colonel Granville +Baker was quickly organised on the lines +of the Padua Commission and dispatched to +Salonika. Operations were promptly started, +but it soon became evident that the end +was near. As the Allied armies on the +Western fronts advanced, news of their progress +and of Bulgaria’s defection was continually +and promptly sent over the Austrian +lines. There is no doubt that this contributed +to the increased amount of desertion +and disorder among the Austrian forces, +culminating in the <i>débâcle</i> produced by the +final Allied attack in October, which brought +down the military and political organisations +of the Dual Monarchy.</p> + + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_49">[49]</span> +Crewe House had every reason to be proud +of the success of its work against Austria-Hungary. +The conception of the whole +propaganda campaign—its policy, its scope, +its application—was due to Lord Northcliffe +and the co-directors of the Austrian Section of +his department, Mr. Wickham Steed and Dr. +Seton-Watson. The results fully vindicated +every basic principle of their propaganda +strategy. There were difficulties to be overcome +at every turn, of which political and +personal ambitions abroad were not the +least. To keep the work on the straight +metals of uninterrupted progress necessitated +unremitting vigilance and ceaseless consultation +with the numerous interests concerned. +The result was the greatest victory +achieved by war propaganda—the culmination +of a constructive campaign, which, +could it have been extended to its logical +conclusions, would have achieved a just +and lasting peace, liberating millions of our +fellow-men from a tyrannous yoke to the +enjoyment of that political freedom which is +the inalienable right of civilised mankind.</p> + + + +<div class="column"><figure class="figcenter illowp80" id="i_p032a" style="max-width: 100%;"> + <img class="w100" src="images/i_p032a.jpg" alt=""> + <figcaption class="caption">MR. H. WICKHAM STEED.<br> +MEMBER OF THE ENEMY PROPAGANDA COMMITTEE, AND +ONE OF THE DIRECTORS OF THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN SECTION.<br> +<i>Photo: Russell, London.</i></figcaption> +</figure></div> + + +<div class="column"><figure class="figcenter illowp80" id="i_p032d" style="max-width: 100%;"> + <img class="w100" src="images/i_p032d.jpg" alt=""> + <figcaption class="caption">DR. R. W. SETON-WATSON.<br> +CO-DIRECTOR OF THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN SECTION OF CREWE HOUSE.</figcaption> +</figure></div> + + +<div class="column"><figure class="figcenter illowp80" id="i_p064a" style="max-width: 100%;"> + <img class="w100" src="images/i_p064a.jpg" alt=""> + <figcaption class="caption">MR. H. G. WELLS.<br> +MEMBER OF THE ENEMY PROPAGANDA COMMITTEE, +AND FIRST DIRECTOR OF GERMAN SECTION.<br> +<i>“Daily Mirror” Photograph.</i></figcaption> +</figure></div> + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> + +<div class="chapter"> +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_50">[50]</span></p> + +<h2 class="nobreak" id="CHAPTER_IV">CHAPTER IV<br> +<span class="fs80">OPERATIONS AGAINST GERMANY</span> +</h2> +</div> + +<p class="sub">Early British neglect of propaganda—War Office establishes +a department—Lord Northcliffe takes office—Mr. H. G. Wells’s +and Mr. Hamilton Fyfe’s work—The final “intensive” campaign—Ways +and means.</p> + + + +<p>The successful launch of the “propaganda +offensive” against Austria-Hungary raised +high hopes for the success of the corresponding +campaign against the Germans on the +Western Front. These hopes were shared +by the Prime Minister, who wrote to Lord +Northcliffe on May 16, 1918:—“It seems to +me that you have organised admirable work +in your Austrian propaganda.... I trust +that you will soon turn your attention +towards German propaganda along the +French and British Fronts. I feel sure that +much can be done to disintegrate the <i>moral</i> +of the German army along the same lines as +we appear to have adopted with great success +in the Austro-Hungarian army.”</p> + +<p>For the first eighteen months of the war all<span class="pagenum" id="Page_51">[51]</span> +propaganda had been sadly neglected by the +British Government. Few realised its value, +and officially it was regarded as an unimportant +“side-line.” That it might be a weapon of +warfare, equal in effect to several army +corps, would at that time have been ridiculed. +Money for such purposes was grudgingly +spent, while the whole-hearted endeavours +of a few enthusiasts were disparaged as the +exuberances of harmless “cranks.”</p> + +<p>In October, 1914, Lieutenant-Colonel (now +Major-General) Swinton, who was then acting +as “Eye-Witness” with the British Army, +prepared a propaganda leaflet, a reproduction +of which appears in this book. To +enable him to produce it, Lord Northcliffe lent +the aid of his Paris organisation, and a large +number of copies were printed and distributed +by aeroplane among the German troops. +But the Army chiefs at that time did not +show any enthusiasm for the innovation, and +Colonel Swinton was unable to proceed with +the project.</p> + +<p>Propaganda against the enemy was, during +a long period, almost a single-handed campaign +by Mr. S. A. Guest. He struggled on, +despite official discouragement or lack of +encouragement, undeterred by all the vicissitudes +through which British propaganda<span class="pagenum" id="Page_52">[52]</span> +passed. Indeed, the early direction of +British propaganda was like an epidemic; it +occasionally took strange forms and occurred +in unexpected places. Mr. Guest’s work was +the institution and maintenance of those +agencies by which propagandist literature +was produced and smuggled into Germany +and Austria-Hungary.</p> + +<p>Within the War Office, there were some +in favour of propagandist activity, but for +a long time they were in a minority. Early +in 1916, Major-General (now Lieutenant-General) +Sir George Macdonogh, K.C.M.G., +C.B., returned from France to become Director +of Military Intelligence, and mainly owing +to his efforts and those of Brigadier-General +G. K. Cockerill, C.B. (then Director of +Special Intelligence), a propaganda branch +of the Military Intelligence Department of +the War Office was established. From small +beginnings, the activities of this branch grew.</p> + +<p>It was in the spring of 1916 that a sub-section +of this branch began the preparation +of leaflets in German for distribution among +enemy troops. One use of the leaflets was +to disprove the false beliefs spread among +German soldiers that the British and French +treated their prisoners with great severity. +To counteract this, reproductions of letters<span class="pagenum" id="Page_53">[53]</span> +actually written by German prisoners of war, +photographs and descriptions of prisoners +and their camps, and similar material, were +prepared and distributed. As the political +and social discontent in Germany increased +it was thought useful that the German soldiers +should be provided with more evidence of +the internal conditions in their own country +than their officers would allow them to have, +and leaflets prepared from German sources, +as, for instance, from suppressed editions of +German pamphlets and newspapers, were +scattered on the lines and rest billets.</p> + +<p>It then undertook the publication of +an excellent weekly news-sheet, entitled +<i>Le Courrier de l’Air</i>, containing news in +French for circulation among the French +and Belgian inhabitants of occupied districts. +This newspaper, save for one short break, +was regularly distributed by air until November, +1918, and naturally was greatly +valued by those who otherwise would only +have received “news” from German sources.</p> + +<p>During 1917 reports obtained by the +examination of prisoners and information +derived from more secret sources showed that +the propaganda campaign was achieving +useful results, and the Directorate of Military +Intelligence, in co-operation with the G.H.Q.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_54">[54]</span> +in France, made arrangements for the work +to be extended, until by the spring of 1918 +about a million leaflets monthly were being +issued.</p> + +<p>The task of distribution of propaganda +literature by air would have been simpler but +for an extraordinary military decision. When +this work was started by the military authorities +the leaflets were dropped from aeroplanes. +This method had the widest limits, and, at +the same time, was the best means of carrying +a large bulk and of distributing with accuracy. +Perturbed by the success attained, the Germans +threatened to inflict severe penalties +upon airmen captured when performing such +duties, and, on capturing two British airmen, +followed their threats by action. Instead of +instituting immediate reprisals, the British +authorities tamely submitted and gave instructions +for the discontinuance of the use of +aeroplanes for the purpose.</p> + +<p>In consequence of this weak action, experiments +had to be undertaken to find a substitute +for the aeroplane. There were a +number of possible, although inferior, +methods. Hand and rifle grenades were +devised to burst and shower leaflets over a +limited area among enemy troops. Trench +mortars would serve a similar purpose. But<span class="pagenum" id="Page_55">[55]</span> +thanks to the progress of military meteorological +science during the war and to several +months’ patient experimenting with various +devices, it was found possible to utilise +specially adapted balloons. The Air Inventions +Committee, the Munitions Inventions +Department, the Inspectorate of H.M. Stores, +Woolwich, Army Intelligence officers experienced +in the use of silk balloons for other +military purposes, and the manufacturers, +all assisted the War Office in arriving at a +result which proved to be effective and as +nearly as possible “fool-proof.” Designs +and apparatus were tested in the workshop +and laboratory, at experimental stations +near London, and on Salisbury Plain. They +were taken out to France and tried under the +actual conditions of war, and gradually each +difficulty was overcome and each detail +reduced to its simplest form.</p> + +<p>In its standard form in which it was being +manufactured at the rate of nearly 2,000 a +week the propaganda balloon was made of +paper, cut in 10 longitudinal panels, with a +neck of oiled silk about 12 inches long. The +circumference was about 20 feet and the +height, when inflated, over eight feet. The +absolute capacity was approximately 100 +cubic feet, but the balloons were liberated<span class="pagenum" id="Page_56">[56]</span> +when not quite taut, containing 90 to 95 +cubic feet of hydrogen. Hydrogen readily +passes through paper, and the part of the +experimental work that caused most trouble +was the discovery of a suitable varnish, or +“dope,” to make the paper gas-tight. After +many disappointments, a formula was arrived +at, the application of which prevented appreciable +evaporation of the gas for two or three +hours, and which left a balloon with some +lifting capacity after thirty-six hours.</p> + +<p>The lifting power of a balloon is the +difference between the weight of the hydrogen +and the weight of the same bulk of air, <i>less</i> +the weight of the balloon itself. The weight +of the paper balloon was just over one +pound; the available lifting power varied +with the degree of tautness to which the +balloon was filled, the height of the barometer +and the temperature, but on the average, at +ground level, the balloon as inflated would +just support five and a half pounds. After a +good deal of experiment the load of propaganda +and releasing apparatus was fixed at +four pounds and a few ounces, this allowing +from 500 to 1,000 leaflets, according to their +size, to be carried by each balloon, the +balance of lifting power being sufficient to +take the balloon sharply into the air to a<span class="pagenum" id="Page_57">[57]</span> +height of five or six thousand feet. As a +balloon rises the pressure of the air decreases +and the contained hydrogen expands. In +the earlier experiments the neck of the +balloon was tied after inflation, and, to +allow for expansion, the balloon was filled +only to a little over two-thirds of its capacity. +This was unsatisfactory; it reduced the load +of propaganda and led to many failures from +bursting and to great uncertainty as to +where the load would fall. It was found +more satisfactory to inflate the balloon +nearly to its full capacity and to liberate +it with the neck open, or with a large slit +cut at the base of the neck, to allow the +gas to escape as it expanded. At a height +of, on the average, from 4,000 to 6,000 feet +the escape of gas had reduced the free lift +to a negative quantity, and the balloon would +begin to drop slowly, but for the liberation of +ballast.</p> + +<p>After several ingenious mechanical devices +had been tested, a method of releasing +leaflets by the burning of a fuse was adopted. +A suitable length of prepared cotton wick, +similar to that used in flint pipe-lighters, +and burning evenly at the rate of five minutes +to the inch, was securely threaded to a wire +by which it was attached to the neck of the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_58">[58]</span> +balloon. Several inches of the upper end +were left free, and the load of leaflets was +strung in small packets by cotton threads +along the length of the fuse. As soon as a +balloon was inflated and the loaded release +attached, the free end of the fuse was +cut to the required length, so as to burn +for five, ten, or so many minutes, before the +first packet was reached, the cut end was +lighted, usually from the pipe or cigarette +the soldier was smoking, and the balloon +sent off on its journey. The release of each +packet acted as a discharge of ballast, and +the balloon, although continually losing gas, +kept in the air until the end of its course. +The arrangement used most frequently was +designed for liberating the balloons a few +miles behind the front lines and for distributing +the leaflets from the enemy lines to +a few miles behind them. The total length of +fuse was twelve inches, giving an hour’s run. +The first six inches were left free to be cut +before lighting according to the position of +the station and the strength of the wind; the +load of propaganda was arranged over the +second half-hour at intervals of two and a +half minutes. Much longer fuses, with the +load distributed at greater intervals, were +used for longer runs. Experiment showed<span class="pagenum" id="Page_59">[59]</span> +that the lateral scattering of the leaflets, +dropped from a height of 4,000 feet and +upwards, was considerable. The length of +the track varied with the strength of the wind.</p> + +<p>The unit for distribution consisted of two +motor lorries, which took the men, the +cylinders of hydrogen, and the propaganda +loaded on releases to a sheltered position +selected in the morning by the officer in +charge after consultation with the meteorological +experts. The vans were drawn up +end to end, separated by a distance of about +ten feet, and a curtain of canvas was then +stretched on the windward side between the +vans, thus forming a three-sided chamber. +The balloon was laid on the ground, rapidly +filled, the release attached and lighted, and +the balloon liberated, the whole operation +taking only a few minutes.</p> + +<p>The load of the balloons was chosen according +to the direction of the wind. If it was +blowing towards Belgium, copies of <i>Le +Courrier de l’Air</i> were attached; if towards +Germany, propaganda leaflets for enemy +troops. The experimental improvement of +the “dope” with which the paper was treated +in order to prevent loss of gas by diffusion, +and the manufacture of balloons of double the +standard capacity, had placed runs of upwards<span class="pagenum" id="Page_60">[60]</span> +of 150 miles well within the capacity of the +method before the Armistice suspended operations, +but the bulk of the propaganda was +distributed over an area of from 10 to 50 +miles behind the enemy lines. Fortunately, +during the late summer and autumn of 1918 +the wind was blowing almost consistently +favourable for their dispatch.</p> + +<p>When Lord Northcliffe took office in +February, 1918, Austria-Hungary was the +most urgent field for his operations, as has +been explained. While Crewe House was +concentrating upon that work he desired the +War Office to continue on his behalf the +admirable and assiduous work carried on +since 1916. Early in May, 1918, Mr. H. G. +Wells accepted Lord Northcliffe’s invitation +to direct the preparation of propaganda +literature against Germany, with the co-operation +of Dr. J. W. Headlam-Morley. +The first need was felt to be the definition +of a policy to be followed against Germany, +in order to prevent dissipation of energy +and diversity of treatment. It was obvious +that this propaganda policy must be in +accord with the general policy of the Allies. +In some points it followed the declared +aims of the Allies; in others, it preceded the +general policy as a pathmaker and pacemaker.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_61">[61]</span> +Mr. Wells undertook to prepare a +memorandum on the position of Germany at +that time from the point of view of propaganda. +This was submitted by Mr. Wells +to the Enemy Propaganda Committee +and fully discussed. A preface was prepared +and upon the two statements was +based a letter to the Secretary of State +for Foreign Affairs, as in the case of the +propaganda policy against Austria-Hungary, +asking for the assent of the British Government +to the policy therein contained.</p> + +<p>Mr. Wells’s memorandum was of the +highest interest as a contemporary study of +Germany, by a master of psychology, at that +juncture when Germany was making her +great (and, fortunately, her final) bid for +world-mastery. The document possesses no +little historical value; much that was prophetic +has been forged into history by the +rapid march of events; and the non-fulfilment +of much of what has not attained to its +consummation is due to lack of political +wisdom in the chancelleries. Following is +the text of preface and memorandum:—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"> + +<p><i>Preface.</i></p> + +<p>“Propaganda in Germany, as in other +enemy countries, must obviously be based<span class="pagenum" id="Page_62">[62]</span> +upon a clear Allied policy. Hitherto Allied +policy and Allied war aims have been defined +too loosely to be comprehensible to the +Germans.</p> + +<p>“The real war aim of the Allies is not only +to beat the enemy, but to establish a world +peace that shall preclude the resumption of +war. Successful propaganda in Germany +presupposes the clear definition of the kind +of world-settlement which the Allies are +determined to secure and the place of Germany +in it.</p> + +<p>“The points to be brought home to the +Germans are:—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"> + +<p>“1. <i>The determination of the Allies to +continue the war until Germany accepts +the Allied peace settlement.</i></p> + +<p>“2. <i>The existing alliance as a Fighting +League of Free Nations will be deepened +and extended, and the military, naval, +financial and economic resources of its +members will be pooled until</i>—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"> + +<p>“(<i>a</i>) <i>Its military purpose is achieved, +and</i></p> + +<p>“(<i>b</i>) <i>Peace is established on lasting +foundations.</i></p> +</div></div></div> + +<div class="blockquot"> + +<p>“German minds are particularly susceptible +to systematic statements. They are<span class="pagenum" id="Page_63">[63]</span> +accustomed to discuss and understand co-ordinate +projects. The ideas represented +by the phrase ‘Berlin-Baghdad’ and ‘Mittel-Europa’ +have been fully explained to them +and now form the bases of German political +thought. Other projects, represented by +‘Berlin-Teheran’ and ‘Berlin-Tokyo’ are +becoming familiar to them. Against these +ideas the Allies have not yet set up any +comprehensive and comprehensible scheme +of world organisation. There is no Allied +counterpart of Naumann’s ‘Mittel-Europa’ +which the neutral and the German Press +could discuss as a practical proposition. +This counterpart should be created without +delay by competent Allied writers. It would +form an effective basis for propaganda, and +would work automatically.</p> + +<p>“It follows that one of the first requisites +is to study and to lay down the lines of a +practical League of Free Nations. The +present alliance must be taken as the nucleus +of any such League. Its control of raw +materials, of shipping, and its power to +exclude for an indefinite period enemy or +even neutral peoples until they subscribe +to and give pledges of their acceptance of its +principles should be emphasised. It should +be pointed out that nothing stands between<span class="pagenum" id="Page_64">[64]</span> +enemy peoples and a lasting peace except +the predatory designs of their ruling dynasties +and military and economic castes; that +the design of the Allies is not to crush any +people, but to assure the freedom of all on +a basis of self-determination to be exercised +under definite guarantees of justice and fair +play; that, unless enemy peoples accept +the Allied conception of a world peace +settlement, it will be impossible for them to +repair the havoc of the present war, to +avert utter financial ruin, and to save themselves +from prolonged misery; and that the +longer the struggle lasts the deeper will +become the hatred of everything German in +the non-German world, and the heavier the +social and economic handicap under which +the enemy peoples will labour, even after +their admission into a League of Nations.</p> + +<p>“The primary war aim of the Allies thus +becomes the changing of Germany, not +only in the interest of the Allied League, but +in that of the German people itself. Without +the honest co-operation of Germany, +disarmament on a large scale would be impossible, +and, without disarmament, social +and economic reconstruction would be impracticable. +Germany has, therefore, to +choose between her own permanent ruin by +adhering to her present system of government +and policy and the prospect of economic +and political redemption by overthrowing her +militarist system so as to be able to join +honestly in the Allied scheme of world +organisation.”</p> +</div> + + +<p class="cl"><span class="pagenum" id="Page_65">[65]</span></p> + +<div class="blockquot"> +<p> +<i>Memorandum.</i><br> +</p> + +<p>“It has become manifest that for the +purposes of an efficient pro-Ally propaganda +in neutral and enemy countries a clear and +full statement of the war aims of the Allies is +vitally necessary. What is wanted is something +in the nature of an authoritative text +to which propagandists may refer with confidence +and which can be made the standard +of their activities. It is not sufficient to +recount the sins of Germany and to assert +that the defeat of Germany is the Allied war +aim. What all the world desires to know is +what is to happen <i>after</i> the war. The real +war aim of a belligerent, it is more and more +understood, is not merely victory, but a +peace of a certain character which that +belligerent desires shall arise out of that +victory. What, therefore, is the peace sought +by the Allies?</p> + +<p>“It would be superfluous even to summarise +here the primary case of the Allies,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_66">[66]</span> +that the war is on their part a war to resist +the military aggression of Germany, assisted +by the landowning Magyars of Hungary, +the Turks, and the King of Bulgaria, upon the +rest of mankind. It is a war against belligerence, +against aggressive war, and the +preparation for aggressive war. Such it +was in its beginning, and such it remains. +But it would be idle to pretend that the ideas +of the Governments and peoples allied against +Germany have not developed very greatly +during the years of the war. There has been +a deepening realisation of the danger to +mankind of existing political divisions and +separations, a great experience in the suffering, +destruction, and waste of war; a quickening +of consciences against conquests, annexations, +and subjugations; and a general +clearing up of ideas that have hitherto stood +in the way of an organised world peace. +While German Imperialism, to judge by the +utterances of its accredited heads, and by the +behaviour of Germany in the temporarily +disorganised States on her Eastern Front, is +still as truculent, aggressive, and treacherous +as ever, the mind of her antagonists has +learnt and has matured. There has arisen +in the great world outside the inner lives of +the Central Powers a will that grows to<span class="pagenum" id="Page_67">[67]</span> +gigantic proportions, that altogether overshadows +the boasted <i>will to power</i> of the +German junker and exploiter, <i>the will to a +world peace</i>. It is like the will of an experienced +man set against the will of an obstinate +and selfish youth. The war aims of the anti-German +Allies take more and more definitely +the form of a world of States leagued together +to maintain a common law, to submit their +mutual differences to a conclusive tribunal, +to protect weak communities, to restrain and +suppress war threats and war preparations +throughout the earth.</p> + +<p>“Steadfastly the great peoples of the world +outside the shadow of German Imperial +domination have been working their way +to unanimity, while the ruling intelligences +of Germany have been scheming for the base +advantages of conquest; while they have +been undermining, confusing, and demoralising +the mentality of Russia, crushing down +the subject peoples of the Austro-Hungarian +Imperialism, and threatening and cajoling +neutrals there has been a wide, free movement +in the minds of their antagonists towards the +restraint and wisdom of a greater and nobler +phase in human affairs. The thought of the +world crystallises now about a phrase, the +phrase ‘The League of Free Nations.’ The<span class="pagenum" id="Page_68">[68]</span> +war aims of the Allies become more and +more explicitly associated with the spirit +and implications of that.</p> + +<p>“Like all such phrases, ‘The League of +Free Nations’ is subject to a great variety of +detailed interpretation, but its broad intentions +can now be stated without much risk of +dissent. The ideal would, of course, include +all the nations of the earth, including a +Germany purged of her military aggressiveness; +it involves some sort of <span class="smcap">International +Congress</span> that can revise, codify, +amend and extend international law, a +supreme Court of Law in which States may +sue and be sued, and whose decision the +League will be pledged to enforce, and the +supervision, limitation, and use of armaments +under the direction of the international +congress. It is also felt very widely that +such a congress must set a restraint upon +competitive and unsanctioned ‘expansionist’ +movements into unsettled and disordered +regions, must act as the guardian of feeble +races and communities, and must be empowered +to make conclusive decisions upon +questions of transport, tariffs, access to raw +material, migration, and international intercourse +generally. The constitution of this +congress remains indefinite; it is the crucial<span class="pagenum" id="Page_69">[69]</span> +matter upon which the best thought of the +world is working at the present time. But +given the prospect of a suitable congress +there can be little dispute that the great +Imperial Powers among the Allies are now +prepared for great and generous limitations +of their sovereignty in the matter of armaments, +of tropical possessions and of subject +peoples, in the common interest of mankind. +The spectacle of German Imperialism, boastful, +selfish, narrow, and altogether hateful, +in its terrible blood-dance through Europe, +has been an object-lesson to humanity against +excesses of national vanity and national +egotism and against Imperial pride. Among +the Allies, the two chief Imperial Powers, +measured by the extent of territory they +control, are Britain and France, and each of +these is more completely prepared to-day +than ever it has been before to consider its +imperial possessions as a trust for their +inhabitants and for mankind, and its position +in the more fertile and less settled regions of +the world as that of a mandatory and trustee. +These admissions involve a plain prospect +and promise of the ultimate release and liberation +of all the peoples in these great and +variegated Empires to complete world-citizenship.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_70">[70]</span></p> + +<p>“But in using the phrase ‘The League of +Nations,’ it may be well to dispel certain +misconceptions that have arisen through the +experimental preparation by more or less +irresponsible persons and societies of elaborate +schemes and constitutions of such a league. +Proposals have been printed and published, +for example, of a Court of World Conciliation, +in which each sovereign State will be represented +by one member—Montenegro, for +example, by one, and the British Empire +by one—and other proposals have been +mooted of a Congress of the League of +Nations, in which such States as Hayti, +Abyssinia, and the like will be represented +by one or two representatives, and France +and Great Britain by five or six. All such +projects should be put out of mind when the +phrase ‘League of Free Nations’ is used by +responsible speakers for the Allied Powers. +Certain most obvious considerations have +evidently been overlooked by the framers of +such proposals. It will, for example, be +a manifest disadvantage to the smaller Powers +to be at all over-represented upon the +Congress of any such League; it may +even be desirable that certain of them should +not have a <i>voting</i> representative at all, for +this reason, that a great Power still cherishing<span class="pagenum" id="Page_71">[71]</span> +an aggressive spirit would certainly attempt, +as the beginning of its aggression, to compel +adjacent small Powers to send representatives +practically chosen by itself. The coarse fact +of the case in regard to an immediate world +peace is this, that only five or six great Powers +possess sufficient economic resources to make +war under modern conditions at the present +time, namely, the United States of America, +Great Britain, France, Germany, Japan, and, +doubtfully, Austria-Hungary. Italy suffers +under the disadvantage that she has no coal +supply. These five or six Powers we may +say, therefore, permit war and can prevent it. +They are at present necessarily the custodians +of the peace of the world, and it is mere +pedantry not to admit that this gives them a +practical claim to preponderance in the opening +Congress of the World League. It may +be pointed out that a small State with a +voice in the discussions, but no vote in the +decisions of the League, would logically be +excused from the liability to assist in enforcing +those decisions.</p> + +<p>“But this question of the constitution of +a world Congress is not to be solved by +making a coarse classification of States into +large and war-capable Powers, and small +and weak Powers. Take the case of Italy,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_72">[72]</span> +for example: though she is almost incapable +of sustaining a war against the world by +herself because of her weakness in the matter +of coal, she can as an ally be at once of +enormous importance. Take the case of +Spain again, a very similar case. And whatever +the war ability of Latin-America may +be to-day, there can be no question that this +great constellation of States must count very +heavily in the framing of the world of to-morrow. +Then, again, we have to consider +the vast future possibilities of the Chinese +Republic, with coal, steel, and a magnificent +industrial population, and the probable reconstruction +of Eastern Europe and a renascence +of Russia which may give the world a loose-knit +but collectively-important Slavonic confederation. +While an isolated small Power +within the orbit of attraction of a large +Power, a State of 5,000,000 people or less, +must always remain a difficult problem in +the world representation, it is clear that +something like an adequate representation of +small and weak Powers becomes possible so +soon as they develop a disposition towards +aggregation, for the purposes of world politics, +into associations with States racially, linguistically, +and historically akin to them. The +trend of Allied opinion is to place not Peru<span class="pagenum" id="Page_73">[73]</span> +or Ukrainia, nor Norway, nor Finland on a +level with the United States of America or +the British Empire at the League of Nations +Congress, but to prepare the way for adequate +representation through a preliminary Latin-American +or a Slavonic or a Scandinavian +Confederation, which could speak with a +common idea at the World Congress.</p> + +<p>“It should be manifest that there is one +Power whose splendid achievement in this +war, and whose particular needs, justify her +over-representation (as measured by material +wealth, and millions of population) upon the +Congress of the League, and that is France. +It is open to question whether Italy should +not also be disproportionately over-represented, +seeing that she will not have, as +Spain will have, the moral reinforcement of +kindred nations over seas. And with regard +to the British Empire, seeing that there +exists no real Imperial legislature, it is +open to consideration whether Canada, South +Africa, and Australasia should come into the +Council as separate nationalities. The Asiatic +and African possessions of Britain and France, +Belgium and Italy, possessions, that is, +which have no self-government, might possibly +for a time be represented by members +appointed by the governing power in each<span class="pagenum" id="Page_74">[74]</span> +case. These are merely suggestions here, +indications of a disposition of mind, but they +are suggestions upon which it is necessary for +the Allied Powers to decide as speedily as +possible. The effective working out of this +problem of the League of Nations Congress by +the Allies without undue delay is as vital a +part of the Allied policy as the effective conduct +of the war.</p> + +<p>“It has to be recognised that the institution +of a League of Nations precludes any +annexations or any military interference with +any peoples whatever, without a mandate +from the Congress of the League. The +League must directly or indirectly become +the guardian of all unsettled regions and +order must be kept and development promoted +by it in such derelict regions as +Mesopotamia and Armenia, for example, +have now become. In these latter instances +it is open to consideration whether the League +should operate through some single power +acting as a mandatory of the League, or else +by international forces under the control of +the League as a whole. Theoretically the +latter course is to be preferred, but there +are enormous practical advantages in many +cases to be urged for the former. The Allies +have indeed had a considerable experience<span class="pagenum" id="Page_75">[75]</span> +during the war of joint controls and joint +expeditions; there has been a great education +in internationalism since August, 1914; +but nevertheless the end of the war is likely +to come long before any real international +forces have been evolved. It is, however, +towards the ultimate use of international +forces in such cases that the joint policy of +the Allies is plainly and openly directed.</p> + +<p>“The bringing of the League into practical +politics profoundly affects the question of +territorial adjustment after the war. The +Allies are bound in honour to follow the will +of France in the matter of Alsace-Lorraine, +and the rectification of the Italian frontier +and the bringing of the bulk of the Italian-speaking +population, now under Austrian +dominion, into one ring-fence with Italy, +also seem a necessary part of a world pacification. +It is, however, of far less importance +in the war aims of the Allies that this and that +particular scrap of territory should change +hands from the control of one group of combatants +to that of the other, than that the +present practical ascendency of German Imperialism +over the resources of the Polish, +Russian, Ukrainian, Czech, Jugo-Slav, Finnish, +and Roumanian peoples should cease. +The war aim of the Allies in Eastern Europe<span class="pagenum" id="Page_76">[76]</span> +is to create in the place of the present Austro-Hungarian +Empire a larger synthesis of +associated States, something in the nature of +an ‘East Central European League,’ within +the League of Nations, a confederation that +might possibly reach from Poland to the +Black and Adriatic Seas, and have also access +to, if not a port upon, the Baltic at Danzig. +The Allies are necessarily obliged to wait +upon the development of affairs in Russia, +but the hopes and efforts of the Allies are +towards a reconciliation of at least Great +Russia, Siberia, and Ukrainia into a workable +association within the League. It is premature +to speculate upon the grouping of +Finland at the present time. Relieved of the +feverish and impossible ambitions the political +weaknesses of these peoples have stimulated, +a free and united Germany could then become +one of the predominant partners in the World +League of Free Nations. The Allies do not +propose an unconditional return of the former +African possessions of Germany, but they +contemplate an over-ruling international +<i>régime</i> in Africa between the Sahara and the +Zambesi, restraining armament, reorganising +native education, and giving absolute equality +of trade to all the nations in the League. +Such an international <i>régime</i> under the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_77">[77]</span> +League may not be incompatible with the +retention of national flags in the former +‘possessions’ of the leagued Powers.</p> + +<p>“Exact territorial definition does not +appear to the Allies to be of nearly such +importance as the establishment of a common +system of disarmament and a common effort +to restore the ravages of the war. The full +effect of the war is still not realised by the +mass of the belligerent peoples, more especially +in America and Western Europe, +where life is still fairly comfortable. There +has already been a destruction not merely of +the political, but of the social order over +great areas of the world, especially in Eastern +Europe, and it is doubtful whether any peace +can restore these disorganised areas to anything +like their former productivity for many +years. A universal shortage not merely of +man-power, but of transport and machinery +available for the purposes of peace cannot be +avoided. It is doubtful, moreover, if social +discipline in the ports of the British Empire +and America will be strong enough to restrain +an organised resistance to the use of German +shipping after the war for any purpose and +to the use of Allied shipping for the transport +of goods to and from Germany on the part of +Allied and neutral seamen and transport<span class="pagenum" id="Page_78">[78]</span> +workers indignant at the U-boat campaign; +moreover, there is a world-wide cry for a +vindictive trade after the war against Germany, +and for organised boycotts that may +further restrict the process of economic world +recovery. It is doubtful if the menace of +these ‘revenge’ movements and the difficulty +of controlling them in democratic States is +properly appreciated in Germany. The militarist +Government of Germany, fighting now +for bare existence, is concealing from its +people this world-wide disposition to boycott +German trade and industry at any cost to the +boycotting populations, and buoying them +up with preposterous hopes of ‘business as +usual’ as soon as peace is made. The fact +has to be faced that while the present +German Government remains no such economic +resumption is possible. The ‘War after +the War’ possibility has to be added to the +economic destruction in Russia, Belgium, and +elsewhere in any estimate of the situation +after the war.