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diff --git a/76880-0.txt b/76880-0.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..aded7f0 --- /dev/null +++ b/76880-0.txt @@ -0,0 +1,30345 @@ + +*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 76880 *** + + + + + + THE MONIST + + A + QUARTERLY MAGAZINE + + VOL. II + + CHICAGO: + THE OPEN COURT PUBLISHING CO. + 1891-1892 + + COPYRIGHT BY + THE OPEN COURT PUBLISHING CO. + 1891-1892. + + + + +CONTENTS OF VOLUME II. + + + PAGE. + + ARTICLES. + + American Politics. By Thomas B. Preston 41 + + Anschauung, What Does —— Mean? Editor 527 + + Artificial Selection and the Marriage Problem. By Hiram M. Stanley 51 + + Clifford on the Soul in Nature, Professor. By F. C. Conybeare 209 + + Conservation of Spirit and the Origin of Consciousness, The. By + Francis C. Russell 357 + + Criminal Suggestion, On. By J. Delbœuf 363 + + Ethnological Jurisprudence. By Albert H. Post 31 + + Evolution, The Continuity of. The Science of Language versus The + Science of Life, as represented by Prof. F. Max Müller and Prof. + G. J. Romanes. Editor 70 + + Facts and Mental Symbols. By Ernst Mach 198 + + Littré, Émile. A Sonnet. By Louis Belrose Jr. 110 + + Logical Theory, The Present Position of. By John Dewey 1 + + Magic Square, The. By Hermann Schubert 487 + + Mechanical Invention, The New Civilisation Depends on. By W. T. + Harris 178 + + Mental Evolution. An Old Speculation in a New Light. By C. Lloyd + Morgan 161 + + Mind, The Law of. By Charles S. Peirce 533 + + Monism, Our. The Principles of a Consistent, Unitary World-View. + By Ernst Haeckel 481 + + Necessity, Mr. Charles S. Peirce’s Onslaught on the Doctrine of. + Editor 560 + + Necessity, The Doctrine of —— Examined. By Charles S. Peirce 321 + + Psychical Monism. By Edmund Montgomery 338 + + Religion and Progress. Interpreted by the Life and Last work of + Wathen Mark Wilks Call. By Moncure D. Conway 183 + + Spencer, Mr., on the Ethics of Kant. Editor 512 + + Things in themselves, Are There ——? Editor 225 + + Thought and Language. By George John Romanes 56 + + Will and Reason. By B. Bosanquet 18 + + LITERARY CORRESPONDENCE. + + France. By Lucien Arréat 266, 386, 583 + + France. The Intellectual Awakening of the Langue D’Oc. + By Theodore Stanton 95 + + Germany. Christian Ufer 103, 272, 396, 593 + + DIVERSE TOPICS. CRITICISMS AND DISCUSSIONS. + + Clergy’s Duty of Allegiance to Dogma and the Struggle between + World-Conceptions. Editor 278 + + Comte and Turgot. Prof. Schaarschmidt 611 + + Evolution and Language, Comment on the Discussion on. By F. + Max Müller 286 + + Haeckel’s Monism, Professor. Editor 598 + + James’s Psychology, Observations on Some Points in. By W. L. + Worcester 417 + + Littré, A Defense of. By Louis Belrose Jr. 403 + + Littré’s, Émile, Positivism. A Reply. Editor 410 + + Logical Theory, The Future Position of. Edward T. Dixon 606 + + Mind, The Nature of —— and the Meaning of Reality. Editor 434 + + Monism and Mechanicalism: Comments upon Prof. Ernst Haeckel’s + Position. Editor 438 + + Peirce, Mr. Charles S., on Necessity. Editor 442 + + Religion of Science, The. Editor 600 + + Thought and Language. A letter by G. J. Romanes 402 + + Thought-forms, The Origin of. Editor 111 + + BOOK REVIEWS. + + Avenarius, Richard. _Der menschliche Weltbegriff_ 451 + + Baldwin, James Mark. _Handbook of Psychology_ 467 + + Bernheim. _Hypnotisme, Suggestion, Psychotherapie_ 465 + + Cornill, C. H. _Einleitung in das alte Testament_ 443 + + Curtis, Mattoon Monroe. _An Outline of Locke’s Ethical Philosophy_ 300 + + Delabarre, Edmund Burke. _Ueber Bewegungsempfindungen_ 297 + + Delbœuf, J. _Les Fêtes de Montpellier_ 131 + + Dillmann, Edmund. _Eine neue Darstellung der Leibnizischen + Monadenlehre auf Grund der Quellen_ 460 + + Dixon, Edward T. _The Foundations of Geometry_ 126 + + Erhardt, Franz. _Der Satz vom Grunde als Prinzip des Schliessens_ 631 + + Gruber, Hermann. _Der Positivismus vom Tode August Comte’s bis + auf unsere Tage (1857-1891)_ 133 + + Holzmann, H. J. _Synoptiker. Apostelgeschichte_ 287 + + Hübbe-Schleiden. _Das Dasein als Lust, Leid und Liebe_ 468 + + Husserl, E. G. _Philosophie der Arithmetik_ 627 + + Koenig, Edmund. _Die Entwickelung des Causalproblems in der + Philosophie seit Kant_ 457 + + Lasswitz, Kurd. _Seifenblasen_ 471 + + Loeb, Jacques. _Untersuchungen zur physiologischen Morphologie + der Thiere_ 468 + + Lombroso, C. L. _Nouvelles Recherches de Psychiatrie et + D’Anthropologie Criminelle_ 618 + + Lyons, Daniel. _Christianity and Infallibility_ 629 + + Mach, E. _Grundriss der Naturlehre für die oberen Classen + der Mittelschulen_ 617 + + Münsterberg, Hugo. _Schriften der Gesellschaft für psychologische + Forschung_ 289 + + Paszkowski, Wilhelm. _Die Bedeutung der theologischen Vorstellungen + für die Ethik_ 453 + + Pearson, Karl. _The Grammar of Science_ 623 + + Pellegrini, Pietro. _Diritto Sociale Tentativo in Bozza_ 298 + + Roberty, E. de. _Agnosticisme_ 631 + + Roberty, E. de. _La Philosophie du Siècle_ 293 + + Romanes, George John. _Darwin and After Darwin_ 612 + + Schmidkunz, Hans. _Psychologie der Suggestion_ 464 + + Schröder, Ernst. _Vorlesungen über die Algebra der Logik_ 618 + + Schurmann, Jacob Gould. _Belief in God_ 121 + + Schwarz, Hermann. _Das Wahrnehmungsproblem vom Standpunkte des + Physikers, des Physiologen und des Philosophen_ 455 + + Scripture, E. W. _Ueber den associativen Verlauf der Vorstellungen_ 137 + + Seth, Andrew. _The Present Position of the Philosophical Sciences_ 450 + + Toy, Crawford Howell. _Judaism and Christianity_ 123 + + Van Bemmelen, P. _Le Nihilisme Scientifique_ 298 + + Whitney, William Dwight. _Max Müller and the Science of Language_ 469 + + Wise, Isaac M. _Pronaos to Holy Writ_ 124 + + Ziehen, Th. _Leitfaden der physiologischen Psychologie in 14 + Vorlesungen_ 461 + + PERIODICALS 140-160; 303-320; 472-480; 634-640 + + APPENDIX. + + Kant and Spencer. Reprinted articles relative to Mr. Spencer’s estimate + of Kant. (In No. 4 of this volume.) + + + + + VOL. II. OCTOBER, 1891. NO. 1. + + THE MONIST. + + + + +THE PRESENT POSITION OF LOGICAL THEORY. + + +The remarkable fact in the intellectual life of to-day is the +contradiction in which it is entangled. On one hand we have an enormous +development of science, both in specialisation of method and accumulation +of material; its extension and thorough-going application to all ranges +of experience. What we should expect from such a movement, would seem to +be confidence of intelligence in itself; and a corresponding organisation +of knowledge, giving some guide and support to life. The strange thing +is that instead of this we have, probably, the greatest apparent +disorganisation of authority as to intellectual matters that the world +has ever seen; while the prevalent attitude and creed of scientific men +is philosophic agnosticism, or disbelief in their own method when it +comes to fundamental matters. Such a typical representative of modern +science as Mr. Huxley virtually laughs to scorn the suggestion of Mr. +Frederic Harrison that science should or could become so organised as to +give any support, any authoritative stay, to life. + +Now I do not intend to discuss this apparent contradiction. It seems +to me obvious enough that the contradiction is due to the fact that +science has got far enough along so that its negative attitude towards +previous codes of life is evident, while its own positive principle of +reconstruction is not yet evident. But without urging this view upon the +reader, I wish to ask how and where in the prevailing confusion logical +theory, as a synopsis of the methods and typical forms of intelligence, +stands. Logical theory at once reflects and transforms the existing +status of matters intellectual at any period. It reflects it, for +logical theory is only the express, the overt consciousness on the part +of intelligence of its own attitude, prevailing spirit. It transforms +it, because this express consciousness makes intelligence know where +it stands, makes it aware of its strength and of its weakness, and by +defining it to itself forces it to take up a new and more adequate place. + +It is obvious, then, that as the prevailing influence in the intellectual +world to-day is science, so the prevailing influence in logical theory +must be the endeavor to account for, to justify, or at least to reckon +with this scientific spirit. And yet if there is such confusion as we +have indicated, then there is also manifested some chaos in logical +theory, as to the true nature and method of science. Were it otherwise, +were there at present a logical theory adequate to the specific and +detailed practical results of science, science and scientific men would +be conscious of themselves, and would be confident in their work and +attitude. + +The especial problem of logic, as the theory of scientific method, is the +relation of fact and thought to each other, of reality and thought. It +is, however, differentiated from the metaphysical theory of knowledge. +Logic does not inquire into the ultimate _meaning_ of fact and thought, +nor into their _ultimate_ relations to one another. It simply takes +them from the attitude of science itself, its business being, not the +justification nor refutation of this attitude, but its development into +explicit doctrine. Fact means to logic no more, but certainly no less, +than it means to the special sciences: it is the subject-matter under +investigation, under consideration; it is that which we are trying to +make out. Thought too means to logic what it means to science: method. +It is the attitude and form which intelligence takes in reference to +fact—to its subject-matter, whether in inquiry, experiment, calculation, +or statement. + +Logic, then, would have for its essential problem the consideration of +the various typical methods and guiding principles which thought assumes +in its effort to detect, master, and report fact. It is presupposed here +that there is some sort of fruitful and intrinsic connection of fact and +thought; that thinking, in short, is nothing but the fact in its process +of translation from brute impression to lucent meaning. + +But the moment such a presupposition is stated, ninety-nine persons out +of a hundred think that we have plunged, _ex abrupto_, from the certainty +of science into the cloudland of metaphysic. And yet just this conception +of the relation of thought (method) to fact (subject-matter) is taken +for granted in every scientific investigation and conclusion. Here, +then, we have in outline the present position of logic. It is that any +attempt to state, in general, or to work out, in detail, the principle of +the intrinsic and fruitful relation of fact and thought which science, +without conscious reflection, constantly employs in practice, seems +“metaphysical” or even absurd. Why is this? The answer to this question +will give the filling-up of the outline just presented. + +The chief cause is that superstition which still holds enthralled +so much of modern thought—I mean formal logic. And if this seems +like applying a hard name to what, at best and at worst, is only an +intellectual gymnastic, I can only say that formal logic seems to me +to be, at present, _fons et origo malorum_ in philosophy. It is true +enough that nobody now takes the technical subject of formal logic very +seriously—unless here and there some belated “professor.” It is true that +it is generally relegated to the position of a subject which, for some +unclear reason, is regarded as “disciplinary” in a young man’s education; +just as certain other branches are regarded as elegant accomplishments +in a young woman’s finishing. But while the subject itself as a doctrine +or science hardly ranks very high, the conception of thought which is at +the bottom of formal logic still dominates the _Zeitgeist_, and regulates +the doctrine and the method of all those who draw their inspiration +from the _Zeitgeist_. Any book of formal logic will tell us what this +conception of thought is: that thought is a faculty or an entity existing +in the mind, apart from facts, and that it has its own fixed forms, with +which facts have nothing to do—except in so far as they pass under the +yoke. Jevons puts it this way: “Just as we thus familiarly recognise +the difference of form and substance in common tangible things, so we +may observe in logic, that the form of an argument is one thing, quite +distinct from the various subjects or matter which may be treated in that +form.”[1] + +Professor Stock varies the good old tune in this way: “In every act of +thought we may distinguish two things—(1) the object thought about, (2) +the way in which the mind thinks of it. The first is called the Matter; +the second the Form of Thought. Now formal ... logic is concerned only +with the way in which the mind thinks, and has nothing to do with the +particular objects thought about.”[2] + +It is assumed, in fine, that thought has a nature of its own independent +of facts or subject-matter; that this thought, _per se_, has certain +forms, and that these forms are not forms which the facts themselves +take, varying with the facts, but are rigid frames, into which the facts +are to be set. + +Now all of this conception—the notion that the mind has a faculty of +thought apart from things, the notion that this faculty is constructed, +in and of itself, with a fixed framework, the notion that thinking is +the imposing of this fixed framework on some unyielding matter called +particular objects, or facts—all of this conception appears to me as +highly scholastic, as the last struggle of mediævalism to hold thought in +subjection to authority. Nothing is more surprising than the fact that +while it is fashionable to reject, with great scorn, all the results +and special methods of scholasticism, its foundation-stone should still +be accepted as the corner-stone of the edifice of modern doctrine. It +is still more surprising when we reflect that the foundation-stone is +coherent only with the mediæval superstructure. The scholastics when they +held that the method of thought was a faculty pursuing its own method +apart from the course of things, were at least consistent. They did not +conceive that thought was free, that intelligence had rights, nor that +there was possible science independent of data authoritatively laid down. +Really believing what they professed,—that thought was something _in +se_,—they held that it must be supplied with a fixed body of dogmatic +fact, from tradition, from revelation—from external authority. They +held that thought in its workings is confined to extracting from this +dogmatic body of fact what is already contained in it, and to rearranging +the material and its implications. To examine the _material_, to test +its truth; to suppose that intelligence could cut loose from this body +of authority and go straight to nature, to history itself, to find +the truth; to build up a free and independent science—to this point +of incoherency mediæval scholasticism never attained. To proclaim the +freedom of thought, the rejection of all external authority, the right +and the power of thought to get at truth for itself, and yet continue +to define thought as a faculty apart from fact, was reserved for modern +enlightenment! And were it not somewhat out of my present scope, I should +like to show that modern culture is thus a prepared victim for the +skilful dialectician of the reactionary army. If the modern _Zeitgeist_ +does not fall a prey to the cohorts of the army of external authority, it +is not because it has any recognised methods or any recognised criterion +by which it can justify its raising the “banner of the free spirit.” It +is simply the obstinate bulwark of outer fact, built up piecemeal by +science, that protects it. + +The two main forces, which have been at work against the formulæ of +formal logic, are “inductive” or empirical logic on one side, and the +so-called “transcendental” logic, on the other. Of these two, the +influence of inductive logic in sapping in practical fashion and popular +results the authority of syllogistic logic has undoubtedly been much +the greater. I propose, briefly, to give certain reasons for holding, +however, that the inductive logic does not furnish us with the needed +theory of the relation of thought and fact. To show this adequately would +demand the criticism of inductive logic in the detail of its methods, in +order to show where it comes short. As this is impossible, I shall now +confine myself to a couple of general considerations. + +To begin with, then, the empirical logic virtually continues the +conception of thought as in itself empty and formal which characterizes +scholastic logic. It thus has really no theory which differentiates it, +as regards the nature of thought itself, from formal logic. I cannot see, +for example, what quarrel the most stringent upholder of formal logic +can have with Mill as to the latter’s theory of the syllogism. Mill’s +theory is virtually simply a theory regarding the formation of the major +premiss—regarding the process by which we formulate the statement that +All _S_ is _P_. Now, if we once accept the syllogistic position, this +process lies outside the scope and problem of formal logic. It is not an +affair of what Jevons calls the form of argument at all, but simply of +the matter, the particular facts which make the filling of the argument. +I do not see that it is any part of the business of formal logic to tell +where the major premiss comes from, nor how it is got. And, on the other +hand, when it comes to the manipulation of the data contained in the +premiss, Mill must fall back upon the syllogistic logic. Mill’s theory, +so far as the thought-element is concerned, presupposes the syllogistic +theory. And if this theory, on its side, does not presuppose something +like Mill’s inductive theory, it is simply because the logician, as a +_philosopher_, may prefer “intuitionalism” to “empiricism.” He may hold, +that is, that the content of some major premisses is given by direct +“intuition” rather than gathered from experience. But in either case, +this consideration of the source of the content of the premiss belongs +not to formal logic, but to metaphysics. + +If, then, the theory of the syllogism is incorrect in its assumptions +as to the relation of fact and thought, the inductive logic must be +similarly in error. Its great advantage over the old scholastic logic +lies not in its logic as such, but in something back of the logic—in +its account of the derivation of the material of judgment. Whatever the +defects of Locke’s or Mill’s account of experience, any theory which +somehow presupposes a first-hand contact of mind and fact (though it be +only in isolated, atomic sensations) is surely preferable to a theory +which falls back on tradition, or on the delivery of dogma irresponsible +to any intellectual criticism. But in its account of the derivation +of the material of judgment, inductive logic is still hampered by the +scholastic conception of thought. Thought, being confined to the rigid +framework in which the material is manipulated after being obtained, is +excluded from all share in the gathering of material. The result is that +this material, having no intrinsic thought-side, shrinks into a more +or less accidental association of more or less shifting and transitory +mental states. + +I shall not stop to argue that, on this ground, the “inductive” logic +deprives science of its most distinctive scientific features—the +permanence and objectivity of its truths. I think no one can deny that +there is at least an _apparent_ gap between the actual results of +concrete science and these results as they stand after the touch of +the inductive logic—that the necessity and generality of science seem +rather to have been explained away, than explained. I think most of the +inductive logicians themselves (while endeavoring to account for this +apparent necessity as generated through association) would admit that +something of science _seems_, at least, to have been lost, and that the +great reason for putting-up with this loss is that the inductive logic +is the sole alternative to a dogmatic intuitionalism and to arbitrary +spinning-out of _a priori_ concepts. + +Certainly as long as thought is conceived after the fashion of +syllogistic logic, as a scheme furnished and fixed in itself, apart from +reality, so long scientific men must protest against allowing thought any +part or lot in scientific procedure. So long some such _modus operandi_ +as that given by Mill must be resorted to in order to explain scientific +methods and results. But, on the other hand, if the scholastic idea +of thought as this something having its character apart from fact is +once given up, the cause which at present cramps the logic of science +into the logic of sensationalism and empiricism is also given up. And +this brings us to the other point in general regarding the inductive or +empirical logic. It is not strictly a logic at all but a metaphysic. It +does not begin with the fact of science, the fact of the fruitful inquiry +into fact by intelligence, at all. It does not, starting from this fact +analyse the various methods and types which thought must take upon itself +in order to maintain this fruitful inquiry. On the contrary, it begins +with sensations, and endeavors by a theory of knowledge on the basis +of sensationalism to build up the structure of cognition, ordinary and +scientific. I am not concerned here with the truth of sensationalism as +a metaphysical theory of knowledge, nor with the adequacy of the notion +of sensation advanced by Mill. It is enough from the logical point of +view to point out that such a theory is not logic—that logic does not +deal with something _back_ of the fact of science, but with the analysis +of scientific method as such. And is it forcing matters to indicate that +this retreat from logic to metaphysic is also caused by the syllogistic +notion of thought? Formal thought, with its formulæ for simply unfolding +a given material, is of no use in science. There is, therefore, the +need of some machinery to take the place of thought. And this is found +in sensation and in “experience” according to the peculiar notion of +experience current in the inductive logic. + +In a word, then (without attempting to show the insufficiency of +inductive logic as the theory of science by reference to its treatment +of specific points) inductive logic does not meet our needs because it +is not a free, unprejudiced inquiry into the special forms and methods +of science, starting from the actual sciences themselves. It is founded +and built up with constant reference to the scholastic notion of thought. +Where it is not affected positively by it, it is still affected by its +reaction from it. Instead of denying once for all validity or even sense +to the notion of thinking as a special, apart process, and then beginning +a free, unhampered examination with an eye single to the fact of science +itself, it retains this conception of thought as valid in a certain +department, and then sets out to find something to supply the gap in +another department. And thus we have the usual division of inductive and +deductive logic, inductive being interpreted as empirical and particular, +deductive as syllogistic and formal. They are counterpart and correlative +theories, the two sides of the notion of the separateness of fact and +thought; they stand and fall together. + +“Transcendental” logic, while usually conceived as utterly opposed in +spirit and in results to inductive logic, has yet been one with it +in endeavoring to abolish formal logic as the sufficient method and +criterion of scientific truth. I say this although well aware that +inductive logic is usually conceived as specifically “scientific,” while +the transcendental movement is regarded as the especial foe of science—as +a belated attempt to restore an _a priori_ scholasticism, and to find +a scheme for evolving truth out of pure thought. This is because when +the “transcendental” school talks of thought, of the synthetic and +objective character of thought, of the possibility of attaining absolute +truth through thought, and of the ontological value of thought, it is +understood as meaning thought in the old, scholastic sense, a process +apart and fixed in itself, and yet somehow evolving truth out of its own +inner being, out of its own enclosed ruminations. But on the contrary, +the very meaning of “transcendentalism” is not only that it is impossible +to get valid truth from the evolution of thought in the scholastic sense, +but that there is no such thought at all. Processes of intelligence which +have their nature fixed in themselves, apart from fact and having to +be externally applied to fact, are pure myths to his school. Types of +thought are simply the various forms which reality progressively takes +as it is progressively mastered as to its meaning,—that is, understood. +Methods of thought are simply the various active attitudes into which +intelligence puts itself in order to detect and grasp the fact. Instead +of rigid moulds, they are flexible adaptations. Methods of thought fit +fact more closely and responsively than a worn glove fits the hand. They +are only the ideal evolution _of_ the fact,—and by “ideal” is here meant +simply the evolution of fact into meaning. + +If this is a fair description of what the “transcendental” school means +by thought, it is evident that it is a co-worker with the spirit and +intent of “inductive” logic. Its sole attempt is to get hold of and +report the presupposition and rationale of science; its practical aim +is to lay bare and exhibit the method of science so that the true seat +of authority—that is, the authority, the _backing_, of truth—shall be +forever manifest. It has simply gone a step further than “inductive” +logic, and thrown overboard once for all the scholastic idea of thought. +This has enabled it to start anew, and to form its theory of thought +simply by following the principles of the actual processes by which man +has, thus far in history, discovered and possessed fact. + +I shall not attempt here any defence of the “transcendental” logic; I +shall not even attempt to show that the interpretation of it which I +have given above is correct. It must go, for the present, simply as +my individual understanding of the matter. Simply taking this view of +“transcendental” logic for granted, I wish, in order to complete our +notion of the present position of logic, to consider the reasons which +have thus far prevented, say, the Hegelian logic from getting any popular +hold—from getting recognition from scientific men as, at least in +principle, a fair statement of their own basic presupposition and method. + +The first of these reasons is that the popular comprehension of the +“transcendental” movement is arrested at Kant and has never gone on to +Hegel. Hegel, it is true, overshadowed Kant entirely for a considerable +period. But the Hegelian régime was partly pyrotechnical rather than +scientific in character; and, partly, so far as it was scientific, it +exhausted itself in stimulating various detailed scientific movements—as +in the history of politics, religion, art, etc. In these lines, if +we trust even to those who have no faith in the Hegelian method or +principles, the movement found some practical excuse for being. But +the result of the case was—and its present status is—that because +the principle of Hegel was, for the time, lost either in display of +dialectical fireworks, or in application to specific subjects, the +principle itself has never met with any _general_ investigation. The +immense amount of labor spent on Kant during the past twenty years has +made method and principle familiar, if not acceptable, to the body of +men calling themselves educated. And thus, so far as its outcome is +concerned, the transcendental movement still halts with Kant. + +Now, at the expense of seeming to plunge myself deeper in absurdity than +I have already gone, I must say that the Kantian principle is by far +more “transcendental” in the usual interpretation of that term—more _a +priori_, more given to emphasising some special function of some special +thought-power—than the Hegelian. As against the usual opinion that while +some compromise between science and Kant is possible, the scientific +spirit and Hegel are at antipodes, it appears to me that it is Kant who +does violence to science, while Hegel (I speak of his essential method +and not of any particular result) is the quintessence of the scientific +spirit. Let me endeavor to give some reasons for this belief. Kant +starts from the accepted scholastic conception of thought. Kant never +dreams, for a moment, of questioning the existence of a special faculty +of thought with its own peculiar and fixed forms. He states and restates +that thought in itself exists apart from fact and occupies itself with +fact given to it from without. Kant, it is true, gives the death-blow +to scholasticism by pointing out that such a faculty of thought is +purely analytic—that it simply unfolds the material given, whether that +material be true or false, having no method of arriving at truth, and no +test for determining truth. This fact once clearly recognised, dogmatic +rationalism, or the attempt to get truth from the “logical” analysis of +concepts was forever destroyed. The way was opened for an independent +examination of the actual method of science. + +But while Kant revealed once for all the impossibility of getting truth, +of laying hold of reality, by the scholastic method, he still retained +that conception of thought. He denied, not its existence, but its worth +as relates to truth. What was the result? Just this: when he came to his +examination (criticism) of knowledge, it fell apart at once into two +separate factors, an _a priori_ and _a posteriori_. For if Kant finds, +as against the dogmatic rationalist, that formal thought cannot give +knowledge, he also finds, as against the sceptical empiricist, that +unrelated sensation cannot give knowledge. Here too, instead of denying, +_in toto_, the existence of unrelated sensation, he contented himself +with denying its functional value for knowledge. Unrelated sensation and +formal thought are simply the complementary halves of each other. Admit +the one, and the other is its necessary counterpart. + +Kant must now piece together his two separated factors. Sensation, +unrelated manifold of sensation, is _there_, thought, isolated, analytic +thought, is _here_. Neither is knowledge in itself. What more natural +than to put them together, and hold that knowledge is the union of a +matter or stuff, of sensations, atomic in themselves, on one hand, and a +form, or regulating principle of thought, empty in itself, on the other? +We have two elements, both existing in isolation, and yet both useless +for all purposes of knowledge. Combine them, and presto, there is science. + +Such a “transcendentalism” as this may well stick in the crop of +scientific men. For consider what is involved in it: an _a priori_ +factor, on one side, and an _a posteriori_, on the other. Kant, from +one point of view, seems thus to have simply combined the weaknesses of +empiricism and rationalism. He still continues to talk of experience +itself as particular and contingent, and denies that it gives a basis +for any universal laws. Aside from his effort in the “Kritik der +Urtheilskraft” to overcome his original separation, special scientific +laws are to him only more or less extensive generalisations from +experience—as much so to him as to Locke, or Mill. Scientific men indeed, +have accustomed themselves to this derogation of their own methods and +results, and, as “inductive” logicians, indulge in it quite freely +themselves. But an _a priori_ element, supplied by a thought fixed and +separate, scientific men cannot do away with. Nor do I know any reason +why they should. + +It is coming short, in my opinion, of the full stature of science to +treat it as a quantitative and varying generalisation of contingent +particulars, but this, at least, leaves what science there is free and +unhindered. But _a priori_ elements supplied from outside the fact +itself, _a priori_ elements somehow entering into the fact from without +and controlling it—this is to give up the very spirit of science. For +if science means anything, it is that our ideas, our judgments may in +some degree reflect and report the fact itself. Science means, on one +hand, that thought is free to attack and get hold of its subject-matter, +and, on the other, that fact is free to break through into thought; free +to impress itself—or rather to express itself—in intelligence without +vitiation or deflection. Scientific men are true to the instinct of +the scientific spirit in fighting shy of a distinct _a priori_ factor +supplied to fact from the mind. Apriorism of this sort must seem like an +effort to cramp the freedom of intelligence and of fact, to bring them +under the yoke of fixed, external forms. + +Now in Hegel there is no such conception of thought and of _a priori_, as +is found in Kant. Kant formulated the conception of thought as objective, +but he interpreted this as meaning that thought subjective in itself +_becomes_ objective when synthetic of a given sense-manifold. When Hegel +calls thought objective he means just what he says: that there is no +special, apart faculty of thought belonging to and operated by a mind +existing separate from the outer world. What Hegel means by objective +thought is the meaning, the significance of the fact itself; and by +methods of thought he understands simply the processes in which this +meaning of fact is evolved. + +There has been, of late, considerable discussion of the place and +function of “relations” in knowledge. This discussion in English +speculation, at least, tends to turn largely about Thomas Hill Green’s +reconstruction of Kantianism. I consider it unfortunate that this +discussion has taken the form of a debate between empiricism and +Kantianism. The question of knowledge has thus come to be whether or +not certain relations are supplied by thought to sensations in order to +make an orderly whole out of the latter, chaotic in themselves. Now when +Hegel talks of relations of thought (not that he makes much use of just +this term) he means no such separate forms. Relations of thought are, to +Hegel, the typical forms of meaning which the subject-matter takes in +its various progressive stages of being understood. And this is what _a +priori_ means from a Hegelian standpoint. It is not some element _in_ +knowledge; some addition of thought to experience. It is experience +itself in its skeleton, in the main features of its framework. + +“Refutations” of Hegel, then, which attempt to show that “thought” in +itself is empty, that it waits for content from experience, that it +cannot by any manipulation evolve truth out of itself are, if taken as +having relevance to Hegel, simply meaningless. Hegel begins where these +arguers leave off. Accepting all that they can say, he goes one step +further, and denies that there is any such “thought” at all anywhere in +existence. The question of the relations or “categories of thought” is +just the question of the broad and main aspects of fact as that fact +comes to be understood. + +For example, Kant would prove the _a priori_ character and validity +of the principle of causation by showing that without it science is +impossible, that it helps “make experience.” Now, in terms, Hegel’s +justification of this relation would be the same; he too would show +that the fabric of experience implies and demands the causal relation. +But in Kant’s case, the justification of the principle of causality +by reference to the possibility of experience means that thought must +continually inject this principle _into_ experience to keep it from +disappearing: that experience must be constantly braced and reinforced +by the synthetic action of thought or it will collapse. In short, the +need of experience for this principle of causation means its need for +a certain support outside itself. But Hegel’s demonstration of the +validity of the causal principle is simply pointing out that the whole +supports the part, while the part helps make the whole. That is to say, +Hegel’s reference is not to some outside action of thought in maintaining +fact as an object of knowledge; it is to the entire structure of fact +itself. His contention is simply that the structure of fact itself, +of the subject-matter of knowledge, is such that in one of its phases +it presents necessarily the aspect of causality. And if this word +“necessarily” gives pause, it must be remembered what the source of this +necessity is. It does _not_ lie in the principle of causation _per se_; +it lies in the whole fact, the whole subject-matter of knowledge. It is +the same sort of necessity as when we say that a complete man _must_ have +an eye; i. e., it is the nature of the human organism to develop and +sustain this organ, while the organ, in turn, contributes to and thus +helps constitute the organism. + +It is then evident that the question upon which the “refutation” of +Hegel turns is not in showing that formal “thought” cannot give birth to +truth except through the fructifying touch of experience. The question +is simply whether fact—the subject-matter of knowledge—is such as Hegel +presents it. Is it, in general, a connected system as he holds it to +be? And, if a system, does it, in particular, present such phases +(such relations, categories) as Hegel shows forth? These are objective +questions pure and simple; questions identical, in kind, with the +question whether the constitution of glucose is what some chemist claims +to have found it. + +This, then, is why I conceive Hegel—entirely apart from the value of any +special results—to represent the quintessence of the scientific spirit. +He denies not only the possibility of getting truth out of a formal, +apart thought, but he denies the existence of any faculty of thought +which is other than the expression of fact itself. His contention is +not that “thought,” in the scholastic sense, has ontological validity, +but that fact, reality is significant. Even, then, if it were shown +that Hegel is pretty much all wrong as to the special meanings which he +finds to make up the significance of reality, his main principle would +be unimpeached until it were shown that fact has not a systematic, or +interconnected, meaning, but is a mere hodgepodge of fragments. Whether +the scientific spirit would have any interest in such a hodgepodge may, +at least, be questioned. + +Having dealt at such length with the first reason why as yet the +“transcendental” movement has found no overt coalescence with the +scientific, we may deal briefly with the remaining reason.[3] In the +second place, then, the rationality of fact had not been sufficiently +realised in detail in the early decades of the century to admit of +the principle of the “transcendental” movement being otherwise than +misunderstood. That is to say, the development and, more particularly, +the application of science to the specific facts of the world was +then comparatively rudimentary. On account of this lack of scientific +discovery and application, the world presented itself to man’s +consciousness as a blank, or at least as only stuff _for_ meaning, and +not as itself significant. The result was that Hegel must be interpreted +subjectively. The difficulties in the way of conceiving a world, upon +which science had not yet expended its energies in detail, as an organism +of significant relations and bearings were so great, that Hegel’s attempt +to point out these significant types and functions as immanent in reality +was inevitably misconstrued as an attempt, on Hegel’s part, to prove that +a system of purely “subjective” thoughts could somehow be so manipulated +as to give objectively valid results. + +Hegel, in other words, anticipated somewhat the actual outcome of the +scientific movement. However significant fact may be, however true it +may be that an apart faculty of thought is an absurdity, however certain +it may be that there are no real types or methods of thought at all +excepting those of the object-matter itself as it comes to be understood, +yet to man this objective significance cannot be real till he has made +it _out_ in the details of scientific processes, and _made_ it applied +science in invention. Hegel’s standpoint was, therefore, of necessity +obscure. When the significant character of fact was not yet opened up +in detail, a method which worked upon the basis that the only possible +thought is the reflection of the significance of fact, had no chance of +fair interpretation.. And thus it was (and largely is) that when Hegel +speaks of objective thought and its relations, he is understood as having +the ordinary conception of thought (that is, of thought as a purely +separate and subjective faculty), and yet as trying to prove that this +apart faculty has some mysterious power of evolving truth. + +The question which now confronts us, therefore, as to the present place +of logic is just this: Has the application of scientific thought to the +world of fact gone far enough so that we can speak, without seeming +strained, of the rationality of fact? When we speak of the rationality, +of the intrinsic meaning of fact, can these terms be understood in their +direct and obvious sense, and not in any remote, or _merely_ metaphysical +sense? Has the theoretical consideration of nature in its detailed +study, has practical invention, as the manifestation of the rationality +of fact, gone far enough so that this significance has become, or could +become with some effort, as real and objective a material of study as are +molecules and vibrations? + +It seems to me that we are already at this stage, or are at the point of +getting to it. Without arguing this question, however, (which, indeed, +can be proved only by acting upon it, only _ambulando_,) I would point +out that the constant detailed work of science upon the world in theory +and in invention, must in time give that world an evident meaning in +human consciousness. What prevents scientific men from now realising this +fact, is that they are still afraid of certain “transcendent” entities +and forces; afraid that if they relax their hostility to metaphysic, +some one will spring upon them the old scholastic scheme of external, +supernatural unrealities. To those who take the prevailing agnosticism +not as a thing, but as a symptom, this agnosticism means just this: The +whole set of external, or non-immanent entities, is now on the point of +falling away, of dissolving. We got just so far, popularly, as holding +that they are unknowable. In other words, they are crowded to the extreme +verge. One push more, and off they go. The popular consciousness will +hold not only that they are unknowable, but that they are not. + +What then? Science freed from its fear of an external and dogmatic +metaphysic, will lose its fear of metaphysic. Having unquestioned and +free possession of its own domain, that of knowledge and of fact, it +will also be free to build up the intrinsic metaphysic of this domain. +It will be free to ask after the structure of meanings which makes +up the skeleton of this world of knowledge. The moment this point is +reached, the speculative critical logic worked out in the development of +Kantian ideas, and the positive, specific work of the scientific spirit +will be at one. It will be seen that this logic is no revived, redecked +scholasticism, but a complete abandonment of scholasticism; that it deals +simply with the inner anatomy of the realm of scientific reality, and has +simply endeavored, with however much of anticipation, to dissect and lay +bare, at large and in general, the features of the same subject-matter, +which the positive sciences have been occupying themselves with in +particular and in detail. + +That we are almost at the point of such conflux, a point where the +general, and therefore somewhat abstract lines of critical logic will run +in to the particular, and therefore somewhat isolated, lines of positive +science, is, in my opinion, the present position of logical theory. + + JOHN DEWEY. + + +FOOTNOTES: + +[1] Jevons, _Elementary Lessons in Logic_, p. 5. + +[2] Stock, _Deductive Logic_, p. 3. + +[3] It should be understood that in the previous discussion so far as it +relates to Kant, I have taken him at his lowest terms—those of logical +self-consistency. So far as Kant does not succeed in freeing himself +from his original position—the existence of a formal, or apart, faculty +of thought—so far his emphasis of the _a priori_ in the sense already +attributed to him is inevitable. But that the _tendency_ of Kant is to +make the thought-relations _a priori_ simply in the sense of being fact’s +own anatomy and physiognomy I should not deny. + + + + +WILL AND REASON. + + +It has always been, I think, the practice in civilised society to speak +of reason or good sense as in some way influencing action. And of course +it must do so, if, as we suppose, it forms the radical distinction +between man and the lower animals. “Be reasonable,” we say, in reference +to action no less than to speculation. “Wisdom and blood,” says +Shakespeare, “combating in so tender a body, we have ten proofs to one +that blood hath the victory.” Blood here means passion. How does wisdom +or knowledge combat passion? I do not say that wisdom and knowledge mean +the same thing, but if they do not, we should like to know the difference +between them. + +In this prevalent notion of the conflict between reason and desire, it +may be observed that reason is, as a rule, supposed to be negative or +prohibitive. “Be reasonable” generally means “give up something you want +very much.” According to one account, the inward monitor of Socrates +was always negative, and throughout moral philosophy, and especially +throughout moralising philosophy, which is not quite the same thing, you +find the point of view that reason conflicts with desire, and has in fact +for its function very much to prevent you doing or caring about whatever +you very particularly want to do or incline to care about. This is what +gives rise to the state of things satirised in the old saying “Any +young man would rather face an imputation on his moral character than +an imputation on his horsemanship.” If moral character means a sort of +detachment from everything, this feeling is both natural and justifiable. +The popular interpretation of Aristotle leans in the direction of this +idea about reason, in so far as the conception of the reason seems to be +connected with commonplace notions about the evils of excess, strongly +represented in Greek proverbial philosophy. It was easy to add to these +ideas the conception of the evils of defect, which is little more than a +verbal refinement on the other. These quantitative expressions have not +much meaning in morality. Unquestionably, I think, the popular aspect of +the Aristotelian doctrine is an idea that you ought not to throw yourself +very deeply into anything. Reason is, in short, according to these +moralistic conceptions, though not according to Aristotle’s fundamental +view, a sort of check upon desire and little more. + +This negative character of reason will, I hope, explain itself away as we +proceed. The primary point on which I want to insist is not why reason is +thus treated as negative, but how it comes that reason can be supposed +to conflict with or control desire at all. I speak for the present of +Desire, not of Will, because the meaning of desire is clearer; whereas +it is a doubt, until we have explained the nature of active reason, what +Will is, and whether it is distinguishable from desire. + +Now, on the other hand, there is a sentence of Aristotle “Intelligence +as such moves nothing,” and this seems to come home to us quite as +naturally as the idea that reason controls action. All plain or +unambiguous instances of reason or reasoning or intelligence, seem to +deal with discovery of fact, couched in a form which is capable of truth +and falsehood. For our purpose we may treat it as elaborate perception, +whether direct or assisted through inference, such as calculation. +Calculation is the old meaning of reasoning, both in Greek and Latin. + +How do we get across from perception or calculation to anything that can +interfere with desire? + +Of course there is a meeting-point in the idea that attends desire. +Human desire, at least, is not blind. It is desire of something, which +is before the mind as an idea; and in the case of desire which issues +in action this something must be mentally specified in respect of the +particular means needed to bring it about. And also, the end or purpose +which is desired for its own sake, is, in the connection of cause and +effect, itself _de facto_ a means to other results _ad infinitum_, more +or less of which are foreseen by the person who acts. Thus the act, +as fully presented to the mind in idea, is a complication of external +circumstances, which are ideally distinguished, supposing the act to +be reflected on, as means, realisation of the purpose, and foreseen +consequences both of the means and of the realisation of the purpose. + +It is, I think, all-important to remember, that these distinctions are +distinctions of relation to the acting subject, drawn very lightly by the +acting subject on the shifting surface of a complicated set of results +presented in idea, and are not at all complete distinctions, and lend +themselves very readily to self-deception. We shall see the importance of +this remark directly. + +In the meantime, here we have one way in which reasonings about fact do +help to modify our actions. If we know distinctly what we desire, say, +a week’s holiday, then it is reasoning about matters of fact that will +tell us what we must do to get it, and, in part, what the results will be +both of our getting it and of what we do to get it. Now for philosophical +purposes we need not consider the foreseen consequences separately. They +must rank, morally, as means. That is to say, they are something which +you have to take into the bargain in order to get what you want. They +come in with all the other circumstances in determining whether you like +the action or not. + +Now is _this_ connection between action and reason what we have in mind +when we say that a person ought to act reasonably, or that reason combats +desire? Do we understand by acting reasonably, that assuming some one +part of the imagined circumstances to represent the purpose, the agent +has got all the means to it, and the foreseen consequences of it, and +the interdependence of the parts of the purpose itself, set out in a +connection which is truly perceived or scientifically inferred? + +We do sometimes appear to mean this. We say: it is unreasonable to ask me +to be at the station at nine when the train does not start till ten. It +is unreasonable, you may say, on the ground that the means demanded of +me are not, scientifically speaking, necessary to the end agreed upon. +Still more we should pronounce it unreasonable to adopt any means which +actually defeats your purpose; which could only happen, one would think, +either from moral self-deception, or in complicated matters where the +means are disputable. This second case does not matter to us; the first +carries us a little further, because it suggests that what you call the +means may really contain your purpose, or one of your purposes, perhaps +inconsistent with another. The hackneyed example of selfish charity is +as good a case of this unreasonableness as can be found. The gift, which +is professed to be merely a means to the good of another, is, under all +the conditions, a means contrary to that good, and is given because it +gratifies an impulse of the donor. It might seem, in this case again, a +fair explanation to pronounce such conduct unreasonable merely because +the means adopted are scientifically speaking inconsistent with the end +proposed. We might bear in mind, however, that we seem to have detected +here a probable conflict of ends, not merely of means to an end. + +Admitting, then, for the moment, that we hold conduct to be unreasonable +if the perception, implied in it, of the relation between means, +ends, and consequences is flagrantly false, do we admit conduct to be +reasonable _simply_ because the intellectual perception in question is +clear and true? Taking truth in its ordinary sense, as truth of simple +fact, we must deny this. I may know perfectly well that so much wine +will make me drunk, and may drink it with that object and with that +result, and yet no one will pronounce this a reasonable action, though my +judgment of facts and results was as true and reasonable as could be. It +may be, however, that in a larger sense true judgment involves reasonable +action. + +Thus it does not seem that truth of perception or correctness of +calculation as to the connection of the circumstances which are presented +in the idea of an act are sufficient to make the act reasonable, although +serious blunders in the perception or calculation seem to make the act +which implies them unreasonable. I even doubt whether the last clause +was rightly stated. I was obliged to say _flagrant_ errors, _serious_ +blunders. For it seems doubtful whether a purely intellectual error, or +blunder of perception, does make an act “unreasonable,” which owing to +such a blunder misses its mark. I incline to think that the reason why +we are forced, in such cases as I have instanced, to lay stress on the +_flagrancy_ of the blunder, is that it makes us suspect self-deception +or moral neglect on the part of the agent, makes us suspect, in other +words, that the inconsistency between means and ends was not owing to +mere intellectual misjudgment, but was adopted with open or partially +open eyes. I do not think that I _should_ call my friend unreasonable +for wanting to meet at the station an hour before the departure of the +train, if he could show me _bona fide_ grounds which made him imagine +that it was necessary to arrive so early. I might in that case think him +mistaken, but should not venture to call him unreasonable, unless his +mistake seemed so obvious that I thought it was committed on purpose, +that is, was not an intellectual mistake at all. When I call him +unreasonable, perhaps I really suspect he is making a claim on my time +to meet some private convenience of his own—to avoid a crowd or to make +sure of some particular carriage, which I do not care about—and therefore +perhaps it may after all be his _purpose_ that I think unreasonable. + +But there is one great doctrine of reasonableness which does reduce it to +a question of means and ends, and that is, the doctrine that everything +else is a means to pleasure, whether that of the agent or that of all +sentient beings. I do not want to discuss Hedonism psychologically +just now, I only want to use it as an illustration of one way in which +intelligence may be alleged to control action. The ultimate theory would +then be that this uniform purpose, pleasure, is a natural or obvious, or, +so to speak, a _given_ purpose, and that all definite action is or has +been prescribed by the intelligence dealing with matter of fact, as a +means to the realisation of this given purpose. + +Then reasonable action would mean what our reasoning and perceptive +powers, dealing with matters of fact, pronounce to make for pleasure, +and unreasonable action would be all that does not. Here, though I +wish to avoid hackneyed criticism, I must note that there is a certain +difficulty in getting across from the idea of one’s own pleasure to that +of other people’s pleasure as a natural purpose, and sometimes we find +the contention that any person’s pleasure is a _reasonable purpose_ to +any person, which, like several indications before, takes us out of the +connection between reason and the mere calculation of means to an end. + +Apart from this, I have, for our object, only to refer back to the +suspicion with which we regarded these distinctions between means, ends, +and consequences, in the presented idea of an action. The burden of +proof lies on those who limit the aspects in and for which activities or +results can be or ought to be desired. If we say that the whole complex +of our moral life is a means to a partial though necessary incident in +it, it seems to me that we are putting the cart before the horse. If you +could really say “moral life is the means, and pleasure is the end” then +it would follow that, should calculation tell you that moral life was not +the most effectual means, you would not prefer it. Now this old argument +may be pronounced unfair on the ground that it puts an impossible case; +just like the counter-question which is asked by the opposite side, “If +morality led only to increased pain, would you prefer it then?” Still, +if these two questions together bring out the fact that pleasure is an +incident of a whole complex of functions and activities which we cannot +suppose to be separated from it, we do get this much result, that there +is no firm ground for distinguishing part of the complex as the end from +the rest as the means. And it seems clear, also, that we differentiate +pleasures _in kind_ according to the activities which they accompany, +just as we have constantly found that the so-called means differentiates +and qualifies the so-called purpose. + +Thus I do not think that it is possible to represent the reasonableness +of action as consisting in its guidance by right calculation of the means +to an end, not even to the alleged simple and universal end of pleasure. +At the same time, this view has one essential element of truth, that is +the recognition that a positive impulse or claim can only be combated or +defeated by a positive impulse or claim. The view goes so far indeed as +to say that one form of a general impulse can only be combated by another +form of that same impulse through the discrepancy of the alternative +means to its attainment. However this may be, so much does seem clear, +viz. that reasonableness cannot be, as popular language tends to make +it, something purely negative and prohibitive. Its negative aspect must +be secondary, and according to the suggestions furnished by the notions +we have been examining, must arise out of a discrepancy between two +sets of means to the same acknowledged or accepted end. This I think is +solid ground, so far that we are bound to deduce the negative side of +reasonableness from a positive nature, whether a general relation to one +and the same purpose, or relations to different purposes. We have learnt, +on the other hand, to distrust the absolute distinction between means and +end. + +2. Now I turn for a moment to what I may describe as _maxims_ of +reasonableness. I will not call them “A priori principles,” because such +an expression raises a question about the nature of experience which does +not concern the point before us. But I do treat them as characteristic of +a view which explains reasonableness rather by rules than by purposes; +and it seems to follow from this that the rule must be alleged to be +self-evident, because if they were derivative, they would most naturally +be derivative from purposes. But in the history of speculation of course +the same principle may be recommended at one time as analogous to an +axiom of the reasoning power, and at another time as involved in the +purposes which are recognised as good. Even the same writer may combine +both views. + +Now if such principles are supported as constituting the reasonableness +of action, either because connected with the predominance of the +speculative intelligence, or because of an analogy between such +principles and any axioms acceptable to the speculative intelligence, I +believe that this support of them is due to a sheer confusion. + +I take two only, as illustrations, one of each type I have mentioned. + +Plato, it seems to me, constantly fails to distinguish between the +reasonableness of conduct, and the reasonableness of abstract reasoning, +that is, of the scientific intellect. To the moral philosopher, +scientific or theoretical interest and activity are one interest and +activity among others; and the reasonableness of activity is not +insured by pursuing an activity of reasonableness. It _may_ be quite +unreasonable, in the moral sense, to pursue abstract reasoning as a +vocation in life. When we say that in every man the reason should be +uppermost, we do not mean that every man should devote himself to +intellectual pursuits. Plato knows this, as, in a sense, he knows +everything; but he uses all arguments for his purpose, and among others +I think he allows it to be supposed that occupation with intellectual +matter is in a moral sense a predominance of the reason. I may instance +his attempt to prove that intellectual pleasures are the pleasantest, +more especially with reference to his aim in making the attempt, which +is, I suppose, to recommend intellectual occupation as pre-eminently +reasonable in the moral sense. To this I say No; if and in as far as the +inference is meant to rest upon an identification of scientific with +moral reasonableness, I think it a sheer confusion. It is like saying +that because a doctor has to do with the promotion of health, therefore +it is a healthy profession to be a doctor. But Plato’s argument shows +how strongly this idea appealed to him, because he even recommends +intellectual pleasures on the score of their sheer pleasantness, implying +not only that intellectual occupation is reasonableness in the moral +sense, but that intellectual occupation, even when chosen by way of +self-indulgence, is still reasonableness in the moral sense. Of course +the matter is complicated by a substantive connection, the degree of +which is matter of opinion, between the two things, like that between +being a physician and leading a healthy life. Intellectual exercise and +ambition have a definite influence on certain capacities concerned in the +reasonable will. But it cannot be made out, that a tendency to the more +intellectual occupations is in itself a tendency to moral reasonableness. +Moral reasonableness must be a general characteristic of moral action, +not guaranteed by the special content of any form of activity. + +Next I have to discuss a principle which is advocated as an expression +of the morally reasonable, on the ground of having a sort of analogy +to several maxims or axioms of the intellectual world. It used to be +said that justice is like a square; or that the rightness of an action +consists in its conformity to certain eternal proportions impressed upon +the world by God. I take one more modern form of these principles as a +type of them all. Bentham said, “One is only to count for one,” and it is +a mere amplification of this when Mr. Sidgwick maintains, if I understand +him, that it is objectively reasonable not to prefer my own interest or +pleasure simply because it is my own, to that of some one else. This +principle seems to me a commendable expression of moral judgment, and I +do not think that it is needless or empty. There is a famous passage in +Middlemarch where the heroine, in a matter which acutely touches her own +feelings, thinks to herself, “Now how should I act if I could compel my +own pain to be silent, and merely consider what is best for the lives of +all the persons concerned in the situation?” That I suppose is a concrete +rendering of what this principle means. + +But if we look closer, we see its weak side. It is negative, and +consequently abstract. You are not to heed your own feelings unless they +are such that you would heed them if they were some one’s else in the +same circumstances. This amounts to no more than saying, “We believe +there is always, under all circumstances, a right course.” It is strictly +parallel to the theoretical principles of Uniformity or Causation. “We +believe that there is an explanation for everything; that nothing changes +without some reason.” These are useful maxims if they make us look for +the explanation, and so the other is a useful maxim, if it makes us look +for the right course. But it really falls between two stools. It is +not capable, as intellectual theorems are, of accurate development and +application by measurement and analysis. Yet on the other hand it makes +no special appeal to any special content, or tendency of reasonableness +embodied in definite ends. It is neither theoretically fertile, nor is it +a description of a practical influence. + +It is a well-known phenomenon that those who suggest maxims or moral +axioms of this kind as defining moral reasonableness are apt to be +reduced to assuming a particular impulse, told off to assist or obey +the reason. Such are Plato’s “Spirited” element in the soul, Kant’s +reverence, Mr. Sidgwick’s general desire to do what is reasonable. This +seems to me to be creating a rule which has no positive content, and +therefore has not the character of a human purpose, and then imagining an +impulse to obey it the nature of which is not accounted for in reference +to any plan of life, but must simply be propounded as an isolated fact. + +It kept suggesting itself to us above that reasonableness could not be +thoroughly explained on the basis of a distinction between means and +end, because actual ends are not simple and uniform, but are obviously +qualified by the so-called means, or context of circumstance. We agreed, +however, that what is reasonable must be so in virtue of a positive +content, whether as means or perhaps as end, and that its negative or +prohibitive aspect must arise from the conflict of two such positive +contents. + +We have in this section looked at two interpretations of moral +reasonableness apparently suggested by analogies with intellectual +reasonings or principles, and we could not deny that each of them had a +certain appearance of truth, but one seemed to confuse the content with +the form, the other to consist of a form without any content. + +3. It suggests itself therefore that moral reasonableness must be a +characteristic which we ascribe to purposes of action. Then we get a +variety of positive content, without relying on the distinction between +means and end; while the abstract principles which we feel to be +reasonable fall into their right place as very general descriptions of a +purpose or scheme of life which can be called reasonable. + +But the idea of a reasonable purpose requires explanation. + +First, it is irreconcilable with abstract Hedonism. You cannot have any +relations within a single and uniform purpose, and reason always involves +relations. + +Secondly, it is not the most intellectual purpose, the purpose that has +most to do with reasoning. I have tried to explain this above. + +Thirdly, it _is_ such a life or purpose as possesses a self-consistent +relation of the parts to the whole. This is the general characteristic of +any reasonable totality _qua_ reasonable, and it is this which forms the +general characteristic of reasonable purpose _qua_ reasonable. + +Then what is the meaning of the self-consistent relation of parts to the +whole in the case of a human scheme of life? + +We cannot demand that our specific purposes should be related consciously +to the purpose of the universe; because the universe as a whole is the +object of theoretical knowledge only, and this does not furnish us with +the idea of a concrete purpose at all. It seems then that the whole, by +consistency with which human purpose is or is not reasonable, must be the +whole of existing human purpose, taken of course as moving in a certain +direction, owing to the modification continually introduced through the +progressive realisation of purposes. I do not see that more than this can +be said without entering upon the analysis of the actual structure of the +moral world, of society and of history. What is important seems to me +to be that we cannot construct the reasonable world of morality from a +theoretical view of men in general and of nature. We have to take it as +it is, and are then perhaps able to show that it is an organised movement +in the direction of self-consistency of purpose. + +Is there not more than one kind or type of self-consistency possible, as +when self-indulgence is restricted simply within the bounds of health and +decency? This is the question whether consistency demands completeness, +i. e. whether mere omission destroys consistency. It has often been +discussed, and I suppose the general answer is that _assuming the unity +of the total moral movement_, any elements omitted in any portion of the +movement must ultimately have their revenge by producing disturbance. + +Then if we ask what after all is the relation of the theoretical reason +to the reasonable will or moral reason, the only answer seems to be +that the moral reason, in the individual or in the race, is the body of +intellectual ideas which are in fact predominant as purposes in either, +having become predominant by the power they have shown of crushing out +or adjusting to themselves the active associations of all other ideas. +And the power is what might be described as logical power; that is to say +it depends on the range and depth which enables one idea to include in +itself as in a system a great variety of minor purposes. + +The intellect as such is for morality in the first instance simply the +medium in which the moral world or content of the moral world exists; +and which therefore conveys to that content its own peculiar character +of system and totality. Then, further, in theoretical reflection on the +moral world, I imagine that we notice this predominance of ideas which +have organising power, and we frame to express this predominance such +predicates as important, right, good. And the whole of these judgments +we must call wisdom as opposed to knowledge. But I cannot myself see how +these or any judgments can be judgments of the moral reason. They seem +to me to be, as judgments, necessarily judgments of the theoretic reason +dealing with the facts of the moral world. But then there is the further +complication that these judgments themselves, forming the content of +intellectual ideas, may, if they have organising power, become actively +predominant, and then again they will form a portion of the actual moral +world as general ideas or clues, inciting to the active search for +concrete ideas which are concordant with them. In this case they are not +acting _as_ judgments, which are true and false, but only as dominant +contents. It is one thing to judge that there is a right in the moral +world, and another thing to be mastered by the right in one’s own mind. + +If I am asked, what I mean by the predominance of dominant ideas, which +I allege to form the content of the reasonable will, I start from the +position that every idea would produce action if unchecked, simply by +suggestions which through associative reproductions call up the necessary +movement. Desire may, I believe, or may not intervene, as a state of +tension between a pain of want and a pleasure produced by an idea. All +that is essential, it appears to me, is this idea which can suggest an +action. + +In the formed life of a civilised man the organising ideas have long +asserted their predominant power, and in every moment crush out countless +intruders each of which has in itself suggestions quite capable of +leading to action. In childhood or insanity the yielding to every +suggestion is a mark of what is called absence or loss of will; that +is, not the loss of a _general_ power to check minor suggestions, but of +perfectly _definite_ habitual purposes which check them as a matter of +course. + +This view sounds no doubt like an iron Determinism, and I am not much +concerned to defend it from that imputation. After all, if we are +determined by the content of our own minds, why then I suppose we +determine ourselves. And trivial examples of indifferent alternatives +such as “I can blow out this candle or not as I please” seem to me very +poor representatives of the moral will, compared with the necessary +pressure of an over-mastering idea which drives the man up to the point +of saying, “This is what must be decisive with one like me, and I have no +alternative.” We feel, as we say, that “we shall have to do it.” Almost +all really serious action, it seems to me, is of this type. And if I have +read at all correctly this lesson of the new psychology which owes its +origin largely to Herbart, it is an instructive meeting of extremes, that +the most analytic of psychologies should more than ever represent the +individual as the incarnation of a progressive order in ideas. + + B. BOSANQUET. + + + + +ETHNOLOGICAL JURISPRUDENCE.[4] + + +There is in the history of jurisprudence no more significant event than +the foundation of the historical school by Gustav Hugo and Carl von +Savigny. Jurisprudence, up to that time, was not a science, at least +not a science in the modern acceptation of the term. It was an art, +which the practical lawyer learned and employed in strict conformity +with practical traditions, without reflecting on the reasons in virtue +of which a legal norm or a social institution existed. The only part +of jurisprudence of a scientific tendency was the philosophy of law. +This latter branch had, since Hugo Grotius, emancipated itself from the +church, but it had advanced no farther than to substitute for the will +of God, to which formerly right and wrong had been traced, the principle +of human nature, and to found upon the social instincts of man a system +of natural law,—an ideal jurisprudential state by reference to which +positive laws were tested in respect of their conformity with the ideally +right and the ideally wrong. This fundamental conception of the essential +character of law was only slightly modified by the substitution of the +human reason for human nature. The rational systems of jurisprudence also +derived the state and the law from the individuality of man, especially +from the social traits of this individuality, and definite notions and +principles were thus enunciated from which state and law were deductively +constructed. + +The historical school first introduced a change in all this. It afforded +the legal practitioner the possibility of seeing that the law which he +applied was the slowly ripened product of a course of development that +extended over many centuries, and it afforded the philosophical juristic +inquirer the possibility of understanding, that the law was not founded +on immutable ideas and principles, but that it was a product of the +creative mind of a nation, that this product was subjected to processes +of transformation and development, and did not admit of regulation by +the individual reason of a single philosophical inquirer. But while the +history of law has become a universally recognised discipline in the +science of jurisprudence, the application of its underlying principles +to the philosophy of law has as yet by no means been universally carried +out. On the contrary, the reason still plays an extensive rôle as +foundation and evolutionary principle; and to a great extent the history +of law and the philosophy of law still pursue their solitary ways as +independent branches of knowledge. + +In recent times, through the influence of ethnology, jurisprudence has +entered on a new epoch. A new branch of the science of law has arisen in +Europe, the so-called ethnological jurisprudence, and has already found +in Germany, Austria, Italy, France, Belgium, and Holland, enthusiastic +supporters. Ethnology, as it is known, is the science that has for the +subject of its investigations the totality of phenomena of social life of +all the peoples of the earth, and which makes use, in this investigation, +of the methods of inductive inquiry exclusively employed by physical +and natural science. After the science of ethnology had advanced to a +certain point, the extension of ethnological inquiry to the domain of +jurisprudence followed as of course. + +To a certain extent the investigations of the history of law had prepared +the way for ethnological jurisprudence. The inductive method was common +to both. The idea of a history of the development of law was no longer +strange to jurisprudence. Only the courage was wanting to allow the eye +to range over the legal systems of all the peoples of the globe, instead +of, as before, restricting it to very narrow limits. The historical +investigation of law began in Europe with the history of the Roman law. +Thereupon it was immediately extended to the Germanic laws of Europe, so +that now all West-European peoples possess a highly developed history of +law of their own. Recently, also, the history of Slavonic law has been +assiduously treated. + +Whereas in every case here it was a question of the sources of the +laws that stood in immediate historical connection with the prevailing +systems of Europe, jurisprudential investigation was slowly extended to +more remote ethnical fields. The first impulse in this direction came +from comparative philology. This science had succeeded in tracing the +languages of extended groups of peoples back to common primitive tongues. +Among these primitive tongues the Aryan, the common original language +of the Indo-Germanic group of nations, first occupied the attention of +inquirers, and the law of this group of nations thus became the first +object of investigation of a comparative jurisprudence extending beyond +the more restricted provinces of the history of law. The provinces of +Græco-Italic, Germanic, Slavic, Celtic, Iranic, and Indian law were +investigated with respect to a common origin, and various agreements and +various deviations were discovered. In very recent times the laws of the +Armenians and the Ossetes in the Caucasus have been added to the laws of +the Aryans, and the laws of the Afghans will probably soon follow these. + +A number of more remote provinces of law have also been entered upon, in +connection with theological, philological, and connate inquiries. Thus, +particularly, in connection with biblical investigation the Israelitic +law, in connection with the study of Arabic the Islamitic, in connection +with the decipherment of the hieroglyphic writings the Old-Egyptian, +in connection with the decipherment of the cuneiform inscriptions the +Soumerian and the Assyrian-Babylonian, and in connection with sinology +the law of China. In very recent times the Japanese law has also been +treated. + +In the laws of all these peoples, by the side of many peculiarities, were +also found many phenomena of frequent and universal recurrence. + +After the science of law had so far extended its activity in this +direction, it was a final step only that ethnological jurisprudence +took when it declared that the subject of juristic science was the +investigation of the laws of _all_ the peoples of the earth. And yet +this step was perhaps a more important one than all that had hitherto +been taken. For a considerable group of peoples had up to then been +entirely neglected by the science of law, namely the uncivilised +peoples, the so-called primitive peoples or _Naturvölker_. And just the +laws of these savages furnished the most remarkable disclosures. They +exhibited everywhere the most singular parallel phenomena, and made it +possible to open up a complete early history of the law, and to bring +to light periods of jural development of which the history of civilised +peoples has preserved but a few unintelligible remains. Ethnological +jurisprudence is thus able to supply complementary information at a point +where the threads of the history of law are lost in the obscurity of +early times. + +The condition of jural life in these primitive periods is very singular. +No juristic philosopher has ever lighted on the idea that primitive man +could exist with such jural conceptions as he actually does. That which +ethnological jurisprudence has brought to light in this connection is +something absolutely new and astonishing, something that no brooding +brain could have ever developed out of any idea or principle. Indeed, it +is so strange that it could not be conceived at all if we did not have it +before our eyes to-day among savage tribes. + +The collecting of the laws of uncivilised peoples constitutes an +independent task of ethnological jurisprudence. In this way the latter +science will fill up the gaps which historical jurisprudential inquiry +left open in our knowledge of the jural life of man. But more important +than all, perhaps, will ethnological jurisprudence become for the future +development of the philosophy of law. In this connection it goes hand in +hand with the sociological tendency which dominates our time and has its +surest foundation in ethnology. + +The prime significance of ethnological jurisprudence lies in the fact +that it is an ethnological science. + +At first ethnology was a purely empirical science. It gathered together +all the attainable phenomena of ethnic existence, and separately, at +first, among single peoples and tribes. After an extensive store of +material had accumulated in this manner, the discovery was made that +in many provinces of ethno-social life, especially in the provinces of +religion, law, and morals, especially also in all provinces of social +custom, phenomena of essentially similar character presented themselves +among a great number of peoples in the case of whom neither any original +tribal relationship nor any infusion from one nation into the other could +be assumed; and, curious to say, these were frequently the most singular +phenomena, of which one would have thought at first that they had sprung +from the individuality of a determinate people. This discovery of +universal ethnographic parallels was all the more surprising in view of +the fact that historical special inquiry, whose province up to then had +been essentially national life, had placed especial emphasis on outwardly +prominent events occurring in a different form in every nation, whereas +phenomena that appeared uniformly among the different nations were little +noticed. People had therefore grown accustomed to regard every nation as +something existing by itself and peculiar to itself, and, particularly, +had also declared it as inadmissible to employ phenomena of the life of +one nation to explain corresponding phenomena of the life of another +nation. + +The discovery of ethnographical parallels led to wholly different ideas. +It became clear that a great portion of human ethnical existence was +not founded in the peculiar character of particular peoples, but in the +character of the human race, in the universal nature of man. And it +became in addition clear that that which repeated itself everywhere on +the earth, which was therefore an expression of the universal human, was +something entirely different from that which previous philosophy had +declared to be the actual human. It also became clear, at the same time, +that the nations thought quite differently from what the individual man +did. With this, however, the foundation of the entire previous philosophy +was shaken. If the axiom of modern ethnology is correct, namely that it +is not _we_ that think, but _it_ that _thinks in us_,[5] we shall no +longer be able to explain our nature from our consciousness, from our +ego, from our reason, but we shall have to pursue this momentous “It” +that thinks in us, and since we cannot find it _in_ us we shall have to +search for it _outside of_ us in the expressions of the human soul in the +life of the race. + +This is the fundamental idea of modern ethnology. It seeks to collect all +the expressions of the human soul in the life of the species, and from +them to derive its inferences as to the nature of man. It regards ethnic +existence as the precipitate of human psychical existence, and not merely +of that part of it which is conscious, but also of that part of it which +is unconscious, that which is inaccessible to introspective observation, +that which is not thought, but is merely lived. It enlarges accordingly +the domain of psychology, which was restricted hitherto to the analysis +of the human consciousness, by the incorporation of an additional domain +unmeasured in extent. + +These general conceptions of ethnology are also determinative for +the science of ethnological jurisprudence, and from this results its +peculiarity as contrasted with the other branches of juristic knowledge. + +Ethnological jurisprudence places the centre of gravity of the science +of law not like the previous juristic philosophy in the individual jural +consciousness, but in the law viewed as a province of ethnic existence. +It regards the laws of the nations as the precipitates of that which +is now active and has been active as jural instinct in the entire +human race. It assumes that when all the phenomena of law in the life +of the nations have been fixed, an infinitely more valuable material +will be drawn therefrom adapted to the disclosure of the nature of law +than could have ever in the world been acquired by an analysis of the +individual jural consciousness. It does not regard the individual jural +consciousness as something innate in man and exempt from the altering +effects of time, but as a product of the social conditions in which the +individual has grown up. It assumes, therefore, that the individual jural +consciousness changes with a change of the social conditions, so that a +man who grows up under different social conditions possesses a different +jural perception. This assumption, if we compare the expressions of the +jural consciousness of races low in the scale of culture with those of +civilised peoples, is one that cannot be escaped. We have only to recall +to mind the irresistible force with which the jural sense of peoples +that live under clan-constitutions demand vengeance of blood, whereas +this species of retaliation no longer exists in our jural consciousness +of to-day. Thus there are hundreds and thousands of jural instincts and +conceptions which are present at certain stages of civilisation and +disappear entirely at others. + +Ethnological jurisprudence therefore assumes, that the juristic +philosopher who lays at the foundation of his system essentially his own +jural consciousness, simply enunciates therewith a system of law that +answers perhaps to the current conceptions of his time and his people, +but which can in no sense lay claim to a value beyond that. + +Quite different, on the other hand, are matters conditioned when the +inquirer has before him the laws of all the peoples of the earth from the +lowest to the highest. Here he has in his possession a picture of the +jural consciousness of the mind of humanity, which is no longer subject +to alteration, but which, to the extent that the development of human +jural life has advanced, is complete. + +For the execution of its task ethnological jurisprudence first requires +a collection of the laws of all the peoples of the earth. Each one of +these laws is of equal value to ethnological jurisprudence in so far +as the jural consciousness of humanity has found expression in it in +any form. Especially deserving of consideration are the laws of the +so-called savage peoples that have been so much neglected and contemned +hitherto; since they bring to light the jural consciousness of humanity +in its germinal stages, and since higher formations are invariably best +understood when we know their first beginnings. + +The solidest basis for ethnological jurisprudence would be furnished by +a monographic treatment of the law of every single tribe and people of +the earth. By such monographic treatments the entire social organisation +of a given tribe or people would be exhibited in all its complicated +reciprocal relations, and we should be able to follow the law in all the +thousands of minute ramifications that connect it with the remaining +provinces of national life. But such a monographic treatment of the law +of all the nations of the earth is accompanied with great difficulties, +and this part of the task of the science of law has as yet been +undertaken only to a limited extent. + +The condition of affairs is best in this respect where the nations +themselves have collected and compiled their legal customs in books of +laws. But such collections are found only among peoples that deserve +to some extent the appellation of civilised peoples. Among the great +majority of peoples the law is simply practised and handed down by oral +tradition, so that here the legal customs must be collected by members +of foreign civilised nations,—a very difficult labor and one that can be +accomplished only by persons who take up their abode permanently among +the races in question and become thoroughly familiar with their language +and habits of life. + +Collections of this character we possess unfortunately only to a very +limited extent, and our knowledge accordingly of the law of uncivilised +peoples is still very meagre. Even the books of law possessed by the +various peoples have not all been made available to juristic science. +In part they have not yet been printed, and in part they have not yet +been translated into a generally understood language. Considerable time +will yet be required before the existing material has been made wholly +accessible. + +Not before the legal customs of all the peoples of the earth have been +collected will ethnological jurisprudence be in a position to furnish a +successful solution of the task it has set itself,—the task namely of a +causal analysis of all the phenomena of the jural life of the human race. +Yet to a certain extent this task may be undertaken at present, even with +a relatively limited store of material. + +The starting-point for the ethno-juristic investigation of the phenomena +of jural life is furnished by the ethno-juristic parallels, legal customs +that are found uniformly appearing among the nations, without there being +any reason to assume that one nation has received them from another. +Legal customs of this character are in part so universally diffused +over the earth that they may be characterised as a common possession of +mankind; in part they appear sporadically among unrelated peoples; in +part they are restricted to more limited domains. The most important +legal customs are those that have universal dissemination; for here it +may be assumed that they are a necessary emanation of the social side +of human life. Legal customs that occur only sporadically, but appear +uniformly among unrelated peoples, must likewise be regarded as the +products of the universal nature of man, yet only as such that _can_ +arise under definite conditions of existence. Legal customs that occur +only in limited ethnological domains will have to be referred to the +peculiar character of definite peoples and tribes. Legal institutions of +universal character are, for example, the forms of marriage by capture +and purchase of the bride, blood-vengeance, the right of refuge, the +systems of composition, ordeals, oaths, and so forth. Almost universal +are the levirate, and the betrothal of children. Sporadically among +unrelated peoples appear: the seizure of the corpse of the debtor for +debt; execution by fasting, whereby the creditor brings pressure to bear +upon his debtor by having him fast a definite period of time before his +dwelling; the custom of the chief doing combat with his grown up son, +to whom the command of the tribe passes if he conquers his father; and +so forth.[6] Frequently it is the most curious customs that thus recur, +among peoples that are completely separated from each other by oceans +and inaccessible mountain ranges and have unquestionably never been in +communication with each other. + +The explanation of these ethno-juristic parallel phenomena is in part +not very difficult, inasmuch as many of them can be traced back to +fixed forms of social organisation. Thus, for example, a whole group +of universally recurring legal customs is associated with the peculiar +formation of the clan-constitutions and clan-law which regularly appears +among uncivilised peoples and characteristically differs from the form of +political organisation familiar to the present age. Many legal customs +are also based on religious conceptions and social customs, and their +explication in such cases is frequently very difficult. + +A complete explanation of all the legal customs of all the peoples of +the earth with respect to their social causes would exhaust the work of +ethnological jurisprudence as an ethnological discipline. But in the +same way that the acquisitions of ethnology are in their turn utilisable +towards the constitution of a universal philosophy, to which they will +impart perhaps an entirely different character, so will the results +of ethnological jurisprudence be in their turn utilisable towards the +constitution of a universal science of law and for the philosophy of +law, in which probably, through its means also, a powerful change will +be inaugurated. These are the ideas, traced in their most general +characters, that may be regarded as the fundamental ones in “ethnological +jurisprudence.” + + ALBERT HERMANN POST. + + +FOOTNOTES: + +[4] Translated from the manuscript of Dr. Albert Hermann Post by Thomas +J. McCormack. + +[5] Bastian. + +[6] The reader will find a brief survey of the ethno-juristic parallels +appearing among the various peoples of the earth, in a treatise of mine +entitled _Ueber die Aufgaben einer allgemeinen Rechtswissenschaft_ +(1891), pp. 27 to 72. + + + + +AMERICAN POLITICS. + + +Nothing in this country appears to the stranger more intricate and +inexplicable than our politics. The different parties, two big ones and +several little ones, the various machines, county, state, and national, +the “bosses,” “heelers,” and “workers” present such a confusion of ideas +and a terminology so varied, that it is only after many years that +the foreigner begins to comprehend our system of government and the +principles underlying our political movements. Indeed, the majority of +Americans themselves are no better off and have no clear perception of +the part they are playing in the administration of affairs or the ethical +effects of the ballot which they cast. Ask the ordinary voter why he +supports the candidates of a certain party and you will find that his +reasons are reducible to a few concrete facts, and are rarely governed by +any general principles. + +In the Southern states the vast majority of the whites are democrats +through opposition to the republican party which fought the war and +deprived them of their slaves. The negroes on the other hand are +republicans because it is to that party they owe their freedom, and +from it they expect protection for themselves in the exercise of their +political rights and the blessings of opportunity for education. The +political question there becomes a race question, utterly regardless +of the principles which the two great parties represent. Let there be +a complete change of platforms and the result would be precisely the +same as it has been for the past generation—the South would still remain +democratic, and the votes of their presidential electors would still be +cast for the candidates of that party. + +There is a minor race question in the feeling against foreigners, more +especially Irish, Italians, and Germans, influenced to some extent by +the fact that a large number of these foreigners are Roman Catholics and +that there is an uneasy suspicion on the part of some Americans that the +Catholic church is hostile to the spirit of democracy, a suspicion not +entirely unfounded if one should judge solely by the sayings and doings +of some of the prelates of that church for the past forty years. This +“Know-nothing” sentiment at one time threatened to create a solid foreign +vote in opposition. Germans and Irish united under the protecting wings +of Tammany Hall and, aided by clergymen who hoped to obtain part of the +state educational fund for their private parochial schools, formed a +strong ally to the national democratic party. Happily prejudices of race +and religion are dying out and neither party can now claim a monopoly +of the foreign vote. Strange as it may seem, however, the Irish and +German elements, so recently the objects of proscription themselves, +have in late years become embittered against the Chinese. To the patient +industry of the Mongolian immigrants is due the building of the Pacific +railroads, when it would have been impossible to obtain white labor, and +the cultivation and development of the Pacific coast states. Congress was +terrorised into passing the law excluding all Chinese laborers. It was +more than race prejudice which contributed to this hatred of the Chinese. +The chief reason for Chinese exclusion was an economic one. Great masses +of laborers feared that the Chinese by immigrating in vast numbers would +deprive them of work by taking their places at lower wages, and, having +the ballot, they dictated to Congress the terms of the Anti-Chinese Act. + +The alien contract labor law is a measure conceived in the same +spirit and directed against the hiring of laborers abroad by American +contractors, who could thus displace their employés at lower wages by +Hungarians, or Poles, or Russians, ignorant of the language of this +country and whose compensation could be the more easily reduced to a +bare maintenance, and who in sickness or old age could be turned out on +the roads to die without costing the contractor any contraction of his +bank account. There was some excuse for this law, or at least for the +feeling which prompted it, when the miners of a whole section could be +evicted and they and their families made to suffer the pangs of slow +starvation because the owners of the coal lands found they could obtain +human machines at a less cost from abroad. It was natural that the +laborers should demand a law which offered some immediate relief even +at the risk of meeting wrong with wrong, rather than that they should +attempt to regulate affairs on abstract principles of justice while their +stomachs were empty and their wives and children were dying for want of +sufficient nourishment. That feeling, however, is also vanishing and +American workingmen are beginning to see that the increase in population, +native-born as well as that imported by contract, is steadily adding to +the number of competitors and lowering the rate of wages. Their attention +is becoming more and more directed to the opening of new opportunities +for work rather than to the restricting of the number of workers. + +Another class of men, if they vote at all, do so on no general principle +of public welfare, but solely for their own advantage at the expense of +their fellow men. These are to be found among the rich manufacturers, the +coal, and iron, and railway kings, and the manipulators of the crops of +the nation. Rarely casting a ballot in person, they give notice to their +thousands of employés that if the latter do not support the candidates +or the party which they happen to favor, the employés’ places will be +given to more pliant servants. These men are as non-partisan as the most +ardent reformer could wish. One of them, a few years ago when questioned +by an investigating committee of the New York state legislature, said: +“In a republican district I was a strong republican; in a democratic +district I was democratic; and in doubtful districts I was doubtful, but +in politics I was an Erie railroad man every time.” Another famous man +of the same type said he had no politics; that he found it cheaper to +buy up one set of legislators after they were elected than to purchase +two sets of candidates before election. These corrupt men, counting +their wealth by tens of millions, influencing state legislatures and the +national Congress, and throwing their weight into Presidential campaigns, +constitute the chief “dangerous class” in the United States to-day, +far more threatening to the permanency of free institutions than the +anarchists who were hanged at Chicago. + +Then there are the illy-paid employés of these men who do their bidding +at the polls, voting for the candidates of their masters. Promise of +office or patronage lures others into the support of one party or the +other. Lastly come the poorest of the poor who live in the most miserable +tenement houses, or when single hive in the big lodging-houses which +are found chiefly in New York and Chicago. A ton of coal or a barrel of +flour is the bribe to the former, frequently effected through the medium +of the poor wretch’s wife who does not care for politics but sees a very +material advantage in the food or fuel offered by the ward worker. The +lodging-house voters, paid by drinks of whiskey or dollar bills, until +recently in New York were marshalled in squads of twenty or thirty early +on the morning of election day, given their ballots and compelled to hold +them aloft between the thumb and forefinger of the right hand so that +the heeler or paid servant of some political faction might watch them +from the moment they took their place in the line of voters until their +ballots were handed to the election inspectors and dropped in the box. +Both parties wink at such frauds and their henchmen directly countenance +and assist in them but the party that happens to be in the majority in +any locality is usually the one most guilty. The result is that the +minority affects great virtue and loudly denounces the corruption of its +opponents. + +Among those who do vote on principle are the prohibitionists, the +greenbackers, the adherents of ephemeral labor parties and the +socialists. The anarchists generally refrain from voting because they +do not believe in any government by force and say that an enlightened +public opinion will lead the people to dispense with such things as the +army and navy and police and law courts. The socialists occasionally +vote for the men of other parties whom they think represent the worst +measures, in order the sooner, as they frankly avow, to produce +revolutionary conditions, which they expect would assist them greatly +in their propaganda. The prohibitionists, greenbackers, and labor men +each take a partial view of political economy. The first see the evils +and degradation arising from intemperance and think that everything +else must yield to the one consideration of the abolition of the liquor +traffic. The panacea of the greenbackers consists in the destruction of +the monopoly of the currency now enjoyed by the national banks. The labor +men have different shibboleths at different times such as the prevention +of child labor in factories, an eight-hour work-day and the like—measures +which might effect some relief but are minor matters compared with the +great social problem of the increase of poverty in the midst of the +greatest productive energies which the world has ever seen, a problem +which is rapidly coming to the front and overshadowing all others. + +But these minor movements hardly produce a ripple on the surface of our +political waters. There are only two parties worthy of the name in the +United States to-day, as there have been but two ever since the days of +Thomas Jefferson and Alexander Hamilton. These parties go on forming +platforms chiefly on the theory of offending the least number of voters +and phrasing their declarations in vague terms which may be explained one +way in one part of the country and another way in another part. Such is a +cursory view of the field of American politics to-day. + +It may seem that I have made out a pretty bad indictment of corruption +against our politics and that the view of the cynic is correct that +American politics are desperately wicked and there is no health in them. +But the moral forces which are operating in the world are fortunately +not dependent upon the changeable methods or the selfish objects of +men. It is here in America, perhaps more than anywhere else, that the +natural laws of social development have fullest play. It is here that +the evolution of politics is working itself out freely, untrammelled by +tradition or custom. It is here that the ultimate ideal of politics will +first be reached. When the framers of the Declaration of Independence +formulated their proposition that governments derive their just powers +from the consent of the governed, a step in the right direction was +taken—a step that was in accordance with our old Saxon traditions, yet +for the first time in the world’s history made on an extended scale, to +base human government on the principles of natural law. And through all +the vicissitudes of our country, its struggle for independence, its +war for the liberation of its commerce, its civil conflict which would +have dismembered any other nation, or would have left one section the +subjugated serfs of the other, through a disputed presidential election +which strained the written constitution to its utmost, the great moral +force of natural law has been working, now through one party, now through +another, gathering impetus as it goes and giving promise always of better +times to come. + +It is in this broad view that all the petty thieveries and striving for +place and power sink into utter insignificance. The people do still rule. +They may sleep for a time but are sure, sooner or later, to assert their +rights in accordance with the instincts of the human mind, which are +good and not bad. As long as the suffrage shall exist it is reasonably +certain that this American government, “of the people, by the people, for +the people,” shall not perish from the earth. If the wealthy monopolists +could control the suffrage, the prospects might be different. The freedom +of the voter has been impaired to a certain extent but the American +people with quick instincts have awakened to the danger. The Australian +system of voting, which secures secrecy and freedom from intimidation and +almost extinguishes bribery is now becoming very popular. Fifteen of the +states have adopted it and the other twenty-nine will, no doubt, follow +their example in a few years. But the introduction of measures for its +establishment presented the curious anomaly of being opposed by democrats +in some localities and by republicans in others, both for partisan +reasons, constitutional and high moral pretexts being of course advanced. +When it becomes the general law, it will do more than anything else to +purify electoral methods. + +Entirely above the question of methods, however, there are certain +principles involved in American politics which it becomes of the highest +importance to comprehend and which furnish the key to the apparently +inexplicable confusion. These principles, it seems to me, are reducible +to two, which may be likened to the centripetal and centrifugal forces in +nature. As both are needed for the stability of the physical universe, +so both the centralising and decentralising tendencies in politics are +necessary for the co-ordination of the state. It is in the free play +of these forces, each in its proper sphere, that lies the assurance of +the perpetuity of American institutions. But as the ideal has not yet +been reached, the practical result is that one tendency begins to act, +at first legitimately, then from the aggrandisement of power and the +“cohesive force of public plunder” the administrators of government +attempt to stretch it unduly, the opposition comes to power and the +same story is repeated. In each case the liberal party succeeds the +conservative, acts at first wisely, then corrupted by the subtle +temptations of place and power, and wishing to retain both, it becomes +opposed to change and begets a new conservatism, while new liberals arise +on a higher plane of evolution to continue the never-ending struggle. And +it must be recollected that the conservative party of each generation is +far more liberal than the one which it displaced, thus giving assurance +of perpetual progress. + +This has been the epitome of all American history; each party +government, by whatever name it may have been known, has been liberal in +comparison with its predecessor and conservative as to its successor. +When Washington organised his administration it was no doubt regarded +in Europe as highly revolutionary and anarchistic. But such a class +government, with laws of entail and slavery, and cruel punishments for +petty offences, as existed then, would not be tolerated for a single year +at the present time. Thomas Jefferson who founded the democratic party, +then called the republican, was a consistent opponent of aristocracy +and personally was a man far in advance of his time, but most of his +followers would be horrified if they should now come back to earth and +see the powers possessed by the general government to-day, necessary, +legitimate powers, without which the affairs of the nation could not be +administered for a single week. The United States soon got rid of laws +of entail and the established churches. The democracy came to power and +held it nearly sixty years. Long continuance in office endeared its +possession to that party while the very growth of the nation, from five +millions to thirty-one millions, demanded changes in internal policy +which were not forthcoming. There were not lacking signs of popular +discontent. In 1840 the democrats met their first defeat, and for three +or four presidential terms the votes vibrated between the democrats and +the whigs. But the latter were not united on a consistent policy. They +needed a principle. The principle was shaping itself. Slavery, which had +been abolished in the Northern states, was gradually strengthening in +the South. The democrats forgot, or rather most of them never learned, +that true democracy knows no distinction of color. The abolitionists +were denounced by press and pulpit as socialists, as the disturbers of +public order, as blasphemers against the very law of God contained in +Holy Writ. The people, however, returned to power these same socialists +and the institution of chattel slavery was doomed. That would have been +the case in any event, but the civil war precipitated it, just as many +other unjust wars in history have resulted in disestablishing the very +institutions to perpetuate which the wars were made. + +The republican party grandly and patriotically fulfilled its mission. By +degrees, however, the enormous destruction of wealth during the war and +the heavy debt entailed by it, created a burdensome system of taxation +which substituted self-interest for patriotism. Duties were laid upon +imports from abroad heavier than those which formed one of the chief +causes for the revolt of the colonies against Great Britain. These duties +enabled American manufacturers to make on American soil the same class +of goods that were imported and charge the same price as the imported +goods enhanced by the duty, of course pocketing for themselves the extra +profit which the tariff aided them to obtain from consumers. The quickest +way to wealth was to start some manufacture, get the government to put a +tax on similar articles imported and pocket the difference, or to get an +internal revenue measure passed taxing a certain line of domestic goods, +pay the tax in the first instance and then charge it to the consumers +with of course a good commission added for patriotic services. As long as +the government had work for every man who could shoulder a musket, the +pernicious effect of the system was not clearly seen. But when the war +was over and one million men returned to productive avocations, wages +began to fall. Then the question of taxation inevitably came to the +front and has now become the living issue of the hour. The needle of the +suffrage is again vibrating, the republican party has been deprived of +power for four years and the democratic President emphasised the issue by +pushing the question of tariff reform to the foreground. His re-election +was defeated, but the question is debated with more vigor than ever, and +all signs point to absolute free trade as one of the certainties of the +future. Judging from the last Congressional elections, the people have at +last turned their faces in the right direction. + +It will be noticed that two elements, which I have called the centripetal +and the centrifugal, have been predominant in shaping American politics. +They may be termed the socialistic and the anarchistic forces. Socialism +claims the direction of everything by a strong centralised government. +Anarchists say with the democrats, “That government is best which governs +least,” and logically argue for the abolition of all government. Now, +the right or wrong of these principles depends upon their application. +Only the most rabid anarchist would object to the Post Office, for +instance, and few socialists would claim that the state has a right to +regulate a man’s clothing or his religion. It is on the question as to +what subjects these principles should be applied that all our American +parties arise. The early federalists were socialistic in that they +believed in a strong central government and in relegating as few things +as possible to the states. President Jefferson introduced the anarchistic +or centrifugal principle of decentralisation and individualism. But as +the nation grew, it was seen that this wrought injustice, especially in +the matter of slavery which was a violation of human rights, however the +different states might regard it. Then the socialistic or centripetal +principle began to act and slavery disappeared. Now it seems likely +that the individualistic principle will again become dominant in an +attempt to abolish all fiscal restrictions upon trade. After this may +follow the socialistic principle of state ownership of railways and +telegraphs. Perhaps this will be the work of the new political forces +evidently gathering, as foreshadowed by the Farmers’ Alliance, after the +breaking-up of parties and after the democrats, having given us free +trade, will have resumed their natural position of conservatives. Then, +in the remoter future, may come the anarchistic principle of the removal +of the restrictions against female suffrage. And so it will go on, first +one principle acting and fulfilling its mission, then the other, each +bringing the nation to a higher plane of progress and uniting it more and +more closely with the grand upward march of the human race. + +What is this, after all? It is not socialism. It is not anarchy. It is +neither democracy nor republicanism. It is EVOLUTION. It does not depend +on the temporary success of party governments for its action. It does not +even solely result from our unique position or our independence wrested +from Great Britain. Back of it lie the broad principles of British +liberty, of common law, of Magna Charta won from King John on the plains +of Runnymede. Back of it is the great wave of democracy arising out of +the darkness of the Middle Ages. Back of it are the injunctions of Him +of Galilee who taught the natural law as no man ever taught before. Back +of it is Roman jurisprudence and Greek art and culture and the early +efforts of the days when Cadmus brought the alphabet to Europe with his +Phœnician colony. Indeed, back of it lies the primeval impulse of the +first man, God-endowed, ape-descended, who stood upon his feet and began +to think. We may carry our thoughts still further to the times when the +red sunlight first filtered through the thick clouds upon an uninhabited +world, and still further may we go in thought into the ages of eternity, +and assert with fullest confidence that the principles of progress to-day +working themselves out in politics are but the reflection of the divine +ideals founded in the laws of nature. + +Can the course of such progress be turned back? Can we despair of the +future in the light of all the past? Is not the general movement onward +and upward? Will not the sneers at ephemeral phases of our American +politics pass away with the incidents which they justly condemn, while +the principles of progress remain forever? + + THOMAS B. PRESTON. + + + + +ARTIFICIAL SELECTION AND THE MARRIAGE PROBLEM.[7] + + +By artificial selection I mean all conscious and purposive arrangements +between men and women which have in view character of offspring. This is +opposed to natural selection which is merely instinctive unteleological +union with one of the opposite sex as impelled by animal passion or +romantic love. All sexual union among the lower animals is by natural +selection; they do not forecast consequences, and by conforming to +known laws determine consequences. Among the lower races of men natural +selection is the sole or at least dominant factor in marital matters, +but as civilisation advances artificial selection becomes a more and +more powerful element. A truly thoughtful and intelligent man in our +day in view of marriage will most carefully consider his own life +history and that of his parents and ancestors, and also that of his +intended partner and her ancestors, as to physical or mental disease, +which might be handed down to the issue of the proposed union. He +would not, for instance, marry into a family which has a tendency to +consumption or insanity, for this would be a crime against his possible +descendants. Further, this growth of artificial selection with the +progress of society is manifest not only as regards individual action but +by state regulation. Even in barbarous states it soon becomes evident +to the leaders that if strong healthy men are to be had to defend and +maintain the nation, strict attention must be paid to the character of +those who marry. In Sparta and other ancient states this principle was +recognised, and modern governments seek in many more or less indirect +ways to encourage marriage between the most fit, so that good citizens +and warriors may be raised up to serve the state. All this regulation +of marriage by either individual or state action which looks to the +character of offspring I term artificial selection. + +In the evolution of man as a rational animal artificial selection will +more and more prevail, and human breeding will become a well defined +art. Man is always artificial,[8] and it is his goal to become in all +his life unnatural and thoroughly artful. There can ultimately be no +_laissez-faire_ policy as to marriage or any other institution. The +history of marriage is the history of the gradual retirement of natural +selection; but art has come in here more slowly than in other relations +of life owing to tremendous conservatism and the power of human passion. +But the time has now come when man must more than ever before attend by +artificial selection—that is, purposed care—to the perpetuation of the +species in the line of its true advancement, spiritual achievement. I do +not now see how the necessity of artificial selection can be gainsaid by +any one who takes a broad view of the evolution of the race. + +The methods of artificial selection are either negative, which restrain +the unfit from propagating, or positive, which encourage the fit to +propagate. The most radical negative method is mutilation, and is +employed by man with the lower animals and with slaves, but this +plan could hardly be used by civilised society for human breeding. +Imprisonment temporarily restrains some classes of society from +perpetuating themselves. Prevention of conception is at present mostly +a voluntary means, but accomplishes the elimination of both fit and +unfit. Celibacy of monk and nun, of bachelor and maid, works also in both +directions. In many indirect ways society discourages from marriage those +whom it supposes to be unfit as tested by wealth, rank, or birth. + +It is not, however, so much by the extension of any negative methods, but +rather by positive means that artificial selection may be best employed. +I will mention three forms by which human breeding might be materially +advanced. + +By common law and custom the wife surrenders herself physically to submit +and morally to obey the husband. This is not for the most part harshly +and literally carried out in civilised countries; still there is a vast +deal of oppression which is hidden from all eyes, and which is often +passively received by women as her rightful lot. This again is a subject +upon which delicacy—perhaps unwise—forbids free discussion, but its +bearing is manifest. If women have the choice to bear or not to bear, and +she with educated conscience choose by fitness of offspring, a large and +powerful element of artificial selection may be introduced. Again all +governments have laws concerning marriage which act in general toward +encouraging the fit. Certain conditions as to age, etc., being fulfilled, +the state grants a marriage licence, and public opinion might easily be +led to make the requirements more stringent. As a physician has suggested +to me a certificate of health from an approved medical examiner might +be required of all applicants for legal marriage. This would certainly +be a strong measure of artificial selection, and would save much misery +springing from ignorance and vice. It surely seems scarcely fitting that +those who cannot pass an examination for life insurance freely contract +marriage with view to issue. + +But the plan of artificial selection which seems to me most feasible at +the present time would be voluntary associations of men and women who +bind themselves to learn and apply the laws of heredity in their marriage +relations, to seek for expert guidance, and in all their life to live not +merely purely, but according to reason and science. Heredity societies +of this stamp which should favor marriages only between members would +ultimately become a rational aristocracy, and true and good blood would +be perpetuated in the best manner. There is much, indeed, to be done in +the science of heredity, especially as regards laws of transmission of +mental and moral qualities,[9] but still we have even now a sufficient +basis of knowledge to make the experiment well worth trying. + +Many objections can be raised to such schemes. For instance, it will +be said that they might assure us of obtaining men of talent, but we +should forever lose men of genius. If such societies were in, vogue in +the Elizabethan period, we might never have had a Shakespeare. What +likelihood that a scientific expert would advise the marriage of John +Shakespeare and Mary Arden! I answer that we should have had a dozen +Shakespeares instead of one. The law of the production of geniuses is +not beyond human ken. Maud S. is truly a genius in horseflesh, but +she came into the world in no fortuitous or instinctive way, but by +scientific breeding. The applicability of similar foresight in breeding +men would produce geniuses in abundance. It may not be accomplished in an +exactly analogous manner, an expert leading around eminent men to “make +the season,” but the analogous practical results will nevertheless be +obtained. + +Another objection which might be urged is that any such scheme would +seriously diminish population. True; but what thoughtful man applies +the numerical test to the progress of the race! It is not quantity of +citizens but quality, which constitutes the true greatness of states. The +counting of heads instead of what is in heads, is a mistake into which +democracies are peculiarly apt to fall. Were all men exactly equal a +census would be a true test, but considering the tremendous inequalities +in humanity it is sheer folly for a country to glory in the number of its +adherents, or a sect in the number of its adherents, or a city in the +number of its citizens. Civilisations are weighed down and ultimately +crushed by the dead weight of the masses. The barbarian is not without +but within the civilisation. By recent inquiries in New York and Chicago +the slums appear to be five times as prolific as the most aristocratic +portions; and while good may come from the lowest born, and bad from the +highest born, still the chances are decidedly in favor of the high born. +A few rise above the level of their birth, a few sink below it, but the +great majority of men remain for their lives on the general level of +society in which they were born. The United States would be a greater +nation with 10,000,000 choice inhabitants than with ten times 10,000,000 +of the ill bred and low bred. Athens by the vulgar test of numbers was +but a small and mean city, but in true greatness as revealed in far +reaching spiritual power, she stands in the very forefront. + +Again it will be objected that scientific schemes for human breeding +would inevitably destroy that beautiful flower of Christian civilisation, +the poetry and romance of love. Sentiment and chivalry would wither, and +brutality and cold calculation would supplant all tender and refined +emotion. I should answer that the true refinement which refuses to +obtrude the things of sense, and true purity which refuses to dwell on +them salaciously, are perfectly compatible with the fullest knowledge +and the consequent action. Lubricity breeds best upon a half knowledge +acquired in dubious ways. A serious practical scientific treatment of +this subject will not glorify the flesh with the fierce gusto of Walt +Whitman, nor, with the Zola school, dwell upon animalism with the morbid +detail of a heated imagination; but it will bring into the clearest light +the laws of sex and the rules for the development of the human race into +the perfect man. These laws of nature, which science reveals, are laws of +duty and laws of God, and when once appropriated as such by Ethics and +Religion, they will become the basis for all that is high in emotion and +chivalrous in action. + +In that most vital of matters, human breeding, man is far behind his +progress in all other spheres of action; but here as elsewhere Science +must enter, not to destroy but to fulfil, to build up manhood and +womanhood into the perfected relations which can only come from rational +action, illuminated by complete knowledge, and sanctioned by noblest +sentiment. + + HIRAM M. STANLEY. + + +FOOTNOTES: + +[7] In an article in _The Arena_ for June, 1890, I endeavored to plainly +set forth the renewal of society from its lowest elements as the +greatest disease in our social life, and to show that the remedy lies +in a thorough application of science to human breeding. Just how this +application was to be made I did not state, for I did not include this +in the scope of my discussion. Mr. Stead in his _Review of Reviews_ for +July, 1890, and Mr. Wallace in the September _Fortnightly Review_ and +October _Popular Science Monthly_, 1890, have drawn inferences on this +point which I am not prepared to allow. Mr. Stead speaks in headlines and +in text of “murder, mutilation, or imprisonment” as the methods which I +hint at, and Mr. Wallace remarks upon my views “that such interference +with personal freedom in matters so deeply affecting individual happiness +will never be adopted by the majority of any nation, or if adopted would +never be submitted to by the minority without a life-and-death struggle.” +It seems incumbent then on me to state more clearly what I understand +by artificial selection, and what forms of it are most expedient at the +present time. + +[8] By artificial I understand not what is unnatural or against nature +but that which is after conscious deliberation more in accord with the +laws of nature. It is a higher degree of the natural. + +[9] See my remarks on this point in _Nature_, Oct. 31, 1889. + + + + +THOUGHT AND LANGUAGE. + + +I have read with interest Prof. Max Müller’s paper on the above subject +in the current issue of _The Monist_, not only because it is in large +part devoted to a consideration of my own work on “Mental Evolution,” +but still more because the explanations which it supplies touching +certain points of disagreement between us appear to show that I have +not misrepresented his statements, even if, as he alleges, I have +misapprehended his meanings. + +The work to which allusion has just been made was published in 1888, and, +as far as I am aware, it is only now that Prof. Max Müller has sought to +meet my views as there expressed. Hence we may take it that his answer +is, at all events, well matured. Furthermore, we may take it, from the +tone in which his answer is conveyed, that he credits me with having had +at least an honest desire to understand, and accurately to represent, +his meaning in all the places where I have ventured to criticise it. It +appears, however, that at all events in one important respect I have +betrayed “a complete misapprehension” of his meaning—viz. with reference +to his “theory of the origin of roots” (_The Monist_, p. 582); and it is +for the purpose of correcting this misapprehension that he has published +the latter half of his present paper. My reply, therefore, must take +the form of excusing myself for the complete misapprehensions which are +alleged. + +It is desirable at the outset to emphasise a distinction which I was +careful to draw in my work on “Mental Evolution in Man”—that, namely, +between philology and philosophy. A man may be an excellent authority on +the “Science of Language,” and yet but a very indifferent writer on the +“Science of Thought.” On the other hand, a man may know nothing at first +hand touching the special province of a philologist, and nevertheless +be fully capable of criticising what a philologist has published in the +way of theoretical deductions from his facts—especially where these +deductions quit the sphere of philology, and soar into that of Darwinian, +or anti-Darwinian, speculation. This distinction, indeed, between the +particular science of philology and the general scope of philosophy, +Prof. Max Müller himself recognises where he says: “While the student +of language seems to me to have a perfect right to treat the roots of +language as ultimate facts, it is difficult for the philosopher not to +look beyond.” (_The Monist_, p. 579.) Nevertheless he complains of me +because, while accepting all his philological facts upon his authority +as a philologist (save in so far as they are not accepted by other +philologists), I have been obliged to express dissent from not a few +of his theoretical deductions—especially, as I have already indicated, +where these have reference to the general doctrine of evolution as +applied to the mind of man. But how, I may ask, could a treatise be +written on “Mental Evolution in Man,” or “The Origin of Human Faculty,” +without considering the results which have been gained by the science +of comparative philology? Or how can it be maintained that, in order to +deal with these results in relation to the general theory of descent, a +writer must first of all himself become an authority in that particular +science? At any rate, I deemed it enough for the only purposes which I +had in view, to read attentively all the leading authorities in this +science, and, after extracting from them the information upon matters of +fact which their researches had established, to show what I regarded as +the bearing of these facts upon the theory of mental evolution. Nor can I +plead guilty to the charge of arrogant presumption, which the following +words appear to convey: + + “We see in his case how dangerous it is for a man who can claim + to speak with authority on his own special subject, to venture + to speak with authority on subjects not his own. Professor + Romanes has, no doubt, read several books on philology and + philosophy, but he is not sufficiently master of his subject to + have the slightest right to speak of men like Noiré, Huxley, + Herbert Spencer, to say nothing of Hobbes, with an air of + superiority. That is entirely out of place.” (_The Monist_, p. + 383.) + +Now that any such “air of superiority” occurs in my book, I must deny—and +this is a matter of fact. Noiré is alluded to only with reference to +his theory of the origin of language, which I go further in accepting +than does any “philosopher” or “philologist,” with the single exception +of Prof. Max Müller himself. Huxley is mentioned in several places as a +leading authority on anatomical matters, where my argument requires an +authoritative statement upon them. Herbert Spencer, curiously enough, +is never mentioned at all; while Hobbes is named only once, and then as +sustaining, by a “shrewd analysis,” an opinion which I am advocating by +quotations from recognised authorities in philosophy. Truly, therefore, +it would be well for my critic “to say nothing of Hobbes”; and better +still if he had looked at my index before condemning my supposed +treatment of Herbert Spencer, Huxley, and Noiré. As it is, his allusion +to these names “is entirely out of place.” + +But even apart from this particularly unfortunate allusion, his more +general charge as to my “venturing to speak authoritatively on subjects +not his [my] own,” is equally out of place. The following is my +introduction to the chapter on Comparative Philology, and I cannot see +that it betokens any “air of superiority”: + + “In now turning to this important branch of my subject, I may + remark, _in limine_, that, like all the sciences, philology can + be cultivated only by those who devote themselves specially + to the purpose. My function, therefore, will here be that + of merely putting together the main results of philological + research, so far as this has hitherto proceeded, and so far + as these results appear to me to have any bearing upon the + ‘origin of human faculty.’ Being thus myself obliged to rely + upon authority, where I find that authorities are in conflict, + I will either avoid the points of disagreement, or else state + what has to be said on both sides of the question. But where + I find that all competent authorities are in substantial + agreement, I will not burden my exposition by tautological + quotations.” + + * * * * * + +Having thus disposed of a merely personal matter, I may pass on to my +justification of the “complete misapprehension” into which I have fallen +with respect to Prof. Max Müller’s work on the “Science of Thought.” + +In the first place he tells us: + + “On page 267 Mr. Romanes says that I profess, as a result of + more recent researches, to have reduced the number of Sanskrit + roots to 121. I wish I had. But the number of roots in Sanskrit + stands as yet at about 800: the number 121 of which he speaks + is the number of concepts expressed by these roots, many of + them conveying the same, or nearly the same, idea.” (_The + Monist_, p. 583.) + +Now it is quite true that on page 267 I made the statement which is here +challenged; but as I immediately go on to speak repeatedly of the “number +121” as being “the number of concepts expressed by the roots,”—and +actually quote at length the whole 121 concepts with Prof. Max Müller’s +own heading,—I am not sure that the point is worth the stress which is +now laid upon it. Nevertheless, I may explain why in this one passage +I used the word “roots,” instead of the word “concepts.” Briefly, the +only reason was because, according to Prof. Max Müller’s theory of +the origin of roots, it seemed to me virtually the same thing, from +a psychological point of view, whether we speak of the reduction in +question as pertaining to roots or to concepts. For, according to the +theory, “every root embodies a concept,” or is the obverse side of a +concept. Consequently, if the Sanskrit language presents some 800 roots, +while it is expressive of only 121 concepts, the balance of the 800 roots +must be concerned in conveying the same, or nearly the same, ideas—as +Prof. Max Müller himself expressly asserts in the above quotation from +_The Monist_. Indeed, the whole object of his psychological analysis of +linguistic roots was to prove that such is the case; and, therefore, that +the 121 roots which serve to convey the 121 concepts are the only roots +required for the purposes of communication in Sanskrit speech. No doubt +it would have been better if I had stated all this in my book; but even +if its omission led to obscurity, I can scarcely see that on this account +there could have been a “misrepresentation” where there was certainly +no “misapprehension.” For, as already stated, I spoke of “121 roots” +only once, while I alluded to “121 concepts” many times—and usually, +moreover, in inverted commas. Lastly, it may be observed that, following +his theory concerning the “origin of roots,” Prof. Max Müller himself +so far identifies roots with concepts as to head one of his lists, in +large capitals—ROOTS OR CONCEPTS. Therefore in saying that he professed +to have reduced the psychologically efficient elements of Sanskrit speech +to 121 constituents, it did not appear to me that I was departing from +his own terminology when in one passage I spoke of these 121 constituents +as roots, while everywhere else I spoke of them as concepts. “Give us,” +he says, “about 800 roots, and we can explain the largest dictionary; +give us about 121 concepts, and we can account for the 800 roots.” +(“Science of Thought,” p. 551.) Well, if this is so, the 800 roots (i. e. +phonetically separable elements) have been reduced to the 121 “concepts +or roots” (i. e. psychologically separable elements). My critic cannot +both have his cake and eat it. Either he must abide by the philological +meaning of a root, as the ultimate result of philological analysis; or +else he must abide by his own philosophical meaning of a root, as the +embodiment of a concept. Under the former definition there will be about +800 roots of Sanskrit; under the latter definition, and according to his +analysis, there will be only 121. + + * * * * * + +The next point with regard to which “complete misapprehension” is alleged +may best be presented by my critic’s own words, thus: + + “Professor Romanes thinks it necessary to remark that ‘these + concepts do not represent the ideation of primitive man’! I + never said they did. I never pretended to be acquainted with + the ideation of primitive man. All I maintained was that, + making allowance for obscure words, every thought, that of the + lowest savage as well as of the most minute philosopher, can be + expressed with these 800 roots, and traced back to these 121 + concepts.” (_The Monist_, p. 584.) + +Now, it is perhaps needless to say, I am extremely glad to learn that +such was the meaning intended; but I trust that the following quotations +will furnish a sufficient excuse for my misunderstanding of it: + + “I hope that those who will carefully examine the results + at which I have arrived, will admit that they prove by + overwhelming evidence that the meanings of roots are really + what we expected them to be, and that they express the + primitive social acts of primitive social man, and the states + more or less closely associated with such acts.” (“Science of + Thought,” p. 403.) + +From this it appears that if Prof. Max Müller never professed to be +acquainted with the ideation of _primitive_ man, he did profess to have +proved, by overwhelming evidence, a very large acquaintance, not only +with the ideation, but also with primitive acts of primitive _social_ +man. Possibly his acquaintance with both these matters is very much +more intimate than mine; but as I have always taken it to be virtually +certain that “primitive man” was “social” in his habits, I should like +to learn the reasons which have induced my critic to believe in a still +more “primitive man,” who was addicted to a solitary mode of life. For, +otherwise, the only distinction on which his criticism appears to rest is +a distinction without a difference. + +Again he says: + + “The Science of Thought assures us that every thought that ever + crossed the mind of man can be traced back to about 121 simple + concepts.” (Ibid., p. 418.) + +And that the word “man” here is not intended tacitly to exclude +“primitive man” (whether “social” or solitary), I gathered from the fact +of the 121 concepts in question being tabulated under the heading, in +large capitals, THE 121 ORIGINAL CONCEPTS. For, if the word “original” +here was intended to mean original only with reference to the Sanskrit +language, why did the writer follow it up with his statement about the +Science of Thought, assuring us that _every_ thought which had _ever_ +crossed the mind of _man_ could be _traced back_ to these 121 original +concepts? + +Lastly, not only by such particular passages was I led to suppose that +the writer was referring to “primitive man” when he was writing about +“primitive social man,” etc.; but still more was I led to suppose this +by the whole drift and tenor of his work. For what would be the sense +of all his disquisitions upon the importance of linguistic science in +its relation to the theory of evolution, if he intended to restrict his +inferences to the _semi-civilised_ condition of man, which (as he allows) +must have been the condition of the speakers of Sanskrit? Clearly, if +this were his intention, there would have been _no_ sense in all these +disquisitions; and therefore, here again, my critic cannot both preserve +his cake and consume it. Either let him adopt the position which he +takes up in _The Monist_, as a philologist pure and simple, who “never +pretended to be acquainted with the ideation of primitive man,” who +refuses to go beyond the “facts” of the “Science of Language,” or to +speculate upon their theoretical relations to the “Science of Thought”: +or else let him do as he does in his published works—superimpose upon his +functions as a “Student of Language” the functions of a “Philosopher,” +freely speculate upon “the origin of roots,” elaborately argue the whole +psychology of “concepts,” and strenuously endeavor to show that “language +is the Rubicon of mind,” which not only now, but at all times, has +separated man from the lower animals, as a being mysterious in origin, if +not unique in kind. + + * * * * * + +Next we are told: + + “Professor Romanes dwells on what he calls the interesting + feature of all roots being verbs. This is simply a + contradiction in terms. In giving the meaning of roots scholars + generally employ the infinitive or the participle, “to go,” + or “going”; but they have stated again and again that a root + ceases to be a root as soon as it is used in a sentence.” (_The + Monist_, p. 584.) + +Now, by a “verb” I understand a word that signifies either an action or a +state; and by a “root” I understand—here agreeing with Prof. Max Müller +himself—“an element of human speech,” so far as this has been hitherto +reduced by philological analysis. Again, I hold—in this also agreeing +with him—that “as soon as a root is used for predication it becomes a +word, whether outwardly it is changed or not.” (“Science of Thought,” p. +440.) Well, if we are agreed upon these points, I do not see how there +can be any “contradiction in terms” when I stated the fact “of all roots +being verbs.” + +In the first place, if one were to agree with Prof. Max Müller himself +in holding that originally every root was “something real, something +that was actually used in conversation” (Ibid. p. 420), there can be no +contradiction in terms if we translate this into saying that originally +every root was a word—for the mere quibble that not until it was spoken +did the root become a word does not affect the matter, any more than if +we were to say the same of any word now in use, which has given birth to +a progeny of other words. But even if we disagree with Prof. Max Müller, +and suppose that roots are merely “phonetic elements,” or the residual +extract of a group of originally allied words, we should still be correct +in saying that the “concepts” which they “embody” are all concepts which +now admit of being expressed in equivalent words. + +So much for the “contradiction in terms,” which is alleged to arise if we +speak of roots as _words_. Touching the second point, or the accuracy of +saying that the words which roots express are always _verbs_, my defence +is sufficiently easy. For to say, as my critic says, that “in giving +the meaning of roots scholars generally employ the infinitive or the +participle,” appears to me a most unphilosophical observation, since it +appears to indicate that in the opinion of its writer the significance +of a verb is but conventionally given to a root by the verbal form into +which it is thrown by scholars. But the fact is that, even if they tried, +scholars could rarely deprive a root of its significance as a verb, no +matter into what verbal form they might choose to throw it. Take any root +at random, such as HA _to go_. However much we may ring the changes, as +“to go,” “going,” “goer,” it is impossible to get rid of the fundamental +significance of the root as a verb. And although it is, of course, +possible to select a root which presents a more equivocal interpretation, +the cases in which this can be done are, comparatively speaking, not +numerous, and apparently never such as to exclude the probability of its +having primarily conveyed the force of a verb. For instance, HUR _to +fall_, may be regarded either as a verb or a noun-substantive; but we +cannot say that there is anything to render more probable the view of +the root having been originally expressive of a fall than of the act of +falling; and inasmuch as there do not appear to be any roots which _can_ +only have originally had the force of nouns or adjectives, while there +are so many which _can_ only have originally had the force of verbs, +we may fairly conclude that in the accidentally more equivocal cases +the roots were likewise originally expressive of actions or of states. +For, if not, why are there not as many roots which convey such meanings +as _sky_, or _blue_ (which never can have had equivalents in the forms +of verbs), as there are roots like HA, where we cannot doubt that the +meaning from the first must have been the meaning of a verb? + +I am the more surprised at this head of Prof. Max Müller’s criticism, +because it belongs to the very essence of his own theory touching “the +origin of roots,” that they _must_ all originally have conveyed the +meaning of verbs. Therefore from end to end of his own book he constantly +alludes to roots as expressive of “actions”; never as expressive of +objects or qualities. For instance: + + “All, or nearly all, the roots of Sanskrit, or rather of the + Aryan family in general, express, as we shall see, acts, and + more particularly the commonest acts performed by members of a + primitive society.” (“Science of Thought,” p. 272.) + +And even in _The Monist_ article itself the same thing is stated thus: + + “Let us remember that a most careful psychological analysis + had led Noiré to the conclusion that the germs of all + conceptional thought were to be found in the consciousness of + our own repeated acts. And let us place by the side of this, + the well-ascertained fact that the germs of all conceptional + language, what we call roots, express with few exceptions the + repeated acts of men.” (_The Monist_, p. 580.) + +Again: + + “We begin with the fact that the great bulk of a language + consists of words, derived, according to the strictest rules, + not from cries, but from articulate roots. No one denies this. + We follow this up with a second fact, that nearly all the roots + express acts of men. No one denies that.” (p. 588.) + +Very well then, I submit that the only real distinction between Prof. Max +Müller’s rendering of this “fact,” and my own rendering of it, consists +in my having added “states” to “acts,” and observing that then the +comparatively few outstanding roots may be included with the “nearly all” +under the one category of “verbs.” + +For the distinction which he draws in _The Monist_ is not a real +distinction: it is merely a verbal distinction. + +Here it is: + + “If Professor Romanes approves of my saying that roots stood + for any part of speech, just as the monosyllabic expressions + of children do, I can only say that, if I ever said so, I + expressed myself incorrectly. A root never stands for any part + of speech, because as soon as it is a part of speech it is no + longer a root.” (_The Monist_, p. 585.) + +This, as I have previously observed, is merely a quibble. If originally +every root was “something real, something used in conversation,” +originally all roots were _words_, in just the same sense as “the +monosyllabic expressions of children” are words. And if “nearly all these +roots express the acts of man,” while most (if not all) the outstanding +residuum were apparently expressive of states, it follows that the +roots in question were not only words, but _verbs_. And in stating this +“fact” I supposed that I was but following Prof. Max Müller’s statement +of it, where he constitutes it the philological basis of his theory on +the “origin of roots”—viz. that all roots sprang from sounds made by +“primitive social man” when engaged in their “social _acts_.” But, while +accepting this fact, I objected to the theory raised upon it, because +the latter did not consider that roots which originally had the force of +verbs must have been more likely to have survived, and so to have come +down to us, than those which may originally have had the significance +of any other parts of speech. And it was only in order to supply this +further consideration that I alluded to the “fact” at all. + + * * * * * + +We come next to some disparaging remarks upon “babies,” “parrots,” +and the lower animals generally (_The Monist_, pp. 586-7). Prof. Max +Müller “refuses to argue” with me, “or any other philosopher, either in +the nursery or the menagerie.” So be it. As a philologist, of course, +he is assuredly right; no one would expect him so to argue. But as a +philosopher, who has written a large book on the “Science of Thought,” he +is no less assuredly wrong. And one may be pardoned for wondering at this +intentionally ostrich-like attitude on the part of a philosopher—who is +“going beyond the origin of roots”—with respect to the fundamental germs +of the sign-making faculty. + +Again, my critic appears to imagine that I am a supporter of the +onomatopoetic theory—to the extent of regarding _all_ human language as +having originated in imitations of natural sounds. (_The Monist_, pp. +586-7.) But over and over again I have stated that this is not my view. +I believe, indeed, that there is a very large amount of truth in this +theory; but I deem it on all grounds most improbable that the principle +of imitation has been the _only_ principle concerned in the origin of +speech. I have argued that probably many other principles must have been +concerned, including the “synergastic” principle suggested by Noiré, and +enthusiastically adopted by my critic as alone sufficient to explain the +whole problem of the origin of speech—and this although it is clearly but +a particular branch of the general onomatopoetic theory. Hence, so far +as I am concerned, it does not signify one iota whether any given root +owed its origin to the principle of imitation, or to some other of the +general principles which I believe to have been concerned in the birth +of articulate language. And, if possible, still less does it signify +whether or not in the development of any given word, such as “thunder,” +the original root-sound has been afterwards imitatively modified, “from a +feeling that it should be so.” These matters are no doubt of importance +within the four corners of philology; but in relation to the “biological +theory” of descent they present no importance at all. + +Yet I am told: + + “Those who cannot see the difference between a man, or for all + that, between a mocking-bird, saying _Cuckoo_, and a whole + community fixing on the sound of TAN, as differentiated by + various suffixes and prefixes, and expressing the concept + of stretching in such words as _tonos_, _tone_, _tonitru_, + _thunder_, _tanu_, _tenuis_, _thin_, should not meddle with the + Science of Language.” (_The Monist_, pp. 588-9.) + +Doubtless. But as no word of this applies to me, I may be permitted to +observe that if any one who has read my book can possibly suppose that it +does, he should not meddle with the Science of Thought. + + * * * * * + +In conclusion, if it be the case that I have completely misapprehended +Prof. Max Müller with regard to the points which he has mentioned,—and +all of which I have now considered,—have I not furnished sufficient +justification? Even now I cannot see in what respects it is possible +to amend any subsequent edition of my book, so as to correct the +misapprehensions which are alleged. But although my “mistakes” are thus +far from “clear,” I am glad to have had this opportunity of publicly +discussing them with Prof. Max Müller, if only for the sake of adding the +following remarks. + +Be it observed, in the first place, that whatever may be thought of the +foregoing “justification,”—whether it be held that the misapprehensions +are due to ambiguity on the one side or to obtuseness on the other,—at +least it is certain that the misapprehensions complained of all have +reference to points of no importance whatsoever as regards the general +theory of descent, even although some of them are not altogether +without importance as regards the particular science of philology. Thus +it is quite immaterial, so far as the doctrine of _Mental Evolution_ +is concerned, whether we say that the roots of Sanskrit are 800, +philologically speaking, or 121, psychologically speaking. Again, as +soon as it is explained by Prof. Max Müller that by his “121 original +concepts” he means the number of concepts “original” only as regards +the Sanskrit language; that by “primitive social man” he means only the +semi-civilised progenitors of the Indo-European race; that by “every +thought that ever crossed the mind of man” admitting of being “traced +back to about 121 simple concepts,” he means no more than that such is +the case as regards the recent and highly evolved Aryan branch of the +human species;—when once all this is explained, it becomes evident that +thus far there _can_ be no difference of opinion between us. For in that +case he is not dealing with “the Origin of Human Faculty,” either in +regard to language or to thought: he is considering merely the higher +inflorescence of both. Once more, whether all, or nearly all, the roots +of Sanskrit can properly be called _words_, and, if so, whether we must +not go still further and call them _verbs_,—these are questions of +mere terminology. If the roots were originally “used in conversation,” +and if, as thus used, they were, with but few doubtful exceptions, all +expressive of “acts” or “states,” it becomes mere verbal hair-splitting +to challenge the propriety of saying that the roots were originally +verbs. At all events, the matter has nothing to do with the general +question of man’s derivative origin. Lastly, the same has to be said of +the purely philological question as to how far the principle of imitation +has obtained in the first formation of these archaic “words,” or “roots.” +For, archaic though they be in a philological sense, in a phylological +sense they are things of yesterday, and so can scarcely be said to have +any direct relation at all to “the origin of speech,” or the rise of +articulate sign-making. This has to be inferred from observations in +the “menagerie,” as distinguished from research in the library; and the +fact that Prof. Max Müller expressly refuses to give me the pleasure of +his company where the best materials for studying the really “primitive” +condition of the sign-making faculty are to be met with, merely renders +more impossible than ever any real collision between his linguistic +studies on the one side, and my “biological theory” on the other. + +But although it thus appears sufficiently evident that my +“misapprehensions” of his linguistic conclusions are as unimportant +in relation to the theory of descent as they are few—and, I think, +also excusable—in themselves, it is impossible to doubt that far below +the level of Sanskrit roots, and far beyond the range of philological +science, there is a wide difference of opinion between us. For when he +passes from the “Science of Language” to the “Science of Thought,”—when +he quits his sphere as a philologist to enter that of the philosopher,—he +persistently and consistently affirms that what he calls “the old barrier +between man and beast” remains, and that he is as yet unable to perceive +how it can ever be removed. This barrier of course is predicative +language—the obverse side of conceptional thought; and the firm opinion +thus expressed by so eminent a philologist is not only of weight _per +se_, but is rendered more so on account of the manifest freedom from +prejudice with which it is associated. It is on this account that I +devoted so much space in my book on “Mental Evolution” to a consideration +of his views; and therefore I am sorry that his present reply has not +been directed to meeting my criticisms on this really important matter +of philosophical doctrine, rather than to indicating “misapprehensions” +with regard to such merely trivial matters of a purely philological kind +as those which I have here been dealing with. But perhaps at some future +time he may give me the benefit of his criticism upon my work as a whole, +or not merely on the fringes of such details as really have no bearing on +the objects of that work. + +And, if he should ever see his way to doing this, I am quite sure that +the discussion would be one of a friendly character. For the points +at issue would all have reference to that large and vague domain of +speculative theory touching “the origin of human faculty,” where it is +inevitable—and, in my judgment, even desirable—that wide differences of +opinion should obtain. We are but at the commencement of a great and +obscure problem, which only in our own generation has been presented by +the science of biology to the contemplation of philosophy. Therefore it +would be folly indeed if any man were to regard his own opinions upon it +as other than provisional—and even more foolish if he were to introduce +any “_meum_ and _tuum_ into these discussions.” + +Thus I invite Prof. Max Müller to state the grounds of his assertion in +_The Monist_, that “all the facts of real language are against” me as +an advocate of what he calls the biological theory of the developmental +origin of man. This theory, he says, “derives no support whatever from +the Science of Language.” I believe, on the other hand, that these are +wholly unwarranted statements; and that the Science of Language does +support the theory in question to as high a degree as is possible from +the nature of the case. On account of this great difference of opinion, I +felt, when writing my book, that I should be doing but scant justice to +the matured judgment of so eminent a philologist if I did not carefully +consider all that he had written upon the subject. And so, as I have +said, I devoted more of my book to a consideration of his views than to +those of any other philologist; and while accepting his scientific facts +on his authority as a philologist, I nevertheless felt it incumbent on me +to show why his philosophical deductions, where they had reference to the +theory of descent, appeared to me by no means of equivalent value. This +distinction, as I observed at the commencement of the present article, is +surely a legitimate distinction; and I should be sorry indeed if anything +that I have ever said can appear inconsistent with the genuine admiration +which is due to Prof. Max Müller as “a student of language,” or with the +no less genuine esteem which I have the best reason for knowing is due to +him as a friend. + + GEORGE J. ROMANES. + + + + +THE CONTINUITY OF EVOLUTION. + +THE SCIENCE OF LANGUAGE VERSUS THE SCIENCE OF LIFE, AS REPRESENTED BY +PROF. F. MAX MÜLLER AND PROF. GEORGE JOHN ROMANES. + + +All the sciences form, or at least ought to form, one great system, +culminating in the science of sciences. Therefore it is more than +doubtful how any science could exist without being somehow in contact +with other sciences; and all of them must stand in some relation to +philosophy. It is necessary that each science should develop in relative +independence of the other sciences. We cannot expect to decide, for +instance, chemical problems by physical or purely mechanical laws +before we have carefully searched the nature and conditions of chemical +processes. But as soon as this has been done we can expect that a +comparison between the results of two or more sciences will throw new +light upon the subject-matter on both sides. Solomon says: “To everything +there is a season and a time to every purpose under the heaven.” Thus the +sciences have to grow, each one on its own grounds, and when they have +reached a certain state of maturity, they will coalesce with each other. +And two sciences will by their coalescence fertilise the one the other so +as to produce a new department which may by and by develop into a special +science. + +Now it appears to the uninitiated as if the spiritual world of science +were in every respect different from the world of objective realities +around us. While in the world of bodily realities the struggle for +existence is fought eternal peace is supposed to reign in the sacred +halls of intellectual aspirations. Says the German poet: + + “_Härt in dem Raume stossen sich die Körper,_ + _Leicht bei einander wohnen die Gedanken._” + +This is true only in a very limited sense. Ideas are the most intolerant +beings imaginable. The struggle for existence is raging as fiercely in +the intellectual realm as in the world of realities, and there also the +law that the fittest will survive holds good. + +Far be it from us to denounce this state of general warfare, for although +it is hard on those who succumb, it is the means by which evolution +becomes possible; and evolution in the domain of science means a nearer +approach to truth. If in the evolution of thought two neighboring +sciences have developed so far as to meet, a struggle will ensue. The +ideas on the two sides will have to fight before they coalesce. It +is natural that different scientists look at things from different +standpoints. They have developed a terminology which exactly suits their +purpose and thus the representatives of the different sciences are often +like people of a different nationality. They do not understand each +other because they speak different languages. Moreover they have not +unfrequently a different religion; that means, their ideas about truth +and the test of truth appear to be different and sometimes they regard +one another as no better than heathens. The battle is unavoidable, +and considering all in all, the battle is desirable, it should not be +avoided. The fittest to survive being the truest, the whole progress of +science through the struggle for existence among ideas consists in the +approach to truth. + +It may be objected that there are peacemakers who will reconcile the +contending parties. True. And it is further true that the aim of every +war is peace. But a peacemaker can be successful only if his mind is +broad enough to let the whole battle be fought out within himself. +The battle itself is and will remain unavoidable. Idea stands against +idea, and the mental process of reflection is nothing but a struggle of +conflicting ideas which takes place in one and the same mind. The aim of +all reflection is the settlement of the conflict, so that all ideas will +agree. The two parties disappear in one; errors are given up, and that +which is consistent only will remain. In other words Dualism makes room +for Monism. + +It is a good sign of the times that a battle has begun to rage between +the so-called natural sciences and the science of language. The old +Hegelian distinction between the _Geisteswissenschaften_ and the +_Naturwissenschaften_ has been surrendered; and Prof. F. Max Müller was +among the foremost to inculcate the truth that philology is a natural +science. If philology is a natural science it cannot be but that its +subject of investigation is a part of nature and as such it stands in +close relation to other parts of nature. One and the same thing may +be the subject of investigation of different sciences. One and the +same plant may be an object of observation to the physiologist, to the +botanist, to the druggist, to the physician, and to the chemist. Their +standpoints and their purposes being different, they will bring to light +very different results, and if these results are contradictory among each +other the conflict is at hand. It cannot be shirked but must be decided +by an honest and square fight. We have witnessed of late a conflict +between philology and anthropology concerning the origin of the Aryas +and it looks as if this conflict will contribute much to promote our +knowledge of the oldest history of mankind, although the last word has +not as yet been spoken: _adhuc sub judice lis est_. + +We are now confronted with a conflict between Philology and Biology. The +first skirmishes have been fought by two men who are entitled to speak, +each one in behalf of his science. Prof. F. Max Müller stands up for +philology and Prof. George John Romanes for biology. + +Professor Romanes takes it for granted that the rational mind of man has +developed gradually from the lower stage of the brute. He says in his +book “Mental Evolution in Man,” p. 276: + + “The whole object of these chapters has been to show, that on + psychological grounds it is abundantly intelligible how the + conceptual stage of ideation may have been gradually evolved + from the receptual—the power of forming general, or truly + conceptual ideas, from the power of forming particular and + generic ideas. But if it could be shown—or even rendered in any + degree presumable—that this distinctly human power of forming + truly general ideas arose _de novo_ with the first birth of + articulate speech, assuredly my whole analysis would be + destroyed: the human mind would be shown to present a quality + different in origin—and, therefore, in kind—from all the + lower orders of intelligence: the law of continuity would be + interrupted at the terminal phase: an impassable gulf would be + fixed between the brute and the man.” + +And Prof. Max Müller criticises the position of Professor Romanes in an +article on Thought and Language (_The Monist_, Vol. I. No. 4, p. 582); he +says: + + “My learned friend, Professor Romanes, labors to show that + there is an unbroken mental evolution from the lowest animal + to the highest man. But he sees very clearly and confesses + very honestly that the chief difficulty in this evolution is + language and all that language implies. He tries very hard to + remove that barrier between beast and man.... Professor Romanes + is, I believe, a most eminent biologist, and the mantle of + Darwin is said to have fallen on his shoulders. Far be it from + me to venture to criticise his biological facts. But we see in + his case how dangerous it is for a man who can claim to speak + with authority on his own special subject, to venture to speak + authoritatively on subjects not his own.” + +It is not at all my intention to appear on the battle-field as a +peacemaker between these two generals, or to settle the problems that +arise from the conflict between philology and biology. That will +be better done by the parties concerned, and I am rather inclined +to speak with Schiller when he thought of the struggle between the +transcendentalist philosopher and the empirical naturalist: + + “Enmity be between you! Your alliance would not be in time yet. + Though you may separate now, Truth will be found by your search.” + +I look forward with great interest to further discussions which will +bring out with more clearness the positions of both parties, and it is +not impossible that both parties as soon as they have better understood +each other, will agree much better than either of them expected. But +it may be permitted me to make a few comments upon a proposition that +is involved in this conflict, which, however, properly considered, is +neither of a philological nor a biological nature. This is the idea of +the continuity of evolution. Prof. Max Müller says somewhere that, if +a Darwinian means an evolutionist, he had been a Darwinian long before +Darwin. “How a student of the science of language,” he says, “can be +anything but an evolutionist is to me utterly unintelligible.” So there +is no doubt about his being an evolutionist as much as Professor Romanes. +But the question is, What means evolutionist? Is he an evolutionist who +believes in a piecemeal evolution interrupted here and there by acts of +special creation? In my conception of the term, an evolutionist believes +in evolution wherever there is life and this involves the wholesale +rejection of special-creation acts as well as of the idea that any being +or organism (the organism of language included) could ever have made its +appearance in full growth and maturity or that any phenomenon of life +could present a break in the continuity of evolution. + +The Greek myth tells us that the Goddess of Reason, the blue-eyed Pallas +Athene, was not born like other gods and mortals in the natural way of a +slow development. She jumped out of the head of Zeus full-armed in all +her beauty and gifted with the powers of her unusual accomplishments. +Is this myth true after all? Does the Logos of rational thought +present us with an instance in which the development process has been +interrupted? If so, we shall have to abandon the evolution theory as a +theory and return to the old-fashioned view of special-creation acts. +The difference between these two views is not of degree, but of kind. +He who accepts the principle of evolution as the law of life abandons +forever the idea of special and unconnected beginnings as much as that of +special-creation acts. He cannot with consistency believe in an evolution +with interruptions, for the theory of evolution is serviceable only if +evolution is conceived as continuous. Prof. Max Müller of course has a +right to define and use the word evolutionist as he sees fit, but if he +excludes continuity from the idea of evolution, we declare that he has +taken out the quintessence of its meaning and the core of its truth. + +Why this is so, we shall now briefly discuss. + +The evolution theory has been gradually developed by empirical +investigations and it owes its all but universal acceptance to the great +mass of _a posteriori_ evidence furnished by the natural sciences. It +rests nevertheless upon a better and safer foundation than isolated +instances of hap-hazard experience. Its foundation is quarried out of +another and more reliable material. The evolution theory rests upon the +ground of _a priori_ arguments. + +By _a priori_ we do not understand anything mysterious, but simply such +cognition as possesses universality and necessity. That cognition which +is in possession of universality and necessity is also called formal +cognition. The formal sciences (for instance arithmetic, mathematics, +pure logic, and pure mechanics) give us information about such truths as +are applicable, because they are purely formal, to the formal conditions +of anything and everything possible. Because we know _beforehand_ that +the purely formal laws will hold good under all conditions Kant called +their formulated theorems “a priori.” All the objections to the idea of +apriority made by John Stuart Mill and other empiricists are due to their +misinterpretation of the term.[10] + +Mr. Mill was mistaken when he thought Kant meant _a priori_ cognitions +were innate ideas which came to man from spheres unknown. The very first +sentence of Kant’s “Critique of Pure Reason” proves that Kant knew of no +other knowledge than that which begins with experience. Kant says, “That +all our knowledge begins with experience there can be no doubt.” But our +knowledge consists of two elements, viz. the empirical and the formal. +The former bears always the character of the special and incidental, +the latter of the universal and necessary. The former is sensory, being +furnished by the senses, the latter is properly mental originating in and +with the action of the mind in dealing with sense-materials, in arranging +them and bringing them into certain relations. + +Formal knowledge is different in kind from empirical knowledge. The +rule “twice two is four” will hold good for all possible cases, but the +statement “A swan is white” does not hold good for all possible cases. +European swans as a rule are white, but Australian swans are black, and +for all we know, we might find swans that are blue, or red, or yellow. +Empirical knowledge is full of exceptions, formal knowledge is rigid, +there is no exception to any rule of formal knowledge. + +All formal knowledge has developed by degrees. The history of the +sciences, of mathematics, logic, arithmetic, and also of the natural +sciences furnishes sufficient evidence. The formal part of the natural +sciences, by Kant called _reine Naturwissenschaft_, consists of such +cognitions as the law of cause and effect and the law of the conservation +of matter and energy. The formulation of these laws has been accomplished +after much and careful empirical investigation. And it could not be +otherwise. The latter law was elaborated in its full clearness long after +Kant. The law of causality and the law of the conservation of matter +and energy are purely formal, they are not sense-impressions and do +not contain any sensory elements. They are general rules of universal +applicability which being rigidly universal and without exceptions are +necessary under all conditions. Before we make any experiment we can know +that they will hold good in the experiment. Indeed all our experimenting +is based upon the supposition that the law of causation holds good and +that there can be neither an increase nor a decrease of matter and energy. + +The mistake made by the so-called transcendentalists is this, that +they consider formal thought as having an independent existence, being +ready at hand before cognition is possible, while in fact it is a part +of cognition which at least in its germ is present in every actual +experience. + +The theory of evolution is not more and not less a formal principle +than the law of causation and the law of the conservation of matter and +energy. Indeed it is nothing but the same thing applied to a special +case. The theory of evolution is the principle of the conservation +of matter and energy applied to the province of life. The theory +of evolution denies the possibility of special acts of creation. +There cannot come something out of nothing. And the new creations +that actually originate daily before our eyes are not creations from +nothing, they are simply transformations. There was a time on earth in +which no living being existed, neither plant nor animal. How did life +originate? Our answer is, It did not originate out of nothing, but it +evolved. Non-organised matter organised. That non-organised matter must +contain the elementary conditions of organised life is a conclusion +which we cannot escape from our point of view; and which is fully and +satisfactorily corroborated by our daily experience that water, earth, +and air under the sun’s influence are changed into wheat; and wheat is +manufactured into the bread which nourishes man and sustains his life. +Non-organised particles of matter are constantly being organised in +living organisms and displace the worn-out materials in their tissues—not +one atom of the latter remaining for good in a healthy living body. + +The theory of evolution may be called an hypothesis, an assumption, a +presumption. But in that case we must say with Mill that the rule twice +two is four is also a mere assumption. The evidence for the latter is not +stronger than that for the former. Mill declares that after all twice two +might somewhere be five. Exactly so and not otherwise evolution might be +somewhere interrupted, so that something would originate out of nothing +instead of evolving from other things through transformation. + +Prof. Max Müller speaks very sarcastically about the speechless man, the +_homo alalus_ who is supposed to be the ancestor of the present man. He +says (l. c., p. 585): + + “Of the _Homo alalus_, the speechless progenitor of _Homo + sapiens_, with whom Professor Romanes seems so intimately + acquainted, students of human speech naturally know nothing.” + +Prof. Max Müller also condemns all efforts of approaching the problem +of the origin of language through observation of children and animals. +The former he calls “nursery philology” the latter “menagerie +psychology.” And it is certainly true that the problem of the origin +of language cannot be solved from observations of children or animals, +because the problem lies in another field. The problem is not how a +ready made language is transferred upon the growing mind of a baby +but how speechless beings developed into speaking beings. And all the +intelligence of clever animals is still very different from the rational +thought of man. This is true, but it is also true that good observations +of animal psychology and also of nursery philology will throw some light +upon the evolution of rational thought. + +Prof. Max Müller says: + + “How can we attempt to realise what passes within the mind of + an animal?... We can imagine anything we like about what passes + in the mind of an animal,—we can know absolutely nothing.” + +We are fully aware of the fact that the problem of the origin of language +is quite different from the problems of animal psychology. A solution of +the latter, which are extremely complex and difficult, would not help +us to solve the former. This being conceded we can nevertheless see +no reason why animal psychology should be condemned and given up as a +hopeless task. + +It is not true that “we can know absolutely nothing about what passes in +the mind of an animal.” It is true we cannot see the animals’ feelings +and thoughts, but we can see their actions which reveal their feelings +as much as and sometimes even plainer than the speech of our brother man +reveals his thoughts. Might we not say with the same reason, “We see only +the printed book of a scientist (which is an expression of his views as +much as the behavior of an animal is of its feelings) but we can know +absolutely nothing about what passes in the mind of that scientist. All +we can do is to judge from analogy”? And should we on that account give +up all reading and studying and also all arguing with others? + +Animal psychology is not only justified as a science, but we can even +hope that correct observations of animal intelligence will assist us +in correctly understanding the higher intelligence of human thought. +And “that some useful hints may be taken from watching children is not +denied” by Prof. Max Müller either, although this little concession +appears only in the shape of a short foot-note. The _homo alalus_ is by +no means a merely mythical figure, for according to the law of evolution +man must have developed out of a being lower than the present man. His +first ancestor must have been simple life-substance something like that +of the amœba. He must have passed through a long period in which he was +not capable of articulate speech. That we know nothing particular about +the _homo alalus_ is no proof against his existence. Moreover every +infant is an actual real _homo alalus_, a speechless man, or should we +according to Prof. Max Müller class our babies among the brutes? + +Prof. Max Müller says (_The Monist_, p. 585): + + “If, like Professor Romanes, we begin with the ‘immense + presumption that there has been no interruption in the + developmental process in the course of psychological history,’ + the protest of language counts for nothing; the very fact that + no animal has ever formed a language, is put aside simply as an + unfortunate accident.” + +The theory of evolution rightly understood is no presumption in the +usual sense of the word. It is no more a presumption than to say that +something cannot come from nothing. And what is “the protest of language” +which would disprove the continuity of evolution? That rational or human +thought is something _sui generis_, that it is different in kind and +not in degree from brute intelligence; that language is an impassable +barrier between man and brute, being the Rubicon which no other animal +has crossed. Very well. We agree entirely with all these propositions. +Human reason is different in kind from brute intelligence and human +reason has developed such as it is through language only. Nay reason is +language. Noiré is right when he says, Man thinks because he speaks. +But the Rubicon of language was not an absolutely impassable barrier. +The speechless ancestor of man, whether we call him _homo alalus_ or +anthropoid, or even man-ape, _has_ crossed it, and having crossed it he +became the Cæsar of the animal creation. + +Prof. Max Müller’s theory of the identity of language and thought[11] is +so valuable because it bridges the gap between the rational sphere of +man and the not-yet rational sphere of the brute creation. It explains +the origin of reason. The origin of reason in the world of living beings +is explained as soon as the origin of language is understood, for reason +develops with language and rational thought is nothing but rational +speech. If the origin of language were an unfathomable mystery, Prof. +Max Müller’s view of the identity of language and thought would lose all +practical importance. + +The proposition of the identity of language and thought is a very radical +idea; it is the fundamental idea of monism. In a more general form it +was first pronounced by Giordano Bruno, who says somewhere that, if we +could put the soul of a man into the organism of an animal, say of a +snake, it would cease to be a human soul and become the soul of a snake. +Speech would be changed into a hissing, in accordance with the snake’s +organs for uttering sounds. And in the same way all the feelings, all the +concepts, all the desires and inclinations—in short the whole psychical +life would be that of a snake. + +Thought is the soul of language. As there are no ghost-souls, so there +are no ghost-thoughts. And the soul is not something distinct from the +organism, it is the form of the organism. It happens in fairy-tales that +the Prince is transformed into a frog, but if a fairy could transform +a man into a frog, his soul would certainly also become a frog-soul. +Language is the visible organism of the invisible thought, and as is +language, exactly so is thought. + +The problem how language has developed was first answered by the +onomatopoetic theory, “the bow-wow theory” as Max Müller calls it. +Language was conceived as an echo of nature, as a reflex action that +takes place in a living and feeling being. Yet this theory had to be +abandoned, because an historical investigation of language proved that +words with very few exceptions were not imitations of external sounds. +Yet the spirit of investigation was not daunted by this defeat, and +the bow-wow theory reappeared in a modified form. Language was still +considered as a reflex action; however, it was conceived to be a reflex +which re-echoed the impressions of natural phenomena as they had affected +man. This was the exclamation theory which seeks the origin of language +in the “ohs and ahs,” the sighs and shouts of a feeling mind. Prof. Max +Müller calls this theory “the pooh-pooh theory.” This theory had also +to be discarded because it was in conflict with the actual facts of +the evolution of language. Next Noiré and Prof. Max Müller came with +their theory, called by Noiré “the synergastic theory,” which conceives +language as the expression of common work, also called by Noiré the Logos +theory, the sympathetic theory, and the causality theory. Prof. Max +Müller in order to forestall any deriders of this theory suggests calling +it “the yo-he-ho theory,” yo-he-ho being the sailors’ song when engaged +in some common work as hoisting or hauling. + +This yo-he-ho theory actually explains the origin of language, and it is, +so far as we can see, not in conflict with any historical or philological +facts. But in honor of the inventors of the onomatopoetic theory it must +be recognised that the main idea of the yo-he-ho theory is the same as +that of the bow-wow theory. The main idea is this: Language did not +originate in man’s mind out of itself in some mysterious way representing +a break in the continuity of evolution, but it is a certain reflex-action +of living and feeling beings taking place in consequence of external +stimuli. This reflex-action however is not direct, but indirect. It is +not that of a single being, it is the reflex-action of a whole society, +engaged in common work. It developed in consequence of their common +activity and through their want of intercommunication. + + * * * * * + +Prof. Max Müller charges against the evolutionist, that “the very fact +that no animal has ever formed a language is put aside simply as an +unfortunate accident.” Is this a fair reprehension? Is not the fact that +no animal, except man, crossed the Rubicon of language quite a distinct +problem? And accepting Professor Noiré’s theory of the origin of language +which considers speech as the product of a common activity accompanied +by what may be called _clamor concomitans_, I see very good reasons why +other animals did not develop language. First, there is no animal, with +the sole exception perhaps of ants and bees, that lives in societies. +Some of them live in herds, but there is a great difference between a +herd and a society. This difference is first a difference of degree, but +gradually it becomes a difference of kind. Secondly, animals have no +organs to work with, while man has his hands, and we may add, thirdly, +that no animal, not even the parrot, has the same power of articulation. + +Prof. Ludwig Noiré accepts without equivocation the idea that the +speechless ancestor of man became a rational being by developing language +and I was always under the impression that Prof. Max Müller agreed with +his late friend not only concerning the identity of language and reason, +but also concerning the origin of reason. But if Prof. Max Müller agrees +with Noiré, why does he object to the continuity of evolution which as +he states in a private letter to us is “only a beautiful postulate”? + +Now there are indeed facts which prove that the Rubicon of reason is not +so impassable to animals as Prof. Max Müller makes us believe. Let us +hear Noiré on the subject. He explains most logically that man performs +his many labors and has become a civilised being only with the help of +language, by naming things and handling them in his mind. Noiré says: + + “It can be graphically shown, how ideas may represent for + man the rôle of things real; how man has acquired the power + of combining in his representative faculty the most remote + objects, and thereby has been able to accomplish the great + miracles of human industry and commerce. But all this would + be utterly inconceivable without concepts, which impart to + percepts their unity and self-dependence, bring about and + multiply their rational connection. Hence also, no animal + can ever advance a single step beyond _present_ perceptive + representation, can never escape from the constraint with + which Nature circumscribes the narrow sphere of its wants. + Unfortunately, however, in apparent contravention of this rule, + ants to the present day carry on a regular and methodical + species of agriculture, keep livestock and domestics like + we! Nay, they have been caught in conversations and social + entertainments of a quarter of an hour’s duration—God save the + mark!”