Initial commit of ebook 77798 filesHEAD main

author: www-data <www-data@mail.pglaf.org> 2026-01-27 22:04:08 -0800
committer: www-data <www-data@mail.pglaf.org> 2026-01-27 22:04:08 -0800
commit: e7e8d49a2e80e4477763258ac48ce6f7126a6273 (patch)
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+      Secrets of Crewe House | Project Gutenberg
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+<body>
+<div style='text-align:center'>*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 77798 ***</div>
+
+
+
+
+<figure class="figcenter illowp47" id="i_f004" style="max-width: 85.5625em;">
+  <img class="w100" src="images/i_f004.jpg" alt="">
+  <figcaption class="caption">VISCOUNT NORTHCLIFFE.<br>
+DIRECTOR OF PROPAGANDA IN ENEMY COUNTRIES.<br>
+<i>Photo: Hoppé.</i></figcaption>
+</figure>
+
+
+<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_iii">[iii]</span></p>
+
+
+<h1 class="nobreak" id="SECRETS_OF">SECRETS OF CREWE HOUSE</h1>
+</div>
+
+
+<p class="center"><i>The Story of a Famous Campaign</i></p>
+
+<p class="fs80 p4 center">BY</p>
+
+<p class="center">SIR CAMPBELL STUART, K.B.E.</p>
+
+
+<p class="fs80 p4 center">HODDER AND STOUGHTON<br>
+LONDON&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;NEW YORK&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;TORONTO<br>
+MCMXXI
+</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_iv">[iv]</span></p>
+<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">
+
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<p class="center">
+<i>First Edition printed September, 1920.</i><br>
+<i>Second Edition printed October, 1920.</i><br>
+<i>Third Edition printed November, 1920.</i><br>
+<i>Fourth Edition printed March, 1921.</i><br>
+</p>
+</div>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_v">[v]</span></p>
+
+
+<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">
+<div class="chapter"></div>
+<p class="center">TO<br>
+VISCOUNT NORTHCLIFFE<br>
+IN<br>
+GRATEFUL AND AFFECTIONATE
+APPRECIATION
+</p>
+<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_vii">[vii]</span></p>
+
+<h2 class="nobreak" id="AUTHORS_FOREWORD">AUTHOR’S FOREWORD</h2>
+</div>
+
+
+<p>Some courage is required to add to the
+already too swollen list of war books, of the
+making of which there seems to be no end.
+The justification for the present volume,
+which tells the remarkable story of British
+propaganda in enemy countries during 1918,
+lies in the fact that it records historic
+activities, some of which were of a pioneer
+character.</p>
+
+<p>Necessarily its publication had to be postponed
+until the main principles of the Peace
+had been decided. The nature of the documents
+quoted precluded earlier publication,
+which might have embarrassed the Allied
+Governments. No such embarrassment will
+be caused at this late stage. The march of
+events has removed the need, which existed
+during the War and during the peace-making,
+for withholding from public knowledge particulars
+of the organisation and work directed
+with such effect from Crewe House.</p>
+
+<p>Much that was interesting, and even<span class="pagenum" id="Page_viii">[viii]</span>
+dramatic, can never be divulged. Otherwise,
+many who did valuable and dangerous service
+might, by a breach of faith, be exposed to
+reprisals.</p>
+
+<p>The activities of Crewe House will stand
+the test of judgment by results. German
+comments on Viscount Northcliffe’s department
+leave no room for doubt as to the verdict
+of enemy countries.</p>
+<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_ix">[ix]</span></p>
+
+<h2 class="nobreak" id="CONTENTS">CONTENTS</h2>
+</div>
+
+
+
+<table class="tw60 autotable">
+<tr>
+<td class="tdc" colspan="2">CHAPTER I</td>
+
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="tdl fs80">PROPAGANDA: ITS USES AND ABUSES</td>
+<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#Page_1">1</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="tdc" colspan="2">CHAPTER II</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="tdl fs80">CREWE HOUSE: ITS ORGANISATION AND <i>PERSONNEL</i></td>
+<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#Page_8">8</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="tdc" colspan="2">CHAPTER III</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="tdl fs80">OPERATIONS AGAINST AUSTRIA-HUNGARY: PROPAGANDA’S MOST STRIKING SUCCESS</td>
+<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#Page_20">20</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="tdc" colspan="2">CHAPTER IV</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="tdl fs80">OPERATIONS AGAINST GERMANY</td>
+<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#Page_50">50</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="tdc" colspan="2">CHAPTER V</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="tdl fs80">TRIBUTES FROM THE ENEMY</td>
+<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#Page_105">105</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="tdc" colspan="2">CHAPTER VI</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="tdl fs80">OPERATIONS AGAINST BULGARIA AND OTHER ACTIVITIES</td>
+<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#Page_134">134</a><span class="pagenum" id="Page_x">[x]</span></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="tdc" colspan="2">CHAPTER VII</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="tdl fs80">INTER-ALLIED CO-OPERATION</td>
+<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#Page_146">146</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="tdc" colspan="2">CHAPTER VIII</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="tdl fs80">FROM WAR PROPAGANDA TO PEACE PROPAGANDA</td>
+<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#Page_201">201</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="tdc" colspan="2">CHAPTER IX</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="tdl fs80"><i>VALE!</i></td>
+<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#Page_233">233</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="tdl fs80">APPENDIX—Facsimile leaflets and translations</td>
+<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#Page_237">237</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="tdl fs80">INDEX</td>
+<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#Page_253">253</a></td>
+</tr>
+</table>
+
+
+
+<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_xi">[xi]</span></p>
+
+<h2 class="nobreak" id="LIST_OF_ILLUSTRATIONS">LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS</h2>
+</div>
+
+
+
+<table class="tw80 autotable">
+<tr>
+<td class="tdl hang2">Viscount Northcliffe</td>
+<td class="tdrbot"><i><a href="#i_f004">Frontispiece</a></i></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="tdl hang2"></td>
+<td class="tdc fs50">BETWEEN PAGES</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="tdl hang2">Crewe House</td>
+<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#i_p008a">8 and 9</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="tdl hang2">Rear-Admiral Sir Reginald Hall, K.C.M.G., C.B., M.P.</td>
+<td class="tdr"><a href="#i_p008b">8 and 9</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="tdl hang2">Lieutenant-General Sir George Macdonogh, K.C.M.G., C.B.</td>
+<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#i_p016a">16 and 17</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="tdl hang2">The Rt. Hon. Lord Beaverbrook</td>
+<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#i_p016b">16 and 17</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="tdl hang2">Mr. H. Wickham Steed</td>
+<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#i_p032a">32 and 33</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="tdl hang2">Dr. R. W. Seton-Watson</td>
+<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#i_p032d">32 and 33</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="tdl hang2">News of Allied successes on Western Front for Jugo-Slav soldiers in the Austrian Armies</td>
+<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#leaflet01">48 and 49</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="tdl hang2">A manifesto from Dr. Trumbitch distributed from aeroplanes among Jugo-Slav troops in the Austrian Army</td>
+<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#leaflet02">48 and 49</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="tdl hang2">Mr. H. G. Wells</td>
+<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#i_p064a">64 and 65</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="tdl hang2">Leaflet—probably the first—distributed by British aeroplanes among German troops in October, 1914. It announced a Russian victory in East Prussia</td>
+<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#leaflet03">64 and 65</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="tdl hang2">Mr. Hamilton Fyfe</td>
+<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#i_p064c">64 and 65</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="tdl hang2">Aeroplane distribution of copies of an early leaflet prepared for the German soldier</td>
+<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#leaflet04">64 and 65</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="tdl hang2">Brigadier-General G. K. Cockerill, C.B.</td>
+<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#i_p080a">80 and 81</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="tdl hang2">A typical news-sheet for German soldiers</td>
+<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#leaflet05">80 and 81</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="tdl hang2">Captain Chalmers Mitchell</td>
+<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#i_p096a">96 and 97</a><span class="pagenum" id="Page_xii">[xii]</span></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="tdl hang2">“Reporting Progress”—Leaflet which gave particulars of Allied progress against the Germans</td>
+<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#leaflet06">96 and 97</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="tdl hang2">Diagrammatic representation of the growth of the American Army in the Field</td>
+<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#leaflet07">96 and 97</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="tdl hang2">Map-leaflet showing the breaking of the Hindenburg line</td>
+<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#leaflet08">112 and 113</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="tdl hang2">News for German soldiers of the destruction of the Turkish Army in Palestine</td>
+<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#leaflet09">112 and 113</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="tdl hang2">Some pointed quotations for German soldiers culled from German sources</td>
+<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#leaflet10">112 and 113</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="tdl hang2">A medallion struck by the Germans in “dishonour” of Lord Northcliffe</td>
+<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#i_p128a">128 and 129</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="tdl hang2">Leaflet with particulars of the fate of 150 German submarine commanders, which created great depression in German naval ports</td>
+<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#leaflet11">128 and 129</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="tdl hang2">Leaflet warning the Germans that such places as Berlin and Hamburg had been brought within range of aerial attack and could be bombed if the war were prolonged</td>
+<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#leaflet12">128 and 129</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="tdl hang2">A German dream and the result. A leaflet illustrating the collapse of the Mittel-Europa ambition of German militarism</td>
+<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#leaflet13">144 and 145</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="tdl hang2">Front page of a “Trench Newspaper,” issued by Crewe House for German troops</td>
+<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#leaflet14">144 and 145</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="tdl hang2">The late Sir Charles Nicholson, Bart., M.P.</td>
+<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#i_p144d">144 and 145</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="tdl hang2">Sir Roderick Jones, K.B.E.</td>
+<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#i_p160a">160 and 161</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="tdl hang2">Illustrated leaflet portraying contentment of German prisoners in British hands</td>
+<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#leaflet15">160 and 161</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="tdl hang2">Colonel the Earl of Denbigh, C.V.O.</td>
+<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#i_p160c">160 and 161</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="tdl hang2">Leaflet showing how the Allies had shattered the great Berlin-Bagdad plan</td>
+<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#leaflet16">160 and 161</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="tdl hang2">Mr. Robert Donald</td>
+<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#i_p176a">176 and 177</a><span class="pagenum" id="Page_xiii">[xiii]</span></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="tdl hang2">Manifesto to Magyar Troops</td>
+<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#leaflet17">176 and 177</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="tdl hang2">“Drifting down in white showers”: Leaflets, from Italian aeroplane squadron, dropping on Vienna</td>
+<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#i_p176c">176 and 177</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="tdl hang2">Manifesto, signed by Professor (now President) Masaryk, to Czecho-Slovak soldiers</td>
+<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#leaflet18">176 and 177</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="tdl hang2">Sir Sidney Low</td>
+<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#i_p192a">192 and 193</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="tdl hang2">Rapidly-distributed leaflets for German troops telling of Allied successes in the Balkans and in Syria</td>
+<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#leaflet19">192 and 193</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="tdl hang2">Mr. James O’Grady, M.P.</td>
+<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#i_p192d">192 and 193</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="tdl hang2">Inflating the balloons and attaching the truth-telling leaflets</td>
+<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#i_p208a">208 and 209</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="tdl hang2">Registering the direction and velocity of the wind, in order to judge where the leaflets would fall</td>
+<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#i_p208b">208 and 209</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="tdl hang2">How leaflets were attached to the balloons</td>
+<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#i_p208c">208 and 209</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="tdl hang2">Dispatching the balloons</td>
+<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#i_p208d">208 and 209</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="tdl hang2">Testing the lifting power of balloons used for propaganda purposes</td>
+<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#i_p224a">224 and 225</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="tdc" colspan="2">LIST OF MAPS.</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="tdl hang2">Ethnographic map of Austria-Hungary</td>
+<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#map1">32 and 38</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="tdl hang2">The partition of Austria-Hungary: Showing the boundaries as defined in the Peace Treaties</td>
+<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#map2">48 and 49</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="tdl hang2">Germany’s new boundaries as fixed by the Treaty of Peace</td>
+<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#map3">80 and 81</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="tdl hang2">Bulgaria as delimited by the Peace treaty</td>
+<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#map4">144 and 145</a></td>
+</tr>
+</table>
+
+
+
+<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_1">[1]</span></p>
+
+<h2 class="nobreak" id="CHAPTER_I">CHAPTER I<br>
+<span class="fs80">PROPAGANDA: ITS USES AND ABUSES</span>
+</h2>
+</div>
+
+
+
+<p class="sub">Definition and Axioms: Why German Propaganda Failed:
+Ludendorff’s Lament and Tribute.</p>
+
+
+<p>Propaganda in war is a comparatively
+modern activity. Certainly, in the stage
+of development to which it attained in the
+closing phases of the Great War, it is a new
+weapon of warfare and a powerful weapon.
+Therefore it requires skilful and careful
+handling. Otherwise it destroys rather than
+creates, and alienates whom it should conciliate.</p>
+
+<p>What is propaganda? It is the presentation
+of a case in such a way that others may
+be influenced. In so far as its use against
+an enemy is concerned, the subject matter
+employed must not be self-evidently propagandist.
+Except in special circumstances,
+its origin should be completely concealed.
+As a general rule, too, it is desirable to hide
+the channels of communication.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_2">[2]</span></p>
+
+<p>Creation of a favourable “atmosphere”
+is the first object of propaganda. Until this
+psychological effect is produced (as the result
+of military events, of propagandist activity
+or of internal political disaffection) the mentality
+of enemy troops and civil population—and
+both are equally important in modern
+warfare—will be naturally unsympathetic
+and unresponsive to influence. In order to
+produce this “atmosphere” of receptivity
+and susceptibility, continuity of propaganda
+policy is indispensable. This presupposes
+definition of sound policy, based upon comprehensive
+knowledge of the facts and of the
+developments of the political, military, and
+economic situation, and also of the enemy
+psychology.</p>
+
+<p>When a line of policy has been laid down,
+actual propaganda operations may be begun,
+but not before. First of all axioms of propaganda
+is that only truthful statements be
+made. Secondly, there must be no conflicting
+arguments, and this can only be
+ensured by close co-operation of all propagandists
+and by strict adherence to the
+policy defined. A false step may possibly be
+irretrievable.</p>
+
+<p>Owing to inattention to these cardinal
+principles of propaganda against an enemy—inattention<span class="pagenum" id="Page_3">[3]</span>
+due to lack of appreciation of
+their importance—the Germans’ very energetic
+propaganda effort miscarried. Wrongly
+assuming that the war would be of short
+duration, they made use of untruths and half-truths,
+mis-statements and over-statements.
+These produced a temporary effect, but the
+protraction of the war brought its own refutation
+of their misrepresentation, and, instead
+of operating to the good of the Central
+Empires, the campaign wrought harm to their
+cause.</p>
+
+<p>Moreover, as they afterwards realised, the
+Germans did not agree among themselves
+in their misrepresentations. There was, as a
+well-known British authority on German
+propaganda has pointed out, a chaotic
+exuberance of different points of view. And
+they were incapable of understanding other
+nations. Dr. Karl Lamprecht, the distinguished
+German professor, deplored this in
+the course of a lecture at the end of 1914,
+when the Germans regarded their victory as
+assured. “When the war came,” he said,
+“everyone who could write obtained the
+largest possible goose quill and wrote to all
+his foreign friends, telling them that they did
+not realise what splendid fellows the Germans
+were, and not infrequently adding that in<span class="pagenum" id="Page_4">[4]</span>
+many cases their conduct required some
+excuse. The effect was stupendous.” “I
+can speak with the most open heart on the
+subject,” he added, “for amongst the whole
+crowd it was the professors who were most
+erratic. The consequences were gruesome.
+Probably much more harm came to our
+cause in this way than from all the efforts
+of the enemy. None the less, it was done
+with the best intentions. The self-confidence
+was superb, but the knowledge was
+lacking. People thought that they could
+explain the German cause without preparation.
+What was wanted was organisation.”</p>
+
+<p>Before coming to Allied methods and
+matter, it will be interesting to examine the
+scope of German propaganda. In the early
+stages of the war, Germany loudly proclaimed
+that she was winning. As the progress of
+events belied such words, she changed her
+theme. The Allies could not win, she averred,
+and the longer they took to realise this the
+greater would be their suffering and losses.
+She continually endeavoured to sow discord
+between the Allies. Great Britain was not
+taking her fair share of the Allied burden;
+Great Britain intended to retain Belgium
+and the northern part of France; Great
+Britain was using France and Russia for her<span class="pagenum" id="Page_5">[5]</span>
+own selfish ends; the interests of the Balkan
+Powers could not be reconciled. These were
+some of the foolish falsehoods in which she
+indulged. They were ineffective, as were her
+many attempts to stir up disaffection within
+Allied countries. Ireland, South Africa,
+India, Egypt and Mohammedan countries
+were examples in the case of Great Britain,
+and Algeria in that of France. She spared
+no effort to encourage Pacifism among the
+Allied peoples.</p>
+
+<p>Their lack of success became evident even
+to the Germans themselves. Government
+agencies and Press became more reticent as
+the war went on and the propaganda was
+found to be doing more harm than good.
+The military leaders became apprehensive of
+the effectiveness and superiority of British
+propaganda. Soldiers and writers made
+bitter complaints of the lack of any German
+organisation to maintain an adequate counter-campaign.</p>
+
+<p>General Ludendorff (“My War Memories,”
+pp. 360 <i>et seq.</i>) is pathetic in his laments
+at the non-success of German efforts. “The
+German propaganda,” he writes, “was only
+kept going with difficulty. In spite of all our
+efforts, its achievements, in comparison to the
+magnitude of the task, were inadequate. We<span class="pagenum" id="Page_6">[6]</span>
+produced no real effect on the enemy
+peoples.” He admits failure, too, in propaganda
+efforts on the fighting fronts. In the
+East, he says, the Russians were the authors of
+their own collapse. In the West, “the
+fronts of our enemies had not been made
+susceptible by the state of public opinion in
+their home countries, and the propaganda
+we gradually introduced had no success.”
+He records his efforts to induce the Imperial
+Chancellor to create a great organisation, as
+it had become “undeniably essential to
+establish an Imperial Ministry of Propaganda,”
+and he was convinced that no adequate
+counter-campaign to Allied propaganda
+could be organised except by an Imperial
+department possessing special powers. “At
+last a feeble step in this direction was taken
+in August, 1918. A totally inadequate organisation
+was set up; besides, it was then too
+late. In these circumstances it was quite
+impossible to achieve uniformity in propaganda
+work between Germany and Austria-Hungary,
+as was conspicuously the case with
+our enemies. The Army found no ally in a
+strong propaganda directed from home. While
+her Army was victorious on the field of
+battle, Germany failed in the fight against
+the <i>moral</i> of the enemy peoples.”</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_7">[7]</span></p>
+
+<p>Ludendorff’s <i>apologia</i> shows that he understood
+the principles which should govern a
+propaganda campaign; but he did not
+understand that the German case was bad.
+He has the doubtful consolation of knowing
+he was right in his theories; for they coincided
+in large degree with the principles
+upon which Viscount Northcliffe based his
+famous intensive campaign from Crewe House.
+No other German has exhibited such a grasp
+of the fundamentals of propaganda as
+Ludendorff, and he had excellent opportunity
+of judging the efficacy of the action into which
+these theoretical principles were translated.
+His verdict is an unqualified tribute, as the
+extracts from his writings quoted in another
+chapter show.</p>
+
+<p>How this success was attained it is the
+purpose of this book to reveal.</p>
+
+
+<figure class="figcenter illowp80" id="i_p008a" style="max-width: 125.4375em;">
+  <img class="w100" src="images/i_p008a.jpg" alt="">
+  <figcaption class="caption">CREWE HOUSE.</figcaption>
+</figure>
+
+
+
+<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">
+<div class="chapter">
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_8">[8]</span></p>
+
+<h2 class="nobreak" id="CHAPTER_II">CHAPTER II<br>
+<span class="fs80">CREWE HOUSE: ITS ORGANISATION AND
+<i>PERSONNEL</i></span>
+</h2>
+</div>
+
+
+
+<p class="sub">Viscount Northcliffe’s appointment: The Formation of an
+Advisory Committee: Other Government Departments’
+Co-operation.</p>
+
+
+
+<p>In February, 1918, Viscount Northcliffe
+accepted the Prime Minister’s invitation to
+become Director of Propaganda in Enemy
+Countries. Only a few weeks earlier, Lord
+Northcliffe had concluded his mission to the
+United States, where he had undertaken the
+co-ordination and supervision of the multiplex
+British missions engaged in purchasing
+food and munitions and in other vitally
+important operations. Upon his return to
+England, he had become Chairman of the
+London headquarters of the British War
+Mission to the United States of America,
+after having declined a seat in the Cabinet.
+Despite the importance of his new duties,
+he elected to retain his connection with the
+British War Mission to the United States.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_9">[9]</span></p>
+
+<p>Lord Northcliffe’s name bore in itself a
+propaganda value in enemy countries. None
+knew better than the Germans with what
+assiduity and tenacity he had striven to
+awaken the British nation to the extent and
+significance of the war preparations of
+German militarism. From the time of his
+entry into this office he and his work were
+the subjects of continual reference in the
+German Press. The vehemence of their
+attacks showed the depth of their apprehension.</p>
+
+<p>The direction and organisation of propaganda
+abroad, and especially against enemy
+countries, required a <i>personnel</i> deeply versed
+in foreign politics, with an intimate understanding
+of enemy psychology, and with
+professional knowledge of the art of presenting
+facts plainly and forcefully. The work
+was of a highly specialised character,
+designed to reveal to the enemy the hopelessness
+of their cause and case and the inevitability
+of Allied victory. This called
+for continuity of policy and persevering
+effort. But the problems of the penetration
+of propaganda into enemy countries were as
+exacting as the definition of policy and the
+presentation of the facts of the situation.</p>
+
+<p>In order to bring as wide a knowledge as<span class="pagenum" id="Page_10">[10]</span>
+possible to bear upon the conduct of this
+campaign of education and enlightenment of
+enemy peoples, Lord Northcliffe invited and
+obtained the enthusiastic co-operation of a
+committee of well-known men of affairs and
+publicists. Each had won distinction in
+some sphere of public service which rendered
+his aid in this work valuable.</p>
+
+<p>Lord Northcliffe appointed me as Deputy-Director
+of the department and Deputy-Chairman
+of the Committee.</p>
+
+<p>The members of the Committee were:—</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot">
+
+<p>Colonel the Earl of Denbigh, C.V.O.</p>
+
+<p>Mr. Robert Donald (then Editor of the
+<i>Daily Chronicle</i>).</p>
+
+<p>Sir Roderick Jones, K.B.E. (Managing
+Director of Reuters Agency).</p>
+
+<p>Sir Sidney Low.</p>
+
+<p>Sir Charles Nicholson, Bt., M.P.</p>
+
+<p>Mr. James O’Grady, M.P.</p>
+
+<p>Mr. H. Wickham Steed (Foreign Editor
+and later Editor-in-Chief of <i>The
+Times</i>).</p>
+
+<p>Mr. H. G. Wells.</p>
+
+<p>Secretary, Mr. H. K. Hudson, C.B.E.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>It was an advisory committee of wide
+knowledge and many talents, with a strong<span class="pagenum" id="Page_11">[11]</span>
+representation of authors and journalists
+of distinction. Regular fortnightly meetings
+were held, at which each section of the
+department reported progress and submitted
+programmes of future activities for approval.</p>
+
+<p>The headquarters of the department were
+established at Crewe House, the town mansion
+of the Marquis of Crewe, who had, with
+characteristic public spirit, placed it at the
+disposal of the Government for war purposes.</p>
+
+<p>The department was divided into two main
+branches, the one for production, and the
+other for distribution, of propaganda material.
+In its turn the production branch was divided
+into German, Austro-Hungarian, and Bulgarian
+sections.</p>
+
+<p>For reasons which will be given in the next
+chapter, the Austro-Hungarian section was
+the first to begin operations. Mr. Steed
+and Dr. R. W. Seton-Watson were co-directors
+of this section. They were an
+admirable choice. As Foreign Editor (as he
+then was) of <i>The Times</i>, author of “The
+Hapsburg Monarchy,” and with experience
+from 1902 to 1913 as correspondent of <i>The
+Times</i> at Vienna, Mr. Steed had intimate
+and authoritative knowledge of the peoples
+and conditions of the Dual Monarchy. Dr.
+Seton-Watson was also a distinguished<span class="pagenum" id="Page_12">[12]</span>
+authority on Austro-Hungarian and Balkan
+history and politics, to which he had devoted
+many years of study.</p>
+
+<p>After determination of the policy to be
+pursued against Austria-Hungary, Lord
+Northcliffe entrusted to them the important
+mission to Italy which initiated the campaign
+against the Dual Monarchy, resulting in such
+far-reaching and remarkable consequences.
+In the course of this mission they attended
+the historic Rome Congress of the Oppressed
+Hapsburg Nationalities and they took a
+prominent part in the establishment of the
+inter-Allied commission which waged propaganda
+warfare against Austria-Hungary.
+The subsequent conduct of this campaign
+necessitated keeping in close touch with the
+different national organisations of the oppressed
+Hapsburg races—Poles, Czecho-Slovaks,
+Southern Slavs, Rumanes—throughout
+1918, and they were able to render signal
+services to these peoples as well as to the
+Allies.</p>
+
+<p>When operations began against Germany,
+Mr. H. G. Wells accepted Lord Northcliffe’s
+invitation to take charge of the German
+Section. Mr. Wells made an exhaustive
+study of the conditions affecting Germany
+from a propaganda point of view, with the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_13">[13]</span>
+co-operation of Dr. J. W. Headlam-Morley,
+and his memorandum (which is published
+in Chapter IV of this book) is a noteworthy
+document of exceptional interest. When, in
+July, 1918, he found himself unable to continue
+the direction of the German Section
+(although retaining membership of the Committee)
+he had collected a mass of valuable
+data for the use of his successor, Mr. Hamilton
+Fyfe, the well-known journalist. To Mr.
+Fyfe and his colleagues of the German Section
+fell the organisation of the “intensive”
+propaganda activities of the last three months
+of the war.</p>
+
+<p>There thus remained the work against
+Turkey and Bulgaria. By arrangement
+between Lord Northcliffe and Lord Beaverbrook,
+propaganda against Turkey was ably
+conducted by the Near East section of the
+Ministry of Information, in charge of Mr.
+(now Sir Hugo) Cunliffe-Owen. This was
+obviously wise in the interests of economy
+and efficiency. Propaganda in Bulgaria,
+however, was directed from Crewe House.</p>
+
+<p>The production of propaganda literature
+and its distribution were different functions
+and were performed by separate sections of
+the department, but, of course, in the closest
+co-operation. So far as enemy troops were<span class="pagenum" id="Page_14">[14]</span>
+concerned, the distribution for Germans and
+Bulgarians was undertaken by the British
+military authorities. For Austro-Hungarian
+troops, the work was placed on an inter-Allied
+basis, distribution being organised by the
+Italian Army.</p>
+
+<p>Distribution through civil channels, a
+difficult task, was in the hands of Mr. S. A.
+Guest, who, alone of British propagandists
+against the enemy, had been constantly
+engaged in that work since the early days of
+the war. He built up a series of organisations
+in different parts of Europe by which
+news and views could be introduced into all
+the enemy countries. Great ingenuity and
+perseverance were required, but no little
+measure of success crowned his efforts.</p>
+
+<p>Co-ordination of these activities was a
+vital necessity, and this was effectively
+ensured by a daily meeting of those in charge
+of the different sections, the liaison officers
+between Crewe House and other departments,
+and the heads of the administrative branches
+of Crewe House. At this meeting, held
+usually under my chairmanship, the general
+details of policy and operations of all sections
+were systematically discussed. Each
+section knew what the other was doing,
+and uniformity of policy and action was<span class="pagenum" id="Page_15">[15]</span>
+secured. In addition, the consideration of
+the problems which arose, whether in the
+general work of Crewe House or in the
+work of one particular section, benefited
+from the collective attention of a combination
+of enthusiastic minds. Mr. Hudson,
+the able secretary of the advisory committee,
+also acted as secretary of these daily
+meetings.</p>
+
+<p>All at Crewe House were profoundly grateful
+for the cordiality with which the many
+other Government departments, with whom
+they were brought into contact, lent their
+co-operation. In this respect the Foreign
+Office, War Office, Admiralty, Treasury,
+Ministry of Information, and Stationery
+Office, all contributed materially to the success
+attained, although this list by no means
+exhausts the departments which willingly
+placed their resources at the disposal of
+Crewe House. It is pleasing to be able to
+record this as a recollection of and tribute to
+the service rendered by these departments in
+this phase of war activity.</p>
+
+<p>The liaison officers’ duties were extremely
+important. Mr. C. J. Phillips, a distinguished
+Civil Servant, who had been transferred from
+the Board of Education for special work in
+the Foreign Office, was the connecting link<span class="pagenum" id="Page_16">[16]</span>
+between the latter department and Crewe
+House. To him fell the task of keeping
+Crewe House informed of foreign developments
+which affected the work of propaganda
+in enemy countries and of keeping
+the Foreign Office <i>au courant</i> with Crewe
+House activities. His assistance and judgment
+were of immense value in dealing with
+the questions affecting foreign affairs which
+were constantly arising.</p>
+
+<p>For a few months after Lord Northcliffe’s
+appointment, the Military Intelligence
+Directorate of the War Office continued the
+production of literature for propaganda work
+against the Germans, and during this period
+Major the Earl of Kerry, M.P., acted as
+liaison officer between the two departments.
+Each department was able to complement
+and supplement the other’s work with good
+effect, and the co-operation was carried out
+most harmoniously. When production was
+subsequently centralised at Crewe House,
+Captain Chalmers Mitchell became liaison
+officer with the War Office and with the Air
+Ministry. No greater tribute can be paid to
+his work than the record in the pages that
+follow.</p>
+
+
+<p>Most cordial, too, were the relations maintained
+with the Admiralty, and especially<span class="pagenum" id="Page_17">[17]</span>
+with Rear-Admiral Sir Reginald Hall (Director
+of Naval Intelligence), through Commander
+(now Sir Guy) Standing, R.N.V.R. Crewe
+House was rightly grateful for constant
+co-operation of a confidential character
+through the exercise on its behalf of naval
+resources.</p>
+
+<p>Most valuable assistance was readily given
+to Crewe House by the Ministry of Information,
+so efficiently organised by Lord
+Beaverbrook. Close consultation was maintained
+between heads of sections of the
+two departments wherever co-operation could
+be advantageous. In certain European
+countries, for instance, the same agents
+acted for both departments—an arrangement
+which proved effective as well as
+economical. Invaluable service for Crewe
+House was performed by one agent of the
+Ministry in regard to Bulgarian affairs in
+which he displayed high competence and
+discretion. Crewe House was also indebted
+to the Ministry for the use of its wireless
+service in sending out matter for the enlightenment
+of the enemy by that means, and for
+many similar facilities, too numerous to
+mention, willingly offered and gladly accepted.</p>
+
+<p>With the Treasury—<i>bête noire</i> to so many
+temporary war departments—Crewe House<span class="pagenum" id="Page_18">[18]</span>
+had the smoothest working arrangements
+through Mr. C. S. Kent, who acted as Financial
+Controller and Accounting Officer in
+addition to other duties connected with the
+general administration of Crewe House. At
+no time was Treasury sanction withheld or
+delayed in regard to any expenditure proposed
+in connection with enemy propaganda.</p>
+
+<p>The enemy leaders frequently alleged
+that Lord Northcliffe expended huge sums
+of money on his propaganda work. According
+to the report of the Comptroller and
+Auditor-General, the expenditure for the
+four months from September 1 to December
+31, 1918—which was the period of the
+“intensive” campaign and consequently the
+most expensive—was £31,360 4s. 9d., which
+included expenses borne by the Office of
+Works, the Stationery Office, and the War
+Office on behalf of Crewe House. Only
+£7,946 2s. 7d. of this amount was incurred
+directly by Crewe House, one reason for
+the smallness of the amount being that
+many members of the department worked
+without remuneration for their services.
+The Auditor-General made a complimentary
+reference to the manner in which the
+accounts were rendered.</p>
+
+<p>Last, but not least, the Stationery Office<span class="pagenum" id="Page_19">[19]</span>
+which undertook all the printing arrangements
+for the millions of leaflets and other
+publications required in German, Croat,
+Bulgarian, and other languages, rendered
+great assistance by the promptness and
+efficiency with which they met Crewe House
+requirements which, from their very nature,
+generally necessitated working against time.</p>
+
+<p>It is particularly pleasing to look back and
+remember all the help so willingly given by
+other Government departments and to record
+the unfailing courtesy with which it was
+proffered and the zeal displayed. Crewe
+House gladly recognised the value of such
+loyal co-operation, of which those who were
+concerned in its work still retain grateful
+memories.</p>
+
+
+  <div class="column">
+   <figure class="figcenter illowp80"  id="i_p008b">
+  <img class="w100" src="images/i_p008b.jpg" alt="" style="width:100%">
+  <figcaption class="caption">REAR-ADMIRAL SIR REGINALD HALL, K.C.M.G., C.B., M.P.<br>
+[DIRECTOR OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE, 1918.]<br>
+<i>Photo: Russell, London.</i></figcaption>
+</figure>
+  </div>
+
+  <div class="column">
+    <figure class="figcenter illowp80"  id="i_p016a" >
+  <img class="w100" src="images/i_p016a.jpg" alt="" style="width:100%">
+  <figcaption class="caption">LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SIR GEORGE MACDONOGH, K.C.M.G., C.B.<br>
+[DIRECTOR OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, 1918.]<br>
+<i>Photo: Russell, London.</i></figcaption>
+</figure>
+  </div>
+
+  <div class="column">
+<figure class="figcenter illowp80"  id="i_p016b" >
+  <img class="w100" src="images/i_p016b.jpg" alt="" style="width:100%">
+  <figcaption class="caption">RT. HON. LORD BEAVERBROOK, MINISTER OF INFORMATION, 1918.<br>
+<i>Photo: M. S. Kay, Bolton.</i></figcaption>
+</figure>
+  </div>
+
+
+
+
+<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_20">[20]</span></p>
+
+<h2 class="nobreak" id="CHAPTER_III">CHAPTER III<br>
+<span class="fs80">OPERATIONS AGAINST AUSTRIA-HUNGARY:
+PROPAGANDA’S MOST STRIKING SUCCESS</span>
+</h2>
+</div>
+
+<p class="sub">Anti-German Hapsburg Races: The Secret Treaty of London:
+Problem of the Adriatic: Importance of the Rome Congress:
+Lord Northcliffe’s Policy against Austria-Hungary:
+Formation of an Inter-Allied Propaganda Commission and
+its Effective Operations: The Final Triumph.</p>
+
+
+
+<p>Little time was spent in deciding that, of
+all enemy countries, Austria-Hungary would
+be most susceptible to propaganda. With
+the assistance of such authorities as Mr.
+Wickham Steed and Dr. Seton-Watson, Lord
+Northcliffe was soon able to propose a line
+of sound policy for the sanction of the
+Foreign Office.</p>
+
+<p>It is strange that determined action on
+some such lines had not been initiated
+previously by the Allied Governments. They
+had failed to profit from the anti-Hapsburg
+and anti-German sentiment of the oppressed
+subject races of the Dual Monarchy. Three-fifths<span class="pagenum" id="Page_21">[21]</span>
+of the Hapsburg peoples were actually
+or potentially well disposed to the Allies,
+and it was towards this majority that Lord
+Northcliffe decided that propaganda must be
+directed with two objectives, one constructive
+and one destructive:—</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot">
+
+<p>(1) The moral and active support of
+the national desires of these races
+for independence, with the ultimate aim
+of forming a strong non-German chain
+of Central European and Danubian
+States.</p>
+
+<p>(2) The encouragement of their disinclination
+to fight on behalf of the
+Central Empires, thus greatly handicapping
+the Austro-Hungarian Armies
+as a fighting force, and seriously embarrassing
+the German military leaders.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>It will be seen with what success each
+object was secured.</p>
+
+<p>The nationalities chiefly affected were the
+Czechs and the Southern Slavs. There were
+also lesser numbers of Italians, Poles and
+Rumanes, whom it was intended to place
+under their own national Governments of
+Italy, the State of Poland (then projected
+and now established), and Rumania, which
+countries marched with the districts of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_22">[22]</span>
+Austria-Hungary inhabited by their respective
+races.</p>
+
+<p>Operations were comparatively straightforward
+in every case except that of the
+Southern Slavs, in which the secret Treaty
+of London of April, 1915, presented a serious
+obstacle. At the beginning of 1918 few
+people realised the difficulties thus created,
+but since the cessation of hostilities the
+“Adriatic question” has loomed largely in
+the public view of international relations
+and is rightly regarded as one of the most
+troublesome problems of world politics. Its
+bearing on propaganda lay in the fact that by
+this treaty Great Britain, France and Russia
+had promised to Italy certain Austrian territories
+inhabited by Southern Slavs. These territories,
+moreover, provided trading access to
+the sea and were of the highest economic value
+to any Southern Slav state which might be
+formed. So long as that treaty was regarded
+by the Southern Slavs as representing Allied
+policy, it was difficult to persuade them that
+Allied sympathies were with them or that the
+Allies would secure for them the economic
+interests necessary to the establishment of
+the united Southern Slav state peopled by
+the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes.</p>
+
+<p>With the object of creating a counterpoise<span class="pagenum" id="Page_23">[23]</span>
+to the secret pact, representatives of the
+Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, had assembled
+in Corfu, under the leadership of Dr. Trumbitch
+(president of the Southern Slav Committee)
+and M. Pashitch (Prime Minister of
+Serbia), and had issued the Southern Slav
+Unitary Declaration on June 20, 1917, proclaiming
+the union of the three peoples and
+claiming all territory compactly inhabited by
+them, which (said the Declaration) “cannot
+be mutilated without attaint to the vital
+interests of the community. Our nation
+demands nothing that belongs to others, but
+only what is its own.” On the one hand,
+this was an important counter-step to the
+partition of Dalmatia proposed in the Treaty
+of London; while on the other, it was a
+definite advance towards the solidification
+of the three peoples into nationhood. Consequently
+it was not without effect upon the
+German military leaders, who foresaw its
+influence upon the Southern Slav regiments
+of the Austro-Hungarian armies, and it undoubtedly
+hastened their decision to take
+direct control of the forces of the Dual
+Monarchy.</p>
+
+<p>The next move was made after the Italian
+armies had recovered from the disaster of
+Caporetto and had re-established their line<span class="pagenum" id="Page_24">[24]</span>
+on the Piave. On the initiative of Mr.
+Wickham Steed, Dr. Seton-Watson, and other
+members of the Serbian Society of Great
+Britain, conferences took place in London
+between leading Italians and Southern Slavs,
+with the aim of outlining a solution of the
+question which would be acceptable to the
+two nations. A memorandum of the discussions
+was given to the Prime Minister of
+Italy (Signor Orlando), who was then
+(January, 1918) in London. At Mr. Steed’s
+suggestion, Signor Orlando met Dr. Trumbitch
+and they discussed the question at
+great length, with the result that Dr. Trumbitch
+accepted an invitation from the Italian
+Premier to go to Rome.</p>
+
+<p>Before that visit took place, Dr. Torre, a
+prominent member of the Italian Parliament,
+was sent to London, as representative of an
+influential joint committee of the two Italian
+Houses of Parliament, to endeavour to
+establish a definite basis of agreement. After
+much negotiation the representatives of the
+two nations engaged themselves to settle
+amicably the various territorial controversies
+in the interest of the future good and sincere
+relations between the two peoples, on the
+basis of the principles of nationality and of
+the right of peoples to decide their own<span class="pagenum" id="Page_25">[25]</span>
+destiny. The linguistic and economic interests
+of such minorities as might have to
+be included in the national territory of either
+party were also guaranteed.</p>
+
+<p>This agreement of principle, made under the
+stress of war, coincided approximately with
+Lord Northcliffe’s entry into office. One
+of his first official acts was to dispatch Mr.
+Steed and Dr. Seton-Watson as a special
+mission to Italy. While there, they represented
+his department at the Congress of the
+Oppressed Hapsburg Nationalities which met
+with the consent of the Italian Government
+at Rome on April 7, 8, and 9, 1918. The
+holding of this Congress was, in itself,
+an important act of propaganda. This
+unprecedented assembly, representing
+Italians, Poles, Czecho-Slovaks, Southern
+Slavs, and Rumanes, resolved upon common
+action in the proclamation of the right of
+national unity of these peoples and also
+confirmed, in striking fashion, the decisions
+arrived at between Italians and Southern
+Slavs in London. Signor Orlando, Signor
+Bissolati and other Italian Ministers
+expressed publicly their adhesion to the
+resolutions, which were as follows:—</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot">
+
+<p>“The representatives of the nationalities
+subjected in whole or in part to the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_26">[26]</span>
+rule of Austria-Hungary—the Italians,
+Poles, Rumanes, Czechs, and Southern
+Slavs—join in affirming their principles
+of common action as follows:—</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot2"><p>“(1) <i>Each of these peoples proclaims
+its right to constitute its own nationality
+and State unity, or to complete it, and to
+attain full political and economic independence.</i></p>
+
+<p>“(2) <i>Each of these peoples recognises in
+the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy the instrument
+of German domination and the
+fundamental obstacle to the realisation of
+its aspirations and rights.</i></p>
+
+<p>“(3) <i>The assembly recognises the
+necessity of a common struggle against
+the common oppressors, in order that each
+people may attain complete liberation
+and national unity within a free State
+unit.</i></p></div>
+
+<p>“The representatives of the Italian
+people and of the Jugo-Slav people in
+particular, agree as follows:—</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot2"><p>“(1) <i>In the relations of the Italian
+nation and the nation of the Serbs, Croats
+and Slovenes—known also under the name
+of the Jugo-Slav nation—the representatives
+of the two peoples recognise that the
+unity and independence of the Jugo-Slav<span class="pagenum" id="Page_27">[27]</span>
+nation is a vital interest of Italy, just as
+the completion of Italian national unity
+is a vital interest of the Jugo-Slav nation.
+And therefore the representatives of the
+two peoples pledge themselves to employ
+every effort in order that during the war
+and at the moment of peace, these ends
+of the two nations may be completely
+attained.</i></p>
+
+<p>“(2) <i>They declare that the liberation
+of the Adriatic Sea and its defence against
+every present and future enemy is a vital
+interest of the two peoples.</i></p>
+
+<p>“(3) <i>They pledge themselves also, in
+the interest of good and sincere relations
+between the two peoples in the future to
+solve amicably the various territorial controversies
+on the basis of the principles of
+nationality and of the right of peoples to
+decide their own fate, and in such a way
+as not to injure the vital interests of the
+two nations, as they shall be defined at the
+moment of peace.</i></p>
+
+<p>“(4) <i>To such racial groups</i> (nuclei)
+<i>of one people as it may be found necessary
+to include within the frontiers of the other,
+there shall be recognised and guaranteed
+the right of their language, culture, and
+moral and economic interests.</i>”</p>
+</div></div>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_28">[28]</span></p>
+
+<p>Meanwhile, Lord Northcliffe and his experts
+had, in accordance with the principle
+consistently followed by Crewe House,
+determined the broad lines of policy upon
+which propaganda against Austria-Hungary
+was to be based. A memorandum on the
+subject was prepared and forwarded by Lord
+Northcliffe on February 24, 1918, to the
+Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs for his
+consideration and approval. The following
+are the principal points of the memorandum:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>“I have long been of opinion that it would
+be well to concentrate on Propaganda in
+Austria.</p>
+
+<p>“I have made a point of seeing every
+available person who has come out of Austria,
+including many Americans who returned to
+the United States when I was there. All
+shared the same view—that the Dual
+Monarchy entered the greater war in a halfhearted
+spirit; is weary of the war; has
+endured hardships approaching starvation;
+and realises that there is no benefit for Austria
+arising out of the war.</p>
+
+<p>“The control of the Presses of the various
+nationalities composing the Dual Monarchy
+is so absolute that the real facts of the war
+are unknown to the multitude. Germany is
+not idle in Austria or elsewhere.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_29">[29]</span></p>
+
+<p>“For example, the entrance of the United
+States into the war has been belittled, and
+described as mere American ‘bluff.’ Many
+subjects of Austrian nationalities had, before
+the war, considerable knowledge of the United
+States, owing to the great emigration to that
+country. They would realise the power of
+the United States if explained to them.</p>
+
+<p>“It is submitted with respect, therefore,
+that one of the first steps to be taken is to
+spread, through all available channels, accurate
+facts about the American preparations.</p>
+
+<p>“But, before making any beginning in
+that direction, or any others, I feel that I
+must be placed in possession of knowledge
+of the policy of the Allies as to the Dual
+Monarchy.</p>
+
+<p>“I should be greatly obliged if you would
+give me your opinion on the following suggestions,
+which are made after consultation
+with those well acquainted with Austria.