</p> + +<p>“The plain prospect of material disorganisation +thus opened should alone suffice to +establish the absolute necessity for peace +now of such a nature as will permit a world-wide +concentration upon reconstruction, in +good faith and without any complications of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_79">[79]</span> +enmity and hostility. But in addition to the +material destruction and dislocation, and +to the ‘hatred’ disorganisation already noted, +the financial transactions of the last few +years have created a monetary inflation which, +<i>without the concerted action of all the Powers</i>, +may mean a collapse of world credit. Add +now the plain necessity for continued armament +if a real League of Nations is not +attained. Without any exaggeration the +prospect of the nations facing these economic +difficulties in an atmosphere of continuing +hostility, intrigue, and conflict, under a continuing +weight of armaments, and with a +continuing distrust, is a hopeless one. The +consequences stare us in the face; Russia +is only the first instance of what must happen +generally. The alternative to a real League +of Nations is the steady descent of our +civilisation towards a condition of political +and social fragmentation such as the world +has not seen since the fall of the Roman +Empire. The honest co-operation of Germany +in the League of Nations, in disarmament, +and in world reconstruction is, therefore, +fundamentally necessary. There is now no +other rational policy. And since it is impossible +to hope for any such help or co-operation +from the Germany of the Belgian<span class="pagenum" id="Page_80">[80]</span> +outrage, the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, the betrayal +of Ukrainia, <span class="allsmcap">THE CHANGING OF GERMANY</span> +becomes a primary war aim, <i>the</i> primary war +aim for the Allies. How Germany is to be +changed is a complex question. The word +<i>Revolution</i> is, perhaps, to be deprecated. +We do not, for instance, desire a Bolshevik +breakdown in Germany, which would make +her economically useless to mankind. We +look, therefore, not so much to the German +peasant and labourer as to the ordinary, +fairly well-educated mediocre German for +co-operation in the reinstatement of civilisation. +Change there <i>must</i> be in Germany; +in the spirit in which the Government is +conducted, in the persons who exercise the +control, and in the relative influence of +different classes in the country. The sharpest +distinction, therefore, has to be drawn between +Germany and its present Government +in all our propaganda and public utterances; +and a constant appeal has to be made by the +statesmen of the Alliance, and by a frank and +open propaganda through the Germans of the +United States of America and of Switzerland, +through neutral countries and by every possible +means, from Germany Junker to Germany +sober. We may be inclined to believe +that every German is something of a Junker, +we have to remember he is also potentially +a reasonable man.</p> +</div> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_81">[81]</span></p> + +<div class="blockquot"> + +<p>“And meanwhile, the Allies must continue +with haste and diligence to fight and defeat +Junker Germany, which cannot possibly +conquer but which may nevertheless succeed +in ruining the world. They must fight the +German armies upon the fronts, they must +fight an unregenerate Germany economically +and politically, and they must bring home +to the German reason and conscience at +home, by an intensive air war and by propaganda +alike, the real impossibility of these +conceptions of national pride and aggressiveness +in which the German population has +been bred.”</p> + +<p>These documents were used as a basis for +the policy of Crewe House, which was summarised +into seven parts in Lord Northcliffe’s +subsequent letter to Mr. Balfour, +extracts from which follow:—</p> + +<p>“I wish to submit to you the following +general scheme of policy as a basis for +British—and eventually Allied—propaganda +in Germany. Propaganda, as an active form +of policy, must be in harmony with the +settled war aims of the Allies:—</p> + +<p>“1. The object of all propaganda is to +weaken the will of the enemy to war and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_82">[82]</span> +victory. For this purpose it is necessary to +put in the forefront the ultimate object of +the Allies, and the use which they would +make of victory, for this is the matter with +which the Germans are most concerned. +We cannot, of course, expect that the war +aims of the Allies should be determined solely +by the effect which they may have upon the +German people, but, on the other hand, it is +clearly undesirable to put forward for propaganda +purposes objects which it is not really +intended to secure. It appears to me, however, +that our war aims, as I understand +them, are such as could, if presented in a +suitable form, be made to do something to +strengthen whatever ‘opposition’ exists in +Germany.</p> + +<p>“2. From such information as is available +as to the internal condition of Germany two +points emerge which are of the greatest +importance for immediate purposes:—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"> + +<p>“(<i>a</i>) There is much evidence that the +German people as a whole desire above +all a cessation of the war. They are +suffering more than their opponents, and +war weariness has advanced further with +them than it has with us. They acquiesce +in the continuance of the present +offensive chiefly because they are assured<span class="pagenum" id="Page_83">[83]</span> +by their leaders that this is the only way +in which a speedy peace can be achieved. +It is, therefore, necessary to impress upon +them that they are face to face with a +determined and immutable will on the +part of Allied nations to continue the +war at whatever cost, notwithstanding +German military successes, and that for +this reason military success is not the +way to bring about the peace they desire. +It must be made plain that we are prepared +to continue a ruthless policy of +commercial blockade.</p> + +<p>“(<i>b</i>) Side by side with this we have +another motive of the highest importance. +One of the chief instruments of +the German Government is the belief +which they foster that any peace that +the Allies would, if they had their way, +impose would mean the internal ruin of +Germany, and this again would mean that +each individual German family would +find itself without work, without money, +and without food. As against this it is +necessary to impress on the German +nation that these results might happen, +but that they can be avoided. They will +happen if the Government of Germany +continues to carry out its openly avowed<span class="pagenum" id="Page_84">[84]</span> +design of subjecting the other free nations +of Europe to its domination. They can +be avoided if the German nation will +resign these projects of domination and +consent to accept the Allied scheme for +a new organisation of the world.</p> +</div> + +<p>“These two points (<i>a</i>) and (<i>b</i>) must be +kept in close connection; the first provides +the element of fear, the second provides the +element of hope.</p> + +<p>“3. The first point presents no difficulty +to us; we can go ahead in full confidence +that we are in harmony with both the nation +and the Government. As to the second, on +the other hand, I must ask for your guidance +and support. Hitherto Allied policy and +war aims have been defined too loosely to be +comprehensible to the Germans, and there +have been apparent inconsistencies, of which +they have quickly taken advantage. Moreover, +it has been possible for German writers +to misrepresent our war aims as dictated by +Imperialistic ambitions, similar in kind to +those by which they are themselves actuated, +and involving ‘annexations and indemnities,’ +such as have in the past been too often the +result of victory in war. I take it that the +real object of the Allies is, after defeating +Germany, to establish such a world peace<span class="pagenum" id="Page_85">[85]</span> +as shall, within the limits of human foresight, +preclude another conflagration. It +seems necessary, therefore, that the separate +aims which would, of course, be maintained, +such as the restoration of Belgium, the +liberation of Alsace-Lorraine, the establishment +of civilised government in Mesopotamia +and Palestine, should be put forward in their +proper places as individual but essential +points in the general scheme for the settlement +of world politics on a basis which would +go far to remove the causes of future wars.</p> + +<p>“4. Any such scheme would, in effect, +amount to the constitution of a ‘League of +Free Nations.’ It is, I presume, generally +understood that eventually Germany would +be invited to take her place in such a League +on condition that she accepted the principles +of its foundation. Her admission to the +League would be in itself her guarantee +against the establishment of, <i>e.g.</i>, a hostile +monopoly of raw materials. Our terms of +peace, therefore, can be represented as the +conditions on which Germany should be +invited to take her part in such a League. +In order to secure the economic benefits she +would have to accept the political conditions. +If this is so, the task of propaganda is +greatly lightened, for it would be easier to<span class="pagenum" id="Page_86">[86]</span> +put our aims in such a form as to make +them to some extent acceptable to the +moderate elements in Germany than if they +were put forward merely as terms to be +imposed on a defeated enemy.</p> + +<p>“5. It is, however, obvious that propaganda +conducted on these lines will be of +little use unless it is supported by public +and authoritative statements from the Allied +Governments. Otherwise, it would be represented +that the real object is to beguile +Germany into accepting a peace of renunciation, +and that, as soon as this object +has been achieved, these schemes will be +repudiated, and a weakened Germany will +find herself face to face with an Anglo-Saxon +combination which aims at dominating the +world, and keeping Germany permanently +in a position of political inferiority.</p> + +<p>“6. No such statement has yet been made, +so far as I am aware, by the British Government +or by the Allies. What, therefore, I +should venture to ask is for such support +from you as will enable us to carry on our +work with the full consciousness that we +have behind us the support of His Majesty’s +Government. If it were known that the +Government itself, in conjunction with the +Allies, was investigating the problem with<span class="pagenum" id="Page_87">[87]</span> +a view to speedy action, this knowledge +would give a great and needed incentive to +the more popular work which we should be +doing.</p> + +<p>“7. I am well aware of the very great +practical difficulties which are bound to arise +so soon as an attempt is made to give formal +expression to the general idea of a ‘League of +Free Nations.’ But for the purposes of our +work, it is of the most urgent importance +that some statement of this kind should be +put forward at the earliest possible date. +Such a statement would in effect be an offer +to the Germans of peace on stated conditions. +If it were accepted, Germany would be able +shortly after the conclusion of the war to +come into the new society of nations; if it +were refused, the war would have to continue. +But it should also be made clear to the +German people that the privilege of admission +to this society would inevitably be +postponed for a period proportional to the +length of time that they continued the +war.”</p> +</div> + +<p>In answer to an inquiry, Lord Northcliffe +wrote a supplementary letter, dealing with +propaganda policy as to the German colonies. +The following is an extract:—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>“I have no settled views as to the future<span class="pagenum" id="Page_88">[88]</span> +of what were the German colonies, beyond a +very strong conviction that they must never +again be allowed to fall, for any military or +naval purpose, under German control. But, +broadly, my feeling is this: The whole +situation of the Allies in regard to Germany +is governed by the fact that Germany is +responsible for the war. The Allies are, +therefore, entitled to demand from her restitution, +reparation, and guarantees as preliminary +conditions of any peace settlement. +The territories which the Allies have taken +from Germany in the course of their legitimate +self-defence do not come into the same +category as the territories seized by Germany, +and the allies of Germany, in the course of +their predatory aggression. To contemplate +barter or exchange between one set of territories +and the other would be to assimilate, +by implication, the moral situation of the +Allies to that of Germany. Therefore, however +closely we may study the question, or +rather the questions—for there are several—of +the German colonies, we ought to make it +clear that the ultimate settlement of those +questions will be reserved for treatment by +the Allies as a fighting league of free nations, +or by the general League of Nations should +the behaviour of Germany entitle her to<span class="pagenum" id="Page_89">[89]</span> +admission to it in time to take part in any +scheme of world reorganisation.”</p></div> + +<p>The policy laid down in these letters was +approved by the Government as a basis for +propaganda, and Mr. Wells was able to +develop his work in many directions.</p> + +<p>He kept in close touch with the different +organisations at home and abroad which were +endeavouring to promote the League of +Nations. In conjunction with Mr. Steed, +Mr. Wells assisted in the drawing up of a restatement +of the aims of the League of Nations +Society in Great Britain and in the formation +of a new association for the study of the +problems arising out of the League proposal. +This movement was always kept prominently +before the German mind, for it was a threat +of future isolation, with its resultant economic +disabilities, and yet was an invitation to +national repentance.</p> + +<p>A second line of action was designed to +appeal to the German workers. For this +purpose Mr. Wells arranged, among other +things, for the preparation and issue of a +short and compact summary of the British +Labour War Aims, which was subsequently +used with much effectiveness not only in +Germany but also in Austria.</p> + +<p>Economic conditions, both during and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_90">[90]</span> +after the war, were made by Mr. Wells and +his co-workers the subject of systematic and +scientific study with the object of undertaking +a propaganda of economic discouragement +and persuasion in Germany. Signs were not +lacking of the existence of misgivings among +the commercial communities in that country +at the prospect of loss of commerce, ships, +and colonies in the case of defeat. Here was +an opportunity to bring home to the Germans +the conviction that the longer they persisted +in continuing the war, so would their loss and +sufferings increase.</p> + +<p>Unfortunately, in July, Mr. Wells found +himself unable to continue the direction of +the German Section and, at his request, the +Enemy Propaganda Committee accepted his +resignation of that office, although he retained +his membership of the Committee. +Mr. Hamilton Fyfe was appointed to succeed +him and continued in the important post +until the end. Mr. Fyfe developed the work +along the lines already laid down.</p> + +<p>From the time of Mr. Wells’s appointment, +Crewe House and the enemy propaganda +section of the Military Intelligence Department +maintained close touch with each other, +but in July, 1918, Lord Northcliffe wrote to +the Secretary of State for War expressing his<span class="pagenum" id="Page_91">[91]</span> +considered view that it would be advisable +that British propaganda agencies against the +enemy should, both for technical reasons and +in order to preclude possible differences of +statement in propaganda literature, as far as +possible be closely co-ordinated. While gladly +recognising the most friendly relations which +had been cultivated between his department +and the enemy propaganda branch of the +War Office, through Major the Earl of Kerry, +Lord Northcliffe thought that the time had +come for the whole of the work of production +to be centralised at Crewe House. This did +not alter the arrangements for distribution +through military channels which were always +admirably organised and carried out by the +military authorities. And, as a matter of +fact, a large proportion of the literature, +apart from the “priority” leaflets referred to +hereinafter, was produced by the War Office +on Lord Northcliffe’s behalf. Lord Northcliffe +asked for urgent consideration of the +matter, in view of the necessity for the intensification +and extension of propaganda on the +Western Front. On Lord Milner’s agreeing to +this reorganisation, it was arranged that the +services of Captain P. Chalmers Mitchell, who, +well-known in civil life as a distinguished +man of science, had been the officer immediately<span class="pagenum" id="Page_92">[92]</span> +in charge of this enemy propaganda +branch, should be transferred to Crewe House. +He was a valuable acquisition, and his +experience, knowledge, and counsel were of +great practical service. Captain Chalmers +Mitchell also acted as liaison officer with the +War Office (in succession to Lord Kerry) and +with the Royal Air Force, and, in conjunction +with Mr. Hamilton Fyfe, co-ordinated production +and distribution.</p> + +<p>This centralisation soon bore fruit. One +of the earliest developments aimed at abolishing +the delays which might have caused the +contents of leaflets to become stale owing to +the time which elapsed between their composition +and their distribution. This defect +was obviated by dividing the leaflets into two +classes, namely, “priority” leaflets for those +of a news character and “stock” leaflets +with matter of a less urgent nature.</p> + +<p>A time-table was prepared for the “priority” +leaflets in which the time allotted for the +different processes of composition, translation, +printing, transport to France, and distribution, +was cut down to an absolute +minimum. With the willing aid of Messrs. +Harrison and Son, the printers, and of +Messrs. Gamage, who undertook the work of +attaching the leaflets to the “releases,” it<span class="pagenum" id="Page_93">[93]</span> +was found possible to arrange for these news +bulletins to be in the hands of the Germans +within approximately forty-eight hours of +their being written. Three times a week a +consignment of not fewer than 100,000 leaflets +of this character was rushed over to +France for prompt dispatch to the Germans. +This “speeding-up” became a factor of the +highest importance when military events +moved so rapidly in the closing months of +the war.</p> + +<p>In June and July the number of leaflets +dropped over the German lines and behind +them totalled 1,689,457 and 2,172,794 respectively. +During August an average of +over 100,000 a day was attained, the actual +number of leaflets issued by the Enemy +Propaganda Department in that month being +3,958,116, in September 3,715,000, and in +October 5,360,000, while in the first ten days +of November, before the Armistice put an +end to such activities, 1,400,000 were sent +out. The Germans were greatly disturbed. +One of their writers described the flood of +leaflets picturesquely as “English poison +raining down from God’s clear sky.” +Marshal von Hindenburg, in his autobiography, +“Out of My Life” (Cassell & Co.), +admits that this propaganda intensified the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_94">[94]</span> +process of German demoralisation. “This +was a new weapon,” he continues, “or rather +a weapon which had never been employed on +such a scale and so ruthlessly in the past.”</p> + +<p>The leaflets were written in simple language, +and aimed at letting the Germans +know the truth which was being concealed +from them by their leaders. They gave +information as to the progress of the war +in all theatres, and showed at a glance, by +means of shaded maps, the territory gained +by the Associated Nations. Great stress +was laid upon the large number of troops +arriving daily from the United States. While, +by the use of diagrams, the steadily progressive +increase of the American forces +was strikingly illustrated, German losses +and the consequent futility of making further +sacrifices in a losing cause were strongly +emphasised. We have again the testimony +of Hindenburg’s autobiography as to the +effect on the German troops: “Ill-humour +and disappointment that the war seemed +to have no end, in spite of all our victories, +had” (he writes) “ruined the character of +many of our brave men. Dangers and hardships +in the field, battle and turmoil, on +top of which came the complaints from home +about many real and some imaginary privations!<span class="pagenum" id="Page_95">[95]</span> +All this gradually had a demoralising +effect, especially as no end seemed to be in +sight. In the shower of pamphlets which was +scattered by enemy airmen our adversaries +said and wrote that they did not think so +badly of us; that we must only be reasonable +and perhaps here and there renounce something +we had conquered. Then everything +would be soon right again and we could live +together in peace, in perpetual international +peace. As regards peace within our own +borders, new men and new Governments +would see to that. What a blessing peace +would be after all the fighting! There was, +therefore, no point in continuing the struggle. +Such was the purport of what our men read +and said. The soldier thought it could not +be all enemy lies, allowed it to poison his +mind, and proceeded to poison the minds of +others.”</p> + +<p>Despite such compliments as to the effectiveness +of the distribution, this branch of +the work provided the thorn in the Crewe +House flesh. Distribution by aeroplane was +the ideal method, and the decision to discontinue +the use of aeroplanes for the purpose +was a serious handicap to Lord Northcliffe’s +work. Balloon distribution was dependent +upon favourable winds, and could only be<span class="pagenum" id="Page_96">[96]</span> +performed in one direction, whereas aeroplanes +could cover a much more extensive +area at great speed. On several occasions +Lord Northcliffe pressed for the resumption +of their use. Lord Milner replied to the first +request, early in May, to the effect that the +British authorities were disputing the German +contention that the distribution of literature +from aeroplanes was contrary to the laws of +war, and had given notice that they intended +to institute prompt reprisals if they received +information that any British airmen were +undergoing punishment for similar action. +Although distribution by aeroplane on the +Western Front had been temporarily suspended, +they held themselves free at any +moment to resume it, and stated that meanwhile +literature would be distributed by +other and, as they thought, more effective +means. <i>Yet it was admitted that there had been +no stoppage of the use of aeroplanes for the +purpose on the Italian Front.</i></p> + + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_97">[97]</span></p> + +<p>A month later, Lord Northcliffe again +wrote, asking if anything had been done to +cancel the temporary suspension of the +distribution of leaflets by aeroplane on the +Western Front. He and his co-workers felt +strongly that propaganda work against Germany +was being severely handicapped by disuse +of this method of distribution, especially +as, according to his information, the Germans +themselves continued to drop leaflets over +the British lines from aeroplanes. He +could not believe that distribution by balloon +was as accurate or as effective. It was a +curious commentary on the British attitude +that the French continued to use aeroplanes +for the purpose on the Western Front.</p> + +<p>Many weeks passed before the War Cabinet +agreed to the resumption of the use of aeroplanes, +and even then the Air Ministry raised +further objection. Finally, all obstacles were +overcome, but not until the end of October. +In one week 3,000,000 leaflets were prepared +for the interior of Germany, and the distribution +of these was begun just before the +Armistice.</p> + +<p>With the turn of the tide of military events +in the summer of 1918, propaganda had assumed +greater importance than ever. Military +defeat rendered the German soldier more +amenable to propagandist influences, to which +in victory he could afford to turn a blind +eye and deaf ear. Moreover, the Allied +successes seriously disturbed the German +nation, and as the news was disseminated +by the various agencies carefully organised +by Crewe House the spirit of the people<span class="pagenum" id="Page_98">[98]</span> +became generally depressed. The commercial +classes exhibited great fear at the threatened +economic war. Thus the soil became fertilised +for the reception of propagandist +views. One obvious but important way of +spreading such views was by ensuring that +important speeches of leading British statesmen +should be adequately and promptly +reported in enemy countries. Means were +found of accomplishing this object. When +occasion arose, publication in neutral newspapers +of interviews with British public men +on important subjects was arranged for, and +these were widely quoted in the enemy +Press.</p> + +<p>The valuable material collected by Mr. +Wells on British progress in those lines of +industry in which Germany had excelled +was used by Mr. Fyfe in many ways. Articles +on the subject were sent to, and published +by, German-Swiss papers, which were known +to be much read in Germany. Pamphlets +were written in German in tones of serious +warning and distributed through channels +prepared by the perseverance and ingenuity +of Mr. S. A. Guest. By these means, also, a +large number of descriptive catalogues of an +exhibition in London of British scientific +products were introduced into Germany and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_99">[99]</span> +were snapped up and read with avidity. +Treatment of these issues was found to +influence enlightened German opinion more +than any other kind of propaganda.</p> + +<p>From time to time special topics were +selected. For instance, a series of “London +Letters” was sent to Swiss and Scandinavian +papers purporting to be written with a pro-German +flavour, but containing, under this +disguise, a true picture of food and other +conditions in Great Britain. It was gratifying +to find these reprinted in enemy papers, for +the German reader was thus led to institute +mental comparisons with the much worse +conditions prevalent in Germany. Secret +means, too, were found to circulate in +German naval ports, as a deterrent to men +picked for service in submarines, leaflets (of +which a reproduction appears in this +volume) containing a long list of U-boat +commanders, dead or captured, with description +of their rank. Particulars so easy +of verification proved the mastery of the +British Navy over the U-boat campaigners +and created great depression in the German +ports.</p> + +<p>In addition to the “priority” leaflets +containing news of Allied successes, illustrated +with shaded maps and diagrams, a<span class="pagenum" id="Page_100">[100]</span> +“trench newspaper” was prepared in a style +which exactly resembled a German publication. +The propaganda pill was coated to +make it attractive. The newspaper was +homely in appearance—its title-decoration +included a head of the Kaiser—and it +provided excellent reading matter which +would appeal to the German soldier, while +revealing facts hitherto carefully hidden from +him. As many as from 250,000 to 500,000 +copies of each weekly issue were distributed. +Some leaflets, on the other hand, were in +religious vein, for there is a deep religious +strain in the German character. These +leaflets pointed out that their military defeats +were a just retribution for the crimes of their +Government. One was a little sermon on +the text “Be sure your sin will find you +out.”</p> + +<p>With knowledge of the dwindling of their +own reserves, the Germans became increasingly +anxious about the supply of American +troops, artillery, and munitions. No opportunity +was lost by Crewe House of keeping +the enemy armies and civil populations fully +aware of the wonderful extent of the American +effort. A series of leaflets was prepared which +gave in succinct and vigorous form the latest +details about that effort, both in the field<span class="pagenum" id="Page_101">[101]</span> +and at home in the factory, the shipyard and +the farm.</p> + +<p>British propagandist work against Germany +was both positive and negative. +Its aim was to give the German people +something to hope for in an early peace +and much to fear from the prolongation of +the war—that is, to make it clear to them +that the only way to escape complete ruin +would be to break with the system that +brought the war upon Europe, and to qualify +for admission eventually into the League of +Nations on the Allied terms. In addition to +these very necessary educative efforts, the +enemy armies were supplied with constant +and <i>invariably truthful</i> information about the +actual military position. Its veracity was a +more essential factor to its success than its +quantity. The news withheld by the German +authorities was supplied by us. Hence the +cries of alarm from Marshal von Hindenburg +and General von Hutier, to which fuller +reference is made in the next chapter.</p> + +<p>In the “intensive propaganda” of the last +few weeks of hostilities the Hohenzollern +Government was denounced. It was pointed +out that all Germany’s sufferings and tribulations +were due to its “Old Gang,” of which a +clean sweep would have to be made before<span class="pagenum" id="Page_102">[102]</span> +the world would make friends or do business +with Germans again. Chapter and verse +were given to prove that the German Government +could not be trusted, and that it was +a great obstacle to peace. Attention, too, +was drawn to the changes then taking place +in Germany, to the cries raised for the abdication +of the Emperor, and to the growing +demand for the punishment of all who had +brought Germany to her disastrous situation. +German soldiers were urged to consider +whether it was worth while to risk being +killed when they had nothing left to fight for, +and it was suggested that their best course +was to make off to their homes and ensure +the safety of their families. The consequences +to Germans of the continuation of the war +were plainly indicated. Maps and diagrams +showed at a glance how Allied air raids over +Germany had increased in number, how +larger and larger Allied air squadrons and +more powerful bombs were being provided +and how easily it would be possible to attack +Berlin, Hamburg, Hanover, and other places +which had previously escaped. A map was +also prepared showing all the steamship +routes by which food, munitions, and raw +materials were being brought to Great Britain +and France, and demonstrating the falsity<span class="pagenum" id="Page_103">[103]</span> +of the German leaders’ assurance that we +could be starved into submission.</p> + +<p>By the courtesy of the Admiralty and of +the Ministry of Information, use was regularly +made of wireless telegraphy as a means of +disseminating information, combating false +German statements, and influencing German +opinion through neutral newspapers and +public opinion.</p> + +<p>Many other agencies for introducing +propagandist material into enemy countries +were organised by Mr. Guest, whose work +demanded extraordinary patience and perseverance. +He experimented with many +methods, and, despite the vigilance of the +Germans, the inflow into Germany increased. +Some of the methods can never be revealed, +but it is permissible to hint that, for instance, +among foreign workmen of a certain nationality +who went into Germany each morning +and returned each evening there might be +some to whom propagandist work was not +uncongenial. And, of course, all secret +agents were not necessarily Allies or neutrals. +Somehow, huge masses of literature were +posted in Germany to selected addresses +from which the German postal revenues +derived no benefit. Easiest of all were +certain obvious channels left wholly or partially<span class="pagenum" id="Page_104">[104]</span> +open in most incredible fashion, as, for +instance, the book trade, which was by no +means as closely supervised as might have +been expected. None were more amazed +at the facility with which such valuable +propaganda material as Prince Lichnowsky’s +pamphlet achieved clandestine circulation in +Germany and Austria than were British +propagandists. Perhaps, as a gratuitous +hint to the curious, it may be added that the +outside covers with titles of works by revered +German authors did not always correspond +to the contents of the books, but, oft-times, +as the poet said, “things are not what +they seem.”</p> + +<p>Personal propaganda among enemy subjects +resident in neutral countries—and especially +those unsympathetic to the perverted +ideals of their respective nations—was tactfully +pursued. Neutrals in prominent +positions in any walk of life whose views +were likely to react on enemy opinion were +brought within the orbit of salutary personal +intercourse. Enemy newspaper correspondents +were carefully “nursed.” No +avenue of approach into enemy countries +was considered too insignificant, for each +had its particular use.</p> + + +<div class="column"><figure class="figcenter illowp80" id="i_p064c" style="max-width: 100%;"> + <img class="w100" src="images/i_p064c.jpg" alt=""> + <figcaption class="caption">MR. HAMILTON FYFE.<br> +SUCCEEDED MR. H. G. WELLS AS DIRECTOR OF THE +GERMAN SECTION.<br> +<i>Photo: Elliott & Fry, Ltd.</i></figcaption> +</figure></div> + +<div class="column"><figure class="figcenter illowp80" id="i_p096a" style="max-width: 100%;"> + <img class="w100" src="images/i_p096a.jpg" alt=""> + <figcaption class="caption">CAPTAIN CHALMERS MITCHELL.</figcaption> +</figure></div> + +<div class="column"><figure class="figcenter illowp80" id="i_p080a" style="max-width: 100%;"> + <img class="w100" src="images/i_p080a.jpg" alt=""> + <figcaption class="caption">BRIGADIER-GENERAL G. K. COCKERILL, C.B.<br> +[DEPUTY-DIRECTOR OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, 1918.]<br> +<i>Photo: Russell, London.</i></figcaption> +</figure> +</div> + + + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> + +<div class="chapter"> +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_105">[105]</span></p> + +<h2 class="nobreak" id="CHAPTER_V">CHAPTER V<br> +<span class="fs80">TRIBUTES FROM THE ENEMY</span> +</h2> +</div> + + +<p class="sub">Hindenburg’s outburst: German Press Comments: Ludendorff +on the conduct and effect of British Propaganda against the +Central Powers.</p> + + + +<p>The Press of the enemy countries was +closely watched for references to British +propaganda in editorial articles or in the +reports of utterances of political and military +leaders. During August, 1918, the +misgivings engendered by the trend of +events, as revealed by our propaganda, +found expression in print. Then, as if +a pent-up stream had at last carried +away the dam, came a flood of wails +from many quarters, generals vying with +editors in hurling imprecations at the British +Enemy Propaganda Department, with +blackest vilifications of Lord Northcliffe, and +in beseeching German troops and people not +to be affected by the leaflets which had by +this time found their way into even the +remotest corner of rural Germany.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_106">[106]</span></p> + +<p>These outbursts were symptomatic of the +fear of defeat which had laid hold of the +Germans, and were correctly interpreted in +England as foreshadowing the end which +came so dramatically in November, 1918. It +was obvious that even the German Government +felt it unwise to restrain, by use of the +censorship, the publication of such damaging +admissions of the deadliness of British propaganda. +It was impossible to stop the +rising tide of truth which was covering +Germany.</p> + +<p>To attempt to quote even a small proportion +of these unintentional tributes to the +work of Sir George Macdonogh’s department +of the War Office and of Crewe House +would be wearisome. Perhaps the best +specimen of all came in the form of a manifesto +from no less a person than Field +Marshal von Hindenburg, the war idol and +personification of German militarism. This +is the text of the remarkable document:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"> + +<p>We are engaged in a hard struggle +with our enemies. If numerical superiority +alone guaranteed victory, Germany +would long since have lain shattered on +the ground. The enemy knows, however, +that Germany and her Allies cannot +be conquered by arms alone. The enemy<span class="pagenum" id="Page_107">[107]</span> +knows that the spirit which dwells within +our troops and our people makes us unconquerable. +Therefore, together with +the struggle against the German arms, +he has undertaken a struggle against the +German spirit; he seeks to poison our +spirit and believes that German arms +will also become blunted if the German +spirit is eaten away.</p> + +<p>We should not take this plan of the +enemy lightly. The enemy conducts his +campaign against our spirit by various +means. He bombards our Front, not +only with a drumfire of artillery, but +also with a drumfire of printed paper. +Besides bombs which kill the body, his +airmen throw down leaflets which are +intended to kill the soul.</p> + +<p>Of these enemy leaflets our field-grey +men delivered up:</p> + + +<table class="autotable"> +<tr> +<td class="tdl">In May</td> +<td class="tdr">84,000</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdl">In June</td> +<td class="tdr">120,000</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdl">In July</td> +<td class="tdr">300,000</td> +</tr> +</table> + + +<p>A gigantic increase! Ten thousand +poisoned arrows daily in July; 10,000 +times daily the attempt to deprive the +individual and the whole body of belief +in the justice of our cause and of the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_108">[108]</span> +strength and confidence for ultimate +victory! We can reckon, in addition, +that a great part of the enemy leaflets +will not have been found by us.</p> + +<p class="center"> +<span class="smcap">Poisoning the Home Spirit.