[12] + +This passage is full of humor, and the humor is slightly mingled with a +comical anger and self-irony. There is a fine theory excellent in every +respect worked out in all its details by the Professor and now he finds a +few trifles of facts which possess the impudence not to adapt themselves +to the theory. “_Gott besser’s_,” sighs Noiré, for it is not his fault +that the ants accomplish things which they ought not to, and the good +Lord is called upon to adapt nature with more rigidity to the Professor’s +theories. + +Is there not an obvious reason why ants stand so high in their +performances? Are not ants social beings, more so than any other animal? +We are ignorant still of all their means of communication. But that they +have some means of communication seems to be an established fact. When +ants from different hills but of the same kind give each other battle, +it happens not unfrequently that a warrior attacks another warrior of the +same people most fiercely, but both let go as soon as they touch each +other with their feelers.[13] I refrain from telling stories about the +life of these wonderful creatures partly because one well-authenticated +report is sufficient for our purpose and partly because I must suppose +that most of my readers are familiar with the facts as presented by +Darwin, Lubbock, Forel, Huber, and many others. I will add only one +observation which is so far as I know undisputed. If ants of a special +kind rob the larvæ of another kind and educate them as their slaves, the +slaves will in case of war or danger stand by their masters even against +their own folks. They evidently speak the language of the hill in which +they have been raised. + +Professor Forel successfully made the experiment, with the assistance of +ant-nurses, of raising together several kinds of ants from the larvæ of +hostile species. The ferocious Amazons and the Sanguineæ did not show +any enmity toward their comrades of the Pratensis and Rufa. When set +at liberty and transferred to a new residence they remained together +and behaved exactly as if they naturally belonged together. And this +experiment may be quoted to corroborate the proposition of Prof. Max. +Müller that “thought is thicker than blood.”[14] + +Now it would be a desperate case for Professor Noiré to maintain his +theory in the face of these facts, if by language we have to understand +vocal signs only. Yet the idea of his and also of Prof. Max Müller’s +theory consists in the truth that thoughts cannot walk about like ghosts +in bodiless nudity: they are a system of notation. As such they are +symbolised in signs and are inseparable from their signs. These signs are +sounds with men, and by words we understand usually sound-symbols. But +there are other systems of notation besides vocal signs and they are +for that reason not less language than speech. We have reason to believe +that ants are in possession of symbolical signs and that most of them are +communicated through their feelers. + +Professor Romanes describes the origin of ideas (in the second chapter of +“Mental Evolution in Man,” p. 23) in the following way: + + “Just as Mr. Galton’s method of superimposing on the same + sensitive plate a number of individual images gives rise + to a blended photograph, wherein each of the individual + constituents is partially and proportionally represented; so + in the sensitive tablet of memory, numerous images of previous + perceptions are fused together into a single conception, which + then stands as a composite picture, or class-representation, + of these its constituent images. Moreover, in the case of + a sensitive plate it is only those particular images which + present more or less numerous points of resemblance that admit + of being thus blended into a distinct photograph; and so in the + case of the mind, it is only those particular ideas which admit + of being run together in a class that can go to constitute a + clear concept.” + +Professor Romanes calls such a composite picture of sense-impressions +as must be supposed to exist in the animal brain “a recept” and he +distinguishes it from “the concept” of man. He says: “Reception means a +_taking again_.... The word ‘recept’ is seen to be appropriate to the +class of ideas in question, because in receiving such ideas the mind is +passive.” By “concept” however he understands “that kind of composite +idea which is rendered possible only by the aid of language or by the +process of naming abstractions as abstractions.”[15] + +We agree with Professor Romanes in the main point, viz. that the process +of evolution must be considered as uninterrupted, but we cannot agree +with him on several minor points.[16] + +We must express our doubt concerning the propriety of calling the mind +passive when receiving impressions. Every single sensation is an active +process, just as much as a reflex motion, and it may be considered as a +reaction that takes place in response to the stimulus of the impression. +Conception of course is also an active process, and concepts, the +products of conception, establish a new department in the mind. “Noiré, +quoted by Prof. Max Müller, says: ‘All trees hitherto seen by me leave +in my imagination a mixed image, a kind of ideal presentation of a tree. +Quite different from this is my concept, which is never an image.’”[17] + +And this is true. + +We have on another occasion explained that sensations are +sense-impressions which have acquired meaning.[18] Rays of light are +reflected from an object and fall upon the retina of an eye. Here they +produce a disturbance of nervous substance which is transmitted to the +brain where it is felt as the image say of a tree. Now the ether-waves +are not sight, but a certain form of ether-waves corresponds to a +certain form of sight, and the latter comes to stand for the former. The +mental picture of a tree becomes a symbol for a special object outside +of us and it is projected to the place where experience has taught +us to expect that object. In naming objects we repeat the process of +expressing by symbols. Sensations are symbols, and names are symbols of +symbols. The name and concept tree is not the composite picture of all +the trees I have seen, but it is the symbol of this composite picture +of sense-impressions. Sensations are like the chords of a piano and the +concepts are like the keys. The key is different in kind from the chord +which belongs to it. When I touch the key the chord will sound: when I +pronounce a name the composite sensation of all its analogous memories +will be awakened. + + * * * * * + +Can there be any question that difference in kind can originate by +degrees? Professor Romanes uses the phrase “different in kind” as +synonymous with “different in origin” and therefore declares that human +reason and animal intelligence are “different in degree” only. The +word “kind,” it is true, is at least as vague as the word species and a +naturalist may often be doubtful where to draw the line. Man and monkey +are different in kind, and they are also more different in origin than +Carl Vogt assumed, for man is not the descendant of any of the monkey +families now existent. But this does not disprove that they are of a +still remoter common origin or at least that they originated in the same +way in some amœboid form as simple life-substance. + +New formations which originate through combining are as much new +creations, i. e. things new in kind, as if they were produced through +special-creation acts of God which are said to be creations out of +nothing and not mere transformations. + +Man builds houses out of bricks and timbers. Is not the house something +different in kind from the trees and the clay from which the materials +have been taken? Is not the boiler of a steam-engine different in purpose +and accordingly also different in kind from a tea-kettle? Is not every +invention something different in kind? And is not the same true of the +products of thought? Is not a triangle something different in kind from +a line? And the origin of the former is not more miraculous than that of +the latter. A triangle is more complex than a line, but its existence +in the mind is not more of a mystery than the existence of the line. +Difference in kind need not include difference of origin. Harmony is +different in kind from melody. Notes in succession produce melody, while +simultaneous notes produce harmony. In either case it is simply a matter +of combination. + +Professor Romanes when speaking of the passivity of sense-impressions +seems to think of the unconsciousness of the process. We are not +conscious of the transformation of impressions into sensations while +we can become aware of our efforts to change the sense-material into +concepts. Yet the nature of mind is throughout activity. And no one has +perhaps insisted more strongly on the activity of mind than Prof. Max +Müller. But Prof. Max Müller distinguishes between the activity of the +mind and the ego which as he supposes performs that activity. He says +(“Science of Thought,” p. 63): + + “We think of a mind dwelling in a body, and we soon find + ourselves in the midst of psychological mythology. Let it be + clearly understood, therefore, that by Mind I mean nothing but + that working which is going on within, embracing sensation, + perception, conception, and naming, as well as the various + modes of combining and separating the results of these + processes for the purpose of new discovery. + + “But if Mind is to be the name of the work, what is to be the + name of the worker? It is not yet the Self, for the Self, in + the highest sense, is a spectator only, not a worker; but it is + what we may call the Ego, as personating the Self; it is what + other philosophers mean by the Monon, of which, as we shall + see, there are many. Let us call therefore the worker who does + the work of the mind in its various aspects, the Monon or the + Ego.” + +And in another passage (l. c., p. 552) he speaks of the simplicity of the +monon: + + “If then the process of thought is so simple as we saw, not + less simple, at least, than that of speech, it follows, that + the complicated apparatus which had been postulated by most + philosophers for the performance of thought in its various + spheres of manifestation, must make room for much plainer + machinery. Instead of intuition, intellect, understanding, + mind, reason, genius, judgment, and all the rest, we want + really nothing but a self-conscious Monon, capable of changing + all that is supplied by the senses into percepts, concepts, + and names. These changes may be represented as something + very marvellous, and we may imagine any number of powers and + faculties for the performance of them.” + + “Grant a Monon conscious of itself, and conscious therefore of + the impacts made upon it or the changes produced in it by other + Mona which it resists, and we require little more to explain + all that we are accustomed to call Thought.” + +The continuity of evolution naturally holds good according to Max Müller +for the natural man, but not for the Self. + +How is this? Is the monon perhaps conceived as not-natural or outside of +nature. Hardly. For Prof. Max Müller speaks of the object also as being a +monon.[19] If the objects are as much mona as the subjects the same laws +must hold good for both, and the subject-monon must be supposed to be an +object-monon if considered in its relation to other object-mona. + +If Prof. Max Müller’s protest against the continuity of evolution is not +based upon the dualism of natural and extra-natural mona, what can it +mean when he says that evolution does not hold good for the Self? + +If the Self is conceived as a monon, i. e. something “alone” like an +atomic unit, it can have no evolution. Evolution is change of form +through the production of new configurations. A monon or an isolated unit +considered by itself cannot evolve. It is as it ever has been and will +be—a monon. + +If this is Prof. Max Müller’s meaning, we must ask, How does he know +that the self is a monon and that objects are mona? Do they not, if so +conceived, become highly mysterious entities? New mona are constantly +born into this World. Whence do they come? Is every birth of a child +the new creation of another monon by the creator, who so distributes +the babes in the world that like babes are given to like parents thus +producing the wrong impression of heredity as well as of a continuity of +evolution? The idea of explaining all the activities of the mind by the +postulate of a conscious monon is very simple indeed, but the problems +which would arise from this postulate are extremely complex, and it seems +to us that after all the proposition of evolution is by far the simplest +solution of all the difficulties.[20] + +Mind as we conceive it is the product of evolution. Mind has been +evolved in a world which (judging from its product) must be conceived as +being freighted not only with energy but also with the potentiality of +feeling. Mind, as we know it in experience, is no monon, no indivisible +unit, but a unitary system of feelings and thoughts produced through +external impressions upon one part of the world by the rest of the world +which surrounds it. Mind is an abstract term; it does not denote a part +of the world, but a certain quality of a part of the world, viz. the +feelings and thoughts of special kinds of organisms. Mind is produced +through external impressions, but it does not consist merely of external +impressions. Mind, as we have stated before, is not passive; it is +active. It consists of the reactions which take place in response to +impressions and also of the accumulated products of these reactions. +Thus every mind is the concentrated effect of the whole cosmos upon one +special part of the cosmos, not as it takes place in one moment, but as +it has taken place in a definite and continuous period up to date. The +accumulation of these effects makes the mind grow and expand and the +system of the growth constitutes its specific character. We can as little +think of the mind as appearing suddenly by an act of special creation +as we can think that an oak tree can be created out of nothing or that +it can exist without previous growth. The law of continuity holds good +as much in the realm of the human mind as in the domain of animal and +plant-life. + + * * * * * + +So far we have borne in mind the philosophical and scientific aspect +only of the continuity of evolution. There is another aspect however +of no less importance, that is the religious view of the subject. We +do not believe that science and religion are two different spheres of +thought and that something may be true in science which is not true in +religion. Since the theory of evolution has revolutionised almost all our +sciences, we ask, what influence must this change of thought exercise +upon religion? Is not the religious idea of God destroyed and the whole +system of religion overturned? + +We think not. An old and very powerful system of theology which has been +considered as orthodox for centuries will become untenable as soon as +the idea of evolution and the continuity of evolution are recognised in +their sweeping importance; but religion itself will enter into a new +phase of evolution and the idea of God will not be cast aside as a +mere superstition of the Dark Ages, it will be purified and appear in a +greater and sublimer, in a nobler, higher, and in a truer conception than +ever before. + +The idea of God is an historical heirloom of past ages. The religious +man and the philosopher of all times have tried to put into it their +highest, their best, their grandest, and their purest emotions as well +as thoughts. And these thoughts were not meaningless, they were not mere +fancies. They contained the quintessence of their conception concerning +that feature of reality which has produced us as living, thinking, and +aspiring beings, and which still prompts us to aspire to higher aims. The +world which has produced other beings and ourselves, cannot be and is not +a meaningless congeries of material particles in motion. It is a living +cosmos. It is a grand harmonious universe pregnant with mind, and nothing +in it is suffered to exist for any length of time but that which conforms +to its laws; and that which conforms to its laws we call moral. + +The idea of God, however, as it is commonly taught in our schools is +full of pagan notions, and the very paganism of the present God-idea is +often supposed to be its deepest and holiest meaning. No wonder that +atheism increases with the progress of science! And why should not +atheism increase, if it is truer than a superstitious theism? Atheism +I believe will increase more and more until theism is cleansed of its +pagan notions. But atheism will not come to stay, for atheism is a mere +negative view and negations have no strength to live. They have power to +criticise and they will serve as a leaven in the dough. Their purpose is +the purification of the positive views. Negations will pass away as soon +as their purpose is fulfilled. + +The old pagan conception (now considered as orthodox) places God in the +dark nooks and crevices of our knowledge. Wherever science fails and +wherever our inquiring mind is entangled in problems which we cannot hope +to solve, wherever the continuity of nature and of the order of nature +is hidden from our intellectual sight, the so-called orthodox believer +comes forth and declares: “This is a holy place. Here is the finger of +God’s special interference!” Consider what a degrading view of God this +is! The place of darkness is conceived as an actual break in the order +of the world and this break is supposed to be a special revelation of +God! If we trust in truth, we need not shun the light of science and the +God of science—in contradistinction to the pagan notion of God—reveals +himself in the discoveries of science. God lives not in darkness but +in light, and his existence is proved not through the breaks in nature +(which we can be sure do not exist, and wherever they appear are due to +our ignorance) but through the order of nature, for God _is_ the order of +nature. God is that power through which we exist as living, thinking, and +aspiring beings, and to which we have to conform in order to live. + +When Darwin speaks of “life as having been originally breathed into a few +forms or into one _by the Creator_,” he either uses allegorical language +or he means that the beginning of life was an act of special creation. +He apparently means the latter and is in this respect not a consistent +evolutionist. Darwin was great as a reformer of natural science, but +in theology he still stood upon the old standpoint. He calls God to +rescue where science fails. The Creator did not originally breathe life +into the organism, but his breath is constantly ensouling all living +beings. Now suppose there were or there could be exceptions to the law of +causation, to the conservation of matter and energy, or to the continuity +of evolution, would that not rather be a drawback in nature? Are the +patches on a coat better proof that it was made by a tailor than the +whole coat? Any kind of theology which still recognises special-creation +acts, or miracles, or breaks in evolution, we do not hesitate to say, +is not yet free from paganism, for it still sticks to the religious +conception of the medicine-man that God is a great magician. The God of +the medicine-man lives in the realm of the unknown and he appears in +man’s imagination where the light of science fails. The God of science +however is the God of truth, and evidence of his existence is not found +in the darkness of ignorance but in the light of knowledge. God’s being +is not recognised in the seeming exceptions to natural laws, but in the +natural laws themselves. God’s existence is not proved by our inability +to trace here or there the order of cause and effect, as if a disorder +in the world made it divine; on the contrary the only rational ground +of a faith in God is the irrefragable cosmic order of the universe. It +is true that we have to give up the idea of a personal God, but is not a +superpersonal God greater than the idol which we have made unto our own +likeness? + +The God of science is perhaps more in agreement with the biblical God +than the God of dogmatic theology. The interpretations of biblical +passages which are at present generally considered as orthodox are +(merely from the standpoint of impartial exegetics) untenable. The first +chapter of Genesis has not one word about special-creation acts. Neither +the Elohim nor the Jahveh-Adonai account declares that in the beginning +there had been Nothing. Both accounts (Gen. Chap. I. 1 to II. 3, and +II. 3 et seqq.) agree that God “shaped” the world. The word _barah_ (to +shape, to form, to make) is nowhere used in the sense of creating out of +nothing. The Psalmist says, “By the word of the Lord were the heavens +made,” which was so interpreted in the New Testament that it meant “by +the logos,” and the gospel of St. John adds καὶ θεὸς ἦν ὁ λόγος, i. +e. and the word was God. Logos means rational speech or reason, and +the world-reason through which the heavens were made can mean only the +cosmic order of the universe. This idea of St. John’s thought out to its +ultimate conclusions means monism. + +There is a common error that scientific progress is dangerous to +religion. Scientific progress is dangerous to superstition only. Religion +(i. e. true religion) is not based upon our ignorance, but upon our +knowledge; it is not a child of the darkness but of the light, and faith +far from being a mere belief, i. e. the imperfect knowledge of an opinion +for which no proof is forthcoming, is applied knowledge, it is knowledge +plus the confidence that this knowledge can be made the basis of ethics +and the supreme rule for regulating our conduct in life. The history of +religion has been and is still a constant purification of our religious +ideas, and the crucible in which the religious ideas are purified is +science. We are slowly but constantly progressing toward a high religious +ideal and this ideal is a cosmical religion free from the pagan notions +so severely criticised by Christ and yet so carefully preserved by +the Christian churches. This cosmical religion will be the religion +of science. It will not consist of religious indifference nor of a +toleration of any and every opinion as is so often erroneously proclaimed +as the ideal of liberalism. On the contrary it will be in a certain sense +the most orthodox religion, for its maxim will be to stand on the truth +and nothing but the truth. And the truth is not at all indifferent or +tolerant. The truth is extremely intolerant and suffers no error beside +it, although, as a matter of course, the truth is very tolerant in so +far as it sanctions no violence but employs only the spiritual sword of +conviction by argument and logical proof. + +We have given up the idea of special acts of creation as the calling +forth disconnectedly of something out of nothing. We conceive the whole +world as an orderly cosmos, well regulated by laws and evolving the +forms of life in agreement with its laws. Is there less divinity in a +cosmos than in a half chaotic world in which God makes exceptions and +counteracts his own ordinances? Is the idea of creation less religious +if it ceases to mean an origination of something out of nothing? Is not +man at least just as wonderful if evolved step by step out of the dust +of the earth through innumerable stages in the long process of evolution +as if he were made directly out of clay? And is there less divinity in +his soul, is he any less shaped unto the image of God because his growth +took place according to natural laws? Natural laws, in the conception +of purified religion, of the religion of science, are nothing but the +ideas of God, eternal and immutable, and formulated by scientists not on +the ground of special revelations but on the ground of the universal and +unchangeable, and throughout consistent revelation of God in his works. + + * * * * * + +The science of language and the science of life are two important +highroads to the cognition of truth. That both sciences will be +consistent with each other, that their results will finally be seen to +harmonise perfectly is beyond all doubt and also that their bearing upon +religious ideas will contribute much to their purification. Prof. F. +Max Müller and Prof. George John Romanes are two great scholars, each +one is a leader in his own branch of knowledge, and where they come in +conflict, it appears to us, that they rather complement than refute each +other. Both are strong Monists, although emphasising different sides of +Monistic truth and we feel convinced that their very differences will +help us to elaborate more fully and clearly and more comprehensively +the great truth of Monism—of that Monism which will more and more be +recognised as the corner-stone of science and also of the religion of +science. + + EDITOR. + + +FOOTNOTES: + +[10] Compare the article _The Origin of Thought-Forms_ in the present +number, under the caption “Diverse Topics.” + +[11] I should prefer to speak of the oneness or inseparableness of +thought and language, but since Prof. Max Müller has sufficiently +explained himself, I use here his term “identity” in the sense of +inseparableness as it is used by Prof. Max Müller. + +[12] _The Logos Theory_, by Ludwig Noiré. Translated from the German. +_The Open Court_, iii. p. 2196. English translations of Noiré’s most +important articles concerning the origin of language, have appeared in +Nos. 33, 137, 139, 141, 142 of _The Open Court_. + +[13] That ants communicate with each other through their antennæ is an +undeniable fact. But Landois believes that they communicate also through +sounds. Some ants possess in their stridulation-organ a kind of a rattle +the sound of which, however, is perceptible to the human ear only in the +Ponera ants. + +[14] See _Three Lectures on the Science of Language_, p. 47. The Open +Court Publishing Co., Chicago. + +[15] Prof. Lloyd Morgan introduces several new terms, which seem well +coined. The mental product which is called the object of sense he calls +“construct”; the most prominent feature in a composite sense-image, he +calls the “predominant”; and if the predominant is named and isolated by +abstraction he calls it an “isolate.” + +[16] An impartial criticism of Professor Romanes’s position has been made +by Prof. Lloyd Morgan in his recent work _Animal Life and Intelligence_. + +[17] This quotation is requoted from Prof. Lloyd Morgan, _Animal Life and +Intelligence_, p. 325. + +[18] _The origin of Mind_, in _The Monist_, Vol. I. No. I. + +[19] L. c., p. 281. “So much about the subject or the monon. What now +about the objects or the mona?” + +[20] Prof. Max Müller is a great admirer of Kant and so am I. But it +appears to me that we differ greatly in what we accept as the essential +teachings of the master; and I grant willingly that Prof. Max Müller has +preserved the doctrines of Kant more faithfully than I. I have attempted +to modernise Kant. If I am called a Kantian (and I do not object to the +name, on the contrary I am proud of it) it is because I proceed from +Kant and I attempt to preserve the spirit of Kant’s philosophy rather +than his doctrines. For the sake of the spirit of Kantian philosophy I +have seen myself urged to surrender the idea of the thing-in-itself as +something unknowable. Prof. Max Müller has preserved in his philosophy +(for such is the _Science of Thought_) the Ding-an-sich theory. Believing +in things-in-themselves he must consistently believe in a self or monon, +for this monon is nothing but the thing-in-itself of the soul. + +I have limited myself in the present article to the principle of +continuity in evolution as a point of divergence between Prof. Max Müller +and the views defended by _The Monist_. If I attempted at present to +enter into the philosophical problem of things-in-themselves, I should be +obliged to tax too much the patience of my readers. But as I am convinced +that the reason of our difference with Prof. Max Müller concerning the +continuity of evolution lies deeper still, I intend to treat the subject +of things-in-themselves in a future number. + + + + +LITERARY CORRESPONDENCE + + + + +I. + +FRANCE.—THE INTELLECTUAL AWAKENING OF THE LANGUE D’OC. + + +I have never seen mentioned in your periodical publications the _Revue +des Pyrénées_; and perhaps I should never have heard of the periodical +myself if I had not been in this interesting old city, and if my eye +had not chanced on the title of one of the articles of a recent number +advertised in a local journal. “Un Ariégeois sénateur des Etats-Unis +d’Amérique: Pierre Soulé” was the title that attracted my attention and +caused me to procure a copy, which I have found interesting in more ways +than one. + +The publication is a well-printed quarterly of 150 pages, and has +completed some time since the second year of its existence. Its full +title is as follows: _Revue des Pyrénées et de la France meridionale, +Organe de l’Association Pyrénéenne et de l’union des Sociétés Savantes +du Midi_. The founders of the periodical are the late JULIEN SACAZE, a +savant much venerated in these parts, and DR. F. GARRIGOU, its present +editor. + +The Association Pyrénéenne, of which, as we have just seen, the _Revue_ +is the organ, is an active and significant organisation. Here are some +of its aims. While it recognises the greatness of the Capital, Paris, +it advocates decentralisation, by “showing that workers living in the +provinces are as capable as others, though enjoying less support and +funds, to aid in the building up of the great scientific edifice of +France.” The importance and boldness of this declaration can scarcely be +appreciated by those who have not breathed for some time the excessively +monopolistic atmosphere of the French capital, which has been so baneful +to so many national interests. The Association would also act as a +means of union between the various learned societies of the South, the +Midi, and thus render it possible to organise an annual Congress “for +the discussion and defense of the grand scientific, industrial, and +commercial questions which concern Southern France.” + +Here we see brought out still more precisely that rivalry between the +South and North, characteristic of most nations, and which presents such +curious aspects in the past and present history of France. + +I never weary of quietly noting, while in the South, the delightful +contempt which the _méridionaux_ show for their Parisian fellow +countrymen. The other day at dinner, for instance, I heard a learned +professor of one of the Southern Universities defending the Southern +accent and preferring it to “the Parisian accent,” as he put it. But I +would need pages of your space to develop this line of thought. Suffice +it to say here that the Association Pyrénéenne and its organ the _Revue +des Pyrénées_ intend to prove, and have succeeded in proving, if we may +judge by this number of the _Revue_ and by the account of the proceedings +of the first Congress of the Association, placed at the head of the +number, that there are creditable savants and sound learning outside of +the walls of Victor Hugo’s “Ville Lumière.” + +Another object of the Association would be dear to Castelar’s heart. +I give it in full: “To remove morally the grand Pyreneean curtain and +to offer the hand of friendship to a nation justly proud of its past, +whose interests touch our own, and which has the right, because of +the illustrious sons of Catalonia, Aragon, and Navarre, to take part +in an intellectual and Pyreneean association based on science.” This +is a paraphrase of Louis XIV’s famous remark concerning the Pyrenees, +when he placed his grandson on the throne of Spain. Nor can one be +surprised at the strong affection which binds Southern France to the +Iberian peninsula. The grand mountains, the “Pyreneean curtain,” which +separate the two countries, are always in sight, their snow-capped peaks +glittering in the sun; the various _patois_, especially the dialect +of Pau, resemble the Spanish more than they do the French tongue; +Spanish money is foisted on you at the shops, and picturesque Spanish +mountaineers lend a peculiar charm to the country fairs, while the nation +is ever on the eve of a pronunciamento, destined to give to Spain the +republican institutions of France. + +But to return to PIERRE SOULÉ who is the cause and starting point of this +letter. Commandant Trespaillé’s eulogistic biographical sketch is of +slight interest to American readers, who can find elsewhere a fuller and +more exact account of the brilliant but rather disappointing career of +the once famous Franco-Louisiana statesman. M. Trespaillé’s reference to +“Old Hickory” as “the immortal Jackson,” his statement that the American +people is full of prejudices against the French race, his metamorphosing +New Hampshire’s only President into Pierre Francklin, and some other +similar slips can be overlooked, for this essay offers a striking example +of the dominant idea of the _Revue_, the Association and patriotic +Southerners generally,—the glorification of the great men and great +actions of the sunny South, the “Midi ensoleillé.” + +And I must admit, foreigner though I am, that I share much of this +enthusiasm for persons and things meridional, and especially for the +latter. What a land this is for historical and archæological study! +Take this number of the _Revue des Pyrénées_, for instance; it is full +of it. Here, for example, are the titles of three of the papers read +at the first Congress of the Association Pyrénéenne, to which Congress +I referred above: “The Domitian Road from Narbonne to Perpignan,” “The +Third Century School of Sculpture in Southern Gaul,” and “The Roman Road +from Narbonne to Carcassonne.” There are several articles in the _Revue_ +about the University of Toulouse, which is stated to be the oldest in +France after that of Paris, having been founded in 1229, more than two +hundred and fifty years before the discovery of America. The law school +even antedates 1229 and its foundation is lost in the obscurity of +the early centuries of the Christian era. Another article begins the +publication of a list of the professors at the law school. The first +recorded name dates from 1251. When one finds such themes as these on +every hand, Rome, Gaul, the Middle Ages, and feudalism become almost +living realities. And how inexhaustibly rich Languedoc is in these +reminders of the distant past. + +And the patois or dialects of this part of France are not the least +ancient and interesting subjects for study. Wonder is often expressed +that the English of America differs so slightly from the English of +England, with three thousand miles of ocean separating the two countries. +The wonder increases when you find that here in Languedoc the same patois +differs in some particulars from town to town. Let me first mention some +big differences and then touch upon some minor ones. If you take the +train which leaves Toulouse at about half past eleven in the morning, +you will arrive at Pau at half past four. During these five hours on a +pretty slow train you have passed from one patois to another. The lower +classes of Toulouse cannot understand the lower classes of Pau. And +if you continue in the same train, at about half past eight you reach +Mauléon, in the French Basque Provinces, where the populace of neither +Toulouse nor Pau could carry on a conversation with the populace of +Mauléon. Thus a nine hours’ ride of about 175 miles on an accommodation +train carries you through a region where French is the vernacular of the +educated classes and is the official language, but where the great mass +of the population is divided into three groups, each speaking a different +dialect. + +The modifications which the same patois undergoes in neighboring +localities is not less curious though of course not so radical. Roughly +speaking it may be said that the same patois is spoken from Montpellier +to Bordeaux and from Toulouse well up into the centre of France, which +embraces the region where prevailed the Langue d’oc from which the +present patois is derived. But, while a peasant could make himself +understood throughout this wide territory, his ear would often be +perplexed by more than one strange word and phrase. I was once told on +the Riviera that the patois of Menton differed considerably from that of +Nice and that this was particularly the case before the construction of +the Corniche road and the railway, when a denizen of the former place +could reach the latter city only by doubling Cape Martin under sail. I +do not know how true this statement is, but I believe it to be correct, +after a superficial study on these same lines which I have just made in +the Department of the Tarn, one of the most isolated portions of Upper +Languedoc. I find that the patois of towns as near together, as are New +York, Newark, Patterson, Nyack and Tarrytown, for example, differs, not, +perhaps, in its construction but in its vocabulary. Let me give some +examples. Thus, potato, which is _truffet_ at Cordes, becomes _truffo_ +at Castres. _Patano_, the word employed in the South East end of the +Department is also heard at Castres, but never at Cordes, which is in the +North West end of the Department, Castres being about in the centre. Dog +is _cagnot_ and _cô_ at Cordes, and _gous_ at Castres. (At Montpellier, +in a contiguous Department it is _tschi_, while at Pau they say _can_, +which approaches very near the Latin.) Pig is _pourcel_ at Castres and +_tessou_ at Cordes. Broom _engranicro_ at Castres and _balatso_ at +Cordes. I have also noted the following difference between the Tarn +patois and that of Pau. The _f_ of the former always becomes an aspirated +_h_ in the latter. Thus, _femo_, woman (Castres) is _henno_ at Pau; +_fourco_, pitchfork (Castres) _hourco_ (Pau); _foun_ fountain (Castres) +_houn_ (Pau). + +A comparison of this patois with the French as regards the spelling of +geographical names reveals a fact that would somewhat dampen the ardor +of our friend Colonel Shephard, of New York, in his effort to force the +gazeteers to give geographical names as they are written in the countries +where they are found. One might have thought that such near neighbors as +the Langue d’oil and the Langue d’oc would have come to some rational +understanding on this point and that the Ile-de-France would have +accepted the spelling of Languedoc. But not so. The towns and rivers of +this part of France look as different in French and patois printed pages +and sound as differently when pronounced by educated and peasant mouths, +as do the towns and rivers of Italy when seen in Italian and English +books or when spoken by Americans and Italians. Thus Toulouso became +Toulouse; Castros, Castres; Dourgnos, Dourgne; Carcassouno, Carcassonne; +Narbouno, Narbonne; Billofranco, Villefranche; Labaou, Lavaur; Bibiers, +Viviers; Boou, Vour; Abrayrou, Aveyron; Cordos, Cordes, etc. + +These patois, these dialects of the old Langue d’oc, are awakening just +now increasing interest in the literary circles of the Midi, for it is +only within recent years that the French has appeared to threaten their +extinction. The spread of the railroad system and especially the wide +development of the primary school since the advent of the Third Republic, +are dealing deadly blows at these popular dialects. But they are still +far from moribund. I have frequently been told that even to-day one +stumbles now and then on old peasants living up in the isolated Black +Mountain, a spur of the Cévennes, and which divides Upper from Lower +Languedoc, who cling to _oc_, although _obe_ or _ope_, or the French +_oui_ and _si_, are the common affirmative particles of the patois. + +It has often happened to me when taking a constitutional to ask my way +and discover that I am addressing a person who neither understands +nor speaks French, though, as a rule, all peasants understand French +and the vast majority can speak the language too, but after a rather +sorry fashion. A foreigner finds at least one comfort in all this: in +Languedoc he uses the national tongue more correctly than thousands of +native born Frenchmen! Nor is the knowledge of patois confined to the +peasantry or the working classes of the towns. The _bourgeoisie_, with +exceedingly rare exceptions, are quite at home in it, and the children +of the nobility often prattle with their peasant nurse more easily in +patois than in the polished speech of their parents. During a political +campaign, it is a very common thing for a would-be deputy to address +country voters in their familiar dialect, thereby gaining the favor not +alone of the _félibres_; while, during this same period of electoral +excitement, the local papers publish almost daily editorials written in +patois. In hundreds of rural churches the short sermon after early mass +is preached in patois, and many a time I have found myself turning with +surprise when I heard French spoken in the streets of Languedocian towns +of considerable size. + +There was a time when the government and the ruling classes of Languedoc +itself strove to eradicate these dialects and to substitute French +for them. The aim was a patriotic one; greater national unity, it was +believed, would thus be secured. But that period has gone by, and at +present there is a strong tendency to preserve from destruction these +linguistic souvenirs of a rapidly fading past. What the enthusiastic +_félibres_ would do for Provençal, they and their disciples and imitators +in Languedoc would do for the dialects of South Western France. At the +Congrès d’Etudes Languedociennes, held recently at Montpellier, one of +the members proposed that the French language should be taught in the +primary schools through the medium of the langue d’oc. The suggestion +is not so chimerical as it appears to be at first blush, for one of the +greatest and never-ending difficulties of the country schoolmaster in +this part of France is to teach his scholars the three R’s by means of +the French, which is a foreign tongue to ninety-nine out of a hundred +of them. One is not surprised, therefore, to find that one of the +resolutions passed by this same Congress takes up the plan proposed in +the paper just referred to, and declares in favor of “the utilisation of +the langue d’oc for teaching French in the primary schools.” + +At a recent sitting of the General Council of the Bordeaux University a +resolution was passed calling for the creation of a chair of “Southern +languages.” In explanation of this term, the _Gironde_, the leading +Bordeaux newspaper, says: “Besides giving instruction in Spanish, one of +the labors of the professor would be to teach our South Western dialects +in which the most important historical documents of this part of the +country were drawn up during several centuries.” The editor then goes on +to say: “If the State does not feel able to found this chair, will not +some private individual come forward and imitate the example of James E. +Clark, who recently established at Worcester, Mass., a university endowed +with a capital of $12,500,000?” + +Speaking of primary schools reminds me of a curious fact which has +frequently attracted my attention in Languedoc this winter. In no other +part of France perhaps was it so common for a town to grow up around a +castle; for this region was terribly harried by the Wars of Religion, +and the poor peasants were forced to seek the protection of some lord. +In order to render them more impregnable, these castles were generally +built on some high hill. So now one sees on every hand decaying hamlets +surrounding ruined castles left almost deserted on the very crown of some +pyramidal mount, while the busy town of to-day has descended to the more +accessible base of the hill. But since the advent of the Third Republic +and the grand impetus given to primary instruction, these abandoned +castles have taken a new lease of life, and been converted into school +buildings. The other day during an hour’s drive in Upper Languedoc I saw +two of these old useless feudal piles consecrated to popular nineteenth +century education. What a train of reflections is thus suggested! Within +the very same walls where some proud ignorant seignior once lorded it +over his humble vassals, the descendants of these serfs, still speaking +the tongue of their oppressed ancestors, but enjoying all the liberties +then usurped by their masters, are now being instructed in branches of +knowledge of which the feudal knight had scarcely an inkling. What a +revolution was that of ’89! + + THEODORE STANTON. + + + + +II. + +GERMANY.—RECENT PUBLICATIONS IN THE DOMAIN OF PATHOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY. + + +The science of anthropology claims, as we know, to have discovered, that +the various epochs of history are marked not only by characteristic +religious, political, social, and literary conditions, but not +unfrequently also by particular forms of disease; and it is the opinion +of eminent medical authorities that nervous and mental diseases +constitute the “pathological feature” of modern civilisation. This, +of course, is not to be understood as meaning that diseases of this +character have not appeared in previous epochs, but simply that they +occur with unusual frequency at the present day and in unusually grave +forms. + +A book treating of the affliction of the age ought to count on a large +circle of readers, and it will be all the more deserving of such if it +thoroughly and skilfully fulfils its purpose of holding up the mirror to +the time and of imparting the light and advice required in this matter. +This has been done in an excellent manner by the work of the Bremen +alienist Dr. SCHOLZ, entitled _Die Diätetik des Geistes—Ein Führer zu +praktischer Lebensweisheit_, which has just appeared in its second and +enlarged edition, Leipsic, E. H. Mayer. This book is distinguished from +the majority of similar recent publications intended for a greater public +by its relative thoroughness. It must be characterised as thorough and +comprehensive, also, in comparison with the older and more celebrated +work, which its title at once suggests, FEUCHTERLEBEN’S _Diätetik +der Seele_. The character of the book is not “purely psychological,” +overlooking the high importance of the influence of the body, as was +the case with Beneke; nor does it lean towards the moralising of a +Heinroth and Ideler; nor does the author treat his subject from an +exclusively medical point of view: the work, in fact, is anthropological +in character. Its contents possess chiefly in two respects great +interest: (1) from a universal human point of view, in that it affords +us a glance into the awful abysses of life, in the company of an expert +guide who tells us how these depths are to be avoided, or at least gives +consolation to those whose way leads necessarily through them; and (2) +from a pedagogical point of view, in that it directs attention to the +heredity of the morbid constitutions and abnormalities that oppose +obstacles to education or may become such if improperly treated. + +It is obvious that morbid mental dispositions must be taken into account +in all work of education and instruction, if we wish to avoid an +egregious violation of the universally recognised requirement to regard +individuality. And from this point of view the book of Dr. Scholz will +awaken in readers who have anything to do at all with education, the +desire to learn more about the nature of morbid mental life in the young +than is presented in this treatise destined for a large public. + +Such a wish would have had to remain unsatisfied six years ago, when the +_Diätetik des Geistes_ first appeared. It is true, English physicians +particularly, like West, Conolly, Maudsley, and others, had a long time +previously directed attention to the morbid phenomena of infant psychic +life, but their work, like that of their French and German professional +associates, lies buried in medical magazines and volumes not easily +accessible. The first to apply himself to the work needed in this +condition of affairs was Professor EMMINGHAUS, who digested and collected +all the material, thus supplied, in a compendious work bearing the title +_Die psychischen Störungen des Kindesalters_, Tübingen, Laupp, 1887. The +fact indeed is not to be left unrecognised that the book, in so far as it +may be used by those who have not had a medical training, possesses two +defects,—defects, however, for which the author cannot be censured. In +the first place, it is intended for physicians only, and is therefore, +on account of the many technical terms it uses, at times not uniformly +intelligible. To the serious student, however, who possesses the previous +psychological and physiological knowledge most indispensable, it presents +no difficulties of too great magnitude. The second defect likewise +springs from the purpose of the work. It consists in the fact that, +excepting a few occasional references and hints, the pedagogical aspect +of the question is not considered. Pedagogists, here, are confronted with +a problem which must be solved, and of which the solution will certainly +not be a thankless task. The writer of these lines has approached one +aspect of this question in a treatise of his entitled _Nervosität and +Mädchenerziehung_, Wiesbaden, 1890, in the course of which study he has +arrived at the conviction that an important factor is lacking in modern +pedagogics and the training of teachers. This conviction he has put into +words in another treatise, _Geistesstörungen in der Schule_, Wiesbaden, +1891, with what success it remains for the future to say. + +Two years after the appearance of Emminghaus’s work a translation was +published in Germany of a French book of a similar character. _Der Irrsin +im Kindesalter_, by Dr. PAUL MOREAU, authorised edition by Dr. Demetrio +Galatti, Stuttgart, 1889, Ferdinand Enke, publisher. Unfortunately, +Moreau, as his own preface reveals, did not know, when he wrote his +book, of the existence of the German work,—a circumstance that has not +been without regrettable consequences. Taken in conjunction with the +work of Emminghaus, however, Moreau’s book possesses, on account of the +numerous morbid cases it gives, a high value; although it cannot bear +comparison with the former work in richness of material and familiarity +with the literature of the subject, and much less so in the psychological +treatment of the subject, where Emminghaus is incomparably subtler and +more profound. + +A treatise that is closely related, in point of subject-matter, on +the one hand to the works of Emminghaus and Moreau, and on the other +to the books of Preyer (_Die Seele des Kindes_) and Pérez (_Les trois +premières années de l’enfant_ and _L’enfant de trois à sept ans_) on +the development of children, has just been published by a Leipsic +teacher under the title of _Die Periodicität in der Entwickelung +der Kindesnatur_, _Neue Gesichtspunkte für Kinderforschung und +Jugenderziehung_, by GUSTAV SIEGERT, Leipsic, 1891, R. Voigtländer. +The author endeavors, in a very interesting manner we must admit, to +show that, in the development of the child, lasting states in regular +alternate succession occur of mental and physical buoyancy on the one +hand and depression on the other, of moral exaltation, likewise, and +moral subsidence. The fundamental cause of this periodical alternation, +of the general existence of which numerous proofs are adduced, is +supposed to lie in the alternate strengthening and relaxation of the +individual’s forces of action, brought on by the expenditure and +reproduction of energy; additional determinative causes, accelerative as +well as retardatory, are found in intercourse with the world and with +other human beings. We may call the former the individual and the latter +the social cause of the phenomena of periodicity. In the application of +his results to juvenile education the author arrives at some far-reaching +propositions of reform, the consideration of which, however, we shall +have to leave to the pedagogical press. + +We shall have to preserve the same attitude with regard to a new work +of the well-known Leipsic professor Dr. STRUMPELL—_Die pädogogische +Pathologie oder die Lehre von den Fehlern der Kinder_, Leipsic, 1890, +Verlag von Georg Böhme Nachfolger. We must refer here to this otherwise +highly deserving book only in one respect, where we have occasion for +censure. The author does not in his expositions sufficiently take account +of the intimate connection between physical and mental phenomena, and the +consequence of this is among other things that he excludes pathological +mental conditions (the physical causes of which he is forced to admit) +as a matter of principle from the pedagogic system and consigns them +entirely into the charge of the physician. In our treatise mentioned we +have explained why this is not allowable, as well as, in addition, what +portion of duty devolves on the teacher in the consideration of these +pathological mental conditions. Strumpell’s mistake springs from the +fact that he conceives with Herbart the essential object of education +to be intellectual culture. Allowing that Herbart cannot be taken to +task for entertaining this conception, we may yet demand of Strumpell +the recognition of the results of recent physiological psychology to the +extent at least of perceiving that psychical and physical phenomena are +_one_ if not the _same_. Even the opponents of Monism dare not overlook +this truth,—a truth moreover that admits very well of reconciliation with +the Herbartian pluralism to which Strumpell is devoted. + +We might cite here numerous pathological conditions of mind that very +plainly spring from physical causes and to which the instructor has to +give attention just as much as the physician. Instead, however, of citing +particular cases, we will refer to three little treatises that are in +the highest degree instructive on this point, not only for teachers +exclusively but also for all who have to do with children. Dr. MAXIMILIAN +BRESGEN, specialist in diseases of the nose and throat at Frankfort on +the Main, has published at the house of Leopold Voss in Hamburg (1890) +a brochure entitled _Ueber die Bedeutung behinderter Nasenathmung nebst +besonderer Berücksichtigung der daraus hervorgehenden Gedächtniss- und +Geistesschwäche_. A treatise of like character is that of Dr. med. +LENZMANN of Duisburg, entitled _Ueber den schädlichen Einfluss der +behinderten Nasenathmung auf die körperliche und geistige Entwickelung +des Kindes_, Bielefeld, 1890, Anders Verlag. Both treatises contain, +among other things not to be considered here, instructive examples of +the rise and disappearance of that morbid mental condition to which Hack +first directed notice in Germany but which elsewhere became known through +the researches of the Dutch physician Guye by the name of _Aprosesia +nasalis_. The third treatise is by Dr. med. RALF WIECHMANN, specialist +for nervous diseases at Brunswick, and bears the title _Eine sogenannte +Veitstanzepidemie in Wildbad_, Leipsic, 1890, Verlag von Georg Thieme. +By St. Vitus’s dance (Ger. _Veitstanz_) we understand the disease of +which the well-known symptoms are involuntary muscular twitchings usually +accompanied by severe or light psychical disturbances, known in medicine +by the name of _chorea minor_ and _chorea rhythmica_, and sometimes +occurring in epidemics. At the school in Wildbad the number of the +afflicted children rose in the course of time to twenty-six. Wiechmann +expatiates at length in his book on the character of the contagion, and +arrives through an exhaustive use of the existing literature on the +subject at the result, that there was present in the individual children +attacked substantially a physical predisposition, an unstable nervous +system. As the first children attacked were not removed, the convulsive +motions were seen and perceptually taken up by the other children, who +were just approaching the period of puberty and labored under hereditary +predispositions. “Once these images had entered perceptually into the +unstable brain, they became competent to operate as stimuli and to be +translated into involuntary muscular motions.” + +The conclusion of my letter may be taken up with the discussion of a +treatise that deserves a somewhat more detailed consideration. The +director of the Royal Würtembergian State Insane Asylum at Zwiefalten, +Dr. F. L. A. Koch, who already possesses eminent repute in the domain +of psychiatry, has just published the first part of a new work called +_Die psychopathischen Minderwertigkeiten—Erste; Abteilung: Einleitung, +Die angeborenen andauernden psychopathischen Minderwertigkeiten_, +Ravensburg, 1891, Verlag von Otto Maier. In this work the author extends +the development of the ideas he some time previously outlined in his +_Rudiments of Psychiatry_, second edition, 1889. In the expression +“psychopathische Minderwertigkeiten” (psychopathical secondary factors) +Koch embraces all those psychical irregularities, be they natural or +acquired, affecting the life of the human personality, which though in +the severest cases even not amounting to actual mental disorders, yet in +the most favorable instances so affect the persons afflicted with them +that they appear as lacking the full possession of mental normality and +capacity. Primarily, of course, the treatise is intended for physicians, +and the author counts on the gratitude of this profession in so far as +he has undertaken to put in independent form the separate facts formerly +scattered over the whole domain of psychiatry, to free them from other +neuro- and psycho-pathological subjects, and to unite them into one +special group of pathological states. But the author also counts on his +book being used by the representatives of other professions, by pastors, +tutors, teachers, jurists, sociologists, historians, and the like, and +indeed with perfect justice. + +The savers of souls, if they had mastered to a slight degree even +the comprehension of the psychopathical secondary factors, would be +astonished to see how many people there are in the case of whom medicine +is more effective against “spiritual” vexations than pastoral advice, +and that often such advice, being one-sided and starting from false +assumptions, does harm only. They would see in the peculiarity of the +religious needs and tribulations of many a man a psycho-pathological +abnormality; they would come to understand how the otherwise +unintelligible badness of many another has its source in a pathological +basis: they would not regard and hail as absolutely good, moreover, many +“good impulses”;—all this they would find out if they had learned to +note and comprehend what the import is of such persons being descended +from neurotic ancestors, of their exhibiting palpable indications of +degeneration, and having also perhaps insane, idiotic, whimsical, and +epileptical brothers and sisters. They would furthermore perfectly +comprehend, that in the case of people who are descended from healthy +parents, but who from being in times past happy and joyful Christians +are now struggling with distractions of soul, it were often better +first to inquire after the state of their organs of digestion. And they +would be able to deal quite differently from formerly with many a soul +entrusted to their care, perhaps also more easily to conquer, or at least +to endure, some secret burden of their own lives. The import of the +book for the educator is easily inferrible from the remarks made. For +the jurist, who has to deal with the problems of accountability and the +administering of punishment, its importance is manifest. Sociology, too, +the deeper it enters into its problems, will not be able to dispense with +psychopathology, and in this field it is precisely the psychopathical +secondary factors that eminently demand attention. In that which concerns +its connection with history we need only mention the names of Lombroso, +Emminghaus (_Allgemeine Psychopathologie_) and Möbius (_Rousseaus +Krankheitsgeschichte_), to point out the importance of a work like that +before us. We recommend it without reserve to all whom it touches. + + CHR. UFER. + +Altenburg, July, 1891. + + + + +ÉMILE LITTRÉ. + + + Some debts there are that make the debtor proud; + So ours to him, who could philosophise + With common-sense, and sweep from starry skies + The brain-spun webs that darken like a cloud. + + We loved him, for his highest thoughts avowed + Our own akin and less than ours allies; + Born of the common soil but born to rise + And light the labor of the laurel-browed. + + Justice he traced to truth; morality, + Back to the brutish primal needs of man; + And stood himself for all the best might be. + + He wrought in words, a faithful artisan; + And lived to shame their loutish mockery + Whose virtue ended where his own began. + + LOUIS BELROSE, JR. + + + + +DIVERSE TOPICS. + + + + +THE ORIGIN OF THOUGHT-FORMS. + + +Dr. H. Potonié, the editor of the _Naturwissenschaftliche Wochenschrift_, +Berlin, advances in one of its recent numbers (Vol. vi. 15) the following +proposition concerning the origin of the forms of thought: “All the +forms of thought have originated in the struggle for life not otherwise +than the forms of organisms.” This is further explained in the following +sentence: “Those conceptions which are called _a priori_, are inherited; +they have been necessarily used by the primitive thinking organisms and +are now in their disposition immediately present. Yet they have been +gained by experience. Without any knowledge, for instance, of space and +time, no action is possible; accordingly their conception is perhaps the +oldest and therefore it appears aprioristic.” + + +I. THOUGHT-FORMS AND THE FORMS OF EXISTENCE. + +We agree with Dr. Potonié that thought-forms grow naturally and that they +grow such as they are, of necessity. In our opinion formal thought, with +its so-called _a priori_ theorems, is derived from the thought-forms by +abstraction. (See “Fundamental Problems” pp. 26-60, the chapter Form and +Formal Thought.) If it had been possible for other thought-forms to have +originated together with those which we possess at present, and it may be +parenthetically remarked that we do not consider it as possible; but _if_ +it had been possible, we do not deny that all the other thought-forms +would have gone to the wall, they would have perished in the struggle for +existence and our present thought-forms alone would have survived. In +this we agree with Dr. Potonié, and a naturalist may be satisfied with +this statement, because it suffices for his purposes. The recognition +of the objective validity of the laws of formal thought is all that +the specialist wants for this or that branch of science. But this +recognition is not sufficient for the philosopher. He has to understand +the problem why the subjective laws of purely formal thought possess an +absolute and an objective validity for the world of real existences. He +must understand not only how thought-forms originated, but also why and +on what ground the laws of formal thought are considered as necessary +and universal truths. The question of their origin and growth is of +secondary importance compared with the question of their rigidity and +apriority. + +Mr. Herbert Spencer has made the same proposition as Dr. Potonié and +his view briefly expressed is this: “The laws of formal thought are _a +priori_ to the individual, but _a posteriori_ to the race.” In other +words apriority must be explained by heredity. A dog cannot count, +because none of his ancestors have ever counted, but a child has the +faculty to learn counting because innumerable ancestors of his have +counted and his brain possesses a predisposition to learn counting +easily. Concerning our apprehension of space-relations which expressed as +mathematical theorems appear to us necessary and are called _a priori_, +Mr. Spencer says: + + “We cannot think otherwise because during that adjustment + between the organism and the environment which evolution has + established, the inner relations have been so moulded upon + the outer relations that they cannot by any effort be made + not to fit them. Just in the same way that an infant’s hand, + constructed so as to grasp by bending the fingers inwards, + implies ancestral hands which have thus grasped, and implies + objects in the environment to be thus grasped by this infantine + hand when it is developed, so the various structures fitting + the infant for apprehension of space-relations, imply such + apprehensions in the past by its ancestors and in the future by + itself.” + +Man’s ability to learn counting is inherited, and there may be more or +less of it in different people. Mathematical talent is inherited just as +much as musical talent or other faculties. But the philosophical question +concerning the apriority of mathematical theorems has nothing whatever to +do with the origin of mathematical talent. When Mr. Spencer declares that +apriority is but an inherited aposteriority, this is equivalent and is +intended to be equivalent to an actual denial of all apriority. His very +explanation proves that he does not see the real problem, and in the same +way Dr. Potonié overlooks it entirely. The philosophical problem of the +apriority is not an historical problem, it cannot be solved by tracing +the evolution of thought-forms. The philosopher does not ask how did +thought-forms originate, but why do we attribute to the laws of formal +thought necessity and universality and on what ground can we justify our +assumption? + +Mr. Spencer compares our apprehension of space-relations to our inherited +habit to grasp with our hands and to walk with our feet. This comparison +is misleading and inappropriate. That we grasp with our hands and walk +with our feet is incidental. There are animals who have developed other +limbs for the same purposes. There are monkeys who grasp with their +tails and the elephant grasps with his nose. There is no necessity and +no universality in our predisposition of grasping with our hands. Yet +there resides necessity and universality in the laws of formal thought +so that wherever animals develop rational thought we are sure that to +them twice two will always equal four just as much as it does to us. +However they may be different in other respects: they may be winged +creatures or may be somewhat like our ants, they may have developed other +bodily structures than we can dream of, nevertheless their arithmetic, +their logic, and their mathematics will in all essentials be exactly the +same as ours. There are animals whose thought-forms are not as highly +developed as in man, but there are no animals in whom they are developed +differently. We must consider it as impossible even that on other stars +rational creatures can be found whose reason differs from ours. To them +also twice two will be four. + + +II. THE PROBLEM OF APRIORITY. + +Kant did not call the formal laws _a priori_ in order to characterise +them as innate ideas, but simply to denote that their validity is +necessary and universal. If I have to walk twice a distance of two miles, +I know “beforehand” (i. e. _a priori_) that I shall have to walk four +miles—even before I have made the actual experience. And this wonderful +quality of giving information beforehand is characteristic of all the +laws of formal thought. It is certain that our ability of applying the +laws of formal thought has been acquired by experience in the race as +well as in the individual. But their necessity has to do with experience +in so far only as its recognition is the indispensable condition of all +methodical experience—i. e. of science. The laws of formal thought and +our recognition of their necessity and universality (alias, “apriority”) +are the organ of any and all scientific cognition. The methods of the +sciences are exact measuring and counting based upon the faith that the +laws of measuring and counting are unalterable and unfailingly reliable. +We know beforehand that they will hold good for all possible cases. + +Our experience of millenniums suffices to prove that the laws of formal +thought agree with the laws of actual existence, and Kant’s view to +consider them as merely subjective and not objective appears to me +untenable. We may fairly consider Kant’s subjectivism as a thing of the +past. And the agreement of the forms of objectivity with the forms of +subjectivity is easily explained when we bear in mind that the thinking +subject is a part of the objective world. It is but natural that the +forms of existence are impressed upon the thinking subject as forms of +thought. + +Yet the question of the necessity and universality of the laws of form +remains. Can we comprehend why the form of objective reality as well as +of subjective thought must be such as they are, and might they not just +as well be different? Is this question legitimate and can it be answered? +We say Yes, the question is legitimate and can be answered. + +All the laws of formal thought are products of thought-operations which +are based on no other principle than that of identity (_A_ = _A_). As +soon as thinking beings have developed to that degree of thought-ability +in which they are able to deal with the abstract idea of pure form, they +can make constructions of pure forms. So long as these constructions +of pure forms are made consistently and correctly (i. e. in strict +agreement with the principle of identity), they will be found to hold +good in reality and we can _a priori_—before we have made the actual +experience—rely on their applicability. + +The laws of pure forms (forms of thought as well as forms of existence) +can satisfactorily be proved to anyone who acknowledges the principle +of identity. The principle of identity is not an assumption but it is +the generalised statement of the simplest thought-operation, which, if +employed with consistency, can serve as a rule for other and more complex +thought-operations. Consistency is the condition of thought. Consistency +produces order, and order is the most characteristic feature of thought. +We create some pure form in some definite way, for instance in counting +we posit a unit (we call it “one”). Now we create in the same definite +way again a pure form, we again posit a unit (we again call it “one”). +In so far as these two “ones” are the product of the same operation they +will be the same and we express this truth in the sentence 1 = 1 or _A_ = +_A_. + +When, for the sake of assistance in the process of abstract thought, we +use real objects to represent our pure forms, similarly as an abacus is +employed for assisting the young mind of a child in learning arithmetic, +the dissimilarity of the objects is of no account. The proposition of +their identity has no reference to the material objects, but to the +operation. Two operations being according to some special and definite +method exactly the same, their products are also exactly the same, +and the rest is not to be minded, because we have in our abstraction +purposely excluded everything else. + +Here is not the place to show the palpable advantages of the methods +of abstract thought and especially of the abstract thought-operations +with pure forms. It is sufficient to characterise its main principle of +procedure. We may also parenthetically remark that from our position +we are no longer in need of axioms either in mathematics or in any +other formal science. The data of formal sciences are certain mental +operations, viz. positing pure forms, and combining, separating, and +recombining them. The subject matter of formal sciences consists in the +products of these operations. To formulate some of the simplest products +in axioms is a mistake which has been pointed out by Hermann Grassmann in +his _Ausdehnungslehre_. + +We are struck and overawed with the cosmic order of all natural phenomena +which, as science teaches, is produced through the rigidity of the formal +laws of existence. The planetary system with its regularity of motion +which in spite of its many complications has been formulated by Kepler in +most simple laws is an object of wonder to us. This order of nature is +the same order as the grand harmony that prevails in mathematics and all +the other formal sciences. The most complicated laws of both, forms of +nature and forms of thought, are nothing but generalisations of special +applications of the principle of identity in some kind of action that +takes place. While the order of the objective world excites our wonder +we can understand the order of the subjective world of thought-forms +and know that, being the product of certain mental operations according +to the principle of identity, it must be a matter of course. Thus the +intrinsic necessity of the laws of our thought-forms gives us a clue to +the intrinsic necessity of the laws of nature. + + +III. CONSERVATION OF MATTER AND ENERGY, AND CAUSATION. + +The law of the conservation of matter and energy is nothing but an +application of the principle of identity to nature as a whole. And the +law of cause and effect is again a corollary only of the law of the +conservation of matter and energy. The law of causation is a formula +which maintains that there is identity in difference. Some motion +produces a change of form. There is accordingly a different state after +the motion than before. Yet the total amount of matter and energy +remains the same. This is the identity in the change. David Hume and +with him John Stuart Mill and the empiricists misunderstood the problem +of causation. Instead of considering cause and effect as one continuous +process that should be analysed, they considered cause and effect +separately and attempted a synthesis. In addition to this mistake, causes +as well as effects were defined to be objects. Hume says cause and +effect are objects following one another. Cause however is a process; +it is a motion, a change that takes place, an event that happens; it +is not a thing. And effect is the product of such a process. Effect is +a special form, a special state of things, a special configuration, +but not the material of which this configuration consists. A certain +poison introduced into the stomach of a living being produces certain +motions in the bowels, called cramps, which may finally prove fatal. +One change produces other changes and their product is a new state of +things which is accompanied with pain and ends in death. It is wrong to +call strychnine the cause and a dead mouse the effect. But if we call +strychnine the cause and a dead mouse the effect, we must forever despair +of solving the problem of causation by a reduction to the principle of +identity, for strychnine is not at all identical with a dead mouse. No +cause is the same thing as its effect, and we can by no means identify +cause and effect. And yet the principle of identity holds good. The +identity in causation is the conservation of matter and energy in a +change of form. + +It has been maintained that the law of cause and effect could never be +proved; it is either an innate idea prior to experience (Schopenhauer and +Schopenhauer’s interpretation of Kant) or it is an assumption derived +from experience of which (since experience is not as yet exhausted) +we cannot know whether it will hold good forever (J. S. Mill). In +contradistinction to these views we maintain, that the law of cause and +effect can satisfactorily be proved to anyone who accepts the principle +of identity. So far as the principle of identity is recognised, all +the formal laws are unequivocally determined, or popularly expressed +they are as they are, they will remain so and cannot be otherwise, they +are necessary. All the determining factors and also the procedure of +an operation are set forth, no unforeseen events are possible, for the +non-formal elements are excluded, and therefore the result will be in one +case just as it is in any other. Thus it can _a priori_ be stated that +formal laws will always hold good. + +The question has been raised: Whether or not our knowledge of the +apriority of formal laws is independent of experience. We answer: In +a certain sense it is dependent upon experience, in another it is +not. Historically and evolutionarily it is dependent upon experience. +A store of innumerable experiences has to be gained before a rational +creature will be able to make the abstraction of pure forms. As soon as +this stage is attained, man possesses a world in himself. He can now +experiment within himself with mental images, for instance with numbers: +he can calculate. His mental operations with pure form are called “pure +thought” and “pure thought” is now opposed to “experience through the +senses.” The word “experience” accordingly is used in two ways; it has a +broad and a narrow meaning. In its broad sense it means any acquisition +of knowledge generally, in its narrow sense it means knowledge acquired +through the sense-activity alone. Our knowledge of the apriority of +formal laws rests upon experience in its broad sense, but not upon +experience in its narrow sense. We can never derive the idea of necessity +from sense-impressions. John Stuart Mill in rejecting innate ideas saw +no other way than to derive the formal laws from experience (taking +here experience in the broad sense). Yet he did not make a distinction +between formal thought and sense-experience. He considered the nature of +sense-experience as typical for all experience. And thus, again, taking +experience in the narrow sense of the term, he was from his premises +perfectly justified in rejecting the idea of necessity. If the process +of cause and effect is really a synthesis of two things represented in +two different sense-impressions following each other, then indeed we have +no guarantee that the same sequences will always be observed; and there +may be worlds in which the law of causality does not operate. Mill saw +all the consequences of his mistake, he conceded freely that we are not +justified in assuming that twice two will always be four: many thousands +of experiences are in its favor, but we cannot be at all sure that no +case will ever happen in which twice two makes five. + +The ideas of causality and of the conservation of matter and energy are +not derived from experience in the narrow sense of the word, not from +sense-experience, but from experience in the wider sense of the word, i. +e. from sense-experience arranged with the assistance of formal laws. We +should not forget that mere sense-experience exists only in our abstract +thought. In reality all sense-experience is relational, it is inseparable +from its form. Form and the laws of form are not something purely mental +which is transferred to the world of reality, form is something real, it +is objective, it is a quality of the facts and the thought-forms of mind +are a part and a product of the formal structure of the universe. + +The ideas of causation and of the conservation of matter and energy are +not prior to experience, they are a part of experience, i. e. experience +in the wider sense. They are not part of the sense-experience, but the +results of our experiments with purely formal thought-operations, and +being the vital instrument or organ of cognition they are the condition +of all methodical experience. + + +IV. WHY IS MR. MILL’S PROPOSITION UNTENABLE? + +In practical life we all expect that 2 × 2 will under all circumstances +make 4, and not 5. We reject Mr. Mill’s idea that there may be even a +possibility of the latter. Is our expectancy really due to _a posteriori_ +experience which having been repeated so often in the lives of our +ancestors is now so firmly rooted in our minds that we imagine it to +be necessary and _a priori_? No! certainly not. The experiences of our +race in the struggle for life has produced our ability of thought, +but it has nothing to do with the apriority of the products of formal +thought-operations. A statement of formal thought such as “twice two +makes four,” cannot be compared to statements of sense-experience such +as that sugar has a sweet taste. There may be a moment in which the +taste of sugar will be bitter to our tongue. This is quite possible. +But to say that twice two might in the future or in any other world, as +Mr. Mill maintains, make five is nonsensical, and the possibility of +this assumption cannot be placed in one line with the possibilities of +extraordinary and exceptional sense-experiences. + +What does “twice two makes four” mean? Two means 1 + 1, and twice two +means 1 + 1 plus 1 + 1. This sum is called “four”; and what we call +five is 4 + 1. To maintain that the operation 2 × 2 might produce the +result 5, is to admit conditions which have been excluded. Pure forms +are not like animals which multiply; they are and remain such as they +have been posited. When we put two amœbas into a glass and then add two +other amœbas, it is quite possible that in the mean time one of the first +set has divided into two. In that case we would have five amœbas. But +the operation 2 × 2 cannot breed any additional units, so as to produce +a greater number than the sum of 1 + 1 + 1 + 1. Nor can we let any of +these units disappear into naught, so as to produce the result 3, without +committing some inconsistency in our thought-operations, for the products +of our thought-operations are rigid and must remain such as they have +been posited. They are not animals blessed with fertility but pure forms +and nothing but pure forms. + +How could Mr. John Stuart Mill overlook so palpable a contrast as +that between formal knowledge and sense-experience? He was apparently +prejudiced against the term “a priori,” which as we freely confess is a +very poor and inadequate expression. Mr. Mill himself states the cause of +his prejudice in his autobiography. He says: + + “There is not any idea, feeling, or power, in the human mind, + which, in order to account for it, requires that its origin + should be referred to any other source than experience.” + +Mr. Mill was justly exasperated against anything _a priori_, for in his +time, it had become customary among certain philosophers to classify all +pet superstitions which could not be proved by experience as _a priori_. +Mr. Mill continues: + + “Whatever may be the practical value of a true philosophy + of these matters, it is hardly possible to exaggerate the + mischiefs of a false one. The notion that truths external + to the mind may be known by intuition or consciousness, + independently of observation and experience, is, I am + persuaded, in these times the great intellectual support of + false doctrines and bad institutions. By the aid of this theory + every inveterate belief and every intense feeling, of which + the origin is not remembered, is enabled to dispense with the + obligation of justifying itself by reason, and is erected into + its own all-sufficient voucher and justification. There never + was such an instrument devised for consecrating all deep-seated + prejudices.” + +We appreciate the cause of Mr. Mill’s prejudice, but we cannot agree +with him. And Mr. Mill is mistaken when he imagines that a rejection +of apriority will abolish false doctrines and superstitions. On +the contrary. The recognition of absolute necessity based upon the +universality of formal thought will alone be a safe basis of science +through which we can reject _prima facie_ the wrong pretensions of +superstitions and pseudo-science. If we assume with Mr. Mill that all +formal knowledge partakes of the nature of sense-experience, that there +is no difference between the two, no general judgment would be allowable +and the idea of necessity would be inadmissible. These consequences +are accepted by Mill. In that case science would lose its value and +philosophy would be without foundation. The most absurd superstition +could not be rejected off-hand on the ground of being contrary to that +which through logic and other formal sciences has been found to be +necessary and a condemnation of any superstition on the part of science +would be mere arrogance. Pseudo-science would have the same right with +true science. + +It is obvious that without being obliged to consider the apriority of +formal laws as innate, we need not accept the consequence of Mr. Mill’s +philosophy. We can and we do retain the idea of necessity and we consider +it as the corner-stone of all science. + + +V. THE MEANING OF “NECESSARY.” + +We have to be on our guard lest we introduce some mystical element +into the idea of necessity. There is nothing mystical about necessity. +Necessary means that a certain operation, if it is exactly the same +operation as another one, will produce exactly the same result. When we +posit two units twice, we shall have the same result as when we posit +one unit four times; and we call this result four. We shall reach the +same product whenever we repeat the same operation. Knowing that we +shall always reach the same result, we can, _a priori_ (or beforehand) +and with certainty, determine the result of certain operations after we +have mentally gone through the same operations for all possible cases +and under any imaginable conditions. That a perfect apriority with an +unfailing certainty is possible only in the domain of formal thought +is natural. The reason is that we know our thought-forms exhaustively. +They contain nothing but that which has been predicated about them. Our +sense-experience however is always piecemeal and never exhaustive. + +Comprehension is actually a tracing of form relations and a formulating +them in concise statements. The scientist’s work is based upon the +methods of measuring and counting (i. e. the methods of formal sciences) +and he undertakes to show that certain phenomena, different in some +respects, are the same in other respects, that their sameness can be +stated in a comprehensive and exact formula. In this way he marks out +their determining factors in terms of formal thought (for instance in +numbers), so that we can compute them and predict them according to their +determining factors, so that we can know, according to their conditions, +that they will be always as they are. + +The importance of formal thought is paramount in science and the problem +about the necessity which attaches to the laws of formal thought is the +fundamental problem of philosophy. + +There are many philosophers, still, troubling themselves to solve the +problem in the fashion of Schopenhauer or of Mill or looking upon the +problem as insolvable. We do not doubt that the solution here presented +is the only possible solution which as soon as it is understood will find +a general acceptance. + +Must it be added that the solution of this fundamental problem does +not involve the ready solutions of all other minor problems? Oh no! We +all know that the solution of one problem is only a stepping-stone for +attacking other problems. The possibilities of progress are as unlimited +as the scope of cognition. Light on this general subject gives us hope +that we shall succeed in throwing light also upon other subjects which +are still shrouded to the philosophical inquirer in impenetrable darkness. + + +VI. MODERN LOGIC. + +The problem of modern logic is at bottom no other problem than that of +formal thought and of the origin of thought-forms. Professor Dewey in +the excellent essay which appears as the leading article of this number +says: “Any book of logic will tell us what this conception of thought +is: that thought is a faculty or an entity existing in the mind apart +from facts and that it has its own fixed forms with which facts have +nothing to do—except in so far as they pass under the yoke.” This is +the old conception of thought, rightly criticised by Professor Dewey, +for, closely considered, it turns out to be dualistic. However, as soon +as a proposition is recognised to contain or to rest upon dualism, it +becomes a problem. The problem of modern logic is, How can we arrive at a +monistic conception of logic, how can we rid ourselves of the dualism on +the one side of facts not yet rationalised by the method of thought-forms +and on the other side of mind with its empty thought-forms assimilating +facts to its own nature. + +Our solution of the difficulty has been proposed, in the sense outlined +by Professor Dewey, in “Fundamental Problems.” Professor Dewey, according +to our opinion, is right when he says there is no such a thing as +transcendental thought, or pure thought, thought by itself. And there is +no such a thing either as fact, crude irrational chaotic fact. The world +of fact, indeed, is a cosmos and no chaos; there never was a chaos and +never will be a chaos, for the laws of form are an essential and the most +characteristic feature of the world. + +Can there be any question how the order found in thought-forms originates +in a world in which the inorganic and unfeeling mineral crystallises in +a regular shape according to strict mathematical laws, i. e. the laws +of form? A world in which the plant grows not otherwise than according +to strict mathematical laws building up roots and stem and leaves and +petals and stamens and all other organs obedient to a certain plan which +will vary according to circumstances, but throughout consistent with +the principles of formal laws? Can there be any question that in this +world of cosmic harmony thought-forms will develop in feeling beings as +a microcosm exhibiting the same regularity and conformity to law as do +in this world all other things animate and inanimate? Our pure, i. e. +merely formal, thought is an abstraction which serves the purpose of +comprehension. And so is the concept “matter,” being that which produces +sense-impressions. There are no such ghosts as pure matter or pure +thoughts in reality. + +Modern logic, so far as we conceive it to be right, is by no means an +overthrow of the old formal Logic, generally called Aristotelian. It is +simply an amendment made in order to exclude an erroneous interpretation. +And so is modern mathematics not so much a revolution as an extension +of the old Euclidian system. It is a revolution only against a certain +unclear conception of mathematics according to which this science is said +to rest upon axioms, these axioms representing absolute truth—unprovable, +incomprehensible, and mysterious.[21] + +The main truth of monism is that reality forms one indivisible whole +and all our concepts are mere abstractions representing certain parts +or certain features of the whole. As soon as we try to think of any +of them as things in themselves we become involved in inextricable +contradictions. It appears as if the formal sciences contained some +truths which were absolute and independent of actual reality. But let any +one think of any number, of 2 or 3, and he will soon find that conceived +as absolute beings they are meaningless and unthinkable. + +This is not to say that numbers are phantoms, but that conceived as +absolute beings they are phantoms. Numbers and all formal concepts +represent something real, they represent pure forms. And form is as much +a part and feature of reality as is matter and energy. + + P. C. + + +FOOTNOTES: + +[21] Hermann Grassmann, one of the founders of modern mathematics, has +called attention to the fact that Euclid had a clearer conception of the +fundamental concepts of mathematics than his ill-informed translators +and interpreters. Grassmann says in his _Ausdehnungslehre_: “From the +imputation of confounding axioms with assumed concepts Euclid himself, +however, is free, Euclid incorporated the former among his postulates +(αἰτήματα) while he separated the latter as common concepts (κοιναὶ +ἐννοιαι)—a proceeding which even on the part of his commentators was no +longer understood, and likewise with modern mathematicians, unfortunately +for science, has met with little imitation. As a matter of fact, the +abstract methods of mathematical science know no axioms at all.”—Quoted +from _The Open Court_, Vol. II. No. 77, _A Flaw in the Foundation of +Geometry_, by Hermann Grassmann, translated from his _Ausdehnungslehre_ +by μκρκ. + + + + +BOOK REVIEWS. + + +BELIEF IN GOD. Its Origin, Nature, and Basis. Being the Winkley Lectures +of the Andover Theological Seminary for the Year 1890. By _Jacob Gould +Schurmann_. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons. 1890. + +The learned Sage Professor of Philosophy in Cornell University, after +tracing the historical origin and development of the belief in God, +expresses his conviction that the problem of the modern theist consists +in the union of the Aryan and Semitic modes of interpreting existence. We +shall then have “a synthesis of the Father of all spirits with the ground +of all nature.” This is the hypothesis developed in the course of the +lectures delivered by Professor Schurmann last year before the Andover +Theological Seminary on the Winkley foundation, that form the contents of +the present volume. The theism embodied in that hypothesis is called by +the author _anthropocosmic_, because, while it is based on the facts of +the universe and those of human nature, the universe must be interpreted +in the terms of man, and not man in the terms of the universe. The key +to the universe is the self-conscious spirituality which makes us selves +and persons. Hence anthropocosmic theism is the doctrine of a Supreme +Being “who is ground both of nature and of man, but whose essence is not +natural but spiritual.” + +Before considering the evidence for this hypothesis, let us see what +the author has to say with reference to the logical character of the +belief in God. He shows that _agnosticism_—of which he treats under +its three significations as referring to the method of knowledge, the +object of knowledge, and the subject of knowledge—is not consistent +with the insight into nature and the constitution of knowledge gained +by the Newtonian method of hypotheses and verifications. Science, as +opposed to pure phenomenalism, assumes that what has not originated +in the percipient subject is objectively real, and it postulates the +universality of law in nature, a postulate which is the expression of a +conviction of “the unity and universal inner connection of all reality.” +The objective world cannot be understood without reference to our own +conscious experience, and as the only reality we know from the inside +is a spiritual _ego_, self-conscious spirit must be ascribed to the one +ultimate reality whose existence science assumes, as that which will +alone satisfy the requirement of unity in the midst of change. + +It might be objected here, that the existence in man of a spiritual +_ego_ requires proof before that of a universal spirit or world-soul can +be inferred from it. The author takes the existence of the _ego_ for +granted, a course which is quite allowable from the theistic standpoint, +although, in the face of what is now known as to the dissolution of the +ego under abnormal conditions of the organism, not scientific. Having +made that assumption and inferred the existence of God from that of the +human spirit, the author explains the nature of the one by reference to +that of the other. He tells us, that the finite spirit is identical, +within the limits of its range, with the infinite spirit, because it is +an _ego_, and that in the _ego_ we have, not merely a mode of the divine +activity, but a part of the divine essence. Such being the case, the +author has no difficulty in inferring the attributes of God from the +phenomena exhibited by man. Thus God is a God of righteousness because +the moral capacity in the human spirit must have its ground in the +infinite Spirit. Again universal benevolence or love is the ideal of +which human morality is the realisation; hence we must conceive of the +Spirit of the universe as a God of love. + +We do not think the author’s final conclusion, that “the phenomena +both of the universe and of human life require the thinking mind to +postulate a Supreme Ground of things which we are entitled to describe as +self-conscious Spirit and loving Father,” is warranted by his premises. +But we can accept the statement that our knowledge of God must continue +to grow with our knowledge of man and nature. Through these alone can we +know Him, but the difficulty is to interpret the revelation. Let it be +admitted also that the end of nature is the production of man, and that +what is referred to by the author as the human spirit is “the organ of +that communication of God which is the end of the universe.” This does +not in reality throw any light on the nature of God. The utmost that can +be said is that, as man is an organism possessing certain functions, the +universe, viewed as God, must have an organic existence with functions +_corresponding_ to those exhibited by the human organism. + +The author’s reasoning in support of the belief in God as cause or ground +of the world, and as realising purpose in the world is very ingenious. +He affirms that the creational form of the argument from causality is +insufficient. It satisfies the devotional needs of a certain class +of worshipers, but what the religious, as well as the scientific, +consciousness demands is a God “here in the world, not there outside of +it or making it.” It has not yet been shown that the universe has had a +beginning in time, and the argument in favor of the eternity of matter +ends with an assurance of the eternity of spirit alone. Spirit is the +eternal reality, and nature its eternal manifestation, the latter being +no more separable from the former “than the spoken word from the thought +it symbolises.” The causal relation is, however, absolutely necessary +for our apprehension of the facts of the universe, and as it cannot +be interpreted without contradiction as an action between independent +beings, it must be explained as the eternal dependence of the world upon +God. This implies that God must be volitional as well as self-conscious; +“for without will there could be no activity, no efficient causation, +no material universe.” The universe is thus the eternal expression of +the divine will. But what is the purpose realised in creation? The +activity of the divine will precludes the notion of a blindly working +nature. As creation is the eternal self-revelation of God, the supreme +and preconceived end of all things must be the glory of God. But man is +indispensable for the attainment of God’s glory, and therefore the end +of nature as a realised scheme of divine ideas is the production of man. +The volitional and teleological arguments as thus stated by the author +are consistent with the theory of evolution developed by Darwin, but +they may be combatted on other grounds connected with the conditions of +the existence of God as one with Nature. With this observation, we must +leave Professor Schurmann’s very thoughtful book which, although for the +reasons we have stated, not conclusive, presents the theistic argument +with great clearness and in its strongest form. + + Ω. + + +JUDAISM AND CHRISTIANITY. A Sketch of the Progress of Thought from Old +Testament to New Testament. By _Crawford Howell Toy_. Boston: Little, +Brown & Co. 1890. + +This work is another contribution to that genuine history which is alone +competent to impart any true instruction. In it the author undertakes to +give an account of the genesis of Christianity as a child of Judaism. + +It seems to be the thesis of the author that those conceptions and +beliefs that characterise any form of religion are rather determined by +the social evolution than that the social progress and its features are +determined by the evolution of ideas among which the religious ideas +are specially influential. In his introduction the author sketches out +his view of the general laws of social progress as the same are related +to religious thought. He notices in history the tendency of ethnic +religions to give way to or to develop into universal religions, and +argues that Christianity is destined to overcome all its rivals and +prevail universally. This kind of a conclusion is a natural one to follow +from the theory that the character of thought is determined by social +circumstances and progress. But if it be true that the special course +of the evolution of thought and its characteristic form at any epoch is +determined by causes that are uncontrolled by social conditions, that as +between thought and society thought is the masterful factor, then quite +another conclusion may ensue. But the dubitable nature of the main thesis +of the work does not much detract from the great excellence of the work +in general. As a history of the evolution of Jewish religious conceptions +and beliefs from the very first until the establishment of Christianity, +it is in the highest degree interesting and instructive. + +After a discussion of the literature of the Jews and the formation of the +canon, the author proceeds to describe in full detail the nature genesis +and mutations of the cardinal religious doctrines as they revealed +themselves to the Israelite, Jewish, and early Christian insight. The +entire body of the data are interpreted in consonance with the modern +scientific idea of the organic nature of society. Jesus is regarded as +the master spirit that created the Christian Church, and Paul whom many +would install as the real author of the same is accordingly given only a +second place. Altogether it may be said that Professor Toy has given us +a most valuable contribution to religious history and to the scientific +interpretation of the same. + + ρσλ. + + +PRONAOS TO HOLY WRIT. Establishing, on Documentary Evidence, the +Authorship, Date, Form, and Contents of each of its Books, and the +Authenticity of the Pentateuch. By _Isaac M. Wise_. Cincinnati: Robert +Clarke & Co. 1891. + +Rabbi Isaac Wise, the president of the Hebrew Union College of Cincinnati +and the Nestor of Orthodox Judaism in America, presents in the “Pronaos +to Holy Writ” a review of the Biblical books with comments as to their +authenticity and the times in which they were written. Having read these +“books and every word thereof in the original for a term of sixty-six +years, i. e. from boyhood up to his seventy-second birthday,” and having +“acquainted himself with all the ancient versions and commentaries +and a large portion of the modern translations and commentaries of +the Bible,” the author is entitled to be heard. Rabbi Wise is a stern +monotheist and he declares: “God only did create light out of darkness; +man cannot produce truth out of fiction, unless in his self-delusion +problematic truth satisfies him. All so-called gems of truth buried under +the quicksand of fiction and deception are problematic at best, if not +supported by authoritative corroborants.” This is true. All truth depends +upon verification. We cannot make truth, but must find it, we must be +able to corroborate it, and the corroborants of truth are its authority. +Dr. Wise’s idea of a corroborant is different from ours, he says: “No +one can speak conscientiously of Bible truth before he knows that the +Bible is true, and especially in its historical data.” This seems to +indicate that we must have a belief in the truth of the Bible before +we investigate it and that moral truths, the ethics, the philosophy of +the Bible depend upon its historical data. We cannot go so far with the +author of the Pronaos. Dr. Wise says: “The science commonly called Modern +Biblical Criticism, actually Negative Criticism which maintains on the +strength of unscientific methods that the Pentateuch is not composed of +original Mosaic material, no Psalms are Davidian, no Proverbs Solomonic, +the historical books are unhistorical, the prophecies were written +post festum, there was no revelation, inspiration, or prophecy, must +also maintain that the Bible is a compendium of pious or even impious +frauds, wilful deceptions, unscrupulous misrepresentations.” Dr. Wise +thought it necessary to meet Negative Criticism with the documentary +evidence and for this purpose he wrote his Pronaos, which is to be an +entrance-hall to the Temple of Biblical Truth. We do not side with the +negativism of certain biblical critics, for we believe that historical +investigations have proved large portions of the Pentateuch to be Mosaic, +several psalms to be Davidian, and the historical books to contain as +much history as many old historical books contain. We believe that they +have to be judged and searched and commented just as much and in the +same spirit of scientific inquiry as our philologists treat Herodotus +or Livy. But the value of the Bible, in our opinion, does not depend +upon the acceptance or rejection of these or those historical data; nor +is it necessary to consider the Hebrew prophets as special revelations +of God, in contradistinction to the divine revelation in nature and the +history of mankind in general. It may be true enough that the orthodox +God-idea of Monotheism depends upon the belief in special revelation +and prophecies, and it is also true that most of the Biblical criticism +has been destructive and negative. But there is a way possible between +both standpoints which may be called positive criticism. This positive +criticism attempts to understand the very life and meaning of the old +religion, it attempts to comprehend the belief of the orthodox and +construe it in the terms of science—i. e. of rational and clear thought. +Religion is certainly not a mere fraud or a vain illusion, it is an +ideal which developed naturally out of certain needs of man and the +conditions of society. That religious ideas, especially the idea of God +as the cosmic power which represents the moral authority, are no mere +fictions, is proved by their survival, and those who believe in evolution +should not be blind to the fact that there is something good, something +true, something well adapted to surroundings in religion. To find these +elements of truth and goodness which constitute the life of religion +is not mere negative criticism, but positive criticism, and it is not +at all necessary for those who aspire in this direction, to believe in +any historical data, or in special revelations, or in prophecies, or in +the personality of God, but simply to trust in truth. Truth is the only +way of salvation even though it may shatter the most sacred idols of a +venerable orthodoxy. + +The contents of the book show that the standpoint of the author does not +blind him to the finer traits of the natural development of his religion. +So, for instance, Solomon’s rationalism is excellently contrasted with +the spirit which manifested itself in the Judges as well as the Prophets. +The author of the Judges was an outspoken theocratic democrat. “He +literally pours out his abhorrence of the monarchical anti-theocratic +institution in narrating the story of the first usurper Abimelech, the +son of Gideon.... Entirely different are the language and tendency of +the two appendices, evidently written by another author, who evinces his +animosity to the democratic form of government by saying four times: +‘In those days there was no king in Israel,’ to which he adds twice +‘every man did what seemed right in his sight’” (p. 46). “The Solomonic +ethics is a commentary on the Mosaic ethics, as by reason understood.... +Man’s knowledge of ethical doctrine is identical with his knowledge +of God’s moral attributes, and all moral obligation has its root in +the Mosaic God-idea....” According to Solomon “wisdom based upon and +rooted in the fear of Jehovah with the revealed material before them was +all-sufficient, without any further special oracles of any prophets. This +peculiar rationalism brought upon him the ire of prophets and rabbis” (p. +111). + +Some reviewers of Dr. Wise’s book will probably find fault with him that +he has taken little if any account of the results of modern biblical +investigations. And this is a grievous fault in our times where it seems +to be essential for a scholar and author to have read the very latest +things published on a subject while an acquaintance with the views of +the classical old authorities is considered unnecessary. It appears that +Dr. Wise did not intend to present his views or criticisms of and his +answers to the latest biblical investigations. It may even be that he is +not familiar with many of them. Granting this to be a fault of his book +it is, nevertheless, refreshing to us to find an author who has actually +read and is excellently familiar with all the old sources of the subject +he is writing upon. + + κρς. + + +THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEOMETRY. By _Edward T. Dixon_. Cambridge (Eng.): +Deighton, Bell & Co. 1891. + +This work is divided into three parts, the first containing such +doctrines of psychology and logic as the author deems sound and useful +for his purposes, the second exhibiting the author’s “subjective theory +of geometry deduced from the two fundamental concepts _position_ and +_direction_,” and the third “on the applicability of the foregoing +subjective geometry to the geometry of material space.” + +In his preface the author expresses his desire that those who criticise +his work shall “consider categorically” certain questions relating to his +theory of definition, to the definitions and axioms prescribed by him, +to his proofs of propositions and to the “objective applications” of his +three axioms. + +Geometry may be studied for two distinct purposes, neither of which +necessarily involves the other. Unless the aim is mainly the discipline +of the logical faculty, it is plainly a poor method of study to pore +over the definitions, axioms, postulates, theorems, problems, and +demonstrations of Euclid or any similar text-book. Practical resources +and geometrical information can be acquired much better and more rapidly +by a course of mechanical drawing with here and there a more or less +loose explanation of the grounds and reasons that warrant the geometrical +doctrines, than by means of the Euclidian course. Under such a method of +instruction the student would rarely feel any real doubt as to the truth +of his geometrical knowledge. + +But where the paramount aim is the training of the reason the Euclidian +rigor is all important. Hence the perfection of that method by the +discovery and certification of the ultimate grounds on which, and the +principles by which, it may be unfolded systematically and in necessary +and sufficient sequence without presumption or fallacy, is an object of +the most momentous concern to science, to philosophy, and to culture in +general. For it is well known that however good an account elementary +geometry may give of its superstructure the reports given of its +foundations are all very far from satisfactory. + +Repeated and strenuous efforts have been made, and by the most competent +of our race, to discover and certify the true state of the case in +respect to the geometrical foundations, in order that the whole edifice +of that science shall display throughout the same thorough-going +necessity and sufficiency that distinguishes it in general. + +The author of the work under review is persuaded that he is now able to +perform this so desirable service. He avers his belief that the system +of geometry he “has set forth in this book is _logically sound_ and that +consequently the more it is discussed and criticised, the more firmly +will it become established.” He takes his stand upon two fundamental +concepts, _position_ and _direction_, which he defines not explicitly but +“implicitly.” This leads us to consider his first question and his theory +of definition. + +The embarrassments that involve the foundations of elementary geometry +are mainly, if not wholly, those which involve the general problems of +definition. Now a definition is the certification of the purport of a +name by means of a statement or a conspiracy of statements necessary and +sufficient to that end. But names are constituents absolutely necessary +for the formation of any statement, so that the above definition of a +definition may be restated thus: A definition is the certification of the +purport of one name by means of other names, necessary and sufficient +to certify the purport of the one defined. Evidently then, definition +can only lead us from name to name in unending process, or to some +undefinable name, or to some name that we choose to leave undefined; and +the question arises, on what sort of names shall we take our stand as +ultimate grounds? + +Our author answers this question as follows: “The propounder of a +scientific theory is not of course expected to teach his readers to +speak, it is only necessary for him to define the terms peculiar to his +science, or those to which he wishes to attach peculiar meanings. He may +therefore assume that the meanings of all other words are known to his +readers.” + +He then propounds that “all that is logically required for a definition +is one or more assertions with regard to the word to be defined or, its +attributes,” provided “they are not demonstrably incompatible with each +other.” + +Although our author conceives that logical competence requires no more +than this for a good definition, he yet goes on to remark, that “if the +definition is to form the basis of a deductive science it is further +advisable that the assertions should be independent,” and that “where +it is required to define a term whose denotation is already known, it +is further necessary not only that the assertions should be commonly +accepted as true with respect to it, but that they should restrict the +meaning of the term exactly to its accepted denotation, neither more nor +less, and should do so in the simplest manner that can be devised.” + +It is upon this theory of definition that our author requests of his +critics a “categorical” answer to his first question, “Do you accept the +requirements I have laid down for a logical definition? (If not please +state which of them you object to, why you object to it, and what you +would propose to substitute for it.)” + +Since it is a “categorical” answer that is requested and since also it is +the matter of definition that is put in issue, we wish that our author +had been more definite and had made his propositions better issuable, for +we must protest that we regard ourselves obliged to answer to what we +can best conceive to be the author’s true meanings rather than to what he +has explicitly said. + +We do not conceive that he regards it as _necessary_ to a definition that +the defining assertions should be expressed “in the simplest manner that +can be devised.” We have also to take his use of the word “restrict” +as importing completion as well as limitation, and his use of the word +“requirements” as intending conditions that together are sufficient as +well as necessary. + +If we are right in our understanding of the meanings of our author he +contemplates four cases, first, the definition of a name that has no +denotation already known and that is not to form the basis of a deductive +science, second, the definition of a name that has no denotation already +known but which is to form the basis of a deductive science, third, the +definition of a name that has a denotation already known but which is not +to form the basis of a deductive science, and fourth the definition of a +name that has a denotation already known and is to form the basis of a +deductive science. + +In this fourth case our author deems it requisite for a logical +definition that there shall be made one or more assertions about the +subject of definition that are not demonstrably incompatible with one +another, that are independent of one another, that are commonly accepted +as true in respect to the subject defined and that “restrict” the meaning +of the name under definition exactly to its accepted denotation. + +It seems to us that this last requirement dispenses with the necessity +of all the rest. If we have provided an assertion or a set of assertions +that do in fact complete and limit the meaning of the subject of +definition exactly to its proper denotation that is a definition in full. +It implies that the defining assertions are all consistent with one +another, and in case any assertion is dependent upon one or more of the +rest that is a circumstance wholly immaterial. _Utile per inutile non +nocetur._ + +Again, what is it to be commonly accepted as true? Does logical +competence depend on the altering states of our knowledge or on the +fluctuations of opinion? Was a whale logically defined as a fish before +we learned that it was a mammal? + +The third case allows of the application of the same comment as that +made upon the fourth. But in the first and second cases the doctrines +of the author as well as his suppositions are very notable. He supposes +the anomaly of names without any known denotation, by which he may mean +those which have no application whatever. In respect to such he propounds +that they may be given a logical definition by making one or various +consistent assertions as applicable to them or to their attributes. + +“The proof of the pudding will be found in the eating,” as our author +says. So let us say that a troft may be perceived whenever our attention +is excited, and that trofts are of multitudinous variety. Do these +assertions constitute a logical definition? It is a prime requisite for +a definition that the defining assertion or assertions shall have a +meaning, which is the same as to say that names must be employed that +are already significant. These significant names must be so used that the +intellectual sensibility shall be excited to perceive in a determinate +way that which is intended to be defined. In other words, sense and not +nonsense must be produced in the mind that considers the definition. +Perhaps, however, our author intends such words as electricity, or +spirit, or energy. + +Because of the considerations above indicated and others we cannot accept +the author’s requirements for a logical definition as a whole. Some of +them are in some of his cases unnecessary, while taken together they +supply no new means whereby to solve the several problems of definition. + +The author’s subjective theory of geometry is plainly the outgrowth of +his confidence in the solvent power of the concept of direction as a +prime datum of geometry. + +Everything of consequence in his essay depends upon the worth of this +concept as a geometrical foundation. Considering the disparagement +that has been visited upon that concept by numerous writers of good +geometrical rank we naturally look for considerations tending to remove +the discredit that has befallen that notion. Instead however of this we +find the most palpable set of circular definitions. Direction is defined +by direction in the most distracting way, thus: + +“(_a_) A direction may be conceived to be indicated by naming two points +as the direction from one to the other.” + +The inaptitude of the term direction for use in geometry is rooted in +its ambiguous purport. As commonly used it means at least three distinct +but closely associated notions which become confused in thought and +expression unless the most solicitous care is taken to distinguish +them. When we speak of the direction of one point from another or of +the direction from one point to another we mean the straight off-ness +or from-ness or to-ness which one bears to the other; in other words +a relation of separation and straight mediation. When again we speak +of the direction of a motion we intend the indefinite straight sense +of its procession, which is not a relation but an attribute of the +motion. When still again we speak of the direction of a line we mean its +straight _lay_ as compared or as comparable with other actual or possible +correlates which is again a relation but not necessarily the same +relation as that that obtains between two points. + +In all these meanings the notion of straightness is involved, and could +we say in lieu of straightness first directness and then direction and +holding fast in thought this sense of the word, make a noun of it, so +that a direction would intend the same as a straightness and no more, it +might obtain a useful geometric term and notion. + +To define it we might first define a line thus: A line is a space +boundary that is indefinitely long but not otherwise of any extent. +Then, a direction is a line such that between the points that bound any +assigned parcel of it no copy of said parcel is possible. + +But direction purports to our author the second of the meanings above +set forth, namely, the indefinite straight sense of the procession of a +motion. Definite parcels of a direction thus understood are identical +with vectors. + +Now the notion of straightness is after the notions of point and line +the most fundamental one of geometry and the one which is altogether the +most prominent and useful. It is the necessary means for any definition +of a vector or of the notion which our author deems so important. As +straightness is attributable only to lines and long things which a line +may represent it makes no difference whether we define straightness +or a straight line, but a masterful performance of this definition is +absolutely necessary before the foundations of geometry can be abidingly +certified. + +Our author defines a straight line thus: “A straight line is a continuous +series of points extending from each of them in the same two directions.” +What kind of a thing a continuous series of points may be we are not told +but as a point is defined to be “a portion of matter so small that for +the purpose in hand variations of positions within it may be neglected” +we take it that a straight line is a continuous series of particles of +matter. The “purpose in hand” in this case must of course be the purpose +of geometry. + +In defining an angle our author first lays down that “The difference +between two directions is called their _inclination_ to one another” and +then “The measure of an inclination is called an _angle_.” + +Considering that it is the doctrine of the author that every straight +line has two contrary directions the measure of whose inclination is an +angle of one hundred and eighty degrees, we imagine a northeast southwest +line cutting an east west line and wonder if the right hand upper angle +is really two angles according to whether or not the directions both pass +to the left or both pass to the right or pass one to the left and the +other to the right. + +Were this an ordinary work we might regard it as due to the author to +notice the many excellencies which characterise it, in spite of the +defects which we notice. But as our author evidently realises, the +eminent dignity of the topic challenges and its singular importance +demands unsparing criticism. He who offers to instruct the world on the +foundations of geometry draws his sword and throws away the scabbard, and +like a doughty champion he will scorn to accept any favor, prizing only +such success as he shall take at the point of an efficacy of treatment +that conquers all competent and candid criticism. + +Stringent as are such terms of contest an author who is a worthy +competitor in the field of geometric research can be well content with +them in the perception that the very same conditions apply in full force +to the comments of his critics. + +The author is undoubtedly an able man and a close thinker. He has +concentrated his mind upon a work that is worth the energy of a lifetime. +But we must confess our judgment to be that in spite of his capacity and +evident devotion he has come short of the high result to which he has +aspired. + + ρσλ. + + +LES FÊTES DE MONTPELLIER. PROMENADE A TRAVERS LES CHOSES, LES HOMMES ET +LES IDEES. By _J. Delbœuf_. Paris: Félix Alcan. + +We have here a charming narrative by the well-known Professor at the +University of Liège of his visit to the fêtes of Montpellier, undertaken +in great measure to make the personal acquaintance of M. Dauriac, the +critic in the _Revue Philosophique_ of the author’s work “La matière +brute et la matière vivante.” The description given of the fêtes, +which marked the sixth centenary of the University of Montpellier, is +very entertaining, as is the account of the journey through the South +of France; but as M. Delbœuf says that he was more curious to become +acquainted with men than with places, what he tells us about the former +will be the more interesting. + +The author, with the companions of his tour, could not pass Nancy +without stopping to see “the masters in the science of hypnotism” there. +An account of what he saw and heard gives the author the opportunity +of repeating “That he does not regard forgetfulness on awaking as +characteristic of profound hypnosis, and that experience is against +the efficacity of criminal suggestion unless the subject is criminally +inclined.” The fêtes at Montpellier commenced with a religious service +in the Cathedral, during which the Bishop, M. de Cabrières, preached a +sermon so liberal in tone, that M. Delbœuf thinks the time is arriving +when the church will demonstrate that Moses was the precursor of Darwin. +At the University reception which followed, M. Delbœuf sought out among +the professors for his friend M. Dauriac, whom he had figured when first +he heard from him as small, thin and dark, but now found, in accordance +with the usual rule in such cases, that he was tall, robust and fair. +In the course of their subsequent conversations the two Professors +made mutual confidences, M. Dauriac confessing that his true vocation +was music, and that he was preparing a work on the psychology of the +musician; while M. Delbœuf informed his friend that he was about to reply +to his criticism of “La matière brute et la matière vivante,” and that he +would throw the greatest light on the origin, which was still obscure, of +life and death. If the genial Liège Professor can do this, he may be the +first to reap the benefit referred to in his own words: “The discovery of +the cause of death could not fail to assure the immortality of its author +and its inspirer, and sooner or later that of humanity at large.” For, +according to a medical adage, if the cause of a disease is known it is +already conquered. + +Montpellier was honored during the fêtes with the presence of Helmholtz, +to whom but for national jealousy would have been confided the part of +speaking in the name of the foreign universities. Nevertheless he was +the true hero of the occasion, and when at the official reception, on +the President of the Republic shaking his hand and saying a few gracious +words someone feebly hissed, Helmholtz received in response a perfect +ovation of applause. M. Delbœuf met with a congenial spirit in the +Professor of Zoology, M. Sabatier, who has a laboratory at Cette. Their +views on free-will were in sympathy. They agreed in allowing freedom not +only to the superior animals, and to inferior animals and plants, but +even to so called inorganic matter. M. Sabatier is a Christian and at +the same time a convinced transformist; having arrived at his views from +religious considerations. He cited M. Dauriac as saying, “The reign of +determinism is not in the objective world; its empire extends itself over +nature only after having been exercised over thought. There is no other +necessity than that of logic or mathematics.” M. Delbœuf is evidently +an “indeterminist” by nature. He heartily sympathised with the students +in all their demonstrations of freedom, although one of them assumed +a somewhat serious character. Dining in the open air with M. Milhaud +the author of an article in the _Revue Philosophique_ on non-Euclidian +geometry, he was prepared to talk mathematics. The surroundings were +too much for him, however, and in recalling the scene he cries, “To the +devil with philosophy and mathematics! I cannot recall what we said; in +my remembrances, I see only blooming faces, I hear only the indistinct +bursts of gaity.” M. Delbœuf’s sympathetic nature is shown in the fact, +which he records, that wild animals in confinement soon become familiar +with him. + +One of the principal objects of the author’s journey was to see M. +Gabriel Tarde, “one of the most prolific and original publicists in +France, if not in Europe,” who resides at Sarlat. After quoting passages +from an article of M. Tarde on Social Darwinism, which appeared in the +_Revue Philosophique_, M. Delbœuf remarks that nothing is more attractive +and at the same time more fatiguing than the reading of his works. M. +Tarde is “the locomotive that carries you to the end of your journey +across countries by turns wild, agricultural, industrial, picturesque; +but without giving you time to regard and admire.” Referring to M. +Tarde’s acute criticisms of Lombroso and his theories, the author says, +“It is not that he strikes the pseudo-thinker with formidable blows, but +he makes him drop gently to the ground.” The French publicist sees in +_imitation_ the source of social life, and he has been long engaged in +developing the idea, to the great importance of which M. Delbœuf bears +witness; although he objects to the use which M. Tarde makes of terms +taken from mathematics, physics, and biology, to express his sociological +views. On the question of free-will there was no agreement. Although the +latter is a determinist, he believes in penal responsibility, on the +ground of personal identity; the diseased person or the madman is no +longer himself, in which they differ from the criminal. + +We can say nothing of M. Delbœuf’s visit to the canons of the Tarn. Here +was captured a lizard which displayed, when compared with a Spanish +lizard in captivity with it, as much difference in character as could be +found between two men chosen at hazard. The author concludes an amusing +description of the habits of the two captives by recommending their +history to the politicians and the historians of France and Spain, as +likely to throw light on that of the peoples themselves. We leave M. +Delbœuf, whose book of seventy-five pages may be said to be as full of +interesting matter as an egg is of meat, with quoting his postscript: +“On the day that these lines appear (March 1891) the Spanish lizard has +finally cast off his savage character and follows in the footsteps of the +French. Effect of imitation.” + + Ω. + + +DER POSITIVISMUS VOM TODE AUGUST COMTE’S BIS AUF UNSERE TAGE (1857-1891). +By _Hermann Gruber_, S. J. Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder’sche +Verlagshandlung. 1891. + +This pamphlet of 194 pages is the continuation of another pamphlet on +August Comte, the founder of Positivism, which was reviewed in _The Open +Court_, No. 134. The author is a Jesuit and it is a matter of course that +all the facts he relates, all the doctrines he explains are represented +from the standpoint of Roman Catholicism. The booklet is of great +importance in so far as we learn through it what an erudite Catholic mind +thinks of that recent movement of philosophy which has been called by +the collective name Positivism. The method pursued by Hermann Gruber is +most recommendable. He states facts and quotes abundantly so as to let +the various philosophers speak for themselves. He is economical with the +salt of his own opinion, yet he uses it with such a discretion that Roman +Catholics can become thoroughly acquainted with infidel views without +suffering in their faith. + +The book consists of two parts: (I) The Positivism of the schools in +connection with Comte and of the Positivistic movement outside of these +schools. The first part begins with a discussion of Littré. Littré, “the +voice, the spirit and the soul of Positivism,” as Bourdon calls him, +is characterised as a philological genius. Although he had chosen the +medical profession, which however he abandoned early, and although he +regarded the propaganda of the positive philosophy as his life-work, +all his talents lay in the direction of special investigation in the +literary, historical, and linguistic fields, and the editing of the +French dictionary remains his main achievement. + +Comte had not nominated a successor who should in his place be the +_Directeur du positivisme_. Littré had forfeited this honor on account +of his quarrels with Comte in which he strongly sided with Madame Comte +against her husband. After Comte’s death P. Lafitte was elected as a +temporary director and he has kept this office ever since, which he +conducts with remarkable devotion and unselfishness. Although without +property himself he proposed not to use the positivistic funds until he +had shown himself through his work worthy of using them. He ekes out a +scanty living for himself by giving lessons in mathematics, and devotes +all the rest of his time to the management of and the propaganda for +the Positive Church. His co-workers are Audiffrent, Antoine, Robinet, +and others—all of them as the reviewer thinks strange people, visionary +enthusiasts, and, to use an expressive Americanism, regular cranks. +Lack of space prevents us from recapitulating their ceremonies, their +sacraments, festivals, pilgrimages, memorials, and other forms of +service. Their whole behavior proves that they are and will remain +infidel Roman Catholics and it would have been wiser if they had not +left the church at all. The positivistic orthodoxy culminates in the +positivistic mystery of Comte’s idea of a “Virgin-Mother” (_Vierge-Mère_) +which according to Lafitte is destined to elevate the intercourse +between the sexes, while Audiffrent, Lagarrigue, and the Brasilian Lemos +stick closely to Comte’s view “to represent positivism as directly +conceived under the Utopia of a virgin-mother.”[22] General Lemos goes +so far as to say “We prefer to be looked upon with St. Paul for the +sake of our faithfulness toward Comte as fools than to be praised by +the contemporary frivolity as sages.” And Audiffrent defends against +Lafitte the diplomatic action of Comte’s with the General of the Jesuits +concerning an alliance between Positivism and Catholicism. Positivism, +he says, invites all who have ceased to believe in God to become +positivists, but it induces all those who still believe in God to turn +Catholics, thus making an alliance possible of the disciplined against +the non-disciplined. + +If the Jesuit General ever has seriously considered the offer, he would +perhaps have accepted it, for there is no doubt that he would have made +the better bargain as all the discipline we should say is on his side. + +The English group of Comtean Positivists consists mainly of Fr. Harrison, +Richard Congreve, George Eliot and James Cotter Morison. The second part +of the book which treats of the positivistic movement outside of the +positivistic schools in England, France, Germany and other countries will +be less interesting to English and American readers partly because the +subject is better known to them partly because our author is apparently +more familiar with his French than with his English sources. The second +part begins with John Stuart Mill and Herbert Spencer. It mentions Bain, +Lewes, Clifford, Maudsley, Darwin, Sully, Romanes, Huxley, Tyndall. +Clifford’s view is sketched in sixteen lines but in such a way that +it appears grotesque. As French positivists outside the schools are +mentioned Taine, Ribot, Fouillée, Guyau, Charles Richet, J. Luys, Cl. +Bernard, and Roberty. It is correctly said of Ribot that his doctrine +of personality is most characteristic of his views. The unity of a +personality in the ego does not grow from above downwards but from below +upwards, but Gruber is mistaken in saying of Charles Richet, the editor +of the _Revue Scientifique_, that he represents about the same views as +Th. Ribot. Richet’s publication on telepathic experiments in which he +confidently believes, would never be countenanced by Ribot. + +As the first German positivist is mentioned Eugen Dühring. Riehl, Laas, +Lange, Vaihinger and Avenarius are disposed of together in the next +following chapter. Several pages are devoted to Wundt. + +The little chapter headed _Nord-America_ (p. 171) consisting of two and +a half pages begins with the words: “According to the testimony of G. +Stanley Hall philosophy in the new world is in its swaddling-clothes +still (_in den Kinderschuhen_). Philosophers over there are as rare +as snakes in Ireland (_Schlangen in Norwegen_).[23] For scientific +instruction in the United States are used as guiding stars Spencer, +Lewes, Darwin, Huxley, and Haeckel.” As a representative Atheist is +named Ludeking, a man unknown to fame, while Colonel Ingersoll is not +mentioned at all. It is maintained that J. D. Bell, a professor in +New York had proclaimed the same confession of faith as Comte in _The +Modern Thinker_—a journal which we have never seen nor ever heard of. +The societies for ethical culture are characterised as avowing “a purely +natural religion” while in fact natural religion, the religion of science +and philosophy, as a basis of ethics is as rigorously rejected by +Professor Adler as any dogmatic religion, and more than half of the two +and a half pages is filled with a masonic proclamation of the Sovereign +Grand Commander, Albert Pike, of Washington, which preaches the belief in +an unknowable God and denounces Atheism. + +The booklet closes with the following sentences: “The full and true +positivism is embodied in the Catholic Church. The divine revelation +which she represents is that which is truly real ... truly sure ... truly +precise ... truly organic ... truly useful. The deepest root, however, +and the most essential nature of all true positivism (this is vouched for +by reason as well as by revelation) is not the relative but the absolute.” + +Here we conclude our review of the book. We have however to add a few +words which concern _The Monist_ as well as all the publications of The +Open Court Publishing Co. Hermann Gruber mentions in his book _The Open +Court_ and its editor together with the societies for ethical culture. +We have, ourselves, characterised our views as positivism and as monism, +but we stated at the same time that our positivism had nothing to do +with Comte or with any one of Comte’s disciples.[24] They have (with the +sole exception of Ribot and I should hesitate to call him a Comtean) +contributed little if anything to the formation of our views. The name +Positivism is a good and expressive word and we have adopted it because +taken in its proper meaning it represents the true principle of modern +philosophy. However we cannot agree with any of the fundamental tenets +either of Comte or of his most positivistic and most scientific disciple +Littré.[25] Comte as well as Littré are radical agnostics they repeat +again and again that “We can know nothing about first and final causes. +Positive philosophy denies nothing and maintains nothing.” According +to our view of the subject this attitude is rather negativism than +positivism. But it is not even negativism; it is worse, it is mere +scepticism leading to indifferentism. It sounds very philosophical to +speak of the inscrutability of first and final causes but the very +terms “first causes” and “final causes” are most nonsensical and +self-contradictory concepts. (See “Fundamental Problems,” pp. 88-90, and +101.) Comte and Littré imagine to have conquered metaphysics, but in fact +they are the worst kind of metaphysicians. They believe in the ghosts of +metaphysics as strongly as some mediæval minds believe in devils but are +afraid to wrestle with them, because, as they maintain these metaphysical +ghosts cannot be conquered. + +Comtean Positivism, especially as it is represented by Littré, consists +mainly if not exclusively of the doctrine to “let metaphysics alone” +(which latter includes the object of religious worship) and limits +science to positive issues. Thus the oneness of the sciences, a unitary +world-conception is lost, for the hierarchy of the sciences which are +to serve as a substitute for philosophy is rather a summing up of the +stock of knowledge than a system of the sciences exhibiting their organic +growth. It is an inventory rather than a plan to guide science in its +further evolution. It is an anatomy rather than a physiology, for the +very life and spirit of the sciences is missing. And outside the pale of +the hierarchy of the sciences there is looming around an awful something +quite different in its nature, like an infinite ocean surrounding a +forlorn island, the unknowable first and final causes! That which is +called by former philosophers “metaphysics,” which is at the same time +the essence of religion, is by no means either unknowable or indifferent. +It is not something beyond, something extramundane, it is the very life +of the world and our religious and philosophical opinions are not only +of a theoretical interest. They are the main factors of our lives which +in the long run will determine the direction of our development. That +this is so, has not been sufficiently recognised, and we would suggest in +this connection that a history of the United States should be written to +point out that the political liberty of the country and its republicanism +are nothing but the application of its religious principles and of the +Puritan conviction of religious independence. The historic growth of the +colonies remained faithful to this maxim. The religion of a man and of +a nation is the most important thing. In the same way the structure of +a seed predetermines the whole plant, and the angle of crystallisation +together with the shape of the crystal-nucleus from which the process of +crystallisation starts, will determine the formation of the whole crystal. + +His sceptical attitude led Littré to what he and his friends call +“tolerance.” Littré’s wife was a devout Catholic and his daughter was +educated in her mother’s faith. He had intended to explain to her his +views of the subject when she had reached maturity, and leave the choice +to her. But when the moment came, he declared that “the experiment was +not worth the tears which it would cause.” Our view of “tolerance” is +radically different. Whatever the truth may be it should be struggled +for, cost it ever so many tears or pains. + +We cannot sympathise with Littré’s method of constructing ethics upon the +nutritive and sexual instincts, the former producing egotism, the latter +altruism. Emotions are, says Littré, as much as ideas, the result of +brain-processes in consequence of external impressions and “the struggle +between both kinds of emotion make up the moral life.” Littré rejects +the evolution theory and its attempts to explain ethics. (See Gruber’s +book p. 20.) Having explained our views of ethics on other occasions, +it is sufficient here to state that we consider Littré’s attempt as a +failure. We cannot even adopt the so-called “positive method,” of which +Littré says: “Whoever adopts this method is a positivist and whether +he acknowledges the fact or not, also a disciple of Comte. Whoever +employs another method is a metaphysician. It is the surest mark by +which a careful mind will discriminate what belongs to the positive +philosophy and what is foreign to it.” What is this method? Says Littré: +“It is an acknowledged principle of positive science that nothing real +can be stated through reasoning (_raisonnement_). The world cannot be +guessed.” Littré is opposed to so-called _a priori_ arguments. Hermann +Gruber says in the preface: “This positive method is embraced by all +the representatives of the lines of thought here discussed. All of them +intend to build up their systems with the exclusion of scholastic, +respectively of Kantian, Hegelian, or any _a priori_ speculations +after purely ‘scientific’ methods upon the foundation of the facts of +experience.” We certainly intend to build our world conception “upon the +facts of experience” but the most important facts among them are their +formal relations and these formal relations when represented in thought +are exactly that element which Kant called _a priori_. The sense-element +affords us the building stones, but the _a priori_ element represents +the mortar without which we could not build. So much do we oppose +this one-sided philosophy which takes its stand upon what is wrongly +called the purely scientific method, that our views have been called +the Philosophy of Form, and justly, for Form is that feature of the +world which makes of it a cosmos and formal thought is the organ of our +comprehension. + + κρς. + + +UEBER DEN ASSOCIATIVEN VERLAUF DER VORSTELLUNGEN. Inaugural-Dissertation. +By _E. W. Scripture_, M. A., Fellow of Clark University. Leipzig: Wilhelm +Engelmann. 1891. + +This essay of 102 pages characterises most excellently some of the +proceedings and methods of Professor Wundt’s psychological laboratory. +The author, a disciple of Wundt, is a native American who studied in +Berlin, Zürich, and Leipzig, and took his degree of Doctor on the ground +of this dissertation. The object of the treatise is not so much to solve +as to formulate the problem of the associative course of concepts, and +the author hopes that in a future treatise he will be able to propound +his theory based upon the facts here related. + +The experiments were made with the assistance of seven friends, among +them German students, a doctor of philosophy, a doctor of medicine, +and a teacher. They were of different nationality, three Germans, one +Belgian, one Japanese, one Englishman from the Cape, and two Americans, +the author included. The apparatus used was so arranged that the person +operated upon sat in the dark, before him was a plate of ground glass +intercepting from a camera an image which was exposed for four seconds. +Pictures of all kinds, colors, and plainly printed words were used. For +other sense-impressions the observer was also seated in the dark. Several +instruments for producing sounds were ready on a table. Tastes were +effected by liquids which the person operated upon had to drink, and the +sense of touch was investigated through handing him cards to which some +small objects had been attached. The author was partly operator, partly +observer, i. e. the person operated upon. The ideas evoked through the +sense-impressions produced in this way, are enumerated in tabular form in +the order in which they arose. + +Among the experiments made in this way we find one kind which is of +special interest. Sir William Hamilton made the remark in his Lectures +on Metaphysics that unconscious ideas may serve as connecting links +between two ideas otherwise unassociated. He represented his view in the +following way: Let _A_, _B_, _C_, be three ideas, _A_ does not suggest +_C_, but both are associated with _B_. It happens that _A_ is directly +followed by _C_ in consciousness. In such a case _A_ may recall _B_ +and _B_ may recall _C_, but _B_ being a _minimum visibile_ or _minimum +audibile_ does not enter consciousness. Thus the idea of the mount Ben +Lomond called into Hamilton’s mind the system of Prussian education. +Subsequent reflection taught him that he had met on Ben Lomond a German. +The recollection of the place was associated with the ideas—a German, +Germany, Prussia. These ideas were too weak to enter consciousness yet +they reawakened another idea which did enter consciousness, the system of +Prussian education. + +This is a mere suggestion of Hamilton’s but Dr. Scripture proved its +truth by actual experiment. He took cards containing some simple +words, such as MENSCH, GEHEN, KOMMEN, BLUME, etc., and also Japanese +words in Roman characters HANA, HITO, IUKU, KURU. To every word was +attached another Japanese word in Japanese characters so that the same +character appeared on HANA and BLUME; HITO and MENSCH; JUKU and GEHEN; +KURU and KOMMEN. The words were shown twice so as to give a stronger +impression. The Japanese gentleman was excluded from these experiments, +and indeed, the unknown Japanese characters which were only dimly or +not at all remembered, evoked the corresponding words: HITO—MENSCH; +KURU—KOMMEN; BLUME—HANA, etc. Dr. Scripture adds: “These associations +were involuntary, the observer imagined them to be wrong, and could find +no reason for the involuntary appearance of the words. He had not thought +at all of the connecting links.” + +It appears that the links in a chain of concepts need not be all +conscious and the result of his experiments in this line is formulated by +Dr. Scripture as follows: A concept apperceived can bring another concept +into the focus of consciousness although it was never associated with it, +if there are other psychic elements of lower degrees or even outside of +consciousness which are connected with both—provided that there are no +other elements stronger than these. The effect of the unconscious link +however is much weaker than that which was conscious. + +Pages 71-101 are devoted to the investigations of the after-effect of +concepts. The phenomena of ideation being extremely complex, we cannot +assume that the process of a so-called reproduced concept is analogous +to the original idea. A sensation changes during its presence with +reference to the degree of consciousness of its parts and even the +concepts as a whole may be altered. The process is different according +to circumstances. The renewed concepts differ from their originals, +(1) in the degree of the consciousness of the whole idea, (2) in the +degree of the consciousness of its parts among themselves, (3) in +form, color, relations, etc., (4) in duration. In order to avoid the +metaphysical influence of hypothetical theories we ought to avoid all +kinds of terms suggestive of a theory and stick closely to a simple +description of facts. Therefore Dr. Scripture proposes to discard such +words as “retention, reproduction, revival,” etc., and suggests the term +“after-effect.” Yet he adds, quoting from Wundt, “these after-effects +themselves are as little ideas as the effects produced upon nerves and +muscles by exercise can be called actions of will.” + +Dr. Scripture avoids explaining what he conceives these after-effects to +be. We see no reason for disagreement and should say that the result of +the after-effects is what generally goes by the name of “disposition.” +And a certain disposition is produced according to the law of the +conservation of form in living structures. (See “The Soul of Man,” pp. +418-424.) + +Dr. Scripture is led by a consideration of his observations to the +following statement: “Each concept is conditioned through the effects of +the elements of the present state of consciousness and the after-effects +of many (if not of all) previous elements of consciousness.” + +This result is not compatible with the theory of reproduction now almost +universally accepted by the association-psychology. Wundt says: “If only +certain single concepts were renewed, we might perhaps explain why in the +memory-picture certain elements of a former reproduction are missing: +but we could not explain why the elements of a concept change so often +qualitatively as is indeed the case. This, it appears, is possible only +because a memory-picture and others of a kindred nature affect each other +mutually.” + +This will find explanation in the following experiment. The observer +sees a dog, and thinks of a circus, which he saw a year ago. There is +no direct association between the picture of the dog and the special +reminiscence of that circus visited a year ago. The association was +formed at the moment. Former sensations of dogs had their after-effects +and this special reminiscence was localised. + +Dr. Scripture maintains that Höffding’s association theory contains too +many hypothetical elements; it presupposes faculties of the soul to join +like with like and to combine simultaneous or consecutive events. + + κρς. + + +FOOTNOTES: + +[22] ... “A represénter le positivisme comme directement résummé par +l’utopie de la Vierge-Mère”—Comte to Audiffrent, the 8th of St. Paul 69 +(May 28, 1857.) + +[23] Good philosophers, it is true, are rare in America, perhaps rarer +than in Europe. Nevertheless the interest in philosophy is exceedingly +strong here. There are metaphysical and philosophical clubs all over the +country, and the crop of philosophical dilettanti is at least as great on +this side of the Atlantic as in Paris. + +[24] It is a matter of course that we are in strong sympathy with many +philosophers and scientists whom Hermann Gruber classes among the +positivists outside of the positivistic schools, not only Th. Ribot, but +also Guyau, Fouillée, Roberty, and others. How much they were influenced +by the Comte-Littré or the Comte-Lafitte Positivism is difficult to say. +It is certain that many of them would have accomplished the same work in +the same way with or without Comte. Roberty was first a fervid disciple +of Comte, but he soon combated not only Comte’s law of the three stages +(which latter by the bye was according to Schaarschmidt first pronounced +by Turgot) but also his agnosticism, declaring that Comte was still +entangled in metaphysicism, and that the last bulwark, the idea of the +unknowable, had to be conquered also. + +[25] We publish in this number a sonnet by Louis Belrose, Jr. to Émile +Littré. Mr. Belrose is a positivist who attended together with Mr. Fred. +Harrison positivistic lectures in France. We publish Mr. Belrose’s poem +as an expression of his gratitude and admiration toward a master mind but +not as an expression of our view of Littré. + + + + +PERIODICALS. + + +MIND. July, 1891. No. LXIII. + +CONTENTS: + + THE PROBLEM OF PSYCHOLOGY. By _E. W. Scripture_. + + THE PHYSICAL BASIS OF PLEASURE AND PAIN. I. By _H. R. Marshall_. + + SCHOPENHAUER’S CRITICISM OF KANT. By _W. Caldwell_. + + DISCUSSION: On the Origin of Music. (1) By _R. Wallaschek_; + (2) By Prof. _J. McK. Cattell_; The Coefficient of External + Reality. By Prof. _J. Mark Baldwin_. + + CRITICAL NOTICES: James’s “The Principles of Psychology”; + Pfleiderer’s “Development of Theology in Germany”; Keynes’s + “Scope and Method of Political Economy”; Lehmann’s “Die Hypnose + und die damit verwandten normalen Zustände.” + +As all sciences treat, to a great extent, of the same objects, they +can be separated only according to _how_ they treat things. On this +principle, Mr. Scripture divides sciences into Special Sciences, +General or Philosophical Sciences, and Didactic Sciences. The Special +sciences are, I, the Mathematical Sciences, treating the _forms_ of all +experience; II, the Phenomenal Sciences, treating of the _contents_ +of all experience; the second class is divided into the Physical +Sciences, which treat experience from its objective side, and Mental +Sciences, which treat experience from its subjective side. The group +of Mental Sciences is best divided, according to Wundt’s scheme, into +the sciences of mental processes, Psychological Sciences; the sciences +of mental products, Philological Sciences; and the Sciences of mental +development, Historical Sciences. Psychology as a science of mental +phenomena has a two-fold relation to the physical sciences: it is +complementary to them, a necessary auxiliary; they are complementary +to it, accessories in psychological investigation. States of mind +always remain states of mind; they cannot be resolved into motions of +particles of matter, and it is a fundamental axiom that _mental phenomena +cannot influence or be influenced by material phenomena_. But we are +justified in talking about a nervous stimulation becoming a percept, a +muscular contraction following an act of will, as long as we remember +that these are only substitutes for unknown quantities. Physiology +investigates nervous changes; Psychology, mental changes; Physiological +Psychology, the relations between the two. Mental phenomena are of two +kinds, mental processes and mental products. Psychology is the science +of mental processes; it seeks the exact description and explanation +of the operations of our inner experience. The relation of Psychology +to Philosophy is a burning question. Metaphysics, or Philosophy in +the narrower sense, seeks from the agreement of the results of all +other sciences to establish a system of the principles that underlie +all existence, i. e. a theory of the universe, material and mental. +After the general principles have been determined by metaphysics, +philosophy has the duty of correcting the special sciences when they +set up one-sided hypotheses, and of helping where they are unable to +proceed alone. Psychology is considered a part of philosophy, but as +a special science, treating mental processes from its own standpoint, +it is distinct from psychology as a general science treating mind, +relations of mind and matter, etc., from the standpoint of philosophy. +The latter should be termed Philosophical Psychology. The relation of +Psychology to Logic depends on what the latter is. Logic is a science of +thought, but thought is also a subject of psychology. Psychology treats +thoughts as we think them; Logic, as we ought to think them. Each of the +sciences, Epistemology, the doctrine of knowledge, and Methodology, the +doctrine of methods, treats of thought for its own distinct purpose. +The former determines what the truth is; the latter determines how we +ought to think. The didactic sciences are of two kinds: the sciences of +the general principles or ends to be obtained, and the sciences of the +means to attain these ends. Among the former is General Pedagogy, which +determines the ends to be sought for in education. Psychology furnishes +the foundation of fact; the science of general pedagogy judges which of +these facts are desirable, in much the same way as epistemology judges +which are true. + +In a former article (_Mind_ No. 56) Mr. Marshall showed that Pleasure +and Pain are primitive qualities which, under proper conditions, _may_ +appear with any psychosis, whatever be its content. He now finds that +all the most notable pleasure-pain theories may in the first instance +be placed in four groups, determined by the emphasis of certain kinds +of pleasure or pain. An examination of pleasure-pain theories shows, +_first_ that there is a general agreement, with but few dissenting +voices, that all pleasure is at bottom the same thing, and that all pain +in its essence is a single psychological phenomenon, and further that +pleasures and pains are unifiable; _second_, that there are certain facts +so marked in experience as to have become the basis of the majority of +pleasure-pain theories. Mr. Marshall proceeds to consider the theory that +“the activity of the organ of any content if efficient is pleasurable, +if inefficient is painful.” He concludes that pleasures and pains are +involved with the nutritive conditions of the active organ, and lays +down the principle that “all pleasure-pain phenomena are determined by +the action in the organs concomitant of the conscious state, as related +to the nutritive conditions of the organs at the time of the action.” +The difference between the hypernormality of pain and of pleasure, +turns upon the fact that pleasure is obtained where the organ has been +_rested_. Rest in an organ which is sometimes active means storage of +energy derived from blood supply; and action after rest means the use +of stored energy. But as action of an organ after rest gives a psychic +content which is pleasurable, we have the working hypothesis: “Pleasure +is experienced wherever the physical action which determines the content +involves the use of stored force—the resolution of potential into actual +energy; or, in other words, whenever the energy involved in the reaction +to a stimulus is greater in amount than the energy of the stimulus.” +By a similar process of reasoning we obtain the hypothesis: “Pain is +experienced whenever the physical action which determines the content +is so related to the supply of nutriment that the energy involved in +the reaction to the stimulus is less in amount than the energy of the +stimulus.” We may also say in general, “Pleasure and pain are primitive +qualities of psychic states which are determined by the relation +between activity and capacity in the organs, the activities of which +are concomitants of the psychosis.” Mr. Marshall then supplies the +psychological interpretation of the physiological phenomena attendant on +the pleasures of Rest and of Relief, and of the pain of Obstruction or +hindered activity. He concludes the present article with the statement +that the physical concomitants of pleasure-pain phenomena are to be found +in general qualities common to all processes which are at the basis +of our conscious life; and that this is corroborated by introspective +analysis of pleasures and pains. Mr. Marshall’s idea does not appear to +us as a happy solution of the problem. + +The object of Mr. Caldwell’s paper is to explain Kantism through +Schopenhauer, who claimed to be Kant’s only true successor in philosophy. +Schopenhauer came to the conclusion that Kant’s only real discovery, +given in the “Æsthetic,” was that Space and Time were known by us _a +priori_. The principle of Causality is the only element of value he +finds in the “Analytic,” and a much simpler account could have been +given of it. The “Dialectic” represents the Negative side of the +Critical Philosophy, which although conclusive, might have been stated +more simply. In Ethics Kant rendered the immortal service of showing, +by his attribution of a noumenal freedom to man, compensating for his +phenomenal necessary determination, “that the kingdom of virtue is not +of this world”; although the _K. d. prakt. V._ is only an application +to ethics of the principles already reached in the sphere of the Pure +Reason. Schopenhauer finds the _K. d. Urtheilskraft_ to contain the +characteristic defect of Kant’s whole Philosophy—the starting from +indirect instead of direct knowledge. Lastly, the criticism of the +Teleological Judgment only shows what the _K. d. r. V._ already showed, +the subjectivity of what we may call the ontological categories. +According to Schopenhauer, the chief tendency of the Kantian philosophy +is to establish “the total diversity of the real and the ideal.” The +Ideal he explains as “the visible, spatial appearance with the qualities +that are perceived on it,” and the Real as the “thing-in-and-for-itself,” +which is the reality underlying and determining the world of experience, +and, as such, a real and not a hypothetical entity. Schopenhauer never +speaks of it in the plural, as Kant does, and so keeps consistently to +a monistic point of view. He says, “The way in which Kant introduced +such a thing-in-itself and sought to reconcile it with his philosophy +was faulty.” This concerns Kant’s method, against which Schopenhauer +directs the full force of his criticism. The fundamental principle +of Kant’s method Schopenhauer takes to be the starting from indirect +reflective knowledge: Philosophy is for Kant a science of conceptions, +while for himself it is a science _in_ conceptions; philosophy being a +conceptualised or _generalised_ statement of our knowledge. Schopenhauer +sees all Kant’s errors contained in the following sentence from the _K. +d. r. V._: “If I take away all thought” (through the categories), “from +empirical knowledge, there remains absolutely no knowledge of an object, +for through mere perceptions nothing at all is thought.” In endeavoring +to construct a philosophy out of pure conceptions Kant failed to solve +the problem, in having the thing-in-itself left on his hands. This proved +to Schopenhauer that the path of abstract reflection was closed as the +path of philosophy. Mr. Caldwell demurs to Schopenhauer’s statement +that the “Æsthetic” is Kant’s only discovery, yet as the “Æsthetic” +shows the tendency to conceptual abstraction, his view of Space and Time +is of extreme importance. It is of the “Logic” of the _K. d. r. V._ +that Schopenhauer’s criticism is materially and formally most radical. +He gives a different account of the functions of the Soul, rejecting +altogether the faculty-distinctions of Kant: he associates Kant’s faculty +of Understanding more with Sense and the category of Cause with the +spatio-temporal or perceptual construction of the world, and holds the +other eleven categories to be mere blind windows put into a scheme +through Kant’s love of symmetry; and, secondly, he holds Kant’s account +of Reason to be utterly false, and substitutes his own doctrine of the +thing-in-itself for Kant’s three Ideas of Reason. By Reason Schopenhauer +means the power the mind has of forming general conceptions and of +knowing by way of conception or idea, the matter for conceptions and +ideas being of course derived from Perception. Reasoned knowledge is an +abstraction from perceived knowledge, and all knowledge, as Schopenhauer +says, is originally and in itself perceptive. The confusion in Kant’s +account of the elements entering into knowledge, is Schopenhauer’s +reason for holding that Kant can only have had the fundamental principle +of his method imperfectly present to his mind. His whole difficulty +in relating the elements of knowledge to each other arose from the +fact that he in his thought likened the categories to conceptions +through want of an explicit and persistent recognition of the nature of +conception. Schopenhauer himself classifies the categories according to +the planes or stages of experience they characterise: the perceptual, +the mathematical, the logical, and the ethical in order. The categories +are all abstractions, but not conceptions or notions. Conceptions are a +particular kind of abstractions, and so are categories: to conceptions +_material_ entities correspond, but to categories only relations or +forms. Knowledge consists in the detection of relations existing between +the different planes or sections of the perceptual continuum, the +difference in perceived things being that some are immediately and others +only mediately perceived. The true reason of Schopenhauer’s revolt from +the method of conceptions is to be found in the difficulties in which he +felt himself involved by the theory of Subjective Idealism. Philosophy, +he says, is a search for the Thing-in-itself, but he tells Kant that from +the idea nothing but the idea follows, and that the path of Reflexion +or Knowledge is closed as the path of philosophy. Had Schopenhauer kept +more true to his ruling that knowledge is originally and in itself +perception, he would not have maintained that the world is my idea. The +Thing-in-itself is the shadow cast by the Reflective or Abstracting +Understanding. With both Kant and Schopenhauer it is primarily invented +to get rid of the difficulty bred of a belief in an abstraction or +unreality, and as it is a pure mental fiction, we may safely deny that +there is any such thing in reality. + +Mr. Wallaschek finds the origin of music in a rhythmical impulse in man. +The sense of rhythm arises from the general appetite for exercise, which +recurs in rhythmical form owing to sociological as well as psychological +conditions. On the one hand, there is the social character of primitive +music, compelling a number of performers to act in concert. On the +other hand, our perception of time-relations involves a process of +intellection, by means of which the mind is able to comprehend them as +a whole. Since music is produced not merely as an auditory impression +and expression, but also in order to evoke reflexion, it must contain +the qualities of time-order and rhythm. Mr. Herbert Spencer’s theory of +the origin of the general appetite for exercise is said to afford the +most valid explanation. It is the surplus vigor in more highly evolved +organisms, exceeding what is required for immediate needs, in which play +of all kinds takes its rise. We owe our musical faculty to the time-sense +rather than to our sense of hearing. The perception of particular +tones and tunes plays a very low part, if any, in primitive music. In +almost all the examples furnished by ethnology, we see that music is +the expression of emotion, which is also one of the sources of human +language. Mr. Spencer is said to be wrong, however, in thinking that +musical modulation originates in the modulations of speech Music and +speech have a reciprocal influence, and primitive human utterance, using +sound-metaphors and onomatopœia, may resemble primitive musical tones. +Nevertheless, an early separation of distinct tones and indistinct sounds +seems to have taken place, not as a transition from the one as prior to +the other as succeeding, but as a divergence from a primitive state which +is, strictly speaking, neither of the two. + +Professor Cattell objects that the theories of Darwin and Spencer on the +origin of music, describe what probably took place, rather than explain +why it was necessary that it should have taken place. As to Spencer’s +explanation of harmony, he affirms that it amounts to saying that harmony +gives pleasure because it is pleasant. After referring to the connection +of harmony with the existence of overtones, Prof. Cattell states that +music is not, as commonly supposed, a creation of the imagination, freer +than the other arts from a physical basis, but is rather a discovery and +a development. All the combinations of music are latent in the sounds Of +nature, and the history of music bears witness to the gradual adoption of +such as are more remote. The difference in voices rests on the overtones +present, and the immense emotional effects of music are due to the fact +that music expresses the emotion of the human voice, using and developing +those combinations of tones which the voice uses when moved by sorrow and +joy, despair and exultation. + +By the _Coefficient_ of External Reality, Professor Baldwin means the +something which attaches to some presentations in virtue of which we +attribute reality to them; while others, not having the coefficient, +are discredited. Diametrically opposed solutions of this question +are held. To one class of writers, the coefficient of the reality +of an image is its independence of the will; to another class, the +coefficient is subjection to the will. If we make a distinction between a +memory-coefficient of reality—that is, the something about a memory which +leads us to believe it represents a real experience—and a sensational +coefficient, that is, the criterion of present sensational reality, we +see that those two kinds of reality differ in their relation to the +will. A present sensible reality is not under the control of any will, +but a memory coefficient is subjected to will, in the sense that we +are able to get the image again as a sensation by repeating the series +of voluntary muscular sensations which were associated with it in its +first experience. This memory-coefficient of external reality must be +distinguished from the coefficient of memory itself; the latter being +the feeling that an image has been in consciousness before, i. e. +recognition, or sense of familiarity. A true memory is an image which I +can get at will by a train of memory-associates, and which, when got, is +further subject to my will. (London: Williams & Norgate.) + + +INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS. July, 1891. Vol. I. NO. 4. + +CONTENTS: + + THE MODERN CONCEPTION OF THE SCIENCE OF RELIGION. By Prof. + _Edward Caird_. + + THE FUNCTIONS OF ETHICAL THEORY. By Prof. _James H. Hyslop_. + + THE MORALITY OF NATIONS. By Prof. _W. R. Sorley_. + + J. S. MILL’S SCIENCE OF ETHOLOGY. By _James Ward_. + + VICE AND IMMORALITY. By _R. W. Black_. + + THE PROGRESS OF POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE ADAM SMITH. By _Francis + W. Newman_. + + PROGRAMME OF SCHOOL OF APPLIED ETHICS. + + DISCUSSIONS: The Moral Aspect of “Tips” and “Gratuities.” By + _Christine Ladd Franklin_. + +Ideas and facts, says Professor Caird, are continually being woven +together as warp and woof, into the web of man’s intellectual life. +The idea of the unity of mankind has within the last century become +an almost instinctive presupposition of all civilised men. It has +special application to the history of religion. In a man’s religion we +have expressed his ultimate attitude to the universe. Even atheism or +agnosticism involves a definite attitude towards the ultimate problem +of human life. The modern ideas of the organic unity and the organic +evolution of man inevitably compel us to seek for the one principle of +life which is striving towards the full realisation of itself. + +Professor Hyslop remarks, that two questions may be asked: (1) Why is +it that any disturbance in ethical speculation at once brings men up +in arms about the consequences? (2) Why is there such a tendency even +in speculative ethics to bring its theories into harmony and sympathy +with “practical” problems? The preliminary answer is the distinction +between science and art. The aim of science is to find causes; the aim +of art to produce ends by means of these causes. But art may be divided +into productive and practical art. Every consideration of the scope and +aim of ethics shows it to be both a science and an art. As a science it +endeavors to explain something; as an art, to realise something. Its +complications are thus two-fold. Ethics may be a science in two distinct +relations. First, it aims to show the general conception which will +reduce the various motives actually governing human conduct to unity. +Secondly, it aims to show the end that ought ideally to govern conduct, +and this is the supreme object of ethics as a science. + +In relation to the Morality of Nations, Professor Sorley says that the +relations of the state, diplomatic or military, with other states may be +compared with the relations of one individual to another, but the two +sets of relations are not the same. A crime is an act punishable by law, +and it is absurd therefore to speak as if the state, acting legally, +could commit a crime. But if theft ceased to be a crime it would be as +much an offense against morality as before. Taxation to which the taxed +have not consented and unfair taxation cannot be regarded as theft, as +some suppose. Individual morality becomes mixed with national morality +when those through whom the state acts act for themselves and for their +own interests, instead of for the common good. Within a nation the state +is above all individuals, but there is no corresponding superior power +over nations. What remains is a general obligation upon states to observe +justice in their dealings with one another. National morality differs +from individual morality in that a nation’s first duty may be said to +be to itself. There is no selfishness, there is only patriotism, in its +recognising the fact and acting upon it. The intercourse of nations can +only reach a full measure of development under a common moral law, which +recognises the rights of one nation as of equal value with the rights of +any other. + +Mr. Ward points out, that Mill, in his exposition of what he called +Ethology, or the Exact Science of Human Nature, repeated in all the +issues of his “Logic,” remarks that Ethology must first proceed +deductively. The laws of the formation of character “are derivative +laws, resulting from the general laws of mind, and are to be obtained by +deducing them from those general laws.” There was a want of clearness +in Mill’s conception of an individual. The notion of a Self proved, +on his own admission, “the real stumbling block” to his psychological +theory. In discussing the influence of remarkable men, Mill allows that +“whatever depends on the peculiarities of individuals, combined with the +accidents of the positions they hold, is necessarily incapable of being +foreseen.” When we attempt to estimate the influence of circumstances +on individuals, we must often know how the circumstances appear to +_them_,—this personal equation so to say is frequently incalculable. + +In the main, says Mr. Black, sin exists intimately in, or as an +inseparable affection or potentiality of, the person as a whole, and to +discourage it is to discourage the person, and tantamount, therefore, +to discouraging his goodness as well. At this point the division of +sin into vice and immorality becomes essential to a rational solution. +Immorality is crime against living moral agents. Vice may be defined as +the spending of the forces of one’s own life to the detriment of its +moral capabilities. + +Mr. Francis W. Newman, who began the study of Political Economy seventy +years ago, when he was sixteen, gives in this article his views on the +evils of land tenure in England. + +Mrs. Franklin thinks “the subjective feeling of worth and dignity” which +distinguishes the people of this country will be injured by “giving +fees to our inferiors when they perform some service for which they are +(or ought to be) otherwise well paid.” That the matter is not “absolute +ethics” is apparent from the fact that in Japan a totally different +sentiment prevails. The editor, Prof. Josiah Royce (under the signature +of J. R.) in commenting on Mrs. Franklin’s communication after referring +to the evils of the German custom of Trinkgeld as detailed by v. Ihering, +says that if it harms the manhood of our writers to “tip” them the +mischief should be met by organised devices such as v. Ihering proposes, +and not by individual action. (Philadelphia: _International Journal of +Ethics_, 1602 Chestnut Street.) + + Ω. + + +REVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE. + +CONTENTS: June, 1891. No. 186. + + LES RESULTATS DES THEORIES CONTEMPORAINES SUR L’ASSOCIATION DES + IDEES. By _B. Bourdon_. + + COMMENT LA SENSATION DEVIENT IDEE. By _J. Payot_. + + NOTES ET DISCUSSIONS. QU’EST-CE QUE LA PHYSIOLOGIE GENERALE? By + _Durand_ (_de Gros_). + +CONTENTS: July, 1891. No. 187. + + LA NOTION DE LIMITE EN MATHEMATIQUES. By _G. Milhaud_. + + COUP D’OEIL SUR L’HISTOIRE DE LA PHILOSOPHIE EN RUSSIE (I). By + _F. Lannes_. + + LES SOURCES DE LA PHILOSOPHIE DE L’INDE. By _P. Regnaud_. + +M. Bourdon reviews the modes of association proposed by various +psychologists, and the factors which intervene to give force to +associations. Wundt alone; among psychologists has the great merit of not +placing ideas and sensations in actual opposition. The laws of ideology +are almost the same as those of physics; and the law of association ought +to be true not only for ideas, but for sensations and for objects. M. +Bourdon’s conclusion is that the theory of the association of ideas has +hitherto been treated from a too subjective and idealistic point of view. +He would substitute for the theory of _association_ of idea a theory of +a _society_ of phenomena, which conception he thinks better explains the +process. + +In a preceding contribution to the _Revue Philosophique_ (May, 1890) +M. Payot showed that sensation is the translation into terms of +consciousness of that which, considered from the objective point +of view, is a reaction of the organism, as a whole, to an external +impression. Sensations are the irreducible element of the psychic life. +They contribute the materials which the mind modifies, combines, and +classes according to their relations, variable or invariable. This +is chronologically posterior to sensation, which has an affective +origin. The reactions corresponding to the most frequent sensations +become more and more rapid until consciousness, “which translates only +physiological states of a sufficient duration,” has not time to appear. +Here we have a reflex-act. In an intermediate zone where reactions take +a time sufficient for them to be conscious, the intellectual states, +to which the abstract name of the intellectual faculty has been given, +have birth. Differentiation operates between sensible and intellectual +facts, until they seem to belong to two irreducible faculties; but the +intellectual states are grafted on the sensible states, and although +the graft develops so greatly that the sensibility appears like a +parasite, the latter is the primitive trunk and through it the graft +exists by a kind of continued creation. Sensations are convenient +abstractions but nothing more. A sensation never presents itself in +the adult consciousness without a crowd of instantaneously evoked +relations. There is never absolute exclusion between perception and +sensation: these are two states which dissolve into each other, which +have no difference in nature, and which are separable only in gross. +Properly speaking there are no sensations, only perceptions more or less +complex. In sensation the state of mind is considered in itself without +reference to its relations; in perception attention is paid chiefly to +the relations. But sensation exists only for consciousness, as it can +never enter directly into intellectual constructions, but only through +the state of remembrance. Every sensation so far as we are sensible of +it is purely felt, and we effectuate our mental constructions not with +sensations, but with our remembrances of sensations. But the rôle of +sensation is still more restricted. However rapid its flight across +consciousness it instantaneously provokes the remembrance of numerous +sensations of differences and resemblances with anterior sensations. It +is an occasion for this, and nothing more. To be perceived, a sensation +must be followed by sensations different from itself. The mind seizes +relations of resemblance between sensations and resemblances between +relations: it classes them, the chaos unravels and organises itself. +The organisation has been progressive, but at all stages the procedure +is alike; it consists in disengaging remembrances more or less masked +by dissimilarities: this is the universal procedure of the mind and the +condition _sine qua non_ of thought. + +In his article on _General Physiology_, M. Durand (de Gros) in criticism +of M. Ch. Richet’s article on this subject which appeared in the +April number of the _Revue Philosophique_, points out that Richet in +applying the term “general anatomy” to the anatomy of the tissues, and +“special anatomy” to the anatomy of the organs, overlooked the fact that +_generality_ and _speciality_ when used to express the two opposite sides +of a science express relations of abstract, nominal extension and not +real extension. Thus, by general chemistry is intended the consideration +of the higher laws governing the molecular actions of bodies, the +one on the other, whatever that may be, and the modes of composition +which result therefrom for each of them. General physiology should be, +therefore, the philosophy of the science of the functions of life, +that is to say, the higher laws embracing all these various particular +functions; special physiology having for its object these particular +functions in what is proper to each of them and distinguishes it from +the others. Physiology has reference, however, to the other animals as +well as man, and also to plants, and hence the term general physiology +has been applied to the physiology common to all living beings, and +special physiology to that which concerns the various animal and vegetal +species taken separately. But this is in reality comparative physiology, +and thus positive physiologists have made a false use of the term general +physiology, and have left the true general physiology unrecognised and +unnamed. In conclusion, M. Durand presents his conception of “organology.” + +In the form of a dialogue M. Milhaud meets the objections made to the +notion of limit in Mathematics. The question whether to have a limit, +for anything variable, is not synonymous with attaining a limit, is +considered in connection with Zeno’s problem of Achilles and the +tortoise, the strict solution of which is, not that Achilles will +never overtake the tortoise, but that he will not overtake it on this +side of a spot situated at a distance of 10/9 of a metre from the +starting-point, within a period equal to 10/9 of a second commencing +at the instant of starting. To the objection that by its very nature +the limit cannot be attained, as where the limit and the variable +element which indefinitely approaches it are essentially different, +it is replied that when a variable element has a limit, this element +is a _quantity_ and the limit is a quantity of the same kind, quality +being neglected. In the proposition: the length of the circumference is +the limit of the perimeters of the inscribed polygons, the limit is a +quantity of the same kind, that of length. It is not necessary to know +whether the definition accords with reality. M. Milhaud then shows by +reference to the properties of an unlimited series of inscribed polygons +and the corresponding circumscribed polygons, that two such series of +geometrical lengths satisfying the required conditions can always be +considered as defining a new length, superior to all the first and +inferior to all the others. As to its existence, it can be said only +that a length exists only as determined, as limited; and a state of +length, or a particular length has a right to exist, provided that the +properties of quantity which condition it are not contradictory. The +essence of mathematical space, breadth, length is only the content of +their definitions. Mathematics owes its existence to the condition of +creating for itself a world of fictions. There is a divergence of opinion +as to whether incommensurables should be represented by lengths or by +numerical symbols, but the divergence is a last echo of the endless +discussions which the notions of infinity and continuity have raised +among mathematicians. + +Philosophic thought, says M. Lannes, presents, in Russia, in its past +history, a very poor condition. Philosophy does not exist, unless that +name be given to such moral precepts, or domestic recommendations as we +find in “the instruction” of a Vladimir Monomaque or in the “Domostroï.” +The Russian mind was easily guarded against the liberties of thought, +regarding science and philosophy with contempt and holy dread. There, as +during the Middle Ages in the rest of Europe, the end to attain, to which +all others were subordinated, was the safety of the soul. It was only +with Peter the Great that thought took a freer flight, notwithstanding +the restrictions that it had still to support. The Little Russians were +the first to turn towards western instruction. In order to meet the +Jesuits, who appeared in Russia about the middle of the 16th century, +with the arms they used, scholastic philosophy was introduced into the +college of Pierre Mohila, at Kief. Aristotle was taken as guide and the +teaching was in Latin. Under Alexis Mikhaïlovitch, rational, natural, and +moral philosophy began to be taught in a formal manner at the Academy +of Moscow. Peter the Great ordered an important place to be given to +rhetoric and dialectics, and the mention of logic, psychology, and +metaphysics in the programme of the Academy. In 1755 logic, metaphysics, +and morality entered into the teaching of philosophy at the University. +In the 18th century two currents of ideas manifested themselves, of +which some are connected with mysticism, others with the influence of +French philosophy. The former became associated, through Novikof and +Schwartz, with free-masonry, which was regarded as a means of acquiring a +knowledge of God, of nature, and of man, of becoming a better Christian, +a better citizen, and a better family head. Novikof and Schwartz founded +the “Society of the Friends of Instruction,” and through their zeal +a mass of moral and religious books were published for distribution +in places of instruction. The influence of the French “philosophers” +of the 18th century was preponderant in Russia in the second half of +the 18th century. Voltaire enjoyed the greatest favor, and his renown +was universal. Freethought penetrated the middle classes, and even +conservative and religious men denied miracles in the course of history, +considered religion as a political instrument, and attacked the ignorance +and cupidity of the clergy. On the happening of the French revolution +Catherine was frightened and took rigorous measures against those who +wished to use freedom of thought. + +Questions of pedagogy held a great place in the thoughts of Catherine. +She confided the care of pedagogic reforms to Betski, who showed that +true education is that which unites the development of the body, of the +mind, and of the heart; but the moral element ought to have the first +place. Alexander I. re-established philosophic liberalism and sought +to excite interest in social, economic, and political questions. The +university of Moscow was reorganised, and one of the faculties included +dogmatic and moral theology, theoretical and practical philosophy, +natural, political and popular rights. Philosophy also established itself +in the new universities of Kharkof, Kazan, and Petersburg. But minds +were possessed with more living ideas and various tendencies, political, +moral, religious, sceptical, led to the establishment of numerous secret +societies whose starting point was the masonic alliance. About 1816, +Schröder had introduced into the foreign lodges a spirit of cosmopolitan +humanity. Fessler saw in the lodges a means of moral education, the basis +of civic education. In order to be received as a mason, it was necessary +to pass through certain “consecrations,” to obtain certain “degrees of +knowledge.” Among those “consecrated” by Fessler was Spéranski who, +notwithstanding his mysticism, was imbued with the principles of the +Revolution. On the reaction under Prince Galitzyn, the minister of +public instruction, science was given a mystical end, and religion was +declared to be the supreme science. The sciences which could do injury +to religion, as geology, were either discarded, or directed to be taught +according to the spirit of Holy Scripture. As to philosophy, the teaching +of moral philosophy, which does not separate morality from the faith, +was alone allowed. The treatises of the Kantian Jacob were forbidden, as +containing scandalous theories. In general, in the universities, during +the first year of the nineteenth century the objects of philosophic +study were somewhat vague. The utility of the sciences, of education, +of the individual characters of peoples, enthusiastic discourses on +free will, on the rights of reason, on the spirit and forces of nature. +Fessler and Vellanski introduced the German philosophy and principally +that of Schelling, which became in some sort the lever which put in +movement ideas on the independence and the nationality of civilisation. +The most ardent champion of Schelling’s doctrine was Odoievski, whose +external personality marks curiously the idea entertained of philosophy +and philosophers between 1820 and 1845. A philosopher was represented as +a sort of romantic Faust, leading a kind of life different from common +mortals. If he occupied himself with physical sciences, the philosopher +was regarded as the equal of a sorcerer with terrible powers. M. Lannes +concludes his present article with a sketch of the life and philosophy +of Galitch, who on his return to St. Petersburg from a three years +tour through Europe wrote a dissertation on philosophy, in which he +explained the development of beings by the double action of _activity_ +and _passivity_, the one being cause, the other product. In 1819 Galitch +taught in the University logic, psychology, and metaphysics, and later +he received authority to teach the history of philosophy, to which he +gave an _eclectic_ character, in accordance with the instructions of +his hierarchical superiors. In his _esoteric_ teaching he initiated his +friends into the philosophy of Schelling. In that year he published a +“History of Philosophic Systems,” the appearance of which was a rare +novelty in the Russian Scientific World. He subsequently published +several other works, but the manuscript of one on the “Philosophy of +the History of Humanity,” which cost him much labor was destroyed by +fire. The merit of Galitch is to have wished to establish in Russia +philosophy _as science_. He assigned to the study of philosophy the +whole encyclopedia of the sciences, but true philosophic knowledge +is the knowledge of the unity from which external phenomena flow. M. +Lannes gives an analysis of Galitch’s “Picture of Man,” where, before M. +Renouvier, he says of freedom, “it can itself begin an entire series of +phenomena, which are then linked together in the relations of dependence, +that is to say are the necessary acts of a voluntary principle.” Galitch +deserves to occupy a small place in the general history of the philosophy +of humanity. If there existed before him a science of the relations of +the soul and the body, he was at least one of the first to elaborate a +programme of what is called to-day _comparative psychology_. + +M. Regnaud finds the sources of the philosophy of India in India itself, +as they appear in all their simplicity and primitive character in +the Rig-Veda, the very ancient collection of liturgical hymns of the +Brahmans. The whole doctrine implied by both the Vedic cult and the +text of the hymns is resumed in a verse of the Rig Veda. “Each day the +same liquid rises and descends; the rains vivify the earth, the fires +of the sacrifice vivify the sky.” The libations destined to feed the +fire of sacrifice and which consisted of inflammable liquids, such as +the _ghrita_ or clarified butter, were poured out each time that the +sacrifice was celebrated into the atmosphere (or the sky) whose life +they maintained, in like manner as liquid and solid foods sustain the +life of man. The whole religious conception of the Vedic epoch consists +then in the idea of an endless _circulus_, of a perpetual exchange +of the elements of life, in an immense body which is the universe, +whose arterial centre is the sacrifice, and the fire the motor, the +distributer, and so to say the brain. (Paris: Félix Alcan.) + + Ω. + + +REVUE DE L’HYPNOTISME. April, 1891. No. 10. 