+If they merit your approval, it is suggested
+that they be submitted to the United States,
+France, and Italy.</p>
+
+<p>“It is suggested that there are two
+policies for the Department of Propaganda in
+Enemy Countries. In order that there may
+be no misunderstanding I have recapitulated
+elementary facts generally known.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_30">[30]</span></p>
+
+<p>“These two policies are as follows:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot2"><p>“(<i>a</i>) To work for a separate peace with
+the Emperor, the Court, and the aristocracy,
+on the principle of not interfering with the
+domestic affairs of the Hapsburg Monarchy,
+and of leaving its territory almost or quite
+intact; or</p>
+
+<p>“(<i>b</i>) To try to break the power of Austria-Hungary,
+as the weakest link in the chain of
+enemy States, by supporting and encouraging
+all anti-German and pro-Ally peoples
+and tendencies.</p></div>
+
+<p>“The (<i>a</i>) policy has been tried without
+success. The Hapsburgs are not free agents.
+They have not the power, even though they
+may wish, to break away from Germany,
+because—</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot2"><p>“(1) They are controlled by the internal
+structure of their dominions (the Dual System),
+which gives Germany decisive leverage
+over them through the Germans of Austria
+and the Magyars of Hungary; and</p>
+
+<p>“(2) Because the Allies cannot offer them
+acceptable terms without breaking with
+Italy.</p></div>
+
+<p>“It remains to try the (<i>b</i>) policy.</p>
+
+<p>“This policy is not primarily, or even, in
+the last resort, necessarily anti-Hapsburgian;
+it is not opposed to the interests of the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_31">[31]</span>
+Roman Catholic religion; and it is in harmony
+with the declared aims of the Allies.</p>
+
+<p>“The Empire of Austria contains some
+31,000,000 inhabitants. Of these less than
+one-third, <i>i.e.</i>, the 9,000,000 or 10,000,000
+Germans of Austria, are pro-German. The
+other two-thirds (including the Poles, Czecho-Slovaks,
+Rumanes, Italians, and Southern
+Slavs) are actively or passively anti-German.</p>
+
+<p>“The Kingdom of Hungary, including the
+‘autonomous’ kingdom of Croatia-Slavonia
+has a population of approximately 21,000,000
+of which one-half (Magyars, Jews, Saxons,
+and Swabians) may be considered pro-German,
+and the rest (Slovaks, Rumanes,
+and Southern Slavs) actively or passively
+anti-German.</p>
+
+<p>“There are thus in Austria-Hungary, as a
+whole, some 31,000,000 anti-Germans, and
+some 21,000,000 pro-Germans. The pro-German
+minority rules the anti-German
+majority. Apart from questions of democratic
+principle, the policy of the Allies should
+evidently be to help and encourage the anti-Germans.</p>
+
+<p>“The chief means of helping them may be
+specified thus:</p>
+
+<p>“(1) The Allied Governments and the
+President of the United States should insist<span class="pagenum" id="Page_32">[32]</span>
+upon their determination to secure democratic
+freedom for the races of Austria-Hungary
+on the principle of ‘government by consent of
+the governed.’ Expressions such as ‘self-government,’
+or ‘autonomous development’
+should be avoided, because they have a
+sinister meaning in Austria-Hungary and
+tend to discourage the friends of the
+Allies.</p>
+
+<p>“(2) For the same reason, statements that
+the Allies do not wish to ‘dismember Austria’
+should be avoided. The war cannot be won
+without so radical a transformation of Austria-Hungary
+as to remove its peoples from German
+control. The Hapsburgs may be driven
+to help in this transformation if Allied encouragement
+of the anti-German Hapsburg
+peoples is effective. By themselves the
+Hapsburgs cannot effect a transformation
+except in an increasingly pro-German sense.</p>
+
+<p>“(3) For propaganda among the anti-German
+peoples the agencies already existing
+should be utilised. These agencies are
+chiefly the Bohemian (Czecho-Slovak)
+National Alliance, the Southern Slav Committee,
+and various Polish organisations.</p>
+
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_33">[33]</span></p>
+
+<p>“(4) The present tendency of the Italian
+Government to shelve the policy embodied
+in the London Convention of April 26, 1915,
+and to adopt a policy of agreement with
+the anti-German races of Austria-Hungary
+should be encouraged and stimulated.</p>
+
+<p>“(5) The ultimate aim of Allied policy
+should be, not to form a number of small,
+disjointed States, but to create a non-German
+Confederation of Central European
+and Danubian States.</p>
+
+<p>“(6) The Germans of Austria should be
+free to join the Confederated States of
+Germany. They would, in any case, tend to
+secede from a transformed Austria, in which
+they would no longer be able to rule over
+non-German peoples.</p>
+
+<p>“In view of the great amount of cabling
+that will be necessary to achieve unity, may
+I ask you to let me have either your own
+suggestions, or your approval of those above
+mentioned, as speedily as possible?”</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>In his reply, Mr. Balfour wrote on February
+26, 1918:—</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot">
+<p>“Your very lucid memorandum raises in
+one shape or another the fundamental problem
+of the Hapsburg Empire. A final and
+authoritative answer to the question you
+put to me can only be given (if given at all)
+by the Cabinet, speaking in the name of the
+Government. But I offer the following observations
+on the subject, in the hope that<span class="pagenum" id="Page_34">[34]</span>
+they may help you in the immediate task for
+which you have been made responsible.</p>
+
+<p>“If the two alternative policies of dealing
+with the Dual Monarchy set forth in your
+paper were mutually exclusive, and if they involved
+distinct and even opposite methods of
+propaganda, our position would be even more
+difficult than it is. For what we can do with
+the Austrian Empire does not wholly depend
+upon our wishes, but upon the success of our
+arms and the views of our Allies, and, as
+these elements in our calculations cannot
+be estimated with certainty, we should inevitably
+remain in doubt as to which of the
+two mutually exclusive methods of propaganda
+it would be judicious to adopt.</p>
+
+<p>“Fortunately, however, our position is
+not quite so embarrassing. As you point
+out with unanswerable force, everything
+which encourages the anti-German elements
+in the Hapsburg dominions really helps
+to compel the Emperor and the Court to a
+separate peace, and also diminishes the
+efficiency of Austria-Hungary as a member
+of the Middle-Europe combination. The
+Emperor, by these means, might be induced,
+or compelled, fundamentally to modify the
+constitution of his own State. If he refused
+to lend himself to such a policy, the strengthening<span class="pagenum" id="Page_35">[35]</span>
+of the non-German elements might
+bring about the same end even more effectually
+than if he lent his assistance to the
+process. But in either case the earlier stages
+of that process are the same, and a propaganda
+which aids the struggle of the nationalities
+now subject either to Austrian Germans
+or to Magyar Hungarians towards freedom
+and self-determination, must be right, whether
+the complete break-up of the Austrian Empire
+or its de-Germanisation under Hapsburg
+rule be the final goal of our efforts.”</p>
+
+<p>When acknowledging this prompt reply,
+Lord Northcliffe pointed out that his anxiety
+to move as rapidly as possible was due to
+the belief of the Italians that a strong
+Austrian or Austro-German offensive against
+Italy would be launched within the next
+two months. “If our propaganda in Austria
+is to help to weaken this offensive, or to turn
+it into a defeat, it ought, in my judgment,
+to begin at once, and all the agencies we can
+command ought to be hard at work within a
+fortnight.</p>
+
+<p>“The representative of the American
+Propaganda Department is in London. The
+Italian will be here next week, and we could
+no doubt have a French representative at
+the same time.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_36">[36]</span></p>
+
+<p>“As to the memorandum, I am very
+pleased that you are in substantial agreement
+with the policy outlined. The two policies
+may not be mutually exclusive in the last
+resort, but it is very important that one or
+the other of them should be given absolute
+precedence. It would place me in an
+awkward predicament if, after basing
+vigorous propaganda on the (<i>b</i>) policy, I
+were confronted with some manifestation of
+the (<i>a</i>) policy on the part of the British or
+other Allied Government. For this reason
+I hope that the War Cabinet will not delay
+its own decision, and that it will try to get
+a decision from France, Italy, and the United
+States as quickly as possible.</p>
+
+<p>“It goes without saying that public
+declarations on behalf of the British, French,
+and Allied Governments, and, if possible, on
+the part of President Wilson, in the sense of
+the (<i>b</i>) policy would, if promptly made,
+greatly facilitate my efforts.”</p>
+</div>
+<p>Obviously the wise course was to place
+action in carrying out this policy on an Inter-Allied
+basis. Lord Northcliffe, therefore,
+convened meetings in London which were
+attended by Italian, French and American
+representatives. It was decided to organise
+a committee to arrange with France and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_37">[37]</span>
+Italy for united operations on the Italian
+front against the Austro-Hungarian armies.</p>
+
+<p>Accordingly, the special mission which
+Lord Northcliffe had sent to Italy, and of
+which Mr. Steed and Dr. Seton-Watson were
+the principal members, was entrusted with
+this task. With the willing support and co-operation
+of the Italian Prime Minister,
+the Italian Commander-in-Chief, and the
+British and French Commanders on the
+Italian Front, a permanent Inter-Allied
+Propaganda Commission was organised at
+the Italian General Headquarters. Italy
+provided the President (Colonel Siciliani) and
+one commissioner (Captain Ojetti) and Great
+Britain and France one commissioner each
+(Lieutenant-Colonel B. Granville Baker and
+Major Gruss respectively). To the Commission
+were attached, as a result of representations
+from Mr. Steed, representatives
+of committees of each of the oppressed
+nationalities. Mr. Steed, speaking on behalf
+of Lord Northcliffe, urged that only representatives
+of these races were fully qualified
+to speak to their co-nationals on the vital
+subjects which would form the theme of
+their propagandist productions.</p>
+
+<p>The Commission began work on April 18,
+1918. It acquired a polyglot printing press<span class="pagenum" id="Page_38">[38]</span>
+at Reggio Emilia. A weekly journal was
+published containing news (collected by a
+special Italian office ably organised by Professor
+Borgese at Berne) quadruplicated in
+the Czech, Polish, Southern Slav, and
+Rumanian languages. The assistance of the
+national representatives was valuable to the
+point of indispensability in ensuring accuracy
+of translation and suitability of contents.
+These representatives also composed leaflet
+manifestoes. Coloured reproductions of
+pictures of a patriotic, or religious, nature
+which appealed to the nationalist aspirations
+and piety of the races, were made. All this
+literary matter was dispatched straight to
+the front-line armies from the printing press,
+and distributed by means of aeroplanes (one
+per army being detailed for this purpose),
+rockets, which were constructed to hold
+about 30 pamphlets, and grenades, and also
+by contact patrols. These patrols were
+originally formed by bodies of troops raised
+on the responsibility of the various Italian
+armies, and were composed of deserters of
+Czecho-Slovak, Southern Slav, Polish, or
+Rumanian nationalities who had volunteered
+for this service against their hereditary
+enemy. They were wonderfully successful.
+The total number of leaflets and other<span class="pagenum" id="Page_39">[39]</span>
+productions thus distributed ran into many
+millions. But this by no means exhausted
+the channels of propagandist effort. Gramophone
+records of Czecho-Slovak and Southern
+Slav songs were secured by the British
+Commissioner and effectively used for the
+awakening of the nationalist sentiment among
+the troops of these races in the Austrian
+armies. The instruments were placed in
+“No Man’s Land,” and so close to each
+other were the front trenches of the opposing
+armies that the words and music could easily
+be heard.</p>
+
+<p>The Austro-Hungarian section of Crewe
+House, of which section Mr. Steed and Dr.
+Seton-Watson were the directors, maintained
+the closest touch with the Commission.
+Specimens of literature were exchanged
+between the Commission and other sections
+of Crewe House, and it was not uncommon
+for one news leaflet to appear in eight or ten
+different languages, with a total circulation
+of several millions of copies. The Austro-Hungarian
+section also necessarily kept in
+the closest touch with the Czecho-Slovak,
+Southern Slav, Polish, and Rumanian leaders
+and organisations in Allied and neutral
+countries. It also co-operated with Mr.
+S. A. Guest in the organisation of civil and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_40">[40]</span>
+secret channels in neutral countries by which
+propaganda literature could be introduced
+into Austria-Hungary.</p>
+
+<p>The effect of the launching of the propaganda
+leaflet campaign was soon apparent.
+Unrest became manifest among the Austro-Hungarian
+forces. Deserters belonging to
+the subject races came over to the Allied
+lines. This was one of the chief causes
+contributory to the postponements of the
+Austrian offensive carefully planned for April.
+When this attack was eventually made—in
+June—the Italian commanders, and their
+Allied colleagues, had full information concerning
+enemy plans and positions.</p>
+
+<p>But, unhappily, the propaganda, and,
+consequently, the military, campaigns were
+impaired by reactionary tendencies within
+the Italian Government. Had the Italian
+Government been prepared in May, 1918, to
+join with their Allies and Associates in making
+a joint public declaration in strong and unmistakable
+language in favour of the creation
+of a united and independent Southern Slav
+State and in recognising the Czecho-Slovaks
+as an Allied and belligerent nation, the result
+would undoubtedly have precipitated the
+collapse of Austria in the early part of the
+summer of 1918.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_41">[41]</span></p>
+
+<p>Instead of seizing the opportunity for this
+united and strong pronouncement which
+presented itself at a meeting of the Prime
+Ministers of Great Britain, France, and Italy,
+held at Versailles, on June 3, 1918, the following
+declarations were made:—</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot">
+
+<p>(1) The creation of a united and independent
+Polish State with free access
+to the sea constitutes one of the conditions
+of a solid and just peace and of
+the rule of right in Europe.</p>
+
+<p>(2) The Allied Governments have noted
+with pleasure the declaration made by
+the Secretary of State of the United
+States Government (in referring to the
+resolutions of the Rome Congress of
+Austro-Hungarian nationalities), and
+desire to associate themselves in an
+expression of earnest sympathy for the
+nationalistic aspirations towards freedom
+of the Czecho-Slovak and Jugo
+(Southern)-Slav peoples.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>The regrettable weakness of the second
+declaration, which followed very closely the
+wording of Mr. Lansing’s earlier announcement
+on behalf of the United States Government,
+was entirely due to the opposition of
+Baron Sonnino (Italian Foreign Minister),<span class="pagenum" id="Page_42">[42]</span>
+who rejected the stronger declarations prepared
+by Mr. Balfour and the French Foreign
+Minister, M. Pichon. It was a retrogressive
+step by Italy from the position she had taken
+at the Rome Congress, at which her Prime
+Minister had expressly associated himself
+with the terms of the Italo-Southern Slav
+agreement that recognised the “unity and
+independence of the Jugo-Slav nation as a
+vital Italian interest.” In regard to the
+Czecho-Slovaks, the British, French, and
+Italian Governments had already recognised
+the Czecho-Slovak Army, under the Bohemian
+National Council, as an Allied force.</p>
+
+<p>Towards the end of June, Mr. Lansing made
+considerable advance with a definite statement
+that the United States aimed at the
+complete liberation of all Slav peoples from
+Austro-German domination.</p>
+
+<p>While Lord Northcliffe and his associates
+were striving hard in London to retrieve the
+opportunities thus wasted, the propaganda
+organisation in Italy was making remarkable
+progress despite the vacillations of the politicians.
+Undoubtedly the reactionary attitude
+of Baron Sonnino at Versailles influenced
+adversely the response of the Southern Slav
+troops in the Austrian ranks to the appeals
+made by the propaganda leaflets. Nevertheless,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_43">[43]</span>
+there was a considerable amount of
+desertion from the Austro-Hungarian Army.
+Among the deserters were numbers of junior
+officers, not professional soldiers, but men who
+in private life were lawyers, merchants, and
+so on. These men were all led to come over
+by the prospect of liberation which the propaganda
+held out to them. Men of other ranks
+were induced to desert, either in order to
+join relatives among their co-nationals fighting
+in the Italian Army, of whom news had
+reached them through the propaganda agency,
+or else by the more elementary considerations
+of food, comfort, and safety. It was
+noticeable that nearly all the deserters
+brought with them copies of the leaflets
+distributed by the Allied Commission.</p>
+
+<p>That the propaganda had seriously alarmed
+the Austro-Hungarian authorities was made
+evident by reference to it in Army Orders and
+in the Austrian and German Press, which
+even reproduced some of the literary efforts,
+and vilified Lord Northcliffe in their most
+fervent manner. It even affected the minor
+tactics of the Austro-Hungarian Army, for
+it necessitated the detachment of machine-gun
+sections to deal with attempts at desertion
+<i>en masse</i> during the Piave offensive,
+which was eventually launched by the Austrians<span class="pagenum" id="Page_44">[44]</span>
+at the end of June. There was at
+least one authenticated account of a mutiny
+among Czech troops being suppressed by
+Germans and Magyars during that offensive.
+Desertions of single men or small parties were
+frequent before and during the action, and
+one case is known of a whole unit having
+come over. This was a company composed
+entirely of Jugo-Slavs. The Company Commander
+(Jugo-Slav and strongly Nationalist),
+on going his rounds a couple of hours before
+the attack began, gathered from his men’s
+conversation that they had no intention of
+fighting. He was able to bring his whole
+company over.</p>
+
+<p>The delay of the offensive, mainly on
+account of Allied propaganda, proved to be
+very important, because, when it came the
+Piave rose behind the Austrian army and
+converted the attack into something like a
+disaster. There is reason to believe that
+many ammunition dumps behind the enemy
+lines were blown up by the Czechs. A
+rumour was spread in the Press that the
+Southern Slavs had been fighting desperately
+against Italy, but this was officially denied.
+The divisions in question were a mixture of
+Germans, Magyars, Poles, and Ruthenes. It
+appeared that the Southern Slav divisions<span class="pagenum" id="Page_45">[45]</span>
+had been divided up and mixed with “reliable”
+troops, which showed that the
+Austrians were afraid of them. The prisoners
+taken, as a rule, expressed willingness
+to volunteer at once. Dalmatian prisoners
+showed great enthusiasm for Jugo-Slavia and
+the Allies.</p>
+
+<p>After the Piave battle, members of the
+Inter-Allied Propaganda Commission were
+received and thanked by the Italian Commander-in-Chief.
+General Diaz said that
+the victory was due in considerable measure
+to their efforts.</p>
+
+<p>In August the Inter-Allied Conference on
+Enemy Propaganda, convoked by Lord
+Northcliffe, met at Crewe House. In regard
+to propaganda against Austria-Hungary,
+the Committee formed to consider questions
+of policy found itself in complete agreement
+with the scheme of policy sanctioned by the
+British Government for purposes of Propaganda,
+and amplified by the decisions of the
+British, French, and Italian Governments
+at the time of, or in connection with, the
+Rome Congress of Oppressed Austro-Hungarian
+Nationalities. It recognised that such
+extensions of policy, while springing from
+considerations of Allied principles, had, in
+part, corresponded to the real demands of the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_46">[46]</span>
+propaganda situation, which, in their turn,
+had sprung from the exigencies of the
+military situation and, in particular, from
+the necessity of utilising the established
+principles of the alliance for the purpose of
+impeding or hampering the Austro-Hungarian
+offensive against Italy. Subsequent acts and
+declarations on the part of Allied Governments
+and of the Government of the United
+States made it clear that the joint policy
+of the Allies was tending increasingly towards
+the constructive liberation of the subject
+Austro-Hungarian races. The main task
+of the Committee in relation to propaganda
+in Austria-Hungary seemed, therefore, to be
+one of unifying for propaganda purposes
+these various acts and declarations, and of
+preparing, if possible, the way for a joint
+Allied declaration that might complete and
+render more effective the work of Allied
+propaganda both in the interior of Austria-Hungary
+and among Austro-Hungarian
+troops at the front. The Committee resolved
+to suggest that the Italian Government take
+the initiative in promoting a joint and unanimous
+public declaration that all the Allies
+regard the establishment of a free and united
+Jugo-Slav State, embracing Serbs, Croats, and
+Slovenes, as one of the conditions of a just<span class="pagenum" id="Page_47">[47]</span>
+and lasting peace, and of the rule of right in
+Europe. Such a declaration was actually
+made by the Italian Government, but so
+tardily that its propaganda effect was reduced
+to a minimum.</p>
+
+<p>Reports from the British Commissioner at
+Padua chronicled the uninterrupted continuance
+of the preparation and distribution
+of leaflets. The work was so developed that a
+distributing capacity of almost a million
+leaflets a day was obtained. Proof of the
+value of the work was afforded by the arrival
+of deserters, belonging to the subject races,
+in the Italian lines bringing with them the
+manifestoes and saying, “I have come because
+you invited me.” A special leaflet
+was prepared in London, with the co-operation
+of a member of the Southern Slav
+Committee, for distribution by aeroplane
+at various points on the Dalmatian coast,
+where Southern Slav insurgents were ascertained
+to be gathered in considerable numbers.
+A detailed description, compiled from official
+sources, of the overwhelming character of
+American war preparations (which the enemy
+was constantly belittling) was telegraphed
+to Padua for translation into Austro-Hungarian
+languages, and for distribution in
+leaflet form among Austro-Hungarian troops.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_48">[48]</span></p>
+
+<p>Progress was even made among the Magyars
+who had fought with remarkable ferocity
+on the Montello. The agrarian question
+that had troubled Hungary for some time
+was used for propaganda purposes and many
+Magyar desertions ensued. The constant
+efforts exerted an ever-increasing and cumulative
+influence on the enemy. The collapse
+of Bulgaria opened a new front for operations
+against Austria-Hungary and a Propaganda
+Commission under Lieutenant-Colonel Granville
+Baker was quickly organised on the lines
+of the Padua Commission and dispatched to
+Salonika. Operations were promptly started,
+but it soon became evident that the end
+was near. As the Allied armies on the
+Western fronts advanced, news of their progress
+and of Bulgaria’s defection was continually
+and promptly sent over the Austrian
+lines. There is no doubt that this contributed
+to the increased amount of desertion
+and disorder among the Austrian forces,
+culminating in the <i>débâcle</i> produced by the
+final Allied attack in October, which brought
+down the military and political organisations
+of the Dual Monarchy.</p>
+
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_49">[49]</span>
+Crewe House had every reason to be proud
+of the success of its work against Austria-Hungary.
+The conception of the whole
+propaganda campaign—its policy, its scope,
+its application—was due to Lord Northcliffe
+and the co-directors of the Austrian Section of
+his department, Mr. Wickham Steed and Dr.
+Seton-Watson. The results fully vindicated
+every basic principle of their propaganda
+strategy. There were difficulties to be overcome
+at every turn, of which political and
+personal ambitions abroad were not the
+least. To keep the work on the straight
+metals of uninterrupted progress necessitated
+unremitting vigilance and ceaseless consultation
+with the numerous interests concerned.
+The result was the greatest victory
+achieved by war propaganda—the culmination
+of a constructive campaign, which,
+could it have been extended to its logical
+conclusions, would have achieved a just
+and lasting peace, liberating millions of our
+fellow-men from a tyrannous yoke to the
+enjoyment of that political freedom which is
+the inalienable right of civilised mankind.</p>
+
+
+
+<div class="column"><figure class="figcenter illowp80" id="i_p032a" style="max-width: 100%;">
+  <img class="w100" src="images/i_p032a.jpg" alt="">
+  <figcaption class="caption">MR. H. WICKHAM STEED.<br>
+MEMBER OF THE ENEMY PROPAGANDA COMMITTEE, AND
+ONE OF THE DIRECTORS OF THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN SECTION.<br>
+<i>Photo: Russell, London.</i></figcaption>
+</figure></div>
+
+
+<div class="column"><figure class="figcenter illowp80" id="i_p032d" style="max-width: 100%;">
+  <img class="w100" src="images/i_p032d.jpg" alt="">
+  <figcaption class="caption">DR. R. W. SETON-WATSON.<br>
+CO-DIRECTOR OF THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN SECTION OF CREWE HOUSE.</figcaption>
+</figure></div>
+
+
+<div class="column"><figure class="figcenter illowp80"  id="i_p064a" style="max-width: 100%;">
+  <img class="w100" src="images/i_p064a.jpg" alt="">
+  <figcaption class="caption">MR. H. G. WELLS.<br>
+MEMBER OF THE ENEMY PROPAGANDA COMMITTEE,
+AND FIRST DIRECTOR OF GERMAN SECTION.<br>
+<i>“Daily Mirror” Photograph.</i></figcaption>
+</figure></div>
+
+<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_50">[50]</span></p>
+
+<h2 class="nobreak" id="CHAPTER_IV">CHAPTER IV<br>
+<span class="fs80">OPERATIONS AGAINST GERMANY</span>
+</h2>
+</div>
+
+<p class="sub">Early British neglect of propaganda—War Office establishes
+a department—Lord Northcliffe takes office—Mr. H. G. Wells’s
+and Mr. Hamilton Fyfe’s work—The final “intensive” campaign—Ways
+and means.</p>
+
+
+
+<p>The successful launch of the “propaganda
+offensive” against Austria-Hungary raised
+high hopes for the success of the corresponding
+campaign against the Germans on the
+Western Front. These hopes were shared
+by the Prime Minister, who wrote to Lord
+Northcliffe on May 16, 1918:—“It seems to
+me that you have organised admirable work
+in your Austrian propaganda.... I trust
+that you will soon turn your attention
+towards German propaganda along the
+French and British Fronts. I feel sure that
+much can be done to disintegrate the <i>moral</i>
+of the German army along the same lines as
+we appear to have adopted with great success
+in the Austro-Hungarian army.”</p>
+
+<p>For the first eighteen months of the war all<span class="pagenum" id="Page_51">[51]</span>
+propaganda had been sadly neglected by the
+British Government. Few realised its value,
+and officially it was regarded as an unimportant
+“side-line.” That it might be a weapon of
+warfare, equal in effect to several army
+corps, would at that time have been ridiculed.
+Money for such purposes was grudgingly
+spent, while the whole-hearted endeavours
+of a few enthusiasts were disparaged as the
+exuberances of harmless “cranks.”</p>
+
+<p>In October, 1914, Lieutenant-Colonel (now
+Major-General) Swinton, who was then acting
+as “Eye-Witness” with the British Army,
+prepared a propaganda leaflet, a reproduction
+of which appears in this book. To
+enable him to produce it, Lord Northcliffe lent
+the aid of his Paris organisation, and a large
+number of copies were printed and distributed
+by aeroplane among the German troops.
+But the Army chiefs at that time did not
+show any enthusiasm for the innovation, and
+Colonel Swinton was unable to proceed with
+the project.</p>
+
+<p>Propaganda against the enemy was, during
+a long period, almost a single-handed campaign
+by Mr. S. A. Guest. He struggled on,
+despite official discouragement or lack of
+encouragement, undeterred by all the vicissitudes
+through which British propaganda<span class="pagenum" id="Page_52">[52]</span>
+passed. Indeed, the early direction of
+British propaganda was like an epidemic; it
+occasionally took strange forms and occurred
+in unexpected places. Mr. Guest’s work was
+the institution and maintenance of those
+agencies by which propagandist literature
+was produced and smuggled into Germany
+and Austria-Hungary.</p>
+
+<p>Within the War Office, there were some
+in favour of propagandist activity, but for
+a long time they were in a minority. Early
+in 1916, Major-General (now Lieutenant-General)
+Sir George Macdonogh, K.C.M.G.,
+C.B., returned from France to become Director
+of Military Intelligence, and mainly owing
+to his efforts and those of Brigadier-General
+G. K. Cockerill, C.B. (then Director of
+Special Intelligence), a propaganda branch
+of the Military Intelligence Department of
+the War Office was established. From small
+beginnings, the activities of this branch grew.</p>
+
+<p>It was in the spring of 1916 that a sub-section
+of this branch began the preparation
+of leaflets in German for distribution among
+enemy troops. One use of the leaflets was
+to disprove the false beliefs spread among
+German soldiers that the British and French
+treated their prisoners with great severity.
+To counteract this, reproductions of letters<span class="pagenum" id="Page_53">[53]</span>
+actually written by German prisoners of war,
+photographs and descriptions of prisoners
+and their camps, and similar material, were
+prepared and distributed. As the political
+and social discontent in Germany increased
+it was thought useful that the German soldiers
+should be provided with more evidence of
+the internal conditions in their own country
+than their officers would allow them to have,
+and leaflets prepared from German sources,
+as, for instance, from suppressed editions of
+German pamphlets and newspapers, were
+scattered on the lines and rest billets.</p>
+
+<p>It then undertook the publication of
+an excellent weekly news-sheet, entitled
+<i>Le Courrier de l’Air</i>, containing news in
+French for circulation among the French
+and Belgian inhabitants of occupied districts.
+This newspaper, save for one short break,
+was regularly distributed by air until November,
+1918, and naturally was greatly
+valued by those who otherwise would only
+have received “news” from German sources.</p>
+
+<p>During 1917 reports obtained by the
+examination of prisoners and information
+derived from more secret sources showed that
+the propaganda campaign was achieving
+useful results, and the Directorate of Military
+Intelligence, in co-operation with the G.H.Q.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_54">[54]</span>
+in France, made arrangements for the work
+to be extended, until by the spring of 1918
+about a million leaflets monthly were being
+issued.</p>
+
+<p>The task of distribution of propaganda
+literature by air would have been simpler but
+for an extraordinary military decision. When
+this work was started by the military authorities
+the leaflets were dropped from aeroplanes.
+This method had the widest limits, and, at
+the same time, was the best means of carrying
+a large bulk and of distributing with accuracy.
+Perturbed by the success attained, the Germans
+threatened to inflict severe penalties
+upon airmen captured when performing such
+duties, and, on capturing two British airmen,
+followed their threats by action. Instead of
+instituting immediate reprisals, the British
+authorities tamely submitted and gave instructions
+for the discontinuance of the use of
+aeroplanes for the purpose.</p>
+
+<p>In consequence of this weak action, experiments
+had to be undertaken to find a substitute
+for the aeroplane. There were a
+number of possible, although inferior,
+methods. Hand and rifle grenades were
+devised to burst and shower leaflets over a
+limited area among enemy troops. Trench
+mortars would serve a similar purpose. But<span class="pagenum" id="Page_55">[55]</span>
+thanks to the progress of military meteorological
+science during the war and to several
+months’ patient experimenting with various
+devices, it was found possible to utilise
+specially adapted balloons. The Air Inventions
+Committee, the Munitions Inventions
+Department, the Inspectorate of H.M. Stores,
+Woolwich, Army Intelligence officers experienced
+in the use of silk balloons for other
+military purposes, and the manufacturers,
+all assisted the War Office in arriving at a
+result which proved to be effective and as
+nearly as possible “fool-proof.” Designs
+and apparatus were tested in the workshop
+and laboratory, at experimental stations
+near London, and on Salisbury Plain. They
+were taken out to France and tried under the
+actual conditions of war, and gradually each
+difficulty was overcome and each detail
+reduced to its simplest form.</p>
+
+<p>In its standard form in which it was being
+manufactured at the rate of nearly 2,000 a
+week the propaganda balloon was made of
+paper, cut in 10 longitudinal panels, with a
+neck of oiled silk about 12 inches long. The
+circumference was about 20 feet and the
+height, when inflated, over eight feet. The
+absolute capacity was approximately 100
+cubic feet, but the balloons were liberated<span class="pagenum" id="Page_56">[56]</span>
+when not quite taut, containing 90 to 95
+cubic feet of hydrogen. Hydrogen readily
+passes through paper, and the part of the
+experimental work that caused most trouble
+was the discovery of a suitable varnish, or
+“dope,” to make the paper gas-tight. After
+many disappointments, a formula was arrived
+at, the application of which prevented appreciable
+evaporation of the gas for two or three
+hours, and which left a balloon with some
+lifting capacity after thirty-six hours.</p>
+
+<p>The lifting power of a balloon is the
+difference between the weight of the hydrogen
+and the weight of the same bulk of air, <i>less</i>
+the weight of the balloon itself. The weight
+of the paper balloon was just over one
+pound; the available lifting power varied
+with the degree of tautness to which the
+balloon was filled, the height of the barometer
+and the temperature, but on the average, at
+ground level, the balloon as inflated would
+just support five and a half pounds. After a
+good deal of experiment the load of propaganda
+and releasing apparatus was fixed at
+four pounds and a few ounces, this allowing
+from 500 to 1,000 leaflets, according to their
+size, to be carried by each balloon, the
+balance of lifting power being sufficient to
+take the balloon sharply into the air to a<span class="pagenum" id="Page_57">[57]</span>
+height of five or six thousand feet. As a
+balloon rises the pressure of the air decreases
+and the contained hydrogen expands. In
+the earlier experiments the neck of the
+balloon was tied after inflation, and, to
+allow for expansion, the balloon was filled
+only to a little over two-thirds of its capacity.
+This was unsatisfactory; it reduced the load
+of propaganda and led to many failures from
+bursting and to great uncertainty as to
+where the load would fall. It was found
+more satisfactory to inflate the balloon
+nearly to its full capacity and to liberate
+it with the neck open, or with a large slit
+cut at the base of the neck, to allow the
+gas to escape as it expanded. At a height
+of, on the average, from 4,000 to 6,000 feet
+the escape of gas had reduced the free lift
+to a negative quantity, and the balloon would
+begin to drop slowly, but for the liberation of
+ballast.</p>
+
+<p>After several ingenious mechanical devices
+had been tested, a method of releasing
+leaflets by the burning of a fuse was adopted.
+A suitable length of prepared cotton wick,
+similar to that used in flint pipe-lighters,
+and burning evenly at the rate of five minutes
+to the inch, was securely threaded to a wire
+by which it was attached to the neck of the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_58">[58]</span>
+balloon. Several inches of the upper end
+were left free, and the load of leaflets was
+strung in small packets by cotton threads
+along the length of the fuse. As soon as a
+balloon was inflated and the loaded release
+attached, the free end of the fuse was
+cut to the required length, so as to burn
+for five, ten, or so many minutes, before the
+first packet was reached, the cut end was
+lighted, usually from the pipe or cigarette
+the soldier was smoking, and the balloon
+sent off on its journey. The release of each
+packet acted as a discharge of ballast, and
+the balloon, although continually losing gas,
+kept in the air until the end of its course.
+The arrangement used most frequently was
+designed for liberating the balloons a few
+miles behind the front lines and for distributing
+the leaflets from the enemy lines to
+a few miles behind them. The total length of
+fuse was twelve inches, giving an hour’s run.
+The first six inches were left free to be cut
+before lighting according to the position of
+the station and the strength of the wind; the
+load of propaganda was arranged over the
+second half-hour at intervals of two and a
+half minutes. Much longer fuses, with the
+load distributed at greater intervals, were
+used for longer runs. Experiment showed<span class="pagenum" id="Page_59">[59]</span>
+that the lateral scattering of the leaflets,
+dropped from a height of 4,000 feet and
+upwards, was considerable. The length of
+the track varied with the strength of the wind.</p>
+
+<p>The unit for distribution consisted of two
+motor lorries, which took the men, the
+cylinders of hydrogen, and the propaganda
+loaded on releases to a sheltered position
+selected in the morning by the officer in
+charge after consultation with the meteorological
+experts. The vans were drawn up
+end to end, separated by a distance of about
+ten feet, and a curtain of canvas was then
+stretched on the windward side between the
+vans, thus forming a three-sided chamber.
+The balloon was laid on the ground, rapidly
+filled, the release attached and lighted, and
+the balloon liberated, the whole operation
+taking only a few minutes.</p>
+
+<p>The load of the balloons was chosen according
+to the direction of the wind. If it was
+blowing towards Belgium, copies of <i>Le
+Courrier de l’Air</i> were attached; if towards
+Germany, propaganda leaflets for enemy
+troops. The experimental improvement of
+the “dope” with which the paper was treated
+in order to prevent loss of gas by diffusion,
+and the manufacture of balloons of double the
+standard capacity, had placed runs of upwards<span class="pagenum" id="Page_60">[60]</span>
+of 150 miles well within the capacity of the
+method before the Armistice suspended operations,
+but the bulk of the propaganda was
+distributed over an area of from 10 to 50
+miles behind the enemy lines. Fortunately,
+during the late summer and autumn of 1918
+the wind was blowing almost consistently
+favourable for their dispatch.</p>
+
+<p>When Lord Northcliffe took office in
+February, 1918, Austria-Hungary was the
+most urgent field for his operations, as has
+been explained. While Crewe House was
+concentrating upon that work he desired the
+War Office to continue on his behalf the
+admirable and assiduous work carried on
+since 1916. Early in May, 1918, Mr. H. G.
+Wells accepted Lord Northcliffe’s invitation
+to direct the preparation of propaganda
+literature against Germany, with the co-operation
+of Dr. J. W. Headlam-Morley.
+The first need was felt to be the definition
+of a policy to be followed against Germany,
+in order to prevent dissipation of energy
+and diversity of treatment. It was obvious
+that this propaganda policy must be in
+accord with the general policy of the Allies.
+In some points it followed the declared
+aims of the Allies; in others, it preceded the
+general policy as a pathmaker and pacemaker.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_61">[61]</span>
+Mr. Wells undertook to prepare a
+memorandum on the position of Germany at
+that time from the point of view of propaganda.
+This was submitted by Mr. Wells
+to the Enemy Propaganda Committee
+and fully discussed. A preface was prepared
+and upon the two statements was
+based a letter to the Secretary of State
+for Foreign Affairs, as in the case of the
+propaganda policy against Austria-Hungary,
+asking for the assent of the British Government
+to the policy therein contained.</p>
+
+<p>Mr. Wells’s memorandum was of the
+highest interest as a contemporary study of
+Germany, by a master of psychology, at that
+juncture when Germany was making her
+great (and, fortunately, her final) bid for
+world-mastery. The document possesses no
+little historical value; much that was prophetic
+has been forged into history by the
+rapid march of events; and the non-fulfilment
+of much of what has not attained to its
+consummation is due to lack of political
+wisdom in the chancelleries. Following is
+the text of preface and memorandum:—</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot">
+
+<p><i>Preface.</i></p>
+
+<p>“Propaganda in Germany, as in other
+enemy countries, must obviously be based<span class="pagenum" id="Page_62">[62]</span>
+upon a clear Allied policy. Hitherto Allied
+policy and Allied war aims have been defined
+too loosely to be comprehensible to the
+Germans.</p>
+
+<p>“The real war aim of the Allies is not only
+to beat the enemy, but to establish a world
+peace that shall preclude the resumption of
+war. Successful propaganda in Germany
+presupposes the clear definition of the kind
+of world-settlement which the Allies are
+determined to secure and the place of Germany
+in it.</p>
+
+<p>“The points to be brought home to the
+Germans are:—</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot">
+
+<p>“1. <i>The determination of the Allies to
+continue the war until Germany accepts
+the Allied peace settlement.</i></p>
+
+<p>“2. <i>The existing alliance as a Fighting
+League of Free Nations will be deepened
+and extended, and the military, naval,
+financial and economic resources of its
+members will be pooled until</i>—</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot">
+
+<p>“(<i>a</i>) <i>Its military purpose is achieved,
+and</i></p>
+
+<p>“(<i>b</i>) <i>Peace is established on lasting
+foundations.</i></p>
+</div></div></div>
+
+<div class="blockquot">
+
+<p>“German minds are particularly susceptible
+to systematic statements. They are<span class="pagenum" id="Page_63">[63]</span>
+accustomed to discuss and understand co-ordinate
+projects. The ideas represented
+by the phrase ‘Berlin-Baghdad’ and ‘Mittel-Europa’
+have been fully explained to them
+and now form the bases of German political
+thought. Other projects, represented by
+‘Berlin-Teheran’ and ‘Berlin-Tokyo’ are
+becoming familiar to them. Against these
+ideas the Allies have not yet set up any
+comprehensive and comprehensible scheme
+of world organisation. There is no Allied
+counterpart of Naumann’s ‘Mittel-Europa’
+which the neutral and the German Press
+could discuss as a practical proposition.
+This counterpart should be created without
+delay by competent Allied writers. It would
+form an effective basis for propaganda, and
+would work automatically.</p>
+
+<p>“It follows that one of the first requisites
+is to study and to lay down the lines of a
+practical League of Free Nations. The
+present alliance must be taken as the nucleus
+of any such League. Its control of raw
+materials, of shipping, and its power to
+exclude for an indefinite period enemy or
+even neutral peoples until they subscribe
+to and give pledges of their acceptance of its
+principles should be emphasised. It should
+be pointed out that nothing stands between<span class="pagenum" id="Page_64">[64]</span>
+enemy peoples and a lasting peace except
+the predatory designs of their ruling dynasties
+and military and economic castes; that
+the design of the Allies is not to crush any
+people, but to assure the freedom of all on
+a basis of self-determination to be exercised
+under definite guarantees of justice and fair
+play; that, unless enemy peoples accept
+the Allied conception of a world peace
+settlement, it will be impossible for them to
+repair the havoc of the present war, to
+avert utter financial ruin, and to save themselves
+from prolonged misery; and that the
+longer the struggle lasts the deeper will
+become the hatred of everything German in
+the non-German world, and the heavier the
+social and economic handicap under which
+the enemy peoples will labour, even after
+their admission into a League of Nations.</p>
+
+<p>“The primary war aim of the Allies thus
+becomes the changing of Germany, not
+only in the interest of the Allied League, but
+in that of the German people itself. Without
+the honest co-operation of Germany,
+disarmament on a large scale would be impossible,
+and, without disarmament, social
+and economic reconstruction would be impracticable.
+Germany has, therefore, to
+choose between her own permanent ruin by
+adhering to her present system of government
+and policy and the prospect of economic
+and political redemption by overthrowing her
+militarist system so as to be able to join
+honestly in the Allied scheme of world
+organisation.”</p>
+</div>
+
+
+<p class="cl"><span class="pagenum" id="Page_65">[65]</span></p>
+
+<div class="blockquot">
+<p>
+<i>Memorandum.</i><br>
+</p>
+
+<p>“It has become manifest that for the
+purposes of an efficient pro-Ally propaganda
+in neutral and enemy countries a clear and
+full statement of the war aims of the Allies is
+vitally necessary. What is wanted is something
+in the nature of an authoritative text
+to which propagandists may refer with confidence
+and which can be made the standard
+of their activities. It is not sufficient to
+recount the sins of Germany and to assert
+that the defeat of Germany is the Allied war
+aim. What all the world desires to know is
+what is to happen <i>after</i> the war. The real
+war aim of a belligerent, it is more and more
+understood, is not merely victory, but a
+peace of a certain character which that
+belligerent desires shall arise out of that
+victory. What, therefore, is the peace sought
+by the Allies?</p>
+
+<p>“It would be superfluous even to summarise
+here the primary case of the Allies,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_66">[66]</span>
+that the war is on their part a war to resist
+the military aggression of Germany, assisted
+by the landowning Magyars of Hungary,
+the Turks, and the King of Bulgaria, upon the
+rest of mankind. It is a war against belligerence,
+against aggressive war, and the
+preparation for aggressive war. Such it
+was in its beginning, and such it remains.