</span><br> +</p> + +<p>But the enemy is not merely satisfied +in attacking the spirit of our Front, he +wishes above all also to poison the spirit +of our home. He knows what sources +of strength for the Front rest in the +home. True, his aeroplanes and balloons +do not carry these leaflets far into our +homeland; they lie far from it in the +lines in which the enemy vainly struggles +for victory by arms. But the enemy +hopes that many a field-grey soldier will +send home the leaflet which has innocently +fluttered down from the air. At +home it will pass from hand to hand +and be discussed at the beer-table, in +families, in the sewing-room, in factories, +and in the street. Unsuspectingly many +thousands consume the poison. For +thousands the burden the war in any +case imposes upon them is increased, and +the will and hope for a victorious issue +of the war is taken from them. All these +again write their doubts to the Front,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_109">[109]</span> +and Wilson, Lloyd George and Clemenceau +rub their hands.</p> + +<p>The enemy attacks the spirit of the +home in another way besides. The +silliest rumours, designed to break our +inner power of resistance, are put into +circulation. We find them simultaneously +in Switzerland, in Holland, +and in Denmark. Thence they spread +like a wave over the whole of Germany. +Or they emerge simultaneously, agreeing +in silly details, in the remotest regions +of our country—in Silesia, in East +Prussia, in the Rhineland—and wend +their way thence over the remainder of +the home territory. This poison works +on the men on leave and flows in letters +to the Front. Again the enemy rubs +his hands.</p> + +<p>The enemy is ingenious. He knows +how to mix the little powder for everyone. +He decoys the fighters at the Front. +One leaflet runs:</p> + +<p>“German soldiers! It is a shameful +lie that the French ill-treat German +prisoners. We are not brutes; only +come over to us without fear; here you +will find a most considerate reception, +good food, and a peaceful refuge.”</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_110">[110]</span></p> + +<p>Ask brave men who have succeeded +with unspeakable difficulty in escaping +from the enemy captivity about this. +Plundered to the utmost in wire compounds, +roofless, goaded by hunger and +thirst into treasonable utterances, forced +by blows and threats of death to betray +their comrades, spat upon, pelted with +filth by the French populace while being +driven to hard labour, that is what the +paradise that the enemy conjures up +really looks like.</p> + +<p>Reproductions of original letters +written by prisoners are also thrown +down, in which these men describe how +well it goes with them. God be praised, +there are still also decent and humane +commandants of prisoners’ camps in +England and France; but these are the +exception, and the letters the enemy +throws down are only of three or four +different kinds. But he sends these +multiplied by many thousands of copies. +The enemy intimidates the faint-hearted +by saying:</p> + +<p>“Your struggle is hopeless; America +will settle you; your submarines are +no good; we are building more ships +than they sink; after the war we shall<span class="pagenum" id="Page_111">[111]</span> +debar you from getting raw materials, +then Germany’s industry must starve. +You will never see your colonies again.”</p> + +<p>That is the tone of the leaflets; now +enticement, now threat.</p> + + +<p class="center"> +<span class="smcap">German Facts and Fancies.</span><br> +</p> + +<p>What is the real situation? We have +enforced peace in the East and are +strong enough to do it in the West, notwithstanding +the Americans; but we +must be strong and united; that is what +the enemy is fighting against with these +leaflets and rumours. He wishes to +deprive us of faith and confidence, will +and force.</p> + +<p>Why is the enemy continually seeking +new allies in the struggle against us? +Why does he try to press nations still +neutral into the struggle against us? +Because in strength we are his equals.</p> + +<p>Why does he incite black and other +coloured men against German soldiers? +Because his will is to destroy us.</p> + +<p>Again, the enemy says another thing:</p> + +<p>“You Germans, your form of government +is wrong. Fight against the +Hohenzollerns, against capitalism; help<span class="pagenum" id="Page_112">[112]</span> +us, the Entente, to give you a better +form of State.”</p> + +<p>The enemy knows perfectly what +strength resides in our State and Empire; +but that is precisely why he +combats it. The enemy also seeks to +tear open old wounds in the German +body politic. With his leaflets and by +rumours he attempts to sow division +and distrust among the Federal States. +At Lake Constance we confiscated many +thousands of leaflets conveyed to Bavaria +and intended to excite anger against the +North Germans. They wish to destroy +the German Empire, which for centuries +was the dream of Germans and which +our fathers won for us, and to condemn +Germany to the impotence of the Thirty +Years’ War.</p> + +<p>The enemy also wishes to shake our +loyalty to our allies. He does not +know the German way and the word of +a German man. He himself sacrifices +his allies; he who is England’s ally +dies of it.</p> +</div> + + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_113">[113]</span></p> + +<div class="blockquot"> +<p class="center"> +<span class="smcap">Traitors to the Fatherland.</span><br> +</p> + +<p>And finally the enemy sends not the +least dangerous of his poisoned arrows +dipped in printers’ ink when he throws +down the utterances of German men and +German newspapers. The utterances of +German newspapers are torn from their +context. Regarding the utterances of +Germans which are reproduced, remember +that at every time there have been +conscious and unconscious traitors to +the Fatherland. Most of them reside +abroad in neutral countries, in order +not to be obliged to share our struggle +and our privations, or to be condemned +by our Judges as guilty of high treason. +Nor have champions of extreme party +tendencies any right to claim to speak +for the generality of the German people.</p> + +<p>It is our strength, but also our weakness +that even in war we allow unrestricted +utterance to every opinion. +We still tolerate the reproduction in +our newspapers of enemy Army reports +and the speeches of enemy statesmen +which are weapons of attack directed +against the spirit of the German Army +and people. This is a sign of strength, +because it proves a consciousness of +might. But it is a weakness because it +allows the enemy’s poison to find an +entrance among us.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_114">[114]</span></p> + +<p>Therefore, German Army, German +Homeland, if one of these thrown-out +pieces of poison in the form of leaflet or +rumour comes before your eyes and +ears, remember that its originates with +the enemy. Remember nothing comes +from the enemy which is not harmful to +Germany. Every one must be mindful +of this, whatever his position or party. +If you meet anyone whose name and +origin indeed are German, but who by +nature stands in the enemy’s camp, +keep him at a distance, despise him, +put him publicly in the pillory in order +that every other true German may +despise him.</p> + +<p>Defend yourself, German Army, +German Homeland!</p> +</div> + +<p>Hindenburg’s fear that only a small part +of the leaflets was given up was fully justified. +The numbers which he quotes suggest that +hundreds of thousands must have been +carried to their homes by the “field-grey +men.”</p> + +<p>The whole manifesto is an interesting +study in psychology. Hope had slipped +away; dismay had ripened into despair +and despair had sown wild anger and hatred. +The dissemination of the unwelcome facts<span class="pagenum" id="Page_115">[115]</span> +of the position caused him to burst out in +vituperation and so to give a valuable clue +as to the effect which Allied propaganda was +producing on the German troops and public.</p> + +<p>After such a mighty oracle, it is not +surprising that others took up the cry. Not +long after, the following noteworthy message, +signed by General von Hutier of the Sixth +German Army, was captured:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"> + +<p>The enemy begins to realise that we +cannot be crushed by blockade, +superiority of numbers, or force of arms. +He is, therefore, trying a last resource. +While engaging to the utmost of his +military force he is racking his imagination +for ruses, trickery, and other underhand +methods of which he is a past +master, to induce in the minds of the +German people a doubt of their invincibility. +He has founded for this +purpose a special Ministry (“The Ministry +for the Destruction of German +Confidence”), at the head of which he +has put the most thoroughgoing rascal +of all the Entente—Lord Northcliffe, +who has been given billions for use in +influencing opinion in the interior of +the country and at the Front by means of +paid agents, the assassination of Ambassadors,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_116">[116]</span> +and all the other ways in +favour with the Entente.</p> + +<p>The method of Northcliffe at the +Front is to distribute through airmen +a constantly increasing number of leaflets +and pamphlets; the letters of German +prisoners are falsified in the most +outrageous way; tracts and pamphlets +are concocted, to which the names of +German poets, writers, and statesmen +are forged, or which present the appearance +of having been printed in Germany, +and bear, for example, the title of the +Reclam series, when they really come +from the Northcliffe Press, which is +working day and night for this same +purpose. His thought and aim are that +these forgeries, however obvious they +may appear to the man who thinks +twice, may suggest a doubt, even for a +moment, in the minds of those who do +not think for themselves, and that their +confidence in their leaders, in their own +strength, and in the inexhaustible resources +of Germany may be shattered.</p> + +<p>Fortunately, Northcliffe, the Minister +for the Destruction of German Confidence, +forgets that German soldiers +are neither Negroes nor Hindus, nor<span class="pagenum" id="Page_117">[117]</span> +illiterate French, English, and Americans, +incapable of seeing through such machinations. +Explain these infamous attempts +to your young and inexperienced comrades, +and tell them what our mortal +enemy expects of them, and what is at +stake. Pick up the leaflets and pamphlets +and give them to our commanders +for transmission to the High Command, +which may be able to make valuable +deductions from them as to the aims of +our enemies. You will thus help the +Command, and you will also help to +hasten the hour of victory.</p> +</div> + +<p>The allegation that huge sums of money +were expended by Lord Northcliffe is comic. +As will have been seen already, the total cost +of the operations conducted by Lord Northcliffe +during his tenure of office was considerably +less than a one-hundredth part of +Great Britain’s <i>daily</i> war bill.</p> + +<p>German Army orders, which fell into +Allied hands, showed plainly how widespread +was the effect produced among the enemy +troops by the leaflets. Officers and men +were threatened with severe punishment if +they neglected to hand the leaflets in immediately. +On the other hand, bonuses for +the delivery of unknown specimens of pamphlets,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_118">[118]</span> +books, leaflets, and pictures were +offered as follows:—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"> + +<p>3 marks (nominally 3<i>s.</i>) for the first +copy.</p> + +<p>30 pfgs. (nominally 4<i>d.</i>) for other +copies.</p> + +<p>5 marks (nominally 5<i>s.</i>) for a book.</p> +</div> + +<p>An order issued by Ludendorff showed that +the influence of the propaganda extended +beyond the troops to the population of +Germany. This read:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"> + +<p>“There has been an increase in the +number of complaints received from +home that men on leave from the front +create a very unfavourable impression +by making statements actually bordering +on high treason and incitement to +disobedience. Instances such as these +drag through the mud the honour and +respect of the individual as well as of +the whole Army, and have a disastrous +effect upon the <i>moral</i> of the people at +home.”</p> +</div> + +<p>A “high officer at the front” describing, +in the <i>Kölnische Zeitung</i> of October 31, 1918, +the demoralisation of the German Army as +a result of the retreat, wrote:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"> + +<p>What damaged us most of all was +the paper war carried on by the enemy,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_119">[119]</span> +who dropped daily among us 100,000 +leaflets, which were extraordinarily well +distributed and well edited.</p> +</div> + +<p>This strikingly confirmed a report received +by the Foreign Office the previous month +which stated:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"> + +<p>Leaflets thrown by Allied airmen have +much more effect now. Instead of being +thrown away or laughed at, as was +often the case in the past, they are +eagerly picked up and read. There is +no doubt that recent events have +seriously shaken the <i>moral</i> of the German +people and Army. One of the returned +officers mentioned above said that if +the Entente knew what poison these +leaflets, etc., were working in the minds +of the German soldiers they would +give up lead and bombard with paper +only in future.</p> +</div> + +<p>That neither threats nor bribes was inducing +the surrender of the leaflets to German +Headquarters was plainly shown by the +statements of prisoners captured during the +last four months of hostilities, and by the +fact that most of them had British leaflets in +their possession. Among the subjects which +seemed to have attracted special attention<span class="pagenum" id="Page_120">[120]</span> +were the German responsibility for starting +the war, for the adoption of poison gas +attacks, and for the bombing of open towns; +the ineffectiveness of Zeppelin attacks and of +the U-boats preventing the transport of +food and troops; the arrival of the American +armies; the Allied war aims; comparison +of food conditions in Germany with those in +Great Britain; and the extracts from German +Socialist newspapers. Inhabitants of +the recaptured territory testified to the +effect of the propaganda on the German +troops, remarking on the lowering of <i>moral</i> +and the increasing number of deserters which +they attributed to it.</p> + +<p>Politicians and newspapers were also greatly +excited, and raised loud cries for the creation +of an organisation for counter-propaganda. +Herr F. Stossinger described British propaganda +in the <i>Frankfurter Zeitung</i> as “the +most complicated and dangerous of all,” +and commented on its “countless” activities. +The Minister of War, General von Stein +was complimentary enough to say “In +propaganda the enemy is undoubtedly our +superior.” (Berlin <i>Morgenpost</i>, August 25, +1918.) Other tributes were:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"> + +<p><i>Rheinische-Westfälische-Zeitung</i>: “At +any rate, the British Propaganda Department<span class="pagenum" id="Page_121">[121]</span> +has worked hard. Had we +shown the same activity in our Propaganda +perhaps many a thing would have +been different now. But in this, we +regret to say, we were absolutely unprepared, +but we hope that by now we +have learned differently.”</p> + +<p><i>Deutsche Tageszeitung</i>: “We Germans +have a right to be proud of our General +Staff. We have a feeling that our +enemies’ General Staff cannot hold a +candle to it, but we also have the +feeling that our enemies have a brilliant +Propaganda General Staff, whereas we +have none.”</p> +</div> + +<p>Violent and bitter attacks were repeatedly +made. The revelations of the British propaganda +created great nervousness, which in +turn gave rise to all kinds of wild rumours, +which spread all over Germany. These were +attributed to Lord Northcliffe’s department. +Speaking in the Bavarian Lower House of +Parliament during August, 1918, General +von Hellingrath, the Bavarian Minister of +War, said:—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"> + +<p>“These rumours are nothing but the +result of the industrious and determined<span class="pagenum" id="Page_122">[122]</span> +agitation which our enemies carry on in +the interior through their agents.”</p> +</div> + +<p>Herr von Kupffer, the editor of the Berlin +<i>Lokal-Anzeiger</i>, referred to them as “a +carnival of soul-storms, idiotic terror, and +criminal irresponsibility,” and he continued:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"> + +<p>“The main thing is to remember the +source of such rumours and to bear in +mind what their object is. Their object +is to demoralise us and, by so doing, +turn into realities what otherwise would +remain merely nightmares. One would +have to be really blind not to see that +these things radiate from that organisation +in England formed to shatter the +German nervous system by means of +shameful and impudent lies. Is not +the figure of Lord Northcliffe, the great +Propaganda Chief of the English Home +Army, pilloried in world-history for all +time?</p> + +<p>“Is anybody in doubt as to the +purpose of this propaganda? Does not +everybody know that the generalissimo +of this campaign of mendacity has +unlimited funds at his disposal in order +to circulate streams of lies through +neutral channels with devilish cunning<span class="pagenum" id="Page_123">[123]</span> +and almost impressive skill? Does not +everybody realise that the Northcliffe +Propaganda is too shrewd to work by +means of mere newspaper tales that +could easily be disproved, and therefore +resorts to the much more subtle method +of carrying unrest, disloyalty, and alarm +into our country and into the lands of +our allies by means of verbal communications +of all sorts? Paid rascals are +systematically employed for this purpose. +It is this sort of person who propagates +these wild stories in Germany and upsets +our sense of proportion in connection +with war events. These are the facts. +Let people bear them in mind before they +promote the Northcliffe Propaganda by +repeating every bit of washerwoman’s +gossip as gospel, even though it be +without the slightest foundation in fact.”</p> +</div> + +<p>In the Hamburg district matters were +much the same, for the influential shipping +journal <i>Hansa</i> printed the following on +September 14:—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"> + +<p>“God be thanked! At last we are +just beginning to recognise what the +hour of war demands; what is our +duty as Germans and as citizens. Despondency,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_124">[124]</span> +discontent, depression, hanging +heads, grumbling! We meet them +at every step and turn, but we did not +know their origin, these growths of +evil fantasy. We did not understand +what meant these secret whispers about +alleged unfavourable news from the +front, these exaggerated reports, fraught +with misfortune, which passed so glibly +from mouth to mouth. One had heard +this, another that, but always it was +something bad in regard to our military +situation. Nothing definite was ever +mentioned. There were only suggestions, +which proved to be chimeras as +soon as ever they could be run to earth. +They were the birth of ignoble defeatism. +Yet there they were, invisibly surrounding +us, disturbing our spiritual balance, +darkening our temper; like an epidemic, +like poisonous bacilli, they flew hither +and thither in all directions through our +German air.</p> + +<p>“Whence came they? Who brought +them to us? To-day we know. To-day +we can recognise the origin of this +depression of German will-power. It +was the long-advertised publicity offensive +of the Entente directed against us<span class="pagenum" id="Page_125">[125]</span> +under England’s lead, and under the +special direction of that unprincipled, +unscrupulous rascal, Northcliffe.”</p> +</div> + +<p>In the <i>Kölnische Volkszeitung</i> for September +11, a letter from the front said:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"> + +<p>“Leaflets destined to cause low spirits +and despair, or to send deserters to the +enemy, are being showered down in +thousands in certain places and their +surroundings. It is this combat, waged +openly or secretly, which, particularly +at home, produces low spirits and despair. +Here you find statements that Hindenburg +was once regarded as a Divinity, +but that his laurels are beginning to +fade, which is quite evident from the +way the enemy advance daily; that +our troops have lost courage, whole +companies are deserting to the enemy, +and such like things.”</p> +</div> + +<p>In another letter to the same newspaper, +published on August 20, the writer said:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"> + +<p>“Our enemies have recently been +very busy distributing leaflets from the +air. I have had two of these leaflets +in my hands, and it is not to be doubted +that our enemies are in that, also, our<span class="pagenum" id="Page_126">[126]</span> +masters, for the pamphlets are so well +produced that anyone who is not on the +lookout is very likely to fall a victim to +them.”</p> +</div> + +<p>That such Propaganda might have had +an effect if it had been tried earlier was +evident from the admissions of war correspondents +as well as of generals. Herr W. +Scheurmann wrote in the <i>Norddeutsche Allgemeine +Zeitung</i> (October 30):</p> + +<div class="blockquot"> + +<p>“We Germans have learnt <i>for the +first time this autumn</i> that the moral +resistance of the fighter at the front is +a power with which the Command must +reckon, all the more cautiously inasmuch +as it is difficult to estimate.”</p> +</div> + +<p>All charges of the mendacity of British +propaganda were unfounded, for the greatest +care was unremittingly exercised to tell only +the truth. One effect of this was to make +the Germans distrust their official <i>communiqués</i>. +“We have in our dear Fatherland +to-day,” wrote the <i>Kölnische Zeitung</i> +on September 11, “great numbers of +innocent and ingenuous minds who doubt +the plain statements of the German Army +reports, but <i>believe the false reports and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_127">[127]</span> +omissions of the enemy</i>. To prove constantly +the contrary to them is a rather thankless +task, but of which one should never tire.”</p> + +<p>It was, indeed, a thankless task to try +to keep the truth from the whole German +nation. “Warn your brothers, your sons, +your husbands, not to believe the enemy’s +leaflets,” was one of “Ten Commandments +for German Women,” published by the +<i>Kölnische Volkszeitung</i> on October 20, +but it was then too late to maintain the +lie-system by which the German resistance +had been stimulated for so long.</p> + +<p>Writing in July, 1919, Herr Arnold +Rechberg said in the <i>Tägliche Rundschau</i>: +“It cannot be doubted that Lord Northcliffe +very substantially contributed to England’s +victory in the world war. His conduct of +English propaganda during the war will +some day find its place in history as a performance +hardly to be surpassed. The +Northcliffe propaganda during the war correctly +estimated ... the character and +intellectual peculiarities of the Germans.”</p> + +<p>Praise from an enemy, when there is no +underlying motive, can usually be accepted +as sincere. Most of the foregoing quotations +were primarily warnings and exhortations +to their own people issued during the war,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_128">[128]</span> +and compliments to Allied propaganda only +indirectly.</p> + +<p>When, however, hostilities had ceased +disastrously for Germany and her allies, +passions of hatred and pride began to give +place to the cold logic of reason. Ludendorff, +who, as First Quartermaster-General from +1916 to the end of the war, was regarded as +one of the cleverest of Germany’s military +leaders, sat down to write his “War +Memories” (Hutchinson and Co., London). +His reputation entitles him to respect, and +he has much to say of value regarding +propaganda.</p> + +<p>He learned one important lesson. “Good +propaganda,” he wrote, “must keep well +ahead of actual political events. It must +act as pacemaker to policy and mould +public opinion without appearing to do so.” +This was the great basic principle upon which +was built the success of Lord Northcliffe’s +department. To try to make propaganda +shape policy is as fatal as endeavouring to +conduct propaganda campaigns without +policy or with conflicting policies. Illuminating +volumes could be written on failures +from all these causes. But whoever follows +the history of the operations conducted from +Crewe House will find that painstaking study +was made of the factors governing the +political, economic, and military position of +each of the enemy countries concerned +before action was taken. As <i>The Times</i> +observed in a leading article (October 31, +1919) Lord Northcliffe’s work “differed from +the praiseworthy and painstaking efforts +that had preceded it mainly by adopting as +its guiding principle the very maxim which +Ludendorff lays down. The consideration +that, without a definite policy in regard to each +enemy country, propaganda must be at best +a hand-to-mouth business was, from the first, +regarded as self-evident by Lord Northcliffe +and the handful of experts who advised him.”</p> + + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_129">[129]</span></p> + +<p>Ludendorff compared the work of the +British and German propaganda departments, +to the great disparagement of the latter. +Indeed he attributed the moral collapse of +the German soldier—and consequently the +military defeat—in part to British propaganda +and in part to the demoralisation of +the German home population, which, in +turn, he ascribed to British propaganda and +to the feebleness of the German Government +in counteracting it. Of British propaganda +he wrote:—</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_130">[130]</span></p><div class="blockquot"> + +<p><a id="FNanchor_1" href="#Footnote_1" class="fnanchor">[1]</a>Lloyd George knew what he was +doing when, after the close of the war, +he gave Lord Northcliffe the thanks of +England for the propaganda he had +carried out. Lord Northcliffe was a +master of mass-suggestion. The enemy’s +propaganda attacked us by transmitting +reports and print from the neutral States +on our frontier, especially Holland and +Switzerland. It assailed us in the same +way from Austria, and finally in our own +country by using the air. It did this +with such method and on such a scale +that many people were no longer able +to distinguish their own impressions +from what the enemy propaganda had +told them. This propaganda was all +the more effective in our case as we +had to rely, not on the numbers, but on +the quality of our battalions in prosecuting +the war. The importance of +numbers in war is incontestable. Without +soldiers there can be no war. But +numbers count only according to the +spirit which animates them. As it is +in the life of peoples, so it is also on +the battlefield. We had fought against +the world, and could continue to do so +with good conscience so long as we were +spiritually ready to endure the burden<span class="pagenum" id="Page_131">[131]</span> +of war. So long as we were this, we +had hope of victory and refused to bow +to the enemy’s determination to annihilate +us. But with the disappearance +of our moral readiness to fight everything +changed completely. We no +longer battled to the last drop of our +blood. Many Germans were no longer +willing to die for their country.</p> + +<p>The shattering of public confidence +at home affected our moral readiness to +fight. The attack on our home front +and on the spirit of the Army was the +chief weapon with which the Entente +intended to conquer us, after it had lost +all hope of a military victory.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_1" href="#FNanchor_1" class="label">[1]</a> This passage is a translation from the German edition.</p> + +</div> + +<p>His references to German enemy propaganda +are generally in terms of disgust. He +considered it rendered Germany no service. +“Our political aims and decisions, issued to +the world as sudden surprises, often seemed +to be merely brutal and violent. This could +have been skilfully avoided by broad and +far-sighted propaganda.... The German +propaganda was only kept going with difficulty. +In spite of all our efforts, its achievements, +in comparison to the magnitude of the +task, were inadequate. We produced no +real effect on the enemy peoples.... We<span class="pagenum" id="Page_132">[132]</span> +also attempted to carry on propaganda on +the enemy fronts. In the East, the Russians +were the authors of their own collapse, and +our work there was of secondary importance. +In the West, the fronts of our enemies had +not been made susceptible by the state of +public opinion in their home countries, and +the propaganda we gradually introduced had +no success.... Germany failed in the fight +against the <i>moral</i> of the enemy peoples.”</p> + +<p>Again and again Ludendorff quotes instances +of the effect of propaganda. For +example, just before the last German offensive +of July 15, 1918:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"> + +<p>“The Army complained of the enemy +propaganda. It was the more effective +because the Army was rendered impressionable +by the attitude at home.... +The enemy propaganda had seized +on Prince Lichnowsky’s pamphlet, which, +in a way that I myself could not explain, +placed on the German Government the +responsibility for the outbreak of war. +And this, though his Majesty and the +Chancellor again and again asserted +that the Entente was responsible....</p> + +<p>“The Army was literally drenched with +enemy propaganda publications. Their +great danger to us was clearly recognised.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_133">[133]</span> +The Supreme Command offered rewards +for such as were handed over to us, but +we could not prevent them from poisoning +the heart of our soldiers.”</p> +</div> + +<p>No greater effect could have been desired +by the British authorities than that described +by Ludendorff, and such an acknowledgment +of the results produced gave the highest +satisfaction.</p> + +<figure class="figcenter illowp80" id="i_p128a" style="max-width: 130.25em;"> + <img class="w100" src="images/i_p128a.jpg" alt=""> + <figcaption class="caption">A MEDALLION STRUCK BY THE GERMANS IN “DISHONOUR” OF LORD NORTHCLIFFE.</figcaption> +</figure> + + + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> + +<div class="chapter"> +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_134">[134]</span></p> + +<h2 class="nobreak" id="CHAPTER_VI">CHAPTER VI<br> +<span class="fs80">OPERATIONS AGAINST BULGARIA AND +OTHER ACTIVITIES</span> +</h2> +</div> + + + + + +<p class="sub">Peculiar difficulties of propaganda against Bulgaria—Educative +work among prisoners of war.</p> + + + +<p>Operations against Bulgaria—the other +objective of Crewe House activities—were +somewhat dissimilar to those against either +Austria-Hungary or Germany. There were +complications due to the general state of +Balkan affairs and politics, and to the fact +that technically the United States was not at +war with Bulgaria. The definition of propaganda +policy against Bulgaria called for +most delicate expression, lest any offence +should be given to Serbia, Roumania, or Greece.</p> + +<p>Lord Northcliffe, in submitting to the +Foreign Office a statement of policy proposed +for use against Bulgaria, pointed out +that he and his advisers felt that there was +need for a definite Allied policy in regard +to the Jugo-Slav and Roumanian questions.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_135">[135]</span> +These, in their turn, were dependent upon +Allied policy in regard to Austria-Hungary. +On May 25, 1918, Lord Northcliffe wrote +to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"> + +<p>“After careful consideration, and with +the advice of our most competent authorities +on Bulgarian and Balkan affairs, I +beg to submit to you the following +scheme of Allied policy in regard to +Balkan countries as the framework +within which any propaganda in Bulgaria +should be carried out. I would especially +direct your attention to the need for a +Government decision in regard to the +Southern Slav, Greek, and Roumanian +questions before any definite proposals +from Bulgaria are entertained:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"> + +<p>“The adoption of a clear and +comprehensive Balkan policy by the +British and Allied Governments is an +essential condition of any propaganda +in Bulgaria.</p> + +<p>“Without such a policy any propaganda +in Bulgaria would resolve itself +into competitive bargaining between +the Allies on the one hand and the +Austro-Germans on the other.</p> + +<p>“This bargaining would tend to<span class="pagenum" id="Page_136">[136]</span> +estrange and to dishearten the Serbians +and the Greeks. In attempting +it the Allies would be, moreover, at a +disadvantage, inasmuch as Bulgaria +already occupies, as a member of the +enemy Alliance, considerably more +than all the territories that would be +the subject of the bargaining.</p> + +<p>“The aim of Allied policy in the +Balkans should be a lasting territorial +and political settlement, framed as +nearly as possible on lines of ethnography, +with the object of paving the +way for a permanent League of the +Balkan Nations.</p> + +<p>“Bulgaria cannot possess all the +territories ethnographically Bulgarian +unless she retain at the peace districts +held by Serbia, Greece, and Roumania +before the war. Serbia, Greece, and +Roumania, on the other hand, cannot +fairly be asked or compelled to +abandon those districts unless they, +in their turn, be united with territories +ethnographically Serbo-Croatian (Jugo-Slav), +Greek, and Roumanian.</p> + +<p>“Allied policy should therefore deliberately +aim at the solution of the +Southern Slav, Hellenic, and Roumanian<span class="pagenum" id="Page_137">[137]</span> +questions in the sense of the +fullest possible racial unity and independence.</p> + +<p>“The chief difficulty in defining the +just claims of Bulgaria lies in the +uncertainty as to the proper delimitation +of Bulgarian Macedonia. A purely +ethnographical delimitation might involve +economic and strategical injustice +to Serbia and Greece, unless it +were accompanied by due provision, +internationally guaranteed, for Serbian +and Greek rights of way. Similarly, +the retention of ports like Salonika +and Kavalla by Greece would involve +hardship to Bulgaria unless adequate +provision, internationally guaranteed, +were made for a Bulgarian right of way +to those ports.</p> + +<p>“Should it prove impossible to +obtain, by persuasion or pressure, the +assent of Serbia and Greece to the +retention of ethnographical Macedonia +by Bulgaria, an autonomous Macedonia +might be set up, proper provision +being made for the maintenance +of order and for the repression of armed +Serbian and Greek or Bulgarian ‘propaganda’ +by an international force of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_138">[138]</span> +<i>gendarmerie</i>. One advantage of an +autonomous Macedonia would be that +it would meet the wishes of the Macedonian +Bulgars themselves, who would +prefer autonomy to annexation outright +by Bulgaria.</p> + +<p>“The Allied policy in the Balkans +should be made known to the Bulgarians +by the Allies and by the +United States. The necessary ethnographical +delimitation of Bulgarian, +or of autonomous Macedonian territory +should be undertaken by a competent +Allied Commission, possibly under +the presidency of the United States. +The announcement of Allied policy +should be accompanied by an intimation +that only by accepting it can +Bulgaria hope to escape economic +and political ostracism for an indefinite +period; but that acceptance of the +Allied policy would, on the contrary, +carry with it a claim to financial and +economic support.</p> + +<p>“Bulgaria should at the same time +be told that the Allies would guarantee +to her the Enos-Midia line as her +minimum frontier on the east, provided +that she refrained from further<span class="pagenum" id="Page_139">[139]</span> +active co-operation with the enemies +of the Allies. Active co-operation on +the side of the Allies should be rewarded +by a frontier yet more favourable +to her aspirations, <i>e.g.</i> by the line +Midia-Rodosto. The inclusion of Silistria +in the future Bulgarian territory +should likewise be made contingent +upon the behaviour of Bulgaria before +the conclusion of peace.</p> +</div> + +<p>“May I ask you to give me your views +on this scheme of policy as early as +possible?</p> + +<p>“I wish to send to Salonika, without +delay, a competent mission to begin +propaganda on this, or some similar +basis, but cannot authorise its departure +unless the ideas it would propagate have +the explicit approval of His Majesty’s +Government.”</p> +</div> + +<p>Mr. Balfour replied on June 6, 1918:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"> + +<p>“I have carefully considered your +letter of May 25, in which you were so +kind as to furnish me with your ideas +as to the lines on which we should +conduct our propaganda in the Balkans.</p> + +<p>“I fully agree with the general ideas +underlying your policy.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_140">[140]</span></p> + +<p>“I feel, indeed, that it will be of value +if our own efforts in this direction, which, +for obvious reasons, can at present be +only of the most tentative nature, are +preceded by discreet and intelligent +propaganda, such as will not only appeal +to our enemies but enlighten our friends.”</p> +</div> + +<p>It was well-known that influential Bulgarians +realised the meaning of the trend of +events in the main theatres of war and would +have welcomed the opening of negotiations +with the Allies. But it was obviously +impossible to begin territorial bargaining with +Bulgarian representatives of any party, because +Bulgaria already possessed more territory +than that to which she was ethnographically +entitled. On the other hand, +strictly to follow the ethnographic principle +would raise difficulties to which Lord Northcliffe +referred in the foregoing letter. As +it would obviously require long and patient +negotiations with our Allies to establish a +just basis, it was deemed to be strongly +advisable to restrict immediate propaganda +to telling the Bulgarians the fate which must +inevitably befall them and that unless they +made a complete and effective reversal of their +policy, the Allies would do nothing to save them +from that fate or to alleviate their position.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_141">[141]</span></p> + +<p>Four preliminary conditions were laid +down as essential to the establishment of +relations with Bulgaria:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"> + +<p>“(<i>a</i>) The expulsion of King Ferdinand +and his family;</p> + +<p>“(<i>b</i>) A complete rupture with Germany;</p> + +<p>“(<i>c</i>) Establishment of a democratic +Government;</p> + +<p>“(<i>d</i>) The orientation of Bulgarian policy +in the direction of a Balkan Confederation +under the <i>ægis</i> of the +Allied Powers and of the United +States.”