5th YEAR. + +CONTENTS: + + (1) ACCOUCHEMENT DANS L’HYPNOTISME. By _Dr. Fraipont_ and _M. + J. Delbœuf_. (2) ACCOUCHEMENT PENDANT LE SOMMEIL HYPNOTIQUE. + By _Dr. M. G. Kingsbury_. (3) MEMOIRE RELATIF A CERTAINES + RADIATIONS PERQUES PAR LESSENSITIFS. By _Baron de Reichembach_. + (4) DISCUSSIONS ET POLEMIQUE: La Nutrition dans l’hypnotisme. + By _Gilles de la Tourette_ and _H. Cathelineau_. (5) RECUEIL + DE FAITS: Contribution à l’application de la thérapeutique + suggestive. By _Dr. P. Van Velsen_. Huit observations + d’accouchement sans douleur sous l’influence de l’hypnotisme. + By _Dr. Marie Dobrovosky_. REVUE BIBLIOGRAPHIQUE. + +Dr. Fraipont terminates his interesting memoir with the remark that +save under very exceptional circumstances, as when the subject is very +sensitive or has before suffered a sort of trance, hypnotism can +scarcely have any practical importance in accouchment. M. Delbœuf refers +in a postscript to the case of a patient described in his writings by the +initial J..., and states that her accouchment confirms him in his view of +the rôle of the brain, which he regards as a moderating and inhibiting +organ, and consequently in the opinion expressed by him in the _Revue +Philosophique_ as to the essence of freedom, which he regards as having +an arresting and not an inciting effect. + +MM. de la Fourette and Cathelineau confirm the conclusion drawn from +researches made by them for Professor Charcot, that nutrition is affected +during the hypnotic sleep, and therefore that hypnotism is a pathological +condition. (Paris: 170 Rue Saint-Antoine.) + + +PHILOSOPHISCHE MONATSHEFTE. Vol. XXVII. Nos. 9 and 10. + +CONTENTS: + + GOETHES VERHAELTNISS ZU SPINOZA UND SEINE PHILOSOPHISCHE + WELTANSCHAUUNG. By _G. Schneege_. I. + + WILHELM WUNDT’S “SYSTEM DER PHILOSOPHIE.” By _Johannes + Volkelt_. I. + + RECENSIONEN: (1) A. Fouillée, L’Avenir de la métaphysique + fondée sur l’expérience. By _C. Schaarschmidt_. (2) Th. von + Varnbüler, Widerlegung der Kritik der reinen Vernunft. By + _E. König_. (3) Bericht über neuere Erscheinungen aus dem + Gebiete der Geschichte der Æsthetik. By _E. Kühnemann_. (4) + C. Baeumker, Das Problem der Materie in der griechischen + Philosophie. By _P. Natorp_. + + LITTERATURBERICHT. + +Johannes Volkelt continues his review of Wilhelm Wundt’s “System of +Philosophy.” Prof. C. Schaarschmidt criticises Fouillée’s view of a +future metaphysics as based upon experience, from the Kantian standpoint. +Dr. E. König explains with sufficient strength the futility of Varnbüler +in his bold attempt of refuting Kant’s “Critique of Pure Reason,” and Dr. +Paul Natorp, the editor, devotes an article to Prof. Clemens Baeumker’s +book “Das Problem der Materie in der Griechischen Philosophie,” in +which the author sets forth that the problem of matter is not a limited +problem, but the sum total of all those questions which have reference to +the existence of some cause of sensory phenomena which in its nature is +different from consciousness. The problems of psycho-physics and of the +theory of cognition are modern and were unknown to the ancients. Their +standpoint remained throughout that of realism. A résumé of the views of +Greek philosophers from Thales down to the New Platonists follows. + +The leading article is devoted to Goethe’s relation to Spinoza and his +philosophical world-conception. + +Goethe’s philosophical and religious opinions are naturally of the +greatest interest, because Goethe, the child of nature in the highest +sense of the word, represents a genius not such as our great contemporary +Cesare Lombroso conceives him to be, i. e. a species of the abnormal +man and a kind of insane person, but such as genius is conceived by the +layman, i. e. an abnormally normal man, a man whose excellencies lie in +a rare harmony of highly developed perfections—not in eccentricities. +Goethe’s eccentricities were not worse or more extended than those of +average people, but he had more sense, more humor, more depth, and more +spirit. Well, Goethe as a son of man and as a type of an unusually +perfect man was a poet, a philosopher, a scientist, an historian, an +artist, a man of the world, and a man of practical life, all in one, and +the opinions of this man in the religio-philosophical field show at least +that they accord with man as a child of nature. + +Goethe’s philosophical views were strongly influenced by Spinoza yet not +so as if Spinoza had impressed his view upon Goethe. Goethe happened to +read Spinoza’s “Ethics” while still immature in mind and felt himself +powerfully attracted by the spirit of the book. “What I may have read out +of or into that work,” he writes, “I could give no account. Yet I found +a pacification of my passions. A great and free vista upon the sensual +and moral world seemed to open before my eyes. That strange sentence ‘_He +who loves God must not demand of God to love him in return_,’ with all +its premises and conclusions filled all my thoughts. To be unselfish in +everything and most so in love and friendship was my highest delight, my +maxim, my practice, so that the bold expression of later years ‘If I love +thee, it is none of thy business’ came right from my heart. In addition +to this, it must be recognised that the most intimate combinations result +from contraries. The all-pervading calmness of Spinoza contrasted with +my excited aspirations, his mathematical method was a counterpart of +my poetical thoughts and habits.” In Spinoza’s doctrine of necessity +Goethe found comfort concerning man’s dependence upon the outer world +which caused him so much pain. It is probable that the famous sentence +of the liberation from passions through a clear comprehension of them +was very sympathetic to Goethe, for it is a characteristic feature of +his poetry that they were confessions as well as liberations of all that +moved and disturbed him. As soon as Goethe was able to give to himself +a clear account concerning that which had affected his soul and as soon +as he could give a poetical form to it so that it became something +independent and outside of him, he gained, in the sense of Spinoza’s +doctrine of liberation from passions, the peace and liberty of his soul. +Yet Spinoza’s doctrine of necessity was a metaphysical conception. +Goethe transferred it into the domains of practical ethics, thus giving +rise to his idea of resignation. Goethe writes in the beginning of the +sixteenth book of “Wahrheit und Dichtung”: “Our physical as well as our +social life, customs, habits, worldly wisdom, philosophy, religion, even +many incidental events, everything demands of us that we should resign +ourselves. So many things which most intrinsically belong to us we are +not allowed to develop. That of the outer world which we want as a +complement of our nature is taken away and many things which are foreign +to us and disagreeable are thrown upon us. We are deprived of everything +that we have with difficulty acquired, of everything that is friendly and +before we fully comprehend it we find ourselves obliged _to surrender +our very personality_, first piecemeal and finally in its entirety.” +Professor Schneege says that Goethe’s practice of resignation gave him +solace when he felt low-spirited concerning the limits of human willing +and wishing and hoping, and his resignation was as a matter of principle +a total resignation. A partial resignation leads to the pessimistic +outcry “All is vanity,” yet the total resignation affords an inner peace +and produces that “air of peace,” _die Friedensluft_ as Goethe calls it, +which surrounds us when reading Spinoza. + +One of Goethe’s maxims is quite Spinozistic. Goethe says (_Max. und Refl. +Abth._ v.): “He who declares himself to be free will feel himself at once +dependent but he who dares to declare himself dependent, feels himself +free.” + +Goethe rejected the idea of a personal and transcendent Deity which was +urged so strongly upon him by Lavater. Rejecting Lavater’s view, he says +(_Wahrh. und Dicht._ xiv.): “I assured him in accord with my Realism +which is inborn as well as acquired that since it had pleased God and +Nature to make me as I am, I must remain so.” The expression “God and +Nature” savors strongly of Spinoza’s “Deus sive natura.” + +According to Eckermann (_Gesp. m. G._ ii, p. 169) Holbach’s _Systéme de +la nature_ had also made a strong impression upon Goethe. Nevertheless +he was dissatisfied with the spirit of French materialism. He says: “How +empty and hollow is this sad atheistic twilight, in which the earth with +all its forms and the heaven with all its stars disappear. Matter only is +said to exist, being in motion from eternity to eternity, thus producing +to the right and to the left without further ado all the innumerable +phenomena of being.” Goethe’s view of “God and nature,” did not deny the +Deity as such, but identified both in the sense of Spinoza. In this sense +Goethe interpreted the sentence: _Qui deum amat conari not potest, ut +Deus ipsum contra amet—si homo id conaretur, cuperet ergo ut Deus quem +amat, non esset Deus_. The latter idea, “if a man wished that God should +love him in return, he would wish that God be not God” is a corollary +only to the impersonal conception of Spinoza’s non-anthropomorphised +Deity. We cannot and we must not think of God as a human being who like +a monarch makes favorites of those who are faithful not so much to the +divine laws of ethics but to God personally. + +Goethe agreed in his views of Spinoza with Herder, who in a letter +to Jacobi writes: “The πρὼτον ψεῦδος, my dear Jacobi, in all +anti-spinozistic systems is that God is supposed to be the great _ens +entium_, the cause of all phenomena, a cypher, an abstract idea which we +have formulated. However, that is not so according to Spinoza; God is to +him the most real and active unity which says to itself ‘I am that I am, +and shall be in all the changes of my phenomena that which I shall be.’ +What you mean, my dear fellows, by an existence outside of the world, +I do not understand. If God does not exist in the world, and indeed, +everywhere unlimited in his totality and entirety, he does not exist at +all. The limitation of personality does not belong to the infinite being, +since a person originates with us by limitation as a kind of _modus_ or +as an aggregate of beings whose activity is endowed with the illusion of +unity.” A modification of Spinoza’s view consists in the recognition of +the creative activity which Herder attributes to God. In another letter +to Jacobi, Herder writes: “You wish God in the shape of man like a friend +who thinks of you. Consider that in that case he must think humanly of +you. If he is partial to you he will be partial against others. Explain +to me why you need him to be human. He speaks to you, he affects you +through all noble men who are his organs and most so through his organ +of organs, the core of his spiritual creation, his only begotten. I must +confess that this philosophy makes me exceedingly happy. Goethe has read +Spinoza since your departure and it is a test case to me that he has +conceived him exactly as I do.” + +Herder was a clergyman and he held the highest position of his church, +being Superintendent General. Would the protestant state churches of +to-day either in England or in Germany have room for a man like Herder? + +Goethe concurred with Herder, that the idea of an extramundane Deity has +no sense, an outside God is powerless and an immanent God alone is a +reality. He puts in the mouth of Faust the following lines: + + “The God that in my breast is owned + Can deeply stir the inner sources. + The God above my powers enthroned + He cannot change external forces.” + + _Faust I, Scene 4, Tr. Bayard Taylor._ + +Spinoza makes a difference between _natura naturans_ and _natura +naturata_. A similar contrast is made by Goethe in the following lines +which are found among the _Zahme Xenien_, Part vii. + + “Life dwells in each celestial body + And on its self-selected roads + It likes to travel with the others. + There are in our earth’s deep abodes + The forces, shrouded now in night + And rising up again to light + If with eternal repetition + Some circles infinitely roam, + If thousand stones in strong construction + Together build life’s glorious dome, + Then through all things is pleasure thrilling, + The great, the little, both are blessed, + _Yet all this yearning, all this striving_ + _In God the Lord, is eternal rest_.”[26] + +According to Schneege, Goethe was an agnostic. Faust says: + + “Mysterious even in open day + Nature retains her veil, despite our clamors. + That which she doth not willingly display, + Cannot be wrenched from her with levers, screws and hammers.” + + _I, 1. Tr. Bayard Taylor._ + +This quotation however expresses Faust’s despair and not Goethe’s +philosophical view. It is true that Goethe has made a few utterances +which savor of agnosticism, but most of them are expressive of the idea +that we can never be through with our wisdom; every new solution proposes +new problems. + + “_Will mich jedoch des Worts nicht schämen:_ + _Wir tasten ewig an Problemen._” + + _Zahme Xenien_, vii. + + [Will not be ashamed of the confession: + We are dealing with problems without intercession.] + +How little Goethe was in accord with the view of modern agnosticism +or phenomenalism, that we know the outside of nature only and not her +inside, can be learned from his opposition to Haller’s famous lines: + + “Nature’s Within from mortal mind + Must ever lie concealed. + Thrice blessed e’en he, to whom she has + Her outer shell revealed.” + +In answer to the agnostic sentiment of the famous naturalist, Goethe +answered with the following verses (quoted in the translation given in +“Fundamental Problems,” p. 142): + + “_Nature’s ‘within’ from mortal mind_” + Philistine, sayest thou, + “_Must ever lie concealed?_” + To me, my friend, and to my kind + Repeat this not. We trow + Where’er we are that we + Within must always be. + + “_Thrice blessed e’en he to whom she has_ + _Her outer shell revealed?_” + This saying sixty years I heard + Repeated o’er and o’er, + And in my soul I cursed the word, + Yet secretly I swore. + Some thousand thousand times or more + Unto myself I witness bore: + Gladly gives Nature all her store, + She knows not kernel, knows not shell, + For she is all in one. + But thou, + Examine thou thine own self well + whether thou art kernel or art shell. + +We ought to bear in mind that Goethe was no philosopher in the strict +sense of the word and did not attempt to have a system that should +be free from contradictions. So we read in one place: “Man is not +born to solve the problem of the world, but to seek for the limit +of the incomprehensible and then to remain within the limits of the +comprehensible,” and in another place “Man must hold fast to the belief +that what seems incomprehensible is comprehensible, for otherwise he +would cease to investigate.” + +The idea of evolution was the basis of Goethe’s idea of immortality. Here +also he remains in accord with Herder who had proposed in his “Ideas for +a Philosophy of the History of Mankind” his views of the development +of beings by degrees. Goethe wrote from Rome (See “Herder’s Nachlass,” +ed. Düntzer, Frankfort, 1756, i, p. 17.): “How much I enjoy Herder’s +‘Ideas,’ I can scarcely express. Since I expect no Messiah, this [viz. +the prospect of further evolution] is to me the dearest Gospel.” + +Goethe’s idea of the soul is not clearly worked out in its philosophical +aspect. He speaks of souls as of monads and believes in a migration +of the soul. “I am sure,” Goethe said to Falk, “I have been here some +thousand times and expect to come again some thousand times.” + +Goethe was very decided in practical and ethical respects. Goethe +deviated from Spinoza by introducing a strong trait of individualism into +Spinoza’s cosmism. + + “_Zweck sein selbst ist jegliches Thier._”[27] + + [Every creature has its purpose in itself.] + +And man is the last product of constantly higher evolving Nature—_das +letzte Product der sich immer steigernden Natur_. Nature’s intention +according to Goethe’s view is to produce constantly more perfect +creatures. He says: “Imagine Nature standing as a gamester before the +roulette table constantly shouting _au double_. With all she has won +through all the phases of her activity she continues to play on into +infinity. Stone, plant, animal, everything is risked in such hazarding +ventures again and again, and who can tell whether man himself is not but +a venture for a higher aim.” Death was to Goethe no destruction but a +dissolution. A destruction or annihilation appeared as an impossibility +to him. And his idea of immortality was not one of existence after +death but of a continued activity. In the year 1825 Goethe declared to +Chancellor von Müller (“Gespräche m.d. Kanzler von Müller,” p. 99), that +he should not know what to do with an immortality in which he would not +find new tasks to do and new difficulties to conquer. (Heidelberg: Georg +Weiss.) + + κρς. + + +ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR PSYCHOLOGIE UND PHYSIOLOGIE DER SINNESORGANE. Vol. II. +No. 4. + +CONTENTS: + + ZUR PSYCHOLOGIE DER KOMPLEXIONEN UND RELATIONEN. By _E. + Meinong_. + + WUNDT’S ANTIKRITIK. By _C. Stumpf_. + + UEBER DIE UNTERSCHIEDSEMPFINDLICHKEIT FUER KLEINE ZEITGROESSEN. + Eine vorläufige Mitteilung. By _F. Schumann_. + + LITTERATURBERICHT. + +Professor A. Meinong discusses Ch. v. Ehrenfels’s article “Ueber +Gestaltqualitäten”[28] adding the results of his own investigations +suggested to him by this essay. Ehrenfels starts from Professor Mach’s +consideration of figure and melody (see Mach’s _Beiträge zur Analyse der +Empfindungen_) and proposes the question, What are figure and melody +in themselves? Are they merely a combination of elements or are they +something in contradistinction to their elements, something entirely +new? Melodies and figures, says Ehrenfels, can be so transposed that +not any one of their original elements will remain. Thus the similarity +of figures in space as well as of tones is something different from the +similarity of their elements; they must be something different than +their mere sum. This is “the figure-quality” or _Gestaltsqualität_, and +Ehrenfels distinguishes between two kinds, (1) those of time (2) those +of space, which he calls (1) _Tongestalten_ and (2) _Raumgestalten_. In +addition to these are discussed the figure-qualities of sensations and +of inner apperception. Ehrenfels proposes the psychological question +whether these figure-qualities are immediately given together with +their foundations or whether they must be considered as the product of +a special activity, and he decides in favor of the former possibility. +Professor Meinong whose work has been in similar lines, refers to his +article “Phantasievorstellung und Phantasie”[29] and criticises the term +“figure-quality,” proposing in its stead the words _fundierend_ and +_fundiert_, using the German term _Fundament_ as a correlative expression +of “relation.” There is no relation without complexity and psychological +experience has actually to deal with complex facts only. Melody and +figure are names for the totality of the foundations including their +“founded” contents. + +It may be that we are unduly prejudiced in favor of our own terminology, +but it seems to us that the expression “form” will prove to be the most +appropriate word. Form is neither quality nor quantity, but form can +produce qualities. Let the same qualities, say of chemical elements, +combine in different forms, and we shall obtain substances with different +qualities. Figure and melody are special kinds of form. Forms consist +in and originate through combination, and the unity produced through a +special form-combination is actually something new, as much so as if +it were a special-creation act. This wonderful power of form makes the +study of form all-important in all branches of science. A neglect of the +study of form will lead either to materialism when matter and motion are +conceived as the only quality-producing factors, or to agnosticism as +soon as a deeper inquiry proves that matter and motion are not sufficient +to explain the most essential properties of the objects of investigation. +We cannot judge from the present article how much Ehrenfels and Meinong +are in sympathy with our standpoint, but we can see that their efforts +are in the same direction. + +The second article is a rejoinder by Prof. C. Stumpf of Munich to Prof. +W. Wundt’s reply to his critic. Professor Stumpf complains of Wundt that +he ignored the points raised in his criticism and that his “Antikritik” +consisted only of “a chain of distortions and insinuations.” + +F. Schumann publishes his results regarding sensibility for the +difference between smallest quantities of time. He employed a chronograph +modified in two respects from Wundt’s chronograph. First he replaced +the expensive chronometer by a treading-wheel and introduced Pfeil’s +time-marker, which, as he thinks, is handier as well as more precise +than Wundt’s time-marker. Schumann’s results agree with the results of +Professor Mach showing a maximum of 0.3-0.4 seconds, the relation of the +perceptible difference to the normal time being in different persons only +0.022. (Hamburg and Leipsic: L. Voss.) + + κρς. + + +PHILOSOPHISCHES JAHRBUCH. Vol. IV. No. 3. + +CONTENTS: + + ENTHAELT DIE CHEMISCH-PHYSIKALISCHE ATOMTHEORIE WIDERSPRUECHE? + By _S. J. Linsmeier_. + + NOCH EINMAL ZU PLATON’S TIMAEUS p. 51 E-p. 52 B. By _Clemens + Baeumker_. + + DAS GESETZ VON DER ERHALTUNG DES LEBENS. (Zusatz der + Redaction.) By _W. Frye_. + + DIE LOGISCHEN GAENGE DES DENKENS. By _Dr. G. Grupp_. + + W. WUNDT’S SYSTEM DER PHILOSOPHIE. By _C. Gutberlet_. + + RECENSIONEN UND REFERATE. + +The publishers and editors of _The Monist_ are not Roman Catholics and +we suppose that the majority of our readers are not either. But all the +more it appears to us necessary to state as a matter of justice that the +Roman Catholic publications (i. e. those which avowedly and confessedly +represent Roman Catholic thought) are far superior to their analogous +Protestant contemporaries. The latter are debating their particular +sectarianisms and do not seem to be interested in the progress of their +times. They do not heed the discoveries of science or the views of +philosophers, they live in a world of their own. It is different with +Roman Catholics. The present magazine proves that they have thinkers +among them who keep abreast of the time. It is true that there is more +discipline in the camp of Roman Catholics which shuts their champions +out from free enquiry in a certain direction concerning some fundamental +tenets, but with all this discipline goes along a broad-mindedness in +attacking the different problems of modern science and philosophy and +bringing them into harmony with the Roman Catholic faith. + +The _Philosophisches Jahrbuch_ is published by the _Görres-Gesellschaft_ +and edited by Dr. Const. Gutberlet. Jacob Joseph Görres is the well-known +champion of the Catholic Church (1776-1848)—a restless spirit who began +his public career as an enthusiastic defender of the French Revolution +for the propagation of which he published a fanatical journal _Das rothe +Blatt_. With the rise of Napoleon he despaired of the cause of liberty, +but he took courage again in the war of independence (1813-1815). In his +journal _Der Rheinische Merkur_ he denounced bitterly those Germans who +still held to the French; he recommended his countrymen to have more love +for their language, customs, and traditions and exhorted the princes to +stand united against the common foe and re-institute the empire. The +war over he was persecuted by the Prussian government on account of his +renewed interests in revolutionary affairs (he had published in 1820 a +pamphlet “Germany and the Revolution”) and showing a decided inclination +to mysticism (“Emanuel Schwedenborg, his Visions and his Relation to +the Church,” 1827) he joined the Ultramontane party in the conviction +that his ideals could be realised in the Roman Catholic Church. The rest +of his life he remained faithful to Rome and was the most active, the +most vigorous, and also the ablest defender of Roman Catholic views and +interests. The present magazine is a Quarterly conducted with scholarship +and tact, although as a matter of course not without that prejudice +which necessarily results from the principle of giving all thoughts into +captivity under a special and foredetermined faith. The last volume (vol. +iii) is rich in interesting articles. Prof. Dr. Hayd, strange enough, +defends the liberty of investigating the authority of faith, which the +editor, however, without rejecting the idea off-hand considers as bold +(_gewagt_). There are articles on the freedom of will, on the infinite +number of possibilities, mongolian cosmology, Pascal’s position toward +scepticism, analogies between cognition of God and cognition of nature +with special reference to Kant’s criticism of the evidences of the +existence of God. The present number of vol. iv contains an article on +the chemico-physical theory of atoms. The question is proposed whether or +not this theory contains contradictions. The author starts from Dalton’s +Definition, whom he regards together with Wallaston as the founder of +modern atomism. The four weightiest objections are considered, but +the author arrives at the conclusion that all of them are based upon +misconceptions. He sums up: “Chemists and Physicists do not repudiate +eyes and senses when proposing and defending the atomistic theory. On +the contrary they use for their view and build it upon an exceedingly +richer material of observation than is employed by their antagonists.... +This denial of the validity of the most important objections, however, +does not imply that the atomistic theory is without difficulties, gaps, +unexplained details, etc. It is not as yet so certain a fact as for +instance the heliocentric world-conception. It is an hypothesis still and +will have to remain such for quite a long time. Yet we can confidently +assert that the difficulties are by far less than those offered to +the acceptance of the Copernican hypothesis at the time of the first +condemnation of Galileo (1616) which were solved afterward by Galileo in +the year 1632. We have further to state that the atomistic theory has +been developed more and more since Dalton, the number and the importance +of the explanations offered in it have constantly increased.” + +Dr. Frye of Jena discusses Preyer’s latest view of “The Self-Gubernation +of Life—_Die Selbststeuerung des Lebens_” which appeared in a recent +number of the _Naturwissenschaftliche Wochenschrift_ (Berlin). Preyer +considers his newly discovered law as a corollary to the conservation +of matter and energy and maintains that the total amount of life in the +world is as much constant as are matter and energy. Living mass (_Mz_) +plus inanimate mass (_Mn_) are constant (_C_); _Mz_ + _Mn_ = _C_. So +far scientists will agree, but Preyer adds that each separate item is +constant for itself. He declares that “the total amount of protoplasm +in the world remains unchanged in quantity.” It is hardly probable that +Preyer’s view will be adopted by science. + +Dr. Grupp discusses the logical paths of thought, and the editor, +Professor Dr. Gutberlet explains and criticises Wundt’s System of +Philosophy. + +One of the most valuable features for Catholic readers must be considered +the book reviews. Here the thoughts of the most advanced thinkers are as +it were digested for the Catholic world. The material is carefully sifted +but the exposition of heretic opinions is not evaded. The criticisms +from the pen of Dr. Gutberlet are often trenchant and should not be left +unheeded by the adversaries of the Church. (Fulda: Verlag der Fuldaer +Aktien-Druckerei.) + + κρς. + + +RIVISTA ITALIANA DI FILOSOFIA. July and August, 1891. + +CONTENTS: + + LA SCIENZA DELL’EDUCAZIONE NELLE SCUOLE E NELLE RIVISTE + ITALIANE. By _F. Cicchitti-Suriani_. + + LA FILOSOFIA DI EMPEDOCLE. By _S. Ferrari_. + + SCIENZE FILOSOFICHE E SOCIALI: RELAZIONE SUL CONCORSO AI PREMII + MINISTERIALI. By _A. Chiappelli_. + + ALCUNE CONSIDERAZIONI SULL’ECLETTISMO. By _L. Ferri_. + + BIBLIOGRAFIA, ETC. + +_The Science of Education in Italian Schools and in Italian Reviews._ +Every nation is said to possess a peculiar physiognomy of its own, +through which it is distinguished from every other nation; and +consequently any nation will adopt a system of education that is best +suited to its own national genius, to its racial, religious, and +historical traditions. This may be true in a purely practical sense; but +on the other hand, education, theoretically, as science or pedagogics, +passes the narrow limits of any state or form of government, and ought +to be ruled by principles and general laws common to the entire human +family. Historically, ever since the 16th century, the educational +movements in Italy have been directly called forth by the Catholic +revival and reaction during and immediately following the period of the +renaissance. Such was the origin of the _Filippini_, _Ignorantelli_, +_Barnabiti_, _Ignaziani_, _Calasanziadi_, _Somaschi_, and of many other +religious teaching-bodies that have made Italy until recently a bustling +arena of ecclesiastical educational systems. + +_The Philosophy of Empedocles._ This first instalment of Signor Ferrari’s +studies deals with the cosmological ideas of the great Agrigentine +poet-philosophers. From the formation of the first elements to the +highest functions of the human soul throughout, we perceive that +everything is governed by the same laws, and that which is best, all +happiness in fact, is only found in unity and harmony, evil and pain in +disagreement and in separation. The law of evolution, in the modern sense +of the word, prevails everywhere in the physical system of Empedocles. +Yet his philosophy did not exclusively consist in mechanical evolution. +To his cosmological doctrines were added moral and religious tenets, +which, however, are not evolved continuously with the former. (Rome. +Tipografia delle Terme Diocleziane di G. Balbi—160 Via Cavour, 162.) + + γνλν. + + +VOPROSUI FILOSOFII I PSICHOLOGII. Vol. II. No. 4. May, 1891. + +CONTENTS: + + ETHICS OF LIFE AND OF THE FREE IDEAL. By _K. Ventzel_. (In + this article the writer explains and criticises the well-known + ethical theories of the late French thinker M. Guyau.) + + THE PESSIMIST THEORIES OF KNOWLEDGE: CRITICISM, POSITIVISM. By + _E. de Roberti_. + + RELIGIOUS METAPHYSICS OF THE MOSLEM ORIENT. (Conclusion.) By + _S. Umanetz_. + + LETTERS ON COUNT TOLSTOÏ’S BOOK. “On Life.” (Conclusion.) By + _A. Kozloff_. + + (The writer concludes his letters to Mr. N. N. with remarks + to the effect that count Tolstoï’s philosophy in all its + aspects and phases is manifestly characterized by a principle + of _dualism_. In the development of this general principle + through the different phases of his system and in his theory of + knowledge this dualism might assume the name of rationalism, + in metaphysics, that of idealism, and in ethics the name of + ascetical, quietistic eudemonism. + + ON DETERMINISM IN CONNECTION WITH MATHEMATICAL PSYCHOLOGY. + By _N. Shishkin_. Lecture delivered before the Moscow + Psychological Society. February, 1891. + + THE DOMAIN AND LIMITS OF SUGGESTION. By _N. Bajenoff_. Lecture + delivered at the annual session of the Moscow Psychological + Society. January, 1891. + + ANENT THE FICTIONS OF PROFESSED CHRISTIANITY. By _Vladimir + Solovieff_. + + (This article has appeared in an English translation in _The + Open Court_, Nos. 206 and 208, under the title “Christianity: + Its Spirit and its Errors.” It is a remarkable contribution + to the literature of to-day. Professor Nicolas von Grote of + Moscow writes about its author: “Vladimir Solovieff is at + present, besides the Count Tolstoï, our most eminent thinker; + he is a distinguished philosopher as well as theologian.... + You Americans should be familiar with his works on religious + and ecclesiastical ‘questions’.” Vladimir Solovieff is the + author of the following works: “The Religious Foundations of + Life,” “The Dogmatic Development of the Church,” “Judaism and + the Christian Question.” (These titles are translated from the + Russian.) Other writings of his are “L’idée russe,” “La Russie + et l’église universelle,” “Geschichte der Theokratie.”) + + SPECIAL DEPARTMENT. (1) Hegel’s Ontology. A Posthumous + Dissertation. By _N. P. H. Platonoff_. (2) The Influence of + fatigue upon the intuition of special relations. By _Nik. + Marün_. (3) Fundamental moments in the evolution of the new + philosophy. Main tendencies of the new philosophy. Empiricism + and Naturalism. Bacon and Hobbes. By _N. Grote_. (Moscow.) + + γνλν. + + +FOOTNOTES: + +[26] Specially translated for _The Monist_. + +[27] _Metamorphose der Thiere._ + +[28] _Vierteljahrsschr. f. wissensch. Phil._ 1890. 3, p. 249-292. + +[29] _Zeitschrift für Phil. n. philos. Kritik._ Vol. 95, p. 173. 1889. + + + + + VOL. II. JANUARY, 1892. NO. 2. + + THE MONIST. + + + + +MENTAL EVOLUTION. + +AN OLD SPECULATION IN A NEW LIGHT. + + +The theory of organic evolution, now generally accepted, needs to +be supplemented by a theory of mental evolution. On a superficial +examination of the matter the necessity for such a supplementary theory +does not perhaps strike one as obvious, the mental seeming naturally to +arise out of the organic and to be part of one continuous development. +But closer investigation and a more rigid and exact treatment bring to +light certain important and peculiar features, and disclose the necessity +of some such hypothesis as it is my purpose to set forth briefly in the +following pages. + +By organic evolution I mean the natural development, whether by +“selection” alone or by this in co-operation with other natural +processes, of the organisms which live upon the surface of this earth; +and by mental evolution I mean the natural development of the mental +faculties in at least the higher animals among these organisms. Now with +regard to organic evolution there is no common and general agreement +in respect of the first origin of primitive life on the earth. Some +evolutionists believe that the living was somewhen, somehow, and +somewhere evolved from the not-living. Others do not feel justified in +holding this view, and deem it wiser to restrict their speculations as +to natural genesis within the limits of the organic. So too at the other +end of the developmental curve; there is no common and general agreement +as to the evolution of the mental faculties or spiritual being of man. +Some evolutionists believe that both in body and in mind, man is the +product of natural development; others do not feel justified in holding +this view, and retain unshaken the conviction that man in his spiritual +essence is no part nor product of the common elements of nature. Seeing +then that on either side there is want of agreement, on the one hand as +to the origin of life, on the other as to the origin of man, I shall deal +for the most part with that large area concerning which there is a more +unanimous consensus of opinion, and in the main confine my speculations +within the field of mental evolution in animals, ranging, say, from the +amœba to the dog. + +Few will be found to deny or even to question the fact that our dumb +companions and four-footed friends have mental faculties which enable +them accurately to adjust their actions to the varied circumstances +in the midst of which their lives are passed. Even if we see cause +to hesitate, as I myself hesitate, before we ascribe to them +self-consciousness and reason, in the narrower sense in which this word +is used; still we must acknowledge that their instincts are powerful, +their intelligence wonderfully keen and active; and that they are capable +of strong emotional feeling both of affection and of antipathy. Should +we so welcome them as our companions and friends if we regarded them as +unconscious, insentient automata? But when we turn to the other end of +the scale of life, to the amœba and all the myriad minutiae that swarm +in ponds and stagnant pools, we are wont to speak with less confidence. +Their consciousness, if so we can call it, is of so simple an order, +their sentience of so low a grade, that we can hardly with any accuracy +use the phrase “mental faculties” with reference to organisms so lowly. +We feel uncertain whether in their case unconscious automatism does not +after all pretty accurately express the facts. At any rate it would +trouble us little or not at all if some one proved their automatism +to-morrow. And yet, on the theory of evolution, out of such lowly +beginnings have sprung the sagacity and affectionate devotion of the +dog. But if the amœba and his tribe are insentient automata, at what +stage of the development did consciousness creep in? And whence came +it? Or put what is fundamentally the same question in another way. In +the common course of generation the dog is developed from a minute +egg-cell, one hundredth of an inch or less in diameter, with which a yet +more minute sperm has entered into fertile union. Supplied with shelter, +warmth, and nutriment by that maternal self-sacrifice which is a deeply +significant fact of organic progress, this little speck of living stuff +passes, by a process strictly continuous, though profoundly modified by +the catastrophe of birth, into the dog with its wealth of intelligence +and affection. It is surely impossible without extravagance to speak of +the fertilised ovum as conscious. Where then in the continuous process +of development does consciousness come in? How, and whence? We are not +nowadays to be put off with the ambiguous assertion that consciousness +and intelligence are “potentially” present in the germ. We ask: What is +_actually_ present therein as the basis of this potentiality? Or are we +told that consciousness dawns at or shortly after the catastrophe of +birth? Then again we ask: Whence comes this dawning consciousness, and +by what means does it become associated with the puppy’s brain? In yet +another form does a question of like general implication suggest itself. +Granted that in the ovum there is present something which we may call the +germ of consciousness somehow associated with the protoplasmic material +of which that ovum is constituted. How comes it that, in the adult dog, +consciousness is associated with the brain? Why is the association of +consciousness concentrated, so to speak, in this one tissue of the +many which arise during the differentiation of development? That the +association is so concentrated or specialised is now generally admitted +to be the fact. We speak indeed of the skin, the palate, the nose, the +eye, the ear, as each in its kind sensitive. But none the less we believe +that the seat of consciousness is the brain or some part of it. Only +when the nerves running inwards from skin, palate, nose, eye, or ear, +have conveyed their appropriate stimuli to the brain, does that organ +tingle with the accompaniment of consciousness. There and there only +does consciousness “emerge”; not in peripheral sense-organ or ingoing +nerve. But why? How comes it that there is this peculiar association of +consciousness with the functioning of a particular organ? + +Perhaps we are told that consciousness is the special product of +brain-tissue. But let us note that the word “product” is here used in +an unwonted sense. We are not likely, it is to be hoped, to fall into +the crude and demonstrably false materialism expressed in the formula, +“as the liver secretes bile, so does the brain secrete consciousness.” +Consciousness being immaterial, the second and fourth terms are +incommensurable, and the formula is sheer nonsense. Nor are we likely +(though here there is greater danger) to fall into the more subtle error +of regarding consciousness as a mode of energy. “Granted,” says Professor +Tyndall, “that a definite thought and a definite molecular action of the +brain occur simultaneously; we do not possess the intellectual organ, nor +apparently any rudiment of the organ, which would enable us to pass by +a process of reasoning from the one to the other: the chasm between the +two classes of phenomena would still remain intellectually impassable.” +Consciousness is something _sui generis_. It is neither matter nor +energy. It may accompany the transformations of energy in the dog’s +brain; but to the category of these transformations of energy it does +not, and, for any clear thinker, can not belong. And if we are told that +the word “product” is used in the sense implied by Professor Huxley when +he speaks of phenomena of consciousness being “called into existence” by +physical processes; then we must again ask whence they are called into +existence. We do not now speak of matter or energy being called into +existence from a shadowy nowhere. When a cloud is called into existence +on a mountain peak we know that the material particles have only assumed +a new form. When the electrical current is called into existence or +generated as we phrase it, we know that we are dealing with one of the +many transformations of energy. And when phenomena of consciousness +are said to be called into existence, we have a right to ask: Do you +mean, by this phrase, creation _ex nihilo_? Or do you mean, origin by +transformation? And if the latter, transformation of what? + +Having thus opened up these several questions, all of like implication, +let us now endeavor to set forth the answer which seems most +philosophical and most closely in accordance with scientific analogies. +And to this end let us consider the living dog. His frame is pulsating +with life and restless activity, and somehow associated with the +transformations of energy in that brain of his there is consciousness—or +what in the dog is the analogue of that consciousness with which +alone I can claim any acquaintance at first hand, my own. Were his +skin and the walls of his skull as transparent as glass; did the +molecular vibrations of his brain lie open to the keenest scrutiny of +the physical investigator; could we trace in detail all the varied and +orderly transformations of energy of which that brain is the theatre; +the accompanying consciousness would still be beyond our reach. _We_ +might follow the changes of energy; he alone would feel the states of +consciousness. But suppose that the dog dies. His body lies before us +stiff with the _rigor mortis_. If we had weighed it previous to death, +and if we were to weigh it again after death, the scales would give +us no information of the departure of anything material. All signs of +consciousness, however, are gone. And could we see through skin and skull +into the brain, which during life was the theatre of so complex and +orderly a sequence of transformations of energy, we should find that it +was still and motionless. It is true that we cannot actually do this. But +we know that, whereas, during life, the functional action of the brain +gives rise to certain material products, at death the production of these +substances ceases. We are therefore justified in saying that, omitting +minor qualifications, the orderly transformations of energy in the brain +and the concomitant consciousness cease together at death. Closely +associated during life, varying together in health and sickness, ceasing +together at death, what is the nature of their connection? + +On the hypothesis of scientific monism it is believed that they are +different aspects of the same phenomena: that what objectively to the +physical investigator are transformations of energy in the brain, are +subjectively to the dog states of consciousness? Let us look into this +hypothesis. Let us see whither it will lead us; and if it will in any way +help us over some of our difficulties. But first let us pay a moment’s +attention to the impatient exclamation which some may feel inclined to +interpose, that this assumption of the ultimate identity of brain-energy +and consciousness, the two being respectively the objective and +subjective aspects of the same occurrences, does not in the least do away +with the mystery of the matter. That the same two occurrences should have +different aspects, objective and subjective, is, it will be said, just +as mysterious as that two separate existences energy and consciousness +should be associated together. Of course it is. I should be shallow and +pretentious indeed if my object were by any _hocus pocus_ to attempt to +hide the so-called mystery. _All_ ultimate facts are mysterious. The +fall of a stone to the ground is to-day as mysterious as it was in the +days before Newton; the phenomena of life, as mysterious as in the days +before Darwin. Our advances in science and in thought may do away with +minor mysteries, but they leave the great ultimate facts of nature as +mysterious as before. The end of our explanations is always to bring us +face to face with the inexplicable. Not, therefore, in any hope of doing +away with an ultimate mystery do I suggest that we look into and follow +out some implications of this so called identity hypothesis. + +Let us regard the matter from the objective aspect first, from the side +to which the occurrences present themselves as transformations of energy. +The state of consciousness being _ex hypothesi_ accompanied or “called +into existence” by certain complex and orderly molecular vibrations in +the brain or some part thereof, we have to note that from the physical +point of view these molecular vibrations constitute an exceeding complex +and orderly mode of energy. It is upon this energy that we must fix our +attention; the material structure of the brain being what we may call +the vehicle of its manifestation. I am anxious that the reader should +carefully follow me here. We are too apt to regard the _structure_ as +the essential thing on which to concentrate our mental gaze, partly no +doubt because, through the invaluable labors of microscopists, we know +so much that is definite about this structure. But a more penetrating +insight enables us to see that the structure is merely the necessary +basis of what is the really important thing—the manifestation of +energy. The material structure of a steam-engine is of importance. But +why? Because it is the vehicle for the performance of work. That is the +really essential part of the business. In like manner nerve-structure +is of importance. But why? Because it is the vehicle for what Professor +Huxley happily termed the neurosis, the complex and orderly manifestation +of energy. The essential importance of looking at the _going_ machine, +at the performance of work, at the energy of the matter in motion, not +merely the material structure that is moved—the essential importance, I +say, of fixing our attention on this, being fairly grasped, we may now +proceed to enquire from what the complex and orderly vibrations of the +dog’s brain have been evolved. In the fertilised ovum from which the dog +was developed, (and the same is true of the amœboid ancestor from which, +hypothetically, the race of dogs has been evolved,) there is certainly +nothing approaching the orderly complexity of these molecular vibrations. +But there are simpler organic modes of motion from which these complex +molecular vibrations have arisen by a continuous process of development. +It is from these simpler modes of energy in the simpler organic substance +of the ovum that the more complex modes of energy which characterise +the workings of the dog’s brain have been evolved. In the development +of the ovum into the embryo, and thence into the puppy and the dog, we +may trace step by step all the stages of the evolution of those material +structures which are the vehicles of these special manifestations of +organic energy. We may watch the further and further differentiation of +the nervous tissue, and the fashioning of the brain and its parts. It is +true that we cannot indicate the exact moment when, in the increasing +complexity of the tissues, the simpler forms of organic energy pass +into the higher form of brain energy accompanied by consciousness. But +that is just because it is a continuous development, an evolution. That +the passage from the one into the other does actually take place we are +bound, by all the canons of logical reasoning, to admit. It is only +during life, however, that neurosis occurs or is possible. A great number +of modes of organic energy proceed side by side in the pulsating tissues +of the living dog, their orderly continuance being what we term _life_. +And only in and through their orderly continuance is the maintenance of +the structure of the tissues rendered possible. The organic structure is +like a spinning top. Only so long as it spins and manifests its proper +energy is its stability maintained. All around it are forces which tend +to make it totter to its fall. But so long as it spins freely it can +resist all minor attempts to upset its stability. And when the dog dies; +what happens then? The molecular vibrations of the brain in common with +all other forms of organic energy cease. The top no longer spins; and the +structure totters to its fall. Decomposition sets in. The orderly organic +changes which characterise life, give place to the destructive changes +which characterise decay. But according to the law of the conservation +of energy, although there is decomposition of the tissues of which the +body was composed there is no destruction or annihilation of energy. The +particular modes of energy through which the body was instinct with life +pass away; but only to give rise to their equivalents in other modes +of energy. Just as the puddle in the road disappears, but only to give +origin to an equivalent mass of invisible water-vapor; just as the candle +disappears, but only to give rise to its equivalent mass in the products +of combustion; so throughout life and in death the energy which throbs +in the tissues neither appears nor disappears except at the expense of, +or to the gain of, other modes of energy. Life is like a vortex in a +rapid stream; on surrounding energy it is dependent for its continued +existence; into surrounding energy it melts away. And this is true not +only of individual life but of life in its entirety. Some believe that +the vortex had a natural origin, the organic being evolved from the +inorganic. Others hold that it was through the direct interposition +of the finger of God that the tiny vortex of primitive life was set +a twirling. Be this as it may, once initiated the vortex of life is +dependent on surrounding stores of energy. + +Turning now from the objective aspect to the subjective aspect we pass +from neural processes to states of consciousness. In the language of +the identity hypothesis, here provisionally adopted, the states of +consciousness in the dog’s mind, are the subjective aspect of what, from +the objective aspect, are the molecular vibrations of his brain-tissues. +And as in considering the matter objectively, so now in regarding the +mental aspect, we must ask from what the complex and orderly states of +consciousness of the dog’s mind have been evolved. In the fertilised +ovum from which the dog is developed, (and the same is true of the +amœboid ancestor from which, hypothetically, the race of dogs has been +evolved,) nothing so complex as a state of consciousness is to be found. +From what then have the states of consciousness been evolved? Do we not +seem forced by parity of reasoning to answer: From something more simple +than consciousness but of the same order of existence, which answers +subjectively to the simpler organic energy of the fertilised ovum? Such, +at any rate, is the hypothesis which appears to me the most philosophical +and the most logically consistent. It requires, however, no little effort +of thought to conceive the existence of those elementary states from +which consciousness may have had its origin. We may be aided in doing so, +perhaps, if we fix our attention on the close association of brain-energy +and states of consciousness, regarding them as _distinguishable_ but +not _separable_. Now the nervous energy of the brain is extraordinarily +complex; and yet we believe that it arises by a process of continuous +development from the much less complex energy of the fertilised ovum. In +the ovum there is no brain-energy; there is only the far simpler germinal +energy from which it is evolved. So too, the consciousness in the dog’s +mind is wonderfully complex; but if it has arisen by a process of +development, it must have been evolved from something of like nature only +indefinitely simpler. May we not fairly suppose, therefore, that in the +fertilised ovum, though there is no consciousness, there are the germinal +states from which consciousness may be evolved? Or to put the matter +tersely, may we not say: As the complex molecular vibrations of the brain +are to the simpler molecular vibrations of the ovum; so are the complex +states of consciousness associated with the former to the simpler states +of infra-consciousness, if we may so call them, associated with the +latter? It is the association of consciousness and infra-consciousness +with energy—its objective manifestation—that is the distinguishing +feature of the view which I am endeavoring to set forth. Concomitant +with the evolution of higher modes of organic energy from those lowly +modes which alone obtain in the ovum or the amœba, is the evolution of +consciousness from lowly modes of infra-consciousness. + +It is true that it is only through the exercise of the conceptual +faculty of reason, never through the senses or by direct perception, +that we can reach this suggested infra-consciousness. But this will +hardly be regarded as a valid objection by those who believe in the +existence of the ether, or by those who adopt the atomic theory, neither +of which could be reached by the senses or by perception alone. Still +less will it be regarded as an objection by those who have grasped +the distinction between energy as manifested in the objective world, +and consciousness as inevitably subjective. Of no consciousness other +than our own have we direct and first-hand experience. And yet certain +manifestations of energy as exhibited by other living beings force upon +us the conviction that we are not alone in possessing the subjective +attribute of consciousness. That not only the dog and the elephant, but +the bee also and the spider are endowed with this attribute and are +conscious, though not self-conscious, few of us doubt for a moment. But +their consciousness is presumably far simpler than ours. Carrying this +simplification yet farther down the scale of animal life, we reach in +the jelly-fish, the sea-anemone, and the sponge, forms of life which can +hardly be said to be conscious at all with a consciousness comparable to +our own. Yet they would seem to be endowed with the dim foreshadowings +of such consciousness. Finally in the amœba and the monad we have these +dim foreshadowings reduced to the lowest terms that are suggested by +the study of organic life. If, then, in the series of organic forms, +down even to the lowest, we admit consciousness or its foreshadowing, +though it lies and must ever lie beyond the reach of our senses, why +should we hesitate to generalise our belief in logical and scientific +form, and hold that all organic modes of energy are associated with +conscious or infra-conscious states?[30] It may perhaps, be objected +that such a view, carried to its logical conclusion involves the +supposition that all the tissues of the body are conscious or at +least infra-conscious, whereas it is a well-established scientific +conclusion that consciousness is specially associated with the nervous +tissue of the brain. I see no reason, however, why this conclusion +should not be accepted. If the organic transformations of energy in +the ovum are associated with what for lack of a better term I have +here called infra-consciousness, then there are two possibilities. +Either the accompanying consciousness is _entirely_ concentrated in +association with the molecular vibrations of the brain; or it merely +becomes _dominant_ in the functioning of that tissue and continues in +the dim infra-conscious condition in the other tissues of the body. +Now to judge from our own experience it is only the dominant molecular +vibrations in the brain that are accompanied by the clear light of +consciousness. The sub-dominant neural changes are indeed accompanied by +a dim sub-consciousness. But there are many molecular changes (even in +the cerebral hemispheres themselves where consciousness is “called into +existence”) which do not rise to the level of consciousness at all or +are quite lost in the glare of that consciousness. Why this should be +so I am not prepared to say. It seems to be a law of our mental being. +Certainly it is convenient that it is so; and it may have been fostered +or established by natural selection. We all know the sense of confusion +that arises when, in certain states of intense nervous excitement, a +host of ideas are crowding up into dominance and jostling each other +for supremacy. An organism so constituted that such a state of things +was normal, would, we may suppose, stand but a poor chance of survival. +Hence perhaps there has arisen that due subordination of conscious, +sub-conscious, and infra-conscious states which characterises the +normal life of conscious beings. Having regard, then, to the cerebral +hemispheres where consciousness emerges, not all the molecular changes +there transpiring rise to the level of full consciousness. There is not +a little of what Dr. Carpenter used to call unconscious cerebration. We +seem forced to admit the existence of submerged states of consciousness; +states which are infra-conscious, but which may become conscious at any +moment by rising into dominance. And if in the cerebral hemispheres +there are infra-conscious states, why should there not be associated +with every molecular thrill of the living body yet lower states of +infra-consciousness too deeply submerged ever in man to become dominant? + +It is, however, one thing to show that there is no insuperable objection +to accepting the existence of such infra-conscious states, if such +existence be otherwise probable, and another thing to establish this +probability. And this leads us back again to the grounds on which their +existence may fairly be regarded as probable. We are told that the mental +faculties of the dog in common with his physical or organic frame, have +arisen in the course of ages by a process of development. It is clear +that such a statement is intended to apply to the living dog with active +faculties; to a _going_ mechanism, or rather organism which is also +conscious. Well and good. The material structure has been evolved from +lower forms of matter: the organic modes of energy (in virtue of which he +lives), from lower forms of energy, the mental states (in virtue of which +he is conscious), from—what? I suggest in continuation and conclusion of +this sentence—from lower forms of infra-consciousness; that is to say, +of what is of the same order of existence as consciousness, but has not +yet risen to the level of consciousness. Many people will no doubt see +no necessity for such a conclusion. It is making an unnecessary bother, +they will say, about a very simple matter. At some undefined stage of +organic evolution—perhaps when nervous tissue had its genesis, perhaps +earlier—consciousness began to dawn and has since developed in clearness +and brightness during the evolution of higher and higher organisms. +According to this view, the ascending curve of evolution is divisible at +some undefined point into two portions: of which one represents organic +evolution previous to the dawn of consciousness; the other organic +evolution subsequent to the dawn of consciousness. But the question at +once suggests itself: From what did consciousness dawn at this undefined +point? In answer to which there are some who do not hesitate to reply +that the consciousness arose out of the physical conditions; that when +the rhythmic dance of organic molecules reached a certain intensity and +intricacy consciousness was developed. There is, indeed, a certain class +of nerve-physiologists, or of medical men who write on nerve-physiology, +who, if they do not hold that states of consciousness are generated +from the energy which accompanies the working of the brain-tissues, at +any rate write as if this was their belief. But such a view is quite +untenable. If there is one thing clearly established, both by those who +have approached the matter from the scientific side, and by those who +have approached the matter from the metaphysical side, it is that the +distinction between energy and consciousness is radical and absolute. +No conceivable increase in the orderly complexity of the molecular +vibrations of brain-tissue could give rise to that consciousness which +differs _toto cœlo_ from any manifestation of energy. + +And yet though stated in a form that is philosophically false, and +therefore misleading, the conclusions of these earnest students of +nerve-physiology are practically sound. Grant, for the moment, that the +states of consciousness in the dog’s mind are the subjective aspect of +the molecular energy of his brain. Then the following diagram (Fig. +1.) will represent the ascending curve of development which, from the +objective aspect, is a development of modes of energy, and from the +subjective aspect is a development of modes of consciousness. + +[Illustration: FIG. 1.] + +Now what the nerve-physiologists are sometimes apt to do is, at some +moment of development say _a_, to change their point of view, from +the subjective aspect which deals with consciousness to the objective +aspect which deals with energy. Their conclusions are practically sound +because they are still dealing with the same developmental curve. They +state these conclusions in language which is philosophically misleading +because they suddenly jump from the subjective aspect to the objective +aspect and ignore the great distinction between the two. When they say +that consciousness emerges from the physical conditions at _a_, they +presumably mean that at this point we are first justified in speaking of +consciousness or the subjective aspect in anything like a human sense. +But is it not more logical to hold that, just as from the objective +standpoint the complex energy of the dog’s brain has been developed +from the simpler energy of the ovum, so from the subjective standpoint, +the complex consciousness of the dog’s mind has been developed from +the simpler infra-consciousness of the ovum? And if we do not accept +this view, do we not seem committed to the unevolutionary doctrine +that the conscious aspect suddenly makes its appearance, without those +lowly germinal beginnings which it is of the essence of any theory of +development to postulate? + +It will perhaps be said that all this assumes an identity hypothesis, +with its supposed double aspect, which is not accepted by the majority +of men of science. Let us look at the matter, therefore, from what would +seem the only other point of view open to one who accepts the theory of +development as applicable alike to the dog’s mind and to the dog’s body. +If states of consciousness and the molecular transactions in the brain +are not different aspects of the same occurrences, they are parallel, +concomitant, or associated phenomena. Our diagram will thus become that +given below. + +[Illustration: FIG. 2.] + +Here the parallel or associated phenomena occur together at the higher +end of the developmental curve, and, at _a_, the consciousness is +supposed to emerge. On this view there is less justification for the +nerve-physiologists’ assertion that it arises out of physical processes; +for it is not simply another aspect of these processes, but something +wholly different arbitrarily associated with them. Even on this view +it would seem more logical to suppose that since the association of +mental states with the dominant neural energy is of normal occurrence +from _a_ onwards, the consciousness there emerging has been evolved from +infra-consciousness parallel and concomitant with the physical processes +in the ovum. If this be not so, we may once more ask: From what has +the parallel line to the right of the diagram been evolved? We cannot +say from the neural conditions without changing our point of view and +ignoring the great distinction between matter and energy on the one hand +and consciousness on the other. From what then has the consciousness been +evolved, if not from something of like nature only indefinitely simpler +which has here been spoken of as infra consciousness? + +We must now take a further step, one however in which all evolutionists +will not be prepared to follow us. Attention has already been drawn to +the fact that those who accept the theory of evolution are not agreed +in their faith—for it is on either side a matter rather of belief than +of demonstration—with respect to the origin of life. Some believe that +the primitive organic germs were not produced by natural development +nor through any process of evolution. For such, the hypothesis I am +advocating must be submitted in the following form—when first the +life-energy was started by the direct interposition of the finger of God +it was endowed with some dim form of infra-consciousness which in the +course of evolution developed into consciousness. And presumably those +who see in the amœba and the fertilised ovum some dim foreshadowings of +consciousness may follow me thus far. But for those who believe that +the organic has arisen on this earth by process of natural development +from the inorganic, the hypothesis must be more sweeping in its range. +We must say that all modes of energy of whatever kind whether organic or +inorganic have their conscious or infra-conscious aspect.[31] Startling +as this may sound there is, I believe, no other logical conclusion +possible for the evolutionist _pur sang_. For where are we to draw +the line? The states of consciousness of the higher animals have been +evolved from lower forms of infra-consciousness in the amœba-like or +yet more simple protoplasmic germs in the dawn of life. But if those +low forms of organic infra-consciousness were themselves evolved, from +what could they arise if they were not developed from yet more lowly +forms of infra-consciousness similar in kind but inferior in degree +associated with inorganic transformations of energy? In any case it is +here submitted that this doctrine that infra-consciousness is associated +with _all_ forms of energy is necessarily implied in the phrase mental +evolution for all thinkers who have grasped the distinction between +consciousness and energy. And if this be admitted there is disclosed, +by implication, an answer behind and beyond that ordinarily given to a +question which has again and again been asked—the question:—Is there a +conservation of consciousness analogous to the conservation of energy? +The negative answer generally given to this question results from the +fact that the question itself has always been put in a form which does +not admit of a satisfactory solution. There is not a conservation of +consciousness any more than there is a conservation of neural energy +or a conservation of electricity. There is no conservation of neural +energy because this is only one mode of energy which may be transformed +into other modes. Not until we have generalised energy so as to include +_all_ its modes can we speak of conservation in reference to it. So +too not until we have generalised that universal form of existence, of +which consciousness is only the highest and most developed mode, so as +to include all modes, can we speak of conservation in reference to it. +But so generalised I submit that there is a conservation of that form +of existence which includes both consciousness and infra-consciousness, +co-ordinate and coextensive with the conservation of energy.[32] Just as +the dominant neural transformations in the dog’s brain are like a special +vortex in the onward-flowing stream of the world’s energy, so are the +states of consciousness in his mind like a special vortex in the onward +flowing stream of that mode of existence which, whether it have risen to +the level of consciousness or not, is still of the conscious order. For +the believer in scientific monism there is but one vortex, objectively +presented as energy, subjectively felt in consciousness. For the dualist +there are two vortices, (1) an objective vortex and (2) a subjective +vortex associated with the other and “called into existence” by it. +In either case the vortex is dependent for its continual existence on +surrounding stores of that out of which it has arisen; and in either case +the modern tendencies of scientific thought suggest conservation which is +but the antithesis of creation _ex nihilo_.[33] + +In conclusion it should be noted that this hypothesis is but a new +presentation of an old speculation. It differs as it here stands from +any theory of “mind-stuff” in that it regards the question rather from +the dynamical than from the statical point of view. Not “mind-stuff” +answering to matter but a universal conscious order or aspect of +existence answering to universal energy is the leading idea I have sought +to develop. In its newer form, again, this hypothesis differs from the +view that “all force is will-power,” or the view that “all matter is +conscious,” or the theory of “intelligent monads,” in endeavoring, not to +carry anything like _our_ consciousness down into association with the +simpler manifestations of energy, but rather to seek in association with +these lower manifestations the germinal states indefinitely simpler than +consciousness, from which nevertheless consciousness has been developed. +Finally the keynote of this newer presentation is that which is the +keynote of all modern theories of life and of thought—the doctrine of +evolution. + + C. LLOYD MORGAN. + + +FOOTNOTES: + +[30] I have elsewhere (_Animal Life and Intelligence_, p. 467) suggested +the term _kinesis_ for the manifestation of energy, and the term +_metakinesis_ for its conscious or infra-conscious aspect. + +[31] In the phraseology I have elsewhere suggested, there is no kinesis +unaccompanied by its metakinetic aspect. + +[32] That is to say, a conservation of metakinesis co-ordinate and +coextensive with the kinetic conservation of energy. + +[33] The bearing of this conservation of consciousness and +infra-consciousness (metakinesis) on Eastern conceptions of immortality +and on transmigration would be an interesting theme to follow out but is +beyond the scope of the present paper. + + + + +THE NEW CIVILISATION DEPENDS ON MECHANICAL INVENTION. + + +By reason of his physical nature man is hampered by three wants—he +needs food, clothing, and shelter. In his first and lowest stage of +civilisation man lives in a state of enthrallment to nature. He dreads +and worships the cruel forces of matter. But by the aid of science, and +invention which flows from science, man attains domination or control +over things and forces and directs them into the service of humanity for +use or for beauty. The soul conquers nature by science and machinery and +then it next desires to see this conquest over nature reflected in works +of art. Hence it creates architecture, sculpture, painting, music, and +poetry, all of these fine arts portraying man’s victory over wants and +necessities. + +If the spectacle of pauperism and crime, the savagery that still lingers +in the slums of our cities, sternly reminds us of the yet feeble hold +which our civilisation has obtained even in cities—if the census of +mankind proves that three-fourths are yet counted as below the line +that separates the half-civilised from the civilised—yet we are wont to +console ourselves by the promise and potency which we can all discern +in productive industry aided by the might of science and invention. +This view is always hopeful. We see that there is a sort of geometric +progress in the conquest over things and forces. The ability of man to +create wealth continually accelerates. The more he obtains the more +he can obtain. The more each one gets the more his neighbor also can +get. Even the weakling of society, the pauper or beggar, the insane, +and the criminal all fare better in the centres of wealth than they do +at a distance from them where there is no wealth to beg or steal and +no asylums created and sustained by wealth to shelter and heal their +diseased bodies. + +Wealth in the modern sense of the word, far more than in its ancient +sense, is self-productive. It is capital, and capital is wealth +that generates wealth. Capital represents conquered forces and +things—conquered for the supply of human wants. Capital consists of +natural forces yoked and set to work for food, clothing, shelter, and the +facilities of human culture. The three physical wants (food, clothing, +and shelter) are produced by nature—they are the chains and fetters +whereby nature asserts her right to enslave humanity—to keep man in a +state of thralldom. + +But the Promethean cunning of man, realised first in science and next +in useful machines, has succeeded in subduing the powers of nature and +imposing on them the task of supplying and gratifying the very needs +which nature creates in us. Nature had chained man to the task of daily +toil for food, clothing, and shelter. But man turns back upon nature and +compels her to take the place of human drudgery and produce an abundance +of these needed supplies and bring them wherever they are needed for +consumption. This is accomplished by mechanical combinations that secure +the service of steam, electricity, and various devices of earth, air, +fire, and water. + +This self-generating wealth that exists in the shape of capital is so +much on the increase that it fills all classes of our population with +hopes or if not with hopes at least with discontents—and discontent is +certainly the product of hope struggling up from the depths of the soul. +Without the vivid perception of a higher ideal and without the feeling +that it is attainable, there would not be any such thing as discontent. +The average production of man, woman, and child in the United States +increased in the thirty years between 1850 and 1880 from about 25 cents +per day to 40 cents per day—an increase of over 60 per cent. This means +the production of far more substantial improvements for human comfort. +Much more wealth is created that possesses an enduring character and may +be handed down to the next generation. Finer dwellings, better roads and +streets, fences for lands, drainings and levelings, and the processes +necessary to bring wild land under cultivation, artificial supplies +of water and gas, the warehouses and elevators, and the appliances of +commerce—and finally the buildings and furnishings of culture, including +churches, schools, libraries, museums, asylums, and all manner of +public buildings. Great Britain, the leading nation in commerce and +manufactures, according to the returns for 1888 (see Mulhall’s “Dict. +Statistics,” new edition) distributed comfortable incomes of $1000 and +upwards to each family of 30 per cent. of the entire population, and the +remaining 70 per cent. averaged $485 per annum (for each family). France +provided incomes of $1300 per annum for 24 per cent. of its families. +This shows what great capitalists are doing for the creation and +distribution of wealth. Italy showed by its income returns that less than +2 per cent. received incomes of $1000 and upwards, while 98 per cent. of +the families averaged less than $300 income. Italy makes little use of +steam power and labor saving machines. + +If science progresses and its concomitant, useful invention, progresses +as fast for the next hundred years as it has done for the past forty +years, the vision of Edward Bellamy of comfort for all will be realised +without the necessity of any form of socialism. There will be comfort and +even luxury for all who will labor a moderate amount of time. + +Science inventories nature and discovers properties and possible +combinations. Invention uses these combinations to meet mechanical +problems. Can any one doubt who looks into the state of science and its +continually improving methods that the conquest of nature will be more +rapid in the coming century than it has been in the past century? + +But we are challenged by the question: What is the good of annihilating +the necessity for bodily toil? Will not man degenerate spiritually as +he comes to possess luxury at cheaper and cheaper rates? These material +advantages gained by useful invention which create a steady and permanent +supply of food, clothing, and shelter, are they not mere sumptuary +provisions and do they imply progress in civilisation? To this challenge +we reply by pointing out the relation of invention to the communication +of intelligence and the diffusion of knowledge by newspaper and book. + +In the first place it is obvious that the three classes of employments +devoted chiefly to the supply of the physical wants—namely agriculture, +manufactures, and commerce—are undergoing change by aid of mechanic +invention in such a manner as to bring the laborer everywhere more and +more into relation with his fellow men. In other words commerce increases +more and more, and becomes a part of all employments. In exchanging goods +each gets something that he needed more than what he parted with. But the +best result of the exchange is the acquaintance formed between producer +and consumer. Each has learned something of the other’s ideas, modes of +looking at the world and habits of action. Each one’s life is enriched by +the addition of the knowledge of the life of the other. + +Man as a spiritual being has for his problem the exploration of the two +worlds—the worlds of nature and man. The problem is too great for the +individual and he must avail himself of the work of others. Each man may +inventory a small portion of nature different from all others. Each one +may live a life different from another’s. But the individual gets a very +small glimpse of nature by the aid of his own senses. He gets a very +small arc of the total of human life in his survey of his own biography. + +But by intercommunication each one may extend and supplement his own +observations of nature and of the experience of life,—he may avail +himself of the aid of the sense-perceptions of others and still more of +the aid of the thoughts and reflections of others. + +We see at once that man is man because he possesses and uses this means +of re-enforcing his individual observations and reflections by those of +the race. Man is an individual endowed with the power of absorbing the +results of the race. We have with this a definition of civilisation and a +standard of measurement by which we may determine the rate of progress. +Advancement means that there are improved means realised by which each +individual can give to the rest of mankind the results of his living and +doing and thinking and at the same time share in the lives, thoughts, and +deeds of others. + +Looked at in the light of this definition we shall be enabled to claim +progress in civilisation on substantial grounds. We shall be able to +see something more hopeful in the material progress promised us in +the coming century than the cheap supply of bodily comforts. We see +a progressive increase of intercommunication which will enable each +individual to command the results of the rational intelligence of all +mankind. + +Man is first a speaking animal and next a writing animal. Each +word that he uses expresses a general meaning. Each word therefore +stores up an indefinite amount of experience. All men may pour into +it their experience and by it recognise the experience of others. +The art of writing at once increases infinitely the possibility of +intercommunication because it preserves the experience recorded for +persons widely separated in space and far removed in time. It renders +every _where_ in some sense a _here_ and every _when_ a _now_. But +mechanic invention comes to the aid of speech and the elementary arts of +writing by printing with movable types. Printing and gunpowder are two +great elementary arts both attributed to the Germanic race—the two wheels +of modern civilisation so to speak. But the Anglo-Saxon has added the +steam engine and the telegraph. The one makes locomotion possible to an +increasing degree and the other makes instantaneous intercommunication +with all places possible. + +Armed with these instrumentalities our modern civilisation lives in a +sort of spiritual border land. It looks across the frontier and is in +a constant process of interaction with all other nations. The great +instrument of this process is the daily newspaper. Our people are +becoming from year to year a travelled people—in a short time the per +cent. of the population that has crossed the ocean has doubled. The +per cent. that has visited the western border land has quadrupled. But +the number of people who live in constant daily interrelation with all +mankind by aid of the daily newspaper has increased a hundred fold within +a single generation. + +The test of a civilisation is its efficiency in re-enforcing the +endeavors of each individual so as to give him access to the labors of +the world. We are approaching a spiritual civilisation as well as an era +of the general distribution of wealth. + + W. T. HARRIS. + + + + +RELIGION AND PROGRESS. + +INTERPRETED BY THE LIFE AND LAST WORK OF WATHEN MARK WILKS CALL. + + +On August 20, 1890, died Wathen Mark Wilks Call, M. A.,—a spirit finely +touched to fine issues. The posthumous work before me revives the sense +of personal bereavement, but soothes it with the satisfaction of holding +another interview with the beloved scholar on themes that through many +years engaged our conversation. Here is a casket of golden thoughts cast +up from the deep where went down the white-winged ship freighted with +such treasures. The general world is unconscious that it is poorer; +its ports and marts had little welcome for the dainty wares of this +unfamiliar bark. Many an American thinker will through this specimen of +the sunken treasures realise the world’s loss when it is irreparable; +and some who used to hover around the silver sail now vanished, and come +ashore laden with its gifts, have wondered that this writer, valued by +Mill, George Eliot, and the scholarly English circle, should have courted +obscurity rather than fame. He was not indolent, though his published +volumes were few: “Lyra Hellenica” (1842), “Reverberations” (1849, +second edition 1876), “Golden Histories” (1871). Besides his poems, his +contributions in the reviews,—some, like “The Nero Saga” (_Theological +Review_, July, 1871), equal to volumes,—would make a substantial and +important collection. There is enough thought and learning in his poems +and anonymous articles, to have earned fame for an ambitious and pushing +author. Why then did the world get so much less than it ought to have +got from this fine and active brain, and why is he so little known? + +Many years ago I heard from his own lips the story of his life, which +is partly told in the fifty pages that introduce this book, under the +title “A Chapter from my Autobiography.” It will there be seen that +even so late as thirty-six years ago the finest minds and hearts that +could not accept creed-dogmas might be almost mortally wounded. From +that time he lived and wrote as from a retreat. The actual case, as he +told it me, was that his sister, a widow, left him executor of her last +will and testament, and the guardian of her children. He was tenderly +attached to this sister and to her children. She knew his opinions and +his doubts. When he went into the court for confirmation of his trust he +was confronted by the postscript of a letter he had written to a supposed +friend intimating his “dissent from the creeds of the churches.” For this +mild and vague heresy he was prevented from acting as the guardian of his +sister’s children, and fulfilling a sacred trust. + +At this time he was a clergyman in the Church of England, which to-day +contains many ministers more unorthodox than Mr. Call was when he +received this crushing legal blow. This public disgrace of a sensitive +scholar, the loss of position, the alienation of friends, added to the +grief of seeing his sister’s children carried to strangers, parted him +from the world. He seemed to have no place in it. Stunned, lacerated, he +had no heart to enter on any new profession. But from his retreat came +the poems, pathetic but hopeful, entitled “Reverberations,” some of which +are sung in the liberal chapels of England. Deified egotism and vengeance +had brought home to him all their heartlessness: all nature was overcast +with this chilling cloud. + +Silently bearing his grief, he gave himself to the search for truth +in those matters which had been predetermined for him by a thousand +subtle influences and associations. Born in 1817, he had graduated +at Cambridge,—the chief poet of its Magazine,—had passed through his +Shelleyan phase of scepticism, and entered the church (1845) through one +of the many casuistical blind-ways provided in that old minster for those +who hesitate at the main portal. Eleven years were occupied in passing +from one to another theoretical cloister or tower of the venerated church +before he finally discovered that it had no place for him. Nor was there +any church which he could honestly enter. He must be the hermit of his +truth. But in that retreat, where the lonely scholar must eat his own +heart, the healing hand of a true divinity found him. + +Love found him. He married (1857) a lady whose beauty was the expression +of her genius. Her father was Dr. Brabant, the friend of Strauss, and +founder of the _Westminster Review_. In early life she married C. C. +Hennell, author of “An Inquiry into the Origin of Christianity,”—a +work which made a deep impression on Theodore Parker, who made it the +subject of an article in the old _Dial_. Miss Brabant, versed in ancient +and modern languages, did excellent work on the _Westminster Review_, +assisted by her friend Marian Evans, afterwards known as “George Eliot.” +These two ladies, as I have heard, undertook together the translation +of Strauss’s “Leben Jesu,” and were more than half through it when Miss +Brabant married. By a contrivance of Mrs. Hennell the name of Marian +Evans alone, and to her regret, appeared on the title-page. “George +Eliot” thereby gained a reputation helpful to her, though somewhat +embarrassing, implying as it did a knowledge of Hebrew and Greek which +she did not possess. + +Mr. Call’s marriage was most happy. The Calls were regarded by their +circle of kindred spirits as representing the true ideal union. They had +together shared the friendship of the finest intellects, and had moved +abreast in intellectual progress, for more than the life of a generation +when parted by death. + +About seven years ago trouble for the first time entered this almost +sacred household. A formidable consumption of one lung set in, +threatening Mr. Call’s life. I have always believed that this was the +long latent bequest of pious cruelties suffered in earlier life. Six +years ago the case became hopeless, in its normal course, and the +physicians said that the only possibility of recovery lay in a rare +and difficult operation, imperilling the few months of life that might +remain. The patient and his devoted wife resolved to incur this risk. +A tube was inserted through the back; through it the pus was drained +from the ulcerated lung; and little by little the tube was withdrawn, by +infinitesimal degrees, as the healing process went on behind it. It was +a painful anxious process of many weeks. At this time, when he was kept +motionless, I marvelled at his cheerful spirit; though the slightest +miscarriage in the wearisome operation might prove fatal, the patient was +always serene. One of his physicians, by no means sure of the result, +approached him on the subject of religion, and the condition of his soul. +Soon after Mr. Call gave me an account of the conversation. In religious +matters the doctor had dabbled where Call had dived; it ended in the +physician’s being compelled to consider the condition of his own soul, +and why he should be holding the religion of primitive man along with a +science almost able to raise the dead. + +The wonderful operation was perfectly successful. Love had healed the +young man’s broken heart; science had healed the mature man’s dying +frame. The real miracles that supplant fictitious ones, and fulfil +their fables, had been brought home to him. Five happy years were added +to his life, during which he wrote the important work to be hereafter +considered. On a summer evening last year he passed a pleasant evening +at home, ended with a game of cribbage with his wife. During the night +he died painlessly of heart disease; a _post mortem_ examination proved +the lungs quite sound. My friend’s body and mind and affections were so +combined in organic unity that his very ailments had for me symbolical +significance. The unsuspected failure of the heart, for instance, seems a +last sequel of the spiritual lesion given him by Dogma as a parting blow: +its counterpart is to me visible in the fact that after writing this work +he hardly had heart to publish it. The substance of it was completed in +1887; it was entirely finished in 1889; it lay in his library one year. +His wife wished him to publish it—so she told me—but he thought the world +would not be interested in his views. So deep had bigotry been able to +send this man into the vale of Humiliation; and what an intellect was +thus discouraged may be partly estimated by those who shall read this +book on “Final Causes” published by his widow. + +In the last generation many young men, awakened by the song of Byron +and Shelley, started out on a new spiritual pilgrimage. Their path was +at first fringed with poetic flowers, and in the distance shone the city +called Beautiful. But the path at length became flinty, the city became +more dim with progress towards it, and many a pilgrim turned back. Those +who pressed on were unique men, so that they came to parting ways, and +each had to advance on his individual and lonely path, albeit they were +travelling in the same direction. The records of these pilgrimages, +wherever found, are chapters in the scriptures of their generation. There +is one thing common to them all,—the tenacity with which they have clung +to their old faith, and after it to their old church, until beaten off by +bigotry or by conscience. “My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?” It +was no mere cry, but a question reaching far into the ages, and stirring +innumerable crucified hearts that have found no voice. Men do not forsake +their God; their God forsakes them. They have invested some ancient name +with all the pearls of their heart; they have idealised him as wisdom, +justice, love, compassion; but no sooner do they think an honest thought, +or maintain justice and love against unjust and heartless dogmas, than +their Good Shepherd beats such tender lambs with his crook and sets the +wolves on them. Yet even then, so long as they can, they keep in the +fold, and lift their lacerated hands in prayer. They will even practice +some self-deception that they may continue the old formulas after the +truth has forsaken these. + +Mr. Call’s youthful scepticism,—a spell wrought by Byron and +Shelley,—being chiefly the expression of others’ experiences, and with +but little root in his own, carried him no further than the study of +philosophy and theology. It was not deep enough to prevent his entering +on residence in the University of Cambridge with a view of becoming +a clergyman. The struggle being not yet in the arena of his own life +and heart, but a combat for his soul between the Humes and the Jeremy +Taylors, poetic sentiment easily carried the day. His nature clamored +for a realised ideal, and the Church captivated him. “The church, as the +embodiment of celestial truth, as the aggregate of noble and beautiful +spirits, dead or living, appeared a sublime conception.” When a youth +falls in love does he consider whether his beautiful lady’s bloom may +not be hectic, or hereditary cancer be hovering near the fair breast? +Our young scholar weds our Lady of the Litany amid the light of stained +windows, and the white-robed choristers. He presently finds that the +lovely creature insists on his preaching the doctrine that all who +do not yield to her charms are to be burnt at the stake eternally. +“Human philosophy had failed to explain to me the mystery of existence; +Christian philosophy explained it to be the perpetuation of sin and +misery, intensified by omnipotent intervention.” Recoiling from this the +young clergyman went through years of critical investigation; he mastered +the exegesis of the Germans and the French; and at length found himself +a simple believer in the religion of Humanity. He, a clergyman of the +Church of England! + +In the fifty preliminary pages of this posthumous book, comprising “A +Chapter from my Autobiography,” we have a succinct and useful summary of +the crucial criticisms under which biblical authority and supernaturalism +have been relegated to professional casuistry. This we will not study +here—profoundly interesting as it is—but dwell for a little on the +situation in which the scholar found himself. + +“While I had thus been working my way through darkness into light—the +sober light of sad reality—life had been bringing to all who belonged +to me, as well as to myself, varied experiences of pain and sorrow. For +their sake I had already done violence to my better nature. Was I now +to render the previous sacrifice nugatory? Was the black shadow of my +unbelief to enfold those who had already more than their share of the +burden of life to sustain? Sympathising friends had early encouraged me +to retain my position in the church. A beneficed clergyman, advanced +in years, whose studies had ended, like my own, in the abandonment of +dogmatic Christianity, had drawn up a statement of the motives which, +as he argued, justified him in the retention of his preferment. This +statement was forwarded to me. A celebrated and venerable German +professor had sent me a message deprecating the abandonment of a post +which, he thought, I might continue to occupy without dishonor to myself +and with profit to others. I had hitherto deferred to the judgment of +persons whom I regarded as superior to myself in knowledge of life and +in ability to determine questions of moral obligation; but the progress +of unbelief and enlarged experience decided me, at last, on the adoption +of an independent course of thought and action. Taking counsel of my own +heart, I resolved to terminate a conflict which had become intolerable. +Painful and singular complications preceded, accompanied, and followed my +retirement from the English Church.” + +Here is the “Robert Elsmere” of real life. Since Mr. Call left the Church +of England, thirty-five years ago, it has become a largely rationalistic +institution. Legal prosecutions of clergymen for heresy have resulted +in proving that the evangelical and orthodox have no more right to the +Church, in Law, than the liberals. They were usurpers of authority not +guaranteed by the constitution, in which there is nothing requiring +a clergyman to believe in hell, or the devil, or miracles, or the +infallibility of the Bible. Many clergymen are now honestly preaching a +simple theistic and humanitarian religion, and when told they ought to +leave the Church need only reply, “If you think so you have a right to +prosecute me.” + +The English charlatan who calls himself “Father Ignatius,” who could only +make himself ridiculous as a heresy-hunter abroad, seems to have found +the Episcopal Church in New York provincial enough to take him seriously. +He would never venture to suggest the prosecution of a Broad Churchman +at home. His ignorant tribe have too keen a recollection of their severe +falls in grappling with Bishop Colenso, and the authors of “Essays and +Reviews.” We have, however, to deal with America, where the sects, by +departure of some of their best brains, seem falling more and more under +control of their illiberal constituents, though the consecration of +Bishop Phillips Brooks show that reactionists will not have it all their +own way. The passage I have quoted above bears upon a moral problem +which has already become urgent among us, and in the progress of inquiry +must inevitably become of very serious importance to large numbers +of ministers and their families. I therefore introduce here a little +digression on this subject. + +What is the moral duty of a young minister who finds himself occupying +the pulpit of a denomination in whose generally accepted doctrines he has +ceased to believe? The New York _Evening Post_ recently declared this +to be a plain moral question. If—thus it argues—a man has voluntarily +entered the ministry of a church, and afterwards forms opinions which, +if known, would have prevented his admission, he is morally bound to +resign. But the question is much more complex than that. In a majority +of cases the minister has not entered “voluntarily,”—within the genuine +moral scope of that term. His orthodox parents, abetted by their +preacher, have kept light from him, repressed his reason, imprisoned +him in Sunday schools and prayer-meetings; he has been accorded no free +choice; he has been led as a captive, before his intellect was capable +of judgment, artificially terrified about his soul, and the world’s +danger of damnation, and at length found himself in the pulpit. When +the victim finds himself disabused of these fictions, what is his duty? +In my belief it would be immoral for him to resign without having first +secured a public decision of his church on the issue. His paramount +obligations are to the community in which he lives. He is morally bound +to preach the truth as he sees it, openly, honestly, plainly. He cannot +utter the discredited creeds, prayers, or dogmas. But he has a right,—nay +he is bound,—to throw upon the church which has entrapped him the +responsibility of repudiating his principles and doctrines. He should say +to his church: “You are responsible for the unhappy situation in which I +find myself. By your zealous propaganda you frightened or persuaded my +parents, my friends, myself, into acceptance of dogmas I now find false. +The logical result of taking you seriously was to turn from all worldly +occupations, and devote my life to the work of saving mankind from a +terrible doom. Now, awakened from the nightmare superinduced by you, I +find myself past the opportunities of youth, the time for preparations +in other professions irrecoverably lost, and a family dependent on me. +The situation concerns not only you and me, but others we have involved. +For years I have been laboring with you to try and persuade other youths +into the same situation as my own. Something is due to them. I have +deceived them and must undeceive them. You say I must be true, but you +must be true also. I have innocently reached a position which enables +me to compel you to publish to the world exactly where you stand. I will +clearly define my convictions: if you cannot tolerate them in your pulpit +the youth will know the precise limits to their freedom they agree to +in entering your ministry. If you can tolerate them they will know your +liberalism. Therefore I remain here proclaiming my truth, and will not +help you to cover the truth up by a resignation relieving you of the duty +of proclaiming your position with equal clearness. You have got me here, +and if I go now you must turn me out. So shall the cause of truth be +advanced.” + +While this may be affirmed, I think, as a general ethical principle, +it is equally true that each case must be judged by itself. The above +principle depends on the condition that the ministry has been honestly +entered from religious motives, there being no mental reservations +at that time. It will be observed that in the case of Mr. Call the +consideration entered that he had passed through a phase of Shelleyan +scepticism in early youth. This had to be weighed, and perhaps may +have had much to do with his determination to retire voluntarily from +the ministry. He never concealed his views, however, and it is well +known that great efforts are made by older preachers to beat down the +scepticism that often arises in the minds of young candidates for the +ministry. In such case these unwise advisers assume a large share of +responsibility for the event, whether enough to justify the subsequent +heretic in compelling a conflict must depend on the minister’s +conscience. Although, therefore, Mr. Call decided rightly, in accordance +with his moral consciousness, it were by no means fair to maintain, with +the author of “Robert Elsmere,” that ministers who find themselves more +liberal than the majority of preachers in their church should surrender +to such mere superiority of physical force without testing its legality +and laying on it responsibility for its exercise of power. Robert Elsmere +should, on moral principles, have remained in the church. By so remaining +Colenso, Dean Stanley, Charles Kingsley, Max Müller, Professor Jowett, +Matthew Arnold, and others, have revealed the fact that, in their church, +thought is not delivered up by law to the despotism of a majority. + +The case, however, is somewhat different again where the new opinions +adopted by a minister amount to an abandonment of the fundamental +doctrines of his church. That may not exonerate him from demanding a +formal and public declaration of the church, but this being secured, it +must affect his relation to the general world. Should it be proved that +he may be legally tolerated, he must then consider whether it is his +legitimate means of influence, or whether he would be substituting for +his own expression the mask of an extinct faith. The ethical principle +above affirmed relates to the first practical step of the minister whose +beliefs have changed. The progressive and inquiring mind that continues +in a church where it is barely tolerated does so at great peril. Where +the swift foot agrees to march with the halt the pace must be that of the +halt. Sceptical minds occupying pulpits even of liberal denominations +are likely to discover, should such engagements end, that they have been +unconsciously arresting their own development in finding a conciliatory +_modus vivendi_ with the reactionary brethren. There is, indeed, a class +of fine intellects, like the great English Broad Churchmen already +named, whose comparatively advanced views are the result of larger +learning; they have discovered that two and two are four, and gathered +courage to deny that the amount is five. These constitute the right +leaven by which great organisations are raised to higher standards of +knowledge and veracity. But there are original and philosophic inquirers +whose particular power were only buried in such organisations, without +elevating them. These are due to the corps of pioneers in the direction +whither the organisations are advancing. Their task is original research. +These cannot wisely wear the uniform of any religious or political party. + +Mr. Call was such an original mind, and after he had left the English +church his course was to the maturity represented in this ripe book on +“Final Causes.” But had he not passed eleven of his best years in the +church, out of his true habitat, we should have more fruit of this fine +flavor. It is therefore a voice from his experience that here reaches us, +as from his grave: + + “Scepticism has been vigorously advancing in the nation—I + might say, in Europe. And not only has it extended its sphere, + but it includes within that sphere some of the loftiest and + profoundest intellects of the age—men renowned for vast and + exact erudition, for scientific research or critical acumen. + Philosophers, poets, historians, novelists, openly or silently + disavow Christianity. In palaces, in lordly mansions, in + college halls, in secluded homesteads, and here and there in + rectory or vicarage, scepticism, if it has not a bold and + fearless utterance, at least expresses itself in a guarded + whisper. It becomes doubly a duty, then, when notwithstanding + the general diffusion of avowed or latent unbelief, we trace + everywhere the presence of a conservatism that conceals and + hesitates and trembles at the doubts which it cannot suppress, + that individual dissentients should candidly disclose their + theological divergences. Christianity, indeed, which has had + its triumphs in the past, will long conserve a portion of + its power, and continue to furnish guidance not only for the + unreasoning multitude, but for thousands of excellent men and + women who cannot abandon the old religious ideal. But there is + no final arrest for the intellectual progress of mankind.” + +We now turn to Mr. Call’s work on “Final Causes.” In an introductory +chapter of eight pages he compresses the history of the doctrine of +Design in nature from Anaxagoras, B. C. 500, to our own time, stating +its modifications, criticisms, denials. In the second chapter a brief +account is given of “Natural Theology,” whose modern form is found to +rest fundamentally on Newton’s generalisation, that a body at rest +continues at rest unless acted upon by some external force; and on the +geometrical order of planetary revolutions. Starting anew from this point +the human mind has discovered in the varied realms of nature apparent +evidences of a supersensuous Intelligence. Kant, however, is brought +to criticise Newton. “Kant notes with delight that the ‘harmonical +relations which excite the feelings in a more sublime manner than even +the contingent beauties of nature originate in the properties of space’; +and this inevitable congruity he refers ultimately, indeed, to Divine +Wisdom, but directly to a common dependence on a single sovereign +ground, to a unity of possibilities which it is no more difficult to +conceive as self-existent than it is to conceive an Intelligent Cause as +self-existent.” Matter is not, then, naturally inert, but an aggregate +of forms and forces, and nature a self-adjusting, self-evolving power. +In a chapter on “Order and General Adaptation” it is shown that nature +contains vast realms of Disorder; and alleged “special adaptations” +are shown too as often as otherwise for cruelty and agony. “With what +feelings,” asks G. H. Lewes, “can we contemplate the destruction of +such an organism as that of man for the sake of some microscopic animal +made to live upon it? With what feelings can we think of a human being +sacrificed to the growth of cancer-cells? What is the contrivance +and benevolence here?” Particular illustrations of design on which +teleologists have depended,—the eye, the bee’s cell, the bird’s wing—are +examined with critical and scientific care, and imperfections, gratuitous +and cruel if ascribed to omnipotent wisdom, found everywhere. “To assert +that the Creator of the world is infinitely powerful and infinitely wise +were to deny that he is infinitely good.” + +To escape the dilemma just stated, some theists postulate a “limited +or constitutional deity.” Dr. Martineau’s idea of a “material datum +objective to God” is an effort to relieve the deity of responsibility +for the evils of nature, but Mr. Call declares the selection of “power” +as the limited attribute is arbitrary. We have, he thinks, no more +logical right to limit the deity’s power than his intelligence, or his +benevolence. (This is doubtful, however, and requires more consideration +than is here given it.) “The Evolutionary God” is next considered, and +disproved by the uselessness and unfitness of some structures in various +organisations, the often injurious character of others, (e.g. the +intestinal canal called the vermiform process,) while the moral sense is +still offended by the general predatory method of natural selection. + +The validity of the Design argument disposed of, Mr. Call leaves to the +theist whatever evidences of a deity he may find in his ideals, emotions, +aspirations, intuitions. He points out that the Designer thus disproved +has never been able to satisfy the intellect or heart, the like being +true of the “Unknowable.” The sole sacred ideal left us is that of +humanity; not of the whole race but of the purer, nobler constituents of +it. + + “As Humanity will be the sole Ideal Object to which dutiful + obligation and exalted sentiment will be referred, so the + world of Humanity will be the world revealed, not by divine + inspiration or metaphysical intuition, but by Positive Science + The shadowy abstractions of the speculative rationalist, the + fanciful conceptions of the theologian, will gradually pass + away. To the Semitic explanation of the world and of man will + succeed that of Laplace and Darwin. The great and majestic + truths of the stellar universe, the mysteries of life, of + light, of heat, of sound; the wonders of natural history, + the magic of geologic lore, the epic of man’s progression in + time; the exaltation, the solace, the delight which flow from + poetry, music, painting, sculpture; the interest in the arts, + industrial no less than æsthetic; in the fellowship of work + which ameliorates the common lot; in friendships of man and + woman, short of passionate love, and in the happier profounder + affection of wife and husband; in all home charities and + patriotic activities, and in the identification of personal + ‘feelings with the entire life of the human race’;—all these + incidents of thought and varieties of emotion and action will + possess the intellect and fill the heart of future generations, + in a mode and degree which we can now only imperfectly realise, + and which, in the end, will leave men but little reason to + regret that the raptures of saint or prophet, or the splendours + of ancient theocracy, or the power and glory of the Mediæval + Church, or the imposing premise of Hellenic or of Teutonic + speculation, are as the dreams of a night that has passed + forever away.” + +Have we, in this prophetic conclusion, the afterglow of a faith sunk +beneath the horizon? Why should we suppose that such beautiful things +will come to pass in the future? Such prophecies have hitherto been +inspired by belief in an overruling and omnipotent Love. But we are now +brought by science and philosophy to the misgiving of Solomon, “We are +born at all adventure.” Things, the sceptic may say, will grow better if +man compels them so, otherwise they can as easily grow worse. + +It appears to me that in the old dogma of Jehovah’s curse on the world +and its redemption by Jesus there is buried, as in a sarcophagus, a +skeleton of human nature, and of moral history, resembling the man of +to-day, and the history we are making. There was an appeal of the human +heart from Jehovah to Jesus,—from the cursing to the saving deity. The +terrible arraignments of nature written by some of the greatest men since +Darwin’s discovery have not found any one to answer them. The severest +indictment of the world, perhaps, is that by the late Cardinal Newman, +who declares, “Either there is no Creator, or this living society of +men is in a true sense discarded from his presence.... _Since_ there +is a God, the human race is implicated in some terrible aboriginal +calamity.” From a deity who having created his own materials, built up +a creation liable to such calamity, mankind are once more appealing. +The ancient case was Jesus _vs._ Jehovah; the present case is Humanity +_vs._ the Creator of Nature. This rebellion of the moral sentiment and +of compassionateness is not intellectually conscious; it goes on, and +for a long time must go on, with ceremonial respect to the Final Cause +of all the evils humanity tries to heal; but it appears to me certain +that the heart and enthusiasm which once went out to a personal God +are again turning to a crucified humanity. The humanitarian movements +of our time have arisen simultaneously with the overwhelming evidences +of nature’s cruelty and imperfections revealed by Science. The earlier +deists appealed from biblical superstitions and ecclesiastical cruelties +to the God visible in the order and beauty of the universe. With the +existence of evil in external nature they never grappled. Bishop Butler’s +“Analogy” first stated the problem. He answered deistic objections to the +inhumanities of the Bible by pointing out the like in nature. Instead of +answering the deists he set them on a new departure which has ended in +results summed up in Mr. Call’s book. The omnipotent creator of nature +is following the biblical Jehovah into extinction. But the instincts and +aspirations of the human heart and mind remain the same; the religious +sentiment remains. The stream that is dammed up in one direction or +another does not lose any force thereby; it streams into other channels +if it can find such, or floods field and village if it finds none. It +will beat earthward as strongly as it once beat heavenward; it will, if +channels be not provided, carry away institutions as it has carried away +gods and goddesses. + +It has become therefore of great importance to recognise if possible +the lines of least resistance along the mighty stream of religious +enthusiasm, and provide that its energies shall not be destructive but +conservative of human welfare. At present the most conservative force +in the earth is ignorance: were the suffering masses of the world to +discover, suddenly and universally, that the old creeds are fictions, +their evils not providential, their heavenly hopes vain, every nation +would be filled with convulsions. Fortunately the sun is not shot up into +the heavens. But enlightenment progresses rapidly, and we have begun +none too soon turning the rising flood of light and fire into the human +channels long obstructed by sanctified inhumanities. + +Mr. Call’s little book, which I hope will find publication and wide +circulation in America, sums up succinctly and cogently the present +religious situation, and the steps by which it has been reached. It +remains for us all to sweep the new horizon with eye and telescope, +to compare our observations and to catch the first ray of the star +that shall point wise men to the new incarnation. To my own mind this +book is one of the many signs and promises that the divine will be +steadily merged into and identified with the human. Not with humanity +as an objective and historical entity, as Comte believed, but with the +distinctive characteristics of humanity, the supreme qualities of reason +and love: this will become the ideal of the reasoners and the lovers; it +will then become the creating Word, instructing all; it will finally be +made flesh and dwell among us, and all shall behold in it the glory of +the kingdom of Man. + + MONCURE D. CONWAY. + + + + +FACTS AND MENTAL SYMBOLS. + + +I perceive from Dr. Carus’s answer to my letter in No. 3 Vol. I of _The +Monist_, that amid all the agreement of our mutual endeavors a material +difference of opinion exists between us on an important question of +special character. As I was not successful in rendering my thought clear +on this point, I shall endeavor on the present occasion to explain _what_ +it was that forced me to abandon my old position (1863), which is very +near to that of Dr. Carus, and to assume a new one. The supposition +that our difference of opinion is merely apparent and can be adjusted +by a precise agreement as to the terms employed is a very natural one +in philosophical discussions. It is hardly tenable, though, when the +divergent views in question arise _subsequently_ to one another in the +_same_ person. + +I must state, in starting, that I pursued in my youth physical _and_ +philosophical studies, particularly psychology, with equal ardor. There +was hardly the question at that time of an experimental psychology, of +a relation of psychological to physiological research. No more so did +physics at that day think of a psychological analysis of the notions it +was constantly employing. How the notions of “body,” “matter,” “atom,” +etc., were come by, was not investigated. Objects were given of which +physicists never questioned the inviolability and with which they +unconcernedly pursued their labors. + +The fields of physical and psychological research thus stood +_unconciliated_ the one by the side of the other, each having its own +particular concepts, methods, and theories. No one questioned, indeed, +that the two departments were connected in some way. _The way_, however, +appeared an insoluble riddle; as it yet appears to Dubois-Reymond. + +Now although this condition of things was not such as to satisfy my mind, +it was nevertheless natural that as a student I should seek to acquire +tentatively the prevailing views of both provinces and put them into +consistent connection with one another. + +I thus formed provisorily the view that Nature has two _sides_—a physical +and a psychological side. If psychical life is to be harmonised at all +with the theories of physics we are obliged, I thought, to conceive of +the atoms as _feeling_ (ensouled). The various dynamic phenomena of the +atoms would then represent the physical processes, while the internal +states _connected therewith_ would be the phenomena of psychic life. If +we accept in faith and seriousness the atomistic speculations of the +physicists and of the early psychologists (on the unity of the soul), I +still see hardly any other course to arrive at a half-way supportable +monistic conception. + +It is unnecessary to set forth at length here what a prominent place the +artificial scaffolding we employ in the construction of our knowledge +assumes in these monadic theories as contradistinguished from the facts +that deserve knowledge, and how poorly such theories satisfy in the long +run a vigorous mind. As a fact, employment with this cumbrous artifice +was in my case the means that effected very soon the appearance of my +better conviction, already latently present.[34] + +In the further progress of my physical work I soon discovered that it was +very necessary _sharply to distinguish_ between what we _see_ and what +we mentally _supply_. When, for example, I imagine heat as a substance +(a fluid) that passes from one body into another, I follow with ease +the phenomena of conduction and compensation. This idea led Black, +who established it, to the discovery of specific heat, of the latent +heat of fusion and vaporisation, and so forth. _This same_ idea of a +constant quantity of heat-substance _prevented_ on the other hand Black’s +successors from using their eyes. They no longer mark the fact which +every savage knows, that heat is _produced_ by friction. By the help of +his undulatory theory Huygens follows with ease the phenomena of the +reflexion and refraction of light. The same theory _prevents_ him, for he +thinks solely of the longitudinal waves with which he was familiar, from +marking the fact of polarisation which he himself discovered, but which +Newton on the other hand, undisturbed by theories, perceives at once. +The conception of fluids acting at a distance on conductors charged with +electricity facilitates our view of the behavior of the objects charged, +but it _stood in the way of_ the discovery of the specific inductive +capacity, which was reserved for the eye of Faraday undimmed by any +traditional theories. + +Valuable therefore as the conceptions may be which we mentally +(theoretically) supply in our pursuit of facts, bringing to bear, as +they do, older, richer, more general, and more familiar experiences +on facts that stand alone, thus affording us a broader field of view, +nevertheless, the same conceptions may, as classical examples and our +own experience demonstrate, lead us astray. For a theory, indeed, always +puts in the place of a fact something _different_, something more +simple, which is qualified to represent it in some _certain_ aspect, +but for the very reason that it is different does _not_ represent it +in other aspects. When in the place of _light_ Huygens mentally put +the familiar phenomenon of _sound_, light itself appeared to him as a +thing that he knew, but with respect to polarisation, which sound-waves +lack, as a thing with which he was doubly unacquainted. Our theories are +abstractions, which, while they place in relief that which is important +for _certain fixed_ cases, neglect almost necessarily, or even disguise, +what is important for other cases. The law of refraction looks upon +rays of light as homogeneous straight lines, and that is sufficient +for the comprehension of the geometrical aspect of the matter. But the +propositions that relate to refraction will never lead us to the fact +that the rays of light are periodical, that they interfere. Just the +contrary, the favorite and familiar conception of a ray as a smooth +straight line will rather render this discovery difficult. + +Only in rare cases will the resemblance between a fact and its +theoretical conception extend _further_ than we ourselves postulate. Then +the theoretical conception may lead to the discovery of _new_ facts, of +which conical refraction, circular polarisation, and Hertz’s electric +waves furnish examples that stand in opposition to those given above. But +as a general rule we have every reason to distinguish sharply between +our theoretical conceptions of phenomena and that which we observe. The +former must be regarded merely as auxiliary instruments that have been +created for a _definite_ purpose and which possess permanent value only +with respect to that purpose. No one will seriously imagine for a moment +that a real circle with angles and sines actually performs functions in +the refraction of light. Every one, on the contrary, regards the formula +sinα/sinβ = _n_ as a kind of geometrical model that _imitates in form_ +the refraction of light and _takes its place_ in our mind. In this +sense, I take it, all the theoretical conceptions of physics—caloric, +electricity, light-waves, molecules, atoms, and energy—must be regarded +as mere helps or expedients to facilitate our viewing things. Even +within the domain of physics itself the greatest care must be exercised +in transferring theories from one department to another, and above all +more instruction is not to be expected from a theory than from the facts +themselves. + +But instances were not lacking that demonstrated to me, how much greater +the confusion was which was produced by the direct transference of +theories, methods, and inquiries that were legitimate in physics, into +the field of psychology. + +Allow me to illustrate this by a few examples. + +A physicist observes an image on the retina of an excised eye, notices +that it is turned upside down with respect to the objects imaged, and +puts to himself very naturally the question, How does a luminous point +situated _at the top_ come to be reflected on the retina _at the bottom_? +He answers this question by the aid of dioptrical studies. If, now, this +question, which is perfectly legitimate in the province of physics, be +transferred to the domain of psychology, only obscurity will be produced. +The question why we see the _inverted_ retina-image _upright_, has no +meaning as a psychological problem. The light-sensations of the separate +spots of the retina are connected with sensations of locality from the +very beginning, and we _name_ the places that correspond to the parts +down, _up_. Such a question cannot present itself to the perceiving +subject. + +It is the same with the well-known theory of projection. The problem of +the _physicist_ is, to seek the luminous object-point of a point imaged +on the retina of the eye in the backward prolonged ray passing through +the point of intersection of the eye. For the perceiving subject this +_problem_ does not exist, as the light-sensations of the retinal spots +are connected from the beginning with determinate space-sensations. The +entire theory of the psychological origin of the “external” world by the +projection of sensations outwards is founded in my opinion on a mistaken +transference of a _physically_ formulated inquiry into the province +of _psychology_. Our sensations of sight and touch are bound up with, +are connected with, various _different_ sensations of space, that is to +say these sensations have an existence _by the side of_ one another or +_outside of_ one another, exist in other words in a _spatial_ field, +in which our body fills but a part. That table is thus self-evidently +_outside of_ my body. A projection-problem does not present itself, is +neither consciously nor unconsciously solved. + +A physicist (Mariotte) makes the discovery that a certain spot on the +retina is blind. He is accustomed to associating with every spatial +point an imaged point, and with every imaged point a sensation. Hence +the question arises, what do we see at the points that correspond to the +blind spots, and how is the gap in the image filled out? If the unfounded +influence of the physicist’s method of procedure on the discussion of +psychological questions be excluded, it will be found that no problem +exists at all here. We see _nothing_ at the blind spots, the gap in the +image is _not_ filled out. The gap, moreover, is not felt, for the reason +that a defect of light-sensation at a spot blind from the beginning can +no more be perceived as a gap in the image than the blindness say of the +skin of the back can be so perceived. + +I have chosen intentionally simple and obvious examples, such as +render it clear what unnecessary confusion is caused by the careless +transference of a conception or mode of thought which is valid and +serviceable in one domain, into another. + +In the work of a celebrated German ethnographer I read recently the +following sentence: “This tribe of people deeply degraded itself by the +practise of cannibalism.” By its side lay the book of an English inquirer +who deals with the same subject. The latter simply puts the _question +why_ certain South-Sea islanders eat human beings, finds out in the +course of his inquiries that our own ancestors also were once cannibals, +and comes to understand the position the Hindus take in the matter—a +point of view that occurred once to my five-year-old boy who while +eating a piece of meat stopped suddenly shocked and cried out, “_We_ are +cannibals to the animals!” “Thou shalt not eat human beings” is a very +beautiful maxim; but in the mouth of the ethnographer it sullies the +calm and noble lustre of unprepossession by which we so gladly discover +the true inquirer. But a step further and we will say, “Man _must_ not +be descended from monkeys,” “The earth _shall_ not rotate,” “Matter +_ought_ not everywhere to fill space,” “Energy _must_ be constant,” and +so on. I believe that our procedure differs from that just characterised +only in degree and not in kind, when we transfer views reached in the +province of physics with the dictum of sovereign validity into the domain +of psychology, where they should be tested anew with respect to their +serviceability. In such cases we are subject to dogma, if not to that +which is forced upon us by a power from without like our scholastic +forefathers, yet to that which we have made ourselves. And what result +of research is there that could not become a dogma by long habit of use, +since the very skill which we have acquired in familiar intellectual +situations, deprives us of the freshness and unprepossession which are so +requisite in a new situation. + +Now that I have set forth in general outlines the position I take, I may +be able perhaps to establish my opposition to the _dualism of feeling +and motion_. This dualism is to my mind an artificial and an unnecessary +one. The way it has arisen is analogous to that in which the imaginary +solutions of certain mathematical problems have arisen—by the improper +formulation of the questions involved. + +In the investigation of purely physical processes we generally employ +notions so abstract that as a rule we only think cursorily or not at +all of the sensations that lie at and constitute their foundation. +For example, when I establish the fact that an electric current of 1 +Ampère develops 10½ cubic centimetres oxyhydrogen gas at 0° C. and 760 +mm mercury pressure in a minute, I am easily disposed to attribute to +the objects defined a reality wholly independent of my sensations. But +I am obliged in order to arrive at what I have determined to conduct +the current through a circular wire having a definite measured radius, +so that the current, the intensity of terrestrial magnetism being +given, shall turn the magnetic needle at its centre a certain angular +distance out of the meridian. The intensity of terrestrial magnetism +must have been disclosed by a definite observed period of vibration +of a magnetic needle of measured dimensions, known weight, and so +forth. The determination of the oxyhydrogen gas is no less intricate. +The whole statement, so simple in its appearance, is based upon an +almost unending series of simple sensory observations (sensations), +particularly so when the observations are added that guarantee the +adjustment of the apparatus, which may have been performed in part long +before the actual experiment. Now it may easily happen to the physicist +who does not study the psychology of his operations, that he does not +(to reverse a well-known saying) see the trees for the woods, and that +he slurs over the sensory elements at the foundation of his work. Now +I maintain, that every physical notion is nothing more than a definite +connection of the sensory _elements_ which I denote by _A_ _B_ _C_ ..., +and that every physical fact rests therefore on such a connection. These +_elements_—elements in the sense that no further resolution has for the +present been effected of them—are the most ultimate building stones of +the physical world that we have as yet been able to seize. + +Physiological research also may have a purely physical character. I can +follow the course of a physical process as it propagates itself through a +sensitive nerve to the spinal column and brain of an animal and returns +by various paths to the muscles of the animal, whose contraction produces +further events in the environment of the animal. I need not think, in so +doing, of any feeling on the part of the animal; what I investigate is a +purely physical object. Very much is lacking, it is true, to our complete +comprehension of the details of this process, and the assurance that it +is all motion can neither console me nor deceive me with respect to my +ignorance. + +Long before there was any scientific physiology people perceived that the +behavior of an animal confronted by physical influences is much better +viewed, that is understood, by attributing to the animal _sensations_ +like our own. To that which I see, to _my_ sensations, I have to _supply +mentally_ the sensations of the _animal_, which are not to be found in +the province of my own sensation. This contrariety appears still more +abrupt to the scientific inquirer who is investigating a nervous process +by the aid of colorless abstract notions, and is required for example +to add mentally to that process the sensation green. This last can +actually appear as something entirely novel, and we can ask ourselves how +it is that this miraculous thing is produced from chemical processes, +electrical currents, and the like.[35] + +Psychological analysis has taught us that this surprise is unjustified, +since the physicist deals with sensations in everything on which he +employs himself. This analysis is also able to render it clear to us that +the mental addition by analogy of sensations and complexes of sensations +which at the time being are not present in the field of sense or cannot +even come into it, is also daily practised by the physicist, as when +for example he imagines the moon an inert heavy mass although he cannot +touch the moon but only see it. The totally strange character of the +intellectual situation above described is therefore an illusion. + +The illusion disappears when I make observations (psychologically) on my +own person which are limited to the sensory sphere. Before me lies the +leaf of a plant. The green (_A_) of the leaf is united with a certain +optical sensation of space (_B_) and sensation of touch (_C_), with the +visibility of the sun or the lamp (_D_). If the yellow (_E_) of a sodium +flame takes the place of the sun, the green (_A_) will pass into brown +(_F_). If the chlorophyl granules be removed,—an operation representable +like the preceding one by elements,—the green (_A_) will pass into white +(_G_). All these observations are _physical_ observations. But the +green (_A_) is also united with a certain process on my retina. There +is nothing to prevent me in principle from physically investigating +this process on my own eye in exactly the same manner as in the cases +previously set forth, and from reducing it to its elements _X_ _Y_ +_Z_.... If this were not possible in the case of my own eye, it might +be accomplished with that of another, and the gap filled out by analogy +exactly as in physical investigations. Now in its dependence upon _B_ _C_ +_D_ ..., _A_ is a _physical element_, in its dependence on _X_ _Y_ _Z_ +... it is a _sensation_. The green (_A_) however is not altered at all +_in itself_, whether we direct our attention to the one or to the other +form of dependence. _I see, therefore, no oppositions of physical and +psychical, no duality, but simply identity._ In the sensory sphere of my +consciousness everything is at once physical and psychical. + +The obscurity of this intellectual situation has arisen according to +my conviction solely from the transference of a physical prepossession +into the domain of psychology. The physicist says: I find everywhere +bodies and the motions of bodies only, no sensations; sensation therefore +must be something _entirely different_ from the physical objects I deal +with. The psychologist accepts the second portion of this declaration: +To him, it is true, sensation is _given_, but there corresponds to it a +mysterious physical something which conformably to physical prepossession +must be _different_ from sensation. But what is it that is the really +mysterious thing? Is it the Physis or the Psyche? or is it perhaps +_both_? It would almost appear so, as it is now the one and now the +other that is intangible. Or does the whole reasoning involved rest on a +fallacious circle? + +I believe that the latter is the case. For me the elements designated by +_A_ _B_ _C_ ... are immediately and indubitably given, and for me they +can never afterwards be volatilised away by any considerations which are +after all based in every case on their existence.[36] + +To the department of special research having for its subject the sensory, +physical, and psychical province which is not made superfluous by this +general orientation and Which cannot be forestalled, the relations of +_A_ _B_ _C_ ... only remain to be ascertained. This may be expressed +symbolically by saying that it is the purpose and end of special research +to find equations of the form _f(A, B, C_, ...) = 0. + +I hope with this to have designated the point in which I am in opposition +to Dr. Carus, with whom I agree so much in other respects. I am obliged, +notwithstanding the latter fact, to regard this point as essential, +inasmuch as my whole mode of thinking and direction of inquiry have +been changed by the view it involves, and because, moreover, I do not +believe that the difference in question can be dissipated by any verbal +explanations however exact. + +This whole train of reasoning has for me simply the significance +of negative orientation for the avoidance of pseudo-problems. I +restrict myself, moreover intentionally here, to the question of +sense-perceptions, for the reason that at the start exact special +research will find here alone a safe basis of operations. + + ERNST MACH. + + +FOOTNOTES: + +[34] A Greek philosopher to whom change of spatial configuration, +pressure, and percussion were probably the only natural processes of +which he had any intimate knowledge, thought out the atomistic theory. +This theory we retain to-day, though it be in a modified form. And in +fact natural phenomena really do exist that act _as if_ the pressure +and impact of very small particles were involved in their production +(the dynamical theory of gases), phenomena that admit therefore by this +conception of being more clearly viewed. However, this conception, like +that of caloric, possesses value only in certain fields. We know to-day +that pressure and impact are by no means simpler phenomena than are for +example the phenomena of gravitation. The contention that in physics +everything can be reduced to the motion of smallest particles is, taken +at its best, a more than improper draft on the future. Utterances of this +kind afford no assistance to the solution of burning special questions, +but only confound, and have about the same explanatory value as the +utterances of the late physical philosophy of Oken which prescribe for +example with the greatest ease the course of the creation of the world by +a division of zero-quantities into _+a_ and _-a_ (0 = _+a_ _-a_). + +The motion of a _single_ body as a totality does indeed appear simpler +at first glance than any other process, and this is the justification +of attempts at a _physical_ monadic theory. The thoughts of a _single_ +man are connected together; the thoughts of two different men are not. +How can the processes of the different parts of the brain of one man be +connected? In order to make the connection very intimate, we collect +everything which requires to be psychically connected in _a single_ +point, although the connection is not explained by this procedure. Thus +the psychological monadic theory is created on the basis of a motive and +of an illusion similar to that on which the physical rests. + +Let us assume for a moment the proposition in the text; viz., that the +atoms are endowed with feeling. By the space coördinates _x_, _y_, _z_, +_x′_, _y′_, _z′_ ... of the atoms are determined _in the atoms_ internal +conditions α, β, γ, α′, β′, γ′ ... and _vice versa_. For we feel by +our senses our physical environment, and our physical invasions of our +environment are conditioned by our sensations. The idea is then at hand, +α, β, γ ... alone being directly given, to set up by the elimination of +_x_, _y_, _z_ ... equations directly between α, β, γ, α′, β′, γ′.... This +latter point of view would be very near to my present one, aside from the +fact that the latter wholly rejects metaphysical considerations. + +[35] The following is a legitimate question: To what kind of nervous +processes is the sensation green to be mentally added. Such questions +can be solved only by special inquiry, and not by a reference in a +general way to motion and electric currents. How disadvantageous our +remaining satisfied with such general conceptions is, can be seen from +the fact that inquirers have been repeatedly on the brink of abandoning +the _specific energies_, one of the greatest acquisitions we have made, +simply because they were unable to discover any difference in the +currents of different sensory nerves. I was impelled as early as 1863 +in my lectures on psycho-physics to call attention to the fact that the +_most diverse kinds_ of nervous processes can conceal themselves in a +current. Current is an abstraction and places in relief but one feature +of the process—the passage of energy though a transverse section. A +current in diluted sulphuric acid is something entirely different from a +current in copper. We must therefore also expect that a current in the +acoustic nerve is something entirely different from a current in the +optic nerve. + +[36] It is the transitoriness of sense-perceptions that so easily leads +us to regard them as mere appearances as contrasted with permanent +bodies. I have repeatedly pointed out that unconditioned permanent states +do not exist in nature, that permanences of connection only exist. A +body is for me the same complex of sight-and-touch-sensations every time +that it is placed in the same circumstances of illumination, position in +space, temperature, and so forth. The supposed constancy of the body is +the constancy of the union of _A_, _B_, _C_ ... or the constancy of the +_equation f_(_A_, _B_, _C_ ...) = 0. + + + + +PROFESSOR CLIFFORD ON THE SOUL IN NATURE. + + +No one can read Clifford’s Lectures and Essays, without feeling that, +if their author is less known and valued as an original thinker than as +a master of mathematical analysis, it is only because having turned the +force of his genius onto mathematics first he had time to complete some +work in that direction, whereas his premature death in 1879 only allowed +him to give us an earnest of the philosophical work which he had it in +him to perform. + +The short biography which Prof. F. Pollock contributed to the first +edition of his lectures and essays gives an interesting sketch of +the phases of opinion through which Clifford passed. It appears that +before he took his degree in 1867 and for a little time after he was +a high churchman; but, says Pollock, “there was an intellectual and +speculative activity about his belief which made it impossible that he +should remain permanently at that stage.” “He never slackened in the +pursuit of scientific knowledge and ideas,” and conscious of a hiatus +between orthodox views and some of the results of science he yet held +that religious beliefs are outside the region of scientific proof and +that there is a special theological faculty or insight, analogous to the +scientific, poetic, and artistic faculties, the persons in whom this +genius is exceptionally developed being the founders of new religions and +religious orders. This is not unlike the solution of religious doubts +which Hume playfully suggested and which John Henry Newman has seriously +adopted, namely that “divinity, or theology, has a foundation in _reason_ +so far as it is supported by experience. But its best and most solid +foundation is _faith_ and divine revelation.” “When or how,” continues +his biographer, “Clifford first came to a clear perception that this +position of quasi-scientific Catholicism was untenable I do not exactly +know; but I know that the discovery cost him an intellectual and moral +struggle, of which traces may be found here and there in his essays. Most +readers of these essays would consider that Clifford is very unfair to +the Christian beliefs which he had abandoned and beyond doubt he felt +a certain grudge against them for having so long duped him.”[37] The +theories of Mr. Darwin and Herbert Spencer took the place in Clifford’s +mind of the old fashioned creed; Natural selection was to unriddle the +universe, to yield a new system of ethics and education. We read that +Clifford had an extraordinary power of taking up a theory provisionally, +of throwing himself into it, accepting it, applying it, and of rejecting +it in case it was not satisfactory; and this may account perhaps for his +somewhat dogmatic assertion in many cases of crude views. There is one +characteristic of Clifford however which all may emulate, and that is the +candor and fearlessness of his thinking and speaking. Let me quote a few +words from one of the best and most stirring of these essays: + + “If I let myself believe anything on insufficient evidence, + there may be no great harm done by the mere belief; it may be + true after all, or I may never have occasion to exhibit it in + outward acts. But I cannot help doing this great wrong towards + man, that I make myself credulous. The danger to society is + not merely that it should believe wrong things, though that is + great enough; but that it should become credulous, and lose + the habit of testing things and inquiring into them; for then + it must sink back into savagery.... If a man, holding a belief + which he was taught in childhood or persuaded of afterwards, + keeps down and pushes away any doubts which arise about it in + his mind, purposely avoids the reading of books and the company + of men that call in question or discuss it, and regards as + impious those questions which cannot easily be asked without + disturbing it—the life of that man is one long sin against + mankind.” + +The essay on the nature of things in themselves marks the furthest +limit at which Clifford’s speculation arrived. In it Clifford begins by +discarding the ordinary distinction between reality and ideas, eternal +object and eternal subject, of feeling and thing. The distinction +is really between two orders of feeling; there is the subjective or +inner order, in which sorrow succeeds the hearing of bad news, and the +objective or outward in which the feeling of letting go is followed +by sight of falling object. It is with the latter order that physical +science concerns itself, and all the inferences of natural science are +inferences of my real or possible feeling. Since an object is a set +of changes _in_ my consciousness and not anything out of it, is just +my feeling real or possible and therefore part of me, it might seem +as if we were shut up in ourselves and excluded from participation in +any other reality. So we should be, says Clifford, if we made no other +inferences beside those of physical science; but when I come to the +conclusion that _you_ are conscious and that you have objects in your +consciousness similar to those in mine, I am not inferring any actual or +possible feelings of my own, but _your_ feelings, which are not and can +never be objects in my consciousness. To feelings and consciousness thus +inferred to exist in another, Clifford gives the name of _eject_, because +in the very act of inference they are _thrown out_ of my consciousness, +recognised as outside of it, as _not_ being a part of me. “The existence +of my conception of you in my consciousness carries with it a belief in +the existence of you outside of my consciousness.... How this inference +is justified, how consciousness can testify to the existence of anything +outside of itself I do not pretend to say; I need not untie a knot which +the world has cut for me long ago.” (Vol. II, p. 73.) + +Thus, _objects_ in the sense of things presented in _my_ consciousness, +my phenomena, are not the sole or chief reality; ejects are equally real +and my conviction of your existence as a conscious being like myself is +coeval and of equal weight with my belief in my own conscious existence. +You and your feelings are strictly speaking the only things which are +real outside of myself and my consciousness. For though my objects or +phenomena are external to my body they are not outside my consciousness, +but part and parcel thereof. Nay, more than this an individual object, +i. e. an object which is mine and mine only, never exists at all, +according to Clifford, in the mind of man; for with each object as it +exists in my mind is bound up the thought of similar objects existing in +other men’s minds. All the objects in fact of which we are ever conscious +are objects of consciousness in general, are in Clifford’s phrase social +objects. “A fixed habit causes an object as it is found in my mind to +be formed as a social object and insensibly embodies in it a reference +to the minds of other men.” This belief in ejects is moreover the root +of all language and all morals:—of language, because any sound which, +becoming a sign to my neighbor, becomes thereby a mark to myself, must +by the nature of the case be a mark of the social object and not of the +individual object: of morals, because the “first great commandment, +evolved in the light of day by healthy processes wherever men have lived +together, is, ‘Put yourself in his place.’” + +So far there is nothing to distinguish Clifford’s theory from ordinary +Idealism, which denies that the universe is real except as a phenomenon +or appearance before a Self conscious thereof. The future course of +Clifford’s argument turns upon two assumptions. One of these, borrowed +from the current physiology of the brain, is this: that the changes in my +consciousness—ejective facts he calls them—run parallel with the changes +in my brain, which are objective facts. The parallelism between them is +one of complexity, an analogy of structure. The complex ejective facts +are the same sort of complication of simple ejects as the complex motions +of the brain are of simple molecular movements. Clifford illustrates the +points from the relation of speech to writing, the sentence spoken is the +same function of the elementary sounds as the same sentence written is of +the corresponding letters. In like manner the complex human mind is the +same function of simple feelings as the brain is of primary atoms. + +The other assumption is based upon the current doctrine of evolution. Our +bodies have been evolved step by step out of inorganic matter, and we +have before our eyes a line of organisms connecting man with the simplest +atom of matter. In this series there is no hiatus between one form and +another, no breach of morphological continuity, but one species arises +by insensible gradation out of its predecessors. Now in the case of +organisms of a certain complexity we cannot help inferring consciousness, +and as we go back along the line we not only see the complexity of the +organism and of its nervous system insensibly diminishing, but for the +first part of our course we have reason to think that the complexity +of consciousness insensibly diminishes also.[38] The conclusion is +forced upon us that nature is animate from top to bottom and that the +humblest atom has an elementary feeling or eject of its own as simple in +comparison with the complex intelligence of man as the atom is itself +simple in comparison with his very complex brain. Unless we admit this we +are in a dilemma. The ejective facts which we cannot help inferring in +the case of all animals must extend further down through vegetables to +inorganic phenomena, or else there must be a point at which we could say: +here the object begins to have an inner or ejective fact corresponding +to it as my mind corresponds to my body. But the series of objective +forms presents no sudden break anywhere, not even between animals and +vegetables, such as to warrant our supposing that ejective facts extend +thus far down in the series and no further. + +Clifford is not quite as explicit about the nature of the elementary +ejects, which answer to moving molecules, as we should like him to be. +Of one thing however he is quite certain; they are elementary feelings +which yet are neither modifications of a consciousness nor yet imply +a consciousness in which alone they can exist. Every feeling may be +part of a consciousness, but it need not be so. Consciousness is only a +derivative and secondary result, following on the arrangement of feeling +in a particular way and it is evolved at a very late period in the +history of the world. In itself a feeling is an absolute _Ding-an-sich_, +whose existence is not relative to anything else. _Sentitur_ is all that +can be said of it. + +Thus strictly speaking it is not _consciousness_ which extends throughout +the series of objective forms from man down to the molecule. It is +only feeling. Consciousness proper only belongs to the later and higher +members of the series. “If we make a jump from man say to the tunicate +mollusks, we see no reason there to infer the existence of consciousness +at all.” Therefore the doctrine of evolution itself forbids us to regard +all ejects as being of the _same_ substant as mind. They are only of like +substance ὁμοιούσιον not ὁμοούσιον, only quasi-mental[39] and not in +themselves either rational, intelligent, or conscious.[40] + +Besides the evolutionist’s reason that it is absurd to attribute +consciousness and personality to tunicate mollusks there is another +reason drawn from human introspection for asserting elementary feelings +to be absolute and unrelated existence. “A feeling, at the instance when +it _exists_, exists _an und für sich_ and not as _my_ feeling.”[41] The +self-perception of the ego, the sense that in all my various feelings it +is _I_ who am conscious, this “unity of apperception” does not exist in +the instantaneous consciousness which it unites, but only in subsequent +reflection upon it. It consists further in the power of establishing a +certain connexion between the memories of any two feelings which we had +at the same instant. + +There is one other point of extreme importance to be noticed in +Clifford’s account of the elementary feelings or ejects. They are +connected together in their sequence and coexistence by counterparts +of the physical laws of matter. Were it not so their correspondence +with motions of matter could not be kept up. That they should be +thus connected with one another militates at first sight with the +characteristic of absoluteness above ascribed to them by Clifford. We +must suppose therefore that when Clifford says that their existence is +not relative to anything else, he means no more than that they are not +ultimately related to a personal consciousness. We must suppose that it +is these laws of the sequence and coexistence of elementary feelings +which, “when molecules are so combined together as to form the film on +the under side of a jelly-fish, so combine the elements of mind-stuff +which go along with them as to form the faint beginnings of sentience. +The same laws combine feelings so as to form some kind of consciousness, +when the molecules are so combined as to form the brain and nervous +system of a vertebrate” (p. 85). + +We are now after these preliminary explanations in a position to +appreciate what is the gist and core of Clifford’s speculations. It is +this, that the reality external to our minds which is represented in +our minds as matter is in itself mind-stuff or elementary feelings. The +universe consists entirely of mind-stuff. Some of this is woven into the +complex form of human minds containing imperfect representations of the +mind-stuff outside them and of themselves also, as a mirror reflects +its own image in another mirror, _ad infinitum_. Such an imperfect +representation is called a material universe. The two chief points +therefore of the doctrine as summed up by Clifford himself are: + +1) Matter is a mental picture in which mind-stuff is the thing +represented. + +2) Reason, intelligence, and volition are properties of a complex which +is made up of elements themselves not rational, not intelligent, not +conscious. + +We shall do Clifford an injustice if we interpret the foregoing theory as +a dualistic and not as a monistic view, i. e. as a view which postulates +two ultimate principles of reality rather than one. Clifford however +often speaks as if feeling and matter were two coördinate aspects of +reality, irreducible to one another. For example he allows himself to +speak of mind-stuff as going along with the material object, of laws +connecting the elements of mind-stuff which are only _counterparts_ of +the physical laws of matter and not those laws themselves. Again he +writes (p. 78) as follows: “The distinction between eject and object, +forbids us to regard the eject, another man’s mind, as coming into the +world of objects in any way, or as standing in the relation of cause +or effect to any changes in that world.” Such language reminds us of +Spinoza’s doctrine that body alone can determine body to move and only +thought determine thought to think, but we must not therefore suppose +that for Clifford as for Spinoza the two rival kingdoms of thought +and extended matter are irreconcilably severed or nominally united by +the figment of a single substance of which they are attributes: What +Clifford means is that the thing _is_ a feeling so far as it is anything +at all and that, if things coexist or succeed each other according to +laws, they only coexist and follow _as_ feelings and conformably to +laws of feeling. Not only is the elementary feeling a thing itself, but +things-in-themselves are elementary feelings. + +It is incumbent therefore on us to ask if an elementary feeling is +equal to the double burden put upon it by this theory of being the real +universe of things and of creating the human intelligence. In answering +this question we must be careful to divest feelings beforehand of any +characteristics which they only possess as gathered up into the unity +of a self, for at the stage in which we are considering reality selves +have not yet arisen. It is hard to conceive what is left of feeling after +these characteristics have been removed, nor does introspection help us +here, for, as Clifford very truly says, the fundamental deliverance of +consciousness affirms its own complexity and it seems impossible, as I +am at present constituted, to have only one absolutely simple feeling at +a time. Elementary feelings however could hardly constitute the cosmos +without they follow one another, coexist, and connect themselves together +in their groupings according to certain laws, i. e. by some inherent +necessity always take up the same attitudes toward each other, and this +much Clifford assumes that they do. Yet these assumptions will not bear +examination. Let us examine first the postulate that feelings follow in +a fixed order; call them _a_ _b_ _c_ _d_, _b_ succeeds _a_ and precedes +_c_ and it makes a difference, which comes after or before the other. Now +being absolute feelings, not only is _a_ past and non-existent before _b_ +begins to be, so _b_ before _c_, but each is in turn the entire reality +and there is no consciousness before which they pass in procession. The +real would thus fall into disconnected and mutually indifferent moments +_a_ _b_ _c_ _d_; and as each of these in turn exhausts reality and is +also unconscious of what goes before and after, there would be no real +succession at all. In a real succession it makes a difference whether _b_ +comes before _or_ after _a_, but in the case we suppose it could make no +difference. In truth there can be no relation of before and after between +two terms except for a self, which takes note of the one disappearing and +of the other appearing; and whenever we speak of things following one +another we tacitly presuppose a self before whom the procession passes. + +It is even more difficult to understand how elementary feelings can be +grouped and complicated in a fixed order of coexistence. Mind has not +yet emerged, so we must suppose that the grouping takes place in space. +In that case one feeling must be right or left, above or below another. +The futility of such speculation will come home to anyone who will try to +realise how a feeling of smell can be above or below one of taste. + +We have next to consider Clifford’s account of the genesis out of +elementary feelings of personal consciousness. The hypothesis of +mind-stuff, we must remember, was framed in order to preserve the same +continuity of ejective facts as we see to exist in the case of objective +facts, to provide, that is, a gradual development of the human mind out +of the simpler feelings of amœbæ and even of atoms. It must be denied +however that the hypothesis is a success if we retain the usual meanings +of the words continuity and development. Properly speaking a thing can +only be said to grow or develop when it remains the same with itself all +through the process and unfolds therein capacities which were anyhow +latent in it to start with. Thus a tadpole develops into a frog, a grub +into a butterfly, and the child grows into the man. But in the series +of ejects which begins from atoms and after running through amœba and +ape finally culminates in the human intelligence there is no point of +identity, no community between the first and last terms. The eject which +is the molecule is denied by Clifford to be either conscious or rational, +nor has it even will, like the philosophical factotum of Schopenhauer or +Von Hartmann. It is a purely negative conception, the abstract opposite +of that mind into which it is to ultimately develop. The hiatus between +our intelligence and a thing in itself, which call it feeling, or +mind-stuff, or what we will, is merely all that our intelligence is not, +is none the less of a hiatus, because it is, with the help of apes and +amœbæ, spread out thin, so to speak. It would be better frankly to avow +the chasm that exists than to gloss over it with words like evolution and +development. + +“When a material organism,” writes Clifford, “has reached a certain +complexity of nervous structure, the complex of ejective facts which goes +along with its action reaches that mode of complication which is called +consciousness. When a stream of feelings is so compacted together that +at each instant it consists of (1) new feelings, (2) fainter repetitions +of previous ones, and (3) links connecting these repetitions, the stream +is called a consciousness. Consciousness is thus a relative thing, a +mode of complication of certain elements, and a property of the complex +so produced.” If we look into this statement we see that it only amounts +to this: that feelings constitute a conscious self when they become the +feelings of a conscious self and not before, for except as gathered up in +the unity of a self which has memory and remains the same throughout its +differences feelings can be neither new nor repeated nor joined by links. + +1) That a feeling is new means that I attend to it, contrast it with +former ones, and decide that I have not felt it before. + +2) That a feeling is a previous feeling now repeated means that I +recognise it as having already occurred. + +3) If feelings are joined by links of what nature are these links? +Clifford does not say that they also are feelings, so presumably they are +not; in that case no link is left save a connecting self. But even if the +link is a feeling it cannot be less than a feeling of the togetherness +of two other feelings, but such a feeling would involve memory of those +feelings and memory involves self-hood. It is really, however, an abuse +of words to apply the term feeling in such a case. We might with Hume ask +of this feeling which links other feelings “Is it a taste, a smell, a +sound, an impression of sight or touch?” + +Clifford makes a reference to Haeckel’s treatise upon “Zellseelen und +Seelenzellen.”