+But it would be idle to pretend that the ideas
+of the Governments and peoples allied against
+Germany have not developed very greatly
+during the years of the war. There has been
+a deepening realisation of the danger to
+mankind of existing political divisions and
+separations, a great experience in the suffering,
+destruction, and waste of war; a quickening
+of consciences against conquests, annexations,
+and subjugations; and a general
+clearing up of ideas that have hitherto stood
+in the way of an organised world peace.
+While German Imperialism, to judge by the
+utterances of its accredited heads, and by the
+behaviour of Germany in the temporarily
+disorganised States on her Eastern Front, is
+still as truculent, aggressive, and treacherous
+as ever, the mind of her antagonists has
+learnt and has matured. There has arisen
+in the great world outside the inner lives of
+the Central Powers a will that grows to<span class="pagenum" id="Page_67">[67]</span>
+gigantic proportions, that altogether overshadows
+the boasted <i>will to power</i> of the
+German junker and exploiter, <i>the will to a
+world peace</i>. It is like the will of an experienced
+man set against the will of an obstinate
+and selfish youth. The war aims of the anti-German
+Allies take more and more definitely
+the form of a world of States leagued together
+to maintain a common law, to submit their
+mutual differences to a conclusive tribunal,
+to protect weak communities, to restrain and
+suppress war threats and war preparations
+throughout the earth.</p>
+
+<p>“Steadfastly the great peoples of the world
+outside the shadow of German Imperial
+domination have been working their way
+to unanimity, while the ruling intelligences
+of Germany have been scheming for the base
+advantages of conquest; while they have
+been undermining, confusing, and demoralising
+the mentality of Russia, crushing down
+the subject peoples of the Austro-Hungarian
+Imperialism, and threatening and cajoling
+neutrals there has been a wide, free movement
+in the minds of their antagonists towards the
+restraint and wisdom of a greater and nobler
+phase in human affairs. The thought of the
+world crystallises now about a phrase, the
+phrase ‘The League of Free Nations.’ The<span class="pagenum" id="Page_68">[68]</span>
+war aims of the Allies become more and
+more explicitly associated with the spirit
+and implications of that.</p>
+
+<p>“Like all such phrases, ‘The League of
+Free Nations’ is subject to a great variety of
+detailed interpretation, but its broad intentions
+can now be stated without much risk of
+dissent. The ideal would, of course, include
+all the nations of the earth, including a
+Germany purged of her military aggressiveness;
+it involves some sort of <span class="smcap">International
+Congress</span> that can revise, codify,
+amend and extend international law, a
+supreme Court of Law in which States may
+sue and be sued, and whose decision the
+League will be pledged to enforce, and the
+supervision, limitation, and use of armaments
+under the direction of the international
+congress. It is also felt very widely that
+such a congress must set a restraint upon
+competitive and unsanctioned ‘expansionist’
+movements into unsettled and disordered
+regions, must act as the guardian of feeble
+races and communities, and must be empowered
+to make conclusive decisions upon
+questions of transport, tariffs, access to raw
+material, migration, and international intercourse
+generally. The constitution of this
+congress remains indefinite; it is the crucial<span class="pagenum" id="Page_69">[69]</span>
+matter upon which the best thought of the
+world is working at the present time. But
+given the prospect of a suitable congress
+there can be little dispute that the great
+Imperial Powers among the Allies are now
+prepared for great and generous limitations
+of their sovereignty in the matter of armaments,
+of tropical possessions and of subject
+peoples, in the common interest of mankind.
+The spectacle of German Imperialism, boastful,
+selfish, narrow, and altogether hateful,
+in its terrible blood-dance through Europe,
+has been an object-lesson to humanity against
+excesses of national vanity and national
+egotism and against Imperial pride. Among
+the Allies, the two chief Imperial Powers,
+measured by the extent of territory they
+control, are Britain and France, and each of
+these is more completely prepared to-day
+than ever it has been before to consider its
+imperial possessions as a trust for their
+inhabitants and for mankind, and its position
+in the more fertile and less settled regions of
+the world as that of a mandatory and trustee.
+These admissions involve a plain prospect
+and promise of the ultimate release and liberation
+of all the peoples in these great and
+variegated Empires to complete world-citizenship.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_70">[70]</span></p>
+
+<p>“But in using the phrase ‘The League of
+Nations,’ it may be well to dispel certain
+misconceptions that have arisen through the
+experimental preparation by more or less
+irresponsible persons and societies of elaborate
+schemes and constitutions of such a league.
+Proposals have been printed and published,
+for example, of a Court of World Conciliation,
+in which each sovereign State will be represented
+by one member—Montenegro, for
+example, by one, and the British Empire
+by one—and other proposals have been
+mooted of a Congress of the League of
+Nations, in which such States as Hayti,
+Abyssinia, and the like will be represented
+by one or two representatives, and France
+and Great Britain by five or six. All such
+projects should be put out of mind when the
+phrase ‘League of Free Nations’ is used by
+responsible speakers for the Allied Powers.
+Certain most obvious considerations have
+evidently been overlooked by the framers of
+such proposals. It will, for example, be
+a manifest disadvantage to the smaller Powers
+to be at all over-represented upon the
+Congress of any such League; it may
+even be desirable that certain of them should
+not have a <i>voting</i> representative at all, for
+this reason, that a great Power still cherishing<span class="pagenum" id="Page_71">[71]</span>
+an aggressive spirit would certainly attempt,
+as the beginning of its aggression, to compel
+adjacent small Powers to send representatives
+practically chosen by itself. The coarse fact
+of the case in regard to an immediate world
+peace is this, that only five or six great Powers
+possess sufficient economic resources to make
+war under modern conditions at the present
+time, namely, the United States of America,
+Great Britain, France, Germany, Japan, and,
+doubtfully, Austria-Hungary. Italy suffers
+under the disadvantage that she has no coal
+supply. These five or six Powers we may
+say, therefore, permit war and can prevent it.
+They are at present necessarily the custodians
+of the peace of the world, and it is mere
+pedantry not to admit that this gives them a
+practical claim to preponderance in the opening
+Congress of the World League. It may
+be pointed out that a small State with a
+voice in the discussions, but no vote in the
+decisions of the League, would logically be
+excused from the liability to assist in enforcing
+those decisions.</p>
+
+<p>“But this question of the constitution of
+a world Congress is not to be solved by
+making a coarse classification of States into
+large and war-capable Powers, and small
+and weak Powers. Take the case of Italy,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_72">[72]</span>
+for example: though she is almost incapable
+of sustaining a war against the world by
+herself because of her weakness in the matter
+of coal, she can as an ally be at once of
+enormous importance. Take the case of
+Spain again, a very similar case. And whatever
+the war ability of Latin-America may
+be to-day, there can be no question that this
+great constellation of States must count very
+heavily in the framing of the world of to-morrow.
+Then, again, we have to consider
+the vast future possibilities of the Chinese
+Republic, with coal, steel, and a magnificent
+industrial population, and the probable reconstruction
+of Eastern Europe and a renascence
+of Russia which may give the world a loose-knit
+but collectively-important Slavonic confederation.
+While an isolated small Power
+within the orbit of attraction of a large
+Power, a State of 5,000,000 people or less,
+must always remain a difficult problem in
+the world representation, it is clear that
+something like an adequate representation of
+small and weak Powers becomes possible so
+soon as they develop a disposition towards
+aggregation, for the purposes of world politics,
+into associations with States racially, linguistically,
+and historically akin to them. The
+trend of Allied opinion is to place not Peru<span class="pagenum" id="Page_73">[73]</span>
+or Ukrainia, nor Norway, nor Finland on a
+level with the United States of America or
+the British Empire at the League of Nations
+Congress, but to prepare the way for adequate
+representation through a preliminary Latin-American
+or a Slavonic or a Scandinavian
+Confederation, which could speak with a
+common idea at the World Congress.</p>
+
+<p>“It should be manifest that there is one
+Power whose splendid achievement in this
+war, and whose particular needs, justify her
+over-representation (as measured by material
+wealth, and millions of population) upon the
+Congress of the League, and that is France.
+It is open to question whether Italy should
+not also be disproportionately over-represented,
+seeing that she will not have, as
+Spain will have, the moral reinforcement of
+kindred nations over seas. And with regard
+to the British Empire, seeing that there
+exists no real Imperial legislature, it is
+open to consideration whether Canada, South
+Africa, and Australasia should come into the
+Council as separate nationalities. The Asiatic
+and African possessions of Britain and France,
+Belgium and Italy, possessions, that is,
+which have no self-government, might possibly
+for a time be represented by members
+appointed by the governing power in each<span class="pagenum" id="Page_74">[74]</span>
+case. These are merely suggestions here,
+indications of a disposition of mind, but they
+are suggestions upon which it is necessary for
+the Allied Powers to decide as speedily as
+possible. The effective working out of this
+problem of the League of Nations Congress by
+the Allies without undue delay is as vital a
+part of the Allied policy as the effective conduct
+of the war.</p>
+
+<p>“It has to be recognised that the institution
+of a League of Nations precludes any
+annexations or any military interference with
+any peoples whatever, without a mandate
+from the Congress of the League. The
+League must directly or indirectly become
+the guardian of all unsettled regions and
+order must be kept and development promoted
+by it in such derelict regions as
+Mesopotamia and Armenia, for example,
+have now become. In these latter instances
+it is open to consideration whether the League
+should operate through some single power
+acting as a mandatory of the League, or else
+by international forces under the control of
+the League as a whole. Theoretically the
+latter course is to be preferred, but there
+are enormous practical advantages in many
+cases to be urged for the former. The Allies
+have indeed had a considerable experience<span class="pagenum" id="Page_75">[75]</span>
+during the war of joint controls and joint
+expeditions; there has been a great education
+in internationalism since August, 1914;
+but nevertheless the end of the war is likely
+to come long before any real international
+forces have been evolved. It is, however,
+towards the ultimate use of international
+forces in such cases that the joint policy of
+the Allies is plainly and openly directed.</p>
+
+<p>“The bringing of the League into practical
+politics profoundly affects the question of
+territorial adjustment after the war. The
+Allies are bound in honour to follow the will
+of France in the matter of Alsace-Lorraine,
+and the rectification of the Italian frontier
+and the bringing of the bulk of the Italian-speaking
+population, now under Austrian
+dominion, into one ring-fence with Italy,
+also seem a necessary part of a world pacification.
+It is, however, of far less importance
+in the war aims of the Allies that this and that
+particular scrap of territory should change
+hands from the control of one group of combatants
+to that of the other, than that the
+present practical ascendency of German Imperialism
+over the resources of the Polish,
+Russian, Ukrainian, Czech, Jugo-Slav, Finnish,
+and Roumanian peoples should cease.
+The war aim of the Allies in Eastern Europe<span class="pagenum" id="Page_76">[76]</span>
+is to create in the place of the present Austro-Hungarian
+Empire a larger synthesis of
+associated States, something in the nature of
+an ‘East Central European League,’ within
+the League of Nations, a confederation that
+might possibly reach from Poland to the
+Black and Adriatic Seas, and have also access
+to, if not a port upon, the Baltic at Danzig.
+The Allies are necessarily obliged to wait
+upon the development of affairs in Russia,
+but the hopes and efforts of the Allies are
+towards a reconciliation of at least Great
+Russia, Siberia, and Ukrainia into a workable
+association within the League. It is premature
+to speculate upon the grouping of
+Finland at the present time. Relieved of the
+feverish and impossible ambitions the political
+weaknesses of these peoples have stimulated,
+a free and united Germany could then become
+one of the predominant partners in the World
+League of Free Nations. The Allies do not
+propose an unconditional return of the former
+African possessions of Germany, but they
+contemplate an over-ruling international
+<i>régime</i> in Africa between the Sahara and the
+Zambesi, restraining armament, reorganising
+native education, and giving absolute equality
+of trade to all the nations in the League.
+Such an international <i>régime</i> under the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_77">[77]</span>
+League may not be incompatible with the
+retention of national flags in the former
+‘possessions’ of the leagued Powers.</p>
+
+<p>“Exact territorial definition does not
+appear to the Allies to be of nearly such
+importance as the establishment of a common
+system of disarmament and a common effort
+to restore the ravages of the war. The full
+effect of the war is still not realised by the
+mass of the belligerent peoples, more especially
+in America and Western Europe,
+where life is still fairly comfortable. There
+has already been a destruction not merely of
+the political, but of the social order over
+great areas of the world, especially in Eastern
+Europe, and it is doubtful whether any peace
+can restore these disorganised areas to anything
+like their former productivity for many
+years. A universal shortage not merely of
+man-power, but of transport and machinery
+available for the purposes of peace cannot be
+avoided. It is doubtful, moreover, if social
+discipline in the ports of the British Empire
+and America will be strong enough to restrain
+an organised resistance to the use of German
+shipping after the war for any purpose and
+to the use of Allied shipping for the transport
+of goods to and from Germany on the part of
+Allied and neutral seamen and transport<span class="pagenum" id="Page_78">[78]</span>
+workers indignant at the U-boat campaign;
+moreover, there is a world-wide cry for a
+vindictive trade after the war against Germany,
+and for organised boycotts that may
+further restrict the process of economic world
+recovery. It is doubtful if the menace of
+these ‘revenge’ movements and the difficulty
+of controlling them in democratic States is
+properly appreciated in Germany. The militarist
+Government of Germany, fighting now
+for bare existence, is concealing from its
+people this world-wide disposition to boycott
+German trade and industry at any cost to the
+boycotting populations, and buoying them
+up with preposterous hopes of ‘business as
+usual’ as soon as peace is made. The fact
+has to be faced that while the present
+German Government remains no such economic
+resumption is possible. The ‘War after
+the War’ possibility has to be added to the
+economic destruction in Russia, Belgium, and
+elsewhere in any estimate of the situation
+after the war.</p>
+
+<p>“The plain prospect of material disorganisation
+thus opened should alone suffice to
+establish the absolute necessity for peace
+now of such a nature as will permit a world-wide
+concentration upon reconstruction, in
+good faith and without any complications of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_79">[79]</span>
+enmity and hostility. But in addition to the
+material destruction and dislocation, and
+to the ‘hatred’ disorganisation already noted,
+the financial transactions of the last few
+years have created a monetary inflation which,
+<i>without the concerted action of all the Powers</i>,
+may mean a collapse of world credit. Add
+now the plain necessity for continued armament
+if a real League of Nations is not
+attained. Without any exaggeration the
+prospect of the nations facing these economic
+difficulties in an atmosphere of continuing
+hostility, intrigue, and conflict, under a continuing
+weight of armaments, and with a
+continuing distrust, is a hopeless one. The
+consequences stare us in the face; Russia
+is only the first instance of what must happen
+generally. The alternative to a real League
+of Nations is the steady descent of our
+civilisation towards a condition of political
+and social fragmentation such as the world
+has not seen since the fall of the Roman
+Empire. The honest co-operation of Germany
+in the League of Nations, in disarmament,
+and in world reconstruction is, therefore,
+fundamentally necessary. There is now no
+other rational policy. And since it is impossible
+to hope for any such help or co-operation
+from the Germany of the Belgian<span class="pagenum" id="Page_80">[80]</span>
+outrage, the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, the betrayal
+of Ukrainia, <span class="allsmcap">THE CHANGING OF GERMANY</span>
+becomes a primary war aim, <i>the</i> primary war
+aim for the Allies. How Germany is to be
+changed is a complex question. The word
+<i>Revolution</i> is, perhaps, to be deprecated.
+We do not, for instance, desire a Bolshevik
+breakdown in Germany, which would make
+her economically useless to mankind. We
+look, therefore, not so much to the German
+peasant and labourer as to the ordinary,
+fairly well-educated mediocre German for
+co-operation in the reinstatement of civilisation.
+Change there <i>must</i> be in Germany;
+in the spirit in which the Government is
+conducted, in the persons who exercise the
+control, and in the relative influence of
+different classes in the country. The sharpest
+distinction, therefore, has to be drawn between
+Germany and its present Government
+in all our propaganda and public utterances;
+and a constant appeal has to be made by the
+statesmen of the Alliance, and by a frank and
+open propaganda through the Germans of the
+United States of America and of Switzerland,
+through neutral countries and by every possible
+means, from Germany Junker to Germany
+sober. We may be inclined to believe
+that every German is something of a Junker,
+we have to remember he is also potentially
+a reasonable man.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_81">[81]</span></p>
+
+<div class="blockquot">
+
+<p>“And meanwhile, the Allies must continue
+with haste and diligence to fight and defeat
+Junker Germany, which cannot possibly
+conquer but which may nevertheless succeed
+in ruining the world. They must fight the
+German armies upon the fronts, they must
+fight an unregenerate Germany economically
+and politically, and they must bring home
+to the German reason and conscience at
+home, by an intensive air war and by propaganda
+alike, the real impossibility of these
+conceptions of national pride and aggressiveness
+in which the German population has
+been bred.”</p>
+
+<p>These documents were used as a basis for
+the policy of Crewe House, which was summarised
+into seven parts in Lord Northcliffe’s
+subsequent letter to Mr. Balfour,
+extracts from which follow:—</p>
+
+<p>“I wish to submit to you the following
+general scheme of policy as a basis for
+British—and eventually Allied—propaganda
+in Germany. Propaganda, as an active form
+of policy, must be in harmony with the
+settled war aims of the Allies:—</p>
+
+<p>“1. The object of all propaganda is to
+weaken the will of the enemy to war and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_82">[82]</span>
+victory. For this purpose it is necessary to
+put in the forefront the ultimate object of
+the Allies, and the use which they would
+make of victory, for this is the matter with
+which the Germans are most concerned.
+We cannot, of course, expect that the war
+aims of the Allies should be determined solely
+by the effect which they may have upon the
+German people, but, on the other hand, it is
+clearly undesirable to put forward for propaganda
+purposes objects which it is not really
+intended to secure. It appears to me, however,
+that our war aims, as I understand
+them, are such as could, if presented in a
+suitable form, be made to do something to
+strengthen whatever ‘opposition’ exists in
+Germany.</p>
+
+<p>“2. From such information as is available
+as to the internal condition of Germany two
+points emerge which are of the greatest
+importance for immediate purposes:—</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot">
+
+<p>“(<i>a</i>) There is much evidence that the
+German people as a whole desire above
+all a cessation of the war. They are
+suffering more than their opponents, and
+war weariness has advanced further with
+them than it has with us. They acquiesce
+in the continuance of the present
+offensive chiefly because they are assured<span class="pagenum" id="Page_83">[83]</span>
+by their leaders that this is the only way
+in which a speedy peace can be achieved.
+It is, therefore, necessary to impress upon
+them that they are face to face with a
+determined and immutable will on the
+part of Allied nations to continue the
+war at whatever cost, notwithstanding
+German military successes, and that for
+this reason military success is not the
+way to bring about the peace they desire.
+It must be made plain that we are prepared
+to continue a ruthless policy of
+commercial blockade.</p>
+
+<p>“(<i>b</i>) Side by side with this we have
+another motive of the highest importance.
+One of the chief instruments of
+the German Government is the belief
+which they foster that any peace that
+the Allies would, if they had their way,
+impose would mean the internal ruin of
+Germany, and this again would mean that
+each individual German family would
+find itself without work, without money,
+and without food. As against this it is
+necessary to impress on the German
+nation that these results might happen,
+but that they can be avoided. They will
+happen if the Government of Germany
+continues to carry out its openly avowed<span class="pagenum" id="Page_84">[84]</span>
+design of subjecting the other free nations
+of Europe to its domination. They can
+be avoided if the German nation will
+resign these projects of domination and
+consent to accept the Allied scheme for
+a new organisation of the world.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>“These two points (<i>a</i>) and (<i>b</i>) must be
+kept in close connection; the first provides
+the element of fear, the second provides the
+element of hope.</p>
+
+<p>“3. The first point presents no difficulty
+to us; we can go ahead in full confidence
+that we are in harmony with both the nation
+and the Government. As to the second, on
+the other hand, I must ask for your guidance
+and support. Hitherto Allied policy and
+war aims have been defined too loosely to be
+comprehensible to the Germans, and there
+have been apparent inconsistencies, of which
+they have quickly taken advantage. Moreover,
+it has been possible for German writers
+to misrepresent our war aims as dictated by
+Imperialistic ambitions, similar in kind to
+those by which they are themselves actuated,
+and involving ‘annexations and indemnities,’
+such as have in the past been too often the
+result of victory in war. I take it that the
+real object of the Allies is, after defeating
+Germany, to establish such a world peace<span class="pagenum" id="Page_85">[85]</span>
+as shall, within the limits of human foresight,
+preclude another conflagration. It
+seems necessary, therefore, that the separate
+aims which would, of course, be maintained,
+such as the restoration of Belgium, the
+liberation of Alsace-Lorraine, the establishment
+of civilised government in Mesopotamia
+and Palestine, should be put forward in their
+proper places as individual but essential
+points in the general scheme for the settlement
+of world politics on a basis which would
+go far to remove the causes of future wars.</p>
+
+<p>“4. Any such scheme would, in effect,
+amount to the constitution of a ‘League of
+Free Nations.’ It is, I presume, generally
+understood that eventually Germany would
+be invited to take her place in such a League
+on condition that she accepted the principles
+of its foundation. Her admission to the
+League would be in itself her guarantee
+against the establishment of, <i>e.g.</i>, a hostile
+monopoly of raw materials. Our terms of
+peace, therefore, can be represented as the
+conditions on which Germany should be
+invited to take her part in such a League.
+In order to secure the economic benefits she
+would have to accept the political conditions.
+If this is so, the task of propaganda is
+greatly lightened, for it would be easier to<span class="pagenum" id="Page_86">[86]</span>
+put our aims in such a form as to make
+them to some extent acceptable to the
+moderate elements in Germany than if they
+were put forward merely as terms to be
+imposed on a defeated enemy.</p>
+
+<p>“5. It is, however, obvious that propaganda
+conducted on these lines will be of
+little use unless it is supported by public
+and authoritative statements from the Allied
+Governments. Otherwise, it would be represented
+that the real object is to beguile
+Germany into accepting a peace of renunciation,
+and that, as soon as this object
+has been achieved, these schemes will be
+repudiated, and a weakened Germany will
+find herself face to face with an Anglo-Saxon
+combination which aims at dominating the
+world, and keeping Germany permanently
+in a position of political inferiority.</p>
+
+<p>“6. No such statement has yet been made,
+so far as I am aware, by the British Government
+or by the Allies. What, therefore, I
+should venture to ask is for such support
+from you as will enable us to carry on our
+work with the full consciousness that we
+have behind us the support of His Majesty’s
+Government. If it were known that the
+Government itself, in conjunction with the
+Allies, was investigating the problem with<span class="pagenum" id="Page_87">[87]</span>
+a view to speedy action, this knowledge
+would give a great and needed incentive to
+the more popular work which we should be
+doing.</p>
+
+<p>“7. I am well aware of the very great
+practical difficulties which are bound to arise
+so soon as an attempt is made to give formal
+expression to the general idea of a ‘League of
+Free Nations.’ But for the purposes of our
+work, it is of the most urgent importance
+that some statement of this kind should be
+put forward at the earliest possible date.
+Such a statement would in effect be an offer
+to the Germans of peace on stated conditions.
+If it were accepted, Germany would be able
+shortly after the conclusion of the war to
+come into the new society of nations; if it
+were refused, the war would have to continue.
+But it should also be made clear to the
+German people that the privilege of admission
+to this society would inevitably be
+postponed for a period proportional to the
+length of time that they continued the
+war.”</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>In answer to an inquiry, Lord Northcliffe
+wrote a supplementary letter, dealing with
+propaganda policy as to the German colonies.
+The following is an extract:—</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>“I have no settled views as to the future<span class="pagenum" id="Page_88">[88]</span>
+of what were the German colonies, beyond a
+very strong conviction that they must never
+again be allowed to fall, for any military or
+naval purpose, under German control. But,
+broadly, my feeling is this: The whole
+situation of the Allies in regard to Germany
+is governed by the fact that Germany is
+responsible for the war. The Allies are,
+therefore, entitled to demand from her restitution,
+reparation, and guarantees as preliminary
+conditions of any peace settlement.
+The territories which the Allies have taken
+from Germany in the course of their legitimate
+self-defence do not come into the same
+category as the territories seized by Germany,
+and the allies of Germany, in the course of
+their predatory aggression. To contemplate
+barter or exchange between one set of territories
+and the other would be to assimilate,
+by implication, the moral situation of the
+Allies to that of Germany. Therefore, however
+closely we may study the question, or
+rather the questions—for there are several—of
+the German colonies, we ought to make it
+clear that the ultimate settlement of those
+questions will be reserved for treatment by
+the Allies as a fighting league of free nations,
+or by the general League of Nations should
+the behaviour of Germany entitle her to<span class="pagenum" id="Page_89">[89]</span>
+admission to it in time to take part in any
+scheme of world reorganisation.”</p></div>
+
+<p>The policy laid down in these letters was
+approved by the Government as a basis for
+propaganda, and Mr. Wells was able to
+develop his work in many directions.</p>
+
+<p>He kept in close touch with the different
+organisations at home and abroad which were
+endeavouring to promote the League of
+Nations. In conjunction with Mr. Steed,
+Mr. Wells assisted in the drawing up of a restatement
+of the aims of the League of Nations
+Society in Great Britain and in the formation
+of a new association for the study of the
+problems arising out of the League proposal.
+This movement was always kept prominently
+before the German mind, for it was a threat
+of future isolation, with its resultant economic
+disabilities, and yet was an invitation to
+national repentance.</p>
+
+<p>A second line of action was designed to
+appeal to the German workers. For this
+purpose Mr. Wells arranged, among other
+things, for the preparation and issue of a
+short and compact summary of the British
+Labour War Aims, which was subsequently
+used with much effectiveness not only in
+Germany but also in Austria.</p>
+
+<p>Economic conditions, both during and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_90">[90]</span>
+after the war, were made by Mr. Wells and
+his co-workers the subject of systematic and
+scientific study with the object of undertaking
+a propaganda of economic discouragement
+and persuasion in Germany. Signs were not
+lacking of the existence of misgivings among
+the commercial communities in that country
+at the prospect of loss of commerce, ships,
+and colonies in the case of defeat. Here was
+an opportunity to bring home to the Germans
+the conviction that the longer they persisted
+in continuing the war, so would their loss and
+sufferings increase.</p>
+
+<p>Unfortunately, in July, Mr. Wells found
+himself unable to continue the direction of
+the German Section and, at his request, the
+Enemy Propaganda Committee accepted his
+resignation of that office, although he retained
+his membership of the Committee.
+Mr. Hamilton Fyfe was appointed to succeed
+him and continued in the important post
+until the end. Mr. Fyfe developed the work
+along the lines already laid down.</p>
+
+<p>From the time of Mr. Wells’s appointment,
+Crewe House and the enemy propaganda
+section of the Military Intelligence Department
+maintained close touch with each other,
+but in July, 1918, Lord Northcliffe wrote to
+the Secretary of State for War expressing his<span class="pagenum" id="Page_91">[91]</span>
+considered view that it would be advisable
+that British propaganda agencies against the
+enemy should, both for technical reasons and
+in order to preclude possible differences of
+statement in propaganda literature, as far as
+possible be closely co-ordinated. While gladly
+recognising the most friendly relations which
+had been cultivated between his department
+and the enemy propaganda branch of the
+War Office, through Major the Earl of Kerry,
+Lord Northcliffe thought that the time had
+come for the whole of the work of production
+to be centralised at Crewe House. This did
+not alter the arrangements for distribution
+through military channels which were always
+admirably organised and carried out by the
+military authorities. And, as a matter of
+fact, a large proportion of the literature,
+apart from the “priority” leaflets referred to
+hereinafter, was produced by the War Office
+on Lord Northcliffe’s behalf. Lord Northcliffe
+asked for urgent consideration of the
+matter, in view of the necessity for the intensification
+and extension of propaganda on the
+Western Front. On Lord Milner’s agreeing to
+this reorganisation, it was arranged that the
+services of Captain P. Chalmers Mitchell, who,
+well-known in civil life as a distinguished
+man of science, had been the officer immediately<span class="pagenum" id="Page_92">[92]</span>
+in charge of this enemy propaganda
+branch, should be transferred to Crewe House.
+He was a valuable acquisition, and his
+experience, knowledge, and counsel were of
+great practical service. Captain Chalmers
+Mitchell also acted as liaison officer with the
+War Office (in succession to Lord Kerry) and
+with the Royal Air Force, and, in conjunction
+with Mr. Hamilton Fyfe, co-ordinated production
+and distribution.</p>
+
+<p>This centralisation soon bore fruit. One
+of the earliest developments aimed at abolishing
+the delays which might have caused the
+contents of leaflets to become stale owing to
+the time which elapsed between their composition
+and their distribution. This defect
+was obviated by dividing the leaflets into two
+classes, namely, “priority” leaflets for those
+of a news character and “stock” leaflets
+with matter of a less urgent nature.</p>
+
+<p>A time-table was prepared for the “priority”
+leaflets in which the time allotted for the
+different processes of composition, translation,
+printing, transport to France, and distribution,
+was cut down to an absolute
+minimum. With the willing aid of Messrs.
+Harrison and Son, the printers, and of
+Messrs. Gamage, who undertook the work of
+attaching the leaflets to the “releases,” it<span class="pagenum" id="Page_93">[93]</span>
+was found possible to arrange for these news
+bulletins to be in the hands of the Germans
+within approximately forty-eight hours of
+their being written. Three times a week a
+consignment of not fewer than 100,000 leaflets
+of this character was rushed over to
+France for prompt dispatch to the Germans.
+This “speeding-up” became a factor of the
+highest importance when military events
+moved so rapidly in the closing months of
+the war.</p>
+
+<p>In June and July the number of leaflets
+dropped over the German lines and behind
+them totalled 1,689,457 and 2,172,794 respectively.
+During August an average of
+over 100,000 a day was attained, the actual
+number of leaflets issued by the Enemy
+Propaganda Department in that month being
+3,958,116, in September 3,715,000, and in
+October 5,360,000, while in the first ten days
+of November, before the Armistice put an
+end to such activities, 1,400,000 were sent
+out. The Germans were greatly disturbed.
+One of their writers described the flood of
+leaflets picturesquely as “English poison
+raining down from God’s clear sky.”
+Marshal von Hindenburg, in his autobiography,
+“Out of My Life” (Cassell &amp; Co.),
+admits that this propaganda intensified the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_94">[94]</span>
+process of German demoralisation. “This
+was a new weapon,” he continues, “or rather
+a weapon which had never been employed on
+such a scale and so ruthlessly in the past.”</p>
+
+<p>The leaflets were written in simple language,
+and aimed at letting the Germans
+know the truth which was being concealed
+from them by their leaders. They gave
+information as to the progress of the war
+in all theatres, and showed at a glance, by
+means of shaded maps, the territory gained
+by the Associated Nations. Great stress
+was laid upon the large number of troops
+arriving daily from the United States. While,
+by the use of diagrams, the steadily progressive
+increase of the American forces
+was strikingly illustrated, German losses
+and the consequent futility of making further
+sacrifices in a losing cause were strongly
+emphasised. We have again the testimony
+of Hindenburg’s autobiography as to the
+effect on the German troops: “Ill-humour
+and disappointment that the war seemed
+to have no end, in spite of all our victories,
+had” (he writes) “ruined the character of
+many of our brave men. Dangers and hardships
+in the field, battle and turmoil, on
+top of which came the complaints from home
+about many real and some imaginary privations!<span class="pagenum" id="Page_95">[95]</span>
+All this gradually had a demoralising
+effect, especially as no end seemed to be in
+sight. In the shower of pamphlets which was
+scattered by enemy airmen our adversaries
+said and wrote that they did not think so
+badly of us; that we must only be reasonable
+and perhaps here and there renounce something
+we had conquered. Then everything
+would be soon right again and we could live
+together in peace, in perpetual international
+peace. As regards peace within our own
+borders, new men and new Governments
+would see to that. What a blessing peace
+would be after all the fighting! There was,
+therefore, no point in continuing the struggle.
+Such was the purport of what our men read
+and said. The soldier thought it could not
+be all enemy lies, allowed it to poison his
+mind, and proceeded to poison the minds of
+others.”</p>
+
+<p>Despite such compliments as to the effectiveness
+of the distribution, this branch of
+the work provided the thorn in the Crewe
+House flesh. Distribution by aeroplane was
+the ideal method, and the decision to discontinue
+the use of aeroplanes for the purpose
+was a serious handicap to Lord Northcliffe’s
+work. Balloon distribution was dependent
+upon favourable winds, and could only be<span class="pagenum" id="Page_96">[96]</span>
+performed in one direction, whereas aeroplanes
+could cover a much more extensive
+area at great speed. On several occasions
+Lord Northcliffe pressed for the resumption
+of their use. Lord Milner replied to the first
+request, early in May, to the effect that the
+British authorities were disputing the German
+contention that the distribution of literature
+from aeroplanes was contrary to the laws of
+war, and had given notice that they intended
+to institute prompt reprisals if they received
+information that any British airmen were
+undergoing punishment for similar action.
+Although distribution by aeroplane on the
+Western Front had been temporarily suspended,
+they held themselves free at any
+moment to resume it, and stated that meanwhile
+literature would be distributed by
+other and, as they thought, more effective
+means. <i>Yet it was admitted that there had been
+no stoppage of the use of aeroplanes for the
+purpose on the Italian Front.</i></p>
+
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_97">[97]</span></p>
+
+<p>A month later, Lord Northcliffe again
+wrote, asking if anything had been done to
+cancel the temporary suspension of the
+distribution of leaflets by aeroplane on the
+Western Front. He and his co-workers felt
+strongly that propaganda work against Germany
+was being severely handicapped by disuse
+of this method of distribution, especially
+as, according to his information, the Germans
+themselves continued to drop leaflets over
+the British lines from aeroplanes. He
+could not believe that distribution by balloon
+was as accurate or as effective. It was a
+curious commentary on the British attitude
+that the French continued to use aeroplanes
+for the purpose on the Western Front.</p>
+
+<p>Many weeks passed before the War Cabinet
+agreed to the resumption of the use of aeroplanes,
+and even then the Air Ministry raised
+further objection. Finally, all obstacles were
+overcome, but not until the end of October.
+In one week 3,000,000 leaflets were prepared
+for the interior of Germany, and the distribution
+of these was begun just before the
+Armistice.</p>
+
+<p>With the turn of the tide of military events
+in the summer of 1918, propaganda had assumed
+greater importance than ever. Military
+defeat rendered the German soldier more
+amenable to propagandist influences, to which
+in victory he could afford to turn a blind
+eye and deaf ear. Moreover, the Allied
+successes seriously disturbed the German
+nation, and as the news was disseminated
+by the various agencies carefully organised
+by Crewe House the spirit of the people<span class="pagenum" id="Page_98">[98]</span>
+became generally depressed. The commercial
+classes exhibited great fear at the threatened
+economic war. Thus the soil became fertilised
+for the reception of propagandist
+views. One obvious but important way of
+spreading such views was by ensuring that
+important speeches of leading British statesmen
+should be adequately and promptly
+reported in enemy countries. Means were
+found of accomplishing this object. When
+occasion arose, publication in neutral newspapers
+of interviews with British public men
+on important subjects was arranged for, and
+these were widely quoted in the enemy
+Press.</p>
+
+<p>The valuable material collected by Mr.
+Wells on British progress in those lines of
+industry in which Germany had excelled
+was used by Mr. Fyfe in many ways. Articles
+on the subject were sent to, and published
+by, German-Swiss papers, which were known
+to be much read in Germany. Pamphlets
+were written in German in tones of serious
+warning and distributed through channels
+prepared by the perseverance and ingenuity
+of Mr. S. A. Guest. By these means, also, a
+large number of descriptive catalogues of an
+exhibition in London of British scientific
+products were introduced into Germany and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_99">[99]</span>
+were snapped up and read with avidity.
+Treatment of these issues was found to
+influence enlightened German opinion more
+than any other kind of propaganda.</p>
+
+<p>From time to time special topics were
+selected. For instance, a series of “London
+Letters” was sent to Swiss and Scandinavian
+papers purporting to be written with a pro-German
+flavour, but containing, under this
+disguise, a true picture of food and other
+conditions in Great Britain. It was gratifying
+to find these reprinted in enemy papers, for
+the German reader was thus led to institute
+mental comparisons with the much worse
+conditions prevalent in Germany. Secret
+means, too, were found to circulate in
+German naval ports, as a deterrent to men
+picked for service in submarines, leaflets (of
+which a reproduction appears in this
+volume) containing a long list of U-boat
+commanders, dead or captured, with description
+of their rank. Particulars so easy
+of verification proved the mastery of the
+British Navy over the U-boat campaigners
+and created great depression in the German
+ports.</p>
+
+<p>In addition to the “priority” leaflets
+containing news of Allied successes, illustrated
+with shaded maps and diagrams, a<span class="pagenum" id="Page_100">[100]</span>
+“trench newspaper” was prepared in a style
+which exactly resembled a German publication.
+The propaganda pill was coated to
+make it attractive. The newspaper was
+homely in appearance—its title-decoration
+included a head of the Kaiser—and it
+provided excellent reading matter which
+would appeal to the German soldier, while
+revealing facts hitherto carefully hidden from
+him. As many as from 250,000 to 500,000
+copies of each weekly issue were distributed.
+Some leaflets, on the other hand, were in
+religious vein, for there is a deep religious
+strain in the German character. These
+leaflets pointed out that their military defeats
+were a just retribution for the crimes of their
+Government. One was a little sermon on
+the text “Be sure your sin will find you
+out.”</p>
+
+<p>With knowledge of the dwindling of their
+own reserves, the Germans became increasingly
+anxious about the supply of American
+troops, artillery, and munitions. No opportunity
+was lost by Crewe House of keeping
+the enemy armies and civil populations fully
+aware of the wonderful extent of the American
+effort. A series of leaflets was prepared which
+gave in succinct and vigorous form the latest
+details about that effort, both in the field<span class="pagenum" id="Page_101">[101]</span>
+and at home in the factory, the shipyard and
+the farm.</p>
+
+<p>British propagandist work against Germany
+was both positive and negative.
+Its aim was to give the German people
+something to hope for in an early peace
+and much to fear from the prolongation of
+the war—that is, to make it clear to them
+that the only way to escape complete ruin
+would be to break with the system that
+brought the war upon Europe, and to qualify
+for admission eventually into the League of
+Nations on the Allied terms. In addition to
+these very necessary educative efforts, the
+enemy armies were supplied with constant
+and <i>invariably truthful</i> information about the
+actual military position. Its veracity was a
+more essential factor to its success than its
+quantity. The news withheld by the German
+authorities was supplied by us. Hence the
+cries of alarm from Marshal von Hindenburg
+and General von Hutier, to which fuller
+reference is made in the next chapter.</p>
+
+<p>In the “intensive propaganda” of the last
+few weeks of hostilities the Hohenzollern
+Government was denounced. It was pointed
+out that all Germany’s sufferings and tribulations
+were due to its “Old Gang,” of which a
+clean sweep would have to be made before<span class="pagenum" id="Page_102">[102]</span>
+the world would make friends or do business
+with Germans again. Chapter and verse
+were given to prove that the German Government
+could not be trusted, and that it was
+a great obstacle to peace. Attention, too,
+was drawn to the changes then taking place
+in Germany, to the cries raised for the abdication
+of the Emperor, and to the growing
+demand for the punishment of all who had
+brought Germany to her disastrous situation.
+German soldiers were urged to consider
+whether it was worth while to risk being
+killed when they had nothing left to fight for,
+and it was suggested that their best course
+was to make off to their homes and ensure
+the safety of their families. The consequences
+to Germans of the continuation of the war
+were plainly indicated. Maps and diagrams
+showed at a glance how Allied air raids over
+Germany had increased in number, how
+larger and larger Allied air squadrons and
+more powerful bombs were being provided
+and how easily it would be possible to attack
+Berlin, Hamburg, Hanover, and other places
+which had previously escaped. A map was
+also prepared showing all the steamship
+routes by which food, munitions, and raw
+materials were being brought to Great Britain
+and France, and demonstrating the falsity<span class="pagenum" id="Page_103">[103]</span>
+of the German leaders’ assurance that we
+could be starved into submission.</p>
+
+<p>By the courtesy of the Admiralty and of
+the Ministry of Information, use was regularly
+made of wireless telegraphy as a means of
+disseminating information, combating false
+German statements, and influencing German
+opinion through neutral newspapers and
+public opinion.</p>
+
+<p>Many other agencies for introducing
+propagandist material into enemy countries
+were organised by Mr. Guest, whose work
+demanded extraordinary patience and perseverance.
+He experimented with many
+methods, and, despite the vigilance of the
+Germans, the inflow into Germany increased.
+Some of the methods can never be revealed,
+but it is permissible to hint that, for instance,
+among foreign workmen of a certain nationality
+who went into Germany each morning
+and returned each evening there might be
+some to whom propagandist work was not
+uncongenial. And, of course, all secret
+agents were not necessarily Allies or neutrals.
+Somehow, huge masses of literature were
+posted in Germany to selected addresses
+from which the German postal revenues
+derived no benefit. Easiest of all were
+certain obvious channels left wholly or partially<span class="pagenum" id="Page_104">[104]</span>
+open in most incredible fashion, as, for
+instance, the book trade, which was by no
+means as closely supervised as might have
+been expected. None were more amazed
+at the facility with which such valuable
+propaganda material as Prince Lichnowsky’s
+pamphlet achieved clandestine circulation in
+Germany and Austria than were British
+propagandists. Perhaps, as a gratuitous
+hint to the curious, it may be added that the
+outside covers with titles of works by revered
+German authors did not always correspond
+to the contents of the books, but, oft-times,
+as the poet said, “things are not what
+they seem.”</p>
+
+<p>Personal propaganda among enemy subjects
+resident in neutral countries—and especially
+those unsympathetic to the perverted
+ideals of their respective nations—was tactfully
+pursued. Neutrals in prominent
+positions in any walk of life whose views
+were likely to react on enemy opinion were
+brought within the orbit of salutary personal
+intercourse. Enemy newspaper correspondents
+were carefully “nursed.” No
+avenue of approach into enemy countries
+was considered too insignificant, for each
+had its particular use.</p>
+
+
+<div class="column"><figure class="figcenter illowp80"  id="i_p064c" style="max-width: 100%;">
+  <img class="w100" src="images/i_p064c.jpg" alt="">
+  <figcaption class="caption">MR. HAMILTON FYFE.<br>
+SUCCEEDED MR. H. G. WELLS AS DIRECTOR OF THE
+GERMAN SECTION.<br>
+<i>Photo: Elliott &amp; Fry, Ltd.</i></figcaption>
+</figure></div>
+
+<div class="column"><figure class="figcenter illowp80"  id="i_p096a" style="max-width: 100%;">
+  <img class="w100" src="images/i_p096a.jpg" alt="">
+  <figcaption class="caption">CAPTAIN CHALMERS MITCHELL.</figcaption>
+</figure></div>
+
+<div class="column"><figure class="figcenter illowp80" id="i_p080a" style="max-width: 100%;">
+  <img class="w100" src="images/i_p080a.jpg" alt="">
+  <figcaption class="caption">BRIGADIER-GENERAL G. K. COCKERILL, C.B.<br>
+[DEPUTY-DIRECTOR OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, 1918.]<br>
+<i>Photo: Russell, London.</i></figcaption>
+</figure>
+</div>
+
+
+
+<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_105">[105]</span></p>
+
+<h2 class="nobreak" id="CHAPTER_V">CHAPTER V<br>
+<span class="fs80">TRIBUTES FROM THE ENEMY</span>
+</h2>
+</div>
+
+
+<p class="sub">Hindenburg’s outburst: German Press Comments: Ludendorff
+on the conduct and effect of British Propaganda against the
+Central Powers.</p>
+
+
+
+<p>The Press of the enemy countries was
+closely watched for references to British
+propaganda in editorial articles or in the
+reports of utterances of political and military
+leaders. During August, 1918, the
+misgivings engendered by the trend of
+events, as revealed by our propaganda,
+found expression in print. Then, as if
+a pent-up stream had at last carried
+away the dam, came a flood of wails
+from many quarters, generals vying with
+editors in hurling imprecations at the British
+Enemy Propaganda Department, with
+blackest vilifications of Lord Northcliffe, and
+in beseeching German troops and people not
+to be affected by the leaflets which had by
+this time found their way into even the
+remotest corner of rural Germany.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_106">[106]</span></p>
+
+<p>These outbursts were symptomatic of the
+fear of defeat which had laid hold of the
+Germans, and were correctly interpreted in
+England as foreshadowing the end which
+came so dramatically in November, 1918. It
+was obvious that even the German Government
+felt it unwise to restrain, by use of the
+censorship, the publication of such damaging
+admissions of the deadliness of British propaganda.