</p> +</div> + +<p>These lines were suggested as the suitable +basis for a reply to secret overtures which +had been made by Bulgarian emissaries +claiming to speak for the new Premier, +M. Malinof.</p> + +<p>In due course, Crewe House was authorised +to convey an informal message to the +effect “that until Bulgaria had given proof +that a complete reversal of her policy had +actually been brought about, we are not +prepared to entertain any suggestions from +her.” The Bulgarian agents were duly +notified in this sense, and it is to be presumed +that so firm a message was not without its +effect upon the Malinof Government.</p> + +<p>Meanwhile propaganda material in this<span class="pagenum" id="Page_142">[142]</span> +sense was prepared, reinforced by pamphlets, +such as, for example, that by Lichnowsky, and +another giving full particulars of American +preparations. These were translated into +Bulgarian, and this was a matter of some +difficulty, as was the subsequent arrangement +for printing. Distribution was principally +arranged through naval and military channels +and through secret agencies of the character +operating against other enemy countries.</p> + +<p>Most painstaking work was undertaken to +prepare for the publication of a newspaper +in Bulgarian to be smuggled into Bulgaria. +When a series of perplexing difficulties had +been surmounted and all arrangements were +in train for an immediate start, the news came +that Bulgaria had surrendered.</p> + +<p>In this connection, too, Ludendorff pays +tribute to the effect of propaganda. “A +few days after the 15th (September, 1918), +a secret report of the French General fell into +my hands which made it evident that the +French no longer expected any resistance +from the Bulgarian army. Entente propaganda +and money, and the United States +representatives who had remained in Sofia, +had done their work. In this instance again +the Entente had made a thoroughly good job +of it.” (“My War Memories.”)</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_143">[143]</span></p> + +<p>Besides the work in enemy countries, +Crewe House also undertook the enlightenment +of prisoners of war in the camps of +Great Britain. The first necessity was the +eradication of innate ideas of militarism, +if it had left them with any illusions which +their own experience had failed to shatter. +Then the advantages of democratic government +would be inculcated. Rightly it was +thought that if these men could be taught +that government of a country must be by the +free will and assent of the governed, a small +step at least would have been taken in the +right direction. Such beneficent influences as +could be brought to bear upon them would +affect their compatriots on their return home +and might fructify in the expression of +changed views in their letters to their friends. +There were several Prisoners of War camps +scattered about Great Britain, each of them +being in charge of a Commandant responsible +to the War Office. The late Sir Charles +Nicholson, Bt., a valued member of the +Enemy Propaganda Committee, took charge +of this section of Crewe House work, his usual +procedure being to have a personal interview +with each of the Commandants, in order to +ascertain from them what newspapers and +books were allowed inside the camps, and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_144">[144]</span> +what were the English and German newspapers +which were most read by the prisoners. +He then submitted to the Commandant a list +of books and newspapers which were approved +for such purposes, and suggested to them +that these should be circulated among the +prisoners and added to the library which +existed in each of the camps. Among the +newspapers in German which were found to +be useful for this purpose were the <i>Arbeiterzeitung</i> +of Vienna, the <i>Vorwärts</i>, the <i>Frankfurter +Zeitung</i>, the <i>Berliner Tageszeitung</i>, and +the <i>Volkstimme</i>, and such pamphlets as +Prince Lichnowsky’s “<i>Meine Londoner Mission</i>,” +Hermann Fernau’s “<i>Gerade weil ich +Deutscher bin</i>,” Dr. Karl Liebknecht’s “<i>Brief +an das Kommandanturgericht</i>,” Dr. Muehlon’s +“<i>Die Schuld der Deutschen Regierung am +Kriege</i>” and “<i>Die Verheerung Europas</i>,” +Dr. Anton Nystroem’s “<i>Vor dem Tribunale</i>,” +and, in addition, German translations of +Mr. H. G. Wells’s “Mr. Britling Sees it +Through,” and copies of Mr. James W. Gerard’s +“My Four Years in Germany.”</p> + +<p>Letters which were sent out by the prisoners +of war to their friends at home were, of course, +examined by the postal censor. Sometimes +this examination indicated that certain of +the prisoners would prove susceptible to +influence, and a point was made of seeing that<span class="pagenum" id="Page_145">[145]</span> +such prisoners were specially supplied with +literature. The examination of prisoners of +war was useful, too, in ascertaining what +were the ideas prevalent in the minds of the +Germans as to the cause of the war, the +progress of events, and the prospect of +ultimate success or failure.</p> + + +<div class="column"><figure class="figcenter illowp80" id="i_p144d" style="max-width: 100%;"> + <img class="w100" src="images/i_p144d.jpg" alt=""> + <figcaption class="caption">THE LATE SIR CHARLES NICHOLSON, BART., M.P.<br> +MEMBER OF ENEMY PROPAGANDA COMMITTEE, AND +DIRECTOR OF PRISONERS OF WAR SECTION.<br> +<i>Photo: Russell & Sons.</i></figcaption> +</figure></div> + + +<div class="column"><figure class="figcenter illowp80" id="i_p160a" style="max-width: 100%;"> + <img class="w100" src="images/i_p160a.jpg" alt=""> + <figcaption class="caption">SIR RODERICK JONES, K.B.E.<br> +MEMBER OF THE ENEMY PROPAGANDA COMMITTEE.<br> +<i>Photo: Elliott & Fry, Ltd.</i></figcaption> +</figure></div> + + +<div class="column"><figure class="figcenter illowp80" id="i_p160c" style="max-width:100%;"> + <img class="w100" src="images/i_p160c.jpg" alt=""> + <figcaption class="caption">COLONEL THE EARL OF DENBIGH, C.V.O.<br> +MEMBER OF THE ENEMY PROPAGANDA COMMITTEE.<br> +<i>Photo: Speight</i></figcaption> +</figure></div> + + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> + +<div class="chapter"> +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_146">[146]</span></p> + +<h2 class="nobreak" id="CHAPTER_VII">CHAPTER VII<br> +<span class="fs80">INTER-ALLIED CO-OPERATION</span> +</h2> +</div> + +<p class="sub">An axiom for propaganda—Results of a successful conference—Policy, +Means and Methods.</p> + +<p>Experience gained at Crewe House proved +that it is as necessary for Allies to co-ordinate +propaganda against a common enemy as to +unify military command. To conduct propaganda +without a policy is bad enough; but +to shut up sets of propagandists working +independently of each other in a number of +water-tight compartments, each set representative +of a different nationality, is to +court ridicule instead of attracting serious +attention from an intelligent enemy, and to +result in the production of contradictory +thoughts and confusion in the minds of +unintelligent adversaries.</p> + +<p>An axiom for propaganda of allies in future +wars is that a clear common policy must be +defined, based upon such a foundation of fact +and justice that it need not be altered in its +essential principles, but can be, <i>and must be</i>,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_147">[147]</span> +rigidly adhered to. It will doubtless be +necessary to lay down such a policy for each +nation of an opposing alliance, in the event +of the enemy not being a single nation.</p> + +<p>Clearly, too, it should be recognised that +propaganda policy, or policies, must accord +with the policy of the diplomatic, military, and +naval authorities. Possessing no administrative +function, propaganda is dependent upon +them to make policy operative. Here, again, +lack of co-ordination would involve the risk +of confusion, contradiction, and consequent +inefficiency. Propaganda may well and +rightly be in advance of these other departments +as a forerunner (with what success other +chapters of this book record) or it may follow, +but it must be in agreement with them.</p> + +<p>Lord Northcliffe had always conceived it +to be a fundamental principle of propaganda +against enemy countries that when a line of +policy had been laid by him before the +British Government and sanctioned as a +basis for propaganda, the Allied Governments +should be asked for their assent to it, so that +their propaganda departments might act in +conformity. In practice it was found that +most rapid co-ordination could be attained +by representatives of the Allied propaganda +departments meeting together. One of Lord<span class="pagenum" id="Page_148">[148]</span> +Northcliffe’s earliest acts was to convene an +inter-Allied gathering at Crewe House which +was attended by Lord Beaverbrook (Minister +of Information), M. Franklin-Bouillon +(France), and Signor Gallenga-Stuart (Italy), +as well as by a number of other British, +French, Italian, and United States representatives.</p> + +<p>To some extent this gathering paved the +way for the close Allied co-operation in Italy. +Lord Northcliffe would have desired the +immediate establishment of an inter-Allied +body for propaganda in enemy countries, +but difficulties were encountered which postponed +the formation of such a body until a +later date. Meanwhile, as close touch as +possible was kept with the French and Italian +departments concerned. But the course of +events in the summer made it obvious to +Lord Northcliffe and his advisers that an +inter-Allied conference on Enemy Propaganda +was indispensable to success. With the assent +of the British War Cabinet, therefore, he +issued invitations to the French, Italian, and +United States Governments to send delegates +to an official conference in London. These +invitations were cordially accepted and the +Conference assembled at Crewe House on +August 14, 1918.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_149">[149]</span></p> + +<p>In addition to representatives of Lord +Northcliffe’s department, and of the Allied +propaganda departments, there were also +present representatives of the British +Foreign Office, War Office, Admiralty, Air +Ministry, and Ministry of Information.</p> + +<p>The full list of delegates was:</p> + + + + + + +<table class="autotable"> + +<tr><td class="tdc" colspan="3">Great Britain:</td> + +</tr> + + + +<tr class="nw"> +<td class="tdl nw">Viscount Northcliffe (Chairman).<br> +Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Campbell Stuart.<br> +Sir Charles Nicholson, Bart, M.P.<br> +Mr. Wickham Steed. +</td> +<td class="tdctop"> <img src="images/rightbr.png" alt="" +style="width: 10px; height: 100px;"> </td> +<td class="tdl">Department of<br>Propaganda in<br>Enemy Countries.</td> +</tr> + + + +<tr> +<td class="tdl">Rear-Admiral Sir Reginald + Hall<br>(Director of Naval Intelligence).<br> +Captain Guy Gaunt.<br> +Commander G. Standing. +</td> +<td class="tdc"> <img src="images/rightbr.png" alt="" +style="width: 10px; height: 100px;"></td> +<td class="tdl">Admiralty. </td> +</tr> + + + +<tr> +<td class="tdl">Brigadier-General G. K. +Cockerill<br>(Deputy-Director of Military Intelligence).<br> +Major The Earl of Kerry, M.P.<br> +Captain P. Chalmers Mitchell.<br> +</td> +<td class="tdc"> <img src="images/rightbr.png" alt="" +style="width: 10px; height: 100px;"></td> +<td class="tdl">War Office. </td> +</tr> + + + + +<tr> +<td class="tdl">Colonel E. H. Davidson.</td> +<td class="tdc"></td> +<td class="tdl">Air Ministry.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_150">[150]</span></td> +</tr> +<tr class="blank"> +<td colspan="3"></td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdl">Mr. C. J. Phillips.</td> +<td class="tdc"></td> +<td class="tdl">Foreign Office.</td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td class="tdl">Sir Roderick Jones<br>(representing +the Minister of Information).<br> +Mr. Cunliffe-Owen<br>(Controller +of Propaganda against Turkey). +</td> +<td class="tdc"> <img src="images/rightbr.png" alt="" +style="width: 10px; height: 120px;"></td> +<td class="tdl">Ministry of Information. </td> +</tr> + + + + + + + +<tr><td class="tdc" colspan="3">France:</td> + +</tr> + +<tr><td colspan="3">M. Klobukowski.<br> +M. Haguenin.<br> +M. Sabatier D’Espeyran.<br> +Major-General le Vicomte de la Panouse.<br> +M. le Capitaine Prince Pierre d’Arenberg.<br> +Lieutenant le Comte Stanislas de Montebello.<br> +M. Comert.<br> +Lieutenant P. Mantoux.<br></td></tr> + + + +<tr><td class="tdc" colspan="3">Italy:</td> + +</tr> + +<tr><td colspan="3">Professor Borgese.<br> +Signor G. Emanuel.<br> +Captain Count Vicino-Pallavicino.<br> +Lieutenant R. Cajrati-Crivello.<br></td></tr> + + + +<tr><td class="tdc" colspan="3">United States of America:</td> + +</tr> + +<tr><td>Mr. James Keeley.<br> +Captain Walter Lippmann.<br> +Captain Heber Blankenhorn.<br> +Lieutenant Charles Merz.<br> +Lieutenant Ludlow Griscom.<br></td> +<td class="tdcbot"><br> <img src="images/rightbr.png" alt="" +style="width: 10px; height: 80px;"></td> +<td><br>Present as observers.</td> +</tr> + +</table> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_151">[151]</span></p> + +<p>In the speech with which, as Chairman, +Lord Northcliffe opened the Conference, he +pointed out that the organisation of British +Propaganda in Enemy Countries had reached +a stage at which greater co-ordination of +Allied purpose and effort was required if its +objects were to be achieved in full measure. +Propaganda in enemy countries presupposed:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"> + +<p><i>a.</i> The definition, for propaganda purposes +at least, of Allied policy in +regard to our enemies;</p> + +<p><i>b.</i> The public manifestation of this +policy; and</p> + +<p><i>c.</i> The study of technical means of +bringing its main features to the +knowledge of the enemy.</p> +</div> + +<p>He suggested that the Conference should +resolve itself into a number of Committees +to examine and to report upon these and other +matters. Such Committees would be concerned +with:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"> + +<p>1. The great subject of the policy of +propaganda;</p> + +<p>2. The difficult question of means of +distribution:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"> + +<p>(<i>a</i>) Military.</p> + +<p>(<i>b</i>) Civil.</p> +</div> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_152">[152]</span></p> + +<p>3. Propaganda material;</p> + +<p>4. Educative work among prisoners of +war who might return to Germany +to tell their compatriots +the real facts.</p> +</div> + +<p>Unless based on a definite policy, propaganda +could only be fragmentary and superficial. +On the basis of a clear policy it might +become destructive of enemy <i>moral</i>, a valuable +adjunct to military operations, and +constructive of the necessary conditions of a +lasting peace.</p> + +<p>The three enemy countries with which his +Department was mainly concerned were +Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Germany. +He cited Austria-Hungary first, because, of +all our enemies, the Hapsburg Monarchy was +the field where positive results were most +readily attainable.</p> + +<p>In the early months of 1918, when he began +that work, Germany was too flushed with +her facile triumphs in Russia to be susceptible +to propaganda, and the attitude of +Bulgaria was too closely bound up with +German fortunes to be at that moment easily +affected by propaganda. Allied policy in +regard to Bulgaria was, moreover, closely +connected with the general Balkan policy of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_153">[153]</span> +the Allies, the formulation of which necessarily +depended, in its turn, upon the adoption +of a definite policy towards Austria-Hungary. +All these considerations pointed to Austria-Hungary +as the foremost object of attack, +and therefore as the country in regard to +which a clear propaganda policy was most +urgently required.</p> + +<p>Lord Northcliffe then outlined the steps +taken in regard to Austria-Hungary, described +fully in Chapter III. He went on +to state that there was abundant evidence that +the work thus begun had helped to prevent +an Austrian offensive in April, and to check +it when it was finally launched in June. There +was also strong reason to believe that, had +action on these lines been taken earlier, +far greater results might have been obtained. +This was an aspect of the vital connection +between propaganda policy and military +operations to which he earnestly directed +attention. He trusted that the Policy Committee +of the Conference might be able to +make valuable recommendations in this +respect.</p> + +<p>One important aspect of propaganda +against Austria-Hungary and, indeed, against +all our enemies, was the dissemination of +knowledge of the greatness of the war effort<span class="pagenum" id="Page_154">[154]</span> +of the American people. With that effort he +had had personal acquaintance; and on that +very day he had received a secret report that +the Germans had little idea of the supreme +effort which the Americans were making. +To this aspect he attributed great and growing +significance.</p> + +<p>In regard to Bulgaria, he had also ventured +to lay before the British Government an +outline of propaganda policy, which had +received general approval. Its main features +were the necessity of a definite Allied decision +in regard to the Jugo-Slav and Rumanian +questions, before any direct attempt could +be made to influence Bulgaria by propaganda. +A definite Jugo-Slav and Rumanian policy +presupposed, however, a definite Allied policy +in regard to Austria-Hungary. Upon the +details of this important subject the Policy +Committee would be fully informed. Broadly +speaking, he considered it at once inexpedient +and dangerous to enter into any direct or +indirect negotiations with Bulgaria or to +make to her proposals even as propaganda +until a complete change of attitude had +actually taken place in Bulgaria itself. Until +then, propaganda could consist only in conveying +information to the Bulgarian troops +and people as to the fate that inevitably<span class="pagenum" id="Page_155">[155]</span> +awaited them unless they reversed completely +their attitude; and in preparing by agreement +among the Allied Governments an +outline of Balkan policy, aiming at a solution +of the various Balkan questions as nearly as +possible on ethnographical lines. In this +way, Allied propaganda might eventually +help to prepare the way for a League of +Balkan States.</p> + +<p>Though for many reasons it had not thereto +been possible to develop British propaganda +in Germany as fully or as efficiently as it +had been developed in Austria-Hungary, +Lord Northcliffe said his department had, +in co-operation with the military authorities, +and by the utilisation of secret channels, +been able to introduce into Germany a +certain amount of propaganda literature. +The decision of the British military authorities +not to allow the use of aeroplanes on +the British Front in France for the distribution +of propaganda had naturally retarded +and hampered the necessary extension of his +work. He trusted that this question of the +use of aeroplanes for propaganda purposes +would be most carefully considered by the +committee on military distribution. In the +meantime, balloons had been employed, +though they were manifestly far inferior to<span class="pagenum" id="Page_156">[156]</span> +aeroplanes as instruments of distribution. +The view seemed to prevail that propaganda +was not worth casualties. Were this view +well-founded it would be hard to understand +why the Germans should have taken such +drastic measures against British airmen +accused of dropping propaganda leaflets. +The Germans, who ought to be good judges, +evidently feared our leaflets more than they +feared our bombs. But the main issue was +the determination of an Allied propaganda +policy in regard to Germany—a matter of no +little difficulty. As he had said in relation +to Austria-Hungary, one of the chief features +of Allied propaganda—apart from questions +of policy—would be the constant dissemination +of knowledge of the immensity and of +the growing efficiency of American effort. +This feature he had endeavoured to develop, +and he intended to develop it increasingly. +On the subject of policy, however, he had +submitted to the British Government an +outline comprising the following points, which +it was necessary to bring home to the +Germans.</p> + +<div class="blockquot"> + +<p>1. The determination of the Allies to +continue the war until Germany accepted +the Allied peace terms.</p> + +<p>2. The existing alliance as a fighting<span class="pagenum" id="Page_157">[157]</span> +league of free nations would be deepened +and extended and the military, naval, +financial, and economic resources of its +members would be pooled until its +military purpose was achieved and peace +could be established on lasting foundations. +He had suggested further that, +as German minds were peculiarly susceptible +to systematic statement, the +Allies should prepare a comprehensive +scheme of world organisation as a counterpart +to the German schemes represented +by the phrases “Berlin-Baghdad” and +“Mittel-Europa.” As a preliminary to +the drafting of such a scheme, he had +urged that the lines of a practical League +of Free Nations should be studied and +laid down.</p> +</div> + +<p>Pending the formulation of this scheme, +he thought that Allied propaganda should +insist upon Allied control of raw materials, +of shipping, and on the Allies’ power to +ostracise for an indefinite period enemy +peoples, until the terms of the Allied peace +settlement were fully accepted. At the same +time it should be pointed out that nothing +stood between enemy people and a lasting +peace except the designs of their ruling +dynasties and of their military and economic<span class="pagenum" id="Page_158">[158]</span> +castes. The primary war aim of the Allies +was the changing of Germany, not only in +their own interest, but also in that of the +German people itself, since, without the +honest co-operation of a reformed Germany, +disarmament on a large scale might be +impossible, and without disarmament social +and economic reconstruction would be impracticable. +He trusted that this question of +Allied propaganda policy in regard to Germany +would be carefully weighed by the +Policy Committee.</p> + +<p>There remained the extremely important +question of the co-ordination of Allied propaganda +effort. It was obvious, he said, that +if each Ally carried on its propaganda in +enemy countries without reference to what +the other Allies were doing, there must result +great dispersion of effort, overlapping, and, +possibly, some conflict of statement if not of +aims. In order to secure the greatest possible +military efficiency, the Allied Governments +had established the Versailles Council, and +had agreed to the appointment of an Allied +Commander-in-Chief. Up till then the only +Inter-Allied propaganda institution set up +was the Inter-Allied Propaganda Commission +at Padua. The working of this Commission +had revealed the great advantages of concerted<span class="pagenum" id="Page_159">[159]</span> +effort, but it had also revealed certain +defects which only fuller Allied co-ordination +in matters of propaganda seemed likely to +overcome. He would therefore submit a +proposal, definite in aim, though variable in +detail, that there be created a central body +for the conduct of propaganda in enemy +countries. By such a step it seemed to him +many delays might be avoided, great economy +of energy and expense might be secured, and +progress be made towards the unification of +Allied propaganda policy and of the means +for carrying it into effect.</p> + +<p>In conclusion, he asked pardon for reverting +once more to the great importance +of a true conception of propaganda in enemy +countries, not only as a means of winning +the war, but also and especially as a means of +winning the peace. It was a work that +demanded all the intelligence of the best +minds in Allied countries, and the sustained +support of responsible Allied statesmen.</p> + +<p>M. Klobukowski, the head of the French +delegation, who followed Lord Northcliffe +with an eloquent speech in French, which +Lieutenant Mantoux interpreted, concurred +in all that Lord Northcliffe had said. The +French Government, he said, answered willingly +to the invitation sent to them by the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_160">[160]</span> +British Government to send their representatives +to the Inter-Allied Conference on Propaganda +in Enemy Countries. It seemed to +them necessary to call it to intensify by +methodical co-operation and concerted direction +the powerful means of action at the +disposal of the Allies. To see exactly what +could be done; to know exactly where they +meant to go—that was the principal aim +which must inspire their propaganda.</p> + +<p>The campaign of systematic untruth which +was being waged by the enemy need not for +one moment divert the Allies from their line. +Honesty had never seemed to the Allies to be +an inferior policy. In the second place, +French propaganda had taken care to put +in a strong light the responsibility for the +war. The war, on the part of our enemies, +was a war of aggression and the service of a +policy of conquest and the enslavement of +nationalities. On the Allied side it was a +purely defensive war, for the defence not +only of territories, but also of the great cause +of Right violated in Belgium, as in Alsace-Lorraine, +in Poland, in the Ukraine, in +Serbia, in Rumania, and in all the Balkan +countries. “We try,” said M. Klobukowski, +“to reach in enemy countries consciences +which have hitherto shut out free examination +and which cannot yet control themselves. +We try to open eyes and ears now shut by +the most extraordinary education of discipline +which has at any time dominated men. And +this with the help not only of arguments +taken from facts which might be considered +as arbitrary in practice and intention, but +also with the help of what is admitted by our +enemies themselves in declarations (the sincerity +of which is incontestable for they +come from their own agents) from those who +dared write what they know, like Prince +Lichnowsky and Dr. Muehlon.”</p> + + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_161">[161]</span></p> + +<p>Co-operation in the work of liberating the +oppressed nationalities (continued M. Klobukowski) +defined clearly one of the ends of +our action against Austria-Hungary; but +although we cannot speak of immediate +results, Allied propaganda was not least +indispensable in Germany. If Austria was +guilty towards her peoples, Germany was +guilty towards the whole of mankind. Since +the war began, the French Government had +been constantly preoccupied with the propaganda +to be effected in Germany. Faced +with the monstrous distortion of facts which +the Imperial Government tried to force +upon the world, the first French Yellow Book, +in December, 1914, gave the full list of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_162">[162]</span> +responsibilities for the war, and showed, by +going back to its origin, that Germany prepared +and finally launched the war.</p> + +<p>One of the essential objects of Allied +propagandists, therefore, must be to come +back frequently to the origin of the war, +in the hope that such effort will not be in +vain. The experience of the publication of +the Lichnowsky memorandum was very encouraging +from that point of view, but that +was not enough, as the majority of the German +nation had still confidence in the +official versions of the causes of the world +conflict such as had been given to them by +the Imperial Government. The Germans +must not be allowed to lower the Allies’ +defensive war to the level of a war of conquest. +The Allies must never be tired of +insisting that they were victims of a deliberate +aggression.</p> + +<p>On the other hand, it was their interest to +insist more and more upon the character of +the struggle in which they were engaged. +They were upon the defensive; they were +defending themselves, they were defending +right and humanity; that was their war aim, +and all other war aims were only +consequences of it. Deeply imbued as the +German nation might be with doctrines of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_163">[163]</span> +historical realism, hostile as their Government +might be to the notion of a policy +founded upon the respect of right, the day +nevertheless must come when their ideas +would triumph over their resistance, when +gradually on one hand the revelations (daily +becoming more definite) would show the +criminal complicities which were the cause +of the war. On the other hand the gradual +failure of that bid for domination would +oblige the Germans themselves to look for the +culprits. The anxiety about the injustice of +their own cause would finally penetrate into +the German nation.</p> + +<p>It was also important clearly to show how +useless was the effort made by the enemy +to sever the link between the Powers of the +Entente. The enemy Press was never tired +of giving its readers the imaginary spectacle +of divisions between their enemies. After +their tales about France being conquered +by the British Army, they proceeded to +announce that the Americans were going to +get hold of France.</p> + +<p>Every peace offensive undertaken by the +German Government in the hour of military +difficulty gave evidence of the naïve confidence +which the best-informed among them +employed in such an attempt to divide us.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_164">[164]</span> +To show that the Allied front was indissolubly +united, to show that the Alliance extends +still further than the war, that it will extend +from the military to the economic field—that +would be the efficient answer of the Allies.</p> + +<p>It must be said above all that the Allies +would conquer and that they had the means +to conquer. They must not let themselves +be led towards discussions. There was always +a danger of seeing the enemy get hold of +Allied formulæ, after having emptied them of +what they contained. The German mind, +so complex and treacherous, had great ability +in the art of turning to its own account the +principles laid down by others. Germany +might attempt once more to mislead the +peoples by writing on her own flag their +mottoes while they reserved to themselves +the possibility of giving to those mottoes +later on an interpretation diametrically +opposed to the real one.</p> + +<p>Nothing was more important than to +defend Allied public opinions against such +enterprises, which would certainly be undertaken +by Germany. The liberation of the +peoples, affirmation of the justice of the +Allied cause, demonstration of the violation +of right perpetrated by the Central Empires—such +must be the basis of Allied propaganda.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_165">[165]</span></p> + +<p>That was in full harmony with the general +policy of principles and tended to assure to +all the peoples the right freely to develop, +as the constitutions of the Allied States had +given the same right to every individual. +So Allied victory would have that character +of moral elevation which was the character +of the great Allied nations during their +history. But until they reached that victory +of liberty and right, according to the strong +words of M. Clemenceau, “let us make +war!”</p> + +<p>Signor Borgese, the representative of Italy, +said that he agreed generally with all the +ideas and proposals that had been made by +Lord Northcliffe.</p> + +<p>The Italians had of late been particularly +active on the field of anti-enemy propaganda. +For example, they had one office in Rome +whose chief duty it was to spread news +arriving from the enemy in order that his +position in the world, and his internal +resistance, might be weakened. They had +also in Switzerland a large organisation, the +principal aim of which was to secure daily +knowledge of what was going on in enemy +countries, and to utilise to the full every +possible means of securing information about +their internal condition.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_166">[166]</span></p> + +<p>The first act of Allied joint propaganda +against the enemy was the Rome Congress +in April, which was due largely to the +concord and the friendship of the most +enlightened and intelligent elements of public +opinion in England and in Italy. As a result +of that Congress, great consequences had +followed in Austria-Hungary, and generally +in the world of the enemy; and the principal +task was to pursue the way that had thus +been opened by the Rome Congress. The +peculiar position of Italy as the enemy of +Austria naturally entered largely into the +motives that inspired Italian action. The +declarations of Lord Northcliffe—whose influence +upon the question of enemy propaganda +was immense—and the declaration +of M. Klobukowski were entirely anti-Austrian +in tendency.</p> + +<p>As regards the Italians, they had been +enemies of Austria not only because Austria +was their enemy, but also because they felt +that it was the most direct and sure way of +being the enemies of Germany and of Germanism. +Those Italians who had understood +the true position since the beginning of the +war had always been enemies of Austria in +this sense, and had sought the best means of +attacking and annihilating German militarism<span class="pagenum" id="Page_167">[167]</span> +through Austria. Although German +militarism was not completely invulnerable, +and although the vulnerability of Germany +was not so certain as that of Austria, Austria +was the Achilles’ heel of Germany. Two +important conditions that had rendered +possible such action against Austria, were +that the necessity of disintegrating Austria +had become generally realised throughout +the world, and that Austria’s responsibility +for the war had been generally acknowledged +not only by the Allies, but also by the enemy. +Lichnowsky and Muehlon had acknowledged +that the chief and immediate responsibility +for the war rested with Austria. The question +of guilt was certainly one of the chief questions +with which propaganda had to deal; +and it would be examined by the committees, +because he believed that it might be possible +to accelerate movements of opinion in Germany +and in Austria if a confession of guilt +as to the origin of the war were made widely +known.</p> + +<p>As to what had been done by Italian +propaganda during the last few months, he +had mentioned the offices at Rome and at +Berne, to which he would refer in more detail +in the committees. As to the work of the +Padua Inter-Allied Commission, it was<span class="pagenum" id="Page_168">[168]</span> +assuredly a very great work, if one were to +judge of its activity not only by personal +convictions but by the convictions of the +foe, who had publicly acknowledged that the +defeat on the Piave was partly caused by the +efforts of the Padua Commission, and by +information that had been brought to them +by the Jugo-Slavs and Czecho-Slovaks. +Allied propaganda must be a propaganda +of truth. The chief difficulty lay in making +a distinction between copying the enemy’s +system of actual military operations and +imitating his methods in the war of ideas. +It was true that the military technique of +war must be dependent upon that of the +adversary, unless we were to be at a disadvantage; +but there was a danger that we +might imitate methods adopted by the enemy +in the war of ideas—that is to say, that we +might copy German methods of propaganda. +Although there were people who thought that +the Allies should copy lies and hypocritical +statements of German propaganda, he was +convinced that their real arm in the propaganda +war was the truth. The Allies +could tell the truth because they were persuaded +that they were right. It was easy +for them to have a system of ideas, +because they believed in them as in a<span class="pagenum" id="Page_169">[169]</span> +kind of religion. Germany and Austria-Hungary +would listen intently to the words +that we should say—not necessarily in that +Conference, but to the words of our Governments. +Political action and propaganda +would have very great importance at the end +of this campaign, and therefore he hoped +that Italians would be able to make their +contribution to the shortening and to the +victorious decision of the war.</p> + +<p>One circumstance that gave them absolute +certainty of victory, and was a certificate +of the moral purity of the Allied cause, was +the action of the United States, whom no one—not +even the enemy—could accuse of any +selfish motive or interest. While it was +conceivable that the European Allies might +be charged, however unjustly, with having +some thought of their direct interests, the +United States could not by any stretch of +imagination be regarded as having intervened +for any issue save that of high principle. +Therefore, he agreed entirely with Lord +Northcliffe and M. Klobukowski that the +more the significance of the American effort, +both in its material and its moral aspects, +were brought to the knowledge of enemy +peoples, the more rapid would be the decline +of their <i>moral</i>, and the surer the attainment<span class="pagenum" id="Page_170">[170]</span> +of the just peace which was the great +common aim of the Allies and the purpose of +their action, both military and propagandist.</p> + +<p>Mr. James Keeley, the representative of +the United States, said that he received his +appointment through the Committee on +Public Information of the United States +Government. Four U.S. military officers +were present, from the Military Intelligence +Branch of the General Staff, as observers. +They all met the Conference as pupils, +having a most earnest desire to learn so that +they might do their part as whole-heartedly +in this as in all other phases of Allied effort.</p> + +<p>Learning from those who have had experience, +they would be enabled to devote +whatever resources they had to the common +purpose. They would report to the American +Government what men of experience in this +work had to recommend, and on the basis +of that report it was hoped that an American +organisation could be created as quickly as +possible, which should work in the fullest, +frankest, and most effective co-operation with +the corresponding organisations of the Allied +nations. It would not be amiss, perhaps, +to suggest that, in addition to material +equipment, the United States could contribute +one element that might possibly be of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_171">[171]</span> +peculiar importance in this work. Its population +contained a large representation of all +the peoples of Central Europe. These peoples +were well organised in the United States, and, +with a few exceptions perfectly well-known, +were loyal to the Allied cause. Those +peoples, of course, had intimate connections +with the peoples of Central Europe, and it +was more than possible that they might be, +in various ways, of great use in carrying +messages across the frontiers. On this point, +particularly, they would be glad of the +advice of the Conference.</p> + +<p>After these speeches the four Committees +referred to by Lord Northcliffe were appointed +to deliberate on policy, distribution, material, +and prisoners of war. The members of the +Conference were suitably distributed among +the different committees, which accomplished +most invaluable work in a business-like +manner, and presented their reports to the +full Conference for consideration at its sitting +on the third day.