[42] Haeckel’s view is that every protoplasmic cell has +a soul of its own and that when a number of these are combined under +certain conditions, as in the human brain, they generate as their +resultant the human soul. He helps out his theory by pointing to such +phrases as national spirit, a nation’s conscience, a people’s will. +Nothing, he contends, could be more real than these entities, which +are yet only resultants of the wills, spirits, and consciences of the +separate individuals who compose the nation. + +This is an interesting speculation, which it would be a pity to dismiss +abruptly merely because it is groundless. No doubt our bodies and brains +may be regarded as colonies of protoplasmic units of which each has an +independent life of its own, of which each is born, nourishes itself, +reproduces itself, and at last breaks up and dies. The colorless cells +especially in our blood are such units and have as good a claim to be +called individuals as the amœba which we find swimming about by itself +in any pond. These units are certainly alike and must be allowed to +have inner states of their own. It may also be freely conceded that the +existence of certain inward states in these cells of which my brain and +nerves are composed is the condition of certain states of feeling and +emotion arising in me. But all these admissions fail to advance us a step +toward Haeckel’s conclusion. That any number of atoms of protoplasm have +souls and soul-states is not enough _per se_ to produce an extra soul +which is none of them, yet _like_ their souls and possessed of a life of +its own. Even if the molecules of my brain were each in possession of a +self-consciousness as ample as my own, their mere juxtaposition could not +give rise to my self-consciousness. From first to last their soul-states +remain theirs, mine remain mine. The reasoning employed by Haeckel +involves a fallacy of composition:—because each of a colony of cells _a_, +_b_, _c_, _d_, has a soul of its own, therefore the colony as a whole has +a soul of its own, which is not the soul of any one of them. Nor do the +analogies Haeckel invokes help him at all, for the life of a nation does +not exist at all except as the lives of the individuals composing that +nation, nor do we expect to find any traits in our so-called national +spirit which are not ultimately contributed by individuals; Haeckel +however would have us believe that the mere composition of the primitive +and simple souls of separate amœbæ results in a _human_ soul with its +wealth of intuitions and interests. The utmost we are entitled to say is +that given a certain collocation of cells in the brain there may by an +entirely new act of the infinite be generated a human soul. It is only by +playing fast and loose with words that we can deduce this new soul from +an aggregate of other souls either like or unlike itself. + +It is surprising that Clifford should have recognised that the reality +underlying so-called matter is akin to mind and yet have identified +it rather with the quasi-mental facts of an amœba or of an atom than +with the intelligence of man. The argument by which he arrives at +this conclusion is as follows: You as a face, a voice, a touch, as an +object to my senses in short, are a mere phantasm or appearance in my +consciousness, part and parcel of myself and not distinct from me in +any way. But I cannot help inferring an eject, to wit feelings and a +consciousness like my own, behind the sensible show of your person; and +this consciousness of yours which I address as _you_, is the truth of +the object or appearance, which I have. _You_ are the reality which I +really perceive, so far as I perceive anything more than my own feelings. +Similarly when I watch an amœba, what I perceive as a somewhat formless +mass of protoplasm is really in itself the struggling life within. Lastly +what I handle and perceive as a crystal or metal is really the eject. If +here we read force or unconscious will instead of eject or mind-stuff, +Clifford’s view would practically coincide with Schopenhauer’s; for force +is truly an eject in Clifford’s sense, not an object or appearance to me. + +Now the human intelligence arises late in the history of things and is +altogether a secondary and derivative thing. Consequently the world +is not really what it is for my consciousness. My _Weltanschauung_ is +false in proportion as my mind is complex and derivative. Conversely, +the _Weltanschauung_ of each being approximates to truth and becomes +less and less illusive in proportion as the eject which it in reality is +approaches the primitive simplicity of mind-stuff. I am _really_ very +little of what I am _consciously_. If you want a truer exponent of the +truth of things you must go to the amœba or lower still. It, as compared +with me, is _consciously_ most of what it is _really_. The absolutely +simple atom is probably the only being who is quite free from delusions. +The conclusion then to which Clifford conducts us is this: that the +universe is not really such as it appears to our intelligence, still +less, I presume, such as it would appear to a higher intelligence than +ours. It is really such and such only as it would appear to the being +whose eject is the lowest rung in the ladder of mind-stuff. Our universe +spread out in space and time, with all its splendours and harmonies, +is a delusion; nay, more, the human soul with its æsthetic and moral +sensibilities, its fears and aspirations, is the parent delusion which +breeds the delusion of a cosmos. “We are such stuff as dreams are made +of.” + +The loose way in which Clifford used the word feeling, as equivalent +to any form of consciousness, blinded him to the fact that a qualified +thing as such is not given in feeling at all and led him to suppose +that the universe as we know it would continue to stand in the absence +of all complex ejects whatever. Mr. Green has shown that all theories +of the object which ignore the workmanship of thought manifest therein +and identify the _esse_ of things with their _percipi_ lead straight to +nihilism. To such nihilism Clifford’s doctrine, like Hume’s which it +resembles, immediately bring us. But Hume did not take seriously the +demolition of reality involved in his theory that things are only real +as they are felt and that feelings are “entirely loose and separate” +(Treatise I, 559) while the solid framework of reality is an illusion +bred of a propensity of our minds to feign connections and relations +where there are none. Hume tells us that he regarded his own speculations +as “philosophical melancholy and delirium,” as “clouds to be dispelled” +(Treatise I, 501). He writes “I dine, I play a game of backgammon, I +converse and am merry with my friends; and when, after three or four +hours’ amusement, I would return to these speculations, they appear so +cold, and strained, and ridiculous, that I cannot find it in my heart to +enter into them any further.” But Clifford, like Huxley, took Hume _au +grand serieux_, forgetting that feeling as such does not reveal an object +at all. There is a passage in a letter of Clifford’s written to Professor +Pollock in September, 1874, à propos of Green’s introduction to Hume, +which evinces pretty clearly that Clifford did not discern the true drift +of Hume’s speculations in the way Hume did himself. “I hope,” he writes, +“you have seen Sidgwick’s remarks on the introduction; he points out +that to prove Hume insufficient is not to do much at the present day.... +Green, for instance, points out that Hume has no complete theory of the +object;—to find fault with Hume for the omission is like blaming Newton +for not including Maxwell’s electricity in the Principia.” Here Clifford +hardly writes as if he saw that his own theory of the object as e. g. an +unrelated feeling is open to exactly the same criticisms as Hume’s, as +if he understood, what Hume had an inkling of, that, in proving the ego +to be a relative thing instead of the heart and centre of reality, you +dissipate the universe into nothing. There are several other features in +Clifford’s doctrine that call for criticism. It should for example be +pointed out that the entire view that ejects are the truth of objects +is in the first instance a deliverance of consciousness itself. I only +transcend my individual feelings, says Clifford, so far as I infer +a consciousness more or less like my own to underlie them; and this +underlying eject is the sole reality. “How this inference is justified, +how consciousness can testify to the existence of anything outside of +itself, I do not pretend to say; I need not untie a knot which the world +has cut for me long ago.” (Vol. II, p. 73.) But if consciousness is but +the property of a temporary conjunction of unconscious feelings, what +value shall we attach to its assurances? They are certainly not valid +except for itself; they do not hold good for the atomic feelings of which +the world ultimately consists. But my belief that the real is in the +last resort an atom of feeling is simply an extension of my conviction +that ejects are the truth of my feelings. Prove this conviction an +illusion—and Clifford does prove it to be such, when he declares +consciousness to be a relative thing—and you prove the entire theory an +illusion. Thus the tail of Clifford’s theory is bitten off by the head. + +The hypothesis that feelings can be felt, without being felt as my +feelings, is a very noteworthy one. “A feeling at the instant when it +_exists_, exists _an und für sich_, and not as my feeling.” This is +why a Greek said δέδορκα in the sense of I see, because the act of +perception is necessarily over, when we become conscious of it. “When,” +continues Clifford, “I remember the feeling as _my_ feeling, there +comes up not merely a faint repetition of the feeling, but inextricably +connected with it a whole set of connections with the general stream of +my consciousness.” This is very truly and acutely observed but it is an +admission that the unrelated feeling is no element in our experience, +that in our cosmos at least there is no ὕλη whatever, but that every +corner of it is illumined by the presence of a relating self. _My_ +consciousness never directly testifies at all to the existence of an +absolute feeling. To be _my_ feeling a feeling must already be brought by +connections of content into the web of my experience, but what do I know +of feelings which are not mine. Are not “absolute feelings” an inference +based on observation of low organisms like the amœba, which we are +convinced have no self and yet feel? It should be also noticed that this +supposition that we are not directly but only _ex post facto_ conscious +of our feelings ἔξεισιν εις ἄπειρον. Thus Clifford writes: “This memory +(of a feeling which existed _an und für sich_ as _my_ feeling) is, _qua_ +memory, relative to the past feeling, which it partially recalls; but +in so far as it is itself a feeling, _it_ is absolute, _Ding an sich_.” +That is to say, I am not directly but only _ex post facto_ conscious even +of what I remember. To be conscious of the content of a memory I must +_remember_ that I remember it. Surely this new memory in turn cannot be +known _ex post facto_ and so I must _remember_ that I remember that I +remember _et sic ad infinitum_, before I become really _conscious_ of +anything at all. + +One other point might be raised. What is the nature and origin of the +laws which govern the sequence and coexistence of feelings. We have +already seen that feelings as such neither follow nor coexist apart from +a self. + +“These laws are counterparts of the laws which govern physical +phenomena.” Clifford in writing thus conducts his speculation Without +prejudice to his common-sense belief in a world of necessarily and +rationally related things. He does not see that with the reduction of +the real to a feeling physical facts disappear and with these facts the +laws to which laws of feeling shall correspond. He is evidently confusing +the laws of feeling with the psychological laws of association which +depend upon the environment of the individual’s senses by a world already +real. He does not see that the problem he really imposes on himself is +this: starting from no world at all to arrive at one, or starting from +the world as it may be supposed to picture itself in the feelings of an +amœba to arrive at it as it exists for the human intelligence. We must +not concede to Clifford any more than to Hume this postulate of a real +cosmical order which shall give the cue to feelings when and how to +follow and coexist. Huxley only allows it to Hume, because not having +passed the threshold of Idealistic philosophy he cannot divest himself +of it. If, however, this postulate be denied, then the doctrine that the +_esse_ of things lies in their _percipi_ will recommend itself to no one. + + F. C. CONYBEARE. + + +FOOTNOTES: + +[37] On the whole, however, it is probable that in dealing such hard +blows as he did at priests and dogmas he was actuated by sheer love of +truth, and those who knew him best assure us that he was entirely free +from bitterness and from the vanity which sets some people upon beating +their grandmother in public by way of showing that they are grown up in +their opinions. + +[38] _Clifford’s Essays_, Vol. ii, p. 83. + +[39] Vol. ii, p. 61. + +[40] Vol. ii, p. 87. + +[41] P. 80. + +[42] _Deutsche Rundschau_, July, 1878. + + + + +ARE THERE THINGS IN THEMSELVES? + + +The proposition that things in themselves cannot be known, has often, and +perhaps justly, been proclaimed as the central idea of Kant’s philosophy. +Kant concludes the first section of his “Transcendentale Elementarlehre” +with this “critical admonition”: + + “That in general nothing which is intuited in space is a thing + in itself, and that space is not a form which belongs as a + property to things; but that objects are quite unknown to us + in themselves, and what we call outward objects are nothing + else but mere representations of our sensibility, whose form + is space, but whose real correlate, the thing in itself, is + not known by means of these representations, nor ever can be.” + (“Kritik d. r. V.” § 4.) + +The term “thing in itself” means originally the object as it is, +independent of the thinking subject’s cognition. For instance: A rainbow +appears in the clouds; the rainbow is not a thing in itself, but the +appearance of a thing in itself. The rainbow exists in man’s sensibility +only. The colors of the spectrum, indeed all colors, the colors of the +sky, of the clouds, of trees, of living beings, are sensations only; +they are subjective phenomena, they are certain kinds of feelings +representing objective realities, but they are not these objective +realities themselves. They are perceived in the brain and are projected +to a place outside the organism. The rainbow, as it is seen, is not a +thing, but it is something seen, it is an appearance only. And this is +true of all things seen and heard and perceived by any one of the senses. +The sense-pictures are localised in space, they are projected outside to +a spot where the combined experience of the senses has taught a sentient +being to expect them. But all the objects of the objective world as they +are perceived are and remain subjective sense-perceptions. The world of +our senses around us is woven of our sensations. It is mere appearance. +This is not a question concerning which there is any doubt, this is +simply a matter of fact. But the question arises, “Can we know things as +they are independent of sensation? Can we know things in themselves?” + +The physicist and every scientist is engaged with the problem, What are +natural phenomena independent of sensation? Light is a sensation of +vision, but what is the objective process that takes place when a human +eye perceives light? The physicist answers this problem by eliminating +in his mind the sense-element and by describing the facts of the process +in terms of matter and motion. His answer is that light, objectively +considered, is a certain vibration of the ether. If we can rely upon +physical science, the thing in itself of a rainbow would be a certain +refraction of ether-waves. These vibrations of the ether-waves are +transmitted from the sun, and being broken in the falling raindrops +actually take place independent of cognition, they are real whether we +look at them or not. + +The ultimate aim of science is a description of the natural phenomena +not in terms of sense-elements, but in terms of form. That feature of a +thing which we call its matter, constitutes its reality, but the form +of a thing, of a motion, or of a process makes the thing that which it +is; every act of causation is a change of form, and the forms of things +are determined with the assistance of the operations of purely formal +thought, i. e. through measuring or counting. Such is science, not only +as it ought to be, but also as it actually is. All our scientists, each +one in his field, are consciously or unconsciously working out a solution +of this problem. And a solution of this problem means, in our conception, +the objective cognition of the world—i. e., a description of the natural +processes as they are independent of sensibility. + +Kant knew very well that a description of things and of natural processes +in terms of form was possible. He clung, nevertheless, to the proposition +that things in themselves are unknowable. And why? A description of +things and of natural processes in terms of form was in his opinion +not as yet a description of things in themselves, for—and here we are +confronted with the original idea and the fundamental error of Kantian +thought—Kant did not consider the forms of things as an objective quality +of theirs, he maintained that the formal element is purely mental and +merely subjective. The thinking mind, he declared, attributes them to the +object. Space and time, the pure forms of existence, together with all +other forms, such as causation, are, according to Kant, not qualities +of the objective world, but of the thinking subject. The thinking +subject cannot help viewing the world in the form of its own cognition, +it transfers these forms to the objects. Therefore the thing in itself +according to Kant would not be represented in a description of the thing +purely in terms of form, the thing in itself would mean the thing as it +would be, independent of time and space. + +Let us here point out a distinction between the thing in itself and +noumenon. Noumenon means “a thing of thought.” The noumenal world is the +world of thoughts in a thinking being’s mind. The noumenon must not be +identified with the thing in itself. The two terms are often confounded, +but they have to be distinguished. The idea of reflected ether-vibrations +is a “noumenon,” but the reflected ether-vibrations themselves, the +objective process are a thing, i. e. an objective reality, and in so far +as they are a reality, considered as being independent of sensation, we +may call them “a thing in itself.” Now when Kant denies the objectivity +of time and space, he must, implicitly, also deny the objective +validity of a description made in terms of measuring and counting. The +pictorial world of our sense-perception is subjective, it is built up of +sensations, it is not objective; and the world of thought is the attempt +to reduce the subjective world of sense-imagery to terms of objective +validity, i. e. to terms of form. But this world of thought is according +to Kant purely mental, it is purely noumenal, or, in other words, noumena +do not represent things independent of cognition, they represent things +as our mind thinks them. The sensory world is mere appearance, it is a +subjective phenomenon, but the world of thought, says Kant, is no less +subjective, it is a world of thought which describes things in terms of +purely mental properties and not in properties of the things themselves. +This is tantamount to the proposition, that things in themselves cannot +be known. + +The term “thing in itself,” in the sense of a thing as it is independent +of sensibility, would better be called “the objective thing,” and we +shall so call it when we wish to distinguish it from Kant’s thing in +itself. The objective thing is the thing, not expressed in terms of +subjective elements, such as feelings or sensibility, but in terms of +objective elements, i. e. in terms of form. That a description of things +in terms of forms is possible has never been denied either by Kant or by +any Kantian; but they deny that these descriptions are anything more than +mere noumena; Kant and the orthodox Kantians deny that they represent the +things as they are in themselves. Thus the term thing in itself in the +Kantian sense comes to mean the thing as it is independent of space and +time. + +That every noumenon is a mental sign is a matter of course; the noumenal +world is ideal. But we maintain that these mental signs represent real +qualities of the objective world; they have a meaning; the things +represented by them are actual features of reality. Kant denies this. +To him the noumenal world is purely noumenal. To Kant there is no space +outside the space-conception, and so he declares that space is ideal; +it is not an objective quality of things. However, we maintain, that +our space-conception describes, i. e. depicts, or represents space, our +space-conception is ideal, yet space is not ideal but real; it is an +objective quality of the world. + +Kant’s view is dualistic, or at least necessarily leads to dualism, and +it appears to rest on an unpronounced dualistic assumption. Kant treats +“the subject” as something quite distinct and separate from “the object.” +If he had borne in mind that the subject is always at the same time an +object, he would have treated both subject as well as object as mere +abstractions of one and the same reality. Resting upon this erroneous +presupposition, Kant’s most consequential mistake, in our opinion, was +his conception of what he called “the ideality of time and space.” If +time and space were purely ideal, purely mental, purely subjective, then +indeed, the things as they are would forever remain unknown to us, then +indeed the thinking mind would be as if shut up within a hollow globe out +of which it could never escape, then indeed the world would be divided +into two parts, the objective world, and the subjective world; and the +gap between both could never be bridged over. The thinking mind would +have within itself a noumenal world built upon the subjective elements +of sense-impressions. This subjective world would possess no objective +value, it would not describe realities, and the objective world would +thus be unknowable, inscrutable, and mystical. + +The idea of a thing in itself found another support in a mistaken +conception of the unity of certain things, especially of organisms. The +unity of a combination of parts is not merely the sum of the parts, +it consists in their peculiar combination which makes an harmonious +co-operation possible. This unity is an additional element; it is an +entirely new creation which exhibits features not contained in any +of its parts. There is no latent watch contained in a heap of little +wheels and cogs, the watch is created through the combination of these +wheels and cogs. The unity of a thing is its form, consisting in a +special arrangement of its parts; and this form although not material is +nevertheless real. + +The materialistic conception overlooks the importance of form; but the +spiritualist and also the transcendentalist materialise it as some +spiritual substance, as entities or independent existences. They are in +this way as much materialistic as the materialist. + +The question has seriously been asked, What is a melody in itself. The +question has sense when we understand by it, What are those new qualities +which appear through a certain combination of sounds? Those qualities +are not nothing, they are something quite peculiar. We call one of them +rhythm, another one is the fixed succession of notes of a different +pitch. The qualities of a melody as a whole are not qualities of its +separate parts; yet therefore the melody is not a thing in itself. We +might just as well speak of a watch in itself, meaning thereby that +peculiar unity of the combination of its parts which makes of them a +watch. But if we thus speak of “the watch in itself,” we must be aware +that this idea has not somewhere in a transcendental fairy-land an +independent existence above space and time, and outside of its parts. +The unity of a certain interacting group of parts is, on the one hand, +no mere addition of the thinking subject, it is not purely noumenal, it +is real and objective; on the other hand it is not a thing in itself, +independent of its parts, it is the product of the relations in which its +parts affect one another. + +Is not perhaps the basis of these vagaries a mistaken conception of +language? We call a certain sensory picture a tree and we say, the tree +has roots, a stem, branches, leaves, and fruits. Autumn sets in and the +wind shakes the leaves off the branches. Now we speak of a leafless +tree. We cut the tree down and we speak of a rootless tree. We burn the +trunk and the branches, and the tree as a phenomenon is gone, all its +properties are taken away. What remains? The tree in itself is left, but +the tree in itself does not exist. If all the property of a person is +taken from him, the person himself is still left. The properties of a +tree, however, are not properties in the same sense; they are qualities. +If all the qualities and parts of a tree are gone, if only the tree in +itself is left—then there is left nothing but the empty word tree, the +idea of a tree. + + +II. KANT’S VIEW OF SPACE AND TIME. + +Let us briefly consider the ground upon which Kant bases his view of the +ideality of space and time. Kant asks: + + “What then are time and space? Are they real existences? Or are + they merely relations or determinations of things, such however + as would equally belong to these things in themselves, though + they should never become objects of intuition; or _are they + such as belong only to the form of intuition, and consequently + to the subjective constitution of the mind_, without which + these predicates of time and space could not be attached to any + object?”[43] (Kr. d. r. V. § 2; “Meiklejohn,” p. 23.) + +We should say, to state our opinion briefly, that space and time are not +“real existences,” i. e. they are not concrete objects, but they are real +nevertheless; they are not material things; not thingish realities, yet +they are objective properties of things. They are the forms of things +and processes, and belong to the things whether they become objects of +cognition or not. In this sense, they actually belong to the things in +themselves, viz. to the objective things. + +Kant argues that space and time are not conceptions derived from outward +experience; they have not been abstracted from sense-impressions. They +are necessary representations _a priori_, they are not discursive ideas +or generalisations, for there is but one space and one time, space being +represented as infinite and time as eternal. + +From these arguments Kant draws the conclusions that space and time do +not represent qualities of an object but that they are the form of all +sensory phenomena, space being the form of the external, time of the +internal sense. In other words, space and time belong to the subjective +condition of the sensibility and not to the objective world. + +We answer that our conceptions of space and time are after all derived +from experience. Space and time are abstractions. There is no time in +itself. There is no space in itself. Space and time are not directly +derived from outward experience, nor are they derived from the +sense-elements of experience. Inner experience, i. e. reflection to the +exclusion of sense-impression, the experimenting with pure forms, will +lead to the construction of the concepts of space as well as of time. +Space and time, magnitudes and numbers having been constructed in the +mind of a thinking subject are applied to practical experience. When +counting three trees we do not abstract the number “three” from the three +trees, but we apply to them the system of numbers in our possession. + +Says Kant: + + “We never can imagine or make a representation to ourselves + of the non-existence of space, though we may easily enough + think that no objects are found in it. It must therefore be + considered as the condition of the possibility of phenomena and + by no means as a determination dependent upon them and is a + representation _a priori_, which necessarily supplies the basis + for external phenomena.” + +Space being the generalised concept of extended form, and time that of +motion without reference to any contents, it is naturally impossible to +think the non-existence of space and time. Thinking is an act, it is a +process; and any act, any process, any event, is a reality which implies +or presupposes the existence of the forms of reality. We can think of +matter without reference to form, i. e. we can have the abstract idea +of matter; but we cannot think that there is any matter void of form. +This does by no means prove that form has nothing to do with matter. On +the contrary, it proves that form and matter are inseparable. The form +of existence need not therefore be called “the basis” of existence, it +is simply one universal feature of existence. And the form of existence +being bound up with existence itself, it is necessary that any thinking +existence in so far as it is real, in so far as it is at the same time +an object and part of the objective world should also be in possession +of the conditions to evolve the idea of form out of itself through inner +experience. + +This inner experience of experimenting with pure forms is also a kind of +experience. It is not a purely subjective process; it is a subjective +process to the thinking subject, which to other subjects, however, would +appear as an objective process. The laws of pure form as stated in the +sciences of purely formal thought, are not merely subjective; they +possess objective validity. It is true and from our standpoint a matter +of course that the laws of form are _a priori_, which means, they hold +good for any pure form. + +Modern positivism, such as we defend it, is monistic. We consider the +entire world as one great whole and do not forget that all noumenal +representations of certain features of the world, of matter, mind, form, +even of things and our own souls included, are mere abstractions. Reality +itself remains undivided and indivisible. Abstract concepts are mental +symbols invented to represent certain features of reality. But although +we can in our mind separate these features and distinguish them from +other features, in the world of reality they cannot be cut out or thought +of as things in themselves. Granting the oneness of reality which dawns +upon us instinctively before consciousness is fully matured, we are +inevitably led to the conception that there is but one form of reality, +which implies that there is but one space and one time. + + +III. FORM NOT IMPORTED BY THE MIND INTO REALITY. + +Kant says, and in this we agree with Kant, that “all thought must +directly by means of certain signs relate ultimately to _Anschauungen_.” +The word _Anschauung_ (the “onlooking,” generally translated by +“intuition”) means the immediate presence of sense-perception. Says Kant: +“The effect of an object upon our faculty of representation is called +sensation, and that intuition which refers to an object by means of +sensation is called empirical intuition.” For instance, I see a rose: The +image of the rose which I see is the appearance or the phenomenon. Kant +continues: + + “That which in the phenomenon corresponds to the sensation I + term its _matter_, but that which effects that the contents of + the phenomenon can be arranged under certain relations, I call + its _form_.” + +In other words matter is that which affects the senses and form is to +be expressed in relations. The difference between the formal and the +material is obvious. The formal is of great importance, nay, it is of +paramount importance, but the formal is neither anything apart from the +material nor is it a substance. Both concepts are disparate, but they +have been derived by mental abstraction from the same reality. + +We fully agree with Kant when he continues: + + “That in which our sensations are merely arranged, and by which + they are susceptible of assuming a certain form, cannot be + itself sensation.” + +But we do not agree with Kant when from this proposition he derives the +following conclusion: + + “It is, then, the _matter_ of all phenomena that is given to us + _a posteriori_; the _form_ must lie ready _a priori_ for them + in the mind, and consequently can be regarded separately from + all sensation.” + +Here lies the great fallacy of Kant, which rests upon an erroneous +statement and an actual distortion of fact. The phenomenon of a rose +which I see before me is not merely sensory, but also formal. The +phenomenon, i. e. the image of the rose (_die Anschauung_) is a sensation +of a special form. The term sensation as it is generally used implies +its having a special form. Accordingly the form does not, at least not +from the beginning, lie ready _a priori_ in the mind; the form is given +together with the sensation. + +Kant speaks of “that which is annexed to perception by the conceptions +of understanding,” as if our understanding added the formal out of the +mind to the sensory elements given by experience. What is the mind? The +mind is a product of the world; it is a system of symbols representing +the things of the world and their relations including such possible +relations as are worthy of aspiring for. In short, the mind consists of +ideas and ideals.[44] + +It has often been said that the mind is the creator of the sensory and +noumenal world. This is incorrectly expressed, for mind _is_ the sensory +and noumenal world itself. The sense-pictures, the thought-symbols, and +the ideals of a man are actual parts of his mind. They are not products +but constituents of his mind. Their organised totality is his mind +itself. The activity which takes place in a mind, i. e. the combining, +the separating, and recombining of memories, thoughts, and ideals are the +actual realities, and if we speak of a man’s understanding, or reason, +or any other so-called faculty, we have to deal with abstractions. The +activity of mentally separating form and matter might be called by the +general term understanding. However the faculty of understanding is not a +distinct mental organ, it consists in the single acts of understanding, +and the word understanding is a mental symbol representing them all +together as if they were one thing. + +And certainly these acts of understanding as little import the formal +into the world of sensation as the miner carries the metals into the +mines. The formal, the relational, or the _a priori_, is first extracted +out of the data of experience not otherwise than iron is gained out of +the ores. The ore is not iron but it contains iron, the phenomenon of +a rose is not purely a sense-impression, it is a sense-impression of +a certain form. We are aware of the fact that mind is an entirely new +creation different from the non-mental world, yet at the same time we +maintain that the elements from which mind develops are the same as +the elements of the non-mental world. Nature furnishes the entire raw +material and whatever new creation the product of a new development is, +nothing can be added to the raw material, of which the formal is the most +indispensable part. + +The raw material of sensory phenomena as soon as it is worked out, and +also the activity of working it out are called mind. Mind accordingly +originates with the appearance of sentient substance as the organisation +of feelings and the memories of feelings—these memories being conditioned +through the preservation of the form of sentient substance. Mind is not +something different from the world but must be considered as its product +and highest efflorescence. Mind is made of the same substance as the +universe and the mind-forms are the forms of objective existence. + +As soon as a system of forms has developed in a sentient being, thus +constituting its mind, this system can again be referred to the +objective forms of things. In this sense we can say with Kant, that the +understanding imports form into phenomena; and this re-importation, this +referring the objectively formal to the subjective system of formal +thought, is an essential element in cognition. + + +IV. PROFESSOR JODL’S VIEW OF THE THING IN ITSELF. + +The idea of a thing in itself independent of space and time and the +unknowableness of the thing in itself are the basis of all agnosticism. +And an agnostic tendency is at present predominant even among positive +workers and thinkers. Agnosticism is still the philosophy of the day +even among those who have surrendered its basis (which is Kant’s +transcendental idealism) and accept the monistic world-conception. +Friedrich Jodl, professor at the University of Prague and author of the +well-known “History of Ethics,” in answer to a letter of mine formulates +in concise terms this modernised view of a thing in itself. He writes: + + “You are right. The thing in itself is a dangerous idea,—one + that easily leads astray. But so long as we have no better + expression to represent the relation for which it stands we + shall have to use it. You also accept the following three + momenta: (1) Objective existence or reality. (2) Effectiveness + of Reality upon consciousness, i. e. sensation. (3) + Effectiveness of sensation upon consciousness and reproduction + of sensation in consciousness, i. e. representation. Nobody, + however, can maintain that in sensation, and still less + in representation, the whole of reality will appear in + consciousness. First we learn from history what progress has + been made in the cognition of reality and secondly it is + obvious that we are infinitely far from an actual comprehension + of reality. We have strong reasons to suspect that there + are many processes in reality which in no way affect our + sensibility and cannot enter into consciousness, and we know + for sure that we do not comprehend—i. e. reconstruct from + them assumed causes—many things, indeed most things, which we + observe in their effects. Our cognition of nature, if we begin + to construct, always leads us to some _x_. It may be doubted + whether this _x_ is an unknown or an unknowable. In my opinion + it is both—anyhow we cannot eliminate it. + + “I am convinced that many things which are unknown to-day and + appear as unknowable will be known and knowable in a thousand + years. But I doubt whether the total mass of the Unknowable has + been noticeably diminished. For the Unknowable is infinite and + the infinite if divided by any finite number can never produce + a finite number. Every solved problem contains new and greater + problems. What shall we call this? I believe that the term + “thing in itself” is after all the best expression. Whoever + wants to turn a mystic on account of it cannot be prevented. + This state of things can be brought out of existence by an act + of violence only.” + +It is most certainly true, as Professor Jodl says, that sensations do not +depict the whole of reality. But why should they? Cognition is possible +only by limiting the attention to a special point. Every sense organ is +an organ of abstraction. Every sense depicts the effects of reality in +its own way and in this way alone. It may freely be granted that there +are many processes in reality which do not affect our sensibility. Yet +there is nothing in reality which does not affect something in some +way. If it did not, it could not be said to exist. The chemical rays +of light do not affect our eye, they are invisible and were for that +reason not noticed. But these rays are not without any effects. If we +cannot observe them directly, we can invent sensitive plates or other +instruments for observing their effects indirectly. Indirect observation +makes it possible that the limitation of our senses does not result in a +limitation of knowledge. + +Says Professor Jodl: + + “Our cognition of nature if we begin to construct always leads + us to some _x_.” + +This sentence indicates that Professor Jodl’s and our conception of +cognition are different. Cognition is not a reconstruction of assumed +causes; it is a unification of our representative sensations or ideas. +Something is again noticed, it is re-cognised, to be the same thing. +Cognition is adaptation of new facts to our present stock of knowledge; +it is the proper arrangement of new data in our system of mental +representations. Cognition, accordingly, is the reduction of the unknown +to terms of the known. How can it ever lead to an _x_? The positive +conception of cognition is, as Kirchoff defines, it “an exhaustive and +most simple description of facts.” It is a reconstruction of facts or, +as Mach says, _Ein Nachbilden der Thatsachen_. Cognition is based upon +_Anschauungen_; it will lead to an ultimate _x_, only in case we expect +that cognition instead of being a description of facts will have to give +us information about how it happens that facts exist, how they originated +out of nothing. + +Professor Jodl’s thing in itself is not outside of Space and Time (as is +Kant’s thing in itself) but it is the overwhelming infinitude of problems +to be solved with which we cannot hope to get through even though our +life lasted billions of light-years. Let me repeat here what I said in +the second edition of “Fundamental Problems,” + + “A philosophy which starts from the positive data of + experience, and arranges them in the system of a monistic + conception of the world, will meet with many great problems + and in solving them will again and again be confronted with + new problems. It will always grapple with something that is + not yet known. The unknown seems to expand before us like an + infinite ocean upon which the ship of knowledge advances. But + the unknown constantly changes into the known. We shall find no + real unknowable wherever we proceed. The idea of the unknowable + is like the horizon—an optic illusion. The more we advance, + the farther it recedes. The unknowable is no reality; the + unknowable can nowhere prevent knowledge nor can the horizon + debar a ship in her voyage, from further progress.” (p. 271.) + +Man’s knowledge has value as positive information concerning the facts +he has to deal with, and the infinitude of the not known, the infinitude +of other problems and things which he will never face, is of no +consequence whatever. Positivism commences and has to commence with the +positive facts of the given experience and not with the infinitude of +possibilities which lie beyond our horizon. Compare knowledge to property +and suppose a man is to buy a farm. Shall we discourage him with the idea +that the whole amount of soil on the surface of the earth and of other +planets is infinite, and this infinitude of all existences if divided by +his finite little possession can never result in a finite number. Even +if it were doubled, if it were multiplied a thousand times, it remains +as good as nothing in comparison with the rest of the world which he +cannot acquire. However, his possession is something to him, whatever the +relation of infinite possibilities may be in proportion to it. + +The concept of infinitude serves a good purpose in its place, but we +cannot use it for analogies in other fields or bring it in relation to +concrete realities. We produce confusion and drop into mysticism as soon +as we handle the idea of infinitude as if it were a positive thing. The +infinite is a function which is mathematically expressed by 1/0 = ∞, and +whenever we bring anything in relation to the infinite, we at once dwarf +the greatest number no less than the smallest number into zero. + +Clearness of thought is the indispensable method of sound philosophy +for constructing a positive world-conception, which in great outlines +is a description of the facts of reality. By suffering mysticism as a +legitimate conception either in science or in philosophy, we enhance the +interests of those who prefer the chiaroscuro of vague notions to clear +thought. + + +V. CLIFFORD’S AND SCHOPENHAUER’S CONCEPTIONS OF THE THING IN ITSELF. + +When Clifford speaks of things in themselves he does not mean Kant’s +thing in itself, he means neither the object independent of the thinking +subject nor the thing independent of space and time. He means the thing +as it would be if viewed from the thing itself. + +A man appears to other thinking beings as an active body, as an organism +that is in motion; but to himself he appears as a feeling being. The +subjectivity of things as they appear to the things themselves consists +in our own case of states of awareness, and this subjectivity is called +by Clifford the thing in itself. + +A certain brain motion is in its subjective aspect a feeling. This +feeling is according to Clifford the thing in itself of the visible, +observable, and measurable motion. The thing in itself of so-called +inanimate beings is not feeling, but elements of feeling. In other words, +the world-substance is everywhere in itself potentiality of feeling and +Clifford therefore calls it “mind-stuff.” + +Schopenhauer arrives at his conception of the thing in itself practically +in the same way. There is the world as it appears to us, the objective +world of motion in space and time. What the kernel of this world may be, +we can know from self-observation. The kernel of ourselves, Schopenhauer +says, is Will; and the will is also the kernel of things; the will is the +thing in itself. + +We understand by will the passage into action, i. e. an incipient +motion of the organism if accompanied with the psychical element of +consciousness, and this consciousness is a state of awareness of the will +including its direction and aim. Will, as the term is generally used, is +always conscious. Schopenhauer however speaks of the will as being blind, +i. e. without knowledge, without awareness of itself and its aim. This +indicates that he uses the word not in its original but in a figurative +meaning. + +The fall of a stone may be characterised as a blind motion without +awareness and without the stone’s having a consciousness as to its +direction or aim; and in a similar (although not in the same) way +Clifford speaks of the elements of feeling as being not rational. We +agree with Schopenhauer that that factor in a stone which makes it fall +when placed in a certain position is as much a natural process as the act +of a man, only of a lower grade and a simpler kind. Schopenhauer calls +that which both have in common “will.” Yet in common language we call the +objective aspect of that which both processes have in common, “motion.” +What then is the subjective aspect of a falling stone? It is not a state +of awareness, it is no feeling, but it is the potentiality of a state of +awareness, it is potential feeling. There _is_ a subjective aspect, but +this subjective aspect is so far as we can judge of no account to the +stone. + +That something in the stone which corresponds to man’s consciousness, +viz. the stone’s subjectivity, is not mind, but it is potential mind. +And potential mind is not as Mr. Conybeare expresses it “mind diluted,” +potential mind is no mind at all. + +The world-substance as it exists in inorganic matter is not mind. But +the universe taken as a whole, the All, is for that reason not less than +mind. On the contrary, it is infinitely more than mind. The All is not +brute force and inert matter only, the universe is a cosmos, and its +subjectivity necessarily develops, according to the laws of form which +characterise the cosmos throughout, into mind. We disagree with Professor +Clifford most emphatically when he describes the mind-stuff of which +according to his terminology the world consists, as not rational. + +The world it is true is not rational in its elements, but the world as +a whole, the entire cosmos with its laws and especially in its formal +order, is the prototype of all rationality. Human reason is rational +only in so far as it conforms with, as it reflects, as it describes the +order of the cosmos. The human mind is a microcosm. We do not call the +macrocosm, in whose image the microcosm has been created, a mind, because +we understand by the term mind not reality itself but reality pictured in +symbols of feeling. We understand by mind the individual conception of +the world as it is mapped out in the brain of a sentient being, and not +the universe itself, not the all-being. We understand by mind a creature +and not the creator, a soul and not God. + +The cosmos, the All, God, that which creates the mind, is not dead, not +irrational, and not inferior to mentality. It is the source of all life, +it is the condition of all order, it is the standard of all morality. All +the minds that exist are but parts of it. In it, with it, and through it +we live and shall live forever. For although we shall die, our being can +never be blotted out. Existence knows no annihilation and life knows no +death. What we call death is a dissolution of life in a special part, +but the contents of a life, the thoughts, the ideas, and the ideals are +preserved and transmitted, they are implanted into other minds; the soul +continues to live. And this continuance of the life of the soul is not +a mere dissolution in the All, it is not the immortality of force and +matter; it is the preservation of its special existence, of its most +characteristic and individual features for an immeasurably long period +hence, which will last as long as the conditions of life remain favorable +upon earth. Yet even if a whole solar system were broken to pieces, life +will reappear; mind will be born again to struggle for truth and to +aspire to live in conformity with truth. + + +VI. THINGS AND RELATIONS. + +The proposition that things in themselves are unknowable finds a strong +argument in the statement that we can know relations only, that all +knowledge is relative. It is undoubtedly true that all knowledge is +relative and knowledge is a knowledge of relations. But what is a +relation? When I once proposed this question, I was answered: + + “A relation is the connection between two things; it is that + something in which the one stands to the other, in short, it is + the betwixtness of things.” + +This is exactly what a relation is not. From such a definition of +relation agnosticism will necessarily follow. It is a misstatement of +the case, and when we come to follow out the idea, we shall be led into +inextricable contradictions, and unless we revise the whole argument, we +shall have to confess that we are at our wit’s end. + +The question, what is a relation? was one of the issues between the +two great mediæval schools of philosophy, the Nominalists and the +Realists.[45] The Nominalists answered: “A relation is a mere product of +the mind,” while the Realists declared that “a relation without which the +thing cannot be, is in the thing.” + +Both schools relied upon Aristotle’s authority. Aristotle had declared +that matter is mere possibility of existence (it is δυνάμει ὄν) and form +is that which makes it real, the formal is the real, form is existence +or being (οὐσία). The metal of a statue, Aristotle says, is its matter, +the idea of the statue is its form, both together make the real statue. +The metal having had another form before, did not exist with the inherent +purpose of being this metal of the statue. The metal is the mere +potentiality of becoming a statue.[46] Hence, says Aristotle, not the +matter but the form constitutes the reality of the statue, the form is +that which is real, or that which makes actual, ἐνεργείᾳ ὄν, it is the +being in completeness or actuality, ἐνετλεχείᾳ ὄν, i. e. that which makes +a thing exist in its purpose (ἐν τέλει ἔχειν). If the formal alone is and +makes real, relations must be real. This is in favor of the Realists. + +Yet Aristotle’s philosophy is not in every respect clearly worked out. +In fact there are two Aristotles, the one being a Platonist, the other +a naturalist, the one believing in universals, the other investigating +concrete things and taking individuals as real beings. But both +Aristotles and with them both parties of the schoolmen had no clear +conception of the nature of ideas, what they are, and what they purport, +and how we can discriminate between their subjective and objective +elements. Ideas have a meaning. Is their meaning purely mental or has it +an objective value? We say that it has. + +The same Aristotle who considered the formal as that which makes real, +denied the objective existence of relations. He said that such qualities +as greater, or smaller, double or half, indeed all relations (the πρός τι +of things) did not belong to the things, but were added to them by the +thinking subject. Ergo relations are mere products of the mind, they have +no objective value. This was in favor of the Nominalists. + +Now it is true that some relations are purely mental in so far as the +comparison upon which they rest is purely imaginary. An answer to the +question, Who was the greater, Alexander or Cæsar? depends upon the +standard of measurement which we create for the special purpose. Some +such relations have no objective value, they are not facts but a play of +imagination dependent on the recognition of the standard of measurement. +But how is it, if we express the relation between the gravity of a stone +and the whole mass of the earth as it manifests itself in the stone’s +fall? Is that also a mere product of the mind? Certainly Newton’s laws +describing gravitation in exact and mathematical formulas are a product +of the mind, but this product of the mind has an objective value, it has +a meaning, it describes facts, and these facts are certain relations +between certain things. + + * * * * * + +The fault of the modern misconception of relativity lies in the +assumption that the two or more things are considered as things in +themselves. We are apt to consider the gravity of two masses, of a stone +and of the earth, as a relation between two independent things. Here is +the stone and there is the earth and the relation is considered as some +third item, being the connection in which the one stands to the other. + +In reality there are not two things and, in addition to them a +betweenness of the two things. The world is not a sum of things, not even +a system of things, but a whole indivisible entirety and what we call +things are abstractions which serve special purposes in the household of +cognition. All things consist as it were of innumerable relations to all +other things. When we abstract one special process which takes place in +the province of what we are wont to call _two_ things, we have to deal +with a relation. + +There are no relations of themselves and there are no things of +themselves. Relations describe certain features of reality obtaining +between what we call two or more things, and in this description all +other features of which the real things consist are purposely omitted. + +There is no quality of things but it is at the same time a quality of +relation. Every quality of a thing characterises it under a certain +condition; it appears as an effect upon something and thus it is actual +as a relation. Cognition analyses things into bundles of relations and +all these relations together make up the things. + +The modern idea that we can know relations only and that there are +things in themselves which are unknowable is an old error inherited +from mediæval scholasticism, and its roots can be traced back to the +philosophy of Aristotle. The difficulty disappears as soon as we +consider the whole world (ourselves included) as an interacting whole, +and that the conceptions “things” and “relations” have been invented +for describing certain of its parts and certain of its interactions or +interconnections. + +If we push the idea of things in themselves to the ultimate extreme +we arrive at the atomistic conception of the universe. _Atoms are the +things in themselves reduced to the point system._ If we consider the +world as a heap of innumerable atoms, we are at a loss how to explain +the interaction among these atoms. The atomist universalises the +substance-abstraction and will be disappointed afterwards not to be able +to deduce from his universalisation other qualities which are found in +reality, such as the relations of things, their interconnections, their +spontaneity of motion, the life of organised beings, and the mind of +thinking creatures. + +Ideas are symbols and symbols have a meaning. The whole realm of +mental representations may be viewed in their symbolism or in their +significance. Considering their symbolism, ideas of things as well as of +relations, are products of the mind, considering their meaning, ideas +represent realities; in other words: their contents or that which they +signify is real. + +It appears that neither Nominalism nor Realism is right; yet if we +stretch them only a little, if we are allowed to interpret them in the +light of a monistic world-conception, both are right. They cease to +be contradictory and become complementary. Universals are real, say +the Realists, i. e. the forms and relations of things are actualities. +Universals are names, say the Nominalists, i. e. the relations and forms +in which we describe the world are mental symbols. + +The Realists had the misfortune to defeat the Nominalists entirely, +and thus had a chance to insist upon being right in every respect. All +opposition having ceased, the errors of Realism grew in extraordinary +exuberance. Nominalism in the mean time raised its head in opposition to +the recognised authority of the church as well as the schools, slowly +yet powerfully and irresistibly. The errors and the tyranny of Realism +gave strength to the Nominalistic movement which reached its height in +Kant’s philosophy. The Realists had gone to the extreme of declaring +that universals were things, real substances, independent of single and +concrete objects, and the Nominalists on the other hand, represented +by Kant, went so far as to declare that all relations, time and space +included were _mere_ products of the mind. + +If the relations are mere products of the mind, all knowledge being +a knowledge of relations, knowledge becomes impossible. That last +consequence was drawn by Kant and is emphatically insisted upon by +agnosticism. + +There is but one world-conception that can dispense with these +conclusions: it is that View which conceives of the All as a whole; and +of knowledge as a description of its parts, qualities, and relations, +ever mindful on the one hand that the parts are parts, that qualities +and relations are certain features only, not entire realities, or +isolated entities, and that the symbols thereof frequently overlap each +other; on the other hand that there is nothing absolute,[47] and that +there are no things in themselves. + +The relativity of knowledge, whether we conceive of it as the relativity +of the object to the subject in general or as an appreciation of the fact +that all knowledge gives and can give information of relations only, does +not lead to the conclusion that knowledge is impossible. Relativity is a +fundamental feature of knowledge, and we shall understand that it must be +so if we consider that reality itself is a great system of relations. + + * * * * * + +The interconnection of all things with all things appears to be so +complete, that if we intended to explain or understand one single fact +fully and exhaustively in all its relations, past, present, and future, +we should be obliged to give a complete description of the universe. Says +Tennyson: + + “Flower in the crannied wall, + I pluck you out of the crannies;— + Hold you here, root and all, in my hand, + Little flower—but if I could understand + What you are, root and all, and all in all, + I should know what God and man is.” + +We might address in the same way anything else, an atom of hydrogen, a +grain of sand as well as the sun, the action of a tiny speck of irritable +protoplasm as well as the soul of man. + + +VII. IS THE EGO A THING IN ITSELF? + +Prof. Lloyd Morgan in his excellent work “Animal Life and Intelligence” +uses repeatedly the word “mind” as if it were a thing in itself. +Professor Morgan is a monist and he does not intend the word to mean a +thing in itself; yet such is the influence of language that we, all of +us, unless we are constantly on our guard, will inadvertently slip into +dualistic expressions. Professor Morgan says, with reference to certain +sensations of animals (p. 309): + + ‘From these stippled sensations the mind in all cases + elaborates a continuum.’ + +The unity which arises out of stippled sensations and which through +their interaction becomes a continuum is called mind. To speak of +mind as working out the continuum is mythological language, it is the +transformation of the abstract idea “mind” into a real and independent +thing whose existence is conceived to be independent of the reality from +which it has been abstracted. + +Again, Professor Morgan says: “Our constructs are literally our +handiwork.” Our constructs, i. e. our mental signs constructed to +represent realities, constitute our soul; they are we ourselves. + +Professor Morgan, as I understand him, does not believe in a mind +behind the psychical facts of mental activity, he does not assume the +pre-existence of mind to the continuum elaborated. His view of mind +appears to be the same as ours. The more noteworthy, then, is his usage +of the term “mind.” It is a remarkable instance of how language naturally +inveigles us into a belief in things in themselves. Words seem to denote +concrete existences and as soon as we use words in this way we are +entangled in dualism. + +Prof. F. Max Müller as well as the late Prof. Thomas Hill Green, +the founder of the Oxford transcendentalist school, start from this +assumption, that man’s mental activity is performed by a something which +is quite distinct from it. This something is the thing in itself of the +human soul. Prof. F. Max Müller says: + + “If mind is the name of the work, what is the name of the + worker?... It is what we may call the ego as personating the + self; it is what other philosophers call the monon. Let us + call therefore the worker who does the work of the mind in its + various aspects, the Monon or the Ego.” + +This conception which asks for the worker of the work is based upon a +materialistic view of the human organism. An organism is not a dead +machine which must be set a-going by somebody who attends to it. +Organisms are active and not passive, they are living and not dead. Every +part of an organism is a worker and so is the whole. And if we speak of +its “life” we must bear in mind that “life” is an abstract which denotes +a certain inseparable quality of the organism. The work and the worker +are two abstracts of one and the same thing. The reality from which these +terms have been abstracted is “something working.” This something working +does not consist of a worker and his work, but the worker is in every +part of his work. The worker of our mental activity is the work itself. +Both are identical. + +The objection is made: “Whence does the activity come which appears in +the realm of organised life.” The answer is: Activity is a universal +quality of all existence. There is no such a thing as absolutely +inert matter. Every chemical element combines with other elements +spontaneously, according to its inherent nature and not through the +influence of a worker manipulating its atoms. Spontaneity is a universal +feature of reality. Nature is throughout self-working activity. And this +its most remarkable character is preserved in its highest efflorescence +in the soul of man. + +The present number of _The Monist_ contains a lucid presentation of the +transcendentalist position by Mr. F. C. Conybeare, an Oxford scholar and +a personal disciple of Professor Green, with special reference to the +views of Prof. William Kingdon Clifford. Mr. Conybeare, like Prof. F. Max +Müller, assumes a Self independent of the reality from which the idea of +self has been abstracted, and he attempts to prove the existence of this +self as follows: + + “In truth there can be no relation of before and after between + the two terms except for a self which takes note of the one + disappearing and of the other appearing; and whenever we speak + of things following one another we tacitly presuppose a self + before whom the procession passes.” + +The transcendentalist adopts, in the realm of psychology, the error +of atomism. If we accept the view that the world consists of isolated +atoms, we are at a loss how to bring the atoms into relations; the unity +of every group of atoms, every thing and every system of things will +become a mystery. And if we look upon feelings as unrelated things in +themselves, their connection becomes a deep problem. Mr. Conybeare solves +this problem of the connection that obtains among the feelings supposed +to be atomical, by postulating a relation-producing entity, called the +self. He says: + + “No link is left, save a connecting self.” + +And this assumed entity of a connecting self or ego is taken to be “the +heart and centre of reality.” Reality, that which we have to deal with +in real life and what is commonly called reality, appears as a second +class of reality in comparison with this assumed thing in itself of our +existence. The thing in itself is thus regarded as something realer than +real; it is conceived to be a reality of a higher degree. + +Mr. Conybeare is very explicit in the explanation of his transcendental +“self.” He says: + + “Feelings constitute a conscious self when they become the + feelings of a conscious self and not before, for except as + gathered up in the unity of a self which has [sic!] memory and + remains the same throughout its differences, feelings can be + neither new, nor repeated, nor joined by links.” + +What does “self” mean? What can it mean? What is the “unity of the self”? +These are questions which have not been answered to our satisfaction +by the transcendentalists. Whenever they speak of the self, they lose +themselves in mysticism. Their “self” is an assumed entity which they +have carefully divested of everything real and actual. Their self is +transcendental and not a being of the world; it is a myth. + +Let us describe the simplest possible instance of psychical activity. + +An irritation takes place in some sentient substance. This irritation +produces an extra-commotion. We must say “extra-commotion” because +all sentient substance is in a state of constant activity. This +extra-commotion causes the sentient substance to assume a certain form, +and while it lasts, a certain and special feeling takes place in some +part of the sentient substance. This certain and special feeling ceases, +as soon as the extra-commotion, caused through the irritation, abates. +There can be no doubt that certain effects of this extra-commotion +remain. Its trace is left in the sentient substance and this trace is +preserved in the constant whirl of the sentient being’s normal activity. +Now, we suppose that an irritation of the same kind takes place in the +same sentient substance. This second irritation finds the substance no +longer in the same condition. It finds the sentient substance prepared +to receive it. The feeling which now appears is no longer a simple +feeling. The second irritation causes a commotion as much as the first, +and this commotion acts as a stimulant upon the trace left by the first +irritation. This trace being again in a state of extra-commotion is +revived and the same kind of feeling appears. Thus the second irritation +is accompanied by a state of awareness in which two feelings are blended, +the revival of the former feeling and the feeling of the present +irritation. + +The preservation of traces left in sentient substance is the condition +of memory. We understand by memory the psychical aspect thereof, and the +act of reviving, so that their correspondent feelings will reappear, is +called recollection. + +“Memory” has been the greatest stumbling-block to our psychologists as +well as to our philosophers. Even modern works written from a positive +standpoint treat memory frequently as a mysterious faculty of the mind. +Mr. Conybeare speaks of the self as _having_ memory, while in fact, +memory is one of the features, indeed the most important feature, of +mind-activity. + +Says Mr. Conybeare: + + “Such a feeling [of the togetherness of two feelings] would + involve memory and memory involves self-hood.” + +Memory does not involve any transcendental self-hood. True self-hood, +viz. that which can reasonably be understood by self-hood, is not prior +to, not the cause of memory; self-hood, i. e. the personality of a man, +the organised unity of the psychical aspect of a human organism, is +consequent upon, it is the effect of, memory. Self-hood is the product of +memory.[48] + +The self is also called the ego. What is the ego? + +The ego is a Latin term used in philosophical language to denote the +pronoun “I,” and the pronoun “I” is quite a definite nerve-structure +situated in quite a definite place of the centre of language. As +all words, so also the term “I” is a symbol. Its general meaning is +unequivocal; it stands for the name of the speaker. It stands for Mr. +Brown, if Mr. Brown speaks of himself, for Mr. Smith, if Mr. Smith speaks +of himself, etc. + +What does Mr. Brown mean when he says, “_I_ speak, _I_ act, _I_ will, _I_ +feel pain, _I_ feel pleasure, _I_ intend,” etc.? + +When Mr. Brown speaks, a certain number of word-structures in the +centre of language are in a state of commotion, innervating the muscles +of speech. Correspondent to this physiological process, a state of +consciousness obtains, which is an awareness of the situation. When +he adds: “I say this,” it is again a special nerve-structure that is +irritated into action and he might just as well say: “Mr. Brown says +this.” The idea of Mr. Brown, viz. of his own personality, is just as +much an idea as his idea of Mr. Smith. The main difference consists +in the fact that the idea of one’s own personality is very much more +important than the ideas representing other personalities. + +The nervous structure representing the feeling of the idea “I” must be +the centre of innumerable nervous tracts connecting it with all those +activities which when performed are thought of as done by ourselves. +The “I do this” is almost constantly ready to fill the present state +of consciousness and to accompany any action performed through the +innervation of other brain structures. + +Sentient substance is not always actually feeling. It is feeling only +when in a state of extra-commotion. Systems of sentient substance +are called organisms; all its structures are interconnected and most +so those structures in which sentiency as well as motory impulses +are differentiated—viz. the nervous structures. The extra-commotions +which agitate the different nervous structures, the memories of +former sense-perceptions, of sounds, of words, of ideas depend upon +the conditions of the moment. Now this and now another structure will +represent the summit of commotion and the feeling of the strongest +commotion at a given time will under normal conditions appear as the +contents of consciousness. It is as it were the focus in which the +attention of the whole organism is centralised. That which appears in +the focus is clear and distinct, while the other weaker feelings rapidly +disappear into the undistinguishable general feeling of the organism as a +whole, commonly called cœnæsthesis or _Gemeingefühl_. + +The centre of attention is constantly changing; yet whenever a thinking +creature stops to ask himself, who is doing this? Who is willing this? +Who is thinking this? the answer is given: “I am doing this; I am willing +this; I am thinking this.” The structure of the little pronoun “I” seems +to be the most ticklish of all; it is always ready to force itself into +the foreground. + +The answer, “I am doing this,” proposes the _totum pro parte_. The +whole personality is supposed to do what a part of it is performing. +The hands are executing this work; these hands of course are innervated +from certain regions of the brain. Some parts of the personality are +in a relative rest and have nothing to do with the work presently on +hand. A commotion in a certain number of brain-structures represents the +physiological aspect of a deliberation, perhaps the planning of some +action. Psychologically considered certain ideas appear successively +and sometimes simultaneously in the focus of consciousness. The ideas +disagree and other ideas replace them until a combination is formed in +which the ideas do agree. This state of agreement brings a temporary +peace into the tumult of conflicting ideas; the plan is ready; it may +pass into action at once, or, perhaps, the ego-structure will appear in +consciousness and will quietly think: “I will do it.” + +When certain motory nerve-structures are innervated, they cause under +normal conditions their respective muscles to contract, they produce +motion. Under normal conditions the nervous process accompanying the idea +“I will raise my arm” serves as an irritation upon the cortical centre of +arm-raising, yet it is not the “I” that in some mystical way raises the +arm. The idea “I” has as little and as much to do with this discharge of +energy as any other idea. The idea “I” is not the power behind the veil +that produces the will. + +What is will? As soon as some plan of action is joined with the idea +that it should be executed, supposing it be not counteracted by any +stronger idea that it should not be done, this combination represents +a will. A will accordingly is the psychological aspect of an incipient +action, and it is usually, or if it is not it can always be accompanied +with the thought “I will it.” But this accompanying thought however is +not the energy displayed in the act of willing. + +The “I will it,” or “I do it,” or “I perceive it” being always ready to +appear together with the strongest idea in the field of consciousness, +the term “ego” has acquired a specialised meaning. It means that part of +a man’s personality which at the time is the contents of the “I will,” or +“I think,” i. e. it is his present state of consciousness. Every organism +is a coherent system and thus all the feelings of an organism naturally +blend into a unity. The strongest feeling however appears in the normal +state of waking in a distinct clearness thus representing a centre of +consciousness. + +However, whether we use the term “ego” in the sense of the idea “I” +meaning the whole personality of the speaker, or in the sense of the +present centre of consciousness, it designates in either case a definite +reality, the origin and action of which are natural facts and as plain as +any other psychological phenomena. + +Neither the ego-idea nor the centre of consciousness are transcendental. +The former is as little mystical as are the ideas dog, horse, man, etc.; +the latter no less miraculous than any other feeling or display of +sentiency. + + +VIII. THE EGO-CENTRIC VIEW ABANDONED. + +The contrast between the old and the new psychology appears strongest +in their conceptions of the ego. The former believes that the ego is +“the thing in itself” of man’s soul and takes it to be the centre of +all psychical phenomena, while the latter looks upon the ego-idea as +one idea among many other co-ordinated ideas and considers the centre +of consciousness as the strongest feeling at a given time, which as +such naturally predominates over and eclipses the other feelings of the +organism. + +The new psychology brings about a change of standpoint similar to +that effected by the Copernican system in astronomy. In astronomy +the geo-centric, and in psychology the ego-centric standpoint had to +be abandoned. And all things seem to be upset to those who are still +accustomed to the old conception. To them the physical and moral +world-conceptions appear to become impossible. If the new view were +correct, so they imagine, the entire universe would break to pieces. All +our modes of speech are formed in accord with the old view. We speak of +sunset and sunrise, and so in our daily conversation the little pronoun +“I” plays a part which makes it seem as if the ego-idea were the centre +of all soul-life and as if this “I” were the active agent in all acts of +willing and doing. + +The advantage of the Copernican system lies in this, that we can think +of the motions of the sun and the planets in a systematic and unitary +conception without being either involved in contradictions or obliged to +invent mysterious qualities in the stars for explaining the velocities, +directions, or other phenomena of the celestial bodies. The most +important advantage however is the practical applicability of the new +theory. + +The old theory of the soul necessarily leads to mysticism. Fictitious +facts of a transcendent character must be invented in addition to the +facts observed, in order to explain the latter. The new theory after +abandoning the ego-centric standpoint of the thing in itself of a soul +shows the facts of psychic life in an harmonious and unitary conception. +All facts agree among themselves and we are not in need of supplementing +them with mysterious inventions. It must be emphasised, at the same time, +that the new conception throws a new light upon ethics; it shows the +error and perversity of all egotism, for it would be a mistake to act as +if the ego were really the centre of soul-life. + +Here the new psychology comes in contact with religion. What is the +practical aim of all the great religions of the world but a surrender +of the ego, a renunciation of the self as the centre of our being, and +the acceptance of the moral law as the regulative power of our actions? +The new psychology gives a justification and a scientific explanation +of Christian ethics while the latter from the standpoint of the old +psychology necessarily appears as mystical and supernatural. + + +IX. PERSONALITY AND EVOLUTION. + +The ego, i. e. the centre of consciousness, is constantly shifting, while +the personality of a man is relatively constant, certain important ideas +being stable and thus lending character to the whole system of thoughts +and intentions. + +The term personality indicating the self-hood of a man is used in several +ways. First, we understand by a man’s personality his bodily appearance; +secondly the whole system of his mentality, viz. his knowledge, his +temperament, his character; thirdly the history of his life, past, +present, and future; fourthly his position in life, his possessions, +his connections, his influence, or at last we mean by it all these four +items together. In all these applications the man and his personality are +conceived as a unity. And they are a unity. Wherever the term unity is +applicable, it is most certainly applicable here. All the many facts of +the history of his life are one continuous process; all the parts of his +body are parts of a system, and the world of his ideas also will under +normal conditions bear a certain harmonious character. Wherever in any +soul the concord among the ideas has been disturbed, a state of unrest +will ensue until the peace of soul is restored in one or another way. But +with the same necessity as every water surface tends to present a smooth +level, so the ideas in one and the same soul tend to come to a state of +agreement. As every water surface has its ripples so even that mind which +has attained an undisturbed peace of soul is constantly confronted with +some problems—be they ever so trifling—producing some slight disturbances +in his life. + +The unity of a self, it is apparent, is the inevitable consequence +of given conditions. It is not something which exists outside the +personality and its constituent parts, it is in the personality and it +develops together with it. Mr. Conybeare supposes that “the unity of +a self remains the same throughout.” This is an error, and this error +vitiates Mr. Conybeare’s whole conception of growth and evolution. He +says: + + “Properly speaking a thing can only be said to grow or develop + when it remains the same with itself all through the process + and unfolds therein capacities which were anyhow latent in it + to start with.” + +The truth contained in this proposition may be expressed thus: When a +thing develops, some part of it remains the same during the change, +so that a continuity is preserved. Yet every change of a part of an +organism—such is the intimate interconnection of all its parts—produces +an alteration, be it ever so small, of the whole unity. And in the course +of evolution the character of the whole thing may be changed. Think of +the growth of a caterpillar into a butterfly, or of an egg-cell into a +man. However, the changes in the character of an adult man will become +slighter and slighter the stronger certain features of his existence +preserve their sameness, although the most stable personality will, +nevertheless, be subject to, at least, unimportant changes as long as +life lasts. + +Mr. Conybeare, like his master Professor Green and all the +transcendentalists, is still under the influence of a belief in the +thing in itself. The unity of an organism which is the product of the +co-operation of its parts, is not some independent thing whose business +it is to gather up their single activities and bring them into relation +with one another. The unity of a self is the combination of all those +relations which make of its parts a systematised whole, and this unity +is changing together with its constituents; as a matter of fact, we have +to state that it does _not_ remain constant or the same with itself. +Mark that I do not deny the unity of the soul, nor do I underrate the +enormous importance of this unity. But I do deny that this unity exists +independent of its parts. It is as much immanent in its parts as is a +melody in its notes. There is as little a transcendental self-hood as a +melody in itself independent of its sounds. + +The assumption of a transcendental unity which throughout the process +of evolution remains the same with itself naturally leads to a wrong +conception of what Mr. Conybeare calls “latent capacities.” The terms +potential existence and latent qualities are fertile and useful ideas but +we must beware not to employ them incorrectly. Any heap of iron ore can +be called a potential sword. This is a mode of speaking which expresses +the possibility that the ore can be changed somehow into a sword. But the +sword does not exist at all, not even as a latent quality of the ore. +The ore has no latent qualities of that kind. Those qualities of the ore +which represent the potential sword are very patent to everybody who +knows the art of using them properly and changing them into an actual +sword. + +We may say that the hen’s egg contains a potential chick; but this is a +mere mode of speech devised to say that the egg can be changed into a +chick under certain conditions. There is no chick at all contained in the +egg and nothing that is like a chick. + +Evolution is not, as the name suggests, a process of unfolding; evolution +is, as Christian Friedrich Wolff calls it, an “epigenesis,” i. e. +the process of the additional growth of new formations. The chick is +something different in kind from the egg. The unity of the egg-cell +organism in the yolk is radically different from the unity of the +full-fledged chick. The former shows traces of irritability but not +of consciousness, while the latter exhibits unmistakable symptoms of +psychical activity. The formation of the chicken-soul is a new formation +as much as the growth of feathers. The feathers of the chick are an +additional growth; there are no latent feathers in the egg. We might +express ourselves to the effect that the egg contains the potential +existence of feathers, but with the same logic we might say the egg +contains a potential chicken broth. + +It is however true that something remains constant in the process of +growth. There is a preservation of form in the constant change of +material particles and this is the physiological basis of memory, so that +a man of eighty may say “I remember when I was a child,” although not one +particle of the substance of which the child consisted is left in him. +The continuity produced through this preservation of form makes growth +and evolution possible. + +The preservation of memory-structures constitutes the possibility of +reviving the feelings of the past, it constitutes a preservation of +soul. The material parts of the body are thrown out but the form being +preserved, the soul remains. And this preservation of the soul is the +basis of its additional growth through new and enlarged experience. The +soul of the child is not lost in the man, it is preserved. It has lost +certain features and at the same time it has gained new features, it has +developed, and the unity of the soul has more or less changed with the +development. + +What is true of the individual is also true of mankind. Mankind as a +whole is different in the savage and in civilised society. Nevertheless +the latter has developed from the former. Certain traits have been +dropped, other radically new features have appeared. That which was +valuable in the soul of primitive man is not lost. The better part of his +soul still lives in the highest developed man of to-day; the continuity +is preserved. And to-day all our moral instruction aims at this, so to +live that our souls also will be preserved in the future evolution of +humanity. The gist of ethics is to make the soul immortal.[49] + + +X. PROFESSOR MACH’S POSITION. + +The problem, “Are there things in themselves?” is closely connected with +the subject of my discussion with Professor Mach. Professor Mach as +well as myself are aspiring to arrive at a consistent and harmonious or +unitary world-conception. Both of us recognise that things in themselves +have no room in a monistic philosophy, both of us recognise that concepts +are means only of orientation, they are the mental tools of living beings +developed as an assistance in dealing with the surrounding world. They +are symbols in which the processes of nature are copied and imitated and +which can serve for planning or modeling and thus predetermining the +course of nature. So far we agree, but then there appears a difference +which it is difficult for me to understand or formulate in precise terms. + +Professor Mach objects to the dualism of motion and feeling, which he +declares he conceives as a unity not as a duality. But so do I. It +appears to me that we must differ somehow in the method of constructing +the unity. I see indeed a contrast of physical and of psychical. This +contrast, however, in my conception does not belong to the object but to +the subject. It is a contrast of our conception of things, but it is not +a contrast existing objectively in the real things themselves. The world +is not composed of the psychical and the physical, but certain features +of the world are called physical, and others psychical. Both terms are +abstracts. + +Professor Mach said in his first article and repeats it again in the +present article that his former standpoint resembles very closely my +present standpoint. When reading Professor Mach’s lectures of 1863, +I took pains to look for the similarity, and finding many things in +which I could agree I dropped the differences taking the agreements +as the essential points. In reading, however, Professor Mach’s résumé +of his former position as stated in this present article, I find that +he attaches prominence to several points which I cannot endorse. +I do not accept the theory that atoms feel, that they are endowed +with consciousness. I have never spoken of atoms when dealing with +psychological problems. The term “atom” is a chemical term invented +as a help for thinking the equivalence of the weight of the elements +which always combine in definite proportions. The term “atom” has in +my opinion no sense if applied to other phenomena. The term “atom” has +not been abstracted from psychical phenomena nor has it been invented +for describing them. There is accordingly no probability that it can +find there any appropriate application. We might as well expect that +mathematical terms such as lines, points, circles, etc., are applicable +in psychology. The idea of conscious circles or points can not in my mind +be more absurd than that of conscious atoms. The rule must be observed +that we can use abstractions made for a special purpose for that purpose +only; they will not serve any other purpose as well. It is true that they +are often employed as analogies, but in such cases, we must bear in mind +that we are dealing with mere analogies. + +In addition to the impropriety of using the term atoms in psychology, it +appears to me erroneous to attribute feeling or anything like feeling +to physical processes of any description. Natural processes are so +constituted, that under certain conditions, such as take place in animal +organisms, they will develop feelings. Clifford speaks in this sense of +the elements of feeling. Lloyd Morgan calls it metakinesis, and I find +that feelings being simply states of awareness represent the subjectivity +of natural processes. We have reasons to suppose that in the processes +of unorganised nature this subjectivity is neither feeling nor anything +like feeling: but the subjectivity of the natural processes is as it were +the stuff out of which our own feelings are formed. + +I accept all the arguments of Professor Mach that our ideas are +artificial products; and I am also anxious to distinguish in our ideas +between that which describes facts and that which has been added to the +description of facts in shape of theories or conjectures. + +The sense-pictures of objects and ideas also are not things but images +and symbols of things created for the purpose of representing things; +they are as Prof. Lloyd Morgan says, “constructs.” But these constructs +are not mere fancy, they are not air-castles. They are constructed in +order to imitate certain realities. Now, in building these constructs +as an imitation or a copy of reality, we are often at a loss how to +build them. There is for instance in the objective reality observed, a +something somewhere high in the air, the basis of which is invisible, +and being limited in our means of acquiring information we are ignorant +of the real state of things. So in reconstructing or imitating the +facts, we build scaffolds to support it, and we are too apt to forget +that these scaffolds do not represent objective facts but are artifices +to make certain facts, which we know in parts only, thinkable, i. e. +representable without breaks in mental constructs. + + +XI. TRUTH IN MYTHOLOGY. + +There is one point which I have emphasised and which it appears to me +Professor Mach neglects, namely that our noumenal world of ideas has +an objective meaning. The ideal constructs represent realities. They +do not consist of scaffolds alone and there is no scaffold which has +not been erected to help in building up representations of facts. Let +us call the representation of facts positive science or simply truth +and the scaffolding the mythology of science, and we shall see that the +road to truth leads everywhere through mythology. Certain facts of the +surrounding world impress themselves upon a sentient being and these +impressions come to represent facts. These facts are not seen at once in +their causal connection, they appear unconnected among themselves, and in +the attempt to formulate them, to represent them, to construct them in +mental images, we fill out the gaps of our knowledge with such inventions +as are supplied by analogy. + +Mythology is, in religion as well as in science, the indispensable ladder +to truth. We cannot build without scaffolds. So we cannot construct truth +without mythology. We have to introduce allegorical expressions in order +to fill out gaps with analogies. + +Mythology becomes fatal to the building up of truth, as soon as we +consider it as truth itself. The scaffold is erected simply as an +assistance for building and if the building is finished the scaffold +should be torn down. The progress of science which is so much helped +by mythology has periods of purification in which the mythology is +discarded. This is sometimes a difficult task, because the very terms +of science are mostly both at the same time truth and mythology, +building-stones and scaffold. + +Take, for instance, the term atom. The chemist observes that the elements +always combine in certain proportions and formulates the law of the +equivalence of their atomic weights. In order to think this process, to +reconstruct it in mental images, he imagines that matter consists of +infinitely small particles of constant weight. This is a fiction useful +for its purpose but it may be just as erroneous as the method employed +in the infinitesimal calculus of thinking of a continuous curve as +consisting of a broken line of infinitely small parts, or of thinking +of a certain force as being composed of a parallelogram of forces. The +parallelogram of forces is a scaffold helpful for representing in mental +symbols the coexistence of different abstractions of the same kind (e. g. +motions of a different velocity and direction). But this scaffold is not +a mere scaffold, it is not erected without any purpose, its final aim is +the description of facts. + +The proposition to consider light as rays traveling in straight lines +is a scaffold, it is mythology; but this analogy contains a truth, it +contains a real building-stone which should not be torn down with the +scaffold. This truth is one-sided; it represents one feature of light +and disregards other features. It disregards entirely the transversal +oscillations of the ether, yet it describes another feature—viz., the +transmission and refraction of light for the comprehension of which we +need not take into consideration the undulation theory. The physicist +calculates with his formula sinα/sinβ = _n_ the angle of refraction. +There is certainly neither a sineα nor a sineβ in reality, but there are +certain relations of reality which are described in these expressions and +the action of the light has a definite quality which can be determined +with the assistance of the formula sinα/sinβ = _n_. + +If the scientist succeeds in determining such real qualities of things, +even though it be done with the assistance of mythology, he discovers +a truth. He has with the help of his scaffolds succeeded in placing a +building-stone where it belongs. + +Some scaffolds have to be torn down because they hinder further building; +other scaffolds must remain because they assist us in modeling, and +planning, and predetermining certain processes of nature. They are like +staircases which enable us to reach with ease otherwise inaccessible +places on towers or domes. + + * * * * * + +The idea that science is full of mythology appears strange to the +non-scientific, and it is often overlooked by scientists themselves. +But the idea that religious mythology in spite of its many irrational +superstitions and wrong analogies beams with truth is also little heeded +by the many. In fact, man’s method of reaching truth is the same in +religion as in science. + +The religious ideas such as God and soul are mental constructs which +copy certain realities; but these very terms, such as they are used, +are mythological expressions; they are still surrounded by their +scaffolds. Many people know by their own experience the usefulness and +indispensability of the scaffold. Without the scaffold they would never +have had an inkling of the truth, for the representation of which it was +built, and it is natural that they consider the scaffold as the building +itself. This is the reason why the narrow-minded orthodox denounce anyone +who would lay hand on or tear down any part of the scaffold, which has +become a hindrance to the further development of religious ideals. + +Positivism, i. e. the representation of facts without any admixture of +theory or mythology, is an ideal which in its purity perhaps will never +be realised. Nevertheless it is no _ignis fatuus_, no will-o’-the-wisp +that leads us astray. Our science is constantly more and more +approaching this ideal and the progress of humanity is intimately +connected with it. + +Science has not merely a theoretic value, its aim and purpose consist +in its application to practical life. Science is throughout ethical. +Thus ethics has also its mythological phase. In agreement with Professor +Mach (p. 204), we should find it ridiculous if one who presumes to be an +ethical teacher of mankind would say: + + “Man _must_ not be descended from monkeys,” “The earth _shall_ + not rotate,” “Matter _ought_ not everywhere to fill space,” + “Energy _must_ be constant,” and so on. + +Why is it ridiculous? Because we cannot prescribe a certain deportment to +facts. It is however not ridiculous to let a precise and carefully sifted +knowledge of facts determine our own deportment. + +Science has to teach ethics. But here also we should distinguish between +positive facts and mythology. Ethics based upon mere theories, upon +our interpretations of nature which we add to facts, is mythological; +positive ethics is simply that deportment which is suggested by a +comprehension of the facts themselves. + +Mythological ethics may be quite correct, just as much so as the +application of a mythological theory of science may be within certain +limits reliable as a working hypothesis. But it is desirable to +understand the nature of mythological ethics in order to distinguish +between truth and fiction. + +When Professor Mach speaks of sensations as being the elements of the +world and of things as being complexes of these elements he apparently +does not use the word sensation in its usual sense. It has ceased to be +an abstract term which represents one feature only of a process of nature +and has become a symbol for an entire reality. And is not such a usage of +terms as if they were not abstracts but the things themselves liable to +lead to misconceptions? + +Professor Mach’s “elements,” it seems to me, are only elements, i. +e. ultimate and unanalysable materials, if considered as terms of a +psychological view of the world; they are not elements in the domains of +other abstractions, such as are made by physiology or physics. Moreover, +although this method eliminates the duality of soul and body, mind and +matter, feeling and motion, it does not explain the problem. + +Professor Mach might answer that the problem as to the duality of mind +and matter is a sham problem, just as much as the problem why do we +see things upright when the retina picture of the eye shows the things +inverted? But a problem is to him who has solved the problem always a +sham problem. Every problem disappears as a problem as soon as it is +solved. It is true that we see as little with the blind spot of the eye +as with the skin of our back. The problem of the blind spot is not why +do we not see with the blind spot, (which is simply a matter of fact,) +but why do we not notice, when using only one eye, its lack of sight +in a spot surrounded with sight-seeing structures? We have to employ +artificial means to convince ourselves that we are really blind in that +spot! + +All problems are merely subjective; they are a conflict between two +conceptions and as Professor Mach himself says, the solution of problems +consists in the adaptation of thought to facts, i. e. to new facts or new +views of facts. By an adaptation of our thought to the enlarged field +of vision the problem vanishes; it has ceased to be a problem. In fact +it never existed as an objective phenomenon. There are no problems in +nature. There are problems only to the investigating mind. But even the +formulation of problems is a problem to be solved, and perhaps the most +difficult and subtle kind of problems is to discover the flaw in wrongly +formulated problems. + +The problem of the duality of body and soul, matter and mind, feeling +and motion, ceases to be a problem to him who has worked his way through +to a monistic conception, but to those who have not as yet succeeded in +establishing a unitary view of these ideas, because they take them to be +separate and distinct existences, it is a problem of great importance. + + +XII. THE ONENESS OF SUBJECTIVITY AND OBJECTIVITY. + +The world is not rigid being, but activity, not absolute existence but +a system of changing relations, not an abstract _Sein_ but a concrete +_Wirklichkeit_—a constant working of cause and effect. There is no +dualism in this, for the _Wirklichkeit_ is one and undivided. + +Yet every relation admits of two standpoints, just as the line _AB_, +which may serve to represent a certain and definite relation, is +determinable from both ends, _A_ as well as _B_. Let us call _A_ the +subject and _B_ the object. Neither _A_ nor _B_ is a reality, a whole +complete _Wirklichkeit_. A thing in order to be real must be active, it +must work, it must stand in relation to something else. _A_ is a mere +mathematical point, but _AB_ representing a process does something, it +performs work, it is real. A thing in itself, if it could exist at all, +would be tantamount to non-existence, it would represent a _Sein_ without +being _Wirklichkeit_. When bearing this in mind, it appears natural +that the oneness of existence, representable in such relations as is +that of _AB_ = -_BA_ will admit of two standpoints, _BA_ representing +subjectivity, and _AB_ representing objectivity. We can consider the +relation of the world at large to one special point (which latter may +in its turn stand for a whole system of relations) or vice versa the +relation of this point to the world at large. The former standpoint is +that of the microcosm, or the soul, the latter that of the macrocosm or +the universe; the former results in awareness, the latter appears as +matter in motion. The former is subjectivity, the latter objectivity. + +Reality must not be conceived of as being a compound of the elements of +feeling and of motion, of subjectivity and objectivity or of kinesis and +metakinesis. I do not think there are atoms one-half of which contains +the potentiality of sentience while the other half is freighted with +energy. I conceive of reality as being one throughout, but, being +throughout resolvable in relations, it will as a matter of course have +two sides. What these two sides are like can be known through experience +only, and experience teaches that under certain conditions the subjective +side develops into feeling and consciousness, while the objective side is +represented in the feeling of conscious beings as motions. + +This view explains the duality of our conception of psycho-physical +facts, but it is certainly not dualism. The duality belongs to the +scaffold not to the facts themselves. The facts can only be thought of +as being one and undivided, and no conception can stand except it be +monistic. + +Subjectivity and objectivity are terms that express relations and not +things in themselves. There are, however, philosophers who show a great +grief unless either the subjectivity of being, or the objectivity of +being, or the unities in which things or personalities are gathered +up, are considered as things in themselves. All those features of +reality which appear to their conception unexplainable, such as the +relations that obtain among things and especially the thoughts of +thinking beings are supposed to be the effects of some transcendental +entity, of a thing in itself. And if a philosophy denies the existence +of transcendentalistic thought-entities or of any such things in +themselves, which serve as cement to combine the _disjecta membra_ of +their world-conception, it is generally declared to lead straight on to +nihilism—not because the world itself but because their world-system +would thereby be annihilated. + +All things that exist, if considered as separate things, will pass +away; but if considered as parts of the all-existence of reality, they +are eternal. In fact things are not separate things, in the sense of +isolated, absolute, or abstract beings, although we may speak of them as +such for our ephemeral purposes. All things that exist, the human soul +included, are and will remain parts of the One and All. + +This destroys their individuality as little as a brick ceases to be a +brick because it serves its part in the building of a dome. The soul of a +man if his life be well spent, is not annihilated in death, his soul has +become a living stone in the temple of humanity. It continues to live and +marches on in the general progress of the race. + +We are parts of a great whole now, and we shall remain parts of the same +great whole forever. We have never been and shall never be transcendental +selfhoods or metaphysical egos, or any kind of things in themselves. Our +personality is real life, it is actual being. As such it is bound up in +the universal life of the One and All and no particle of it will be lost. +We need not fear death, for the air we breathe is immortality. + + EDITOR. + + +FOOTNOTES: + +[43] Italics are ours. Kant affirms the italicised question. + +[44] The problem of “The Origin of the Mind” having been the subject of a +former paper need not be discussed here. See _The Monist_, Vol i, No. 1, +p. 69-86, and _The Soul of Man_, pp. 23-46. + +[45] It is scarcely necessary to mention that mediæval Realism is +different from modern Realism. + +[46] Aristotle’s idea of matter being potential existence is a fiction. +Fictions of that kind are useful for certain purposes, but we must not +forget that they are fictions. We might just as well introduce any +other system of fictions. For instance we might with certainly not less +propriety look upon the idea in the mind of an artist as potential +reality while its appearance in a material shape is conceived to produce +actual reality. + +[47] The term “absolute” is for that reason neither meaningless nor +redundant. It denotes a certain method of viewing things, but is not an +objective quality of things. + +[48] See the chapter “Soul Life and the Preservation of Form” in _The +Soul of Man_, p. 418. + +[49] The abandonment of the ego as a metaphysical being is not, as it +appears to many, a surrender of the soul or of its immortality. That +the immortality of the soul from the standpoint of modern psychology +is preserved, that it appears in a new light, grander and nobler than +before, and that this conception of immortality is of an enormous +practical importance, have been the main incentives of Mr. E. C. Hegeler +in founding _The Open Court_ and _The Monist_. + + + + +LITERARY CORRESPONDENCE + + + + +I. + +FRANCE. + + +The recent work of M. F. PAULHAN, _Le Nouveau Mysticisme_, places us in +the presence of a feature of modern life, if not extremely important, at +least very curious. + +We assist at the formation of a new spirit. But what is it? What is its +value? A reply to this question would exact a long and minute analysis +of all social facts. M. Paulhan does not flatter himself that he has +exhausted it, and he offers us only portions, although excellent and +instructive, of the required work. He shows us in rapid review, the +dissolution of the ancient world, the intellectual and moral anarchy +which has to-day reached its highest possible point; he seeks, in the +ruins amidst which we tread, the constructive elements of a new order of +things, and makes an effort to foresee what it will be. + +“The scientific mind,” writes he, “the religious spirit, pity for +suffering, the sentiment of justice, social mysticism, the attraction for +mysterious perhaps dangerous facts that we begin to have a glimpse of, +the kind of new power which the knowledge of them can give us, a general +need of universal harmony: such are the principal characters of the +spirit which is forming itself.” They are not, he himself says, all new. +It is not the presence of these elements which is significant, but rather +the singular combination in which they occur, and we could say, the +precipitate that they give in the particular chemical solution where they +find themselves thrown. In every case, the phenomenon does not affect +entirely, it seems to us, the same characters, according to whether we +observe it in the philosophic or scientific order, in the practical +order, or in that of sentiment, which literature represents. The name +of mysticism does not belong to every part of the new spirit equally; +or more exactly, the spirit which is produced could well not be truly +mysticism, but only a side phenomenon, and the very evident resurrection +of the spirit which is disappearing. + +M. Paulhan, if I do not deceive myself, sometimes allows himself to be +too much influenced by a certain literature, to which I do not allow a +very great value, and of which even the sincerity may be suspected. It +represents at first, to my mind, individual conditions, and it evidently +impeaches some authors of a morbid diathesis. Many of our prophets, as +is known in the _Quartier Latin_, have or affect vices which exclude by +themselves all generating power. Then, it is very difficult, in our age, +to appreciate exactly the relations of literature to the public mind, +seeing the diversity of romantic books, and the correlation of one to +the other is perhaps not so strict, so profound as it has been in other +junctures of history. In short, the modern romance is a document the +relative value of which needs to be established by a most severe critic. + +Some facts dominate the question, viewed as a whole. It is necessary to +show the work of the scientific mind, which has the result of creating +new mental habits. It is necessary to consider also that the disorder, +_the spirit of evil_, so finely analysed by M. Paulhan, corresponds +chiefly to the interpretations of ignorance, to the exaggerations of +sentiment, and to the dreams, more or less monstrous, of inventive +fantasy. It is necessary, finally, if they wish to augur of the future, +to endeavor to disengage the laws of construction, still badly defined, +of our political fabrics. The thought of M. Paulhan is good at bottom, +and the materials with which he constructs the _possible future_ are +taken from the positive conditions of our mental and social life: in the +practical order, “co-operation” is added to the social systems already +existing, although disturbed, such as the family and the nation; in the +ideal order, the conception, beyond that of humanity, of a “cosmical +whole,” and a “universe,” which, to repeat it after Comte, will be +favorable to man, in a certain sense, seeing that he causes it to exist. + +We recommend the reading of this book. One’s time is never lost with +a thinker of the stamp of M. Paulhan; he has the merit this time of +disclosing to us in a few pages a vast horizon, where some points are +delineated with clearness. Logicism has caused much evil in our country. +Let us now beware of mysticism! + + * * * * * + +One of the most curious episodes of this new mysticism is assuredly +the Buddhist preaching, begun in France by a small group of writers. +M. AUGUSTIN CHABOSEAU, one of the representatives of this religious +tendency, publishes a work, _Essai sur la philosophie boudhique_,[50] +which it is expedient to mention. M. Chaboseau has thought it would be of +interest to sum up in a volume the results of the studies on Buddhism, +and to present it “such as science has proved it, that is to say very +different from what Christian polemists, worldly amusers, theosophic +fanatics, endeavor to disseminate.” He has had the ambition to write this +volume, and for my part, I do not refuse him my curiosity. + +But that Buddhism truly contains a religious formula capable of +attracting to it the souls of our Occident, I have difficulty in +believing. This India is very far from us, and its confused philosophy +is behind us. I do not think that the nations of to-day will return to +a by-gone mode; and then, this doctrine of Sakya-Muni has something +against it, that I hesitate to say, as it might seem puerile: its god is +too fat. Its god or its sage, as you wish. Yes, that breadth of form, +that opulence of flesh, taken as a mark of goodness and power, shocks +our artistic taste. Do not forget that every religion which claims our +will ought to satisfy our æsthetic sentiment: it is one of the essential +factors of the religious sentiment, a compound sentiment where all +the emotions of a race ought to find their harmony. The opposition of +India to us, so striking in the ideal of the beautiful, still continues +in metaphysical speculation. We are too moderate, too sober, for the +debauches of imagination in which it delights. Buddhism will be to us +only a passing excrescence, and I ask myself if it lives well in the +souls where it has sincerely penetrated. + +I should have much to do to speak, in the briefest manner, of all the +books or treatises, which in a direct or indirect manner relate either +to the war of Aryanism against Semitism, and principally against the +Christianism in which certain authors see the most disastrous conquest of +Semitic genius; or to the reviving of mystic traditions, strange dreams, +and monstrous desires; or to a religious restoration, of which the most +ordinary prejudice is to assure the immortality of the soul and to reopen +the beyond to man. These works are in general of slight value; they are +the multiplication of decays, and we are compelled to consider them as +social wastes, of which the abundance betrays unquestionably the bad +health of the organism, or at least a difficult crisis of its evolution. + + * * * * * + +But let us return to the works of philosophy properly so-called. What +are we to think of that of M. F. RAUH? I deceive myself much if his +_Essai sur le fondement métaphysique der la morale_ is considered of +much service in his own circles. M. Rauh, who belongs to the philosophic +youth, the youth of the age, can be well assured that the partisans of +scientific morality will not upbraid him for “the admiration of high +metaphysical thoughts” with which he does himself honor, but he can fear +lest the metaphysicians accuse him of further compromising metaphysics by +the denser obscurities he casts on it. One is stupefied to find again in +a modern book a phraseology so made up of abstract words, of substantives +with capitals, and logical shadows which affect the posture of realities. +Much study, much work, without advancing one step, and still worse, in +order to throw us again into the _culs-de-sac_ from whence we have had +so much difficulty to disengage ourselves. All the profit one can derive +from this dialectic is to contemplate at the end the vague shadow of its +own body that is perceived on the wall. + +The metaphysicians of a certain school are not only reluctant to have +to accept that morality is a natural formation, a social product, an +historical fact; they wish further that the existence even of moral +society should depend on the intelligence that they have of it, or of +the explanation that they give of it. They affirm boldly, and these are +the words even of M. Rauh, that “the fate of morality is united to that +of metaphysics”—their metaphysics. This is a pretension as exorbitant as +would be that of a naturalist who should refer the reality of the animal +world to the idea he formed of zoölogical types, or that of a chemist +who should subject the value of the positive results of science to a +particular hypothesis as to the constitution of bodies. + + * * * * * + +There are certain difficulties of language to criticise in the work of +M. ISIDORE MAUS, barrister in the Court of Appeals at Brussels, _De la +justice pénale, étude philosophique sur le droit de punir_. A curious +spectator, he tells us, of the battle waged between the new school of +anthropology and the ancient penal jurisprudence, he seeks to divine the +issue of it. It will probably end, according to him, in the formation of +a medium penal jurisprudence, which will accept limited responsibilities, +and which, while protecting society, will do its best “to give to +punishment all the advantages it can.” + +It would be exaggerated no doubt, I willingly grant it, to take away from +repression every mark of moral reparation, all weight of “reformative +power”; but I am always shocked to hear partial responsibilities spoken +of. From the social point of view, the responsibility remains perfect; +it is united, indeed, to the very act of having caused injury, beyond +all appreciation. From the point of view of the individual, the word +responsibility has the grave inconvenience of implying that the quantity +of liberty or free-will attributable to the delinquent is measured. +It would be less compromising and more exact, to value simply the +quality, the worth of the delinquent, according to the totality of +his affective, intellectual, voluntary, and pathological character, +according to the nature and the conditions of the act of which he is +accused, etc. We should thus escape contradictions of words which easily +become contradictions of fact; we should no more stumble at this latent +difficulty of free-will, in medium cases—for _serious cases_ are never +difficult. Words exercise a tyranny which jurists would do well to +distrust. + +Is not this, moreover, just about what M. Maus means by his favorite +formula—that justice ought “to individualise as much as possible”? It is +a pity only that he does not present his conclusions with the requisite +clearness. His exposition is not distinct and frank. He has mental +habitudes, subtilities of reasoning, which are of value at the Palais, +but which it is suitable to rid oneself of when writing a book: his would +gain much by being entirely remodeled, made clear and disentangled. + + * * * * * + +M. E. DE LAVELEYE offers to the public a fourth edition, revised and +considerably augmented, of his great work, _De la propriété et de ses +formes primitives_. We have not to recall the numerous facts which this +work contains and the knowledge of which has become sufficiently general; +nor to commend M. de Laveleye, who no longer expects fresh praises for +it. I have only to express the regret that he should have retained the +theory of property expounded in the last chapter of his book, or rather +the metaphysical conception of right with which he connects it. It seems +as if he wished to excuse himself from reducing property to the simple +value of a fact, modifiable in its forms, by indicating as a fixed point +an “order” which shall be the best, which shall be _known_ and _wished_ +of God, _sought_ and _realised_ by man. + +M. de Laveleye knows it as well as any one. Right is only a rule, an +expression of the relations of men among themselves, in a determined +geographical and historical medium. Its changes depend, in part on +external conditions, in part on the characters of man himself, the +state and variable equilibrium of his passions and of his mentality. +If certain forms of right establish themselves proportionally, in the +course of the life of nations, the fact is explained by the constancy +and the universality of certain conditions, either physical or mental; +the repetition of social arrangements, which produces ultimately a +more stable structure and constitutes a sort of axis of development, +is somewhat analogous, if we may be permitted this comparison, to the +repetition of the essential elements in all architecture, or of the +primitive forms in all the products of the ceramic art. What is the +good of enveloping with mystery the ideal we create ourselves, and of +rendering obscure a notion that we can positively explain? But let +us leave here this little quarrel, for it does not touch the solid +groundwork of the book. + +Still to signalise are: _Premiers principes métaphysiques de la +science de la nature_, translated from Kant by M. M. CH. ANDLER and +ED. CHAVANNES, who have written an interesting introduction _On the +philosophy of nature in Kant_; and _L’Année philosophique, Iʳᵉ année_ +1890, published under the direction of F. PILLON, former manager of +_La Critique philosophique_. There will be found in this last volume +two profound studies, one by M. Renouvier on the phenomenist method, +the other by M. Pillon on the criticism of the infinite, an excellent +article by M. L. Dauriac on philosophy and particularly on the æsthetics +of Guyau, finally a bibliography of French works which appeared in 1890. +I wish good success to this publication; it will become valuable, and +it will be still more so, in my opinion, if M. Pillon, will not recoil +before the fatigue, no doubt sufficiently great, of adding to the +Bibliography a critical sketch of the review articles published in the +course of the year. + + LUCIEN ARRÉAT. + + +FOOTNOTES: + +[50] Georges Carré, publisher. The other works mentioned in this article +belong to the _Librarie Alcan_. + + + + +II. + +RECENT GERMAN WORKS IN PSYCHOLOGY. + + +A well-known alienist, Professor Pelman of Bonn, in a recently published +work, advanced the assertion that the literary taste of the day pointed +to a considerable decline of the intellectual health of the present +generation. To him who assumes with Pelman some causal foundation of this +state of affairs, it is indeed an alarming sight to pass in review the +show windows of our great book centres Leipsic and Berlin and to discover +the great number of editions that the products of the literature of a +certain class are passing through. + +Among the books that are at present all the vogue, Tolstoï’s “Kreutzer +Sonata” stands in the front rank. Numberless articles in the newspapers +and the magazines have already made this wonderful work the subject of +discussion, both from the æsthetical and from the moral point of view. +Now comes a physician, who discusses the psychological aspect of the +story, and discusses it in a manner which must claim our interest and to +which in the main points it emphasises we cannot deny our assent. + +Dr. H. BECK has published at the house of Rauert and Rocco of Leipsic, +a brochure bearing the title _Des Grafen Leo Tolstoï Kreutzer Sonate +vom Standpunkte des Irrenarztes_, and arrives on the basis of a careful +analysis at the result that Tosdnischew is a decidedly neuropathical +character. Now as Tolstoï, on his own express declaration in his +concluding remarks, places his own views in Tosdnischew’s mouth, this +judgment respecting the principal character of the story also holds +good in great measure of its author. Generally, indeed, Beck is very +considerate towards Tolstoï’s person, in the expression of his opinions; +but he is nevertheless very plainly outspoken when he says at the +conclusion of his little book: “Let us characterise this monstrous +product, the ‘Kreutzer Sonata,’ as that which it appears to every person +of sound sentiments—as the emanation, namely, of a diseased brain, of a +degenerated Psyche.” + +The Munich physician Dr. Puschmann, who in the year 1873 in a special +treatise represented Richard Wagner, then still alive, as psychically +diseased, has thus found, as we see, in a certain sense a successor +in Dr. Beck. But while Puschmann’s pamphlet, having been occasioned +by certain conditions of affairs in Munich, was written in a hostile +spirit, and while the little book of Beck’s makes no secret of its +author’s aversion to Tolstoï and his works, a notorious representative +of unhealthy “young Germany,” the novelist Wilhelm Walloth, meets at +other hands with an uncommonly tender treatment. There is indeed nothing +remarkable in this, for if anyone is in need of tender treatment it is +a man who is sick. But it is very remarkable that the diseased state of +a nervous system should be accredited to the writer Walloth as a great +poetic excellence. + +G. LUDWIGS, the author of the treatise _Wilhelm Walloth_, Leipsic, 1891, +Verlag von Wilhelm Friedrich, had in so far the advantage of Puschmann +and Beck, that he was not placed under the necessity of originally +demonstrating what the actual state of the nervous system of his hero +was, from his works. This condition had already been established by +expert physicians in a much talked of trial before the District Court of +Leipsic for circulating obscene publications. Ludwigs was able therefore +to proceed immediately with his problem of ascertaining the extent to +which a diseased state of the nervous system had effect in Walloth’s +novels and poems. His discussion of this last question possesses great +interest for the psychologist, although the reader will find considerable +difficulty in accommodating his thoughts to Ludwigs’s occasionally very +singular style. Setting aside the odd expressions of Ludwigs, we may +say that there is exhibited in a pre-eminent degree in the writings of +Walloth, first, what the physicians call hyperæsthesia, and by this +is meant not only an excessive sensitiveness of the senses but also—a +condition that is connected with the last—an extraordinary intensity of +the emotional activity. Secondly, are found numberless bold associations +of ideas which are much better known to the physician than to the +æsthetician. + +Unfortunately Walloth is not the only one of the representatives of +“young Germany,” in whose works the characters of disease appear in such +intensity, and the circumstance that books of this class are bought in +such numbers and read in still greater, places the tastes and sentiments +of a large portion of the educated German public in a questionable light. + +If we turn our glance away from the sensational phenomena of literature +to the phenomena of ordinary life, which are not uncommonly enacted in +the halls of justice, it is in first rank the incorrigible swindlers and +sharpers that excite our attention. We have received on this subject from +Dr. ANTON DELBRUECK, a physician of a Swiss insane asylum, an interesting +little work bearing the title _Die pathologische Lüge und die psychisch +abnormen Schwindler_, Stuttgart, 1891, Verlag von Ferdinand Enke. In +this book the author makes an investigation of the gradual transition of +a normal psychological process into processes exhibiting pathological +symptoms, and shows, in so doing, by ample material, that in every kind +of intentional deception the consciousness of intention can exhibit very +different degrees of intensity and can imperceptibly sink in a succession +of cases to zero. As a matter of course, Delbrück’s treatise is primarily +of interest to medical experts and lawyers, but it will also be of +interest in a secondary degree to all circles that devote their attention +to psychological studies generally, particularly so to educators who +have not infrequently to do with pathological lies, as G. Stanley Hall +quite recently pointed out in a very instructive article in _The America +Journal of Psychology_ on the lying of children, and as is developed in +the work of Dr. Sollier, before mentioned in _The Monist_, entitled _La +psychologie de l’idiot et l’imbécile_, which is also to be had in a very +good German edition, translated by Paul Brie, under the title _Der Idiot +und der Imbecille_, published by Leopold Voss of Hamburg. + +In the German edition of Sollier’s book Professor Pelman, whom we have +above mentioned, has written an introduction in which he speaks of the +work in words of praise similar to those expressed by Lucien Arréat in +_The Monist_. “Sollier,” says he, “has put us into the possession of a +psychology of mental imbecility, in a completeness in which hitherto +it was not at our disposal.” Then follows another passage which we +will also quote, as it forms an important supplement to the remarks +of Arréat. It is this: “Imbecility had remained the step-child of the +science of psychiatry and has not by any means met with the consideration +which in view of its social importance is due to it. If we go through +the works, as great in number as they are in voluminousness, which +have been published in the style of Lombroso on criminals and their +peculiar characteristics, we shall be unable to escape the impression +produced in our minds that the characteristics of imbeciles portrayed by +Sollier recur point for point in the typical criminal. Here as there, +the same insufficiency of all ethical development, the same frivolity, +and the same incapacity for being of use in society exist. That which +in Sollier’s explanation decides the whole anthropological position of +the imbecile—his anti-social, society-hostile attitude—is emphasised by +all writers as the characteristic trait common to all criminals, and +the description of imbeciles and criminals coincides as completely in +this respect as if the same individual had sat for both pictures. The +conclusions that follow from this can only enlist new adherents in the +ranks of the anthropological school, and this result also I should place +to the profit-account of the present book.” + +However profitable and necessary employment with the diseased states of +the human soul may be, personally at least it is an unpleasant subject +for us, and we are glad therefore that we may abandon this domain for the +present letter. + +The occasion of this is afforded by a valuable gift from Prof. W. PREYER, +formerly of Jena, now of Berlin. Professor Preyer has presented us with +a rather large volume bearing the title _Wissenschaftliche Briefe von +Gustav Theodor Fechner und W. Preyer. Nebst einem Briefweschsel zwischen +K. von Vierordt und Fechner sewie mehreren Beilagen. Mit dem Bildnisse +Fechner’s und vier Holzschnitten_. Hamburg und Leipsic, 1890. Verlag +von Leopold Voss. The work contains a correspondence extending from the +year 1873 to the year 1883, in which the two distinguished scientists +discuss (chiefly) myo-physical and psycho-physical questions, and will +be of great interest to many readers of _The Monist_, especially as it +makes its appearance simultaneously with the issuing of a new edition of +Fechner’s _Elemente der Psychophysik_ by Wilhelm Wundt. + +The much fought over and much disputed province of psycho-physics has +also been entered on by a younger psychologist, who has already acquired +a considerable name,—by Hugo Münsterberg, docent at the university of +Freiburg in Baden. In his _Beiträge zur experimentellen Psychologie_, +which are published in parts at indefinite periods by Mohr of Freiburg in +Baden—three parts have already been published—Münsterberg raises, in the +first place, a vigorous protest against Wundt; repudiating on the basis +of the results of independent experiment the apperception hypothesis +which has been propounded by the scientist mentioned, and producing proof +that all kinds of so-called apperception are reducible to associations +of the representative activity. Secondly, he offers us in the third part +a new foundation on which to base psycho-physics. It is, of course, +impossible, in so difficult a subject, to reproduce briefly yet clearly +the developments to which Münsterberg devotes one hundred and twenty-two +pages. But we will at least supply a few hints with regard to what this +new foundation of psycho-physics is. + +In the first place, Münsterberg rejects the notion that prevails with +Fechner and his school, that a powerful sensation is a multiple of a +weaker one, by which the first can be measured. The stronger sensation +is, says he, in comparison with the weaker one something wholly new; +for, accurately considered, the intensity of a sensation is also of a +qualitative nature. However, we are not by any means at liberty to infer +from this that the measurement of psychical quantities is impossible. +To appreciate this, it is first requisite that we should get clear +ideas with respect to the psychological foundation of our physical +measurements. The only foundation of these last is our muscular feeling, +to this extent, that all measurement is founded on the measurement of +quantities of space, time, and mass, and any estimate of the latter is +only possible on the basis of the muscular feeling that enters as a +factor in the conceptions involved. All physical measurement rests on the +establishment, and therefore reproduction, of _like_ muscular sensations; +on exactly the same foundation rests also all measurement of psychical +quantities, of intensities of sensation, and since this foundation is +the same, for this very reason the same justification is due to the +measurement of psychical intensity as is due to physical measurements. +This is the foundation on which the psycho-physics of Münsterberg is +raised, which for a fuller view must be studied in the third part of the +“Beiträge” itself. + + CHR. UFER. + +Altenburg, November, 1891. + + + + +DIVERSE TOPICS. + + + + +THE CLERGY’S DUTY OF ALLEGIANCE TO DOGMA AND THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN +WORLD-CONCEPTIONS. + + +A late number of the _Gegenwart_ of Berlin (Vol. xl, No. 30) contained +an article by Mr. Eugene Schiffer, a German justice, on the subject +“World-Conception and the Office of Judge,” in which attention was called +to the fact that the performance of duties, not only in the pulpit +but in all the professions, and preëminently in the dispensation of +justice through the courts, depends upon and stands in a more or less +close connection with some definite world-conception; thus showing that +religion of some kind forms and must form the background of the practical +life of society. He says: + + “The Church demands of its disciples as an indispensable + condition of serving her the confession of a certain + world-conception; she requires that every one who intends to + take upon himself her rights and duties, should in his inmost + heart agree with her concerning the contents of her faith, + especially concerning the dogmas on eschatology, on God and + world, body and soul, the origin and end of things; and this + is but a matter of course, for the essential part and also the + foundation of her activity lie in these very doctrines and in + their propagation. It is a hard and a severe demand. Although + on the one hand the morally free fulfilment of her requests + contains the germ of an harmonious development of life and + promises an extraordinary concentration and elevation of all + faculties, it leads on the other hand to serious conflicts, of + which the pages of history not less than the experiences of our + daily life exhibit innumerable and sad instances. We recollect + the terrible spiritual struggles in the souls of those who + commenced to doubt, and the outcome is generally a pitiful + catastrophe, either submission and hypocrisy with the weak, + or tribulation, renunciation, and ruin with those who thought + higher of truth than of their worldly emoluments. + + “Most of the other professions and trades know nothing of the + indispensability of a certain world-conception. The merchant, + the mechanic, the lawyer, the soldier, the teacher, the + laborer, can upon the whole think concerning these highest + problems of life as they please. An inner and ideal conflict + between their views and their calling seems definitely + excluded. Outer and practical conditions—such as administrative + injunctions of a certain kind, the aspiration of progress, the + ambition to be better off, etc.—may sometimes produce conflicts. + + “Yet this character of indifference concerning a general + world-conception which is found in the secular professions and + trades does not bear the stamp of permanence. For ultimately + the entire doing and achieving of every thinking man, so far + as it rises above the mere vegetative functions, is intimately + connected with that common world-conception which everywhere + influences and guides him. This is unnoticeable so long as the + harmony of the connection remains undisturbed, but it manifests + itself in consciousness as soon as its harmony is threatened + through some important change of any of its parts. Even to-day + a deep-going change is preparing itself; even now the struggle + about the world-conception is fought more severely and more + bitterly than ever and a new doctrine goes far enough to + uncover the ultimate roots of our civilisation, of our position + in life, of our calling; it attacks and shakes the present + world-conception. + + “This implies the possibility of a conflict between the old + and the new faith even outside the pale of the church, and + this conflict may influence the choice of a calling. This + possibility has become an imminent probability concerning the + office of judge, especially the judge of a criminal court. + + “The dispensation of justice rests to a great extent upon the + presupposition of guilt and the criminal law of to-day is + almost throughout built upon this idea of guilt. It is true + that this view has not always been taken. The Greek law and + the old Germanic law interfered even in the gravest cases + exclusively on account of the objective state of things without + taking into consideration the criminal intent of the defendant. + But this view was superseded in the former case by the Roman, + in the latter by the canonical law, both requiring the + conception of a moral and a subjective guilt, and at present + the criminal law of every civilised nation (with the sole + exception of the Chinese who threaten with capital punishment + him who accidentally kills no less than the intentional + murderer) rests upon the foundation of a belief in guilt. + + “But there is no room for guilt in the materialistic + world-conception. Everything that happens, the activity of the + human soul included is to be explained according to mechanical + principles and thus the view that man’s will is not free is + proposed as one of its fundamental doctrines. While in this + way there is no possibility left that a man might have acted + differently than he actually did, this view takes away his + responsibility. And this movement which either cancels or + weakens the momentum of guilt, has taken hold of the minds of + men far beyond the circle of decided materialists. + + “The foundation of our criminal law stands or falls with the + idea of guilt. With it stands and falls also the office of + the judge, whose duty is the dispensation and utilisation of + justice. He who does not believe in the possibility of guilt + cannot without inconsistency pronounce any one guilty. He who + as a matter of principle or at least within certain not well + defined limits denies the freedom of the human will can no + longer serve as a judge, certainly not as a criminal judge.” + +Justice Eugene Schiffer is a conservative man. He demands that for the +protection of the old world-conception the office of judge should be +carefully guarded against such intruders as are not in sympathy with the +present world-conception. He says: + + “Exactly as the church, in order to preserve herself and + to guard against her theology being diluted into a watery + philosophy of religion, is bound not to separate the conditions + of her life from a definite world-conception, so also justice, + in order to deserve its name, should oblige its servants to + take a definite position toward the ultimate world-problems.... + He who does not accept in his conviction the moral foundations + of a certain calling, must not choose it, or if he has chosen + it, he must renounce it—or he must in his profession act + against his conviction—unless he risks being discharged from + his office on account of a neglect of duties.” + +We agree with Justice Schiffer in one most important point, viz., +the intimate connection of religion with practical life and of our +world-conception with all our doing and achieving. But we differ from him +in another no less important point, viz., in the proposition to prevent +the present world-conception from undergoing a further growth and higher +evolution. His proposition is nothing less than to make humanity and all +its institutions stationary. + +Everything that exists has a natural right to defend its existence, and +so has the present world-conception. But that which grows and develops +out of the conditions of the present existence has also a natural +right to attain existence. The ideal world of the “is to be” is not a +non-existence, as it might appear to the unknowing, but a germ existence, +and if there is no room for both the actual existence of the present +state and the germ existence of a new state, a struggle will ensue. There +are at present and always have been many spurious world-conceptions +which if they overcame the present world-conception would lead humanity +backward to the beginning of civilisation. Indeed most propositions of +reform are reversals which would undo the results of evolution and reduce +mankind to primitive conditions. The fermenting minds of those who still +hope to cure all the ills and woes of society by one stroke, have not +yet outgrown the idea of the perfection, nobility, and happiness of the +so-called original state of nature, + + “When wild in woods the noble savage ran.” + +Yet among all the plans of reform there is one which is correct, +answering the wants of the time; and among all the world-conceptions +which struggle to exist there is also one which is the legitimate outcome +of the present world-conception. It is the present world-conception +enlarged through additional experience and purified of certain errors. +And it is an often repeated occurrence in history that the old and the +new, father and son, have to fight with each other. The heir apparent +either does not know that he is the child of his antagonist, or the +latter the defendant of the present state does not know that he fights +with his own son. This often repeated fact has found a mythological +expression in the old Teutonic song of Hildebrand meeting in combat his +son Hadubrand, a legend which in similar versions appears again in other +Aryan sagas, the best known of which is the tale of Rustem’s struggle +with Sohrab in Firdus’s great Iranian epic. + +Can the struggle between the old and the new world-conception be avoided? +No, it cannot and should not, for the new has to prove its legitimacy +by showing its intrinsic strength; it must show that it has the power +to exist. The struggle cannot be avoided, but the bitterness, the +severity, the barbarity of the struggle can be avoided. Let Hildebrand +and Hadubrand measure swords in a spiritual encounter, let the vanquished +ideas yield to the stronger ideas, and they will prepare the gradual +change of an evolution instead of the sudden rupture of a revolution. + +Freedom of thought is always the best soil for a peaceful evolution +but any system that binds the consciences of men and ties their ideas +down to the average level of a certain age will be as dangerous as a +boiler without a valve. There are periods of instability in history +when the strengthening of the conservative spirit by imposing fetters +upon the consciences of men appears useful and almost a condition for +the development of some kind of a civilisation. This found expression +in the historic legends of Lycurgus and Solon, binding their countrymen +by oath not to alter the laws of the state. But these periods are after +all ephemeral, and we ought to know by this time that we cannot bid +the sun stand still or check the spirit of progress and the growth of +mankind. There are nations which develop slowly because they rush into +innovations, but there are other nations which have gone to the wall +because of over-conservatism through which they were induced to suppress +the freedom of thought and to deny the right of doubting the absolute +validity of the prevailing world-conception. + +The proposition of Justice Schiffer to bind the conscience of the judge +by an oath of allegiance to that world-conception which is at present +recognised as orthodox, is actually a law in the constitution of the +church, and conflicts in the consciences of clergymen are of a common +occurrence. The opinion that a clergyman who has ceased to believe in +certain dogmas of his church has to resign this position is very common +among freethinkers as well as orthodox believers. At first sight this +seems to be the only choice left to a man of honesty and a lover of +truth. I held this opinion myself for a long time. There is nevertheless +another view of the subject which caused me to change my opinion +entirely, and I am glad to perceive that such a man as Mr. Moncure +D. Conway who held himself a position in the church and having grown +more and more liberal has retired from active service, declares most +emphatically that a clergyman who has grown liberal should not resign +but stay in the church and wait till the church forces him to leave his +position. This is an honest course, a clergyman has a right to pursue it +and he will thereby open the eyes of his fellow-men; he will further the +interests of mankind, and people will thus be enabled to judge better +whether or not it is just to impose these burdens upon the pastors of the +church. + +Let us consider the case more closely. First, the oath which a young +clergyman gives at his ordination is a promissory oath, and like all +promissory oaths it holds good on the supposition that all the main +conditions remain the same. If a man promises and binds himself by +an oath to start to-morrow morning on a journey he does so on the +supposition that it will be possible. So far as he can foresee it +is possible, but incidents may happen which will make it impossible +to-morrow. A promissory oath will be a weight on the conscience if it has +to be broken, but it has no legal force. Thus soldiers swear an oath of +allegiance to their king, and under ordinary circumstances there will be +no cause for doubt as to the propriety of remaining faithful to the oath. +But many cases of great perplexity will appear when a civil war splits a +nation in twain so that brother stands against brother and faithfulness +to the king may be the most degrading felony toward one’s highest and +holiest ideals, perhaps also toward one’s bodily parents and nearest +kin. Who does not recollect the sad end of Ludwig II, king of Bavaria. +When the mind of the unfortunate monarch was too much deranged to leave +him in possession of his royal power, a commission of several authorised +men went to the castle where he resided to place him under the care of +a physician. The king refused to receive the commission and ordered his +faithful guards by whom he was surrounded to seize the commission, gouge +out their eyes and treat them otherwise in the most outrageous way. The +commission not being protected were for a moment in great danger, but +happily the guards perceiving the seriousness of the situation did not +execute the king’s orders and we might say,—broke their oath. + +Did they really break their oath? No, they did not, for when they were +sworn to obey their sovereign master and lord, it was supposed that the +king was and would remain in his right mind. He became insane and this +changed the situation entirely. + +The oath of allegiance which the ministers of a church swear at their +ordination is made in the bona fide conviction on both sides,—the church +on the one side and the man that takes orders on the other side,—that +the dogmas to which he pledges his troth are the truth. The oath holds +good so long as a minister believes that the dogmas of the church are the +truth; it still holds good so long as he considers it possible that they +may be true. But the oath to believe them ceases to bind in the sense in +which it was demanded as soon as a minister sees clearly that they are +not true and that their truth is an actual impossibility. It ranks in the +same category as the oath of allegiance to a sovereign who has become +insane. + +But the case is more complex still. If promissory oaths have no legal +force because in certain cases a man would have to act against the letter +of the oath, have these oaths no binding power whatever, as soon as a +minister recognises the incongruity of the church belief with truth? I +should say that they have a binding power, yet this binding power must be +sought not in the letter but in the spirit of the oath. + +One of the most prominent of juridical authorities, Prof. Rudolf von +Jhering, has written a book entitled “Der Zweck im Recht.” He finds that +all laws, all wills, all decrees have a purpose, and this purpose is +their spirit. There are laws worded so badly that obedience to the letter +of the law would under certain and unforeseen circumstances enforce +exactly the contrary of that which the law was made for. Instances of +this kind are of not an uncommon occurrence especially with regard to +wills; testators and their legal advisors being often unable to formulate +their intentions in a logical shape. Jhering maintains that a judge in +construing a will, a decree, or a law has to find out the intention and +purpose of the testator, the magistrate that gave the decree, or the +legislator, and it is this intention or purpose with which his decisions +have to agree. Supposing however that this purpose of a will or a law +is wrong in itself or nonsensical, a judge has to construe it so that +it will have sense. If the purpose is criminal the whole transaction is +illegal, if it is irrational or illogical, it has to be interpreted so as +to make it rational and logical. If it has reference to antiquated views, +customs or institutions it has to be adapted to the corresponding modern +views and to existing conditions. + +An instance from practical life will explain the last point. There are +many institutions in Northern Germany which were founded as cloisters or +monasteries. The nuns and monks have been engaged partly in teaching, +partly in attending to the sick, and in other useful purposes. The funds +of these institutions exist still, and serve now those purposes directly +which they have served formerly indirectly through the service of nuns +and monks. Most of them are employed for the maintenance of schools, +some of them as hospitals, others as homes for unmarried daughters +of government officials or for homeless aristocratic ladies without +means, etc. These changes have been wrought by history as the natural +consequence of new conditions. Many of them were made in actual violation +of the letter of the testators’ will; yet they were made bona fide with +the intention to remain faithful to its spirit? The question is not what +a testator intended his will to be half a millennium ago, but what he +would intend it to be in the living present, knowing all the changes +which the progress of the times have wrought and having progressed with +the times. + +Before we answer the question, What is the purpose of the minister’s +oath? we should first see clearly, what is the purpose of the church. Is +the purpose of the church really to be sought in the propaganda of some +absurd dogmas? Or does not rather the preaching of these dogmas itself +serve a purpose? + +The dogmas of Christianity were some time ago supposed to be the +indispensable instruments of ethical instruction. All the churches are +educational institutions to inculcate the moral ought on the basis of +a popular world-conception. The church of England for instance is a +national institute and it is not true that one church party has the +right to impose its religious conception upon the rest of the nation. +When the church was founded some crude notions were taken to be absolute +truths and no man can at the present time be required to believe these +crudities. All institutions are conservative but most conservative are +the courts of justice and the church. The conservatism of jurisprudence +is characterised in the saying which appears to be its leading principle +_fiat justicia et pereat mundus_. Jurisprudence too often forgets that +the dispensation of justice serves the purpose of sustaining life, +of promoting the general welfare and enhancing the prosperity of the +community; it overlooks the spirit and clings to the letter. + +Our justices are inclined to believe that if a new world-conception +arises, (which by the bye will as we believe not be materialistic nor +will it destroy the idea of moral responsibility, although it may +change our views about guilt,) their whole system of jurisprudence +will break down. They are afraid of a _pereat justicia et vivat +mundus_. Justice Schiffer is not at all anxious to prove the truth of +the old world-conception, he is satisfied with proving that the new +world-conception is incompatible with the old view of justice. Criminal +law means punishment and punishment presupposes the idea of guilt. He +argues: + +“The question remains whether the conflict between the new and the old +world-conception could be avoided by adapting our views of justice to the +new world-conception; yet this question is to be denied, for the notions +of guilt and punishment belong to each other according to logical, +ethical, and moral principles. To punish without assuming guilt is as +nonsensical as it is immoral.” + +It would lead us too far here to show that moral responsibility still +subsists on the supposition of a strict determinism and that the +criminal law with its punishments will not be abolished in the future. +Yet there is no doubt that our views of punishment will have to be +changed; indeed they have changed and how much they have changed, can +be learned by a comparison of an execution of to-day with one of a few +hundred years ago. The idea of punishment in the sense of inflicting +pain as a retribution has gone and it has gone forever. There is no more +burning of the criminal with hot irons, or twitching with hot tongs, +or tearing out his tongue, or stretching on the wheel. The criminal is +executed with as little pain to him as possible. Why this change? Because +a new world-conception has entirely altered our views of punishment +and it is going to alter them still more. Penology is not to be based +upon sentimentality as some so-called philanthropists intend to do; +nevertheless it is to and it will become humane because we have abandoned +the old conception of guilt which as Justice Schiffer correctly states +was a fundamental idea in the old jurisprudence, and this antiquated +conception of guilt has partly but not as yet entirely been overcome. + +The church is in a position similar to that of the criminal law courts. +A change of our world-conception has set in and the church is not as +yet adapted to the change. The church having found it necessary for its +purpose of preaching ethics to insist on the belief in a world-conception +which demonstrates a moral world order, now attempts to perpetuate +certain errors of our ancestors’ conception of this moral world-order. + +The oath of a clergyman having been asked and given bona fide on the +supposition that the dogmas of the church were the truth, holds good +still, but it must be construed as in similar cases a judge would have +to construe a faulty will or an ill-worded law. It has to be construed in +the spirit and not in the letter. + +Clergymen who have grown liberal should not leave the church. It is their +duty to stay in the church and to make their influence felt to broaden +the spirit of the church. If the church removes them from their position, +they yield to the authority at present in power, but they should not +yield without a struggle, to be conducted on their part modestly but +firmly, with reverence toward their authorities, with tact and decency, +but fearlessly and bravely, for they are fighting not only for their +personal interests but for the progress of mankind, they are fighting for +the holiest treasures of the church—for truth. + +The abolition of these burdens on the consciences of the clergy would +be a natural consequence of repeated struggles. Let a pastor be bound +to respect his church authorities, to obey them in all matters of +administration, let him be bound to revere the ecclesiastical traditions +of which he should never speak lightly, but do not prescribe to him a +belief of any kind. Pledge him to serve the truth, to speak the truth and +to live the truth; and that simple pledge will have more weight than the +requirement to believe dogmas which, his superiors know but too well can +no longer be believed literally but must be taken _cum grano salis_. + +Christ says concerning the observances insisted upon by the Scribes +and Pharisees: “They bind heavy burdens and grievous to be borne: and +lay them upon men’s shoulders.” This passage is applicable also to the +present system of ordination. Christ’s saying is read in the churches and +it is, as most of his words are, as new to-day as it was at his time, +but who thinks of its application to our present system of burdening the +consciences of men? + + P. C. + + + + +A COMMENT BY PROF. F. MAX MÜLLER CONCERNING THE DISCUSSION ON EVOLUTION +AND LANGUAGE. + + +_To the Editor of The Monist:_ + +I must thank you and Professor Romanes for the frank and searching +criticism to which you have both subjected my article on “Thought and +Language,” published in _The Monist_. You have shown that you care for +truth and not for victory, and you have carefully abstained from any +personal remarks which are so apt to embitter scientific controversy +and in consequence to render its chief object, the discovery of more +truth, illusory. We all have the same object, we all want to know what +is true—why then should we not all work together, listen to friendly +criticism, accept useful advice, confess our mistakes, and work as hard +as we can in the special field allotted to each of us. + +As soon as I find a little more leisure, I shall not fail to reply fully +to both your articles. At present I only write to you to defend myself +against an undeserved charge brought against me by Professor Romanes. +I had said that Professor Romanes had no right to speak of men like +Noiré, Huxley, Herbert Spencer, to say nothing of Hobbes, with an air +of superiority. Professor Romanes replies that he never mentioned Mr. +Herbert Spencer at all, that it would have been well for me, if, before +condemning his supposed treatment of Herbert Spencer, Huxley, and Noiré, +I had looked at his Index. This is a serious charge. It would show a +want of accuracy unpardonable in a scholar. It is true, Mr. Herbert +Spencer’s name does not occur in the Index. But on p. 230 we read: “So +here again we meet with additional proof, were any required, of the folly +of regarding the copula as an essential ingredient of a proposition.” Now +it is well known that it is Mr. Herbert Spencer who regards the copula +as an essential ingredient of a proposition. I have shown that the facts +of language are against Mr. Herbert Spencer, but I should not therefore +think it right to charge him with folly. This will show that if I wrote +without Index, I did not write without book. + + Yours truly, + + F. MAX MÜLLER. + +Oxford, Oct. 28, 1891. + + + + +BOOK REVIEWS. + + +SYNOPTIKER. APOSTELGESCHICHTE. Bearbeitet von Professor _H. J. Holzmann_. +Zweite verbesserte und vermehrte Auflage. Freiburg, i. B.: Akademische +Verlagsbuchhandlung von J. C. B. Mohr. 1892. + +This book is the first volume of the “Hand-Commentar zum Neuen Testament” +edited by the Professors H. Holtzmann, R. A. Lipsius, P. W. Schmiedel, +and H. v. Soden. + +No better man could have been selected for the first part of this great +work than Prof. H. J. Holtzmann, who is not only a theologian of most +comprehensive scholarship but also has devoted his energies to this +special subject. He has lectured regularly for a number of years at +the university of Strassburg six or eight times weekly on the synoptic +gospels and three times weekly on the Acts. The principle of his +method has been laid down in a former work of his, viz. “Lehrbuch der +historisch-kritischen Einleitung in das Neue Testament.” The present book +contains an enormously voluminous material condensed into a comparatively +small space of 448 pp. large octavo. The author being a theologian his +attitude toward his subject is naturally reverent, paying an unreserved +homage to the greatness of Jesus. Yet at the same time his investigations +are strictly scientific and in accordance with the rules of criticism +as employed in any historical investigation. It is no exaggeration to +consider Professor Holtzmann’s work as representative in the highest +degree; it embraces the most complete knowledge at present attainable and +that too in a most concise form as a practical handbook with parallel +tables and indexes of reference for students of the New Testament. + +The author first formulates “the synoptic problem,” which has been solved +after innumerable vain attempts by the so-called “Marcus-Hypothesis,” +which is at present considered as satisfactory, because it alone fulfils +every condition and explains all the difficulties. Holtzmann regards +the figure of Christ as historical. The impression of his powerful +personality was a living presence in the first congregation at Jerusalem. +But all the interest centred in his words. The words of their Lord were +faithfully preserved by oral tradition. Sentences so short and yet so +pregnant with meaning as “Blessed are the peacemakers,” or “Ye are the +salt of the earth,” “But let your communication be, Yea, yea: Nay, +nay, etc.,” are so impressive that whoever has heard them once, will +never forget them. The interest in the word was soon complemented by +an interest in facts and events which was much later followed by an +interest in dogma. The first differences among the Christians originated +through the mission among the heathens. The gentile Christian became +indifferent concerning the Jewish traditions and clung with all his +religious enthusiasm to the Christ as his saviour. Christianity became +a cosmic religion while the Jewish Christians still looked upon Christ +as the Messiah of the people of Israel. The Jewish view of Christianity +is represented by Matthew, the gentile view by Luke. Mark however does +not show any development of dogma. According to Papias, the Apostle +St. Peter had whenever it became necessary for an explanation of the +words of Christ, occasionally told certain events of the life of Jesus; +which were afterwards written down by Mark. We find in Mark, Matthew, +and Luke the same building stones, but how differently arranged! Mark +shows evidence of relating real facts of history, he begins with John +the Baptist, tells us how Jesus became baptised, how he preached the +kingdom of God; according to Mark, Jesus does not declare himself as the +Messiah from the beginning. His activity grows by degrees, his disciples +increase, he heals the sick, and it is from the mouth of these that +he was first proclaimed as the Messiah. He becomes a power among the +people and makes himself offensive to the authorities who consider him +as dangerous and attempt to take his life. Jesus forbids those whom he +heals to proclaim that he is the Messiah. He sends out his disciples not +to preach him as the Messiah, but to proclaim the kingdom. At last in +Peter the idea dawns that prompts him to declare: “Thou art the Christ.” +Yielding before the persecution of his enemies, Jesus travels North and +East and here he accustoms himself to the idea of a suffering son of man. +His self-confidence increases and he travels courageously to Jerusalem +where, as he could foresee, he would meet his fate. The drama of his +life culminates in his word “ἐγώ εἰμι” (1462) in which he reveals his +self-consciousness as being the Messiah. Being triumphantly hailed in +Jerusalem by people of Galilee and such as believed in him he hastened +his doom. It is not likely that Jesus could have publicly been held to +be the Messiah for any length of time, for the Roman police was wont +to suppress such movements without discrimination. They did not stop +to investigate the case as to the character or motive of the movement +whether or not it was purely religious or political. They never tolerated +any “son of David” or “king of Israel” who held any influence over large +masses of the people. + +While Mark still preserves the development of Jesus’s messianic +consciousness, Luke as well as Matthew have entirely obliterated it. +According to Mark, Jesus proclaims the kingdom; Matthew and Luke make +him preach his person. They make Jesus proclaim himself as the Messiah +from the very beginning and his command not to speak it out openly given +to those whom he healed and also to his disciples has no sense here. +Matthew has a liking for cabalistic numbers, there are three times +seven generations the names of which are not without doing violence to +historical facts adjusted to the pattern, there are three temptations, +seven parables, etc. Throughout we notice reflection, purposive selection +of the material, and artificial adjustment to a plan. The book has a +tendency to show that Jesus was the King of Israel predicted by the +prophets and in the psalms. Luke on the other hand has also a dogmatic +programme. It is the gospel of gentile Christianity as founded by Paul. + +The critical school finds adversaries among theologians as well as +unchristian thinkers, both of whom are apt to speak of fraud when +religious books are written with certain dogmatic tendencies. Professor +Holtzmann objects to such a view of the development of Christianity. He +says that a religion which did not rouse sufficient enthusiasm to develop +a religious poetry would be very poor and lifeless. Even the apocrypha of +the New Testament are evidence of the vigor of the new religion, although +we must be aware of the fact that the Church showed good judgment when +adopting its canon to accept those which were full of moral meaning and +to reject those which were mere myth without any deeper significance. + +We have given this abstract of one part of Holtzmann’s work with +the omission of all the learned by-work for those not familiar with +theological investigation. Similar results are obtained by an inquiry +into the origin of the Acts. The apostles were the first and living +representatives of the Christ. Out of the interest in the apostles’ words +grew an interest in their actions and lives, and there are a great many +writings of this subject preserved. One only has been received into the +canon. + +It is impossible to follow Professor Holtzmann into the details of his +work, but we can warmly recommend it as the best compendium existing, not +only for the student of theology but for everybody who is interested in +the results of the scientific criticism of the synoptic gospels and the +Acts.[51] + + κρς. + + +SCHRIFTEN DER GESELLSCHAFT FUER PSYCHOLOGISCHE FORSCHUNG. Heft 2. Ueber +Aufgaben und Methoden der Psychologie. By _Hugo Münsterberg_. Leipsic: +Ambr. Abel. 1891. + +In this monograph Professor Münsterberg prepares the way for greater and +more important work. His aim is to define the province of psychology and +to investigate the methods which have to be employed. Psychology is not +philosophy; accordingly the consideration whether there is a reality of +an outside world does not belong here. The psychologist is not bound +to wait till this and other metaphysical questions are decided with +certainty; the reality of the outside world has simply to be assumed +together with its cognisability. + +What means ‘to explain’? “To explain means simply to render clear that +which is not clear or to reduce the unknown to the known, the complex +to the simple (p. 104).... It is an indispensable presupposition of +any natural science to consider nature as being capable of explanation +(_erklärbar_), and this presupposition means that natural processes +can be perfectly separated into most simple mechanical processes. +This presumption can be realised to-day only on the basis of the +atom-conception. It is accordingly not an experience, but a postulate +of natural science to derive the whole material world-process from the +mechanism of atoms. A description becomes an explanation in the measure +in which it approaches this aim” (p. 105). The question is, whether in +psychology, description can be supplanted by explanation, whether laws +can be stated instead of mere rules. + +Professor Münsterberg takes that ground in psychology which as it appears +to us is the only tenable ground, viz. that feelings are not motions +and cannot be explained as converted physical processes. Professor +Münsterberg says: “A sensation, a feeling, a will can never fill even +the very smallest space. What is extended in space can never itself be +a state of consciousness. To the psychologist this distinction is now +a matter of course, so much so that it is difficult to call to one’s +mind how much trouble it cost to acquire this insight. The object +of psychology accordingly can never be an object in space, it can +never be a process of motion, accordingly, even brain-irritation can +under no circumstances ever become the object of psychology” (p. 97). +Psychology has to investigate the psychical phenomena of the individual +consciousness (p. 102), it has to separate it into its elements, i. +e. those ingredients which are no longer divisible; which being done, +psychology searches for the rules for the combinations of these psychical +elements and shows us the different complex contents which are formed in +this way by the elements up to that totality of single combinations which +is given us as the contents of our spiritual personality (p. 103). + +“The question is, (1) Are there psychological processes in us, the +development of which presents itself with immediate certainty as +necessary, and (2) can we reduce all the individual and with them all the +spiritual phenomena to such spiritual processes recognised as necessary? +The first question can be affirmed, although only in a limited sense, +and the second question must be unequivocally denied, thus making an +immediate explanation of psychical phenomena impossible” (p. 107). +The first question is to be affirmed in a limited sense, because “if +certain premises are thought, the conclusion, it appears to us as a +necessity, can be thought thus and not otherwise” (p. 108). But this +is “a logical and not a psychological necessity.” To actually think +the conclusion depends upon the will to think it. The will actually +existing, the logical necessity becomes a psychological, for “the +connection between the willing and the willed (_zwischen Willen und +Gewolltem_) always appears to us as necessary.... Where there is inner +will there is an inner necessity.” Now, in order to make explanations in +the physical world, we supplement that which has been actually observed +with not-observed connections. But we cannot, according to Münsterberg, +in an analogous way supplement in the world of psychical phenomena the +conscious states with any other kind of states which are not conscious, +thus referring our spiritual life and acts of will to unconscious +processes, for “the very nature of psychical states is consciousness, +i. e. a state of being conscious. _Ihr Sein ist das bewusst-sein...._ +A state of consciousness, says Münsterberg, which is not conscious, +is comparable not to a body which is not perceived, but to one which +does not exist. Accordingly unconscious psychical phenomena do not +exist. All psychical phenomena are directly given and the reduction of +their combinations in a certain way through hypothetical psychological +supplements is once for all excluded” (p. 110). + +We agree in all the main positions with Professor Münsterberg, but in the +last mentioned point we disagree. Professor Münsterberg limits psychical +states or feelings to states of consciousness without considering that +there are subconscious and even unconscious feelings. By consciousness +we understand those feelings alone which are concentrated so as to be +connected with the ego, i. e. the present centre of consciousness. We +assume that even the spinal ganglions of the brainless frog are feeling +if the skin is irritated, but this feeling can never become conscious, +it can no more be telegraphed to the central station so as to become +co-ordinated with other feelings which are registered in the brain. The +objection may be raised, We do not know whether the ganglion is feeling; +and I should answer, I call feeling anything that is of the same nature +as the elements of which consciousness consists, and we have all reasons +to assume that there is such an elementary psychical accompaniment of +the ganglionic irritations, and that consciousness rises from many such +elements through their co-ordinate combination in the brain. Isolated +feelings are never conscious, and consciousness is a co-operative system +of feeling. This distinction between consciousness and feeling is a mere +matter of terminology. If we find another terminology more practical +we are willing to surrender ours. Yet such a distinction between +consciousness and feeling seems to be necessary for a proper description +of the psychical facts. The assumption of subconscious states and even +of unconscious feelings is a great help in explaining the phenomena of +consciousness. But unless we are grossly mistaken, our disagreement is +merely apparent, for Professor Münsterberg, rejecting the idea of a +psychological explanation, believes in the parallelism of psychical and +physical phenomena. “The physical acts” (he says on p. 125) “reducible +to mechanical axioms can be explained through causation, the psychical +acts follow one another without inner necessity. If we connect both, we +are enabled to transfer the necessity-connection of the physical upon +the psychical and offer thus an explanation where otherwise description +only was possible.” But in doing this, have we not supplemented those +psychical elements which appear as conscious states by other psychical +elements which have not entered into that combination which makes them +actually conscious? It is an hypothetical addition for the sake of +explanation, a _Hilfsconstruction_ just as much as the supposition of the +existence of atoms or electric currents or other physical phenomena which +are not directly observed, but indirectly in their effects only. + +Supplements are necessary for explanation wherever the immediate facts +do not contain all the elements of a certain process. If an observable +phenomenon has not its conditions in observable facts we hypothetically +assume unobservable facts as its causes. But we may incidentally +remark that description and explanation are not different in kind, but +in degree. Explanation is an exhaustive description set forth in its +greatest possible simplicity. An exhaustive description enumerates all +the determinative factors of a process and it drops everything that +is of no account, so that information is imparted with the greatest +economy as well as completeness. An exhaustive description is a reliable +guide to preascertain the outcome of a process, and reveals in this +way the identity in the change, the continuity of the process and the +conservation of matter and energy in their transformations, or, in +other words, it reveals the necessity of the result. There is perhaps +no natural science in which the processes can be exhaustively described +without hypothetical supplements and so the science of psychology forms +no exception to the general rule. + +The aim of psychology in its wider sense will be “to separate all the +contents of consciousness into their elements, to state their laws of +combination, and to seek in an empirical way for the diverse elementary +psychical contents, their correspondent physiological irritations, +in order to explain in this way mediately from the coexistence and +succession of physiological irritations the purely psychological laws of +combinations which as such are unexplainable” (p. 127). + +Our objection to this view resembles much some of the objections which +Professor Münsterberg himself makes when speaking of the availability of +the mathematical method so-called. He says: “Measuring and counting of +psychological phenomena have been made repeatedly, directly as well as +indirectly, and it has been proved that mathematics can be applied to +psychology.... Nevertheless it would be a misuse of the word if we named +these numerical descriptions an ‘application of the mathematical method.’ +If an historian of literature counts the poems and dramas of authors, +if he also calculates how long it took them to write their literary +products, who would call his work a mathematical history of literature? +Even astronomy would be no mathematical science if we counted only the +stars in the sky.” If the aim of psychological explanation were as +Professor Münsterberg here asserts to be reached through the explanation +of physiological states only, we should say, that the physiological +method were alone admissible in psychology, a principle to which our +author rightly objects. Psychical states sometimes demand a physiological +explanation, and we cannot understand psychology without having a +certain amount of physiological knowledge. Nevertheless, the explanation +of psychical states and the necessity of certain connections must be +understood mainly from the psychical elements themselves. Psychical +elements, i. e. feelings, as has been explained on other occasions, +have acquired and constantly do acquire meaning. This meaning which +appears in sensation-symbols and thought-symbols and which is different +in the different forms of feeling (correspondent to different forms of +nervous action), creates a new domain,—the domain of spirit,—and thus +psychical states are changed into spiritual facts. Suppose for instance +that a merchant receives his mail; he opens a letter containing some +important news which sets at once all his nerves into irritation, makes +him neglectful of all other things in order to attend with great haste +to one special affair. How can we explain this instance, or any other +spiritual act through a consideration of physiological conditions. Is +it not the meaning alone which special sense-impressions convey that +produces the extraordinary effects? The physiologist would as little be +able to detect this meaning through an analysis of the sense-impressions, +as an electrician would be to understand the import of a telegram when +measuring the strength of the electric current in the telegraph wires. +The combinations of the purely psychical states may after all not be +quite unexplainable, while their physiological concomitants are in many +cases insufficient to account for spiritual interconnections. + +In discussing the methods of psychology Professor Münsterberg rejects the +speculative and the mathematical methods; he claims a great importance +(and we agree with him) for self-observation. But self-observation is +no easy task; it requires a high degree of training. “He who does not +understand botany cannot make observations of plant-life. The same things +which call into play certain associations in the botanist are also seen +by the layman, but they remain unobserved. Self-observation is in a +similar way ... not without its presuppositions; it is dependent upon a +rich store of ready associations” (p. 164). + +Psychological investigations under natural conditions are classified +by Münsterberg according to their objects, as those of the normal man, +the child, the savage, the insane, the animal, etc. In experimental +psychology, psychopetal, psychofugal, and psychocentral processes are +distinguished. For psycho-physiological investigations we have besides, +(1) the immediate experiment in the laboratory, (2) the method of +anatomy, (3) of comparative anatomy, (4) and of physiology. Professor +Münsterberg concludes with an appeal to institute special professorships +of psychology, which is at present a mere branch of philosophy. It +takes all the energy of one man to keep abreast with the progress of +psychological investigation. “No medical man, no lawyer, no theologian, +or educator should enter into practical life without having passed an +examination in psychology ... the growing generation of children, the +sick, the criminal, and the comfort-seeking souls of mankind have to +suffer if teachers, physicians, judges, and preachers are ignoramuses +in the matter of human soul-life.... But here also the gods have placed +sweat before virtue.” + + κρς. + + +LA PHILOSOPHIE DU SIÈCLE. By _E. de Roberty_. Paris: Félix Alcan. + +The author of the present work, which forms a volume of the Library of +Contemporary Philosophy, is one of those disciples of the founder of +French positivism who, while following in his footsteps to a certain +point, do not hesitate to diverge from the beaten track when they think +their leader has gone astray in his philosophic quest. M. de Roberty +speaks of Comte with reverence as his first guide and his best master, +and he finds in the very contradictions of the Master the germ of his own +conception of the general trend of philosophic development. + +The fundamental thesis of the present work is that the three +contemporaneous philosophic systems, those of Criticism, Positivism, +and Evolutionism, are merely varieties of a single species, as strictly +parallel manifestations of a common stock of beliefs and general +hypotheses. The basic identity of the thought of this century is shown +by the ever increasing convergence of the great leading ideas, as +exhibited in the prevailing theories of knowledge, by the preponderance +of relativism, and of agnosticism. It reveals itself, especially in the +similar conceptions formed by the most varied systems, not only of the +essential characters of philosophy, its method, and the ends it ought to +pursue, but also of the scientific laws which govern its evolution. We +cannot follow the author through his discussion of all these points and +we must therefore restrict ourselves to the most salient features of his +argument. + +Modern philosophy is represented by three principal schools: Criticism +which originated with Kant, Positivism founded by Comte, and Evolutionism +introduced by Spencer. These three systems had a common ancestry, +that of sensualism. The critical philosophy is the legitimate heir of +sensuous idealism, and the positive philosophy the immediate descendant +of sensuous materialism. The evolution philosophy is itself rooted in +sensualism, but it is really a conciliator of the two great philosophies +which preceded it, Criticism and Positivism. This conclusion, which +appears to us just, is supported by various considerations to which +reference here is not necessary. M. de Roberty bears testimony to +the influence of the philosophy of Kant over the development of the +evolutionist conception, which could be applied to society only by +giving an apparent universality to the mechanical hypothesis. This was +accomplished by Spencer, as it had been done to some extent by Comte. +The popularity of the evolution philosophy is explained by the author +as due to its admixture of agnosticism with a monism which captivates +the masses “by the audacious assertion that it has raised all veils and +resolved all enigmas.” Kant, Comte, and Spencer have equally seized this +characteristic trait of the genius of our century. They each treat, says +M. de Roberty, of the most transcendent problems of metaphysics, and +place them carefully under the cover of the experimental method. Let us +add that they are each different expressions of that genius, which marks +the progress of the mental evolution of mankind. + +The second part of M. de Roberty’s work deals in the first place with the +conceptions of philosophy, its nature and its end, framed by the three +great modern systems. The confusion generally made between philosophy +and science is first pointed out, the evil of which arises from the fact +that allowance is not made for the progress of scientific knowledge. The +author is strongly inclined to favor the idea of the general equivalence +of science and philosophy, in the sense that every effect is identified +with its cause. But as the effect is always modified with its cause, +neither the content not the general conception of philosophy can remain +unchangeable. Philosophy becomes thus the co-ordination of the sciences +in view of their general and abstract finality—by which is meant simply +the last term of an evolution—a conception of the world. + +In what do the conceptions of philosophy held by the criticist, the +positivist, and the evolutionist, differ from that formulated by M. de +Roberty? He affirms that they all entertain certain errors of method +derived chiefly from ancient metaphysics. The prototype is found in Kant, +who says that philosophy is a system of universal acquirements formed +of abstract notions, and that it has for its aim the passage of our +understanding from sensible to suprasensible knowledge. The latter is the +_a priori_, the permanent and verifiable hypothesis, for each of them. +It is the transcendental element which all modern philosophy has derived +from the past, and which forms the bond of alliance between faith and +knowledge. Of the three postulates of Spencer, the universal hypothesis +is in the first, an Unknowable Force. The other two belong to psychology, +proving that the English evolutionist, like Comte, confounds science with +philosophy, which to him, as to his predecessors, is a simple theory of +knowledge. + +Philosophy is a method which conducts to a conception of the world. But, +says M. de Roberty, modern philosophies fail in that they deal with +hypotheses. Now, although hypothesis is the soul of the special sciences, +for philosophy it must always be a purely mental recreation. To render +valid the universal hypothesis constructed by philosophers, it would be +necessary that the sum of the final truths of science should include the +sum of the phenomena which constitute nature. + +We cannot follow the author through his ingenious criticisms of Spencer’s +great synthetic formula, to which he devotes the twelfth chapter of the +present work, and which he characterises as the perfect type of the +universal unverifiable hypothesis. Nor can we do more than give a passing +glance at his views of the psychology of the three modern systems of +philosophy. He affirms that the metaphysical transformation by criticism +of psychology into philosophy left hardly anything to the special +science. To positivism is due the conception of psychology as forming an +integral part of biology, which has led to the important psycho-physical +experiments of the present day. But the biological analysis of the +individual should be followed by social analysis, the study of mental +manifestations in society, in connection with which should be created a +special concrete science to embrace the higher psychology, as pointed out +by the author in his work “La Sociologie.” Science, art, and industry are +a projection into the external world of the thinking, feeling, acting +subject, and psychology ought also to be thus projected by fusion with +biology, or with biology and sociology, which it is necessary to study if +we would discover psychic laws. + +In the chapter on the Supremacy of Science, the author affirms that +the philosophy which will result from the progress of psychology and +sociology will present a striking contrast with all known metaphysical +forms, but it will always remain a world-conception, and it will have +to submit to the law of correlation which explains the character and +destinies of its predecessor. Agnosticism, which invites men to bend +before the _Deus ignotus_ of all religions, marks the fatal termination +of ancient anthropomorphism, influenced by a progressive knowledge, +and thus appears as the final integration of all theology. It also +represents, however, the condition of incognisance to which the opposite +state will succeed when the cycle of abstract sciences is completed and +a really scientific psychology formed. Then hypotheses as to universal +causes will receive their psychological solution, and it will remain for +philosophy only to confront and co-ordinate them with the general results +of other sciences. Having arrived at this point M. de Roberty formulates +the conclusion that Philosophy and Science are terms which connote two +principle _species_ in the vast _genus_ designated by the single term +_knowledge_. The most marked trait of future philosophy will be the +distinction of these two species, as their confusion was the most general +character of the philosophy of the past. Philosophy and science will +then be perfectly identified, but the identity will be general and not +specific. Thus philosophy will not be positive in the sense of Comte, it +will never _completely_ identify itself with science. + +In his last chapter, entitled “The Intellectual Series,” M. de Roberty +continues his criticism of the views of Comte as to the law of the +evolution of philosophy. He shows that, so far from this being the most +general law of intellectual evolution, and therefore the supreme law of +all social phenomena, philosophy is only one of three intermediate terms, +the others being art and industry, by the aid of which the evolution +of scientific ideas acts on the ensemble of the social evolution. The +intellectual evolution is the direct consequence of the social fact, but +the social evolution is subject to the laws of intellectual evolution, +which embrace four great classes of conceptions, answering to the four +well recognised groups of facts known as science, philosophy, art, and +industry. We have here the same series of special evolutions as those +supposed by Comte, with the important change, however, marked by the +inversion of the first two members of the series. In this relation, the +author affirms that Comte’s law of the three states is false so far +as concerns the evolution of the sciences, and is of very secondary +importance as regards the evolution of philosophy and the two succeeding +evolutions. + +The author concludes his work with a criticism intended to show that the +principal defects of Comte’s system arise from the confusion previously +insisted on in relation to the first terms of the intellectual series, +science and philosophy. That confusion is exhibited in the statement +that among the ancients philosophy was developed before science and art. +M. de Roberty, moreover, declares Comte’s theory that the industrial +development is the point of departure of modern civilisation, leads to +a complete subversion of the logical and historical. Instead of the +useful or the proper being, as that theory would require, the foundation +of the good and this, in its turn, the germ of the true, the true is +the foundation of the beautiful, and of the good and the useful. But +the true is more complex than supposed by Comte. It possesses at least +two aspects, science and philosophy, which may be really distinguished, +although the line which separates them is yet undetermined. + +We have given a summary of M. de Roberty’s general argument, instead of +referring to particular propositions which may be open to criticism, +because his work appears to us a very valuable contribution towards the +elucidation of the important question as to the position of philosophy +in relation to science. We shall look with much interest for the +appearance of the author’s two further works which he announces as +supplementary to the present one. That on Agnosticism is already in the +press. The subject of the other work is Monism, which M. de Roberty +characterises as “the chimerical pursuit which has essayed, through the +ages, to fix the so-called unity of things, the extra or supralogical +identity of phenomena.” This hypothetical monism of philosophy is dealt +with incidentally in the present work. The “supralogical identity of +phenomena” is a different kind of monism from that of _The Monist_. + + Ω. + + +UEBER BEWEGUNGSEMPFINDUNGEN. Inaugural-Dissertation zur Erlangung +der Doctorwürde vorgelegt der hohen philosophischen Facultät der +Albert-Ludwigs-Universität zu Freiburg i. B. By _Edmund Burke Delabarre_ +of Massachusetts. Freiburg in Baden: Hch. Epstein, 1891. + +Dr. Edmund Burke Delabarre introduces himself to the world of science +with an excellent monograph on motion-sensations, based upon careful +observations which were made in Professor Münsterberg’s psychological +laboratory at Freiburg i. B. The subject of the dissertation is of +great importance and there is much confusion prevalent at present +even among the most prominent authorities. It appears to us that Dr. +Delabarre has adopted the right view and he certainly defends it with +great ability. Professor Wundt rejects in his Physiological Psychology +all the theory of the so-called “muscle-sense” and admits that there +is some truth in the three explanations devised as an explanation of +our consciousness of performed motions, which thus would be a complex +of (1) pressure-sensations, (2) specific muscle-sensations, and (3) +innervation-sensations. This third kind of sensations is of a very +hypothetical nature. The term signifies that, when muscles are innervated +we are supposed to have a direct sensation of the innervation in the +central nerve-organs; and this view is objected to by Münsterberg, who +says that “a brain irritation which is not accompanied with centripetal +effects or central after-effects of former muscular activity has its +physiological consequences but excites no conscious states.” Thus, +according to Dr. Delabarre, without the motion of the sense-organs, +i. e. muscular activity, there is no consciousness; all consciousness +derives its data from the periphery. Dr. Delabarre goes over the whole +field of the literature of the subject and weighs all pros and cons. He +finds that all cases are intelligible without the supposition of central +innervation-sensations. He admits that the term muscle-sense is vague, +but he believes that the term having been generally introduced may be +retained. He defines it as that complex of sensations which results from +muscular activity. + +The second part of the dissertation contains the reports of the +experiments, describing the instruments used and the methods employed. + +We are informed that Dr. Delabarre has been appointed to the chair of +psychology in Brown University. + + κρς. + + +LE NIHILISME SCIENTIFIQUE. I. Dialogue entre le Doctor Oudèn et +L’Etudiant Ti son Neveu. Rapporté par _P. Van Bemmelen_. Leide: E. J. +Brill, 1891. + +Dr. Oudèn’s nephew thus summarises the scientific, or rather +“philosophic” views of his uncle: “There is no God, but there is the +world. In this world there are neither souls, nor mind, nor life; there +is only matter and its elementary forces. Nevertheless these forces do +not exist; there is only movement, the sole function of matter, which is +inert. In its turn, matter has no reality; it is composed of geometrical +points which are susceptible of movement. But as there is neither time +nor space, there is no movement.” Nothingness is thus reached, but +beyond is illusion, the _maja_ of the Hindoos, which explains all our +conceptions of nature including that of our own being. This scientific +_maja_ is not the semblance of a real world, but that of a world which +does not exist, so that illusion and nothingness are the same thing. From +which it follows that there is no illusion and no mind to be deceived! +Mr. Van Bemmelen’s opuscule is an ingenious _jeu d’esprit_, evidently +intended to exhibit a certain phase of speculation as a _reductio ad +absurdum_. + + Ω. + + +DIRITTO SOCIALE TENTATIVO IN BOZZA. Dell’Avv. _Pietro Pellegrini_. Borga +a Mozzano. 