+It was impossible to stop the
+rising tide of truth which was covering
+Germany.</p>
+
+<p>To attempt to quote even a small proportion
+of these unintentional tributes to the
+work of Sir George Macdonogh’s department
+of the War Office and of Crewe House
+would be wearisome. Perhaps the best
+specimen of all came in the form of a manifesto
+from no less a person than Field
+Marshal von Hindenburg, the war idol and
+personification of German militarism. This
+is the text of the remarkable document:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot">
+
+<p>We are engaged in a hard struggle
+with our enemies. If numerical superiority
+alone guaranteed victory, Germany
+would long since have lain shattered on
+the ground. The enemy knows, however,
+that Germany and her Allies cannot
+be conquered by arms alone. The enemy<span class="pagenum" id="Page_107">[107]</span>
+knows that the spirit which dwells within
+our troops and our people makes us unconquerable.
+Therefore, together with
+the struggle against the German arms,
+he has undertaken a struggle against the
+German spirit; he seeks to poison our
+spirit and believes that German arms
+will also become blunted if the German
+spirit is eaten away.</p>
+
+<p>We should not take this plan of the
+enemy lightly. The enemy conducts his
+campaign against our spirit by various
+means. He bombards our Front, not
+only with a drumfire of artillery, but
+also with a drumfire of printed paper.
+Besides bombs which kill the body, his
+airmen throw down leaflets which are
+intended to kill the soul.</p>
+
+<p>Of these enemy leaflets our field-grey
+men delivered up:</p>
+
+
+<table class="autotable">
+<tr>
+<td class="tdl">In May</td>
+<td class="tdr">84,000</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="tdl">In June</td>
+<td class="tdr">120,000</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="tdl">In July</td>
+<td class="tdr">300,000</td>
+</tr>
+</table>
+
+
+<p>A gigantic increase! Ten thousand
+poisoned arrows daily in July; 10,000
+times daily the attempt to deprive the
+individual and the whole body of belief
+in the justice of our cause and of the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_108">[108]</span>
+strength and confidence for ultimate
+victory! We can reckon, in addition,
+that a great part of the enemy leaflets
+will not have been found by us.</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+<span class="smcap">Poisoning the Home Spirit.</span><br>
+</p>
+
+<p>But the enemy is not merely satisfied
+in attacking the spirit of our Front, he
+wishes above all also to poison the spirit
+of our home. He knows what sources
+of strength for the Front rest in the
+home. True, his aeroplanes and balloons
+do not carry these leaflets far into our
+homeland; they lie far from it in the
+lines in which the enemy vainly struggles
+for victory by arms. But the enemy
+hopes that many a field-grey soldier will
+send home the leaflet which has innocently
+fluttered down from the air. At
+home it will pass from hand to hand
+and be discussed at the beer-table, in
+families, in the sewing-room, in factories,
+and in the street. Unsuspectingly many
+thousands consume the poison. For
+thousands the burden the war in any
+case imposes upon them is increased, and
+the will and hope for a victorious issue
+of the war is taken from them. All these
+again write their doubts to the Front,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_109">[109]</span>
+and Wilson, Lloyd George and Clemenceau
+rub their hands.</p>
+
+<p>The enemy attacks the spirit of the
+home in another way besides. The
+silliest rumours, designed to break our
+inner power of resistance, are put into
+circulation. We find them simultaneously
+in Switzerland, in Holland,
+and in Denmark. Thence they spread
+like a wave over the whole of Germany.
+Or they emerge simultaneously, agreeing
+in silly details, in the remotest regions
+of our country—in Silesia, in East
+Prussia, in the Rhineland—and wend
+their way thence over the remainder of
+the home territory. This poison works
+on the men on leave and flows in letters
+to the Front. Again the enemy rubs
+his hands.</p>
+
+<p>The enemy is ingenious. He knows
+how to mix the little powder for everyone.
+He decoys the fighters at the Front.
+One leaflet runs:</p>
+
+<p>“German soldiers! It is a shameful
+lie that the French ill-treat German
+prisoners. We are not brutes; only
+come over to us without fear; here you
+will find a most considerate reception,
+good food, and a peaceful refuge.”</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_110">[110]</span></p>
+
+<p>Ask brave men who have succeeded
+with unspeakable difficulty in escaping
+from the enemy captivity about this.
+Plundered to the utmost in wire compounds,
+roofless, goaded by hunger and
+thirst into treasonable utterances, forced
+by blows and threats of death to betray
+their comrades, spat upon, pelted with
+filth by the French populace while being
+driven to hard labour, that is what the
+paradise that the enemy conjures up
+really looks like.</p>
+
+<p>Reproductions of original letters
+written by prisoners are also thrown
+down, in which these men describe how
+well it goes with them. God be praised,
+there are still also decent and humane
+commandants of prisoners’ camps in
+England and France; but these are the
+exception, and the letters the enemy
+throws down are only of three or four
+different kinds. But he sends these
+multiplied by many thousands of copies.
+The enemy intimidates the faint-hearted
+by saying:</p>
+
+<p>“Your struggle is hopeless; America
+will settle you; your submarines are
+no good; we are building more ships
+than they sink; after the war we shall<span class="pagenum" id="Page_111">[111]</span>
+debar you from getting raw materials,
+then Germany’s industry must starve.
+You will never see your colonies again.”</p>
+
+<p>That is the tone of the leaflets; now
+enticement, now threat.</p>
+
+
+<p class="center">
+<span class="smcap">German Facts and Fancies.</span><br>
+</p>
+
+<p>What is the real situation? We have
+enforced peace in the East and are
+strong enough to do it in the West, notwithstanding
+the Americans; but we
+must be strong and united; that is what
+the enemy is fighting against with these
+leaflets and rumours. He wishes to
+deprive us of faith and confidence, will
+and force.</p>
+
+<p>Why is the enemy continually seeking
+new allies in the struggle against us?
+Why does he try to press nations still
+neutral into the struggle against us?
+Because in strength we are his equals.</p>
+
+<p>Why does he incite black and other
+coloured men against German soldiers?
+Because his will is to destroy us.</p>
+
+<p>Again, the enemy says another thing:</p>
+
+<p>“You Germans, your form of government
+is wrong. Fight against the
+Hohenzollerns, against capitalism; help<span class="pagenum" id="Page_112">[112]</span>
+us, the Entente, to give you a better
+form of State.”</p>
+
+<p>The enemy knows perfectly what
+strength resides in our State and Empire;
+but that is precisely why he
+combats it. The enemy also seeks to
+tear open old wounds in the German
+body politic. With his leaflets and by
+rumours he attempts to sow division
+and distrust among the Federal States.
+At Lake Constance we confiscated many
+thousands of leaflets conveyed to Bavaria
+and intended to excite anger against the
+North Germans. They wish to destroy
+the German Empire, which for centuries
+was the dream of Germans and which
+our fathers won for us, and to condemn
+Germany to the impotence of the Thirty
+Years’ War.</p>
+
+<p>The enemy also wishes to shake our
+loyalty to our allies. He does not
+know the German way and the word of
+a German man. He himself sacrifices
+his allies; he who is England’s ally
+dies of it.</p>
+</div>
+
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_113">[113]</span></p>
+
+<div class="blockquot">
+<p class="center">
+<span class="smcap">Traitors to the Fatherland.</span><br>
+</p>
+
+<p>And finally the enemy sends not the
+least dangerous of his poisoned arrows
+dipped in printers’ ink when he throws
+down the utterances of German men and
+German newspapers. The utterances of
+German newspapers are torn from their
+context. Regarding the utterances of
+Germans which are reproduced, remember
+that at every time there have been
+conscious and unconscious traitors to
+the Fatherland. Most of them reside
+abroad in neutral countries, in order
+not to be obliged to share our struggle
+and our privations, or to be condemned
+by our Judges as guilty of high treason.
+Nor have champions of extreme party
+tendencies any right to claim to speak
+for the generality of the German people.</p>
+
+<p>It is our strength, but also our weakness
+that even in war we allow unrestricted
+utterance to every opinion.
+We still tolerate the reproduction in
+our newspapers of enemy Army reports
+and the speeches of enemy statesmen
+which are weapons of attack directed
+against the spirit of the German Army
+and people. This is a sign of strength,
+because it proves a consciousness of
+might. But it is a weakness because it
+allows the enemy’s poison to find an
+entrance among us.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_114">[114]</span></p>
+
+<p>Therefore, German Army, German
+Homeland, if one of these thrown-out
+pieces of poison in the form of leaflet or
+rumour comes before your eyes and
+ears, remember that its originates with
+the enemy. Remember nothing comes
+from the enemy which is not harmful to
+Germany. Every one must be mindful
+of this, whatever his position or party.
+If you meet anyone whose name and
+origin indeed are German, but who by
+nature stands in the enemy’s camp,
+keep him at a distance, despise him,
+put him publicly in the pillory in order
+that every other true German may
+despise him.</p>
+
+<p>Defend yourself, German Army,
+German Homeland!</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>Hindenburg’s fear that only a small part
+of the leaflets was given up was fully justified.
+The numbers which he quotes suggest that
+hundreds of thousands must have been
+carried to their homes by the “field-grey
+men.”</p>
+
+<p>The whole manifesto is an interesting
+study in psychology. Hope had slipped
+away; dismay had ripened into despair
+and despair had sown wild anger and hatred.
+The dissemination of the unwelcome facts<span class="pagenum" id="Page_115">[115]</span>
+of the position caused him to burst out in
+vituperation and so to give a valuable clue
+as to the effect which Allied propaganda was
+producing on the German troops and public.</p>
+
+<p>After such a mighty oracle, it is not
+surprising that others took up the cry. Not
+long after, the following noteworthy message,
+signed by General von Hutier of the Sixth
+German Army, was captured:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot">
+
+<p>The enemy begins to realise that we
+cannot be crushed by blockade,
+superiority of numbers, or force of arms.
+He is, therefore, trying a last resource.
+While engaging to the utmost of his
+military force he is racking his imagination
+for ruses, trickery, and other underhand
+methods of which he is a past
+master, to induce in the minds of the
+German people a doubt of their invincibility.
+He has founded for this
+purpose a special Ministry (“The Ministry
+for the Destruction of German
+Confidence”), at the head of which he
+has put the most thoroughgoing rascal
+of all the Entente—Lord Northcliffe,
+who has been given billions for use in
+influencing opinion in the interior of
+the country and at the Front by means of
+paid agents, the assassination of Ambassadors,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_116">[116]</span>
+and all the other ways in
+favour with the Entente.</p>
+
+<p>The method of Northcliffe at the
+Front is to distribute through airmen
+a constantly increasing number of leaflets
+and pamphlets; the letters of German
+prisoners are falsified in the most
+outrageous way; tracts and pamphlets
+are concocted, to which the names of
+German poets, writers, and statesmen
+are forged, or which present the appearance
+of having been printed in Germany,
+and bear, for example, the title of the
+Reclam series, when they really come
+from the Northcliffe Press, which is
+working day and night for this same
+purpose. His thought and aim are that
+these forgeries, however obvious they
+may appear to the man who thinks
+twice, may suggest a doubt, even for a
+moment, in the minds of those who do
+not think for themselves, and that their
+confidence in their leaders, in their own
+strength, and in the inexhaustible resources
+of Germany may be shattered.</p>
+
+<p>Fortunately, Northcliffe, the Minister
+for the Destruction of German Confidence,
+forgets that German soldiers
+are neither Negroes nor Hindus, nor<span class="pagenum" id="Page_117">[117]</span>
+illiterate French, English, and Americans,
+incapable of seeing through such machinations.
+Explain these infamous attempts
+to your young and inexperienced comrades,
+and tell them what our mortal
+enemy expects of them, and what is at
+stake. Pick up the leaflets and pamphlets
+and give them to our commanders
+for transmission to the High Command,
+which may be able to make valuable
+deductions from them as to the aims of
+our enemies. You will thus help the
+Command, and you will also help to
+hasten the hour of victory.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>The allegation that huge sums of money
+were expended by Lord Northcliffe is comic.
+As will have been seen already, the total cost
+of the operations conducted by Lord Northcliffe
+during his tenure of office was considerably
+less than a one-hundredth part of
+Great Britain’s <i>daily</i> war bill.</p>
+
+<p>German Army orders, which fell into
+Allied hands, showed plainly how widespread
+was the effect produced among the enemy
+troops by the leaflets. Officers and men
+were threatened with severe punishment if
+they neglected to hand the leaflets in immediately.
+On the other hand, bonuses for
+the delivery of unknown specimens of pamphlets,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_118">[118]</span>
+books, leaflets, and pictures were
+offered as follows:—</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot">
+
+<p>3 marks (nominally 3<i>s.</i>) for the first
+copy.</p>
+
+<p>30 pfgs. (nominally 4<i>d.</i>) for other
+copies.</p>
+
+<p>5 marks (nominally 5<i>s.</i>) for a book.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>An order issued by Ludendorff showed that
+the influence of the propaganda extended
+beyond the troops to the population of
+Germany. This read:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot">
+
+<p>“There has been an increase in the
+number of complaints received from
+home that men on leave from the front
+create a very unfavourable impression
+by making statements actually bordering
+on high treason and incitement to
+disobedience. Instances such as these
+drag through the mud the honour and
+respect of the individual as well as of
+the whole Army, and have a disastrous
+effect upon the <i>moral</i> of the people at
+home.”</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>A “high officer at the front” describing,
+in the <i>Kölnische Zeitung</i> of October 31, 1918,
+the demoralisation of the German Army as
+a result of the retreat, wrote:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot">
+
+<p>What damaged us most of all was
+the paper war carried on by the enemy,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_119">[119]</span>
+who dropped daily among us 100,000
+leaflets, which were extraordinarily well
+distributed and well edited.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>This strikingly confirmed a report received
+by the Foreign Office the previous month
+which stated:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot">
+
+<p>Leaflets thrown by Allied airmen have
+much more effect now. Instead of being
+thrown away or laughed at, as was
+often the case in the past, they are
+eagerly picked up and read. There is
+no doubt that recent events have
+seriously shaken the <i>moral</i> of the German
+people and Army. One of the returned
+officers mentioned above said that if
+the Entente knew what poison these
+leaflets, etc., were working in the minds
+of the German soldiers they would
+give up lead and bombard with paper
+only in future.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>That neither threats nor bribes was inducing
+the surrender of the leaflets to German
+Headquarters was plainly shown by the
+statements of prisoners captured during the
+last four months of hostilities, and by the
+fact that most of them had British leaflets in
+their possession. Among the subjects which
+seemed to have attracted special attention<span class="pagenum" id="Page_120">[120]</span>
+were the German responsibility for starting
+the war, for the adoption of poison gas
+attacks, and for the bombing of open towns;
+the ineffectiveness of Zeppelin attacks and of
+the U-boats preventing the transport of
+food and troops; the arrival of the American
+armies; the Allied war aims; comparison
+of food conditions in Germany with those in
+Great Britain; and the extracts from German
+Socialist newspapers. Inhabitants of
+the recaptured territory testified to the
+effect of the propaganda on the German
+troops, remarking on the lowering of <i>moral</i>
+and the increasing number of deserters which
+they attributed to it.</p>
+
+<p>Politicians and newspapers were also greatly
+excited, and raised loud cries for the creation
+of an organisation for counter-propaganda.
+Herr F. Stossinger described British propaganda
+in the <i>Frankfurter Zeitung</i> as “the
+most complicated and dangerous of all,”
+and commented on its “countless” activities.
+The Minister of War, General von Stein
+was complimentary enough to say “In
+propaganda the enemy is undoubtedly our
+superior.” (Berlin <i>Morgenpost</i>, August 25,
+1918.) Other tributes were:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot">
+
+<p><i>Rheinische-Westfälische-Zeitung</i>: “At
+any rate, the British Propaganda Department<span class="pagenum" id="Page_121">[121]</span>
+has worked hard. Had we
+shown the same activity in our Propaganda
+perhaps many a thing would have
+been different now. But in this, we
+regret to say, we were absolutely unprepared,
+but we hope that by now we
+have learned differently.”</p>
+
+<p><i>Deutsche Tageszeitung</i>: “We Germans
+have a right to be proud of our General
+Staff. We have a feeling that our
+enemies’ General Staff cannot hold a
+candle to it, but we also have the
+feeling that our enemies have a brilliant
+Propaganda General Staff, whereas we
+have none.”</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>Violent and bitter attacks were repeatedly
+made. The revelations of the British propaganda
+created great nervousness, which in
+turn gave rise to all kinds of wild rumours,
+which spread all over Germany. These were
+attributed to Lord Northcliffe’s department.
+Speaking in the Bavarian Lower House of
+Parliament during August, 1918, General
+von Hellingrath, the Bavarian Minister of
+War, said:—</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot">
+
+<p>“These rumours are nothing but the
+result of the industrious and determined<span class="pagenum" id="Page_122">[122]</span>
+agitation which our enemies carry on in
+the interior through their agents.”</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>Herr von Kupffer, the editor of the Berlin
+<i>Lokal-Anzeiger</i>, referred to them as “a
+carnival of soul-storms, idiotic terror, and
+criminal irresponsibility,” and he continued:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot">
+
+<p>“The main thing is to remember the
+source of such rumours and to bear in
+mind what their object is. Their object
+is to demoralise us and, by so doing,
+turn into realities what otherwise would
+remain merely nightmares. One would
+have to be really blind not to see that
+these things radiate from that organisation
+in England formed to shatter the
+German nervous system by means of
+shameful and impudent lies. Is not
+the figure of Lord Northcliffe, the great
+Propaganda Chief of the English Home
+Army, pilloried in world-history for all
+time?</p>
+
+<p>“Is anybody in doubt as to the
+purpose of this propaganda? Does not
+everybody know that the generalissimo
+of this campaign of mendacity has
+unlimited funds at his disposal in order
+to circulate streams of lies through
+neutral channels with devilish cunning<span class="pagenum" id="Page_123">[123]</span>
+and almost impressive skill? Does not
+everybody realise that the Northcliffe
+Propaganda is too shrewd to work by
+means of mere newspaper tales that
+could easily be disproved, and therefore
+resorts to the much more subtle method
+of carrying unrest, disloyalty, and alarm
+into our country and into the lands of
+our allies by means of verbal communications
+of all sorts? Paid rascals are
+systematically employed for this purpose.
+It is this sort of person who propagates
+these wild stories in Germany and upsets
+our sense of proportion in connection
+with war events. These are the facts.
+Let people bear them in mind before they
+promote the Northcliffe Propaganda by
+repeating every bit of washerwoman’s
+gossip as gospel, even though it be
+without the slightest foundation in fact.”</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>In the Hamburg district matters were
+much the same, for the influential shipping
+journal <i>Hansa</i> printed the following on
+September 14:—</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot">
+
+<p>“God be thanked! At last we are
+just beginning to recognise what the
+hour of war demands; what is our
+duty as Germans and as citizens. Despondency,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_124">[124]</span>
+discontent, depression, hanging
+heads, grumbling! We meet them
+at every step and turn, but we did not
+know their origin, these growths of
+evil fantasy. We did not understand
+what meant these secret whispers about
+alleged unfavourable news from the
+front, these exaggerated reports, fraught
+with misfortune, which passed so glibly
+from mouth to mouth. One had heard
+this, another that, but always it was
+something bad in regard to our military
+situation. Nothing definite was ever
+mentioned. There were only suggestions,
+which proved to be chimeras as
+soon as ever they could be run to earth.
+They were the birth of ignoble defeatism.
+Yet there they were, invisibly surrounding
+us, disturbing our spiritual balance,
+darkening our temper; like an epidemic,
+like poisonous bacilli, they flew hither
+and thither in all directions through our
+German air.</p>
+
+<p>“Whence came they? Who brought
+them to us? To-day we know. To-day
+we can recognise the origin of this
+depression of German will-power. It
+was the long-advertised publicity offensive
+of the Entente directed against us<span class="pagenum" id="Page_125">[125]</span>
+under England’s lead, and under the
+special direction of that unprincipled,
+unscrupulous rascal, Northcliffe.”</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>In the <i>Kölnische Volkszeitung</i> for September
+11, a letter from the front said:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot">
+
+<p>“Leaflets destined to cause low spirits
+and despair, or to send deserters to the
+enemy, are being showered down in
+thousands in certain places and their
+surroundings. It is this combat, waged
+openly or secretly, which, particularly
+at home, produces low spirits and despair.
+Here you find statements that Hindenburg
+was once regarded as a Divinity,
+but that his laurels are beginning to
+fade, which is quite evident from the
+way the enemy advance daily; that
+our troops have lost courage, whole
+companies are deserting to the enemy,
+and such like things.”</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>In another letter to the same newspaper,
+published on August 20, the writer said:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot">
+
+<p>“Our enemies have recently been
+very busy distributing leaflets from the
+air. I have had two of these leaflets
+in my hands, and it is not to be doubted
+that our enemies are in that, also, our<span class="pagenum" id="Page_126">[126]</span>
+masters, for the pamphlets are so well
+produced that anyone who is not on the
+lookout is very likely to fall a victim to
+them.”</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>That such Propaganda might have had
+an effect if it had been tried earlier was
+evident from the admissions of war correspondents
+as well as of generals. Herr W.
+Scheurmann wrote in the <i>Norddeutsche Allgemeine
+Zeitung</i> (October 30):</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot">
+
+<p>“We Germans have learnt <i>for the
+first time this autumn</i> that the moral
+resistance of the fighter at the front is
+a power with which the Command must
+reckon, all the more cautiously inasmuch
+as it is difficult to estimate.”</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>All charges of the mendacity of British
+propaganda were unfounded, for the greatest
+care was unremittingly exercised to tell only
+the truth. One effect of this was to make
+the Germans distrust their official <i>communiqués</i>.
+“We have in our dear Fatherland
+to-day,” wrote the <i>Kölnische Zeitung</i>
+on September 11, “great numbers of
+innocent and ingenuous minds who doubt
+the plain statements of the German Army
+reports, but <i>believe the false reports and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_127">[127]</span>
+omissions of the enemy</i>. To prove constantly
+the contrary to them is a rather thankless
+task, but of which one should never tire.”</p>
+
+<p>It was, indeed, a thankless task to try
+to keep the truth from the whole German
+nation. “Warn your brothers, your sons,
+your husbands, not to believe the enemy’s
+leaflets,” was one of “Ten Commandments
+for German Women,” published by the
+<i>Kölnische Volkszeitung</i> on October 20,
+but it was then too late to maintain the
+lie-system by which the German resistance
+had been stimulated for so long.</p>
+
+<p>Writing in July, 1919, Herr Arnold
+Rechberg said in the <i>Tägliche Rundschau</i>:
+“It cannot be doubted that Lord Northcliffe
+very substantially contributed to England’s
+victory in the world war. His conduct of
+English propaganda during the war will
+some day find its place in history as a performance
+hardly to be surpassed. The
+Northcliffe propaganda during the war correctly
+estimated ... the character and
+intellectual peculiarities of the Germans.”</p>
+
+<p>Praise from an enemy, when there is no
+underlying motive, can usually be accepted
+as sincere. Most of the foregoing quotations
+were primarily warnings and exhortations
+to their own people issued during the war,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_128">[128]</span>
+and compliments to Allied propaganda only
+indirectly.</p>
+
+<p>When, however, hostilities had ceased
+disastrously for Germany and her allies,
+passions of hatred and pride began to give
+place to the cold logic of reason. Ludendorff,
+who, as First Quartermaster-General from
+1916 to the end of the war, was regarded as
+one of the cleverest of Germany’s military
+leaders, sat down to write his “War
+Memories” (Hutchinson and Co., London).
+His reputation entitles him to respect, and
+he has much to say of value regarding
+propaganda.</p>
+
+<p>He learned one important lesson. “Good
+propaganda,” he wrote, “must keep well
+ahead of actual political events. It must
+act as pacemaker to policy and mould
+public opinion without appearing to do so.”
+This was the great basic principle upon which
+was built the success of Lord Northcliffe’s
+department. To try to make propaganda
+shape policy is as fatal as endeavouring to
+conduct propaganda campaigns without
+policy or with conflicting policies. Illuminating
+volumes could be written on failures
+from all these causes. But whoever follows
+the history of the operations conducted from
+Crewe House will find that painstaking study
+was made of the factors governing the
+political, economic, and military position of
+each of the enemy countries concerned
+before action was taken. As <i>The Times</i>
+observed in a leading article (October 31,
+1919) Lord Northcliffe’s work “differed from
+the praiseworthy and painstaking efforts
+that had preceded it mainly by adopting as
+its guiding principle the very maxim which
+Ludendorff lays down. The consideration
+that, without a definite policy in regard to each
+enemy country, propaganda must be at best
+a hand-to-mouth business was, from the first,
+regarded as self-evident by Lord Northcliffe
+and the handful of experts who advised him.”</p>
+
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_129">[129]</span></p>
+
+<p>Ludendorff compared the work of the
+British and German propaganda departments,
+to the great disparagement of the latter.
+Indeed he attributed the moral collapse of
+the German soldier—and consequently the
+military defeat—in part to British propaganda
+and in part to the demoralisation of
+the German home population, which, in
+turn, he ascribed to British propaganda and
+to the feebleness of the German Government
+in counteracting it. Of British propaganda
+he wrote:—</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_130">[130]</span></p><div class="blockquot">
+
+<p><a id="FNanchor_1" href="#Footnote_1" class="fnanchor">[1]</a>Lloyd George knew what he was
+doing when, after the close of the war,
+he gave Lord Northcliffe the thanks of
+England for the propaganda he had
+carried out. Lord Northcliffe was a
+master of mass-suggestion. The enemy’s
+propaganda attacked us by transmitting
+reports and print from the neutral States
+on our frontier, especially Holland and
+Switzerland. It assailed us in the same
+way from Austria, and finally in our own
+country by using the air. It did this
+with such method and on such a scale
+that many people were no longer able
+to distinguish their own impressions
+from what the enemy propaganda had
+told them. This propaganda was all
+the more effective in our case as we
+had to rely, not on the numbers, but on
+the quality of our battalions in prosecuting
+the war. The importance of
+numbers in war is incontestable. Without
+soldiers there can be no war. But
+numbers count only according to the
+spirit which animates them. As it is
+in the life of peoples, so it is also on
+the battlefield. We had fought against
+the world, and could continue to do so
+with good conscience so long as we were
+spiritually ready to endure the burden<span class="pagenum" id="Page_131">[131]</span>
+of war. So long as we were this, we
+had hope of victory and refused to bow
+to the enemy’s determination to annihilate
+us. But with the disappearance
+of our moral readiness to fight everything
+changed completely. We no
+longer battled to the last drop of our
+blood. Many Germans were no longer
+willing to die for their country.</p>
+
+<p>The shattering of public confidence
+at home affected our moral readiness to
+fight. The attack on our home front
+and on the spirit of the Army was the
+chief weapon with which the Entente
+intended to conquer us, after it had lost
+all hope of a military victory.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_1" href="#FNanchor_1" class="label">[1]</a> This passage is a translation from the German edition.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<p>His references to German enemy propaganda
+are generally in terms of disgust. He
+considered it rendered Germany no service.
+“Our political aims and decisions, issued to
+the world as sudden surprises, often seemed
+to be merely brutal and violent. This could
+have been skilfully avoided by broad and
+far-sighted propaganda.... The German
+propaganda was only kept going with difficulty.
+In spite of all our efforts, its achievements,
+in comparison to the magnitude of the
+task, were inadequate. We produced no
+real effect on the enemy peoples.... We<span class="pagenum" id="Page_132">[132]</span>
+also attempted to carry on propaganda on
+the enemy fronts. In the East, the Russians
+were the authors of their own collapse, and
+our work there was of secondary importance.
+In the West, the fronts of our enemies had
+not been made susceptible by the state of
+public opinion in their home countries, and
+the propaganda we gradually introduced had
+no success.... Germany failed in the fight
+against the <i>moral</i> of the enemy peoples.”</p>
+
+<p>Again and again Ludendorff quotes instances
+of the effect of propaganda. For
+example, just before the last German offensive
+of July 15, 1918:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot">
+
+<p>“The Army complained of the enemy
+propaganda. It was the more effective
+because the Army was rendered impressionable
+by the attitude at home....
+The enemy propaganda had seized
+on Prince Lichnowsky’s pamphlet, which,
+in a way that I myself could not explain,
+placed on the German Government the
+responsibility for the outbreak of war.
+And this, though his Majesty and the
+Chancellor again and again asserted
+that the Entente was responsible....</p>
+
+<p>“The Army was literally drenched with
+enemy propaganda publications. Their
+great danger to us was clearly recognised.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_133">[133]</span>
+The Supreme Command offered rewards
+for such as were handed over to us, but
+we could not prevent them from poisoning
+the heart of our soldiers.”</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>No greater effect could have been desired
+by the British authorities than that described
+by Ludendorff, and such an acknowledgment
+of the results produced gave the highest
+satisfaction.</p>
+
+<figure class="figcenter illowp80" id="i_p128a" style="max-width: 130.25em;">
+  <img class="w100" src="images/i_p128a.jpg" alt="">
+  <figcaption class="caption">A MEDALLION STRUCK BY THE GERMANS IN “DISHONOUR” OF LORD NORTHCLIFFE.</figcaption>
+</figure>
+
+
+
+<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_134">[134]</span></p>
+
+<h2 class="nobreak" id="CHAPTER_VI">CHAPTER VI<br>
+<span class="fs80">OPERATIONS AGAINST BULGARIA AND
+OTHER ACTIVITIES</span>
+</h2>
+</div>
+
+
+
+
+
+<p class="sub">Peculiar difficulties of propaganda against Bulgaria—Educative
+work among prisoners of war.</p>
+
+
+
+<p>Operations against Bulgaria—the other
+objective of Crewe House activities—were
+somewhat dissimilar to those against either
+Austria-Hungary or Germany. There were
+complications due to the general state of
+Balkan affairs and politics, and to the fact
+that technically the United States was not at
+war with Bulgaria. The definition of propaganda
+policy against Bulgaria called for
+most delicate expression, lest any offence
+should be given to Serbia, Roumania, or Greece.</p>
+
+<p>Lord Northcliffe, in submitting to the
+Foreign Office a statement of policy proposed
+for use against Bulgaria, pointed out
+that he and his advisers felt that there was
+need for a definite Allied policy in regard
+to the Jugo-Slav and Roumanian questions.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_135">[135]</span>
+These, in their turn, were dependent upon
+Allied policy in regard to Austria-Hungary.
+On May 25, 1918, Lord Northcliffe wrote
+to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot">
+
+<p>“After careful consideration, and with
+the advice of our most competent authorities
+on Bulgarian and Balkan affairs, I
+beg to submit to you the following
+scheme of Allied policy in regard to
+Balkan countries as the framework
+within which any propaganda in Bulgaria
+should be carried out. I would especially
+direct your attention to the need for a
+Government decision in regard to the
+Southern Slav, Greek, and Roumanian
+questions before any definite proposals
+from Bulgaria are entertained:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot">
+
+<p>“The adoption of a clear and
+comprehensive Balkan policy by the
+British and Allied Governments is an
+essential condition of any propaganda
+in Bulgaria.</p>
+
+<p>“Without such a policy any propaganda
+in Bulgaria would resolve itself
+into competitive bargaining between
+the Allies on the one hand and the
+Austro-Germans on the other.</p>
+
+<p>“This bargaining would tend to<span class="pagenum" id="Page_136">[136]</span>
+estrange and to dishearten the Serbians
+and the Greeks. In attempting
+it the Allies would be, moreover, at a
+disadvantage, inasmuch as Bulgaria
+already occupies, as a member of the
+enemy Alliance, considerably more
+than all the territories that would be
+the subject of the bargaining.</p>
+
+<p>“The aim of Allied policy in the
+Balkans should be a lasting territorial
+and political settlement, framed as
+nearly as possible on lines of ethnography,
+with the object of paving the
+way for a permanent League of the
+Balkan Nations.</p>
+
+<p>“Bulgaria cannot possess all the
+territories ethnographically Bulgarian
+unless she retain at the peace districts
+held by Serbia, Greece, and Roumania
+before the war. Serbia, Greece, and
+Roumania, on the other hand, cannot
+fairly be asked or compelled to
+abandon those districts unless they,
+in their turn, be united with territories
+ethnographically Serbo-Croatian (Jugo-Slav),
+Greek, and Roumanian.</p>
+
+<p>“Allied policy should therefore deliberately
+aim at the solution of the
+Southern Slav, Hellenic, and Roumanian<span class="pagenum" id="Page_137">[137]</span>
+questions in the sense of the
+fullest possible racial unity and independence.</p>
+
+<p>“The chief difficulty in defining the
+just claims of Bulgaria lies in the
+uncertainty as to the proper delimitation
+of Bulgarian Macedonia. A purely
+ethnographical delimitation might involve
+economic and strategical injustice
+to Serbia and Greece, unless it
+were accompanied by due provision,
+internationally guaranteed, for Serbian
+and Greek rights of way. Similarly,
+the retention of ports like Salonika
+and Kavalla by Greece would involve
+hardship to Bulgaria unless adequate
+provision, internationally guaranteed,
+were made for a Bulgarian right of way
+to those ports.</p>
+
+<p>“Should it prove impossible to
+obtain, by persuasion or pressure, the
+assent of Serbia and Greece to the
+retention of ethnographical Macedonia
+by Bulgaria, an autonomous Macedonia
+might be set up, proper provision
+being made for the maintenance
+of order and for the repression of armed
+Serbian and Greek or Bulgarian ‘propaganda’
+by an international force of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_138">[138]</span>
+<i>gendarmerie</i>. One advantage of an
+autonomous Macedonia would be that
+it would meet the wishes of the Macedonian
+Bulgars themselves, who would
+prefer autonomy to annexation outright
+by Bulgaria.</p>
+
+<p>“The Allied policy in the Balkans
+should be made known to the Bulgarians
+by the Allies and by the
+United States. The necessary ethnographical
+delimitation of Bulgarian,
+or of autonomous Macedonian territory
+should be undertaken by a competent
+Allied Commission, possibly under
+the presidency of the United States.
+The announcement of Allied policy
+should be accompanied by an intimation
+that only by accepting it can
+Bulgaria hope to escape economic
+and political ostracism for an indefinite
+period; but that acceptance of the
+Allied policy would, on the contrary,
+carry with it a claim to financial and
+economic support.</p>
+
+<p>“Bulgaria should at the same time
+be told that the Allies would guarantee
+to her the Enos-Midia line as her
+minimum frontier on the east, provided
+that she refrained from further<span class="pagenum" id="Page_139">[139]</span>
+active co-operation with the enemies
+of the Allies. Active co-operation on
+the side of the Allies should be rewarded
+by a frontier yet more favourable
+to her aspirations, <i>e.g.</i> by the line
+Midia-Rodosto. The inclusion of Silistria
+in the future Bulgarian territory
+should likewise be made contingent
+upon the behaviour of Bulgaria before
+the conclusion of peace.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>“May I ask you to give me your views
+on this scheme of policy as early as
+possible?</p>
+
+<p>“I wish to send to Salonika, without
+delay, a competent mission to begin
+propaganda on this, or some similar
+basis, but cannot authorise its departure
+unless the ideas it would propagate have
+the explicit approval of His Majesty’s
+Government.”</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>Mr. Balfour replied on June 6, 1918:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot">
+
+<p>“I have carefully considered your
+letter of May 25, in which you were so
+kind as to furnish me with your ideas
+as to the lines on which we should
+conduct our propaganda in the Balkans.</p>
+
+<p>“I fully agree with the general ideas
+underlying your policy.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_140">[140]</span></p>
+
+<p>“I feel, indeed, that it will be of value
+if our own efforts in this direction, which,
+for obvious reasons, can at present be
+only of the most tentative nature, are
+preceded by discreet and intelligent
+propaganda, such as will not only appeal
+to our enemies but enlighten our friends.”</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>It was well-known that influential Bulgarians
+realised the meaning of the trend of
+events in the main theatres of war and would
+have welcomed the opening of negotiations
+with the Allies. But it was obviously
+impossible to begin territorial bargaining with
+Bulgarian representatives of any party, because
+Bulgaria already possessed more territory
+than that to which she was ethnographically
+entitled. On the other hand,
+strictly to follow the ethnographic principle
+would raise difficulties to which Lord Northcliffe
+referred in the foregoing letter. As
+it would obviously require long and patient
+negotiations with our Allies to establish a
+just basis, it was deemed to be strongly
+advisable to restrict immediate propaganda
+to telling the Bulgarians the fate which must
+inevitably befall them and that unless they
+made a complete and effective reversal of their
+policy, the Allies would do nothing to save them
+from that fate or to alleviate their position.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_141">[141]</span></p>
+
+<p>Four preliminary conditions were laid
+down as essential to the establishment of
+relations with Bulgaria:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot">
+
+<p>“(<i>a</i>) The expulsion of King Ferdinand
+and his family;</p>
+
+<p>“(<i>b</i>) A complete rupture with Germany;</p>
+
+<p>“(<i>c</i>) Establishment of a democratic
+Government;</p>
+
+<p>“(<i>d</i>) The orientation of Bulgarian policy
+in the direction of a Balkan Confederation
+under the <i>ægis</i> of the
+Allied Powers and of the United
+States.”</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>These lines were suggested as the suitable
+basis for a reply to secret overtures which
+had been made by Bulgarian emissaries
+claiming to speak for the new Premier,
+M. Malinof.</p>
+
+<p>In due course, Crewe House was authorised
+to convey an informal message to the
+effect “that until Bulgaria had given proof
+that a complete reversal of her policy had
+actually been brought about, we are not
+prepared to entertain any suggestions from
+her.” The Bulgarian agents were duly
+notified in this sense, and it is to be presumed
+that so firm a message was not without its
+effect upon the Malinof Government.</p>
+
+<p>Meanwhile propaganda material in this<span class="pagenum" id="Page_142">[142]</span>
+sense was prepared, reinforced by pamphlets,
+such as, for example, that by Lichnowsky, and
+another giving full particulars of American
+preparations. These were translated into
+Bulgarian, and this was a matter of some
+difficulty, as was the subsequent arrangement
+for printing. Distribution was principally
+arranged through naval and military channels
+and through secret agencies of the character
+operating against other enemy countries.</p>
+
+<p>Most painstaking work was undertaken to
+prepare for the publication of a newspaper
+in Bulgarian to be smuggled into Bulgaria.
+When a series of perplexing difficulties had
+been surmounted and all arrangements were
+in train for an immediate start, the news came
+that Bulgaria had surrendered.</p>
+
+<p>In this connection, too, Ludendorff pays
+tribute to the effect of propaganda. “A
+few days after the 15th (September, 1918),
+a secret report of the French General fell into
+my hands which made it evident that the
+French no longer expected any resistance
+from the Bulgarian army. Entente propaganda
+and money, and the United States
+representatives who had remained in Sofia,
+had done their work. In this instance again
+the Entente had made a thoroughly good job
+of it.” (“My War Memories.”)</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_143">[143]</span></p>
+
+<p>Besides the work in enemy countries,
+Crewe House also undertook the enlightenment
+of prisoners of war in the camps of
+Great Britain. The first necessity was the
+eradication of innate ideas of militarism,
+if it had left them with any illusions which
+their own experience had failed to shatter.
+Then the advantages of democratic government
+would be inculcated. Rightly it was
+thought that if these men could be taught
+that government of a country must be by the
+free will and assent of the governed, a small
+step at least would have been taken in the
+right direction. Such beneficent influences as
+could be brought to bear upon them would
+affect their compatriots on their return home
+and might fructify in the expression of
+changed views in their letters to their friends.
+There were several Prisoners of War camps
+scattered about Great Britain, each of them
+being in charge of a Commandant responsible
+to the War Office. The late Sir Charles
+Nicholson, Bt., a valued member of the
+Enemy Propaganda Committee, took charge
+of this section of Crewe House work, his usual
+procedure being to have a personal interview
+with each of the Commandants, in order to
+ascertain from them what newspapers and
+books were allowed inside the camps, and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_144">[144]</span>
+what were the English and German newspapers
+which were most read by the prisoners.