</p> + +<p>The Policy Committee, presided over by +M. Klobukowski, considered exhaustively +the problems of propaganda policy in all its +fields and phases of action. Its discussion +crystallised into a series of resolutions and +recommendations for sanction, modification<span class="pagenum" id="Page_172">[172]</span> +or rejection by the Allied Governments. It +was, of course, fully understood that such +resolutions could be only <i>ad referendum</i> and +not binding on the respective Governments.</p> + +<p>In regard to propaganda against Austria-Hungary, +the Committee found itself in +complete agreement with the scheme of +policy sanctioned by the British Government +for purposes of propaganda, and amplified by +the decisions of the British, French and +Italian Governments at the time of, or in +connection with, the Rome Congress of +Oppressed Austro-Hungarian Nationalities. +It recognised that such extensions of policy, +while springing from considerations of Allied +principles, had, in part, corresponded to the +real demands of the propaganda situation, +which, in their turn, had sprung from the +exigencies of the military situation and, in +particular, from the necessity of utilising +the established principles of the alliance for +the purpose of impeding or hampering the +Austro-Hungarian offensive against Italy. +Subsequent acts and declarations on the +part of Allied Governments and of the +Government of the United States made it +clear that the joint policy of the Allies was +tending increasingly towards the constructive +liberation of the subject Austro-Hungarian<span class="pagenum" id="Page_173">[173]</span> +races. The main task of the Committee in +relation to propaganda in Austria-Hungary +seemed, therefore, to be one of unifying for +propaganda purposes these various acts and +declarations, and of preparing, if possible, +the way for a joint Allied declaration that +might complete and render more effective +the work of Allied propaganda both in the +interior of Austria-Hungary and among +Austro-Hungarian troops at the Front.</p> + +<p>The discussion upon the expediency and +the possibility of such a joint Allied declaration +was exhaustive and illuminating. In view of +the position already taken up by the Allied +Governments and by the United States in +regard to the Czecho-Slovaks, the Poles, and +the Rumanians, it appeared that the main +issue awaiting definition concerned the question +of Jugo-Slav unity and independence, +and of the attitude of Italy towards them. +The Committee adopted the following recommendation:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"> + +<p>“With reference to the best means of +aiding Allied Propaganda in favour of +the freedom of the Austro-Hungarian +subject races, the Committee expresses a +strong hope that all controversial discussions +of the frontiers between Italy +and the future Jugo-Slav State will be<span class="pagenum" id="Page_174">[174]</span> +avoided by the Jugo-Slav Press and the +Jugo-Slav leaders both outside and, as +far as the Jugo-Slav leaders may be able +to exert their influence, also inside the +Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, just as +they have been avoided of late by the +most important organs of the Italian +Press and in the public speeches of +influential Italian leaders.”</p> +</div> + +<p>During the debate upon this recommendation +it became clearly apparent that the +Committee regarded, and was confident that +the Conference would regard, the Italian +national claims to the union with Italy of the +cities and regions of Trent, Trieste, and the +other regions of Italian character as not only +entirely justified, but also as an elementary +dictate of the Allies’ respect for the principles +of nationality and of ethnical justice. Precisely +because the Committee supported the +principles formulated in the Italo-Jugo-Slav +Agreement of last March and saw in them the +basis of fruitful co-ordination between Italy, +Jugo-Slavia, and the other nationalities then +oppressed of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, +it held the Italian national rights above +mentioned to be imprescriptible and not open +to discussion.</p> + +<p>The Committee also felt that both for<span class="pagenum" id="Page_175">[175]</span> +reason of propaganda and from the point of +view of the future independence and moral +and political security of the Italian nation +a foremost part in the work of creating a +free and united Jugo-Slav State naturally +fell to Italy. Therefore, after the most +careful consideration, it unanimously adopted—and +recommended to the Conference—the +following resolution:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"> + +<p>“Considering the adhesion of the +Italian Government, by the Prime Minister’s +speech of April, 1918, to the +resolutions of the Rome Congress of +Austro-Hungarian subject races (which +embodied the agreement between the +Jugo-Slavs and the Italian Committee) +and by his recent telegram to the Prime +Minister of Serbia, M. Pashitch;</p> + +<p>“Considering the exemplifications of +Allied Policy towards Austria-Hungary +in the French and Italian Convention +with the Czecho-Slovak National Council, +the British declaration recognising the +Czecho-Slovaks as an Allied Nation, the +Allied declaration at the Versailles Conference +of June 3rd, 1918 in favour of +the unity and independence of Poland +and Mr. Lansing’s statement of the 28th +June, that all branches of the Slav races<span class="pagenum" id="Page_176">[176]</span> +should be completely freed from German +and Austrian rule;</p> + +<p>“Considering further the extreme expediency, +especially in view of possible +military developments on the Italian +front, that the Allied policy of liberating +the oppressed Hapsburg peoples should +be represented, in the first place, by +Italy, on whose front Allied propaganda +against Austria-Hungary is principally +located;</p> + +<p>“The Policy Committee of the Inter-Allied +Propaganda Conference resolves +to suggest that the Italian Government +take the initiative in promoting a joint +and unanimous public declaration that +all the Allies regard the establishment of +a free and united Jugo-Slav State, embracing +Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, as +one of the conditions of a just and lasting +peace, and of the rule of right in Europe.”</p> +</div> + + + + + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_177">[177]</span></p> + +<p>Passing to the consideration of propaganda +against Bulgaria, the Committee recognised +the essential connection between Allied propaganda +policy towards Austria-Hungary +and Allied propaganda policy in the Balkans. +Without the adoption by the Allied Governments +of a definite policy in regard to Jugo-Slav +and Rumanian unity and independence, +it was impossible to formulate any effective +propaganda policy in regard to Bulgaria. +Upon the merits of propaganda in Bulgaria, +the Committee unanimously adhered to the +principles laid down in Lord Northcliffe’s +opening statement, that is to say, that an +essential preliminary to any conversations or +negotiations with Bulgaria must be a complete +and effective reversal of the policy +hitherto pursued by Bulgaria as the enemy of +the Allies; and until this reversal had taken +place, the objects of the Allied propaganda +should be to bring home to the Bulgarian +people a sense of the dangers that threatened +them unless they could convince the Allies by +their conduct of their sincere repentance. +The Committee was also of the opinion that +pending this necessary change, their Serbian +and Greek Allies should not be left in +ignorance of the propaganda policy which +the chief Allied Powers might adopt.</p> + +<p>With reference to Poland, the Chairman +of the Committee made a brief but pregnant +statement, declaring the policy of propaganda +in regard to the Poles to be identical with +that laid down by President Wilson and +President Poincaré and formulated by the +Allied Prime Ministers on June 3 in the words: +“The creation of a united and independent<span class="pagenum" id="Page_178">[178]</span> +Polish State, with free access to the sea, +constitutes one of the conditions of a solid +and just peace and of the rule of right in +Europe.” He added that the growth of +Prussian power for evil, and the present +position of Prussia in the world, had their +origin in the partition of Poland. Consequently +he urged that the reunion of the +various parts of Poland would be not only +the reparation of an historical injustice, +but would constitute a strong guarantee +against any revival of the Prussian system. +He claimed that the greater the strength of +Poland, the firmer would be the security of +Europe and the world against any renewal of +aggressive Prussian militarism.</p> + +<p>In the discussion which followed, general +agreement was expressed with this view; +but it was pointed out that a reunited Poland +might be stronger in proportion as its +territory was ethnographically compact and +did not include other neighbouring racial +elements with whom Poland would have +every interest to live in concord, but which, +were they included against their will within +her frontiers, might become sources of disturbance +and weakness. It was also considered +desirable that the Polish National +Committee, in order to become not less<span class="pagenum" id="Page_179">[179]</span> +valuable to the Allies as an adjunct and +agency of propaganda in enemy countries +than were the Czech and Jugo-Slav Committees, +might extend the basis of its representation, +so as to secure more unanimous +support from the various sections of Polish +opinion. The Committee adopted, and submitted +to the approval of the Conference, +the following resolution and recommendation. +It proposed to communicate the recommendation +to the Polish National Committee:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"> + +<p>“The Conference records its conviction +that the creation of a united +and independent Polish State, with free +access to the sea, is an essential requirement +of lasting peace in Europe, +and expresses the belief that the more +closely the frontiers of this future Polish +State follow ethnographical lines, the +stronger will it be to play its part in +safeguarding that peace, and the more +harmonious will be its relations with +neighbouring peoples which, like the +Poles, are striving to secure a free +existence.</p> + +<p>“The Conference, anxious that +Allied propaganda may truly express +the desires of the Polish people, as a +whole, and may tend to promote its<span class="pagenum" id="Page_180">[180]</span> +welfare, expresses the hope that the +Polish National Council may extend the +basis of its representation so as to be +in a position to lend still further aid to +Allied Propaganda in enemy countries.”</p> +</div> + +<p>On the question of Alsace-Lorraine, the +Committee found itself in entire agreement +with its Chairman’s declaration that the +return of the two provinces to France was +an imperative demand of international justice +and not a concession to be made by the +Allies to French national feeling. The +undoing of the flagrant wrong done by +Germany in 1871 was so clearly a condition +of any just peace that it required no further +demonstration; quite apart from the +historical justification of the French claim +to the reincorporation of these provinces in +France by their disannexation from Germany, +the title of the people of Alsace-Lorraine to +determine their own allegiance proceeded +from their voluntary adhesion to France in +1790, no less than from the protests of their +elected representatives against the Treaty of +Frankfurt in the French National Assembly +at Bordeaux in 1871, and in the German +Reichstag in 1874. In regard to Alsace-Lorraine, +the Committee was convinced that +Allied Propaganda in Germany should make<span class="pagenum" id="Page_181">[181]</span> +known to the German people the determination +of the Allies to insist in all circumstances +upon this vindication of rights.</p> + +<p>Consequently it adopted the following +resolutions:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"> + +<p>1. Propaganda on the subject of +Alsace-Lorraine should be unified and +conducted on general lines indicated by +France.</p> + +<p>2. The argument to which first place +should always be given is that of outraged +right and of the will of the +inhabitants as expressed in their solemn +and repeated protests.</p> + +<p>3. The question of Alsace-Lorraine +is a question of international right, the +solution of which interests the whole +world.</p> +</div> + +<p>As to propaganda addressed to the German +people themselves in regard to the future +position of Germany, the Committee was in +full agreement with the policy recommended +by Lord Northcliffe with the approval of the +British Government and summarised in his +opening statements. It believed that Allied +propaganda should make it clear that the +chief object of the Allies was the changing of +Germany, not the destruction of the German<span class="pagenum" id="Page_182">[182]</span> +people; and that the German people could +hope for an adequate position in the world, +and for admission into a future society of +nations, when they had qualified themselves +for partnership with civilised communities +by making the necessary reparations and +restorations (primarily in the case of Belgium) +by overthrowing the system known as +Prussian militarism, and when they had +effectively abandoned all designs of mastery +over Europe. At the same time, the Committee +laid stress upon the importance of +bringing home to the German people a sense +of the economic pressure which the Allies, +and above all the United States of America, +were in a position to exercise, and would +exercise, until the conditions of a just peace +were accepted.</p> + +<p>To this end the Committee strongly urged +that, in the various Allied countries and in +the United States, a comprehensive scheme +of world organisation be studied and worked +out, and that, in particular, the steps already +taken to co-ordinate the economic policy of +the Allies and of the United States be +publicly explained and brought to the knowledge +of the Germans. The Committee, +therefore, adopted and recommended to the +Conference the following resolution:</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_183">[183]</span></p> + +<div class="blockquot"> + +<p>“In consideration of the fact that the +Allied Governments have in their own +respective fields of action and by their +joint action begun to give effect to +economic co-operation, which is to-day +a powerful instrument of war, and which +may, after the war, serve as a basis +for the systematic organisation of the +resources of the world:</p> + +<p>“The Conference expresses its +satisfaction with the results already +attained and believes that it would be +expedient to make plain to enemy public +opinion, by means of a service of information, +which would set forth both +the principles of Allied economic action +and their results as worked out in daily +practice, the gravity of the danger by +which the enemy is threatened, and the +advantages assured to those who are +admitted to co-operation with the Allies.”</p> +</div> + +<p>The Committee adopted the following +resolution:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"> + +<p>“That in view of the great importance +of co-ordinating the Allies’ policies and +organisations for the conduct of +propaganda in enemy countries, a +permanent body be constituted for this +purpose;</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_184">[184]</span></p> + +<p>“That this body consist of four members, +representing respectively the four +propaganda departments which have +taken part in this Conference; each +member having the power to nominate +an assistant or a substitute, or both, if +necessary;</p> + +<p>“That the provisional headquarters +of the body shall be at Crewe House, +London, until permanent headquarters +be determined;</p> + +<p>“That the establishment expenses be +shared equally between the four Governments; +and that a permanent secretariat +be appointed thereto.”</p> +</div> + +<p>In adhering to this resolution, and in +deciding that it be recommended for adoption +by the Allied Governments and by the +United States, the Policy Committee had +been influenced especially by the hope that +the proposed arrangement might expedite +the co-ordination of Allied propaganda policy, +facilitate the preparation of concordant +declarations by the Allied Governments at +suitable moments, and assist in the proper +organisation of congresses.</p> + +<p>The discussions of the Distribution Committee +were exceedingly interesting and +fruitful. They ranged over the whole field<span class="pagenum" id="Page_185">[185]</span> +of propaganda effort, and the Committee’s +report summarised the means of distribution +of propaganda in use and assessed their +respective values. So far as military means +were concerned, it was found that the +Italians employed aeroplanes, projectiles, and +contact patrols; the French, aeroplanes, +projectiles, and balloons; the British, only +balloons on the Western Front, but aeroplanes +in the East; and that seaplanes +might be employed to reach special objectives +in the Mediterranean. Each country gave +favourable reports on the methods they +employed, but all were agreed that a constant +exchange of information as to results was +required. In certain cases, such as the +mountainous Italian Front, where very +limited targets had to be reached, the +dropping of propaganda in bulk was +necessary; but in most cases methods that +secured a wide scattering of the leaflets, so +that those might be secured and hidden by +individuals, were necessary. The French +explained a device, in its experimental stage, +to secure an automatic scattering from aeroplanes. +The “releases” of English balloons +were agreed to produce a most adequate +scattering. Various devices employed in +projectiles were successful in the case of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_186">[186]</span> +leaflets when the angle of projection was +high and the wind was favourable, but +hitherto had not been successful with pamphlets. +It was recognised that aeroplanes +were the best means of reaching distant +targets with accuracy; that for shorter +distances, from a few hundred yards up to +ten miles, projectiles would secure great +accuracy.</p> + +<p>With regard to range, it was recognised +that aeroplanes had the widest limits, and +the scattering of literature in Berlin by the +French and in Vienna by the Italians was +considered an accomplishment of great +brilliancy and promise of usefulness, and +that the types of paper balloons in use +were thoroughly effective for ranges up +to twenty or thirty miles, and with less +certainty of aim up to 100 or 150 miles; +but that with larger balloons (such as the +fabric balloons in the possession of the +English, or the new larger “doped” paper +balloons then being prepared in England, or +the reinforced paper balloons being experimented +with in France) the distances could +be increased to several hundred miles.</p> + +<p>As to the bulk that could be distributed, +it was stated that each of the standard +balloons, then used by the English and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_187">[187]</span> +French, carried 4 lb. 2 oz. of literature, and +that projectiles could take from a few +ounces up to 8 or 9 lb. The large fabric +balloons then available at G.H.Q. could +carry up to 15 lb.</p> + +<p>It was recognised that there were no +objections to the use of balloons, as the +operations did not interfere with other work +and did not excite retaliation from the +enemy. The use of projectiles was apt to +provoke retaliation unless it were carried out +at night or to a limited extent. There was +difference of experience and opinion with +regard to the use of aeroplanes. The +Italians and French stated that no action +had been taken by the enemy in the case of +their airmen who had been captured, and +that they found no difficulty in imposing +this duty on their airmen. The British, +however, stated that the Germans had taken +strong measures, and had threatened their +continuance, against airmen captured after +distributing leaflets. The representative of +the British Air Ministry stated that, after +giving full consideration to the matter, and +notwithstanding their appreciation of the +value of propaganda, they were opposed to +the use of aeroplanes for this purpose, +partly on the ground of the bad psychological<span class="pagenum" id="Page_188">[188]</span> +effect of such work on young pilots and +aviators and partly because the supply of +trained men and of machines was no more +than sufficient for the direct purposes of this +arm of the Forces. The representative of +G.H.Q., France, said that the British Army +had accepted this view. He added that +balloons could be employed on the Western +Front three days a week on the average, and +that there was no mechanical reason why +the method by balloons could not be increased +to meet every reasonable requirement.</p> + +<p>A French representative in the course of +a discussion as to the utility of throwing some +leaflets in bombing expeditions, reported the +opinion of a well-known pro-ally German +citizen that in the case of the Rhine towns +and rich cities of Germany the propaganda +of fear, that is to say, the actual dropping +of bombs, was more useful than the dropping +of literature.</p> + +<p>It was agreed that the suggested use of +aeroplanes to scatter leaflets at great heights +parallel with the enemy lines encountered +most of the objections to, and none of the +dangers of, their direct use by crossing the +lines. A device which had been worked +out experimentally in England, but was not +employed because of the danger it might<span class="pagenum" id="Page_189">[189]</span> +occasion to aeroplanes, was explained and +the apparatus shown. It consisted in sending +up leaflets to be liberated at the necessary +height for wind driftage by means of a +messenger travelling up and down the cable +of a box kite. This means was recognised +to be cheap and efficient for employment +where it would not be dangerous to aeroplanes.</p> + +<p>The Committee agreed that the regular +exchange of information as to methods employed +by the Allies, and as to the results +actually obtained by these, would be of +great value, and recommended that a permanent +bureau should be established to +collect and exchange such information and +reports.</p> + +<p>As regards civil means of distribution, the +Committee recommended that increased +attention be paid to the insertion of news +and articles in neutral organs which were +either read or quoted in the enemy countries. +Special stress was laid on the importance of +establishing effective relations with organs +which had a reputation for strict neutrality +or pro-enemy bias.</p> + +<p>The Committee also recommended that each +Power should seek through its agencies to +establish channels through which enemy +newspaper correspondents could be influenced<span class="pagenum" id="Page_190">[190]</span> +or provided with information. The +task of approaching all sufficiently important +correspondents with whom contact had not +been established should be apportioned +among the agencies of the Powers according +to the opportunities of approach available. +Channels created under a scheme of this +kind should be made mutually available to +the respective Allied agents in the localities +concerned.</p> + +<p>Having regard to the extent to which the +ordinary book trade channels into Germany +were still operating, the Committee recommended +the publication in neutral countries +of works which, though not directly bearing +on the issues of the war, were expressly +calculated to educate enemy opinion in a +democratic sense. The Committee held that, +in view of its great utility, clandestine +circulation in the enemy countries of +carefully-chosen literature, especially if +actually written by enemy subjects of pro-Ally +or revolutionary tendencies, should +be secured through every available channel. +In view of the precarious and delicate nature +of this work, the Committee desired specially +to emphasise the necessity of seeking out and +developing new channels for distribution of +this kind.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_191">[191]</span></p> + +<p>The main part of the time which the +Committee on Material gave to the discussion +of its subject was devoted to the question +of the most effective forms of propaganda +and to the special methods desirable for +putting these forms into practice. There +was general agreement that the best way +to depress the <i>moral</i> of the German troops +and the German population was to show +them that it was against their interest to +continue the war; that the longer they +went on the worse they would fare both +during the war and after; and that their +only hope of regaining their place in the +community of nations lay in throwing over +the bad advisers who had led them into the +war, and whose repeated promises of success +had been one after the other falsified. +Thereto the Germans had always had a hope +before them. They were taught to hope +for great advantage from the downfall of +Russia, from the unrestricted U-boat warfare, +from the last offensive on the Western +Front. For the first time their leaders did +not know what hope to dangle before them. +Therefore, the moment was one peculiarly +favourable for propaganda if undertaken +upon the right lines.</p> + +<p>It appeared to the Committee that the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_192">[192]</span> +best lines upon which to work would be to +emphasise as much as possible the great +American effort, both in the field and at +home in the factory, the shipyard, and the +farm. At the same time the dark commercial +outlook for Germans, the dangers +lying latent for them in the control of raw +materials by the Allies, the discovery of so +many of their trade secrets, and the building +up in France, Italy, England, and the +United States of industries in which they +had almost a monopoly before the war +ought also to be brought as vividly as +possible before them. They should be told +the truth about the food situation in France +and England, which so far had been kept from +them. They should be given news as quickly +as possible of Allied successes. They should +be depressed as much as possible, yet at the +same time care should be taken not to let +them think they were for ever excluded from +relations of business and friendship with the +peoples then fighting against them. If they +were made to believe this, their backs +would be stiffened to fight on desperately as +long as possible. A sound line of propaganda, +the Committee considered, would be to +leave open a doorway through which if they +got rid of Pan-Germanism and renounced its +theories of world domination by blood and +iron they would in time be admitted again +to the same intercourse as before. It was +agreed that for soldiers the most elementary +propaganda was the best. More elaborate +arguments and demonstrations should be +kept for pamphlets to be smuggled into +Germany and for articles in neutral papers. +Use should be made wherever possible of +diagrams appealing instantly to the eye.</p> + + + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_193">[193]</span></p> + +<p>A long discussion took place on the question +of revolutionary propaganda. The opinion +was expressed that it was better to denounce +the Pan-German party generally and throw +upon them the responsibility for the war and +for all the misfortunes which Germany had +suffered and would still further suffer from +it, rather than to attack the Emperor. +On the other hand, it was pointed out that +attacks on an individual are always more +effective than attacks on a party. Finally, +it was agreed that anything said against the +Hohenzollern dynasty should be taken, either +in reality or in appearance, from German +sources, so as to avoid the risk that attacks +clearly emanating from Allied sources might +strengthen rather than weaken the Emperor’s +hold upon the people of Germany. While +a good deal of material was available from<span class="pagenum" id="Page_194">[194]</span> +German anti-Imperial sources, it was +suggested that the advantage of circulating, +for example, speeches of Socialists, might +be counterbalanced by the disadvantage that +it would make such speakers less inclined to +talk. Some Socialists had appealed to the +French Government not to use their speeches +for propaganda, because this weakened their +efforts. It was agreed that incitements to +German soldiers to desert were legitimate +and might be useful. The sending into +Germany of photographs of prisoners of war +taken immediately after their capture, when +they were usually in a deplorable condition, +and after two months of captivity, when +their physical condition was good, was +recommended.</p> + +<p>With regard to Austria-Hungary, the Committee +discussed whether it was illegitimate +to exploit the land hunger among the Magyar +peasants and the discontent among the +German proletariat. It was agreed that it +would do no harm to support the agrarian +agitators in Hungary, but, as regards Bolshevik +propaganda among the Austro-German +working classes, that the Allies ought only +to circulate their own literature. It was +suggested that the United States, in mobilising +its Slav elements, might spare members<span class="pagenum" id="Page_195">[195]</span> +of each of the Slav nationalities for propaganda +work in England and in France.</p> + +<p>Propaganda in Bulgaria depended on the +policy which the Entente Powers and the +United States decided to follow with regard +to that country. Until such a policy was +settled little could be done in a large way. +It was useful, however, to make the Bulgarians +acquainted with a number of facts +of which they were ignorant, as for example, +the failure of U-boats to reduce England to +the verge of starvation, the large number of +American troops already in France, and so on. +Leaflets on these and other topics were being +dropped regularly by aeroplanes on the +Salonica front in considerable quantities. +A good deal, it was suggested, could be done +through Bulgars in Switzerland. But so +long as the Bulgarians believed that the +United States was their friend and would +see them through whatever happened, little +impression could be made upon them.</p> + +<p>With regard to co-operation between the +various bodies engaged in propaganda, it was +proposed that closer relations should be +established between the local agents of the +Allied Powers in neutral countries; that +they should meet from time to time to +exchange ideas and to give each other full<span class="pagenum" id="Page_196">[196]</span> +information as to their activities. Special +stress was laid upon the necessity of these +local agents working in union with the +diplomatic and military representatives and +with any other agencies engaged in the same +kind of work. The Committee unanimously +accepted this suggestion, with the proviso +that the local agents should, if possible, be +under the direction of the Central Committee, +to which they could refer for instructions and +advice. Pending the establishment of such +a central body, arrangements were made for +the various Propaganda Departments to +begin at once to exchange information about +all that they were doing and that each should +send out copies of all the material produced +by it to the other departments. It was, of +course, agreed that such circulation of +material produced would be one of the chief +activities of the proposed central body, which +would do it with greater rapidity and effect.</p> + +<p>It was also agreed that such a central +body could be most useful in employing +methods for testing the effectiveness of +propaganda. The means of doing this were +generally admitted to be defective. Only +by co-ordinating effort and by comparing +information could they be improved. It +was decided that the existing system of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_197">[197]</span> +examining prisoners of war for purposes of +military information ought to be supplemented +by a special further examination for +the purposes of propaganda information, +and it was suggested that special representatives +of the Enemy Propaganda Departments +should be allowed to conduct such examinations.</p> + +<p>Some important points connected with +propaganda brought to bear upon Germany +through neutral countries were raised, and +it was agreed that the work of controlling +and distributing films for moving picture +theatres, which was to be done by an Inter-Allied +Commission in Switzerland, ought to +be extended to other neutral countries, +especially Sweden. Information before the +Committee bore testimony that German-owned +picture theatres had of late increased +very much in number both in Switzerland +and in Scandinavia, and that these relied +for the lighter part of their entertainments +upon films from Allied countries, Germany +supplying special propaganda films. By controlling +the supply of films from Allied +countries, the activity of these theatres +could be very much diminished and possibly +brought to an end.</p> + +<p>It was also agreed that it would be advisable<span class="pagenum" id="Page_198">[198]</span> +to invite a number of neutral editors +and newspaper writers to pay a visit to +the United States. It was considered that +articles describing what they saw and what +they were able to judge of the feeling of the +American nation would have a very useful +effect upon German opinion.</p> + +<p>With a view to influencing German opinion, +it was agreed that more news agencies, to all +appearance independent and self-supporting, +might well be established in other neutral +countries; that more efforts should be made +to get articles inserted in enemy newspapers, +not controversial articles, but statements of +what the Allies were doing, especially in the +economic field, written as a German might +write them who was anxious about the +future of his country; and that dispatch of +Allied newspapers to neutral countries should +be improved and extended so that there +might be more chance of their finding their +way into Germany.</p> + +<p>The discussions of the Prisoners of War +Committee showed that agreement existed +as to the soundness of the methods adopted +by Crewe House for this particular work, +and the report took the form of a recommendation +that they should be generally +adopted by the Allies.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_199">[199]</span></p> + +<p>At the final plenary session of the +Conference, on August 17, 1918, it was +unanimously resolved that the Committees’ +reports should be accepted, and submitted +by the heads of the four Missions to their +respective Governments for their approval +and adoption. The Conference resolved to +constitute (as suggested by the Policy Committee) +a permanent inter-Allied body for +the conduct of propaganda in enemy countries +and by so doing made a great advance. +In order to maintain close touch with +the French propaganda authorities, Lord +Northcliffe appointed Colonel Lord Onslow +as resident representative of Crewe House +in Paris. By the time the Armistice was +signed the different Governments had +nominated their delegates to the permanent +Inter-Allied body and all the necessary preliminary +arrangements had been satisfactorily +made. This organisation would have opened +a new chapter in the history of war propaganda +but for the conclusion of hostilities. +As Lord Northcliffe said in his final speech +to the Conference, the constitution of a permanent +Inter-Allied body was a step towards +that general co-ordination of Allied purpose +and organisation which the experience of the +war had proved to be a postulate of rapidity<span class="pagenum" id="Page_200">[200]</span> +and efficiency of action. The work of the +Conference itself, however, was invaluable +as it surveyed the policy and organisation of +propaganda against the enemy in all its +phases and from many points of view at a +time when propaganda had just passed into +the intensive stage. Its reports in themselves +form a text-book in the science and art +of propaganda.</p> + +<figure class="figcenter illowp100" id="i_p176c" style="max-width: 148.0625em;"> + <img class="w100" src="images/i_p176c.jpg" alt=""> + <figcaption class="caption">“DRIFTING DOWN IN WHITE SHOWERS”: LEAFLETS (INSTEAD OF BOMBS), FROM ITALIAN +AEROPLANE SQUADRON, DROPPING ON VIENNA—AN AIR PHOTOGRAPH.<br> +<i>Photograph supplied by the Photographic Studios of the Italian Air Service. +By kind permission of the “Illustrated London News.”</i></figcaption> +</figure> + + +<div class="column"><figure class="figcenter illowp80" id="i_p176a" style="max-width: 100%"> + <img class="w100" src="images/i_p176a.jpg" alt=""> + <figcaption class="caption">MR. ROBERT DONALD.<br> +MEMBER OF THE ENEMY PROPAGANDA COMMITTEE.<br> +<i>Photo: Elliott & Fry, Ltd.</i></figcaption> +</figure></div> + +<div class="column"><figure class="figcenter illowp80" id="i_p192a" style="max-width: 100%;"> + <img class="w100" src="images/i_p192a.jpg" alt=""> + <figcaption class="caption">SIR SIDNEY LOW.<br> +MEMBER OF THE ENEMY PROPAGANDA COMMITTEE<br> +<i>Photo: Elliott & Fry. Ltd</i></figcaption> +</figure></div> + +<div class="column"><figure class="figcenter illowp80" id="i_p192d" style="max-width: 100%;"> + <img class="w100" src="images/i_p192d.jpg" alt=""> + <figcaption class="caption">MR. JAMES O’GRADY, M.P.<br> +MEMBER OF THE ENEMY PROPAGANDA COMMITTEE.</figcaption> +</figure></div> + + + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> + +<div class="chapter"> +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_201">[201]</span></p> + +<h2 class="nobreak" id="CHAPTER_VIII">CHAPTER VIII<br> +<span class="fs80">FROM WAR PROPAGANDA TO +PEACE PROPAGANDA</span> +</h2> +</div> + + + + + +<p class="sub">The Co-ordination of British Policy—A representative committee—Lord +Northcliffe’s Article: “From War to Peace.”</p> + + + +<p>In addition to its success in its practical +bearing and direct influence on the work of +spreading the truth concerning the war in the +enemy countries, the Inter-Allied Conference +at Crewe House in August, 1918, was a +distinctly useful act of propaganda in two +other directions. First, it led to a mutual +appreciation, among the influential representatives +of the four countries, of the effort +and determination of each nation and of their +willingness to combine to achieve victory—in +other words, to a better understanding of +each other’s will to conquer and readiness +to subordinate self-interest to the larger +object of Allied accomplishment of purpose.</p> + +<p>In the second place, the Conference was an +object-lesson to the British Government Departments +which participated in it as to the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_202">[202]</span> +value of concerted and co-ordinated action +in propaganda matters. Shortly afterwards, +a suggestion was made by an influential +representative of one of these Departments +that a committee should be formed to +represent all British departments concerned +in any way with propaganda. Moreover, it +gradually became evident to all concerned +that the collapse of Bulgaria was the beginning +of the end, and that “war propaganda” +must by a process of steady evolution +become “peace-terms propaganda,” by which +public opinion in enemy countries as well +as at home, in the Dominions, and in Allied +and neutral countries, might be made accustomed +to the peace which the Allies +intended to make. The maintenance of +British prestige demanded that our position +in regard to the peace should be explained +and justified by the widespread dissemination +of news and views, both before and during +the Peace Conference.