1891. + +There is no denying the activity of the statesmen and scholars of modern +Italy in the cause of radical, social reconstruction and, as remarked by +a recent traveller in Italy, in the “building up again a Commonwealth, +founded on high principles of right and equality.” “Diritto Sociale,” in +Italian jurisprudence, of course, relates to municipal and positive law, +in its social-economical and social-political aspects. But, in a country +with the municipal and political traditions of Italy, this “Diritto +Sociale,” even in modern times, exhibits a tendency to crystallise into a +kind of concrete, social religion. The Avvocato Signor Pietro Pellegrini, +the learned author of this book, appears to feel deeply concerning the +present condition of this branch of jurisprudence in Italy. + +In his preface the author says, that during the present century legal +science has not made any very substantial progress; that the revolution +of the last century, while asserting the famous rights of man, forgot +the rights of juridic persons, of corporations, and law became an +_individualista_—or, individualiser. On the strength of his juridic +personality man thereupon engaged in a struggle for his rights on +the vast social field, but he found himself alone—an individual and +nothing more. As such, he could not form a juridic, social organism, +but he merely sought to adapt himself to an actual, external juridic +organisation, differing but slightly from old-time despotism. On this +basis the State still continues to create municipal and positive laws, +more or less adapts them to the facts of reality, arbitrarily creating +juridic persons and administrative bodies, such as the _mandamenti_, +_circondarii_, _provincie_ of the modern Italian kingdom—all of which are +only hybrid administrative _entia_, that do not in the least satisfy a +number of local public needs; and therefore, there is no harmony between +individual men and the juridic persons, between the public administrative +entia and the State, and there is bloody war among the States themselves. + +The ultimate cause of all this conflict is to be ascribed to the +individualism of the law, in not recognising organic, juridic relations; +and this, moreover, necessarily called forth the reaction of an +exaggerated socialism.... Person has a much wider significance than +individual; person cannot be isolated, individual, because, juridically, +person implies an exchange of relations with others; hence, juridic +persons ought to enjoy a greater legal authority than they actually +enjoy in our modern jurisprudence. The _plasma sociale_, or the original +social mould, is developed by degrees into a vital, practically real, +organism, endowed with a physical body, that needs the material means +of nutrition, in order to live, to preserve, and develop itself. These, +however, do not exist; because nature furnishes only sufficient means to +preserve man in a purely savage, animal condition. But, at least, there +exist the sources, or fountain-heads, from which it is possible to derive +the desired nutritive materials; on condition of molding or transforming +those fountain-heads, and of assuming their efficacious, practical +direction. In the individualised or individual system there takes place a +struggle among the individuals for the possession of that nourishment, in +which case, however, the sources themselves are appropriated rather than +the nutritive materials they contain. Such is the exclusive nature of +the social means of nutrition, present and future, through which a large +number of individuals will be at the mercy of a few, while the notorious +“rights of man,” remain powerless.... + +The rights emanating from the organic concept of personality, together +with the physico-economical laws of the fountain-heads of social +nourishment, spontaneously furnish the equitable distribution of +the nutritive materials to each organic member, so that there is no +monopolising of those natural fountain-heads, but a normal nutrition of +all the organs, according to their needs, and their actual capacity as +juridically displayed.... + +Those fountain-heads, besides being limited, are scattered through +space, because it is impossible to unite or concentrate them on any +particular point of the globe. Hence this _plasma sociale_ or social +mold is distributed through space according to imperative laws, that +result from the combined capacities of the respective juridic, that is, +social persons, with the capacities of the respective sources of social +nourishment—of different municipal organisations, of cities, townships, +and villages. All these are pre-eminently juridic and social persons, +each one possessing its peculiar functions, that cannot be exercised +by other persons. The present work contains a lengthy but valuable +introduction in four chapters, discussing the general concept of law; and +thereupon the book is divided into three parts, in which are explained +the principles and development of positive law in its respectively +civil-social, social-economical, and social-political aspects. This work, +throughout, presents a number of equally important and novel points of +view, through which the author’s concept of an organic municipal and +social law everywhere becomes the surest means of creating unity and +harmony, not only within the general department of law, but also within +the sphere of practical legislation. + + γνλν. + + +AN OUTLINE OF LOCKE’S ETHICAL PHILOSOPHY. By _Mattoon Monroe Curtis_, M. +A. Leipsic: Gustav Fock, 1890. + +This excellent study was presented to the University of Leipsic as the +Inaugural Dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, and +it is well deserving of publication, if for no other reason than the +need of such a work. There appears to have been hitherto no complete +account of Locke’s System of Ethics, which does not even find a place in +Mackintosh’s “Dissertation on Ethical Philosophy.” The author has not +been able to discover any trace of the treatise on Ethics which Locke +proposed to write, but his published works “abound in ethical observation +and severally took their rise from ethical considerations,” so that there +is no deficiency of materials from which to ascertain his ideas on that +subject. + +Mr. Curtis very justly remarks that it is important to ascertain an +author’s views before criticising them, a truism which is not always +acted on, as indeed was the case with Locke’s own critics. He does not, +however, profess to criticise but, as the title of his work shows, +to give an outline of Locke’s Ethical Philosophy. In his Preface he +states that his author adopted the Stoic division of Philosophy into +Physics, Ethics, and Logic. The object of Ethics, is described by Locke, +in his noted “Essay,” as the seeking out of those rules and measures +of human actions, which lead to happiness, and the means to practice +them. The end of this, is not bare speculation, and the knowledge of +truth; but _right_, and a conduct suitable to it. In the application +of its principles Locke may be said to have gone further than any of +his predecessors and of most of his successors. As pointed out by Mr. +Curtis, he maintains that the institutions of government, religion, and +education are, in essence, ethical and that all are parts of a system +which must be based upon, and be in harmony with, the fundamental +physiological and psychological principles of human nature. This follows +from Locke’s principle that the Individual, and not the Family, is the +real social unit. Man is a rational, social, religious, and political +being, and, therefore, “in the individual is contained, potentially, all +institutionalism.” + +It must be noticed, however, that to Locke the moral dynamic in human +society is the concept of God. He regards this idea “as a natural, +formal, necessary and transcendental principle at the root of human +nature and institutions, and consistently declares that the denial of it +dissolves all,” as it alone gives a sufficient explanation and sanction +to the principles of morality. This brings us to the very foundation of +ethics. All depends, however, on our conception of God. Locke maintained +that duty “cannot be understood without a law, nor a law be known or +supposed without a law giver, or without reward or punishment.” His +conception of God, therefore, was that of a law-giver, and he believed +that the existence of God could be demonstrated not only by teleological +argument, but also by psychological proof drawn from the being and nature +of man. Locke was so thoroughly convinced of the dependence of morality +on the existence of God, that, notwithstanding his general liberality of +thought, he excluded atheists from toleration. He writes: “Promises and +Covenants, and Oaths, which are the bonds of human society, can have no +hold upon an Atheist.” + +It would be a mistake to suppose that, because Locke believed morality +to be founded in our conception of God, he considered the moral law +referable simply to the divine will, and therefore to be arbitrary and +changeable. So far from this, he regarded the moral law as eternal +and immutable, and affirmed that its cardinal principles could be +discovered and laid hold of by the light of nature. As says Pfleiderer, +when speaking of Locke and Wolff, “Locke also considers a supernatural +revelation to be possible, and to have actually taken place in +Christianity, but he insists as strongly as Wolff does, and even more +logically, that this revelation must not in any way contradict the +natural revelation given us by God in our reason.” Locke expressly +declares, that the reason _is_ natural revelation, while revelation is +natural reason enlarged. The latter he regarded as necessary because, +although reason is sufficient for the virtuous, penalties must be relied +upon for influencing the multitude; and in revelation the doctrine of +immortality with future rewards and punishments is made known. Whether +this revelation is true or false, the fear of future punishment has +undoubtedly had a restraining influence over the vicious. But reason +would not be sufficient for the virtuous without an inclination natural +or acquired, to virtue. It is a question of disposition, and this will +be virtuous or vicious, according to the conditions under which the +individual has come into being and been “educated,” in the fullest sense +of this term. Reason forms part of these conditions which, so far as they +are not purely objective, are dependent on or referable to human nature; +as, indeed, must be the supposed revelation of enlarged natural reason. + +In relation to the ethical life, Locke declares that happiness is the +only idea which reason takes up out of the sphere of pleasure and pain, +and yet that if we aim directly at happiness, we shall miss it. What then +has to be done is to seek out “the rules and measures of human actions +which lead to happiness.” This is the office of ethics, the end of which +is virtue, and thus happiness and virtue are one. With Locke moral +actions are only those that depend “upon the choice of an understanding +and free agent.” The agent here intended is, as pointed out by Mr. +Curtis, the man, and not the will. Locke says that the proper question +in connection with freedom, is not “whether the will be free, but whether +the man be free.” The will is determined by the mind, and liberty is +“a power to act, or not to act, according as the mind directs.” In his +“Thoughts concerning Education” Locke affirms that “the result of our +judgment, upon examination, is what ultimately determines the man, who +could not be free, if his will were determined by anything but his own +desire, guided by his own judgment.” The position of Locke is, says the +author, that of Plato and Kant: Reason is given as the governor of the +will, by its sway to constitute it good. Thence we may rightly conclude, +that those who are not governed by reason have not true freedom. + +We have not space to consider the views entertained by Locke on +Institutional Ethics, beyond referring to his doctrine that property +rights are given only by labor, and not by occupation, and that labor +is the source of all values. The latter doctrine cannot now be accepted +as sound, whatever may be said as to the former, but Locke deservedly +holds a high place as a political economist. He seems indeed to have +been a kind of universal genius. Mr. Curtis refers to the remark made of +him “that no philosopher since Aristotle has made and recorded so many +valuable observations, or given so great a stimulus to human thought.” +Any fresh light that can be thrown on the opinions entertained by so +profound a thinker, especially on the important question of ethics, is of +value and hence we welcome the present work as an acceptable addition to +philosophic literature. + + Ω. + + * * * * * + +N. B.—Owing to lack of space, reviews of a number of new works have +been crowded out of the present number of _The Monist_; among which the +following will appear in No. 3: _Die Entwickelung des Causalproblems +in der Philosophie seit Kant_, by Dr. Edmund Koenig; _Spinoza’s +Erkenntnisslehre in ihrer Beziehung sur modernen Naturwissenschaft +und Philosophie_, by Dr. Martin Berendt and Dr. Julius Friedländer; +_Leitfaden der physiologischen Psychologie_, by Dr. Th. Ziehen; _Handbook +of Psychology_, by J. M. Baldwin; _An Essay on Reasoning_, by Edward T. +Dixon; _Das Dasein als Lust, Leid und Liebe_, by Hübbe-Schleiden; _Die +Bedeutung der theologischen Vorstellungen für die Ethik_, by Wilhelm +Paszkowski; and _Einleitung in das Alte Testament_, by Prof. C. H. +Cornill. + + +FOOTNOTES: + +[51] A companion work on the Old Testament has been written by Professor +Cornill. We shall review it in our next number. + + + + +PERIODICALS. + + +VOPROSUI FILOSOFII I PSICHOLOGII.[52] Vol. II. No. 6. September, 1891. + +CONTENTS: + + POSITIVE PHILOSOPHY AND THE UNITY OF SCIENCE. By _B. + Tchitcherin_. + + PHILOSOPHY OF THE CHRISTIAN THEOCRACY IN THE FIFTH CENTURY. The + Cosmic Views of St. Augustine in his Genesis. By _Prince E. + Trubetzkoi_. + + ETHICS OF LIFE AND OF THE FREE IDEAL (conclusion). By _K. N. + Ventzel_. + + OPINIONS CONCERNING L. N. TOLSTOÏ. By _N. Strachoff_. + + FROM THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY. By _Vladimir Solovieff_. + + SPECIAL PART: (1) Fundamental Moments in the Evolution of + the New Philosophy. Metaphysical Philosophy: Descartes and + Occasionalists. By _N. Grote_. (2) Measurableness of the + Simplest Mental Acts. By _E. Tchelpanoff_. + + CRITICISM AND BIBLIOGRAPHY. Review of Philosophical + Periodicals. Book Reviews. + + APPENDIX: 1) Recent Publications. 2) Transactions of the Moscow + Psychological Society. + +_Positive Philosophy and the Unity of Science._ This article is made up +of extracts from a lengthy competitory dissertation presented by the +author to the Moscow Psychological Society. The writer points out the +fallacy of the “fundamental law” of the Comtist philosophy—the supposed +gradual evolution of human thought through three successive phases,—the +theological, metaphysical, and positive stage of development. The +writer contends, that the so-called “positive stage,” as conceived by +Comte, is really neither positive, nor even scientific, if we examine +its main foundations. As all the world knows, Comte was not satisfied +with the results of the particular sciences, but wished to effect their +comprehensive unity. The writer lays stress on the fact that Comte failed +to perceive the inward contradiction of his whole system. His followers, +in order to overcome this difficulty, were compelled to advance still +another step. Despite the teaching of Comte, they recognised in +mathematics the whole of a science that derived its principles from +experience. This is shown by Littré in his criticism of the system of +Comte (_Aug. Comte et la Philosophie positive_, page 567), where Littré +refers himself to the analysis of Stuart Mill in his Logic. The author, +in order to reach a definite and satisfactory solution of this important +problem, in his next, concluding article, will investigate the nature and +alleged solidity of the mathematical principle. + +_The Philosophy of the Christian Clergy in the Fifth Century._ In +analysing the whole literary activity of St. Augustine, we observe, in +the evolution of his doctrine, three stages, that closely correspond +to his own personal struggle against the three heresies of his +time—Manicheism, Donatism, and Pelagianism. Yet all of these three +stages are characterised by one and the same principle—the ideal unity +of the Christian churches. This ideal aspiration reveals itself as a +kind of constructive principle of the universe; as the supreme principle +of a social organisation of humanity, as the substance and contents of +subjective, human freedom. The Bishop of Hippona,—after thus having +developed the several aspects of his doctrine against the heresies,—sums +up, and concentrates his teaching, in its widest bearings, against +the heathen. Here this Christian ideal attains its fullest and final +expression, and is formulated as a _Civitas Dei_, as the unity of a +universal, divine Sovereignty. + +_Ethics of Life and of the Free Ideal._ In concluding his exhaustive +reflections on the subject of Guyau’s system of ethics, in which the +writer frequently has occasion to cite the critical parallel views of +A. Fouillé and of other English and Russian philosophers, Mr. Ventzel +remarks, that his aim has been, not only to introduce M. Guyau’s +system of ethics to his Russian readers, but also and mainly to show +the relations of this system of ethics to moral obligation. The writer +wishes to say in conclusion a few words about Guyau’s relation to ethical +sanction. Guyau rejected any moral sanction, in the strict sense of +the word, that was distinguished or detached from social sanctions, as +such. In this sense he conceives moral sanction and moral obligation in +his Ethics of Life, in his _Equisse d’une Morale_. If life, of itself, +creates an obligation to work, simply, on the strength of our capacity to +work, in such case life also will create its own ethical sanction. Even +when generously giving itself away, life will without fail, again and +again, find itself. No matter how it be cut short, life will preserve a +vivid consciousness of its fulness and significance and will reappear in +some other place and under other conditions; for, truly, nothing in this +world lives and works in vain. + +_Opinions Concerning Leon N. Tolstoï._ Mr. Strachoff’s psychological +study would doubtless possess an additional interest to western readers +if the writer had really given an exclusively Russian estimate of +Tolstoï’s character and intellectual activity. In this respect, however, +we must not expect to find any very marked deviation from the well-known +current views of the reading public of other nations. “The main cause,” +Mr. Strachoff observes, “why people are incensed against Tolstoï, is to +be found in the fact, that, of all men, Tolstoï has most widely deviated +from universally received ethical notions, and that he antagonises his +century, even in certain delicate problems, that will always be the +dearest to mankind. You cannot help feeling this, when you listen to the +clamour, reproach, and vituperation, that have been raised against him +throughout the civilised world. For the rest, it seems rather odd, that, +at the close of the nineteenth century, there should have risen such a +number of deadly foes against an inoffensive writer and thinker like +Tolstoï; and yet, long ago, we had been accustomed to the intemperate +utterances of a host of enraged freethinkers, whom we have endured with +patience and meekness. Why, accordingly, have we all of a sudden lost +our patient tolerance, and why are we almost ready to start a systematic +persecution against the thoughts and words of a book like the _Vasnaya +Polyana_ (Clear Field)?... It must be admitted, that there is a certain +originality in his writings. Every line possesses a freshness and novelty +that are entirely his own; and yet his language is tame, and the subjects +even more common than in other writers. He frequently describes the +birth and death of very plain people. He tells us how these same people +amuse themselves, eat, drink, and dance on feast-days, cut the hay, go to +church, to confession, and so forth. Occasionally he tells how a jealous +husband kills his wife,—a fact, that has been told in so many other +literatures. But in anything he relates, he has the art of throwing a +strong, clear light upon his subject, so that it seems to us, as if those +time-worn scenes were seen and heard for the first time. In this consists +the real originality of Tolstoï’s art. And he is the same in his ethical +teachings. They strike us by their directness, vigor, sincerity; and for +this very reason they powerfully arouse our love and our yearning for +those deep, spiritual cravings that invite man to lead a higher life—“to +live a god-like life.” Here also, at times, it appears to us, that we +hear about those lofty aspirations for the first time; but when you pay +close attention, you will find that his doctrine is really based on the +ethics of the past, and you meet with traits of that self-same Christian +doctrine with which you have been familiar from early childhood.” + +_From the Philosophy of History._ Mr. Solovieff, this time also, has +chosen a title that scarcely conveys a definite idea of the aim and +contents of his article, which describes the specific relations of the +Christian idea to the historical evolution and political ideal of the +nations of antiquity. (Moscow, 1891) + + γνλν. + + +MIND. October, 1891. No. LXIV. + +CONTENTS: + + BELIEF. By _G. F. Stout_. + + THE PHYSICAL BASIS OF PLEASURE AND PAIN. (II.) By _H. R. + Marshall_. + + THE FESTAL ORIGIN OF HUMAN SPEECH. By _J. Donovan_. + + INDUCTION AND DEDUCTION. By _L. T. Hobhouse_. + + DISCUSSION: (1) Dr. Münsterberg and Experimental Psychology. By + _E. B. Titchener_. (2) On the Origin of Music. By _H. Spencer_. + + VALEDICTORY. + +Under “Belief” Mr. Stout includes every mode and degree of assent or +dissent. To disbelieve a proposition is to believe its contradictory. +Doubt is belief in a disjunctive judgment. In a former article he +dealt with the “Genesis of the Cognition of Physical Reality.” He now +treats of the various kinds of real existence; as follows. _The Real in +Sensation._ The real as immediately apprehended in sensation must not be +confounded with the percipient mind. Sensation as such is real in so far +as it limits and controls the movement of attention, by restricting the +range of subjective selection. _The Real in Judgments of Comparison._ +In and through the peculiar movement of attention in endeavoring to +keep it fixed on _A_ in the very act of fixing it on _B_, the points of +agreement and difference between _A_ and _B_ gradually emerge into clear +consciousness. _Objective Attributes of Presentation._ Dr. Pikler’s +theory of the psychology of Objective Existence fails to distinguish +between the phenomena which are merely observed by voluntary attention +and those which are actually produced by it. The act of introspection +modifies more or less the mental processes which it examines. Their +pre-existing strength and mode of operation can be ascertained only by +elimination of the peculiar reinforcement or enfeeblement which they +acquire by emergence into distinct consciousness. _The Objectivity of +Space and Spatial Relations._ Although we can produce change of place +by moving our bodies, according to our will, this freedom of selective +selection has rigid limits imposed on it by the very nature of space. +This control imposed on our freedom by the nature of the object +constitutes its objectivity. The constant possibility of transition +from one position to another is apprehended as inherent in the very +nature of space independently of our will. Whenever I distinctly attend +to the nature of a spatial limit, I must of necessity admit that space +is boundless. What has been said about the objectivity of space in +general applies _mutatis mutandis_ to the objectivity of space-relations +as treated by the geometrician. The psychological conditions of my +subjective certitude lie ultimately in the impassable barriers, +arising from the very nature of space, which confine the freedom of +my constructive movement. _Reality in the Association of Ideas._ +Association is a cause of belief. If certain contents of consciousness +have once been copresented in a certain relation to each other, the +reproduction of the one tends to bring about the reproduction of the +other in the same relation in which they were originally copresented. +A comparatively feeble association may command belief merely from the +absence of counter-associations. This is the basis of Bain’s doctrine +of primitive credulity. _Subconscious Conditions of Belief._ The +presentations which successively emerge into the forms of consciousness +are only fragmentary portions of the total mental system. Many, if not +most, of our beliefs depend on the operation of subconscious elements +which, in massive combination, co-operate to support a certain connection +of ideas which appears in consciousness as an object of attention. But +such massive support may arise from the connexion of the belief with +practical interests or æsthetic enjoyments, or with some powerful organic +sensation. _Apperception and Belief._ Ideal combinations may be separable +or inseparable according as this or that apperceptive system happens to +be predominant. This is best seen in its pathological exaggeration in +the case of suggestible patients. Under normal conditions the necessary +alternation of different apperceptive masses produces a corresponding +variation in the conditions of belief. _The Real in the Products of +Constructive Imagination._ The work of imagination either imposes an +illusion on the mind, or it does not. In both cases there is a certain +reference to reality. Illusion is a temporary and often more or less +imperfect belief in the product of constructive imagination; a belief +which can be indirectly produced or dissipated at will. _The Real as +Physical Resistance._ In the experience of the irregular interruption +of otherwise continuous series of muscular sensation, which, apart from +this restriction, are producible at will, we apprehend real existence. +The reality, however together with that of sensation as such, being +communicated to the interpretations which we are constrained to put both +upon sensations and their order, gives rise by a very complex process to +the presentation of a physical world. _Conclusion._ The law of conflict +is the psychological counterpart of the logical law of contradiction. + +In the present paper Mr. Marshall examines in detail his thesis that +Pleasure and Pain are determined by the relations between the amount of +activity in, and the nutritive conditions of the organ which determines +the conscious content (_Mind_ No. 63). He states the psychological +conditions for Pleasure to be: “A content which appears normally at +regular intervals will tend to be indifferent. If it appear with +hypernormal intensity or frequency suddenly in the course of the normal +regularity, it will for a relatively short time appear as pleasurable, +but this pleasurableness will soon fall away into indifference.” The +psychological condition of Pain is said to be: “If a content which has +already often appeared in consciousness appear with unusual frequency +or exceptional intensity, it will ordinarily be accompanied at first by +pleasure, which usually will wane until the content appears indifferent. +If the hypernormal stimulus continue (except as after described) the +content will become painful, and this pain will increase in amount, and +having reached a maximum will decrease gradually until it disappears, but +in general with it will also gradually disappear the content itself, not +to reappear in consciousness for a considerable time, if ever. In some +cases, however, if the content be not over intense, we may look for a +gradual decrease of the pain felt at the beginning until a condition of +indifference is reached.” Time is an essential factor in the process of +organic repair. For each organ there will be a certain time after action +has ceased at which recurrent activity will be most effective. Here we +have the physical basis of the gratifications obtained through rhythms. +There is also a relation of rhythm to pain. The throbbing of acute pain, +so far as it is not directly traceable to _pressures_ of blood-supply, +is probably indirectly traceable to the _rhythm_ of blood-supply. +Turning to Psychology proper, the laws of Pleasure-Pain may be stated +in terms of Attention. Pleasure, as involving the use of stored force, +implies a continuance of activity in the organ of pleasurable content, +and therefore a tendency to continuance of Attention upon that content. +Pain, on the other hand, implies a tendency to cessation of activity +in the organ of the painful content, and therefore the disappearance +of the content. The notion that pleasure is mere absence of pain is +denied by this theory, which accounts for the connexion, in a broad way, +between Pleasure and Pain and activities respectively advantageous and +disadvantageous. In relation to Ethics this theory teaches that the _act_ +of will, _per se_, is pleasurable as the outcome of the conditions of +opposition which are anterior to the will-act. Further, action in the +direction of the greatest desire is the most pleasant action. But this +does not show that the effect of habit may not be such as to lead to +action against the strongest desire and away from the greatest pleasure. +Further, the object of desire, whilst it may be, is not necessarily the +attainment of pleasure. + +A scrutiny of the psychological aspect of musical pleasure, says Mr. +Donovan, will lead to the conviction that its origin required simpler +psychological machinery than the origin of speech, which was possible +only through the aid of that machinery. The ear is superior to the eye +in respect of their relative contributions toward making up our mental +life and activity. The superiority of the ear rests on its functional +passivity. This allowed auditory impressions to force themselves into +consciousness in season and out of season. The facts of history and +ethnology which may be given a new aspect when regarded in the light of +the analysis of music cover a very wide field, beginning with the first +and rudest vestiges of communal sympathy and tribal glorification, and +extending up to the national song or epic. It is peculiar to man to +give expression to communal interest in a way which has nothing to do +with life-caring instincts. That interest finds its first and rudest +expression in bodily play-excitement: (1) bodily play-movements in +imitation of actions, (2) rhythmic beating, (3) some approach to song, +and (4) some degree of communal interest, display themselves as the +most constant elements of all festal celebrations. If we start from the +generally-accepted explanations of play-movements in animals, and grasp +the ultimate reason why play-excitement became infused with the communal +spirit, there will be no difficulty in tracing evidence of this spirit +even where they are most hidden by accompanying habits. Success in a +common enterprise tends to preserve it. The natural modes of expression +of the communal elation follow, i. e. the bodily play-movements in +imitation of the successful actions and the rhythmic beating. These +movements give to consciousness preservative elements of sensation. Every +step of tonal development was made in order to prove the effectiveness +of the elements of sensation which could preserve the content of +consciousness springing out of play-excitement and communal elation. The +attention-drawing power a musical tone possessed was enhanced by the +conditions of its production which ensured repetition in a persistent +temporal succession. Animals’ excited cries were both before and after +the stimulating rhythmic beating—produced tones. The same excitement +which impelled to these cries also impelled to rhythmic beating, and thus +produced a persistent auditory model for the cries. The philologist says +that roots are elements of words which analysis can reduce no further. +The psychologist can trace them back to the musical tones which became +reproductive agents of the vague presentative elements of actions as they +had been repeatedly held together in consciousness by the psychological +machinery of nascent musical pleasure. + +In a previous article (_Mind_, No. 62) Mr. Hobhouse aimed at proving +that all reasoning involved generalisation from observed facts, and +that all such generalisation could be shown to proceed on a definite +principle. There are two main ways in which Induction and Deduction may +be distinguished. First we may distinguish the assertion of a universal +from its application. The application of a universal to a particular case +is represented by the syllogism in which the major is a general judgment +and the minor a particular judgment of perception. When two judgments are +compared they are found to be (1) Tautologous—the same assertion of the +same fact. (2) Different statements of the same fact. (3) Assertions of +different facts. A judgment expresses a relation between two terms, and +hence two judgments may be said to assert the same fact when they assert +the same relation between the same terms. But if either of the terms or +the relation differs, then they assert different facts. Generalisation +involves a universal principle connecting different facts. Syllogism does +not. Syllogism appears as simply the opposite side of generalisation. +In the latter we assert a universal for the first time, in the former +we apply a universal already asserted. But in both we are dealing with +the same relation of universal and particular. Whether we assert or +apply our universal, the same ultimate logical fact, expressed in the +axiom of Induction, is at the bottom of the process. But a different +distinction may be drawn between Induction and Deduction. The whole +process of bringing particular facts under universals by observation +of similar particulars may be called Induction, while the combination +of several universals in a chain of reasoning is called Deduction. In +the first, Generalisation, we assert a universal on the ground of a +particular, or a particular on the ground of a similar particular. In +the second, Construction, we assert a relation between two universals +on the ground of the relation of each to one or more intermediate +relations. Construction involves generalisation at every step, and is a +true reasoning process. The nature of the generalisation may be shown by +the typical Deductive axiom. If, where two terms are in any way related +to a third, a relation between the two is observed, then when any other +two terms are similarly related to any third, the relation between these +two will be similar to that observed between the first two. The simplest +construction on which others rest is that of two relations to the same +type, and this axiom applies to relations so understood. The axioms +postulated by Reasoning lay down the conditions under which facts not +presented may be known to exist, and they are thus distinguished from +those principles called the “Laws of Thought.” + +Mr. Titchener severely criticises Dr. Münsterberg’s experimental +psychology, pointing out various errors, and concludes that “whether the +theories of the _Beiträge_ stand or fall, their experimental foundation +has very little positive worth.” + +In reply to the criticisms in _Mind_, No. 63, Mr. H. Spencer points +out that Dr. Wallaschek has overlooked a passage in which the former +recognises rhythm as an essential component of music. He does not +coincide with Dr. Wallaschek’s view, however, since it regards music as +acquiring its essential character by a trait which it has in common with +other things, instead of by a trait which it has apart from other thing. +It is from the emotional element of speech that music is evolved—not from +its intellectual element. + +After referring to the fact that harmony, as ordinarily understood and as +spoken of by him, is concerned with the fundamental tones and ignores the +overtones, Mr. Spencer states that he cannot accept Prof. Cattell’s view +that harmony has been developed from melody. To establish the evolution +of the one from the other, there must be found some identifiable +transitions between the combinations of tones constituting _timbre_, +which do not constitute harmony to our perception, and those combinations +of tones which do constitute harmony to our perception. + +In his Valedictory on retiring from the Editorship of _Mind_, Professor +Robertson refers to the establishment of the _Review_ in 1876, on the +initiative of Professor Bain, by whom it has since been sustained, and he +mentions that most of the experimental research has been contributed by +the American hands “that have been or are now organising psychological +laboratories over all the breadth of their own land.” (London: Williams +and Norgate.) + + Ω. + + +INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS. October, 1891. Vol. II. No. I. + +CONTENTS: + + THE UNITY OF THE ETHICS OF ANCIENT GREECE. By Prof. _Leopold + Schmidt_. + + THE PROBLEM OF UNSECTARIAN MORAL INSTRUCTION. By _Felix Adler_, + Ph. D. + + THE THEORY OF PUNISHMENT. By Rev. _Hastings Rashdall_. + + AN INTERPRETATION OF THE SOCIAL MOVEMENTS OF OUR TIME. By Prof. + _Henry C. Adams_. + + THE PREVENTION OF CRIME. By Dr. _Ferdinand Tönnies_. + + THE ETHICAL TEACHING OF SOPHOKLES. By Prof. _Arthur Fairbanks_. + + THE RIGHT OF PRIVATE PROPERTY IN LAND. By Prof. _J. Platter_. + + DISCUSSIONS. + +Prof. Schmidt’s article is a reply to a criticism of his work on the +ethics of the ancient Greeks which had appeared in the _International +Journal of Ethics_. + +Dr. Adler’s article is the introductory lecture of his course on Moral +Instruction before the School of Applied Ethics at Plymouth. He refers +first to the difficulty in the way of combining moral and religious +instruction in the public schools arising from the difference in +religious belief of the tax payers, and to the devices suggested to +circumvent the difficulty. The first of these devices is that Catholics, +Dissenters, and Jews, shall formulate a common platform of belief. There +are two obvious objections to this proposal. It would leave out of +account the party of the agnostics and be a gross injustice to them, and +it would never content the really religious minds of any denomination. It +would be acceptable only to the comparatively small class of so-called +rationalists or theists pure and simple, and they have no right under +the specious plea of reconciling the various creeds, in effect, to force +their own creed upon the rest of the community. The second device is that +religious and moral instruction combined shall be given in the public +schools by persons of the several denominations. The high authority of +Germany is invoked in favor of that system but Dr. Adler states that the +example of Germany cannot be quoted as a precedent owing to the relation +between the state and the schools in that country. The system, moreover +is not a happy one as, agreeably to Professor Smith’s propositions that +scientific instruction must be unsectarian and religious instruction must +be sectarian, the latter ought to have no place in state schools, at +least in a country where the separation of church and state is complete. +To the third arrangement proposed, that each sect should build its own +schools, and draw upon the fund supplied by taxation according to the +number of children which it educates, there are two objections. Owing to +the power of sects and their influence, direct and indirect, the rules +and regulations prescribed by the state for the schools to conform to +would not be enforced. And secondly, the purpose for which the public +school exists would be defeated, as the sectarian schools tend to prevent +the growth of that national unit which it is the very business of the +public school to create and foster. The correct answer to the question +as to the way in which to impart moral instruction so as to satisfy +all parties will be the solution of the problem of unsectarian moral +education. The answer is: It is the business of the moral instructor +in the school to deliver to his pupil the subject matter of morality, +but not to deal with the sanctions of it; to give his pupils a clear +understanding of what is right and what is wrong, but not to enter into +the question why the right should be done and the wrong avoided. The +conscience can be enlightened, strengthened, and always without once +raising the question why. Professor Adler, it appears to us, overlooks +the intimate connection between the two questions of what is wrong, and +why is it wrong. With the “why,” which is the moral sanction so-called, +he excludes the criterion of right and wrong and confines himself to +conventional morality. Professor Adler proposes, that the material for +the moral lessons should be “the stock of moral truths accepted by all +good men.” This would be a very simple solution of the ethical problem. +Mankind need no longer remain in doubt as to what good and bad is. +We have only to accept the propositions of “all good men.” But where +is the judge that shall decide who are to be considered as good men? +Either Professor Adler considers his own views of moral goodness as +authoritative and ultimate or his reasoning moves in a vicious circle. + +Professor Tönnies and the Rev. Hastings Rashdall discuss punishment as a +preventive of crime. Professor Adams finds that the genius of invention +established the factory system replacing the old domestic system of +industry. The change of a society based upon tools into a society based +upon machinery means that the worker has lost control over the conditions +of labor which he now tries to regain. Arthur Fairbanks says that +according to the ethics of Sophokles, conscience was sense of conformity +to an æsthetic ideal. J. Platter of Zürich rejects Henry George’s theory +as “nonsense.” (Philadelphia: _International Journal of Ethics_, 1602 +Chestnut Street.) + + ωκ. + + +RIVISTA ITALIANA DI FILOSOFIA. September and October, 1891. + +CONTENTS: + + L’IMMAGINAZIONE NELLE SUE RELAZIONI NORMALI E MORBOSE COLLA + SENSIBILITA. By _L. Ambrosi_. + + L’ORIGINE INDIANA DEL PITAGORISMO SECONDO L. VON SCHRÖDER. By + _P. D’Ercole_. + + LUIGI VIVES, PEDAGOGISTA DEL RINASCIMENTO. By _A. Piazzi_. + + LA FILOSOFIA DI EMPEDOCLE. By _S. Ferrari_. + +_Imagination in its normal and diseased relations to sensibility._ The +writer calls our attention to the endless variety of different and +apparently contradictory things that are usually attributed to the +faculty of imagination. To some this faculty of the human mind is the +main cause of human errors, and with Montaigne they call it “la folle +du logis”; but to others, imagination plays a rather important part in +the discovery of great scientific theories. All unanimously admit, that +imagination lends fuel to the flames of all kinds of evil passions; but +on the other hand it cannot be denied, that imagination sustains the +will in every work of great stress, or great sacrifice, by the vivid +representation of an expected final success. All human votaries and +possessors of this fleeting, inconstant mental faculty are by turns +“happy, unhappy, sane, sick, wealthy or poor; it makes us believe, doubt, +or deny reason; it makes fools and sages.” (Pascal, _Pensées_, Art. 3, § +3). Yet how can the psychologist reconcile all this; how can he find the +different circumstances, through which one and the same cause produces +such an endless variety and discrepancy of facts? Several psychologists, +who have tried to follow the flights of imagination throughout all its +different manifestations by the sole aid of style and language, have +been poets rather than true philosophers. Such was Delille in his poem +_l’Imagination_; and such was even Professor Mantegazza himself, in that +chapter of his _Physiology of Pleasure_, which he has dedicated to the +“Gioie della fantasia,” where he describes this faculty with far more +enthusiasm than scientific precision. Bonstetten, in his _Recherches sur +la nature et lois de l’imagination_, Genève, 1807, is supposed to have +been the first to give a minute and exclusively psychological analysis +of imagination; but his investigations seem to prove, that a delicate +subject of this kind, like certain volatile essences, evaporates at +the moment we wish to analyse it, and cannot be defined by any strict +scientific formulas and classifications. And yet, if we really wish +to study the psychology of imagination, we must not be frightened by +these difficulties, or regard them as insurmountable. We may not be +able to reduce all these varied phenomena to very definite and limited +categories, but it does not follow from this, that we have only to make +a simple, empirical registration of these phenomena. As Michaut observes +(_L’Imagination_, Introduction): “Wherever we find a general element, +there also we shall find room for science.” Despite the inconstancy of +the phenomena, it remains true, that also in the facts of imagination +there is something constant and regular; that they are subject to laws, +which might be probably severed from the phenomena, and be reduced to a +certain unity and uniformity, without forgetting, at the same time, that +this fleeting and delicate subject is not always reducible to absolutely +strict classification. + +How are we, accordingly, to obtain that harmony and unity of view, that +will unite and group all those diversified manifestations? Mind cannot +be conceived as a collection of different states, but we have to assume, +that within the Psyche there is something substantial; there is unity, +constancy in its energy; and that this side of its being is also the +principle of its transitory actions. We recognise therefore the existence +of two distinct sources of spiritual energy, that will better make us +understand the diversity of its products: on the one side, the soul +itself, with the formal laws of its simple being, and, on the other side, +the power or force of its sensible representations,—of its reactions. +This distinction, applied to the present problem, will on the one hand +cause us to consider images as the products of an activity of an inferior +order, called psyche soul, but we shall behold on the other, that same +soul, when it has freed itself from the tyranny of the senses, itself +becoming properly what is called mind, its emancipation rising to the +higher function of arranging and organising the images produced by the +aid of the senses. Hence follows, that the relations of either conflict +or harmony which these products of the soul have among each other, and +to mind proper, will serve as a criterion of a classification, in which +we have to take note: (1) of the reciprocal action between sensations +and images; (2) of that between images and images; (in both of which +instances the power of the products possesses an advantage over the power +of mind;) and (3) of the action of mind upon images. By this road it +will be possible to follow all the phases of the evolution of mind from +the moment when overcome by obstinate images it is reduced to a life of +disorder, incoherency, or, as it were, to death of mind, until the moment +when in its own turn mind takes hold of the numerous images by which it +is besieged, and by subjecting them to its own laws—to laws of unity and +harmony—it creates out of that disorderly chaos of images the wonderful +synthesis of science and works of art. From that instant we behold mind +rise through a series of intermediate stages, from abject servitude to +the loftiest heights of freedom, from a state of humiliating impotency to +an unhampered display of its true, inward activity,—from folly to genius. +In other words, it is chiefly this psychic activity, in all its different +stages of development and power, that must be our guiding criterion in +the study of the phases and phenomena of imagination. + +The writer, thereupon, seeks to explain the nature of this psychic +activity in its application to images. He briefly investigates the +origin of images, their immediate derivation from the sensations, and +their intimate reciprocal connection, by virtue of which the one cannot +be produced without the other; and whence there arise many different +relations, that not only explain, but even enable us to classify a large +number of facts relating to this mental faculty. The writer concludes +with some general remarks on the diseases of imagination. + +_The Hindu Origin of Pythagorism according to L. von Schroeder._ This +article was suggested by Dr. L. v. Schroeder’s monograph: _Pythagoras +und die Inder. Eine Untersuchung über die Herkunft und Abstammung +der Pythagorischen Lehren_. The discussion about the local origin of +Pythagorism began with the ancients themselves, is being continued in our +own time, and, from the nature of the subject itself, bids fair to be +protracted for an indefinite period still. In recent times this arduous +problem has invaded the domain of comparative ethnology, comparative +religion, philology, in brief, of all the historical sciences, receiving, +doubtless, striking and copious illustrations from all these, yet at the +risk of almost losing sight of itself. In Pythagorism, as in certain +other products of the human mind, it is difficult to discriminate with +absolute historical certainty between “mine” and “thine.” The real +solution of the problem may perhaps be found in the original unity of +the evolution of the Indo-European mind. The writer, however, views +the problem simply as one of comparative religion and the history of +philosophy. The ancients advocated the Italic, or Tyrrhenian origin of +the Pythagorean system, and among modern Italians, Vico and Gioberti have +done the same. The Chinese origin was defended by Gladisch. The third, +the Egyptian origin, also dates from antiquity, and in modern times has +been ardently defended by Roth. The fourth, the supposed Hellenic origin, +has had the greatest number of followers, and has been ably championed by +Dr. Edw. Zeller in his work, _Die Philosophie der Griechen_. As regards +the last, the alleged Hindu origin, this was suggested of course by the +numerous striking analogies found between Hindu and Pythagorean doctrine. +Still, all that has been said on the subject by Schroeder, Max Müller, +Weber, and others, has failed to thoroughly convince the writer. In his +next article he promises to show, that everything has induced him to +believe that the Hindus themselves rather borrowed their doctrine of +transmigration from the philosophical system of Pythagoras. + +_Luigi Vives. A Pedagogist of the Renaissance._ The interesting subject +of this article is probably to this day but little understood or +appreciated by the pedagogists of northern Europe. To this day, many +among them seem ignorant of the fact, or, perhaps, are unwilling to +frankly admit, that along with the Catholic revival, and the intellectual +renaissance of the Latin nations, there was initiated the tradition of +really humane pedagogics, founded on the nature of man, and, in its aim +and workings, vastly superior to the educational systems of the nations +beyond the Alps. It was an earnest, liberal, refining educational +system, that professed an affectionate regard for youth. It banished +corporal punishment, and addressed itself directly to the heart and the +intelligence. The Jesuit maxim: “debetur pueris maxima reverentia,” still +recalls the original spirit of this humane system of education. It is +perhaps not an exaggeration to maintain, that, in the spirit of the time, +it also aimed at the _beautiful_ in education. It was a declared enemy +to any thought, speech or action in _bad form_. To the subject of this +article, the Spanish bishop of Valencia, Louis Vives, is due the honor +of having been one of the most ardent and successful promoters of this +new educational system, and to have been the Jean Jacques Rousseau of +his time. Vives was born in the year 1492, and died in the year 1540. He +had studied at the University of Paris, and was an intimate friend of +Erasmus of Rotterdam. He is moreover the author of a number of valuable +educational works. Bishop Vives, however, must also be regarded as a +clergyman, who in his practical career would at times find it difficult +to reconcile his broad-minded scholastic ideals with the duties of +his calling, and with the exaggerated ascetical tendencies by which +he was surrounded. As a matter of fact, in a short time the church is +seen practically to override all this liberal educational movement of +the renaissance. Within the college- and convent-walls, in the Latin +countries, the humane paternal pedagogics of the renaissance soon and +easily degenerated into oppressive, injurious, personal surveillance, and +an odious theocratic tyranny. With all our sincere admiration for the +work initiated by men like Louis Vives, we must nevertheless maintain, +that all, or nearly all, the ecclesiastic educational systems of the +Latin countries during the following centuries, can scarcely lay valid +claims to a place within the pale of true pedagogical science. + +_The Philosophy of Empedocles._ In this concluding article the writer +exhaustively discusses the religious tenets and ethical precepts of +Empedocles, as both appear in the Proëmium, in the third book on Physics, +and in the poem of the “καθαρμοί”—or expiatory atonements. + +_Bibliography._ In this department we notice a lengthy review of Prof. E. +Dal Pozzo di Mombello’s _Lectures on Monism_, delivered at the University +of Perugia. In this number are also contained the _Bollettino Pedagogico +Filosofico_, _Critical Notices_, and _Recent Publications_. (Rome. +Tipografia delle Terme Diocleziane. 1891.) + + γνλν. + + +REVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE. November, 1891. No. II. + +CONTENTS: + + LES ORIGINES DE NOTRE STRUCTURE INTELLECTUELLE ET CÉRÉBRALE. I. + Le Kantisme. By _A. Fouillée_. + + DU RÔLE DE LA VOLONTÉ DANS LA CROYANCE. By _J. J. Gourd_. + +In discussing the part of the will played in belief, M. J. J. Gourd +considers our belief in an ultra-phenomenal reality which he calls +“metaphysical belief.” “All thought,” he says, “involves a relation, +viz. a relation between subject and object. Every relation presupposes a +comparison of its terms and this comparison is not established if the +subject and object belong to different worlds. The subject is undoubtedly +found in consciousness, the object must be there also. All the ingenious +arguments to escape this conclusion are vain. Accordingly, one may well +believe in the truth of the metaphysical belief, but this belief is not +true.” + +M. G. Tarde, the great criminologist and an opponent of Professor +Lombroso’s school reviews the penological and criminological literature +of recent times in France, Italy, and Belgium. + +Alfred Fouillée revises in the article on “the origin of our intellectual +and cerebral structure” several solutions of the problem of the nature +of thought-forms, especially Kant’s view of the _a priori_. Strongly +influenced by Schopenhauer, he makes of the great pessimist’s will-theory +quite an original and peculiar application and finds that the question of +“_idées-forces_” is also at the bottom of the question of the origin of +ideas. In comparing the origin of ideas to the origin of solar systems, +he says: “Ideas are the condensation of that which exists everywhere in +a nebulous state into luminous centres and conscious focuses. Sensation +is desire.” And he sums up his view in the sentence: “Nihil est in +intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu et voluntate.” (Paris: Félix +Alcan.) + + κρς. + + +ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR PSYCHOLOGIE UND PHYSIOLOGIE DER SINNESORGANE. Vol. II. +No. 5. + +CONTENTS: + + DIE SINNE DER VERBRECHER. By _C. Lombroso_ and _S. Ottolenghi_. + (Mit 4 Figuren.) + + UEBER VERGLEICHUNGEN VON TONDISTANZEN. By _Gustav Engel_. + + LITTERATURBERICHT. + +Cesare Lombroso and his assistant S. Ottolenghi communicate the results +of their investigations of the senses of born criminals in a similar +way as the former of the two had done in his “Studies in Criminal +Anthropology,” _The Monist_, Vol. i, No. 2, p. 177 et sqq. Our authors +say: “Since the days of the famous Greek sage who said that nothing came +into the intellect save through the gateway of the senses, it could be +foreseen that a study of the senses would become the gateway to ethics.” +And, it is a fact recognised for some time but not as yet proved by exact +methods that a lack of moral sense is often accompanied with an obtusity +of the sense-organs. Dr. Azam’s famous Felida showed an entire absence of +the moral sense when she was in a state of analgesia; Romanes has pointed +out that the sensitiveness to pain is greater in tame animals than in +wild beasts, this is especially noticeable in the dog. It is noteworthy +also that savage peoples are almost insensible to pain while civilisation +often increases sensibility till it becomes hyperæsthesia. + +Obtusity of the sense-organs in criminals should not be confounded +however with the anæsthesia of criminals, because the rarity of +laterality, the absence of isolated insensible places, the lack of motory +anomalies, etc., exclude the supposition of hysteria. + +Our authors found among 15 criminal boys between 10 and 14 years no less +than ten cases of absolute analgesia, which proves that this symptom +cannot be the effect of alcoholism, syphilis, marasmus, or overwork of a +special trade. + +Several anecdotes are told about the insensibility to pain. An old thief +had his leg amputated with the greatest apathy: the operation done, he +took the limb into his hand and joked about it. An inveterate murderer, +his penal servitude being ended, was dismissed out of the bagnio of the +island S. He asked the warden to be retained, because he did not know how +to get food and shelter. His demand being refused, he opened his bowels +with the handle of a spoon, went to bed as usual, and died without even a +sigh. Mandrin, a criminal, shortly before his execution allowed himself +to be cut in eight places without giving a sign of pain; criminal R. +flayed the skin of his face with a piece of glass. In the penitentiary at +Chatham during the years 1871 and 1872, 841 voluntary wounds and injuries +were made. Among them 27 convicts had mutilated some limb, and in 17 +cases the limb had to be amputated. + +This obtusity of the sensory organs in criminals is supposed to be of +a cortical origin and being similar to the phenomena of savage life is +interpreted as atavism. Criminals show deficiencies in the senses of +touch, smell, taste, and hearing, but not of sight. And this is analogous +to the savage in whom the sense of sight is naturally very strong, and +no criminal could execute numerous thefts or escape the arm of justice +without a high development of the sense of sight. + +In the second article on comparisons of tone-distances Gustav Engel, +Professor at the Royal High-school of Music in Berlin, takes occasion +to explain his views of the subject with reference to the severe +criticism of C. Stumpf on Carl Lorenz’s theory. Wilhelm Wundt had taken +part in the discussion in favor of Lorenz. The subject of the article +lies in the border-land between the physiology of hearing and music; +and Professor Engel comes to the conclusion that affinity of tones, i. +e. the interval-sense in a melodious succession does not lead to the +same accuracy and reliability of hearing as their concord. He objects +to the idea of an arithmetical difference as proposed by Lorenz and +Wundt, and proves it through the fact that the Pythagorean tierce in +the unaccompanied scale makes a less noticeable disturbance than in a +concord, while the approximately pure tierce (which is too low only +by a small fracture of a comma) is excellent in the concord while it +causes a slight disturbance in the melody. Musical intervals are not +identical with the geometrical intervals, yet they are based upon them as +a selection made among innumerable possibilities for certain purposes. +Their acceptance is established only in harmonic music, but this fact too +adds some difficulties to the investigations made in this field, for if +two tones sound together, we can no longer distinguish them separately, +as would be required for the investigation; and if we let the one succeed +the other their geometrical relation is no longer discerned with the same +precision. (Hamburg and Leipsic: Leopold Voss.) + + κρς. + + +VIERTELJAHRSSCHRIFT FÜR WISSENSCHAFTLICHE PHILOSOPHIE. Vol. XV. Nos. 3 +and 4. + +CONTENTS of No. 3: + + PSYCHISCHE UND PHYSISCHE ACTIVITÄT. By _H. Höffding_. + + UEBER SPRACHREFLEX, NATIVISMUS UND ABSICHTLICHE SPRACHBILDUNG. + (Achter Artikel.) By _A. Marty_. + + ZUR PHILOSOPHIE DER MATHEMATIK. By _Chr. v. Ehrenfels_. + + DER FOLGERUNGSCALCUL UND DIE INHALTSLOGIK. By _E. G. Husserl_. + +CONTENTS of No. 4: + + DIE GESETZMÄSSIGKEIT DER PHYSISCHEN ACTIVITÄT. By _H. Höffding_. + + ETHNOLOGIE UND ÆSTHETIK. By _E. Grosse_. + + UEBER DIE FORTSCHREITENDE ENTWICKLUNG DES MENSCHENGESCHLECHTS. + (Erster Artikel.) By _F. Rosenberger_. + + UEBER SPRACHREFLEX, NATIVISMUS UND ABSICHTLICHE SPRACHBILDUNG. + (Neunter Artikel). By _A. Marty_. + + UEBER FERNWIRKUNG UND ANORMALE. WAHRNEHMUNGSFÄKHIGKEIT. + Methodologische Randglossen. By _M. Offner_. + +Prof. H. Höffding’s article on psychical and physical activity is an +answer to a criticism by Professor Kroman. Professor Höffding had +proposed, concerning the relation of the psychical to the physical, a +theory which he called the “identity hypothesis,” according to which +the physical and psychical activities are not different in their nature +but only in their phenomenal appearance. K. Kroman, a countryman and +colleague of H. Höffding—both are professors at the University of +Copenhagen—rejected in his recent work “Logic and Psychology” the +identity hypothesis and characterised it as “Duplicism,” a name against +which Höffding protests. Kroman’s objections are as follows: _a_) Natural +science knows of no reason to conceive of the relation of the psychical +to the material in the way expressed by the identity-hypothesis. _b_) +On the basis of the identity-hypothesis it remains unexplained how we +can know anything about the external world. _c_) It is inexplicable how +an identity can obtain of two so different things as are the bodily +multiplicity and the psychical unity. Professor Höffding investigates +these three objections separately and comes to the conclusion that +his identity-hypothesis shows the relation between the psychical and +material nature in a clear and simple light. It excludes on the one hand +materialism and on the other hand spiritualism. The question whether +either phenomenon, spirit or matter, represents the absolute nature of +existence, cannot, according to Höffding, be answered. It appears to +us that Professor Höffding’s position is sound in all main points and +may be considered as that view which is most prevalent among modern +psychologists. However, concerning the question whether spirit or matter +represents the absolute nature of existence, we refer the reader to the +editorial article “Are there Things in Themselves?” section XII, “The +Oneness of Subjectivity and Objectivity.” In our opinion the question +itself is illegitimate. Neither the subjectivity of spirit, nor the +objectivity of matter represents the absolute nature of existence; +both together form the nature of existence; and we omit here the word +“absolute” purposely. The question as to which abstract, matter or +spirit, represents the absolute nature of existence seems to us similar +to the question which of the two terms _A_ and _B_ represents in the +relation _A:B_ the absolute nature of the relation. The obvious answer is +neither. + +The eighth article of A. Marty of Prague on Language-reflex is mainly of +a controversial nature directed against L. Tobler’s article on the origin +of language in the _Zeitschrift für Völker-Psychologie_. By Nativism, +Marty understands the theory that certain involuntary articulate sounds +are associated with certain ideas, while the so-called empirical theory +attempts to explain the origin of the first words without such innate +mechanical relations between sounds and concepts. Marty represents the +empirical solution of the problem and objects to the extreme nativism, +but he grants that Tobler’s modified nativism approaches very much to his +own position. + +The longest article of the present number (63 pp.) is an essay full of +valuable hints by Chr. v. Ehrenfels on the Philosophy of Mathematics. +The epistemological basis of mathematics demands a psychological +investigation of its contents. Accordingly the author proposes to present +a psychological characterisation of the number-conceptions, from +which he derives some conclusions concerning the theory of cognition. +He investigates the origin of the unity conception which is generally +defined as “positing a unit” or as “conceiving as a unit.” We usually +believe that we abstract numbers directly from the objects, when we +look for instance at one house with two doors and five windows. But +this process of abstraction is not quite so direct as it seems. The +number-conception is not taken from external observation, but carried +into the same; yet this is done involuntarily and inadvertently so that +it appears as if they were _eo ipso_ contained in it. + +What is the origin of the concepts “unity” and “multiplicity”? Two +methods present themselves: 1) The concentration of attention and (2) +the act of bringing into relation. The former produces a unity and, +when successively directed to several objects, a series of units. The +latter appears to be required by the consideration that the conception +of a number is conditioned by acts of distinguishing. The number +“two” requires two acts of distinguishing, “three” requires three, +“four” requires six and the number _n_ requires _n_/2(_n_-1) acts +of distinguishing. This explains why we can have clear and direct +conceptions only of very low figures. The idea that a combination of both +methods will explain the facts is by no means excluded. But there is a +third source which may be used to explain the unity conception, viz. +inner experience. “The unity of consciousness,” Ehrenfels says, “has been +misused in philosophy to demonstrate the substantiality, simplicity, +and indestructibility of the soul.” Nevertheless there is some truth in +the unity idea, for the present psychical phenomena present themselves +in a peculiar amalgamation, which admits of a comparison between two +elements while it erects a barrier between the _ego_ and the _tu_. Our +psychical contents will always appear to us as a unit; and on this basis +we might declare that the unity conception is derived from this source. +[Here Ehrenfels does not see that the concentration of attention is +practically the same as the unity of consciousness, for attention means +consciousness, and concentration produces unity.] + +Number-conceptions originate by counting. We disjoin things; for +instance, we throw a number of apples into a basket, or we let the finger +slide over the division lines of a measuring stick naming each unit while +proceeding in the act. From such processes the function of counting +can be abstracted while the details are neglected as unimportant. Most +of the higher numbers are never directly but only indirectly realised. +So for instance twenty is to many that number which will be reached by +counting up to twenty, yet the single units of the number are lost sight +of entirely. Such number-conceptions belong to the class of “indirect +concepts” which represent objects not through marks belonging to the +object itself, but originating through its relation to other objects. +The basis of such indirect concepts had been called by Ehrenfels +_Gestaltsqualitäten_, i. e. figure qualities, and by Meinong _fundierte +Inhalte_ or founded contents. Thus indirect conceptions are parts +contingent upon some such basis. + +Number-conceptions are not always clearly thought out and there are some +helps to represent higher or more complex numbers. Thus we can think of +ten as represented by the outside and inside corners of a pentagram, +twelve as the edges of a cube, etc., and common among all nations is the +usage of the fingers to represent numbers up to ten. Such helps are quite +different from indirect number-conceptions and may be called figurative +number-conceptions. + +That there are mathematical conceptions of magnitudes which have no +objective analogon is quite natural, for there is even in an indirect +conception no warrant for its objective reality; and we ought to +consider how many word- and idea-combinations are possible without +their possessing some analogous reality. Yet the so-called irrational +cannot properly be called a number, it is the demand of a number which +in fractions can sufficiently for certain purposes but never fully be +realised. + +Negative numbers always presuppose a contrast and such conditions arise +naturally wherever the fundamental ideas imply two opposite directions, +for instance past and future in time, credit and debit in business, etc. +It is a matter of course that there are in reality as little either +positive or negative numbers, as there are positive or negative colors or +sounds. + +Concerning the necessity idea, Ehrenfels says: “Nobody will consider +it as possible that five plus seven will in some cases make any other +number than twelve. We are confident that the same addition will under +all circumstances yield the same sum.” Ehrenfels grants the psychical +certitude of this but not the mathematical, and thinks that on this +point there is a difference of opinion allowable. Here we disagree from +Ehrenfels and refer the reader to former articles on kindred subjects in +_The Monist_, especially the article on “The Origin of Thought-forms,” +Vol. II, p. 111. We must bear in mind that in mathematics we are moving +in a realm of pure forms and the statement 7 + 5 = 12 is, as the Germans +express it, _eindeutig bestimmt_, i. e. it is determined exhaustively in +one and the only one possible way. The numbers 7 and 5 being rigid, their +sum and their product will also be rigid. + +This difference of opinion may be contingent upon a difference of the +conception of the _a priori_. Ehrenfels defines as “a priori” such +judgments which having come into our possession, are readily accepted +without proof. We follow Grassmann in rejecting the acceptance of +anything without proof, including the idea of mathematical axioms. The +_a priori_ in our terminology becomes identical with that which pertains +to formal thought: and it would make no difference whether the instance +presented is as simple as 1 + 1 = 2 or extremely complex as are the +differential calculus and logarithms. Accordingly we disagree also from +Ehrenfels when he finds even in such additions as for instance 825 + +217 = 1042 vestiges of an _a posteriori_ character. The employment of +the logarithms accordingly appears to Ehrenfels also _aposterioristic_ +because the fruits of other peoples’ labors are utilised! + +Concerning John Stuart Mill’s view of the subject, Ehrenfels says that +“it is still deeply entangled in the errors of that conception which it +so bitterly opposes, viz. in the formalism of the old purely _a priori_ +conception. For only he who adheres to the view that all mathematics +are deduced from a few axioms can think of attributing to those axioms +the highest degree of plausibility which is assumed for them on the +ground of comprehensive deduction.” We agree with Ehrenfels’s objection +to Mill, but we cannot agree with his view that mathematics derives any +elements from _a posteriori_ elements, although we grant that quite new +departments are created simply by a different employment of certain +functions. Accordingly mathematics cannot be derived from a few axioms +only but is the products of certain functions. + +Ehrenfels calls attention to the fact that the mathematician operating +with symbols often forgets entirely what he has to think of in connection +with these symbols. “This is not strange,” he adds, “for thoughtless +word-combinations present analogous instances, yet it is strange that +the result almost without exception comes out right; _es stimmt!_” We +object here; operations with mathematical symbols are not thoughtless +combinations, at least, they are not meaningless. They are operations +not with things, but with symbols representing certain relations among +things. When gamblers play with chips representing real money, they need +not think during the game of the value represented by a chip, and yet +when the account is made, the result attained with the assistance of the +chips will come out right. There is no reason to wonder at it. Chips like +mathematical symbols might in a certain sense be called thoughtless, for +certainly they do not think; but they are not thoughtless in the sense +that they are meaningless, that nothing is thought by them. + +Ehrenfels apparently sees a problem where there is none and this is +closely connected with another point. He looks upon the mathematician’s +inability of thinking out in every respect the objective meaning of +mathematical symbols as a shortcoming of man’s intellect. While it +appears that we cannot think anything by many mathematical symbols (for +instance by _a⁰ = 1_) except the symbol itself, the enormous success +of mathematical thought is evidence that they must have some definite +meaning although it is to be excogitated only by those beings who will +transgress the average intelligence of to-day, the first germs of whose +existence are the mathematical geniuses of the present generation. It +appears to us that undoubtedly every mathematical symbol has a definite +meaning, representing the result of some function. That the result will +sometimes be unattainable or unrealisable, that especially all operations +with zero make the whole calculation indefinite (which naturally arises +from the nature of zero) does not alter the truth of this proposition in +the least. + +We have to make one additional remark. The peculiarity of mathematics +that we do not throughout our operations think out the meaning of the +symbols is not a shortcoming of our intelligence, but the strength of +mathematical science. The advantage of all the formal sciences and +especially of mathematics consists in this that we _need not_ think out +every detail, but that we can, through the assistance of mathematical +symbols, perform the most intricate operations with machine-like +exactness. The economy of thought produced in this way is not a +deficiency of man’s mind, but a virtue. + +Prof. H. Höffding (in No. 4) insists upon the causal law as being +indispensable in psychology. There are some people and among others his +colleague Professor Kroman who regard moral motives as an exception. +“Yet,” says Professor Höffding, “should the decisive moment of a decision +not be determined by the causal law, the will could never be determined +through a reflection on the possible effects of the action and thus every +reason would be missing to attribute to man any responsibility.” + +E. Grosse expatiates on the proposition to apply the comparative method +of ethnology to æsthetics. Ferd. Rosenberger proposes the following +programme: “Knowledge is power; activity based upon such power is the +cause of happiness. Therefore with the increase of knowledge, there is +an increase of happiness, successful activity however is impossible +without virtue. Therefore we conclude that an increase of happiness will +be accompanied with an increase of virtue.” A. Marty in this his ninth +article blames Steinthal for having misrepresented the eighteenth century +theories of the origin of language. + +M. Offner reviews Dr. Charles Richet’s reports of his telepathic +experiments, but the reviewer cannot assent to Richet’s opinion “that +these facts possess a strange coincidence and that they are, probably, +the result of a relation and not of pure chance.” (Leipsic: O. R. +Reisland.) + + κρς. + + +PHILOSOPHISCHE MONATSHEFTE. Vol. XXVIII. Nos. 1 and 2. + +CONTENTS: + + ZUM BEGRIFF DER UNBEWUSSTEN VORSTELLUNG. By _E. v. Hartmann_. + + UEBER DAS GEBET. EIN RELIGIONSPHILOSOPHISCHES FRAGMENT. + Sendschreiben an Herrn E. Renan in Paris. By _M. J. Monrad_. + + WERKE ZUR PHILOSOPHIE DES SOCIALEN LEBENS UND DER GESCHICHTE. + Erster Artikel (H. Spencer, Sociologie, Bd. III). By _F. + Tönnies_. + + RECENSIONEN: H. Münsterberg, Beiträge zur experimentellen + Psychologie No. 3. Neue Grundlegung der Psychophysik. By _Th. + Ziehen_. W. Enoch Der Begriff der Wahrnehmung. By _P. Natorp_. + Ch. Bénard. L’esthétique d’Aristote et de ses successeurs. By + _A. Döring_. + + LITTERATURBERICHT. + +The well-known philosopher Edward von Hartmann defines his position +with reference to the idea of an unconscious representation. Granting +that there are no unconscious sensations, perceptions, conceptions +or memories, because feeling either is conscious or not at all, he +introduces the idea of unconscious representations again as the most +adequate determination. He says, “Either we must renounce all speaking +and thinking of non-sensual objects or we must be satisfied with using +figurative expressions.” + +M. J. Monrad, a Norwegian, argues, in the second article against M. E. +Renan’s theory of prayer, whom he had visited some years ago in Paris, +that prayer has after all an effect upon the objective world and it is +not limited to a merely subjective and psychological influence. Monrad +presupposes a belief in God, prayer bringing the individual in unison +with God, changes the will of the individual into a co-ordinate willing +of God and thus renders the individual a co-worker of God. This, however, +should not be conceived to take place by magic and in contradiction to +nature, but through nature, man using the laws of nature. + +F. Tönnies of Kiel gives an exposition of Mr. Spencer’s social views +which are, briefly expressed, “the final victory of society over +the state.” Professor Tönnies answers that “we all want a higher +civilisation, but the development of a higher civilisation is not +conditioned by the final victory of society over the state. On the +contrary, it may be said that it depends upon a victory of the state over +society in so far as public rights will supersede private rights.... The +truth is that state and society are contingent, the one upon the other +and also limiting each other.” (Berlin: Dr. R. Salinger.) + + κρς. + + +FOOTNOTES: + +[52] _Questions of Philosophy and Psychology._ In the Russian language. + + + + + VOL. II. APRIL, 1892. NO. 3. + + THE MONIST. + + + + +THE DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY EXAMINED. + + +In _The Monist_ for January, 1891, I endeavored to show what elementary +ideas ought to enter into our view of the universe. I may mention that on +those considerations I had already grounded a cosmical theory, and from +it had deduced a considerable number of consequences capable of being +compared with experience. This Comparison is now in progress, but under +existing circumstances must occupy many years. + +I propose here to examine the common belief that every single fact in +the universe is precisely determined by law. It must not be supposed +that this is a doctrine accepted everywhere and at all times by all +rational men. Its first advocate appears to have been Democritus the +atomist, who was led to it, as we are informed, by reflecting upon the +“impenetrability, translation, and impact of matter (ἀντιτυπία καὶ φορὰ +καὶ πληγὴ τῆς ὕλης).” That is to say, having restricted his attention +to a field where no influence other than mechanical constraint could +possibly come before his notice, he straightway jumped to the conclusion +that throughout the universe that was the sole principle of action,—a +style of reasoning so usual in our day with men not unreflecting as to be +more than excusable in the infancy of thought. But Epicurus, in revising +the atomic doctrine and repairing its defences, found himself obliged +to suppose that atoms swerve from their courses by spontaneous chance; +and thereby he conferred upon the theory life and entelechy. For we now +see clearly that the peculiar function of the molecular hypothesis in +physics is to open an entry for the calculus of probabilities. Already, +the prince of philosophers had repeatedly and emphatically condemned the +dictum of Democritus (especially in the “Physics,” Book II, chapters +iv, v, vi), holding that events come to pass in three ways, namely, +(1) by external compulsion, or the action of efficient causes, (2) by +virtue of an inward nature, or the influence of final causes, and (3) +irregularly without definite cause, but just by absolute chance; and this +doctrine is of the inmost essence of Aristotelianism. It affords, at +any rate, a valuable enumeration of the possible ways in which anything +can be supposed to have come about. The freedom of the will, too, was +admitted both by Aristotle and by Epicurus. But the Stoa, which in every +department seized upon the most tangible, hard, and lifeless element, +and blindly denied the existence of every other, which, for example, +impugned the validity of the inductive method and wished to fill its +place with the _reductio ad absurdum_, very naturally became the one +school of ancient philosophy to stand by a strict necessitarianism, thus +returning to the single principle of Democritus that Epicurus had been +unable to swallow. Necessitarianism and materialism with the Stoics went +hand in hand, as by affinity they should. At the revival of learning, +Stoicism met with considerable favor, partly because it departed just +enough from Aristotle to give it the spice of novelty, and partly because +its superficialities well adapted it for acceptance by students of +literature and art who wanted their philosophy drawn mild. Afterwards, +the great discoveries in mechanics inspired the hope that mechanical +principles might suffice to explain the universe; and though without +logical justification, this hope has since been continually stimulated +by subsequent advances in physics. Nevertheless, the doctrine was in +too evident conflict with the freedom of the will and with miracles to +be generally acceptable, at first. But meantime there arose that most +widely spread of philosophical blunders, the notion that associationalism +belongs intrinsically to the materialistic family of doctrines; and thus +was evolved the theory of motives; and libertarianism became weakened. +At present, historical criticism has almost exploded the miracles, great +and small; so that the doctrine of necessity has never been in so great +vogue as now. + +The proposition in question is that the state of things existing at any +time, together with certain immutable laws, completely determine the +state of things at every other time (for a limitation to _future_ time +is indefensible). Thus, given the state of the universe in the original +nebula, and given the laws of mechanics, a sufficiently powerful mind +could deduce from these data the precise form of every curlicue of every +letter I am now writing. + +Whoever holds that every act of the will as well as every idea of the +mind is under the rigid governance of a necessity co-ordinated with that +of the physical world, will logically be carried to the proposition +that minds are part of the physical world in such a sense that the laws +of mechanics determine everything that happens according to immutable +attractions and repulsions. In that case, that instantaneous state of +things from which every other state of things is calculable consists +in the positions and velocities of all the particles at any instant. +This, the usual and most logical form of necessitarianism, is called the +mechanical philosophy. + +When I have asked thinking men what reason they had to believe that every +fact in the universe is precisely determined by law, the first answer +has usually been that the proposition is a “presupposition” or postulate +of scientific reasoning. Well, if that is the best that can be said for +it, the belief is doomed. Suppose it be “postulated”: that does not +make it true, nor so much as afford the slightest rational motive for +yielding it any credence. It is as if a man should come to borrow money, +and when asked for his security, should reply he “postulated” the loan. +To “postulate” a proposition is no more than to hope it is true. There +are, indeed, practical emergencies in which we act upon assumptions of +certain propositions as true, because if they are not so, it can make no +difference how we act. But all such propositions I take to be hypotheses +of individual facts. For it is manifest that no universal principle can +in its universality be compromised in a special case or can be requisite +for the validity of any ordinary inference. To say, for instance, that +the demonstration by Archimedes of the property of the lever would fall +to the ground if men were endowed with free-will, is extravagant; yet +this is implied by those who make a proposition incompatible with the +freedom of the will the postulate of all inference. Considering, too, +that the conclusions of science make no pretence to being more than +probable, and considering that a probable inference can at most only +suppose something to be most frequently, or otherwise approximately, +true, but never that anything is precisely true without exception +throughout the universe, we see how far this proposition in truth is from +being so postulated. + +But the whole notion of a postulate being involved in reasoning +appertains to a by-gone and false conception of logic. Non-deductive, +or ampliative inference is of three kinds: induction, hypothesis, and +analogy. If there be any other modes, they must be extremely unusual +and highly complicated, and may be assumed with little doubt to be of +the same nature as those enumerated. For induction, hypothesis, and +analogy, as far as their ampliative character goes, that is, so far as +they conclude something not implied in the premises, depend upon one +principle and involve the same procedure. All are essentially inferences +from sampling. Suppose a ship arrives in Liverpool laden with wheat +in bulk. Suppose that by some machinery the whole cargo be stirred up +with great thoroughness. Suppose that twenty-seven thimblefuls be taken +equally from the forward, midships, and aft parts, from the starboard, +centre, and larboard parts, and from the top, half depth, and lower +parts of her hold, and that these being mixed and the grains counted, +four fifths of the latter are found to be of quality _A_. Then we +infer, experientially and provisionally, that approximately four fifths +of all the grain in the cargo is of the same quality. I say we infer +this _experimentally_ and _provisionally_. By saying that we infer it +_experientially_, I mean that our conclusion makes no pretension to +knowledge of wheat-in-itself, our ἀλήθεια, as the derivation of that word +implies, has nothing to do with _latent_ wheat. We are dealing only with +the matter of possible experience,—experience in the full acceptation +of the term as something not merely affecting the senses but also as +the subject of thought. If there be any wheat hidden on the ship, so +that it can neither turn up in the sample nor be heard of subsequently +from purchasers,—or if it be half-hidden, so that it may, indeed, turn +up, but is less likely to do so than the rest,—or if it can affect our +senses and our pockets, but from some strange cause or causelessness +cannot be reasoned about,—all such wheat is to be excluded (or have +only its proportional weight) in calculating that true proportion of +quality _A_, to which our inference seeks to approximate. By saying that +we draw the inference _provisionally_, I mean that we do not hold that +we have reached any assigned degree of approximation as yet, but only +hold that if our experience be indefinitely extended, and if every fact +of whatever nature, as fast as it presents itself, be duly applied, +according to the inductive method, in correcting the inferred ratio, +then our approximation will become indefinitely close in the long run; +that is to say, close to the experience _to come_ (not merely close by +the exhaustion of a finite collection) so that if experience in general +is to fluctuate irregularly to and fro, in a manner to deprive the ratio +sought of all definite value, we shall be able to find out approximately +within what limits it fluctuates, and if, after having one definite +value, it changes and assumes another, we shall be able to find that out, +and in short, whatever may be the variations of this ratio in experience, +experience indefinitely extended will enable us to detect them, so as +to predict rightly, at last, what its ultimate value may be, if it have +any ultimate value, or what the ultimate law of succession of values may +be, if there be any such ultimate law, or that it ultimately fluctuates +irregularly within certain limits, if it do so ultimately fluctuate. +Now our inference, claiming to be no more than thus experiential and +provisional, manifestly involves no postulate whatever. + +For what is a postulate? It is the formulation of a material fact which +we are not entitled to assume as a premise, but the truth of which is +requisite to the validity of an inference. Any fact, then, which might +be supposed postulated, must either be such that it would ultimately +present itself in experience, or not. If it will present itself, we +need not postulate it now in our provisional inference, since we shall +ultimately be entitled to use it as a premise. But if it never would +present itself in experience, our conclusion is valid but for the +possibility of this fact being otherwise than assumed, that is, it is +valid as far as possible experience goes, and that is all that we claim. +Thus, every postulate is cut off, either by the provisionality or by the +experientiality of our inference. For instance, it has been said that +induction postulates that, if an indefinite succession of samples be +drawn, examined, and thrown back each before the next is drawn, then in +the long run every grain will be drawn as often as any other, that is to +say postulates that the ratio of the numbers of times in which any two +are drawn will indefinitely approximate to unity. But no such postulate +is made; for if, on the one hand, we are to have no other experience of +the wheat than from such drawings, it is the ratio that presents itself +in those drawings and not the ratio which belongs to the wheat in its +latent existence that we are endeavoring to determine; while if, on +the other hand, there is some other mode by which the wheat is to come +under our knowledge, equivalent to another kind of sampling, so that +after all our care in stirring up the wheat, some experiential grains +will present themselves in the first sampling operation more often than +others in the long run, this very singular fact will be sure to get +discovered by the inductive method, which must avail itself of every sort +of experience; and our inference, which was only provisional, corrects +itself at last. Again, it has been said, that induction postulates that +under like circumstances like events will happen, and that this postulate +is at bottom the same as the principle of universal causation. But this +is a blunder, or _bevue_, due to thinking exclusively of inductions +where the concluded ratio is either 1 or 0. If any such proposition were +postulated, it would be that under like circumstances (the circumstances +of drawing the different samples) different events occur in the same +proportions in all the different sets,—a proposition which is false and +even absurd. But in truth no such thing is postulated, the experiential +character of the inference reducing the condition of validity to this, +that if a certain result does not occur, the opposite result will be +manifested, a condition assured by the provisionality of the inference. +But it may be asked whether it is not conceivable that every instance +of a certain class destined to be ever employed as a datum of induction +should have one character, while every instance destined not to be so +employed should have the opposite character. The answer is that in that +case, the instances excluded from being subjects of reasoning would not +be experienced in the full sense of the word, but would be among these +_latent_ individuals of which our conclusion does not pretend to speak. + +To this account of the rationale of induction I know of but one objection +worth mention: it is that I thus fail to deduce the full degree of +force which this mode of inference in fact possesses; that according to +my view, no matter how thorough and elaborate the stirring and mixing +process had been, the examination of a single handful of grain would +not give me any assurance, sufficient to risk money upon, that the next +handful would not greatly modify the concluded value of the ratio under +inquiry, while, in fact, the assurance would be very high that this ratio +was not greatly in error. If the true ratio of grains of quality _A_ were +0.80 and the handful contained a thousand grains, nine such handfuls out +of every ten would contain from 780 to 820 grains of quality _A_. The +answer to this is that the calculation given is correct when we know +that the units of this handful and the quality inquired into have the +normal independence of one another, if for instance the stirring has been +complete and the character sampled for has been settled upon in advance +of the examination of the sample. But in so far as these conditions are +not known to be complied with, the above figures cease to be applicable. +Random sampling and predesignation of the character sampled for should +always be striven after in inductive reasoning, but when they cannot be +attained, so long as it is conducted honestly, the inference retains some +value. When we cannot ascertain how the sampling has been done or the +sample-character selected, induction still has the essential validity +which my present account of it shows it to have. + +I do not think a man who combines a willingness to be convinced with a +power of appreciating an argument upon a difficult subject can resist the +reasons which have been given to show that the principle of universal +necessity cannot be defended as being a postulate of reasoning. But then +the question immediately arises whether it is not proved to be true, or +at least rendered highly probable, by observation of nature. + +Still, this question ought not long to arrest a person accustomed to +reflect upon the force of scientific reasoning. For the essence of +the necessitarian position is that certain continuous quantities have +certain exact values. Now, how can observation determine the value of +such a quantity with a probable error absolutely _nil_? To one who is +behind the scenes, and knows that the most refined comparisons of masses, +lengths, and angles, far surpassing in precision all other measurements, +yet fall behind the accuracy of bank-accounts, and that the ordinary +determinations of physical constants, such as appear from month to month +in the journals, are about on a par with an upholsterer’s measurements +of carpets and curtains, the idea of mathematical exactitude being +demonstrated in the laboratory will appear simply ridiculous. There is +a recognised method of estimating the probable magnitudes of errors in +physics,—the method of least squares. It is universally admitted that +this method makes the errors smaller than they really are; yet even +according to that theory an error indefinitely small is indefinitely +improbable; so that any statement to the effect that a certain continuous +quantity has a certain exact value, if well-founded at all, must be +founded on something other than observation. + +Still, I am obliged to admit that this rule is subject to a certain +qualification. Namely, it only applies to continuous[53] quantity. Now, +certain kinds of continuous quantity are discontinuous at one or at +two limits, and for such limits the rule must be modified. Thus, the +length of a line cannot be less than zero. Suppose, then, the question +arises how long a line a certain person had drawn from a marked point +on a piece of paper. If no line at all can be seen, the observed length +is zero; and the only conclusion this observation warrants is that the +length of the line is less than the smallest length visible with the +optical power employed. But indirect observations,—for example, that the +person supposed to have drawn the line was never within fifty feet of the +paper,—may make it probable that no line at all was made, so that the +concluded length will be strictly zero. In like manner, experience no +doubt would warrant the conclusion that there is absolutely _no_ indigo +in a given ear of wheat, and absolutely _no_ attar in a given lichen. +But such inferences can only be rendered valid by positive experiential +evidence, direct or remote, and cannot rest upon a mere inability to +detect the quantity in question. We have reason to think there is no +indigo in the wheat, because we have remarked that wherever indigo is +produced it is produced in considerable quantities, to mention only +one argument. We have reason to think there is no attar in the lichen, +because essential oils seem to be in general peculiar to single species, +if the question had been whether there was iron in the wheat or the +lichen, though chemical analysis should fail to detect its presence, +we should think some of it probably was there, since iron is almost +everywhere. Without any such information, one way or the other, we +could only abstain from any opinion as to the presence of the substance +in question. It cannot, I conceive, be maintained that we are in any +_better_ position than this in regard to the presence of the element of +chance or spontaneous departures from law in nature. + +Those observations which are generally adduced in favor of mechanical +causation simply prove that there is an element of regularity in nature, +and have no bearing whatever upon the question of whether such regularity +is exact and universal, or not. Nay, in regard to this _exactitude_, all +observation is directly _opposed_ to it; and the most that can be said +is that a good deal of this observation can be explained away. Try to +verify any law of nature, and you will find that the more precise your +observations, the more certain they will be to show irregular departures +from the law. We are accustomed to ascribe these, and I do not say +wrongly, to errors of observation; yet we cannot usually account for such +errors in any antecedently probable way. Trace their causes back far +enough, and you will be forced to admit they are always due to arbitrary +determination, or chance. + +But it may be asked whether if there were an element of real chance in +the universe it must not occasionally be productive of signal effects +such as could not pass unobserved. In answer to this question, without +stopping to point out that there is an abundance of great events +which one might be tempted to suppose were of that nature, it will be +simplest to remark that physicists hold that the particles of gases +are moving about irregularly, substantially as if by real chance, and +that by the principles of probabilities there must occasionally happen +to be concentrations of heat in the gases contrary to the second law +of thermodynamics, and these concentrations, occurring in explosive +mixtures, must sometimes have tremendous effects. Here, then, is in +substance the very situation supposed; yet no phenomena ever have +resulted which we are forced to attribute to such chance concentration of +heat, or which anybody, wise or foolish, has ever dreamed of accounting +for in that manner. + +In view of all these considerations, I do not believe that anybody, not +in a state of case-hardened ignorance respecting the logic of science, +can maintain that the precise and universal conformity of facts to +law is clearly proved, or even rendered particularly probable, by any +observations hitherto made. In this way, the determined advocate of exact +regularity will soon find himself driven to _a priori_ reasons to support +his thesis. These received such a sockdologer from Stuart Mill in his +Examination of Hamilton, that holding to them now seems to me to denote +a high degree of imperviousness to reason; so that I shall pass them by +with little notice. + +To say that we cannot help believing a given proposition is no argument, +but it is a conclusive fact if it be true; and with the substitution +of “I” for “we,” it is true in the mouths of several classes of minds, +the blindly passionate, the unreflecting and ignorant, and the person +who has overwhelming evidence before his eyes. But that which has been +inconceivable to-day has often turned out indisputable on the morrow. +Inability to conceive is only a stage through which every man must pass +in regard to a number of beliefs,—unless endowed with extraordinary +obstinacy and obtuseness. His understanding is enslaved to some blind +compulsion which a vigorous mind is pretty sure soon to cast off. + +Some seek to back up the _a priori_ position with empirical arguments. +They say that the exact regularity of the world is a natural belief, and +that natural beliefs have generally been confirmed by experience. There +is some reason in this. Natural beliefs, however, if they generally +have a foundation of truth, also require correction and purification +from natural illusions. The principles of mechanics are undoubtedly +natural beliefs; but, for all that, the early formulations of them were +exceedingly erroneous. The general approximation to truth in natural +beliefs is, in fact, a case of the general adaptation of genetic products +to recognisable utilities or ends. Now, the adaptations of nature, +beautiful and often marvellous as they verily are, are never found to +be quite perfect; so that the argument is quite _against_ the absolute +exactitude of any natural belief, including that of the principle of +causation. + +Another argument, or convenient commonplace, is that absolute chance is +_inconceivable_. This word has eight current significations. The Century +Dictionary enumerates six. Those who talk like this will hardly be +persuaded to say in what sense they mean that chance is inconceivable. +Should they do so, it would easily be shown either that they have no +sufficient reason for the statement or that the inconceivability is of a +kind which does not prove that chance is non-existent. + +Another _a priori_ argument is that chance is unintelligible; that is +to say, while it may perhaps be conceivable, it does not disclose to +the eye of reason the how or why of things; and since a hypothesis can +only be justified so far as it renders some phenomenon intelligible, we +never can have any right to suppose absolute chance to enter into the +production of anything in nature. This argument may be considered in +connection with two others. Namely, instead of going so far as to say +that the supposition of chance can _never_ properly be used to explain +any observed fact, it may be alleged merely that no facts are known +which such a supposition could in any way help in explaining. Or again, +the allegation being still further weakened, it may be said that since +departures from law are not unmistakably observed, chance is not a _vera +causa_, and ought not unnecessarily to be introduced into a hypothesis. + +These are no mean arguments, and require us to examine the matter a +little more closely. Come, my superior opponent, let me learn from your +wisdom. It seems to me that every throw of sixes with a pair of dice is a +manifest instance of chance. + +“While you would hold a throw of deuce-ace to be brought about by +necessity?” [The opponent’s supposed remarks are placed in quotation +marks.] + +Clearly one throw is as much chance as another. + +“Do you think throws of dice are of a different nature from other events?” + +I see that I must say that _all_ the diversity and specificalness of +events is attributable to chance. + +“Would you, then, deny that there is any regularity in the world?” + +That is clearly undeniable. I must acknowledge there is an approximate +regularity, and that every event is influenced by it. But the +diversification, specificalness, and irregularity of things I suppose is +chance. A throw of sixes appears to me a case in which this element is +particularly obtrusive. + +“If you reflect more deeply, you will come to see that _chance_ is only a +name for a cause that is unknown to us.” + +Do you mean that we have no idea whatever what kind of causes could bring +about a throw of sixes? + +“On the contrary, each die moves under the influence of precise +mechanical laws.” + +But it appears to me that it is not these _laws_ which made the die turn +up sixes; for these laws act just the same when other throws come up. The +chance lies in the diversity of throws; and this diversity cannot be due +to laws which are immutable. + +“The diversity is due to the diverse circumstances under which the +laws act. The dice lie differently in the box, and the motion given to +the box is different. These are the unknown causes which produce the +throws, and to which we give the name of chance; not the mechanical law +which regulates the operation of these causes. You see you are already +beginning to think more clearly about this subject.” + +Does the operation of mechanical law not increase the diversity? + +“Properly not. You must know that the instantaneous state of a system +of particles is defined by six times as many numbers as there are +particles, three for the co-ordinates of each particle’s position, and +three more for the components of its velocity. This number of numbers, +which expresses the amount of diversity in the system, remains the same +at all times. There may be, to be sure, some kind of relation between +the co-ordinates and component velocities of the different particles, by +means of which the state of the system might be expressed by a smaller +number of numbers. But, if this is the case, a precisely corresponding +relationship must exist between the co-ordinates and component velocities +at any other time, though it may doubtless be a relation less obvious +to us. Thus, the intrinsic complexity of the system is the same at all +times.” + +Very well, my obliging opponent, we have now reached an issue. You think +all the arbitrary specifications of the universe were introduced in one +dose, in the beginning, if there was a beginning, and that the variety +and complication of nature has always been just as much as it is now. But +I, for my part, think that the diversification, the specification, has +been continually taking place. Should you condescend to ask me why I so +think, I should give my reasons as follows: + +1) Question any science which deals with the course of time. Consider +the life of an individual animal or plant, or of a mind. Glance at the +history of states, of institutions, of language, of ideas. Examine the +successions of forms shown by paleontology, the history of the globe +as set forth in geology, of what the astronomer is able to make out +concerning the changes of stellar systems. Everywhere the main fact is +growth and increasing complexity. Death and corruption are mere accidents +or secondary phenomena. Among some of the lower organisms, it is a moot +point with biologists whether there be anything which ought to be called +death. Races, at any rate, do not die out except under unfavorable +circumstances. From these broad and ubiquitous facts we may fairly infer, +by the most unexceptionable logic, that there is probably in nature some +agency by which the complexity and diversity of things can be increased; +and that consequently the rule of mechanical necessity meets in some way +with interference. + +2) By thus admitting pure spontaneity or life as a character of the +universe, acting always and everywhere though restrained within narrow +bounds by law, producing infinitesimal departures from law continually, +and great ones with infinite infrequency, I account for all the variety +and diversity of the universe, in the only sense in which the really +_sui generis_ and new can be said to be accounted for. The ordinary view +has to admit the inexhaustible multitudinous variety of the world, has +to admit that its mechanical law cannot account for this in the least, +that variety can spring only from spontaneity, and yet denies without +any evidence or reason the existence of this spontaneity, or else shoves +it back to the beginning of time and supposes it dead ever since. The +superior logic of my view appears to me not easily controverted. + +3) When I ask the necessitarian how he would explain the diversity and +irregularity of the universe, he replies to me out of the treasury of his +wisdom that irregularity is something which from the nature of things we +must not seek to explain. Abashed at this, I seek to cover my confusion +by asking how he would explain the uniformity and regularity of the +universe, whereupon he tells me that the laws of nature are immutable and +ultimate facts, and no account is to be given of them. But my hypothesis +of spontaneity does explain irregularity, in a certain sense; that is, it +explains the general fact of irregularity, though not, of course, what +each lawless event is to be. At the same time, by thus loosening the +bond of necessity, it gives room for the influence of another kind of +causation, such as seems to be operative in the mind in the formation of +associations, and enables us to understand how the uniformity of nature +could have been brought about. That single events should be hard and +unintelligible, logic will permit without difficulty: we do not expect +to make the shock of a personally experienced earthquake appear natural +and reasonable by any amount of cogitation. But logic does expect things +_general_ to be understandable. To say that there is a universal law, and +that it is a hard, ultimate, unintelligible fact, the why and wherefore +of which can never be inquired into, at this a sound logic will revolt; +and will pass over at once to a method of philosophising which does not +thus barricade the road of discovery. + +4) Necessitarianism cannot logically stop short of making the whole +action of the mind a part of the physical universe. Our notion that +we decide what we are going to do, if as the necessitarian says, it +has been calculable since the earliest times, is reduced to illusion. +Indeed, consciousness in general thus becomes a mere illusory aspect of +a material system. What we call red, green, and violet are in reality +only different rates of vibration. The sole reality is the distribution +of qualities of matter in space and time. Brain-matter is protoplasm +in a certain degree and kind of complication,—a certain arrangement of +mechanical particles. Its feeling is but an inward aspect, a phantom. +For, from the positions and velocities of the particles at any one +instant, and the knowledge of the immutable forces, the positions at all +other times are calculable; so that the universe of space, time, and +matter is a rounded system uninterfered with from elsewhere. But from +the state of feeling at any instant, there is no reason to suppose the +states of feeling at all other instants are thus exactly calculable; so +that feeling is, as I said, a mere fragmentary and illusive aspect of the +universe. This is the way, then, that necessitarianism has to make up +its accounts. It enters consciousness under the head of sundries, as a +forgotten trifle; its scheme of the universe would be more satisfactory +if this little fact could be dropped out of sight. On the other hand, +by supposing the rigid exactitude of causation to yield, I care not how +little,—be it but by a strictly infinitesimal amount,—we gain room to +insert mind into our scheme, and to put it into the place where it is +needed, into the position which, as the sole self-intelligible thing, it +is entitled to occupy, that of the fountain of existence; and in so doing +we resolve the problem of the connection of soul and body. + +5) But I must leave undeveloped the chief of my reasons, and can +only adumbrate it. The hypothesis of chance-spontaneity is one whose +inevitable consequences are capable of being traced out with mathematical +precision into considerable detail. Much of this I have done and find the +consequences to agree with observed facts to an extent which seems to me +remarkable. But the matter and methods of reasoning are novel, and I have +no right to promise that other mathematicians shall find my deductions as +satisfactory as I myself do, so that the strongest reason for my belief +must for the present remain a private reason of my own, and cannot +influence others. I mention it to explain my own position; and partly to +indicate to future mathematical speculators a veritable goldmine, should +time and circumstances and the abridger of all joys prevent my opening it +to the world. + +If now I, in my turn, inquire of the necessitarian why he prefers to +suppose that all specification goes back to the beginning of things, +he will answer me with one of those last three arguments which I left +unanswered. + +First, he may say that chance is a thing absolutely unintelligible, and +therefore that we never can be entitled to make such a supposition. +But does not this objection smack of naïve impudence? It is not mine, +it is his own conception of the universe which leads abruptly up to +hard, ultimate, inexplicable, immutable law, on the one hand, and to +inexplicable specification and diversification of circumstances on the +other. My view, on the contrary, hypothetises nothing at all, unless it +be hypothesis to say that all specification came about in some sense, +and is not to be accepted as unaccountable. To undertake to account for +anything by saying boldly that it is due to chance would, indeed, be +futile. But this I do not do. I make use of chance chiefly to make room +for a principle of generalisation, or tendency to form habits, which I +hold has produced all regularities. The mechanical philosopher leaves +the whole specification of the world utterly unaccounted for, which is +pretty nearly as bad as to boldly attribute it to chance. I attribute +it altogether to chance, it is true, but to chance in the form of a +spontaneity which is to some degree regular. It seems to me clear at any +rate that one of these two positions must be taken, or else specification +must be supposed due to a spontaneity which develops itself in a certain +and not in a chance way, by an objective logic like that of Hegel. This +last way I leave as an open possibility, for the present; for it is as +much opposed to the necessitarian scheme of existence as my own theory is. + +Secondly the necessitarian may say there are, at any rate, no observed +phenomena which the hypothesis of chance could aid in explaining. +In reply, I point first to the phenomenon of growth and developing +complexity, which appears to be universal, and which though it may +possibly be an affair of mechanism perhaps, certainly presents all +the appearance of increasing diversification. Then, there is variety +itself, beyond comparison the most obtrusive character of the universe: +no mechanism can account for this. Then, there is the very fact the +necessitarian most insists upon, the regularity of the universe which for +him serves only to block the road of inquiry. Then, there are the regular +relationships between the laws of nature,—similarities and comparative +characters, which appeal to our intelligence as its cousins, and call +upon us for a reason. Finally, there is consciousness, feeling, a patent +fact enough, but a very inconvenient one to the mechanical philosopher. + +Thirdly, the necessitarian may say that chance is not a _vera causa_, +that we cannot know positively there is any such element in the universe. +But the doctrine of the _vera causa_ has nothing to do with elementary +conceptions. Pushed to that extreme, it at once cuts off belief in the +existence of a material universe; and without that necessitarianism +could hardly maintain its ground. Besides, variety is a fact which must +be admitted; and the theory of chance merely consists in supposing this +diversification does not antedate all time. Moreover, the avoidance of +hypotheses involving causes nowhere positively known to act—is only a +recommendation of logic, not a positive command. It cannot be formulated +in any precise terms without at once betraying its untenable character,—I +mean as rigid rule, for as a recommendation it is wholesome enough. + +I believe I have thus subjected to fair examination all the important +reasons for adhering to the theory of universal necessity, and have shown +their nullity. I earnestly beg that whoever may detect any flaw in my +reasoning will point it out to me, either privately or publicly; for if +I am wrong, it much concerns me to be set right speedily. If my argument +remains unrefuted, it will be time, I think, to doubt the absolute +truth of the principle of universal law; and when once such a doubt +has obtained a living root in any man’s mind, my cause with him, I am +persuaded, is gained. + + C. S. PEIRCE. + + +FOOTNOTES: + +[53] _Continuous_ is not exactly the right word, but I let it go to avoid +a long and irrelevant discussion. + + + + +PSYCHICAL MONISM. + + +In modern thought, ever since Descartes introduced into the conception +of all-comprising nature that perplexing distinction between thinking +and extended substance, the problem of reconciling so radical a dualism +has formed the main task of those who have busied themselves with +philosophical interpretation. + +In the light of the Cartesian system there seemed to exist two entirely +disparate, independent worlds; the one in individual consciousness, the +other outside of it; the one made of mental, the other of material stuff. + +How to conceive these two antithetical worlds, as interdependent +constituents of one and the same unitary nature is, after many discarded +attempts, still the principal endeavor of systematic thinking. + +Every student of philosophy knows how Descartes himself ascribed the +evident concordance and intercommunication of the two worlds to the +miraculous decree and intervention of the Deity; how Spinoza sought to +overcome the distracting dilemma by proving that the two substances are +but attributes of one single absolute substance; how Leibnitz made both +realms, that of inwardness and that of outwardness, form a consistent +universe and keep consonant time by means of a divinely pre-established +harmony; and how numbers of less illustrious devices likewise failed to +gain general acceptance. + +A more important part in the development of modern thought was played by +those other attempts, which strove to reach a monistic interpretation +by showing that nature in all its manifestations is constituted, either +solely by mind and its original endowments; or, on the contrary, solely +by matter and its original endowments. Thinkers versed in physical +science felt inclined to look upon the material world as the matrix of +all natural occurrences; while those versed in psychical science were apt +to conceive the mental world as containing within itself all there is of +nature. + +The physical hypothesis has proved its eminent efficiency by leading to +a vastly more correct and faithful knowledge of the perceptible universe +than had ever been previously attained. + +Still, from the psychical standpoint it became nevertheless evident +beyond contention, that all so-called qualities of matter, all that +in any way enters into our perception of it, is composed of nothing +but mental constituents. And this means simply, that, whatever we +are actually conscious of, must of necessity form part of our own +consciousness, and not of anything outside of it. + +As to the truth of this fundamental psychological conception there is no +longer any dispute among philosophers. But there remains to be solved +the all-important question, whether or not there exists outside this +consciousness of ours, either beyond its peripheral, perceptual range, +or beyond its central, conceptual sphere, another world which it merely +symbolically reveals. And in case such another extra-conscious world is +found actually to exist, how it comes to constitute, together with the +world of consciousness, that unitary system of being of which we mentally +and bodily seem to form part. + +Professor Dewey in a series of articles in _Mind_ (Nos. 41, 42, 49, +57) and in one recently published in this journal (Vol. II, No. 1) +advocates—more profoundly and consistently than has been done before +by any Neo-Kantian or Neo-Hegelian—the view, that consciousness itself +intuits all phenomena of nature by force of its own intrinsic activity, +imparting to them their significance as knowledge by discriminating +their specific position and value within its own all-comprising organic +totality of being. He believes thus in no other world than that of +self-consciousness; asserting that neither its perceptual nor its +conceptual content are significative of any reality beyond. + +The editor, though an ardent defender of cosmic Monism, is by no +means a convert to such purely psychical monism. He maintains, on the +contrary, in the same issue of _The Monist_ (p. 85), that, “The mental +picture of a tree becomes a symbol for a special object outside of us, +and is projected to the place where experience has taught us to expect +that object.” Consequently, the mental picture refers as knowledge +to something outside of us, to something not forming part of our +consciousness. + +The present writer believes likewise, that the perceptual tree is merely +a mental symbol signalising an extra-mental, sense-stimulating existent; +and that the value of this symbol as knowledge consists altogether in +its implication of the existence of an entity subsisting outside our own +being and its consciousness, and having power to affect our sensibility +in definite more or less recognised ways. + +The editor and the present writer assert then, that the content of +perceptual consciousness forms merely a symbolical representation of a +corresponding reality subsisting outside consciousness; while Professor +Dewey acknowledges as really existent only self-consciousness, and +nothing outside of it, either peripherically stimulating the senses, or +centrally imparting universality to individual intelligence. + +The former view frankly admits duality in nature, so far as conscious +and extra-conscious existence are concerned. And in order to overcome +this dualism of _ordo idearum_ and _ordo rerum_—essentially the same +dualism as bequeathed to us by Descartes—it has to show how the world +within consciousness with its “mental picture,” and the world “outside of +us” containing the existent symbolically represented; how these totally +disparate worlds come to constitute a unitary nature, whose divers modes +of existence are throughout interdependently connected. + +It is clear that the reality symbolised by the “mental picture”—if any +such reality actually exists—can be known to us solely as thus mentally +symbolised, and not known to us in any way as it subsists extra-mentally +“outside of us,” as it subsists in itself when not thus symbolically +represented by our casual and intermittent perception of it. + +The mental picture being a mere representative symbol must needs differ +_toto genere_ from the non-mental existent symbolised thereby. We know +only what as mental representation is forming part of our consciousness. +We cannot possibly know anything we are not conscious of. The entity +“outside of us,” the “thing in itself”—if it at all exists—is therefore +as such of necessity unknown to us. This confession of ontological +ignorance is unavoidably involved in the acceptance of a symbolised +reality “outside of us.” + +The complex and prodigious difficulties in the way of a monistic +interpretation, when we start with the dualistic presupposition of a +conscious and an extra-conscious world, are all effectively circumvented, +as soon as with Professor Dewey we deny altogether the existence of a +world of “things-in-themselves” or sense-affecting existents, and roundly +assert that consciousness as such constitutes, comprises, and has direct +knowledge of ultimate reality; that it is in fact itself the absolute +all-sufficient and all-efficient entity. + +To understand the philosophical strength and influence of a position so +strangely at variance with that of current common sense, which holds as +self-evident the existence of body as well as mind, we have somewhat to +probe its deep-laid foundations in the history of modern thought. + +It was rendered plausible through Descartes’s, Locke’s, Berkeley’s, and +Hume’s philosophical argumentation, that what we are consciously aware +of, what is actually present to us as perception or “idea,” and therewith +as the world at large, is altogether made up of a more or less complex +combination of our own actual and remembered sensations. + +The conscious content itself was thus necessarily held to constitute +the exclusive object of philosophical research. And by starting with +sensations as its primordial elements, and taking all “ideas,” or facts +of memory, to be but faint reproductions of such elements, it became the +task of investigators “of the human mind” to analyse the given content of +consciousness into these its assumed elements, and to discover the “laws” +or general ways of their combination. + +Proud of its purely experiential method, concerned about nothing but what +is actually found present in consciousness, this mode of philosophising +disclaimed, in consequence, all knowledge of any “power” giving rise +from without to sensorial “impressions” and their order of conscious +emergence. And it ignored likewise the existence of any “power” combining +and systematising them from within; and, moreover, of any entity for whom +the sensorially constituted experience had intelligent significance. + +Such nominalistic, sensorial idealism has until lately reigned supreme +in English philosophy. Previous to the new departure introduced by it +philosophical interpretation had always followed the method of conceptual +evolution, carried on according to the rules of formal or deductive +logic. It took some widely inclusive, ready-made concepts as its starting +points or major premises, and extracted therefrom all knowledge that +seemed to be implicitly contained in them. + +Even Kant in his younger days had no idea that valid knowledge or +truth could possibly be attained in any other way than by logically +deducing it from ready-made premises. At a later period he learned from +Hume to distinguish between what he termed analytical and synthetical +propositions, and what had been called by the former thinker connection +between vivid impressions or matter of fact on the one side, and +connection between their faint copies or the so-called ideas on the other +side. + +The discovery on the part of Kant, that our knowledge of the actual +connection of matters of facts has in every instance to be learned from +direct experience and cannot be ratiocinatively deduced from ready-made +general notions, was a complete revelation to him. It changed his entire +way of thinking, and became the starting-point of his system of critical +or transcendental philosophy. He saw clearly, that, if all instructive +cognition is gained, and has always been gained, solely by means of +actual experience, if it has been synthetically built up bit by bit as +directly given to us, without our being able to construct a valid system +of knowledge transcending in any way actual experience; that reason then +as a knowledge-constituting faculty is impotent, and that metaphysics, +as the science of a realm of intelligible existence, must be ever more +rejected as a pure illusion. + +Kant’s thought, like that of most of our own rationalistic thinkers, was +however predominantly swayed by the belief in an intelligible world, +the veritable home of man’s spiritual being, where it eternally abideth +in close communion with a supreme creative intelligence. After a brief +attack of Humian scepticism, the theologically trained, though rationally +wide-awake and profound thinker, set out to examine the faculties of +reason with a view to discover a philosophically legitimate ingress +into that cherished realm of intelligible subsistence. Hitherto reason +had been effectively used in philosophy only as an analytic instrument. +Real knowledge being, however, as proved by Hume, a matter of synthesis, +it would evidently be making proper way toward a rationally conceived +intelligible world, if it could be proved that reason is itself in +possession of synthetical powers. + +After many years of profound meditation in this direction, Kant gave +its results to the philosophical world. He had become convinced that +mathematical truth, instead of being analytically derived as hitherto +believed, is on the contrary built up synthetically by intelligence +itself, and this without the aid of externally imparted experience; that +intelligence is therefore efficient to form synthetical propositions _a +priori_. It followed, as a matter of course, that time and space in which +mathematical figurations take shape, are not conditions of existence +outside of us, but original forms of our own perceptive faculty, and that +intelligence by dint of its synthetical powers constructs mathematical +figurations within these perceptual forms. And finally the conclusion +was reached that time and space, the empty forms of perception, +being themselves wholly deficient of any kind of activity, it must +be intelligence alone which possesses synthetical efficiency, which +exercises in fact whatever activity is operative in the conscious world. + +But though Kant enthroned intelligence as the creator of pure +mathematics, and endowed it with the exclusive gift of synthetical +efficiency, he did not see his way to constitute it also the creator of +the sense-given material that comes experientially to fill the empty and +passive forms of perception. Against all denunciations of his system as +purely idealistic, he insisted that there exists outside our being and +its consciousness a world of things-in-themselves, having power to affect +our sensibility, so that time and space, its receptive forms, become +filled with experiential, though wholly unsynthetised material. + +Reluctantly, though in faithful adherence to the unbiassed results of +his investigation, he was at last led to declare that intelligence or +reason as an instrument of knowledge—called by him theoretical reason in +contradistinction to practical reason, conceived as the leading principle +of moral conduct;—that such theoretical reason has power only over +sensorially given material, and is incapable of attaining knowledge of +the intelligible sphere. + +Still Kant regarded his so-called categories or synthetical functions +of reason as modes of activity, belonging not only to individual +reason, but to reason in general. And on the strength of this realistic +generalisation he attributed to them the power of imparting necessity to +synthetical propositions, such propositions—otherwise merely subjective +or empirical—being rendered thereby objective or universally valid. +He showed, moreover, that the relation of every kind of knowledge +to a common centre of all-inclusive awareness,—that this “synthetic +unity of apperception” as he called it,—presupposes an intelligible +ego, whose veritable nature becomes however nowise manifest within +our time-and-space-conditioned experience. And he taught that an +all-comprehending intelligible being had to be hypostatised in order to +complete the totality of rational knowledge. + +Thus, instead of giving us a monistic philosophy, Kant’s theoretical +speculations disclosed, on the contrary, a tripartite world. At the +centre the non-manifest intelligible ego in communion with a supernatural +sphere, and conceived as the veritable bearer of the synthetical reason. +In the median and only known region the synthetical reason itself, +constructing and cognising nature, by synthetically elaborating the +chaotic manifold in time and space. And at the periphery, beyond our own +being and its perception, an unknowable realm of things-in-themselves +affecting our sensibility. + +So complex an appearance did existence assume under Kant’s critical +inspection. Contemplative man, however, never ceases to hanker after a +monistic world-conception. Though individualised, he feels himself one +with universal being, and strenuously strives to understand how those +bonds of union are established, and what part he in verity is playing in +this stupendous drama of being and becoming. + +To most philosophers, before Kant, knowledge seemed to be given to us +ready-made, first conceptually as innate ideas or universal notions; and +then perceptually as the finished image of an outside world. + +Kant has exerted, and still exerts, a controlling influence over +thinkers by having systematically demonstrated, that not only knowledge, +but nature itself as we know it, is constructed by powers inherent in +our own being. He taught that we ourselves, by force of our combining +and ordering intellectual organisation, fashion out of meaningless +sense-material the wondrous world we know. And, moreover, that by force +of our intelligible being we have power to bend the otherwise rigorously +mechanical course of nature in compliance with moral injunctions. + +No wonder that so inspiriting a philosophy electrified to new vigor and +valiant self-reliance the dogmatically slumbering life of German thought. +And it was Fichte, above all other followers of Kant, who by his fervent +exposition kindled in crowds of hearers the vivifying spark of this “new +philosophy” of all-efficient intelligence. + +Fichte is the real father of such psychical monism as has recently found +so proficient an expounder in Professor Dewey. Fichte understood, what +Kant failed to see, that the “dynamical idealism” of nature-constituting +reason involves, not merely the _elaboration_ of sense-given material, +but the _out and out production_ within consciousness of the entire +world of perception. For perception undeniably takes place within our +own being, and must therefore be, as regards matter as well as form, the +outcome of powers inherent in ourselves. Between a consistent dream and +the apperception of reality the difference lies merely in our feeling, in +the latter instance, compelled in a peculiar manner to perceive what we +perceive. But this feeling of compulsion is likewise a constituent of our +own consciousness, and, moreover, under the influence of hallucinations +even this test of reality fails us. + +According to Fichte’s matured thought, our being consists altogether +in intellectual activity, an activity rendering explicit by means of +self-consciousness what it already implicitly contains. And it is +universal being that becomes thus self-conscious in us. Infinite reason, +constituting a system of ideas, a spiritual organisation, is the fount +and origin of all existence, its own self-revelation becoming manifest in +finite beings. + +Thus, by force of logical consistency, was eliminated from Kantian +transcendentalism the world of things-in-themselves as superfluous +to all-constituting intelligence. And the unification of individual +self-consciousness with universal intelligence was established +by considering individual self-consciousness as partaking in the +self-revealing activity of universal intelligence. + +Hegel elaborated systematically the psychical or idealistic monism thus +foreshadowed in Fichte’s later writings. Philosophical interpretation +turns principally upon the source and import of consciousness. And from +the recognition of the fact, that all constituents of perception form +part of this consciousness of ours, it obviously follows that objects, +and indeed the entire objective world realised in perception and solely +as perception; that the realisation of this entire world of perceptual +objects is in verity realisation of a world contained in our own being or +subject. Subject and object are therefore, from this point of view, at +bottom identical; the objective world—our human bodies included—being a +self-revelation of our all-comprehending subject. Mind as well as matter, +that which we call mental and that which we call material, are thus mere +abstract terms denoting the subjective and objective sides of one and the +same reality. + +This reality transcendental idealism declares to be “intellectual +activity.” It is intellectual activity which—from its point of view—is +revealing itself in the conscious content, becoming thus self-conscious. +This process of recognition of one’s self as subject-object, as the +unitary essence and completion of both, is what Hegel calls the “Idea.” +And with him theoretical or logical self-recognition and practical +or ethical self-realization coincide as “Absolute Idea.” For to think +absolute truth and to will its realisation are but two sides of one and +the same activity. Thought, intelligence, reason, knowing itself as in +every sense veritable being is thus the absolute One and All. + +Such out and out psychical monism is the legitimate outcome of a +conception which takes the content of consciousness to be ultimate +reality, signifying nothing beyond itself; and which then constitutes a +spiritually conceived entity, called thought, intelligence, or reason, as +the originator and bearer of such consciousness. + +After a period of glorious triumph the Hegelian philosophy of +self-evolving intelligence became a general laughing-stock at home and +abroad. This ignominious fate overtook it, first in consequence of its +fawning prostitution by the master himself to the reactionary service +of Church and State; and then also in consequence of the ridiculous +“pyrotechnical” abuse of its dialectical method by the “Young-Hegelians.” + +However, by “going back to Kant,” the teachings of transcendental +idealism have in our time once more gained the ascendency, and have +succeeded not only in conquering materialism, but also in invading and +almost supplanting English experientialism. + +In Germany, after a season of complete estrangement between science and +philosophy, a re-approachment was effected by the Neo-Kantian movement. +It originated principally in the recognition on the part of science, that +sense-perception is above all a psychical and not a purely physiological +process, a mental not a material fact; that therefore the effort to +arrive at a correct “theory of knowledge” is by no means a vain endeavor, +and that psychics as well as physics deserves a place in the hierarchy of +sciences. + +In England and America the Neo-Kantian movement owed, on the other hand, +its success, above all, to such theistic rationalism as found popular +expression in “Robert Elsmere.” In Professor Caird’s words it is said +to afford a means for the “vindication of the religious consciousness.” +And this it accomplishes “by an objective or absolute synthesis,” +which establishes “the indivisible unity of the intelligence and the +intelligible world,” “the unity of man as spiritual with an absolute +spirit.” + +Dr. Hutchison Sterling’s “Secret of Hegel” gave the first effective +impulse to this transcendental mode of thinking among university men +of a speculative turn. The late Thomas Hill Green of Oxford and Prof. +Edward Caird of Glasgow became its foremost exponents, and made numerous +converts. The former by elaborately disclosing, by force of Kant’s +principle of synthetical reason, the insufficiency of the sensorial +experientialism generally accepted in England since Locke’s “Essay +Concerning Human Understanding.” The latter by consistently developing +the idealistic and transcendental implications of this same principle of +synthetical reason. + +As repeatedly noticed, and never to be lost sight of, transcendental +idealism derives its convincing force from the undeniable truth, that +whatever we are directly aware of forms part of our own consciousness. +This involves the indivisible unity of such fact as we are directly +conscious of and the faculty through which we are conscious of it. This +unity of the realising self and the realised world, of object and subject +as content of consciousness; or rather the unity of the objective and +subjective factors of it, this subject-object oneness of conscious states +and occurrences is an irrefutable truth, from which one has to start, +whatever direction one may take. You assert, then, that that which exists +thus interblended as consciousness is itself ultimate reality, and you +will encounter but little difficulty in deducing therefrom a pretty +plausible psychical monism. For the power through which and as which +this ultimate reality exists is then immanent in us individually. And +when this power is conceived as intelligence or spirit, and the world +at large as existing solely as content of this spirit’s consciousness, +or indeed as such consciousness itself, it is clear that our own +self-and-world-awareness must be—according to this view—identical in +essence with the spiritual power which is ultimate and universal Reality. + +In self-consciousness, when regarded as a totality of all actual and +potential awareness, our feelings as well as the perceptual objects +composed of them constitute an organically completed order. They all +stand in definite and interdependent relations to our unitary being. +This all-comprising being has time and space as modes of gradual +self-realisation, but is not—according to transcendentalism—itself in +time and space. And this is undeniably true, so far at least as the being +that combines all transient events of experience into a unitary system +of permanent knowledge cannot possibly itself form part of the ephemeral +flux of conscious states experienced by it. + +Still the multifold individuations of the ultimate reality into +separate personal self-consciousnesses and deciduous bodily organisms +forms the great, if not insuperable, obstacle in the way of psychical +monism. If, on the one hand, we take with Green and Professor Caird +individual self-consciousness as a “reproduction,” and not as a mere +phase of universal consciousness; and on the other hand admit a natural +and gradual development “of man as an animal organism,” instead of +proving such natural development to be a misconception of our time +and space bound recognition, we are far from having as yet succeeded +in establishing a consistent psychical monism on Kantian lines. His +tripartite world remains ununified. + +To achieve its unification is, however, after a profound study and +appreciation of the difficulties to be encountered, the arduous task +Professor Dewey has courageously undertaken. To accomplish his purpose +he has to show how individual consciousness proves itself to be ultimate +reality, and as such identical with universal consciousness; how man, +appearing among other perceptible objects in multifold individuated +specimens as a gradually developed organism, is nevertheless in reality a +complete, all-comprising entity, not essentially subject to time, space, +or numerical limitations. And he has to make clear how all conscious +content, including the external world as well as the feeling and thinking +subject, has no other existence and significance than in and for +consciousness. + +Professor Dewey maintains that individual consciousness is in reality +one with universal consciousness, because it comprehends within itself +subject-and-object-consciousness; the abiding consciousness of oneself +as an ever-changing individual, and that of the world at large, though +figured in transient groups of sensations. This being so, that which +is thus the bearer and realiser of all being and becoming in nature, +cannot itself form part of this becoming, but must—according to +Professor Dewey’s view—be eternal and absolute. The all-comprehending +consciousness—and there is no existence outside of it—is thus identical +with universal intelligence, identical with that eternally active +intelligence which is everlastingly creating the organic synthesis of all +being and becoming. + +“Consciousness the ultimate fact reveals itself as reason.” Sensations +have no self-existence, no meaning in themselves. They exist only as +intellectually apprehended and for intelligence alone. It is from +intellectual interpretation that they receive their entire significance. +On solicitation of sensations the ideal content of universal intelligence +becomes partially and interruptedly revealed to individual consciousness. +The sole office of sensations is to give in us occasion to this +self-realisation of the eternal content of intelligence. + +Professor Dewey establishes his psychical monism by discovering +self-consciousness as the Absolute, the One and All. Individual idealism +or so-called solipsism, such as expounded by Fichte in his earlier +writings from the side of intellect, and in the writings of English +experientialists from the side of sensation, this individual idealism +presents itself likewise as a psychical monism, but as an absurdly narrow +one. Professor Dewey points out how it fails to understand that by +constituting mind, as such, the ego or subject for which all experience +exists, it artificially divides our unitary consciousness into two +separate constituents, and takes the subjective constituent to be the +bearer and realiser of the objective constituent; while in reality both +constituents are but elements of consciousness in general; are in fact +completely unified in eternal and absolute consciousness. + +Now it is perfectly true, that during conscious awareness object and +subject-consciousness are inextricably interblended so as to constitute +a unified experience. It is true also, that the veritable subject that +thus consciously experiences, and that furthermore imparts intelligent +meaning to such experience, cannot itself form part of these its own +fragmentary and transient moments of awareness. Comprehending them all, +it must evidently be an enduring, at least a relatively persistent being. +It is undoubtedly to such a persistent being or subject that experience +gradually accrues, and in whom it is all retained and organised into more +or less systematic order. + +But is there the least warrant for assuming that this persistent subject, +weaving thus intelligent experience out of its transient conscious +states, is itself “consciousness” or “intelligence”? + +Intelligent consciousness is very obviously only one of the functions +of the persistent subject, and by no means its being or essence. And +the experience accruing to it, that at least of the external world, +bears nowise the characteristics of Platonic reminiscence, does nowise +consist in self-revelation, in the becoming explicitly aware of what +already implicitly existed within itself. We may indeed say, that our +emotions, when aroused, constitute such self-revelation. But, for +instance, yonder visual figuration, consisting of nothing but colored +forms, though intelligently interpreted as a landscape with plains, +woods, and creeks; interpreted thus by the aid of no end of former +experience; this landscape now perceived by me for the first time was +certainly not implicitly immanent in my consciousness previous to all +my individual experience. Its conscious realisation does assuredly not +render explicit as objective experience what for ever has been an organic +member of my self-consciousness. What is immanent in my being—not in my +consciousness—is the sensorial faculty of symbolically picturing whatever +sense-affecting agent is placed before me. The conscious picture itself +is an evanescent phenomenon, having no steadfast existence or reality. + +To assert—as is usually done by transcendentalists and by Professor Dewey +among them—that our individual experience, when—as mostly occurs—not +actually conscious to ourselves, exists then nevertheless as conscious +content of a universal being; to venture such an utterly gratuitous +assertion, even when merely hypothetically advanced, transcends all +legitimate inference from given facts. When declared to be positively +justified by given facts, it all too obviously betrays the theological +bias by which it is inspired, the set purpose of vindicating the +religious consciousness which has faith in “the unity of man as spiritual +with an absolute spirit.” + +Through consciousness we indeed become aware of the divers faculties +of our being, together with their functionally accruing experience. +All this, however, rises into conscious awareness only at times, when +casually awakened. To give to the vast system of consciously latent being +and experience the name of “consciousness,” to call that “consciousness” +whose principal distinction is to constitute a persistent subject +with an organised system of experience abiding for the most part in +extra-conscious latency; to do this only because all this extra-conscious +existence may and does at times become more or less conscious; this is +surely committing the fatal error of denoting a state of things by its +outright opposite. + +There is no denying that most of the content of our being is usually +not present in consciousness. Consequently, abiding thus outside +consciousness, it cannot possibly form part of consciousness either +individual or universal. + +Nothing could be more to the point than Professor Dewey’s statement, +that “only a living actual fact (let us say existent instead of fact) +can preserve within its unity that organic system of differences in +virtue of which it lives and moves and has its being.” There is not the +least doubt that the subject, who at times is conscious of more or less +of his experience, is exactly such an existent as here described. But +consciousness, though the medium in which and through which everything +is realised, is itself but an intermittent function of that living +actual subject which preserves within its unity the organic system of +differences in virtue of which it lives and moves and has its being. The +consciousness of the subject conveys information to it only interruptedly +and in broken bits. These become organically unified into a more or less +consistent totality of experience. But this process of unification takes +place, not in the dream like stuff which makes up consciousness, but in +the persistent, extra-conscious matrix whence our ever lapsing, ever +renewed moment of conscious awareness emerges ready-made. + +The subject capable of thought and feeling becomes thinkingly and +feelingly manifest to _itself_, when its functions through which +consciousness arises are in operation; becomes manifest as bodily active +to _other sentient beings also_, when its functions through which such +activity arises are in operation. + +But if the real nature of the experiencing subject is not +self-consciousness or intelligence, what then can it be? + +Idealists, and with them Professor Dewey, become such by believing that +the perceptually realised objects are themselves veritable reality, +and not mere symbols of extra-conscious reality. Now can they in all +sincerity bring themselves to believe that a baby—to use one of Professor +Dewey’s illustrations—which experiences a sensation, say a pain caused +by the prick of a pin, that this pain-experiencing baby is no other +than that colored form within the perceptual consciousness of may be +half a dozen spectators; and that it is the perceptual pin within the +consciousness of each of them that has pricked the baby and caused the +pain? + +Does the pain-experiencing baby derive its existence from the fact that +the intellect of the spectator interprets the perceptual form within his +consciousness to signify a baby, which has forever implicitly formed part +of the organic content of his own self-consciousness? + +Surely the pain experienced by the baby is not experienced by the +perceptually realised baby, not by the baby existing as interpreted +perception in the consciousness of him who perceives it. The pain +experienced by the baby does nowise form part of the consciousness +of the perceiver. Consequently and incontestably, the subject that +experiences the sensation, that experiences in fact any kind of feeling +or thought, is itself an extra-conscious being, a being only casually and +symbolically realised in consciousness. + +And if the perceptual baby is merely a conscious symbol signalising +an extra-conscious existent, then all perceptual existence, all that +constitutes what we perceptually realise as nature, symbolises likewise +an extra-conscious reality, a reality that has power so to affect our +sensibility as to arouse in us perceptual representations of itself and +its characteristics. + +The matter stands then exactly as denied by Professor Dewey. It is +indeed the “baby thing-in-itself which is affected,” and it is “a +world thing-in-itself which calls forth the sensation.” It is not, as +maintained by Professor Dewey the baby known to him as his own perception +which experiences the sensation by having been pricked within the +beholder’s consciousness by a perceptually constituted pin. + +But if the entity, which affects the beholder’s sensibility and awakens +in him the percept of a baby, exists in verity outside his, the +beholder’s, consciousness, and is known to him only as thus symbolically +pictured by his own percept; such sense-affecting entity is, on the other +hand, nowise to be construed as the unknowable “First Cause,” nowise as +that protean Persistent Force, which Mr. Spencer imagines capable of +assuming every kind of mental or material appearance. + +The so-called material or physical modes which constitute in the beholder +the perceptually realised baby, and the so-called immaterial or mental +modes which are experienced by the baby as his sensations and emotions; +these material and mental modes are in no sense the manifestation of an +“Absolute Force” or “inscrutable Power,” as our Spencerians would lead us +religiously, and almost theologically to believe.[54] + +The material modes that constitute the perceptually realised baby are +awakened in the beholder by a definite sense-affecting existent, which is +thus revealing not only its bare presence, but most vividly and minutely +also its perceptible and distinguishing characteristics. And in the same +manner it makes also known that it is interdependently connected with +the vast system of sense-affecting entities, that constitutes nature in +general. + +All reality is interdependently conditioned. The “Unconditioned Reality” +of the Hamiltons, Mansels, and Spencers, has nowhere any existence, +either in consciousness or outside of it. It is altogether a fictitious, +superfluous, and most misleading conception. + +As regards the mental modes experienced by the baby, they are evidently +exclusively his own affections as a highly and most specifically +organised being, and not by any means are they modes of appearance of +that most empty abstraction “The Unknowable,” that has with so many +believers usurped the throne of their former anthropomorphic Deity. + +This coiled up thing over there, is it a rope or a snake? I see it move, +and my intellect interprets it to be a snake. Surely the significance +of the interpretation does not consist in my realising what was already +implicitly contained in my consciousness, but in knowing that in contact +with the being out there, which forms no part whatever of myself +though perceptually realised by me, I shall become affected in certain +additional ways taught by former experience. + +Will any unbiassed and competent judge assert that the far-fetched +idealistic interpretation is more in accordance with what we really +experience, than the very simple one here given? + +No doubt the immediate object of physical observation is not the +thing-in-itself, but its perceptual realisation. It is such, however, +only as symbolical representation of something subsisting outside +consciousness, only as a conscious affection awakened with compulsory +force in the observer from without. The observer offers his diversely +differentiated and delicately attuned sensibilities to the outside world +and carefully notices its specific modes of reaction upon definite modes +of stimulation. This in truth is the method of scientific observation, +from which all conclusions regarding the characteristics of nature are +drawn. + +The conscious subject phylogenetically evolved in constant interaction +with the medium in which he lives and moves and has his being, possesses +realising faculties so adjusted as to correctly subserve his needs in +relation to such a medium. He then furthermore uses these faculties +in order to gain a fuller and more accurate knowledge of further +perceptible characteristics of this same medium. + +A monistic interpretation of nature cannot possibly be reached by +assuming consciousness or intelligence to be ultimate reality, and +as such the One and All. It can be reached only by recognising that +consciousness is a function of subjects that stand in definite relations +to the rest of nature, and have power along with the other constituents +of nature so to affect the sensibility of other sentient beings as to +cause to arise therein the symbolical representation of themselves. + +Systematised experience consists in the organised totality of such +symbolical representations. And this organised totality of experience +exists as potential possession of the subject in extra-conscious +latency, in what we figuratively call memory. Emerging on occasion +into consciousness it reproduces more or less faithfully the order and +connection of the manifold that constitutes the sense-affecting universe. + +In highly developed sentient subjects self-realisation or the “inner +life,” which arises from the activity of their emotional and above all +their social nature, gains predominant influence over their sensual and +perceptual experience, urging them so to transform the given aspect of +the outer world as to render it subservient to the aspirations of that +inner life. + + EDMUND MONTGOMERY. + + +FOOTNOTES: + +[54] Mr. Spencer grapples with the problem of ultimate reality from +three different and widely divergent standpoints. First, by assuming +that our out and out conditioned nature and knowledge presupposes the +existence of an “Unconditioned Reality,” he arrives at the conception of +an “Absolute Cause.” Second, by attributing—in keeping with the principle +of the Conservation of Energy, all physical and psychical activity to the +interconvertible play of modes of force, he arrives at the conception +of an “Absolute Force,” whence all these manifest modes proceed; +hinting, moreover, that, as our experience of force-manifestation is +of a psychical nature, the “Absolute Force” may rather be conceived as +psychical than as physical. Third, besides explaining at times that +the psychical and physical modes, instead of being interconvertible, +are only two different aspects of one and the same reality—and +contrary to his assumption of the interconvertibility of psychical and +physical modes proceeding from an Absolute Force, he advocates in his +_Transfigured Realism_ the view, that our perceptual consciousness +figures representatively the corresponding characteristics of a world of +things-in-themselves. No wonder that Spencerians are getting somewhat +mixed, as the saying is. + + + + +THE CONSERVATION OF SPIRIT AND THE ORIGIN OF CONSCIOUSNESS. + + +The consideration of the relation that subsists between body and mind is +a topic that has led to several theories, one of which has found favor +with many on account of its supposed monistic implications. Dr. Carus in +his work “The Soul of Man” seems to adopt that theory, and his method of +explaining the matter is one of notable superiority. He says: + + “Matter and mind (the elements of feeling) are to be considered + as one—not the same, but one. They are as inseparable as are + the two sides of a sheet of paper. If we look at it from the + mind side its activity represents itself as elements of feeling + and all kinds and degrees of actual feelings. If we look at it + from the matter side its activity represents itself as motions + or as all kinds of potential and kinetic energy.” + +This doctrine of a double-faced unity has no doubt been favored because +it has seemed the best and perhaps the only refuge available against +the various forms of dualism. Still this same doctrine is very far from +inducing that final pacification of mind which we rightly expect from a +competent theory. It is open to the charge of being arbitrary, and it +brings no access of insight. + +The expressions of those whom we must suppose to be well affected towards +any doctrine that gives promise of a monistic issue show this to be the +case. Thus Tyndall says: + + “I do not think that he (i. e. the materialist) is entitled + to say that his molecular groupings and his molecular motions + explain everything. In reality they explain nothing. The + utmost that he can affirm is the association of two classes + of phenomena of whose real bond of union he is in absolute + ignorance. _The problem of the connection of body and soul is + as insoluble in its modern form as it was in the prehistoric + ages._” + +And Huxley protests that, + + “How anything so remarkable as a state of consciousness comes + about as a result of irritating nervous tissue is _just as + unaccountable_ as the appearance of the Djinn when Alladin + rubbed his lamp.” + +In truth those who might be expected to speak with considerable reserve +in regard to the inabilities of human attainment have emphasised without +due sobriety the insuperable aspects of the problem. The past history +of culture should have counseled caution, especially in view of the +certainty that consciousness is _somehow_ dependent upon nerve action. + +It is submitted that the recent progress of science should induce a +hopeful temper of mind on this question. Not only have physiology and +psychology brought to light more results in the last decades than in +centuries past, but in positive monism and formal thought philosophy +has also attained to a clearness of method which will prove beneficial +to all special investigations. A clear and concise statement of the +new positivism is found in the chapter Form and Formal Thought of +“Fundamental Problems” by Dr. Carus. Any one who has watched the +development of the algebra of thought and the philosophy of logic, will +naturally expect signal aid towards the solution of the world-questions +from a proper consideration of form and the laws of form. In Dr. Carus’s +book and especially in the above mentioned chapter will be found a most +popular exposition of that subject. + +Those who hold that form and formal thought is the very constituted means +by which our information with respect to real existence may be improved, +ought to regard it a decided step towards the solution of any hitherto +apparently inexplicable problem, if we only but find ourselves able to +_formulate_ an idea or process that mediates between the known and the +unknown, and represents to our insight how it is possible to think of a +phenomenon in accordance with notions that yield perceptible imagery. + +Riemann in what has been well characterised as his “stupendous” essay on +“The hypotheses that lie at the basis of geometry” remarks: + + “We are quite at liberty to suppose that the metric relations + of space in the infinitely small do not conform to the + hypotheses of geometry; _and we ought in fact to suppose it if + we can thereby obtain a simpler explanation of phenomena_.” + +So also Jevons in his “Principles of Science” commenting on “The +Character of the Experimentalist” refers to the audacity of speculation +that characterised Faraday and that was the leading of his efforts +towards some of his most brilliant discoveries. He says: + + “We have only to notice the profound conviction in the unity of + natural laws, the active powers of inference and imagination, + _the unbounded license of theorising_.” + +Theory must precede experiment. We must formulate before we can verify. +The words of Faraday: “Let us encourage ourselves by a little more +imagination prior to experiment,” shows us the method he followed. + +Recent developments in connection with the study of electricity supply us +with at least an analogy that may instruct us as to how we may _suppose_ +the appearance of consciousness as a result of nerve action. + +The nature of electricity has long been an unformulated thesis. That it +may be produced by the motion of matter is proved by every dynamo in +operation: indeed the oldest experiments in static electricity are to the +same effect. + +At the present time it seems to be an acceptable doctrine or at least a +good working hypothesis that electricity and magnetism are manifestations +of that once hypothetical medium called _the ether_. + +Prof. G. F. Fitzgerald in his opening address before Section A of the +British Association for the Advancement of Science in 1888 made these +very important remarks: + + “In a presidential address on the borderlands of the known, + delivered from this chair, the great Clerk Maxwell spoke of it + as an undecided question whether electro-magnetic phenomena are + due to direct action at a distance or are due to the action of + an intervening medium. The year 1888 will ever be memorable as + the year in which this great question has been experimentally + _settled_ by Hertz in Germany. Henceforth I hope no learner + will fail to be impressed with the theory—_hypothesis no + longer_—that electro-magnetic actions are due to a medium + pervading all known space.” + +That the ether really exists: that it is a proved fact and that it is +the substantial basis out of which electricity and magnetism arises, +are pretensions too momentous to remain unchallenged if they lacked +good evidence in their favor. Yet instead of awakening dissent among +the critical hosts of science, these utterances of Professor Fitzgerald +have not only been received as voicing the convictions of the scientific +world but they are confirmed from time to time by the sometimes tacit and +sometimes express assent of all who discourse upon the matters involved. + +Prof. Oliver Lodge, one of the leading scientific men of England and an +acknowledged authority upon the subject has recently published a work +entitled “Modern Views of Electricity.” In his preface he says: + + “Few things in physical science appear to me more certain than + that what has so long been called electricity is a form or + rather a mode of manifestation of the ether.” + +He supposes the ether as a compound of two constituents corresponding +to positive and negative electricity. Each of these constituents has +affinities, cohesions, or entanglements with the various kinds of +matter, which affinities, cohesions, or entanglements are greater or +less according to the kind of matter involved, so that by the motions of +certain sorts of matter under proper conditions the two constituents of +the ether are torn apart or separated, or in the language of dynamics, +strained. But at the same time these constituents also tend with +unceasing persistence to reunite and saturate one another into a state of +absolute neutrality. Separate, these constituents show an existence and +an energy towards one another. United neither of them shows any existence +at all nor any efficacy whatever. They are as though they did not exist. + +It is of small moment to the present purpose whether or not this +electrical theory is well grounded. In either case its very formulation +supplies us with a suggestion as to how it is possible to think of +consciousness as a product of nerve action. + +Just as the ether is supposed as the substantial basis out of which in +consequence of the motion of matter electricity and magnetism becomes +manifest, so may we suppose an analogous (perhaps the same) basis +surrounding and permeating all things, and out of which in consequence of +nerve action, consciousness becomes manifest. + +Why may we not suppose this consciousness basis, (which suppose we name +spirit,) to be the ultimate substance which being variously modified +by energy manifests in one case the phenomena of mind, in another the +phenomena of electricity, magnetism, etc., and then again in a third case +that phenomenon, mass, or inertia, which is the essential attribute of +matter? + +As with the ether in the absence of any cause that separates it so that +electricity and magnetism become manifest, so spirit may be supposed +to be utterly without manifestation and neutral until nerve action +modifies its condition, when like electricity in the one case, so here, +consciousness becomes manifest. + +Why may we not imagine spirit as composed of two constituents +corresponding to feeling and volition which united saturate one another +into neutrality, but which separated by nerve action manifest feeling +that tends to pass into volition, or volition that tends to pass into +feeling? This would be in accordance with the phenomena if of reflex +action which is supposed to be the elementary type of mentality. + +This is in harmony with the views of the author of “The Soul of Man,” for +he, although for other reasons, also explains the origin of consciousness +from tension. He says: + + “Consciousness is an intensified state of feeling caused + through tension. It lies between a want and its satisfaction. + Satisfaction not being immediately attainable, feelings are no + longer in a state of equilibrium, and it is this tension which + concentrates and intensifies feeling into consciousness. + + “It appears that consciousness never arises without a certain + tension. Days spent in an idyllic life flow away almost + unconsciously; there is little friction, there are no problems + to be solved; there are no unsatisfied wants, or if there are + any, they are quickly and easily attended to. There is no need + of consciousness, there is not much tension to call it into + play, so life passes dreamlike as a tale that is told. The + more life is burdened with problems that demand a man’s full + care and deliberation, and the stronger are his attempts to + solve the problems of his situation, the more intense will his + consciousness be. + + “It appears to me very doubtful whether conscious beings could + exist in a world—if such a world were possible at all—where the + struggle for existence was unknown; for it is the struggle for + existence that presents the first and most imperative problems + to living and feeling beings.” + +Spirit or the elementary basis of consciousness considered as a +quantity, would on this supposition remain the same, but the forms of +its manifestations would change. There would be more or less straining +of spirit and accordingly more or less manifestation of consciousness. +Or to formulate it in one sentence, we would have to postulate _the +conservation of spirit_. + +Such a supposition or some similar supposition if tolerable would +bring our ideas into some sort of accord with scientific customs of +explanation, and would extricate our minds from that state of utter +stultification into which they are cast whenever they are confronted with +the relations of body and mind. + + FRANCIS C. RUSSELL. + + + + +ON CRIMINAL SUGGESTION. + + +A widely known criminal trial has brought before thoughtful minds, on +both sides of the water, this question, viz.: Whether a subject in a +hypnotic condition possesses any free will, and whether in such a state, +it is possible to transform him into a criminal or at least, for the time +being into becoming an accomplice in crime! It is not the first time +that this question has been agitated; indeed at the very beginning of +Mesmerism, as it was then called, this idea was brought forward. + +It was clearly formulated by Dr. Charpignon, whose own opinion +nevertheless is, that it was “much easier to restore moral rectitude to a +somnambulist who had fallen therefrom, than to pervert the integrity of +character of a woman of high moral standing.” In 1866 Dr. Liébeault, in +his work on, “Sleep and Kindred States of Being,” of which at that time +there were but six copies sold, coincides entirely with this opinion. The +passage is too noticeable, not to be quoted in its entirety. (P. 524.) + + “We may postulate, as a first principle, that a subject during + the state of magnetic sleep, is at the mercy of the hypnotiser. + I have made experiments that have confirmed me in this opinion; + I have many a time, removed the hats of such persons, searched + their pockets, drawn off the rings from their fingers, untied + their shoes, etc., ... without their having noticed the action + at all, or having made the least resistance, the isolation into + which I had thrown them, being the cause of this absence of all + consciousness.... + + “How very grave, the possibilities, are which may ensue from + this state of being, we may readily conceive! What I have + advanced here, is the result of certain experiments which I + made upon a young girl, who, while being very intelligent in + her natural waking condition, became during hypnotic sleep the + most cross-grained and wilful person I had ever had to deal + with. Nevertheless I always ended by mastering her will. I was + able to excite in her mind the most criminal resolves; I roused + her passions to a high degree. I was able to cause her to fall + into a violent rage with a person, to fly out upon her with a + knife in her hand; having displaced in her mind the sentiment + of friendship, still armed with that instrument, I sent her to + stab her best friend, whom I told her she saw in front of her; + she obeyed, the knife burying itself in the wall opposite. I + almost prevailed upon another young girl, who was however less + under the influence, to kill her own mother, and though she + wept, she actually prepared to do the deed. + + “After all, it has been known for a fact, that a man, who, up + to that moment, was of sound mind, hearing a voice continually + repeating: ‘Kill your wife. Kill your children’—has obeyed this + command, incited thereto by an irresistible impulse; and shall + the hypnotic subject already predisposed to hallucination, + escape this same involuntary impulse? I am firmly convinced, + after having made many other experiments, that a subject to + whom is suggested the commission of any bad action, will carry + out the crime after his awakening, by reason of what has + now become in him a fixed idea. The most moral will become + vitiated, the highest-minded perverted. + + “If it has already been found possible to reform a woman + of loose morals and bring her to abandon entirely her evil + courses, why cannot the reverse be effected and by the same + means? It would be in the power of the magnetiser to suggest to + his subject, not only to become a tale-bearer, a calumniator, + a thief, dissolute, etc., at some period subsequent to the + magnetic sleep, but, he might use him, for example, as the + instrument of his personal vengeance and the poor dreamer, + unmindful of the primary incitement to the criminal action, + would commit on another’s account, instead of on his own, the + evil deed, prompted and forced on thereto, by the irresistible + suggestion and will, imposed upon him by another person. And + when the crime shall have been consummated, where shall he find + the medical jurist, who can hold up to Justice, the torch which + is to throw the Light of Truth upon the act, and challenge the + innocency of a man, who, up to the moment of the crime never + exhibited the slightest sign of insanity, had shown every mark + of a sound mind and yet, when convicted of the dreadful deed, + states with every apparent sign of good faith, that he has + committed it of his own accord? And who can tell whether such + cases have not already taken place.” + +These momentous words passed unnoticed. At that time, the world did not +believe in Hypnotism. M. M. Richot and Charcot restored it to a place +of honor. The School of the Salpêtrière made its advent, and saw in +Hypnotism a pathological condition. Simultaneously with this school of +thought, there arose the rival one at Nancy, which following its leader, +Dr. Liébeault, saw in hypnotism, only a psychological phenomenon. One of +the masters in this school, M. Liégeois, Professor of the Faculty of Law, +in 1884, in his pamphlet on “Hypnotic Suggestion, in relation to Civil +and Criminal Law” also propounded to the public this idea of criminal +suggestion. + +M. Liégeois, like M. Liébeault, did not confine himself merely to theory. +He went on to demonstrate and prove his thesis by conclusive experiments. + +Strange to say, the Salpêtrière took issue on this point, adopting and +defending the opposite opinion. + +I would now ask permission to raise my own voice in this debate, and I am +the more emboldened so to do, inasmuch as my own personal observations +and the study which I have brought to bear on this matter, have caused me +to pass, so to speak, from one rival camp to the other. The thesis upheld +by the School at Nancy, while it found in me at first an adherent, finds +me to-day an adversary. + +Just a word about myself to the readers of _The Monist_. + +I have always been a believer in Magnetism. At the outset, and until +towards 1875, merely on the faith of books, later, because I had been +present at one or two more or less public exhibitions. And it appears +singular enough, that though thus imperfectly trained in the knowledge +of it, I should have explained, as I did in 1869, the ecstasies and +the stigmata of the celebrated Louise Lateau, as coming simply from +auto-suggestion; and that even to-day, there should be neither jot nor +tittle to subtract from what I then wrote, regarding it. + +I only began practising magnetism at the commencement of 1886. I was +returning from a visit to the Salpêtrière whither I had been attracted by +my doubts on this very transference of thought and from which I returned +with my doubts intensified. I have already recounted, in a series of +articles, that appeared in less than a year in the _Revue Philosophique_ +(“Upon Memory in Hypnotic Subjects”; “On the influence of Imitation +and Education in Somnambulism, as exhibited in the so-called hypnotic +sleep”; etc.) my experiences, observations, and inductions. Not to speak +of my contributions to the Magazines, and notably to the _Revue de +l’Hypnotisme_, I introduced hypnotism into the science course of the +Royal Academy of Belgium by means of two works. One, on the “Origin,” the +other on the “Extent of the Curative Effects of Hypnotism” (1887-1890). +Besides many other polemical writings in favor of the liberty of holding +public exhibitions (“Letters to M. Chiriar, Representative,” 1888. +“Magnetisers and Physicians,” 1890). I related at length what M. Charcot +and his pupils had shown me in Paris, as well as what M. M. Liébeault, +Bernheim, and Liégeois, had let me witness at Nancy (“A Visit to the +Salpêtrière,” 1886—“A Visit to the School at Nancy,” 1889). + +At the time then, that I took upon myself to hypnotise, I firmly believed +that the subject became the property of the magnetiser; passing over, +as of no importance, the manifest resistances that I met with at every +point and in every form on the part of subjects, who, in all other +respects I found perfectly adapted to such experiments; as for instance, +one who permitted his tongue to be pierced with a large darning needle +by my sceptical colleague, Dr. Masius; and to be burned several times, +both with a red hot iron and by thermocautery, by my colleague, the +surgeon Von Winiwarter, both these experiments having reference to the +curative effects of hypnotism. Thus, adhering entirely to the belief +of M. M. Liébeault and Beaunis, at the close of 1886 (“A Visit to the +Salpêtrière”) I wrote these words: + + “M. Beaunis’s statement is perfectly exact. The somnambulist, + in the hands of the hypnotiser, is less than the _corpse_, + which the perfect disciple of Loyola should resemble. He is a + slave, with no will other than that of his ruler, and in order + to fulfil the commands laid upon him, he will push precaution, + prudence, cunning, dissimulation and falsehood, to their + extremest limits. He will open and shut doors noiselessly, walk + in his stockings; will listen and watch, with what keen sight, + what acute hearing! He will remember anything and everything + you want him to, will forget all you desire him to forget. He + will, in good faith, accuse a perfectly innocent man before a + Court of justice. He will have seen everything, that in reality + he has never seen, if you command him so to do; he will have + heard, what he never could have heard and done everything that + he never could have done. He will swear by his Household Gods, + that he has acted throughout, of his own free will, without any + external pressure, will invent motives if need be, and will + completely protect and cover his hypnotiser. + + “Theoretically, such a power is the most dangerous thing on the + face of the earth! I believe though, that practically, with the + exception of what might relate to physical or moral abuses or + tampering with testamentary wills, there is actually little or + no danger. It appears to me the fear of this has been unduly + exaggerated.” + +In a foot-note of mine, while mentioning with highest praise the memoir +of M. Liégeois, I added further: “I do not express any alarm that I +cannot show a good reason for.” Among other reasons, I pondered on the +difficulty, say rather, the impossibility there is, of obtaining from the +subject an absolute abnegation of will-power, whilst at the same time we +allow him to retain the necessary free will to cope with any unforeseen +accidents which might occur to compromise the fulfilment of the thought +and action suggested. + +Two or three months later I should not have expressed myself thus; and +hence the remarks that accompany the experiments related in my articles +on Hypnotic Consciousness, _Revue Philosophique_, Feb., March, 1887, +experiments which took place about a year previous to this (see the +note to the contributed articles, Feb. 1887, p. 119). It may there be +noticed that my assent is tempered by certain marked reservations. I +was even then opposing practice to theory, i. e. I narrowed down these +apprehensions of danger to two legitimate causes of alarm, viz. attempts +against morals, and tampering with testamentary wills. + +Upon these two points I am still of the same opinion, with this +exception, that what I then feared probable, I now regard as exceedingly +problematic. I mean to say, that a villain who was contemplating the +perpetration of a crime, would not easily find an accomplice in a subject +of good moral standing. And in any case, I still think as I thought then, +that such an accomplice would not only be inapt, but compromising. It +is this latter point, I wish to demonstrate to you, by the following +criticism upon an experiment never before published. + +At the end of May, of last year, I was passing through Nancy with some +friends, among whom was Dr. L. Frédéricq, Professor of Physiology at the +University of Liège. We were spending the evening at M. Beaunis’s house +together with M. M. Liébeault, Bernheim, and Liégeois. Naturally this +question of Criminal Suggestion came upon the _tapis_ and was discussed +in all its phases, without advancing one step towards its solution. We +made an engagement to meet at the hospital on the following day, where M. +Bernheim invited me to be present at an experiment, which he maintained +would convince me. I will relate at length the occurrence, for in such +cases, the slightest details may acquire very great importance. + +M. Bernheim threw into the magnetic sleep a great, tall fellow, quite +easily influenced, and whose illness did not prevent him from walking +about in the ward. + +“Presently, when you have waked up, you will go and steal an orange from +the patient that you see over there, in that bed opposite. Remember that +what you are going to do is very wrong; it is strictly forbidden by +honesty and by the law, and you will run the risk of being punished.” +The man is waked. He appears to be collecting his thoughts. He rubs his +forehead, he is visibly meditating something. + +“What is the matter with you? What are you thinking about?” I ask him. + +“Nothing.” + +“You seem preoccupied.” + +“Well, yes, I have to do something.” + +“What?” + +“I am not obliged to render you an account of my actions.” + +“Ah! one would almost say you were meditating some mischief, where are +you going?” + +“That’s no business of yours.” + +“Oh! very well then, I shall watch you and follow you.” + +I follow him; he walks towards his companion’s bed, glances at the +orange, then leaning up against the window, he calls me to admire some +cherries growing on a potted plant. He keeps quite still. Why? Simply +because I had told him that I intended to watch him, _otherwise my +presence would not have troubled him in the least_. During this time, M. +Bernheim had acquainted the other patient with the intended proceeding, +he nevertheless having heard the whole transaction. “I do not think +he will do it,” said he to the Doctor, “he is one of my mates and he +wouldn’t steal from me.” I walk away and join the group of persons +present. I say to M. Beaunis, that this experiment will prove nothing, +he answers me by a gesture of surprise. The subject, as soon as he sees +me go away and _thinks that I am not watching him any more_, stretches +out his hand, seizes the orange that is behind his mate’s pillow, _the +latter meanwhile looking full at him_. A score for M. Bernheim, but one +also for M. Delbœuf! I should need twenty pages at least of commentary on +this experiment. But I shall only allow myself to point out the essential +points. + +This hypnotised subject then, or to speak more correctly, this man +to whom a thought has been suggested, after I had warned him that I +was watching him, and from whom I never took my eye, goes with the +unerringness, so to speak, “of the falling stone,” to carry out the +suggested action, not however without a certain distrust of me, and +this only, because he had been forewarned. And moreover in his dim +consciousness, it is I alone, whom he is watching in that clumsy fashion, +in order to seize upon some momentary forgetfulness on my part. He +has never noticed at all, that his mate is intently watching him and +following his every movement with open eyes; so he steals the orange +from under his very nose! Let us not forget that it was M. Bernheim +the house physician, who suggested to him to take the orange. But M. +Frédéricq himself would equally well have fulfilled that command, even +preceded as it was by the little homily, recorded above. Why should he +have disobliged M. Bernheim? But indeed, the logic of my opponents is +very weak. If, say they, a somnambulist resists criminal suggestion, it +is because he is not a susceptible subject, or, that the experiment has +been ill conducted, or, that the suggestion has not been strong enough. +At that rate, it is useless to continue experimenting, if failure is +always to be explained away. On my side, I might with equal reason, +argue, that they had been dealing with some licentious mind, as yet all +unknowing its inner self, or with a born criminal or a latent thief; and +though I object to this kind of argument, it would often prove to be more +legitimate reasoning than theirs. Who among us is absolutely virtuous? +How many actions which the law calls criminal have we committed, or might +we commit, under the pressure of circumstances, without a shadow of +remorse? But let us further examine this experiment. + +Our subject then put the orange in his trousers’ pocket which stuck +out very noticeably. This man might be a criminal, but he was not a +dissembler. Looking him straight in the face I said: “What have you been +doing?” + +“Nothing, I have just done my errand.” + +“You have stolen!” + +“What nonsense!” + +“What have you got in your pocket?” + +“Nothing” (notice the absurdity of this reply). + +“What do you mean?” + +“Nothing!” + +“What do you call that?” + +“Why! it’s an orange! it’s a very fine orange! _Ma foi!