+He then submitted to the Commandant a list
+of books and newspapers which were approved
+for such purposes, and suggested to them
+that these should be circulated among the
+prisoners and added to the library which
+existed in each of the camps. Among the
+newspapers in German which were found to
+be useful for this purpose were the <i>Arbeiterzeitung</i>
+of Vienna, the <i>Vorwärts</i>, the <i>Frankfurter
+Zeitung</i>, the <i>Berliner Tageszeitung</i>, and
+the <i>Volkstimme</i>, and such pamphlets as
+Prince Lichnowsky’s “<i>Meine Londoner Mission</i>,”
+Hermann Fernau’s “<i>Gerade weil ich
+Deutscher bin</i>,” Dr. Karl Liebknecht’s “<i>Brief
+an das Kommandanturgericht</i>,” Dr. Muehlon’s
+“<i>Die Schuld der Deutschen Regierung am
+Kriege</i>” and “<i>Die Verheerung Europas</i>,”
+Dr. Anton Nystroem’s “<i>Vor dem Tribunale</i>,”
+and, in addition, German translations of
+Mr. H. G. Wells’s “Mr. Britling Sees it
+Through,” and copies of Mr. James W. Gerard’s
+“My Four Years in Germany.”</p>
+
+<p>Letters which were sent out by the prisoners
+of war to their friends at home were, of course,
+examined by the postal censor. Sometimes
+this examination indicated that certain of
+the prisoners would prove susceptible to
+influence, and a point was made of seeing that<span class="pagenum" id="Page_145">[145]</span>
+such prisoners were specially supplied with
+literature. The examination of prisoners of
+war was useful, too, in ascertaining what
+were the ideas prevalent in the minds of the
+Germans as to the cause of the war, the
+progress of events, and the prospect of
+ultimate success or failure.</p>
+
+
+<div class="column"><figure class="figcenter illowp80"  id="i_p144d" style="max-width: 100%;">
+  <img class="w100" src="images/i_p144d.jpg" alt="">
+  <figcaption class="caption">THE LATE SIR CHARLES NICHOLSON, BART., M.P.<br>
+MEMBER OF ENEMY PROPAGANDA COMMITTEE, AND
+DIRECTOR OF PRISONERS OF WAR SECTION.<br>
+<i>Photo: Russell &amp; Sons.</i></figcaption>
+</figure></div>
+
+
+<div class="column"><figure class="figcenter illowp80"  id="i_p160a" style="max-width: 100%;">
+  <img class="w100" src="images/i_p160a.jpg" alt="">
+  <figcaption class="caption">SIR RODERICK JONES, K.B.E.<br>
+MEMBER OF THE ENEMY PROPAGANDA COMMITTEE.<br>
+<i>Photo: Elliott &amp; Fry, Ltd.</i></figcaption>
+</figure></div>
+
+
+<div class="column"><figure class="figcenter illowp80" id="i_p160c" style="max-width:100%;">
+  <img class="w100" src="images/i_p160c.jpg" alt="">
+  <figcaption class="caption">COLONEL THE EARL OF DENBIGH, C.V.O.<br>
+MEMBER OF THE ENEMY PROPAGANDA COMMITTEE.<br>
+<i>Photo: Speight</i></figcaption>
+</figure></div>
+
+
+<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_146">[146]</span></p>
+
+<h2 class="nobreak" id="CHAPTER_VII">CHAPTER VII<br>
+<span class="fs80">INTER-ALLIED CO-OPERATION</span>
+</h2>
+</div>
+
+<p class="sub">An axiom for propaganda—Results of a successful conference—Policy,
+Means and Methods.</p>
+
+<p>Experience gained at Crewe House proved
+that it is as necessary for Allies to co-ordinate
+propaganda against a common enemy as to
+unify military command. To conduct propaganda
+without a policy is bad enough; but
+to shut up sets of propagandists working
+independently of each other in a number of
+water-tight compartments, each set representative
+of a different nationality, is to
+court ridicule instead of attracting serious
+attention from an intelligent enemy, and to
+result in the production of contradictory
+thoughts and confusion in the minds of
+unintelligent adversaries.</p>
+
+<p>An axiom for propaganda of allies in future
+wars is that a clear common policy must be
+defined, based upon such a foundation of fact
+and justice that it need not be altered in its
+essential principles, but can be, <i>and must be</i>,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_147">[147]</span>
+rigidly adhered to. It will doubtless be
+necessary to lay down such a policy for each
+nation of an opposing alliance, in the event
+of the enemy not being a single nation.</p>
+
+<p>Clearly, too, it should be recognised that
+propaganda policy, or policies, must accord
+with the policy of the diplomatic, military, and
+naval authorities. Possessing no administrative
+function, propaganda is dependent upon
+them to make policy operative. Here, again,
+lack of co-ordination would involve the risk
+of confusion, contradiction, and consequent
+inefficiency. Propaganda may well and
+rightly be in advance of these other departments
+as a forerunner (with what success other
+chapters of this book record) or it may follow,
+but it must be in agreement with them.</p>
+
+<p>Lord Northcliffe had always conceived it
+to be a fundamental principle of propaganda
+against enemy countries that when a line of
+policy had been laid by him before the
+British Government and sanctioned as a
+basis for propaganda, the Allied Governments
+should be asked for their assent to it, so that
+their propaganda departments might act in
+conformity. In practice it was found that
+most rapid co-ordination could be attained
+by representatives of the Allied propaganda
+departments meeting together. One of Lord<span class="pagenum" id="Page_148">[148]</span>
+Northcliffe’s earliest acts was to convene an
+inter-Allied gathering at Crewe House which
+was attended by Lord Beaverbrook (Minister
+of Information), M. Franklin-Bouillon
+(France), and Signor Gallenga-Stuart (Italy),
+as well as by a number of other British,
+French, Italian, and United States representatives.</p>
+
+<p>To some extent this gathering paved the
+way for the close Allied co-operation in Italy.
+Lord Northcliffe would have desired the
+immediate establishment of an inter-Allied
+body for propaganda in enemy countries,
+but difficulties were encountered which postponed
+the formation of such a body until a
+later date. Meanwhile, as close touch as
+possible was kept with the French and Italian
+departments concerned. But the course of
+events in the summer made it obvious to
+Lord Northcliffe and his advisers that an
+inter-Allied conference on Enemy Propaganda
+was indispensable to success. With the assent
+of the British War Cabinet, therefore, he
+issued invitations to the French, Italian, and
+United States Governments to send delegates
+to an official conference in London. These
+invitations were cordially accepted and the
+Conference assembled at Crewe House on
+August 14, 1918.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_149">[149]</span></p>
+
+<p>In addition to representatives of Lord
+Northcliffe’s department, and of the Allied
+propaganda departments, there were also
+present representatives of the British
+Foreign Office, War Office, Admiralty, Air
+Ministry, and Ministry of Information.</p>
+
+<p>The full list of delegates was:</p>
+
+
+
+
+
+
+<table class="autotable">
+
+<tr><td class="tdc" colspan="3">Great Britain:</td>
+
+</tr>
+
+
+
+<tr class="nw">
+<td class="tdl nw">Viscount Northcliffe (Chairman).<br>
+Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Campbell Stuart.<br>
+Sir Charles Nicholson, Bart, M.P.<br>
+Mr. Wickham Steed.
+</td>
+<td class="tdctop">&nbsp;<img src="images/rightbr.png" alt=""
+style="width: 10px; height: 100px;">&nbsp;</td>
+<td class="tdl">Department of<br>Propaganda in<br>Enemy Countries.</td>
+</tr>
+
+
+
+<tr>
+<td class="tdl">Rear-Admiral Sir Reginald
+ Hall<br>(Director of Naval Intelligence).<br>
+Captain Guy Gaunt.<br>
+Commander G. Standing.
+</td>
+<td class="tdc">&nbsp;<img src="images/rightbr.png" alt=""
+style="width: 10px; height: 100px;"></td>
+<td class="tdl">Admiralty.  </td>
+</tr>
+
+
+
+<tr>
+<td class="tdl">Brigadier-General G. K.
+Cockerill<br>(Deputy-Director of Military Intelligence).<br>
+Major The Earl of Kerry, M.P.<br>
+Captain P. Chalmers Mitchell.<br>
+</td>
+<td class="tdc">&nbsp;<img src="images/rightbr.png" alt=""
+style="width: 10px; height: 100px;"></td>
+<td class="tdl">War Office.  </td>
+</tr>
+
+
+
+
+<tr>
+<td class="tdl">Colonel E. H. Davidson.</td>
+<td class="tdc"></td>
+<td class="tdl">Air Ministry.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_150">[150]</span></td>
+</tr>
+<tr class="blank">
+<td colspan="3"></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="tdl">Mr. C. J. Phillips.</td>
+<td class="tdc"></td>
+<td class="tdl">Foreign Office.</td>
+</tr>
+
+<tr>
+<td class="tdl">Sir Roderick Jones<br>(representing
+the Minister of Information).<br>
+Mr. Cunliffe-Owen<br>(Controller
+of Propaganda against Turkey).
+</td>
+<td class="tdc">&nbsp;<img src="images/rightbr.png" alt=""
+style="width: 10px; height: 120px;"></td>
+<td class="tdl">Ministry of Information. </td>
+</tr>
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+<tr><td class="tdc" colspan="3">France:</td>
+
+</tr>
+
+<tr><td colspan="3">M. Klobukowski.<br>
+M. Haguenin.<br>
+M. Sabatier D’Espeyran.<br>
+Major-General le Vicomte de la Panouse.<br>
+M. le Capitaine Prince Pierre d’Arenberg.<br>
+Lieutenant le Comte Stanislas de Montebello.<br>
+M. Comert.<br>
+Lieutenant P. Mantoux.<br></td></tr>
+
+
+
+<tr><td class="tdc" colspan="3">Italy:</td>
+
+</tr>
+
+<tr><td colspan="3">Professor Borgese.<br>
+Signor G. Emanuel.<br>
+Captain Count Vicino-Pallavicino.<br>
+Lieutenant R. Cajrati-Crivello.<br></td></tr>
+
+
+
+<tr><td class="tdc" colspan="3">United States of America:</td>
+
+</tr>
+
+<tr><td>Mr. James Keeley.<br>
+Captain Walter Lippmann.<br>
+Captain Heber Blankenhorn.<br>
+Lieutenant Charles Merz.<br>   
+Lieutenant Ludlow Griscom.<br></td> 
+<td class="tdcbot"><br>&nbsp;<img src="images/rightbr.png" alt=""
+style="width: 10px; height: 80px;"></td>
+<td><br>Present as observers.</td>
+</tr>
+
+</table>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_151">[151]</span></p>
+
+<p>In the speech with which, as Chairman,
+Lord Northcliffe opened the Conference, he
+pointed out that the organisation of British
+Propaganda in Enemy Countries had reached
+a stage at which greater co-ordination of
+Allied purpose and effort was required if its
+objects were to be achieved in full measure.
+Propaganda in enemy countries presupposed:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot">
+
+<p><i>a.</i> The definition, for propaganda purposes
+at least, of Allied policy in
+regard to our enemies;</p>
+
+<p><i>b.</i> The public manifestation of this
+policy; and</p>
+
+<p><i>c.</i> The study of technical means of
+bringing its main features to the
+knowledge of the enemy.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>He suggested that the Conference should
+resolve itself into a number of Committees
+to examine and to report upon these and other
+matters. Such Committees would be concerned
+with:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot">
+
+<p>1. The great subject of the policy of
+propaganda;</p>
+
+<p>2. The difficult question of means of
+distribution:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot">
+
+<p>(<i>a</i>) Military.</p>
+
+<p>(<i>b</i>) Civil.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_152">[152]</span></p>
+
+<p>3. Propaganda material;</p>
+
+<p>4. Educative work among prisoners of
+war who might return to Germany
+to tell their compatriots
+the real facts.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>Unless based on a definite policy, propaganda
+could only be fragmentary and superficial.
+On the basis of a clear policy it might
+become destructive of enemy <i>moral</i>, a valuable
+adjunct to military operations, and
+constructive of the necessary conditions of a
+lasting peace.</p>
+
+<p>The three enemy countries with which his
+Department was mainly concerned were
+Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Germany.
+He cited Austria-Hungary first, because, of
+all our enemies, the Hapsburg Monarchy was
+the field where positive results were most
+readily attainable.</p>
+
+<p>In the early months of 1918, when he began
+that work, Germany was too flushed with
+her facile triumphs in Russia to be susceptible
+to propaganda, and the attitude of
+Bulgaria was too closely bound up with
+German fortunes to be at that moment easily
+affected by propaganda. Allied policy in
+regard to Bulgaria was, moreover, closely
+connected with the general Balkan policy of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_153">[153]</span>
+the Allies, the formulation of which necessarily
+depended, in its turn, upon the adoption
+of a definite policy towards Austria-Hungary.
+All these considerations pointed to Austria-Hungary
+as the foremost object of attack,
+and therefore as the country in regard to
+which a clear propaganda policy was most
+urgently required.</p>
+
+<p>Lord Northcliffe then outlined the steps
+taken in regard to Austria-Hungary, described
+fully in Chapter III. He went on
+to state that there was abundant evidence that
+the work thus begun had helped to prevent
+an Austrian offensive in April, and to check
+it when it was finally launched in June. There
+was also strong reason to believe that, had
+action on these lines been taken earlier,
+far greater results might have been obtained.
+This was an aspect of the vital connection
+between propaganda policy and military
+operations to which he earnestly directed
+attention. He trusted that the Policy Committee
+of the Conference might be able to
+make valuable recommendations in this
+respect.</p>
+
+<p>One important aspect of propaganda
+against Austria-Hungary and, indeed, against
+all our enemies, was the dissemination of
+knowledge of the greatness of the war effort<span class="pagenum" id="Page_154">[154]</span>
+of the American people. With that effort he
+had had personal acquaintance; and on that
+very day he had received a secret report that
+the Germans had little idea of the supreme
+effort which the Americans were making.
+To this aspect he attributed great and growing
+significance.</p>
+
+<p>In regard to Bulgaria, he had also ventured
+to lay before the British Government an
+outline of propaganda policy, which had
+received general approval. Its main features
+were the necessity of a definite Allied decision
+in regard to the Jugo-Slav and Rumanian
+questions, before any direct attempt could
+be made to influence Bulgaria by propaganda.
+A definite Jugo-Slav and Rumanian policy
+presupposed, however, a definite Allied policy
+in regard to Austria-Hungary. Upon the
+details of this important subject the Policy
+Committee would be fully informed. Broadly
+speaking, he considered it at once inexpedient
+and dangerous to enter into any direct or
+indirect negotiations with Bulgaria or to
+make to her proposals even as propaganda
+until a complete change of attitude had
+actually taken place in Bulgaria itself. Until
+then, propaganda could consist only in conveying
+information to the Bulgarian troops
+and people as to the fate that inevitably<span class="pagenum" id="Page_155">[155]</span>
+awaited them unless they reversed completely
+their attitude; and in preparing by agreement
+among the Allied Governments an
+outline of Balkan policy, aiming at a solution
+of the various Balkan questions as nearly as
+possible on ethnographical lines. In this
+way, Allied propaganda might eventually
+help to prepare the way for a League of
+Balkan States.</p>
+
+<p>Though for many reasons it had not thereto
+been possible to develop British propaganda
+in Germany as fully or as efficiently as it
+had been developed in Austria-Hungary,
+Lord Northcliffe said his department had,
+in co-operation with the military authorities,
+and by the utilisation of secret channels,
+been able to introduce into Germany a
+certain amount of propaganda literature.
+The decision of the British military authorities
+not to allow the use of aeroplanes on
+the British Front in France for the distribution
+of propaganda had naturally retarded
+and hampered the necessary extension of his
+work. He trusted that this question of the
+use of aeroplanes for propaganda purposes
+would be most carefully considered by the
+committee on military distribution. In the
+meantime, balloons had been employed,
+though they were manifestly far inferior to<span class="pagenum" id="Page_156">[156]</span>
+aeroplanes as instruments of distribution.
+The view seemed to prevail that propaganda
+was not worth casualties. Were this view
+well-founded it would be hard to understand
+why the Germans should have taken such
+drastic measures against British airmen
+accused of dropping propaganda leaflets.
+The Germans, who ought to be good judges,
+evidently feared our leaflets more than they
+feared our bombs. But the main issue was
+the determination of an Allied propaganda
+policy in regard to Germany—a matter of no
+little difficulty. As he had said in relation
+to Austria-Hungary, one of the chief features
+of Allied propaganda—apart from questions
+of policy—would be the constant dissemination
+of knowledge of the immensity and of
+the growing efficiency of American effort.
+This feature he had endeavoured to develop,
+and he intended to develop it increasingly.
+On the subject of policy, however, he had
+submitted to the British Government an
+outline comprising the following points, which
+it was necessary to bring home to the
+Germans.</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot">
+
+<p>1. The determination of the Allies to
+continue the war until Germany accepted
+the Allied peace terms.</p>
+
+<p>2. The existing alliance as a fighting<span class="pagenum" id="Page_157">[157]</span>
+league of free nations would be deepened
+and extended and the military, naval,
+financial, and economic resources of its
+members would be pooled until its
+military purpose was achieved and peace
+could be established on lasting foundations.
+He had suggested further that,
+as German minds were peculiarly susceptible
+to systematic statement, the
+Allies should prepare a comprehensive
+scheme of world organisation as a counterpart
+to the German schemes represented
+by the phrases “Berlin-Baghdad” and
+“Mittel-Europa.” As a preliminary to
+the drafting of such a scheme, he had
+urged that the lines of a practical League
+of Free Nations should be studied and
+laid down.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>Pending the formulation of this scheme,
+he thought that Allied propaganda should
+insist upon Allied control of raw materials,
+of shipping, and on the Allies’ power to
+ostracise for an indefinite period enemy
+peoples, until the terms of the Allied peace
+settlement were fully accepted. At the same
+time it should be pointed out that nothing
+stood between enemy people and a lasting
+peace except the designs of their ruling
+dynasties and of their military and economic<span class="pagenum" id="Page_158">[158]</span>
+castes. The primary war aim of the Allies
+was the changing of Germany, not only in
+their own interest, but also in that of the
+German people itself, since, without the
+honest co-operation of a reformed Germany,
+disarmament on a large scale might be
+impossible, and without disarmament social
+and economic reconstruction would be impracticable.
+He trusted that this question of
+Allied propaganda policy in regard to Germany
+would be carefully weighed by the
+Policy Committee.</p>
+
+<p>There remained the extremely important
+question of the co-ordination of Allied propaganda
+effort. It was obvious, he said, that
+if each Ally carried on its propaganda in
+enemy countries without reference to what
+the other Allies were doing, there must result
+great dispersion of effort, overlapping, and,
+possibly, some conflict of statement if not of
+aims. In order to secure the greatest possible
+military efficiency, the Allied Governments
+had established the Versailles Council, and
+had agreed to the appointment of an Allied
+Commander-in-Chief. Up till then the only
+Inter-Allied propaganda institution set up
+was the Inter-Allied Propaganda Commission
+at Padua. The working of this Commission
+had revealed the great advantages of concerted<span class="pagenum" id="Page_159">[159]</span>
+effort, but it had also revealed certain
+defects which only fuller Allied co-ordination
+in matters of propaganda seemed likely to
+overcome. He would therefore submit a
+proposal, definite in aim, though variable in
+detail, that there be created a central body
+for the conduct of propaganda in enemy
+countries. By such a step it seemed to him
+many delays might be avoided, great economy
+of energy and expense might be secured, and
+progress be made towards the unification of
+Allied propaganda policy and of the means
+for carrying it into effect.</p>
+
+<p>In conclusion, he asked pardon for reverting
+once more to the great importance
+of a true conception of propaganda in enemy
+countries, not only as a means of winning
+the war, but also and especially as a means of
+winning the peace. It was a work that
+demanded all the intelligence of the best
+minds in Allied countries, and the sustained
+support of responsible Allied statesmen.</p>
+
+<p>M. Klobukowski, the head of the French
+delegation, who followed Lord Northcliffe
+with an eloquent speech in French, which
+Lieutenant Mantoux interpreted, concurred
+in all that Lord Northcliffe had said. The
+French Government, he said, answered willingly
+to the invitation sent to them by the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_160">[160]</span>
+British Government to send their representatives
+to the Inter-Allied Conference on Propaganda
+in Enemy Countries. It seemed to
+them necessary to call it to intensify by
+methodical co-operation and concerted direction
+the powerful means of action at the
+disposal of the Allies. To see exactly what
+could be done; to know exactly where they
+meant to go—that was the principal aim
+which must inspire their propaganda.</p>
+
+<p>The campaign of systematic untruth which
+was being waged by the enemy need not for
+one moment divert the Allies from their line.
+Honesty had never seemed to the Allies to be
+an inferior policy. In the second place,
+French propaganda had taken care to put
+in a strong light the responsibility for the
+war. The war, on the part of our enemies,
+was a war of aggression and the service of a
+policy of conquest and the enslavement of
+nationalities. On the Allied side it was a
+purely defensive war, for the defence not
+only of territories, but also of the great cause
+of Right violated in Belgium, as in Alsace-Lorraine,
+in Poland, in the Ukraine, in
+Serbia, in Rumania, and in all the Balkan
+countries. “We try,” said M. Klobukowski,
+“to reach in enemy countries consciences
+which have hitherto shut out free examination
+and which cannot yet control themselves.
+We try to open eyes and ears now shut by
+the most extraordinary education of discipline
+which has at any time dominated men. And
+this with the help not only of arguments
+taken from facts which might be considered
+as arbitrary in practice and intention, but
+also with the help of what is admitted by our
+enemies themselves in declarations (the sincerity
+of which is incontestable for they
+come from their own agents) from those who
+dared write what they know, like Prince
+Lichnowsky and Dr. Muehlon.”</p>
+
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_161">[161]</span></p>
+
+<p>Co-operation in the work of liberating the
+oppressed nationalities (continued M. Klobukowski)
+defined clearly one of the ends of
+our action against Austria-Hungary; but
+although we cannot speak of immediate
+results, Allied propaganda was not least
+indispensable in Germany. If Austria was
+guilty towards her peoples, Germany was
+guilty towards the whole of mankind. Since
+the war began, the French Government had
+been constantly preoccupied with the propaganda
+to be effected in Germany. Faced
+with the monstrous distortion of facts which
+the Imperial Government tried to force
+upon the world, the first French Yellow Book,
+in December, 1914, gave the full list of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_162">[162]</span>
+responsibilities for the war, and showed, by
+going back to its origin, that Germany prepared
+and finally launched the war.</p>
+
+<p>One of the essential objects of Allied
+propagandists, therefore, must be to come
+back frequently to the origin of the war,
+in the hope that such effort will not be in
+vain. The experience of the publication of
+the Lichnowsky memorandum was very encouraging
+from that point of view, but that
+was not enough, as the majority of the German
+nation had still confidence in the
+official versions of the causes of the world
+conflict such as had been given to them by
+the Imperial Government. The Germans
+must not be allowed to lower the Allies’
+defensive war to the level of a war of conquest.
+The Allies must never be tired of
+insisting that they were victims of a deliberate
+aggression.</p>
+
+<p>On the other hand, it was their interest to
+insist more and more upon the character of
+the struggle in which they were engaged.
+They were upon the defensive; they were
+defending themselves, they were defending
+right and humanity; that was their war aim,
+and all other war aims were only
+consequences of it. Deeply imbued as the
+German nation might be with doctrines of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_163">[163]</span>
+historical realism, hostile as their Government
+might be to the notion of a policy
+founded upon the respect of right, the day
+nevertheless must come when their ideas
+would triumph over their resistance, when
+gradually on one hand the revelations (daily
+becoming more definite) would show the
+criminal complicities which were the cause
+of the war. On the other hand the gradual
+failure of that bid for domination would
+oblige the Germans themselves to look for the
+culprits. The anxiety about the injustice of
+their own cause would finally penetrate into
+the German nation.</p>
+
+<p>It was also important clearly to show how
+useless was the effort made by the enemy
+to sever the link between the Powers of the
+Entente. The enemy Press was never tired
+of giving its readers the imaginary spectacle
+of divisions between their enemies. After
+their tales about France being conquered
+by the British Army, they proceeded to
+announce that the Americans were going to
+get hold of France.</p>
+
+<p>Every peace offensive undertaken by the
+German Government in the hour of military
+difficulty gave evidence of the naïve confidence
+which the best-informed among them
+employed in such an attempt to divide us.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_164">[164]</span>
+To show that the Allied front was indissolubly
+united, to show that the Alliance extends
+still further than the war, that it will extend
+from the military to the economic field—that
+would be the efficient answer of the Allies.</p>
+
+<p>It must be said above all that the Allies
+would conquer and that they had the means
+to conquer. They must not let themselves
+be led towards discussions. There was always
+a danger of seeing the enemy get hold of
+Allied formulæ, after having emptied them of
+what they contained. The German mind,
+so complex and treacherous, had great ability
+in the art of turning to its own account the
+principles laid down by others. Germany
+might attempt once more to mislead the
+peoples by writing on her own flag their
+mottoes while they reserved to themselves
+the possibility of giving to those mottoes
+later on an interpretation diametrically
+opposed to the real one.</p>
+
+<p>Nothing was more important than to
+defend Allied public opinions against such
+enterprises, which would certainly be undertaken
+by Germany. The liberation of the
+peoples, affirmation of the justice of the
+Allied cause, demonstration of the violation
+of right perpetrated by the Central Empires—such
+must be the basis of Allied propaganda.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_165">[165]</span></p>
+
+<p>That was in full harmony with the general
+policy of principles and tended to assure to
+all the peoples the right freely to develop,
+as the constitutions of the Allied States had
+given the same right to every individual.
+So Allied victory would have that character
+of moral elevation which was the character
+of the great Allied nations during their
+history. But until they reached that victory
+of liberty and right, according to the strong
+words of M. Clemenceau, “let us make
+war!”</p>
+
+<p>Signor Borgese, the representative of Italy,
+said that he agreed generally with all the
+ideas and proposals that had been made by
+Lord Northcliffe.</p>
+
+<p>The Italians had of late been particularly
+active on the field of anti-enemy propaganda.
+For example, they had one office in Rome
+whose chief duty it was to spread news
+arriving from the enemy in order that his
+position in the world, and his internal
+resistance, might be weakened. They had
+also in Switzerland a large organisation, the
+principal aim of which was to secure daily
+knowledge of what was going on in enemy
+countries, and to utilise to the full every
+possible means of securing information about
+their internal condition.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_166">[166]</span></p>
+
+<p>The first act of Allied joint propaganda
+against the enemy was the Rome Congress
+in April, which was due largely to the
+concord and the friendship of the most
+enlightened and intelligent elements of public
+opinion in England and in Italy. As a result
+of that Congress, great consequences had
+followed in Austria-Hungary, and generally
+in the world of the enemy; and the principal
+task was to pursue the way that had thus
+been opened by the Rome Congress. The
+peculiar position of Italy as the enemy of
+Austria naturally entered largely into the
+motives that inspired Italian action. The
+declarations of Lord Northcliffe—whose influence
+upon the question of enemy propaganda
+was immense—and the declaration
+of M. Klobukowski were entirely anti-Austrian
+in tendency.</p>
+
+<p>As regards the Italians, they had been
+enemies of Austria not only because Austria
+was their enemy, but also because they felt
+that it was the most direct and sure way of
+being the enemies of Germany and of Germanism.
+Those Italians who had understood
+the true position since the beginning of the
+war had always been enemies of Austria in
+this sense, and had sought the best means of
+attacking and annihilating German militarism<span class="pagenum" id="Page_167">[167]</span>
+through Austria. Although German
+militarism was not completely invulnerable,
+and although the vulnerability of Germany
+was not so certain as that of Austria, Austria
+was the Achilles’ heel of Germany. Two
+important conditions that had rendered
+possible such action against Austria, were
+that the necessity of disintegrating Austria
+had become generally realised throughout
+the world, and that Austria’s responsibility
+for the war had been generally acknowledged
+not only by the Allies, but also by the enemy.
+Lichnowsky and Muehlon had acknowledged
+that the chief and immediate responsibility
+for the war rested with Austria. The question
+of guilt was certainly one of the chief questions
+with which propaganda had to deal;
+and it would be examined by the committees,
+because he believed that it might be possible
+to accelerate movements of opinion in Germany
+and in Austria if a confession of guilt
+as to the origin of the war were made widely
+known.</p>
+
+<p>As to what had been done by Italian
+propaganda during the last few months, he
+had mentioned the offices at Rome and at
+Berne, to which he would refer in more detail
+in the committees. As to the work of the
+Padua Inter-Allied Commission, it was<span class="pagenum" id="Page_168">[168]</span>
+assuredly a very great work, if one were to
+judge of its activity not only by personal
+convictions but by the convictions of the
+foe, who had publicly acknowledged that the
+defeat on the Piave was partly caused by the
+efforts of the Padua Commission, and by
+information that had been brought to them
+by the Jugo-Slavs and Czecho-Slovaks.
+Allied propaganda must be a propaganda
+of truth. The chief difficulty lay in making
+a distinction between copying the enemy’s
+system of actual military operations and
+imitating his methods in the war of ideas.
+It was true that the military technique of
+war must be dependent upon that of the
+adversary, unless we were to be at a disadvantage;
+but there was a danger that we
+might imitate methods adopted by the enemy
+in the war of ideas—that is to say, that we
+might copy German methods of propaganda.
+Although there were people who thought that
+the Allies should copy lies and hypocritical
+statements of German propaganda, he was
+convinced that their real arm in the propaganda
+war was the truth. The Allies
+could tell the truth because they were persuaded
+that they were right. It was easy
+for them to have a system of ideas,
+because they believed in them as in a<span class="pagenum" id="Page_169">[169]</span>
+kind of religion. Germany and Austria-Hungary
+would listen intently to the words
+that we should say—not necessarily in that
+Conference, but to the words of our Governments.
+Political action and propaganda
+would have very great importance at the end
+of this campaign, and therefore he hoped
+that Italians would be able to make their
+contribution to the shortening and to the
+victorious decision of the war.</p>
+
+<p>One circumstance that gave them absolute
+certainty of victory, and was a certificate
+of the moral purity of the Allied cause, was
+the action of the United States, whom no one—not
+even the enemy—could accuse of any
+selfish motive or interest. While it was
+conceivable that the European Allies might
+be charged, however unjustly, with having
+some thought of their direct interests, the
+United States could not by any stretch of
+imagination be regarded as having intervened
+for any issue save that of high principle.
+Therefore, he agreed entirely with Lord
+Northcliffe and M. Klobukowski that the
+more the significance of the American effort,
+both in its material and its moral aspects,
+were brought to the knowledge of enemy
+peoples, the more rapid would be the decline
+of their <i>moral</i>, and the surer the attainment<span class="pagenum" id="Page_170">[170]</span>
+of the just peace which was the great
+common aim of the Allies and the purpose of
+their action, both military and propagandist.</p>
+
+<p>Mr. James Keeley, the representative of
+the United States, said that he received his
+appointment through the Committee on
+Public Information of the United States
+Government. Four U.S. military officers
+were present, from the Military Intelligence
+Branch of the General Staff, as observers.
+They all met the Conference as pupils,
+having a most earnest desire to learn so that
+they might do their part as whole-heartedly
+in this as in all other phases of Allied effort.</p>
+
+<p>Learning from those who have had experience,
+they would be enabled to devote
+whatever resources they had to the common
+purpose. They would report to the American
+Government what men of experience in this
+work had to recommend, and on the basis
+of that report it was hoped that an American
+organisation could be created as quickly as
+possible, which should work in the fullest,
+frankest, and most effective co-operation with
+the corresponding organisations of the Allied
+nations. It would not be amiss, perhaps,
+to suggest that, in addition to material
+equipment, the United States could contribute
+one element that might possibly be of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_171">[171]</span>
+peculiar importance in this work. Its population
+contained a large representation of all
+the peoples of Central Europe. These peoples
+were well organised in the United States, and,
+with a few exceptions perfectly well-known,
+were loyal to the Allied cause. Those
+peoples, of course, had intimate connections
+with the peoples of Central Europe, and it
+was more than possible that they might be,
+in various ways, of great use in carrying
+messages across the frontiers. On this point,
+particularly, they would be glad of the
+advice of the Conference.</p>
+
+<p>After these speeches the four Committees
+referred to by Lord Northcliffe were appointed
+to deliberate on policy, distribution, material,
+and prisoners of war. The members of the
+Conference were suitably distributed among
+the different committees, which accomplished
+most invaluable work in a business-like
+manner, and presented their reports to the
+full Conference for consideration at its sitting
+on the third day.</p>
+
+<p>The Policy Committee, presided over by
+M. Klobukowski, considered exhaustively
+the problems of propaganda policy in all its
+fields and phases of action. Its discussion
+crystallised into a series of resolutions and
+recommendations for sanction, modification<span class="pagenum" id="Page_172">[172]</span>
+or rejection by the Allied Governments. It
+was, of course, fully understood that such
+resolutions could be only <i>ad referendum</i> and
+not binding on the respective Governments.</p>
+
+<p>In regard to propaganda against Austria-Hungary,
+the Committee found itself in
+complete agreement with the scheme of
+policy sanctioned by the British Government
+for purposes of propaganda, and amplified by
+the decisions of the British, French and
+Italian Governments at the time of, or in
+connection with, the Rome Congress of
+Oppressed Austro-Hungarian Nationalities.
+It recognised that such extensions of policy,
+while springing from considerations of Allied
+principles, had, in part, corresponded to the
+real demands of the propaganda situation,
+which, in their turn, had sprung from the
+exigencies of the military situation and, in
+particular, from the necessity of utilising
+the established principles of the alliance for
+the purpose of impeding or hampering the
+Austro-Hungarian offensive against Italy.
+Subsequent acts and declarations on the
+part of Allied Governments and of the
+Government of the United States made it
+clear that the joint policy of the Allies was
+tending increasingly towards the constructive
+liberation of the subject Austro-Hungarian<span class="pagenum" id="Page_173">[173]</span>
+races. The main task of the Committee in
+relation to propaganda in Austria-Hungary
+seemed, therefore, to be one of unifying for
+propaganda purposes these various acts and
+declarations, and of preparing, if possible,
+the way for a joint Allied declaration that
+might complete and render more effective
+the work of Allied propaganda both in the
+interior of Austria-Hungary and among
+Austro-Hungarian troops at the Front.</p>
+
+<p>The discussion upon the expediency and
+the possibility of such a joint Allied declaration
+was exhaustive and illuminating. In view of
+the position already taken up by the Allied
+Governments and by the United States in
+regard to the Czecho-Slovaks, the Poles, and
+the Rumanians, it appeared that the main
+issue awaiting definition concerned the question
+of Jugo-Slav unity and independence,
+and of the attitude of Italy towards them.
+The Committee adopted the following recommendation:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot">
+
+<p>“With reference to the best means of
+aiding Allied Propaganda in favour of
+the freedom of the Austro-Hungarian
+subject races, the Committee expresses a
+strong hope that all controversial discussions
+of the frontiers between Italy
+and the future Jugo-Slav State will be<span class="pagenum" id="Page_174">[174]</span>
+avoided by the Jugo-Slav Press and the
+Jugo-Slav leaders both outside and, as
+far as the Jugo-Slav leaders may be able
+to exert their influence, also inside the
+Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, just as
+they have been avoided of late by the
+most important organs of the Italian
+Press and in the public speeches of
+influential Italian leaders.”</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>During the debate upon this recommendation
+it became clearly apparent that the
+Committee regarded, and was confident that
+the Conference would regard, the Italian
+national claims to the union with Italy of the
+cities and regions of Trent, Trieste, and the
+other regions of Italian character as not only
+entirely justified, but also as an elementary
+dictate of the Allies’ respect for the principles
+of nationality and of ethnical justice. Precisely
+because the Committee supported the
+principles formulated in the Italo-Jugo-Slav
+Agreement of last March and saw in them the
+basis of fruitful co-ordination between Italy,
+Jugo-Slavia, and the other nationalities then
+oppressed of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy,
+it held the Italian national rights above
+mentioned to be imprescriptible and not open
+to discussion.</p>
+
+<p>The Committee also felt that both for<span class="pagenum" id="Page_175">[175]</span>
+reason of propaganda and from the point of
+view of the future independence and moral
+and political security of the Italian nation
+a foremost part in the work of creating a
+free and united Jugo-Slav State naturally
+fell to Italy. Therefore, after the most
+careful consideration, it unanimously adopted—and
+recommended to the Conference—the
+following resolution:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot">
+
+<p>“Considering the adhesion of the
+Italian Government, by the Prime Minister’s
+speech of April, 1918, to the
+resolutions of the Rome Congress of
+Austro-Hungarian subject races (which
+embodied the agreement between the
+Jugo-Slavs and the Italian Committee)
+and by his recent telegram to the Prime
+Minister of Serbia, M. Pashitch;</p>
+
+<p>“Considering the exemplifications of
+Allied Policy towards Austria-Hungary
+in the French and Italian Convention
+with the Czecho-Slovak National Council,
+the British declaration recognising the
+Czecho-Slovaks as an Allied Nation, the
+Allied declaration at the Versailles Conference
+of June 3rd, 1918 in favour of
+the unity and independence of Poland
+and Mr. Lansing’s statement of the 28th
+June, that all branches of the Slav races<span class="pagenum" id="Page_176">[176]</span>
+should be completely freed from German
+and Austrian rule;</p>
+
+<p>“Considering further the extreme expediency,
+especially in view of possible
+military developments on the Italian
+front, that the Allied policy of liberating
+the oppressed Hapsburg peoples should
+be represented, in the first place, by
+Italy, on whose front Allied propaganda
+against Austria-Hungary is principally
+located;</p>
+
+<p>“The Policy Committee of the Inter-Allied
+Propaganda Conference resolves
+to suggest that the Italian Government
+take the initiative in promoting a joint
+and unanimous public declaration that
+all the Allies regard the establishment of
+a free and united Jugo-Slav State, embracing
+Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, as
+one of the conditions of a just and lasting
+peace, and of the rule of right in Europe.”</p>
+</div>
+
+
+
+
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_177">[177]</span></p>
+
+<p>Passing to the consideration of propaganda
+against Bulgaria, the Committee recognised
+the essential connection between Allied propaganda
+policy towards Austria-Hungary
+and Allied propaganda policy in the Balkans.
+Without the adoption by the Allied Governments
+of a definite policy in regard to Jugo-Slav
+and Rumanian unity and independence,
+it was impossible to formulate any effective
+propaganda policy in regard to Bulgaria.
+Upon the merits of propaganda in Bulgaria,
+the Committee unanimously adhered to the
+principles laid down in Lord Northcliffe’s
+opening statement, that is to say, that an
+essential preliminary to any conversations or
+negotiations with Bulgaria must be a complete
+and effective reversal of the policy
+hitherto pursued by Bulgaria as the enemy of
+the Allies; and until this reversal had taken
+place, the objects of the Allied propaganda
+should be to bring home to the Bulgarian
+people a sense of the dangers that threatened
+them unless they could convince the Allies by
+their conduct of their sincere repentance.
+The Committee was also of the opinion that
+pending this necessary change, their Serbian
+and Greek Allies should not be left in
+ignorance of the propaganda policy which
+the chief Allied Powers might adopt.</p>
+
+<p>With reference to Poland, the Chairman
+of the Committee made a brief but pregnant
+statement, declaring the policy of propaganda
+in regard to the Poles to be identical with
+that laid down by President Wilson and
+President Poincaré and formulated by the
+Allied Prime Ministers on June 3 in the words:
+“The creation of a united and independent<span class="pagenum" id="Page_178">[178]</span>
+Polish State, with free access to the sea,
+constitutes one of the conditions of a solid
+and just peace and of the rule of right in
+Europe.” He added that the growth of
+Prussian power for evil, and the present
+position of Prussia in the world, had their
+origin in the partition of Poland. Consequently
+he urged that the reunion of the
+various parts of Poland would be not only
+the reparation of an historical injustice,
+but would constitute a strong guarantee
+against any revival of the Prussian system.
+He claimed that the greater the strength of
+Poland, the firmer would be the security of
+Europe and the world against any renewal of
+aggressive Prussian militarism.</p>
+
+<p>In the discussion which followed, general
+agreement was expressed with this view;
+but it was pointed out that a reunited Poland
+might be stronger in proportion as its
+territory was ethnographically compact and
+did not include other neighbouring racial
+elements with whom Poland would have
+every interest to live in concord, but which,
+were they included against their will within
+her frontiers, might become sources of disturbance
+and weakness. It was also considered
+desirable that the Polish National
+Committee, in order to become not less<span class="pagenum" id="Page_179">[179]</span>
+valuable to the Allies as an adjunct and
+agency of propaganda in enemy countries
+than were the Czech and Jugo-Slav Committees,
+might extend the basis of its representation,
+so as to secure more unanimous
+support from the various sections of Polish
+opinion. The Committee adopted, and submitted
+to the approval of the Conference,
+the following resolution and recommendation.
+It proposed to communicate the recommendation
+to the Polish National Committee:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot">
+
+<p>“The Conference records its conviction
+that the creation of a united
+and independent Polish State, with free
+access to the sea, is an essential requirement
+of lasting peace in Europe,
+and expresses the belief that the more
+closely the frontiers of this future Polish
+State follow ethnographical lines, the
+stronger will it be to play its part in
+safeguarding that peace, and the more
+harmonious will be its relations with
+neighbouring peoples which, like the
+Poles, are striving to secure a free
+existence.</p>
+
+<p>“The Conference, anxious that
+Allied propaganda may truly express
+the desires of the Polish people, as a
+whole, and may tend to promote its<span class="pagenum" id="Page_180">[180]</span>
+welfare, expresses the hope that the
+Polish National Council may extend the
+basis of its representation so as to be
+in a position to lend still further aid to
+Allied Propaganda in enemy countries.”</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>On the question of Alsace-Lorraine, the
+Committee found itself in entire agreement
+with its Chairman’s declaration that the
+return of the two provinces to France was
+an imperative demand of international justice
+and not a concession to be made by the
+Allies to French national feeling. The
+undoing of the flagrant wrong done by
+Germany in 1871 was so clearly a condition
+of any just peace that it required no further
+demonstration; quite apart from the
+historical justification of the French claim
+to the reincorporation of these provinces in
+France by their disannexation from Germany,
+the title of the people of Alsace-Lorraine to
+determine their own allegiance proceeded
+from their voluntary adhesion to France in
+1790, no less than from the protests of their
+elected representatives against the Treaty of
+Frankfurt in the French National Assembly
+at Bordeaux in 1871, and in the German
+Reichstag in 1874. In regard to Alsace-Lorraine,
+the Committee was convinced that
+Allied Propaganda in Germany should make<span class="pagenum" id="Page_181">[181]</span>
+known to the German people the determination
+of the Allies to insist in all circumstances
+upon this vindication of rights.</p>
+
+<p>Consequently it adopted the following
+resolutions:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot">
+
+<p>1. Propaganda on the subject of
+Alsace-Lorraine should be unified and
+conducted on general lines indicated by
+France.</p>
+
+<p>2. The argument to which first place
+should always be given is that of outraged
+right and of the will of the
+inhabitants as expressed in their solemn
+and repeated protests.</p>
+
+<p>3. The question of Alsace-Lorraine
+is a question of international right, the
+solution of which interests the whole
+world.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>As to propaganda addressed to the German
+people themselves in regard to the future
+position of Germany, the Committee was in
+full agreement with the policy recommended
+by Lord Northcliffe with the approval of the
+British Government and summarised in his
+opening statements. It believed that Allied
+propaganda should make it clear that the
+chief object of the Allies was the changing of
+Germany, not the destruction of the German<span class="pagenum" id="Page_182">[182]</span>
+people; and that the German people could
+hope for an adequate position in the world,
+and for admission into a future society of
+nations, when they had qualified themselves
+for partnership with civilised communities
+by making the necessary reparations and
+restorations (primarily in the case of Belgium)
+by overthrowing the system known as
+Prussian militarism, and when they had
+effectively abandoned all designs of mastery
+over Europe. At the same time, the Committee
+laid stress upon the importance of
+bringing home to the German people a sense
+of the economic pressure which the Allies,
+and above all the United States of America,
+were in a position to exercise, and would
+exercise, until the conditions of a just peace
+were accepted.</p>
+
+<p>To this end the Committee strongly urged
+that, in the various Allied countries and in
+the United States, a comprehensive scheme
+of world organisation be studied and worked
+out, and that, in particular, the steps already
+taken to co-ordinate the economic policy of
+the Allies and of the United States be
+publicly explained and brought to the knowledge
+of the Germans. The Committee,
+therefore, adopted and recommended to the
+Conference the following resolution:</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_183">[183]</span></p>
+
+<div class="blockquot">
+
+<p>“In consideration of the fact that the
+Allied Governments have in their own
+respective fields of action and by their
+joint action begun to give effect to
+economic co-operation, which is to-day
+a powerful instrument of war, and which
+may, after the war, serve as a basis
+for the systematic organisation of the
+resources of the world:</p>
+
+<p>“The Conference expresses its
+satisfaction with the results already
+attained and believes that it would be
+expedient to make plain to enemy public
+opinion, by means of a service of information,
+which would set forth both
+the principles of Allied economic action
+and their results as worked out in daily
+practice, the gravity of the danger by
+which the enemy is threatened, and the
+advantages assured to those who are
+admitted to co-operation with the Allies.”</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>The Committee adopted the following
+resolution:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot">
+
+<p>“That in view of the great importance
+of co-ordinating the Allies’ policies and
+organisations for the conduct of
+propaganda in enemy countries, a
+permanent body be constituted for this
+purpose;</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_184">[184]</span></p>
+
+<p>“That this body consist of four members,
+representing respectively the four
+propaganda departments which have
+taken part in this Conference; each
+member having the power to nominate
+an assistant or a substitute, or both, if
+necessary;</p>
+
+<p>“That the provisional headquarters
+of the body shall be at Crewe House,
+London, until permanent headquarters
+be determined;</p>
+
+<p>“That the establishment expenses be
+shared equally between the four Governments;
+and that a permanent secretariat
+be appointed thereto.”</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>In adhering to this resolution, and in
+deciding that it be recommended for adoption
+by the Allied Governments and by the
+United States, the Policy Committee had
+been influenced especially by the hope that
+the proposed arrangement might expedite
+the co-ordination of Allied propaganda policy,
+facilitate the preparation of concordant
+declarations by the Allied Governments at
+suitable moments, and assist in the proper
+organisation of congresses.</p>
+
+<p>The discussions of the Distribution Committee
+were exceedingly interesting and
+fruitful. They ranged over the whole field<span class="pagenum" id="Page_185">[185]</span>
+of propaganda effort, and the Committee’s
+report summarised the means of distribution
+of propaganda in use and assessed their
+respective values. So far as military means
+were concerned, it was found that the
+Italians employed aeroplanes, projectiles, and
+contact patrols; the French, aeroplanes,
+projectiles, and balloons; the British, only
+balloons on the Western Front, but aeroplanes
+in the East; and that seaplanes
+might be employed to reach special objectives
+in the Mediterranean. Each country gave
+favourable reports on the methods they
+employed, but all were agreed that a constant
+exchange of information as to results was
+required. In certain cases, such as the
+mountainous Italian Front, where very
+limited targets had to be reached, the
+dropping of propaganda in bulk was
+necessary; but in most cases methods that
+secured a wide scattering of the leaflets, so
+that those might be secured and hidden by
+individuals, were necessary. The French
+explained a device, in its experimental stage,
+to secure an automatic scattering from aeroplanes.