</p> + +<p>Thus it was more than ever imperative +that all British propagandists should speak +with one voice. Here then was work ready +to be done by the suggested inter-departmental +committee, for the formation of which +invitations had already been issued to the +departments concerned to send as delegates<span class="pagenum" id="Page_203">[203]</span> +to this Committee responsible officials able +to give decisions for their departments on +such matters as would be discussed by such +a committee. These invitations were accepted +by:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"> +<p> +The War Cabinet,<br> +The Admiralty,<br> +The War Office,<br> +The Foreign Office,<br> +The Treasury,<br> +The Ministry of Information,<br> +The Air Ministry,<br> +The Colonial Office,<br> +The India Office,<br> +The War Aims Committee, and<br> +The Official Press Bureau.<br> +</p> +</div> + +<p>Representatives of these departments and +of Lord Northcliffe’s department, which, +for official purposes, had been renamed The +British War Mission, thus formed what was +known as the Policy Committee of the +British War Mission.</p> + +<p>While this Committee was in process of +formation, Crewe House had been studying +the problems of “peace-terms propaganda” +and had, as a result of a series of conferences, +prepared a memorandum outlining a basis +upon which such propaganda could be +developed.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_204">[204]</span></p> + +<p>The first meeting of the Policy Committee +was held at Crewe House on October 4, 1918, +and I presided in the absence, through +indisposition, of Lord Northcliffe. After +giving a summarised account of the work +carried on from Crewe House, I said that +whatever results it had been possible to +achieve had proceeded mainly from the +circumstance that it had in each case been +based upon definite policies in regard to the +countries concerned. These policies had all +been submitted to, and had received the +approval of, the British Government. The +advantages of this procedure were obvious. +It enabled propagandists to work on consistent +lines without fear that the representations +they made to the enemy would be +contradicted by actual occurrences. In this +way, propaganda representations had a cumulative +effect. If, for instance, enemy troops +were at first inclined to regard representations +with scepticism, they were gradually convinced +by the force of events that they had +been told the truth from the outset, and that +consequently subsequent representations +deserved serious attention. Another advantage +had proceeded from the obvious +circumstance that as Allied policy must +correspond to the aims which the Allies<span class="pagenum" id="Page_205">[205]</span> +were determined to secure at the peace, +the representation of that policy to propaganda +was in harmony with the war aims of +the Allies, and was strengthened by every +successive declaration by Allied statesmen +of the objects for which they were fighting. +A third advantage was that the propaganda +of the enemy could not destroy the effects of +our propaganda without having gained such +military successes as to render the Allied +war aims themselves unattainable. Consequently +every Allied victory that brought the +war aims nearer attainment enhanced also +the efficacy of propaganda.</p> + +<p>At the outset, the efforts made by Crewe +House were naturally tentative and experimental. +Their real value could only be +proved by the test of experience. This +test had been applied in Austria-Hungary, +Bulgaria, and Germany. As against Austria-Hungary, +Crewe House propaganda contributed +to the defeat of the Austrians on +the Piave in June, and had its efforts not +been thwarted by political short-sightedness +and some personal intrigue on the part of +various Italian authorities, it was certain that +much greater headway would have been +made and that the Italian armies would +have been in a much more favourable<span class="pagenum" id="Page_206">[206]</span> +position. As it was, the policy of liberating +the Austro-Hungarian subject races, upon +which propaganda had been based, had +already had a marked effect in the interior +of the Dual Monarchy, and had brought large +sections of the inhabitants to the point of +revolt. This would be clear when it was +said that the Italo-Jugo-Slav Agreement of +March, 1918, the Rome Congress of the +Hapsburg Subject Races of April, with its +sequel in the declarations by the Allies and +the United States to the Poles, Czecho-Slovaks +and Southern Slavs, as well as the +actual recognition of the Czecho-Slovaks and +the prospective recognition of the Jugo-Slavs +as Allied and belligerent nations, had all been +influenced, if not directly promoted, by the +efforts of Crewe House.</p> + +<p>As regards Bulgaria, Crewe House +definitely rejected Bulgarian overtures until +there should be a complete reversal of +Bulgarian policy. That reversal had taken +place, and had opened up further prospects +of propaganda against Austria-Hungary of +which speedy advantage was being taken.</p> + +<p>The work in Germany had been positive +and negative. Its aim had been to give the +German people something to hope for and +much to fear—in other words, to make it<span class="pagenum" id="Page_207">[207]</span> +clear to them that the only way to escape +complete ruin would be to break with the +system that brought the war upon Europe, +and to qualify for admission into a League +of Nations on the Allied terms. In addition +to these educative efforts, we had supplied +the enemy armies with constant and invariably +truthful information about the +actual military position. The news which +the German military authorities were withholding +from their troops had been supplied +by us. Hence their cries of alarm. Nevertheless, +much remained to be done in the +co-ordination of the efforts of all Government +Departments so as to make the general +work of propaganda as rapid and as efficient +as possible. Much use had unfortunately +deprived the term “propaganda” of its real +meaning. In its true sense it meant the +education of the enemy to a knowledge of +what kind of world the Allies meant to +create, and of the place reserved in it for +enemy peoples according as they assisted in, +or continued to resist, its creation. It implied +also the dissemination of this knowledge +among the Allied peoples, so that there +might be full popular support for Allied +policy and no tendency at the critical moment +of peace to sacrifice any essential feature of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_208">[208]</span> +the settlement because its importance might +not have been explained or understood in +time. Next to the actual work of fighting +the enemy on land and sea, there was no +more important work than this; and the +joint intelligence and energy of all Departments +of the Government were required to +accomplish it successfully. For this reason +the suggestion that this council of representatives +of the Government Departments +chiefly concerned should be formed had +been warmly welcomed, in order that there +might be less dispersion of effort, less overlapping, +and greater mutual comprehension +of the work which each Department was +striving to do, and fuller co-ordination in the +direction of all those efforts to one single end.</p> + + + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_209">[209]</span></p> + +<p>As the war approached its end, enemy +propaganda must gradually pass into peace +offensives and counter-offensives. The British +War Mission therefore had already in +existence an organisation to collect and +collate various suggestions, territorial, +political, economic, and so forth, that had +been made by the different sections and +parties in Allied, neutral, and enemy +countries. A step in this direction was the +report on the Propaganda Library, issued by +the War Office early in 1917, by Captain +Chalmers Mitchell, who had since become the +liaison officer between the British War +Mission and the War Office, and who had +been asked to act as Secretary of the Policy +Committee. Captain Chalmers Mitchell +was in charge of the aforesaid organisation +at Crewe House, and although its immediate +function was to collect information useful +for propaganda, it was clear that it would +also obtain material useful to those who had +to shape peace policy. For propaganda to +the enemy was in a sense a forecast of +policy; it must be inspired by policy, but +at the same time its varying needs also +suggested policy.</p> + +<p>It was hoped, therefore, that this Policy +Committee might assist in furnishing materials +for the compilation of the various +peace proposals, in revising the collation +of them, in drawing inferences from them +and in discussing the action and reaction of +peace propaganda and peace policy that the +inferences suggested.</p> + +<p>The Committee decided to undertake the +following immediate activities:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"> + +<p>Study of Peace Terms.</p> + +<p>Study of utterances by important +enemy representatives to form decisions<span class="pagenum" id="Page_210">[210]</span> +as to what credence should be +given them and what response should +be made to them.</p> + +<p>Suggestion of statements to be made +by Allied representatives, and consideration +of their phraseology and substance.</p> + +<p>Special consideration of the reception +to be given to German statements as +to the course of democratisation in +Germany.</p> +</div> + +<p>At an emergency meeting of the Committee +summoned a few days later to draft a +statement of propaganda policy with +reference to the German Peace Note, Lord +Northcliffe said his department had prepared +for submission to the Committee a draft +statement, based on a consideration of +President Wilson’s pronouncements. After +various slight modifications had been made, +the statement was adopted in principle.</p> + +<p>In its final form it read:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"> + +<p>“In order to stop further bloodshed, the +German Government requests the immediate +conclusion of an armistice on land and +water and in the air.</p> + +<p>“The Note accepts the programme set +forth by the President of the United States +in his message to Congress of January 8th, +1918, and in his later pronouncements,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_211">[211]</span> +especially his speech of September 27th, as +a basis for peace negotiations.</p> + +<p>“In point of fact, the pronouncements of +President Wilson were a statement of attitude +made before the Brest-Litovsk treaty, and +enforcement of the peace of Bucharest on +Rumania, and the German statement of +their intentions at the outset of the Spring +offensive. They cannot, therefore, be understood +as a full recitation of the conditions of +peace.</p> + +<p>“The phrasing of the German acceptance +of them as a ‘basis for peace negotiations’ +covers every variety of interpretation from +sincere acceptance to that mere desire for +negotiations which is the inevitable consequence +of the existing military situation. +It is, therefore, impossible to grant any +armistice to Germany which does not give +the Entente full and acceptable guarantees +that the terms arranged will be complied with. +There must be a clear understanding that +Germany accepts certain principles as indisputable, +and reserves for negotiation only +such details as, in the opinion of the Associated +Powers, are negotiable.</p> + +<p>“In the full conviction of the power and +the will of the Associated Powers to enforce +a peace that shall be just and lasting, we<span class="pagenum" id="Page_212">[212]</span> +shall thankfully accept conclusive evidence +that the peoples of our present enemies are +willing to co-operate in the establishment of +such a peace. With the object of making +the conditions of such co-operation clear, we +take the opportunity, presented by the +German peace note, of exploring more fully +the ground covered by President Wilson’s +pronouncements and of distinguishing +explicitly between principles and conditions +that must be accepted as indisputable, and +terms and details that may be the subject of +negotiation.</p> + +<p>“The following conditions are indisputable:—</p> + +<p>“<i>In no sense whatever shall restoration or +reparation in the case of Belgium be taken +into consideration when adjusting any other +claims arising from the war.</i></p> + +<p>“1. The complete restoration, territorial +and political, of Belgium. The assumption +by Germany of the full financial burden +involved in material restoration and reconstruction, +including the replacement of +machinery, the provision of war pensions +and adequate compensation for all civilian +losses and injuries, and the liquidation of all +Belgian war debts. In view of the circumstances +in which Germany invaded Belgium,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_213">[213]</span> +no allegations that Belgian civilians acted +against military law or imposed authority +shall be taken into consideration. The +future international status of Belgium shall +be settled in accordance with the wishes of +the Belgian nation.</p> + +<p>“2. The freeing of French territory, reconstruction +of the invaded provinces, compensation +for all civilian losses and injuries.</p> + +<p>“3. The restoration to France of Alsace-Lorraine, +not as a territorial acquisition or +part of a war indemnity, but as reparation +for the wrong done in 1871, when the inhabitants +of the two Provinces, whose +ancestors voluntarily chose French allegiance, +were incorporated in Germany against their +will.</p> + +<p>“4. Readjustment of the Northern +frontiers of Italy as nearly as possible +along the lines of nationality.</p> + +<p>“5. The assurance to all the peoples of +Austria-Hungary of their place amongst the +free nations of the world and of their right +to enter into union with their kindred +beyond the present boundaries of Austria-Hungary.</p> + +<p>“6. The evacuation of all Territory +formerly included in the boundaries of the +Russian Empire, the annulment of all treaties,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_214">[214]</span> +contracts, or agreements made with subjects, +agents, or representatives of Enemy Powers +since the Revolution and affecting territory +or interests formerly Russian, and co-operation +of the Associated Powers in securing +conditions under which the various +nationalities of the former Empire of Russia +shall determine their own form of Government.</p> + +<p>“7. The formation of an independent +Polish State with access to the Sea, which +State shall include the territories inhabited +by predominantly Polish populations, and +the indemnification of Poland by the Powers +responsible for the havoc wrought.</p> + +<p>“8. The abrogation of the Treaty of +Bucharest, the evacuation and restoration of +Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro, the +Associated Powers to aid the Balkan States +in settling finally the Balkan question on an +equitable basis.</p> + +<p>“9. The removal, so far as is practicable, +of Turkish dominion over all non-Turkish +peoples.</p> + +<p>“10. The people of Schleswig shall be free +to determine their own allegiance.</p> + +<p>“11. As reparation for the illegal submarine +warfare waged by Germany and +Austria-Hungary, these Powers shall be held<span class="pagenum" id="Page_215">[215]</span> +liable to replace the merchant tonnage belonging +to the Associated and Neutral nations +illegally damaged or destroyed.</p> + +<p>“12. The appointment of a tribunal before +which there shall be brought for impartial +justice individuals of any of the belligerents +accused of offences against the laws of +war or of humanity.</p> + +<p>“13. The former Colonial possessions of +Germany lost by her in consequence of her +illegal aggression against Belgium shall in no +case be returned to Germany.</p> + +<p>“The following conditions of Peace are +negotiable:</p> + +<p>“1. The adjustment of claims for damage +necessarily arising from the operations of +war, and not included amongst the indisputable +conditions.</p> + +<p>“2. The establishment, constitution, and +conditions of Membership of a League of +Free Nations for the purpose of preventing +future wars, and improving international +relations.</p> + +<p>“3. The League of Free Nations shall be +inspired by the resolve of the Associated +Powers to create a world in which, when the +conditions of the Peace have been carried out, +there shall be opportunity and security for +the legitimate development of all the Peoples.”</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_216">[216]</span></p> +</div> + +<p>This was approved by a representative of +the Government, designated <i>ad hoc</i>, for +unofficial use as propaganda policy. Each +department adapted it to its own needs. So +far as Crewe House was concerned, effective +use was made of it on two occasions—the +first being when Lord Northcliffe, at the +suggestion of the Enemy Propaganda Committee, +dealt with the subject of peace +terms in an address to United States officers +at the “Washington Inn,” London, on +October 22, 1918.</p> + +<p>At a meeting of the Policy Committee at +Crewe House on October 28, the action of the +various departments on the memorandum +was stated and approved.</p> + +<p>The Crewe House Committee reported +first as to Lord Northcliffe’s address at the +Washington Inn; next that the production +department of the Enemy Propaganda Committee +was engaged on a series of pamphlets +and leaflets dealing with different points of +the terms; third, that a reasoned statement +covering the whole ground, and showing +what Germany had to gain in the end, was +being drafted for publication, the idea being +that it should appear as an article or as a +speech to which wide circulation would be +given; and lastly that the secretary of the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_217">[217]</span> +permanent Inter-Allied Body for Propaganda +in Enemy Countries had written to the +French, Italian, and American members of +that body enclosing a copy of the Peace +Policy Memorandum and suggesting that +they should take action similar to that of +the British Policy Committee and bring the +subject up for discussion at the next meeting +of the Inter-Allied Body. (It may be +mentioned here that the rapid course of +events prevented the contemplated meeting +of the Inter-Allied Body.)</p> + +<p>That was the last meeting of the Policy +Committee. There remains to be set forth +the final result of its work. Crewe House, +as explained above, had stated its intention +of publishing an article covering the whole +ground of the memorandum in such a way +that the policy could be presented in the same +terms to our own people, to our Allies, and +to the enemy. It was found impracticable +to get such an article published quickly +enough in a high-class magazine, or to get an +immediate occasion for making it the text +of a speech. In these circumstances the +Committee asked their chairman, Viscount +Northcliffe, to give the Peace Policy the +wide publicity possible by the use of his +name and by the sources of distribution<span class="pagenum" id="Page_218">[218]</span> +which he was able to command. Lord +Northcliffe agreed, and accordingly produced +the article which follows and which was a +full statement of the agreed policy. He +arranged for its simultaneous publication in +the London Press and, at his own expense, +had it cabled to the remotest parts of the +world. As stated in the House of Commons +by the Financial Secretary to the Treasury, +the document was unofficial. Its purpose +was to form the basis of a policy of publicity +and the fact that it was proposed to elaborate +it for publication was announced beforehand, +and approved by the Policy Committee. +This is the text of the article from <i>The Times</i> +of November 4, 1918:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"> +<p class="center"> +FROM WAR TO PEACE<br> +<br> +By <span class="smcap">Lord Northcliffe</span><br> +</p> + +<p><i>This article is appearing to-day in the leading papers +in Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, +Newfoundland, India, the British Dependencies, United +States, South America, France, Italy, Spain, Switzerland, +Holland, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Japan and +elsewhere.</i></p> + +<p><i>It will be circulated in Germany during the present +week.</i></p> + +<p>Now that peace is at last in sight, I hear the question +being asked on all sides: “How are we to pass from +war conditions to peace conditions?” This cannot +be done by a sudden and dramatic declaration like<span class="pagenum" id="Page_219">[219]</span> +the declaration which in August, 1914, changed peace +into war. It must be a slow and laborious process—a +process with, as it seems to me, at least three distinct +and successive stages. Out of these stages will be +formed the organic whole which will constitute the +machinery for replacing war conditions by peace +conditions.</p> + +<p>It is important to get these three stages clearly +outlined in our imaginations, and it is important +also to bear in mind that each stage will smooth the +path for its successor precisely in proportion to the +sincerity and thoroughness with which it has been +completed. There is but one goal for those who are +honest and far-seeing. That goal is to create a condition +of the world in which there shall be opportunity +and security for the legitimate development of all +Peoples. The road is long and difficult, but I believe +that its course is already clear enough to be described, +in the same words, to those who are our friends and +to those who are now our enemies.</p> + +<p class="center"> +I<br> +</p> + +<p>The first stage is the cessation of hostilities. Here, +whether they cease on account of an armistice or by +reason of surrender, there can be no question as to the +“Honour” of the German people, or as to any adjustment +of the conditions to any supposed strategical or +actual strength of the Central Powers.</p> + +<p>If they feel humiliated, they must blame those who +brought humiliation upon them; and as to military +strength, the semi-official organ of the German Government, +the <i>Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung</i>, has admitted +that our reserves are such as Germany cannot +compete with.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_220">[220]</span></p> + +<p>It is clear [said this newspaper on October 12] +that if we systematically continued the war in this +way, fighting might go on for a long time. The +annihilation of the German Army is still a long way +from attainment; we still have a quantity of unspent +forces at our command in the recruit depôts behind +the front, in the reserve battalions, and at home. But +<i>doubtless there are certain limits to all this on our side, +whereas our enemies—chiefly America—are in a position +to replace men and materials on an ever-increasing scale</i>.</p> + +<p>Another equally important admission I found in +the <i>Münchner Neueste Nachrichten</i>, the leading South-German +organ, on October 25.</p> + +<p>A German retreat beyond the frontier [this journal +said] and especially an advance by the enemy to the +frontier, would render the German situation much +worse, as it would expose Germany’s industrial territory +to the Entente’s artillery fire, and particularly +their air attacks, while the danger to the enemy’s +industrial districts would be correspondingly removed. +<i>This condition alone would not only secure the enemy’s +military preponderance, but would increase it.</i></p> + +<p>Thus it is clear that Germany, deprived now of the +help of her allies, recognises her hopeless situation. +The conditions upon which hostilities can cease must +be laid down by the military and naval leaders of the +Associated Powers and accepted by the Central Powers +in such form that no resumption of hostilities is possible.</p> + +<p>And this I will say: The spirit in which Germany +accepts these stern and necessary conditions will do +much to determine the course of future events. If +she haggles over the conditions, or is sullen and obstructive +in her mode of carrying them out, then +our profound distrust of her spirit and motives will<span class="pagenum" id="Page_221">[221]</span> +survive into the subsequent stages and still further +delay that re-establishment of tolerable relations +which must be our object. But if Germany by word +and deed makes plain her abandonment of that belief +in Might which her rulers, supported until recently +by the majority of her people, have used as a menace +to the power of Right, the greatest obstacle in the +path of equal justice will have been removed.</p> + +<p>By a stroke of the pen, in accepting the conditions +of armistice, or by a mere gesture of unconditional +surrender, Germany can cause fighting to cease. +Naturally, the business of evacuation and of reoccupation +will have to be conducted by concert +between the military and naval leaders. The first +governing condition in these operations and detailed +arrangements will be the safety of the peace. The +second condition will be the security of civilian life +and property. The emotional background to all this +will be a daily increasing desire on the part of all to +get back to normal conditions of life. Co-operation and +agreement will be required, not so much to secure that +demobilisation and disarmament shall be forced +sternly on those who have surrendered as to secure +that each side takes its fair share in the burden of +maintaining order and in facilitating the change from +military to civilian organisation.</p> + +<p class="center"> +II<br> +</p> + +<p>The second stage of the passage from war conditions +to peace conditions will begin as soon as it is certain +that security has been obtained for the permanence +of the first stage. It will consist in the acceptance by +Germany of certain principles as indisputable. The +security provided in the first stage ought to be sufficient<span class="pagenum" id="Page_222">[222]</span> +to enable us to pass through the second stage quickly. +With sufficient guarantees there need be no waiting +to see whether the transformation of the German +Government from irresponsible autocracy to responsible +democracy is as genuine as it is represented to be, or +whether the changed professions of those who speak +for the People represent a change of heart.</p> + +<p>The indisputable principles which Germany must +accept in this second stage have been stated in different +forms at different times, but the consensus of opinion +amongst all classes of the Associated Powers seems to +me to be so clear that it is not difficult to state them +objectively in a form very close to that which they +are likely to assume in their final enunciation.</p> + +<p>The first is the complete restoration, territorial, +economic, and political, of Belgium. In this there +can be no reservation, no bargaining, no attempt to +raise counter-claims or offsets of any kind. By her +initial violation of International Law, and by her +subsequent treatment of Belgium, Germany has +forfeited all right to discussion. Reparation is impossible, +but she must undertake restoration in such +form and measure as shall be indicated to her.</p> + +<p>2. The freeing of French territory, reconstruction +of the invaded provinces, compensation for all civilian +losses and injuries. Here again reparation in any full +sense of the word is beyond human power, but Germany +must accept the full burden of material reconstruction, +replacement, and compensation, again in such form and +measure as shall be laid down.</p> + +<p>3. The restoration to France of Alsace-Lorraine, +not as a territorial acquisition or part of a war indemnity, +but as reparation for the wrong done in +1871, when the inhabitants of the two provinces,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_223">[223]</span> +whose ancestors voluntarily chose French allegiance, +were incorporated in Germany against their will.</p> + +<p>4. Readjustment of the Northern Frontiers of +Italy as nearly as possible along the lines of nationality; +the Eastern and Adriatic frontiers to be determined in +accordance with the principles embodied in the Italo-Jugo-Slav +Agreement and ratified by the Rome Congress +of April, 1918.</p> + +<p>5. The assurance to all the peoples of Austria-Hungary +of their place amongst the free nations +of the world and of their right to enter into union +with their kindred beyond the present boundaries of +Austria-Hungary. This involves the creation of +independent Czecho-Slovak and Jugo-Slav States, +the reduction of Hungary to the ethnographic limits +of the Magyar race, and the union of all Rumanians +with the present kingdom of Rumania. In the same +way the Poles and Ukrainians of the Dual Monarchy +must be free to unite with their co-nationals across +existing frontiers, and it is obvious that the same right +of self-determination cannot be denied to the German +provinces of Austria, should they desire to enter +Germany as a federal unit.</p> + +<p>6. The evacuation of all territory formerly included +in the boundaries of the Russian Empire; the annulment +of all Russian treaties, contracts, or agreements +made with subjects, agents, or representatives of +Enemy Powers since the Revolution and affecting +territory or interests formerly Russian; and the unimpeded +co-operation of the Associated Powers in securing +conditions under which the various nationalities of the +former Empire of Russia shall determine their own +forms of government.</p> + +<p>When Russia offered a peace of reconciliation<span class="pagenum" id="Page_224">[224]</span> +without annexations or indemnities, the Central +Powers, taking advantage of the military position, +rejected all considerations of justice and imposed +terms that were brutal and selfish. Thus they forfeited +the right to aid Russia and the various nationalities +of the former Empire of Russia in their efforts +to establish self-determination and their own form of +government.</p> + +<p>The seventh indisputable principle concerns (<i>a</i>) the +formation of an independent Polish State with access +to the sea, which State shall include the territories +inhabited by predominantly Polish populations; and +(<i>b</i>) the indemnification of Poland by the Powers +responsible for the havoc wrought.</p> + +<p>This condition is indispensable for the reign of +justice in Europe. Germany has ruthlessly oppressed +the Poles within her Empire. Justice and stability +demand the restoration of the predominantly Polish +parts of the present German Empire to the new Polish +State.</p> + +<p>8. The abrogation of the Treaty of Bucharest; the +evacuation and restoration of Rumania, Serbia, and +Montenegro; the Associated Powers to aid the Balkan +States in settling finally the Balkan question on an +equitable basis.</p> + +<p>The Balkan question must be settled, and it follows +from that principle of self-determination to which the +Associated Powers adhere that the Balkan States +must be encouraged to agree among themselves and +give what advice or assistance they may ask in coming +to an agreement.</p> + +<p>9. The removal, as far as is practicable, of Turkish +dominion over all non-Turkish peoples.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_225">[225]</span></p> + +<p>The complexity of the distribution of nationalities +in the present Empire of Turkey makes the details of +the problem difficult, but the failure of the Turks, in +act and in intention, to rule justly has been so disastrous, +and the acquiescence of the Central Powers in +Turkish misdeeds so complete, that no departure from +this principle can be considered.</p> + +<p>10. The people of Schleswig to be free to determine +their own allegiance.</p> + +<p>The case of Schleswig is a fundamental instance of +the fashion in which Prussia and Austria used their +might to override the principle of self-determination. +The wrong done must be redressed.</p> + +<p>11. As reparation for the illegal submarine warfare +waged by Germany and Austria-Hungary, these Powers +shall be held liable to replace the merchant tonnage, +belonging to the associated and neutral nations, +illegally damaged or destroyed.</p> + +<p>In spite of repeated warnings, and in defiance +of the pledges which they had given to the Government +of the United States, then a neutral Power, the Central +Powers have persisted in operations which, by their +nature and by the fashion in which they were conducted, +outraged both International Law and common humanity. +The question of punishment must be dealt +with separately; that of restoring the ships or their +equivalents, and of material compensation to the +victims and their families, cannot be subject to discussion +or negotiation.</p> + +<p>12. The appointment of tribunals before which +there shall be brought for impartial justice as soon as +possible individuals of any of the belligerents accused +of offences against the laws of war or of humanity.</p> + +<p>While I regard this condition as an essential preliminary +to peace, as a just concession to the outraged<span class="pagenum" id="Page_226">[226]</span> +conscience of humanity, I admit freely that its practical +application is full of difficulty. I foresee the extraordinary +difficulty of assigning responsibility; I +recognise that during the actual conduct of war there +are reasons why belligerents should hesitate to punish +adequately those whom in normal times they would +unhesitatingly condemn. I offer my own solution of +the difficulty. It is that the appointed tribunals +should act as Courts of First Instance. They would +hear the evidence brought against the accused, and, if +they found a <i>prima facie</i> case established against them, +would refer them to their own countries for ultimate +trial, judgment, and sentence. I believe that more +stern justice will be done if nations which desire to +purge themselves condemn their own criminals than if +the punishment were left to other nations which might +hesitate to be severe lest they should invest the +individuals punished with the halo of martyrdom.</p> + +<p>13. The former colonial possessions of Germany, lost +by her in consequence of her illegal aggression against +Belgium, shall in no case be returned to Germany.</p> + +<p>Germany’s possession of her colonies would have +been inviolate but for her illegal aggression against +Belgium, which brought England into the war. She +has proclaimed that the fate of her colonies would be +decided on the Western front; it has been so decided. +She has proclaimed the uses to which, if victorious, she +would have put her colonies; such uses must be +prevented for ever in the interest of the peace of the +world. Furthermore, there is this consideration that, +after what has happened, it would be as intolerable for +Australasia to have New Guinea in German hands as +it would be for the United States to have Germany in +possession of Cuba. The colonies therefore cannot be<span class="pagenum" id="Page_227">[227]</span> +returned to Germany, but their assignment as possessions, +or in trusteeship, together with the fashion in +which they shall be administered in the interests of their +inhabitants and of the world generally, are matters for +future decisions.</p> + +<p>These are the indisputable conditions of peace +which must be accepted in the second stage of the +negotiations.</p> + +<p>I have dealt with the first two stages as logically +separate and successive. In actual fact agreement +on them might be coincident in time. In any event, +acceptance of the indisputable conditions would be +made before the guarantees required under the terms +of surrender or of armistice had become accomplished +facts.</p> + +<p>The conclusion of the first two stages, whether +concurrent or consecutive, will be the end of dictation. +They form the preliminary to co-operation. They will +be an earnest of a complete break with the past on the +part of Germany. They will go far to satisfy the natural +desire of those who demand that the guilty should be +punished, and yet I believe that they contain nothing +that is not imperative for a just and lasting peace. +And I hope that their imposition and acceptance will, +in the subsequent stages, make it possible to take +advantage, for the benefit of the world, of those powers +of discipline and organisation which Germany has +perverted to the great harm of the world.</p> + +<p class="center"> +III<br> +</p> + +<p>The third stage, should I consider, consist in the appointment +of a large number of Commissions to study +and work out the details of the principles which I have +enumerated. These will report ultimately, some of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_228">[228]</span> +them quickly, some of them after months or years, to +the Central Peace Conference. For my part I see no +reason why the members of the Commissions, if the +principles on which they shall act are settled beforehand, +should not be selected chiefly from among those +who have the greatest interest in the matters to be +settled. I do not see, for instance, why a Commission +consisting largely of Poles and Prussians should not +be asked to work out the future frontier of Prussia and +Poland. This may be thought the suggestion of an +idealist. But I claim that in this instance the idealist +is the realist. If our goal be lasting peace, then let us +give every opportunity for arrangement and mutual +accommodation before we resort to compulsion.</p> + +<p>So far I have said nothing of the future government +of Germany. The Germans assure us that the transformation +of autocratic government to responsible +government is taking place. I should like to believe +them. I am certain that its accomplishment is +necessary to Germany itself and to the final attainment +of a just and lasting peace. I frankly admit that the +perfect form of government does not exist, and that the +genius of Germany may evolve some form as good as, +or even better than, existing constitutions.</p> + +<p>But Germany must understand that it will take +time to convince the world, which has so much reason +to distrust her, that this sudden change is to be a +permanent reality. Fortunately the stages which I +have described do not require for their accomplishment +more than the hope that Germany has set out on the +right path. Whilst the last stage is in progress there +will be time, and more than time, to see whether +Germany realises our hopes and what I believe to be +now the wishes of the majority of her own people.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_229">[229]</span></p> + +<p>For the last stage will mean nothing less than +reconstructing the organisation of the world, and +establishing a new policy in which a League of Free +Nations shall replace the old system of the balance of +rival Powers.