+The “releases” of English balloons
+were agreed to produce a most adequate
+scattering. Various devices employed in
+projectiles were successful in the case of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_186">[186]</span>
+leaflets when the angle of projection was
+high and the wind was favourable, but
+hitherto had not been successful with pamphlets.
+It was recognised that aeroplanes
+were the best means of reaching distant
+targets with accuracy; that for shorter
+distances, from a few hundred yards up to
+ten miles, projectiles would secure great
+accuracy.</p>
+
+<p>With regard to range, it was recognised
+that aeroplanes had the widest limits, and
+the scattering of literature in Berlin by the
+French and in Vienna by the Italians was
+considered an accomplishment of great
+brilliancy and promise of usefulness, and
+that the types of paper balloons in use
+were thoroughly effective for ranges up
+to twenty or thirty miles, and with less
+certainty of aim up to 100 or 150 miles;
+but that with larger balloons (such as the
+fabric balloons in the possession of the
+English, or the new larger “doped” paper
+balloons then being prepared in England, or
+the reinforced paper balloons being experimented
+with in France) the distances could
+be increased to several hundred miles.</p>
+
+<p>As to the bulk that could be distributed,
+it was stated that each of the standard
+balloons, then used by the English and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_187">[187]</span>
+French, carried 4 lb. 2 oz. of literature, and
+that projectiles could take from a few
+ounces up to 8 or 9 lb. The large fabric
+balloons then available at G.H.Q. could
+carry up to 15 lb.</p>
+
+<p>It was recognised that there were no
+objections to the use of balloons, as the
+operations did not interfere with other work
+and did not excite retaliation from the
+enemy. The use of projectiles was apt to
+provoke retaliation unless it were carried out
+at night or to a limited extent. There was
+difference of experience and opinion with
+regard to the use of aeroplanes. The
+Italians and French stated that no action
+had been taken by the enemy in the case of
+their airmen who had been captured, and
+that they found no difficulty in imposing
+this duty on their airmen. The British,
+however, stated that the Germans had taken
+strong measures, and had threatened their
+continuance, against airmen captured after
+distributing leaflets. The representative of
+the British Air Ministry stated that, after
+giving full consideration to the matter, and
+notwithstanding their appreciation of the
+value of propaganda, they were opposed to
+the use of aeroplanes for this purpose,
+partly on the ground of the bad psychological<span class="pagenum" id="Page_188">[188]</span>
+effect of such work on young pilots and
+aviators and partly because the supply of
+trained men and of machines was no more
+than sufficient for the direct purposes of this
+arm of the Forces. The representative of
+G.H.Q., France, said that the British Army
+had accepted this view. He added that
+balloons could be employed on the Western
+Front three days a week on the average, and
+that there was no mechanical reason why
+the method by balloons could not be increased
+to meet every reasonable requirement.</p>
+
+<p>A French representative in the course of
+a discussion as to the utility of throwing some
+leaflets in bombing expeditions, reported the
+opinion of a well-known pro-ally German
+citizen that in the case of the Rhine towns
+and rich cities of Germany the propaganda
+of fear, that is to say, the actual dropping
+of bombs, was more useful than the dropping
+of literature.</p>
+
+<p>It was agreed that the suggested use of
+aeroplanes to scatter leaflets at great heights
+parallel with the enemy lines encountered
+most of the objections to, and none of the
+dangers of, their direct use by crossing the
+lines. A device which had been worked
+out experimentally in England, but was not
+employed because of the danger it might<span class="pagenum" id="Page_189">[189]</span>
+occasion to aeroplanes, was explained and
+the apparatus shown. It consisted in sending
+up leaflets to be liberated at the necessary
+height for wind driftage by means of a
+messenger travelling up and down the cable
+of a box kite. This means was recognised
+to be cheap and efficient for employment
+where it would not be dangerous to aeroplanes.</p>
+
+<p>The Committee agreed that the regular
+exchange of information as to methods employed
+by the Allies, and as to the results
+actually obtained by these, would be of
+great value, and recommended that a permanent
+bureau should be established to
+collect and exchange such information and
+reports.</p>
+
+<p>As regards civil means of distribution, the
+Committee recommended that increased
+attention be paid to the insertion of news
+and articles in neutral organs which were
+either read or quoted in the enemy countries.
+Special stress was laid on the importance of
+establishing effective relations with organs
+which had a reputation for strict neutrality
+or pro-enemy bias.</p>
+
+<p>The Committee also recommended that each
+Power should seek through its agencies to
+establish channels through which enemy
+newspaper correspondents could be influenced<span class="pagenum" id="Page_190">[190]</span>
+or provided with information. The
+task of approaching all sufficiently important
+correspondents with whom contact had not
+been established should be apportioned
+among the agencies of the Powers according
+to the opportunities of approach available.
+Channels created under a scheme of this
+kind should be made mutually available to
+the respective Allied agents in the localities
+concerned.</p>
+
+<p>Having regard to the extent to which the
+ordinary book trade channels into Germany
+were still operating, the Committee recommended
+the publication in neutral countries
+of works which, though not directly bearing
+on the issues of the war, were expressly
+calculated to educate enemy opinion in a
+democratic sense. The Committee held that,
+in view of its great utility, clandestine
+circulation in the enemy countries of
+carefully-chosen literature, especially if
+actually written by enemy subjects of pro-Ally
+or revolutionary tendencies, should
+be secured through every available channel.
+In view of the precarious and delicate nature
+of this work, the Committee desired specially
+to emphasise the necessity of seeking out and
+developing new channels for distribution of
+this kind.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_191">[191]</span></p>
+
+<p>The main part of the time which the
+Committee on Material gave to the discussion
+of its subject was devoted to the question
+of the most effective forms of propaganda
+and to the special methods desirable for
+putting these forms into practice. There
+was general agreement that the best way
+to depress the <i>moral</i> of the German troops
+and the German population was to show
+them that it was against their interest to
+continue the war; that the longer they
+went on the worse they would fare both
+during the war and after; and that their
+only hope of regaining their place in the
+community of nations lay in throwing over
+the bad advisers who had led them into the
+war, and whose repeated promises of success
+had been one after the other falsified.
+Thereto the Germans had always had a hope
+before them. They were taught to hope
+for great advantage from the downfall of
+Russia, from the unrestricted U-boat warfare,
+from the last offensive on the Western
+Front. For the first time their leaders did
+not know what hope to dangle before them.
+Therefore, the moment was one peculiarly
+favourable for propaganda if undertaken
+upon the right lines.</p>
+
+<p>It appeared to the Committee that the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_192">[192]</span>
+best lines upon which to work would be to
+emphasise as much as possible the great
+American effort, both in the field and at
+home in the factory, the shipyard, and the
+farm. At the same time the dark commercial
+outlook for Germans, the dangers
+lying latent for them in the control of raw
+materials by the Allies, the discovery of so
+many of their trade secrets, and the building
+up in France, Italy, England, and the
+United States of industries in which they
+had almost a monopoly before the war
+ought also to be brought as vividly as
+possible before them. They should be told
+the truth about the food situation in France
+and England, which so far had been kept from
+them. They should be given news as quickly
+as possible of Allied successes. They should
+be depressed as much as possible, yet at the
+same time care should be taken not to let
+them think they were for ever excluded from
+relations of business and friendship with the
+peoples then fighting against them. If they
+were made to believe this, their backs
+would be stiffened to fight on desperately as
+long as possible. A sound line of propaganda,
+the Committee considered, would be to
+leave open a doorway through which if they
+got rid of Pan-Germanism and renounced its
+theories of world domination by blood and
+iron they would in time be admitted again
+to the same intercourse as before. It was
+agreed that for soldiers the most elementary
+propaganda was the best. More elaborate
+arguments and demonstrations should be
+kept for pamphlets to be smuggled into
+Germany and for articles in neutral papers.
+Use should be made wherever possible of
+diagrams appealing instantly to the eye.</p>
+
+
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_193">[193]</span></p>
+
+<p>A long discussion took place on the question
+of revolutionary propaganda. The opinion
+was expressed that it was better to denounce
+the Pan-German party generally and throw
+upon them the responsibility for the war and
+for all the misfortunes which Germany had
+suffered and would still further suffer from
+it, rather than to attack the Emperor.
+On the other hand, it was pointed out that
+attacks on an individual are always more
+effective than attacks on a party. Finally,
+it was agreed that anything said against the
+Hohenzollern dynasty should be taken, either
+in reality or in appearance, from German
+sources, so as to avoid the risk that attacks
+clearly emanating from Allied sources might
+strengthen rather than weaken the Emperor’s
+hold upon the people of Germany. While
+a good deal of material was available from<span class="pagenum" id="Page_194">[194]</span>
+German anti-Imperial sources, it was
+suggested that the advantage of circulating,
+for example, speeches of Socialists, might
+be counterbalanced by the disadvantage that
+it would make such speakers less inclined to
+talk. Some Socialists had appealed to the
+French Government not to use their speeches
+for propaganda, because this weakened their
+efforts. It was agreed that incitements to
+German soldiers to desert were legitimate
+and might be useful. The sending into
+Germany of photographs of prisoners of war
+taken immediately after their capture, when
+they were usually in a deplorable condition,
+and after two months of captivity, when
+their physical condition was good, was
+recommended.</p>
+
+<p>With regard to Austria-Hungary, the Committee
+discussed whether it was illegitimate
+to exploit the land hunger among the Magyar
+peasants and the discontent among the
+German proletariat. It was agreed that it
+would do no harm to support the agrarian
+agitators in Hungary, but, as regards Bolshevik
+propaganda among the Austro-German
+working classes, that the Allies ought only
+to circulate their own literature. It was
+suggested that the United States, in mobilising
+its Slav elements, might spare members<span class="pagenum" id="Page_195">[195]</span>
+of each of the Slav nationalities for propaganda
+work in England and in France.</p>
+
+<p>Propaganda in Bulgaria depended on the
+policy which the Entente Powers and the
+United States decided to follow with regard
+to that country. Until such a policy was
+settled little could be done in a large way.
+It was useful, however, to make the Bulgarians
+acquainted with a number of facts
+of which they were ignorant, as for example,
+the failure of U-boats to reduce England to
+the verge of starvation, the large number of
+American troops already in France, and so on.
+Leaflets on these and other topics were being
+dropped regularly by aeroplanes on the
+Salonica front in considerable quantities.
+A good deal, it was suggested, could be done
+through Bulgars in Switzerland. But so
+long as the Bulgarians believed that the
+United States was their friend and would
+see them through whatever happened, little
+impression could be made upon them.</p>
+
+<p>With regard to co-operation between the
+various bodies engaged in propaganda, it was
+proposed that closer relations should be
+established between the local agents of the
+Allied Powers in neutral countries; that
+they should meet from time to time to
+exchange ideas and to give each other full<span class="pagenum" id="Page_196">[196]</span>
+information as to their activities. Special
+stress was laid upon the necessity of these
+local agents working in union with the
+diplomatic and military representatives and
+with any other agencies engaged in the same
+kind of work. The Committee unanimously
+accepted this suggestion, with the proviso
+that the local agents should, if possible, be
+under the direction of the Central Committee,
+to which they could refer for instructions and
+advice. Pending the establishment of such
+a central body, arrangements were made for
+the various Propaganda Departments to
+begin at once to exchange information about
+all that they were doing and that each should
+send out copies of all the material produced
+by it to the other departments. It was, of
+course, agreed that such circulation of
+material produced would be one of the chief
+activities of the proposed central body, which
+would do it with greater rapidity and effect.</p>
+
+<p>It was also agreed that such a central
+body could be most useful in employing
+methods for testing the effectiveness of
+propaganda. The means of doing this were
+generally admitted to be defective. Only
+by co-ordinating effort and by comparing
+information could they be improved. It
+was decided that the existing system of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_197">[197]</span>
+examining prisoners of war for purposes of
+military information ought to be supplemented
+by a special further examination for
+the purposes of propaganda information,
+and it was suggested that special representatives
+of the Enemy Propaganda Departments
+should be allowed to conduct such examinations.</p>
+
+<p>Some important points connected with
+propaganda brought to bear upon Germany
+through neutral countries were raised, and
+it was agreed that the work of controlling
+and distributing films for moving picture
+theatres, which was to be done by an Inter-Allied
+Commission in Switzerland, ought to
+be extended to other neutral countries,
+especially Sweden. Information before the
+Committee bore testimony that German-owned
+picture theatres had of late increased
+very much in number both in Switzerland
+and in Scandinavia, and that these relied
+for the lighter part of their entertainments
+upon films from Allied countries, Germany
+supplying special propaganda films. By controlling
+the supply of films from Allied
+countries, the activity of these theatres
+could be very much diminished and possibly
+brought to an end.</p>
+
+<p>It was also agreed that it would be advisable<span class="pagenum" id="Page_198">[198]</span>
+to invite a number of neutral editors
+and newspaper writers to pay a visit to
+the United States. It was considered that
+articles describing what they saw and what
+they were able to judge of the feeling of the
+American nation would have a very useful
+effect upon German opinion.</p>
+
+<p>With a view to influencing German opinion,
+it was agreed that more news agencies, to all
+appearance independent and self-supporting,
+might well be established in other neutral
+countries; that more efforts should be made
+to get articles inserted in enemy newspapers,
+not controversial articles, but statements of
+what the Allies were doing, especially in the
+economic field, written as a German might
+write them who was anxious about the
+future of his country; and that dispatch of
+Allied newspapers to neutral countries should
+be improved and extended so that there
+might be more chance of their finding their
+way into Germany.</p>
+
+<p>The discussions of the Prisoners of War
+Committee showed that agreement existed
+as to the soundness of the methods adopted
+by Crewe House for this particular work,
+and the report took the form of a recommendation
+that they should be generally
+adopted by the Allies.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_199">[199]</span></p>
+
+<p>At the final plenary session of the
+Conference, on August 17, 1918, it was
+unanimously resolved that the Committees’
+reports should be accepted, and submitted
+by the heads of the four Missions to their
+respective Governments for their approval
+and adoption. The Conference resolved to
+constitute (as suggested by the Policy Committee)
+a permanent inter-Allied body for
+the conduct of propaganda in enemy countries
+and by so doing made a great advance.
+In order to maintain close touch with
+the French propaganda authorities, Lord
+Northcliffe appointed Colonel Lord Onslow
+as resident representative of Crewe House
+in Paris. By the time the Armistice was
+signed the different Governments had
+nominated their delegates to the permanent
+Inter-Allied body and all the necessary preliminary
+arrangements had been satisfactorily
+made. This organisation would have opened
+a new chapter in the history of war propaganda
+but for the conclusion of hostilities.
+As Lord Northcliffe said in his final speech
+to the Conference, the constitution of a permanent
+Inter-Allied body was a step towards
+that general co-ordination of Allied purpose
+and organisation which the experience of the
+war had proved to be a postulate of rapidity<span class="pagenum" id="Page_200">[200]</span>
+and efficiency of action. The work of the
+Conference itself, however, was invaluable
+as it surveyed the policy and organisation of
+propaganda against the enemy in all its
+phases and from many points of view at a
+time when propaganda had just passed into
+the intensive stage. Its reports in themselves
+form a text-book in the science and art
+of propaganda.</p>
+
+<figure class="figcenter illowp100" id="i_p176c" style="max-width: 148.0625em;">
+  <img class="w100" src="images/i_p176c.jpg" alt="">
+  <figcaption class="caption">“DRIFTING DOWN IN WHITE SHOWERS”: LEAFLETS (INSTEAD OF BOMBS), FROM ITALIAN
+AEROPLANE SQUADRON, DROPPING ON VIENNA—AN AIR PHOTOGRAPH.<br>
+<i>Photograph supplied by the Photographic Studios of the Italian Air Service.
+By kind permission of the “Illustrated London News.”</i></figcaption>
+</figure>
+
+
+<div class="column"><figure class="figcenter illowp80" id="i_p176a" style="max-width: 100%">
+  <img class="w100" src="images/i_p176a.jpg" alt="">
+  <figcaption class="caption">MR. ROBERT DONALD.<br>
+MEMBER OF THE ENEMY PROPAGANDA COMMITTEE.<br>
+<i>Photo: Elliott &amp; Fry, Ltd.</i></figcaption>
+</figure></div>
+
+<div class="column"><figure class="figcenter illowp80"  id="i_p192a" style="max-width: 100%;">
+  <img class="w100" src="images/i_p192a.jpg" alt="">
+  <figcaption class="caption">SIR SIDNEY LOW.<br>
+MEMBER OF THE ENEMY PROPAGANDA COMMITTEE<br>
+<i>Photo: Elliott &amp; Fry. Ltd</i></figcaption>
+</figure></div>
+
+<div class="column"><figure class="figcenter illowp80" id="i_p192d" style="max-width: 100%;">
+  <img class="w100" src="images/i_p192d.jpg" alt="">
+  <figcaption class="caption">MR. JAMES O’GRADY, M.P.<br>
+MEMBER OF THE ENEMY PROPAGANDA COMMITTEE.</figcaption>
+</figure></div>
+
+
+
+<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_201">[201]</span></p>
+
+<h2 class="nobreak" id="CHAPTER_VIII">CHAPTER VIII<br>
+<span class="fs80">FROM WAR PROPAGANDA TO
+PEACE PROPAGANDA</span>
+</h2>
+</div>
+
+
+
+
+
+<p class="sub">The Co-ordination of British Policy—A representative committee—Lord
+Northcliffe’s Article: “From War to Peace.”</p>
+
+
+
+<p>In addition to its success in its practical
+bearing and direct influence on the work of
+spreading the truth concerning the war in the
+enemy countries, the Inter-Allied Conference
+at Crewe House in August, 1918, was a
+distinctly useful act of propaganda in two
+other directions. First, it led to a mutual
+appreciation, among the influential representatives
+of the four countries, of the effort
+and determination of each nation and of their
+willingness to combine to achieve victory—in
+other words, to a better understanding of
+each other’s will to conquer and readiness
+to subordinate self-interest to the larger
+object of Allied accomplishment of purpose.</p>
+
+<p>In the second place, the Conference was an
+object-lesson to the British Government Departments
+which participated in it as to the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_202">[202]</span>
+value of concerted and co-ordinated action
+in propaganda matters. Shortly afterwards,
+a suggestion was made by an influential
+representative of one of these Departments
+that a committee should be formed to
+represent all British departments concerned
+in any way with propaganda. Moreover, it
+gradually became evident to all concerned
+that the collapse of Bulgaria was the beginning
+of the end, and that “war propaganda”
+must by a process of steady evolution
+become “peace-terms propaganda,” by which
+public opinion in enemy countries as well
+as at home, in the Dominions, and in Allied
+and neutral countries, might be made accustomed
+to the peace which the Allies
+intended to make. The maintenance of
+British prestige demanded that our position
+in regard to the peace should be explained
+and justified by the widespread dissemination
+of news and views, both before and during
+the Peace Conference.</p>
+
+<p>Thus it was more than ever imperative
+that all British propagandists should speak
+with one voice. Here then was work ready
+to be done by the suggested inter-departmental
+committee, for the formation of which
+invitations had already been issued to the
+departments concerned to send as delegates<span class="pagenum" id="Page_203">[203]</span>
+to this Committee responsible officials able
+to give decisions for their departments on
+such matters as would be discussed by such
+a committee. These invitations were accepted
+by:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot">
+<p>
+The War Cabinet,<br>
+The Admiralty,<br>
+The War Office,<br>
+The Foreign Office,<br>
+The Treasury,<br>
+The Ministry of Information,<br>
+The Air Ministry,<br>
+The Colonial Office,<br>
+The India Office,<br>
+The War Aims Committee, and<br>
+The Official Press Bureau.<br>
+</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>Representatives of these departments and
+of Lord Northcliffe’s department, which,
+for official purposes, had been renamed The
+British War Mission, thus formed what was
+known as the Policy Committee of the
+British War Mission.</p>
+
+<p>While this Committee was in process of
+formation, Crewe House had been studying
+the problems of “peace-terms propaganda”
+and had, as a result of a series of conferences,
+prepared a memorandum outlining a basis
+upon which such propaganda could be
+developed.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_204">[204]</span></p>
+
+<p>The first meeting of the Policy Committee
+was held at Crewe House on October 4, 1918,
+and I presided in the absence, through
+indisposition, of Lord Northcliffe. After
+giving a summarised account of the work
+carried on from Crewe House, I said that
+whatever results it had been possible to
+achieve had proceeded mainly from the
+circumstance that it had in each case been
+based upon definite policies in regard to the
+countries concerned. These policies had all
+been submitted to, and had received the
+approval of, the British Government. The
+advantages of this procedure were obvious.
+It enabled propagandists to work on consistent
+lines without fear that the representations
+they made to the enemy would be
+contradicted by actual occurrences. In this
+way, propaganda representations had a cumulative
+effect. If, for instance, enemy troops
+were at first inclined to regard representations
+with scepticism, they were gradually convinced
+by the force of events that they had
+been told the truth from the outset, and that
+consequently subsequent representations
+deserved serious attention. Another advantage
+had proceeded from the obvious
+circumstance that as Allied policy must
+correspond to the aims which the Allies<span class="pagenum" id="Page_205">[205]</span>
+were determined to secure at the peace,
+the representation of that policy to propaganda
+was in harmony with the war aims of
+the Allies, and was strengthened by every
+successive declaration by Allied statesmen
+of the objects for which they were fighting.
+A third advantage was that the propaganda
+of the enemy could not destroy the effects of
+our propaganda without having gained such
+military successes as to render the Allied
+war aims themselves unattainable. Consequently
+every Allied victory that brought the
+war aims nearer attainment enhanced also
+the efficacy of propaganda.</p>
+
+<p>At the outset, the efforts made by Crewe
+House were naturally tentative and experimental.
+Their real value could only be
+proved by the test of experience. This
+test had been applied in Austria-Hungary,
+Bulgaria, and Germany. As against Austria-Hungary,
+Crewe House propaganda contributed
+to the defeat of the Austrians on
+the Piave in June, and had its efforts not
+been thwarted by political short-sightedness
+and some personal intrigue on the part of
+various Italian authorities, it was certain that
+much greater headway would have been
+made and that the Italian armies would
+have been in a much more favourable<span class="pagenum" id="Page_206">[206]</span>
+position. As it was, the policy of liberating
+the Austro-Hungarian subject races, upon
+which propaganda had been based, had
+already had a marked effect in the interior
+of the Dual Monarchy, and had brought large
+sections of the inhabitants to the point of
+revolt. This would be clear when it was
+said that the Italo-Jugo-Slav Agreement of
+March, 1918, the Rome Congress of the
+Hapsburg Subject Races of April, with its
+sequel in the declarations by the Allies and
+the United States to the Poles, Czecho-Slovaks
+and Southern Slavs, as well as the
+actual recognition of the Czecho-Slovaks and
+the prospective recognition of the Jugo-Slavs
+as Allied and belligerent nations, had all been
+influenced, if not directly promoted, by the
+efforts of Crewe House.</p>
+
+<p>As regards Bulgaria, Crewe House
+definitely rejected Bulgarian overtures until
+there should be a complete reversal of
+Bulgarian policy. That reversal had taken
+place, and had opened up further prospects
+of propaganda against Austria-Hungary of
+which speedy advantage was being taken.</p>
+
+<p>The work in Germany had been positive
+and negative. Its aim had been to give the
+German people something to hope for and
+much to fear—in other words, to make it<span class="pagenum" id="Page_207">[207]</span>
+clear to them that the only way to escape
+complete ruin would be to break with the
+system that brought the war upon Europe,
+and to qualify for admission into a League
+of Nations on the Allied terms. In addition
+to these educative efforts, we had supplied
+the enemy armies with constant and invariably
+truthful information about the
+actual military position. The news which
+the German military authorities were withholding
+from their troops had been supplied
+by us. Hence their cries of alarm. Nevertheless,
+much remained to be done in the
+co-ordination of the efforts of all Government
+Departments so as to make the general
+work of propaganda as rapid and as efficient
+as possible. Much use had unfortunately
+deprived the term “propaganda” of its real
+meaning. In its true sense it meant the
+education of the enemy to a knowledge of
+what kind of world the Allies meant to
+create, and of the place reserved in it for
+enemy peoples according as they assisted in,
+or continued to resist, its creation. It implied
+also the dissemination of this knowledge
+among the Allied peoples, so that there
+might be full popular support for Allied
+policy and no tendency at the critical moment
+of peace to sacrifice any essential feature of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_208">[208]</span>
+the settlement because its importance might
+not have been explained or understood in
+time. Next to the actual work of fighting
+the enemy on land and sea, there was no
+more important work than this; and the
+joint intelligence and energy of all Departments
+of the Government were required to
+accomplish it successfully. For this reason
+the suggestion that this council of representatives
+of the Government Departments
+chiefly concerned should be formed had
+been warmly welcomed, in order that there
+might be less dispersion of effort, less overlapping,
+and greater mutual comprehension
+of the work which each Department was
+striving to do, and fuller co-ordination in the
+direction of all those efforts to one single end.</p>
+
+
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_209">[209]</span></p>
+
+<p>As the war approached its end, enemy
+propaganda must gradually pass into peace
+offensives and counter-offensives. The British
+War Mission therefore had already in
+existence an organisation to collect and
+collate various suggestions, territorial,
+political, economic, and so forth, that had
+been made by the different sections and
+parties in Allied, neutral, and enemy
+countries. A step in this direction was the
+report on the Propaganda Library, issued by
+the War Office early in 1917, by Captain
+Chalmers Mitchell, who had since become the
+liaison officer between the British War
+Mission and the War Office, and who had
+been asked to act as Secretary of the Policy
+Committee. Captain Chalmers Mitchell
+was in charge of the aforesaid organisation
+at Crewe House, and although its immediate
+function was to collect information useful
+for propaganda, it was clear that it would
+also obtain material useful to those who had
+to shape peace policy. For propaganda to
+the enemy was in a sense a forecast of
+policy; it must be inspired by policy, but
+at the same time its varying needs also
+suggested policy.</p>
+
+<p>It was hoped, therefore, that this Policy
+Committee might assist in furnishing materials
+for the compilation of the various
+peace proposals, in revising the collation
+of them, in drawing inferences from them
+and in discussing the action and reaction of
+peace propaganda and peace policy that the
+inferences suggested.</p>
+
+<p>The Committee decided to undertake the
+following immediate activities:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot">
+
+<p>Study of Peace Terms.</p>
+
+<p>Study of utterances by important
+enemy representatives to form decisions<span class="pagenum" id="Page_210">[210]</span>
+as to what credence should be
+given them and what response should
+be made to them.</p>
+
+<p>Suggestion of statements to be made
+by Allied representatives, and consideration
+of their phraseology and substance.</p>
+
+<p>Special consideration of the reception
+to be given to German statements as
+to the course of democratisation in
+Germany.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>At an emergency meeting of the Committee
+summoned a few days later to draft a
+statement of propaganda policy with
+reference to the German Peace Note, Lord
+Northcliffe said his department had prepared
+for submission to the Committee a draft
+statement, based on a consideration of
+President Wilson’s pronouncements. After
+various slight modifications had been made,
+the statement was adopted in principle.</p>
+
+<p>In its final form it read:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot">
+
+<p>“In order to stop further bloodshed, the
+German Government requests the immediate
+conclusion of an armistice on land and
+water and in the air.</p>
+
+<p>“The Note accepts the programme set
+forth by the President of the United States
+in his message to Congress of January 8th,
+1918, and in his later pronouncements,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_211">[211]</span>
+especially his speech of September 27th, as
+a basis for peace negotiations.</p>
+
+<p>“In point of fact, the pronouncements of
+President Wilson were a statement of attitude
+made before the Brest-Litovsk treaty, and
+enforcement of the peace of Bucharest on
+Rumania, and the German statement of
+their intentions at the outset of the Spring
+offensive. They cannot, therefore, be understood
+as a full recitation of the conditions of
+peace.</p>
+
+<p>“The phrasing of the German acceptance
+of them as a ‘basis for peace negotiations’
+covers every variety of interpretation from
+sincere acceptance to that mere desire for
+negotiations which is the inevitable consequence
+of the existing military situation.
+It is, therefore, impossible to grant any
+armistice to Germany which does not give
+the Entente full and acceptable guarantees
+that the terms arranged will be complied with.
+There must be a clear understanding that
+Germany accepts certain principles as indisputable,
+and reserves for negotiation only
+such details as, in the opinion of the Associated
+Powers, are negotiable.</p>
+
+<p>“In the full conviction of the power and
+the will of the Associated Powers to enforce
+a peace that shall be just and lasting, we<span class="pagenum" id="Page_212">[212]</span>
+shall thankfully accept conclusive evidence
+that the peoples of our present enemies are
+willing to co-operate in the establishment of
+such a peace. With the object of making
+the conditions of such co-operation clear, we
+take the opportunity, presented by the
+German peace note, of exploring more fully
+the ground covered by President Wilson’s
+pronouncements and of distinguishing
+explicitly between principles and conditions
+that must be accepted as indisputable, and
+terms and details that may be the subject of
+negotiation.</p>
+
+<p>“The following conditions are indisputable:—</p>
+
+<p>“<i>In no sense whatever shall restoration or
+reparation in the case of Belgium be taken
+into consideration when adjusting any other
+claims arising from the war.</i></p>
+
+<p>“1. The complete restoration, territorial
+and political, of Belgium. The assumption
+by Germany of the full financial burden
+involved in material restoration and reconstruction,
+including the replacement of
+machinery, the provision of war pensions
+and adequate compensation for all civilian
+losses and injuries, and the liquidation of all
+Belgian war debts. In view of the circumstances
+in which Germany invaded Belgium,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_213">[213]</span>
+no allegations that Belgian civilians acted
+against military law or imposed authority
+shall be taken into consideration. The
+future international status of Belgium shall
+be settled in accordance with the wishes of
+the Belgian nation.</p>
+
+<p>“2. The freeing of French territory, reconstruction
+of the invaded provinces, compensation
+for all civilian losses and injuries.</p>
+
+<p>“3. The restoration to France of Alsace-Lorraine,
+not as a territorial acquisition or
+part of a war indemnity, but as reparation
+for the wrong done in 1871, when the inhabitants
+of the two Provinces, whose
+ancestors voluntarily chose French allegiance,
+were incorporated in Germany against their
+will.</p>
+
+<p>“4. Readjustment of the Northern
+frontiers of Italy as nearly as possible
+along the lines of nationality.</p>
+
+<p>“5. The assurance to all the peoples of
+Austria-Hungary of their place amongst the
+free nations of the world and of their right
+to enter into union with their kindred
+beyond the present boundaries of Austria-Hungary.</p>
+
+<p>“6. The evacuation of all Territory
+formerly included in the boundaries of the
+Russian Empire, the annulment of all treaties,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_214">[214]</span>
+contracts, or agreements made with subjects,
+agents, or representatives of Enemy Powers
+since the Revolution and affecting territory
+or interests formerly Russian, and co-operation
+of the Associated Powers in securing
+conditions under which the various
+nationalities of the former Empire of Russia
+shall determine their own form of Government.</p>
+
+<p>“7. The formation of an independent
+Polish State with access to the Sea, which
+State shall include the territories inhabited
+by predominantly Polish populations, and
+the indemnification of Poland by the Powers
+responsible for the havoc wrought.</p>
+
+<p>“8. The abrogation of the Treaty of
+Bucharest, the evacuation and restoration of
+Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro, the
+Associated Powers to aid the Balkan States
+in settling finally the Balkan question on an
+equitable basis.</p>
+
+<p>“9. The removal, so far as is practicable,
+of Turkish dominion over all non-Turkish
+peoples.</p>
+
+<p>“10. The people of Schleswig shall be free
+to determine their own allegiance.</p>
+
+<p>“11. As reparation for the illegal submarine
+warfare waged by Germany and
+Austria-Hungary, these Powers shall be held<span class="pagenum" id="Page_215">[215]</span>
+liable to replace the merchant tonnage belonging
+to the Associated and Neutral nations
+illegally damaged or destroyed.</p>
+
+<p>“12. The appointment of a tribunal before
+which there shall be brought for impartial
+justice individuals of any of the belligerents
+accused of offences against the laws of
+war or of humanity.</p>
+
+<p>“13. The former Colonial possessions of
+Germany lost by her in consequence of her
+illegal aggression against Belgium shall in no
+case be returned to Germany.</p>
+
+<p>“The following conditions of Peace are
+negotiable:</p>
+
+<p>“1. The adjustment of claims for damage
+necessarily arising from the operations of
+war, and not included amongst the indisputable
+conditions.</p>
+
+<p>“2. The establishment, constitution, and
+conditions of Membership of a League of
+Free Nations for the purpose of preventing
+future wars, and improving international
+relations.</p>
+
+<p>“3. The League of Free Nations shall be
+inspired by the resolve of the Associated
+Powers to create a world in which, when the
+conditions of the Peace have been carried out,
+there shall be opportunity and security for
+the legitimate development of all the Peoples.”</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_216">[216]</span></p>
+</div>
+
+<p>This was approved by a representative of
+the Government, designated <i>ad hoc</i>, for
+unofficial use as propaganda policy. Each
+department adapted it to its own needs. So
+far as Crewe House was concerned, effective
+use was made of it on two occasions—the
+first being when Lord Northcliffe, at the
+suggestion of the Enemy Propaganda Committee,
+dealt with the subject of peace
+terms in an address to United States officers
+at the “Washington Inn,” London, on
+October 22, 1918.</p>
+
+<p>At a meeting of the Policy Committee at
+Crewe House on October 28, the action of the
+various departments on the memorandum
+was stated and approved.</p>
+
+<p>The Crewe House Committee reported
+first as to Lord Northcliffe’s address at the
+Washington Inn; next that the production
+department of the Enemy Propaganda Committee
+was engaged on a series of pamphlets
+and leaflets dealing with different points of
+the terms; third, that a reasoned statement
+covering the whole ground, and showing
+what Germany had to gain in the end, was
+being drafted for publication, the idea being
+that it should appear as an article or as a
+speech to which wide circulation would be
+given; and lastly that the secretary of the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_217">[217]</span>
+permanent Inter-Allied Body for Propaganda
+in Enemy Countries had written to the
+French, Italian, and American members of
+that body enclosing a copy of the Peace
+Policy Memorandum and suggesting that
+they should take action similar to that of
+the British Policy Committee and bring the
+subject up for discussion at the next meeting
+of the Inter-Allied Body. (It may be
+mentioned here that the rapid course of
+events prevented the contemplated meeting
+of the Inter-Allied Body.)</p>
+
+<p>That was the last meeting of the Policy
+Committee. There remains to be set forth
+the final result of its work. Crewe House,
+as explained above, had stated its intention
+of publishing an article covering the whole
+ground of the memorandum in such a way
+that the policy could be presented in the same
+terms to our own people, to our Allies, and
+to the enemy. It was found impracticable
+to get such an article published quickly
+enough in a high-class magazine, or to get an
+immediate occasion for making it the text
+of a speech. In these circumstances the
+Committee asked their chairman, Viscount
+Northcliffe, to give the Peace Policy the
+wide publicity possible by the use of his
+name and by the sources of distribution<span class="pagenum" id="Page_218">[218]</span>
+which he was able to command. Lord
+Northcliffe agreed, and accordingly produced
+the article which follows and which was a
+full statement of the agreed policy. He
+arranged for its simultaneous publication in
+the London Press and, at his own expense,
+had it cabled to the remotest parts of the
+world. As stated in the House of Commons
+by the Financial Secretary to the Treasury,
+the document was unofficial. Its purpose
+was to form the basis of a policy of publicity
+and the fact that it was proposed to elaborate
+it for publication was announced beforehand,
+and approved by the Policy Committee.
+This is the text of the article from <i>The Times</i>
+of November 4, 1918:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot">
+<p class="center">
+FROM WAR TO PEACE<br>
+<br>
+By <span class="smcap">Lord Northcliffe</span><br>
+</p>
+
+<p><i>This article is appearing to-day in the leading papers
+in Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa,
+Newfoundland, India, the British Dependencies, United
+States, South America, France, Italy, Spain, Switzerland,
+Holland, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Japan and
+elsewhere.</i></p>
+
+<p><i>It will be circulated in Germany during the present
+week.</i></p>
+
+<p>Now that peace is at last in sight, I hear the question
+being asked on all sides: “How are we to pass from
+war conditions to peace conditions?” This cannot
+be done by a sudden and dramatic declaration like<span class="pagenum" id="Page_219">[219]</span>
+the declaration which in August, 1914, changed peace
+into war. It must be a slow and laborious process—a
+process with, as it seems to me, at least three distinct
+and successive stages. Out of these stages will be
+formed the organic whole which will constitute the
+machinery for replacing war conditions by peace
+conditions.</p>
+
+<p>It is important to get these three stages clearly
+outlined in our imaginations, and it is important
+also to bear in mind that each stage will smooth the
+path for its successor precisely in proportion to the
+sincerity and thoroughness with which it has been
+completed. There is but one goal for those who are
+honest and far-seeing. That goal is to create a condition
+of the world in which there shall be opportunity
+and security for the legitimate development of all
+Peoples. The road is long and difficult, but I believe
+that its course is already clear enough to be described,
+in the same words, to those who are our friends and
+to those who are now our enemies.</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+I<br>
+</p>
+
+<p>The first stage is the cessation of hostilities. Here,
+whether they cease on account of an armistice or by
+reason of surrender, there can be no question as to the
+“Honour” of the German people, or as to any adjustment
+of the conditions to any supposed strategical or
+actual strength of the Central Powers.</p>
+
+<p>If they feel humiliated, they must blame those who
+brought humiliation upon them; and as to military
+strength, the semi-official organ of the German Government,
+the <i>Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung</i>, has admitted
+that our reserves are such as Germany cannot
+compete with.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_220">[220]</span></p>
+
+<p>It is clear [said this newspaper on October 12]
+that if we systematically continued the war in this
+way, fighting might go on for a long time. The
+annihilation of the German Army is still a long way
+from attainment; we still have a quantity of unspent
+forces at our command in the recruit depôts behind
+the front, in the reserve battalions, and at home. But
+<i>doubtless there are certain limits to all this on our side,
+whereas our enemies—chiefly America—are in a position
+to replace men and materials on an ever-increasing scale</i>.</p>
+
+<p>Another equally important admission I found in
+the <i>Münchner Neueste Nachrichten</i>, the leading South-German
+organ, on October 25.</p>
+
+<p>A German retreat beyond the frontier [this journal
+said] and especially an advance by the enemy to the
+frontier, would render the German situation much
+worse, as it would expose Germany’s industrial territory
+to the Entente’s artillery fire, and particularly
+their air attacks, while the danger to the enemy’s
+industrial districts would be correspondingly removed.
+<i>This condition alone would not only secure the enemy’s
+military preponderance, but would increase it.</i></p>
+
+<p>Thus it is clear that Germany, deprived now of the
+help of her allies, recognises her hopeless situation.
+The conditions upon which hostilities can cease must
+be laid down by the military and naval leaders of the
+Associated Powers and accepted by the Central Powers
+in such form that no resumption of hostilities is possible.</p>
+
+<p>And this I will say: The spirit in which Germany
+accepts these stern and necessary conditions will do
+much to determine the course of future events. If
+she haggles over the conditions, or is sullen and obstructive
+in her mode of carrying them out, then
+our profound distrust of her spirit and motives will<span class="pagenum" id="Page_221">[221]</span>
+survive into the subsequent stages and still further
+delay that re-establishment of tolerable relations
+which must be our object. But if Germany by word
+and deed makes plain her abandonment of that belief
+in Might which her rulers, supported until recently
+by the majority of her people, have used as a menace
+to the power of Right, the greatest obstacle in the
+path of equal justice will have been removed.</p>
+
+<p>By a stroke of the pen, in accepting the conditions
+of armistice, or by a mere gesture of unconditional
+surrender, Germany can cause fighting to cease.
+Naturally, the business of evacuation and of reoccupation
+will have to be conducted by concert
+between the military and naval leaders. The first
+governing condition in these operations and detailed
+arrangements will be the safety of the peace. The
+second condition will be the security of civilian life
+and property. The emotional background to all this
+will be a daily increasing desire on the part of all to
+get back to normal conditions of life. Co-operation and
+agreement will be required, not so much to secure that
+demobilisation and disarmament shall be forced
+sternly on those who have surrendered as to secure
+that each side takes its fair share in the burden of
+maintaining order and in facilitating the change from
+military to civilian organisation.</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+II<br>
+</p>
+
+<p>The second stage of the passage from war conditions
+to peace conditions will begin as soon as it is certain
+that security has been obtained for the permanence
+of the first stage. It will consist in the acceptance by
+Germany of certain principles as indisputable. The
+security provided in the first stage ought to be sufficient<span class="pagenum" id="Page_222">[222]</span>
+to enable us to pass through the second stage quickly.
+With sufficient guarantees there need be no waiting
+to see whether the transformation of the German
+Government from irresponsible autocracy to responsible
+democracy is as genuine as it is represented to be, or
+whether the changed professions of those who speak
+for the People represent a change of heart.</p>
+
+<p>The indisputable principles which Germany must
+accept in this second stage have been stated in different
+forms at different times, but the consensus of opinion
+amongst all classes of the Associated Powers seems to
+me to be so clear that it is not difficult to state them
+objectively in a form very close to that which they
+are likely to assume in their final enunciation.</p>
+
+<p>The first is the complete restoration, territorial,
+economic, and political, of Belgium. In this there
+can be no reservation, no bargaining, no attempt to
+raise counter-claims or offsets of any kind. By her
+initial violation of International Law, and by her
+subsequent treatment of Belgium, Germany has
+forfeited all right to discussion. Reparation is impossible,
+but she must undertake restoration in such
+form and measure as shall be indicated to her.</p>
+
+<p>2. The freeing of French territory, reconstruction
+of the invaded provinces, compensation for all civilian
+losses and injuries. Here again reparation in any full
+sense of the word is beyond human power, but Germany
+must accept the full burden of material reconstruction,
+replacement, and compensation, again in such form and
+measure as shall be laid down.</p>
+
+<p>3. The restoration to France of Alsace-Lorraine,
+not as a territorial acquisition or part of a war indemnity,
+but as reparation for the wrong done in
+1871, when the inhabitants of the two provinces,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_223">[223]</span>
+whose ancestors voluntarily chose French allegiance,
+were incorporated in Germany against their will.</p>
+
+<p>4. Readjustment of the Northern Frontiers of
+Italy as nearly as possible along the lines of nationality;
+the Eastern and Adriatic frontiers to be determined in
+accordance with the principles embodied in the Italo-Jugo-Slav
+Agreement and ratified by the Rome Congress
+of April, 1918.</p>
+
+<p>5. The assurance to all the peoples of Austria-Hungary
+of their place amongst the free nations
+of the world and of their right to enter into union
+with their kindred beyond the present boundaries of
+Austria-Hungary. This involves the creation of
+independent Czecho-Slovak and Jugo-Slav States,
+the reduction of Hungary to the ethnographic limits
+of the Magyar race, and the union of all Rumanians
+with the present kingdom of Rumania. In the same
+way the Poles and Ukrainians of the Dual Monarchy
+must be free to unite with their co-nationals across
+existing frontiers, and it is obvious that the same right
+of self-determination cannot be denied to the German
+provinces of Austria, should they desire to enter
+Germany as a federal unit.</p>
+
+<p>6. The evacuation of all territory formerly included
+in the boundaries of the Russian Empire; the annulment
+of all Russian treaties, contracts, or agreements
+made with subjects, agents, or representatives of
+Enemy Powers since the Revolution and affecting
+territory or interests formerly Russian; and the unimpeded
+co-operation of the Associated Powers in securing
+conditions under which the various nationalities of the
+former Empire of Russia shall determine their own
+forms of government.</p>
+
+<p>When Russia offered a peace of reconciliation<span class="pagenum" id="Page_224">[224]</span>
+without annexations or indemnities, the Central
+Powers, taking advantage of the military position,
+rejected all considerations of justice and imposed
+terms that were brutal and selfish. Thus they forfeited
+the right to aid Russia and the various nationalities
+of the former Empire of Russia in their efforts
+to establish self-determination and their own form of
+government.</p>
+
+<p>The seventh indisputable principle concerns (<i>a</i>) the
+formation of an independent Polish State with access
+to the sea, which State shall include the territories
+inhabited by predominantly Polish populations; and
+(<i>b</i>) the indemnification of Poland by the Powers
+responsible for the havoc wrought.</p>
+
+<p>This condition is indispensable for the reign of
+justice in Europe. Germany has ruthlessly oppressed
+the Poles within her Empire. Justice and stability
+demand the restoration of the predominantly Polish
+parts of the present German Empire to the new Polish
+State.</p>
+
+<p>8. The abrogation of the Treaty of Bucharest; the
+evacuation and restoration of Rumania, Serbia, and
+Montenegro; the Associated Powers to aid the Balkan
+States in settling finally the Balkan question on an
+equitable basis.</p>
+
+<p>The Balkan question must be settled, and it follows
+from that principle of self-determination to which the
+Associated Powers adhere that the Balkan States
+must be encouraged to agree among themselves and
+give what advice or assistance they may ask in coming
+to an agreement.</p>
+
+<p>9. The removal, as far as is practicable, of Turkish
+dominion over all non-Turkish peoples.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_225">[225]</span></p>
+
+<p>The complexity of the distribution of nationalities
+in the present Empire of Turkey makes the details of
+the problem difficult, but the failure of the Turks, in
+act and in intention, to rule justly has been so disastrous,
+and the acquiescence of the Central Powers in
+Turkish misdeeds so complete, that no departure from
+this principle can be considered.</p>
+
+<p>10. The people of Schleswig to be free to determine
+their own allegiance.</p>
+
+<p>The case of Schleswig is a fundamental instance of
+the fashion in which Prussia and Austria used their
+might to override the principle of self-determination.
+The wrong done must be redressed.</p>
+
+<p>11. As reparation for the illegal submarine warfare
+waged by Germany and Austria-Hungary, these Powers
+shall be held liable to replace the merchant tonnage,
+belonging to the associated and neutral nations,
+illegally damaged or destroyed.</p>
+
+<p>In spite of repeated warnings, and in defiance
+of the pledges which they had given to the Government
+of the United States, then a neutral Power, the Central
+Powers have persisted in operations which, by their
+nature and by the fashion in which they were conducted,
+outraged both International Law and common humanity.
+The question of punishment must be dealt
+with separately; that of restoring the ships or their
+equivalents, and of material compensation to the
+victims and their families, cannot be subject to discussion
+or negotiation.</p>
+
+<p>12. The appointment of tribunals before which
+there shall be brought for impartial justice as soon as
+possible individuals of any of the belligerents accused
+of offences against the laws of war or of humanity.</p>
+
+<p>While I regard this condition as an essential preliminary
+to peace, as a just concession to the outraged<span class="pagenum" id="Page_226">[226]</span>
+conscience of humanity, I admit freely that its practical
+application is full of difficulty. I foresee the extraordinary
+difficulty of assigning responsibility; I
+recognise that during the actual conduct of war there
+are reasons why belligerents should hesitate to punish
+adequately those whom in normal times they would
+unhesitatingly condemn. I offer my own solution of
+the difficulty. It is that the appointed tribunals
+should act as Courts of First Instance. They would
+hear the evidence brought against the accused, and, if
+they found a <i>prima facie</i> case established against them,
+would refer them to their own countries for ultimate
+trial, judgment, and sentence. I believe that more
+stern justice will be done if nations which desire to
+purge themselves condemn their own criminals than if
+the punishment were left to other nations which might
+hesitate to be severe lest they should invest the
+individuals punished with the halo of martyrdom.</p>
+
+<p>13. The former colonial possessions of Germany, lost
+by her in consequence of her illegal aggression against
+Belgium, shall in no case be returned to Germany.</p>
+
+<p>Germany’s possession of her colonies would have
+been inviolate but for her illegal aggression against
+Belgium, which brought England into the war. She
+has proclaimed that the fate of her colonies would be
+decided on the Western front; it has been so decided.
+She has proclaimed the uses to which, if victorious, she
+would have put her colonies; such uses must be
+prevented for ever in the interest of the peace of the
+world. Furthermore, there is this consideration that,
+after what has happened, it would be as intolerable for
+Australasia to have New Guinea in German hands as
+it would be for the United States to have Germany in
+possession of Cuba. The colonies therefore cannot be<span class="pagenum" id="Page_227">[227]</span>
+returned to Germany, but their assignment as possessions,
+or in trusteeship, together with the fashion in
+which they shall be administered in the interests of their
+inhabitants and of the world generally, are matters for
+future decisions.</p>
+
+<p>These are the indisputable conditions of peace
+which must be accepted in the second stage of the
+negotiations.</p>
+
+<p>I have dealt with the first two stages as logically
+separate and successive. In actual fact agreement
+on them might be coincident in time. In any event,
+acceptance of the indisputable conditions would be
+made before the guarantees required under the terms
+of surrender or of armistice had become accomplished
+facts.</p>
+
+<p>The conclusion of the first two stages, whether
+concurrent or consecutive, will be the end of dictation.
+They form the preliminary to co-operation. They will
+be an earnest of a complete break with the past on the
+part of Germany. They will go far to satisfy the natural
+desire of those who demand that the guilty should be
+punished, and yet I believe that they contain nothing
+that is not imperative for a just and lasting peace.
+And I hope that their imposition and acceptance will,
+in the subsequent stages, make it possible to take
+advantage, for the benefit of the world, of those powers
+of discipline and organisation which Germany has
+perverted to the great harm of the world.</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+III<br>
+</p>
+
+<p>The third stage, should I consider, consist in the appointment
+of a large number of Commissions to study
+and work out the details of the principles which I have
+enumerated. These will report ultimately, some of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_228">[228]</span>
+them quickly, some of them after months or years, to
+the Central Peace Conference. For my part I see no
+reason why the members of the Commissions, if the
+principles on which they shall act are settled beforehand,
+should not be selected chiefly from among those
+who have the greatest interest in the matters to be
+settled. I do not see, for instance, why a Commission
+consisting largely of Poles and Prussians should not
+be asked to work out the future frontier of Prussia and
+Poland. This may be thought the suggestion of an
+idealist. But I claim that in this instance the idealist
+is the realist. If our goal be lasting peace, then let us
+give every opportunity for arrangement and mutual
+accommodation before we resort to compulsion.</p>
+
+<p>So far I have said nothing of the future government
+of Germany. The Germans assure us that the transformation
+of autocratic government to responsible
+government is taking place. I should like to believe
+them. I am certain that its accomplishment is
+necessary to Germany itself and to the final attainment
+of a just and lasting peace. I frankly admit that the
+perfect form of government does not exist, and that the
+genius of Germany may evolve some form as good as,
+or even better than, existing constitutions.</p>
+
+<p>But Germany must understand that it will take
+time to convince the world, which has so much reason
+to distrust her, that this sudden change is to be a
+permanent reality. Fortunately the stages which I
+have described do not require for their accomplishment
+more than the hope that Germany has set out on the
+right path. Whilst the last stage is in progress there
+will be time, and more than time, to see whether
+Germany realises our hopes and what I believe to be
+now the wishes of the majority of her own people.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_229">[229]</span></p>
+
+<p>For the last stage will mean nothing less than
+reconstructing the organisation of the world, and
+establishing a new policy in which a League of Free
+Nations shall replace the old system of the balance of
+rival Powers.</p>
+
+<p>The accomplishment of a change so gigantic as the
+adjusting of national organisations to fit into new super-national
+machinery must be difficult and slow. Fortunately
+the very steps necessary to make it possible are
+steps that will slowly make it actual. Let me select
+a few simple examples. The cessation of hostilities
+will leave the world short of food, short of transport,
+short of raw materials. The machinery that has
+regulated these during war will have to be kept in
+action beyond the war. Food will have to be rationed,
+transport will have to be rationed, raw material will
+have to be rationed. It is a world problem that can be
+settled only on a world basis, and there will be every
+opportunity, in the years of transition, to transform
+those economic relations which are forced upon us by
+necessity into a system which will meet with free and
+general acceptance.</p>
+
+<p>Intimately connected with these matters will be the
+problem of the returned soldier, whether wounded or
+otherwise, the problem of pensions, the problems of
+wages, housing, hours and conditions of work, regulation
+of child labour, female labour, and so forth. The
+equalisation of those in different countries will be
+necessary to fair rationing, and from this necessity
+will arise international conferences of workers which
+may be able to settle some of the most difficult questions
+of super-national organisation. When the question of
+disarmament arises, some will demand as a fundamental
+necessity that their nation must have a large army<span class="pagenum" id="Page_230">[230]</span>
+or a large navy. Some will advocate, as an act of
+punishment or of justice, the disarmament of other
+nations. In the consequent negotiations it will soon
+be found that to insist on an unduly large army or
+navy is to saddle one’s country with a huge expense; to
+insist on the disarmament of another country may
+be to present that country with a huge annual income
+that can be used in commercial rivalry. And so we
+may come to a condition in which, if there be international
+security, there will be a contest, not as to
+which country shall maintain the largest navy and the
+largest army, but as to which country shall most completely
+disarm.</p>
+
+<p>I foresee international Commissions at work for a
+long time, trying to establish frontiers, conditions of
+Parliamentary responsibility, canons of international
+law, rules of international commerce, laws even of
+religious freedom, and a thousand other conditions of
+national organisation. In the very act of seeking the
+foundation for a League of Free Nations, and in slowly
+building up the fabric, we shall get rid of the passions
+and fears of war. By the mere endeavour to find the
+way to a better condition of the world, we shall bring
+this better condition about.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>This article created the desired interest
+and public discussion in the enemy countries.
+It was widely reproduced by German newspapers
+and it had the effect of producing
+a state of mind which culminated in the
+complete collapse of German resistance. It
+was a fitting wind-up to the work of propaganda
+in enemy countries. The article gave<span class="pagenum" id="Page_231">[231]</span>
+rise to a great deal of comment at home and
+elsewhere abroad also, and did much to form
+a public opinion favourable to the conditions
+of peace which were in the minds of Allied
+statesmen but which they had themselves
+refrained from declaring in public.</p>
+
+<p>Thus the Policy Committee, although it
+existed so short a time, had useful achievement
+to its credit. Had it been possible to
+constitute such a Committee early in the
+war the results might have been incalculable
+in the effect on British propaganda.</p>
+
+<p>On November 15, 1918, Lord Northcliffe
+sent the following valedictory letter to each
+of the members of the Committee:—</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot">
+
+<p>“I am sending you herewith a copy
+of the minutes of the last meeting of the
+Policy Committee, and feel that it is
+unnecessary under the changed circumstances
+to call another meeting.</p>
+
+<p>“May I remind you that this Committee
+was formed under my chairmanship
+by the British War Mission at
+a time when it seemed urgent to correlate
+propaganda addressed to the enemy, to
+Allies, and to Neutrals? In the opening
+remarks by the Chairman at the first
+meeting it was pointed out that as the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_232">[232]</span>
+war approached its end, war propaganda
+would change into peace propaganda.
+This change took place with even greater
+rapidity than was at the moment anticipated,
+and the Committee had at once
+to undertake the task of devising a
+propaganda policy with regard to peace.
+You are acquainted with the steps that
+the Committee took and with the large
+measure of success that their efforts
+achieved. All questions of policy have
+now, however, passed from the hands of
+the Committee to those of the Council
+of the Nations, and there seems to me no
+immediate sphere for our action, especially
+as by arrangement with the
+Government the British War Mission
+is being wound up.</p>
+
+<p>“May I take this opportunity of
+thanking you for your co-operation, and
+of stating my belief that, had the war
+continued, the Policy Committee would
+have developed into an organ of ever-increasing
+value?</p>
+
+<p class="right">
+<span style="margin-right: 9.5em;">Yours very truly,</span><br>
+(Signed) “<span class="smcap">Northcliffe</span>.”<br>
+</p>
+</div>
+
+
+
+
+<figure class="figleft illowp45" id="i_p208a" style="max-width: 92.5625em;">
+  <img class="w100" src="images/i_p208a.jpg" alt="">
+  <figcaption class="caption">INFLATING THE BALLOONS AND ATTACHING THE TRUTH-TELLING
+LEAFLETS.<br>
+<i>Official Photograph.</i></figcaption>
+</figure>
+
+
+<figure class="figright illowp45" id="i_p208c" style="max-width: 88.625em;">
+  <img class="w100" src="images/i_p208c.jpg" alt="">
+  <figcaption class="caption">HOW LEAFLETS WERE ATTACHED TO THE BALLOONS.<br>
+<i>Official Photograph.</i></figcaption>
+</figure>
+
+
+<figure class="cl figcenter illowp80" id="i_p208b" style="max-width: 134.6875em;">
+  <img class="w100"  src="images/i_p208b.jpg" alt="">
+  <figcaption class="caption" >REGISTERING THE DIRECTION AND VELOCITY OF THE WIND, IN ORDER TO JUDGE WHERE THE
+LEAFLETS WOULD FALL.</figcaption>
+</figure>
+
+
+
+<figure class="figcenter illowp80" id="i_p208d" style="max-width: 128.6875em;">
+  <img class="w100" src="images/i_p208d.jpg" alt="">
+  <figcaption class="caption">DISPATCHING THE BALLOONS.</figcaption>
+</figure>
+
+
+<figure class="figcenter illowp80" id="i_p224a" style="max-width: 135.5em;">
+  <img class="w100" src="images/i_p224a.jpg" alt="">
+  <figcaption class="caption">TESTING THE LIFTING POWER OF BALLOONS USED FOR PROPAGANDA PURPOSES<br>
+<i>“Daily Mirror” Photograph.</i></figcaption>
+</figure>
+
+
+<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_233">[233]</span></p>
+
+<h2 class="nobreak" id="CHAPTER_IX">CHAPTER IX<br>
+<span class="fs80"><i>VALE!</i></span>
+</h2>
+</div>
+
+
+
+
+<p>With the foundations well and truly laid
+and with increasing and widening avenues
+of approach into enemy countries, the work
+of the British War Mission was always
+expanding. Had the war continued, the
+gathering momentum of Crewe House
+activities would have dealt many other
+blows which, even in November, 1918, were
+in an advanced state of preparation. But,
+happily for the Allies, one enemy collapsed
+quickly after another. When the following
+letter was received from the War Office on
+November 9, and was followed by the signing
+of the Armistice with Germany—the last of
+our enemies—on November 11, the work of
+Crewe House as the headquarters of Propaganda
+in Enemy Countries was finished:—</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot">
+
+<p>“<span class="smcap">Sir</span>,</p>
+
+<p>“I am commanded by the Army
+Council to inform you that, in view of
+the armistices which have been concluded
+with Austria, Turkey, and Bulgaria,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_234">[234]</span>
+the Council has decided that the
+distribution of propaganda in those
+countries by military means should cease
+during the period of the armistice.</p>
+
+<p>“I am to say that, in the event of the
+conclusion of an armistice with Germany,
+distribution of propaganda by military
+means in that country will also cease
+during the existence of the armistice.</p>
+
+<p>“I am further to inform you that
+the Commanders-in-Chief in the various
+theatres of war have been notified in the
+above sense.</p>
+
+<p class="right">
+<span style="margin-right: 10em;">“I am, Sir,</span><br>
+<span style="margin-right: 2em;">“Your obedient servant,</span><br>
+“<span class="smcap">B. B. Cubitt</span>.<br>
+</p>
+
+<p>
+“The Secretary,<br>
+<span class="ind1">“The British War Mission,</span><br>
+<span class="ind2">“Crewe House.”</span><br>
+</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>On the day following the signing of the
+Armistice with Germany Lord Northcliffe
+wrote to the Prime Minister:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot">
+
+<p>“<span class="smcap">Dear Prime Minister</span>,</p>
+
+<p>“The signing of the last armistice
+with our enemies has necessarily brought
+the labours upon which I have been
+engaged for the past year to a close.
+The very nature of the armistices themselves<span class="pagenum" id="Page_235">[235]</span>
+necessitates the termination of
+enemy propaganda, and I beg, therefore,
+to request you to accept my resignation
+of my post as Director of Propaganda
+in Enemy Countries.</p>
+
+<p>“I wish to thank you for the confidence
+you have reposed in me in
+appointing me to this office. I have
+endeavoured, with the assistance of a
+most able Committee and of an untiring
+staff of experts, to render the very best
+possible services to the Government
+and to the country.</p>
+
+<p class="right">
+“Believe me, dear Prime Minister,<br>
+<span style="margin-right: 6em;">“Yours sincerely,</span><br>
+<span style="margin-right: 1em;">“<span class="smcap">Northcliffe</span>.”</span><br>
+</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>In reply, the Prime Minister wrote on the
+same day:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot">
+
+<p>“<span class="smcap">My Dear Northcliffe</span>,</p>
+
+<p>“I have received your letter, and I
+agree with you that the office of Director
+of Propaganda in Enemy Countries is
+rendered unnecessary by recent events.</p>
+
+<p>“In accepting your resignation, I
+wish to assure you how grateful I am
+for the great services you have rendered
+to the Allied Cause while holding this
+important post. I have had many<span class="pagenum" id="Page_236">[236]</span>
+direct evidences of the success of your
+invaluable work and of the extent to
+which it has contributed to the dramatic
+collapse of the enemy strength in Austria
+and Germany.</p>
+
+<p>“I shall be glad if Sir Campbell
+Stuart, the present Vice-Chairman of the
+Mission, will remain in office as Acting-Chairman
+of the Mission until December
+31st, 1918, in order to wind up its
+activities.</p>
+
+<p class="right">
+<span style="margin-right: 7.5em;">“Ever sincerely,</span><br>
+“<span class="smcap">D. Lloyd George</span>.”<br>
+</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>When the year 1918 came to its close the
+affairs of the Mission had been wound up,
+and Crewe House as a propaganda force
+ceased to exist. The building was handed
+over to another Government department,
+but by those who had even a remote
+connection with the work carried on within
+its walls in 1918 Crewe House will always
+be remembered for its propaganda politics
+for which, as has been truly said, it
+became as well-known in the Chancelleries
+of Europe as it had been in Great Britain
+for so long as a social centre for national
+politics.</p>
+
+<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_237">[237]</span></p>
+
+<h2 class="nobreak" id="APPENDIX">APPENDIX<br>
+<span class="smcap">Facsimile Leaflets and Translations.</span></h2>
+
+</div>
+
+
+<div class="captiontop"><figure class="figcenter illowp38" id="leaflet01" style="max-width: 61.4375em;">
+
+  <figcaption class="caption"><i>Leaflet No. 1.</i><br>
+NEWS OF ALLIED SUCCESSES ON WESTERN FRONT
+FOR JUGO-SLAV SOLDIERS IN THE AUSTRIAN
+ARMIES.</figcaption>
+  <img class="w100" src="images/leaflet01.jpg" alt="">
+</figure></div>
+
+
+
+
+<p>Map representing the great offensive of the Allies, with the
+results achieved from August 9th to September 1st:—</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+[<span class="smcap">Map</span>]<br>
+</p>
+
+<p>In the offensive from July 15th to August 31st the Allies
+captured 140,000 Germans (2,674 of whom were officers), 2,500
+guns, 1,734 Flamethrowers, 13,783 machine guns, together with
+a huge amount of other war material.</p>
+
+<p class="right">
+<span class="smcap">The Jugoslav Committee.</span><br>
+</p>
+
+<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">
+
+<div class="captiontop"><figure class="figcenter illowp53" id="leaflet02" style="max-width: 63.125em;">
+<figcaption class="caption"><i>Leaflet No. 2.</i><br>
+A MANIFESTO FROM DR. TRUMBITCH DISTRIBUTED
+FROM AEROPLANES AMONG JUGO-SLAV TROOPS IN
+THE AUSTRIAN ARMY.</figcaption>
+  <img class="w100" src="images/leaflet02.jpg" alt="">
+</figure></div>
+
+
+
+<p class="center">
+SERBOCROATS AND SLOVENES.<br>
+</p>
+
+<p>The “Agenzia Stefani” announces officially:—</p>
+
+<p>“By a decree of the Ministerial Council on September 8th
+the Home (Italian) Government has informed the Allied Governments
+that it regards the Jugoslav movement for obtaining
+independence and the formation of a free State as a principle
+for which the Allies are fighting, and as a condition of a just
+and lasting peace.”</p>
+
+<p>The Governments of the Allied States have replied that they
+have received with satisfaction this declaration of the Italian
+Government.</p>
+
+<p><span class="smcap">Jugoslavs!</span></p>
+
+<p>By this historic and fateful declaration Italy has set up the
+following war aim: The destruction of the Austro-Hungarian
+monarchy such as it is to-day, and upon its ruins the establishment
+of an independent State of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes.</p>
+
+<p>This noble decree of hers is accepted by all our Allies.</p>
+
+<p><span class="smcap">Soldiers!</span></p>
+
+<p>The part which Italy has been assigned by history has been
+manifested to-day more strongly than ever. She is the protector
+of the weak, the bearer of freedom and of the ideal for which
+the Allies have been fighting for four years. The aim of the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_238">[238]</span>
+fighting is not the peace of Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest, but
+the freedom of the weak and oppressed.</p>
+
+<p>Therefore open your eyes. Remember that by fighting against
+it you are fighting against yourselves, against our posterity,
+against our freedom and unity.</p>
+
+<p>Long live Italy, long live the united and free Jugoslavia,
+long live our Allies!</p>
+
+<p class="right">
+<span style="margin-right: 1.5em;"><span class="smcap">Dr. Ante Trumbic</span>,</span><br>
+Chairman of the Jugoslav Council.<br>
+</p>
+
+<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">
+
+
+
+<div class="captiontop"><figure class="figcenter illowp53" id="leaflet03" style="max-width: 86.1875em;">
+  <figcaption class="caption"><i>Leaflet No. 3.</i><br>
+LEAFLET—PROBABLY THE FIRST—DISTRIBUTED BY BRITISH
+AEROPLANES AMONG GERMAN TROOPS IN OCTOBER 1914.
+IT ANNOUNCED A RUSSIAN VICTORY IN EAST PRUSSIA.</figcaption>
+  <img class="w100" src="images/leaflet03.jpg" alt="">
+</figure></div>
+
+
+
+<p class="center">
+[<i>Note.—This was distributed in October, 1914.</i>]<br>
+<br>
+NOTICE.<br>
+<br>
+<span class="smcap">Explanation for German Soldiers.</span><br>
+</p>
+
+<p>It has become known that German soldiers have been told
+the British treat their captives inhumanly. That is a lie.</p>
+
+<p>All German prisoners of war are well-treated and receive
+from the British the same food as their own soldiers.</p>
+
+<p>The opportunity is now taken to enlighten the German soldier
+about some facts which hitherto have been kept secret from him.</p>
+
+<p>The German Army never reached or occupied Paris and has
+been retiring since September 5.</p>
+
+<p>The British Army has been neither made prisoner nor beaten.
+It increases in strength every day.</p>
+
+<p>The French Army is not beaten. Quite on the contrary,
+for it inflicted a heavy defeat on the Germans at <span class="smcap">Montmirail</span>.</p>
+
+<p>Russia and Serbia have so decisively defeated Austria that
+she no longer plays any part in the war. With the exception
+of a few cruisers, German shipping, the merchant service as
+well as the fighting fleet, is no longer to be seen upon the seas.</p>
+
+<p>The British and German Navies have both suffered casualties,
+but the German the heaviest.</p>
+
+<p>Germany has already lost several colonies and will presently
+also lose what now remains to her. Japan has declared war
+on Germany. Kiauchau is now besieged by the British and
+the Japanese.</p>
+
+<p>The report circulated in the Press that the British Colonies
+and India have rebelled against Great Britain is wholly untrue.
+Quite on the contrary, these Colonies have sent to France large
+masses of troops and many supplies to come to the help of the
+Fatherland.</p>
+
+<p>Ireland is one with England, and from North and South is
+sending her soldiers who are fighting with enthusiasm alongside
+their English comrades.</p>
+
+<p>The Kaiser and the Prussian War Party wanted this war
+against all interests of the Fatherland. In secret they prepared<span class="pagenum" id="Page_239">[239]</span>
+for this war. Germany alone was prepared, which explains her
+temporary successes. Now we have succeeded in checking her
+victorious advance. Supported by the sympathies of the whole
+civilised world, which regards with horror an arbitrary war of
+conquest, Great Britain, France, Russia, Belgium, Serbia,
+Montenegro, and Japan will carry on the war to the end.</p>
+
+<p>We bring these facts to general notice in order to throw light
+upon the truth which has been hidden from you. You are not
+fighting to defend your Fatherland, as no one ever thought of
+attacking Germany. You are fighting to satisfy the ambitious
+war-lust of the military party at the cost of the true interests of
+the Fatherland. The whole business is blackguardly.</p>
+
+<p>At first sight these facts will seem improbable to you. But
+now it is for you to compare the events of the past weeks with
+the information manufactured by the military authorities.</p>
+
+<p class="center">ON OCTOBER 4 THE RUSSIANS GAINED A TREMENDOUS
+VICTORY OVER THE GERMAN ARMIES IN
+EAST PRUSSIA. GERMAN LOSSES 70,000.</p>
+
+<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">
+
+<div class="captiontop"><figure class="figcenter illowp54" id="leaflet04" style="max-width: 97.125em;">
+
+  <figcaption class="caption"><i>Leaflet No. 4.</i><br>
+AEROPLANE DISTRIBUTION OF COPIES OF AN EARLY LEAFLET PREPARED
+BY THE FRENCH AUTHORITIES FOR THE GERMAN SOLDIER.</figcaption>
+  <img class="w100" src="images/leaflet04.jpg" alt="">
+</figure></div>
+
+
+
+
+<p class="center">
+To the German Soldiers!<br>
+</p>
+
+<p><span class="smcap">It is not true</span> that we French shoot or ill-treat German
+prisoners.</p>
+
+<p><span class="smcap">On the contrary</span>, our prisoners are well-treated and receive
+plenty to eat and drink.</p>
+
+<p>All who are tired of this wretched life may report themselves
+unarmed, without fear, to the French outposts.</p>
+
+<p>They will be well received there.</p>
+
+<p>After the war everyone can go home again.</p>
+
+<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">
+<div class="captiontop"><figure class="figcenter illowp40" id="leaflet05" style="max-width: 70.0625em;">
+
+  <figcaption class="caption"><i>Leaflet No. 5.</i><br>
+A TYPICAL NEWS-SHEET FOR GERMAN SOLDIERS.</figcaption>
+  <img class="w100" src="images/leaflet05.jpg" alt="">
+</figure></div>
+
+
+
+
+<p class="center">
+<span class="smcap">Information Leaflet for the Troops.</span><br>
+<br>
+IS PEACE AT THE DOOR?<br>
+</p>
+
+<p class="center">Our enemies reject negotiations until we have evacuated
+Belgium and France.</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+<span class="smcap">What must we do now?</span><br>
+</p>
+
+<p>Well, what does it all mean?</p>
+
+<p>“A few weeks ago,” says the <i>Frankfurter Zeitung</i>, “it appeared
+as if our armies were very near their goal, the defeat of the
+enemy forces and peace. But what a change!”</p>
+
+<p>In these few weeks the German armies have lost three-quarters
+of a million men. More than a quarter of a million
+have given themselves up and are now out of danger and have
+plenty to eat.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_240">[240]</span></p>
+
+<p>In these few weeks Bulgaria has dropped out of the war and
+has been compelled to surrender unconditionally. The best
+Turkish armies have been destroyed and Turkey is about to
+follow Bulgaria’s example.</p>
+
+<p>And what is the result of all these events in the last few
+weeks?</p>
+
+<p>All hope of victory by the military Junker party in Germany
+abandoned: an armistice demanded: the admission of the
+new Imperial Chancellor, Prince Max von Baden, that Belgium
+was wrongfully attacked.</p>
+
+<p>The following is the text of the Note addressed to President
+Wilson through the Swiss Government:—</p>
+
+<p>“The German Government requests the President of the
+United States to bring about the restoration of peace, to inform
+all belligerent States of this request and to summon them to
+send plenipotentiaries to open negotiations. Germany takes
+as a basis for peace negotiations the programme set forth by
+the President of the United States in his Message to Congress
+of January 8th, 1918, and particularly in his speech of September
+27th.</p>
+
+<p>“With a view to preventing further bloodshed the German
+Government requests the immediate conclusion of an armistice
+on land, on water, and in the air.</p>
+
+<p class="right">
+<span style="margin-right: 3em;">(Signed) <span class="smcap">Max</span>, Prince von Baden,</span><br>
+Imperial Chancellor.”<br>
+</p>
+
+
+<p>Why was this Note addressed to President Wilson?</p>
+
+<p>Partly because he laid down certain conditions which he
+explained the German Government must accept before he would
+enter into any discussion whatever on peace terms.</p>
+
+<p>But also partly because the German Government at length
+became aware of the United States’ military effort.</p>
+
+<p>In this, as in every other important matter dealing with the
+war, our leaders deceived us in the most unheard-of way. They
+fed us with false hopes.</p>
+
+<p>They have brought us to such a desperate pass that we are
+retiring on every front and are now compelled to sue for peace.</p>
+
+<p>But will our enemies consent to discuss peace?</p>
+
+<p>Not as long as we are still in Belgium, which, as our Government
+admits, was wrongfully attacked; not whilst we are still
+in Northern France.</p>
+
+<p>Before our enemies will consent to negotiate with us we must
+retire to Germany. For, they say, they will gladly conclude a
+just and honourable peace with the German people if they can
+be sure that militarism and medieval methods of statesmanship
+are abolished for good.</p>
+
+<p>What must we do to save ourselves? We must retire to our
+own country, then we may hope for an end of all the horror
+and hardships we have suffered for more than four years, only<span class="pagenum" id="Page_241">[241]</span>
+because our Government let its policy be dictated by militarism
+and underestimated the forces which had to be arrayed against
+us owing to the attempt to realise the criminal ambition of the
+Pan-Germans.</p>
+
+<p>We have been miserably deceived.</p>
+
+<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">
+
+<div class="captiontop"><figure class="figcenter illowp79" id="leaflet06" style="max-width: 141.5625em;">
+
+  <figcaption class="caption"><i>Leaflet No. 6.</i><br>
+“REPORTING PROGRESS”—LEAFLETS (SUCH AS THE ONE, BOTH SIDES OF WHICH ARE REPRODUCED, ABOVE) GAVE
+PARTICULARS OF ALLIED PROGRESS AGAINST THE GERMANS. CLEARLY-PRINTED MAPS DROVE THE
+TRUTH HOME. THE SHADED PORTION SHOWS TERRITORY WON BY THE ALLIES.</figcaption>
+  <img class="w100" src="images/leaflet06.jpg" alt="">
+</figure></div>
+
+
+
+
+
+<p class="center">
+WHAT THE ALLIES HAVE WON.<br>
+Back on the Line of Last March.<br>
+</p>
+
+<p class="center">[<span class="smcap">Map</span>]</p>
+
+<p>The whole ground has been twice won and twice lost by the
+German armies. How much blood has been spilled, and how
+much misery has been caused? For what object? Think it
+over!</p>
+
+<p><i>On the other side of the leaflet was the following</i>:</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+<span class="smcap">Further Successes of the Entente; the German Retreat
+continues.</span>
+</p>
+
+<p>During the last few weeks there has been fighting west of
+Cambrai and St. Quentin. The battle reached a degree of
+vehemence fully equal to any previously experienced in the
+course of the whole war.</p>
+
+<p>The Germans and British attacked simultaneously; both
+sides fought with stubborn determination, but</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+<span class="smcap">the British gained the victory.</span><br>
+</p>
+
+<p>They beat off the German attack, made many prisoners, and
+killed an enormous number, thanks to the manner in which the
+German troops were driven forward under murderous machine-gun
+fire.</p>
+
+<p>The British attack succeeded. The German front was pressed
+back closer to St. Quentin.</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+<span class="smcap">Ten thousand prisoners</span><br>
+</p>
+
+<p>were made and a number of guns were captured. The outer
+works of the Siegfried Line are in British possession in spite of
+the determined and plucky attempts of the German troops to
+hold them. The latter did not retreat “according to plan,”
+but because in open honourable fight</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+<span class="allsmcap">THEY GOT THE WORST OF IT.</span><br>
+</p>
+
+<p>The operations of the Entente forces have in no way reached
+an end, as reported in the German newspapers a week ago by
+military writers. The German forces were unable to stand<span class="pagenum" id="Page_242">[242]</span>
+their ground. The French threaten Laon and the Chemin des
+Dames and in these regions are driving the Germans back.</p>
+
+<p>On the Balkan Front</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+<span class="smcap">the Bulgarians are totally defeated</span><br>
+</p>
+
+<p>and are still retreating. The French and Serbian troops have
+advanced 20 kilometres. Many thousands of Bulgarians have
+surrendered. The prisoners ascribe the blame for Bulgaria’s
+disastrous situation to Germany.</p>
+
+<p>The Austrian proposal that representatives of the belligerent
+nations should hold a secret conference in order to discuss</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+<span class="allsmcap">THE POSSIBILITIES OF PEACE</span><br>
+</p>
+
+<p>was described by the representatives of the Workmen’s and
+Socialist parties assembled at the London Conference as inspired
+more by the anxiety to strengthen the monarchy than by the
+desire to help effectively to put an end to the world war.</p>
+
+<p>No voice was raised for the acceptance of the Austrian proposal.</p>
+
+<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">
+<div class="captiontop"><figure class="figcenter illowp44" id="leaflet07" style="max-width: 71.125em;">
+
+  <figcaption class="caption"><i>Leaflet No. 7.</i><br>
+DIAGRAMMATIC REPRESENTATION OF THE GROWTH OF THE
+AMERICAN ARMY IN THE FIELD. THE IMMENSITY OF THE
+AMERICAN EFFORT WAS A STRONG POINT OF THE CREWE
+HOUSE PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN.</figcaption>
+  <img class="w100" src="images/leaflet07.jpg" alt="">
+</figure></div>
+
+
+
+
+<p class="center">
+TO-DAY WE ARE IN RETREAT.<br>
+<br>
+<span class="smcap">Next Year we shall be destroyed.</span><br>
+</p>
+
+<p>America, which has now 1,750,000 men in France, had made
+arrangements to send 3,500,000 troops by next year.</p>
+
+<p>But now, in view of the refusal of the German Government to
+make a genuine peace proposal, America has decided to increase
+the number.</p>
+
+<p>By next year America will have 5,000,000 men on the Western
+Front.</p>
+
+<p>What do our leaders say to this—our leaders who declared
+that America was not a danger to us because our U-boats would
+prevent them from sending troops to Europe?</p>
+
+<p>What do we say to this, we who will be completely crushed
+by the huge superiority of numbers?</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+[<span class="smcap">Diagram</span>]<br>
+</p>
+
+<p>The increase of the American Army on the Western Front.</p>
+
+
+<table class="autotable">
+<tr>
+<td class="tdc">1917.<br>100,000</td>
+<td class="tdc">1918.<br>1,750,000</td>
+<td class="tdc">1919.<br>5,000,000</td>
+</tr>
+</table>
+        
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_243">[243]</span></p>
+<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">
+<div class="captiontop"><figure class="figcenter illowp48" id="leaflet08" style="max-width: 70em;">
+  <figcaption class="caption"><i>Leaflet No. 8.</i><br>
+MAP-LEAFLET SHOWING THE BREAKING OF
+THE HINDENBURG LINE.</figcaption>
+  <img class="w100" src="images/leaflet08.jpg" alt="">
+</figure></div>
+
+
+
+
+<p class="center">
+WHERE THE HINDENBURG LINE IS BROKEN<br>
+<br>
+[<span class="smcap">Map</span>]<br>
+</p>
+
+<p>This map shows exactly where the British troops have forced
+a way through an important part of the Hindenburg defence
+line. The dotted line from North to South indicates these
+defences. The black line shows the positions reached by the
+British. Their advance continues. In Flanders the German
+armies are in full retreat. Kemmel Hill has been given up.
+“Our troops left it with heavy heart,” writes Karl Rosner,
+war correspondent of the <i>Lokalanzeiger</i>.</p>
+
+<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">
+<div class="captiontop"><figure class="figcenter illowp86" id="leaflet09" style="max-width: 148.1875em;">
+  <figcaption class="caption"><i>Leaflet No. 9.</i><br>
+NEWS FOR GERMAN SOLDIERS OF THE DESTRUCTION OF THE TURKISH ARMY IN PALESTINE. TWO SIDES
+OF THE SAME LEAFLET.</figcaption>
+  <img class="w100" src="images/leaflet09.jpg" alt="">
+</figure></div>
+
+
+
+
+<p class="center">
+TURKISH ARMY IN PALESTINE DESTROYED.<br>
+<br>
+<span class="smcap">No further Resistance against the British Troops.
+Brilliant Encircling Manœuvre.</span><br>
+<br>
+20,000 PRISONERS.<br>
+<br>
+<span class="smcap">Turkey incensed against Germany for leading her to
+irretrievable disaster.</span>
+</p>
+
+<p>The Turkish Army in Palestine has ceased to exist. The
+British took them unawares, broke through the front, sent
+through large masses of cavalry, cut off all lines of retreat and
+completely surrounded the Turks.</p>
+
+<p>Twenty thousand surrendered, a large number were killed,
+and only a few stragglers succeeded in escaping. The Holy
+Land has been liberated from the Mussulman suzerainty which
+the German Government did its best to uphold. Turkey could
+not have received a harder blow. Her best troops have been
+destroyed. The Turks’ feeling against Germany is extremely
+bitter. They openly threaten to turn against the German
+Government.</p>
+
+<p>The Bulgarians are scarcely less embittered against Germany.
+They are still pursued in the Balkan mountains by the French
+and Serbian troops, who have driven them back 64 kilometres.
+Their defeat is a wholesale disaster.</p>
+
+<p>On the Western Front the British and French troops are still
+gaining ground, slowly but steadily, a little every day.</p>
+
+<p>Everywhere Germany and her allies are in retreat.</p>
+<br>
+<p>Read no leaflets which you may find accidentally, say Field Marshal
+Hindenburg and General von Hutier.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_244">[244]</span></p>
+
+<p class="center">
+WHY?<br>
+</p>
+
+<p>Because they know that the leaflets contain the truth which
+they and the Government want to conceal.</p>
+
+<p>They fear the truth. When the German people know it the
+Government and militarism will be wiped out.</p>
+
+<p>Read overleaf of the successes of the Entente Powers and ask
+yourselves</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+<span class="smcap">How long can it go on like this?</span><br>
+<br>
+Map illustrating the Turkish disasters.<br>
+<br>
+[<span class="smcap">Map of Palestine</span>]<br>
+</p>
+
+<p>The black lines and arrows show the position of the English
+forces. The Turks were between Samaria and Nablus. They
+were wiped out. Their army no longer exists.</p>
+<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">
+<div class="captiontop"><figure class="figcenter illowp41" id="leaflet10" style="max-width: 69.625em;">
+  <figcaption class="caption"><i>Leaflet No. 10.</i><br>
+SOME POINTED QUOTATIONS FOR GERMAN SOLDIERS
+CULLED FROM GERMAN SOURCES.</figcaption>
+  <img class="w100" src="images/leaflet10.jpg" alt="">
+</figure></div>
+
+
+
+
+<p class="center">
+<span class="smcap">The High Official.</span><br>
+</p>
+
+<p>“We have no cause for anxiety.”—Dr. Wekerle, Hungarian
+Premier.</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+<span class="smcap">The People.</span><br>
+</p>
+
+<p>“The men must thoroughly understand that they must
+stand fast.”—Order of the Day to 200th Infantry Division.</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+<span class="smcap">The General.</span><br>
+</p>
+
+<p>“We have no reason to be downhearted.”—General von
+Wrisberg, War Minister in the Reichstag.</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+<span class="smcap">The Soldier.</span><br>
+</p>
+
+<p>“The principle that troops must continue fighting all day
+long, to the last man, to the last cartridge, even when they are
+surrounded, appears to have sunk into oblivion.”—General Army
+Order, signed by General Ludendorff.</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+<span class="smcap">Preparations for Civil War.</span><br>
+</p>
+
+<p>Every precaution has been taken in Berlin and other places
+to suppress an eventual attempt at revolution.</p>
+
+<p>Orders for the suppression of risings are issued under the
+heading “Measures for the Suppression of Strikes.” Proof of
+this is furnished by the order of German G.H.Q. to all Guards
+Infantry troops and to the 3rd, 4th, and 5th Corps.</p>
+
+<p>On receipt of the telegraphic order “Prepare for the suppression
+of strikes,” all man-power must be mobilised. On
+receipt of the order “Suppress strikes,” the commandant of
+the transport troops must be immediately informed. The men
+must be equipped as for field service, only without masks. On
+receipt of the telegraphic order “Make preparations for<span class="pagenum" id="Page_245">[245]</span>
+surrounding,” all detachments of troops will be marched to
+their allotted positions. Battalion commanders should place
+themselves at the head of their units and direct all further
+movements.</p>
+
+<p>On receipt of the telegraphic order “Surround,” the troops
+selected for this duty, the 3rd, 4th, and 5th Corps, will march
+on Berlin to the Vorstadtbahn (Suburban Railway). The
+Guards will take the opposite direction from the centre of the
+city to the Vorstadtbahn, driving the populace before them.