</p> + +<p>The accomplishment of a change so gigantic as the +adjusting of national organisations to fit into new super-national +machinery must be difficult and slow. Fortunately +the very steps necessary to make it possible are +steps that will slowly make it actual. Let me select +a few simple examples. The cessation of hostilities +will leave the world short of food, short of transport, +short of raw materials. The machinery that has +regulated these during war will have to be kept in +action beyond the war. Food will have to be rationed, +transport will have to be rationed, raw material will +have to be rationed. It is a world problem that can be +settled only on a world basis, and there will be every +opportunity, in the years of transition, to transform +those economic relations which are forced upon us by +necessity into a system which will meet with free and +general acceptance.</p> + +<p>Intimately connected with these matters will be the +problem of the returned soldier, whether wounded or +otherwise, the problem of pensions, the problems of +wages, housing, hours and conditions of work, regulation +of child labour, female labour, and so forth. The +equalisation of those in different countries will be +necessary to fair rationing, and from this necessity +will arise international conferences of workers which +may be able to settle some of the most difficult questions +of super-national organisation. When the question of +disarmament arises, some will demand as a fundamental +necessity that their nation must have a large army<span class="pagenum" id="Page_230">[230]</span> +or a large navy. Some will advocate, as an act of +punishment or of justice, the disarmament of other +nations. In the consequent negotiations it will soon +be found that to insist on an unduly large army or +navy is to saddle one’s country with a huge expense; to +insist on the disarmament of another country may +be to present that country with a huge annual income +that can be used in commercial rivalry. And so we +may come to a condition in which, if there be international +security, there will be a contest, not as to +which country shall maintain the largest navy and the +largest army, but as to which country shall most completely +disarm.</p> + +<p>I foresee international Commissions at work for a +long time, trying to establish frontiers, conditions of +Parliamentary responsibility, canons of international +law, rules of international commerce, laws even of +religious freedom, and a thousand other conditions of +national organisation. In the very act of seeking the +foundation for a League of Free Nations, and in slowly +building up the fabric, we shall get rid of the passions +and fears of war. By the mere endeavour to find the +way to a better condition of the world, we shall bring +this better condition about.</p> +</div> + +<p>This article created the desired interest +and public discussion in the enemy countries. +It was widely reproduced by German newspapers +and it had the effect of producing +a state of mind which culminated in the +complete collapse of German resistance. It +was a fitting wind-up to the work of propaganda +in enemy countries. The article gave<span class="pagenum" id="Page_231">[231]</span> +rise to a great deal of comment at home and +elsewhere abroad also, and did much to form +a public opinion favourable to the conditions +of peace which were in the minds of Allied +statesmen but which they had themselves +refrained from declaring in public.</p> + +<p>Thus the Policy Committee, although it +existed so short a time, had useful achievement +to its credit. Had it been possible to +constitute such a Committee early in the +war the results might have been incalculable +in the effect on British propaganda.</p> + +<p>On November 15, 1918, Lord Northcliffe +sent the following valedictory letter to each +of the members of the Committee:—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"> + +<p>“I am sending you herewith a copy +of the minutes of the last meeting of the +Policy Committee, and feel that it is +unnecessary under the changed circumstances +to call another meeting.</p> + +<p>“May I remind you that this Committee +was formed under my chairmanship +by the British War Mission at +a time when it seemed urgent to correlate +propaganda addressed to the enemy, to +Allies, and to Neutrals? In the opening +remarks by the Chairman at the first +meeting it was pointed out that as the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_232">[232]</span> +war approached its end, war propaganda +would change into peace propaganda. +This change took place with even greater +rapidity than was at the moment anticipated, +and the Committee had at once +to undertake the task of devising a +propaganda policy with regard to peace. +You are acquainted with the steps that +the Committee took and with the large +measure of success that their efforts +achieved. All questions of policy have +now, however, passed from the hands of +the Committee to those of the Council +of the Nations, and there seems to me no +immediate sphere for our action, especially +as by arrangement with the +Government the British War Mission +is being wound up.</p> + +<p>“May I take this opportunity of +thanking you for your co-operation, and +of stating my belief that, had the war +continued, the Policy Committee would +have developed into an organ of ever-increasing +value?</p> + +<p class="right"> +<span style="margin-right: 9.5em;">Yours very truly,</span><br> +(Signed) “<span class="smcap">Northcliffe</span>.”<br> +</p> +</div> + + + + +<figure class="figleft illowp45" id="i_p208a" style="max-width: 92.5625em;"> + <img class="w100" src="images/i_p208a.jpg" alt=""> + <figcaption class="caption">INFLATING THE BALLOONS AND ATTACHING THE TRUTH-TELLING +LEAFLETS.<br> +<i>Official Photograph.</i></figcaption> +</figure> + + +<figure class="figright illowp45" id="i_p208c" style="max-width: 88.625em;"> + <img class="w100" src="images/i_p208c.jpg" alt=""> + <figcaption class="caption">HOW LEAFLETS WERE ATTACHED TO THE BALLOONS.<br> +<i>Official Photograph.</i></figcaption> +</figure> + + +<figure class="cl figcenter illowp80" id="i_p208b" style="max-width: 134.6875em;"> + <img class="w100" src="images/i_p208b.jpg" alt=""> + <figcaption class="caption" >REGISTERING THE DIRECTION AND VELOCITY OF THE WIND, IN ORDER TO JUDGE WHERE THE +LEAFLETS WOULD FALL.</figcaption> +</figure> + + + +<figure class="figcenter illowp80" id="i_p208d" style="max-width: 128.6875em;"> + <img class="w100" src="images/i_p208d.jpg" alt=""> + <figcaption class="caption">DISPATCHING THE BALLOONS.</figcaption> +</figure> + + +<figure class="figcenter illowp80" id="i_p224a" style="max-width: 135.5em;"> + <img class="w100" src="images/i_p224a.jpg" alt=""> + <figcaption class="caption">TESTING THE LIFTING POWER OF BALLOONS USED FOR PROPAGANDA PURPOSES<br> +<i>“Daily Mirror” Photograph.</i></figcaption> +</figure> + + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> + +<div class="chapter"> +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_233">[233]</span></p> + +<h2 class="nobreak" id="CHAPTER_IX">CHAPTER IX<br> +<span class="fs80"><i>VALE!</i></span> +</h2> +</div> + + + + +<p>With the foundations well and truly laid +and with increasing and widening avenues +of approach into enemy countries, the work +of the British War Mission was always +expanding. Had the war continued, the +gathering momentum of Crewe House +activities would have dealt many other +blows which, even in November, 1918, were +in an advanced state of preparation. But, +happily for the Allies, one enemy collapsed +quickly after another. When the following +letter was received from the War Office on +November 9, and was followed by the signing +of the Armistice with Germany—the last of +our enemies—on November 11, the work of +Crewe House as the headquarters of Propaganda +in Enemy Countries was finished:—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"> + +<p>“<span class="smcap">Sir</span>,</p> + +<p>“I am commanded by the Army +Council to inform you that, in view of +the armistices which have been concluded +with Austria, Turkey, and Bulgaria,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_234">[234]</span> +the Council has decided that the +distribution of propaganda in those +countries by military means should cease +during the period of the armistice.</p> + +<p>“I am to say that, in the event of the +conclusion of an armistice with Germany, +distribution of propaganda by military +means in that country will also cease +during the existence of the armistice.</p> + +<p>“I am further to inform you that +the Commanders-in-Chief in the various +theatres of war have been notified in the +above sense.</p> + +<p class="right"> +<span style="margin-right: 10em;">“I am, Sir,</span><br> +<span style="margin-right: 2em;">“Your obedient servant,</span><br> +“<span class="smcap">B. B. Cubitt</span>.<br> +</p> + +<p> +“The Secretary,<br> +<span class="ind1">“The British War Mission,</span><br> +<span class="ind2">“Crewe House.”</span><br> +</p> +</div> + +<p>On the day following the signing of the +Armistice with Germany Lord Northcliffe +wrote to the Prime Minister:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"> + +<p>“<span class="smcap">Dear Prime Minister</span>,</p> + +<p>“The signing of the last armistice +with our enemies has necessarily brought +the labours upon which I have been +engaged for the past year to a close. +The very nature of the armistices themselves<span class="pagenum" id="Page_235">[235]</span> +necessitates the termination of +enemy propaganda, and I beg, therefore, +to request you to accept my resignation +of my post as Director of Propaganda +in Enemy Countries.</p> + +<p>“I wish to thank you for the confidence +you have reposed in me in +appointing me to this office. I have +endeavoured, with the assistance of a +most able Committee and of an untiring +staff of experts, to render the very best +possible services to the Government +and to the country.</p> + +<p class="right"> +“Believe me, dear Prime Minister,<br> +<span style="margin-right: 6em;">“Yours sincerely,</span><br> +<span style="margin-right: 1em;">“<span class="smcap">Northcliffe</span>.”</span><br> +</p> +</div> + +<p>In reply, the Prime Minister wrote on the +same day:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"> + +<p>“<span class="smcap">My Dear Northcliffe</span>,</p> + +<p>“I have received your letter, and I +agree with you that the office of Director +of Propaganda in Enemy Countries is +rendered unnecessary by recent events.</p> + +<p>“In accepting your resignation, I +wish to assure you how grateful I am +for the great services you have rendered +to the Allied Cause while holding this +important post. I have had many<span class="pagenum" id="Page_236">[236]</span> +direct evidences of the success of your +invaluable work and of the extent to +which it has contributed to the dramatic +collapse of the enemy strength in Austria +and Germany.</p> + +<p>“I shall be glad if Sir Campbell +Stuart, the present Vice-Chairman of the +Mission, will remain in office as Acting-Chairman +of the Mission until December +31st, 1918, in order to wind up its +activities.</p> + +<p class="right"> +<span style="margin-right: 7.5em;">“Ever sincerely,</span><br> +“<span class="smcap">D. Lloyd George</span>.”<br> +</p> +</div> + +<p>When the year 1918 came to its close the +affairs of the Mission had been wound up, +and Crewe House as a propaganda force +ceased to exist. The building was handed +over to another Government department, +but by those who had even a remote +connection with the work carried on within +its walls in 1918 Crewe House will always +be remembered for its propaganda politics +for which, as has been truly said, it +became as well-known in the Chancelleries +of Europe as it had been in Great Britain +for so long as a social centre for national +politics.</p> + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> + +<div class="chapter"> +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_237">[237]</span></p> + +<h2 class="nobreak" id="APPENDIX">APPENDIX<br> +<span class="smcap">Facsimile Leaflets and Translations.</span></h2> + +</div> + + +<div class="captiontop"><figure class="figcenter illowp38" id="leaflet01" style="max-width: 61.4375em;"> + + <figcaption class="caption"><i>Leaflet No. 1.</i><br> +NEWS OF ALLIED SUCCESSES ON WESTERN FRONT +FOR JUGO-SLAV SOLDIERS IN THE AUSTRIAN +ARMIES.</figcaption> + <img class="w100" src="images/leaflet01.jpg" alt=""> +</figure></div> + + + + +<p>Map representing the great offensive of the Allies, with the +results achieved from August 9th to September 1st:—</p> + +<p class="center"> +[<span class="smcap">Map</span>]<br> +</p> + +<p>In the offensive from July 15th to August 31st the Allies +captured 140,000 Germans (2,674 of whom were officers), 2,500 +guns, 1,734 Flamethrowers, 13,783 machine guns, together with +a huge amount of other war material.</p> + +<p class="right"> +<span class="smcap">The Jugoslav Committee.</span><br> +</p> + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> + +<div class="captiontop"><figure class="figcenter illowp53" id="leaflet02" style="max-width: 63.125em;"> +<figcaption class="caption"><i>Leaflet No. 2.</i><br> +A MANIFESTO FROM DR. TRUMBITCH DISTRIBUTED +FROM AEROPLANES AMONG JUGO-SLAV TROOPS IN +THE AUSTRIAN ARMY.</figcaption> + <img class="w100" src="images/leaflet02.jpg" alt=""> +</figure></div> + + + +<p class="center"> +SERBOCROATS AND SLOVENES.<br> +</p> + +<p>The “Agenzia Stefani” announces officially:—</p> + +<p>“By a decree of the Ministerial Council on September 8th +the Home (Italian) Government has informed the Allied Governments +that it regards the Jugoslav movement for obtaining +independence and the formation of a free State as a principle +for which the Allies are fighting, and as a condition of a just +and lasting peace.”</p> + +<p>The Governments of the Allied States have replied that they +have received with satisfaction this declaration of the Italian +Government.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Jugoslavs!</span></p> + +<p>By this historic and fateful declaration Italy has set up the +following war aim: The destruction of the Austro-Hungarian +monarchy such as it is to-day, and upon its ruins the establishment +of an independent State of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes.</p> + +<p>This noble decree of hers is accepted by all our Allies.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Soldiers!</span></p> + +<p>The part which Italy has been assigned by history has been +manifested to-day more strongly than ever. She is the protector +of the weak, the bearer of freedom and of the ideal for which +the Allies have been fighting for four years. The aim of the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_238">[238]</span> +fighting is not the peace of Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest, but +the freedom of the weak and oppressed.</p> + +<p>Therefore open your eyes. Remember that by fighting against +it you are fighting against yourselves, against our posterity, +against our freedom and unity.</p> + +<p>Long live Italy, long live the united and free Jugoslavia, +long live our Allies!</p> + +<p class="right"> +<span style="margin-right: 1.5em;"><span class="smcap">Dr. Ante Trumbic</span>,</span><br> +Chairman of the Jugoslav Council.<br> +</p> + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> + + + +<div class="captiontop"><figure class="figcenter illowp53" id="leaflet03" style="max-width: 86.1875em;"> + <figcaption class="caption"><i>Leaflet No. 3.</i><br> +LEAFLET—PROBABLY THE FIRST—DISTRIBUTED BY BRITISH +AEROPLANES AMONG GERMAN TROOPS IN OCTOBER 1914. +IT ANNOUNCED A RUSSIAN VICTORY IN EAST PRUSSIA.</figcaption> + <img class="w100" src="images/leaflet03.jpg" alt=""> +</figure></div> + + + +<p class="center"> +[<i>Note.—This was distributed in October, 1914.</i>]<br> +<br> +NOTICE.<br> +<br> +<span class="smcap">Explanation for German Soldiers.</span><br> +</p> + +<p>It has become known that German soldiers have been told +the British treat their captives inhumanly. That is a lie.</p> + +<p>All German prisoners of war are well-treated and receive +from the British the same food as their own soldiers.</p> + +<p>The opportunity is now taken to enlighten the German soldier +about some facts which hitherto have been kept secret from him.</p> + +<p>The German Army never reached or occupied Paris and has +been retiring since September 5.</p> + +<p>The British Army has been neither made prisoner nor beaten. +It increases in strength every day.</p> + +<p>The French Army is not beaten. Quite on the contrary, +for it inflicted a heavy defeat on the Germans at <span class="smcap">Montmirail</span>.</p> + +<p>Russia and Serbia have so decisively defeated Austria that +she no longer plays any part in the war. With the exception +of a few cruisers, German shipping, the merchant service as +well as the fighting fleet, is no longer to be seen upon the seas.</p> + +<p>The British and German Navies have both suffered casualties, +but the German the heaviest.</p> + +<p>Germany has already lost several colonies and will presently +also lose what now remains to her. Japan has declared war +on Germany. Kiauchau is now besieged by the British and +the Japanese.</p> + +<p>The report circulated in the Press that the British Colonies +and India have rebelled against Great Britain is wholly untrue. +Quite on the contrary, these Colonies have sent to France large +masses of troops and many supplies to come to the help of the +Fatherland.</p> + +<p>Ireland is one with England, and from North and South is +sending her soldiers who are fighting with enthusiasm alongside +their English comrades.</p> + +<p>The Kaiser and the Prussian War Party wanted this war +against all interests of the Fatherland. In secret they prepared<span class="pagenum" id="Page_239">[239]</span> +for this war. Germany alone was prepared, which explains her +temporary successes. Now we have succeeded in checking her +victorious advance. Supported by the sympathies of the whole +civilised world, which regards with horror an arbitrary war of +conquest, Great Britain, France, Russia, Belgium, Serbia, +Montenegro, and Japan will carry on the war to the end.</p> + +<p>We bring these facts to general notice in order to throw light +upon the truth which has been hidden from you. You are not +fighting to defend your Fatherland, as no one ever thought of +attacking Germany. You are fighting to satisfy the ambitious +war-lust of the military party at the cost of the true interests of +the Fatherland. The whole business is blackguardly.</p> + +<p>At first sight these facts will seem improbable to you. But +now it is for you to compare the events of the past weeks with +the information manufactured by the military authorities.</p> + +<p class="center">ON OCTOBER 4 THE RUSSIANS GAINED A TREMENDOUS +VICTORY OVER THE GERMAN ARMIES IN +EAST PRUSSIA. GERMAN LOSSES 70,000.</p> + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> + +<div class="captiontop"><figure class="figcenter illowp54" id="leaflet04" style="max-width: 97.125em;"> + + <figcaption class="caption"><i>Leaflet No. 4.</i><br> +AEROPLANE DISTRIBUTION OF COPIES OF AN EARLY LEAFLET PREPARED +BY THE FRENCH AUTHORITIES FOR THE GERMAN SOLDIER.</figcaption> + <img class="w100" src="images/leaflet04.jpg" alt=""> +</figure></div> + + + + +<p class="center"> +To the German Soldiers!<br> +</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">It is not true</span> that we French shoot or ill-treat German +prisoners.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">On the contrary</span>, our prisoners are well-treated and receive +plenty to eat and drink.</p> + +<p>All who are tired of this wretched life may report themselves +unarmed, without fear, to the French outposts.</p> + +<p>They will be well received there.</p> + +<p>After the war everyone can go home again.</p> + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> +<div class="captiontop"><figure class="figcenter illowp40" id="leaflet05" style="max-width: 70.0625em;"> + + <figcaption class="caption"><i>Leaflet No. 5.</i><br> +A TYPICAL NEWS-SHEET FOR GERMAN SOLDIERS.</figcaption> + <img class="w100" src="images/leaflet05.jpg" alt=""> +</figure></div> + + + + +<p class="center"> +<span class="smcap">Information Leaflet for the Troops.</span><br> +<br> +IS PEACE AT THE DOOR?<br> +</p> + +<p class="center">Our enemies reject negotiations until we have evacuated +Belgium and France.</p> + +<p class="center"> +<span class="smcap">What must we do now?</span><br> +</p> + +<p>Well, what does it all mean?</p> + +<p>“A few weeks ago,” says the <i>Frankfurter Zeitung</i>, “it appeared +as if our armies were very near their goal, the defeat of the +enemy forces and peace. But what a change!”</p> + +<p>In these few weeks the German armies have lost three-quarters +of a million men. More than a quarter of a million +have given themselves up and are now out of danger and have +plenty to eat.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_240">[240]</span></p> + +<p>In these few weeks Bulgaria has dropped out of the war and +has been compelled to surrender unconditionally. The best +Turkish armies have been destroyed and Turkey is about to +follow Bulgaria’s example.</p> + +<p>And what is the result of all these events in the last few +weeks?</p> + +<p>All hope of victory by the military Junker party in Germany +abandoned: an armistice demanded: the admission of the +new Imperial Chancellor, Prince Max von Baden, that Belgium +was wrongfully attacked.</p> + +<p>The following is the text of the Note addressed to President +Wilson through the Swiss Government:—</p> + +<p>“The German Government requests the President of the +United States to bring about the restoration of peace, to inform +all belligerent States of this request and to summon them to +send plenipotentiaries to open negotiations. Germany takes +as a basis for peace negotiations the programme set forth by +the President of the United States in his Message to Congress +of January 8th, 1918, and particularly in his speech of September +27th.</p> + +<p>“With a view to preventing further bloodshed the German +Government requests the immediate conclusion of an armistice +on land, on water, and in the air.</p> + +<p class="right"> +<span style="margin-right: 3em;">(Signed) <span class="smcap">Max</span>, Prince von Baden,</span><br> +Imperial Chancellor.”<br> +</p> + + +<p>Why was this Note addressed to President Wilson?</p> + +<p>Partly because he laid down certain conditions which he +explained the German Government must accept before he would +enter into any discussion whatever on peace terms.</p> + +<p>But also partly because the German Government at length +became aware of the United States’ military effort.</p> + +<p>In this, as in every other important matter dealing with the +war, our leaders deceived us in the most unheard-of way. They +fed us with false hopes.</p> + +<p>They have brought us to such a desperate pass that we are +retiring on every front and are now compelled to sue for peace.</p> + +<p>But will our enemies consent to discuss peace?</p> + +<p>Not as long as we are still in Belgium, which, as our Government +admits, was wrongfully attacked; not whilst we are still +in Northern France.</p> + +<p>Before our enemies will consent to negotiate with us we must +retire to Germany. For, they say, they will gladly conclude a +just and honourable peace with the German people if they can +be sure that militarism and medieval methods of statesmanship +are abolished for good.</p> + +<p>What must we do to save ourselves? We must retire to our +own country, then we may hope for an end of all the horror +and hardships we have suffered for more than four years, only<span class="pagenum" id="Page_241">[241]</span> +because our Government let its policy be dictated by militarism +and underestimated the forces which had to be arrayed against +us owing to the attempt to realise the criminal ambition of the +Pan-Germans.</p> + +<p>We have been miserably deceived.</p> + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> + +<div class="captiontop"><figure class="figcenter illowp79" id="leaflet06" style="max-width: 141.5625em;"> + + <figcaption class="caption"><i>Leaflet No. 6.</i><br> +“REPORTING PROGRESS”—LEAFLETS (SUCH AS THE ONE, BOTH SIDES OF WHICH ARE REPRODUCED, ABOVE) GAVE +PARTICULARS OF ALLIED PROGRESS AGAINST THE GERMANS. CLEARLY-PRINTED MAPS DROVE THE +TRUTH HOME. THE SHADED PORTION SHOWS TERRITORY WON BY THE ALLIES.</figcaption> + <img class="w100" src="images/leaflet06.jpg" alt=""> +</figure></div> + + + + + +<p class="center"> +WHAT THE ALLIES HAVE WON.<br> +Back on the Line of Last March.<br> +</p> + +<p class="center">[<span class="smcap">Map</span>]</p> + +<p>The whole ground has been twice won and twice lost by the +German armies. How much blood has been spilled, and how +much misery has been caused? For what object? Think it +over!</p> + +<p><i>On the other side of the leaflet was the following</i>:</p> + +<p class="center"> +<span class="smcap">Further Successes of the Entente; the German Retreat +continues.</span> +</p> + +<p>During the last few weeks there has been fighting west of +Cambrai and St. Quentin. The battle reached a degree of +vehemence fully equal to any previously experienced in the +course of the whole war.</p> + +<p>The Germans and British attacked simultaneously; both +sides fought with stubborn determination, but</p> + +<p class="center"> +<span class="smcap">the British gained the victory.</span><br> +</p> + +<p>They beat off the German attack, made many prisoners, and +killed an enormous number, thanks to the manner in which the +German troops were driven forward under murderous machine-gun +fire.</p> + +<p>The British attack succeeded. The German front was pressed +back closer to St. Quentin.</p> + +<p class="center"> +<span class="smcap">Ten thousand prisoners</span><br> +</p> + +<p>were made and a number of guns were captured. The outer +works of the Siegfried Line are in British possession in spite of +the determined and plucky attempts of the German troops to +hold them. The latter did not retreat “according to plan,” +but because in open honourable fight</p> + +<p class="center"> +<span class="allsmcap">THEY GOT THE WORST OF IT.</span><br> +</p> + +<p>The operations of the Entente forces have in no way reached +an end, as reported in the German newspapers a week ago by +military writers. The German forces were unable to stand<span class="pagenum" id="Page_242">[242]</span> +their ground. The French threaten Laon and the Chemin des +Dames and in these regions are driving the Germans back.</p> + +<p>On the Balkan Front</p> + +<p class="center"> +<span class="smcap">the Bulgarians are totally defeated</span><br> +</p> + +<p>and are still retreating. The French and Serbian troops have +advanced 20 kilometres. Many thousands of Bulgarians have +surrendered. The prisoners ascribe the blame for Bulgaria’s +disastrous situation to Germany.</p> + +<p>The Austrian proposal that representatives of the belligerent +nations should hold a secret conference in order to discuss</p> + +<p class="center"> +<span class="allsmcap">THE POSSIBILITIES OF PEACE</span><br> +</p> + +<p>was described by the representatives of the Workmen’s and +Socialist parties assembled at the London Conference as inspired +more by the anxiety to strengthen the monarchy than by the +desire to help effectively to put an end to the world war.</p> + +<p>No voice was raised for the acceptance of the Austrian proposal.</p> + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> +<div class="captiontop"><figure class="figcenter illowp44" id="leaflet07" style="max-width: 71.125em;"> + + <figcaption class="caption"><i>Leaflet No. 7.</i><br> +DIAGRAMMATIC REPRESENTATION OF THE GROWTH OF THE +AMERICAN ARMY IN THE FIELD. THE IMMENSITY OF THE +AMERICAN EFFORT WAS A STRONG POINT OF THE CREWE +HOUSE PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN.</figcaption> + <img class="w100" src="images/leaflet07.jpg" alt=""> +</figure></div> + + + + +<p class="center"> +TO-DAY WE ARE IN RETREAT.<br> +<br> +<span class="smcap">Next Year we shall be destroyed.</span><br> +</p> + +<p>America, which has now 1,750,000 men in France, had made +arrangements to send 3,500,000 troops by next year.</p> + +<p>But now, in view of the refusal of the German Government to +make a genuine peace proposal, America has decided to increase +the number.</p> + +<p>By next year America will have 5,000,000 men on the Western +Front.</p> + +<p>What do our leaders say to this—our leaders who declared +that America was not a danger to us because our U-boats would +prevent them from sending troops to Europe?</p> + +<p>What do we say to this, we who will be completely crushed +by the huge superiority of numbers?</p> + +<p class="center"> +[<span class="smcap">Diagram</span>]<br> +</p> + +<p>The increase of the American Army on the Western Front.</p> + + +<table class="autotable"> +<tr> +<td class="tdc">1917.<br>100,000</td> +<td class="tdc">1918.<br>1,750,000</td> +<td class="tdc">1919.<br>5,000,000</td> +</tr> +</table> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_243">[243]</span></p> +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> +<div class="captiontop"><figure class="figcenter illowp48" id="leaflet08" style="max-width: 70em;"> + <figcaption class="caption"><i>Leaflet No. 8.</i><br> +MAP-LEAFLET SHOWING THE BREAKING OF +THE HINDENBURG LINE.</figcaption> + <img class="w100" src="images/leaflet08.jpg" alt=""> +</figure></div> + + + + +<p class="center"> +WHERE THE HINDENBURG LINE IS BROKEN<br> +<br> +[<span class="smcap">Map</span>]<br> +</p> + +<p>This map shows exactly where the British troops have forced +a way through an important part of the Hindenburg defence +line. The dotted line from North to South indicates these +defences. The black line shows the positions reached by the +British. Their advance continues. In Flanders the German +armies are in full retreat. Kemmel Hill has been given up. +“Our troops left it with heavy heart,” writes Karl Rosner, +war correspondent of the <i>Lokalanzeiger</i>.</p> + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> +<div class="captiontop"><figure class="figcenter illowp86" id="leaflet09" style="max-width: 148.1875em;"> + <figcaption class="caption"><i>Leaflet No. 9.</i><br> +NEWS FOR GERMAN SOLDIERS OF THE DESTRUCTION OF THE TURKISH ARMY IN PALESTINE. TWO SIDES +OF THE SAME LEAFLET.</figcaption> + <img class="w100" src="images/leaflet09.jpg" alt=""> +</figure></div> + + + + +<p class="center"> +TURKISH ARMY IN PALESTINE DESTROYED.<br> +<br> +<span class="smcap">No further Resistance against the British Troops. +Brilliant Encircling Manœuvre.</span><br> +<br> +20,000 PRISONERS.<br> +<br> +<span class="smcap">Turkey incensed against Germany for leading her to +irretrievable disaster.</span> +</p> + +<p>The Turkish Army in Palestine has ceased to exist. The +British took them unawares, broke through the front, sent +through large masses of cavalry, cut off all lines of retreat and +completely surrounded the Turks.</p> + +<p>Twenty thousand surrendered, a large number were killed, +and only a few stragglers succeeded in escaping. The Holy +Land has been liberated from the Mussulman suzerainty which +the German Government did its best to uphold. Turkey could +not have received a harder blow. Her best troops have been +destroyed. The Turks’ feeling against Germany is extremely +bitter. They openly threaten to turn against the German +Government.</p> + +<p>The Bulgarians are scarcely less embittered against Germany. +They are still pursued in the Balkan mountains by the French +and Serbian troops, who have driven them back 64 kilometres. +Their defeat is a wholesale disaster.</p> + +<p>On the Western Front the British and French troops are still +gaining ground, slowly but steadily, a little every day.</p> + +<p>Everywhere Germany and her allies are in retreat.</p> +<br> +<p>Read no leaflets which you may find accidentally, say Field Marshal +Hindenburg and General von Hutier.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_244">[244]</span></p> + +<p class="center"> +WHY?<br> +</p> + +<p>Because they know that the leaflets contain the truth which +they and the Government want to conceal.</p> + +<p>They fear the truth. When the German people know it the +Government and militarism will be wiped out.</p> + +<p>Read overleaf of the successes of the Entente Powers and ask +yourselves</p> + +<p class="center"> +<span class="smcap">How long can it go on like this?</span><br> +<br> +Map illustrating the Turkish disasters.<br> +<br> +[<span class="smcap">Map of Palestine</span>]<br> +</p> + +<p>The black lines and arrows show the position of the English +forces. The Turks were between Samaria and Nablus. They +were wiped out. Their army no longer exists.</p> +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> +<div class="captiontop"><figure class="figcenter illowp41" id="leaflet10" style="max-width: 69.625em;"> + <figcaption class="caption"><i>Leaflet No. 10.</i><br> +SOME POINTED QUOTATIONS FOR GERMAN SOLDIERS +CULLED FROM GERMAN SOURCES.</figcaption> + <img class="w100" src="images/leaflet10.jpg" alt=""> +</figure></div> + + + + +<p class="center"> +<span class="smcap">The High Official.</span><br> +</p> + +<p>“We have no cause for anxiety.”—Dr. Wekerle, Hungarian +Premier.</p> + +<p class="center"> +<span class="smcap">The People.</span><br> +</p> + +<p>“The men must thoroughly understand that they must +stand fast.”—Order of the Day to 200th Infantry Division.</p> + +<p class="center"> +<span class="smcap">The General.</span><br> +</p> + +<p>“We have no reason to be downhearted.”—General von +Wrisberg, War Minister in the Reichstag.</p> + +<p class="center"> +<span class="smcap">The Soldier.</span><br> +</p> + +<p>“The principle that troops must continue fighting all day +long, to the last man, to the last cartridge, even when they are +surrounded, appears to have sunk into oblivion.”—General Army +Order, signed by General Ludendorff.</p> + +<p class="center"> +<span class="smcap">Preparations for Civil War.</span><br> +</p> + +<p>Every precaution has been taken in Berlin and other places +to suppress an eventual attempt at revolution.</p> + +<p>Orders for the suppression of risings are issued under the +heading “Measures for the Suppression of Strikes.” Proof of +this is furnished by the order of German G.H.Q. to all Guards +Infantry troops and to the 3rd, 4th, and 5th Corps.</p> + +<p>On receipt of the telegraphic order “Prepare for the suppression +of strikes,” all man-power must be mobilised. On +receipt of the order “Suppress strikes,” the commandant of +the transport troops must be immediately informed. The men +must be equipped as for field service, only without masks. On +receipt of the telegraphic order “Make preparations for<span class="pagenum" id="Page_245">[245]</span> +surrounding,” all detachments of troops will be marched to +their allotted positions. Battalion commanders should place +themselves at the head of their units and direct all further +movements.</p> + +<p>On receipt of the telegraphic order “Surround,” the troops +selected for this duty, the 3rd, 4th, and 5th Corps, will march +on Berlin to the Vorstadtbahn (Suburban Railway). The +Guards will take the opposite direction from the centre of the +city to the Vorstadtbahn, driving the populace before them. +Headquarters will be Kaulsdorf. Then follow detailed instructions +for the employment of machine guns. The order is strictly +secret.</p> + +<p class="center"> +<span class="smcap">What shall we do with the Kaiser?</span><br> +</p> + +<p>Stockholm, 10th September.—The German Minister in +Stockholm has requested the Swedish Foreign Office to seize +the copy of the “<i>New York Herald</i> Magazine of the War” of the +14th July because it publishes on the first page a photograph of +the German Emperor underneath which are the words:—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"> + +<p>“What shall we do with the Kaiser after the War?”</p> +</div> + +<p>The Minister of Justice is said to have ordered the copies in +question to be seized.</p> + +<p class="center"> +<span class="smcap">Arrest of Socialists.</span><br> +</p> + +<p>According to the <i>Neue Badische Landeszeitung</i>, wild scenes +took place last week at a meeting of Independent Socialists in +Berlin. “In the course of the meeting the Reichstag member +Hoffmann was arrested by two policemen because of provocative +speeches. A scene of such excitement ensued that in the general +disturbance Hoffmann escaped, while the hall rang with cries of +‘Down with the War!’ ‘Long live Liebknecht!’</p> + +<p>“The following morning the officials arrived at Hoffmann’s +house in order to arrest him again, but the deputy was not to be +found. Many arrests were made among his adherents.”</p> + +<p class="center"> +<span class="smcap">Pork in Bottles.</span><br> +</p> + +<p>“The smugglers are still devising new tricks so as to prevent +their costly goods from falling into the clutches of the war contraband +officials. At the Schlesicher Station a man was stopped +as he was fetching away two carboys such as are used for the +transport of dangerous acids. A closer inspection showed that +the carboys were divided in two parts, a small receptacle at the +top being filled with vinegar, while the lower and larger part +contained 55 kilos. of freshly killed pork neatly packed. The +expensive pork was seized.”—<i>Berliner Tageblatt</i>, Sept. 19, 1918.</p> + +<p class="center"> +<span class="smcap">The Veto on Dancing.</span><br> +</p> + +<p>“In the Hanover Command dancing lessons are only allowed +for men and women separately, and anyone who has already<span class="pagenum" id="Page_246">[246]</span> +taken a course of dancing is not allowed to learn again. A +sensible regulation has been issued at Essen. Only dancing +instructors belonging to the two German dancing instructors’ +unions may hold dancing classes as in peace time.”—<i>Berliner +Tageblatt</i>, Sept. 19, 1918.</p> +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> +<div class="captiontop"><figure class="figcenter illowp81" id="leaflet11" style="max-width: 135.8125em;"> + <figcaption class="caption"><i>Leaflet No. 11.</i><br> +THIS LEAFLET WITH PARTICULARS OF THE FATE OF 150 GERMAN SUBMARINE COMMANDERS CREATED +GREAT DEPRESSION IN GERMAN NAVAL PORTS.</figcaption> + <img class="w100" src="images/leaflet11.jpg" alt=""> +</figure></div> + + + + +<p class="center"> +THE 150 LOST GERMAN U-BOATS.<br> +</p> + +<p>In the House of Commons the British Prime Minister, Mr. +Lloyd George, said, “Our British vessels are serving as convoys, +patrolling, laying mines, sweeping mines, protecting merchant +ships and hunting U-boats over vast and uncharted distances. +They have destroyed at least 150 of these ocean pests, the German +U-boats—more than half that number in the course of last +year.”</p> + +<p>In reply to this, the following official Berlin telegram was sent +out to the German papers and to neutral countries:</p> + +<p>“We are in the position to state that the enemy’s war against +the U-boats does not show anything like so great a success as +that claimed by the British Prime Minister.”</p> + +<p>The Chief of the Naval General Staff in London has in his +possession a complete list of the names of the commanders of the +150 U-boats which Germany has lost through sinking, capture, +or internment. The greater part of these officers are dead, a +certain percentage are prisoners of war, a few are interned in +neutral countries. The truth of the statement of the British +Prime Minister is thus proved. It is also proved that the +statement contained in the official Berlin telegram is untrue. +Here is the list:</p> + +<p class="center"> +[<i>List of U-boat commanders.</i>]<br> +</p> + + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> +<div class="captiontop"><figure class="figcenter illowp55" id="leaflet12" style="max-width: 85.3125em;"> + <figcaption class="caption"><i>Leaflet No. 12.</i><br> +LEAFLET WARNING THE GERMANS THAT SUCH PLACES +AS BERLIN AND HAMBURG HAD BEEN BROUGHT +WITHIN RANGE OF AERIAL ATTACK AND COULD BE +BOMBED IF THE WAR WERE PROLONGED.</figcaption> + <img class="w100" src="images/leaflet12.jpg" alt=""> +</figure></div> + + + + +<p class="center"> +A MAP WHICH EXPLAINS ITSELF.<br> +</p> + +<p>In 1914 the English air squadrons which carried out reprisals +for the attacks made on English towns were small and carried +small bombs. In 1915 they grew larger and dropped larger +bombs. In 1916 both had doubled in size. In 1917 there was +a further increase in the size of the bombing squadrons and the +bombs were 7½ times again as heavy. 1918 saw further increases +and throughout the period under review the range of attacks +steadily extended. In 1919 Berlin, Hamburg, Brunswick, and +Hanover will be easily within range of attack—if we do not make +peace in the meantime.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_247">[247]</span></p> +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> +<div class="captiontop"><figure class="figcenter illowp46" id="leaflet13" style="max-width: 79.4375em;"> + <figcaption class="caption"><i>Leaflet No. 13.</i><br> +A GERMAN DREAM AND THE RESULT. A LEAFLET +ILLUSTRATING THE COLLAPSE OF THE MITTEL-EUROPA +AMBITION OF GERMAN MILITARISM.</figcaption> + <img class="w100" src="images/leaflet13.jpg" alt=""> +</figure></div> + + + + +<p class="center"> +HOW THE THING WENT WRONG.<br> +</p> + +<p><i>The upper map is entitled</i> “<span class="smcap">Pan-German Dream</span>,” <i>the wording +under it being as follows</i>:</p> + +<p>“Our rulers went to war because they hoped to found a +gigantic empire for the Kaiser and the Junkers. All the territories +shaded in on the above map were to be their realm. It +would have meant the subjection of half the world under the +German sword.”—<i>Vorwärts</i>, Oct. 11, 1918.</p> + +<p><i>The lower map is entitled</i> “<span class="smcap">The Awakening of the German +People</span>.” <i>Under it is the following inscription</i>:</p> + +<p>This is how Germany looks to-day. Her allies can give no +further aid. What the Kaiser calls “his heritage from God” +will soon be smaller than it was at the beginning of the war. +But the German people will be the better for it. They will have +escaped from autocracy and militarism. Freedom at last!</p> + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> +<div class="captiontop"><figure class="figcenter illowp43" id="leaflet14" style="max-width: 79.75em;"> + <figcaption class="caption"><i>Leaflet No. 14.</i><br> +FRONT PAGE OF A “TRENCH NEWSPAPER” ISSUED BY CREWE +HOUSE FOR GERMAN TROOPS.</figcaption> + <img class="w100" src="images/leaflet14.jpg" alt=""> +</figure></div> + + + + +<p class="center"> +WAR AND HOME.<br> +<br> +<span class="smcap">The Summons to Unity.</span><br> +</p> + +<p><i>The picture on the left is headed</i> “<span class="smcap">The Ideal</span>” <i>and represents +“The Assembly.” On its right is the following parody, entitled</i> +“<span class="smcap">Paradise Lost</span>,” <i>on Goethe’s “Faust”</i>:</p> + +<p class="center"> +“PARADISE LOST.”<br> +</p> + +<p> +“Gretchen, how different thou wast!”—(Goethe—“Faust.”)<br> +<br> +Germany, how different thou wast before the war<br> +Brought about by thy lust of conquest.<br> +With self-assurance thou wentst from triumph to triumph<br> +And reached the summit of thy power<br> +Untouched, with ample possessions<br> +In earthly goods, in fame and world renown<br> +Thou hadst all mankind can crave,<br> +In high respect regarded, if not beloved.<br> +<br> +But now what disgust, what horror<br> +The mere name of Germany excites!<br> +There is deep mourning for thy vanished happiness,<br> +Thy honour lost, thy peace of mind destroyed!<br> +Thou liest parted by the iron wall<br> +Which thy crime has built between us<br> +Fast fettered to thy false ideal<br> +And all thy former glory gone!<br> +</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_248">[248]</span></p> + +<p><i>The lower picture is called</i> “<span class="smcap">The Reality</span>,” <i>the quotation from +Moltke underneath being “March separately, strike together.” On +its left</i>:</p> + +<p class="center"> +<span class="smcap">The War was decided at Potsdam.</span><br> +</p> + +<p>During a debate on the origin of the war in the Hungarian +Parliament, Count Tisza claimed that the ultimatum to Serbia +was drawn up at a conference at which no German representative +was present.</p> + +<p><i>A Deputy</i>: Not in Vienna but in Potsdam.</p> + +<p><i>Count Tisza</i>: Neither in Potsdam nor anywhere else.</p> + +<p><i>The Deputy</i>: The ultimatum was not drawn up at Potsdam, but +the outbreak of war was decided there.</p> + +<p class="center"> +<span class="smcap">A Prophecy.</span><br> +</p> + +<p>The Dutch newspaper, the <i>Handelsblad</i>, reports that a person +who has just returned from Germany saw this rhyme written up +in gigantic letters at an important factory:</p> + +<div class="poetry-container"> +<div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div class="verse indent0">“If the war lasts another year,</div> + <div class="verse indent0">William’s fate will be the Tsar’s!”</div> + </div> +</div> +</div> +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> +<div class="captiontop"><figure class="figcenter illowp49" id="leaflet15" style="max-width: 66.625em;"> + <figcaption class="caption"><i>Leaflet No. 15.</i><br> +ILLUSTRATED LEAFLET PORTRAYING CONTENTMENT +OF GERMAN PRISONERS IN BRITISH HANDS. +THIS WAS ISSUED TO COUNTERACT ENEMY +ASSERTIONS OF SEVERE TREATMENT.</figcaption> + <img class="w100" src="images/leaflet15.jpg" alt=""> +</figure></div> + + + + + +<p>German prisoners of war arriving behind the British lines are +greeted by their comrades, who assure them of good treatment.</p> + + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> +<div class="captiontop"><figure class="figcenter illowp42" id="leaflet16" style="max-width: 73.5em;"> + <figcaption class="caption"><i>Leaflet No. 16.</i><br> +THIS LEAFLET SHOWED HOW THE ALLIES HAD +SHATTERED THE GREAT BERLIN-BAGDAD PLAN.</figcaption> + <img class="w100" src="images/leaflet16.jpg" alt=""> +</figure></div> + + + + +<p class="center"> +WHY THE GOVERNMENT IS SUING FOR PEACE.<br> +</p> + +<p>The reason is clear.</p> + +<p>The Government undertook the war in the hope of realising +the Pan-German dream of a Middle Europe.</p> + +<p>This was the real cause of the war.</p> + +<p>If there remained any doubt on the subject it is clearly proved +by the fact that the moment the realisation of the Pan-German +dream became impossible the Government sues for peace.</p> + +<p>This was the plan of the Pan-Germans who led us into the +war.</p> + +<p>The whole of the territory coloured black was to become +German.</p> + +<p>Bulgaria and Turkey would become vassal States.</p> + +<p>The Kaiser and the Prussian Junker aristocracy, the bureaucrats +and the rich who exploit the rest of the people, should +become the most powerful class in the world.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_249">[249]</span></p> + +<p class="center"> +THIS IS WHAT HAS BECOME OF THE PAN-GERMAN PLAN.<br> +</p> + +<p>Bulgaria refuses to be a vassal State.</p> + +<p>Turkey is becoming anxious.</p> + +<p>The plan for the realisation of which the Pan-Germans persuaded +Germany to go to war and which has cost so many +millions of lives and caused such universal misery is completely +frustrated.</p> + +<p>What reason remains why we should fight?</p> + +<p>The Government has no further reason for continuing the +struggle and is therefore suing our enemies for peace.</p> + +<p>Therefore all the talk about a defensive war proves to have +been absolutely untruthfully and dishonestly</p> + +<p class="center"><span class="allsmcap">STARTED TO DECEIVE US.</span></p> +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> +<div class="captiontop"><figure class="figcenter illowp50" id="leaflet17" style="max-width: 86.5625em;"> + <figcaption class="caption"><i>Leaflet No. 17.</i><br> +MANIFESTO TO MAGYAR TROOPS.</figcaption> + <img class="w100" src="images/leaflet17.jpg" alt=""> +</figure></div> + + + + +<p class="center"> +HUNGARIAN SOLDIERS!<br> +</p> + +<p>What are you fighting for?</p> + +<p>For the Emperor of Austria and the King of Hungary!</p> + +<p>Or is it for the German Emperor?</p> +<p>You are only fighting for the German Emperor. The Austrian +Emperor has given over to him the army and the State revenues +for twenty-five years by a formal treaty the contents of which +are kept from you.</p> + +<p>But your newspapers also announce a “Waffenbund” which +was entered upon on May 12th, 1918, between your old and your +new masters.</p> + +<p>But you Magyars, whose ancestors shed so much blood for +freedom, you are ignorant of the truth.</p> + +<p>For behold according to the Germans you are idle and slow.</p> + +<p>The <i>Frankfurter Zeitung</i> says on May 13th, “<b>The new treaty +should finally seal the disappearance of Austria as an independent +State and the seizing of the Hapsburg Monarchy by +Germany</b>.”</p> + +<p>The <i>Deutsche Zeitung</i> of the 19th May remarks, “What the +Mittel-Europa Confederacy chiefly needs is strength, and never +more so than at the time the war broke out. Austria-Hungary +was not sufficiently prepared. According to the ‘Waffenbund’ +<b>Austria-Hungary must arm its inhabitants in exactly the same +way as Germany</b>. It is no longer possible that it should happen +that the delegates should vote extraordinary credits for military +purposes, and that afterwards they should waste a long time +before they pass the amount because either the Hungarian or +the Austrian Minister of Finance says there is no money; or<span class="pagenum" id="Page_250">[250]</span> +that the delegates vote the guns but that the <b>Hungarian +Parliament</b> refuses the necessary calling up of the recruits, so +that afterwards the guns are there but there are not soldiers to +man them.”</p> + +<p>Is this clear enough? The Germans struggle for a mad +whim—they wish to rule the whole world. To fight for years, +to pour out Hungarian blood for German glory for years and +years.</p> + +<p>Naturally the <i>Neue Freie Presse</i> should with triumph proclaim +that the new treaty is specially a triumph for the “upholders of +Germany in Austria.”</p> +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> +<div class="captiontop"><figure class="figcenter illowp57" id="leaflet18" style="max-width: 71.5625em;"> + <figcaption class="caption"><i>Leaflet No. 18.</i><br> +MANIFESTO, SIGNED BY PROFESSOR (NOW PRESIDENT) +MASARYK, TO CZECHO-SLOVAK SOLDIERS IN THE AUSTRIAN +ARMIES.</figcaption> + <img class="w100" src="images/leaflet18.jpg" alt=""> +</figure></div> + + + + +<p class="center"> +MESSAGE OF PROFESSOR MASARYK TO THE +CZECHO-SLOVAK ARMY IN ITALY. +</p> + +<p>Through the agency of the Italian Legation, Professor T. G. +Masaryk has sent the following message from Washington to the +autonomous Czecho-Slovak army in Italy:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"> + +<p>“Brothers! Austria-Hungary, desiring to break the +opposition at home, has asserted that our army is a rabble +which has no political or military significance. She has +even uttered the lie that our army is composed of Russians +and other nationalities, and that a Czecho-Slovak army +does not exist. Our nation does not believe this dishonesty +and has remained obdurate and proud of its army. Then +Austria-Hungary endeavoured to deal a decisive blow to +our nation by destroying you, and with you its army. +She desired to gain possession of our banners of resistance +and independence, the symbol of trust and aspiration +cherished by our people.</p> + +<p>“Brothers! Your will, your far-reaching glance frustrated +the enemy’s plans. Our flag is still flying proudly +upon the position entrusted to you for defence. Our nation +recognises your heroic deeds and all hearts are stirred by +profound gratitude to you. They extol you and the proud +memory of your fallen brothers.</p> + +<p>“As your Commander-in-Chief I send you my heartiest +thanks for the bravery by which you have contributed to +the victory of our nation, of Italy, the Allies and all +mankind.</p> + + +<p> +“Greetings! +</p> +<p class="right"> +<span style="margin-right:2em;"> +“<span class="smcap">T. G. Masaryk.</span>”</span><br> +</p> +</div> + +<p>We cannot help telling you how proud we are of the recognition +by our beloved leader, who will guide us and our nation to the +goal of victory.</p> + +<p>We are convinced that you also, in concert with the whole<span class="pagenum" id="Page_251">[251]</span> +nation, see the salvation of our country and the realisation of +our sacred rights only in the destruction of Austria.</p> + +<p>When they drive you forward to protect the treacherous +dynasty, to which the nation has no obligations, you will +certainly find an opportunity of retaliating worthily for centuries +of oppression and of saving yourselves for a better future.</p> + +<p>Greetings!</p> + +<p class="center"> +<span class="smcap">Volunteers of the Czecho-Slovak Army in Italy.</span><br> +</p> + +<p>October 2nd, 1918.</p> +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> +<div class="captiontop"><figure class="figcenter illowp85" id="leaflet19" style="max-width: 144.875em;"> + <figcaption class="caption"><i>Leaflet No. 19.</i><br> +RAPIDLY-DISTRIBUTED LEAFLETS FOR GERMAN TROOPS TELLING OF ALLIED SUCCESSES IN THE +BALKANS AND IN SYRIA.</figcaption> + <img class="w100" src="images/leaflet19.jpg" alt=""> +</figure></div> + + + + +<p class="center"> +INFORMATION LEAFLET FOR THE TROOPS.<br> +<br> +FLIGHT OF GERMAN GENERAL.<br> +<br> +<span class="smcap">The Turks make Liman von Sanders responsible for +their Misery.</span><br> +<br> +TWO ARMIES DESTROYED.<br> +<br> +<span class="smcap">Bulgarians pursued on an Extended Front in the +Balkans.</span><br> +<br> +<span class="smcap">Count Hertling’s Gloom.</span><br> +</p> + +<p>The victory of the British troops in Palestine over the Turkish +troops commanded by General Liman von Sanders has made +further progress and assumed much greater dimensions than +was indicated by the first reports.</p> + +<p>Two Turkish armies, the 7th and 8th, have ceased to exist. +The whole of their baggage train, all their guns, and their entire +material of war have been captured.</p> + +<p class="center"> +30,000 <span class="allsmcap">MEN SURRENDERED</span><br> +</p> + +<p>and the few who escaped death or captivity fled in small dispersed +bodies across the Jordan and are now wandering about the +country.</p> + +<p>The British are now pursuing the 4th Turkish Army, which is +also in danger of destruction. In any case the Turkish resistance +in Palestine is definitely broken. General Liman von Sanders, +the German Commander-in-Chief, who was so completely +surprised and so much surpassed in leadership by the enemy +headquarters,</p> + +<p class="center"> +<span class="smcap">is in flight before the British</span>.<br> +</p> + +<p>The Turks claim that they have been betrayed and led into +misfortune by the German officers appointed to command their +forces. Palestine is now lost to them for ever. The Holy +Places have been liberated from the suzerainty of the Mussulman. +The Entente has undertaken to restore Palestine to the Jewish +people. The victory of the French and Serbian troops over the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_252">[252]</span> +Bulgarians in the Balkan mountains has strikingly developed. +The Bulgarians are now</p> + +<p class="center"> +<span class="allsmcap">WITHDRAWING ON A FRONT OF 160 KILOMETRES.</span><br> +</p> + +<p>They have made no strong opposition to the advance of the +Entente troops. The German defeats on the Western front +have merely depressed them and weakened their fighting ardour. +We know it is useless to continue the struggle.</p> + +<p>Count Hertling, the Imperial Chancellor, knows this too. +He told the Chief Commission of the Reichstag that deep discontent +had seized wide circles of the people. What does he +recommend? That the German people shall maintain its old +and sure confidence in Hindenburg and Ludendorff in the hope +that they may improve the situation a little? But he knows, +we know, and the whole world knows that they cannot improve it.</p> + +<p class="center"> +<span class="smcap">Only the German people itself</span><br> +</p> + +<p>can bring about an improvement by putting an end to autocracy +and militarism, pan-Germanism, and the out-of-date absurdities +which other peoples have long since done away with.</p> + +<p><i>On the other side of the leaflet</i>:</p> + +<p>The upper map shows the encircling movement of the British +which annihilated the Turkish forces under General Liman von +Sanders.</p> + +<p><i>Notes in the body of the map</i>:</p> + +<p> +British cavalry.<br> +Here 25,000 Turks surrendered.<br> +Site of break-through on the Turkish front.<br> +</p> + +<p>The lower map shows the ground gained in the Balkans by +the French and Serbian troops which have inflicted on the +Bulgarians the heaviest defeat they have suffered in the war.</p> +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> +<div class="chapter"></div> + +<figure class="figcenter illowp80" id="map1" style="max-width: 162.375em;"> + <img class="w100" src="images/map1.jpg" alt=""> + <figcaption class="caption">ETHNOGRAPHIC MAP OF AUSTRIA-HUNGARY.<br> +OF AUSTRIA-HUNGARY’S PRE-WAR POPULATION OF 52,000,000, ONLY ABOUT 21,000,000 WERE GERMANS OR MAGYARS. THE REMAINING 31,000,000, +COMPRISING POLES, CZECHS, SLOVAKS, SOUTHERN SLAVS, RUMANES, ITALIANS, ETC., WERE ACTIVELY OR PASSIVELY ANTI-GERMAN. THE ABOVE +MAP SHOWS HOW THESE OPPRESSED RACES WERE DISTRIBUTED OVER THE DUAL MONARCHY.</figcaption> +</figure> + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> +<figure class="figcenter illowp80" id="map2" style="max-width: 152.875em;"> + <img class="w100" src="images/map2.jpg" alt=""> + <figcaption class="caption">THE PARTITION OF AUSTRIA-HUNGARY: SHOWING THE BOUNDARIES AS DEFINED IN THE PEACE TREATIES. IT IS INTERESTING TO COMPARE +THIS WITH THE ETHNOGRAPHIC MAP BETWEEN PAGES 32 AND 33.</figcaption> +</figure> +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> + +<figure class="figcenter illowp80" id="map3" style="max-width: 199.625em;"> + <img class="w100" src="images/map3.jpg" alt=""> + <figcaption class="caption">GERMANY’S NEW BOUNDARIES AS FIXED BY THE TREATY OF PEACE. THE DARK PORTIONS SHOW THE TERRITORY LOST TO GERMANY; THE SHADED +PORTIONS INDICATE TERRITORY WITHIN WHICH THE INHABITANTS WERE TO CHOOSE BY PLEBISCITE UNDER WHOSE FLAG THEY WOULD LIVE. +THE FREE TERRITORY OF DANZIG IS ALSO MARKED.</figcaption> +</figure> + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> +<figure class="figcenter illowp79" id="map4" style="max-width: 95.75em;"> + <img class="w100" src="images/map4.jpg" alt=""> + <figcaption class="caption">BULGARIA, AS DELIMITED BY THE PEACE TREATY.</figcaption> +</figure> + + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> + +<div class="chapter"> +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_253">[253]</span></p> + +<h2 class="nobreak" id="INDEX">INDEX</h2> +</div> + + +<ul class="index"> +<li class="ifrst">A</li> + +<li class="indx">Alsace-Lorraine, Propaganda policy, <a href="#Page_180">180-1</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Austria-Hungary—propaganda against, <a href="#Page_20">20</a> <i>et seqq.</i>;</li> +<li class="isub1">Congress of the Oppressed Hapsburg Nationalities: resolutions, <a href="#Page_25">25-7</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">propaganda policy: memorandum to Foreign Office, <a href="#Page_28">28</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">policies outlined, <a href="#Page_30">30-3</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">Inter-Allied Propaganda Commission organised at Italian G.H.Q., <a href="#Page_37">37</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">publishes weekly journal, <a href="#Page_38">38</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">effect of leaflet campaign, <a href="#Page_40">40</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">work impaired by reactionary tendencies within Italian Government, <a href="#Page_40">40</a>, <a href="#Page_205">205</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">weakness of declaration made at Versailles meeting of June 3, 1918, <a href="#Page_41">41</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">effect of propaganda, desertions, <a href="#Page_43">43-4</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">recommendations of Inter-Allied Policy Committee, <a href="#Page_173">173-6</a></li> + + +<li class="ifrst">B</li> + +<li class="indx">Baker, Lieut.-Col. B. Granville, <a href="#Page_37">37</a>, <a href="#Page_48">48</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Balfour, Mr. A. J., reply to Lord Northcliffe’s memorandum on policy to be adopted against Austria, <a href="#Page_33">33</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">against Bulgaria, <a href="#Page_139">139</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Beaverbrook, Lord, <a href="#Page_17">17</a>, <a href="#Page_148">148</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Bissolati, Signor, <a href="#Page_25">25</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Borgese, Professor, <a href="#Page_38">38</a>, <a href="#Page_150">150</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">on inter-Allied co-operation, <a href="#Page_165">165</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Bulgaria, propaganda against:</li> +<li class="isub1">policy submitted to Foreign Office, <a href="#Page_134">134-9</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">Mr. Balfour’s reply, <a href="#Page_139">139</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">Ludendorff on effect of, <a href="#Page_142">142</a></li> + + +<li class="ifrst">C</li> + +<li class="indx">Cinematograph films, use for propaganda purposes, <a href="#Page_197">197</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Cockerill, Brig.-Gen. G. K., <a href="#Page_52">52</a>, <a href="#Page_149">149</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Comert, M., <a href="#Page_150">150</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Congress of the Oppressed Hapsburg Nationalities at Rome: resolutions, <a href="#Page_25">25-6</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Cunliffe-Owen, Sir H., in charge of propaganda against Turkey, <a href="#Page_13">13</a>, <a href="#Page_150">150</a></li> + + +<li class="ifrst">D</li> + +<li class="indx">Denbigh, Col. the Earl of, <a href="#Page_10">10</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Department of Propaganda in Enemy Countries (Crewe House):</li> +<li class="isub1">Lord Northcliffe appointed Director, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">personnel of advisory committee, <a href="#Page_10">10</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">two main branches, <a href="#Page_11">11</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">co-operation of other Government Departments, <a href="#Page_15">15</a>, <a href="#Page_19">19</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">expenditure during “intensive” campaign (Sept.-Dec. 1918), <a href="#Page_18">18</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">production work centralised at Crewe House, <a href="#Page_91">91-2</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">good effect of, <a href="#Page_93">93</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">inter-Allied Conference: list of delegates, <a href="#Page_149">149</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1"><span class="pagenum" id="Page_254">[Pg 254]</span>propaganda to cease during period of Armistice, <a href="#Page_234">234</a></li> + +<li class="isubsep"> Austro-Hungarian Section, <a href="#Page_11">11</a>, <a href="#Page_12">12</a></li> + +<li class="isubsep"> German Section, <a href="#Page_12">12</a>, <a href="#Page_13">13</a></li> + +<li class="isubsep"> Peace terms propaganda, <a href="#Page_202">202</a> <i>et seqq.</i>;</li> +<li class="isub2">Lord Northcliffe’s article published in <i>The Times</i> and circulated throughout the World, <a href="#Page_218">218-230</a>.</li> + +<li class="isubsep"> Work against Turkey, <a href="#Page_13">13</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Deutsche Tageszeitung</i>, tribute to propaganda staff, <a href="#Page_121">121</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Diaz, General, on effect of propaganda work on Italian front, <a href="#Page_45">45</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Donald, Mr. Robert, <a href="#Page_10">10</a></li> + + +<li class="ifrst">F</li> + +<li class="indx">Franklin-Bouillon, M., <a href="#Page_148">148</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Fyfe, Mr. H., succeeds Mr. H. G. Wells as head of German Section, <a href="#Page_13">13</a>, <a href="#Page_90">90</a></li> + + +<li class="ifrst">G</li> + +<li class="indx">Gallenga-Stuart, Signor, <a href="#Page_148">148</a>.</li> + +<li class="indx">Germany:—</li> +<li class="isubsep">Allied propaganda against, early neglect of, <a href="#Page_50">50-2</a>;</li> +<li class="isub2">use of leaflets, <a href="#Page_52">52</a>;</li> +<li class="isub2">effect, <a href="#Page_53">53</a>;</li> +<li class="isub2">suspension of distribution by aeroplane: reasons, <a href="#Page_54">54</a>: use of balloons, <a href="#Page_55">55-7</a>;</li> +<li class="isub2">Mr. H. G. Wells’s memorandum on policy, <a href="#Page_61">61</a> <i>et seqq.</i>;</li> +<li class="isub2">Lord Northcliffe’s letter to Mr. Balfour, <a href="#Page_81">81</a>;</li> +<li class="isub2">summary of British Labour War Aims distributed: effect, <a href="#Page_89">89</a>;</li> +<li class="isub2">use of aeroplanes resumed, <a href="#Page_97">97</a>;</li> +<li class="isub2">leaflets circulated among submarine crews: effect, <a href="#Page_99">99</a>;</li> +<li class="isub2">use of “trench newspaper,” <a href="#Page_100">100</a>;</li> +<li class="isub2">German press comments, <a href="#Page_105">105</a> <i>et seqq.</i>;</li> +<li class="isub2">rewards offered for leaflets, <a href="#Page_117">117-8</a>;</li> +<li class="isub2">admission of Allied superiority, <a href="#Page_120">120</a>;</li> +<li class="isub2">basis for peace negotiations, <a href="#Page_212">212</a> <i>et seqq.</i>;</li> +<li class="isub2">Lord Northcliffe’s article, <a href="#Page_218">218</a> <i>et seqq.</i></li> + +<li class="isubsep"> German propaganda, methods, <a href="#Page_3">3</a> <i>et seqq.</i>;</li> +<li class="isub2">reasons for failure, <a href="#Page_4">4</a>;</li> +<li class="isub2">organisation set up, <a href="#Page_6">6</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Gramophone records of Czech and Slav songs used on Italian front, <a href="#Page_39">39</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Gruss, Major, <a href="#Page_37">37</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Guest, Mr. S. A., propaganda campaign, <a href="#Page_14">14</a>, <a href="#Page_39">39</a>, <a href="#Page_51">51</a>, <a href="#Page_98">98</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">methods, <a href="#Page_103">103</a></li> + + +<li class="ifrst">H</li> + +<li class="indx">Hall, Rear-Adm. Sir R., <a href="#Page_17">17</a>, <a href="#Page_149">149</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Hansa</i>, article quoted, <a href="#Page_123">123</a>.</li> + +<li class="indx">Headlam-Morley, Dr. J. W., <a href="#Page_13">13</a>, <a href="#Page_60">60</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Hellingrath, General von, <a href="#Page_121">121</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Hindenburg, Marshal von, on effect of propaganda on German troops, <a href="#Page_93">93-4</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">manifesto on, <a href="#Page_106">106-15</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Hudson, Mr. H. K., <a href="#Page_10">10</a>, <a href="#Page_15">15</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Hutier, General von, manifesto; attack on Lord Northcliffe, <a href="#Page_115">115-7</a></li> + + +<li class="ifrst">J</li> + +<li class="indx">Jones, Sir Roderick, <a href="#Page_10">10</a>, <a href="#Page_150">150</a></li> + + +<li class="ifrst">K</li> + +<li class="indx">Keeley, Mr. James, <a href="#Page_150">150</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">on need for inter-Allied co-operation, <a href="#Page_170">170</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Kent, Mr. C. S., financial controller of Crewe House, <a href="#Page_18">18</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Kerry, Major, the Earl of, <a href="#Page_16">16</a>, <a href="#Page_91">91</a>, <a href="#Page_149">149</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Klobukowski, M., <a href="#Page_150">150</a>, <a href="#Page_160">160</a>, <a href="#Page_171">171</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Kölnische Zeitung</i>, letter describing effect of leaflets, <a href="#Page_119">119</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1"><span class="pagenum" id="Page_255">[Pg 255]</span>“Ten Commandments for German Women,” <a href="#Page_127">127</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Kölnische Volkszeitung</i>, letters quoted, <a href="#Page_125">125</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Kupffer, Herr von, article quoted, <a href="#Page_122">122</a></li> + + +<li class="ifrst">L</li> + +<li class="indx">Lamprecht, Dr. Karl, <a href="#Page_3">3</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Lansing, Mr., <a href="#Page_41">41</a>, <a href="#Page_42">42</a></li> + +<li class="indx">League of Nations, <a href="#Page_67">67</a>, <i>et seqq.</i></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Le Courrier de l’Air</i>, <a href="#Page_53">53</a>, <a href="#Page_59">59</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Lichnowsky, Prince, his pamphlet used by Allies for propaganda, <a href="#Page_104">104</a>, <a href="#Page_132">132</a>, <a href="#Page_142">142</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Lloyd George, Mr. D., on success of propaganda against Austria, <a href="#Page_50">50</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">appreciation of Lord Northcliffe’s work, <a href="#Page_235">235</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Low, Sir Sidney, <a href="#Page_10">10</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Ludendorff, Gen., on failure of German propaganda, <a href="#Page_5">5</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">efforts to create organisation, <a href="#Page_6">6</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">order showing influence of propaganda on German population, <a href="#Page_118">118</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">value of good propaganda, <a href="#Page_128">128</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">comparison between British and German departments, <a href="#Page_129">129-31</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">on effect of propaganda on Bulgarian defeat, <a href="#Page_142">142</a></li> + + +<li class="ifrst">M</li> + +<li class="indx">Macdonogh, Lieut.-Gen. Sir George, <a href="#Page_52">52</a>, <a href="#Page_106">106</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Malinof, M., <a href="#Page_141">141</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Ministry of Information, <a href="#Page_17">17</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Mitchell, Capt. P. Chalmers, <a href="#Page_16">16</a>, <a href="#Page_91">91</a>, <a href="#Page_92">92</a>, <a href="#Page_149">149</a>, <a href="#Page_209">209</a></li> + + +<li class="ifrst">N</li> + +<li class="indx">Nicholson, Sir Charles, <a href="#Page_10">10</a>, <a href="#Page_143">143</a>, <a href="#Page_149">149</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Northcliffe, Lord, Mission to United States; +Chairman of London H.Q. of British War Mission; +declines seat in Cabinet; appointed Director of Propaganda in Enemy Countries, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">anxiety to commence work against Austria, <a href="#Page_35">35</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">letter of appreciation from Mr. Lloyd George, <a href="#Page_50">50</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">on need for greater co-ordination, <a href="#Page_151">151</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">outline of policy, <a href="#Page_156">156</a></li> + +<li class="isubsep"> Bulgaria, outlines policy against, <a href="#Page_135">135-139</a></li> + +<li class="isubsep"> Enemy attacks on, <a href="#Page_43">43</a>, <a href="#Page_105">105</a>, <a href="#Page_115">115-7</a>, <a href="#Page_125">125</a></li> + +<li class="isubsep"> Germany, outlines policy against, <a href="#Page_81">81</a></li> + +<li class="isubsep"> Ludendorff, tribute, <a href="#Page_130">130</a></li> + +<li class="isubsep"> Peace terms, article published in <i>The Times</i> and circulated throughout the world, <a href="#Page_218">218-230</a></li> + +<li class="isubsep"> Rechberg, Herr A., tribute, <a href="#Page_127">127</a></li> + +<li class="isubsep"> Resignation, letter to Mr. Lloyd George, <a href="#Page_234">234</a>;</li> +<li class="isub2">Mr. Lloyd George’s reply, <a href="#Page_235">235</a></li> + +<li class="isubsep"> <i>The Times</i>, leading article on propaganda work quoted, <a href="#Page_129">129</a></li> + + +<li class="ifrst">O</li> + +<li class="indx">O’Grady, Mr. James, <a href="#Page_10">10</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Ojetti, Capt., <a href="#Page_37">37</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Onslow, Col. Lord, <a href="#Page_199">199</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Orlando, Signor, meeting with Dr. Trumbitch, <a href="#Page_24">24</a></li> + + +<li class="ifrst">P</li> + +<li class="indx">Pashitch, M., <a href="#Page_23">23</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Phillips, Mr. C. J., <a href="#Page_15">15</a>, <a href="#Page_150">150</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Poland, propaganda policy in regard to, <a href="#Page_178">178-180</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Prisoners of War, information for, <a href="#Page_143">143</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Propaganda, objects, <a href="#Page_2">2</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">axioms: truthful statements only to be made, <a href="#Page_2">2</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">necessity of co-ordination, <a href="#Page_146">146</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1"><span class="pagenum" id="Page_256">[Pg 256]</span>inter-Allied conference at Crewe House, list of delegates, <a href="#Page_149">149</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">distribution devices, <a href="#Page_54">54-59</a>; <a href="#Page_184">184-190</a></li> + + +<li class="ifrst">R</li> + +<li class="indx">Rechberg, Herr A., tribute to Lord Northcliffe’s work, <a href="#Page_127">127</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Rheinische-Westfälische-Zeitung</i>, article quoted, <a href="#Page_121">121</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Rome Congress, <a href="#Page_25">25</a> <i>et seqq.</i></li> + + +<li class="ifrst">S</li> + +<li class="indx">Scheurmann, Herr W., letter quoted, <a href="#Page_126">126</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Seton-Watson, Dr. R. W., <a href="#Page_11">11</a>, <a href="#Page_12">12</a>, <a href="#Page_20">20</a>, <a href="#Page_24">24</a>, <a href="#Page_37">37</a>, + <a href="#Page_49">49</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Siciliani, Col., <a href="#Page_37">37</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Sonnino, Baron, <a href="#Page_41">41</a>, <a href="#Page_42">42</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Standing, Sir Guy, <a href="#Page_17">17</a>, <a href="#Page_149">149</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Steed, Mr. H. Wickham, <a href="#Page_10">10</a>, <a href="#Page_20">20</a>, <a href="#Page_24">24</a>, <a href="#Page_39">39</a>, <a href="#Page_49">49</a>, + <a href="#Page_149">149</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">Co-Director of Austro-Hungarian Section, <a href="#Page_11">11</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">mission to Italy, <a href="#Page_37">37</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Stein, Gen. von, admission of superiority of Allies’ propaganda, <a href="#Page_120">120</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Stossinger, Herr F., <a href="#Page_120">120</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Stuart, Lieut.-Col. Sir Campbell, <a href="#Page_10">10</a>, <a href="#Page_149">149</a>, <a href="#Page_204">204</a>, <a href="#Page_236">236</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Swinton, Maj.-Gen., <a href="#Page_51">51</a></li> + + +<li class="ifrst">T</li> + +<li class="indx"><i>The Times</i>, leading article on Lord Northcliffe’s work quoted, <a href="#Page_129">129</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Torre, Dr., <a href="#Page_24">24</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Trumbitch, Dr., <a href="#Page_23">23</a>, <a href="#Page_24">24</a></li> + + +<li class="ifrst">W</li> + +<li class="indx">Wells, Mr. H. G., <a href="#Page_10">10</a>, <a href="#Page_12">12</a>, <a href="#Page_60">60</a>, <a href="#Page_89">89</a>, <a href="#Page_90">90</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">memorandum on propaganda policy against Germany, <a href="#Page_61">61</a> <i>et seqq.</i></li> + +<li class="indx">Wireless Telegraphy, used as means of disseminating information, <a href="#Page_17">17</a>, <a href="#Page_103">103</a></li> +</ul> + + +<p class="center fs80"> +PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN BY THE CORNWALL PRESS, LTD.,<br> +PARIS GARDEN, STAMFORD STREET, LONDON, S.E.1.<br> +</p> + + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> +<div class="chapter transnote"> +<p class="center">Transcriber’s notes:</p> + +<p>Underlining in the translation of leaflet 17, where it is used for emphasis, +has been marked as bold, but ignored elsewhere.</p> + +<p> +Evident typographical and punctuation errors have been corrected +silently. Inconsistent spelling/hyphenation has been normalised. +</p> + +<p> The usage of both Roumania & Rumania is the author’s. +</p> + +<p> A half-title page has been discarded. +</p> + +<p> +A single footnote has been relocated at the end of the quoted passage to which it refers. +</p> + + +<p>To improve text flow, illustrations have been relocated as follows:</p> +<div class="blockquot"><p>Photographs have been grouped between chapters.</p> +<p>Each “leaflet” has been moved to the appendix, to accompanying its translation.<br> +Redundant cross-references and reiterations of the leaflet number have been discarded.<br> +The explanatory text “Facsimile leaflets and translations” has been appended to the appendix and table of contents.</p> + +<p>Maps follow immediately after the appendix.</p></div> + +<p>Page numbers in the List of Illustrations are no longer relevant, +but will link to the indicated image.</p> + +</div> + + + + + +<div style='text-align:center'>*** END OF THE PROJECT 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