+Headquarters will be Kaulsdorf. Then follow detailed instructions
+for the employment of machine guns. The order is strictly
+secret.</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+<span class="smcap">What shall we do with the Kaiser?</span><br>
+</p>
+
+<p>Stockholm, 10th September.—The German Minister in
+Stockholm has requested the Swedish Foreign Office to seize
+the copy of the “<i>New York Herald</i> Magazine of the War” of the
+14th July because it publishes on the first page a photograph of
+the German Emperor underneath which are the words:—</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot">
+
+<p>“What shall we do with the Kaiser after the War?”</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>The Minister of Justice is said to have ordered the copies in
+question to be seized.</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+<span class="smcap">Arrest of Socialists.</span><br>
+</p>
+
+<p>According to the <i>Neue Badische Landeszeitung</i>, wild scenes
+took place last week at a meeting of Independent Socialists in
+Berlin. “In the course of the meeting the Reichstag member
+Hoffmann was arrested by two policemen because of provocative
+speeches. A scene of such excitement ensued that in the general
+disturbance Hoffmann escaped, while the hall rang with cries of
+‘Down with the War!’ ‘Long live Liebknecht!’</p>
+
+<p>“The following morning the officials arrived at Hoffmann’s
+house in order to arrest him again, but the deputy was not to be
+found. Many arrests were made among his adherents.”</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+<span class="smcap">Pork in Bottles.</span><br>
+</p>
+
+<p>“The smugglers are still devising new tricks so as to prevent
+their costly goods from falling into the clutches of the war contraband
+officials. At the Schlesicher Station a man was stopped
+as he was fetching away two carboys such as are used for the
+transport of dangerous acids. A closer inspection showed that
+the carboys were divided in two parts, a small receptacle at the
+top being filled with vinegar, while the lower and larger part
+contained 55 kilos. of freshly killed pork neatly packed. The
+expensive pork was seized.”—<i>Berliner Tageblatt</i>, Sept. 19, 1918.</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+<span class="smcap">The Veto on Dancing.</span><br>
+</p>
+
+<p>“In the Hanover Command dancing lessons are only allowed
+for men and women separately, and anyone who has already<span class="pagenum" id="Page_246">[246]</span>
+taken a course of dancing is not allowed to learn again. A
+sensible regulation has been issued at Essen. Only dancing
+instructors belonging to the two German dancing instructors’
+unions may hold dancing classes as in peace time.”—<i>Berliner
+Tageblatt</i>, Sept. 19, 1918.</p>
+<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">
+<div class="captiontop"><figure class="figcenter illowp81" id="leaflet11" style="max-width: 135.8125em;">
+  <figcaption class="caption"><i>Leaflet No. 11.</i><br>
+THIS LEAFLET WITH PARTICULARS OF THE FATE OF 150 GERMAN SUBMARINE COMMANDERS CREATED
+GREAT DEPRESSION IN GERMAN NAVAL PORTS.</figcaption>
+  <img class="w100" src="images/leaflet11.jpg" alt="">
+</figure></div>
+
+
+
+
+<p class="center">
+THE 150 LOST GERMAN U-BOATS.<br>
+</p>
+
+<p>In the House of Commons the British Prime Minister, Mr.
+Lloyd George, said, “Our British vessels are serving as convoys,
+patrolling, laying mines, sweeping mines, protecting merchant
+ships and hunting U-boats over vast and uncharted distances.
+They have destroyed at least 150 of these ocean pests, the German
+U-boats—more than half that number in the course of last
+year.”</p>
+
+<p>In reply to this, the following official Berlin telegram was sent
+out to the German papers and to neutral countries:</p>
+
+<p>“We are in the position to state that the enemy’s war against
+the U-boats does not show anything like so great a success as
+that claimed by the British Prime Minister.”</p>
+
+<p>The Chief of the Naval General Staff in London has in his
+possession a complete list of the names of the commanders of the
+150 U-boats which Germany has lost through sinking, capture,
+or internment. The greater part of these officers are dead, a
+certain percentage are prisoners of war, a few are interned in
+neutral countries. The truth of the statement of the British
+Prime Minister is thus proved. It is also proved that the
+statement contained in the official Berlin telegram is untrue.
+Here is the list:</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+[<i>List of U-boat commanders.</i>]<br>
+</p>
+
+
+<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">
+<div class="captiontop"><figure class="figcenter illowp55" id="leaflet12" style="max-width: 85.3125em;">
+  <figcaption class="caption"><i>Leaflet No. 12.</i><br>
+LEAFLET WARNING THE GERMANS THAT SUCH PLACES
+AS BERLIN AND HAMBURG HAD BEEN BROUGHT
+WITHIN RANGE OF AERIAL ATTACK AND COULD BE
+BOMBED IF THE WAR WERE PROLONGED.</figcaption>
+  <img class="w100" src="images/leaflet12.jpg" alt="">
+</figure></div>
+
+
+
+
+<p class="center">
+A MAP WHICH EXPLAINS ITSELF.<br>
+</p>
+
+<p>In 1914 the English air squadrons which carried out reprisals
+for the attacks made on English towns were small and carried
+small bombs. In 1915 they grew larger and dropped larger
+bombs. In 1916 both had doubled in size. In 1917 there was
+a further increase in the size of the bombing squadrons and the
+bombs were 7½ times again as heavy. 1918 saw further increases
+and throughout the period under review the range of attacks
+steadily extended. In 1919 Berlin, Hamburg, Brunswick, and
+Hanover will be easily within range of attack—if we do not make
+peace in the meantime.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_247">[247]</span></p>
+<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">
+<div class="captiontop"><figure class="figcenter illowp46" id="leaflet13" style="max-width: 79.4375em;">
+  <figcaption class="caption"><i>Leaflet No. 13.</i><br>
+A GERMAN DREAM AND THE RESULT. A LEAFLET
+ILLUSTRATING THE COLLAPSE OF THE MITTEL-EUROPA
+AMBITION OF GERMAN MILITARISM.</figcaption>
+  <img class="w100" src="images/leaflet13.jpg" alt="">
+</figure></div>
+
+
+
+
+<p class="center">
+HOW THE THING WENT WRONG.<br>
+</p>
+
+<p><i>The upper map is entitled</i> “<span class="smcap">Pan-German Dream</span>,” <i>the wording
+under it being as follows</i>:</p>
+
+<p>“Our rulers went to war because they hoped to found a
+gigantic empire for the Kaiser and the Junkers. All the territories
+shaded in on the above map were to be their realm. It
+would have meant the subjection of half the world under the
+German sword.”—<i>Vorwärts</i>, Oct. 11, 1918.</p>
+
+<p><i>The lower map is entitled</i> “<span class="smcap">The Awakening of the German
+People</span>.” <i>Under it is the following inscription</i>:</p>
+
+<p>This is how Germany looks to-day. Her allies can give no
+further aid. What the Kaiser calls “his heritage from God”
+will soon be smaller than it was at the beginning of the war.
+But the German people will be the better for it. They will have
+escaped from autocracy and militarism. Freedom at last!</p>
+
+<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">
+<div class="captiontop"><figure class="figcenter illowp43" id="leaflet14" style="max-width: 79.75em;">
+  <figcaption class="caption"><i>Leaflet No. 14.</i><br>
+FRONT PAGE OF A “TRENCH NEWSPAPER” ISSUED BY CREWE
+HOUSE FOR GERMAN TROOPS.</figcaption>
+  <img class="w100" src="images/leaflet14.jpg" alt="">
+</figure></div>
+
+
+
+
+<p class="center">
+WAR AND HOME.<br>
+<br>
+<span class="smcap">The Summons to Unity.</span><br>
+</p>
+
+<p><i>The picture on the left is headed</i> “<span class="smcap">The Ideal</span>” <i>and represents
+“The Assembly.” On its right is the following parody, entitled</i>
+“<span class="smcap">Paradise Lost</span>,” <i>on Goethe’s “Faust”</i>:</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+“PARADISE LOST.”<br>
+</p>
+
+<p>
+“Gretchen, how different thou wast!”—(Goethe—“Faust.”)<br>
+<br>
+Germany, how different thou wast before the war<br>
+Brought about by thy lust of conquest.<br>
+With self-assurance thou wentst from triumph to triumph<br>
+And reached the summit of thy power<br>
+Untouched, with ample possessions<br>
+In earthly goods, in fame and world renown<br>
+Thou hadst all mankind can crave,<br>
+In high respect regarded, if not beloved.<br>
+<br>
+But now what disgust, what horror<br>
+The mere name of Germany excites!<br>
+There is deep mourning for thy vanished happiness,<br>
+Thy honour lost, thy peace of mind destroyed!<br>
+Thou liest parted by the iron wall<br>
+Which thy crime has built between us<br>
+Fast fettered to thy false ideal<br>
+And all thy former glory gone!<br>
+</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_248">[248]</span></p>
+
+<p><i>The lower picture is called</i> “<span class="smcap">The Reality</span>,” <i>the quotation from
+Moltke underneath being “March separately, strike together.” On
+its left</i>:</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+<span class="smcap">The War was decided at Potsdam.</span><br>
+</p>
+
+<p>During a debate on the origin of the war in the Hungarian
+Parliament, Count Tisza claimed that the ultimatum to Serbia
+was drawn up at a conference at which no German representative
+was present.</p>
+
+<p><i>A Deputy</i>: Not in Vienna but in Potsdam.</p>
+
+<p><i>Count Tisza</i>: Neither in Potsdam nor anywhere else.</p>
+
+<p><i>The Deputy</i>: The ultimatum was not drawn up at Potsdam, but
+the outbreak of war was decided there.</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+<span class="smcap">A Prophecy.</span><br>
+</p>
+
+<p>The Dutch newspaper, the <i>Handelsblad</i>, reports that a person
+who has just returned from Germany saw this rhyme written up
+in gigantic letters at an important factory:</p>
+
+<div class="poetry-container">
+<div class="poetry">
+  <div class="stanza">
+    <div class="verse indent0">“If the war lasts another year,</div>
+    <div class="verse indent0">William’s fate will be the Tsar’s!”</div>
+  </div>
+</div>
+</div>
+<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">
+<div class="captiontop"><figure class="figcenter illowp49" id="leaflet15" style="max-width: 66.625em;">
+  <figcaption class="caption"><i>Leaflet No. 15.</i><br>
+ILLUSTRATED LEAFLET PORTRAYING CONTENTMENT
+OF GERMAN PRISONERS IN BRITISH HANDS.
+THIS WAS ISSUED TO COUNTERACT ENEMY
+ASSERTIONS OF SEVERE TREATMENT.</figcaption>
+  <img class="w100" src="images/leaflet15.jpg" alt="">
+</figure></div>
+
+
+
+
+
+<p>German prisoners of war arriving behind the British lines are
+greeted by their comrades, who assure them of good treatment.</p>
+
+
+<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">
+<div class="captiontop"><figure class="figcenter illowp42" id="leaflet16" style="max-width: 73.5em;">
+  <figcaption class="caption"><i>Leaflet No. 16.</i><br>
+THIS LEAFLET SHOWED HOW THE ALLIES HAD
+SHATTERED THE GREAT BERLIN-BAGDAD PLAN.</figcaption>
+  <img class="w100" src="images/leaflet16.jpg" alt="">
+</figure></div>
+
+
+
+
+<p class="center">
+WHY THE GOVERNMENT IS SUING FOR PEACE.<br>
+</p>
+
+<p>The reason is clear.</p>
+
+<p>The Government undertook the war in the hope of realising
+the Pan-German dream of a Middle Europe.</p>
+
+<p>This was the real cause of the war.</p>
+
+<p>If there remained any doubt on the subject it is clearly proved
+by the fact that the moment the realisation of the Pan-German
+dream became impossible the Government sues for peace.</p>
+
+<p>This was the plan of the Pan-Germans who led us into the
+war.</p>
+
+<p>The whole of the territory coloured black was to become
+German.</p>
+
+<p>Bulgaria and Turkey would become vassal States.</p>
+
+<p>The Kaiser and the Prussian Junker aristocracy, the bureaucrats
+and the rich who exploit the rest of the people, should
+become the most powerful class in the world.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_249">[249]</span></p>
+
+<p class="center">
+THIS IS WHAT HAS BECOME OF THE PAN-GERMAN PLAN.<br>
+</p>
+
+<p>Bulgaria refuses to be a vassal State.</p>
+
+<p>Turkey is becoming anxious.</p>
+
+<p>The plan for the realisation of which the Pan-Germans persuaded
+Germany to go to war and which has cost so many
+millions of lives and caused such universal misery is completely
+frustrated.</p>
+
+<p>What reason remains why we should fight?</p>
+
+<p>The Government has no further reason for continuing the
+struggle and is therefore suing our enemies for peace.</p>
+
+<p>Therefore all the talk about a defensive war proves to have
+been absolutely untruthfully and dishonestly</p>
+
+<p class="center"><span class="allsmcap">STARTED TO DECEIVE US.</span></p>
+<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">
+<div class="captiontop"><figure class="figcenter illowp50" id="leaflet17" style="max-width: 86.5625em;">
+  <figcaption class="caption"><i>Leaflet No. 17.</i><br>
+MANIFESTO TO MAGYAR TROOPS.</figcaption>
+  <img class="w100" src="images/leaflet17.jpg" alt="">
+</figure></div>
+
+
+
+
+<p class="center">
+HUNGARIAN SOLDIERS!<br>
+</p>
+
+<p>What are you fighting for?</p>
+
+<p>For the Emperor of Austria and the King of Hungary!</p>
+
+<p>Or is it for the German Emperor?</p>
+<p>You are only fighting for the German Emperor. The Austrian
+Emperor has given over to him the army and the State revenues
+for twenty-five years by a formal treaty the contents of which
+are kept from you.</p>
+
+<p>But your newspapers also announce a “Waffenbund” which
+was entered upon on May 12th, 1918, between your old and your
+new masters.</p>
+
+<p>But you Magyars, whose ancestors shed so much blood for
+freedom, you are ignorant of the truth.</p>
+
+<p>For behold according to the Germans you are idle and slow.</p>
+
+<p>The <i>Frankfurter Zeitung</i> says on May 13th, “<b>The new treaty
+should finally seal the disappearance of Austria as an independent
+State and the seizing of the Hapsburg Monarchy by
+Germany</b>.”</p>
+
+<p>The <i>Deutsche Zeitung</i> of the 19th May remarks, “What the
+Mittel-Europa Confederacy chiefly needs is strength, and never
+more so than at the time the war broke out. Austria-Hungary
+was not sufficiently prepared. According to the ‘Waffenbund’
+<b>Austria-Hungary must arm its inhabitants in exactly the same
+way as Germany</b>. It is no longer possible that it should happen
+that the delegates should vote extraordinary credits for military
+purposes, and that afterwards they should waste a long time
+before they pass the amount because either the Hungarian or
+the Austrian Minister of Finance says there is no money; or<span class="pagenum" id="Page_250">[250]</span>
+that the delegates vote the guns but that the <b>Hungarian
+Parliament</b> refuses the necessary calling up of the recruits, so
+that afterwards the guns are there but there are not soldiers to
+man them.”</p>
+
+<p>Is this clear enough? The Germans struggle for a mad
+whim—they wish to rule the whole world. To fight for years,
+to pour out Hungarian blood for German glory for years and
+years.</p>
+
+<p>Naturally the <i>Neue Freie Presse</i> should with triumph proclaim
+that the new treaty is specially a triumph for the “upholders of
+Germany in Austria.”</p>
+<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">
+<div class="captiontop"><figure class="figcenter illowp57" id="leaflet18" style="max-width: 71.5625em;">
+  <figcaption class="caption"><i>Leaflet No. 18.</i><br>
+MANIFESTO, SIGNED BY PROFESSOR (NOW PRESIDENT)
+MASARYK, TO CZECHO-SLOVAK SOLDIERS IN THE AUSTRIAN
+ARMIES.</figcaption>
+  <img class="w100" src="images/leaflet18.jpg" alt="">
+</figure></div>
+
+
+
+
+<p class="center">
+MESSAGE OF PROFESSOR MASARYK TO THE
+CZECHO-SLOVAK ARMY IN ITALY.
+</p>
+
+<p>Through the agency of the Italian Legation, Professor T. G.
+Masaryk has sent the following message from Washington to the
+autonomous Czecho-Slovak army in Italy:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot">
+
+<p>“Brothers! Austria-Hungary, desiring to break the
+opposition at home, has asserted that our army is a rabble
+which has no political or military significance. She has
+even uttered the lie that our army is composed of Russians
+and other nationalities, and that a Czecho-Slovak army
+does not exist. Our nation does not believe this dishonesty
+and has remained obdurate and proud of its army. Then
+Austria-Hungary endeavoured to deal a decisive blow to
+our nation by destroying you, and with you its army.
+She desired to gain possession of our banners of resistance
+and independence, the symbol of trust and aspiration
+cherished by our people.</p>
+
+<p>“Brothers! Your will, your far-reaching glance frustrated
+the enemy’s plans. Our flag is still flying proudly
+upon the position entrusted to you for defence. Our nation
+recognises your heroic deeds and all hearts are stirred by
+profound gratitude to you. They extol you and the proud
+memory of your fallen brothers.</p>
+
+<p>“As your Commander-in-Chief I send you my heartiest
+thanks for the bravery by which you have contributed to
+the victory of our nation, of Italy, the Allies and all
+mankind.</p>
+
+
+<p>
+“Greetings!
+</p>
+<p class="right">
+<span style="margin-right:2em;">
+“<span class="smcap">T. G. Masaryk.</span>”</span><br>
+</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>We cannot help telling you how proud we are of the recognition
+by our beloved leader, who will guide us and our nation to the
+goal of victory.</p>
+
+<p>We are convinced that you also, in concert with the whole<span class="pagenum" id="Page_251">[251]</span>
+nation, see the salvation of our country and the realisation of
+our sacred rights only in the destruction of Austria.</p>
+
+<p>When they drive you forward to protect the treacherous
+dynasty, to which the nation has no obligations, you will
+certainly find an opportunity of retaliating worthily for centuries
+of oppression and of saving yourselves for a better future.</p>
+
+<p>Greetings!</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+<span class="smcap">Volunteers of the Czecho-Slovak Army in Italy.</span><br>
+</p>
+
+<p>October 2nd, 1918.</p>
+<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">
+<div class="captiontop"><figure class="figcenter illowp85" id="leaflet19" style="max-width: 144.875em;">
+  <figcaption class="caption"><i>Leaflet No. 19.</i><br>
+RAPIDLY-DISTRIBUTED LEAFLETS FOR GERMAN TROOPS TELLING OF ALLIED SUCCESSES IN THE
+BALKANS AND IN SYRIA.</figcaption>
+  <img class="w100" src="images/leaflet19.jpg" alt="">
+</figure></div>
+
+
+
+
+<p class="center">
+INFORMATION LEAFLET FOR THE TROOPS.<br>
+<br>
+FLIGHT OF GERMAN GENERAL.<br>
+<br>
+<span class="smcap">The Turks make Liman von Sanders responsible for
+their Misery.</span><br>
+<br>
+TWO ARMIES DESTROYED.<br>
+<br>
+<span class="smcap">Bulgarians pursued on an Extended Front in the
+Balkans.</span><br>
+<br>
+<span class="smcap">Count Hertling’s Gloom.</span><br>
+</p>
+
+<p>The victory of the British troops in Palestine over the Turkish
+troops commanded by General Liman von Sanders has made
+further progress and assumed much greater dimensions than
+was indicated by the first reports.</p>
+
+<p>Two Turkish armies, the 7th and 8th, have ceased to exist.
+The whole of their baggage train, all their guns, and their entire
+material of war have been captured.</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+30,000 <span class="allsmcap">MEN SURRENDERED</span><br>
+</p>
+
+<p>and the few who escaped death or captivity fled in small dispersed
+bodies across the Jordan and are now wandering about the
+country.</p>
+
+<p>The British are now pursuing the 4th Turkish Army, which is
+also in danger of destruction. In any case the Turkish resistance
+in Palestine is definitely broken. General Liman von Sanders,
+the German Commander-in-Chief, who was so completely
+surprised and so much surpassed in leadership by the enemy
+headquarters,</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+<span class="smcap">is in flight before the British</span>.<br>
+</p>
+
+<p>The Turks claim that they have been betrayed and led into
+misfortune by the German officers appointed to command their
+forces. Palestine is now lost to them for ever. The Holy
+Places have been liberated from the suzerainty of the Mussulman.
+The Entente has undertaken to restore Palestine to the Jewish
+people. The victory of the French and Serbian troops over the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_252">[252]</span>
+Bulgarians in the Balkan mountains has strikingly developed.
+The Bulgarians are now</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+<span class="allsmcap">WITHDRAWING ON A FRONT OF 160 KILOMETRES.</span><br>
+</p>
+
+<p>They have made no strong opposition to the advance of the
+Entente troops. The German defeats on the Western front
+have merely depressed them and weakened their fighting ardour.
+We know it is useless to continue the struggle.</p>
+
+<p>Count Hertling, the Imperial Chancellor, knows this too.
+He told the Chief Commission of the Reichstag that deep discontent
+had seized wide circles of the people. What does he
+recommend? That the German people shall maintain its old
+and sure confidence in Hindenburg and Ludendorff in the hope
+that they may improve the situation a little? But he knows,
+we know, and the whole world knows that they cannot improve it.</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+<span class="smcap">Only the German people itself</span><br>
+</p>
+
+<p>can bring about an improvement by putting an end to autocracy
+and militarism, pan-Germanism, and the out-of-date absurdities
+which other peoples have long since done away with.</p>
+
+<p><i>On the other side of the leaflet</i>:</p>
+
+<p>The upper map shows the encircling movement of the British
+which annihilated the Turkish forces under General Liman von
+Sanders.</p>
+
+<p><i>Notes in the body of the map</i>:</p>
+
+<p>
+British cavalry.<br>
+Here 25,000 Turks surrendered.<br>
+Site of break-through on the Turkish front.<br>
+</p>
+
+<p>The lower map shows the ground gained in the Balkans by
+the French and Serbian troops which have inflicted on the
+Bulgarians the heaviest defeat they have suffered in the war.</p>
+<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">
+<div class="chapter"></div>
+
+<figure class="figcenter illowp80" id="map1" style="max-width: 162.375em;">
+  <img class="w100" src="images/map1.jpg" alt="">
+  <figcaption class="caption">ETHNOGRAPHIC MAP OF AUSTRIA-HUNGARY.<br>
+OF AUSTRIA-HUNGARY’S PRE-WAR POPULATION OF 52,000,000, ONLY ABOUT 21,000,000 WERE GERMANS OR MAGYARS. THE REMAINING 31,000,000,
+COMPRISING POLES, CZECHS, SLOVAKS, SOUTHERN SLAVS, RUMANES, ITALIANS, ETC., WERE ACTIVELY OR PASSIVELY ANTI-GERMAN. THE ABOVE
+MAP SHOWS HOW THESE OPPRESSED RACES WERE DISTRIBUTED OVER THE DUAL MONARCHY.</figcaption>
+</figure>
+
+<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">
+<figure class="figcenter illowp80" id="map2" style="max-width: 152.875em;">
+  <img class="w100" src="images/map2.jpg" alt="">
+  <figcaption class="caption">THE PARTITION OF AUSTRIA-HUNGARY: SHOWING THE BOUNDARIES AS DEFINED IN THE PEACE TREATIES. IT IS INTERESTING TO COMPARE
+THIS WITH THE ETHNOGRAPHIC MAP BETWEEN PAGES 32 AND 33.</figcaption>
+</figure>
+<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">
+
+<figure class="figcenter illowp80" id="map3" style="max-width: 199.625em;">
+  <img class="w100" src="images/map3.jpg" alt="">
+  <figcaption class="caption">GERMANY’S NEW BOUNDARIES AS FIXED BY THE TREATY OF PEACE. THE DARK PORTIONS SHOW THE TERRITORY LOST TO GERMANY; THE SHADED
+PORTIONS INDICATE TERRITORY WITHIN WHICH THE INHABITANTS WERE TO CHOOSE BY PLEBISCITE UNDER WHOSE FLAG THEY WOULD LIVE.
+THE FREE TERRITORY OF DANZIG IS ALSO MARKED.</figcaption>
+</figure>
+
+<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">
+<figure class="figcenter illowp79" id="map4" style="max-width: 95.75em;">
+  <img class="w100" src="images/map4.jpg" alt="">
+  <figcaption class="caption">BULGARIA, AS DELIMITED BY THE PEACE TREATY.</figcaption>
+</figure>
+
+
+<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_253">[253]</span></p>
+
+<h2 class="nobreak" id="INDEX">INDEX</h2>
+</div>
+
+
+<ul class="index">
+<li class="ifrst">A</li>
+
+<li class="indx">Alsace-Lorraine, Propaganda policy, <a href="#Page_180">180-1</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Austria-Hungary—propaganda against, <a href="#Page_20">20</a> <i>et seqq.</i>;</li>
+<li class="isub1">Congress of the Oppressed Hapsburg Nationalities: resolutions, <a href="#Page_25">25-7</a>;</li>
+<li class="isub1">propaganda policy: memorandum to Foreign Office, <a href="#Page_28">28</a>;</li>
+<li class="isub1">policies outlined, <a href="#Page_30">30-3</a>;</li>
+<li class="isub1">Inter-Allied Propaganda Commission organised at Italian G.H.Q., <a href="#Page_37">37</a>;</li>
+<li class="isub1">publishes weekly journal, <a href="#Page_38">38</a>;</li>
+<li class="isub1">effect of leaflet campaign, <a href="#Page_40">40</a>;</li>
+<li class="isub1">work impaired by reactionary tendencies within Italian Government, <a href="#Page_40">40</a>, <a href="#Page_205">205</a>;</li>
+<li class="isub1">weakness of declaration made at Versailles meeting of June 3, 1918, <a href="#Page_41">41</a>;</li>
+<li class="isub1">effect of propaganda, desertions, <a href="#Page_43">43-4</a>;</li>
+<li class="isub1">recommendations of Inter-Allied Policy Committee, <a href="#Page_173">173-6</a></li>
+
+
+<li class="ifrst">B</li>
+
+<li class="indx">Baker, Lieut.-Col. B. Granville, <a href="#Page_37">37</a>, <a href="#Page_48">48</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Balfour, Mr. A. J., reply to Lord Northcliffe’s memorandum on policy to be adopted against Austria, <a href="#Page_33">33</a>;</li>
+<li class="isub1">against Bulgaria, <a href="#Page_139">139</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Beaverbrook, Lord, <a href="#Page_17">17</a>, <a href="#Page_148">148</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Bissolati, Signor, <a href="#Page_25">25</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Borgese, Professor, <a href="#Page_38">38</a>, <a href="#Page_150">150</a>;</li>
+<li class="isub1">on inter-Allied co-operation, <a href="#Page_165">165</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Bulgaria, propaganda against:</li>
+<li class="isub1">policy submitted to Foreign Office, <a href="#Page_134">134-9</a>;</li>
+<li class="isub1">Mr. Balfour’s reply, <a href="#Page_139">139</a>;</li>
+<li class="isub1">Ludendorff on effect of, <a href="#Page_142">142</a></li>
+
+
+<li class="ifrst">C</li>
+
+<li class="indx">Cinematograph films, use for propaganda purposes, <a href="#Page_197">197</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Cockerill, Brig.-Gen. G. K., <a href="#Page_52">52</a>, <a href="#Page_149">149</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Comert, M., <a href="#Page_150">150</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Congress of the Oppressed Hapsburg Nationalities at Rome: resolutions, <a href="#Page_25">25-6</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Cunliffe-Owen, Sir H., in charge of propaganda against Turkey, <a href="#Page_13">13</a>, <a href="#Page_150">150</a></li>
+
+
+<li class="ifrst">D</li>
+
+<li class="indx">Denbigh, Col. the Earl of, <a href="#Page_10">10</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Department of Propaganda in Enemy Countries (Crewe House):</li>
+<li class="isub1">Lord Northcliffe appointed Director, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>;</li>
+<li class="isub1">personnel of advisory committee, <a href="#Page_10">10</a>;</li>
+<li class="isub1">two main branches, <a href="#Page_11">11</a>;</li>
+<li class="isub1">co-operation of other Government Departments, <a href="#Page_15">15</a>, <a href="#Page_19">19</a>;</li>
+<li class="isub1">expenditure during “intensive” campaign (Sept.-Dec. 1918), <a href="#Page_18">18</a>;</li>
+<li class="isub1">production work centralised at Crewe House, <a href="#Page_91">91-2</a>;</li>
+<li class="isub1">good effect of, <a href="#Page_93">93</a>;</li>
+<li class="isub1">inter-Allied Conference: list of delegates, <a href="#Page_149">149</a>;</li>
+<li class="isub1"><span class="pagenum" id="Page_254">[Pg 254]</span>propaganda to cease during period of Armistice, <a href="#Page_234">234</a></li>
+
+<li class="isubsep">  Austro-Hungarian Section, <a href="#Page_11">11</a>, <a href="#Page_12">12</a></li>
+
+<li class="isubsep">  German Section, <a href="#Page_12">12</a>, <a href="#Page_13">13</a></li>
+
+<li class="isubsep">  Peace terms propaganda, <a href="#Page_202">202</a> <i>et seqq.</i>;</li>
+<li class="isub2">Lord Northcliffe’s article published in <i>The Times</i> and circulated throughout the World, <a href="#Page_218">218-230</a>.</li>
+
+<li class="isubsep">  Work against Turkey, <a href="#Page_13">13</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Deutsche Tageszeitung</i>, tribute to propaganda staff, <a href="#Page_121">121</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Diaz, General, on effect of propaganda work on Italian front, <a href="#Page_45">45</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Donald, Mr. Robert, <a href="#Page_10">10</a></li>
+
+
+<li class="ifrst">F</li>
+
+<li class="indx">Franklin-Bouillon, M., <a href="#Page_148">148</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Fyfe, Mr. H., succeeds Mr. H. G. Wells as head of German Section, <a href="#Page_13">13</a>, <a href="#Page_90">90</a></li>
+
+
+<li class="ifrst">G</li>
+
+<li class="indx">Gallenga-Stuart, Signor, <a href="#Page_148">148</a>.</li>
+
+<li class="indx">Germany:—</li>
+<li class="isubsep">Allied propaganda against, early neglect of, <a href="#Page_50">50-2</a>;</li>
+<li class="isub2">use of leaflets, <a href="#Page_52">52</a>;</li>
+<li class="isub2">effect, <a href="#Page_53">53</a>;</li>
+<li class="isub2">suspension of distribution by aeroplane: reasons, <a href="#Page_54">54</a>: use of balloons, <a href="#Page_55">55-7</a>;</li>
+<li class="isub2">Mr. H. G. Wells’s memorandum on policy, <a href="#Page_61">61</a> <i>et seqq.</i>;</li>
+<li class="isub2">Lord Northcliffe’s letter to Mr. Balfour, <a href="#Page_81">81</a>;</li>
+<li class="isub2">summary of British Labour War Aims distributed: effect, <a href="#Page_89">89</a>;</li>
+<li class="isub2">use of aeroplanes resumed, <a href="#Page_97">97</a>;</li>
+<li class="isub2">leaflets circulated among submarine crews: effect, <a href="#Page_99">99</a>;</li>
+<li class="isub2">use of “trench newspaper,” <a href="#Page_100">100</a>;</li>
+<li class="isub2">German press comments, <a href="#Page_105">105</a> <i>et seqq.</i>;</li>
+<li class="isub2">rewards offered for leaflets, <a href="#Page_117">117-8</a>;</li>
+<li class="isub2">admission of Allied superiority, <a href="#Page_120">120</a>;</li>
+<li class="isub2">basis for peace negotiations, <a href="#Page_212">212</a> <i>et seqq.</i>;</li>
+<li class="isub2">Lord Northcliffe’s article, <a href="#Page_218">218</a> <i>et seqq.</i></li>
+
+<li class="isubsep">  German propaganda, methods, <a href="#Page_3">3</a> <i>et seqq.</i>;</li>
+<li class="isub2">reasons for failure, <a href="#Page_4">4</a>;</li>
+<li class="isub2">organisation set up, <a href="#Page_6">6</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Gramophone records of Czech and Slav songs used on Italian front, <a href="#Page_39">39</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Gruss, Major, <a href="#Page_37">37</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Guest, Mr. S. A., propaganda campaign, <a href="#Page_14">14</a>, <a href="#Page_39">39</a>, <a href="#Page_51">51</a>, <a href="#Page_98">98</a>;</li>
+<li class="isub1">methods, <a href="#Page_103">103</a></li>
+
+
+<li class="ifrst">H</li>
+
+<li class="indx">Hall, Rear-Adm. Sir R., <a href="#Page_17">17</a>, <a href="#Page_149">149</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Hansa</i>, article quoted, <a href="#Page_123">123</a>.</li>
+
+<li class="indx">Headlam-Morley, Dr. J. W., <a href="#Page_13">13</a>, <a href="#Page_60">60</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Hellingrath, General von, <a href="#Page_121">121</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Hindenburg, Marshal von, on effect of propaganda on German troops, <a href="#Page_93">93-4</a>;</li>
+<li class="isub1">manifesto on, <a href="#Page_106">106-15</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Hudson, Mr. H. K., <a href="#Page_10">10</a>, <a href="#Page_15">15</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Hutier, General von, manifesto; attack on Lord Northcliffe, <a href="#Page_115">115-7</a></li>
+
+
+<li class="ifrst">J</li>
+
+<li class="indx">Jones, Sir Roderick, <a href="#Page_10">10</a>, <a href="#Page_150">150</a></li>
+
+
+<li class="ifrst">K</li>
+
+<li class="indx">Keeley, Mr. James, <a href="#Page_150">150</a>;</li>
+<li class="isub1">on need for inter-Allied co-operation, <a href="#Page_170">170</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Kent, Mr. C. S., financial controller of Crewe House, <a href="#Page_18">18</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Kerry, Major, the Earl of, <a href="#Page_16">16</a>, <a href="#Page_91">91</a>, <a href="#Page_149">149</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Klobukowski, M., <a href="#Page_150">150</a>, <a href="#Page_160">160</a>, <a href="#Page_171">171</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Kölnische Zeitung</i>, letter describing effect of leaflets, <a href="#Page_119">119</a>;</li>
+<li class="isub1"><span class="pagenum" id="Page_255">[Pg 255]</span>“Ten Commandments for German Women,” <a href="#Page_127">127</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Kölnische Volkszeitung</i>, letters quoted, <a href="#Page_125">125</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Kupffer, Herr von, article quoted, <a href="#Page_122">122</a></li>
+
+
+<li class="ifrst">L</li>
+
+<li class="indx">Lamprecht, Dr. Karl, <a href="#Page_3">3</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Lansing, Mr., <a href="#Page_41">41</a>, <a href="#Page_42">42</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">League of Nations, <a href="#Page_67">67</a>, <i>et seqq.</i></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Le Courrier de l’Air</i>, <a href="#Page_53">53</a>, <a href="#Page_59">59</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Lichnowsky, Prince, his pamphlet used by Allies for propaganda, <a href="#Page_104">104</a>, <a href="#Page_132">132</a>, <a href="#Page_142">142</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Lloyd George, Mr. D., on success of propaganda against Austria, <a href="#Page_50">50</a>;</li>
+<li class="isub1">appreciation of Lord Northcliffe’s work, <a href="#Page_235">235</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Low, Sir Sidney, <a href="#Page_10">10</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Ludendorff, Gen., on failure of German propaganda, <a href="#Page_5">5</a>;</li>
+<li class="isub1">efforts to create organisation, <a href="#Page_6">6</a>;</li>
+<li class="isub1">order showing influence of propaganda on German population, <a href="#Page_118">118</a>;</li>
+<li class="isub1">value of good propaganda, <a href="#Page_128">128</a>;</li>
+<li class="isub1">comparison between British and German departments, <a href="#Page_129">129-31</a>;</li>
+<li class="isub1">on effect of propaganda on Bulgarian defeat, <a href="#Page_142">142</a></li>
+
+
+<li class="ifrst">M</li>
+
+<li class="indx">Macdonogh, Lieut.-Gen. Sir George, <a href="#Page_52">52</a>, <a href="#Page_106">106</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Malinof, M., <a href="#Page_141">141</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Ministry of Information, <a href="#Page_17">17</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Mitchell, Capt. P. Chalmers, <a href="#Page_16">16</a>, <a href="#Page_91">91</a>, <a href="#Page_92">92</a>, <a href="#Page_149">149</a>, <a href="#Page_209">209</a></li>
+
+
+<li class="ifrst">N</li>
+
+<li class="indx">Nicholson, Sir Charles, <a href="#Page_10">10</a>, <a href="#Page_143">143</a>, <a href="#Page_149">149</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Northcliffe, Lord, Mission to United States;
+Chairman of London H.Q. of British War Mission;
+declines seat in Cabinet; appointed Director of Propaganda in Enemy Countries, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>;</li>
+<li class="isub1">anxiety to commence work against Austria, <a href="#Page_35">35</a>;</li>
+<li class="isub1">letter of appreciation from Mr. Lloyd George, <a href="#Page_50">50</a>;</li>
+<li class="isub1">on need for greater co-ordination, <a href="#Page_151">151</a>;</li>
+<li class="isub1">outline of policy, <a href="#Page_156">156</a></li>
+
+<li class="isubsep">  Bulgaria, outlines policy against, <a href="#Page_135">135-139</a></li>
+
+<li class="isubsep">  Enemy attacks on, <a href="#Page_43">43</a>, <a href="#Page_105">105</a>, <a href="#Page_115">115-7</a>, <a href="#Page_125">125</a></li>
+
+<li class="isubsep">  Germany, outlines policy against, <a href="#Page_81">81</a></li>
+
+<li class="isubsep">  Ludendorff, tribute, <a href="#Page_130">130</a></li>
+
+<li class="isubsep">  Peace terms, article published in <i>The Times</i> and circulated throughout the world, <a href="#Page_218">218-230</a></li>
+
+<li class="isubsep">  Rechberg, Herr A., tribute, <a href="#Page_127">127</a></li>
+
+<li class="isubsep">  Resignation, letter to Mr. Lloyd George, <a href="#Page_234">234</a>;</li>
+<li class="isub2">Mr. Lloyd George’s reply, <a href="#Page_235">235</a></li>
+
+<li class="isubsep">  <i>The Times</i>, leading article on propaganda work quoted, <a href="#Page_129">129</a></li>
+
+
+<li class="ifrst">O</li>
+
+<li class="indx">O’Grady, Mr. James, <a href="#Page_10">10</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Ojetti, Capt., <a href="#Page_37">37</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Onslow, Col. Lord, <a href="#Page_199">199</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Orlando, Signor, meeting with Dr. Trumbitch, <a href="#Page_24">24</a></li>
+
+
+<li class="ifrst">P</li>
+
+<li class="indx">Pashitch, M., <a href="#Page_23">23</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Phillips, Mr. C. J., <a href="#Page_15">15</a>, <a href="#Page_150">150</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Poland, propaganda policy in regard to, <a href="#Page_178">178-180</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Prisoners of War, information for, <a href="#Page_143">143</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Propaganda, objects, <a href="#Page_2">2</a>;</li>
+<li class="isub1">axioms: truthful statements only to be made, <a href="#Page_2">2</a>;</li>
+<li class="isub1">necessity of co-ordination, <a href="#Page_146">146</a>;</li>
+<li class="isub1"><span class="pagenum" id="Page_256">[Pg 256]</span>inter-Allied conference at Crewe House, list of delegates, <a href="#Page_149">149</a>;</li>
+<li class="isub1">distribution devices, <a href="#Page_54">54-59</a>; <a href="#Page_184">184-190</a></li>
+
+
+<li class="ifrst">R</li>
+
+<li class="indx">Rechberg, Herr A., tribute to Lord Northcliffe’s work, <a href="#Page_127">127</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Rheinische-Westfälische-Zeitung</i>, article quoted, <a href="#Page_121">121</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Rome Congress, <a href="#Page_25">25</a> <i>et seqq.</i></li>
+
+
+<li class="ifrst">S</li>
+
+<li class="indx">Scheurmann, Herr W., letter quoted, <a href="#Page_126">126</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Seton-Watson, Dr. R. W., <a href="#Page_11">11</a>, <a href="#Page_12">12</a>, <a href="#Page_20">20</a>, <a href="#Page_24">24</a>, <a href="#Page_37">37</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_49">49</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Siciliani, Col., <a href="#Page_37">37</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Sonnino, Baron, <a href="#Page_41">41</a>, <a href="#Page_42">42</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Standing, Sir Guy, <a href="#Page_17">17</a>, <a href="#Page_149">149</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Steed, Mr. H. Wickham, <a href="#Page_10">10</a>, <a href="#Page_20">20</a>, <a href="#Page_24">24</a>, <a href="#Page_39">39</a>, <a href="#Page_49">49</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_149">149</a>;</li>
+<li class="isub1">Co-Director of Austro-Hungarian Section, <a href="#Page_11">11</a>;</li>
+<li class="isub1">mission to Italy, <a href="#Page_37">37</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Stein, Gen. von, admission of superiority of Allies’ propaganda, <a href="#Page_120">120</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Stossinger, Herr F., <a href="#Page_120">120</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Stuart, Lieut.-Col. Sir Campbell, <a href="#Page_10">10</a>, <a href="#Page_149">149</a>, <a href="#Page_204">204</a>, <a href="#Page_236">236</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Swinton, Maj.-Gen., <a href="#Page_51">51</a></li>
+
+
+<li class="ifrst">T</li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>The Times</i>, leading article on Lord Northcliffe’s work quoted, <a href="#Page_129">129</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Torre, Dr., <a href="#Page_24">24</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Trumbitch, Dr., <a href="#Page_23">23</a>, <a href="#Page_24">24</a></li>
+
+
+<li class="ifrst">W</li>
+
+<li class="indx">Wells, Mr. H. G., <a href="#Page_10">10</a>, <a href="#Page_12">12</a>, <a href="#Page_60">60</a>, <a href="#Page_89">89</a>, <a href="#Page_90">90</a>;</li>
+<li class="isub1">memorandum on propaganda policy against Germany, <a href="#Page_61">61</a> <i>et seqq.</i></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Wireless Telegraphy, used as means of disseminating information, <a href="#Page_17">17</a>, <a href="#Page_103">103</a></li>
+</ul>
+
+
+<p class="center fs80">
+PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN BY THE CORNWALL PRESS, LTD.,<br>
+PARIS GARDEN, STAMFORD STREET, LONDON, S.E.1.<br>
+</p>
+
+
+<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">
+<div class="chapter transnote">
+<p class="center">Transcriber’s notes:</p>
+
+<p>Underlining in the translation of leaflet 17, where it is used for emphasis,
+has been marked as bold, but ignored elsewhere.</p>
+
+<p>
+Evident typographical and punctuation errors have been corrected
+silently.  Inconsistent spelling/hyphenation has been normalised.
+</p>
+
+<p> The usage of both Roumania & Rumania is the author’s.
+</p>
+
+<p> A half-title page has been discarded.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+A single footnote has been relocated at the end of the quoted passage to which it refers.
+</p>
+
+
+<p>To improve text flow, illustrations have been relocated as follows:</p>
+<div class="blockquot"><p>Photographs have been grouped between chapters.</p>
+<p>Each “leaflet” has been moved to the appendix, to accompanying its translation.<br>
+Redundant cross-references and reiterations of the leaflet number have been discarded.<br>
+The explanatory text “Facsimile leaflets and translations” has been appended to the appendix and table of contents.</p>
+
+<p>Maps follow immediately after the appendix.</p></div>
+
+<p>Page numbers in the List of Illustrations are no longer relevant,
+but will link to the indicated image.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+
+
+
+
+<div style='text-align:center'>*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 77798 ***</div>
+</body>
+</html>
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author	www-data <www-data@mail.pglaf.org>	2026-01-27 22:04:08 -0800
committer	www-data <www-data@mail.pglaf.org>	2026-01-27 22:04:08 -0800
commit	e7e8d49a2e80e4477763258ac48ce6f7126a6273 (patch)
tree	4ea9c16b7e9cc7f9cb03c662023c04756c17bf8f /77798-h