_ I can’t imagine +how it came there!” + +M. Bernheim intervenes: “You took it from a fellow-patient, from a +comrade! That was very wrong.” + +“Yes, that’s so, but I wanted it. Look! did you ever see such a fine +orange? I took a fancy to it and I determined to have it. Besides, _he +hadn’t seen it_(!) It’s not stealing when it isn’t missed.” + +Then I asked: “What is that you said?” + +“Why, yes, it is not stealing to take what nobody misses,” answers he, +with a scarce perceptible cunning and significant wink. + +A few minutes later, after we had ceased noticing him, he came up to M. +Frédéricq of his own accord laughingly told him that he was in the habit +of abstracting tobacco from his companions on this same ground, that if +they never missed it, it was not stealing. “It is all in fun, you know!” + +I conclude therefore, that this subject had in him latent tendencies to +theft, or if you prefer it, to pilfering. And dare any of us, honestly +confess to himself that we have not, deep down in ourselves, the germs +of any such vices? Who among the most upright of us, does not consider +himself perfectly entitled to defraud the government, or to get the +better of a Railway Company, or quietly to appropriate an object which he +may casually find? + +M. Liégeois will very likely say to me: “We will grant that this +experiment has not fulfilled the desired requirements; the subject has +not very high moral qualities, and he juggled a little. But here now, are +some experiments absolutely unimpeachable.” Thereupon M. Liégeois relates +the histories of Miss E..., of N..., of Mme. G..., and of Mme. C... Here +are the facts as collated by him in the Gouffe trial. + +_First narrative._ M. Liégeois believed that he had produced in Miss E... +such absolute automatism, so complete an annihilation of moral sense and +of all liberty of action, that he caused her, without moving a muscle, to +place the muzzle of a revolver close to her mother and fire upon her. The +youthful criminal appeared completely awake and far calmer than were the +witnesses of this scene. (Take notice of this.) Her mother, immediately +reproaching her and telling her that she might have killed her, Miss +E... answers smiling, with a great deal of common sense: “I have not +killed you, since you are speaking to me now.”—“Is any one likely to +believe that this is merely pretence and acting,” adds M. Liégeois, “that +a daughter will amuse herself by firing at her mother with a revolver, +_which she does not know is not loaded_, simply to deceive the public?” + +Well, shall I say it? The hypothesis of simulation, the simulation which +is practised in the hypnotic state appears to me to be the only plausible +explanation. The calm, smiling attitude of Miss E... is an unanswerable +proof of this. I have no doubt that if in a dream she had seen herself +firing at her mother, she would have suffered as in a terrible nightmare. + +Lately, it was in the beginning of January, I dreamed I was present at +a sale of paintings. Among others exposed for sale, there was a long +picture, nineteen or twenty feet high and less than three feet wide, +representing the assumption of some saint. Hardly had the auctioneer +mentioned the price, 6,000 francs, than I made a sign of assent. It is +knocked down to me. I start for home with my purchase, but on the way I +am seized with remorse. Where shall I hang the religious picture? And +even if I find a place for it on the staircase what will it look like in +my house, with its old black frame and its extraordinary dimensions? And +what a price to have paid, at such a moment when the house bills are +pouring in! In the midst of these reflections, I woke up, my heart was +beating tumultuously and during the remainder of the night I continued +under the most disagreeable impressions. In spite of my knowing that I +was awake and reasoning with myself, congratulating myself that it was +nothing but a dream, the enormity of my absurd action weighed upon my +mind and I kept continually dreading the reproaches of my family, when +they should learn the stupid bargain I had made. How widely different +is this mental distress from the placid, smiling condition of Miss E... +and how naturally one is brought to suppose that during the hypnotic +state the subject is not even under the sway of the ordinary illusions of +dreamland. + +M. Liégeois affirms that Miss E... _was not aware that the pistol was +not loaded_. I do not believe it. Upon what grounds are we to infer that +a somnambulist is an imbecile? You and I, and everybody would easily +surmise that M. Liégeois’s revolver was not loaded! Then why should not +Miss E... surmise the same? Is it not for the very reason that he handed +it to her, to fire at her mother, that she would opine as much? Might +she not have gathered this from the attitude of the spectators, full of +expectancy unmixed by any apprehension? and might she not have wished to +astonish them by her docility and _sang-froid_? All sorts of suppositions +are both rational and possible. Besides all this, somnambulists who +are absorbed in the work in hand, generally speaking, show a quicker +and surer perspicuity; their sensibilities are finer, their quickness, +their memory, overstep the ordinary limits as exhibited in their normal +state. Do we not hear of scholars, who in the hypnotic sleep, learn their +lessons in a very short time and write their essays admirably? I have +recorded in the _Revue Philosophique_, August, 1886, some facts about a +subject, upon whom I experimented before one of my classes. + + “The experiment I am about to give an account of might serve + very well as the explanation of many a miracle. B.[55] is in + the hypnotic sleep. We wish to give him some peculiar order, + which he shall execute, after he is awake, at a special + signal. The signal is to be a knock given by me on the desk; + the action, to carry a glass of water (a carafe of water + and glass being on a chair) to the student Eucher. He does + not know any of the fifteen students present, nor has he yet + heard their names. The pupils take their places, without any + special order, some standing, some sitting. B. is awakened. + We chat a little. I give the signal. B. rises, fills a glass, + and _without the slightest sign of hesitation_, carries it + to the student mentioned before, who was sitting on one of + the back benches, beside a fellow student. We looked at each + other with stupefaction. The intention of the experiment had + been, to see how he would obey an obscure command. There + were in my audience, certain persons, with leanings toward + belief in second-sight. This result seemed to overthrow all my + convictions. I again throw him into the sleep, and I command + him to carry a glass of water to the student Gérard; we are + all standing, awaiting with impatient curiosity what will take + place. B. fills the glass and this time sends a questioning + look over all the spectators, presents the glass first to one, + then to another, and finally I had to point out the student + Gérard, to whom he brought the water and made him drink it. I + again put him to sleep, and asked him to whom he carried the + first glass of water. To M. Eucher—Did you know him? No—How did + you recognise him?—By his attitude, he looked as if he wanted + to hide away.” + +And this is how the mystery was solved. We had unconsciously prepared +the scene, and it was this preparation which betrayed us. But it is none +the less a remarkable example of the perspicuity shown by somnambulists. +This goes to prove that hypnosis, instead of dulling the understanding, +sharpens it. + +The second of M. Liégeois’s experiments appears to me quite as open to +suspicion, and exactly for the same reasons. + + “I offered N. a white powder, of the nature of which he is + ignorant; I said to him: ‘Pay great attention to what I am + about to tell you. This paper contains arsenic. You will go + presently to such a street to your Aunt’s Mme. M. _who is here + now_. You will take a glass of water, carefully dissolve the + arsenic in it and then you will offer it to your Aunt.’ ‘Yes + Sir’—That evening I received the following note from Mme. M.: + ‘Mme. M. begs leave to inform M. Liégeois that the experiment + succeeded perfectly. Her nephew offered her the poison.’ The + criminal remembered nothing about it, and it was very difficult + to persuade him that he had indeed wished to poison an Aunt for + whom he had a deep affection. The automatism had been complete.” + +I cannot help seeing here an erroneous line of reasoning. They +conclude, from the absence of all remembrance, that the somnambulist +is an automaton, and from this they go on to deduce that he swallows +everything that is said to him. But, since he listens to the voice of +his hypnotiser; since he knows that to accomplish the behest, he must +do things that have not been expressly pointed out, though they are +understood in the execution of the deed:—such as to get the water from a +well or pump—why do they not allow that he is able also to reflect upon +the nature of the deed which he is told to do? Why is it that N..., who +is aware that he is being used in an experiment, cannot say to himself +during his hypnotic state, that this is only an experiment, that the +paper does not contain arsenic, that M. Liégeois never would really want +him to poison his aunt, _his aunt who is present at the time, and who +hears every word_? + +I repeat again, a hypnotic subject is not an idiot—quite the reverse. All +the precaution which M. Liégeois takes to render the experiments reliable +and conclusive, turns against the proof desired. Can you imagine the +poisoner, Dr. Castaing, saying to his servant before Hypolite Ballet, +whom he intended to kill, “Here is some poisoned wine, you will presently +give it to the sick man, whom you see over there in that bed.” If he had +done this, he would not have been condemned to lose his head, but they +would simply have shut him up in a lunatic asylum. And, as far as that +goes, the servant might easily, without any suspicion being attached to +the action, have given the poison to Hypolite Ballet, and the latter have +drunk it. + +But we have dallied long enough over these absurd suppositions. Let us +pass on now to the third narrative: + +M. Liégeois caused Mme. G... to fire at M. P..., an ex-magistrate. In +order to show clearly that the revolver was loaded, M. Liégeois fired a +shot in the garden and came in, showing a piece of card-board, through +which the ball had passed. “With absolute unconsciousness and perfect +docility Mme. G... advances to M. P... and fires. Being questioned +on the spot by the Chief Magistrate (who was present at the _séance_) +she avows the crime with entire indifference. She has killed M. P... +_because he was not pleasing to her_(!) They can arrest her; she knows +quite well what awaits her. If they take away her life, she will pass +into the other world like her victim, whom she sees stretched out, and +bathed in his own blood. They ask her whether it was not I who suggested +to her the idea of the murder. She denies it, and says she did it +spontaneously; that she alone is guilty; she is resigned to her fate, she +will accept without complaint the consequences of her deed.” + +The more I meditate to-day upon these experiments, the less they appear +to me to prove what it is desired they should. This perfect tranquillity +of Mme. G..., her generosity in not inculpating M. Liégeois; her +resignation to the fate that awaits her, establish entirely the fact that +she is present in mind and knowledge of events; and just because of this +very attitude, that she possesses her full presence of mind. She never +dreamed for an instant that she would really kill M. P.... She plays +her part conscientiously, she faithfully recites a lesson which she has +learned by heart and with which she intermingles side play of her own, +childish tricks, as for instance, saying that _her victim had displeased +her_. Let us recall to mind the patient who stole an orange, _because it +was a fine one_. That Mme. G.... sees M. P.... bathed in his own blood, +is more than doubtful. I can produce numberless proofs of facts that go +to prove that fictitious somnambulists are not dupes of the illusions +suggested to them; their calmness proves this. That it is possible to +make them commit an action dangerous to themselves or to others, I am not +prepared to deny. I will explain myself later upon this point. But from +this state, to that of criminal participation, there is an incalculable +distance. + +That the somnambulist repeats a lesson that he has learned, is shown +forth by M. Liégeois’s fourth narrative. + + “Mme. C.... was to give some arsenic in a liquid to M. D.... + who was thirsty. But M. D.... asked a question that I had not + foreseen; he asked what was in the glass. With a frankness that + precluded all idea of simulation Mme. C.... answered ‘Arsenic.’ + + “I was then obliged to amend my suggestion, and I said: ‘If you + are asked what is in the glass, say it is sweetened water.’ + + “Mme. C.... answered the question the second time, ‘Sweetened + water.’ + + “Very courageously M. D.... swallowed the supposed poison. + Questioned by the Chief Magistrate Mme. C. remembers nothing; + she had seen nothing, done nothing, given no drink to any one. + She does not know what they are talking about.” + +Again all this is proof to me, that Mme. C. feels that she is being told +to perform an innocent action. It would have been interesting to have +awakened her in the middle of the act, to see whether she would have +remembered her thoughts, just at the moment when she was giving the +drink to M. D.... I am not sure but that she would have answered like +Miss E... that she had no doubt the poison was imaginary, and the scene +prearranged. + +We have seen M. D... ask an unforeseen question, which upset the carrying +out of the crime. We have witnessed M. Bernheim’s patient steal an orange +under the nose of its proprietor, who was looking at him. Admitting, +therefore, that all had been foreseen, that M. Liégeois had warned +Mme. C... of all the possible questions that might be put to her; that +M. Bernheim had strongly recommended his subject to commit his theft +secretly, and that every possible detail had been perfectly carried +out—should we have even then a faithful transcript of a crime? Can we +have the unerring certitude from these occurrences, that a subject in the +hypnotic sleep, a bona fide somnambulist will allow himself to be used as +an accomplice by a veritable criminal? + + * * * * * + +In the preceding paragraphs, I carefully analysed the slightest details +invalidating experiments, in which the hypnotic subject acts the part +of a criminal, in a fictitious crime. I was able to show, that in all +these tests, there had been certain suspicious traits suggesting doubt +as to the complete illusion of the actor therein, and I finally added: +Supposing that everything had worked smoothly, i. e. that everything had +been foreseen and that the subject had not been tripped up anywhere, are +we authorised in maintaining that a subject thus far unimpeachable as +regards a fictitious crime, would accomplish this same deed in reality? I +answer, No. + +In order to justify this denial, it will be necessary for us to enter +into the Psychology of Hypnosis. + +A person in the hypnotic sleep, as well as in the natural sleep, is not +so absolutely withdrawn from the real world about him as is generally +supposed. The hypnotic subject even less so, than the sleeper, for the +former remains in intelligent communication with his magnetiser. If the +latter tells him to take a book from a table upon which is an inkstand, +some boxes, a statuette, he will pick up the book and not any of the +other objects. If he is enjoined to walk straight before him in a room +encumbered with chairs he will manage to avoid them, and even if the +illusion is pushed further he may knock up against them, but the action +will be done quite cautiously. And this is why, in public séances, he +never hurts himself, in spite of the wildness and apparent excitement of +his movements. This is also the reason, that in experiments intended to +demonstrate this absolute automatism, the preparation for the proposed +crime, the attitude of the spectators, while the subject is carrying out +his part, the integrity of the person who is suggesting the action, the +calmness of the intended victim; all these things, render the suggestion +less illusive than even an ordinary dream would be. + +M. Liégeois asks this question at the conclusion of his first narrative: +“Where is the spectator, who could believe that this scene was only a +melodrama with clever acting; and that a daughter for her amusement, +and solely to deceive an audience, would fire an unloaded revolver at +her mother?” To this I answer: And why should she not play her part in +this melodrama, when she sees M. Liégeois devise it, her mother lend her +co-operation, and the audience watch it with curiosity and interest? + +Here again we find the same fallacy in the argument: Because a subject +does not reveal what is going on within himself, and only puts into +visible speech what is suggested to him, it is taken for granted that he +is going through a mental process identical with that of his magnetiser. +But allow me to ask in my turn: Will it be easily credited, that a +daughter, would, deliberately and without a trace of feeling, shoot at +her mother, unless, she fully believed the action would have no serious +consequences, and that the person who had suggested this impious deed, +was only requiring her to act a part? + +Hypnotic subjects do not take long to realise that they are being used +as tests in experiments. Some are always gracious in responding to them, +many end by refusing to lend themselves to be used in such fashion, +especially in public séances. All these details go far to prove that in +hypnosis, the subjects retain, at least a partial independence. + +If a sleeper, who dreamed he was murdering his mother, should behold +her terrified, beseeching, invoking the pity of her son, calling for +help to the horrified spectators, he would feel that he was induced +to commit this deed by some sort of motive, which, absurd or unlikely +though it might be, would still be the controlling power; in a word, the +dream would be in reality a kind of incoherent and unreal drama, though +composed of very real elements, in which horror would play a very present +part. But if he should see his ostensible victim smiling and conversing +with him amidst a company animated only by a sentiment of curiosity, he +might well suspect, even in his sleep, that what he sees and what he +is doing, is a pure delusion. And this is exactly what he would say to +himself, should it come into his head to fire upon a _magistrate_, and +for the reason _that his looks displeased him_. + +These prearranged scenes fail in verisimilitude and no more deceive the +actors in them, than they do the spectators or the author. + +To this you may object: But, if the pistol had been loaded, Miss E. would +have shot her mother! This rests upon the supposition that the mother and +the spectators, still believed it to be unloaded, otherwise, their terror +alone, would have been quite sufficient to call back the subject to the +reality. And even with this assumption, this murder-test would have borne +a greater resemblance to a simple homicide from imprudence. By this I +mean to say, that so far as the spectators, the victim, and the assassin +were concerned, the act would not have been changed in its character, +simply because the magnetiser, had by mistake, given a loaded instead of +an unloaded pistol to the subject. I need hardly remark that a real crime +would never be perpetrated in this manner. + +Thoroughly convinced though I was, of the impossibility of making +experiments that would entirely fathom this question, circumstances +nevertheless, allowed me once more to make a test which is well adapted +to show that it is not as easy as some may think, to transform an +hypnotic subject into a murderous automaton. + +J... is that excellent somnambulist to whom my experiments have given a +certain notoriety. It is she together with her sister, whom I made use +of in my studies on “Memory in Hypnosis,” on “Imitation,” and “Hypnotic +Consciousness.” She it is, who three several times allowed herself to be +experimented upon by blistering on corresponding parts of the body; and +notably in one case where in accordance with suggestion no inflammation +took place.[56] She is tall, robust, intelligent, industrious, healthy. +She is now married and has had a child. The _accouchement_ took place in +the hypnotic sleep. The case being in the hands of M. Fraipont, Professor +of Obstetrics in the University of Liège; and never was the power of +hypnotism more remarkably exhibited.[57] In the case of this patient +there remained no trace of remembrance whatever, after awakening. + +I have gone into these details merely to show the reader that no +better subject could have been found for my purpose. I have in another +place (see _Revue Philosophique_, article on “Hypnotic Consciousness”) +pointed out certain traits in her case, which at my _début_, were +strongly calculated to make me a believer in the absolute servility of +the hypnotic subject; traits which I shall subsequently recall to your +attention and comment upon. + +To judge more fairly of the value of the experiment, I must further +state, that J. is both resolute and courageous. During several summers +she remained in the country in the environs of Seraing in attendance upon +my wife who was in ill-health, and in whose room she slept. After the +summer vacation it often happened that she spent the whole night alone +with her. At the head of the bed hung a six-barrelled revolver, loaded; a +precaution that we had taken on account of the well-known strikes which +took place in 1886, amongst the workmen of the numerous factories in our +neighborhood. + +In the summer of 1887 I happened to be absent. A man came one night, +prowling round the garden and fumbling at the lock of the door, which he +even tried to force. The barking of the dogs wakened J., she opened the +window, perceived the man, took the revolver and went down into the hall +watching for the moment in which to fire at the nocturnal visitor. The +man hearing the noise slipped away with celerity. And the same year that +this occurrence took place, J. slept on the first floor with her loaded +revolver hanging on a nail beside her bed. + +The 24th Feb. 1888, without communicating my intentions to anybody +except to my daughter, and that only at the very moment of beginning the +experiment, I discharged the revolver. It was six o’clock in the evening. +A young lady, (herself an hypnotic subject,) and my daughter, were seated +at a table, cutting out articles from a newspaper, which they afterwards +tied up in bundles. I called J. and at the moment she opened the door, I +hypnotised her by a motion. I said to her in an agitated tone—“Here are +some thieves, who are carrying off papers.”—J. came quickly forward and +turning towards me said: “No sir, they are playing with them—Why sure +enough they are taking them.” Then she walked resolutely up to them and +tore the papers out of their hands, put them on the table in front of her +and in an imperious tone said: “Don’t you touch them any more.” + +I—“You are never going to let those knaves remain in the house—run and +fetch the revolver” (it was in the adjoining room). J. ran without +hesitation. She returned holding the weapon in her hand and stood on the +threshold. “Fire,” cried I. + +“Sir, we must not kill them.” + +“Thieves? Why certainly!” + +“No sir! I will not kill them.” + +“You must.” + +“I won’t do it.” And she walked backwards still holding the revolver, I +following her and energetically reiterating my command. “I won’t. I won’t +do it. I will not murder.” She then placed the revolver on the floor but +_cautiously_. She continued to go backwards, I, meanwhile insisting and +following her. “I will not do it.”—Having come to a dead stand in the +corner of the room, she repulsed me violently and I thought it prudent to +awaken her, upon which she came to herself smiling in her usual pleasant +manner. She remembered, however, nothing whatever, although at the sight +of the revolver lying on the floor, she seemed to have a kind of vague +recollection. She did not seem at all discomposed in manner. If this +scene had taken place in a dream, she would certainly have exhibited more +excitement. + +This is what we may term conclusive evidence, that is to say if ever +negative evidence can be called so. Let us comment now upon these facts. + +It will be noticed that J. is not the dupe of the hallucination to which +she has been subjected. She does not take either of the young ladies +for thieves, nor the newspapers for valuable papers. Her first answer +is very significant—“No sir, they are playing with them.” Besides which +her expression, her attitude, the manner in which she looked at the +two reputed thieves, and tore the newspapers out of their hands, had +something so keenly observant, so prepared, so theatrical, that both my +witnesses and myself could not possibly believe her actions ingenuous. I +have often questioned her about the illusions that I suggested to her. I +asked her for example, if, when I appeared to her under another aspect, +for instance under the appearance of a young man, with clustering locks +and a black beard, she ever perceived anything of my real resemblance. +She invariably answered, that she saw my actual person, as it were in a +cloud, behind the figure which I had called up before her mental vision. +It is very probable that she recognised my daughter and her friend in the +persons whom I pointed out as the robbers. I might have assured myself of +this by causing her to recall her thoughts at the time. I am aware that +the opponents of this opinion challenge, and not unreasonably, tests made +in this manner because they have doubts about the suggestion. + +If then the facts were such as are related, J. was playing a rôle not +perhaps strictly in accordance with the rules of ordinary acting, knowing +that she was reciting a part, but feeling nevertheless that she had a +certain part to play and must enter into the spirit of it. + +It is incontrovertible that the hypnotic subject really does play his +part in precisely this fashion. When, for example, you extend his arm and +defy him to put it down he seems to make an effort to lower it, but in +reality he does not bring the required muscles into play at all. If you +bid him keep his hand open, he never dreams of using the flexor muscles. +Again, if the spectators try to change the position of either hand or +arm, they meet with energetic resistance. + +You will ask me how it was that J. did not carry out her acting all +through? Why, after she had gone for the revolver with such deliberation, +she did not fire it? It was because, the action being so rapid in its +development, she had no time for reflection; she must have thought and +she actually did believe, that the revolver was loaded as it always was. +This is proved by the precaution with which she handled it and put it on +the floor. It is evident that she thought it was a dangerous game. If I +had known how the affair would terminate, I would have taken the pistol +and told her that I would fire myself, in order to see what her thought +and action would have been. But notwithstanding all this, supposing she +had fired could we have concluded from this, that she really had latent +murderous tendencies? We could not have drawn any legitimate conclusions +even yet. For if, as we have just stated, J. was not entirely withdrawn +from her actual surroundings, she might naturally suppose that I was only +joking, and that I should never make her fire on my own child, and on +this account she need not feel any anxiety in fulfilling the order that I +had given her. + +The problem is a serious one. It is also a psychological problem. I have +already partially disclosed the solution which I myself am led to give +to it, and I can best translate my thoughts by these words and in the +following formula: Persons in hypnosis will only execute acts similar to +those they would naturally perform in dreams. I have asked a number of +persons, among others, those connected with the law, whether they had +ever dreamt they committed murders or robberies, and up to the present +time all have answered in the negative. And yet, lawyers interrogate +criminals, and it would be quite within the realm of possibility through +one of those duplications of personality which I pointed out in my work +on “Sleep and Dreams,”[58] that they should take up for an instant the +rôle of an assassin. This is not an impossible supposition. Does it ever +happen that the novelist or the actor, in portraying or impersonating an +infamous character, the creation of his imagination, does so identify +himself for the nonce, with his own invention, that even in sleep, for +a brief space, he incorporates himself, so to speak, into the fictitious +personage he has evoked. There are some very curious investigations +to make on this subject. But even if any positive facts could be +gathered from this, we should still be left in doubt, as to whether by +post-hypnotic suggestion the subject would continue to carry out the same +rôle. + +Doubtless, an anatomist may dream that he is dissecting a body, but +could we produce an hypnotic condition such as to make him use the +knife as freely upon a living body? Can I make a butcher believe that +a child is a sheep? I consider the thing to be perfectly feasible, yet +my thesis is not at all weakened by this concession. We will take it +for granted that, animated by evil designs you proceed to hypnotise +beforehand, the anatomist and the butcher, and then bring them at a given +moment to the victim! And let us further imagine that the combination +succeeds perfectly. How will you manage to veil in deepest secrecy all +your previous manœuvres and cast a semblance of likelihood over the +culpability of your accomplices? + +Will not the old adage, _Cui bono_, be quoted against you? In order to +insure perfect impunity, you would have to overcome such an accumulation +of material _impedimenta_, the lightest of which would suffice to +dissipate all apprehensions in the minds of those in whom chimerical +fears have not entirely obliterated their common sense. It is therefore +evident that in so far as we know now, from experiments intended to +test this theory and these possibilities of Criminal Suggestion, no +positive results can be obtained. These criminal actions, so appositely +named—Laboratory Crimes—bear no resemblance to actual ones. + +If this debate is ever to be closed it can only be before a Criminal +Court when a Troppman, a Pranzini, or an Eyraud, shall have been the +operator, and it shall have been clearly shown, what interest the +assassin had in making use of a so-called, unconscious and automatic +accomplice. Then only, shall we be able to appreciate to what degree +hypnotism may become a dangerous enemy to society at large. And even +then, we shall have to remind ourselves that all our medicines are +poisons and that they have the power of destroying even more surely, than +that of healing. + +Thus the problem is still unsolved. + +Here is a story told me by Dr. Liébeault. He, or perhaps it was M. +Bernheim, or both together, hypnotised a workman and told him to steal +a couple of little plaster figures, that were used as ornaments on the +mantel-piece in a house where he was working. He did so. The affair had +been forgotten for some time because the suggestion had not been carried +out on the spot. About three months after the occurrence, this same +workman was arrested for stealing a pair of trousers from the front of a +shop. Upon which the previous hypnotic suggestion was remembered. + +My opinion is that the workman—and how many there are of the same +calibre—had a very slight regard for _meum and tuum_. This reminds us +of that hospital patient, whom we saw pilfering the tobacco from his +comrades, and I do not think it was at all necessary to have thrown +the workman into the hypnotic sleep in order to make him steal the +statuettes. But from another point of view, this experiment, which did +not prove anything, might give rise to party arguments from those who +deem it desirable to maintain that it was the initiatory suggestion that +first gave this man the taste for stealing. + +To sum up in a few words this portion of my investigation; the result of +my experiments and of my analyses is this: that the experiments of my +opponents prove nothing. + +For the present I shall confine myself to this purely negative conclusion. + +But there are other grounds besides experiments on which we may examine +this question. We can do so by careful observation and minute analysis of +the actions of hypnotised persons. + +I have said before that the degree of morality observable in the dreams +of the subject, gives the measure of what may be expected from him during +hypnosis. + +According to my opinion, hypnotism is less powerful in inciting to +actions of grave moral import, than the corrupting influence of word or +example, the love of gold, or the excitement of the passions. + +All truly scientific experiments have brought into prominence the analogy +between physiological and incited dreams, and to-day we may say that this +is the doctrine of the future. Thus if an hypnotic subject admits without +opposition that he is made of sugar, or of glass, that he feels he is +melting in the rain, or being broken to atoms by the awkwardness of the +bystanders; if he thinks he is a lamp, or allows himself to be trundled +along like a wheelbarrow; if such a subject, I repeat, refuses to steal +a purse, or to receive an embrace, the conclusion forces itself upon one +that the hypnotic subject has more power over himself than some persons +would wish us to believe; in spite of his docility, there are some things +he absolutely refuses to do. + +If then, reasoning by analogy has ever been legitimate, it is surely so +in this case, when the inference can be drawn that the man who refuses to +give a blow will refuse to use a knife; and that the woman who refuses +to give a token of affection will certainly refuse to allow of serious +tampering with morals. + +Let us then pay close attention to what observation may teach us. + +I shall hope to be able to demonstrate by actual facts, that persons in +an hypnotic condition, preserve at least a sufficient portion of their +intelligence, their reason, together with freedom of action, to prevent +them from committing deeds that neither their conscience nor their habits +approve of. + + J. DELBŒUF. + + +FOOTNOTES: + +[55] A lad of about 15, very bright. Has been one of Donato’s subjects. +Very susceptible and having been hypnotised in a great many public +séances. + +[56] See my pamphlet on _The Origin of Curative Effects in Hypnotism_. + +[57] See _Revue de L’Hypnotisme_. April, 1891. + +[58] _Sleep and Dreams_, p. 24 et seqq. (Paris: Félix Alcan). + + + + +LITERARY CORRESPONDENCE + + + + +I. + +FRANCE. + + +When, some ten years ago, M. de Roberty published in the _Review of +Positive Philosophy_ a series of articles, under the title of the +“New and the Old Philosophy,” I was much impressed by the work. The +conception of the three types; the idealistic, the materialistic, and the +sensualistic, under which nomenclature he ranged the various philosophic +systems, seemed to bring order into the history of philosophy. He also +proceeded to treat, after the same manner and in a very happy way, the +“law of the three states” of Auguste Comte, by this means rectifying +and justifying the latter. The law of the three states, wrote M. de +Roberty, corresponds with the present state of philosophy, which is again +explained by science, so that to whatever measure knowledge may attain +to, it will be equalled by philosophy, which borrows its types and its +characteristics from the sequence of facts, at the point where it leaves +the sphere of explanatory hypotheses. + +Since then M. DE ROBERTY has completed by a new study, his first work on +this subject. In the “Unknown” he has laid his finger on one of the weak +points of modern positivism; perhaps by dint of searching into details, +he has shown himself a little too severe on Comte in the book about +which I am going to speak to-day, _The Philosophy of the Century_ (_La +Philosophie du Siècle._). + +This book contains a thoughtful criticism of the three doctrines that +occupy contemporaneous thought; and which are: criticism, positivism, +and evolutionism. He considers these in conformance to his _criterium_, +as simply the varieties of one single species and the absolutely +identical manifestation of a common fund of beliefs and hypotheses held +generally by all. According to him critical philosophy derives its +direct origin from idealism. Positive philosophy, from materialism; and +the philosophy of evolution from sensualism. Going further still, he +considers critical philosophy as the legitimate outcome of sensualistic +idealism; and positive philosophy, similarly, as the product of +sensualistic materialism. Sensualism is thus the common ancestor; the +three systems inter-penetrating each other. But the promoters of these +systems must be judged with equity, put back into their proper places, +and ranged according to their epochs. In my opinion, a philosophical +doctrine is valuable, not so much by the clear solutions it affords us, +as by its methods of procedure, may I say, even by the coloring it gives +to thoughtful minds. + +I do not hesitate to recognise in Kant, the strong, rough-handed workman +of modern philosophy; in Comte, the most utilitarian; in Spencer the +subtlest as well as the most successful. Kant possesses the greatest +speculative vigor; Comte, the clearest scientific turn of mind; Spencer, +the keenest conception of, and insight into, psychological subjects. +Taking these philosophers as a whole, Spencer, in spite of his merits, +appears to me the least original, the least remarkable of the three. +His universal metaphysics has feet of clay. The classification of the +sciences that he wished to substitute for that of Comte is obscure, +devoid of general utility; in short the influence of Comte on succeeding +generations will be more considerable than Spencer’s, if indeed there are +any philosophers who will be bold enough to avow themselves deliberately +as Comtists. + +This contradiction should not surprise us. It not seldom happens that the +influence of a master continues even when his doctrines have suffered +shipwreck. We notice this in the great schools of thought of the +present day. We may say with truth, that the criticists are inclined to +dialectics; the positivists, to methods and systems; the evolutionists +to facts. The first excel in the analysis of ideas, but they expose +themselves to be lost in abstractions. The second endeavor to reduce to +a system all scientific matter, but they run the risk of being either +rigorists or becoming too elementary. The last while making rapid strides +in the genesis of the subtler phenomena of life, incur the danger of +accepting arbitrary _liaisons_, or of remaining in an inchoate condition. +Each one possesses most valuable qualities, which it would be desirable +indeed to meet with in the same mind. Each has rendered services which it +is but just to recognise and which it would be unwise to disregard. + +The main thing is always to be able to understand one another upon the +question of what philosophy means and its relation to science. What M. de +Roberty cares most for, in all his writings, is the elucidation of this +problem. We must concede, that it is one which is worth striving after. +And it is surely not asking too much if we demand of every philosopher, +that he shall know, more or less, what is meant by philosophising. + +Philosophy will be, in the future, very much what it has always been in +the past, a general _conception of the world_. This is a fixed fact for +M. de Roberty. Is it true that philosophy preceded science, or, that on +the contrary it has always been and will continue to be subsidiary to +it? Many are, we know, partisans of the first opinion; it has seemed to +them that the sciences have separated little by little from the hazy and +indistinct conglomerate which bore the name of theology, metaphysics, +in a word, of philosophy. M. de Roberty does not hesitate to adopt the +contrary opinion. Philosophy, according to him, has always sprung from +science, it has always been the equal of science. But though he proclaims +this equality as existing between science and philosophy, this does not +in the least oblige him to recognise any equality in their manifestations +“in history.” The knowledge of a given science, implies a certain +_conception of the world_; this is the supreme law of philosophical +evolution. Philosophy is an abstract science of general interest, having +for its end, the integration of the documentary evidence furnished +by the various sciences. Comte was strongly imbued with this truth. +Spencer made it his own, but he makes a more serious mistake than his +predecessor, when he asserts that philosophy is able to “play an active +part” in scientific discovery. In the opinion of M. de Roberty, it is +neither the antecedent of science, nor is it even to be called an art. +Must it then be called a science? Or is it to be comprehended in science? +Neither the one, nor the other. He prefers rather to regard it as a link +(“_un trait d’union_”) between these two different kinds of intellectual +activity, science and art. The mental faculties may, he tells us, aim +at subjugating nature, either in a direct manner, the result of which +will be called science; or in an indirect way, in which case we name it +art; or they may have still a third intention, taking a kind of middle +course between the utility of _science_ and the indirect utility of art, +which while actively participating in both, facilitates as well the +transition from one to the other, from which springs _philosophy_. “Most +unmistakably identical,” says he finally, “are the elements which produce +a particular combination, in the one, they are called science, in the +other philosophy.” + +But we must not confound the two propositions. “If a house is to be +built of brick, does that mean that we are not to distinguish between +the materials required in its erection?—that we are to apply to its +construction, the ingredients and the procedures used in the making and +firing of bricks? We never should build a house if we acted thus.” + +Let us not misunderstand this comparison! The house here spoken of is +entirely figurative. The hypothesis which underlies it is universally +accepted, but its primal condition is always wanting—i. e. universal +knowledge. It would be presumptuous indeed, to draw, to-day, the plans +and define the style of architecture which shall be used in our future +philosophical habitation, since we do not yet possess even the materials +wherewith to build it. We can only hope to erect such a temporary +shelter, a fort, that may be swept away in a few hours, whenever the +enemy shall have discovered an explosive powerful enough to blow it into +atoms. I do not care very much, I confess, for the distinction spoken of +“between a direct and an indirect utility” and the idea of philosophy +forming a link between art and science. This way of representing the +facts of the case, seems to me both cumbersome and incomplete. I will +not stop here to discuss it. The thoughtful study of M. de Roberty is +not compromised by such a small detail, and I would rather remember the +positive teaching which is given in the very striking book that I have +just been criticising. + +“Philosophy and science,” writes the author, “are terms which define +two principal _species_ of the vast _genus_ designated under the one +name,—knowledge.” The most marked trait of the philosophy of the future, +will be the _distinction_ between the two species, as _confusion_ was the +predominant characteristic of the philosophy of the past. + + * * * * * + +The work of M. de Roberty gave us a methodic history of philosophy. +That of M. F. PICAVET, _The Ideologists—An Essay on the Scientific, +Philosophic, Religious, etc., ideas and theories in France since 1789_, +stretches over a very vast area of descriptive history. His book +conducts us from Condorcet to Destutt de Tracy, and Cabanis; from these +to Degérando and Laromiguière; it embraces thus nearly the whole of +the philosophy of the eighteenth century, which it carries back to the +seventeenth, from thence following the thread of its history, through +the intervening years, down to our own times. The name “Ideologist” is +vague, as are all the rest of the battle-cries which are used by the +leaders of parties, or that their adversaries may make use of against +them. Ideology, in the sense used by Destutt de Tracy, signifies, that +philosophers must confine themselves to psychological research, more +particularly to that which concerns the origin and the formation of +ideas, an immense field, embracing philology, ethnology, etc. With +regard to the wrong sense which Napoleon attached to this word, it was +justified in a certain measure by the pretensions of the philosophers in +governing life, politics, and law, by doubtful hypotheses, which did not +often accord with practice. It cannot be denied that since the time of +Rousseau, we pass much too easily from theory to action, and that we fall +back too readily on our imagination, to supplement our actual experience. +We find in M. Picavet’s book, new and valuable information about all the +men who have contributed to the intellectual life of the French nation, +during and since the time of the Revolution. We can trace there the +origin of certain doctrines, which have appeared to spring up suddenly +before our eyes, and shall often be extremely surprised by what we shall +read there. It is a most valuable and important work, showing an enormous +amount of erudition, fine critical acumen, and a rare descriptive talent. +It is quite voluminous (more than 600 pp. 8vo.), and some might indeed +consider that it could have been more condensed. But it is primarily a +book of reference, in whose pages we shall surely not complain of finding +a large amount of information, when we refer to it. + + * * * * * + +With the book of M. BERNARD PÉREZ, _Le Caractère, de l’enfant à l’homme_, +(Character, from Childhood to Manhood), we leave the domain of philosophy +and history to enter into that of psychology. M. Pérez modestly disclaims +all pretension to founding a science of character. Nevertheless, that +which he has given us and produced here, bears the stamp of originality +in a subject in which authors have hitherto only repeated one another. +His work is composed of two parts, of which the second forms the +completion of, or rather a commentary on, the first. We find here, to +start with, a classification of characters, illustrated by portraits +which render the developments more tangible; secondly, a study on the +common combinations of the principle traits of personality. + +The classification of M. Pérez is founded on movements, that is to say +it is displayed in sufficiently complete groups connected with some +distinct mode of expression, such as rapidity, slowness, and energy of +movements. It offers the practical advantage of substituting for the four +or six temperaments of the old schools, which are frequently hard to +distinguish, classes more flexible and distinguished by visible gestures +which betray, more or less clearly, their physiological foundation. M. +Pérez has provisorily established six of these classes. He distinguishes +the vivacious, the vivacious-ardent, the ardent, the sluggish, the +sluggish-ardent, and lastly the balanced type. The last category is +in my judgment a sort of utility-box, apparently designed to receive +specimens which we are at a loss where else to put. For one of two things +is certainly true, either this balance is an insignificant trait or it +is one that is dominant in the person, and it is absolutely necessary to +state which. + +Many will undoubtedly question this doctrine that the movements of +a person express all his character and that consequently they are +competent to reveal it to us. We might maintain, indeed, that if the +movements supply us with the labels of each class, it is not always to be +distinctly seen how the different traits of character and of intelligence +(the author does not separate the two, and gives his reasons for so +doing) subordinate themselves to one another and vary with the motor sign +chosen to express them. There can be no question, however, that rapidity, +energy, or slowness of movement, do not have certain actual and profound +connections with our visceral and cerebral functions, and that the motor +sign is easy to be made use of, although it does not reach all the facts +which it is employed to describe, and although the explanation of these +facts still remains to be sought in the physiological substratum. + +M. Pérez has secondly attempted a systematisation of character-traits, by +successively studying the relations of gaiety and sadness, irascibility +and gentleness, courage and fear, kindness and malevolence, self-love and +will, with the principal emotional intellectual and volitional traits +of character. He has perceived, instinctively as it were, that the +pointing out of generic, specific, and individual marks does not possess +its entire worth except on the condition that we also point out _the +subordination_ of the same, and he has given this factor much prominence +in the last chapters of his book. This portion of the work is replete +with subtle observations, and ingenious and profound reflections, but it +is fragmentary in character, a half-way production, I might say, between +the disconnected literature of the moralist and a reasoned and methodical +description such as ethology ought to furnish later on, after the manner, +if possible, of the natural sciences. + +The desiderata which I here briefly refer to, are not set forth to +diminish the value of the work of M. Pérez. It will in its present form +render great services, and I should not be at all surprised if the +terminology which he has invented should pass into the language of the +day, as it is convenient and easily lends itself to the description of +character-portraits. Even readers who shall find here much to criticise, +will not refuse to accord to it real and solid merit. + + * * * * * + +After the work of M. Pérez, a study of my own naturally ranges itself—_La +Psychologie du peintre_[59]—concerning which I ask permission to +offer a few remarks. I have set myself the problem, in this work, of +determining a professional type, and I have chosen one of those which +are certainly the most distinctly defined. If other authors could give +us the psychology of the musician, of the lawyer, of the physician, and +of the geometer, such a task would not be an indifferent performance in +what concerns our knowledge of _character_, and we should arrive at the +construction of a natural history of society from a different point of +view and by different methods from those at the disposal of the novelist. +We should accomplish, unquestionably, the passage from general and +_abstract_ psychology, to _concrete_ psychology. + +Do professional types really exist? and if they exist, what are they +composed of? The question as I view it, is not bereft of interest for the +psychologist. We do, no doubt, find among painters, vivacious, sluggish, +and ardent individuals, and we may indeed, in studying this or that +particular painter, discover in him some one or other of the combinations +described by M. Pérez. But that does not stand in the way of the growth +and constitution of social types, and individuals may find a natural +place in the different categories of a general classification without +ceasing to belong to their professional category in consequence of a +natural self-grouping of their intellectual faculties, and a definite +tendency of the traits of their emotional nature. It would be justifiable +to say, at the same time simplifying and enlarging a little the facts, +that originally our viscera form our character but our cerebral organism +forms our profession; and if it is true furthermore that a certain +physiological state brings with it a definite intellectual mode of +operation, it is none the less true that the same culture of the mind and +the long-continued habits of a profession are apt to impose upon one’s +personality a definite discipline and mean equilibrium of tendencies and +sentiments; and it is in this sense that it has seemed to me we are at +liberty to speak of a professional type without equivocation or violence. + +Those who will not accept this manner of looking at this subject will +find, I hope, some additional interest in my work on the score of the +special questions which are treated of there: the heredity of genius, +memory, the classification of the sentiments (implied rather than +formulated), the relations of the will to the design considered as +writing, the evolution of art in its connection with visual analysis, +and so forth. There is here a sufficiently abundant supply of materials +capable of being wrought up in social psychology and the criticism of +art. But it does not become me to bestow praises on my own work, and it +would be too easy for me to subject it to criticism. My readers will +find in it themselves the weak portions, without my pointing them out to +them; and it would be a source of great pleasure to me to have the same +assurance that they will discover in it qualities which I do not perceive +there. + + * * * * * + +There remains still to be mentioned _La Première partie d’une étude sur +la théorie du droit musulman_,[60] by SAVVAS PACHA, one time governor +and governor general, one time minister of public works and foreign +secretary of Turkey. Savvas Pacha—a Christian of Greek descent—has held +high positions in the Ottoman Empire and is esteemed as one of the most +learned men in Islamic law who have ever lived. His book therefore +demands the greatest consideration; it will not possess less interest for +philosophers than for statesmen and jurists. In my opinion, works of this +class should be consulted by psychologists as much as by sociologists; we +are too much inclined nowadays to neglect certain social studies which +offer us valuable information respecting the genius of races and the +conditions of their moral existence. + +The work of Savvas Pacha will undoubtedly contribute much toward the +elucidation of some mooted points of very first importance; I should like +to mention—the history of creation, and the exposition of the principles +of a law which rules more than a million human beings and is intimately +interwoven with their political life; a more exact knowledge of the +Semitic genius; an estimate of the relations which have existed between +the juridical metaphysics of the Semitic peoples and that of the schools +of Greece, between the Mohammedan law and the Roman law in provinces once +Romanised but afterwards subjected to the empire of the Caliphs. + +It does not seem at all doubtful that the ontology of Aristotle in +particular has exercised an influence on the philosophy of the Arabian +jurisconsults. A second truly remarkable fact, too, is not the new +ontology which they have produced, but the use they have made of it in +their legislative fabrics. It is impossible to enter into details here; I +limit myself to the mere pointing out of the facts. + +With respect to the originality of the institutions that belong to the +period of the first Abbassids, the same has been contested by a number of +historians. M. Renan, among others has maintained that they are the work +of the Iranian genius. Savvas Pacha refutes this opinion in a peremptory +manner, and we shall no longer be able to deny, after having read him, +that the Mohammedan civilisation, with the _corpus juris_ which stands +for its most perfect production, has really proceeded from the genius of +the races that bore the banner of Islam from the confines of China to the +Straits of Gibraltar. + +Shall I add that we may deduce from this work, so learned and so +suggestive, the elements of an instructive comparison between two grand +divisions of human history whose evolution seems still to be pursued on +lines wholly apart—that which we call Christianity and that which has +sprung from the teachings of Mohammed? + +I fervently hope that Savvas Pacha will not delay the publication of +the other works which he has promised. When they appear he will have +furnished us with the most considerable work which we possess on the +institutions of a great division of humanity, still too little known to +us. + + LUCIEN ARRÉAT. + + +FOOTNOTES: + +[59] All the works so far mentioned are published by F. Alcan. + +[60] Published by Marchal et Billard, Paris. + + + + +II. + +GERMANY. + + +Productions of a literary-historical character are under certain +circumstances also entitled to mention in a philosophical magazine, +especially if they present to us the intellectual development and +physiognomy of an individual or of a community in a scientific manner, as +is done in the _Essays_ of KARL WEIGAND which have just been published by +Merhoff, of Munich. Of the larger essays contained in this book we will +especially mention those on Voltaire, Rousseau, Baudelaire, and Taine, to +which in psychological respects a high value is to be accorded, and which +although not exactly easy are nevertheless pleasant reading. + +Viewed from this standpoint the _History of North American Literature_ by +KARL KNORTZ (Berlin, 1891, Lustenöder) hardly admits of consideration; +not even Edgar Allen Poe, who in the psychological point of view is of +unexceptionally great importance, is in any respect profoundly treated. +The work is made up of a series of well written articles which first no +doubt were published in newspapers and magazines for the public at large. +We deem it proper, however, to mention the work in this place, because it +contains a chapter on the philosophical literature of North America, in +which, we must admit, philosophy does not appear to the best advantage. +The representatives of philosophy in North America, the author says, +are in the main doctors of divinity and securely installed university +professors, and this department of study has therefore no dangerous +connections; the gentlemen calmly wend their way along the ancient and +well-trodden path of the aprioristic philosophers and proscribe without +any ado all modern innovations, Darwinism in particular. + +As they have not as yet consigned the belief in God and immortality and +the freedom of the will to the lumber-room of traditional opinions, and +as they are as a rule only superficially acquainted with the results of +the exact sciences, despite the fact that many assure us of the contrary, +they accordingly fancy that they are easily able to solve the imagined +chief problem of philosophy, the reconciliation of religion and science. + +This judgment may contain much that is true, but from the little that +we personally know of things in North America, is to be decidedly +restricted. Moreover, we by no means share the low opinion which the +author entertains of all attempts to reconcile religion and science. +Religion is a phenomenon of too great antiquity and its influence +in the life of nations is too thoroughly established to entitle us, +on the ground of science with which it is still involved in violent +conflict, summarily to disregard it; and consequently every attempt at +reconciliation is worthy of the best efforts of the noblest. It is of +course a question whether we shall ever arrive at the point where we +will completely understand _all_ religious things, but we certainly +must with time arrive at a point where religion shall no longer contain +inconsistencies, contain nothing, that is, of which the absurdities are +patent. + +There was indeed, in Germany also, a time when the belief was very +widely spread that religion as compared with science might be ignored +completely; it was the time when Ludwig Büchner and Karl Vogt were so +much read, when the magazine _Gartenlaube_ counted its greatest number +of readers. But this time is long since past, and just as since that +time employment with philosophy, especially with ethics, has become +more comprehensive, so also the interest in religio-philosophical +questions, which aim at a reconcilement of the two hostile powers, has +been considerably augmented. Aside from the German productions which have +been written in a conciliatory tone, like the book, to give an example, +of Moriz Carrière on Christianity and the Modern World Conception, +foreign works of this same class have also been much read, particularly +Drummond’s _Natural Law in the Spiritual World_, to which indeed in +our judgment no particular value is attributable, as it does not help +us to any real knowledge but contents itself with analogies which +scientifically are absolutely worthless. + +Recently the little treatise _Ernste Gedanken_ of the Saxon officer VON +EGIDY (Leipsic, 1891, Wilh. Wigand) has been much talked about. The +reformatory effect of this brochure has, indeed, hitherto been very +slight and will hardly become more extensive in the future, but the +response that it has met with in the widest circles of the German public, +proves that many ardent friends of religion anxiously desire that the +dogmatic shackles and integuments shall be stripped from the body of the +Christian beliefs, and that it shall appear, in the clearest and purest +light, that which it is, the religion of love. + +Theological criticism has not taken an exactly favorable attitude towards +the little book of Lieut. Egidy, and even the liberals, who pay the +fullest credit to the good intentions of the author call attention to the +fact that the greater part of what Egidy advances has been said before +and said better, and that there is an almost absolute lack of positive +proposals to be adopted. The Egidy movement will thus probably have, they +conclude, no lasting effects. + +We cannot indeed absolutely say that these critics are wrong, if we +are at all conversant with the development of protestant theology. +A very instructive and opportune work in this respect is a book +of the well-known Berlin professor OTTO PFLEIDERER, who, as his +religio-philosophical treatises evidence, himself belongs to the +reconcilers of Christianity and the modern world-conceptions. In the +year 1889, at the instigation of the editor of the Library of Philosophy +issued by Swan, Sonnenschein, & Co. of London, he published in the +English language a work on _The Development of Protestant Theology +since Kant and in Great Britain since 1825_, and this same work has now +just appeared in German (published by Mohr of Freiburg) in a somewhat +more extended form. As its title proclaims, and as its belonging to the +Library of Philosophy would signify, the work is chiefly concerned with +the influence which philosophy has exercised on theological thought. +To make this influence plain, the author presents at the start, in the +form of an introduction, a concise but extremely lucid exposition of the +philosophical doctrines that especially demand consideration in this +direction. Of German philosophers, Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, +and of English, Herbert Spencer are treated of at length. + +In view of the great respect which Hegel still enjoys in America, it will +perhaps interest many of the readers of _The Monist_ if I give here an +utterance of Pfleiderer, which in the point of view of the history of +religion is also deserving of consideration, at least on the part of +those who are recognised adherents of evolutionism. + +“No other branch of inquiry,” says Pfleiderer, “owes so much to Hegel as +History; the arbitrary construction of details from the philosophical +concept which had crept in by Hegel and his immediate followers, has +of course been discarded by exact historical inquirers, but there has +remained that profounder conception of historical life generally as a +development of the common mind of all ages and nations, conformable +to law, dominated by ideas, and aiming at necessary general purposes; +there has remained that profounder insight into the intricate play of +phenomena, into the kernel of things and men, into the dominating ideas +that lie as guiding impulses at the foundation of even the apparent +disharmony of individual passions; there has remained that unprepossessed +understanding for the necessity of even the contrarieties and struggles, +for the errors and passions of men, for conflict is the father of all +things, as Hegel says with Heraclitus, and as it is only through the +struggle of partial rights and one-sided truths that the whole truth of +the idea can force its way into existence; there has remained finally +that intelligent respect for the heroic figures of history in which the +genius of a people and of an age have been incarnated, which as the +instruments of a higher power have awakened the thought that slumbered +in all souls, given it clear expression, and infused in it life by their +mighty deeds. Neither a Leopold Ranke, nor a Thomas Carlyle, nor a +Ferdinand Christian Bauer would be conceivable without Hegel’s philosophy +of history.” + +Pfleiderer expresses himself here very cautiously concerning Hegel, and +in other passages his caution is extended further still. Nevertheless, it +will seem to many as if that philosopher has been too highly estimated by +Pfleiderer. Especially will the followers of Herbart be dissatisfied, who +was involved in violent combat with Schelling and Hegel. It is not the +place here to enter minutely into this subject; but it is to be mentioned +that the name of Herbart does not occur once in this large book. Perhaps +Pfleiderer is of Edward Zeller’s opinion who says in his “History of +Modern Philosophy,” that the philosophy of Herbart has proved itself +unfruitful. It must be confessed, indeed, that the philosophy of Hegel +has proved itself for religious doctrine very fruitful; but whether we +should be satisfied with its results is quite a different question. Be +that however as it may; still, after Schoel has presented Herbart’s ideas +concerning religion in a special work, since men like Drobisch, Thilo, +and Strumpell have further elaborated these ideas; since particularly +Ziller in his Ethics has also profoundly treated religious problems in +the sense of Herbart, it is no longer allowable to omit the name of +Herbart when we treat of the modern philosophy of religion. + +In other respects also we are not always in full accord with the author. +So, for example, in Hausrath’s _Neutestamentliche Zeitgeschichte_, a work +to which we ourselves are very much indebted, the perfection of the form +of the presentment is justly praised, as is also the merit of having +inserted into the greater setting of universal history the development +of early Christianity; but it is not mentioned that Hausrath has often +allowed himself to be misguided into combinations whose flimsiness cannot +escape the notice even of the lay student. + +But these are only slight deficiencies of a work that is otherwise +excellent and full of matter, closing with the words: “This much is +certain, that the labors of the best and wisest of all the theologians of +our century, who have here been passed in review before the eyes of the +reader, however different the paths may be which individually they have +entered upon, have yet been all directed to the one end that Christianity +shall strip itself of its dogmatic coverings and fetters and evince its +world-conquering power in the ethical idealism of a love that unites us +with God and joins together the hands of humanity into the federation of +brotherhood.” + +If this aim were universal, that is if it were also recognised by the +theologians, a not inconsiderable portion of the dispute between religion +and science would be done away with, and the sole question would then +turn on the contrariety of theological and philosophical ethics. But even +respecting this point a settlement would be much sooner brought about, +if those concerned would evince the same spirit of reconciliation as +HANS GALLWITZ, city pastor of Sigmaringen, has recently done in his book +_Das Problem der Ethik in der Gegenwart_ (Göttingen, 1891, Vandenhoeck +and Ruprecht). The author, it is true, deals critically not only with +the philosophical ethics of a Paulsen and a Wundt, but also with the +theological ethics of a Hermann and a Kaftan; still the settlement of +things with the philosophers forms the bulk of this rather extensive +work, the contents of which we cannot of course give here. Gallwitz also +speaks in considerable detail of Kant, whom he opposes in respect of the +psychological questions here involved, wholly rejecting anything like +a transcendental will. If we must agree with him in this respect, we +can nevertheless not follow him in his assumption of a special ethical +constitution of the soul. + +In conclusion let me note the titles of two works to which I shall revert +in a subsequent letter. On _The Psychology in Kant’s Ethics_ Dr. ALFRED +HEGLER of Tübingen presents a meritorious and compendious treatise of 300 +pages (Freiburg, 1891, Mohr), and Professor HOSTINSKY of Prague publishes +an exposition and interpretation, based on the sources, of _Herbart’s +Æsthetics_, in which, as is well known, ethics and æsthetics in the +restricted sense are wholly severed from psychology. + + CHR. UFER. + + + + +CRITICISMS AND DISCUSSIONS. + + + + +THOUGHT AND LANGUAGE. + + +_To the Editor of The Monist_: + +SIR—I am glad to hear that Prof. Max Müller intends to answer our +double-barrelled criticism of his article on the above subject. +Meanwhile, however, I should like to say a few words with regard to the +point which he selects for immediate response (see _The Monist_, Jan. +1892, p. 286). And my object in saying these few words is to remove from +his mind the idea that with regard to the point in question I had the +smallest intention of bringing against him “a serious charge of want of +accuracy, unpardonable in a scholar.” On the contrary, as regards this +point I was simply defending myself from _his_ charge against _me_—to +wit, the charge of arrogance. + +In his article on “Thought and Language” he observed, “Professor Romanes +has no right to speak of men like Noiré, Huxley, Herbert Spencer, to say +nothing of Hobbes, with an air of superiority.” In answer to this charge +I stated the bare facts of the case,—viz. that in my book I had alluded +to Noiré merely for the sake of stating his theory as to the origin +of speech, and of expressing my large measure of agreement therewith; +that I had quoted Huxley only in places where my argument needed +authoritative opinions on matters of comparative anatomy; that I had +only once mentioned Hobbes, and then in order to back by his authority a +philosophical doctrine for which I was contending; and, lastly, that I +had never mentioned Herbert Spencer at all. Now, if my critic feels that +a mere statement of these facts amounts to a serious charge against him +as a scholar, I can only express my regret that he should have imposed on +me the necessity of stating them. + +But what now is his reply to this simple statement of facts? Briefly, +he drops his own “serious charge” as regards Noiré, Huxley, and Hobbes, +and takes his stand upon the case of Herbert Spencer. “It is true,” he +says, “Mr. Spencer’s name does not occur in the index. But on p. 230 we +read: ‘So here again we meet with additional proof, were any required, +of the folly of regarding the copula as an essential ingredient of a +proposition.’ Now it is well known that it is Herbert Spencer who regards +the copula as an essential ingredient of a proposition.” As if it were +one man alone who takes this view, and that man Herbert Spencer! Or as +if Herbert Spencer’s name were so specially identified with it, that +in calling it a philosophically foolish view I expected my readers to +understand a disrespectful allusion to him! Surely my critic knows as +well as I do that this question touching the function of the copula +is one which has been debated for centuries; and therefore that with +much more show of reason he might accuse me of making an attack on the +President of the United States, on the ground that I had expressed a +decided opinion in favor of free trade. + +But more than this. So far is it from being “well known that it is +Herbert Spencer who regards the copula as an essential ingredient of a +proposition,” that I am under the necessity of asking Prof. Max Müller +for references in proof of such a statement. Chapters X and XI of the +“Principles of Psychology” (Vol. II) are those which, as far as I am +aware, most nearly approach the subject. Yet the word “copula” does not +once occur in them. Moreover, with all that Mr. Spencer has there said +upon the nature and structure of propositions I am, and always have been, +in full agreement. + + Yours faithfully, + + GEORGE J. ROMANES. + +Oxford, Feb. 12. + + + + +A DEFENSE OF LITTRÉ. + + +_To the Editor of The Monist._ + +If all the readers of _The Monist_ for October were acquainted with the +life and writings of Littré I should not have to defend him against your +criticism, as everyone could see that there is more truth than poetry +in my sonnet. But I fear that “the voice, the spirit, and the soul of +Positivism” is not so well known as he deserves to be, and I venture to +ask for space to reply. + +Proceeding in order, I should like to correct the impression left by the +following passage: “Comte had not nominated a successor who should in his +place be the _Directeur du positivisme_. Littré had forfeited this honor +on account of his quarrels with Comte in which he strongly sided with +Madame Comte against her husband.” The misunderstanding between the two +men had a more serious origin than these family squabbles and arose from +the fact that Littré would not follow Comte through the mystic vagaries +of the _Politique Positive_. He admits that being under his intellectual +ascendency he went too far on the new way, but he soon found that the +master was violating his own method and, having to choose between them, +he held to the method. Littré’s refusal to join Comte in his adhesion +to the régime of the coup d’état of 1851 was the immediate cause of the +rupture. His “excessive tolerance” did not extend to the Bonapartes, whom +he detested cordially. It is characteristic of the man that he continued +his yearly subscription to the fund that he had created for his friend’s +support notwithstanding this break in their relations. + +As to his tolerance, I think with you that he carried it a little too far +in his own family. Greater firmness might have spared us the vision of +priests bedeviling him in his agony and dragging his body in triumph to +holy ground. But the case that you take as an example does not seem to +me conclusive. It was not necessary to possess his knowledge of history +in order to appreciate the difficulties attendant upon interference with +his catholic wife in the education of their daughter, and as success was +impossible he wisely limited his endeavor to fields unobstructed by the +“eternal feminine.” + +Seriously, we admit that Littré was tolerant to excess, but not that the +attitude of his philosophy is, as you say, “mere scepticism leading to +indifferentism.” In the words of M. Wyrouboff, who aided him for many +years in editing the magazine called _La Philosophie Positive_, “men, no +matter how superior they may be, are never abstract formulas interpreting +with equal facility all the parts of a mental conception; they always +represent a mixture of strength and weakness in variable proportions.... +It seemed as if intellectual activity had absorbed all the living forces +of his (Littré’s) being, leaving in the place of physical activity only +the faculty of passive resistance to the will of others.” This refers +to the man in his old age but in youth he was an athlete of remarkable +strength. Renan said of him: “While his temperament was calm his mind was +revolutionary, and therefore he never gave way. In July 1830, he was in +the first line of those who broke into the place du Carrousel and George +Farcy was shot through by his side.” I am tempted to quote a little +more from this master of words. “So great was his love of truth that, +perhaps alone in our century, he could retract without lessening himself. +Truth led him like a child.... It is not well to be too perfect.... His +apparent negations were only the extreme reserve of a mind that dreads +hazardous appreciations. He was so much afraid of going beyond what he +saw clearly that he often stopped short of it. Hesitation that implies a +thousand times more delicate worship of the eternal ideal than the rash +solutions that satisfy superficial minds.” + +Even in old age there were no signs of “indifferentism” in his conduct. +In the words of Pasteur, “At the Mesnil he was consulting physician for +the whole village (always gratuitously). Continuing his labors till three +o’clock in the morning, the light of his lamp shone afar during the night +like a beacon that reassured the sick. It was known that at the first +call, M. Littré would leave his work and go wherever his aid was needed.” + +These are the words of men that knew him, but my first-hand opinion of +him was formed solely from his writings and his public acts as senator, +etc.; fancy such a man in _our_ senate! + +The note in which you say that I attended positivistic lectures +(Comte’s?) in France together with Mr. Frederic Harrison is a flattering +anachronism. + +Littré’s father received a sword of honor while in the navy for beating +off an English ship of superior force, and the son’s philosophy prompts +not only to action but to action, if necessary, in the good old fashioned +positive way. + +My second objection refers to the line where you say that your positivism +“has nothing to do with Comte or with any of Comte’s disciples,” and, +leaving Comte aside, I hope to show that you and Littré are much better +friends than you imagine. A view noted by him on p. 27, Vol. 1, of his +magazine, _La Philosophie Positive_, ought to assure this happy result. + +In the preface of your valuable work entitled “Fundamental Problems” you +draw particular attention to the part that treats of “Form and Formal +Thought,” which, you say, discusses a subject of fundamental importance. +“A correct conception of form and the laws of form will clear away many +mysteries; it will afford a satisfactory explanation of causality and +shed a new light on all the other problems of philosophy.” + +The part referred to begins thus: “In the introduction to his ‘Critique +of Pure Reason,’ Immanuel Kant proposes the question: How are synthetical +Judgments _a priori_ possible? on the solution of this problem the +whole structure of his philosophy rests, which he characterises as +_Transcendental Idealism_.” (“A priori, as used in the limited sense by +Kant, is purely formal knowledge, while a posteriori is identical with +experience.”) + +Further on I read, “Our own views grew out of a study of Kant’s +Transcendentalism”; and the first words of your “Conclusion” are these: +“Although Kant’s Transcendental Idealism cannot be considered as a final +solution of the basic problem of philosophy, it nevertheless pursues the +right method and has thus actually led us to a solution which, we hope, +will in time be recognised as final.” + +In looking for the difference between the two solutions to find the +part in yours that belongs to you alone, I see on p. 50 of “Fundamental +Problems” that “Kant thinks it is a strange and wonderful fact that +our formal thought (the rules of arithmetic, mathematics, logic, etc., +which are _a priori_) agrees so precisely with the highest (i. e. the +most general) laws of nature, which can be ascertained and verified by +experience. Kant sees only two ways of solution. Either the laws of pure +reason, he says, have been gathered by experience from nature, or, on +the contrary, the laws of nature have been deduced from our _a priori_ +rules. The former solution is impossible, since the formal sciences +are proven to have been formulated with the exclusion of all sensory +experience. ‘Therefore,’ says Kant, ‘the second solution only remains. +Reason dictates its laws to nature’; i. e. ... the sensory impressions +are the raw material only from which the well-ordered whole of nature, as +an object of science, is created by the synthetic faculty of reason.... +Kant has taken into consideration two ways only. He overlooks the third +and most obvious explanation.... The third possibility is that which has +been propounded in the foregoing pages. According to our explanation, the +formal (the highest or most general) laws of nature and the formal laws +of thought are identical. Their agreement is not wonderful but inevitable +as both are expressions of the forms of existence in general.” + +This then is your “solution of the basic problem of philosophy.” + +Turning back to page 34, I find under the title “The Origin of the A +Priori”: “Kant answers the question ‘How are synthetic judgments _a +priori_ possible?’ by showing that such synthetic judgments undoubtedly +exist.” “He might have ventured a step further by proposing another +question: ‘What is the origin of the _a priori_?’ Only by answering +this question could he have shown _how_ synthetic judgments _a priori_ +are possible. This he did not do, and the omission has produced great +confusion among German, French, and English thinkers.” On the next +page, 36, I find “According to our view, form is a property of reality +as well as of our cognition. Formless matter does not exist. Form and +matter as they exist in reality, are inseparable.... Knowledge also +in its primitive shape, when it is, so to say, natural and crude, is +an intimate combination of sense-perceptions and formal cognition. +The sense-perceptions are the real substance of knowledge, while +formal cognition is the principle which arranges and systematises +sense-experiences.” ... “Logic does not create order and system in our +brain, but it makes us conscious of the order that naturally grew in our +mind.” + +In the division entitled “The Order of Nature” you say that “Formal +thought represents the mere laws of thought in their abstractness, and +has been acquired by abstraction. The mere forms of thought exhibit +a wonderful regularity.... This regularity of formal thought, which +is expressed in all logical laws, arithmetical calculations, and in +all mathematical conceptions, has naturally grown in our mind as the +psychical expression of a physical regularity in the arrangement of the +various brain-structures and their combinations. The arrangement of +brain-structures in certain regular forms has been effected in accordance +with the same laws that govern the development of forms generally.” + +This answer to the question, “What is the origin of the _a priori_” is +what you call the corner-stone of your positivism, which, you say, “it is +to be hoped, will prove the only true Monism.” + +Now I give my translation of Littré’s view, which he published in 1867, +in an article entitled “The Three Philosophies.” + +“The effective certainty that the mathematical laws of number, of figure +and of motion are at the base of physical phenomena, and the inductive +belief that they are equally at the base of chemical and of biological +phenomena induce me to note here a view upon the relation that must be +found between subjective phenomena and objective phenomena, that is to +say upon the relation that causes the subject to draw from the object +a science and laws. The nervous substance, which is the organ of all +intelligence, is made up of material elements which arrive with their +conditions; and when this substance becomes capable of thinking, it +passes under the conditions proper to the elements that form it; which +results in (_se traduit par_) a science and its laws. The material +work that takes place in the brain while it fulfils its office, is, as +is known, a work of nutrition, which consists of a chemical exchange +of molecules. Every chemical action is, in turn, equivalent to a +certain quantity of heat; and again, this heat is equivalent to a +certain quantity of motion. Thus thought, no matter how we represent +to ourselves the relation to nervous substance, is connected with +mathematical modes of which it becomes conscious when it becomes +luminous. Not that I would in any way have it understood that thought +is but an equivalent of heat or of motion. Far from that, equivalence +is not identity; and whenever we change from one degree to another in +the natural and scientific order we meet a new unknown which is the +characteristic of this degree. The induction that leads us to connect +thought with mathematical conditions, leads us also to connect it with +physical, chemical, and biological conditions, of which it is necessarily +participant. Finally, when, at the highest point, it arrives face to face +with itself, it studies itself experimentally like the rest, and forms +its own doctrine. If it attempts to go out metaphysically into space, +it is reduced to combining subjectively its own elements, turns in a +circle without issue and falls back upon itself. If, on the contrary, it +makes the same attempt towards nature from which it emanates, then the +ways open, science is established, and positive philosophy appears. The +material constitution of the nervous substance is the point of junction +between the human mind and laws or general facts. If I had been younger, +I should have made a work of this view, not a paragraph; but old age must +hasten.” + +I have translated more than was necessary so as to give the “view” as +a whole. Does it not contain the answer to your question, “What is the +origin of the _a priori_”? + +Though Littré solved your “basic problem of philosophy” he did not attach +so much importance to this solution as you do because his philosophy is +based upon a generalisation from all facts and not upon any one fact, +however important it may be. + +“Positive Philosophy is the conception of the world that results from the +systematised ensemble of the positive sciences” and does not depend upon +the solution of any psychological problem, although it recognises the +importance of all psychological facts. + +Your originality lies in your application of Littré’s discovery. + +The reader has his choice between Littré’s positivism and your +neo-Kantism, but if he side with you he must at least thank Littré for +the solution on which your philosophy is based. + +You say that “Comtean Positivism, especially as it is represented by +Littré, consists mainly if not exclusively of the doctrine to ‘let +metaphysics alone.’” Is this fair to the man that solved your “basic +problem of philosophy” in a paragraph? + +Positivism as represented by Littré gives due importance to the +subjective element. He recognised that three essentials were necessary +to the completion of Comte’s philosophy: a political economy, a cerebral +theory, and what, for want of a better name he termed the subjective +theory of humanity. This last comprised ethics, æsthetics, and +psychology. Speaking of a confusion that obscures the whole discussion +relative to psychology, he says: “_Cerebral theory_, _mental_ or +_psychological theory_ are taken in two very different senses, which +are never distinguished. These terms signify sometimes the organic +conditions under which intelligence manifests itself, sometimes the +formal conditions under which the intellect operates. As soon as these +two significations are separated we perceive the means of settling the +debate as to the place of psychology; for to the question: Where should +these two orders be studied? it will be answered that the first should +be studied in anatomy, physiology, zoölogy, the evolution of ages, +pathology, it belongs therefore without contest to biology; but it will +be answered that the second should be studied in the total development +of history and in the application to all the modes of cognition; it +belongs incontestably to philosophy. Thus there are two psychologies, +one biological, the other philosophical, one relating to the individual +man, the other to the collective man, one furnishing what is necessary +in order to pass from biology to sociology, the other examining the +subjective instrument by the light of all positive knowledge. But +this complement of philosophy I do not call psychology, I call it the +_subject-theory_ of _humanity_; because while including psychology, it +includes much more.” That is to say; ethics and æsthetics.... “In the +order of the positive method it is at first by means of the object that +human knowledge is built up, and we end with the subject.” “The theory of +the subject is the indispensable complement of the theory of the object.” + +Of positive philosophy Littré says: “While it constructs the series of +the partial philosophies and thus embraces all objective knowledge, it +constructs at the same time the series of effective methods and thus +embraces all logical power. I borrow this expression from M. Comte, who +so happily named these effective methods the logical powers of the human +mind. When it has terminated its first series it is found to have also +terminated the second. Thus the ensemble of the methods represents the +function of the subject; the ensemble of the partial philosophies, the +function of the object.” + +Is this what you call a “one-sided philosophy”? + +You say that Littré is the worst kind of a metaphysician because he +maintains that we can know nothing about first and final causes; I quote +him to show his position: “Positive philosophy is at the same time a +system that comprises all that is known of the world, of man and of +society, and a general method including all the ways by which things have +been learned. What is beyond, either, materially, the depths (fond) of +boundless space, or, intellectually, the endless enchainment of causes, +is absolutely inaccessible to the human mind. But inaccessible does not +mean null or non-existent. Immensity, both material and intellectual, +holds by a narrow tie to what we know and becomes by this alliance a +positive idea of the same order; I mean to say that by touching and +bordering it, this immensity appears in its double character, reality and +inaccessibility. It is an ocean that washes our shore, and for which we +have neither bark nor sail, but whose clear vision is as salutary as it +is formidable.” _Aug. Comte et la Phil. Pos._, 2d Ed., p. 519. + +As Littré had found this shore encumbered with the wrecks of expeditions +that had started out in search of first causes and final causes, it is no +wonder that he was a little timid. His metaphor needs explanation in the +light of other passages, otherwise it might seem to discourage pursuit +of the unknown. He did not discountenance hypotheses but he was very +much afraid of our inclination to take guesses for truth; and this, by +the way, is the reason why he is not appreciated in this country, where +we are so fond of guessing. What he really did was to discourage those +navigators who would go in search of the Jumping-off-place, for the best +that can befall them is to come back to where they started. The men that +know the earth is round are the only men that find new worlds. + +In answer to your statement that Littré’s philosophy “is an inventory +rather than a plan to guide science in its further evolution” I will only +repeat in his words, what he has shown so well, that “positive philosophy +is the ensemble of human knowledge, disposed according to a certain order +which enables us to grasp its connections and its unity, and to draw from +it the general directions for each part and for the whole.” + +You say that “Littré rejects the evolution theory and its attempts to +explain ethics.” I quote him from _La Philosophie Positive_, March, 1880: +“Positive philosophy does not deny the evolution of ethics; far from +doing so, it maintained and inculcated this evolution long before the +utilitarian doctrine made it its ethical pivot.”.... “General morality, +born of the gradual culture of the sentimental basis of the human +soul under the social protection of progressive centres, is entirely +disinterested, and this is what makes its purity and its force.” + +In your philosophy you have a god and a religion, in his we have the same +things, but as they are so different from what is generally understood by +these terms, we use others. Here are some of the _Paroles de Philosophie +Positive_: “In the eyes of history, there are no false religions, there +are only incomplete religions which make their way through time and +perfect themselves.... The definition of religion is taken from its +office, which is: to put education, and consequently moral life, en +rapport with the conception of the world at each phase of humanity. +Whoever examines this definition will find that it satisfies all the +conditions of religion, either in the past, the present, or the future. +It will be perceived that theology is not inherent in the religious +idea. It was not always there in the past; for we cannot give the name +of theology to primordial fetichism, which addressed its worship to +neighboring objects, nor to the religions that adore natural agents, such +as air, wind, night, dawn; it is with polytheism that theology begins. As +for the future, general science, conceiving the world differently from +the way in which it was conceived during the reigns of the successive +religions, takes an office equivalent to the religious office, and must +in its turn place education and moral life in accord with the universe as +it appears to us.”.... “We do not outrage the old doctrine, whose past +is glorious and venerable; but there is a public for which it is a dead +letter; and it is to this public that we address ourselves and for this +public that we labor.” + +Is this not aspiration to be in unison with “the order of the world,” +which you call God? And when Littré traces this aspiration back to its +organic origin is he not explaining what you affirm? + +Our philosophies are not perfect, but we must apply them, such as they +are, to the needs of the day. The most pressing of all these needs, in +my opinion, is unity of action among those who are animated with the new +spirit. + +Let us pull together. + + Very truly yours, + + LOUIS BELROSE, JR. + + + + +ÉMILE LITTRÉ’S POSITIVISM. + + +An editor cannot make it a rule to accept criticisms of considerable +length which have reference to a remark incidentally made in a book +review. The present case, however, although it belongs in this category, +is of a peculiar nature. First, the remark on Littré was made by the +editor himself, and accordingly he feels personally responsible for it; +secondly, it contains a brief delineation of Littré’s character as a man +and as a philosopher in the way in which he is usually regarded by the +most prominent historians of philosophy. Mr. Belrose presents Littré in +quite a new light and quotes passages in corroboration of his conception +of Littré which are perhaps not generally known, for they are buried in +articles of the positivistic journal _La Philosophie Positive_, and this +journal enjoyed neither a long life nor a large circulation; nor is it +to be had in any of the libraries accessible to me. Seventeen editorial +articles were republished in bookform, (_La Science. Au point de vue +philosophique, par_ É. LITTRÉ. Paris, 1873), but the article “The Three +Philosophies” is not among them. + +If Mr. Belrose’s conception of Littré proves to be true, I shall not +only gladly correct my own wrong view of Littré, but I wish also to call +attention to the fact that he has been misrepresented by almost all and +certainly by the best and most painstaking philosophical historians. + +I cannot however in the main points accede to Mr. Belrose’s view and will +have to sustain my former opinion that M. Littré was an agnostic. He +made it a matter of principle to suspend his opinion on some of the most +fundamental philosophical problems, which he considered as inaccessible. +His positivism, accordingly, differs _toto cœlo_ from the positivism +presented in _The Monist_. His philosophy, like that of Comte, is so far +as I understand it, a policy of let-metaphysics-alone. It gives up the +struggle with metaphysics as a hopeless undertaking. Therefore, I should +say, Littré’s positivism has not conquered metaphysics, and although it +lets metaphysics alone, metaphysics plays an important part in it. Littré +is an agnostic and like every agnostic that believes in the unknowable, a +metaphysician without knowing it. + +The doctrine of the three stages of knowledge, viz., the theological, +metaphysical, and positive stages, appears to me of less importance. The +doctrine of the three stages is at the same time not properly a Comtean +idea; Comte adopted it from Turgot, the great statesman and one of the +greatest men as a thinker and also as a character that ever lived and who +is too little appreciated as such. + +The main doctrine of Comte’s positivism is the doctrine that first and +final causes cannot be known, and we must abandon our search for them; +that human knowledge is limited to the middle, while the two ends are +inaccessible. These insoluble questions, he declares, have made no +progress from the beginning. Mr. Lewes in his book “Comte’s Philosophy of +the Sciences” expresses this agnosticism in the following words (p. 31): +“Our province is to study her [nature’s] laws, to trace her processes, +and, thankful that we can so far penetrate the divine significance of the +universe, be content—as Locke wisely and modestly says—to sit down in +quiet ignorance of all _transcendent_[61] subjects.” + +This idea has so far as I am aware never been given up by Littré; it +remained the basis of his belief in the unknowable and his works abound +in expressions that concerning the main problems of life, “the positive +philosophy will neither assert nor deny anything.” + +Littré concludes the last article of his volume “La Science” with the +following words: + + “Le domaine ultérieur est celui des choses qui ne peuvent + pas être connues. La science positive professe de n’y rien + nier, de n’y rien affirmer; en un mot, elle ne connaît pas + l’inconnaissable, mais elle en constate l’existence. Là est la + philosophie suprême; aller plus loin est chimérique, aller moin + loin est déserter notre destinée.” + +This quotation alone, I think, settles the first main point at issue. + +Now I maintain that Comte’s view of causation where he refers to first +and final causes is fundamentally wrong; causation is transformation +and causality is the formula under which we comprehend the changes of +matter and energy that take place. The expressions first and final causes +are misnomers (see “Fundamental Problems,” the chapter The Problem of +Causality). First cause is either the starting point of a series of some +longer chain of causes and effects, or as the term is generally applied +or rather misapplied, stands for the last ground or reason, i. e. the +answer given to the ultimate question why?, which is the most general +_raison d’être_ that would explain and contain all the other and less +general _raisons d’être_ regarding the nature of existence. The term +final cause, again, means either the last cause in a series of causes or +(and so it is generally used) it is a misnomer for purpose; and the final +cause supposed to be inaccessible to human comprehension is the purpose +of the existence of the world at large. I object to there being three +kinds of causes. There is one kind of causality only, and the causes of +this causality in all the causal processes with which we are confronted +are perfectly intelligible. + +The problem of the first cause of the origin of our world, viz. the +solar system and the milky way, was attacked first by Kant and later by +Laplace, and the latter, without knowing of Kant’s solution, solved it +in the main in the same way. All recent investigations stand upon this +Kant-Laplace hypothesis so called, having added corrections only as to +details. Shall we declare that these labors are vain and gratuitous +efforts of vague speculations? Littré says, with reference to such +speculations, concerning the past and future states of the world (le +monde): + + “La dissémination primordiale de la matière qui devait le + composer, la dissémination future de la matière qui le compose, + dépassant toute expérience, dépassent toute conjecture.” + +If I misunderstand Littré, it appears to me a pardonable mistake. + +Yet is not the problem as to the origin of the world at large, why +matter and energy exist at all, insolvable? Littré says that the +positive cosmogonies, such as the doctrine of evolution do not touch +the absolute; they have nothing to do with first and final causes. He +says: “Les cosmogonies positives la [i. e. la place des cosmogonies +religieuses] remplissent, non pas qu’elles aient la prétention ni le +pouvoir de pénétrer dans l’absolu et d’embrasser, les causes premières et +finales.”—l. c., p. 560. + +That kind of causality which is sometimes called “ontological,” having +reference to the existence, not of single things as transformations from +other things, but of the world at large and formulated in such questions +as how did the universe itself, the world as a whole, originate, is +properly speaking no causality, it is not a question concerning a cause, +but concerning a _raison d’être_. However without haggling about the +words cause and _raison d’être_, this ontological causality so called +is by no means beyond human comprehension. The ontological question +has found a very definite answer in the formulation of the law of the +conservation of matter and energy; which declares that existence at +large did not originate, the total amount of matter as well as of energy +existed always and will exist always. It has not been created; it is +uncreatable and indestructible; it is eternal. + +Littré is quite explicit in declaring that the positive philosophy lets +alone all theological and metaphysical problems. It is neither atheistic +nor theistic, and does not side with either materialism or spiritualism. +He says: + + “Ni spiritualiste, ni matérialiste, la philosophie positive + écarte de la science générale les débats que la science + particulière a depuis long temps et à son grand profit + rejetés.”—Preface d’un disciple in Comte’s “Course de Phil. + pos.” p. xxvii. + +Littré characterises as the main object of the positive philosophy, “to +give to philosophy the positive method of the sciences, to the sciences +the idea of the unity of philosophy.” He says: “Ainsi fut accompli ce +qu’on doit appeler l’œuvre philosophique du dix-neuvième siècle, donner +à la philosophie la méthode positive des sciences, aux sciences l’idée +d’ensemble de la philosophie.” Preface, p. viii. + +I am in perfect agreement with Littré that this is the object of +positivism; but, if I understand Littré correctly, I disagree from his +conception of the positive method. He limits the positive method to what +he calls “experience,” and excludes every notion of the _a priori_. +Littré apparently misunderstood the proper meaning of Kant’s idea of +the _a priori_, for he used as a matter of course the _a priori_ method +wherever it was indispensable, so for instance in mathematics and in the +application of mathematics. + +Mr. Belrose says: + +[Littré] “solved your basic problem of philosophy [i. e. what is the +origin of the _a priori_] in a paragraph.” + +The problem of the _a priori_ reasoning is the question “Why can we +know certain things before we have tested them by experiment? Man has +not arrived by experience but by pure reasoning at the conclusion that +the sum of the angles of every plane triangle has 180 degrees. How is +he justified in declaring _a priori_ that the angles of a certain plane +triangle make up 180 degrees, although he has not measured them?” This +problem is the fundamental problem of the scientific or positive method; +it is the same problem which Mr. Charles S. Peirce discusses in his +article (see pp. 321 et seqq. of the present number of _The Monist_), for +the problem of apriority is identical with the question of necessity. + +Littré has, so far as I know, never discussed the problem of apriority +and necessity. He has simply rejected the idea of the _a priori_ as +the method of a false metaphysics, which is incompatible with the _a +posteriori_ method of positive science. The passage quoted by Mr. Belrose +most certainly does _not_ contain a solution of the problem. Littré +declares therein that every chemical action is equivalent to a certain +quantity of heat; and again this heat is equivalent to a certain quantity +of motion. Thus, he says, thought is connected with mathematical modes +of which it becomes conscious. Thought, he adds, is not an equivalent of +heat or motion, for equivalence is not identity, but it is connected with +mathematical conditions. This means that that kind of brain-action which +represents conscious thought, depends upon definite proportions. But +what in all the world has this idea to do with the problem of apriority? +The phrase “mathematical modes” (which is misleading in this passage) is +an unfortunate expression for “proportions” and we must add that Littré +is mistaken when he says that the nervous substance when it becomes +luminous, becomes conscious of these mathematical modes with which it is +connected. Aside from “luminous” being simply an allegorical expression +for conscious, it is wrong to say that the nervous substance becomes +conscious of the mathematical modes of heat as they are proportioned in +the brain. A sentient being knows through sensation nothing about the +mechanism or the mechanical proportions of its own sentient structure. +Sensation is the act of a becoming conscious not of the sentient +structure itself but of the meaning which this sentient structure has +acquired, and a consciousness of the mathematical modes which according +to Comte’s hierarchy of the sciences ought to be the beginning of +knowledge develops at a very late period. Any explanation of the origin +of _a priori_, be it ever so brief, would lead us too far away from the +points of our controversy. It is sufficient here to point out that the +passage quoted by Mr. Belrose, contains no solution of the problem of +our knowledge and certitude of mathematical, arithmetical, and other +purely formal laws. On the contrary, this very passage is replete with +error; it is a misstatement of facts and does not even bring to light the +difficulties of the problem. + +Littré was prejudiced against the _a priori_, and his prejudice induced +him to underrate its importance. I read in one of Littré’s passages +quoted by Mr. Belrose: + + “If it [thought] attempts to go out metaphysically into space, + it is reduced to combining subjectively its own elements, turns + in a circle without issue and falls back upon itself.” + +The _a priori_ method of thought subjectively combining its own elements, +is by no means a turning in a circle without issue so that in the end it +will fall back upon itself. The _a priori_ method of thought subjectively +combining its own elements is employed by arithmetic, mathematics, and +logic, and we are confronted with the astonishing fact that rules, or +formulas, or calculations which were made by pure thought subjectively +combining its own elements, are applicable and hold good as reliable +guides in our experiments. If there were no _a priori_, how could we +foretell or, what is more still, how could we predetermine the course +of nature? The _a priori_ has been wrongly employed by the so-called +metaphysical philosophers to give us information about the substance and +essence of the world. But the misapplication of the _a priori_ is no +reason for denouncing it as radically wrong. + +The existence of the _a priori_ is an undeniable fact. Kant was +right in recognising it in its sweeping importance, yet he was wrong +in his interpretation of the _a priori_, which according to his +transcendentalism was based exclusively upon a peculiarity of the mind +and not upon the nature of things. The positivists in France did not only +object to the wrong interpretation of the transcendentalists but also +denied the existence of the _a priori_. Accepting the principle that +every knowledge must ultimately be a statement of facts, the question +How is the _a priori_ to be based upon facts? became in my conception of +philosophy the burning problem which was next in order as a conciliation +between Kant and Comte. + +The French positivists, foremost among them Comte and Littré, have not +given us an explanation of what is true and false in the theological +and metaphysical notions of first and final causes, of the _a priori_ +of God, of substance, of force, etc.; they have simply abandoned the +investigation of these ideas which are after all the most important tools +in the household of the human mind for scientific and ethical purposes; +and thus they have, in spite of their positivism in questions of detail, +retained the metaphysical method of _a priori_ reasoning which is quite +legitimate in the formal science but out of place concerning facts. Take +for instance the following argument concerning the materiality of things: + + “Là, c’est à dire dans les sciences positives, on ne connaît + aucune propriété sans matière, non point parce que, _a priori_, + on y a l’idée préconçue qu’il n’existe aucune substance + spirituelle indépendante, mais parce que, _a posteriori_, + on n’a jamais rencontré la gravitation sans corps pesant, + la chaleur sans corps chaud, l’électricité sans corps + électrique, l’affinité sans substances de combinaison, la + vie, la sensibilité, la pensée, sans être vivant, sentant et + pensant.”—_La Science_, p. 307. + +I do not mean to say that there are immaterial or spiritual substances, +but I should say that any purely _a posteriori_ argument in favor of +their non-existence is insufficient. Would Littré mean that a Zulu +should declare that ice cannot exist because he has never seen water +frozen as hard as a stone? Any amount of experience, i. e. all _a +posteriori_ evidence, is in parts and will out of itself never acquire +universal validity. + +How strongly Littré is still implicated in the metaphysical method of +applying _a priori_ ideas to _a posteriori_ experiences can be learned +from the following statement: + + “Le monde est constitué par la matière et par les forces de + la matière: la matière dont l’origine et l’essence nous sont + inaccessible; les forces qui sont immanentes à la matière. Au + delà de ces deux termes, matière et force, la science positive + ne connaît rien.” Preface, p. ix. + +The metaphysical ideas, matter and force, are _a priori_ notions of +mystical entities or things in themselves, and thus it appears natural +that experience should know nothing of them. But real matter and actual +force are not unknowable existences. They can be known. We know something +of them and positive science is engaged in broadening and deepening this +knowledge. Says Littré: + + “Les propriétés physiques sont manifestes en toute substance, + dans quelque état qu’elle soit, isolée ou non isolée, et + s’exercent sur les masses; les propriétés, n’apparaissent + qu’entre deux substances, ont besoin de la binarité et + s’exercent sur les molécules; enfin les propriétés vitales + dépassant la binarité, ne sont compatibles qu’avec un état + moléculaire plus composé.” Preface, p. x. + +One of the fundamental principles of positivism, as I conceive it, +is the definition of knowledge as a description of facts or of their +properties. We call certain properties of the facts (i. e. the objects +of our experience) matter and others force. When we say that we do or do +not know a certain phenomenon we mean that we have or have not as yet +succeeded in placing them properly in that system of thought-symbols of +which our mind consists. Yet there is no sense in speaking of matter and +force as being unknowable while the properties of matter and force are +said to be manifest and appearing under certain conditions. + +I have presented the main reasons why I still hold that there is a +radical difference between Littré’s view of positivism and my own. +Littré is an agnostic and he was an agnostic before that name had been +invented. His objection to metaphysicism consists in the doctrine not +that the object of metaphysics is a chimerical non-existence, but that +the object of metaphysics exists yet it cannot be known. Thus Littré is +as much a metaphysician as those philosophers whom he censures for their +metaphysical views. He does not censure them for believing that the +metaphysical exists, but for believing that it is knowable and attempting +to investigate its nature. + +As to the hierarchy of the sciences I shall simply quote a few extracts +from Eugen Dühring’s criticism of Comte. Dühring says (_Krit. Gesch. der +Phil._, p. 486): + + “If Comte’s _positivism_ were nothing more than what we have + here laid down, its main contents would, strange enough, + consist in _negativity_. The criticism of a certain kind of + metaphysics, viz. of an ontology phantastical to a greater or + lesser extent, would form its most significant character. The + other element which consists in presenting a hierarchy and + unitary conjunction of some of the sciences which are called + positive in the usual sense of the term, cannot pretend to + be philosophy in the higher sense of the word or even to be + useful for science. A general view of knowledge, whether it + consists of six or sixty volumes, does not add the least iota + to the contents of our knowledge.... We cannot expect that a + specialist should be pleased with a hierarchical sketch of his + science, especially if the delineations are filled out with + details of which he would be a better judge.” + +It is true, and I concur in this with the French positivists, that a +positive philosophy must be a systematic arrangement of knowledge. But I +conceive it to be the philosopher’s work, not to take an inventory of the +sciences, but to define the fundamental concepts of scientific enquiry +and to elucidate the methods of cognition. Such fundamental concepts +are the ideas, truth and criterion of truth, cause and effect, mind, +thought, knowledge, ethics, etc. Concepts are the tools of thought and +the practice of using them correctly has to be learned. + +Positivism is not the original invention of a world-system, but the +systematising of statements of facts so as to produce a world-system. +The old philosophers gave us first a world-system, from which and in +accord with which they defined their views of truth, cognition, cause, +etc. They began to build their philosophy from the top down. Positivism +begins from the bottom and is building up to the top with the assistance +of the special sciences. A positive philosophy is inseparable from, but +it cannot be replaced by, the sciences. The field of philosophy is to +superintend the method and the plan of building, so as to compare the +details and bear in mind the unity of the whole. In this sense Dühring +says in criticising Comte (p. 486): + + “However, concerning the form of the connections of methodical + reflections, something can be done. Yet it must be possible + to separate everything of such a kind and also new insights, + so as to constitute a special branch of knowledge. Otherwise + they will escape the specialists’ attention.... Not only Comte + but all philosophers given to the idea of systematisation and + construction of particular knowledge have made attempts in + this direction which at most may range as sketches or popular + presentations in a higher sense.” + +Concerning Littré’s view of Comte’s religious vagaries Dühring says (p. +483): + + “His [Comte’s] biographer, the Academician Littré of Paris, + and also Stuart Mill are right in considering ‘The Course of + Positive Philosophy’ as the main and fundamental work which is + decisive as a contribution of his and a source of instruction + to the world. However, they are very one-sided when they + overlook that the philosopher even in his vagaries exhibited a + universality of mind which remains superior to the standpoint + of either Littré or Mill.” + +I agree with Mr. Belrose that Comte’s religion as he conceived it +consists of vagaries, but the main idea of developing the religions +of the past which, as Littré says, are not false but only incomplete +religions, into a religion that shall be in accord with the science of +our day is no vagary, but a great and an important ideal. + +Far be it from me to belittle Littré because I disagree from him in +some fundamental questions. He was in his time, he is still, and will +remain for ever a star of first magnitude in our philosophical galaxy. +That which I consider as his errors does not detract from his greatness. +Were not Kant’s mistakes in a similar way closely interwoven with his +greatest merits? It is flattering to me that Mr. Belrose finds an +agreement between his master’s and my views concerning the basic problem +of philosophy, but I cannot discover it. Yet I gladly acknowledge that +there exists an agreement of aim, and this agreement of aim which finds +its truest expression in the word “positivistic” is perhaps of greater +importance than the agreement of views. + + P. C. + + +FOOTNOTES: + +[61] Italics are not mine. + + + + +OBSERVATIONS ON SOME POINTS IN JAMES’S PSYCHOLOGY.[62] + + +In calling attention to some objections to the views advanced by +Professor James on the subjects of Belief, Emotion, and Will, it is only +justice to myself to express the admiration I feel for his work as a +whole. The thoroughly scientific spirit which pervades it, the author’s +candor in admitting and his skill in surmounting difficulties, his +learning and his originality, his aptness in illustration, and the energy +and vivacity of his style combine to make it full of interest as well as +instruction. It is because it should be, and doubtless will be widely +influential, that it is important that any doubtful positions assumed in +it should be subjected to a careful examination. + +I shall endeavor to avoid any misrepresentation of the views which I +combat, but space will not allow me to do full justice to the arguments +by which they are supported, if such a thing is possible for an +antagonist. For this, I must refer the interested reader to the original +book. If what I have to say should have the effect of increasing the +number of its readers, I shall not have written altogether in vain, +whether I succeed or fail in setting the truth in a clearer light. + + +I. BELIEF. + +Professor James entitles the chapter devoted to this subject “The +Perception of Reality,” and defines belief to be “the mental state +or function of cognising reality.” He explains that, “As used in the +following pages, ‘Belief’ will mean every degree of assurance, including +the highest possible certainty and conviction” (Vol. II, p. 283). + +According to this definition, erroneous beliefs, such, for instance, as +the belief that the earth is flat, stationary, and the centre of the +universe, or the delusion of an insane man that he is Jesus Christ, are +cognitions of reality. Professor James would probably say that they are +realities to the mind entertaining them, and it is true that the feeling +of belief is the same, whether the thing believed be true or false. +I think, however, that it is more customary to use the verb which he +employs in connection with beliefs which agree with the objective facts, +and that the “feeling” or “sense” of reality would be a better term than +“perception” or “cognition.” + +This, however, is not, to my mind, the most serious objection to the +definition. Although Professor James does not use the word “knowledge” +in this connection, it seems evident, from the passage quoted above, and +from what he says elsewhere, that he considers all kinds, as well as all +degrees of certainty to be beliefs. It seems to me evident, on the other +hand, that many of our cognitions of reality are not properly called +beliefs. As an instance, I will quote the illustration with which he +opens the discussion of “The Various Orders of Reality” (p. 287). + + “Suppose a new-born mind, entirely blank and waiting for + experience to begin. Suppose that it begins in the form of a + visual impression (whether faint or vivid is immaterial) of a + lighted candle against a dark background, and nothing else, so + that whilst this image lasts it constitutes the entire universe + to the mind in question. Suppose, moreover (to simplify the + hypothesis), that the candle is only imaginary, and that no + ‘original’ of it is recognised by us psychologists outside. + Will this hallucinatory candle be believed in, will it have a + real existence for the mind? + + “What possible sense (for that mind) would a suspicion have + that the candle is not real? What would doubt or disbelief + of it imply? When _we_, the onlooking psychologists, say the + candle is unreal, we mean something quite definite, viz. + that there is a world known to _us_ which _is_ real, and to + which we perceive that the candle does not belong; it belongs + exclusively to that individual mind, has no status anywhere + else, etc. It exists, to be sure, in a fashion, for it forms + the content of that mind’s hallucination; but the hallucination + itself, though unquestionably it is a sort of existing fact, + has no knowledge of _other_ facts; and since those _other_ + facts are the realities _par excellence_ for us, and the only + things we believe in, the candle is simply outside of our + reality and belief altogether. + + “By the hypothesis, however, the mind which sees the candle + can spin no such considerations as these about it, for of + other facts, actual or possible, it has no inkling whatever. + That candle is its all, its absolute. Its entire faculty of + attention is absorbed by it. It _is_, it is _that_; it is + _there_; no other possible candle, or quality of this candle, + no other possible place, or possible object in the place, no + alternative, in short, suggests itself as even conceivable; + so how can the mind help believing the candle real? The + supposition that it might possibly not do so is, under the + supposed conditions, unintelligible.” + +I readily grant that it is, under the supposed circumstances, +unintelligible that the candle should be thought to be unreal, but it +seems to me equally so that it should be believed to be real. What does +Professor James mean by a belief in the reality of the candle under such +conditions? Nothing more than that the mind is conscious of a sensation +which we know, but it does not, is like that produced by the sight of +a candle. This sensation is certainly a reality, and the only possible +reality to that mind. Professor James must, then, be understood as +maintaining that a sensation, pure and simple, is a belief in an object +exciting the sensation. If, for instance, the first consciousness of the +supposed mind were the odor of a rose, or the whistle of a locomotive, +he must admit that the mind would believe in the rose or the locomotive. +If I have a headache, or am hungry or tired, I not only have beliefs +about these sensations, but the headache, the hunger, the weariness, are +themselves beliefs. Now I submit that this is contrary to all ordinary +use of language. It is, perhaps, impossible for an adult, with his mind +full of memories of past experiences, to have a sensation without some +sort of a belief about it, but although the sensation and the belief +may be inseparable, they are not indistinguishable, and, as a matter of +fact, every one does distinguish between his sensations and his beliefs +about them. I do not think it would be quite correct to say even of an +adult who had never seen or heard of a candle, that, on seeing one for +the first time, he would believe in the reality of the candle, although +doubtless he would believe he saw something real—a real flame, for +instance. + +If it be admitted that sensations are entitled to be called beliefs, +it seems impossible to stop short of the conclusion that all states of +consciousness are beliefs. + +Emotions and volitions are as much realities as sensations, and are known +as such by the mind that experiences them. That memory and imagination +involve belief, is too evident to need discussion. But if this be the +case, the chapter on belief could have been very greatly abbreviated—need +not in fact, contain more than four words. To say that all consciousness +is belief would perhaps simplify matters, but it would not advance our +knowledge very much, nor would it accord with the ordinary use of the +word, which has reference to a particular kind of consciousness, which +every one knows, however hard he may find its definition. + +It seems to me, therefore, that Professor James’s definition of belief +is defective in two ways. There are beliefs which are not cognitions +of reality, and there are cognitions of reality which are not beliefs. +Especially in regard to the latter class, I think that the definition +confuses a distinction that is real and important, between different +kinds of knowledge. We know our sensations, emotions and volitions in a +way which differs not only in degree but in kind from any usual, or, I +think, legitimate sense of the word “Belief.” + +Perhaps it would be the safer course to rest content with pointing out +the objections to the author’s definition without laying myself open +to retaliation by attempting one of my own, but it does not seem to me +impossible to give one which will include all that is understood by the +term and nothing more. I should say that belief is the sense or feeling +of relation between mental objects. That we have belief whenever we have +this feeling, seems to me too plain to require argument, and I am unable, +after a good deal of reflection, to call to mind any belief that is not +included in the definition. If I see, or imagine that I see a lighted +candle, it may excite in my mind a great variety of beliefs, as, that the +flame is hot, that the light and heat are caused by the chemical union of +oxygen with carbon and hydrogen, that the material of which the candle +is composed is wax, paraffine or tallow, that it has a cotton wick, that +it is of a certain size, weight, and color, and so on indefinitely. +All of these are evidently ideas of relation. To say “flame,” or “hot” +does not express a belief, unless something else is understood, but to +say “flame is hot” does so. If I say that the color red is equal to the +square of the hypothenuse of a right-angled triangle, I fail to express +a belief because the mind perceives no relation between the objects, and +the answer to such a statement would be, not that it is or is not true, +but that it has no meaning. The only cases which occur to me in which it +might be plausibly argued that a belief did not involve the feeling of +relation are such impersonal expressions as “it rains,” or, “it is cold.” +The exception, however, is only apparent, arising from the erroneous +idea that everything which is implied in language must be expressed. +When we say, “it rains,” we mean, “rain is falling.” In either form of +language, the thought conveyed is that of the relation of the drops of +water and their motion. The stock-broker, with his prearranged code, +may communicate the ideas of a long sentence in a single word, or the +Freemason may do the same to the initiated by a gesture. In such a case, +it would be absurd to contend that no relation is felt or communicated +because there is no formal subject or predicate. + +Whatever may be thought of the sufficiency of my definition, I risk the +assertion that it includes all beliefs that can be affirmed, denied or +doubted. We never question our sensations, emotions or volitions—we +have them, are aware of them, and that is the end of the matter. It is +the relations of our sensations to each other, and to our pleasures +and pains, our choices and rejections, that involve us in all sorts of +perplexities. The whole question of the grounds of belief in general, and +the truth or falsehood of particular beliefs is a question of relations. +It is, then, in the sense indicated above that I shall use the word +hereafter. + +Having settled the definition, it may be worth while to consider for +a moment whether this feeling of relation, which can only be known by +experience, is enough like any other mental states to be classed with +them. On this point Professor James says: “_In its inner nature, belief, +or the sense of reality, is a sort of feeling more allied to the emotions +than to anything else._ Mr. Bagehot distinctly calls it the ‘emotion’ +of conviction. I just now spoke of it as acquiescence. It resembles +more than anything else what in the psychology of volition we know as +consent. Consent is recognised by all to be a manifestation of our active +nature. It would naturally be described by such terms as ‘willingness’ +or the ‘turning of our disposition.’ What characterises both consent +and belief is the cessation of theoretic agitation through the advent +of an idea which is inwardly stable, and fills the mind solidly to the +exclusion of contradictory ideas. When this is the case, motor effects +are apt to follow. Hence the states of consent and belief, characterised +by repose on the purely intellectual side, are both intimately connected +with subsequent practical activity. This inward stability of the mind’s +content is as characteristic of disbelief as of belief. But we shall +presently see that we never disbelieve anything except for the reason +that we believe something else that contradicts the first thing. +Disbelief is thus an incidental complication to belief, and need not be +considered by itself.” (P. 283). + +I am unable to satisfy myself whether, in the above passage, Professor +James has in mind the feeling of belief or other feelings which often +accompany it. The “cessation of theoretic agitation,” “willingness,” +“turning of our disposition,” are accompanied by feelings which I should +say are not only like, but identical with emotion. In the case of old, +confirmed beliefs, however, theoretic agitation ceased, and the turning +of the disposition occurred, if at all, long ago, and I am unable to +recognise anything resembling emotion in my belief that two and two make +four, that cows eat grass, that iron is a metal, and many others that +might be mentioned. Nor do these beliefs, at the present time, give rise +to motor effects, which, so far as I am able to see, only result from +such beliefs as are, directly or indirectly, associated with emotion. +If such beliefs as I have mentioned are not purely intellectual, as +distinguished from emotional phenomena, I should be at a loss to know +where the distinction is to be made between “the head” and “the heart.” +The sense of relation seems to me to be the most purely intellectual of +all the mental functions, and, although it may give rise to all sorts of +emotions, the more settled, undisturbed and unquestioning the belief, +the less likely is it to give rise to any but the feeling of calm, which +seems to me to be the antithesis of emotion. I should say that belief is +a feeling _sui generis_, without enough analogy with any other to justify +classing them together. + +I have already quoted the illustration with which Professor James opens +the discussion of the subject of Reality. After quoting from Spinoza, +to the same effect, the supposed case of a horse with wings imagined to +be real in the absence of any contradictory thought, he goes on to say: +“The sense that anything we think of is unreal can only come, then, when +that thing is contradicted by some other thing of which we think. _Any +object which remains uncontradicted is ipso facto believed and posited as +absolute reality._” (P. 288). Elsewhere he says: + + “... _all propositions, whether attributive or existential, are + believed through the very fact of being conceived, unless they + clash with other propositions believed at the same time, by + affirming that their terms are the same as the terms of those + other propositions._” (P. 290). + +This, I think, is stated too strongly, at least, in the latter quotation. +A proposition that is uncontradicted will be believed, but it is not +necessary that the contradictory proposition should be believed in +order that the first may fail of belief. I believe nothing, at present, +contradictory of the proposition that it is now raining in Boston. I +think it not improbable that such may be the case, but at the same time +the contrary proposition is present to my mind, that it may not be +raining in Boston, and the result is the state of mind which Professor +James very properly regards as the opposite of belief—doubt. But +supposing that a proposition is presented to the mind, which, being for +the time uncontradicted, is believed, and that subsequently another, +contrary proposition is presented, is it certain that the latter will +be disbelieved? May not a state of doubt replace belief in this case +also? Or supposing that two propositions, which have been believed +independently, are brought into juxtaposition in such a way as to show +that they are inconsistent, how are we to determine which if either, +shall be believed? Professor James seems to teach that it is a matter of +choice. + + “That we can at any moment think of the same thing which + at any former moment we thought of is the ultimate law of + our intellectual constitution. But when we now think of it + incompatibly with our other ways of thinking of it, then we + must choose which way to stand by, for we cannot continue to + think of it in two contradictory ways at once. _The whole + distinction of real and unreal, the whole psychology of + belief, disbelief and doubt, is thus grounded on two mental + facts—first, that we are liable to think differently of the + same; and second, that when we have done so, we can choose + which way of thinking to adhere to and which to disregard._[63] + The subjects adhered to become real subjects, the attributes + adhered to real attributes, the existence adhered to real + existence; while the subjects disregarded become imaginary + subjects, the attributes disregarded erroneous attributes, and + the existence disregarded an existence in no man’s land, in the + limbo ‘where footless fancies dwell.’” (P. 290). + +The doctrine that belief is, in the last analysis, a matter of choice +is a prominent feature of Professor James’s teaching, to which I shall +have occasion to refer again. It seems to me to involve him in some +inconsistencies. For the present, it should be noted that he admits the +reality of every mental object in its proper relations. + + “If I merely dream of a horse with wings, my horse interferes + with nothing else and has not to be contradicted. That horse, + its wings, and its place are all equally real. That horse + exists no otherwise than as winged, and is moreover really + there, for that place exists no otherwise than as the place + of that horse, and claims as yet no connection with the other + places of the world. But if with this horse I make an inroad + into the _world otherwise known_, and say, for example, ‘That + is my old mare Maggie, having grown a pair of wings where + she stands in her stall,’ the whole case is altered; for now + the horse and place are identified with a horse and place + otherwise known, and _what_ is known of the latter objects is + incompatible with what is perceived of the former. ‘Maggie + in her stall with wings! Never!’ The wings are unreal, then, + visionary. I have dreamed a lie about Maggie in her stall.” (P. + 289). + +Here, the dream is a reality, and the winged horse is as really a part of +it as the mare Maggie is of the outside world. The reality of the winged +horse in the one case, and his unreality in the other, depend on his +relations to other mental objects. So, for instance, if any one should +say that a mermaid was a creature with the portion of a man from the +waist up united to the body and limbs of a horse, I should be justified +in contradicting him, and saying that it was not a mermaid but a centaur +that he had in mind. It would not be a valid answer to say that there +were really no such things as mermaids and centaurs. In mythology, a +centaur has as definite a structure as a giraffe has in zoölogy, and +it is as inexcusable to confound the one as the other with anything +else. This point is amplified by the author in a section on “The Many +Worlds,” in which the various objects of thought are found in their +proper relations, and out of which each one selects a world of practical +realities, according to his dominant habits of attention. _In the +relative sense_, in which we contrast reality with unreality, or consider +one object more real than another, + + “_Reality means simply relation to our emotional and active + life_ ... in this sense, whatever excites and stimulates our + interest is real.” (P. 295). + + “_Whatever things have intimate and continuous connection with + my life are things of whose reality I cannot doubt._” (P. 298). + +This power of exciting and stimulating our interest, Professor James +finds to be possessed in a pre-eminent degree by sensations, which thus +become, directly or indirectly, our tests of reality, and among which +those which are pleasurable or painful hold the first rank. Next to them, +if not of equal power, are emotions. + + “The greatest proof that a man is _sui compos_ is his ability + to suspend belief in the presence of an emotionally exciting + idea. To give this power is the highest result of education. + In untutored minds the power does not exist. Every exciting + thought in the natural man carries credence with it. To + conceive with passion is _eo ipso_ to affirm.” (P. 308). + +Professor James’s account of the grounds of belief seems to me inadequate +in that it fails to show the connection between our sensations and +emotions and other mental states and our beliefs. Why is it that the +sight of the heavenly bodies, for instance, awakens in different minds +such diverse beliefs as the Ptolemaic and the Copernican systems of +astronomy? What does a man who is frightened believe? What belief would +necessarily result from a colic? It is not enough to say that sensations +and emotions are connected with belief; we want to know how they are +connected. + +Bearing in mind the definition of belief as the sense of relation between +objects, the question resolves itself into the origin of feelings of +relation. As relations are of various kinds, they may be suggested to the +mind by different circumstances. They may, I think, be divided into three +classes: + +1) Relations of likeness and unlikeness. These result from the +comparison and discrimination of objects. All the beliefs involved +in the recognition and classification of objects arise in this way. +When, on seeing a certain object, I say that it is a bay horse, and +will weigh about eleven hundred pounds, I give expression to relations +of comparison. The comparison may be immediate, between objects +simultaneously present to the senses, or alike present only to memory +or imagination, or between a present object and a remembered one, or +mediate, by comparison of two or more objects with some other. All +mathematical truths are of this kind. + +2) Relations of cause and effect, of substance and quality, of whole and +component parts, of order in time and space, are due to association. +When I say of the horse that his movements are caused by muscular +contractions, that he is of a gentle disposition, that he has a bony +skeleton and red blood, that he is five years old and is harnessed +to a carriage, I express relations of association. In his chapter on +Association Professor James says: + + “_Belief_ in anything _not_ present to sense is the very + lively, strong, and steadfast association of the image of that + thing with some present sensation, so that as long as the + sensation persists the image cannot be excluded from the mind.” + (Vol. I, p. 598). + +I do not think it is a fact that the image of the thing believed in need +be associated with any present sensation. I am not aware, for instance, +that there is, at present, any such association in my belief in the +existence of the city of Constantinople, or that Queen Victoria is +reigning in England. The associations in these and similar cases are with +objects of memory and not with present sensations. On the other hand, +what we mean by belief in a present object always involves memory of the +past. When we say that we believe in anything, we either mean that it is +like other things of the same sort of which we have had experience, or +that it stands in some other relation to them. Complete loss of memory +would not only destroy all our past beliefs, but, if it were permanent, +would prevent our ever forming any new ones. The universe, in such a +case, would be a mere chaos of sensations. + +In order that things may be associated, they must first be discriminated, +otherwise, as Professor James has shown, in his chapter on Discrimination +and Comparison, they are thought of, not as associated things, but as +one thing. In like manner, when discriminated things have once been +associated, the tendency is, in the absence of contrary experience, to +think of them as belonging together. A child, attracted by the brightness +of the teapot, touches it and burns his fingers. He naturally expects the +teapot to be hot the next time he sees it. He is told that his Christmas +gifts were brought down the chimney by Santa Claus. Until the statement +is contradicted, he believes it. Why should he not? Or the association +of things in the mind may come about without any external suggestion. +I remember that the first time that I ever heard a person snore, the +thought came into my mind that the strange noise was made by a bear, and +I lay awake most of the night, in fear of being devoured. The tendency +is to think of things as related in the way in which they are first +presented to the mind, until they come up in some different relation. +This seems to be the explanation of the tendency to “believe as much as +we can,” to “affirm immediately the reality of all that is conceived,” +of which Professor James speaks. With increased experience, we find that +there is a difference in the uniformity of associations, and accordingly +the coincidence of two or more things is associated with the doubt +whether or not the association is a constant one. + +3) In addition to the relations considered above, there are some which, +although expressed in terms of association and comparison, seem to me to +have a different origin. That the whole is greater than any of its parts +is a relation of comparison; that a thing cannot be in two different +places at the same time, that every event has a cause, that there is +an external world, are relations of association. Although they do not +arise independently of experience, they contain more than is given in +experience, and the uniformity and firmness with which they are believed +can, it seems to me, only be accounted for by the assumption of an innate +propensity to look upon things as related in these ways. + +So far as I am able to judge, beliefs always arise in one or another +of these three ways. But a still more interesting question, from the +practical point of view, than that of the origin of beliefs, is that of +the comparative validity of the various grounds of belief. Are they all +of equal worth, and if not, is there any way of determining which are to +be given the preference, or is belief, like taste, a matter about which +“_non disputandum_”? + +Professor James does not go very deeply into the discussion of this +question. As we have seen, he assigns to sensation the greatest efficacy +in producing belief, and discusses the comparative power of various +sorts of sensations in this respect. Emotion he makes a close second. +But the question which gives us the more reliable information, in cases +in which they conflict, he does not discuss at all. As a matter of fact, +there is no doubt that a man under the influence of strong emotion often +draws different conclusions from the evidence of his senses from those +at which he would arrive in its absence. Is he warranted in doing so? +Would any degree of personal interest warrant a man in believing or +disbelieving the doctrine of transubstantiation, the Newtonian theory of +gravitation, the Mosaic or the Darwinian view of the origin of species? +There is no doubt that belief on such subjects as these is influenced by +our interest, real or supposed, in one or the other view, and perhaps +Professor James would say that he deals with the working of minds as they +are, not as we imagine that they ought to be, but the general knowledge +that a class of considerations is reliable or the reverse is another +thing that not only ought to, but actually does affect our beliefs, and +the question of the method to be pursued in ascertaining the actual +relations of things, of forming true beliefs instead of false ones, is +one which hardly ought to be ignored in a discussion of the subject. + +Referring to the three classes of relations already considered, it is, I +think, evident that there are differences in the way in which they affect +our belief. In comparison, the essential thing is the accuracy of the +observation. One who has once fully comprehended the proof that the sum +of the angles of a triangle is equal to two right angles, is as sure of +it as he could be after any amount of experience. In comparing sensible +objects, we may, it is true, and our belief confirmed by repetition, but +this is only in case that we doubt whether the comparison was rightly +made in the first place. That red does not look like blue, nor sweet +taste like sour, we are as certain on one trial as a hundred. If we +apply a foot measure to an object eight inches long, nothing can add +to our certainty that they are not of the same length. In matters of +association, on the other hand, a great deal depends on the uniformity of +the association—the number of times that we have experienced it without +contrary experience. When I hear a crow, for instance, I believe that it +is black, because all the crows that I have ever seen have been so. A +sheep I assume to be white, but with a less degree of confidence, because +black sheep are more numerous than white crows. In the case of a horse, +I have no belief in regard to the color within a certain range, unless +I have some means of knowing about the particular animal in question. +If I were told that my friend had bought a horse, I should have no idea +whether it was bay, or black, or white, or some mixture of these colors. +If, however, I were told that the natural color of my friend’s horse +was green, I should be much more confident that the statement was false +than if the same person should tell me he had seen a white crow, for, +the same reason that I should more readily believe in a black sheep than +in the latter. In the customary use of the word, I might say I _knew_ +it was not so. In the case of intuitive judgments experience has little +or nothing to do with the strength of belief. The adult man is no more +firmly convinced of the existence of something external to himself than +the child, and, although he may come to doubt it on speculative grounds, +he no more fails than the child to show by his actions that he has a +practical faith in it. + +In many, if not most of our beliefs, all of these elements are present. +If I see an orange, for instance, I have the intuition of externality, +the comparison with other oranges that I have already seen, and +associations of internal structure, taste, smell, and the like. All of +these, and very possibly some emotion, as, for instance, a desire to eat +it, may arise, simultaneously or so nearly so as not to be distinguished +in time, as parts of a single mental state. + +There is one kind of association, of importance enough to deserve +mention, of which Professor James makes no mention. The beliefs, or +alleged beliefs of other people have an influence on our minds which +is, I think, not inferior to that of emotion. The man who can, without +misgiving, maintain an opinion which contradicts all that he learned +in childhood and all that is held by those whose good opinion he most +values is, I fancy, quite as rare as he who can suspend judgment in the +presence of an emotionally exciting idea. Most of us take our religious, +political, scientific, and practical beliefs at second hand, from the +friends with whom we associate or the books and papers we read. Take a +young man out of his home and put him, for instance, in college, and it +will probably work a change in his moral standards, not necessarily for +the better. At home, if he knew of a theft, or an assault, he would very +probably be ready to bring the offender to justice, but if the offender +is his classmate, and the sufferer a member of the succeeding class, he +will very probably think it a more shameful thing to report the wrong +than to do it. At the same time, he doubtless considers it utterly +reprehensible that ignorant Italian peasants should feel in the same way +about betraying their neighbors who are guilty of robbery or murder. + +Coming now to the influence of emotion on belief, it will not, I presume, +be disputed that it comes about by way of association. Professor James, +as we have seen, holds that “every emotionally exciting thought, in +the natural man, carries credence with it.” I suspect that this is true +only in the sense that, in the absence of experience, not only every +exciting thought, but every thought is believed. However this may be, +in respect to the natural man, I think it is pretty certain that, in +the case of such artificial beings as those who reflect on the causes +of their emotions and beliefs, it will be found that in order for an +idea to excite our emotions, a certain degree of belief is necessary. +Professor James illustrates his position by the fact that a man can +walk along a curbstone without any apprehension of falling, because +the thought of falling awakens no emotion of dread, while on the edge +of a precipice the emotion caused by the thought of the consequences +of a mis-step may quite overcome his belief in his ability to keep his +balance. But a chamois-hunter or an acrobat will pass along the same +place without the slightest apprehension, not because he does not think +of what would happen if he should fall, nor because he has more liking +than any one else for being dashed to pieces, but because he has what the +inexperienced man lacks, entire confidence in his ability to avoid the +danger. + +Since I began writing the last paragraph, a number of thoughts have +passed through my mind, any one of which would be sufficiently exciting +if I believed in them, as, that I may die within the next half hour; +that I may fall heir to a fortune, and the like, none of which have +produced any emotional disturbance, because I do not believe that there +is any probability of their being true. Why was it that not only the +medical profession but the public in general became so much interested, +recently, in the announcement that Dr. Koch had discovered a substance +that promised to be a cure for tuberculosis? Partly on account of the +interests involved, but at least equally because his reputation was such +as to inspire confidence in what he said. There are plenty of medicines +advertised in the newspapers for which greater claims are made than +Dr. Koch made for his discovery, which fail to arouse any such general +interest. These examples are probably enough for illustration of the +familiar fact that belief is the most common cause of emotion, and that a +thought that is not believed is apt to leave us unmoved. + +Nevertheless, it is a notorious fact that emotion has a great deal to do +with determining the sort and degree of evidence which is satisfactory +to us. Love and hate, respect and contempt, affect our beliefs in regard +to the character of their objects in matters entirely independent of the +qualities which originally inspired the feelings. We find it an easy +matter to believe that a man whose religious or political opinions we +think pernicious is a bad man in matters which have nothing to do with +his opinions, and may find it almost incredible that one whom we like +personally should think differently from ourselves on matters in which we +are deeply interested. But what particular evil we shall believe of the +person whom we dislike, or good of the one whom we like, depends entirely +on circumstances. A man, for instance takes a dislike to a stranger +on account of some lack of good manners. Whether he shall suspect him +of being a clergyman or an infidel, a drinker or a prohibitionist, a +Sunday-school teacher or a gambler, or both, is likely to depend very +largely on his own tastes and principles in regard to such matters. +So, on the other hand, his views in regard to religion, temperance and +gambling, are probably due in great measure to the practice of the +people whom he likes. A woman who has been brought up with a horror of +drunkenness hears that a man with whom she is violently in love is a +drinker. She will probably disbelieve it at first, but if she becomes +convinced of the truth of the report, she will very likely come to think +that a drunkard need not be such a bad fellow after all. If there is any +one thing that more affects our beliefs than what the people we like say, +it is what they do. + +In like manner, emotional states without any definite object, such as +we call moods if they are transient, and disposition or temperament if +they are habitual, color our belief, not by originating any definite +propositions, but by making us receptive to those that tend to confirm +them. It is not when a man is broken in spirit by repeated calamities +that he is most ready to believe that “where there’s a will there’s a +way,” nor in the flush of youth, health and triumph that the doctrine +that “all is vanity,” comes home to his heart. In whatever way such +states of mind come about, whether as a result of original constitution, +or of experience, or of disease, they make the mind inhospitable to +whatever does not harmonise with them. In the case of insanity, this +disposition may outweigh the plainest evidence of the senses, so that +a man may believe that he is rolling in wealth and luxury when he is +destitute of the ordinary comforts of life, or that his wife and children +are dead when they are present before his eyes. In a lower degree, most +of us probably have experience of something of the sort in “fits of the +blues,” but while the general character of the belief may be decided +by the emotional tone of the mind, its precise form is determined by +the man’s interests. Low spirits would not be likely, for instance, to +effect a man’s opinion as to the probable course of the stock market, +unless he were in some way interested in stocks, and the view favored by +his emotional condition would depend on the side of the market on which +his interest lay. Beliefs which, in our ordinary state of mind, are not +associated with any strong feeling, such as mathematical truths and the +physical and chemical laws of matter, remain unaffected in all kinds and +degrees of emotional disturbance. + +It seems clear, then, that, as a matter of fact, emotions affect our +beliefs through association. It is not difficult to see how this comes +about. Emotions tend to perpetuate themselves. A man who is in high +spirits will laugh at vexations which, if he were in an irritable frame +of mind would seem intolerable. We allow liberties to our friends which +would offend us in persons to whom we are indifferent. The same inertia +of the mind which is shown in these cases offers a resistance to any +thought that tends to disturb it. If I like a man and hate dishonesty, +evidence that the man is dishonest calls up at the same time two contrary +emotional states, which cannot subsist together. One of three things must +happen; either the association of the feeling of liking with the person +of the man, or of that of repugnance with dishonesty, or of the quality +of dishonesty with the man must be given up, or at least impaired. But +the feeling of affection for my friend and that of hatred for the alleged +fault are old established associations, while that of dishonesty with +his personality is a new one, which, in order to find lodgement, must +expel the original inhabitant. Although I may have formed no definite +association of honesty with him, the difficulty is of precisely the same +sort as if I had. In either case it is the breaking up of an habitual +association. + +Such being the way in which emotion affects belief, its value as a +ground of belief must be determined in the same way as in other cases +of association. If any emotion is so exclusively connected with some +definite object that the one is never present without the other, we are +warranted in inferring the existence of the object from the presence of +the emotion, as Robinson Crusoe inferred from the human footprints on the +sand that men had been there. As a matter of fact, there is comparatively +little uniformity in associations of this kind. The same things affect +different persons differently, and the same persons differently at +different times. Our hopes and fears are sometimes realised and +sometimes disappointed, and people to whom, on slight acquaintance, we +feel attracted, often develop qualities of a different kind from what +we expected as we come to know them better. If I am fond of money, and +also of idleness, or of friendship, and also of having my own way at all +times, it does not follow that taking my ease is the way to get rich, nor +that always insisting on my own way is the course to make friends. The +most, I think, that can be said in favor of emotion as a ground of belief +is, that its existence presupposes the existence of some object adapted +to excite it. Avarice may be said, in a sense, to prove the existence of +wealth—if there were no wealth there would doubtless be no avarice—but +not that a particular avaricious man will be wealthy. Fear implies the +existence of harm, but not necessarily that harm is coming upon the +one that fears. These are matters in which we can apply the test of +experience to our beliefs, and it seems evident that emotion adds nothing +to our knowledge. We know the things independently of the emotions they +excite, and every one recognises that to expect a thing merely because we +either desire or fear it is, in matters which we can test by experience, +utterly fallacious. + +But there are matters lying outside the range of our experience in regard +to which it is often confidently asserted that our desires and fears are +sufficient proof of their reality—a view in which I cannot agree. If it +could be shown that we long for something of an entirely different kind +from anything we have known, that might perhaps be an argument in favor +of its existence, but such is not the case. The wish for immortality, +for instance, is nothing more than the wish for life. Probably there +are but few who would not rather have immortality without death than +after it, but experience has at last convinced the most hopeful that +this is not to be expected, and the search for fountains of youth and +elixirs of life has few devotees. We want life, and we have life; we want +happiness, and we know happiness, whether we ourselves have it or not, +but to say that the fact that we want more than we get of both is a +reason for supposing that we shall ever have all that we want of either +is to reason in a way which we should all see to be fallacious if applied +to things of every-day life. I conclude, then, that the emotions which +a belief excites are utterly valueless as a test of its truth, and that +we may expect that, both with individuals and the race, emotion will +play a smaller and smaller part in belief as true knowledge and culture +increase. This is not saying that, in cases of doubt, it is unreasonable +to hope that things may turn out as we wish. + +As to innate beliefs, it is enough to say that we cannot altogether rid +our minds of them, and that they answer perfectly the purpose of working +hypotheses. A man may question the reality of an external world to his +heart’s content, but if he runs his head against a wall, or drops a brick +on his toe, it will hurt him just as much as the most thorough-going +materialist. The consequence is that such a doubt does not affect our +conduct. Abstractly, these beliefs do not all impress us with the same +degree of certainty. That the same thing cannot be in two different +places at once, is, I think, felt to be more absolutely and necessarily +true than that there is such a necessity in the order of events as is +implied in the idea of causation, but for all practical purposes we are +as sure of the one as of the other. + +I have already quoted Professor James’s assertion of our ability to +choose which among different ways of thinking of the same we shall +adhere to and which disregard. Perhaps the most prominent feature of his +teaching on the subject of belief is that it is an active, not a passive +state of the mind—a choice, not a necessity. One or two more quotations +on this point will make this plain. + + “As bare logical thinkers, without emotional reaction, we give + reality to whatever objects we think of, for they are really + phenomena, or objects of our passing thought, if nothing + more. But, _as thinkers with emotional reaction, we give what + seems to us a higher degree of reality to whatever things we + select and emphasise and turn to WITH A WILL_. These are our + _living_ realities, and not only these, but all things that are + intimately connected with these (p. 297). + + “Now the important thing to notice is that the difference + between the objects of belief and will is entirely immaterial, + as far as the relation of the mind to them goes. All that the + mind does is in both cases the same; it looks at the object and + consents to its existence, espouses it, says ‘it shall be my + reality.’ It turns to it, in short, in the interested emotional + way” (p. 320). + +Although the doctrine is stated, in these and other passages, without +qualification, it is hard to reconcile it with some other statements. He +devotes a chapter to “Necessary Truths,” and says: + + “We _must_ attach the predicate ‘equal’ to the subject + ‘opposite sides of a parallelogram’ if we think those terms + together at all” (p. 617). + +I do not know that it makes much difference whether we say that, in a +case like this, we cannot think differently of the same, or that, having +thought so, we cannot choose which way of thinking to adhere to and which +to disregard. The proposition that a horse is a vertebrate animal cannot +be called a necessary, _a priori_ truth, but I find it as impossible to +think of a horse that is not a vertebrate animal as of a parallelogram +with the opposite sides unequal. A figure with the opposite sides unequal +would not be a parallelogram, and anything that was not animal and +vertebrate would not be a horse. Whether the difficulty in the two cases +is the same or not, it is clear that, by Professor James’s admission, +here is a restriction of our choice as to what we will believe. + +Again, he speaks of pleasurable and painful sensations as +“belief-compelling.” Compulsion, so far as it exists, excludes choice, +and if this expression is justified it implies another limitation on the +freedom of belief. + +With regard to painful sensations, it seems to me that the fact is that +they, and their associations, force themselves on our attention, rather +than that we “select, and emphasise and turn to them with a will.” If I +have a toothache, I may believe that if I retain the tooth it will keep +me in pain for a long time, and if I have it extracted, that will also +be a painful process. It does not seem to me that the expressions quoted +above accurately describe my state of mind in regard to either of these +beliefs. + +According to Professor James, when a man becomes convinced that he is +financially bankrupt, or that he has lost his good name, or that he +is suffering from an incurable and fatal disease, it is because he +“espouses” this view of the matter, “consents to its existence,” says +“it shall be my reality.” This notwithstanding that such a belief may +drive him to determine that, so far as in him lies, all existence, all +reality shall cease; to consent to death and espouse the grave. Would +not the criminal who hears his death-sentence pronounced prefer, if he +could, to disbelieve his eyes and ears, and to feel that it was all a bad +dream? So far as I can judge with regard to many unwelcome beliefs, they +are not like the highwayman who offers the alternative of “your money or +your life,” but like him who throws you down, binds and robs you without +offering any choice. + +Perhaps the most striking example of the view under consideration is +found in a foot-note on p. 318, in which, after quoting, with approval, a +statement of Royce that “The ultimate motive with men of every-day life +is the will to have an external world,” he goes on to say: + + “This immixture of the will appears most flagrantly in the fact + that although external matter is doubted often enough, minds + external to our own are never doubted. We need them too much, + are too intensely social to dispense with them. Semblances + of matter may suffice to react upon, but not semblances of + communing souls. A psychic solipsism is too hideous a mockery + of our wants, and, so far as I know, has never been seriously + entertained.” + +Leaving aside the question whether any one who really disbelieved that +there was any reality, outside of his own mind, in objects of sense, +could believe in the existence of that which he only infers from the +conduct of those objects, it seems to be distinctly stated that the +reason of these beliefs is, not that we cannot help believing so, but +that we choose to believe so, and not otherwise, and that we are able, +having so chosen, to believe as we wish. That there may be no doubt as to +the sense in which the term “Will” is used, I will quote the explanation +with which he opens his chapter on that subject: + + “We desire to feel, to have, to do, all sorts of things which + at the moment are not felt, had, or done. If with the desire + there goes a sense that attainment is not possible, we simply + _wish_; but if we believe that the end is in our power, we + _will_ that the desired feeling, having or doing shall be real; + and real it presently becomes, either immediately upon the + willing or after certain preliminaries have been fulfilled” (p. + 486). + +Now each one must judge for himself whether this, or anything like this +is the way in which he came to believe in an external world. Judging from +my own experience, I should say that the reason we originally have such +a belief is that it arises spontaneously in our minds, and that, for a +long time, it never occurs to us that it can be otherwise. However that +may be, I am certain that when the contrary possibility was presented +to my mind, it struck me as strange, rather than dreadful, and that I +firmly believe many things that seem to me far more hideous than the +doctrine that I am the universe. So far as society is concerned, if I +can _be_ Shakespeare and Milton and Goethe, Plato and Bacon, Newton and +Darwin, Luther and Columbus and Washington, as well as all the people +of my acquaintance, it strikes me that I can be pretty good company for +myself. To use the universality of the belief as a proof of its voluntary +nature seems to me very much such an argument as to say that because all +bodies attract each other in the ratio of their mass and inversely as the +square of the distance, the falling of a stone must be a purely voluntary +matter. I do not see what stronger argument, in a case like this, could +be made for the necessity of a belief than the alleged fact that no one, +under any circumstances, is free from it. + +Now, if we substitute the term “Propensity” for “Will” in the passage +quoted above, it would seem to me an entirely accurate description of +the facts, and I can only understand how the authors quoted could take +the ground they do except on the assumption that all propensities, or +at least all which prevail, are choices or volitions. That such is not +the case seems to me clear enough in regard to belief from some of +the instances which I have already mentioned, but it will perhaps be +still more evident from cases in which belief is not in question. The +propensity to remember and constantly think of painful and distressing +things, which we would gladly banish from our thoughts, or such things as +silly rhymes and trifling tunes; to tremble and lose our presence of mind +in danger, when we have most need of the full use of all our faculties; +to express our emotions by muscular movements when we wish to conceal +them, and many others that might be mentioned, are examples of the fact +that an invincible propensity may be quite the reverse of a choice. + +That belief is an activity of the mind may be freely admitted. The +mind—whatever the substratum of our states of consciousness may be—is +not a receptacle, to hold indifferently whatever may be poured into +it nor a sheet of blank paper, on which this or that may be written +by circumstances; it has a character of its own, and reacts to its +environment. What the reaction shall be depends both on the character of +the mind and what is presented to it, but it seems incorrect to assume +that all the dispositions of the mind are of the nature of desires or +aversions. In the last analysis of which we are capable, our character +is probably due to our physical constitution, original and acquired, and +our beliefs may be profoundly affected by a few glasses of whiskey or an +attack of fever. Whether the reactions of the matter of which our brains +are formed are as invariable as those of inorganic matter need not be +discussed here; the present point is that while belief is a sense of the +relations of things as they are, the essence of will is the desire to +have them otherwise than as they are. To make belief a matter of choice +is the same as to say that I may at the same time choose that things +shall be as they are and otherwise. + +Professor James closes the chapter with a practical observation: + + “If belief consists in an emotional reaction of the entire man + on an object, how _can_ we believe at will? We cannot control + our emotions. Truly enough, a man cannot believe at will + abruptly. Nature sometimes, and indeed not very infrequently, + produces instantaneous conversions for us. She suddenly puts + us in an active connection with objects to which she had till + then left us cold. ‘I realise for the first time,’ we then say, + ‘what that means!’ This happens often with moral propositions. + We have often heard them; but now they shoot into our lives; + they move us; we feel their living force. Such instantaneous + beliefs are truly enough not to be achieved by will. But + _gradually_ our will can lead us to the same results by a very + simple method; _we need only in cold blood act as if the thing + in question were real, and keep acting as if it were real, and + it will infallibly end by growing into such a connection with + our life that it will become real_. It will become so knit with + habit and emotion that our interests in it will be those which + characterise belief. Those to whom God and Duty are now mere + names can make them much more than that, if they make a little + sacrifice to them every day. But all this is so well known in + moral and religious education that I need say no more” (p. 321). + +The above passage seems to me to illustrate at the same time the force +of Professor James’s rhetoric and an occasional tendency on his part to +be carried away by it into statements that are altogether too sweeping. +In an immense proportion of cases, the method that he recommends is +precisely the surest way to convince ourselves that the thing in question +is _not_ real. It is the method which the small boy takes to convince +himself that the gun is not loaded; the drunkard and spendthrift to +satisfy themselves that their vices will not bring them into poverty and +disgrace. A man may sit all day at the fork of the road, and believe that +the broad way does not lead to destruction, but when he puts his belief +in practice he discovers the truth. So far as practical matters, capable +of being brought to the test of experience, are concerned, it can only be +said that _if they are real_, we shall convince ourselves that such is +the case by acting as if they were real. Doubtless Professor James had +not such prosaic things as these in mind when he wrote the passage, but +a method that will not serve us in regard to such questions as whether +water will wet us or fire burn us, can hardly be called infallible. But +even in regard to questions that must always remain matters of opinion +it is not true in the unqualified sense in which Professor James puts +it. Probably many men, brought up in the belief that it was their duty +to observe the first day of the week by religious worship because the +Hebrews were required to abstain from labor on the seventh day, have come +to modify their belief without any material change in their practice, +and even the belief in regard to the nature and attributes of God may be +affected in advance of a change in the conduct based upon it. + +The law of association in this regard is subject to the same limitations +as we have already found to hold in respect to other matters. +Associations of action with belief have a tendency to strengthen it, but, +as in the case of emotion, they may be overcome by other considerations, +and it is entirely possible for a man to go on for the better part of +a lifetime in punctilious conformity to usages which in his heart he +despises, and break out in open rebellion at last. From the ethical +point of view, the advice which seems to be implied, of deliberately +choosing a way of setting doubts at rest which is as efficacious on the +side of error as of truth, of vice as of virtue, seems to me, to say the +least, of doubtful tendency. We must often act in doubtful cases, and +take the risk, amongst others, of thus confirming ourselves in error, +but certainly there can be no more solemn motive for weighing well our +beliefs before committing ourselves to them by action than the fact that +we may, by habit, pervert our moral sense, blind our judgment and stifle +our conscience. + +To the man who believes that there is a universe, of which he forms an +infinitesimal part, and that all his interests depend on his attitude +toward the power that works in it, it is of infinitely more interest to +know how he can know the truth than how he can convince himself of this +or that. Shall truth be our master, to be followed and obeyed, though he +command us to give up all else that we hold dear, or our servant, to be +employed as suits our passion or caprice, and dismissed when he will no +longer serve our purpose? + +This is perhaps the most momentous question that we are called on to +decide. The man who makes the wrong choice may or may not attain what he +seeks, but though he gain the whole world, he will lose his own soul. + + W. L. WORCESTER. + + +FOOTNOTES: + +[62] _The Principles of Psychology_, by William James, Professor of +Psychology in Harvard University. In two volumes. New York: Henry Holt & +Company, 1890. + +[63] The italics, in this and my other quotations, are the author’s. + + + + +THE NATURE OF MIND AND THE MEANING OF REALITY.[64] + + +Professor William James’s supposition of “an hallucinatory candle” seen +by a “new born mind entirely blank and waiting for experience to begin” +is an impossible and self-contradictory figment. We might as well speak +of the dry Niagara falls employed in the manufacture of some material +goods out of nothing. For, first, a mind entirely blank is no mind +and, secondly, a blank mind if it could exist at all, would have no +hallucinations. An hallucinatory candle can be produced only out of the +memories or the combination of memories of former candle-sensations. A +blind man sees in his dream no colors, and a deaf man hears no symphonies. + +A new-born babe is already in possession of many inherited memories. Thus +the first sense-impressions after the babe’s birth find the organism, +especially its skin, nerves and muscles predisposed for their reception. +The babe’s organism accordingly presents an instance of a relative but +not of an absolute blank; an absolute blank of a something that is to +develop into mind can mean only a lump of sentient matter at the moment +of formation. As soon as it is formed it is exposed in every second +of its existence to innumerable impressions which fill the blank with +contents and these contents are the mind that is developing. + +Sentient substance is not at rest, but like a flame it is possessed of +an incessant activity. The form of this activity is both extraordinarily +plastic and stable. It is plastic, for every impression together with the +reaction of the impression modifies it and leaves a trace: it is stable +for the traces of all the impressions and reactions are preserved. + +The first sense-impression of a lump of sentient substance produces an +irritation which objectively considered is a commotion of the sentient +substance and subjectively considered a feeling, the substance being +sentient _ex hypothesi_. This first and primitive feeling is meaningless, +for it has not, and cannot have, any reference to any other feeling, +memory or mind, and meaning is created through the interaction of +feelings with memories of feelings. + +Some later sense-impression of the same kind will not only produce +the same irritation but also serve as an irritation to awaken the +memory-trace left by the former sense-impression. The new feeling will +melt into one with the reawakened memory of the former feeling. In the +long run many traces of the same kind which are, as it were, deposited +in the same place will constitute an organ predisposed to receive the +correspondent impressions; and now a sense-impression received by such an +organ may be called a sensation. A sensation is not merely a feeling, it +is a feeling of a special kind and it is felt to be of a special kind. In +other words, a sensation is a feeling that has acquired meaning; and this +meaning is the product of the interaction and coöperation of feelings +and memories. Sensations have become symbols representing the cause of +the sense-impression which produced the sensation, and ideas are symbols +of a higher order representing either whole classes of a certain kind +of causes of sense-impressions or certain features thereof, or certain +relations among them. + +Thus every mind is a system of sentient symbols. These symbols being as +it were pictures intended somehow to represent or allegorically speaking +to portray things are called “ideas,” while the things symbolised are in +their totality called objective existence or “reality.” + +Considering the nature of mind, it is obvious that there cannot be +an entirely blank mind. We might as well speak of an entirely blank +picture. But an entirely blank picture is a canvas and no picture at +all. That a mind which is not as yet a mind can have neither sensations +nor hallucinations is almost self-evident. Similarly there is no sense +in saying that a picture that consists of an utter blank and thus is +properly speaking no picture at all but an empty canvas, either does or +does not correctly represent a certain object. + +The word “real” is used in two senses (1) as a name for everything that +exists and (2) to signify that kind of existence which is the object of +our sensory and mental experience, i. e. the objective world so-called. +The former of these two definitions is more comprehensive; for it +includes the realm of mentality, the ideal world of subjectivity. The +latter is used in contrast to the subjective world of mental life and +thus expressly excludes the ideal realm of the mind and of mental symbols. + +The questions as to What is reality? and Is there anything real at all? +must not be formulated as they are by Professor James, in terms of belief +but in a statement of facts and by defining certain facts as real. + +An hallucination is real in the first sense of the word; it is an actual +existence; it is a feeling taking place in the mind of some organism. +It is also real in the second sense of the word in so far as it is a +vibration of a brain structure. However an hallucination is not real +in the second sense of the word in so far as its meaning has not its +correspondent analogue. + +Let the meaning of a certain mental symbol be a candle, under which +name we comprise a certain group of experiences, and let the cerebral +structure of this mental symbol be awakened by another stimulus than +that which is generally called a candle. Those experiences which as a +group are called a candle are of a certain kind. If a piece of paper +approaches the lighted candle, it will burn. An hallucinatory candle will +leave the paper intact, although the person who has the hallucination may +see the paper burn. Thus the ideas or images of objects are built up of +experiences which have taught us that under certain conditions certain +events happen; in consequence of certain actions there are constantly +certain reactions taking place. Reality consists of such facts; it is the +sum total of all reactions; reality is the nature of objects which react +somehow. + +Those who jump at the conclusion that our subjective sensations, such as +colors, tastes, sounds, etc., must be regarded as objective properties +of things, are grossly mistaken. Our sensations are not qualities of +things but subjective phenomena: they do not inform us about the nature +of things, but reveal to us how things affect our senses. Those however +who deny or doubt objective existence are no less mistaken. The world +is not a subjective phenomenon of sensations, but an objective existence +symbolised in sensations. + +The question is not “Does reality exist?” but “What is Reality?” or +“What is the meaning of ‘real’?” When we say “Objects are real,” we +mean that they resist, they react, their presence produces somehow some +effect. When we say, We ourselves are real, we mean that we react upon +the objects with which we come in contact, we mean, that in our bodily +existence we are objects in an objective world. + +Actions and reactions are taking place. This is a fact. He who denies +it is like the man who declares that he is not at home; he contradicts +himself: for the denial of a question is a reaction upon an action. The +term reality is the symbol of the nature of actions and reactions in +their efficacy, it denotes the essence of facts and thus the question +“Does reality exist?” has no sense. We denote that which exists, that +which acts and reacts, that which is a fact, or howsoever we may +express it, by the word “reality.” We might deny that the reactions of +the objective world are constant, or that a certain idea of a certain +reaction is erroneous, viz. that the reaction if put to the test would +prove to be different from what it was expected—but all these denials and +doubts which are of daily occurrence in the domain of science presuppose +that there are reactions taking place and reality or objective existence +is only a collective name for these reactions and their nature. The name +object still preserves the idea of reaction, for object is that which +reacts upon touch, which resists, which is objected. + +We shall lose ourselves in inextricable confusion by making a matter of +doubt and belief what is really a statement of facts. To speak of a doubt +or belief in the reality of things in general is tantamount to speaking +of a belief in our experiences which, whatever their particular nature +may be, are facts. And to doubt our experiences, not the correctness +of a particular experience, but experience in general, i. e. the very +existence of experience is tantamount to doubting our own being. + +A consideration of what we mean by an hallucination can best make clear +what we mean, and rationally can only mean, by reality. A real candle is +a mental symbol of something which will under certain conditions react +in a certain way. An hallucinatory candle is also a mental symbol, but +the thing which it purports to mean, does not exist; i. e. there is +nothing that will react. The symbol is there, but not that something the +existence of which the symbol of the idea “candle” would indicate. + +This method of dealing with the problem of the old naïve realism and the +pseudo-critical idealism of former times is not based upon the assumption +of the reality of things (which means, of the reality of reality); it +is simply a careful formulation of the problem to prevent our being +entangled all about with contradictions; it is the method of rendering +clear the basic principle of positivism, that all knowledge is a +description of facts, which description of facts is made for the purpose +of, dealing with facts. + + P. C. + + +FOOTNOTES: + +[64] This article was suggested by Dr. W. L. Worcester’s criticism on +Professor James’s Psychology. When Dr. Worcester discusses Professor +James’s supposition of an hallucination in a blank mind, saying that it +would be “the only possible reality of that mind,” he almost seems to +adopt Professor James’s views of the subject himself. Clearness about +such fundamental terms as mind and reality, are so much needed that the +following remarks may not be out of place as a further explanation of the +subject. Exactness in fundamental and general terms will save much labor +in detail work. + + + + +MONISM NOT MECHANICALISM. + +COMMENTS UPON PROF. ERNST HAECKEL’S POSITION. + + +Prof. Ernst Haeckel’s Anthropogeny, the fourth edition of which appeared +of late,[65] brings again into prominence that conception of monism which +identifies the monistic view with mechanicalism. + +A review of this book has appeared already in _The Open Court_, No. +231, in which we called attention to the great merits of a work which +has become a household book, not only for the scientist, but for every +educated reader who is interested in man and the origin of man. Our +knowledge in Anthropogeny, certainly, will influence not only our general +world-conception, but through our general world-conception it will extend +its influence not only over every branch of science but also into the +broader fields of man’s daily life and his practical morality. + +Professor Haeckel is the most popular naturalist of to-day and there +is no one, perhaps, who has made a more effective propaganda for the +monistic world-conception than he. So it is almost a matter of course +that his definition of monism is generally accepted as the standard. +We have formulated our view of monism in a way which in principle and +general outlines concurs with the commonly accepted usage of the term, +yet it deviates from it in some important points which are perhaps not +merely matters of detail. It will be difficult to say how far we agree +and how far we disagree with Professor Haeckel’s monism because those +subjects in which we disagree, have never been elaborated by him, and we +are inclined to believe that he would modify some of his expressions, if +he devoted a quiet hour’s thought to the objections we have to make to +his definitions. + +Professor Haeckel’s monism being mechanicalism savors strongly of +materialism. He says in the latest edition of his “Anthropogenie” which +is now before us, Vol. II, p. 851: + +“There can be no doubt that a thorough consideration and unprejudiced +deliberation of these facts will lead to a decisive victory of that +philosophical conception which with one word we call monistic or +mechanical in opposition to the dualistic and teleological. Upon the +latter are based most of the philosophical systems of antiquity, of +the mediæval times, and also of the present time. The mechanical or +monistic philosophy declares that certain and immutable laws obtain +everywhere in the phenomena of human life as much as in nature generally, +that a necessary causal connexus obtains everywhere in phenomena and, +accordingly, that the knowable world forms throughout a unitary whole, a +monon. Monism moreover maintains that all phenomena are produced alone +through mechanical causes (_causæ efficientes_) not through premeditated +purposive causes (_causæ finales_).” + +And in the first lecture “The History of Evolution and Philosophy,” (p. +15) he says: + + “We shall clearly recognise in the following investigations how + the most wonderful enigmas of human and animal organisations, + heretofore considered as inaccessible, have become accessible + to a natural solution through Darwin’s reform in the doctrine + of evolution by a mechanical explanation of purposeless + efficient causes.” + +In agreement with these views, Professor Haeckel regards the terms +necessity and mechanicalism as equivalent terms. He rejects any kind of +teleology, any kind of final causes, and also the freedom of the will. +He opposes the so-called moral world-order as contradictory to the idea +that the world is regulated by mechanical law and he adopts the latter to +the exclusion of the former. All these points come out very strongly and +clearly in Professor Haeckel’s letter to the editor of _The Open Court_, +where his view of monism is graphically presented in a concise tabular +form. + +We here reproduce this table from No. 212 of _The Open Court_, for the +convenience of our readers: + + =======================+=======================+======================== + MONISM. | FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS. | DUALISM. + -----------------------+-----------------------+------------------------ + Inseparable. | Matter and force. | As a matter of + | God and world. | principle distinct + | Soul and body. | entities. + -----------------------+-----------------------+------------------------ + Mechanicalism. | Life. | Vitalism. + Necessary evolution. | | Teleological creation. + -----------------------+-----------------------+------------------------ + Universal (conservation| Immortality. | Individual. + of energy). | Freedom of will. | A person’s will being + Determinism. | | absolutely free. + -----------------------+-----------------------+------------------------ + Causæ efficientes. | Causation. | Causæ finales. + (Efficient causes.) | | (Final causes.) + -----------------------+-----------------------+------------------------ + Regulated by mechanical| World-order. | So-called “Moral.” + law. | | + -----------------------+-----------------------+------------------------ + Inseparable and subject| Inorganic and organic | As a matter of + to the same laws. | nature. | principle distinct + | | and subject to + | | different laws. + -----------------------+-----------------------+------------------------ + +Now we agree with Professor Haeckel in one main point, viz. “that certain +and immutable laws obtain everywhere in the phenomena of human life as +much as in nature generally, and that the knowable world forms throughout +a unitary whole, a monon.” But we cannot agree to his proposition that +“the wonderful enigmas of organised life are accessible to a natural +solution by a mechanical explanation of purposeless efficient causes.” +We grant willingly that mechanical explanations will serve for all +motions that take place in the world; even the motions of the brain +take place in strict obedience to the laws of molar and molecular +mechanics. But a mechanical explanation is not applicable to that which +is not motion. If it were applicable it would not be desirable, for +it would be of no avail. Mechanical explanations are to be limited to +mechanical phenomena. Feeling however is not a mechanical phenomenon, +and an idea, being a special and a very complex kind of a feeling, or +rather and more accurately expressed, being the special meaning of a +very complex feeling, is not a mechanical phenomenon either. It is true +that when a feeling takes place and when an idea is thought in the +brain of an organised being, that a certain nervous action takes place. +The nervous action is a motion and this motion represents a definite +amount of energy. There is no theoretical difficulty, although there are +almost insurmountable practical difficulties, in measuring the definite +amount of potential energy that is changed into kinetic energy when a +man thinks. Yet the brain-motion is not the idea and by a mechanical +explanation of the brain-motion we have not even touched the problem of +what the nature of the idea is, why ideas originate and how they act. + +We know that Professor Haeckel when he so vigorously insists on +mechanicalism, opposes those philosophers who believe that there are +motions which cannot be explained by mechanical laws. We side with +Professor Haeckel against any one who maintains that some motions are +mechanical (molar or molecular) and others are exceptions to the laws of +mechanics, representing a kind of hypermechanics. But we cannot admit the +explanation by mechanical laws of non-mechanical phenomena. + +Professor Haeckel speaks of purposeless efficient causes—_zwecklos +thätige Ursachen_. He speaks of efficient causes, as excluding final +causes. He is right in his objection to final causes as the term is +commonly used. But while there are causes that are _zwecklos_, there +are no causes that are _ziellos_. Every process of causation takes a +definite course, it has a certain and definable direction. The end of +this direction need not be a conscious aim, but it is an aim whatever it +be, it is a _Ziel_. In this sense every efficient cause is at the same +time a final cause. The gravitating stone has no purpose, yet it has an +aim. So the evolution of organised life is a natural process having a +very definite aim. And this aim of the evolution of organised life is +determined by factors of a very complex nature. One of these factors is +almost imperceptible at the beginning, but it is of a constantly and +rapidly growing importance; and this factor is the psychical element +that appears with organised life. This factor is nothing supra-natural, +nothing extra-natural, and yet it is not something material or +mechanical. It is this factor which in its highest efflorescence changes +aims into purposes, and with this change it creates again a new factor of +evolution which is the purposive aspiration to conform to the world-order +and thus to advance the further progress of mankind. This aspiration is +in one word called morality. + +When we speak of a moral world-order we mean that such moral behests +as were formulated in prescripts by Confucius, by Buddha, by Moses, +by Jesus, and other moral teachers of mankind have an objective and +immutable foundation in the nature of things. The mechanical law in the +province of motions, the logical law in the realm of thought, geometrical +proportions in mathematics, the regularity of natural laws, etc., form in +our world-conception a part of this moral world-order. The laws of social +life are not opposed to them but correlative. + +The purpose of a man’s action reveals his character, and the character +of the man is his innermost nature. In an analogous way the aim of +evolution and especially the aim of the evolution of organised beings +reveals the character, the innermost nature of the universe. Psychic life +is absent so far as we can see in the primordial world substance as it +appears in the form of a nebula; it is absent still in the primordial +state of planets. It appears with the subjective states of awareness that +rise into existence in organised life. The subjectivity of unorganised +matter is, in comparison with man’s subjectivity, to be considered as +a blank; i. e., if there is in it a state of awareness, which we have +reasons to doubt, it is apparently without meaning; it does not symbolise +external objects; it is no mind; it is, as it were, blind. Yet the aim +of evolution being the development of psychical life, shows that the +subjectivity of unorganised matter is spiritual in its innermost nature. +And the aim of psychical life being the development of moral ideals, we +are very well justified in speaking of the world-order as moral. When +speaking of the world-order as moral we mean that the moral prescripts of +the great ethical teachers of mankind are founded in and derived from the +world-order of nature. + +There is one objection to calling the world-order moral, and we therefore +dislike to use the phrase. It is this: Morality means conformity to +a certain standard. The standard is not moral, but those who do or +do not conform to it are moral or immoral. Therefore if there is any +truth in the idea of God it is this that there is a standard for human +conduct to conform to, there is an authority which has to be obeyed +and this authority is God. To speak of God as moral or immoral is +anthropomorphism. If “God” means anything, it means that power of the +world-order obedience to which is called morality. If we say God is +moral, God ceases to be God, the moral authority above him to which he +has to conform would be the really true God. Thus logically the personal +conception of God leads to a superpersonal conception of God. + +These are in brief our objections to Professor Haeckel’s definition +of monism as being identical with mechanicalism and perhaps also with +materialism. My opinion that Professor Haeckel may after all accede to +our view of monism is based upon an interesting and friendly conversation +which I enjoyed with him several years ago in Jena. Professor Haeckel +is not the one-sided naturalist that he is often represented to be by +orthodox clergymen. He does not see the workings of the natural laws +only, he sees also the moral aspect to which a consideration of the +natural laws leads. That his books emphasise the former without entering +into the problems of the latter is natural for a scientist, but he +personally is certainly even broader than are his books, and I should say +that his very opposition to certain errors which have been foisted by an +antiquated dogmatism upon our religious institutions, show the deeply +religious spirit of his character. + + P. C. + + +FOOTNOTES: + +[65] _Anthropogenie oder Entwickelungsgeschichte des Menschen._ +Keimes-und Stammesgeschichte. By Ernst Haeckel. Mit 20 Tafeln, 440 +Holzschnitten und 25 genetischen Tabellen. Vierte, umgearbeitete und +vermehrte Auflage. Leipzig: Engelmann. + + + + +MR. CHARLES S. PEIRCE ON NECESSITY. + + +Mr. Charles S. Peirce is one of those thinkers who in the investigation +of a subject go right down to the bottom of the problem. This +appears to me the more conspicuously so, as the result to which his +investigations lead stand in a strong contrast to my own views. Yet I +cannot help admiring the boldness of his trenchant critique which finds +the difficulties at the point where really the main difficulty of all +philosophical inquiry lies buried. It lies buried, i. e. it does not +appear on the surface of things. If it lay on the surface, our most +superficial thinkers would naturally light on it; but most of them walk +their way in peace, unmolested by the question, Is there any truth in the +idea of necessity. An editorial treatment of this problem may be expected +in a forthcoming number of _The Monist_. + + P. C. + + + + +BOOK REVIEWS. + + +EINLEITUNG IN DAS ALTE TESTAMENT. By _C. H. Cornill_, Professor at the +University at Königsberg. + +When Darwin and his followers first gave to the world the astonishing +results of their studies, few were those who at once recognised the +importance of the new theories and still fewer those who readily accepted +them. But within the last thirty years, gradually but steadily the +number of those who have adopted as virtually true the hypotheses of the +new school, has been increasing until to-day those are in the minority +who teach a view different from Darwin on the origin and evolution +of the universe. The history and fate of the new studies in Biblical +criticism bear a striking analogy to the reception accorded to Darwinian +researches. At first they were met with well nigh universal opposition. +They were declared to be subversive of the holiest interests of religion. +They were held to rob the Bible of its glory. But by slow degrees the +first passion yielded to wiser counsel. Curiosity led to the examination +of the new positions; and in consequence in ever widening circles the +conviction gained ground that far from taking away from the dignity of +the old Hebrew literature, these new investigations and the method upon +which they footed, lent new lustre to the collection of ancient writings. +And to-day the battle has been won by the school of Wellhausen and +Kuenen. Few are those who to-day urge the old views on the authorship +date and historical succession of the several parts composing what is +called the O. T. or even on the canonisation of the whole collection. + +The startling assumptions of Wellhausen, Graf, and their Dutch colleagues +had their forerunners, as had Darwin and Wallace. But when George and +Vatke in the fourth decade of our century and Reuss, in his first +academic lectures, virtually anticipated the lines of research of their +later successors, the world was too busy with other matters to give their +labors much attention. (Cfr. this work, p. 8.) For all this, primitive +orthodoxy had only few representatives in this domain, at least in +Germany. While Hävernick and Keil and Hengstenberg, are ranged on the +extreme right of the line defending with all the resources of a vast +erudition the traditional views, the middle ground is occupied by such +men as Ewald, and Hitzig, and the teacher of these De-Wette, a school +of critics that to-day yet counts among its protagonists such men as +Dillmann and Schrader and Kittel. With Graf, a new era may be said to +have begun for Biblical criticism. Notwithstanding the violent opposition +encountered, the school has won the day. Its greatest triumph was perhaps +the acquiescence in its positions shortly before his death by that master +of Biblical science, Professor Delitzsch of Leipzig. What the cardinal +point of contention is between the warring camps, is well known. It is +the relative age and position of what is technically designated as the +Priestly code, in the Hexateuch. According to the new school this portion +is the capping stone of the edifice, as it were. For Dillmann it is +pre-exilic; for Wellhausen post-exilic. + +The book before us places itself without equivocation on the standpoint +of this latest criticism. It is thus another leaf in the laurel wreath +crowning the men of the new dispensation. For the name of the author is +guarantee of the scholarly character of the work; and views which have +the endorsement of a man of the renown and the scholarship of Professor +Cornill carry the presumption of having truth on their side. Professor +Cornill is however, a new-comer in this special field. His life work, as +he himself says, lies in another province of the vast realm of Biblical +critical studies. His fame is associated with his critical edition of +the text of Ezekiel, a work which will forever stand as the best guide +for all who would venture on the dangerous ground of conjectural textual +emendations. For Cornill was the first to lay down the method which above +all must be followed in so venturesome a task and his new version is the +classic illustration of the correctness of his method of proceeding. That +a man who has established for himself the reputation of being methodic +and painstaking almost to a fault, a man who is dowered with critical +acumen of the highest order, should after going anew over the whole +ground cast the weight of his scholarly authority in favor of the views +of the new critical school is a fact the significance of which cannot be +blinked. We are indeed glad that the publishers entrusted this number of +their intended series of manuals for theological students, to a scholar +who had hitherto not written _ex cathedra_ on this particular subject. +Thus was ensured a new and impartial examination of all the points +involved. + +The ends which this series of manuals is to serve, decided of course the +style and scope of this work. Of introductions (_Einleitungen_) to the O. +T. there was no scarcity; but (see preface) they were either too bulky +and too full and thus did not answer the requirements of the student, +not yet a scholar; or they were too brief, mere “ponies” as we here in +America would say, intended to be learnt by heart for the purpose of +passing a good examination. The difficulty thus consisted in combining +thoroughness with the necessary brevity without sacrificing lucidity. +No mere results on the other hand were to be stated. The student was to +be initiated into the course of the investigations, the reasons for the +conclusions and thus his interest was to be awakened and the way prepared +for independent research on his own part. That the author has succeeded +in carrying out this his programme, every section of the book confirms. +His fear that the full analysis in paragraph 12, of the priestly code +will be found to be out of place in an “outline of this kind” is +groundless. We do not hesitate that this very section is the gem of the +whole work full as it is of numerous passages which cannot but stir to +profitable reflection the student. None can lay this book aside without +confessing that he has gained a “Gesammtanschauung,” an insight into +the unity and coherence of the new views, apt to convince all earnest +and unbiased minds of the truth that in this science (_Wissenschaft_) +criticism is standing on firm ground. In the selection of the books +named at the head of each chapter, or in the course of the discussion, +the Professor has displayed most consummate skill. There is scarce one +important work which with profit may be consulted but is mentioned; and +what is more in the right connection. This feature is not the least +valuable in the whole work; the student thus has at ready command a +bibliography which excludes the chaff and stores the wheat. + +But let us dwell a little more specifically on the plan and execution +and the contents of this book. Two plans may suggest themselves to +the writer of an “introduction” of this kind. He may attempt to give +a picture of the rise of literature among the ancient Hebrews and +treat of the different writings which have come down to us, often the +fragments of larger works, in the order of their composition and at the +same time connect with this discussion the reasons for departing from +the traditional views as to their dates and so forth and for assigning +them to a new age. This would be virtually writing a history of the +literature. It is this plan which Reuss adopted. But according to our +Professor, investigation has not proceeded far enough to make such a +history possible. He even doubts whether it ever will (p. 2). Perhaps his +verdict is justified. At all events he is right when he urges that in +such a sequence much which belongs to the branch which he is to teach, +will scarcely find its proper or organic place. And therefore it was a +wise conclusion of his to adhere to the second plan, the traditional, for +such _Einleitungen_ which treats of the different books in the order of +the Hebrew canon and finally takes up the discussion of such questions +as the collection of the canon, the condition of the text, the different +ancient versions and their value for the reconstruction, if possible, of +the true original. But what is an _Einleitung_? It is that theological +“discipline” which concerns itself about holy scripture as a book. It is +its business to fix the time when and the manner how the several writings +were composed, which now collectively form the holy scriptures, again it +is one of its main objects to understand at what period and under what +conditions the several writings were collected and also the manner of +the tradition of this collection down to us. The method of this inquiry +can be none other but the historic critical. To this definition of the +character of this discipline, to retain this German name, none will take +exception. It is both succinct and complete. The second paragraph gives a +full survey of the history of the studies in this field. It covers within +the brief space of ten pages the results of scholarly labors extending +over a period of over fourteen hundred years. It is not a dry enumeration +of names and book titles. Under each scholar, the salient element of his +contribution is emphasised. The living principle of these studies is thus +illustrated in its growth and successive development. Take for instance +this description of Wellhausen’s method, and in a similar manner that +of all other predecessors or co-laborers is brought out: “At the hand +of the history of the cultus and that of tradition, he shows how these +two lines of development run parallel to each other, how the religious +process of evolution at every halt and turn finds its expression and at +the same time its corroboration in the productions of literature: Israel +and Judaism are two concepts radically different from each other; it is +the canon that differentiates Judaism from old Israel.” Paragraph three +states the author’s reasons for treating the single books first before +taking up the discussion of their collection into a canon, and also why +the apocrypha are excluded. These not being in the canon, are foreign to +the purposes of an introduction into the canon books. None will deny that +the Professor’s arguments on these points are irrefutable. His inquiry +into the age of the art of writing among the Hebrews concludes this +general preliminary. He is of the opinion that as far back as the memory +of the Hebrews goes, they were acquainted with this art as nowhere there +is a sign that among them there was a dim recollection of an analphabetic +period. Recent finds have made it plain that during the reign of the +Pharaoh of the exodus a lively correspondence was kept up between +Palestine and Egypt, while for the reign of David the names of his court +officials is documentary proof that there were writers at his court. The +use of the pen must have been pretty general among the people as is shown +by Judges viii, a chapter which belongs to the oldest layer of historical +compositions. + +Our space is too limited to abstract every chapter of this remarkable +book. Much as we should like to do this, and especially as in this +manner alone we can hope to do justice to its merits, we must confine +ourselves, now that we come to the “special introduction” to a few +selections taken from the discussion of the main points in reference to +books which have been the centre of critical study. The Pentateuch as +is natural receives the lion’s share of the author’s attention. We have +no hesitancy in saying that his is the best exposition of the modern +views which has yet come under our notice. The Pentateuch cannot be the +work of Moses; internal evidence, as already pointed out by Aben Esra, +Hobbes, Peyrerius, and Spinoza, render the traditional assumption of +Mosaic authorship untenable. But the Pentateuch cannot be the work of +one author. The critical labors of one and a half century, sketched +most skillfully, has made it plain that the Pentateuch has been “worked +together” from four independent original writings, (_Quellenschriften_) +a yahwistic work, J. an elohistic, E. a Deuteronomistic D. and a +priestly which after Kuenen is denoted as P. On this general division +the scholars are agreed, the relative age of the separate parts alone +is yet under controversy. In paragraph seven an analysis is given of +the first four books as assigned to the three sources. Deuteronomy +occupies a position of its own. It is characteristically different in +language and thought from the others; it is something essentially new +and is in itself homogeneous. In the main Deuteronomy is the book of +the covenant mentioned in II. Kings xxiii; this original D. is now +incorporated in chapters xii, xiii, xiv-xvii, where however certain +verses and even parts of verses must be eliminated. Perhaps xxviii, or +as Professor Cornill argues, something more succinct but of the same +general nature, a curse, may have belonged to the original D. This must +have been the book published under such extraordinary circumstances +in 621. Who is its author? It presents itself as the work of Moses. +But this is characteristic of the tendency of the age to take a great +man as the father of a new literary production, a tendency which was +perfectly well understood and was far above the level of a literary +deception. Its early manifestation in D. is merely proof that even then +Moses was among the people the law-giver _par excellence_. The author +of D. must be looked for in the circle of the pious who in consequence +of Manasse’s retrogression were bound all the more closely unto each +other. In other words among the men of the prophetic party, who must have +had influence also over certain priestly orders, for D. is a compromise +and an alliance between the prophets and the priests. Besides these +components of original D. the book contains in its present form additions +and duplicates which partly are historical and hence are denoted by +D.h, partly parenetic, hence D.p; but again in these are many later +interpolations. For the particulars in this regard, we must refer to the +work of Cornill itself. His analysis displays a keen eye and will on the +whole be sure to be accepted as final. The date of D. being 621, what +is the time of the other great sources of the present Pentateuch. It +is clear that D. is acquainted with the “book of the covenant” Ex. xx, +23.-xxiii, 33. and with both Decalogues (?). Thus it was acquainted with +JE. P. on the other hand is totally unknown. The historical portions of +D. confirm this deduction from the legislative pieces. JE is clearly +known to D. while of a knowledge of P. there is not the least trace. +How far back of 621 may we go to fix the date of both J. and E.? The +period of the first kings seem to be the limit, or more particularly +the reign of David. But which of the two is the elder, J. or E.? There +can be no question that J. is. For he is more naïve as appears from +a comparison among others of chapters Gen. xx, 1-17, xxi 22-32 which +belong to E., with chapter Gen. xxvi. 1-33 which is J.’s. E. appears +to be a theological recasting of J. E. is the work of the Northern +kingdom. Joseph always appears as the leader of his brothers and other +features confirm this impression. The year 722, when in the Northern +realm national consciousness was at its high water mark may then be +supposed to be the _terminus ad quem_. But is E. as we have it a literary +unit? Kuenen has proven that it is not. A century after its original +composition a second edition so to speak must have been made with a +view to meet the requirements and prejudices of the Judaic population +of the South. Ex. chapters 32-33, are of great decisive importance in +this connection. They are a rebuke for the golden calf worship at Dan +and Bethel. Thus E. is divided again into two E.1 and E.2, to which come +yet other later amplifications f. i. Num. xxi, 32-35. E.1 then belongs +to the reign of Jeroboam II (750); and E.2 is the work of a later author +living in Judah and under the influence of prophetic ideas. The locality +of J. is a point of controversy. Cornill sides with those who maintain +that his home is the Southern kingdom of Judah. The incidents in the +Patriarchal biographies which seem to weaken such an assumption are +explained as original traits of tradition which J. had no interest to +change. J. again is not a literary unit; it compromises J.1, J.2, and +even J.3. The reasons for these subdivisions are clearly given in the +book. J. must have been composed in its different parts between 850-625. +The priestly code occupies a whole paragraph, the signal merit of which +we have noticed above. This is indeed the master-piece of a great +critical master. The many points which are involved in the discussion of +this mooted problem are treated with a clearness and a calmness which +carry conviction to the most sceptical. P. presents a spiritual unity +but not a literary. P. is the offspring of P.1 an old priestly record +and P.2 a narrative and legislative composition which is as it were +the substance and skeleton of P. around which younger accretions have +gathered at different times for which Cornill in order to simplify his +symbols proposes the designation of P.x. J. S. Vater as early as 1805 has +proven that in the so-called Mosaism, of the influence in literary and +legislative respect of our P. there is no evidence before the captivity. +Wellhausen and Kayser and Kuenen have demonstrated what for Vatke was a +dim suspicion. Dillmann, Kittel, and Delitzsch as little as Baudissin +have succeeded in saving the pre-exilic character of P. Certain it is +that before Esra 458 (444), this code had no official recognition. From +Nehemiah we have the proof that our P. corresponds to the “Book of the +Law of Moses” which was read at the great assembly in October 444. On the +other hand the book of Chronicles is based on P. as it details history, +as it would have been, if P. had been the law regulating life and liturgy +and temple service. Had P. been known before D. what reason should the +priest have had who promulgated it to substitute for it another code +less advantageous for his own order? P. is clearly a development of +D. D. presents itself as something new in all of its demands, in its +insistence on centralisation, in one sanctuary and in one priestly order +on the legitimacy of the tribe of Levi exclusively. Of the tabernacle +there is not one syllable in the whole of the pre-exile literature. +It is a clear projection into antiquity of the Deuteronomic Central +sanctuary. The relations of P. to Ezekiel make this still plainer. This +prophet is the link of transition between D. and P. The omissions in the +festal cycle of E. can only be explained that this prophet-priest was +unacquainted with P. The captivity is thus the time for the composition +of P. in the main. Its emphasis on circumcision as the sign of the +covenant which decides the connection with the chosen seed and nation, +is proof of this. And the chronology finally corroborates all previous +inferences as the chronology of Genesis which is so important a part +of P. is unmistakably a reconstruction after certain principles of the +Babylonian history of the beginnings. (Oppert.) P. was written during +the century from Ezekiel to Esra (570-458). It was not merely P.2 that +Esra read before the assembled people. P.1 and P.2 seem thus to have +been united even at this time. But it is not to be assumed that under +Esra P. was already a part of the other portions of our Pentateuch. P. +itself contains parts which are later than Esra. P.x is undoubtedly +later and these additions are easily explained on the very assumption +of the official introduction of P. P. is not the work of an individual; +it is that of a whole school, a school which naturally formed in the +captivity. Besides these “source-writings,” the Pentateuch contains +smaller pieces of great antiquity mostly of a poetic character which +had for a long time an independent existence. Such is Gen. xlix, Exodus +xv, and others. Exodus xxi-xxiii, the so-called book of the covenant, +requires also a treatment by itself. It is characteristic of this book +that it ignores totally the Decalogue. Kuenen has solved the difficulties +in which this collection of judicial precedents is involved by pointing +out that it is the predecessor of D. D. is merely the substitute for +this. As it is older than E. and is the precipitate of the unwritten law +of the earlier kingly period, we place its date in the ninth century. +Lev. xvii-xxvi while betraying in many regards affinity with P. is still +distinct from it. It stands between Ezekiel and P.; it is one of the many +priestly Thoroth which undoubtedly were current among the class whom +they concerned. How now did these component parts finally combine? This +is elucidated in paragraph fourteen. First J. and E. were put together, +by an editor of Jehovistic leanings, whom Wellhausen has styled Rj. (R. +standing for German Redacteur, Editor). This Rj. worked over, and that +often decidedly, his materials in keeping with his own convictions. This +Rj. probably lived about 650. His position is pre-deuteronomic. A second +editor combined the work of Rj. with D. He is designated as Rd. His +was the placing of the old book of the covenant near Sinai in order to +gain room for Deuteronomy. He thus became the cause of much confusion. +He lived during the second half of the Babylonian captivity. JED. was +finally combined with P. by a third editor (Rp.) who is characterised by +considerable reverence for the old documents. He omitted much to guard +against repetition but at the same time where the relations differed he +preserved them most faithfully and endeavored to place them into their +proper position and connection. Rp. was thus virtually the author of our +Pentateuch. But living after Esra even with him the Pentateuch was not +yet closed. Many younger hands had a share in its final shaping. Glosses +were added or crept into the text, as is shown by comparison with the +lxx. The book of Joshuah is a necessary continuation and complement of +the Pentateuch. + +But here we must stop quoting in detail. Much as we should desire to +reproduce Cornill’s own words relating to other Biblical books, want +of space precludes even the attempt. Suffice it to say that as in his +treatment of the Pentateuch, so every question bearing on Biblical +criticism is handled with the skill of the master. At whatever turn we +ask information of this book we receive it most abundantly. This is +indeed a students book. It stimulates while it instructs. It leads while +it describes the road passed over. In the discussion of the critical +problems on the Psalms, the prophets Isaiah and Zechariah, on the final +collection of the canon, the translation of the Bible and the relation of +the different recensions to each other, the historical books as distinct +from Chronicles, and Esra, and so forth, every point is treated with a +lucidity of style and a fulness of material which is the rare gift of +a man who is saturated with his science and loves it for its own sake. +This book is destined to rank among the classics. Its earnest study and +repeated consultation can therefore be recommended to all who wish to +inform themselves about the method and the achievements of the critical +schools. The kindred book by Driver, recently published will not make +a translation into English of Cornill’s manual less desirable. We take +leave from the author with a feeling of great gratitude for the pleasure +and the profit we derived from his contribution to the literature of +Biblical scholarship. The book is well printed and singularly free from +typographical errors. + + DR. E. G. HIRSCH. + + +THE PRESENT POSITION OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL SCIENCES. An Inaugural Lecture. +By _Andrew Seth_, M. A. Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood and Sons. +1891. + +As stated by the author, this lecture deals, not with the circle of +the philosophical sciences, but only with the subjects traditionally +associated with a Chair of Logic and Metaphysics in Scotland. +These subjects belong to the three-fold classification of logical, +psychological, and metaphysical, or philosophical in the strict sense. +They therefore embrace the study of the conditions to which valid +reasoning must conform, the investigation, introspectively and otherwise, +of the phenomena of consciousness, and the study of the two-fold question +of knowing and being, which as epistemology and metaphysics are included +under the designation of Philosophy. These three lines of learning are +cognate, and the first two are in a measure introductory to the third, or +at least, says Professor Seth, if we go beneath the surface they lead us +into the very heart of philosophical difficulties. The lecturer refers in +his sketch of the present outlook in these three departments of science +to the marvellous activity displayed in the department of psychology. All +the influences at work may be said to meet and come to fruition in Mr. +Ward’s “masterly treatise” in the “Encyclopædia Britannica” and “the rich +and stimulating volumes” of Professor James, of Harvard. Experimental +psychology is now widely spread in Germany and has been enthusiastically +taken up in America, “where every well-equipped college aims at the +establishment of a psychological or psycho-physical laboratory.” +Professor Seth thinks, however, that the experimental psychologists +magnify their office overmuch. The field of experiment is necessarily +limited to the facts of sensation, the phenomena of movement, and the +time occupied by the simpler mental processes. The results are often +so contradictory as to leave everything in doubt, and where definite +results are obtainable, their value is often not apparent. Moreover, +many of the results are of a purely physiological nature, and are only +by courtesy included in psychological science. We would remark on this, +that without the experiments the results would not have been obtained +and that their value will become apparent when the methods of experiment +are perfected. After referring to the critical function of philosophy as +a doctrine of knowledge, Professor Seth states that as constructive it +should lay special stress on a _teleological_ view of the universe. By +this is meant, that philosophical teleology should concentrate itself +upon the proof that there is an end of evolution, “that there is an +organic unity or purpose binding the whole process into one and making +it intelligible—in one word, that there _is_ evolution and not merely +aimless change,” such as is supposed in a purely mechanical view of the +universe. As to the nature of the end, although the lecturer accepts +Hegel’s view that all things are relative to man as rational, he cannot +accept “the abstraction of the race in place of the living children of +men.” + + Ω. + + +DER MENSCHLICHE WELTBEGRIFF. By Dr. _Richard Avenarius_, Ord. Professor +der Philosophie an der Universität Zürich. Leipsic: O. R. Reisland. 1891. + +This monograph is as it were a self-confession. The author endeavors +to attain clearness in his own philosophical standpoint. He looked +back upon the path he has traveled and feels that “the solution of +the problem-attained is fundamentally a personal self-liberation” +(Preface, ix). This book is most commendable reading to all idealists +and agnostics. It is an interesting and instructive little work, +tracing with a keen psychological criticism the vagaries of certain +philosophical conceptions, through which not alone the author but the +thinkers of mankind in general have strayed. The philosopher begins +with what Avenarius calls the “natural world-conception.” But this +natural world-conception leads to contradictions and the evil spirit of +speculation leads us in a circle through the barren fields of idealism. +Avenarius asks: “Is the world really of such a nature that it appears +unitary and consistent only to the superficial thinker, while it +leads every one astray who attempts to grasp it more precisely in its +entirety—the more so the more consistently the thinker proceeds?” (p. +xiii.) + +The author proposes the question: “In what consists the inevitableness +of the contradiction to which every general world-conception seems to +have led? Or, if the world really be unitary what is the evil spirit that +leads those astray who hunger and thirst after a true cognition of the +world?” + +The author has entirely abandoned the idealistic standpoint, an +inclination to which he showed in his first publication, “Philosophie +als Denken der Welt gemäss dem Princip des kleinsten Kraftmasses.” +He says: “Doubt of the correctness of my way heretofore pursued was +induced through the barrenness of theoretical idealism in the field +of psychology; and yet cognition and experience should belong to this +science as psychological ideas.” + +The author in explaining the development of thought as it takes place in +man proceeds in a personal way, so much so that every idealist ought to +be satisfied. There are whole pages which teem with _ME_’s and _I_’s. +The method of notation is what might be called American. Europeans often +complain about our abbreviations, the Y. M. C. A., the S. A. S., the C. +B. & Q. Ry., etc., which are great puzzles to the uninitiated new-comer. +In a similar way Avenarius introduces such algebraic signs as _R_ and +_E_, which means reality and the sensations which our fellow-men are +supposed to have. _M_ is Man, _T_ is fellow-man. _T₁_ is the bodily +appearance of _T_, it is _R_; while _T₂_ is the _E_ of _T_, i. e. his +soul or spirit. _C_ is the nervous central organ, etc. Thus Avenarius +says (p. 18): + +“I can in a relative consideration assume _R_ to be the condition of +changes in the _E_ values, supposed to exist in _M_, only if _M_ and in +_M_ the system _C_ are parts of my supposition,” and in a note (p. 117) +he adds: + +“The skeleton in Goethe’s poem, ‘The Dead’s Dance,’ scents without an +organ of smell, sees without eyes, thinks without a brain; it also +moves without muscles. To consider such acts as true is now universally +declared to be superstition. The time will come when the assumption of +psychical phenomena without the coördination of the system _C_ will +universally be considered in the same way.” + +The first three chapters remind us very much of W. K. Clifford’s article +“On the Nature of Things in Themselves.” But the article is nowhere +mentioned and it is most probable that it is unknown to the author. If +Avenarius had known Clifford’s view, he might have presented his ideas +with more economy of space. But if he did not know Clifford’s article, +the coincidences of procedure and to a great extent also of the result +attained are the more remarkable. What Avenarius calls the _E_ values are +termed by Clifford “ejects,” and the formation of ejects is called by +Avenarius “introjection.” + +On page 52 we read the following sentence on the three phases of the +cognition of the data of experience: + +“The first phase alone, that of ingenuous empiricism, cognises, i. +e. explains the totality of these facts without the assistance of +a non-sensible ... the second that of ingenuous realism conceives +the non-sensible as supersensible, and the third, that of ingenuous +criticism, as the pre-sensible. The epithet ingenuous has reference to +the foundation, not to the doctrinary system built upon it. That which +makes the said realism and criticism ingenuous is a survival of the +ingenuous empiricism.” + +The theory which conceives the external cause of an experience as an +object, effecting _in_ the subject sensations, passes successively +through the following views. The object is said to be (1) not within +the range of experience, (2) not within the range of cognition, (3) +not-existing. Thus it reaches _via_ agnosticism its climax in idealism +and “pure experience becomes a something that is never truly experienced, +it becomes the totality of mere or pure sensations” (p. 62). + +The third part of the pamphlet is devoted to “the restitution of the +natural world-idea.” Here the author comes, at least in some expressions, +very close to the solution editorially upheld in _The Monist_. Avenarius +says: “The task is ... to _describe_ the what of my experience so as to +make a practical application of it in my dealings with my fellow-men” (p. +79). + +Professor Avenarius sums up his conclusions in the term “empirio-critical +principal-coördination” which he defines as the inseparability of +the ego-experience from the surrounding experience. “The ego and the +surrounding belong in the same sense to every experience. It is a +co-ordination peculiar to all experience” (p. 83). If we understand +Avenarius correctly he means to say, to express it in our terms, that +there is no object but there is a subjective aspect of it, no subject but +it appears objectively. Thus there is no subjectivity in itself and there +is no objectivity in itself. This is exactly our position, which we call +Monism. + +The “introjection” was according to Avenarius the evil spirit that led +speculation astray. To get rid of this evil spirit the proposition is +made to discard “introjection” and replace it by the empirio-critical +principal-coördination. But closely considered the latter is only +an improved modification of the former, and this plan would better +be characterised as discarding the error implied in that kind of +introjection theory which assumes that sensations alone are given. The +data of experience are not mere feelings, not mere subjectivity, as +is maintained by the idealist; nor are they mere objectivity, as is +maintained by the ingenuous realist; the data of experience are states +of subject-objectness, they are feelings of a certain kind possessing +objective significance, and the ideas subject as well as object are +abstractions made in a late stage of mental development from this one +inseparable whole of subject-objectness (see _The Monist_ I, No. 1, pp. +78-79). + +Avenarius says in a note (p. 132), “The question should not be ‘Why do we +believe in the reality of an external world?’ but ‘Why did we not believe +that the external world is real?’” We should say that neither question +is admissible. We should first ask: What do we mean by real? Reality is +the sum total of our experiences, including the meaning of sensations +and ideas, and finds its special application in their reliability. The +question, Is the candle I see real? means, Does it react in special ways? +Every name of a special object signifies a certain group of actions or +reactions observable by the subject. This is what we _call_ real and the +idealist would have to deny the existence of his own experience to deny +the reality of objects in this sense. + +Avenarius’s books are not easy reading to the English and American +student, for his style is sometimes heavy and his constructions are +involved. So are his thoughts. But his thoughts show the earnest thinker; +the evolution of his views goes in the right direction and his works +deserve the attention of his co-workers in the philosophical field. + + κρς. + + +DIE BEDEUTUNG DER THEOLOGISCHEN VORSTELLUNGEN FÜR DIE ETHIK. By Dr. +_Wilhelm Paszkowski_. Berlin: Mayer & Müller. 1891. + +Religion originates everywhere, according to the author, in the +self-consciousness of man who feels himself an acting and willing being +limited by and dependent upon greater and higher powers. The religious +relation consists in the regulation of his actions as well as his will +with reference to the ordinances of these powers. Dr. Paszkowski lets +all the best known religions pass in review before our eyes, tracing +in all of them the connection between the properly religious elements +and morality and singling out those religious factors which are most +effective in determining man’s will in a moral way. In the second part +of the little volume he endeavors to show in how far the ecclesiastical +organisation of religion in dogma and cult have strengthened and in how +far they have weakened this result. + +Concerning the most important dogma, which is the belief in immortality, +Paszkowski declares that it had its undoubted effects favorable and +unfavorable upon the social and moral life of mankind. It has prevented +some crimes while it has enhanced others. The question is, he says, +whether an individual immortality such as the religions usually picture +it, is tenable or not. Modern science and anthropology seem to have +proved it an illusion. Yet, as Paulsen says, the belief in immortality is +not a mere imagination. Every reality and so also man’s life is eternal. +It is nonsensical to think of death as a finality. That which has been +alive is a necessary, an eternal and inexpugnable part of reality and can +never again be blotted out. Through death the continuance of a man’s life +is cut off, but the contents of his life can never again be annihilated. +The real is in its very nature eternal. Paszkowski adds to Paulsen’s +remarks that man should find the norm of moral action in his relation to +his fellow-men and posterity, so that morality need not depend upon any +religious views. He will also have to act morally after he has resigned +the belief in the reality of the beautiful immortality-dream as it is +presented by enthusiastic religiosity. + +It appears to us that if the usual conception of immortality is +scientifically untenable it devolves upon the moral teacher to present an +immortality conception that is tenable. The true immortality conception +will never enhance crimes, it will always have a favorable effect upon +the morality of mankind. Furthermore man’s relation to mankind and also +to the universe is of a religious nature. The social order to which +man has to conform is one part of those powers a recognition of which +constitute religion. If these powers are conceived to be outside the +world we have a supernatural deity, if they are the highest, best, +and greatest of, and in the world itself, we have an immanent deity +and ethics still remains intimately connected with and dependent upon +religion. + +This it appears must be after all the author’s meaning, for he says in +prominent print, p. 89: “So long as there are men religion will not +cease, for it is one of the constitutional elements of human nature.” “In +the same measure as religion becomes spiritual, the moral conceptions +also will be purified, the mere ceremonial and the cult-element will lose +their importance in religion” (p. 92). “To divide the ethical factor from +the religious, as a matter of principle, will be seen to be impossible. +We can only conciliate the one with the other, both having originated out +of the same source of emotions” (p. 90). + + κρς. + + +DAS WAHRNEHMUNGSPROBLEM VOM STANDPUNKTE DES PHYSIKERS, DES PHYSIOLOGEN +UND DES PHILOSOPHEN. Beiträge zur Erkenntnisstheorie und empirischen +PSYCHOLOGIE. By Dr. _Hermann Schwarz_. Leipsic: Duncker & Humbolt 1892. + +Dr. Hermann Schwarz treats the most fundamental problem of +philosophy—viz. that of perception. He says in the preface: “There is +a triple state of facts to which obvious yet strange as it appears to +thought, the attention of the naturalist and the philosopher is drawn: +the physical, the physiological, the psychical.” The physical is the +empire of mechanical motion that can be observed with great accuracy to +take place everywhere. The physiological is the fact that when certain +impressions produce mechanical effects upon the nerves, the result +consists in certain sense-data; nervous action is accompanied with +sensation. The psychical state of things exhibits the fact that whether +or not we want it to be so, colors, sounds, odors, tastes, and touches +are always referred to external things, never to the own internal states +of the mind. Every one of these facts is strange in itself, for every +one represents the contrary of what might be expected _a priori_. Who +would expect that the machine-like world of jostling atoms and the +glorious world of colors and sounds should have anything in common? And +the sense-organs appear to the physiologist as mere physical apparatuses +modifying the ether-vibrations somehow. We do not see on the one hand how +consciousness can acquire information concerning the external world and +on the other hand, how motions can develop something so heterogeneous +as is consciousness. If we were confronted with one set of facts only, +everything would be plain, but this triple set of facts produces a +problem, it makes an explanation necessary and to this explanation Dr. +Schwarz has devoted a careful investigation of some four hundred and odd +pages. + +Schwarz distinguishes two elements in what he calls “ingenuous realism,” +(1) its methodology and (2) its metaphysics. The methodology of physical +science consists in arranging the sense-data, while the metaphysics +assume that the objectivity of the sense-data is correctly represented +as “things, qualities, and effects.” Natural science arrived at a +scepsis of the usual metaphysics of naïve realism by a correction of the +ingenuous-realistic method, and Kant by critically investigating the +background or frame of its theory of cognition. The question is, What is +altered by physical science in the conception of ingenuous realism, what +by physiology, what by philosophy and why? + +In the consciousness of an ingenuous realist the data of touch receive a +preference over those of the other senses, which is due to their greater +stability. The color of an object disappears, the sounds cease, while the +objects remain comparatively the same things to the sense of touch. Thus +they are considered as the real objects having certain qualities which +produce the phenomena of the other senses. This view is called by Schwarz +the first methodological dogma of ingenuous realism. The second dogma is +the conception that sense-data are considered as relatively permanent. So +colors are conceived to exist objectively in the dark, an error which has +been sufficiently explained by Helmholtz in his “Physiological Optics,” +§ 26. The third dogma completes the second; it is the view that the +relative permanence or disappearance of the qualities of objects depends +upon causes. Fire is said to be the cause which makes a wire red-hot. The +ingenuous realist knows no reciprocal causation, no action and reaction, +no _Wechselwirkung_. He assumes in addition to the objects certain +force-beings which are regarded as the causes of all change. The sun is +said to produce light. + +Schwarz explains very well how this view of ingenuous realism naturally +arises and also how in the progress of thought it naturally corrects +itself. Suppose there were thinking beings with whom smell took the +place of touch and sight, would not their world-conception be based upon +the data of the sense of smell as is ours upon the data of mechanical +motions? If the females of a certain butterfly (_Frostspanner_) are +caught in the country and placed at a great distance in some house of +the city, the males will be seen on the next morning in great numbers +fluttering before the window of the room in which the females are kept. +What a perfection of the sense of smell while the senses of touch and +sight are very poorly developed! The dog owes his intelligence mainly +to the development of the sense of smell. Would not beings whose +intelligence is mainly due to the sense of hearing rather attempt to hear +the world than to grasp or comprehend it,—to _behorchen_ rather than to +_begreifen_? + +Ingenuous realism is not consistent, and its methodology leads to +alterations of its metaphysics. We shall have to attribute either to +all the sense-data objective reality or to none of them. The data of +touch cannot be treated as exceptions and thus we have the alternative +either to return from our scepsis to realism, not to the ingenuous but +to a critically modified view of it, or to adopt the extremest form of +idealism, be it that of Berkeley or the subjectivism of Fichte. + +The author (not unlike Professor Avenarius in his book “Der menschliche +Weltbegriff”) takes the former view. He says in the concluding chapter +(_Die Mängel der Ding-an-sich-Hypothese_): “This view, viz. that of +ingenuous realism, will in the end of our inquiry be seen to be not only +the most natural, and practically considered the most useful metaphysical +theory, but also that conception which is freest from all theoretical +obscurities” (p. 381). + +We believe that the book which contains much valuable material, would +have been more useful than it actually is, if a chapter had been added +containing a summary of the whole inquiry and delineating in great +outlines the critically modified form of realism whose most appropriate +name we should say is monism—not materialism or mechanicalism which +allows all facts to be swallowed up by the conception that the world +consists only of matter in motion, but that monism which is a unitary +view of the whole, mindful of the fact that the sense-data as well as our +concepts are one-sided aspects only of the one and all. If we bear this +truth in mind we shall avoid from the beginning the three dogmas (alias +errors) of ingenuous materialism. + + κρς. + + +DIE ENTWICKELUNG DES CAUSALPROBLEMS IN DER PHILOSOPHIE SEIT KANT. Studien +zur Orientirung über die Aufgaben der Metaphysik und Erkenntnisslehre. +(Part II.) By Dr. _Edmund Koenig_. Leipsic: Otto Wigand. + +The present work forms the conclusion of a volume published by Dr. Koenig +in 1888, entitled _Die Entwickelung des Causalproblems von Cartesius +bis Kant_. This same subject is here pursued in the history of modern +philosophy since Kant. + +The problem of causality, according to Dr. Koenig, has two aspects, an +epistemological and a metaphysical. The pre-Kantian efforts dealt chiefly +with the latter, the post-Kantian more principally with the former. The +latter, the metaphysical question, is, How do things in the world of +reality produce effects in one another? The former, or that which relates +to the theory of knowledge, is, (1) What is the logical foundation of +the idea of causality, what do we imply when we set up two objects +as cause and effect, and (2) By what right and to what extent are we +justified in imputing to the axiom of causality an objective validity? +With respect to the latter, the epistemological, point of view, Hume and +Kant believed they had established indisputably that experience as given +does not furnish sufficient grounds either for the idea or the axiom of +causality. On the other hand, others, like Maine de Biran, Schopenhauer, +and Trendelenburg, hold, that causality is given us in experience, that +we apprehend the causal relation subsisting between things, together with +the things. Herbart maintains that the idea of the causal relation has +been reached by the logical elaboration of experience in conformity with +the general laws of logical thought. Mill and Spencer see in this idea an +element that goes beyond experience, but justify it only psychologically, +not logically. According to Lotze, Riehl, Wundt, v. Hartmann, Volkelt, +the idea is either wholly or partly of intellectual origin. Finally, +Comte and a few modern scientists look upon the idea of causality as +logically valueless and scientifically superfluous. + +This is, in brief, the opinions of the greatest thinkers whom Koenig +treats of, respecting the logical composition of the idea of causality. +But another question, that namely as to the character of the relation +in which in the causal judgment the notions of the concrete causes +and their effects exist, is one closely allied with this. Some hold, +(Trendelenburg, Goering, Herbart, Hamilton, Spencer,) that the relation +is one of identity; others that it is synthetical. This aspect is also +developed in connection with the last-named thinkers. + +With respect to the axiom of causality, we find diametrically opposed to +each other the doctrines of empiricism and apriorism; but a number of +intermediate opinions have also established themselves. Of the first, +Schopenhauer, Lotze, and Volkelt are representatives, but only the theory +of the first-named is developed at length. The empiricism of Mill and +Goering meets with exhaustive treatment, as does the opposed view of +Laas, Riehl, and Wundt and the conciliatory view of Spencer. + +With respect to the metaphysical aspect of the question, above-mentioned, +we find the modes of conception of phenomenalism and realism opposed. +The latter only is, in the nature of its doctrine, required to explain +ontologically the coming about of the causal relation in reality; the +former does not recognise Being in itself, and hence there can be no +causal connection of such. Schopenhauer’s attempt (the view of the +forces of nature as the emanation of a Universal Will), and the splendid +ontological theories of Herbart and Lotze are regarded by Dr. Koenig +as being no more a solution of the problem than were the efforts of +their famous predecessors Spinoza, Malebranche, and Leibnitz. These +dogmatic realists, as Koenig calls them, proceed from the assumption of +the knowableness of the absolute; opposed to them, in this regard, are +Spencer, Von Hartmann, and Volkelt, the critical realists, the first of +whom gives an ontology that is a vague and metaphysical rendering of the +principle of the conservation of energy, the two last of whom impute a +transcendental ontological significance to the idea of causality. + +The connection, Dr. Koenig concludes, is thus apparent and definite +between the metaphysical and epistemological divisions of the question. +The ontologist, unless he proceed dogmatically, must prove, that +the notion of causality in the form in which critical analysis has +established it as a valid and indispensable empirical idea, calls +inevitably for the notion of an absolute reality and of a state of things +in that reality corresponding to the forms of the connection given. +Therefore, the logical analysis of the idea of causality is in any +philosophy, pre-eminently determinative of its whole position and bearing. + +On the whole, then, in the treatment of the problem forming the subject +of this work, four comparatively independent views are found opposed +to one another and considered in this opposition; viz., Sensualism and +Intellectualism, Positivism and Rationalism, Empiricism and Apriorism, +Realism and Phenomenalism. The author views the result of his researches +to be, the proof of the untenability of Sensualism, Rationalism, +Empiricism, and Realism, so far as this, by an historico-critical +analysis, is possible. + +This is but a brief sketch of the treatment pursued by the author. +The author’s own view has been barely hinted at. He is a Kantian. He +calls himself a “transcendental idealist.” Dr. Koenig’s developments, +appreciative, acute and pointed as they are, are too detailed and +exhaustive to be separately taken into discussion here; but we may +illustrate his point of view by a summary of a few remarks of his on the +ontological problem as solved by physics. They are as follows. + +The _natural_ modes of thought cling irresistibly to the notion of +a constant substratum; this being so, how does process, how does +change spring from an invariability of existence? Physical science +answers, by _force_; which exists as a constant potentiality of the +substratum, is now active, now latent. Dr. Koenig maintains that in +this physical science accomplishes nothing towards the solution of the +present problem; it does not by its notion of force make intelligible +the _acting_ of bodies on each other, for when it comes to define the +mode of action of force it involves itself in hopeless difficulties. +What is the consequence then, of this dilemma of science, where it can +neither render plain the “nature” of the material substratum, nor the +nature of “force,” which is, so to speak, the source of the activity of +the substratum? It is either agnosticism, which places limits to our +knowledge, and which Dr. Koenig rejects as unbecoming true thought, or +it is that theory which regards the phenomena alone as real and views +the concepts of theoretical physics as the mere shifts and helps of +thought whereby we bring the phenomena into connection with one another. +This latter view also Dr. Koenig cannot accept. His express contention +is, that we can interpret, _ontologically_, the phenomena of reality +by the notions of substance, force, etc.; he holds that the position +of transcendental idealism is the correct theory here, the position +namely that matter and force conceived as transcendent, independent +entities cannot be _thought away_, because substantiality and causality +are _forms_ of transcendental apperception, which alone can make +nature an object of cognition; matter and force must, for purposes of +empiric observation, of necessity possess the same reality as phenomena +themselves. + +In connection with this subject Dr. Koenig contests Mach’s doctrine, that +natural laws are simple economical descriptions of phenomena; he contends +that “law” is the foundation of natural science, and particularly so the +law of causality. + +This, however, does not say much. For the formal laws _in themselves_ +are empty. The law, the axiom of causality may, _a priori_, be without +exception; but this circumstance, the _conviction_ we may call it, +offers us no hold on nature. When we investigate nature we have to +perceive _definite facts_; about which we formulate particular laws or +statements. The law of causality, however, does not help us to _discern_ +the determinative facts or features of any phenomenon. It simply says +that _if_ we have hit upon the determinative facts and formulated a law +describing them, that law holds good throughout all nature. But what is +to tell us _what_ the characteristic and determinative features of a +given event are and when we have lighted on them? The law of causality? +Surely not. The law of causality cannot tell us that for falling bodies +_v_ = _gt_, i. e. that _t_ is decisive. It simply says that when once +this fact has been _discerned_ it holds universally good. But it would +have asserted the same thing with regard to Galileo’s first (false) +assumption, namely that _v_ = _Cs_. If, then, the law of causality cannot +tell us what those features are between which the causal connection is +assumed to exist, what is to tell us? Our observation simply, which +must be tested by experience. But our observation has no limits placed +to it except this, that it shall select some fact that _represents_ the +phenomenon and best and most easily enables _us_ to represent it. And +there is nothing that requires that there should be only _one_ feature +or _one_ aspect of an event by which it is representable; there may +be several, as the development of science proves. Accordingly, what +selection we make may depend on arbitrary and historical circumstances. +And this, as we take it, is Prof. Mach’s contention. If it is true, Dr. +Koenig’s criticism of Mach’s view does not hold in its whole extent. + +Dr. Koenig’s treatment of the separate representative thinkers is +exhaustive and in an eminent degree scientific. His work is distinguished +by accuracy and pointedness of characterisation, and by special +knowledge of great range. It is a valuable contribution which he has +given us, to the study of the theory of knowledge and metaphysics, and he +has been true to his promise, as we judge, critically to discuss and not +summarily to dispose of the opinions of others. + + μκρκ. + + +EINE NEUE DARSTELLUNG DER LEIBNIZISCHEN MONADENLEHRE AUF GRUND DER +QUELLEN. By _Eduard Dillmann_. Leipsic: O. R. Reisland, 1891. + +The author is an admirer of Leibnitz’s monadology which he considers +as “the most beautiful, most perfect fruit of philosophic thought and +the most glorious system to be found in the history of philosophy.” +This enthusiasm however is not shown in panegyrics but in a careful +investigation of the great master’s work and we should scarcely know +the attitude of the author toward the philosopher whose thoughts he +discusses, if he did not give vent to his feelings in a few sentences of +the concluding chapter. The rest of the book consists of purely critical +and historical studies by a sober and cool-headed scholar. Leibnitz’s +system as it is represented in our histories of philosophy and as it is +currently conceived lacks a unitary and leading idea, so that many of +its most fundamental propositions appear to be at variance. Mr. Dillmann +maintains that Leibnitz’s philosophy as it really is does not lack this +unity; he has made an extensive and most diligent study of Leibnitz’s +works and proves with great plausibility through the assistance of many +pertinent quotations the justice of his cause. + +Leibnitz’s monadology is according to Dillmann essentially a conciliatory +system. It attempts to reconcile the world-conceptions of his time. The +mechanical explanation of nature as it was proposed in modern times and +according to which all processes should be conceived as motions of bodies +is harmonised with the formalistic views of classical antiquity and of +the schoolmen which seeks for the causes of all phenomena in substantial +forms. In aiming at such a combination, he had to show that all single +phenomena of bodies and also their qualities had some ground and that +the principle of the body itself consisted in a substantial form. This +led him to conceive of bodies and of all things not as phenomena of an +external world but as representations in the mind, and thus an entirely +new standpoint was gained (p. 511). Representations are the inner states +of Monads (p. 318). Monads are substances because representations are +units; for representations are the many expressed in a unity (p. 319). +Every monad is a concentration of the universe (p. 313). It is as if God +had multiplied the universe as often as there are souls (p. 314). Every +substance is a little world in itself, expressing the great world of the +universe. The substance imitates in its little world what God does in the +universe (p. 313). + +Leibnitz’s God-idea has suffered most from a misconception of the +fundamental idea of his system. Dillmann declares that the traditional +view, especially Fischer’s, is in conflict with the philosopher’s own +words. While Fischer says that Leibnitz’s God has created the substances +and arbitrarily endowed them with their natures, Dillmann maintains on +the ground of ample quotations that Leibnitz considers the forms of all +possible existences as given: not even God can alter them. God however +can and did compare all possible worlds, and then created that which his +wisdom found to be the best world. “God,” says Leibnitz, “does not select +a general Adam, but such a one,” i. e. an individual Adam, “whose perfect +representation is found among all the possible beings which exist in +the ideas of God. The nature of every creature is determined by eternal +truths which are in the understanding of God independent of his will.” +“God’s decree consists alone in the decision arrived at after having +compared all possible worlds and having admitted into existence that one +which is the best of all.” + + κρς. + + +LEITFADEN DER PHYSIOLOGISCHEN PSYCHOLOGIE IN 14 VORLESUNGEN. By Dr. +_Th. Ziehen_, Docent in Jena. Mit 21 Abbildungen im Text. Jena: Gustav +Fischer. 1891. + +The merits of these 14 lectures on physiological psychology are +thoroughness, lucidity, and conciseness; the whole book is a pamphlet +of 174 pp. only. The method of presentation is in all its detail work +positive, stating the facts as they have been found to be by experience +and as they are corroborated by experiment. Upon the whole it is a good +résumé of the present state of knowledge. A translation would be very +desirable and it is to be hoped that some of our psychologists will +undertake the work. + +The contents are briefly as follows: I. Contents and scope of psychology. +II. Sensation, association, action. III. Stimulus, sensation. IV. +Taste, smell, touch. V. Hearing. VI. Vision. VII. Affective aspect of +sensation (pleasure and pain). VIII. Sensation, memory, concept. IX. +Association of ideas. X. Judgment and syllogism. XI. Attention, voluntary +thought, the ego (Ziehen says: “psychologically considered the simple +ego is a theoretical fiction,” p. 139). XII. Diseased thinking, sleep, +hypnosis. XIII. Action, expressive motions, language. XIV. Will, general +conclusions. + +Although Dr. Ziehen’s pamphlet is upon the whole an excellent treatise, +we cannot agree with the author in several questions which are of great +importance in their consequences. + +Dr. Ziehen acknowledges that the specifically nervous processes, a +sensible stimulus and a reaction, which latter is a motory effect, +cannot be explained from physical laws alone (p. 4). Yet at the same +time he denies that the fact that the reflexes are adapted to a purpose +(_Zweckmässigkeit_) proves the presence of a psychical parallelism. +“Pflüger,” he says, “was wrong in attributing for this reason to the +spinal cord a spinal-cord-soul.” The _Zweckmässigkeit_ of reflexes (i. +e. their being adapted to a purpose) has originated not otherwise than +the _Zweckmässigkeit_ of the color of the bird’s plumage, i. e. through +natural selection and inheritance. This argument might be admissible, +if we had not to account for the gradual origin of consciousness also. +There was a time when our personal consciousness did not exist, and there +was also a time when no conscious being lived upon the earth. Unless we +assume that consciousness suddenly appeared, creating out of its own +subjectivity alone the objective world which appears to us as what we +call matter in motion, we shall have to adopt some monistic view of the +subject. To consider the psychical states as known and the objectivity of +existence as utterly unknown is no monism. + +Dr. Ziehen is opposed to the idea of psychical parallelism which he +conceives to be dualism, but he proposes a spiritual monism in its stead, +the difficulties of which he does not explain. It is to be regretted +that Dr. Ziehen has not understood the main idea of the parallelism +doctrine. He says in a foot-note (p. 6): “In the most extreme way, but +with quite insufficient reasons Lewes has maintained the omnipresence +of consciousness.” This is a misstatement of Lewes’s view, which by the +bye is held by the reviewer also, although he confesses that the term +parallelism is inappropriate and leads to misunderstandings. The theory +of parallelism, (at least as the reviewer holds it) is not dualistic +but monistic. It implies that the subjectivity and objectivity of +existence are two different abstractions of one and the same reality. +Its parallelism is a parallelism of these two sets of abstraction, while +the reality from which they have been derived is one throughout. There +exist no subjects that are not objects to other subjects, and every +object admits of a subjective aspect. There is a something supposed to +be present throughout nature which under certain conditions appears as +consciousness. This certain something is called by Clifford elements +of feeling, by Lloyd Morgan metakinesis, it has been characterised in +the editorials of _The Monist_ as the subjectivity of existence, and +the presence of this something in the spinal cord was called by Pflüger +_Rückenmarksseele_. + +It appears to me that if we could explain the well adapted reaction of +nervous substance without assuming a psychical element in it, we could +explain the whole process of evolution and the historical development of +mankind, without the assumption of consciousness. Yet it is obvious that +even the explanation of the color of the bird’s plumage by the theory +of natural selection and heredity presupposes the presence of psychical +elements somewhere. Either the bird and his mates show a color sense, or +his enemies do, whose persecution he escapes, or the animals upon whom he +preys do. Man’s entire existence, physical and psychical, including his +feelings of pleasure and pain, can be explained by the theory of natural +selection and heredity; yet this is no proof that psychical elements do +not exist in him. + +It has become customary at present to define “psychical” as that only +which appears in states of consciousness, and to exclude subconscious and +unconscious states. Dr. Ziehen says: “Everything given in consciousness +and that alone is conscious” (p. 3). Yet he introduces after all the +expression “psychically latent,” “latent memory pictures,” and similar +expressions. Dr. Ziehen says, “We cannot even have a conception of that +which an unconscious idea can be”; yet what is a latent memory-picture +but an unconscious idea? + +There are two kinds of unconscious ideas: (1) Latent ideas. Every man’s +brain is full of latent ideas, i. e. of memory-pictures which are at +present unconscious but can become conscious at once if their activity +is roused by an appropriate stimulus. (2) Ideas unrelated to the +centre of consciousness. Those active ideas which, although at present +in a state of activity, are unrelated to the centre of consciousness +that constitutes the ego of the man, remain unconscious. Unconscious +cerebration (which takes place in dreams, in diseased brains and also in +certain phases of healthy brains being, as it were, a by-play of their +conscious activity) need not be destitute of feeling. Any pain may be +lessened when our attention is called away from it. The nervous disorder +remains the same, the feeling substance of the nervous structures in +which the pain was perceived also remains the same, its activity and +throbbing pulsations do not cease. Yet if we succeed in separating its +immediate relation to the centre of consciousness it sinks down into +subconsciousness. There is no reason for assuming that the feeling, no +longer perceived, is wiped out entirely. + +While Dr. Ziehen’s pamphlet is a presentation of the results of positive +science, we were astonished to find in the first chapter the following +statement: “Later on we shall have to investigate whether there are for +all psychical phenomena such material parallel processes in the central +nervous system, and our answer will be decidedly in the negative.” +And again we find in the schedule of psychology a distinction between +(_a_) psychical processes _not_ contingent upon cerebral functions +(transcendental psychology), and (_b_) psychical processes contingent +upon cerebral functions (physiological psychology). These statements +are the more perplexing as the author joins the opposition made by +Münsterberg against Professor Wundt’s idea of apperception, which is +rejected as metaphysical, mystical, and even animistic. While we cannot +in all points agree with Professor Wundt’s theory of apperception, +which received a critical examination by Professor Delabarre (see _The +Monist_ II, No. 2, p. 297), we can most positively say that Dr. Ziehen +in so far as he classes Wundt’s view among the dualistic theories, +misunderstands Wundt’s position. Wundt’s physico-psychical parallelism +cannot be identified with the metaphysical fiction of a subject, be +this subject called ego or soul.[66] Wundt says in a late publication +of his: “Psychology of to-day, since Kant has shown the way, seeks the +nature of the soul again, as did Aristotle of yore, in the facts of the +spiritual life themselves and not in an unknowable ‘thing in itself’....” +_Deutsche Rundschau_ of 1891, p. 203. Wundt’s “apperception” is no +metaphysical being, but simply means the focus of perception, the centre +of consciousness. Wundt is certainly not infallible and we are inclined +to believe that in some details he is mistaken. He is nevertheless one +of the very greatest leaders among the investigators of the soul and his +monism as well as his antimetaphysical tendencies cannot be doubted. + +Ziehen reaches his monism by considering objective existence, as +it appears to us and which we call matter, as “something utterly +unknowable.” He says, “The psychical series alone is given.... Thus the +psycho-physical dualism or parallelism is apparent only. Considering +that the psychical series alone is given, we shall understand, that we +had repeatedly to face in our investigations such factors in which the +material foundations are missing. I here remind you of the projection +of our sensations into space and time, for which we could not find a +psycho-physical explanation.” + +We hope that Dr. Ziehen will soon find occasion to explain his +philosophical views. Such an explanation may throw light on his +psychological theory. We do not as yet see how he can solve without +inconsistency the many difficulties in which his philosophical standpoint +will involve his psychology. + + κρς. + + +PSYCHOLOGIE DER SUGGESTION. By _Dr. Hans Schmidkunz_. Stuttgart, +1892,—pp. 425. Large 8vo. + +The rapidly increasing devotion to the study of Hypnotism has yielded +many valuable results, both practical and theoretical. Its application +to the cure of disease—psychotherapeutics—has been most extensively +introduced and bids fair to become the representative in scientific form +of the germ of truth buried amongst the vast rubbish-heap of suspicious +practices and pseudo-scientific “isms.” New light has been thrown on the +questions of responsibility and the legal aspects of slightly abnormal +states. Education and ethics, it has been more than hinted, are to find +practical aids in hypnotism; while in the light of modern scientifically +recognised phenomena, many of the events influential in the development +of religions find a rationalistic interpretation. But the science which +more than all others, the study of hypnotism is destined to enrich, is +that of Experimental Psychology; and it is this phase of the subject to +which Dr. Schmidkunz has devoted his volume. + +The central core of the whole subject is the fact of suggestion,—a fact +so comprehensive that it is almost easier to say what it is not than what +it is. If we make allowance for that portion of our conduct that is based +upon individual acquisitions and proceeds by logically reasoned steps, +all the rest is more or less the result of suggestions, of one kind or +another. To appreciate the psychology of this process it is necessary +to appreciate its varieties and universality. We receive suggestions +from things and deeds; the sight of food makes us hungry; the sight of +our neighbor consulting his watch induces a strong desire to know what +time it is. Words are powerful implements of suggestion; we accept those +doctrines that we hear about us and are influenced much more frequently +than we are convinced. The personal factor in suggestion is important; +to some we feel attracted and accept as leaders, while others excite +repulsion and antagonism. The indirectness of the process of suggestion +is to be noted; in most cases we are quite unconscious of the influences +exerted upon us and by which our conduct is guided, and this ignorance of +the motives of our acts, Spinoza tells us, is the cause of the illusion +of free will. Sympathy, imitation, the contagion of masses, the action +of the mind upon the body, the formation of public sentiment,—all +exemplify the process of suggestion and add their testimony to its power +and domain. + +We must recognise, too, that our suggestibility is a variable phenomenon; +at some moments we are self-assertive and determined, at others passive +and readily following another’s lead. Sometimes we take the reins in +our own hands, and again allow the vehicle to find its way as it will. +Every night we pass into a condition in which conscious control is +abandoned and logic gives way to suggestion. A trifling illness, a dose +of medicine may increase our suggestibility, and place us in a position +allied to that of the hypnotic subject. All this prepares the way for +recognising as the distinctive characteristic of the hypnotic condition, +an exaggerated suggestibility. Not alone is there a ready yielding to +every suggestion of the operator, but functions normally not under +volitional control may be appealed to and utilised by the slighter and +subtler processes of hypnotic suggestion. The variable threshold between +the voluntary and the involuntary is shifted to a surprising extent. That +complex interrelation of centres with which the sense of personality is +intimately connected yields to the same influences and makes possible an +experimental study of this vexed problem. + +This, then, is the Psychology of Suggestion, the contribution that +Hypnotism makes to Psychology. It lays stress upon the great rôle +this process plays in every day mental life and thus asks us to see +in hypnotism a condition closely allied to the normal, and simply +illustrating in an unusually striking way, one great factor in our mental +composition. It rearranges the hierarchy of mental faculties and finds +a more important place for suggestion than has been before accorded +to it. From a somewhat obscure and sporadic phenomenon occasionally +entering into mental states, it is raised to the dignity of one of the +most frequent, most important, most fertile generalisations of scientific +psychology. Whether one fully agrees with this position or not, it is +certainly a service to have it so comprehensively, even if at times +prolixly stated, and to be assured that the study of Psychology is +deriving as much benefit from the researches in hypnotism as are the more +practical sciences. + + J. J. + + +HYPNOTISME, SUGGESTION, PSYCHOTHEROPIE. Études Nouvelles par le _Dr. +Bernheim_, Professeur à la Faculté de médécine de Nancy. Paris: 1891. +Octave Doin, pp. 518. + +The literature of the new science of Hypnotism continues to increase with +unabated pace; most of the contributions consist of studies of a few +cases or a brief exposition of a single point, in most cases of points +relative to the application of hypnotism to disease. The present volume, +however, is of special importance not alone because of the authority that +Dr. Bernheim’s name brings with it,—but because of the comprehensiveness +and the skill and interest of the exposition. It is supplementary to Dr. +Bernheim’s former volume, “Suggestive Psychotherapeutics,” (1886-87, +English translation, 1889) and reflects the progress that has resulted +from continued and systematic observation. The therapeutic interest in +it naturally finds most complete representation and about half the volume +is devoted to the description of cases cured or benefited by suggestive +treatment. Although nervous complaints predominate in these well arranged +and well described cases, yet the method is shown applicable to all the +ills that flesh is heir to. While this portion of the volume will be of +greatest interest to the medical world, the psychologist will find most +food for reflection in the first and more theoretical half of the book. +He will find there an interesting historical sketch illustrating how +processes similar to those now studied as hypnotism have been in use from +ancient times; how all the various healers, and the various processes +and agencies used by them, involve different modes of application of the +one principle of suggestion. “It is the human imagination that works +miracles.” + +Suggestion is defined as the act by which an idea is introduced in +the brain and accepted by it, and thus many of the means by which one +person influences another under every day, normal circumstances would be +included in the term. Hypnotism is simply one of the most important and +efficient methods of producing a state of increased suggestibility. In +every day life we have abundant evidence of the tendency of ideas to be +realised in actions; with every change in thought and emotion there is +associated some motor expression, too subtle perhaps for analysis and +description, but still present and significant. Under excitement and +nervous strain these motor accompaniments of thought are increased and +serve as the basis of the muscle reader’s skill. Again the possibility +of disbelief and of recognising the illusory character of a sensation +involve the control of higher directing powers; the accumulated +experience of the past passes sentence upon the new candidate. If we +imagine a condition in which this form of control is abolished, we should +have a subject accepting as real almost any idea or sensation that is +suggested to him, and expressing freely and unreservedly his acceptance +of the same. And this it is that hypnotism does. It builds upon the +natural credulity which it is the difficult task of reason to shape and +control, and brings into prominence the automatic, subconscious phases +of mental action. It does not endow subjects with new faculties or +deprive them of their individuality, but shows in a strangely perverted +perspective the various faculties and processes that go to build the +endlessly complex elements of a personality. This “suggestion” view of +hypnotism is the contribution of the Nancy School, and is fast becoming +the recognised view of science; one will nowhere find a clearer and more +convincing exposition of it than in Dr. Bernheim’s pages. + +It is clearly impossible to summarise the various details that make +up the body of the volume; but all the important topics are discussed +and result in conclusions unusually free as well from vagueness as +from narrowness. The processes inducing the state, the proportion of +susceptible individuals, the various kinds and stages of hypnotism, +its relation to sleep and other normal states, the rôle of memory in +hypnotism, the interesting post-hypnotic, negative and retroactive +hallucinations, its relation to hysteria, its possible use in +crime,—these are some of the chief topics treated. The volume is a +valuable contribution to the literature of the subject, reflects its most +recent acquisitions, and would well merit a presentation in an English +translation. + + J. J. + + +HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOLOGY. In two volumes; Senses and Intellect, and, +Feeling and Will. By _James Mark Baldwin_, M. A., Ph. D., Professor in +the University of Toronto. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1891. + +These are two books diligently worked out, the former of 343, the latter +of 397 pp. They cover almost the entire field of psychology excluding +however the treatment of such abnormal states as are Mental Pathology +and Hypnotism. The author is a disciple of Dr. McCosh, and is strongly +influenced by Wundt, of Leipzig, and Rabier, of Paris; yet he has +developed an independent view of the nature of the soul which perhaps +comes nearest to that of Prof. William James, of Harvard. The two books +are actually two parts of one work, the one complementing the other. The +former however is not, as the name suggests, an exposition of the nature +of the senses in their relation to or as the basis of the intellect; it +is an inquisition into consciousness, sensation, perception, association, +imagination, rational thought, and kindred subjects. The latter, after +an introduction of 50 pp., characterising the mechanism of the nervous +system, treats of feeling as sensation, as pleasure and pain, as interest +and belief, as emotion, and passes over to the subject of a motor +consciousness, or will, ending in a chapter on volition. + +Professor Baldwin states that “after we enter consciousness we find a +principle of apperception to which there is no analogy in physiological +integration,” adding in a foot-note: “Since the section of the ‘Unity +of Composition’ theory was written, Professor James has published an +acute criticism in substantial agreement with it, and the passage quoted +makes reference to the sixth chapter of Professor James’s Psychology +in which he rejects the so-called ‘mind-stuff,’ theory, declaring a +self-compounding of mental facts to be inadmissible and proposes at last +what he calls ‘soul-theory.’” Professor James in this chapter commits the +mistake indicated in the editorial of the last number of _The Monist_ (p. +248) that he considers things as things in themselves and then looks for +a relation producing principle. He says: + +“In the parallelogram of forces, the ‘forces’ themselves do not combine +into the diagonal resultant; a _body_ is needed on which they may +impinge, to exhibit their resultant effect.” + +“Take a sentence of a dozen words, and take twelve men and tell to each +one word. Then stand the men in a row or jam them in a bunch, and let +each think of his word as intently as he will; nowhere will there be a +consciousness of the whole sentence.” + +Thus Professor W. James is in need of what he calls a “medium.” He says: + +“_All the ‘combinations’ which we actually know are EFFECTS, wrought by +the units said to be ‘combined,’ UPON SOME ENTITY OTHER THAN THEMSELVES._ +Without this feature of a medium or vehicle, the notion of combination +has no sense.” + +We observe that feelings which originate through the impressions of +the outer world upon some sentient organism, enter into relations to +each other, as naturally as things are in relations, or under certain +circumstances will enter more closely into relations with each other. +The “soul” accordingly is postulated by Professor James as a medium to +combine the effects of the manifold brain processes in order to “escape +the absurdity of supposing feelings which exist separately and then ‘fuse +together’ by themselves. The separateness is in the brain-world, on +this theory, and the unity in the soul world, and the only trouble that +remains to haunt us is the metaphysical one of understanding how one sort +of world or existent thing can affect or influence another at all.” This +is dualism and we suppose that Professor James is conscious of it. + + κρς. + + +UNTERSUCHUNGEN ZUR PHYSIOLOGISCHEN MORPHOLOGIE DER THIERE. II. +ORGANBILDUNG UND WACHSTHUM. By Dr. _Jacques Loeb_. Mit 2 Tafeln in +Lithographie und 9 Figuren im Text. Würzburg: Georg Hertz. 1892. + +Dr. Jacques Loeb formerly of Zürich and lately returned from the +Zoological station at Naples has been appointed Professor at Bryn Mawr +College, Pennsylvania. Former publications of his were reviewed in _The +Monist_ I, No. 2, p. 300. The present pamphlet is a continuance of his +investigations in physiological morphology. Some of his experiments are +made with _Antennularia antennina_ (a hydroid polyp) and the author +describes how without mutilation, simply by giving the creature a fixed +position he succeeded in making it develop certain organs in certain +places, thus proving gravitation to be an important factor in determining +the growth of certain limbs. Dr. Loeb adds a few articles on the +dependence of the longitudinal growth and also of the regeneration of +Tubularia upon the concentration of the salt-water. His experiments with +_Ciona intestinalis_ (a solitary ascidia) prove that (1) a section in the +side of the oral orifice as well as of the anus will cause the formation +of ocelli on the margin of the section, (2) after an extirpation of the +central nervous system the reflexes continue although with a higher +threshold of the stimulus, and (3) the ciona is capable of developing the +central nervous system again. + + κρς. + + +DAS DASEIN ALS LUST, LEID, UND LIEBE. Die altindische Weltanschauung in +neuzeitlicher Darstellung. Ein Beitrag zum Darwinismus. Mit 2 Tondrucken, +24 Zeichnungen und 10 Tabellen. By Dr. _Hübbe-Schleiden_. Braunschweig: +C. A. Schwetschke & Sohn, 1891. + +The author of this book is Dr. Hübbe-Schleiden, editor of _The Sphinx_, +a monthly magazine published in Germany which professes to “lay down +historically and experimentally the supersensible World-Conception upon +a monistic basis.” Love of Mysticism is the main feature of _The Sphinx_ +as well as Dr. Hübbe-Schleiden’s book. _The Sphinx_ contains reports +of cases of telepathy and is quite serious in investigating the spook +of a haunted house. The present book contains the author’s confession +of faith. The symbols by which he depicts his world-conception reveal +a cabalistic taste, and we believe that the illustrations will be +rather repugnant to the man of science, as they give the impression of +fantasticism. The main idea of the book is to modernise the old Hindoo +view that “Kama” desire or _Lust_ is the ground of all being, as is said +in the Brihad-Aranyaka Upanishad (IV, 4, 5): “Man consists entirely of +desire (_Kama_); as is his desire, so is his will (_Kratu_); as is his +will, so is his life (_Karma_, i. e., activity); as is his life, so is +his fate.” + +Dr. Hübbe-Schleiden rejects the Hindoo view of a migration of soul in +so far as it suggests the idea of something personal; he prefers to +speak of a transformation of soul. This, he says, has been and it may be +called “metaphysical Darwinism”, and we must confess that the nucleus +of the idea touches the most vital point of all the problems of life. +We cannot explain ethics and the ethical instinct of man without taking +into consideration that man lives and aspires for something that will +outlast his individual existence. The author says: “Why do you strive +for something higher, for perfection, for completion or whatever your +aim may be called? Why all that, if you imagine that your individuality +has only this one life upon earth and you can realise only a very small +part of what you strive for? Why all your trouble, if the main thing is +in vain?” We agree with the author that our moral instinct, our ideals +and aspirations which are most powerful realities in life point to a life +beyond the grave, they indicate that death is no finality and evolution +teaches us that our souls actually continue to exist. Our souls in their +individual features are parts only of the whole evolution of our race and +these very individual features of our souls can be and will be preserved +in the future generations. + +Dr. Hübbe-Schleiden’s book is characteristic of a strange tendency of +our time to combine the results of modern science with the old notions +of occultism. There is in it a psychological and ethical truth overgrown +with a fanciful imagination. + + κρς. + + +MAX MÜLLER AND THE SCIENCE OF LANGUAGE. A Criticism. By _William Dwight +Whitney_, Professor in Yale University. New York: D. Appleton and +Company. 1892. + +The Professors W. D. Whitney and F. Max Müller are not on good terms. +They do not only disagree on several fundamental and many minor points, +concerning the science of language, but their warfare, as is well known, +is at the same time of a personal nature. The present little volume is a +criticism of the new edition of Max Müller’s “Science of Language.” The +great Yale philologist recognising that this work of his antagonistic +Oxford colleague “is still the principal and most authoritative text-book +of that study,” and noting that “its author has gained no new light from +the criticisms that have been made upon his work,” feels called upon to +warn the reader that “it may not be trusted where it is untrustworthy and +so do harm to the science which it was intended to help.” The title of +the book, according to Professor Whitney, ought to be “Facts and Fancies +in Regard to Language and Other Related Subjects.” + +Schleicher says: “Languages are natural organisms which, without +being determinable by the will of man, grew and developed themselves +in accordance with fixed laws.... Its method is on the whole and in +general the same with that of the other natural sciences.” Professor +Whitney censures Max Müller for calling the first part of Schleicher’s +proposition “sheer mythology,” and then adopting the inference made +therefrom considering the science of language as a physical science. Now +it is true that the expression “organism” must not be taken literally; +languages are not animals or plants, but they have some quality that is +comparable to animals and plants. Their life and the development of their +life is in many respects analogous to the life of organisms. Professor +Whitney regards language as “a body of conventional signs for ideas” and +protests against Prof. Max Müller’s usage of the word “conventional” as +if it implied “a convention of people gathered to discuss and decide +on the words and forms by which conceptions should be represented.” In +contradistinction to Max Müller who holds that philology is a physical +science, Professor Whitney regards it as an historical science. “Physical +science,” says Max Müller, “deals with the works of God, historical +science with the works of man.” Thus optics is a physical science, +painting an historical science. Whitney declares that individuals +initiate changes and the community either accepts and uses them, making +them language by its use or rejects and annuls them by refusing to use +them. In one word Max Müller says language is φύσει, a product of nature, +and Whitney says it is θέσει, an institution of man. We believe that +Professor Whitney stands almost alone in his conception of language. + +Another no less important point is Professor Whitney’s objection to Prof. +Max Müller’s proposition of the Identity of Language and Thought. Here +Professor Whitney will find many supporters for his case; but we must +add that Prof. Max Müller does not exactly mean what he says. He means +by identity inseparableness. It is not so much Max Müller’s position +that should be attacked as his misleading terminology. Concerning the +origin of language Professor Whitney finds an instructive parallel in the +beginnings of writing which were mutually intelligible signs, or in the +written language of mathematics. “So we do no longer see,” he says, “the +two and three strokes in our figures 2 and 3, although they are really +there disguised from view.” This is a good simile, and undoubtedly _cum +grano salis_ true. But it is rather strange that Professor Whitney should +find Noiré’s theory of the origin of language “utterly fantastic.” + +These are fundamental differences. There are some more, less important +points such as the etymology of king being the Sanskrit _janaka_. Max +Müller proposes a very improbable reason for the change of meaning in the +Lat. _fagus_, O. Germ. _boka_ (beech), Greek _phegos_, Lat. _quercus_, +and Germ. _foraha_ (fir). Professor Whitney might have mentioned that a +more probable reason for this change has been proposed of late by those +who seek the home of the Aryans in Europe. A migrating people would +naturally have called in their old home the beech, in their new the oak +“a tree with edible fruit.” The same method is applicable to explain the +change of meaning in _forah-a-quercus_ which means in northern countries +a fir and in Italy an oak. + +Professor Whitney sums up his case as follows (p. 77): he finds “language +study ... declared on transparently false grounds, to be a physical +science, and language an existence which man had no part in making +and changing; dialectic growth misunderstood, families of language +regarded as exceptional, and a ‘Turanian’ barathrum arranged to catch +all little-known varieties of speech; antecedent unity of dialect taught +in one case and denied in another; a word held to be killed by the +least mispronunciation; _conventional_ explained to mean ‘voted by a +convention’; thought and its expression viewed as inseparable, and even +identical; the origin of language seemingly ascribed to an instinctive +ding-dong of the tongue—and so on; to complete the list would be almost +to give a table of principal contents of the two volumes—and a style of +discussion used throughout which indicated that the author was playing +with his subject rather than investigating it seriously.... The book is +not science, but literature. Taken as literature, it is of high rank, as +the admiration of the public sufficiently testifies; its author has a +special gift for interesting statement and illustration, for lending a +charm to the subjects he discusses; and he carries captive the judgments +of his hearers and of many of his readers. He is a born _littérateur_.” + +Professor Whitney concludes: “Now as heretofore, I rest my defense on not +the just intent alone, but the real substantial justice of my criticisms; +if they are unfounded, I deserve reprehension for making them; if they +are right, then there is nothing, either in the degree of importance of +the subjects to which they relate, or in the personality against whom +they are directed, to call for their condemnation.” + + κρς. + + +SEIFENBLASEN. Moderne Märchen. By _Kurd Lasswitz_. Hamburg and Leipsic: +Leopold Voss. 1890. + +“Märchen,” in the province of science, we are inclined to believe are +a prize problem for our modern poets. Who will solve it? Kurd Lasswitz +has made an attempt and considering the great difficulty of the problem, +we are not inclined to criticise him. The author, who has worked in +scientific fields and has proved his ability as a close student, exhibits +in these “soap-bubbles” a fertile imagination and poetic invention. Most +of his sketches fall short of the ideal märchen of science as we conceive +it, but their reading is suggestive and deserves the attention of those +whose disposition favors the creation of a middle ground between science +and poetry. + + κρς. + + +FOOTNOTES: + +[66] Ziehen declares (p. 129) that the problem of physiological +psychology consists in reducing the different forms of thinking up to +the most complex argumentation to simple associations of ideas and its +laws. Wundt says, that there are many psychical idea-combinations which +cannot be explained simply by association of ideas. So, Ziehen continues +(p. 130), Wundt assumes above idea associations a special faculty of the +soul called apperception, which serves now as attention, now as will, but +is in either case a metaphysical faculty of the soul, the active subject +which independent of mechanical causality is said to be the cause of +these phenomena.—I do not think that anyone who knows Wundt will accept +this as a fair representation of his views. + + + + +PERIODICALS. + + +REVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE. + +CONTENTS: December, 1891. No. 192 + + UN PROBLÈME D’ACOUSTIQUE PSYCHOLOGIQUE. By _L. Dauriac_. + + LES ORIGINES DE NOTRE STRUCTURE INTELLECTUELLE ET CÉRÉBRALE. + II. L’ÉVOLUTIONNISME. By _A. Fouillée_. + + LÉONARD DE VINCI ARTISTE ET SAVANT. By _G. Séailles_. + + SUR LES DESSINS D’ENFANTS. By _J. Passy_. + + SUR UN CAS D’INHIBITION PSYCHIQUE. By _A. Binet_. + +CONTENTS: January, 1892. No. 193. + + LE PROBLÈME DE LA VIE. By _Dunan_. + + LA MALADIE DU PESSIMISME. By _B. Pérez_. + + PHILOSOPHES ESPAGNOLS DE CUBA: F. VARELA, J. DE LA LUZ. By + _J.-M. Guardia_. + + VARIÉTÉS: LE PROBLÈME D’ACHILLE. By _J. Mouret_. + +CONTENTS: February, 1892. No. 194. + + LES MOUVEMENTS DE MANÈGE CHEZ LES INSECTES. By _A. Binet_. + + LE PROBLÈME DE LA VIE (2nd article). By _Dunan_. + + PHILOSOPHES ESPAGNOLS DE CUBA (concluded). _J.-M. Guardia_. + + REVUE GÉNÉRALE: JUSTICE ET SOCIALISME, D’APRÈS LES PUBLICATIONS + RÉCENTES. By _Belot_. + +One of the problems of the unique and great work of Carl Stumpf’s +“Tonpsychologie” is the subject of L. Dauriac’s essay. The question +is when several sounds enter the ear at the same time, the plurality +of which is not directly known, do you have your information through +an inner sense? Does every unit of the irritation correspond to a +distinct unit of sensation? Is there in consciousness a simultaneousness +of sensations similarly as outside of consciousness there is a +simultaneousness of vibrations? M. Dauriac maintains that Stumpf’s +question can be answered only on the ground of metaphysical postulates, +and if preconceived solutions are to be excluded, it must be considered +as insoluble. + +Alfred Fouillée, in his second article on the origin of our intellectual +and cerebral structure, which treats on evolutionism, comes to the +conclusion that the hypothesis which in the most simple way explains the +agreement of thoughts and objects is the doctrine of a radical unity +generally called Monism. + +J. Passy notes certain characteristic and psychologically interesting +features of the drawings of children. + +M. A. Binet presents two physiognomical pictures of the same face, one +representing disgust or scorn, the other a good-humored and happy smile. +The upper parts of both faces are exactly alike and yet the eyes of +the former look disdainful while the very same eyes of the latter are +full of jest and merriment. This is the fact. M. Binet psychologically +interprets the fact as a phenomenon of automatic inhibition. The fact is +interesting, but its interpretation seems doubtful. + +Charles Dunan discusses the metaphysical aspect of the problem of life. + +B. Pérez’s article is a contribution to pathological psychology with +special reference to M. Magalhâes’s work on the subject. Pessimism, +M. Pérez says, is a disease only if exaggerated, yet he believes that +medico-psychological studies which consider the relation between the +physical system and morality are very helpful even if carried too far. + +M. J.-M. Guardia’s article will have a special interest for Americans. +Three men arose in Spain of late, Valentin Almirall, M. L. Mallada, +and J.-M. Escudor, who spoke bold and hard words of truth to their +country. Cuba is the hen that lays golden eggs for Spain, but the Cubans +are treated with great contempt in Spain; and yet the Spaniards are +by no means their intellectual superiors, for while Spain is poor in +philosophy, Cuba is the only country of Latin America where philosophy +has taken root. M. Guardia sketches in the first article the history and +philosophy of Don Félix Varélay y Moralès who is the harbinger of the +other Spanish-Cuban philosopher, José de la Luz. The second article in +the February number treats of the latter (1800-1862) whom Guardia calls +the master. + +George Mouret with reference to Frontera’s book on Zeno’s argument +against motion makes a few remarks concerning the Eleatic sophism about +Achilles and the tortoise. + +An injury of a thalamus opticus produces in horses and other animals +the effect of their making rotatory movements when intending to walk +straight on. Forel proved that a similar effect is produced in ants by a +lesion of one of their lobes. M. Binet publishes in the present essay his +experiments on certain water-beetles, exhibiting diagrams of their normal +and abnormal walk. (Paris: Félix Alcan.) + + κρς. + + +ZEITSCHRIFT FUR PSYCHOLOGIE UND PHYSIOLOGIE DER SINNESORGANE. Vols. II +and III. + +CONTENTS: November, 1891. No. 6. + + UEBER BRÜCKES THEORIE DES KÖRPERLICHEN SEHENS. By Dr. _C. du + Bois-Reymond_. + + MEIN SCHLUSSWORT GEGEN WUNDT. By _C. Stumpf_. + + ERWIDERUNG. By _O. Flügel_. + + LITTERATURBERICHT. + +CONTENTS: December, 1891. No. 1. + + VERSUCH, DAS PSYCHOPHYSISCHE GESETZ AUF DIE FARBENUNTERSCHIEDE + TRICHROMATISCHER AUGEN ANZUWENDEN. By _H. v. Helmholtz_. + + UNTERSUCHUNGEN ÜBER BINOKULARES SEHEN MIT ANWENDUNG DES + HERINGSCHEN FALLVERSUCHS. By Dr. _Richard Greeff_. + + BEMERKUNGEN ZU DEM AUFSATZE VON DR. SOMMER “ZUR PSYCHOLOGIE DER + SPRACHE.” By Prof. _A. Pick_. + + LITTERATURBERICHT. + +Dr. C. du Bois-Reymond believes that corporeal vision is either produced +by one eye running in succession over several places or two eyes viewing +two aspects of the object. Mach’s theory of the influence of shade upon +the production of the third dimension in vision which affords quite a +new and a better explanation of the phenomenon is not mentioned. Stumpf +closes his controversy with Wundt with a few remarks in answer to Wundt’s +reply (in _Philos. Studien_ VII, pp. 298-327); and Flügel objects to +Professor Rehmke’s proposition made in a criticism of Flügel’s book “Die +Seelenfrage,” that Herbart’s psychology, being atomism, is at bottom +materialism. + +Dr. Richard Greeff describes Hering’s apparatus for investigating the +cause of binocular vision. Wheatstone believes that the perspective +of the two retina pictures produces the effect of corporeality while +Brücke declares that it is mainly due to muscle-sensations. Hering sides +with Wheatstone, and the experiments as described by Greeff prove that +the third dimension is unfailingly perceived whenever the ocular axes +diverge, while in other cases the same result is not attained. + +Dr. Sommer had presented in a former article the facts of an interesting +case of aphasia, (see _The Monist_, Vol. I, No. 4, p. 629) where the +patient, his name is Voit, could remember and pronounce words only when +writing them. Prof. A. Pick objects to Dr. Sommer’s regarding the case as +contrary to our present experience and following two French authorities +Ballet and Bernard, adduces cases of Aphasia by right-sided hemiphlegia +where patients could read only when they were able to write or represent +to themselves the writing motions of their hand. Thus one patient of +Charcot could only read print, and not written words “because,” as +he said, “it was easier for him to reproduce in his mind the written +letter.” This reminds one of the case a deaf-mute who said: “I feel +whenever I think of the motions of my fingers although they are perfectly +at rest. I see internally an image of my moving fingers.” Professor Pick +concludes that the case Voit is a good argument against Max Müller’s +proposition of the identity of language and thought. Max Müller however +includes in his conception of word any symbol of an idea. The finger +motion of a deaf-mute is a word, and the writing motion of Voit is also a +word, according to Professor Max Müller’s theory. + +Prof. H. v. Helmholtz publishes the tables of his experiments in applying +the psycho-physical law upon color differences of trichromatic eyes, and +presents the three fundamental colors diagrammatically in an equilateral +triangle in the centre of which lies white. A curve winding round +this centre shows the relation of the rainbow spectrum in the system +of three fundamental colors. The results do not as yet agree with the +investigations of A. König and C. Diterici who make similar inquiries +with bichromatic eyes. (Leipsic: O. R. Reisland.) + + κρς. + + +VIERTELJAHRSSCHRIFT FÜR WISSENSCHAFTLICHE PHILOSOPHIE. Vol. XVI. No. 1. + +CONTENTS: + + BEITRÄGE ZUR LOGIK. (Erster Artikel.) By _A. Riehl_. + + DIE DIMENSIONEN DER WAHRSCHEINLICHKEIT UND DIE EVIDENZ DER + UNGEWISSHEIT. By _Ad. Nitsche_. + + UEBER DIE FORTSCHREITENDE ENTWICKLUNG DES MENSCHENGESCHLECHTS. + II. By _F. Rosenberger_. + + ERNST PLATNER’S WISSENSCHAFTLICHE STELLUNG ZU KANT IN + ERKENNTNISSTHEORIE UND MORALPHILOSOPHIE. I. By _B. Seligkowitz_. + + UEBER SPRACHREFLEX, NATIVISMUS UND ABSICHTLICHE SPRACHBILDUNG. + X. By _A. Marty_. + +Prof. A. Riehl begins in this number a series of articles on logic. The +first two chapters are (1) concepts and definitions. Riehl distinguishes +between a definition and a predicating sentence (_Aussage_), for +instance, “Space has three dimensions,” is a mere definition, but “Space +is the form of our intuition,” is an _Aussage_. (2) Conceptual sentences +and judgments. The former are merely representative and cannot as the +latter be said to combine or separate ideas. + +Ad. Nitsche criticises Johannes v. Kries’s idea that the calculus +of probabilities is admissible only if the chances are equivalent. +Equivalent Chances (_gleiche Spielräume_), he objects, are apparently +impossible, yet he admits that upon the degree of a knowledge of the +conditions will depend the reliability of the probability. + +The Object of B. Seligkowitz’s article is to rescue from oblivion a +philosopher who especially as a critic of Kant deserves to be better +known than he is, Ernst Platner (1744-1818.) + +The tenth and concluding article of A. Marty on the origin of language +reviews Paul Regnaud’s work _Origine et philosophie du langage_. +(Leipsic: O. R. Reisland.) + + κρς. + + +THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY. December, 1891. Vol. IV. No. 2. + +CONTENTS: + + A SKETCH OF THE HISTORY OF PSYCHOLOGY AMONG THE GREEKS. By + _Charles A. Strong_. + + STUDIES FROM THE LABORATORY OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY OF THE + UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN. By Prof. _Joseph Jastrow_, Ph. D. + + THE SIZE OF SEVERAL CRANIAL NERVES IN MAN AS INDICATED BY THE + AREAS OF THEIR CROSS-SECTIONS. By _Henry H. Donaldson_, Ph. D. + + VISUALISATION AS A CHIEF SOURCE OF THE PSYCHOLOGY OF HOBBES, + LOCKE, BERKELEY, AND HUME. By _Alexander Fraser_, B. A. + + ANATOMICAL OBSERVATIONS ON THE BRAIN AND SEVERAL SENSE-ORGANS + OF THE BLIND DEAF-MUTE, LAURA DEWEY BRIDGMAN. II. By _Henry H. + Donaldson_, Ph. D. + + PSYCHOLOGICAL LITERATURE. I. Nervous System. By Prof. _H. H. + Donaldson_. + + A LABORATORY COURSE IN PHYSIOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY. II. By _E. C. + Sanford_. + + PSYCHIATRY. PSYCHOSES FOLLOWING ACUTE SURGICAL AND MENTAL + AFFECTIONS AND IN MULTIPLE NEURITIS. By _William Noyes_, M. D. + +The post mortem examination of Laura Bridgman shows a brain in which the +olfactory bulbs and nerves, the optic nerves, the auditory nerves, and +possibly the glossopharyngeal, had all been more or less destroyed at +their peripheral ends. This destruction caused a degeneration—most marked +in the optic nerves—which extended towards the centres and involved them +indirectly.... This case represents a maximum loss in these defective +senses with a minimum amount of central disturbance, thus offering the +very best sort of opportunity for education by way of the surviving +senses.... Mental association was for Laura Bridgman limited to various +phases of the dermal sensations and the minor and imperfect senses of +taste and smell.... The motor centre there had lost some, but not all its +associative connections. (Clark University, Worcester, Mass.) + + κρς. + + +INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS. January, 1892. Vol. II. NO. 2. + +CONTENTS: + + THE ETHICAL ASPECTS OF THE PAPAL ENCYCLICAL. By _Brother + Azarias_. + + THE THREE RELIGIONS. By _J. S. Mackenzie_, M. A. + + THE ETHICS OF HEGEL. By _Rev. J. Macbride Sterrett_. + + A PALM OF PEACE FROM GERMAN SOIL. By _Fanny Hertz_. + + AUTHORITY IN THE SPHERE OF CONDUCT AND INTELLECT. By _Prof. H. + Nettleship_, Oxford. + + DISCUSSIONS AND REVIEWS. + +Brother Azarias paraphrases and praises the ethics of the Papal +Encyclical. J. S. Mackenzie starts from Kant’s famous remarks that two +things fill our minds with reverence, the starry, heavens above and the +moral law within. The worship of these two separately and the worship of +them in combination are set forth as the three great religions of the +world. Fanny Hertz pleads for the abolishment of war. She quotes largely +from Bertha Suttner’s novel, “Die Waffen nieder,” and from Friederich’s +letters. Authority, according to Professor Nettleship, is “the power +which in the sphere of conduct, in the long run determines our practice +and in the sphere of intellect in the long run determines our assent.” +There are roughly speaking four kinds of authority: (1) the authority +of law, (2) the authority of religious bodies, (3) the authority of +society or public opinion and (4) the authority of great men. Where +is the seat of authority? “For each individual,” Professor Nettleship +maintains, “the absolute guide can, in the long run be no other than his +own conscience.” The origin of conscience and the criterion whether the +voice of conscience be true or not are not explained. (Philadelphia: +_International Journal of Ethics_, 118 S. Twelfth Street.) + + κρς. + + +MIND. New Series. No. 1. January, 1892. + +CONTENTS: + + PREFATORY REMARKS. _The Editor._ + + THE LOGICAL CALCULUS. (1) General Principles. By _W. E. + Johnson_. + + THE IDEA OF VALUE. By _S. Alexander_. + + THE CHANGES OF METHOD IN HEGEL’S DIALECTIC. (1) By _J. Ellis + McTaggart_. + + THE LAW OF PSYCHOGENESIS. By _Prof. C. Lloyd Morgan_. + + DISCUSSIONS: The Feeling-Tone of Desire and Aversion. By _Prof. + H. Sidgwick_. Sur la Distinction entre les Lois ou Axiomes et + les Notions. By _George Mouret_. + + CRITICAL NOTICES. + +W. E. Johnson says: “As a material machine is an instrument for +economising the exertion of force, so a symbolic calculus is an +instrument for economising the exertion of intelligence. And, employing +the same analogy, the more perfect the calculus, the smaller would be the +amount of intelligence applied as compared with the results produced.” He +continues: + +“But as the exertion of _some_ force is necessary for working the +machine, so the exertion of _some_ intelligence is necessary for working +the calculus.” + +Here we feel inclined to stop our author. That which makes of a certain +amount of metal, brass, and wood a machine, is the form in which they +are composed, and this form is instrumental in using a certain amount of +energy for doing a certain kind of work. Intelligence is not analogous +to force but to the form of force. Not intelligence is necessary to run +the instrument of intelligence, but some power, some force, some energy, +and this power needed for running the instrument of intelligence, as it +exists in man, is generally called will. So we are at variance with Mr. +W. S. Johnson from the outset. Mr. Johnson from his standpoint considers +it “important to examine the kind and degree of intelligence that are +demanded in the employment of any symbolic calculus. It will appear that +the _logical_ calculus stands in a unique relation to intelligence; for +it aims at exhibiting, in a non-intelligent form, those same intelligent +principles that are actually required for working it.” + +We abstain here from discussing the details of this highly suggestive +article which contains much that is of interest to logicians. The author +claims especially with regard to his interpretation of the universal and +particular that his results exactly correspond with the interpretation +given by Dr. Venn and Mr. Peirce, and worked out by Dr. Keynes. + +The Germans distinguish between _Urtheil_ and _Beurtheilung_, the first +being judgment in general, the latter a judgment that declares something +to possess value from the view of truth, beauty or goodness. In this +sense Mr. S. Alexander deals with the idea of value. He states two main +principles. (1) That value is “the efficiency of a conscious agent +to promote the efficiency of society” and this, the author says, was +maintained indirectly in opposition to the view that value was determined +by pleasure. (2) That value is itself no something separable from other +mental facts by a wide gulf, but was itself a fact of a purely natural +order. “Sollen” is one kind of “Sein.” + +Mr. J. Ellis McTaggart in discussing the changes of method in Hegel’s +Dialectic arrives at a conclusion which according to the author must +be admitted to be quite un-Hegelian. Hegel apparently regarded the +procession of the categories with its advance through oppositions and +reconciliations as presenting absolute truth. From this the author +dissents, “for,” he says: “the true process of thought is one in which +each category springs out of the one before it, and not by contradicting +it, but as the expression of its deepest nature, while it, in its turn, +is seen to have its deepest reality in again passing on to the one +after it. There is no contradiction no opposition, and consequently no +reconciliation. There is only development, the rendering explicit what +was implicit, the growth of the seed to the plant. In the actual course +of the dialectic this is never attained. It is an ideal which is never +quite realised, and from the nature of the case never can be quite +realised. In the dialectic there is always opposition, and therefore +always reconciliation. We do not go straight onward, but more or less +from side to side. It seems inevitable, therefore, to conclude that +the dialectic does not completely and perfectly express the nature of +thought.” + +Prof. C. Lloyd Morgan starting from the proposition that “the business +of consciousness is the control of action” shows that “we identify +ourselves rather with the action of our control centres than with our +lower animal instincts. Through experience we learn, and habits being +formed by individual repetition become innate.” Professor Morgan reviews +use-inheritance natural selection, sexual selection, the law of beauty, +and conduct and verification with regard to psychogenesis. “Our nature,” +he says, “is intellectual, æsthetic, moral, and sensitive”: + +“The false is rejected as incongruous to our nature as intellectual; +the ugly is avoided as incongruous to our nature as æsthetic; the wrong +is shunned as incongruous to our nature as moral; so is the painful, so +far as possible, avoided as incongruous to our nature as sensitive.... +The guidance of pleasure and pain is of great importance—so great that +some are found to argue that in moral matters we are influenced solely +by considerations of happiness.... Only by extending the meaning of the +words pleasure and pain so as to be coextensive with what I have here +termed congruous and incongruous can it be said that our actions and +our thoughts are determined by pleasure and pain.” (London: Williams & +Norgate.) + + κρς. + + +THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW. Vol. I, No. 1. January, 1892. + +CONTENTS of No. 1. + + PREFATORY NOTE. + + THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY AND IDEALISM. By Prof. _John Watson_. + + PSYCHOLOGY AS SO-CALLED “NATURAL SCIENCE.” By Prof. _George T. + Ladd_. + + ON SOME PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF THE CHINESE MUSICAL SYSTEM. By + _Benj. Ives Gilman_. + + REVIEWS OF BOOKS AND SUMMARIES OF ARTICLES. + +CONTENTS of No. 2: + + PSYCHOLOGY, EPISTEMOLOGY, AND METAPHYSICS. By Prof. _Andrew + Seth_. + + A PLEA FOR PSYCHOLOGY AS A “NATURAL SCIENCE.” By Prof. _William + James_. + + ON SOME PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF THE CHINESE MUSICAL SYSTEM. + II. By _Benj. Ives Gilman_. + + DISCUSSIONS: Dr. Münsterberg’s Theory of Mind and Body and its + Consequences. By _Charles A. Strong_. + + REVIEWS OF BOOKS AND SUMMARIES OF ARTICLES. + +This is a new magazine which will be an additional proof that the +philosophical interest in America is by no means so poor as the +inhabitants of the old world generally suppose it to be. The character +of the journal, it is to be expected, will be in harmony with the +publications of its scholarly editor, Prof. J. G. Schurmann, whose +position is clearly set forth in a little volume of his “Belief in God,” +in which he conceives God in three ways (1) as the cause or ground of the +world (2) as the realising purpose of the world, and (3) as the father of +spirits. + +Professor Watson reviews in an elaborate article Edward Caird’s work +“The Critical Philosophy of Emanuel Kant.” “The philosophy of Kant,” +says Watson, “was accepted at first by submissive disciples, but it had +afterwards to submit to a severe process of criticism which culminated +in the Absolute Idealism of Hegel. The synthesis of Kant, as based upon +an untenable opposition of the phenomenal and the real, was weighed +and found wanting.... We must be grateful to any one who helps us, +not merely to see Kant, but to see beyond him. This is the task which +Professor Caird, in his exhaustive work on the Critical Philosophy, has +set himself to perform,” and adds Watson, “he has done it in a way that +leaves nothing to be desired.” + +Professor Ladd criticises Professor James’s Psychology as so-called +natural science. + +“What we wish to have in the name of cerebral psychology, is a +description, in terms of a comprehensible theory of molecular physics; +and, also, a statement of the formulæ which define the relations between +the molecular changes and the ‘corresponding’ orders of mental phenomena. +But this is precisely what Professor James avoids doing, even to the +extent which so-called ‘nerve-physiology’ makes possible. And, nothing +worthy of the name ‘science’ _is_ possible for any one in this branch of +cerebral psycho-physics.” + +Professor James replies to the criticism in the second number of _The +Philosophical Review_. He says: + +“Psychology is to-day hardly more than what physics was before Galileo, +what chemistry was before Lavoisier. It is a mass of phenomenal +description, gossip, and myth, including, however, real material enough +to justify one in the hope that its study may become worthy of the +name of natural science at no very distant day. I wished, by treating +Psychology _like_ a natural science, to help her to become one.” + +Professor Ladd is a transcendentalist and Professor James has great +expectations of the work inaugurated by the Society for Psychical +Research. + +Theoretically they stand much nearer than practically, as well indicated +by Professor James’s remark: + +“In Professor Ladd’s own book on ‘Physiological Psychology,’ that ‘real +being, proceeding to unfold powers that are _sui generis_, according to +laws of its own,’ for whose recognition he contends, plays no organic +part in the work, and has proved a mere stumbling block to his biological +reviewers.” + +He adds in a foot-note: + +“I mean that such a being is quite barren of particular consequences. Its +character is only known by its reactions on the signals which the nervous +system gives, and these must be gathered by observation after the fact. +If only it were subject to successive reincarnations, as the theosophists +say it is, so that we might guess what sort of a body it would unite with +next, or what sort of persons it had helped to constitute previously, +those would be great points gained. But even those gains are denied us; +and the real being is, for practical purposes, an entire superfluity, +which a _practical_ psychology can perfectly well do without.” + +Andrew Seth, the well-known coryphæus of philosophy and psychology +at Edinburgh, presses the importance of distinguishing the different +standpoints of psychology, epistemology, and metaphysics. Locke, +Berkeley, Hume and other English as well as Continental thinkers “speak +sometimes from one point of view, sometimes from the other without being +aware that the two points of view are different.” + +“Psychology, assuming the existence of a subject or medium of +consciousness, seeks to explain, mainly by the help of association or +processes practically similar, how out of the come-and-go of conscious +states, there are evolved such subjective facts as perceptions, the +belief in an independent real world, and the idea of the Ego or subject +himself.... Metaphysics has to do with the ultimate nature of the reality +which reveals itself alike in the consciousness which knows and the world +which is known.... The epistemological thing-in-itself to be identified +with the metaphysical essence.... The problem of knowledge and the Real, +is the question which Epistemology has to face.” (Boston, New York, +Chicago: Ginn & Co.) + + κρς. + + +VOPROSUI FILOSOFII I PSICHOLOGII.[67] Vol. III. No. 11. January, 1892. + +CONTENTS: + + POSITIVE PHILOSOPHY AND THE UNITY OF SCIENCE. Part V. + Sociology. By _B. Tchitcherin_. + + COUNT GIACOMO LEOPARDI AND HIS PESSIMISM. Part IV. Continued + from No. 10 of this review. (Conclusion.) By _V. Stein_. + + AN HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE CONCEPTIONS OF NATURE. + (Conclusion.) By _M. Menzhir_. + + J. V. KIRYEBSKII AND THE ORIGIN OF MUSCOVITE SLAVOPHILISM. + Public lecture delivered November 20, 1891, for the benefit of + the rural districts suffering from the bad harvests. By _Paul + Vinogradoff_. + + FOUILLÉ AND THE METAPHYSICS OF THE FUTURE. Part III. General + estimate of Fouillé’s views. Continued from No. 10 of this + review. (Conclusion) By _Aleksei Vnedenskii_. + + TELEPATHY. To be concluded in the next number. By _M. + Petrovo-Solovo_. [This is a review of the publications of and + the work done by the Society for Psychical Research in England.] + + SPECIAL PART: (1) Wundt’s System of Philosophy. By _K. + Ventzel_. (2) Hegel’s Ontology. By _N. P. Hilyaroff-Platonoff_. + New Researches on Plato. By _A. Kozloff_. + + CRITICISM AND BIBLIOGRAPHY. Review of Russian and Foreign + Periodicals. Book Reviews. Bibliographical Index of recent + Philosophical works. Answer to an anonymous letter received + by N. Strachoff on the subject of his article: “Opinions + concerning L. N. Tolstoï.” By _N. Strachoff_. Transactions of + the Moscow Psychological Society. (Moscow, 1892.) + + +FOOTNOTES: + +[67] _Questions of Philosophy and Psychology._ + + + + + VOL. II. JULY, 1892. NO. 4. + + THE MONIST. + + + + +OUR MONISM. + +THE PRINCIPLES OF A CONSISTENT, UNITARY WORLD-VIEW. + + +The question, What are the essential features of Monism? was brought home +to me when I read in the last number of _The Monist_ the critical remarks +made with reference to the new edition of my “Anthropogeny.” I shall +here endeavor briefly to draw up the outlines of my conception of the +world in a manner which will indicate the most characteristic features +of my views. Thus both the agreements with and the divergences from the +position editorially upheld in _The Monist_ will plainly appear. + +As is the case with the majority of philosophical differences, so also +in the present instance I find that the divergences which exhibit +themselves in our respective unitary conceptions of the world are in part +only apparent and in part occasioned by the divergent significances of +our fundamental ideas. But this will, perhaps, be made clearer by the +following methodically arranged eight theses. + + +I. MONISM. + +Like all general concepts of fundamental scope, that of monism also +is liable to different definitions and divergent modifications,—the +natural result of individual differences of subjective conception. In the +determinate sense in which monism is at present employed by the majority +of philosophers and physical inquirers, the sense which I believe I +was the first to establish in 1866 in my “General Morphology” (Vol. I, +p. 105), it denotes a unitary or _natural_ conception of the world, in +opposition to a _supernatural_ or mystical one, that is, in opposition +to _dualism_. For us, accordingly, there exists (in the sense of Goethe) +_no_ opposition whatsoever between nature and mind, between World and +God. Mental existences, “spirits,” outside nature, or in opposition to +nature, do not exist. What are commonly termed the “mental sciences,”—for +example, philology, history, and philosophy,—are in reality simply a part +of _physical philosophy_, of _Natur-philosophie_. The latter discipline +embraces, in our opinion, the entire body of human knowledge; it is +based upon _empiricism_, on the experiences, the observations, and the +experiments of physical inquiry; but it does not become _philosophy_ +until it has brought together and united its empiric products, abstracted +general laws from its isolated experiential facts, and _synthetised_ the +isolated results which _analysis_ has empirically ascertained. + + +II. MECHANICALISM. + +Since an early date, this important fundamental concept has frequently +been used in three different and divergent senses, namely: + +_A._ In its widest sense, as synonymous with _monism_; wherein mechanical +causes (_causæ efficientes_), in the sense of Kant, are assumed as the +sole effective causes and are placed in opposition to the teleological +causes (_causæ finales_) in the sense of dualism. “Mechanical conception +of the world” is in this sense synonymous with “monistic conception of +the world.” + +_B._ In its more restricted sense, as a universal _motion_-principle +of physics, so that, for example, the postulated ether-vibrations of +optics, of electricity, and so forth, as well as the grosser material +oscillations of acoustics, heat, and so forth, are designated as +mechanical processes subject to definite laws. “Mechanical natural +philosophy,” in this sense, is identical with _physics_. + +_C._ In its narrowest sense, as that _branch_ of physics which deals +with the grosser and visible processes of _motion_; as gravitation, +locomotion, and the phoronomy of organisms. Mechanics, in this the most +restricted sense, is viewed as opposed to optics, acoustics, etc., as the +usages of the schools indicate. + +Since, now, the phrases “mechanical laws” and “mechanical +explanation,” at the present day even, are frequently understood in +these three distinct senses, no end of misunderstandings arise. Such +misunderstandings may be best avoided, perhaps, by retaining the notion +of mechanics in its narrowest (_C_) sense, and by substituting _physics_ +for the next narrower sense (_B_) and _monism_ for its most extended +sense (_A_). + + +III. PSYCHISM. + +In exactly the same way as the idea of mechanicalism, so also that of +psychism is employed in a three-fold divergent sense. As in the former +case _motion_, so here _feeling_ is conceived, now as a universal +world-principle, now simply as a vital activity of all organisms, now +simply as the particular mental activity of man. + +_A._ In its widest sense: _Panpsychism_. All matter is ensouled, because +all natural bodies known to us possess determinate chemical properties, +that is to say react uniformly and by law when subjected to the +determinate chemical (i. e. molecular-mechanical) influences of other +bodies: _chemical affinity_. Simplest example: sulphur and quicksilver +rubbed together form cinnabar, a new body of entirely different +properties. This is possible only on the supposition that the molecules +(or atoms) of the two elements if brought within the proper distance, +mutually _feel_ each other, by attraction move towards each other; on the +decomposition of a simple chemical compound the contrary takes place: +repulsion. (Empedocles’s doctrine of the “love and hatred of atoms.”) + +_B._ In its more restricted sense: _Biopsychism_. The _organisms_ alone +are regarded as “ensouled,” because here the chemical processes are +more complicated and more striking (producing motions in cyclically +repeated succession) than in the case of the so-called “dead matter” of +the inorganic bodies. In particular does organic “irritability” appear +here as a higher form of the physical reaction called “_Auslösung_” +[the setting free, disengagement], and “soul-activity” (reflexes) +again as a higher form of irritability. However, all the phenomena +of organic life ultimately admit of being reduced to “mechanical” +(or “physico-chemical”) processes that differ from the processes of +the inorganic world only in point of degree or quantitatively, not +qualitatively. (“General Morphology,” I, Chap. V; VII, pp. 109-238. +“Natural Creation,” VIII, First Edition, Lecture XV.) + +_C._ In its narrowest sense: _Zoopsychism_. Irritability, or universal +organic soul-activity, such as is the attribute of all organisms, +(identical with “life,”) reaches a higher stage through abstraction, +through the formation of _ideas_. _Feeling_ and _will_ become more +distinctly separated. This real soul-life, which is the attribute only +of the higher animals, passes through a long succession of different +stages of development, the most perfect of which is the soul of man. +The so-called “freedom of the will” is apparent only, as each single +volitional action is determined by a chain of precedent actions which +ultimately rest either upon _heredity_ (propagation) or upon _adaptation_ +(nutrition). As these last are (“mechanically”) reducible to molecular +motions, the same also holds true of the former. + + +IV. THEISM. + +The idea of god that alone appears to be logically compatible with +monism, is pantheism (or “cosmotheism”) in the sense of Goethe and +Spinoza. God according to this view is identical with the sum-total +of the force of the universe, which is inseparable from the sum-total +of the matter of the universe. In opposition to this view stands +_anthropotheism_. This is the outcome of dualism, which places God +as a personal being in opposition to the “world” created by him, +and consequently is always forced in its reasonings to resort to +anthropomorphic expedients. + + +V. MATERIALISM. + +The most important differences of form in which this much misunderstood +and variously interpreted movement of philosophy has presented itself, +may be classed as follows: + +_A._ In its most extended sense: as synonymous with _monism_ (or with +mechanicalism). All the phenomena of the world are founded upon material +processes, upon _motions_ (mechanicalism) or upon _feelings_ (psychism), +both of which, as fundamental qualities, are inseparable from matter. +Immaterial forces or immaterial “spirits” (minds) are unknown to us. As +Goethe once said, “Mind can never exist and act without matter, matter +never without mind.” + +_B._ In its more restricted sense: originally matter alone exists and +creates _secondarily_ force (or “mind”). The fallacy of this view lies in +its regarding the two things “matter and force” as disjoint and separate. +According to our view the two are inseparably connected,—united in each +atom from the very first. + + +VI. SPIRITUALISM. + +This phase also of the world-conception has been the subject of the same +misunderstandings and perverted conceptions as its apparent opposite, +materialism. + +_A._ In its most extended sense, spiritualism is susceptible of +identification with _psychism_—consequently also with monism. For +_feeling_ (pleasure and pain) is just as much a thoroughly universal and +fundamental property of matter (of each atom!) as is _motion_ (attraction +and repulsion). Every single “spirit” is inseparably united with some +“matter.” + +_B._ In its more restricted sense: originally force alone exists and +creates _secondarily_ matter. This view, which is very old and very +widely spread (“creation of the world”), is just as false and as +one-sided as its contrary (5 _B_). + + +VII. IMMORTALISM. + +The “belief in immortality” is scientifically (_critically_) tenable only +as a _general_ proposition, and is in this case identical with the most +universal law of physics, the _conservation of energy_ (coincidently, +of course, the conservation of matter). On the other hand, the widely +disseminated _dogmatic_ belief in a _personal_ immortality, a belief +supported by the mass of the ecclesiastical religions, and of utmost +importance as the consciously or unconsciously assumed _base_-axiom of a +great number of philosophical systems, is, _scientifically_, absolutely +untenable. The “human soul” (i. e. the sum-total of the individual +life-activity: feeling, motion,—will,—and idea) is simply a transient +developmentary phenomenon—a very highly developed “vertebrate-soul.” + + +VIII. COSMISM. + +The determinate, and, as I believe, logical, form of the conception of +the world, the principles of which I have advocated for thirty years, +and whose most important aspects have been briefly outlined in the +preceding paragraphs, may also be designated _cosmism_, to the extent +that it proceeds from the fundamental idea that _cosmogeny_ or the +“world-process,” as world-_development_, is, within certain limits, +(within the limits namely of a reduction to the basic notions: matter +and its two inseparable fundamental qualities motion and feeling,) a +_knowable_ natural process. Cosmism is opposed, thus, to _agnosticism_. + + * * * * * + +One highly important principle of my monism seems to me to be, that +I regard _all_ matter as _ensouled_, that is to say as endowed with +_feeling_ (pleasure and pain) and with _motion_, or, better, with the +power of motion. As elementary (atomistic) attraction and repulsion +these powers are asserted in every simplest chemical process, and +on them is based also every other phenomenon, consequently also the +highest-developed soul-activity of man. For the comprehension of this +_graduated_ psychical development of matter perhaps my three stages will +be useful: III _A._ (Panpsychism), III _B._ (Biopsychism), III _C._ +(Zoopsychism). So too consciousness, as the highest psychical action and +the one most difficult to be explained, is in my views imply a higher +stage of brain-activity, based upon the association, the abstraction, +and centralisation of groups of ideas. Perhaps I have expressed myself +poorly in these expositions, as I am little accustomed to dealing with +philosophical axioms abstractly, and am too exclusively engaged in the +concrete activity of my own special department. I cherish the hope, +however, of being able within two or three years to devote more of my +time to purely philosophical labors; when my work with the Challenger +material, which has now absorbed twelve years of unremitting toil, is +ended, my special zoological activity will have been completed; and I +shall then find the opportunity of contributing more frequently to your +highly valued magazines _The Monist_ and _The Open Court_. + + ERNST HAECKEL. + + + + +THE MAGIC SQUARE. + + +I. + +INTRODUCTORY. + +Among the philosophies of modern times there is no other which emphasises +so much the importance of form and formal thought as the monism of _The +Monist_. An expression thereof is found in the following passages: + + “The order that prevails among the facts of reality is due + to the laws of form. Upon the order of the world depends its + cognisability. + + “... The laws of form are no less eternal than are matter and + energy and ‘Verily I say unto you, till heaven and earth pass, + one jot or one tittle shall in no wise pass from the law!’ + + “The laws of form and their origin have been a puzzle to all + philosophers. ‘Ay, there’s the rub!’ The difficulties of Hume’s + problem of causation, of Kant’s _a priori_, of Plato’s ideas, + of Mill’s method of deduction, etc., etc., all arise from a + one-sided view of form and the laws of form and formal thought.” + +Considering the great results which engineering and other applied +sciences accomplish through the assistance of mathematics, we must +confess that the forms of thought are wonderful indeed, and it is not +at all astonishing that the primitive thinkers of mankind when the +importance of the laws of formal thought in some way or another first +dawned on their minds, attributed magic powers to numbers and geometrical +figures. + +We shall devote the following pages to a brief review of magic squares, +the consideration of which has made many a man believe in mysticism. +And yet there is no mysticism about them unless we either consider +everything mystical, even that twice two is four, or join the sceptic in +his exclamation that we can truly not know whether twice two might not be +five in other spheres of the universe. + +[Illustration: ALBERT DÜRER’S ENGRAVING + +MELANCHOLY OR THE GENIUS OF THE INDUSTRIAL SCIENCE OF MECHANICS] + +The author of the short article on “Magic Squares” in the English +Cyclopædia (Vol. III, p. 415), presumably Prof. DeMorgan, says: + + “Though the question of magic squares be in itself of no use, + yet it belongs to a class of problems which call into action + a beneficial species of investigation. Without laying down + any rules for their construction, we shall content ourselves + with destroying their magic quality, and showing that the + non-existence of such squares would be much more surprising + than their existence.” + +This is the point. There obtains a symphonic harmony in mathematics which +is the more startling the more obvious and self-evident it appears to him +who understands the laws that produce this symphonic harmony. + + * * * * * + +On the wood-cut named “Melancholia”[68] of the famous Nuremberg painter, +Albrecht Dürer, is found among a number of other emblems, which the +reader will notice in our reproduction of the cut, the subjoined square. +This arrangement of the sixteen natural numbers from 1 to 16 possesses +the remarkable property that the same sum 34 will always be obtained +whether we add together the four figures of any of the horizontal rows +or the four of any vertical row or the four which lie in either of the +two diagonals. Such an arrangement of numbers is termed a magic square, +and the square which we have reproduced above is _the first magic square +which is met with in the Christian Occident_. + +[Illustration: Fig. 1. + + +--+--+--+--+ + | 1|14|15| 4| + +--+--+--+--+ + |12| 7| 6| 9| + +--+--+--+--+ + | 8|11|10| 5| + +--+--+--+--+ + |13| 2| 3|16| + +--+--+--+--+ +] + +Like chess and many of the problems founded on the figure of the +chess-board, the problem of constructing a magic square also probably +traces its origin to Indian soil. From there the problem found its way +among the Arabs, and by them it was brought to the Roman Orient. Finally, +since Albrecht Dürer’s time, the scholars of Western Europe also have +occupied themselves with methods for the construction of squares of this +character. + +The oldest and the simplest magic square consists of the quadratic +arrangement of the nine numbers from 1 to 9 in such a manner that the sum +of each horizontal, vertical, or diagonal row, always remains the same, +namely 15. This square is the adjoined. + +[Illustration: Fig. 2. + + +-+-+-+ + |2|7|6| + +-+-+-+ + |9|5|1| + +-+-+-+ + |4|3|8| + +-+-+-+ +] + +Here, we will find, 15 always comes out whether we add 2 and 7 and 6, or +9 and 5 and 1, or 4 and 3 and 8, or 2 and 9 and 4, or 7 and 5 and 3, or 6 +and 1 and 8, or 2 and 5 and 8, or 6 and 5 and 4. + +The question naturally presents itself, whether this condition of the +constant equality of the added sum also remains fulfilled when the +numbers are assigned different places. It may be easily shown however +that 5 necessarily must occupy the middle place, and that the even +numbers must stand in the corners. This being so, there are but 7 +additional arrangements possible, which differ from the arrangement +above given and from one another only in the respect that the rows at +the top, at the left, at the bottom, and at the right, exchange places +with one another and that in addition a mirror be imagined present with +each arrangement. So too from Dürer’s square of 4 times 4 places, by +transpositions, a whole set of new correct squares may be formed. A magic +square of the 4 times 4 numbers from 1 to 16 is formed in the simplest +manner as follows. We inscribe the numbers from 1 to 16 in their natural +order in the squares, thus: + +[Illustration: Fig. 3. + + +--+--+--+--+ + | 1| 2| 3| 4| + +--+--+--+--+ + | 5| 6| 7| 8| + +--+--+--+--+ + | 9|10|11|12| + +--+--+--+--+ + |13|14|15|16| + +--+--+--+--+ +] + +We then leave the numbers in the four corner-squares, viz. 1, 4, 13, 16, +as well also as the numbers in the four middle-squares, viz. 6, 7, 10, +11, in their original places; and in the place of the remaining eight +numbers, we write the complements of the same with respect to 17: thus 15 +instead of 2, 14 instead of 3, 12 instead of 5, 9 instead of 8, 8 instead +of 9, 5 instead of 12, 3 instead of 14, and 2 instead of 15. We obtain +thus the magic square + +[Illustration: Fig. 4. + + =34 =34 + \ / + +--+--+--+--+ + | 1|15|14| 4|=34 + +--+--+--+--+ + |12| 6| 7| 9|=34 + +--+--+--+--+ + | 8|10|11| 5|=34 + +--+--+--+--+ + |13| 3| 2|16|=34 + +--+--+--+--+ + 34 34 34 34 +] + +from which the same sum 34 always results. It is an interesting property +of this square that any four numbers which form a rectangle or square +about the centre also always give the same sum 34; for example, 1, 4, +13, 16, or 6, 7, 10, 11, or 15, 14, 3, 2, or 12, 9, 5, 8, or 15, 8, 2, +9, or 14, 12, 3, 5. We may easily convince ourselves that this square is +obtainable from the square of Dürer by interchanging with one another the +two middle vertical rows. + + +II. + +EARLY METHODS FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF ODD-NUMBERED SQUARES. + +Since early times rules have also been known for the construction of +magic squares of more than 3 times 3, or 4 times 4 spaces. In the first +place, it is easy to calculate the sum which in the case of any given +number of cells must result from the addition of each row. We take the +determinate number of cells in each side of the square which we have to +fill, multiply that number by itself, add 1, again multiply the number +thus obtained by the number of the cells in each side, and, finally, +divide the product by 2. Thus, with 4 times 4 cells or squares, we get: +4 times 4 are 16, 16 and 1 are 17, and one half of 17 times 4 is 34. +Similarly, with 5 times 5 squares, we get: 5 times 5 are 25, and 1 makes +26, and the half of 26 times 5 is 65. Analogously, for 6 times 6 squares +the summation 111 is obtained, for 7 times 7 squares 175, for 8 times 8 +squares 260, for 9 times 9 squares 369, for 10 times 10 squares 505, and +so on. The Hindu rule for the construction of magic squares whose roots +are odd, may be enunciated as follows: To start with, write 1 in the +centre of the topmost row, then write 2 in the lowest space of the +vertical column next adjacent to the right, and then so inscribe the +remaining numbers in their natural order in the squares diagonally +upwards towards the right, that on reaching the right-hand margin the +inscription shall be continued from the left-hand margin in the row just +above, and on reaching the upper margin shall be continued from the lower +margin in the column next adjacent to the right, noting that whenever we +are arrested in our progress by a square already occupied we are to fill +out the square next beneath the one we have last filled. In this manner, +for example, the last preceding square of 7 times 7 cells is formed, in +which the reader is requested to follow the numbers in their natural +sequence (Fig. 5). + +[Illustration: Fig. 5. + + =175 =175 + \ / + +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+ + |30 |39 |48 | 1 |10 |19 |28 |=175 + +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+ + |38 |47 | 7 | 9 |18 |27 |29 |=175 + +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+ + |46 | 6 | 8 |17 |26 |35 |37 |=175 + +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+ + | 5 |14 |16 |25 |34 |36 |45 |=175 + +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+ + |13 |15 |24 |33 |42 |44 | 4 |=175 + +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+ + |21 |23 |32 |41 |43 | 3 |12 |=175 + +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+ + |22 |31 |40 |49 | 2 |11 |20 |=175 + +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+ + 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 +] + +For the next further advancements of the theory of magic squares and +of the methods for their construction we are indebted to the Byzantian +Greek, Moschopulus, who lived in the fourteenth century; also, after +Albrecht Dürer who lived about the year 1500, to the celebrated +arithmetician Adam Riese, and to the mathematician Michael Stifel, which +two last lived about 1550. In the seventeenth century Bachet de Méziriac, +and Athanasius Kircher employed themselves on magic squares. About +1700, finally, the French mathematicians De la Hire and Sauveur made +considerable contributions to the theory. In recent times mathematicians +have concerned themselves much less about magic squares, as they have +indeed about mathematical recreations generally. But quite recently the +Brunswick mathematician Scheffler has put forth his own and other’s +studies on this subject in an elegant form. + +[Illustration: Fig. 6. + + | 7| + | | + | 6| |14| + | | | | + | 5| |13| |21| + +==+==+==+==+==+==+==+ + | 4| |12| |20| |28| + ---|--+--+--+--+--+--+--|--- + 3| |11| |19| |27| |35 + ------|--+--+--+--+--+--+--|------ + 2 |10| |18| |26| |34| 42 + --------|--+--+--+--+--+--+--|--------- + 1 9| |17| |25| |33| |41 49 + --------|--+--+--+--+--+--+--|--------- + 8 |16| |24| |32| |40| 48 + ------|--+--+--+--+--+--+--|------ + 15| |23| |31| |39| |47 + ---|--+--+--+--+--+--+--|--- + |22| |30| |38| |46| + +==+==+==+==+==+==+==+ + |29| |37| |45| + | | | | + |36| |44| + | | + |43| +] + +The best known of the various methods of constructing magic squares of an +odd number of cells is the following. First write the numbers in diagonal +succession as in the preceding diagram (Fig. 6). After 25 cells of the +square of 49 cells which we have to fill out, have thus been occupied, +transfer the six figures found outside each side of the square, without +changing their configuration, into the empty cells of the side directly +opposite. By this method, which we owe to Bachet de Méziriac, we obtain +the following magic square of the numbers from 1 to 49: + +[Illustration: Fig. 7. + + +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+ + | 4|29|12|37|20|45|28| + +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+ + |35|11|36|19|44|27| 3| + +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+ + |10|42|18|43|26| 2|34| + +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+ + |41|17|49|25| 1|33| 9| + +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+ + |16|48|24| 7|32| 8|40| + +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+ + |47|23| 6|31|14|39|15| + +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+ + |22| 5|30|13|38|21|46| + +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+ +] + + +III. + +MODERN MODES OF CONSTRUCTION OF ODD-NUMBERED SQUARES. + +The reader will justly ask whether there do not exist other correct +magic squares which are constructed after a different method from that +just given, and whether there do not exist modes of construction which +will lead to all the imaginable and possible magic squares of a definite +number of cells. A general mode of construction of this character +was first given for odd-numbered squares by De la Hire, and recently +perfected by Professor Scheffler. + +To acquaint ourselves with this general method, let us select as our +example a square of 5. First we form two auxiliary squares. In the +first we write the numbers from 1 to 5 five times; and in the second, +five times, the following multiples of five, viz.: 0, 5, 10, 15, 20. +It is clear now that by adding each of the numbers of the series from +1 to 5 with each of the numbers 0, 5, 10, 15, 20, we shall get all the +25 numerals from 1 to 25. All that additionally remains to be done +therefore, is, so to inscribe the numbers that by the addition of the +two numbers in any two corresponding cells each combination shall come +out once and only once; and further that in each horizontal, vertical, +and diagonal row in each auxiliary square each number shall once appear. +Then the required sum of 65 must necessarily result in every case, +because the numbers from 1 to 5 added together make 15, and the numbers +0, 5, 10, 15, 20 make 50. + +We effect the required method of inscription by imagining the numbers +1, 2, 3, 4, 5 (or 0, 5, 10, 15, 20) arranged in cyclical succession, +that is 1 immediately following upon 5, and, starting from any number +whatsoever, by skipping each time either none or one or two or three etc. +figures. Cycles are thus obtained of the first, the second, the third +etc. orders; for example 3 4 5 1 2 is a cycle of the first order, 2 4 1 +3 5 is a cycle of the second order, 1 5 4 3 2 is a cycle of the fourth +order, etc. The only thing then to be looked out for in the two auxiliary +squares is, that the same “cycle” order be horizontally preserved in all +the rows, that the same also happens for the vertical rows, but that the +cycle order in the horizontal and vertical rows is different. Finally we +have only additionally to take care that to the same numbers of the one +auxiliary square not like numbers but _different_ numbers correspond in +the other auxiliary square, that is lie in similarly situated cells. The +following auxiliary squares are, for example, thus possible: + +[Illustration: Fig. 8. + + +--+--+--+--+--+ + |3 |4 |5 |1 |2 | + +--+--+--+--+--+ + |5 |1 |2 |3 |4 | + +--+--+--+--+--+ + |2 |3 |4 |5 |1 | + +--+--+--+--+--+ + |4 |5 |1 |2 |3 | + +--+--+--+--+--+ + |1 |2 |3 |4 |5 | + +--+--+--+--+--+ +] + +and + +[Illustration: Fig. 9. + + +--+--+--+--+--+ + | 0|10|20| 5|15| + +--+--+--+--+--+ + | 5|15| 0|10|20| + +--+--+--+--+--+ + |10|20| 5|15| 0| + +--+--+--+--+--+ + |15| 0|10|20| 5| + +--+--+--+--+--+ + |20| 5|15| 0|10| + +--+--+--+--+--+ +] + +Adding in pairs the numbers which occupy similarly situated cells, we +obtain the following correct magic square: + +[Illustration: Fig. 10. + + +--+--+--+--+--+ + | 3|14|25| 6|17| + +--+--+--+--+--+ + |10|16| 2|13|24| + +--+--+--+--+--+ + |12|23| 9|20| 1| + +--+--+--+--+--+ + |19| 5|11|22| 8| + +--+--+--+--+--+ + |21| 7|18| 4|15| + +--+--+--+--+--+ +] + +It will be seen that we are able thus to construct a very large number +of magic squares of 5 times 5 spaces by varying in every possible manner +the numbers in the two auxiliary squares. Furthermore, the squares thus +formed possess the additional peculiarity, that every 5 numbers which +fill out two rows that are parallel to a diagonal and lie on different +sides of the diagonal also give the constant sum of 65. For example: +3 and 7, 11, 20, 24; or 10, 14 and 18, 22, 1. Altogether then the sum +65 is produced out of 20 rows or pairs of rows. On this peculiarity is +dependent the fact that if we imagine an unlimited number of such squares +placed by the side of, above, or beneath an initial one, we shall be +able to obtain as many quadratic cells as we choose, so arranged that +the square composed of any 25 of these cells will form a correct magic +square, as the following figure will show: + +[Illustration: Fig. 11. + + 2|13|24|10|16| 2|13|24|10|16| 2 + --+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+-- + 9|20| 1|12|23| 9|20| 1|12|23| 9 + --+--+--+--+--+==============+-- + 11|22| 8|19| 5¦11|22| 8|19| 5¦11 + --+--+--+--+--¦--+--+--+--+--¦— + 18| 4|15|21| 7¦18| 4|15|21| 7¦18 + --+--+--+--+--¦--+--+--+--+--¦— + 25| 6|17| 3|14¦25| 6|17| 3|14¦25 + --+--+--+--+--¦--+--+--+--+--¦— + 2|13|24|10|16¦ 2|13|24|10|16¦ 2 + --+--+========¦=====+--+--+--¦— + 9|20¦ 1|12|23¦ 9|20¦ 1|12|23¦ 9 + --+--¦--+--+--+=====¦========+-- + 11|22¦ 8|19| 5|11|22¦ 8|19| 5|11 + --+--¦--+--+--+--+--¦--+--+--+-- + 18| 4¦15|21| 7|18| 4¦15|21| 7|18 + --+--¦--+--+--+--+--¦--+--+--+-- + 25| 6¦17| 3|14|25| 6¦17| 3|14|25 + --+--¦--+--+--+--+--¦--+--+--+-- + 2|13¦24|10|16| 2|13¦24|10|16| 2 + --+--+==============+--+--+--+-- + 9|20| 1|12|23| 9|20| 1|12|23| 9 + --+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+-- + 11|22| 8|19| 5|11|22| 8|19| 5|11 +] + +Every square of every 25 of these numbers, as for example the two +dark-bordered ones, possesses the property that the addition of the +horizontal, vertical, and diagonal rows gives each the same sum, 65. + +As an example of a higher number of cells we will append here a magic +square of 11 times 11 spaces formed by the general method of De la +Hire from the two auxiliary squares of Figs. 12 and 13. From these two +auxiliary squares we obtain by the addition of the two numbers of every +two similarly situated cells, the magic square, exhibited in Diagram 14, +in which each row gives the same sum 671. + +[Illustration: Fig. 12. + + +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+ + | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10| 11| + +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+ + | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10| 11| 1 | 2 | + +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+ + | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10| 11| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | + +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+ + | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10| 11| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | + +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+ + | 9 | 10| 11| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | + +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+ + | 11| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10| + +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+ + | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10| 11| 1 | + +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+ + | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10| 11| 1 | 2 | 3 | + +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+ + | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10| 11| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | + +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+ + | 8 | 9 | 10| 11| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | + +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+ + | 10| 11| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | + +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+ +] + +[Illustration: Fig. 13. + + +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+ + | 0 | 11| 22| 33| 44| 55| 66| 77| 88| 99|110| + +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+ + | 33| 44| 55| 66| 77| 88| 99|110| 0 | 11| 22| + +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+ + | 66| 77| 88| 99|110| 0 | 11| 22| 33| 44| 55| + +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+ + | 99|110| 0 | 11| 22| 33| 44| 55| 66| 77| 88| + +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+ + | 11| 22| 33| 44| 55| 66| 77| 88| 99|110| 0 | + +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+ + | 44| 55| 66| 77| 88| 99|110| 0 | 11| 22| 33| + +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+ + | 77| 88| 99|110| 0 | 11| 22| 33| 44| 55| 66| + +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+ + |110| 0 | 11| 22| 33| 44| 55| 66| 77| 88| 99| + +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+ + | 22| 33| 44| 55| 66| 77| 88| 99|110| 0 | 11| + +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+ + | 55| 66| 77| 88| 99|110| 0 | 11| 22| 33| 44| + +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+ + | 88| 99|110| 0 | 11| 22| 33| 44| 55| 66| 77| + +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+ +] + +[Illustration: Fig. 14. + + +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+ + | 1 | 13| 25| 37| 49| 61| 73| 85| 97|109|121| + +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+ + | 36| 48| 60| 72| 84| 96|108|120| 11| 12| 24| + +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+ + | 71| 83| 95|107|119| 10| 22| 23| 35| 47| 59| + +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+ + |106|118| 9 | 21| 33| 34| 46| 58| 70| 82| 94| + +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+ + | 20| 32| 44| 45| 57| 69| 81| 93|105|117| 8 | + +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+ + | 55| 56| 68| 80| 92|104|116| 7 | 19| 31| 43| + +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+ + | 79| 91|103|115| 6 | 18| 30| 42| 54| 66| 67| + +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+ + |114| 5 | 17| 29| 41| 53| 65| 77| 78| 90|102| + +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+ + | 28| 40| 52| 64| 76| 88| 89|101|113| 4 | 16| + +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+ + | 63| 75| 87| 99|100|112| 3 | 15| 27| 39| 51| + +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+ + | 98|110|111| 2 | 14| 26| 38| 50| 62| 74| 86| + +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+ +] + + +IV. + +EVEN-NUMBERED SQUARES. + +Of magic squares having an even number of places we have hitherto +had to deal only with the square of 4. To construct squares of this +description having a higher even number of places, different and more +complicated methods must be employed than for squares of odd numbers +of places. However, in this case also, as in dealing with the square +of 4, we start with the natural sequence of the numbers and must then +find the complements of the numbers with respect to some other certain +number (as 17 in the square of 4) and also effect certain exchanges of +the numbers with one another. To form, for example, a magic square of 6 +times 6 places, we inscribe in the 12 diagonal cells the numbers that in +the natural sequence of inscription fall into these places, then in the +remaining cells the complements of the numbers that belong therein with +respect to 37, and finally effect the following six exchanges, viz. of +the numbers 33 and 3, 25 and 7, 20 and 14, 18 and 13, 10 and 9, and 5 and +2. In this way the following magic square is obtained. + +[Illustration: Fig. 15. + + +--+--+--+--+--+--+ + | 1|35|34| 3|32| 6| + +--+--+--+--+--+--+ + |30| 8|28|27|11| 7| + +--+--+--+--+--+--+ + |24|23|15|16|14|19| + +--+--+--+--+--+--+ + |13|17|21|22|20|18| + +--+--+--+--+--+--+ + |12|26| 9|10|29|25| + +--+--+--+--+--+--+ + |31| 2| 4|33| 5|36| + +--+--+--+--+--+--+ +] + +This square may also be constructed by the method of De la Hire, from two +auxiliary squares with the numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 0, 6, 12, 18, +24, 30 respectively. In this case, however, the vertical rows of the one +square and the horizontal rows of the other must each so contain two same +numbers thrice repeated that the summation shall always remain 21 and 90 +respectively. In this manner we get the magic square last given above +from the two following auxiliary squares: + +[Illustration: Fig. 16. + + +--+--+--+--+--+--+ + | 1| 5| 4| 3| 2| 6| + +--+--+--+--+--+--+ + | 6| 2| 4| 3| 5| 1| + +--+--+--+--+--+--+ + | 6| 5| 3| 4| 2| 1| + +--+--+--+--+--+--+ + | 1| 5| 3| 4| 2| 6| + +--+--+--+--+--+--+ + | 6| 2| 3| 4| 5| 1| + +--+--+--+--+--+--+ + | 1| 2| 4| 3| 5| 6| + +--+--+--+--+--+--+ +] + +and + +[Illustration: Fig. 17. + + +--+--+--+--+--+--+ + | 0|30|30| 0|30| 0| + +--+--+--+--+--+--+ + |24| 6|24|24| 6| 6| + +--+--+--+--+--+--+ + |18|18|12|12|12|18| + +--+--+--+--+--+--+ + |12|12|18|18|18|12| + +--+--+--+--+--+--+ + | 6|24| 6| 6|24|24| + +--+--+--+--+--+--+ + |30| 0| 0|30| 0|30| + +--+--+--+--+--+--+ +] + +It is to be noted in connection with this example that here also as in +the case of odd-numbered squares, it is possible so to inscribe six +times the numbers from 1 to 6 that each number shall appear once and only +once in each horizontal, vertical, and diagonal row; for example, in the +following manner: + +[Illustration: Fig. 18. + + +--+--+--+--+--+--+ + | 1| 2| 3| 4| 5| 6| + +--+--+--+--+--+--+ + | 2| 4| 6| 1| 3| 5| + +--+--+--+--+--+--+ + | 3| 6| 5| 2| 1| 4| + +--+--+--+--+--+--+ + | 5| 3| 1| 6| 4| 2| + +--+--+--+--+--+--+ + | 6| 5| 4| 3| 2| 1| + +--+--+--+--+--+--+ + | 4| 1| 2| 5| 6| 3| + +--+--+--+--+--+--+ +] + +But if we attempt so to insert, in a like manner, the other set of +numbers 0, 6, 12, 18, 24, 30 in a second auxiliary square, that each +number of the first auxiliary square shall stand once and once only in +a corresponding cell with each number of the second square, all the +attempts we may make to fulfil coincidently the last named condition will +result in failure. It is therefore necessary to select auxiliary squares +like the two given above. It is noteworthy, that the fulfilment of the +second condition is impossible only in the case of the square of 6, but +that in the case of the square of 4 or of the square of 8, for example, +two auxiliary squares, such as the method of De la Hire requires, are +possible. Thus, taking the square of 4 we get + +[Illustration: Fig. 19. + + +--+--+--+--+ + | 1| 2| 3| 4| + +--+--+--+--+ + | 4| 3| 2| 1| + +--+--+--+--+ + | 2| 1| 4| 3| + +--+--+--+--+ + | 3| 4| 1| 2| + +--+--+--+--+ +] + +and + +[Illustration: Fig. 20. + + +--+--+--+--+ + | 0| 4| 8|12| + +--+--+--+--+ + | 8|12| 0| 4| + +--+--+--+--+ + |12| 8| 4| 0| + +--+--+--+--+ + | 4| 0|12| 8| + +--+--+--+--+ +] + +The reader may form for himself the magic square which these give. + +The existence of these two auxiliary squares furnishes a key to the +solution of a pretty problem at cards. If we replace, namely, the +numbers 1, 2, 3, 4 by the Ace, the King, the Queen, and the Knave, and +the numbers 0, 4, 8, 12 by the four suits, clubs, spades, hearts, and +diamonds, we shall at once perceive that it is possible, and must be so +necessarily, quadratically to arrange in such a manner the four Aces, +the four Kings, the Four Queens, and the four Knaves, that in each +horizontal, vertical, and diagonal row, each one of the four suits and +each one of the four denominations shall appear once and once only. The +auxiliary squares above given furnish the appended solution of this +problem: + +[Illustration: Fig. 21. + + +--------+--------+--------+--------+ + | CLUBS | SPADES | HEARTS |DIAMONDS| + | ACE | KING | QUEEN | KNAVE | + +--------+--------+--------+--------+ + | HEARTS |DIAMONDS| CLUBS | SPADES | + | KNAVE | QUEEN | KING | ACE | + +--------+--------+--------+--------+ + |DIAMONDS| HEARTS | SPADES | CLUBS | + | KING | ACE | KNAVE | QUEEN | + +--------+--------+--------+--------+ + | SPADES | CLUBS |DIAMONDS| HEARTS | + | QUEEN | KNAVE | ACE | KING | + +--------+--------+--------+--------+ +] + +To fix the solution of the problem in the memory, observe that, starting +from the several corners, each suit and each denomination must be placed +in the spots of the move of a Knight. If we fix the positions of the four +cards of any one row, there will be only two possibilities left of so +placing the other cards that the required condition of having each suit +and each denomination once and only once in each row shall be fulfilled. + +Of magic squares of an even number of places we have up to this point +examined only the squares of 4 and of 6. For the sake of completeness we +append here one of 8 and one of 10 places. The mode of construction of +these squares is similar to the method above discussed for the lower even +numbers. + +[Illustration: Fig. 22. + + +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+ + | 1|63|62| 4| 5|59|58| 8| + +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+ + |56|10|11|53|52|14|15|49| + +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+ + |48|18|19|45|44|22|23|41| + +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+ + |25|39|38|28|29|35|34|32| + +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+ + |33|31|30|36|37|27|26|40| + +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+ + |24|42|43|21|20|46|47|17| + +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+ + |16|50|51|13|12|54|55| 9| + +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+ + |57| 7| 6|60|61| 3| 2|64| + +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+ +] + +[Illustration: Fig. 23. + + +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+ + | 1 | 99| 3 | 97| 96| 5 | 94| 8 | 92| 10| + +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+ + | 90| 12| 88| 14| 86| 85| 17| 83| 19| 11| + +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+ + | 80| 79| 23| 77| 25| 26| 74| 28| 22| 71| + +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+ + | 31| 69| 68| 34| 66| 65| 37| 33| 62| 40| + +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+ + | 60| 42| 58| 57| 45| 46| 44| 53| 49| 51| + +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+ + | 50| 52| 43| 47| 55| 56| 54| 48| 59| 41| + +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+ + | 61| 32| 38| 64| 36| 35| 67| 63| 39| 70| + +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+ + | 21| 29| 73| 27| 75| 76| 24| 78| 72| 30| + +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+ + | 20| 82| 18| 84| 15| 16| 87| 13| 89| 81| + +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+ + | 91| 9 | 93| 4 | 6 | 95| 7 | 98| 2 |100| + +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+ +] + +The magic squares of even numbers thus constructed are not the only +possible ones. On the contrary, there are very many others possible, +which obey different laws of formation. It has been calculated, for +example, that with the square of 4 it is possible to construct 880, and +with the square of 6, _several million_, different magic squares. The +number of odd-numbered magic squares constructible by the method of De la +Hire is also very great. With the square of 7, the possible constructions +amount to 363,916,800. With the squares of higher numbers the multitude +of the possibilities increases in the same enormous ratio. + + +V. + +MAGIC SQUARES WHOSE SUMMATION GIVES THE NUMBER OF A YEAR. + +The magic squares which we have so far considered contain only the +natural numbers from 1 upwards. It is possible, however, easily to +deduce from a correct magic square other squares in which a different +law controls the sequence of the numbers to be inscribed. Of the squares +obtained in this manner, we shall devote our attention here only to such +in which, although formed by the inscription of successive numbers, the +sum obtained from the addition of the rows is a determinate number which +we have fixed upon beforehand, as _the number of a year_. In such a case +we have simply to add to the numbers of the original square a determinate +number so to be calculated, that the required sum shall each time appear. +If this sum is divisible by 3, magic squares will always be obtainable +with 3 times 3 spaces which shall give this sum. In such a case we divide +the sum required by 3 and subtract 5 from the result in order to obtain +the number which we have to add to each number of the original square. +If the sum desired is even but not divisible by 4, we must then subtract +from it 34 and take one fourth of the result, to obtain the number which +in this case is to be added in each place. If, for example, we wish to +obtain the number of the year 1890 as the resulting sum of each row, we +shall have to add to each of the numbers of an ordinary magic square of +4 times 4 spaces the number 464; in other words, instead of the numbers +from 1 to 16 we have to insert in the squares the numbers from 465 to +480. As the number of the present year 1892 is divisible by 11, it must +be possible to deduce from the magic square constructed by us at the +conclusion of Section III a second magic square in which each row of 11 +cells will give the number of the year 1892. To do this, we subtract from +1892 the sum of the original square, namely 671, and divide the remainder +by 11, whereby we get 111 and thus perceive that the numbers from 112 to +232 are to be inscribed in the cells of the square required. We get in +this way the preceding square, from which _one and the same sum, namely +1892, can be obtained 44 times_, first from each of the 11 horizontal +rows, secondly from each of the 11 vertical rows, thirdly from each of +the two diagonal rows, and fourthly twenty additional times from each +and every pair of any two rows that lie parallel to a diagonal, have +together 11 cells, and lie on different sides of the diagonal, as for +example, 196, 122, 158, 205, 131, 167, 214, 140, 187, 223, 149. + +[Illustration: Fig. 24. + + +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+ + | 112| 124| 136| 148| 160| 172| 184| 196| 208| 220| 232| = 1892 + +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+------- + | 147| 159| 171| 183| 195| 207| 219| 231| 122| 123| 135| = 1892 + +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+------- + | 182| 194| 206| 218| 230| 121| 133| 134| 146| 158| 170| = 1892 + +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+------- + | 217| 229| 120| 132| 144| 145| 157| 169| 181| 193| 205| = 1892 + +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+------- + | 131| 143| 155| 156| 168| 180| 192| 204| 216| 228| 119| = 1892 + +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+------- + | 166| 167| 179| 191| 203| 215| 227| 118| 130| 142| 154| = 1892 + +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+------- + | 190| 202| 214| 226| 117| 129| 141| 153| 165| 177| 178| = 1892 + +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+------- + | 225| 116| 128| 140| 152| 164| 176| 188| 189| 201| 213| = 1892 + +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+------- + | 139| 151| 163| 175| 187| 199| 200| 212| 224| 115| 127| = 1892 + +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+------- + | 174| 186| 198| 210| 211| 223| 114| 126| 138| 150| 162| = 1892 + +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+------- + | 209| 221| 222| 113| 125| 137| 149| 161| 173| 185| 197| = 1892 + +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+ + 1892 1892 1892 1892 1892 1892 1892 1892 1892 1892 1892 +] + + +VI. + +CONCENTRIC MAGIC SQUARES. + +The acuteness of the mathematicians has also discovered magic squares +which possess the peculiar property that if one row after another be +taken away from each side, the smaller inner squares remaining will +still be magical squares, that is to say, all their rows when added +will give the same sum. It will be sufficient to give two examples here +of such squares, (the laws for their construction being somewhat more +complicated,) of which the first has 7 times 7 and the second 8 times 8 +places. The numbers within each of the dark-bordered frames form with +respect to the centre smaller squares which in their own turn are magical. + +[Illustration: Fig. 25. + + +--+---+---+--+--+---+---+ + | 4| 5| 6 |43|39| 38| 40| + +--++================++--+ + |49||15| 16|33|30| 31|| 1| + +--||--++========++--||--+ + |48||37||22|27|26||13|| 2| + +--||--||--+--+--||--||--+ + |47||36||29|25|21||14|| 3| + +--||--||--+--+--||--||--+ + | 8||18||24|23|28||32||42| + +--||--++========++--||--+ + | 9||19| 34|17|20| 35||41| + +--++================++--+ + |10| 45| 44| 7|11| 12| 46| + +--+---+---+--+--+---+---+ +] + +[Illustration: Fig. 26. + + +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+ + | 1 | 56| 55| 11| 53| 13| 14| 57| + +---++=====================++---+ + | 63||15| 47| 22| 42| 24|45|| 2 | + +---||--+==============++--||---+ + | 62||49||25| 40| 34|31||16|| 3 | + +---||--||--+---+---+--||--||---+ + | 4 ||48||28| 37| 35|30||17|| 61| + +---||--||--+---+---+--||--||---+ + | 5 ||44||39| 26| 32|33||21|| 60| + +---||--||--+---+---+--||--||---+ + | 59||19||38| 27| 29|36||46|| 6 | + +---||--++=============++--||---+ + | 58||20| 18| 43| 23| 41|50|| 7 | + +---++=====================++---+ + | 8 | 9 | 10| 54| 12| 52| 51| 64| + +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+ +] + +In the first of these two squares the internal square of 3 times 3 places +contains the numbers from 21 to 29 in such a manner that each row gives +when added the sum of 75. This square lies within a larger one of 5 times +5 spaces, which contains the numbers from 13 to 37 in such a manner that +each row gives the sum of 125. Finally, this last square forms part of +a square of 7 times 7 places which contains the numbers from 1 to 49 so +that each row gives the sum of 175. + +In the second square the inner central square of 4 times 4 places +contains the numbers from 25 to 40 in such a manner that each row gives +the sum of 130. This square is the middle of a square of 6 times 6 places +which so contains the numbers from 15 to 50 that each row gives the sum +165. Finally, this last square is again the middle of an ordinary magic +square composed of the numbers from 1 to 64. + + +VII. + +MAGICAL SQUARES WITH MAGICAL PARTS. + +If we divide a square of 8 times 8 places by means of the two middle +lines parallel to its sides into 4 parts containing each 4 times 4 +spaces, we may propound the problem of so inserting the numbers from 1 +to 64 in these spaces that not only the whole shall form a magic square, +but also that each of the 4 parts individually shall be magical, that +is to say, give the same sum for each row. This problem also has been +successfully solved, as the following diagram will show. + +[Illustration: Fig. 27. + + +--+--+--+--++--+--+--+--+ + | 1| 4|63|62|| 5| 8|59|58| + +--+--+--+--++--+--+--+--+ + |64|61| 2| 3||60|57| 6| 7| + +--+--+--+--++--+--+--+--+ + |42|43|24|21||34|35|32|29| + +--+--+--+--++--+--+--+--+ + |23|22|41|44||31|30|33|36| + +===========++===========+ + |13|16|51|50|| 9|12|55|54| + +--+--+--+--++--+--+--+--+ + |52|49|14|15||56|53|10|11| + +--+--+--+--++--+--+--+--+ + |38|39|28|25||46|47|20|17| + +--+--+--+--++--+--+--+--+ + |27|26|37|40||19|18|45|48| + +--+--+--+--++--+--+--+--+ +] + +The 4 numbers in each row of any one of the sub-squares here, gives 130; +so that the sum of each one of the rows of the large square will be 260. + +Finally, in further illustration of this idea, we will submit to the +consideration of our readers a very remarkable square of the numbers from +1 to 81. This square, which will be found on the following page (Fig. +28), is divided by parallel lines into 9 parts, of which each contains 9 +consecutive numbers that severally make up a magic square by themselves. + +[Illustration: Fig. 28. + + +---+---+---++---+---+---++---+---+---+ + | 31| 36| 29|| 76| 81| 74|| 13| 18| 11| + +---+---+---++---+---+---++---+---+---+ + | 30| 32| 34|| 75| 77| 79|| 12| 14| 16| + +---+---+---++---+---+---++---+---+---+ + | 35| 28| 33|| 80| 73| 78|| 17| 10| 15| + +===========++===========++===========+ + | 22| 27| 20|| 40| 45| 38|| 58| 63| 56| + +---+---+---++---+---+---++---+---+---+ + | 21| 23| 25|| 39| 41| 43|| 57| 59| 61| + +---+---+---++---+---+---++---+---+---+ + | 26| 19| 24|| 44| 37| 42|| 62| 55| 60| + +===========++===========++===========+ + | 67| 72| 65|| 4 | 9 | 2 || 49| 54| 47| + +---+---+---++---+---+---++---+---+---+ + | 66| 68| 70|| 3 | 5 | 7 || 48| 50| 52| + +---+---+---++---+---+---++---+---+---+ + | 71| 64| 69|| 8 | 1 | 6 || 53| 46| 51| + +---+---+---++---+---+---++---+---+---+ +] + +Wonderful as the properties of this square may appear, the law by which +the author constructed it is equally simple. We have simply to regard the +9 parts as the 9 cells of a magic square of the numbers from I to IX and +then to inscribe by the magic prescript in the square designated as I the +numbers from 1 to 9, in the square designated as II the numbers from 10 +to 18, and so on. In this way the square above given is obtained from the +following base-square: + +[Illustration: Fig. 29. + + +----+----+----+ + | IV | IX | II | + +----+----+----+ + | III| V | VII| + +----+----+----+ + |VIII| I | VI | + +----+----+----+ +] + + +VIII. + +MAGIC SQUARES THAT INVOLVE THE MOVE OF THE CHESS-KNIGHT. + +What one of our readers does not know the problems contained in the +recreation columns of our magazines, the requirements of which are to +compose into a verse 8 times 8 quadratically arranged syllables, of +which every two successive syllables stand on spots so situated with +respect to each other that a chess-knight can move from the one to the +other? If we replace in such an arrangement the 64 successive syllables +by the 64 numbers from 1 to 64, we shall obtain a knight-problem made +up of numbers. Methods also exist indeed for the construction of +such dispositions of numbers, which then form the foundation of the +construction of the problems in the newspapers. But the majority of +knight-problems of this class are the outcome of experiment rather than +the product of methodical creation. If however it is a severe test of +patience to form a knight-problem by experiment, it stands to reason that +it is a still severer trial to effect at the same time the additional +result that the 64 numbers which form the knight-problem shall also form +a magic square. + +This trial of endurance was undertaken several decades ago, by a +pensioned Moravian officer named Wenzelides, who was spending the last +days of his life in the country. After a series of trials which lasted +years he finally succeeded in so inscribing in the 64 squares of the +chess-board the numbers from 1 to 64 that successive numbers, as well +also as the numbers 64 and 1, were always removed from one another in +distance and direction by the move of a knight, and that in addition +thereto the summation of the horizontal and the vertical rows always +gave the same sum 260. Ultimately he discovered several squares of this +description, which were published in the _Berlin Chess Journal_. One of +these is here appended: + +[Illustration: Fig. 30. + + +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+ + |47|10|23|64|49| 2|59| 6| + +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+ + |22|63|48| 9|60| 5|50| 3| + +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+ + |11|46|61|24| 1|52| 7|58| + +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+ + |62|21|12|45| 8|57| 4|51| + +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+ + |19|36|25|40|13|44|53|30| + +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+ + |26|39|20|33|56|29|14|43| + +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+ + |35|18|37|28|41|16|31|54| + +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+ + |38|27|34|17|32|55|42|15| + +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+ +] + +The move of the knight and the equality of the summation of the +horizontal and vertical rows, therefore, are the facts to be noted here. +The diagonal rows do _not_ give the sum 260. Perhaps some one among our +readers who possesses the time and patience will be tempted to outdo +Wenzelides, and to devise a numeral knight-problem of this kind which +will give 260 not only in the horizontal and vertical but also in the two +diagonal rows. + + +IX. + +MAGICAL POLYGONS. + +So far we have only considered such extensions of the idea underlying +the construction of the magic square in which the figure of the square +was retained. We may however contrive extensions of the idea in which +instead of a square, a rectangle, a triangle, or a pentagon, and the +like, appear. Without entering into the consideration of the methods for +the construction of such figures, we will give here of magical polygons +simply a few examples, all supplied by Professor Scheffler: + +1) The numbers from 1 to 32 admit of being written in a rectangle of 4 × +8 in such a manner that the long horizontal rows give the sum of 132 and +the short vertical rows the sum of 66; thus: + +[Illustration: Fig. 31. + + +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+ + | 1|10|11|29|28|19|18|16| + +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+ + | 9| 2|30|12|20|27| 7|25| + +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+ + |24|31| 3|21|13| 6|26| 8| + +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+ + |32|23|22| 4| 5|14|15|17| + +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+ +] + +2) The numbers from 1 to 27 admit of being so arranged in three regular +triangles about a point which forms a common centre, that each side of +the outermost triangle will present 6 numbers of the total summation 96 +and each side of the middle triangle 4 numbers whose sum is 61; as the +following figure shows: + +[Illustration: Fig. 32. + + 26 3 6 10 24 27 + 20 9 11 21 + 18 2 + 16 17 + 15 8 + 22 5 + 12 + 7 13 + 4 23 + 19 + 1 14 + + 25 +] + +3) The numbers from 1 to 80 admit of being formed about a point as common +centre into 4 pentagons, such that each side of the first pentagon from +within contains two numbers, each side of the second pentagon four +numbers, each of the third six numbers, and each side of the fourth, +outermost pentagon eight numbers. The sum of the numbers of each side of +the second pentagon is 122, the sum of those of each side of the third +pentagon is 248, and that of those of each side of the fourth pentagon +254. Furthermore, the sum of any four corner numbers lying in the same +straight line with the centre, is also the same; namely, 92. + +[Illustration: Fig. 33. + + 1 + 26 54 + 31 49 + 10 15 80 + 76 36 44 9 + 50 70 72 32 + 55 71 16 66 27 + 5 45 25 65 37 2 + 11 61 60 24 14 + 30 20 17 53 + 40 56 59 43 + 35 21 64 48 + 69 57 58 73 + 6 79 + 77 75 62 23 67 8 + 46 41 19 22 63 18 38 33 + 51 12 39 68 74 42 13 28 + 4 29 34 7 78 47 52 3 +] + +4) The numbers from 1 to 73 admit of being arranged about a centre, +in which the number 37 is written, into three hexagons which contain +respectively 3, 5, and 7 numbers in each side and possess the following +pretty properties. Each hexagon always gives the same sum, not only when +the summation is made along its six sides, but also when it is made along +the six diameters that join its corners and along the six that are +constructed at right angles to its sides; this sum, for the first hexagon +from within, is 111, for the second 185, and for the third 259. + +[Illustration: Fig. 34. + + 1 5 6 70 60 59 58 + 63 8 + 62 19 53 46 22 45 9 + 61 20 24 64 + 2 48 31 42 38 49 57 + 3 47 39 40 44 56 + 67 51 41 37 33 23 7 + 66 50 34 35 54 11 + 65 25 36 32 43 26 12 + 10 30 27 13 + 17 29 21 28 52 55 72 + 18 71 + 16 69 68 4 14 15 73 +] + + +X. + +MAGIC CUBES. + +Several inquirers, particularly Kochansky (1686), Sauveur (1710), Hugel +(1859), and Scheffler (1882), have extended the principle of the magic +squares of the plane to three-dimensioned space. Imagine a cube divided +by planes parallel to its sides and equidistant from one another, +into cubical compartments. The problem is then, so to insert in these +compartments the successive natural numbers that every row from the right +to the left, every row from the front to the back, every row from the top +to the bottom, every diagonal of a square, and every principal diagonal +passing through the centre of the cube shall contain numbers whose sum is +always the same. For 3 times 3 times 3 compartments, a magic cube of this +description is not constructible. For 4 times, 4 times 4 compartments a +cube is constructible such that any row parallel to an edge of the cube +and every principal diagonal give the sum of 130. To obtain a magic cube +of 64 compartments, imagine the numbers which belong in the compartments +written on the upper surface of the same and the numbers then taken +off in layers of 16 from the top downwards. We obtain thus 4 squares of +16 cells each, which together make up the magic cube; as the following +diagrams will show: + +[Illustration: + + First Layer Second Layer Third Layer Fourth Layer + from the Top. from the Top. from the Top. from the Top. + +--+--+--+--+ +--+--+--+--+ +--+--+--+--+ +--+--+--+--+ + | 1|48|32|49| |63|18|34|15| |62|19|35|14| | 4|45|29|52| + +--+--+--+--+ +--+--+--+--+ +--+--+--+--+ +--+--+--+--+ + |60|21|37|12| | 6|43|27|54| | 7|42|26|55| |57|24|40| 9| + +--+--+--+--+ +--+--+--+--+ +--+--+--+--+ +--+--+--+--+ + |56|25|41| 8| |10|39|23|58| |11|38|22|29| |53|28|44| 5| + +--+--+--+--+ +--+--+--+--+ +--+--+--+--+ +--+--+--+--+ + |13|36|20|61| |51|30|46| 3| |50|31|47| 2| |16|33|17|64| + +--+--+--+--+ +--+--+--+--+ +--+--+--+--+ +--+--+--+--+ +] + +The same sum 130 here comes out not less than 52 times; viz. in the first +place from the 16 rows from left to right, secondly from the 16 rows from +the front to the back, thirdly from the 16 rows counting from the top +to the bottom, and lastly from the 4 rows which join each two opposite +corners of the cube, namely from the rows: 1, 43, 22, 64; 49, 27, 38, 16; +13, 39, 26, 52; 61, 23, 42, 4. + +For a cube with 5 compartments in each edge the arrangement of the +figures can so be made that all the 75 rows parallel to any and every +edge, all the 30 rows lying in any diagonal of a square, and all the +4 rows forming any principal diagonal shall have one and the same +summation, 315. + +Just as the magic squares of an odd number of cells could be formed with +the aid of _two_ auxiliary squares, so also odd-numbered magic cubes can +be constructed with the help of _three_ auxiliary cubes. + +[Illustration: + + First Layer from Top. Second Layer from Top. Third Layer from Top. + +---+---+---+---+---+ +---+---+---+---+---+ +---+---+---+---+---+ + |121| 27| 83| 14| 70| | 2 | 58|114| 45| 96| | 33| 89| 20| 71|102| + +---+---+---+---+---+ +---+---+---+---+---+ +---+---+---+---+---+ + | 10| 61|117| 48| 79| | 36| 92| 23| 54|110| | 67|123| 29| 85| 11| + +---+---+---+---+---+ +---+---+---+---+---+ +---+---+---+---+---+ + | 44|100| 1 | 57|113| | 75|101| 32| 88| 19| | 76| 7 | 63|119| 50| + +---+---+---+---+---+ +---+---+---+---+---+ +---+---+---+---+---+ + | 53|109| 40| 91| 22| | 84| 15| 66|122| 28| |115| 41| 97| 3 | 59| + +---+---+---+---+---+ +---+---+---+---+---+ +---+---+---+---+---+ + | 87| 18| 74|105| 31| |118| 49| 80| 6 | 62| | 24| 55|106| 37| 93| + +---+---+---+---+---+ +---+---+---+---+---+ +---+---+---+---+---+ + + Fourth Layer from Top. Lowest Layer. + +---+---+---+---+---+ +---+---+---+---+---+ + | 64|120| 46| 77| 8 | | 95| 21| 52|108| 39| + +---+---+---+---+---+ +---+---+---+---+---+ + | 98| 4 | 60|111| 42| |104| 35| 86| 17| 73| + +---+---+---+---+---+ +---+---+---+---+---+ + |107| 38| 94| 25| 51| | 13| 69|125| 26| 82| + +---+---+---+---+---+ +---+---+---+---+---+ + | 16| 72|103| 34| 90| | 47| 78| 9 | 65|116| + +---+---+---+---+---+ +---+---+---+---+---+ + | 30| 81| 12| 68|124| | 56|112| 43| 99| 5 | + +---+---+---+---+---+ +---+---+---+---+---+ +] + +In this manner the preceding magic cube of 5 times 5 times 5 compartments +is formed, in which, it may be additionally noticed, the middle number +between 1 and 125, namely 63, is placed in the central compartment; by +which arrangement the attainment of the sum of 315 is assured in the four +principal diagonals and the 30 sub-diagonals. The condition attained in +the magic squares, that the diagonal-pairs parallel to the sub-diagonals +also shall give the sum 315 is not attainable in this case but is so in +the case of higher numbers of compartments. + + +CONCLUSION. + +Musing on such problems as are the magic squares is fascinating to +thinkers of a mathematical turn of mind. We take delight in discovering +a harmony that abides as an intrinsic quality in the forms of our +thought. The problems of the magic squares are playful puzzles, invented +as it seems for mere pastime and sport. But there is a deeper problem +underlying all these little riddles, and this deeper problem is of a +sweeping significance. It is the philosophical problem of the world-order. + +The formal sciences are creations of the mind. We build the sciences of +mathematics, geometry, and algebra with our conception of pure forms +which are abstract ideas. And the same order that prevails in these +mental constructions permeates the universe, so that an old philosopher, +overwhelmed with the grandeur of law, imagined he heard its rhythm in a +cosmic harmony of the spheres. + + H. SCHUBERT. + + +FOOTNOTES: + +[68] The term melancholy meant in Dürer’s time, as it did also in +Shakespeare’s and Milton’s, “thought or thoughtfulness.” Says Milton in +_Il Penseroso_: + + “Hail, thou Goddess, sage and holy, + Hail divinest melancholy + Whose saintly visage is too bright + To hit the sense of human sight, + And therefore to our weaker view + O’erlaid with black, staid Wisdom’s hue.”—I, 12. + +Thought that does not lead to action produces a gloomy state of mind. +Thoughtfulness which cannot find a way out of itself is that melancholy +which engenders weakness,—a truth which is illustrated in Hamlet. +Shakespeare still uses the words thought and melancholy as synonyms, +saying: + + “The native hue of resolution + Is sicklied o’er with the pale cast of thought.” + +Dürer’s melancholy does not represent the gloominess of thought, but the +power of invention. Soberness and even a certain sadness are considered +only as an element of this melancholy, but on the whole the genius of +thought appears bright, self-possessed, and strong. + +Dürer represents the Science of Mechanical Invention as a winged female +figure musing over some problem. Scattered on the floor around her lie +some of the simple tools used in the sixteenth century. A ladder leans +against the house, that assists in climbing otherwise inaccessible +heights. A scale, an hour-glass, a bell, and the magic square are hanging +on the wall behind her. + +At a distance a bat-like creature, being the gloom of melancholy, hovers +in the air like a dark cloud, but the sun rises above the horizon, and at +the happy middle between these two extremes stands the rainbow of serene +hope and cheerful confidence. + + + + +MR. SPENCER ON THE ETHICS OF KANT. + + +Mr. Herbert Spencer published in the _Fortnightly Review_ for July 1888 +and in the _Popular Science Monthly_ for August of the same year an +article on “The Ethics of Kant” in which he so strangely misrepresents +Kant’s position that Kant to any uninitiated reader must appear not only +as superficial and shallow, but even as palpably nonsensical. + +Mr. Spencer’s article on “The Ethics of Kant” is a severe criticism +mainly of the nonsensical idea, erroneously imputed to Kant, of a will +that has no end. At the same time Mr. Spencer reproaches Kant with +assuming the simplicity of conscience and believing in a non-evolutionary +origin of the minds of living beings. + +In reply to Mr. Spencer an editorial article appeared in _The Open +Court_ under the caption “Herbert Spencer on the Ethics of Kant” (Nos. +51 and 52), which was supplemented by another article entitled “Kant on +Evolution” (No. 158), the latter being elicited by a renewed attack of +Mr. Spencer upon Kant’s views (which appeared in _Mind_, No. LIX, p. 313). + +Mr. Spencer has republished his article “The Ethics of Kant” together +with many other older articles in a work of three volumes entitled +“Essays Scientific, Political, and Speculative,” 1891, in which he +repeats the following sentence: + + “Thus the basis of the argument by which Kant attempts to + justify his assumption that there exists a good will apart from + a good end, disappears utterly; and leaves his dogma in all its + naked unthinkableness.” + +To this sentence he adds the following foot-note as a reply to my +criticisms: + + “I find that in the above three paragraphs I have done Kant + less than justice and more than justice—less, in assuming + that his evolutionary view was limited to the genesis of + our sidereal system, and more, in assuming that he had not + contradicted himself. My knowledge of Kant’s writings is + extremely limited. In 1844 a translation of his ‘Critique of + Pure Reason’ (then I think lately published) fell into my + hands, and I read the first few pages enunciating his doctrine + of Time and Space: my peremptory rejection of which caused + me to lay the book down. Twice since then the same thing has + happened; for, being an impatient reader, when I disagree with + the cardinal propositions of a work I can go no further. One + other thing I knew. By indirect references I was made aware + that Kant had propounded the idea that celestial bodies have + been formed by the aggregation of diffused matter. Beyond + this my knowledge of his conceptions did not extend; and my + supposition that his evolutionary conception had stopped + short with the genesis of sun, stars, and planets, was due + to the fact that his doctrine of Time and Space, as forms of + thought anteceding experience, implied a supernatural origin + inconsistent with the hypothesis of natural genesis. Dr. Paul + Carus, who, shortly after the publication of this article + in the _Fortnightly Review_ for July, 1888, undertook to + defend the Kantian ethics in the American journal which he + edits, _The Open Court_, has now (Sept. 4, 1890), in another + defensive article, translated sundry passages from Kant’s + ‘Critique of Judgment,’ his ‘Presumable Origin of Humanity,’ + and his work ‘Upon the different Races of Mankind,’ showing + that Kant was, if not fully, yet partially, an evolutionist in + his speculations about living beings. There is, perhaps, some + reason for doubting the correctness of Dr. Carus’s rendering + of these passages into English. When, as in the first of + the articles just named, he failed to distinguish between + consciousness and conscientiousness, and when, as in this + last article, he blames the English for mistranslating Kant, + since they have said ‘Kant maintained that Space and Time are + intuitions,’ which is quite untrue, for they have everywhere + described him as maintaining that Space and Time are _forms_ + of intuition, one may be excused for thinking that possibly + Dr. Carus has read into some of Kant’s expressions, meanings + which they do not rightly bear. Still, the general drift of + the passages quoted makes it tolerably clear that Kant must + have believed in the operation of natural causes as largely, + though not entirely, instrumental in producing organic forms: + extending this belief (which he says ‘can be named a daring + venture of reason’) in some measure to the origin of Man + himself. He does not, however extend the theory of natural + genesis to the exclusion of the theory of supernatural genesis. + When he speaks of an organic habit ‘which in the wisdom of + nature appears to be thus arranged in order that the species + shall be preserved’; and when, further, he says ‘we see, + moreover, that a germ of reason is placed in him, whereby, + after the development of the same, he is destined for social + intercourse,’ he implies divine intervention. And this shows + that I was justified in ascribing to him the belief that Space + and Time, as forms of thought, are supernatural endowments. Had + he conceived of organic evolution in a consistent manner, he + would necessarily have regarded Space and Time as subjective + forms generated by converse with objective realities. + + “Beyond showing that Kant had a partial, if not a complete, + belief in organic evolution (though with no idea of its + causes), the passages translated by Dr. Carus show that he + entertained an implied belief which it here specially concerns + me to notice as bearing on his theory of ‘a good will.’ He + quotes approvingly Dr. Moscati’s lecture showing ‘that the + upright walk of man is constrained and unnatural,’ and showing + the imperfect visceral arrangements and consequent diseases + which result: not only adopting, but further illustrating, + Dr. Moscati’s argument. If here, then, there is a distinct + admission, or rather assertion, that various human organs are + imperfectly adjusted to their functions, what becomes of the + postulate above quoted ‘that no organ for any purpose will be + found in it but what is also the fittest and best adapted for + that purpose’? And what becomes of the argument which sets out + with this postulate? Clearly, I am indebted to Dr. Carus for + enabling me to prove that Kant’s defence of his theory of ‘a + good will’ is, by his own showing, baseless.” + +Mr. Spencer’s reply to my criticisms is surprising in more than one +respect. + +First, without even mentioning the objections I make he discredits my +arguments by throwing doubt upon the correctness of the translations of +the quoted passages. + +Secondly, he alleges, with a view of justifying his doubt, that in the +first of my articles I “failed to distinguish between consciousness and +conscientiousness.”[69] + +Thirdly, Mr. Spencer declares that I had “read into some of Kant’s +expressions, meanings which they do not rightly bear.” + +Fourthly, Mr. Spencer bases this opinion upon a double mistake: he blames +me for not distinguishing between the Kantian phrases that “Space and +Time are intuitions” and that they are “forms of intuition.” + +Fifthly, acknowledging after all that Kant had at least “a partial belief +in organic evolution,” Mr. Spencer accuses him of inconsistency. + +Sixthly, several statements concerning Kant’s views are made not because +Kant held them but because Mr. Spencer assumes for trivial reasons that +he is “justified in ascribing them to him.” + +Seventhly, these statements so vigorously set forth are accompanied by +Mr. Spencer’s remarkably frank confession of unfamiliarity with the +subject under discussion. + +It may be added that Mr. Spencer calls my criticisms “defensive +articles.” He says that “I undertook to defend the Kantian ethics”; +while, in fact, my articles are aggressive. Kant needs no defense for +being misunderstood, and it would not be my business to defend him, for +I am not a Kantian in the sense that I adopt any of the main doctrines +of Kant. On the contrary I dissent from him on almost all fundamental +questions. In ethics I object to Kant’s views in so far as they can be +considered as pure formalism.[70] I am a Kantian only in the sense that +I respect Kant as one of the most eminent philosophers, that I revere +him as that teacher of mine whose influence upon me was greatest, and +I consider the study of Kant’s works as an indispensable requisite for +understanding the problems of the philosophy of our time. Far from +defending Kant’s position, I only undertook to inform Mr. Spencer of what +Kant had really maintained, so that instead of denouncing absurdities +which Kant had never thought of, he might criticise the real Kant. + + * * * * * + +I shall now take up the details of Mr. Spencer’s reply: + + +I. + +I am sorry to see that Mr. Spencer, instead of frankly acknowledging +his errors, has taken refuge in discrediting the translations, which +might very easily have been examined either by himself or by friends of +his; especially as the German original of the most important passages, +wherever any doubt might arise, and also of those expressions on the +misconception of which Mr. Spencer bases his unfavorable opinion of Kant, +were added in foot-notes. + + +II. + +But Mr. Spencer adduces, as if it were a fact, an instance of my grave +mistakes. He says that I failed to distinguish between “consciousness” +and “conscientiousness.” Mr. Spencer makes much of a small matter, which, +if it were as he assumes, would have to be considered as a misprint. + +Mr. Spencer’s statement is so positive that it must make on any reader +the impression of being indubitably true. However, in the whole first +article of mine, and indeed in both articles, “conscientiousness” +is nowhere mentioned and it would be wrong to replace the word +“consciousness” in any of the passages in which it occurs by +“conscientiousness.” + +I should be glad if Mr. Spencer would kindly point out to me the +passage which he had in mind when making his statement, for since there +is not even so much as an occasion for confounding consciousness and +conscientiousness, I stand here before a psychological problem. Mr. +Spencer’s statement is a perfect riddle to me. Either I have a negative +hallucination, as psychologists call it, so that I do not see what is +really there, or Mr. Spencer must have had a positive hallucination. That +which Mr. Spencer has read into my article, was never written and it is +not there. The alleged fact to which he refers, does not exist. + +This kind of erroneous reference into which Mr. Spencer has inadvertently +fallen is a very grievous mistake. It appears more serious than a simple +slip of the pen, when we consider that Mr. Spencer uses the statement for +the purpose of incrimination. He justifies upon this exceedingly slender +basis his doubt concerning the correctness of the translations of the +quoted passages, and Mr. Spencer’s doubt concerning the correctness of +these translations is his main argument for rejecting my criticisms _in +toto_. + +It is not impossible, indeed it is probable, that Mr. Spencer meant +“conscience” instead of “conscientiousness.” There is one passage in +which a superficial reader might have expected “conscience” in place of +“consciousness.” However that does not occur in any of the translations, +but in a paragraph where I speak on my own account. This passage appears +in the appended reprint on page 23, line 14. Whatever anybody might have +expected in that passage, I certainly intended to say “consciousness,” +and only a hasty reader, only he who might merely read the first line of +the paragraph, would consider the word “consciousness” a mistake. + +To avoid any equivocation, however, even to hasty readers, and to guard +against a misconstruction such as Mr. Spencer possibly has given to the +sentence, I propose to alter the passage by adding a few words as follows: + + “It is quite true that _not only conscience, but_ every state + of consciousness is a feeling,” etc. + +The italicised words are inserted, simply to show that here I mean +“consciousness,” and _not_ “conscience.” For the rest, they do not alter +in the least the sense of the sentence. In this passage as throughout the +whole article the terms “consciousness,” and “conscience” have been used +properly. + + * * * * * + +Observing that Mr. Spencer appears to have committed the same mistake for +which he erroneously blames me, I do not mean to say that he “failed to +distinguish between” conscientiousness and conscience. I should rather +regard it as trifling on my part if I drew this inference from what is +either a slip of the pen or an oversight in proof-reading. But it strikes +me that that knavish rogue among the fairies whom Shakespeare calls Puck +and scientists define as chance or coincidence played in a fit of anger +and perhaps from a sentiment of pardonable irony a humorous trick upon +Mr. Spencer. The moral of it is that when an author censures his fellow +authors with undue severity for things that might be mere misprints, he +should keep a close eye on his own printer’s devil. + + +III. + +Mr. Spencer discredits my knowledge of Kant. He says of me: + + “One may be excused for thinking that possibly Dr. Carus has + read into some of Kant’s expressions, meanings which they do + not rightly bear.” + +I did not give Mr. Spencer any occasion for making this personal +reflection. I do not boast of any extraordinary familiarity with Kant’s +writings. There are innumerable German and also English and American +scholars and philosophers who know Kant almost by heart. But the question +at issue is not what I conceive Kant’s ideas to be, but what Kant has +really said, and I was very careful in letting Kant speak for himself. + +My criticism of Mr. Spencer’s conception of Kant consisted almost +exclusively in collating and contrasting Mr. Spencer’s views of Kant with +quotations from Kant’s works. How can I read anything into some of Kant’s +expressions, if I present translations of the expressions themselves, +adding thereto in foot-notes the original whenever doubts could arise? +And the general drift of the quotations alone suffices to overthrow Mr. +Spencer’s conception of Kant. + +The truth is that Mr. Spencer committed the mistake himself, for which +he censures me unjustly. “Mr. Spencer has read into some of Kant’s +expressions meanings which they do not rightly bear.” + + +IV. + +But Mr. Spencer adduces a fact, which, if it were as Mr. Spencer +represents it, would show an inability on my part of making important +distinctions. He says of me: + + “He blames the English for mistranslating Kant, since they have + said ‘Kant maintained that Space and Time are intuitions,’ + which is quite untrue, for they have everywhere described him + as maintaining that Space and Time are _forms_ of intuition.” + +This is a double mistake: (1) Kant and his translators did not make +the distinction of which Mr. Spencer speaks, and (2) the quotation Mr. +Spencer makes from my article is represented to mean something different +from what it actually means in the context. + +Before I speak for myself as to what I actually said, let us state the +facts concerning Kant’s usage of the terms “intuitions” and “forms of +intuition.” + +Kant defines in § 1 of his “Critique of Pure Reason” what he understands +by “Transcendental Æsthetic.” He distinguishes between “empirical +intuition” (_empirische Anschauung_) and “pure intuition” (_reine +Anschauung_). He says: + + “That sort of intuition which relates to an object by means of + sensation, is called an empirical intuition.” + +Representations contain besides that which belongs to sensation some +other elements. Kant says: + + “That which effects that the content of the phenomenon can be + arranged under certain relations, I call its _form_.” + +And later on he continues: + + “This pure form of sensibility I shall call pure intuition.” + +These are Kant’s phrases in J. M. D. Meiklejohn’s well known translation. +The term “pure intuition” is repeated again and again, and we find +frequently added by way of explanation the phrases “as a mere form +of sensibility,” “the mere form of phenomena,” “forms of sensuous +intuition,” and also (as Mr. Spencer emphasises as the only correct way) +“forms of intuition.” + +Kant says: + + 1) “_Diese reine Form der Sinnlichkeit wird auch selber reine + Anschauung heissen._ § 1. + + 2) “_Zweitens worden wir von dieser (der empirischen + Anschauung) noch alles abtrennen, damit nichts als reine + Anschauung und die blosse Form der Erscheinungen übrig bleibe._ + § 1. + + 3) “_Raum ... muss ursprünglich Anschauung sein._ § 3. + + 4) “_Der Raum ist nichts anderes als nur die Form aller + Erscheinungen äusserer Sinne._ § 3. + + 5) “_Der Raum aber betrifft nur die reine Form der Anschauung._ + (This passage appears in the first edition only, the paragraph + containing it is omitted in the second edition.) § 3. + + 6) “_Die Zeit ist ... eine reine Form der sinnlichen + Anschauung...._ § 4. + + 7) “_Es muss ihr[71] unmittelbare Anschauung zum Grunde + liegen._ § 4. + + 8) “_Die Zeit ist nichts anderes als die Form des inneren + Sinnes._ § 6. + + 9) “_... dass die Vorstellung der Zeit selbst Anschauung sei._ + § 6. + + 10) “_Wir haben nun ... reine Anschauung a priori, Raum und + Zeit._ § 10. _Beschluss der transcendentalen Æsthetik._” + +These quotations do not pretend to be exhaustive, nor is that necessary +for the present purpose. + +Kant, as we learn from these quotations, makes no distinction between +_reine Anschauung_ and _Form der Anschauung_. He uses most frequently the +term _reine Anschauung_ and designates in several places Space and Time +simply as _Anschauung_. (See the quotations 3, 7, and 9.) So far as I can +gather from a renewed perusal, the expression proposed by Mr. Spencer, +“form of intuition,” _Form der Anschauung_, occurs only once and that too +in a passage omitted in the second edition. + +It is almost redundant to add that the English translators and +interpreters of Kant follow the original pretty closely. Accordingly it +is actually incorrect “that they have everywhere(!) described Kant as +maintaining that Space and Time are _forms_ of intuition.” In addition +to the quotations from Meiklejohn, I call Mr. Spencer’s attention to +William Flemming’s “Vocabulary of Philosophy” (4th ed., edited by Henry +Calderwood) which reads _sub voce_ “Intuition,” p. 228 with reference to +Kant’s view: + + “Space and time are _intuitions_ of sense.” + +To say “Time and Space are forms of intuition” is quite correct according +to Kantian terminology. No objection can be made to Mr. Spencer on that +ground. But to say “Time and Space are intuitions” is also quite correct, +and Mr. Spencer is wrong in censuring the expression. + +Why does Mr. Spencer rebuke me so severely on a point which is of no +consequence? He appears confident that I have betrayed an unpardonable +misconception of Kant’s philosophy. But having pointed out by quotations +from Kant that this is not so, I shall now proceed to explain why the +quotation which Mr. Spencer makes from my article, although the eight +words in quotation marks are literally quoted, is a misquotation. It +is torn out of its context. I did not blame the English translators +of Kant at all, but I blamed his interpreters, among whom the English +interpreters (not all English interpreters, but certainly some of them) +are the worst, for “mutilating Kant’s best thoughts, so that this hero of +progress appears as a stronghold of antiquated views”; and as an instance +I called attention to the misconception of Kant’s term _Anschauung_, +saying: + + “How different is Kant’s philosophy, for instance, if his + position with reference to time and space is mistaken! ‘Time + and Space are our _Anschauung_,’ Kant says. But his English + translators declare ‘Kant maintained that space and time + are intuitions.’ What a difference it makes if intuition + is interpreted in the sense applied to it by the English + intuitionalist school instead of its being taken in the + original meaning of the word _Anschauung_.” + +The word “intuition” implies something mysterious; the word _Anschauung_ +denotes that which is immediately perceived, simply, as it were, by +looking at it. So especially the sense-perceptions of the things before +us are _Anschauungen_. + +Mr. Spencer, believing that he had caught me in making unawares a +blunder, tears the passage out of its context, ignores its purport, +makes a point of an antithesis which had nothing in the world to do +with the topic under discussion, only to throw on me the opprobrium +of incompetence. Even if Mr. Spencer’s antithesis of “intuition” and +“forms of intuition” were of any consequence (as, unfortunately for Mr. +Spencer, it is not), it would count for nothing against me because I did +not speak of “forms” in the passage referred to, I simply alluded to one +misinterpretation of the term _Anschauung_, which is quite common among +English Kantians. It was not required by the purpose I had in view, to +enter into any details as to what kind of _Anschauung_ I meant, and an +allusion to “form” or to any other subject would have served only to +confound the idea which I intended to set forth in the paragraph from +which Mr. Spencer quotes. + +Misquotation of this kind, into which Mr. Spencer was inveigled by a +hasty reading, should be avoided with utmost care, for it involves an +insinuation. It leads away from the main point under discussion to side +issues, and it misrepresents the author from whom the quotation is made. +It insinuates a meaning which the passage does not bear and which was not +even thought of in the context out of which it is torn. + +Mr. Spencer quotes the passage as if I had preferred the term “intuition” +to the term “form of intuition,” or at least, as if I had no idea that +Kant conceives Time and Space as “forms.” Yet Mr. Spencer in trying to +make out a point against me betrays his own lack of information. Kant +insisted most emphatically on calling the forms of our sensibility (i. e. +space and time) “_Anschauungen_.” + +But Mr. Spencer’s case is worse still. While he insists upon the +statement that according to the translators of Kant space and time are +“forms of intuition,” which is at least correct, he uses twice in the +very same paragraph the expression that according to Kant “space and +time are forms of thought,” which is incorrect. The forms of thought +according to Kantian terminology are not space and time but the domain of +the transcendental logic. Anyone who confounds the two terms “forms of +intuition” and “forms of thought” proves himself unable to form a correct +opinion on Kant’s philosophy. That is just characteristic of Kant that +he regards time and space not as thought, nor as forms of thought, but +as _Anschauungen_ and in contradistinction to sense-intuitions (i. e. +sensations) he calls them _reine Anschauungen_ or _Formen der Anschauung_. + + +V. + +Mr. Spencer commenting upon his criticism of Kant’s idea of a Good Will, +says: + + “I find that in the above three paragraphs I have done Kant + less than justice and more than justice—less, in assuming + that his evolutionary view was limited to the genesis of + our sidereal system, and more, in assuming that he had not + contradicted himself. + + “Clearly, I am indebted to Dr. Carus for enabling me to prove + that Kant’s defence of his theory of ‘a good will’ is, by his + own showing, baseless.” + +Kant’s idea of a good will has nothing to do with evolution, and we can +abstain here from discussing whether or not Kant was an evolutionist. +Whether evolution is true or not, what difference does it make to the +proposition, that a good will is the only thing which can be called good +without further qualification (_ohne Einschränkung_)? Pleasure is good, +but it is not absolutely good, there are cases in which pleasure is a +very bad thing. We must qualify our statement and limit it to special +cases. A good will, however, says Kant, is in itself good under all +circumstances. + +Did Mr. Spencer prove the baselessness of Kant’s proposition by proving +evolution? Is it inconsistent to believe in evolution and at the same +time to regard a good will as absolutely good, as good without reserve or +limitation? I think not! + + +VI. + +Mr. Spencer in admitting that “the general drift of the passages quoted +makes it tolerably clear that Kant must have believed in the operation of +natural causes ... in producing organic forms,” adds: + + “He does not, however, extend the theory of natural genesis to + the exclusion of the theory of supernatural genesis.” + +How does Mr. Spencer prove his statement? Does he quote a passage from +Kant which expresses his belief in supernaturalism? No, Mr. Spencer does +not quote Kant, and it would be difficult to find a passage to suit that +purpose. Mr. Spencer adduces a few unmeaning phrases gleaned at random +and torn out of their context, and from these phrases he concludes +that Kant believed in the supernatural. Kant spoke somewhere of “the +wisdom of nature” who has things so arranged that the species might be +preserved. If the wisdom of nature in preserving the species is to be +taken literally, the phrase might prove that Kant believed nature to be a +wise old woman. Kant spoke further of “the germ of reason placed in man +whereby he is destined to social intercourse.” Does the usage of the word +“destined” really “imply divine intervention,” as Mr. Spencer says? Mr. +Spencer adds: + + “And this [viz. Kant’s usage of these phrases] shows that I was + justified in ascribing to him the belief that Space and Time, + as forms of thought [sic!], are supernatural endowments.” + +What might we not prove by this kind of loose argumentation! + +Kant did not introduce any supernatural explanations; on the contrary, he +proposed to exclude “supernatural genesis.” He says e. g. in a passage of +the “Critique of Judgment” quoted on page 41 of the appendix: + + “If we assume occasionalism for the production of organised + beings, nature is thereby wholly discarded ... therefore it + cannot be supposed that this system is accepted by anyone who + has had to do with philosophy.” + +And furthermore Kant rejects the partial admission of the supernatural, +saying: + + “As though it were not the same to make the required forms + arise in a supernatural manner at the beginning of the world as + during its progress.” + +Mr. Spencer charges Kant with inconsistency. We do not intend to say that +Kant was in all the phases of his development consistent with himself. +But we do say that the charge of Mr. Spencer against Kant consists in +this: the real Kant has said things which are incompatible with Mr. +Spencer’s view of Kant. + +This settles the sixth point. + + +VII. + +Mr. Spencer’s reply to my criticism is a very strange piece of +controversy and I have actually been at a loss, how to account for it. + +The situation can be explained only by assuming that Mr. Spencer, +being an impatient reader, when finding out that he disagreed with my +propositions, could go no further and wrote his reply to me without +having read my articles. This is very hard on a critic who, carefully +avoiding everything that might look like fault-finding, is painstakingly +careful in giving to the author criticised every means of investigating +the truth himself and helps him in a friendly way to correct his errors. + +There is only one consolation for me, which is, that I am in good +company. The great thinker of Koenigsberg is very severely censured in +almost all of Mr. Spencer’s writings for ideas which he never held. And +now Mr. Spencer confesses openly and with ingenuous sincerity, that his +knowledge of Kant’s writings is extremely limited. But why he condemns a +man of whom he knows so little Mr. Spencer does not tell us. + +Mr. Spencer says: + + “My knowledge of Kant’s writings is extremely limited. In 1844 + a translation of his “Critique of Pure Reason” (then I think + lately published) fell into my hands, and I read the first few + pages enunciating his doctrine of Time and Space: my peremptory + rejection of which caused me to lay the book down. + + “Twice since then the same thing has happened; for, being + an impatient reader, when I disagree with the cardinal + propositions of a work I can go no further. + + “One other thing I knew. By indirect references I was made + aware that Kant had propounded the idea that celestial bodies + have been formed by the aggregation of diffused matter. Beyond + this my knowledge of his conceptions did not extend; and my + supposition that his evolutionary conception had stopped short + with the genesis of sun, stars, and planets was due to the + fact that his doctrine of Time and Space, as forms of thought + [sic] anteceding experience, implied a supernatural origin + inconsistent with the hypothesis of natural genesis.” + +Kant has been a leader in thought for the last century. It is very +important to criticise his ideas wherever they are wrong, but his errors +cannot be conquered by _ex cathedra_ denunciations. + +Darwin’s habits in investigating and weighing the pro and con of a +question were very different from Mr. Spencer’s, and Darwin’s success is +in no small degree due to the sternness with which he adhered to certain +rules of reading and studying. We find in his “Autobiography” certain +reminiscences labeled “important” from which the following is most +instructive: + + “I had also, during many years, followed a golden rule, namely, + that whenever a published fact, a new observation or a thought, + came across me, which was opposed to my general results, to + make a memorandum of it without fail, for I had found by + experience that such facts and thoughts were far more apt to + escape from the memory than favorable ones.” + +Experience teaches that we can learn most from those authors with whom we +do not agree. The ethics of reading and studying demand other habits than +laying a book down when we disagree with its cardinal propositions. Such +habits prevent progress and create prejudices. + + * * * * * + +Mr. Spencer has not answered my criticism at all. Mr. Spencer did +not even take into consideration the passages quoted from Kant. He +republished all the false statements of Kant’s views, so inconsiderately +made, together with all the perverse opinions based upon them. The +assurance with which Mr. Spencer makes statements which have no +foundation whatever is really perplexing even to a man who is well +informed on the subject, and it will go far to convince the unwary +reader. What, however, shall become of the general tenor of philosophical +criticism and controversy if a man of Mr. Spencer’s reputation is +so indifferent about being informed concerning the exact views of +his adversary, if he is so careless in presenting them, if he makes +positively erroneous statements on confessedly mere “supposition,” and +finally, if in consequence thereof he is flagrantly unjust in censuring +errors which arise only from his own too prolific imagination? + +We feel confident that Mr. Spencer will explain his side of the question +satisfactorily. His mistakes being undeniable, we do not believe that he +will seek to deny them. Yet we trust that Mr. Spencer as soon as he finds +himself at fault, will not even make an attempt at palliation, that he +will not blink the frank acknowledgment of his misstatements and also of +having treated Kant with injustice. A man who has devoted his life to the +search for truth will not suffer any blot to remain on his escutcheon. + + EDITOR. + + +FOOTNOTES: + +[69] This article “Herbert Spencer on the Ethics of Kant” was +electrotyped at the time it appeared in _The Open Court_. It is appended +to this number of _The Monist_ as documentary evidence of the fact, that +there is not even so much as an occasion in the article for confounding +“consciousness” and “conscientiousness.” + +[70] See _Fundamental Problems_, pp. 197-206; and _The Ethical Problem_, +p. 32, seq., especially p. 33, lines 18-20. + +[71] Second edition reads “_ihnen_” in place of “_ihr_,” viz. _der Zeit_. +The word “_ihnen_” refers to _Theilvorstellungen der Zeit_. + + + + +WHAT DOES ANSCHAUUNG MEAN? + + +Mr. Spencer’s erroneous statement that Kant conceives space and time as +forms of thought instead of forms of intuition induces me to make a few +explanatory remarks concerning the term _Anschauung_. + +Kant means that space and time are immediately given in experience and +not inferences drawn from the data of experience; they are not thoughts, +but objects of direct perception. + +Sense-impressions are data, they are prior to ideas, the latter being +constructions made out of sense-impressions. Sense-impressions are +facts, but ideas are of an inferential nature; they are (to use Lloyd +Morgan’s excellent term) constructs. Now Kant claims that space and +time are in the same predicament: they also are immediately given, they +also are _Anschauungen_. Kant did not trouble himself much to prove +that they are forms; he seems to have taken that for granted. But he +was very careful to show that they are not ideas, not thoughts, not +abstractions, not generalisations, but that they are as direct data +as are sense-impressions and he calls the knowledge which man has by +directly facing the object of knowledge “_Anschauung_.” + +The conclusion which Kant draws from this may be characterised as follows: + +Sensations are not things but appearances; they are subjective, not +objective, they are not the objects themselves but what our sensibility +makes of objects. Space and time being _Anschauungen_, Kant argues that +they are of the same kind as the sense-data of knowledge, that they +are inherent in our nature. Thus Kant maintains: “Sensations are the +products of our sensibility, and space and time are the forms of our +sensibility.” + +The word _Anschauung_ has been a _crux interpretum_ since translations +have been made from Kant, and it is quite true that no adequate word to +express it, exists in English. I enjoyed of late a discussion on the +subject with Mr. Francis C. Russell who called my attention to several +notes in _The Journal of Speculative Philosophy_. The following is from +the pen of Dr. W. T. Harris (Vol. II, p. 191): + + “Through a singular chance, the present number of the journal + contains two notes from two contributors on the proper + translation of the German word _Anschauung_. Mr. Kroeger holds + that the word _Anschauung_, as used by Fichte and also by Kant, + denotes an act of the Ego which the English word _Intuition_ + does not at all express, but for which the English word + ‘contemplation’ is an exact equivalent. Mr. Peirce suggests + that no person whose native tongue is English will translate + _Anschauung_ by another word than _Intuition_. Whether there + is a failure to understand English on the one hand or German + on the other, the Editor does not care to inquire. It is + certain that while intuition has been adopted generally as an + equivalent for the word under consideration both by English + and French translators, yet it was a wide departure from the + ordinary English use of the term. Besides this, we have no + English verb _intuite_ (at least in the Dictionaries), and + the reader will find that the verb used by Meiklejohn (in the + translation of Kant’s _Kritik_) for it, is _contemplate_, + and the same rendering is given by Smith in his excellent + translation of Fichte’s Popular Works (London, 1849).” + +Mr. Charles S. Peirce says: + + “No person whose native tongue is English will need to be + informed that contemplation is essentially (1) protracted (2) + voluntary, and (3) an action, and that it is never used for + that which is set forth to the mind in this act. A foreigner + can convince himself of this by the proper study of English + writers. Thus, Locke (Essay concerning Human Understanding, + Book II., chap. 19, § 1) says, ‘If it [an idea] be held + there [in view] long under attentive consideration, ’tis + _contemplation_”; and again, (_Ibid._, Book II., chap. 10, § 1) + ‘Keeping the _Idea_, which is brought into it [the mind] for + some time actually in view, which is called _Contemplation_.’ + This term is therefore unfitted to translate _Anschauung_; + for this latter does not imply an act which is necessarily + protracted or voluntary, and denotes most usually a mental + presentation, sometimes a faculty, less often the reception of + an impression in the mind, and seldom, if ever, an action. + + “To the translation of _Anschauung_ by intuition, there is, + at least, no such insufferable objection. Etymologically the + two words precisely correspond. The original philosophical + meaning of intuition was a cognition of the present manifold + in that character; and it is now commonly used, as a modern + writer says, ‘to include all the products of the perceptive + (external or internal) and imaginative faculties; every act of + consciousness, in short, of which the immediate object is an + _individual_, thing, act, or state of mind, presented under the + condition of distinct existence in space and time.’ Finally, we + have the authority of Kant’s own example for translating his + _Anschauung_ by _Intuitus_; and, indeed, this is the common + usage of Germans writing Latin. Moreover, _intuitiv_ frequently + replaces _anschauend_ or _anschaulich_. If this constitutes a + misunderstanding of Kant, it is one which is shared by himself + and nearly all his countrymen” (_ibid._ p. 152 et seqq.). + +Mr. Peirce adds the following explanation concerning the term intuition +in another note (_ibid._ p. 103): + + “The word _intuitus_ first occurs as a technical term in St. + Anselm’s Monologium. He wished to distinguish between our + knowledge of God and our knowledge of finite things (and, in + the next world, of God, also); and thinking of the saying of + St. Paul, _Videmus nunc per speculum in œnigmate: tunc autem + facie ad faciem_, he called the former _speculation_ and the + latter _intuition_. This use of ‘speculation’ did not take + root, because that word already had another exact and widely + different meaning. + + “In the middle ages, the term ‘intuitive cognition’ had two + principal senses, 1st, as opposed to abstractive cognition, + it meant the knowledge of the present as present, and this is + its meaning in Anselm; but 2d, as no intuitive cognition was + allowed to be determined by a previous cognition, it came to + be used as the opposite of discursive cognition (see Scotus, + In sentent. lib. 2, dist. 3, qu. 9), and this is nearly the + sense in which I employ it. This is also nearly the sense in + which Kant uses it, the former distinction being expressed + by his _sensuous_ and _non-sensuous_. (See Werke, herausg. + Rosenkrantz, Thl. 2, S. 713, 31, 41, 100, u. s. w.) + + “An enumeration of six meanings of intuition may be found in + Hamilton’s Reid p. 759.” + +If we have to choose between the two translations “intuition” and +“contemplation,” we should with Mr. Peirce decidedly prefer the +word “intuition.” The word contemplation corresponds to the German +_Betrachtung_ and all that Mr. Peirce says against it holds good. But +we must confess that the term intuition (as Mr. Peirce himself seems to +grant) is not a very good translation either. The term intuition has +other meanings which interfere with the correct meaning of _Anschauung_ +and was actually productive of much confusion. + +The English term intuition is strongly tinged with the same meaning that +is attached to the German word _Intuition_. It means an inexplicable +kind of direct information from some supernatural sources, which mystics +claim to possess as the means of their revelations. In this sense +Goethe characterises it satirically in Faust (Scene XIV). Mephistopheles +describes the process as follows: + + A blessing drawn from supernatural fountain! + In night and dew to lie upon the mountains; + All Heaven and Earth in rapture penetrating; + Thyself to Godhood haughtily inflating; + To grub with yearning force through Earth’s dark marrow, + Compress the six days’ work within thy bosom narrow,— + To taste, I know not what, in haughty power, + Thine own ecstatic life on all things shower, + Thine earthly self behind thee cast, + And then the lofty intuition [with a gesture] at last. + +The satire is good on _Intuition_ but it would not apply to _Anschauung_, +for the latter word excludes rigidly any mysticism or supernaturalism +which the former essentially involves. To employ the term “intuition” for +both ideas must necessarily weaken the meaning of _Anschauung_. + +Besides we should bear in mind that the German _Anschauung_ is +vernacular and should find a correspondent Saxon word. Such Latin words +as intuition convey in English as much as in German the impression of +being terms denoting something very abstract. Vernacular terms much more +strongly indicate the immediateness and directness which is implied in +_Anschauung_. In my conversation with Mr. Russell, we tried to coin a +new word that should cover the meaning of _Anschauung_ as an act of +“atlooking” and the word “atsight” readily suggested itself. + +The word “atsight” is an exact English equivalent of the German +_Anschauung_. It describes the looking at an object in its immediate +presence. At the same time the word is readily understood, while +philologically considered, its formation is fully justified by the +existence of the words “insight and foresight.” + + * * * * * + +One of the most important of Kant’s doctrines is the proposition that +all thought must ultimately have reference to _Anschauung_, i. e. to +atsight. Through atsight only the objects of experience can be given us. +All speculations not founded upon this bottom rock of knowledge are mere +dreams. This is the maxim of positivism and it is the basis of all sound +philosophy. Says Kant in the “Anhang” to his Prolegomena (in reply to a +critic who had misunderstood his idealism) as a summary statement of his +views: + + “_Der Satz aller echten Idealisten, von der eleatischen Schule + an bis zum Bischof Berkley, ist in dieser Formel enthalten: + ‘alle Erkenntnis durch Sinne und Erfahrung ist nichts als + lauter Schein, und nur in den Ideen des reinen Verstandes und + Vernunft ist Wahrheit.’_ + + “_Der Grundsatz, der meinen Idealismus durchgängig regiert + und bestimmt, ist dagegen: ‘Alles Erkenntnis von Dingen, aus + blossem reinen Verstande oder reiner Vernunft, ist nichts als + lauter Schein, und nur in der Erfahrung ist Wahrheit.’_” + + “The doctrine of all genuine idealists from the Eleatic School + down to Bishop Berkeley is contained in this formula: All + cognition through the senses and experience is nothing but + illusion; and in the ideas of the pure understanding and reason + alone is truth. + + “The principle, however, that rules and determines my idealism + throughout is this: All cognition out of pure understanding + or pure reason is nothing but mere illusion and in experience + alone is truth.” + +Kant then proposes in order to avoid equivocation to call his views +“formal or critical idealism,” adding that his idealism made any other +idealism impossible. Criticism truly is the beginning of philosophy as +an objective science. It gives the _coup de grace_ to those worthless +declamations which still pass among many as philosophy. Says Kant: + + “_So viel ist gewiss: wer einmal Kritik gekostet hat, den ekelt + auf immer alles dogmatische Gewäsche._” + + “That much is certain: He who has once tasted critique will be + forever disgusted with all dogmatic twaddle.” + +It is strange that in spite of Kant’s explicit declaration, which leaves +no doubt about the positive spirit that pervades the principles of his +philosophy, he is still misunderstood by his opponents no less than by +those who profess to be his disciples. + + * * * * * + +There is no occasion now to treat the subject exhaustively, but it may be +permitted to add a few remarks on Kant’s proposition that space and time +are atsights. + +We must distinguish three things: + +1) Objective space. + +2) Space as atsight, and + +3) Space-conception. + +Space as atsight is the datum. It is the immediate presence of relations +among the sensory impressions. This, however, is not as yet that +something which we generally call space. That which generally goes by the +name of space is a construction built out of the relational data that +obtain in experience and we propose to call it space-conception. Our +space-conception, accordingly, (and here I include the mathematician’s +space-conception) is based upon space as atsight, but it is more +than atsight. It is an inference made therefrom, it is the product +of experience. Space-conception, however, is as are all legitimate +noumena, no mere subjective illusion, it possesses objective validity; +it describes some real existence and this real existence represented in +space-conception is what may be called objective space. + +Objective space is the form of reality. Space as atsight is the form of +sensibility. Space as space-conception is a construct of an abstract +nature and serves as a description or plan of the form of reality. + +The same is true of Time. Time as atsight is the relation of succession +obtaining in the changes of experience. Time as time-conception is the +noumenon constructed out of these data to represent that feature of +reality which may for lack of a better term be called objective time. + +Briefly: Space and Time are not things, not essences, not entities, +but certain features of existence. They are the forms of reality. When +existence finds a representation in the feelings of a sentient being, +time and space appear as their forms, and these forms furnish the +material out of which are built the conceptions of Space and Time. + + EDITOR. + + + + +THE LAW OF MIND. + + +In an article published in _The Monist_ for January 1891, I endeavored +to show what ideas ought to form the warp of a system of philosophy, and +particularly emphasised that of absolute chance. In the number of April +1892, I argued further in favor of that way of thinking, which it will be +convenient to christen _tychism_ (from τύχη, chance). A serious student +of philosophy will be in no haste to accept or reject this doctrine; but +he will see in it one of the chief attitudes which speculative thought +may take, feeling that it is not for an individual, nor for an age, to +pronounce upon a fundamental question of philosophy. That is a task for +a whole era to work out. I have begun by showing that _tychism_ must +give birth to an evolutionary cosmology, in which all the regularities +of nature and of mind are regarded as products of growth, and to a +Schelling-fashioned idealism which holds matter to be mere specialised +and partially deadened mind. I may mention, for the benefit of those who +are curious in studying mental biographies, that I was born and reared +in the neighborhood of Concord,—I mean in Cambridge,—at the time when +Emerson, Hedge, and their friends were disseminating the ideas that they +had caught from Schelling, and Schelling from Plotinus, from Boehm, or +from God knows what minds stricken with the monstrous mysticism of the +East. But the atmosphere of Cambridge held many an antiseptic against +Concord transcendentalism; and I am not conscious of having contracted +any of that virus. Nevertheless, it is probable that some cultured +bacilli, some benignant form of the disease was implanted in my soul, +unawares, and that now, after long incubation, it comes to the surface, +modified by mathematical conceptions and by training in physical +investigations. + +The next step in the study of cosmology must be to examine the general +law of mental action. In doing this, I shall for the time drop my tychism +out of view, in order to allow a free and independent expansion to +another conception signalised in my first _Monist_-paper as one of the +most indispensable to philosophy, though it was not there dwelt upon; +I mean the idea of continuity. The tendency to regard continuity, in +the sense in which I shall define it, as an idea of prime importance in +philosophy may conveniently be termed _synechism_. The present paper +is intended chiefly to show what synechism is, and what it leads to. +I attempted, a good many years ago, to develop this doctrine in the +_Journal of Speculative Philosophy_ (Vol. III.); but I am able now +to improve upon that exposition, in which I was a little blinded by +nominalistic prepossessions. I refer to it, because students may possibly +find that some points not sufficiently explained in the present paper are +cleared up in those earlier ones. + + +WHAT THE LAW IS. + +Logical analysis applied to mental phenomena shows that there is but +one law of mind, namely, that ideas tend to spread continuously and to +affect certain others which stand to them in a peculiar relation of +affectibility. In this spreading they lose intensity, and especially the +power of affecting others, but gain generality and become welded with +other ideas. + +I set down this formula at the beginning, for convenience; and now +proceed to comment upon it. + + +INDIVIDUALITY OF IDEAS. + +We are accustomed to speak of ideas as reproduced, as passed from mind to +mind, as similar or dissimilar to one another, and, in short, as if they +were substantial things; nor can any reasonable objection be raised to +such expressions. But taking the word “idea” in the sense of an event in +an individual consciousness, it is clear that an idea once past is gone +forever, and any supposed recurrence of it is another idea. These two +ideas are not present in the same state of consciousness, and therefore +cannot possibly be compared. To say, therefore, that they are similar +can only mean that an occult power from the depths of the soul forces +us to connect them in our thoughts after they are both no more. We may +note, here, in passing that of the two generally recognised principles of +association, contiguity and similarity, the former is a connection due to +a power without, the latter a connection due to a power within. + +But what can it mean to say that ideas wholly past are thought of at +all, any longer? They are utterly unknowable. What distinct meaning can +attach to saying that an idea in the past in any way affects an idea in +the future, from which it is completely detached? A phrase between the +assertion and the denial of which there can in no case be any sensible +difference is mere gibberish. + +I will not dwell further upon this point, because it is a commonplace of +philosophy. + + +CONTINUITY OF IDEAS. + +We have here before us a question of difficulty, analogous to the +question of nominalism and realism. But when once it has been clearly +formulated, logic leaves room for one answer only. How can a past idea be +present? Can it be present vicariously? To a certain extent, perhaps; but +not merely so; for then the question would arise how the past idea can +be related to its vicarious representation. The relation, being between +ideas, can only exist in some consciousness: now that past idea was in no +consciousness but that past consciousness that alone contained it; and +that did not embrace the vicarious idea. + +Some minds will here jump to the conclusion that a past idea cannot in +any sense be present. But that is hasty and illogical. How extravagant, +too, to pronounce our whole knowledge of the past to be mere delusion! +Yet it would seem that the past is as completely beyond the bonds of +possible experience as a Kantian thing-in-itself. + +How can a past idea be present? Not vicariously. Then, only by direct +perception. In other words, to be present, it must be _ipso facto_ +present. That is, it cannot be wholly past; it can only be going, +infinitesimally past, less past than any assignable past date. We are +thus brought to the conclusion that the present is connected with the +past by a series of real infinitesimal steps. + +It has already been suggested by psychologists that consciousness +necessarily embraces an interval of time. But if a finite time be meant, +the opinion is not tenable. If the sensation that precedes the present +by half a second were still immediately before me, then, on the same +principle the sensation preceding that would be immediately present, and +so on _ad infinitum_. Now, since there is a time, say a year, at the end +of which an idea is no longer _ipso facto_ present, it follows that this +is true of any finite interval, however short. + +But yet consciousness must essentially cover an interval of time; for +if it did not, we could gain no knowledge of time, and not merely no +veracious cognition of it, but no conception whatever. We are, therefore, +forced to say that we are immediately conscious through an infinitesimal +interval of time. + +This is all that is requisite. For, in this infinitesimal interval, +not only is consciousness continuous in a subjective sense, that is, +considered as a subject or substance having the attribute of duration; +but also, because it is immediate consciousness, its object is _ipso +facto_ continuous. In fact, this infinitesimally spread-out consciousness +is a direct feeling of its contents as spread out. This will be further +elucidated below. In an infinitesimal interval we directly perceive the +temporal sequence of its beginning, middle, and end,—not, of course, +in the way of recognition, for recognition is only of the past, but in +the way of immediate feeling. Now upon this interval follows another, +whose beginning is the middle of the former, and whose middle is the end +of the former. Here, we have an immediate perception of the temporal +sequence of its beginning, middle, and end, or say of the second, third, +and fourth instants. From these two immediate perceptions, we gain a +mediate, or inferential, perception of the relation of all four instants. +This mediate perception is objectively, or as to the object represented, +spread over the four instants; but subjectively, or as itself the subject +of duration, it is completely embraced in the second moment. [The reader +will observe that I use the word _instant_ to mean a point of time, and +_moment_ to mean an infinitesimal duration.] If it is objected that, +upon the theory proposed, we must have more than a mediate perception +of the succession of the four instants, I grant it; for the sum of the +two infinitesimal intervals is itself infinitesimal, so that it is +immediately perceived. It is immediately perceived in the whole interval, +but only mediately perceived in the last two thirds of the interval. +Now, let there be an indefinite succession of these inferential acts of +comparative perception; and it is plain that the last moment will contain +objectively the whole series. Let there be, not merely an indefinite +succession, but a continuous flow of inference through a finite time; +and the result will be a mediate objective consciousness of the whole +time in the last moment. In this last moment, the whole series will +be recognised, or known as known before, except only the last moment, +which of course will be absolutely unrecognisable to itself. Indeed, +even this last moment will be recognised like the rest, or, at least be +just beginning to be so. There is a little _elenchus_, or appearance +of contradiction, here, which the ordinary logic of reflection quite +suffices to resolve. + + +INFINITY AND CONTINUITY, IN GENERAL. + +Most of the mathematicians who during the last two generations have +treated the differential calculus have been of the opinion that an +infinitesimal quantity is an absurdity; although, with their habitual +caution, they have often added “or, at any rate, the conception of an +infinitesimal is so difficult, that we practically cannot reason about it +with confidence and security.” Accordingly, the doctrine of limits has +been invented to evade the difficulty, or, as some say, to explain the +signification of the word “infinitesimal.” This doctrine, in one form or +another, is taught in all the text-books, though in some of them only as +an alternative view of the matter; it answers well enough the purposes of +calculation, though even in that application it has its difficulties. + +The illumination of the subject by a strict notation for the logic +of relatives had shown me clearly and evidently that the idea of an +infinitesimal involves no contradiction, before I became acquainted with +the writings of Dr. Georg Cantor (though many of these had already +appeared in the _Mathematische Annalen_ and in _Borchardt’s Journal_, +if not yet in the _Acta Mathematica_, all mathematical journals of the +first distinction), in which the same view is defended with extraordinary +genius and penetrating logic. + +The prevalent opinion is that finite numbers are the only ones that we +can reason about, at least, in any ordinary mode of reasoning, or, as +some authors express it, they are the only numbers that can be reasoned +about mathematically. But this is an irrational prejudice. I long ago +showed that finite collections are distinguished from infinite ones +only by one circumstance and its consequences, namely, that to them +is applicable a peculiar and unusual mode of reasoning called by its +discoverer, DeMorgan, the “syllogism of transposed quantity.” + +Balzac, in the introduction of his _Physiologie du mariage_, remarks that +every young Frenchman boasts of having seduced some Frenchwoman. Now, as +a woman can only be seduced once, and there are no more Frenchwomen than +Frenchmen, it follows, if these boasts are true, that no French women +escape seduction. If their number be finite, the reasoning holds. But +since the population is continually increasing, and the seduced are on +the average younger than the seducers, the conclusion need not be true. +In like manner, DeMorgan, as an actuary, might have argued that if an +insurance company pays to its insured on an average more than they have +ever paid it, including interest, it must lose money. But every modern +actuary would see a fallacy in that, since the business is continually +on the increase. But should war, or other cataclysm, cause the class +of insured to be a finite one, the conclusion would turn out painfully +correct, after all. The above two reasonings are examples of the +syllogism of transposed quantity. + +The proposition that finite and infinite collections are distinguished by +the applicability to the former of the syllogism of transposed quantity +ought to be regarded as the basal one of scientific arithmetic. + +If a person does not know how to reason logically, and I must say that +a great many fairly good mathematicians,—yea, distinguished ones,—fall +under this category, but simply uses a rule of thumb in blindly drawing +inferences like other inferences that have turned out well, he will, +of course, be continually falling into error about infinite numbers. +The truth is such people do not reason, at all. But for the few who do +reason, reasoning about infinite numbers is easier than about finite +numbers, because the complicated syllogism of transposed quantity is not +called for. For example, that the whole is greater than its part is not +an axiom, as that eminently bad reasoner, Euclid, made it to be. It is a +theorem readily proved by means of a syllogism of transposed quantity, +but not otherwise. Of finite collections it is true, of infinite +collections false. Thus, a part of the whole numbers are even numbers. +Yet the even numbers are no fewer than all the numbers; an evident +proposition since if every number in the whole series of whole numbers be +doubled, the result will be the series of even numbers. + + 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, etc. + 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, etc. + +So for every number there is a distinct even number. In fact, there are +as many distinct doubles of numbers as there are of distinct numbers. But +the doubles of numbers are all even numbers. + +In truth, of infinite collections there are but two grades of magnitude, +the _endless_ and the _innumerable_. Just as a finite collection is +distinguished from an infinite one by the applicability to it of a +special mode of reasoning, the syllogism of transposed quantity, so, +as I showed in the paper last referred to, a numerable collection is +distinguished from an innumerable one by the applicability to it of +a certain mode of reasoning, the Fermatian inference, or, as it is +sometimes improperly termed, “mathematical induction.” + +As an example of this reasoning, Euler’s demonstration of the binomial +theorem for integral powers may be given. The theorem is that _(x+y)ⁿ_, +where _n_ is a whole number, may be expanded into the sum of a series +of terms of which the first is _xⁿy⁰_ and each of the others is derived +from the next preceding by diminishing the exponent of _x_ by 1 and +multiplying by that exponent and at the same time increasing the exponent +of _y_ by 1 and dividing by that increased exponent. Now, suppose this +proposition to be true for a certain exponent, _n_ = _M_, then it +must also be true for _n_ = _M_ + 1. For let one of the terms in the +expansion of _(x+y)ᴹ_ be written A_xᵖy𐞥_. Then, this term with the two +following will be + +=Transcriber’s Note:= Unicode has no subscript q character, so the Greek +subscript phi character ᵩ is used in these formulæ to represent it. +Italics have been removed for readability. + + Axᵖy𐞥 + A(ᵖ⁄ᵩ₊₁)xᵖ⁻¹y𐞥⁺¹ + A(ᵖ⁄ᵩ₊₁)(ᵖ⁻¹⁄ᵩ₊₂)xᵖ⁻²y𐞥⁺² + +Now, when _(x+y)ᴹ_ is multiplied by _x+y_ to give _(x+y)ᴹ⁺¹_, we multiply +first by _x_ and then by _y_ instead of by _x_ and add the two results. +When we multiply by _x_, the second of the above three terms will be the +only one giving a term involving _xᵖy𐞥⁺¹_ and the third will be the only +one giving a term in _xᵖ⁻¹y𐞥⁺²_; and when we multiply by _y_ the first +will be the only term giving a term in _xᵖy𐞥⁺¹_, and the second will be +the only term giving a term in _xᵖ⁻¹y𐞥⁺²_. Hence, adding like terms, +we find that the coefficient of _xᵖy𐞥⁺¹_in the expansion of _(x+y)ᴹ⁺¹_ +will be the sum of the coefficients of the first two of the above three +terms, and that the coefficient of _xᵖ⁻¹y𐞥⁺²_ will be the sum of the +coefficients of the last two terms. Hence, two successive terms in the +expansion of _(x+y)ᴹ⁺¹_ will be + + A[1+(ᵖ⁄ᵩ₋₁)]xᵖy𐞥⁺¹ + A(ᵖ⁄ᵩ₊₁)[1+(ᵖ⁻¹⁄ᵩ₋₂)]xᵖ⁻¹y𐞥⁺² + + = A(ᵖ⁺𐞥⁺¹⁄ᵩ₊₁)xᵖy𐞥⁺¹ + A(ᵖ⁺𐞥⁺¹⁄ᵩ₊₁). (ᵖ⁄ᵩ₊₂)xᵖ⁻¹y𐞥⁺². + +It is, thus, seen that the succession of terms follows the rule. Thus if +any integral power follows the rule, so also does the next higher power. +But the first power obviously follows the rule. Hence, all powers do so. + +Such reasoning holds good of any collection of objects capable of being +ranged in a series which though it may be endless, can be numbered so +that each member of it receives a definite integral number. For instance, +all the whole numbers constitute such a numerable collection. Again, all +numbers resulting from operating according to any definite rule with +any finite number of whole numbers form such a collection. For they may +be arranged in a series thus. Let F be the symbol of operation. First +operate on 1, giving F(1) Then, operate on a second 1, giving F(1,1). +Next, introduce 2, giving 3rd, F(2); 4th, F(2,1); 5th, F(1,2); 6th, +F(2,2). Next use a third variable giving 7th, F(1,1,1); 8th, F(2,1,1); +9th, F(1,2,1); 10th, F(2,2,1); 11th, F(1,1,2); 12th, F(2,1,2); 13th, +F(1,2,2); 14th, F(2,2,2). Next introduce 3, and so on, alternately +introducing new variables and new figures; and in this way it is plain +that every arrangement of integral values of the variables will receive a +numbered place in the series.[72] + +The class of endless but numerable collections (so called because they +can be so ranged that to each one corresponds a distinct whole number) is +very large. But there are collections which are certainly innumerable. +Such is the collection of all numbers to which endless series of +decimals are capable of approximating. It has been recognised since the +time of Euclid that certain numbers are surd or incommensurable, and +are not exactly expressible by any finite series of decimals, nor by a +circulating decimal. Such is the ratio of the circumference of a circle +to its diameter, which we know is nearly 3.1415926. The calculation of +this number has been carried to over 700 figures without the slightest +appearance of regularity in their sequence. The demonstrations that this +and many other numbers are incommensurable are perfect. That the entire +collection of incommensurable numbers is innumerable has been clearly +proved by Cantor. I omit the demonstration; but it is easy to see that to +discriminate one from some other would, in general, require the use of an +endless series of numbers. Now if they cannot be exactly expressed and +discriminated, clearly they cannot be ranged in a linear series. + +It is evident that there are as many points on a line or in an interval +of time as there are of real numbers in all. These are, therefore, +innumerable collections. Many mathematicians have incautiously assumed +that the points on a surface or in a solid are more than those on a line. +But this has been refuted by Cantor. Indeed, it is obvious that for every +set of values of coördinates there is a single distinct number. Suppose, +for instance, the values of the coördinates all lie between 0 and + 1. +Then if we compose a number by putting in the first decimal place the +first figure of the first coördinate, in the second the first figure of +the second coördinate, and so on, and when the first figures are all +dealt out go on to the second figures in like manner, it is plain that +the values of the coördinates can be read off from the single resulting +number, so that a triad or tetrad of numbers, each having innumerable +values, has no more values than a single incommensurable number. + +Were the number of dimensions infinite, this would fail; and the +collection of infinite sets of numbers having each innumerable +variations, might, therefore, be greater than the simple innumerable +collection, and might be called _endlessly infinite_. The single +individuals of such a collection could not, however, be designated, even +approximately, so that this is indeed a magnitude concerning which it +would be possible to reason only in the most general way, if at all. + +Although there are but two grades of magnitudes of infinite collections, +yet when certain conditions are imposed upon the order in which +individuals are taken, distinctions of magnitude arise from that cause. +Thus, if a simply endless series be doubled by separating each unit into +two parts, the successive first parts and also the second parts being +taken in the same order as the units from which they are derived, this +double endless series will, so long as it is taken in that order, appear +as twice as large as the original series. In like manner the product of +two innumerable collections, that is, the collection of possible pairs +composed of one individual of each, if the order of continuity is to be +maintained, is, by virtue of that order, infinitely greater than either +of the component collections. + +We now come to the difficult question, What is continuity? Kant confounds +it with infinite divisibility, saying that the essential character of +a continuous series is that between any two members of it a third can +always be found. This is an analysis beautifully clear and definite; +but unfortunately, it breaks down under the first test. For according +to this, the entire series of rational fractions arranged in the order +of their magnitude, would be an infinite series, although the rational +fractions are numerable, while the points of a line are innumerable. +Nay, worse yet, if from that series of fractions any two with all that +lie between them be excised, and any number of such finite gaps he made, +Kant’s definition is still true of the series, though it has lost all +appearance of continuity. + +Cantor defines a continuous series as one which is _concatenated_ and +_perfect_. By a concatenated series, he means such a one that if any +two points are given in it, and any finite distance, however small, it +is possible to proceed from the first point to the second through a +succession of points of the series each at a distance from the preceding +one less than the given distance. This is true of the series of rational +fractions ranged in the order of their magnitude. By a perfect series, he +means one which contains every point such that there is no distance so +small that this point has not an infinity of points of the series within +that distance of it. This is true of the series of numbers between 0 and +1 capable of being expressed by decimals in which only the digits 0 and 1 +occur. + +It must be granted that Cantor’s definition includes every series that +is continuous; nor can it be objected that it includes any important +or indubitable case of a series not continuous. Nevertheless, it has +some serious defects. In the first place, it turns upon metrical +considerations; while the distinction between a continuous and a +discontinuous series is manifestly non-metrical. In the next place, a +perfect series is defined as one containing “every point” of a certain +description. But no positive idea is conveyed of what all the points +are: that is definition by negation, and cannot be admitted. If that +sort of thing were allowed, it would be very easy to say, at once, that +the continuous linear series of points is one which contains every point +of the line between its extremities. Finally, Cantor’s definition does +not convey a distinct notion of what the components of the conception of +continuity are. It ingeniously wraps up its properties in two separate +parcels, but does not display them to our intelligence. + +Kant’s definition expresses one simple property of a continuum; but +it allows of gaps in the series. To mend the definition, it is only +necessary to notice how these gaps can occur. Let us suppose, then, a +linear series of points extending from a point, _A_, to a point, _B_, +having a gap from _B_ to a third point, _C_, and thence extending to +a final limit, _D_; and let us suppose this series conforms to Kant’s +definition. Then, of the two points, _B_ and _C_, one or both must be +excluded from the series; for otherwise, by the definition, there would +be points between them. That is, if the series contains _C_, though +it contains all the points up to _B_, it cannot contain _B_. What is +required, therefore, is to state in non-metrical terms that if a series +of points up to a limit is included in a continuum the limit is included. +It may be remarked that this is the property of a continuum to which +Aristotle’s attention seems to have been directed when he defines a +continuum as something whose parts have a common limit. The property may +be exactly stated as follows: If a linear series of points is continuous +between two points, _A_ and _D_, and if an endless series of points be +taken, the first of them between _A_ and _D_ and each of the others +between the last preceding one and _D_, then there is a point of the +continuous series between all that endless series of points and _D_, and +such that every other point of which this is true lies between this point +and _D_. For example, take any number between 0 and 1, as 0.1; then, any +number between 0.1 and 1, as 0.11; then any number between 0.11 and 1, as +0.111; and so on, without end. Then, because the series of real numbers +between 0 and 1 is continuous, there must be a _least_ real number, +greater than every number of that endless series. This property, which +may be called the Aristotelicity of the series, together with Kant’s +property, or its Kanticity, completes the definition of a continuous +series. + +The property of Aristotelicity may be roughly stated thus: a continuum +contains the end point belonging to every endless series of points which +it contains. An obvious corollary is that every continuum contains its +limits. But in using this principle it is necessary to observe that a +series may be continuous except in this, that it omits one or both of the +limits. + +Our ideas will find expression more conveniently if, instead of points +upon a line, we speak of real numbers. Every real number is, in one +sense, the limit of a series, for it can be indefinitely approximated +to. Whether every real number is a limit of a _regular_ series may +perhaps be open to doubt. But the series referred to in the definition +of Aristotelicity must be understood as including all series whether +regular or not. Consequently, it is implied that between any two points +an innumerable series of points can be taken. + +Every number whose expression in decimals requires but a finite number of +places of decimals is commensurable. Therefore, incommensurable numbers +suppose an infinitieth place of decimals. The word infinitesimal is +simply the Latin form of infinitieth; that is, it is an ordinal formed +from _infinitum_, as centesimal from _centum_. Thus, continuity supposes +infinitesimal quantities. There is nothing contradictory about the idea +of such quantities. In adding and multiplying them the continuity must +not be broken up, and consequently they are precisely like any other +quantities, except that neither the syllogism of transposed quantity, nor +the Fermatian inference applies to them. + +If A is a finite quantity and _i_ an infinitesimal, then in a certain +sense we may write A + _i_ = A. That is to say, this is so for all +purposes of measurement. But this principle must not be applied except +to get rid of _all_ the terms in the highest order of infinitesimals +present. As a mathematician, I prefer the method of infinitesimals to +that of limits, as far easier and less infested with snares. Indeed, +the latter, as stated in some books, involves propositions that are +false; but this is not the case with the forms of the method used by +Cauchy, Duhamel, and others. As they understand the doctrine of limits, +it involves the notion of continuity, and therefore contains in another +shape the very same ideas as the doctrine of infinitesimals. + +Let us now consider an aspect of the Aristotelical principle which is +particularly important in philosophy. Suppose a surface to be part red +and part blue; so that every point on it is either red or blue, and, of +course, no part can be both red and blue. What, then, is the color of the +boundary line between the red and the blue? The answer is that red or +blue, to exist at all, must be spread over a surface; and the color of +the surface is the color of the surface in the immediate neighborhood of +the point. I purposely use a vague form of expression. Now, as the parts +of the surface in the immediate neighborhood of any ordinary point upon a +curved boundary are half of them red and half blue, it follows that the +boundary is half red and half blue. In like manner, we find it necessary +to hold that consciousness essentially occupies time; and what is +present to the mind at any ordinary instant, is what is present during a +moment in which that instant occurs. Thus, the present is half past and +half to come. Again, the color of the parts of a surface at any finite +distance from a point, has nothing to do with its color just at that +point; and, in the parallel, the feeling at any finite interval from the +present has nothing to do with the present feeling, except vicariously. +Take another case: the velocity of a particle at any instant of time is +its mean velocity during an infinitesimal instant in which that time +is contained. Just so my immediate feeling is my feeling through an +infinitesimal duration containing the present instant. + + +ANALYSIS OF TIME. + +One of the most marked features about the law of mind is that it makes +time to have a definite direction of flow from past to future. The +relation of past to future is, in reference to the law of mind, different +from the relation of future to past. This makes one of the great +contrasts between the law of mind and the law of physical force, where +there is no more distinction between the two opposite directions in time +than between moving northward and moving southward. + +In order, therefore, to analyse the law of mind, we must begin by asking +what the flow of time consists in. Now, we find that in reference to any +individual state of feeling, all others are of two classes, those which +affect this one (or have a tendency to affect it, and what this means we +shall inquire shortly), and those which do not. The present is affectible +by the past but not by the future. + +Moreover, if state _A_ is affected by state _B_, and state _B_ by state +_C_, then _A_ is affected by state _C_, though not so much so. It +follows, that if _A_ is affectible by _B_, _B_ is not affectible by _A_. + +If, of two states, each is absolutely unaffectible by the other, they are +to be regarded as parts of the same state. They are contemporaneous. + +To say that a state is _between_ two states means that it affects one +and is affected by the other. Between any two states in this sense lies +an innumerable series of states affecting one another; and if a state +lies between a given state and any other state which can be reached by +inserting states between this state and any third state, these inserted +states not immediately affecting or being affected by either, then the +second state mentioned immediately affects or is affected by the first, +in the sense that in the one the other is _ipso facto_ present in a +reduced degree. + +These propositions involve a definition of time and of its flow. Over and +above this definition they involve a doctrine, namely, that every state +of feeling is affectible by every earlier state. + + +THAT FEELINGS HAVE INTENSIVE CONTINUITY. + +Time with its continuity logically involves some other kind of continuity +than its own. Time, as the universal form of change, cannot exist +unless there is something to undergo change, and to undergo a change +continuous in time, there must be a continuity of changeable qualities. +Of the continuity of intrinsic qualities of feeling we can now form but +a feeble conception. The development of the human mind has practically +extinguished all feelings, except a few sporadic kinds, sound, colors, +smells, warmth, etc., which now appear to be disconnected and disparate. +In the case of colors, there is a tridimensional spread of feelings. +Originally, all feelings may have been connected in the same way, and the +presumption is that the number of dimensions was endless. For development +essentially involves a limitation of possibilities. But given a number of +dimensions of feeling, all possible varieties are obtainable by varying +the intensities of the different elements. Accordingly, time logically +supposes a continuous range of intensity in feeling. It follows, then, +from the definition of continuity, that when any particular kind of +feeling is present, an infinitesimal continuum of all feelings differing +infinitesimally from that is present. + + +THAT FEELINGS HAVE SPATIAL EXTENSION. + +Consider a gob of protoplasm, say an amœba or a slime-mould. It does +not differ in any radical way from the contents of a nerve-cell, +though its functions may be less specialised. There is no doubt that +this slime-mould, or this amœba, or at any rate some similar mass of +protoplasm feels. That is to say, it feels when it is in its excited +condition. But note how it behaves. When the whole is quiescent and +rigid, a place upon it is irritated. Just at this point, an active motion +is set up, and this gradually spreads to other parts. In this action, no +unity nor relation to a nucleus, or other unitary organ can be discerned. +It is a mere amorphous continuum of protoplasm, with feeling passing +from one part to another. Nor is there anything like a wave-motion. The +activity does not advance to new parts, just as fast as it leaves old +parts. Rather, in the beginning, it dies out at a slower rate than that +at which it spreads. And while the process is going on, by exciting the +mass at another point, a second quite independent state of excitation +will be set up. In some places, neither excitation will exist, in others +each separately, in still other places, both effects will be added +together. Whatever there is in the whole phenomenon to make us think +there is feeling in such a mass of protoplasm,—_feeling_, but plainly no +_personality_,—goes logically to show that that feeling has a subjective, +or substantial, spatial extension, as the excited state has. This is, no +doubt, a difficult idea to seize, for the reason that it is a subjective, +not an objective, extension. It is not that we have a feeling of bigness; +though Professor James, perhaps rightly, teaches that we have. It is that +the feeling, as a subject of inhesion, is big. Moreover, our own feelings +are focused in attention to such a degree that we are not aware that +ideas are not brought to an absolute unity; just as nobody not instructed +by special experiment has any idea how very, very little of the field of +vision is distinct. Still, we all know how the attention wanders about +among our feelings; and this fact shows that those feelings that are not +co-ordinated in attention have a reciprocal externality, although they +are present at the same time. But we must not tax introspection to make a +phenomenon manifest which essentially involves externality. + +Since space is continuous, it follows that there must be an immediate +community of feeling between parts of mind infinitesimally near together. +Without this, I believe it would have been impossible for minds external +to one another, ever to become coördinated, and equally impossible for +any coördination to be established in the action of the nerve-matter of +one brain. + + +AFFECTIONS OF IDEAS. + +But we are met by the question what is meant by saying that one idea +affects another. The unravelment of this problem requires us to trace out +phenomena a little further. + +Three elements go to make up an idea. The first is its intrinsic quality +as a feeling. The second is the energy with which it affects other +ideas, an energy which is infinite in the here-and-nowness of immediate +sensation, finite and relative in the recency of the past. The third +element is the tendency of an idea to bring along other ideas with it. + +As an idea spreads, its power of affecting other ideas gets rapidly +reduced; but its intrinsic quality remains nearly unchanged. It is long +years now since I last saw a cardinal in his robes; and my memory of +their color has become much dimmed. The color itself, however, is not +remembered as dim. I have no inclination to call it a dull red. Thus, the +intrinsic quality remains little changed; yet more accurate observation +will show a slight reduction of it. The third element, on the other +hand, has increased. As well as I can recollect, it seems to me the +cardinals I used to see wore robes more scarlet than vermilion is, and +highly luminous. Still, I know the color commonly called cardinal is on +the crimson side of vermilion and of quite moderate luminosity, and the +original idea calls up so many other hues with it, and asserts itself so +feebly, that I am unable any longer to isolate it. + +A finite interval of time generally contains an innumerable series +of feelings; and when these become welded together in association, +the result is a general idea. For we have just seen how by continuous +spreading an idea becomes generalised. + +The first character of a general idea so resulting is that it is living +feeling. A continuum of this feeling, infinitesimal in duration, but +still embracing innumerable parts, and also, though infinitesimal, +entirely unlimited, is immediately present. And in its absence of +boundedness a vague possibility of more than is present is directly felt. + +Second, in the presence of this continuity of feeling, nominalistic +maxims appear futile. There is no doubt about one idea affecting another, +when we can directly perceive the one gradually modified and shaping +itself into the other. Nor can there any longer be any difficulty about +one idea resembling another, when we can pass along the continuous field +of quality from one to the other and back again to the point which we had +marked. + +Third, consider the insistency of an idea. The insistency of a past idea +with reference to the present is a quantity which is less the further +back that past idea is, and rises to infinity as the past idea is brought +up into coincidence with the present. Here we must make one of those +inductive applications of the law of continuity which have produced such +great results in all the positive sciences. We must extend the law of +insistency into the future. Plainly, the insistency of a future idea with +reference to the present is a quantity affected by the minus sign; for it +is the present that affects the future, if there be any effect, not the +future that affects the present. Accordingly, the curve of insistency is +a sort of equilateral hyperbola. [See the figure.] Such a conception is +none the less mathematical, that its quantification cannot now be exactly +specified. + +[Illustration] + +Now consider the induction which we have here been led into. This curve +says that feeling which has not yet emerged into immediate consciousness +is already affectible and already affected. In fact, this is habit, by +virtue of which an idea is brought up into present consciousness by a +bond that had already been established between it, and another idea while +it was still _in futuro_. + +We can now see what the affection of one idea by another consists in. +It is that the affected idea is attached as a logical predicate to the +affecting idea as subject. So when a feeling emerges into immediate +consciousness, it always appears as a modification of a more or less +general object already in the mind. The word suggestion is well adapted +to expressing this relation. The future is suggested by, or rather is +influenced by the suggestions of, the past. + + +IDEAS CANNOT BE CONNECTED EXCEPT BY CONTINUITY. + +That ideas can nowise be connected without continuity is sufficiently +evident to one who reflects upon the matter. But still the opinion may +be entertained that after continuity has once made the connection of +ideas possible, then they may get to be connected in other modes than +through continuity. Certainly, I cannot see how anyone can deny that the +infinite diversity of the universe, which we call chance, may bring ideas +into proximity which are not associated in one general idea. It may do +this many times. But then the law of continuous spreading will produce a +mental association; and this I suppose is an abridged statement of the +way the universe has been evolved. But if I am asked whether a blind +ἀνάγκη cannot bring ideas together, first I point out that it would not +remain blind. There being a continuous connection between the ideas, they +would infallibly become associated in a living, feeling, and perceiving +general idea. Next, I cannot see what the mustness or necessity of this +ἀνάγκη would consist in. In the absolute uniformity of the phenomenon, +says the nominalist. Absolute is well put in; for if it merely happened +so three times in succession, or three million times in succession, in +the absence of any reason, the coincidence could only be attributed to +chance. But absolute uniformity must extend over the whole infinite +future; and it is idle to talk of that except as an idea. No; I think we +can only hold that wherever ideas come together they tend to weld into +general ideas; and wherever they are generally connected, general ideas +govern the connection; and these general ideas are living feelings spread +out. + + +MENTAL LAW FOLLOWS THE FORMS OF LOGIC. + +The three main classes of logical inference are Deduction, Induction, +and Hypothesis. These correspond to three chief modes of action of the +human soul. In deduction the mind is under the dominion of a habit or +association by virtue of which a general idea suggests in each case +a corresponding reaction. But a certain sensation is seen to involve +that idea. Consequently, that sensation is followed by that reaction. +That is the way the hind legs of a frog, separated from the rest of the +body, reason, when you pinch them. It is the lowest form of psychical +manifestation. + +By induction, a habit becomes established. Certain sensations, all +involving one general idea, are followed each by the same reaction; and +an association becomes established, whereby that general idea gets to be +followed uniformly by that reaction. + +Habit is that specialisation of the law of mind whereby a general idea +gains the power of exciting reactions. But in order that the general +idea should attain all its functionality, it is necessary, also, that +it should become suggestible by sensations. That is accomplished by a +psychical process having the form of hypothetic inference. By hypothetic +inference, I mean, as I have explained in other writings, an induction +from qualities. For example, I know that the kind of man known and +classed as a “mugwump” has certain characteristics. He has a high +self-respect and places great value upon social distinction. He laments +the great part that rowdyism and unrefined good-fellowship play in the +dealings of American politicians with their constituency. He thinks that +the reform which would follow from the abandonment of the system by which +the distribution of offices is made to strengthen party organisations +and a return to the original and essential conception of office-filling +would be found an unmixed good. He holds that monetary considerations +should usually be the decisive ones in questions of public policy. He +respects the principle of individualism and of _laisser-faire_ as the +greatest agency of civilisation. These views, among others, I know to +be obtrusive marks of a “mugwump.” Now, suppose I casually meet a man +in a railway-train, and falling into conversation find that he holds +opinions of this sort; I am naturally led to suppose that he is a +“mugwump.” That is hypothetic inference. That is to say, a number of +readily verifiable marks of a mugwump being selected, I find this man +has these, and infer that he has all the other characters which go to +make a thinker of that stripe. Or let us suppose that I meet a man of a +semi-clerical appearance and a sub-pharisaical sniff, who appears to look +at things from the point of view of a rather wooden dualism. He cites +several texts of scripture and always with particular attention to their +logical implications; and he exhibits a sternness, almost amounting to +vindictiveness, toward evildoers, in general. I readily conclude that +he is a minister of a certain denomination. Now the mind acts in a way +similar to this, every time we acquire a power of coördinating reactions +in a peculiar way, as in performing any act requiring skill. Thus, most +persons have a difficulty in moving the two hands simultaneously and in +opposite directions through two parallel circles nearly in the medial +plane of the body. To learn to do this, it is necessary to attend, first, +to the different actions in different parts of the motion, when suddenly +a general conception of the action springs up and it becomes perfectly +easy. We think the motion we are trying to do involves this action, and +this, and this. Then, the general idea comes which unites all those +actions, and thereupon the desire to perform the motion calls up the +general idea. The same mental process is many times employed whenever we +are learning to speak a language or are acquiring any sort of skill. + +Thus, by induction, a number of sensations followed by one reaction +become united under one general idea followed by the same reaction; +while by the hypothetic process, a number of reactions called for by one +occasion get united in a general idea which is called out by the same +occasion. By deduction, the habit fulfils its function of calling out +certain reactions on certain occasions. + + +UNCERTAINTY OF MENTAL ACTION. + +The inductive and hypothetic forms of inference are essentially probable +inferences, not necessary; while deduction may be either necessary or +probable. + +But no mental action seems to be necessary or invariable in its +character. In whatever manner the mind has reacted under a given +sensation, in that manner it is the more likely to react again; were +this, however, an absolute necessity, habits would become wooden and +ineradicable, and no room being left for the formation of new habits, +intellectual life would come to a speedy close. Thus, the uncertainty of +the mental law is no mere defect of it, but is on the contrary of its +essence. The truth is, the mind is not subject to “law,” in the same +rigid sense that matter is. It only experiences gentle forces which +merely render it more likely to act in a given way than it otherwise +would be. There always remains a certain amount of arbitrary spontaneity +in its action, without which it would be dead. + +Some psychologists think to reconcile the uncertainty of reactions with +the principle of necessary causation by means of the law of fatigue. +Truly for a _law_, this law of fatigue is a little lawless. I think it is +merely a case of the general principle that an idea in spreading loses +its insistency. Put me tarragon into my salad, when I have not tasted +it for years, and I exclaim “What nectar is this!” But add it to every +dish I taste for week after week, and a habit of expectation has been +created; and in thus spreading into habit, the sensation makes hardly +any more impression upon me; or, if it be noticed, it is on a new side +from which it appears as rather a bore. The doctrine that fatigue is +one of the primordial phenomena of mind I am much disposed to doubt. +It seems a somewhat little thing to be allowed as an exception to the +great principle of mental uniformisation. For this reason, I prefer to +explain it in the manner here indicated, as a special case of that great +principle. To consider it as something distinct in its nature, certainly +somewhat strengthens the necessitarian position; but even if it be +distinct, the hypothesis that all the variety and apparent arbitrariness +of mental action ought to be explained away in favor of absolute +determinism does not seem to me to recommend itself to a sober and sound +judgment, which seeks the guidance of observed facts and not that of +prepossessions. + + +RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW. + +Let me now try to gather up all these odds and ends of commentary and +restate the law of mind, in a unitary way. + +First, then, we find that when we regard ideas from a nominalistic, +individualistic, sensualistic way, the simplest facts of mind become +utterly meaningless. That one idea should resemble another or influence +another, or that one state of mind should so much as be thought of in +another is, from that standpoint, sheer nonsense. + +Second, by this and other means we are driven to perceive, what is +quite evident of itself, that instantaneous feelings flow together into +a continuum of feeling, which has in a modified degree the peculiar +vivacity of feeling and has gained generality. And in reference to such +general ideas, or continua of feeling, the difficulties about resemblance +and suggestion and reference to the external, cease to have any force. + +Third, these general ideas are not mere words, nor do they consist in +this, that certain concrete facts will every time happen under certain +descriptions of conditions; but they are just as much, or rather far +more, living realities than the feelings themselves out of which they +are concreted. And to say that mental phenomena are governed by law does +not mean merely that they are describable by a general formula; but that +there is a living idea, a conscious continuum of feeling, which pervades +them, and to which they are docile. + +Fourth, this supreme law, which is the celestial and living harmony, +does not so much as demand that the special ideas shall surrender +their peculiar arbitrariness and caprice entirely; for that would be +self-destructive. It only requires that they shall influence and be +influenced by one another. + +Fifth, in what measure this unification acts, seems to be regulated only +by special rules; or, at least, we cannot in our present knowledge +say how far it goes. But it may be said that, judging by appearances, +the amount of arbitrariness in the phenomena of human minds is neither +altogether trifling nor very prominent. + + +PERSONALITY. + +Having thus endeavored to state the law of mind, in general, I descend +to the consideration of a particular phenomenon which is remarkably +prominent in our own consciousnesses, that of personality. A strong +light is thrown upon this subject by recent observations of double and +multiple personality. The theory which at one time seemed plausible that +two persons in one body corresponded to the two halves of the brain +will, I take it, now be universally acknowledged to be insufficient. +But that which these cases make quite manifest is that personality is +some kind of coördination or connection of ideas. Not much to say, this, +perhaps. Yet when we consider that, according to the principle which we +are tracing out, a connection between ideas is itself a general idea, +and that a general idea is a living feeling, it is plain that we have at +least taken an appreciable step toward the understanding of personality. +This personality, like any general idea, is not a thing to be apprehended +in an instant. It has to be lived in time; nor can any finite time +embrace it in all its fulness. Yet in each infinitesimal interval it is +present and living, though specially colored by the immediate feelings +of that moment. Personality, so far as it is apprehended in a moment, is +immediate self-consciousness. + +But the word coördination implies somewhat more than this; it implies +a teleological harmony in ideas, and in the case of personality this +teleology is more than a mere purposive pursuit of a predeterminate end; +it is a developmental teleology. This is personal character. A general +idea, living and conscious now, it is already determinative of acts in +the future to an extent to which it is not now conscious. + +This reference to the future is an essential element of personality. +Were the ends of a person already explicit, there would be no room for +development, for growth, for life; and consequently there would be +no personality. The mere carrying out of predetermined purposes is +mechanical. This remark has an application to the philosophy of religion. +It is that a genuine evolutionary philosophy, that is, one that makes the +principle of growth a primordial element of the universe, is so far from +being antagonistic to the idea of a personal creator, that it is really +inseparable from that idea; while a necessitarian religion is in an +altogether false position and is destined to become disintegrated. But a +pseudo-evolutionism which enthrones mechanical law above the principle of +growth, is at once scientifically unsatisfactory, as giving no possible +hint of how the universe has come about, and hostile to all hopes of +personal relations to God. + + +COMMUNICATION. + +Consistently with the doctrine laid down in the beginning of this paper, +I am bound to maintain that an idea can only be affected by an idea in +continuous connection with it. By anything but an idea, it cannot be +affected at all. This obliges me to say, as I do say, on other grounds, +that what we call matter is not completely dead, but is merely mind +hide-bound with habits. It still retains the element of diversification; +and in that diversification there is life. When an idea is conveyed +from one mind to another, it is by forms of combination of the diverse +elements of nature, say by some curious symmetry, or by some union of a +tender color with a refined odor. To such forms the law of mechanical +energy has no application. If they are eternal, it is in the spirit +they embody; and their origin cannot be accounted for by any mechanical +necessity. They are embodied ideas; and so only can they convey ideas. +Precisely how primary sensations, as colors and tones, are excited, we +cannot tell, in the present state of psychology. But in our ignorance, I +think that we are at liberty to suppose that they arise in essentially +the same manner as the other feelings, called secondary. As far as +sight and hearing are in question, we know that they are only excited +by vibrations of inconceivable complexity; and the chemical senses +are probably not more simple. Even the least psychical of peripheral +sensations, that of pressure, has in its excitation conditions which, +though apparently simple, are seen to be complicated enough when we +consider the molecules and their attractions. The principle with which +I set out requires me to maintain that these feelings are communicated +to the nerves by continuity, so that there must be something like them +in the excitants themselves. If this seems extravagant, it is to be +remembered that it is the sole possible way of reaching any explanation +of sensation, which otherwise must be pronounced a general fact +absolutely inexplicable and ultimate. Now absolute inexplicability is a +hypothesis which sound logic refuses under any circumstances to justify. + +I may be asked whether my theory would be favorable or otherwise to +telepathy. I have no decided answer to give to this. At first sight, it +seems unfavorable. Yet there may be other modes of continuous connection +between minds other than those of time and space. + +The recognition by one person of another’s personality takes place by +means to some extent identical with the means by which he is conscious +of his own personality. The idea of the second personality, which is as +much as to say that second personality itself, enters within the field of +direct consciousness of the first person, and is as immediately perceived +as his ego, though less strongly. At the same time, the opposition +between the two persons is perceived, so that the externality of the +second is recognised. + +The psychological phenomena of intercommunication between two minds have +been unfortunately little studied. So that it is impossible to say, for +certain, whether they are favorable to this theory or not. But the very +extraordinary insight which some persons are able to gain of others from +indications so slight that it is difficult to ascertain what they are, is +certainly rendered more comprehensible by the view here taken. + +A difficulty which confronts the synechistic philosophy is this. In +considering personality, that philosophy is forced to accept the doctrine +of a personal God; but in considering communication, it cannot but admit +that if there is a personal God, we must have a direct perception of that +person and indeed be in personal communication with him. Now, if that be +the case, the question arises how it is possible that the existence of +this being should ever have been doubted by anybody. The only answer +that I can at present make is that facts that stand before our face and +eyes and stare us in the face are far from being, in all cases, the ones +most easily discerned. That has been remarked from time immemorial. + + +CONCLUSION. + +I have thus developed as well as I could in a little space the +_synechistic_ philosophy, as applied to mind. I think that I have +succeeded in making it clear that this doctrine gives room for +explanations of many facts which without it are absolutely and hopelessly +inexplicable; and further that it carries along with it the following +doctrines: 1st, a logical realism of the most pronounced type; 2nd, +objective idealism; 3rd, tychism, with its consequent thorough-going +evolutionism. We also notice that the doctrine presents no hindrances to +spiritual influences, such as some philosophies are felt to do. + + C. S. PEIRCE. + + +FOOTNOTES: + +[72] This proposition is substantially the same as a theorem of Cantor, +though it is enunciated in a much more general form. + + + + +MR. CHARLES S. PEIRCE’S ONSLAUGHT ON THE DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY. + + +The problem of necessity lurks at the bottom of all problems, and +according as we accept or reject the idea of necessity we shall be led to +two entirely different world-conceptions. + +The conception of indeterminism generally offers itself first to the +doubting mind; and it is apparently a pleasant idea. It promises +freedom, it leaves room for the imagination, it makes the world and +its possibilities wide, much wider than it could be on the plan of +determinism. Determinism is at first sight an oppressive notion and we +naturally shrink from it. It seems to destroy the freedom of the will +and all moral responsibility. From infinite possibilities it narrows the +world down to one single actuality; and thus it seems to destroy all the +charms of life. + +The former view may be represented as conceiving the all-power of +the whole in which and through which we live as a well meaning and +yielding ruler or a kind-hearted parent who if strongly plied with +prayer, will for a trifle in order to please an importune favorite +change his decisions. The dispensations of his government will be +full of exceptions, of private cabinet decrees, of counter orders and +irregularities. The latter view, however, would represent the entirety +of the All as an inexorable and uncompromising sovereign, or as a severe +educator, a stern father who unfalteringly clings to his principles. +He leaves full independence to his children, he does not prevent their +mistakes, yet rigidly lets them bear the consequences of their actions. +He never answers prayers except that the prayer itself has its educating +effects upon him who prays; but he never alters objective facts for the +sake of him who requests his interference, and he never makes exceptions +either in favor or disfavor of anybody. In brief; the God of him who +accepts the former view, will be Chance, while the God of him who accepts +the latter view will be Law. + +The choice between the two views seems to remind us of the choice left +to the heroes of our fairy tales. He who chooses that which appears +pleasant will be led into inextricable confusion, he who chooses that +which appears rigid and oppressive will be led on a path where in spite +of many difficulties he will be able to make firm and certain steps and +will arrive at clearness as well as moral freedom. It is not the golden +casket that contains Portia’s picture. + +Science constantly operates on the basis of the maxim that there is no +chance, that everything that happens, happens as it does with necessity. +The question is, Is this maxim a mere assumption, a non-verifiable +working hypothesis; or is there any reliable evidence in its favor? Is it +true, and if it is, how can it be proved? + + +I. + +DAVID HUME REDIVIVUS. + +Mr. Charles S. Peirce’s article entitled “The Doctrine of Necessity +Examined,” which appeared in the last number of _The Monist_, must have +been a surprise to many thinking readers. It must have affected them in +a somewhat similar manner as Hume’s “Treatise of Human Nature” affected +Kant. It roused him from his dogmatic slumber: He abandoned dogmatism +but nevertheless did not accept Hume’s skepticism; he remained positive; +yet he propounded a better positive view than was the old dogmatism; he +established in philosophy the method of critique. + +The parallelism between David Hume, who doubted the validity of our +conception of causation, and Mr. Charles S. Peirce who denies the +universality of the doctrine of necessity, is very marked in more than +one respect. It is, in spite of many differences, a case of close +analogy, and the answer which we shall have to give to either, will in +many respects be suited to both. Both shake the ultimate ground of +scientific research at its very root. Both call in question the most +fundamental concept upon which all our methods of investigation and +philosophy rest. Both challenge the reliability of an idea of which few +would hesitate to say that it is all but universally accepted. In fact +the ideas “causation” and “necessity” are more than kin. If analysed, +many of their elements will be found to be actually identical. Thus the +one cannot be either established or doubted without establishing or +doubting the other. Accordingly Mr. Peirce, in some respect, repeats +David Hume’s onslaught upon the current conception of the basis of human +knowledge with the more formidable weapons which a century of close +thought and scientific investigation have furnished him. + +If Kant’s answer to Hume had been satisfactory, Mr. Peirce probably +would not have renewed the attack or he would have had to modify it +considerably. Kant, however, whom we both, Mr. Peirce as much as I +myself, admire as a master of philosophic thought, did not solve the +question satisfactorily. Yet Kant pointed out the way of solving it, +which was the middle way between dogmatism and scepticism, called by him +and his followers “Criticism,” and it is this way on which we trust is +safest travelling. + +Mr. Peirce is right that the doctrine of necessity cannot be +“postulated,” for “to postulate a proposition is no more than to hope it +will be true.” The doctrine of necessity is, indeed, usually treated as +a postulate, and Mr. Peirce’s attack appears formidable because he shows +the weakness of the arguments which are commonly brought forward in its +favor and which we grant to be insufficient. + +Mr. Peirce says (_The Monist_, II, 3, p. 330): + + “In view of all these considerations, I do not believe that + anybody, not in a state of case-hardened ignorance respecting + the logic of science, can maintain that the precise and + universal conformity of facts to law is clearly proved, or even + rendered particularly probable, by any observations hitherto + made. In this way, the determined advocate of exact regularity + will soon find himself driven to _a priori_ reasons to support + his thesis. These received such a sockdologer from Stuart Mill + in his Examination of Hamilton, that holding to them now seems + to me to denote a high degree of imperviousness to reason; so + that I shall pass them by with little notice.” + +Mr. Peirce is right when saying that necessitarianism must be founded +on something other than observation. Observation is _a posteriori_; it +has reference only to single facts, to particulars; yet the doctrine +of necessity, if there is anything in it at all, is of universal +application. The doctrine of necessity, let us not be afraid to pronounce +it clearly, is of an _a priori_ nature. The scientist assumes _a priori_, +i. e. even before he makes his observations or experiments, as a general +law applicable to every process which takes place, that, whatever +happens, happens of necessity in consequence of a cause and in conformity +to law, so that the same cause under the same circumstances will produce +the same effects. If all the _a priori_ reasons, as Mr. Peirce maintains, +received a sockdologer from Stuart Mill, then indeed we shall have to +abandon the idea of necessity as the superstition of a past and erroneous +philosophy and we shall have to start the world of science over again. + +Mr. Peirce denies the strict regularity of natural law and introduces an +element of chance. He says (ibid. p. 336): + + “To undertake to account for anything by saying boldly that it + is due to chance would, indeed, be futile. But this I do not + do. _I make use of chance chiefly to make room for a principle + of generalization, or tendency to form habits, which I hold + has produced all regularities._[73] The mechanical philosopher + leaves the whole specification of the world utterly unaccounted + for, which is pretty nearly as bad as to boldly attribute it to + chance. I attribute it altogether to chance, it is true, but + to chance in the form of a spontaneity which is to some degree + regular.” + +Mr. Peirce is the pathfinder of a new and as yet untried road. He strikes +out boldly into the tumultuous ocean of chance, hoping to find in his +journey the connection between the East and the West, between contrasts +that seem to him otherwise unconnectible. The confidence of the bold +discoverer is set forth in the warnings he gives to all seafaring people. +He attempts to frighten the ill-informed minds who might innocently +venture out in other directions; and he will thus naturally prevent +many from falling either into the Charybdis of doubting the propriety +of applying the logic of probabilities to the problem of necessity +and causation in general, or, worse still, into the Scylla of the _a +priori_. The former, he tells us denotes “a state of case-hardened +ignorance respecting the logic of science,” the latter “a high degree of +imperviousness to reason.” + +Mr. Peirce is well known as one of the keenest logicians now living. +Considering this fact I am slow to take up arms against him in defending +a case which he so strongly brands beforehand. I must from the beginning +plead guilty to a belief in necessity, and having critically revised +my view once more I cannot help upholding it. I am fully conscious of +the fact that hundreds, thousands, and millions of single experiences +(which in Kantian terminology are called _a posteriori_ arguments) cannot +establish a solid belief in necessity, nor can any imaginable number of +sequences prove the rigidity of causation, and I confess freely that I +support my thesis with _a priori_ reasons. Yet at the same time attention +must be called to the fact that neither Mr. Hamilton nor Mr. Mill had any +adequate conception of the _a priori_, and Mr. Mill’s sockdologer does +not disturb in the least the assurance of my view; for the _a priori_ +can, in my opinion, be based upon the firm ground of experience. + +All the many sense-experiences at our command, if considered singly, +cannot constitute knowledge. In order to weave the woof of the _a +posteriori_ into coherent cloth we want the warp of the _a priori_, and +I do not see how we can do without it. But the _a priori_ is not that +mystical hocus-pocus of absolute truth with its impertinent assumptions +such as it is presented by pseudo-Kantians and justly denounced by Mill; +it is not as Mr. Peirce brands it an “I cannot help believing,” it is +not a “natural belief,” nor is it as others conceive it an innate idea. +It is, briefly described, simply and solely formal knowledge, such as 2 +× 2 = 4, to which we attribute universality and necessity and with the +assistance of which we are enabled to predict and predetermine certain +results beforehand (i. e. _a priori_). We might invent a new name for the +_a priori_, the latter having become odious through the denunciations of +its enemies and worse still, having been distorted beyond recognition +through the misuse to which it was put by its defenders and suppositional +friends. Yet that would be another question, and the idea of the _a +priori_, i. e. of formal knowledge involving universality and necessity +would remain the same. + +The universality and necessity of formal knowledge are as a rule taken +for granted by scientists. But philosophy can take nothing for granted, +and the problem rises: How is the belief in the universality and +necessity of formal knowledge to be justified? Mr. Peirce’s onslaught on +the doctrine of necessity is a challenge to answer this question. + + +II. + +CAUSATION NOT MERE SEQUENCE. + +Mr. John Venn published some twenty-five or six years ago an excellent +treatise called “The Logic of Chance.” This work opened the eyes of many +to the great importance of the calculus of probabilities as a method +of science which was of much wider application than had before been +suspected. This admirable work we may boldly say marks a new epoch in the +study of logic, it opened new vistas, and many expectations created by +it have since been realised. Yet it is to be regretted that the author +adopts Hume’s erroneous conception of causality and thus implicitly +paves the way which Mr. Peirce has actually followed and which leads +to a denial of the doctrine of necessity. Concerning “the doctrine of +universal causation” Mr. Venn says, in Chapter XIV: + + “We will employ the word simply in the sense which is becoming + almost universally adopted by scientific men, viz. that of + invariable unconditional sequence. + + “It is in this sense that the word _cause_ is used by Mr. + Mill.... + + “This meaning of the term is rapidly becoming the popular, or + rather, the popular scientific one.” + +This idea of “sequence” however was exactly Hume’s mistake, adopted by +Mr. Mill and through Mr. Mill popularised among English thinkers. If +the nature of cause and effect were really constituted by invariable +sequence, then the night might be called the effect of the day because +night is invariably consequent upon day. + +Hume, taking the ground that cause and effect constitute a sequence, +attempted a synthesis of both; he searched for a proof of their identity +and failed. And it was natural that he failed, for cause and effect are +so radically different that we cannot bring them into the formula of an +equation as “cause = effect.” There is no cause that is equal to its +effect. + +Hume should have considered causation as one single process, and instead +of attempting a synthesis, he should have made an analysis. The analysis +would have shown that cause and effect are two abstract and correlative +terms of one whole and inseparable event. Cause is not identical with +effect, but the whole event is identical with itself. + +If my finger touches a key of the piano, a chord is struck; the chord +swings and produces certain air-vibrations. In this process from the +beginning to the end all the energy employed and the mass of the material +particles remain in amount the same, yet there is a change of form taking +place. Causation is not mere sequence, but a sequence of quite a special +kind. It is a sequence of two states which belong together as an initial +and a final aspect of one and the same event. + +So long as we know of two events simply that they follow one another, +although the sequence may in every case be invariable and unexceptional, +we are not justified in calling them cause and effect. No amount of +experience is sufficient to constitute causation by a mere synthesis of +sequences, and to have appreciated this truth is the immortal merit of +the great Scotchman who boldly took the consequence of the argument and +acquiesced in scepticism. + +The problem, however, is not so desperate as Hume thought. If Hume +could have considered his argument in the light which the law of the +conservation of matter and energy sheds upon it, he would most likely +have abandoned his scepticism; for causality is perfectly intelligible if +conceived not as a synthesis of two radically different events, but as a +process of transformation, of which the prior state is called cause and +the final one effect. + +That two radically different events, which are not thought of as +transformation, invariably follow each other without our being able to +discover any connection between them, will naturally appear as a mystery; +but that two forms are radically different things, although they may be +forms of the same amount of matter and energy, is no mystery. The effect +is, or may be, something entirely new. + +The configuration of things as it appears in the effect, did not exist +before. But for that reason, it is no creation out of nothing, it is not +an incomprehensible event, it is no miracle. + +It is a very wonderful thing that two congruent regular tetrahedrons, +when put together, will form a hexahedron, but the laws of form do +perfectly and satisfactorily explain it. Supposing we had no idea of the +laws of form or only an incoherent and fragmentary knowledge of them, +should we not look upon the result of this combination as a strange and +incomprehensible mystery. Two heaps of flour one poured upon the other +will give one heap of the same kind and shape but of a larger size. +However, the combination of the two four-sided bodies does not produce +another four-sided body doubly as large as any of the two four-sided +bodies. Nor does it produce an eight-sided body. It produces a six-sided +body, which is something quite new. The result is not contained in the +conditions singly, for no one can say that six-sidedness is a quality +implicitly contained in four-sided bodies. + +The process of combining hydrogen with oxygen into water (H₂O) is +an immensely more complex case, and the qualities resulting from a +difference of density as well as configuration are entirely unknown to +us. There is nevertheless no reason whatever to consider the process +as different in principle; it is a case of transformation in which the +amount of matter and energy remains the same. + +Whatever the value of the logic of chance may be for scientific reasoning +in establishing gradations of certainty and formulating the reliability +of a certain belief, we deny most positively its applicability to the +principle of causation in general. If we ask what the chance is of a +combination of two congruent tetrahedrons becoming a hexahedron, we must +answer that the probability is exactly 1, which means certainty, and +certainty is but another name for necessity. + +Mr. Peirce does not object to necessity in certain cases, he objects +to necessity being a universal feature of the world. He objects to the +rigidity of causation in so far only as to allow a trifle of chance to +enter into nature. + +One or two cases or even a hundred, and a thousand, nay millions of +millions of cases in which causation is explicable as transformation +is no proof that this must always be so. Mr. Peirce may grant and most +likely he does grant that causation in a definite set of experiences is +transformation, yet what guarantee do we have for saying that it is the +only kind of causation. Might there not be room in this world for another +causation which for lack of a full comprehension of its nature, we may +call the causation of chance? + +We answer that form is a quality of this world, not of some samples of +it, but throughout, so far as we know of existence even in the most +superficial way, and thus we know beforehand or _a priori_ that the laws +of form hold good so far as our telescopes sweep through space. We are +ignorant as to the qualities dependent upon special forms of matter or +energy, and we can acquire any knowledge thereof only through experience; +but that is no reason to doubt the validity of causation in general, +or to surmise the probability of there being somewhere a different +arrangement of nature. + +Thus we come to the conclusion that the calculus of probabilities is not +applicable to the order of the world as to whether it may or may not +be universal. And in corroboration of this our position we quote the +following passage from a high authority in the science of logic, who is +no less than Mr. Charles S. Peirce himself. “Illustrations of the Logic +of Science,” (_Popular Science Monthly_, 1877, p. 714): + + “The relative probability of this or that arrangement of + Nature is something which we should have a right to talk about + if universes were as plenty as blackberries, if we could put + a quantity of them in a bag, shake them well up, draw out a + sample, and examine them to see what proportion of them had + one arrangement and what proportion another. But, even in + that case, a higher universe would contain us, in regard to + whose arrangements the conception of probability could have no + applicability.” + +Mr. Peirce is still more emphatic in another passage which reads (ib. +1878, p. 205): + + “If any one has ever maintained that the universe is a pure + throw of the dice, the theologians have abundantly refuted him. + ‘How often,’ says Archbishop Tillotson, ‘might a man, after + he had jumbled a set of letters in a bag, fling them out upon + the ground before they would fall into an exact poem, yea, + or so much as make a good discourse in prose! And may not a + little book be as easily made by chance as this great volume + of the world?’ The chance world here shown to be so different + from that in which we live would be one in which there were + no laws, the characters of different things being entirely + independent; so that, should a sample of any kind of objects + ever show a prevalent character, it could only be by accident, + and no general proposition could ever be established. Whatever + further conclusions we may come to in regard to the order of + the universe, thus much may be regarded as solidly established, + that the world is not a mere chance-medley.” + +Here follows a close reasoning of several pages which ends (on p. 207) +with a paragraph beginning with the words: + + “This shows that a contradiction is involved in the very idea + of a chance world.” + +And a long paragraph on p. 208 winds up with these sentences: + + “The actual world is almost a chance-medley to the mind of a + polyp. The interest which the uniformities of Nature have for + an animal measures his place in the scale of intelligence.” + +This is exactly the position which I defend. If universes were as plenty +as blackberries we might talk about the order of other universes. They +might be four- or five- or _n_-dimensional. Yet even in all these cases +they would not be void of form. The four-dimensional universe would have +another arrangement, but its laws would be none the less orderly, none +the less regular, and a higher universe would contain them all. Supposing +there were four- or five-dimensional space somewhere, we could state +with absolute precision all the formal laws by which bodies of so many +dimensions were governed.[74] + +The order of form and the rigidity of formal laws is as universal and +omnipresent as God. They encompass our path and our lying down, they have +beset our behind and before. If we ascend up into heaven they are there, +if we make our beds in hell, behold they are there. If we take the wings +of the morning and dwell in the uttermost parts of the sea, even there +they shall lead us and hold us. + + +III. + +MR. PEIRCE’S LOGIC OF SCIENCE. + +In spite of the fundamental difference that obtains between Mr. Peirce’s +and our own world-conception, we must state that there are many +most important points of agreement. Mr. Peirce says in his article +“Illustrations of the Logic of Science,” (ibid. p. 3 and 7): + + “The object of reasoning is to find out, from the consideration + of what we already know, something else which we do not know.... + + “The settlement of opinion is the sole object of inquiry.” + +There are according to Peirce several methods of settling opinion, which +swayed humanity in an historic succession: (1) The method of tenacity. +Doubt being an uneasy and dissatisfied state, we cling tenaciously not +merely to believing, but to believing just what we do believe. (2) The +method of authority, which is that of the Roman Church and of all great +political and religious institutions of the past. (3) The _a priori_ +method, by which Mr. Peirce understands the fixing of belief agreeably to +reason, i. e. to the subjective conviction of the individual thinker. All +these methods have their merits, says Mr. Peirce (ibid. p. 13): + + “The _a priori_ method is distinguished for its comfortable + conclusions. It is the nature of the process to adopt whatever + belief we are inclined to, and there are certain flatteries + to the vanity of man which we all believe by nature, until we + are awakened from our pleasing dream by some rough facts. The + method of authority will always govern the mass of mankind.... + But most of all I admire the method of tenacity for its + strength, simplicity, and directness.” + +It is apparent that the merit of the _a priori_ method so called +is really a vice. The _a priori_ method so called is the basis of +agnosticism. If according to my reason this, and according to your reason +that, may be the truth, where does truth remain? If truth is purely +subjective, truth becomes impossible. The method of settling belief +agreeably to our individual tempers is the death of objective truth, of +science and philosophy. + +Mr. Peirce fully recognises the practical importance of thought. He says: + + “The production of belief is the sole function of thought” + (ibid. p. 289). + + “Our beliefs guide our desires and shape our actions” (ibid. p. + 5). + + “What is belief? First, it is something that we are aware of; + second, it appeases the irritation of doubt; and third, it + involves the establishment in our nature of a rule of action, + or, say for short, a _habit_” (ibid. p. 291). + + “Thus, we come down to what is tangible and practical, as + the root of every real distinction of thought, no matter how + subtile it may be; and there is no distinction of meaning so + fine as to consist in anything but a possible difference of + practice” (ibid. p. 293). + +Mr. Peirce is very far from considering philosophy as a mere matter of +speculation or theory without practical importance. He says: + + “What sort of a conception we ought to have of the universe, + how to think of the _ensemble_ of things, is a fundamental + problem in the theory of reasoning.” + +The _a priori_ method, so called by Mr. Peirce, translated into practical +life is not only the death of truth but also of morality. The objective +criterion of truth is gone, and with it goes the objective standard of +right and wrong. If that is true which seems so to my individual reason, +then that is right which pleases me best. What is right to me might be +wrong to you. Thus this method leads either to moral indifference, or to +basing ethics upon the greatest amount of pleasure attainable, (Hedonism, +as represented by Mr. H. Spencer, Prof. Harald Höffding, Professor +Gizycki, and others,) or to relying upon the individual conscience as an +absolute and ultimate authority.[75] + +The method of settling opinion agreeably to individual reason is at +present the most fashionable and widely spread conception, and it shows +its influence in the almost universal acceptation of agnosticism to-day. +Is that the final decision with which we have to rest satisfied? If it +were, we would better return to the method of authority or tenacity. +No, it is not the sum of all wisdom. The _a priori_ method so called +represents a period of transition, which, if persistently pursued, will +lead to the bankruptcy of thought, the desperate appearance of which is +well disguised in the big sounding and modesty-parading term agnosticism. +And here we return to the exposition of Mr. Peirce’s views. Mr. Peirce +does not accept the _a priori_ method, he believes in “the logic of +science.” Mr. Peirce says: + + “To satisfy our doubts, therefore, it is necessary that a + method should be found by which our beliefs may be caused by + nothing human, but by some external permanency—by something + upon which our thinking has no effect.... The method must be + such that the ultimate conclusion of every man shall be the + same. Such is the method of science” (ibid. p. 11.) + + “That whose characters are independent of how you or I think is + an external reality” (ibid. p. 298). + + “All the followers of science are fully persuaded that the + processes of investigation, if only pushed far enough, will + give one certain solution to every question to which they can + be applied.... They may at first obtain different results, but, + as each perfects his method and his processes, the results + will move steadily together toward a destined centre.... The + opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who + investigate, is what we mean by the truth, and the object + represented in this opinion is the real” (ibid. pp. 299-300). + +The word “fated” must be understood as Mr. Peirce understands it. He adds +in a foot-note: + + “Fate means merely that which is sure to come true, and cannot + be avoided.” + + +IV. + +NECESSITY IN THOUGHT PRESUPPOSES NECESSITY IN FACTS. + +I have thus outlined Mr. Peirce’s views, not only because his line of +reasoning[76] is admirable and deserves to be universally known and +recognised, but also because it seems to me to have some bearing upon the +question at issue. + +If the ultimate conclusion of every man concerning reality shall be the +same, there must be some truth in the idea of necessity. If there is an +opinion “fated to be ultimately agreed to,” we are confronted in our +representation of reality with something that is inevitable. Shall there +be necessity in thought but not in that of which all our ideas are but +images and symbols? We can conceive of the necessity in the ideal realm +of thought only as a reflection of that necessity which pervades the +original and prototype of our thought, which lives in reality. + + +V. + +MR. PEIRCE’S EVOLUTIONISM. + +I have tried to find an explanation of Mr. Peirce’s position which +appears to me self-contradictory and I believe I have found the key that +will explain it. + +I read somewhere a stray remark of Mr. Peirce’s in which he demanded +that evolutionism should be thorough-going. The conception of evolution +in vogue at present, he said, stops short at a certain point, and +substitutes for an explanation the unknowable. Mr. Peirce says: + + “Does not space call for some explanation? Is not that a + half-way philosophy which in these our days does not explain, + or at least hold out some promise of explaining, why space + is continuous, why it has such a wonderful uniformity in all + its parts, why there are neither more nor less than three + dimensions everywhere, why every closed curve can, by a + continuous change of position, size, and form, be brought into + coincidence with every other, and why the three angles of a + triangle make exactly one hundred and eighty degrees, or at + least so very closely so that we cannot tell whether they make + more or less?” + +Mr. Peirce does not intend to halt before these problems, but to explain +them and carries the principle of evolution to its ultimate conclusions, +so as to explain from it not only the forms of living organisms but also +the laws of nature including the laws of space. Mr. Peirce declares in +his article “The Architecture of Theories” (_The Monist_, Vol. I, No. 2, +p. 165): + + “Uniformities are precisely the sort of facts that need to be + accounted for.... Law is _par excellence_ the thing that wants + a reason.” + +And what he means by it is further elucidated in his article “The +Doctrine of Necessity Examined” (_The Monist_, Vol. II, No. 3, p. 334): + + “That single events should be hard and unintelligible, logic + will permit without difficulty: we do not expect to make the + shock of a personally experienced earthquake appear natural and + reasonable by any amount of cogitation. But logic does expect + things _general_ to be understandable. To say that there is a + universal law, and that it is a hard, ultimate, unintelligible + fact, the why and wherefore of which can never be inquired + into, at this a sound logic will revolt; and will pass over + at once to a method of philosophising which does not thus + barricade the road of discovery.” + +It is perfectly true that “law is _par excellence_ the thing that wants +a reason,” and any explanation that explains it by the assumption of an +unknowable is unphilosophical. I agree with Mr. Peirce that we must not +halt here; but I have no confidence in his method of explanation. Mr. +Peirce’s original idea, then, and I should add, his main mistake, is that +he proposes to explain the origin of natural law by evolution. + +In his legitimate anxiety to explain law, Mr. Peirce declares chance to +be exempt therefrom. He says: + + “That a pitched coin should sometimes turn up heads and + sometimes tails calls for no particular explanation.” (_The + Monist_, Vol. I, No. 2, p. 165.) + +But chance in our opinion needs exactly as much explanation as anything +else. Mr. Peirce very improperly identifies “that which cannot be +accounted for” with “that which need not be accounted for.” Absolute +chance, if it existed, would _not_ so much _not_ call for a particular +explanation as actually be unexplainable, and being incapable of +explanation, it would have to be considered as an unintelligible fact, +as inscrutable, incomprehensible, and mystical. On the assumption that +chance need not be accounted for, Mr. Peirce builds the architecture of +his theory. He says: + + “Chance is first, law is second, the tendency of habits is + third.” + +The application of this general statement is set forth in the following +passage: + + “In psychology Feeling is First, Sense of reaction Second, + General conception Third, or mediation. In biology, the idea of + arbitrary sporting is first, heredity is second, the process + whereby the accidental characters become fixed is third.” + +How little after all we can escape the determinism of law as being a +feature of the world will be seen from the fact, that the explanation +for the evolution of law is presented by Mr. Peirce as being itself a +law, i. e. a formula describing a regularity supposed to obtain in facts. +Does not Mr. Peirce’s formula, supposing it to be true, deserve the same +reproach which he casts upon natural law in general, viz., that it is “a +hard, ultimate, unintelligible fact, the why and wherefore of which can +never be inquired into”? + + +VI. + +WORLD-CONSTRUCTIONS. + +There are two methods of philosophising, one starts with ideas which +are supposed not to need any explanation, the other starts from facts +and uses facts as data. The former is the method of the constructionist +or ontologist, the latter that of the positivist. The constructionist +attempts to beget a world-theory in the same way that God was supposed +to have created the world; he attempts to bring it into being either +out of a real nothing or out of something like nothing. He constructs a +world-theory out of the self-evident, out of the absolute, out of the +indubitable, or out of that the contrary of which is inconceivable. The +positivist, however, employs facts as the given material, which he works +out into a consistent and systematic whole. The former view is synthetic +and constructive, the latter is analytic and descriptive. The former view +is the method of Hegel, Oken, and also of Mr. Spencer, the latter is the +method of all scientists and the ideal of the positive philosophy. + +Mr. Peirce although very positivistic in his logic of science, must in +philosophy still be counted among the constructionists. + +Chance is to Mr. Peirce as much absolute as was to Hegel the idea +of “abstract being,” which as such, Hegel said, is equivalent to +“non-being.” Non-being need not be accounted for. So Hegel starts with +this idea, and finding that “becoming” is the oscillation between being +and non-being launches his abstract thought upon the terra firma of +reality. + +In the same way and with similar ingenious ingenuity Oken starts +the world with zero. Zero or non-being need not be accounted for. +Its existence calls for no particular reasons. What is zero? We can +conceive it as “0 = 1 - 1.” Thus we have “+1” and “-1,” two units. The +whole world, according to Oken, is only a disintegration of Nothing, +an equation of enormous complexity but always equal to zero. And that +explains the world! + +Mr. Spencer, adopts “the principle of setting out with propositions of +which the negations are unconceivable,” without being aware that any +inveterate belief or prejudice can be defended from that standpoint. +The principle is purely subjective. It does not admit of any objective +verification and limits knowledge to individual conception. If Mr. +Spencer’s principle were admissible, we could not refute the adversaries +of the Copernican system, when they declare that the rotation of the +earth up on which we stand is inconceivable. The maxim that that +proposition is most certain the negation of which is inconceivable might +after all, and it actually did very often, come into conflict with facts. +Many propositions are now confidently accepted which were formerly +declared to be positively inconceivable. + +Mr. Peirce, I say, starts the world with an abstract idea of a something +of which he assumes we need not give any account, as did the great +ontologists of former times. He constructs, agreeably to his reason, a +theory of the way in which the world might have originated, and thus he +falls into the mistake criticised by himself as the _a priori_ method. +Yet the weakest point of Mr. Peirce’s system is that his “absolute +chance” begets order; irregularity becomes law by practice, as if by a +sufficiently prolonged shaking the dice would by and by acquire the habit +of turning up the same faces each time. + +The present world-conception of the scientist regards natural laws as +eternal. The order that prevails in these laws constitutes the principle +of evolution and changes the chaos of a nebula into a well-arranged +planetary system. Thus the original chaos is properly speaking no chaos. +It is in all its parts regulated by law and only appears chaotic in +comparison with more advanced stages of evolution. + +Desirous to account for the regularities of nature Mr. Peirce proposes +the idea that nature in the beginning was a real, true chaos, without +order, without laws, the single actions of reality taking place +irregularly and in a sportive manner. Absolute chance prevailed. +Everything was undetermined, exactly as much so as a man is undetermined +in his action before his belief is settled. Yet a man, by and by, forms +a belief and acts accordingly, not once or twice, but often, until a +habit is formed. Thus Mr. Peirce assumes, Nature’s actions are first +undetermined, they may be of this kind or of another kind. The same +particle of reality may under the same conditions act in different ways, +yet it acts somehow; it acts again, and repeats a certain kind of action +more frequently than others, thus forming habits. Laws according to Mr. +Peirce are the habits acquired by nature. + +The proposition of Mr. Peirce’s logic of science points out another +method of constructing a world-conception. The recognition of reality in +the sense as he conceives it, admonishes us that our world-conception +should be a picturing, a mirroring, an imitation of the objective world +of facts. It should not be the architecture of a theory, but first +an analysis and then a reconstruction of experience; it should be a +description of facts, methodically arranged. + + +VII. + +FACTS AND LAWS. + +That which we call natural law is not the description of a certain +special and concrete form of existence which is now or then and here +or there, but of some general quality of facts which is everywhere and +always. The former, i. e. every special and concrete form of existence, +can be explained by evolution, the latter, i. e. natural law, cannot. The +former has to be accounted for by the law of causation, the latter by the +principle of sufficient reason. And it is this distinction between cause +and reason which Mr. Peirce does not seem to have regarded. + +Every special form of existence must, at least theoretically, be +traceable as the effect of some cause and every law of nature must be +explainable by showing its connection with other natural laws. The only +thing in the world of which we cannot and need not give account is the +existence of facts itself, or being in general, which is the stubborn +presence of reality in us ourselves and also outside of us, objected +to our own being as an independent power to which we have to adapt our +conduct. We need not prove its existence, for it exists. If anything +is ultimate, facts are ultimate; and cognition is nothing but the +reconstruction of facts for the purpose of orientation among them, it is +a methodical description of reality in the symbols of the feelings that +exist in sentient beings. + +A scientist having observed a special process of nature, describes it, +if possible, in such a way that it is recognised as a transformation. A +description of this kind is called an explanation. It renders the process +intelligible to us; it is complete and exhaustive. In order to make such +a description available for comprehending other cases of the same or +similar kind, we have to introduce another principle, which is that of +economy. We must single out those features which are common to a certain +class and remove all diversity and specificalness. All specificalness +and diversity are transient features due to special conditions; they +disappear with these special conditions. Thus the notion of natural law +involves as an essential characteristic and fundamental quality the +absence of the incidental and the temporal. + +Natural laws describe the facts of nature _sub specie aeternitatis_. They +cease to be natural laws in the proper sense of the word as soon as they +are conceived, like legal laws, as products of evolutions, which have +appeared in time and may disappear again. Eternity is the characteristic +feature of a natural law, it is its backbone, the essence of its being, +its _conditio sine qua non_. + +Thus in considering a natural phenomenon we are led to distinguish +between its cause and its reason: Its cause is something special, it is +an individual event, happening in time, and accordingly being transient; +it is an occurrence of some kind, it is a single and definite fact. +However its reason is not anything special, it is something general; +it is not a single and definite fact, but it is a law of universal +application; it is not transient, but a conception of things in which the +incidental and temporal are eliminated. A reason is applicable to all +cases of the same kind and also to all cases of any time. A cause, i. e. +a fact, if it truly exists, is real (not true); a law, i. e. a reason, +if it really obtains in nature, is true (not real), and any attempt at +explaining natural laws as a product of evolution, being based upon the +view that regards them as causes not as reasons, as real not as true, as +a description of temporal existences, not as viewing facts _sub specie +aeternitatis_, must from the outset be a failure.[77] + +Mr. Peirce attempts to explain natural laws as if they were single and +concrete facts. Where we have to look for reasons he evidently employs +the method of searching for causes. He treats that which in its very +nature is eternal, as if it were temporal. He regards the everlasting, +the imperishable, the immutable as if it had originated, as if it were +transient, as if it were the product of a development. + + +VIII. + +LAWS NOT INEXPLICABLE. + +But is not Mr. Peirce justified in declaring that law remains +unexplained? Is law really as he says “hard, ultimate, inexplicable, +immutable”? Law is to be regarded as immutable but not as ultimate or +inexplicable, and thus Mr. Peirce’s denunciation of natural law is not +justified. All natural laws must be conceived as forming one system +ascending from the lower to the higher, from the more special to the +more general. And the more comprehensive law represents in each case the +reason for the less comprehensive law which is comprised in it. Thus we +must finally reach the most general or all-comprehensive law, which is a +description of that which is a universal quality of existence. + +There is wrong notion prevalent among many thinkers that the most +comprehensive description (law or reason) of a certain kind should, +as in a nutshell, contain and immediately explain all that which it +embraces, so that if once in its possession, we should be omniscient as +to all the rest. The most universal law is looked upon as the centre of +existence—_das Innerste der Welt_. If we could but get there, we should +solve all the world-problems by mere intuition. This is the old error of +the students of magic, whose hope is expressed by Faust when he says: + + “_Dass ich erkenne, was die Welt_ + _Im Innersten zusammenhält._” + + That I may detect the inmost force + Which binds the world and shapes its course.—_Bayard Taylor._ + +Comprehension is not attained simply by finding out and stating the most +general feature of a certain class of facts; comprehension does not alone +consist of generalisation but also of discrimination. The differences +among less general laws must be recognised as results of special +conditions. And any knowledge of a general law reveals nothing about the +special conditions under the influence of which the same law will work +differently. + +It is but too often overlooked that the more general a statement is, the +less it will contain, the vaguer it will appear, the emptier it must be. +There is no royal road to cognition and mere generalisation is of no +avail. We shall have to investigate the details of every case and view +it in its relation to the general law. The general law must be viewed +under those conditions which will invariably produce the same special +modifications. + +But do not the most general reasons remain uncomprehended? Do we not at +last arrive at an ultimate law which, then, must be hard and inexplicable? + +Those laws which appear in every respect to be universal are the formal +laws of mathematics, arithmetic, and their kindred sciences. And all +these formal sciences are not only _not_ mystical, unintelligible, and +inexplicable, but they are the most perspicuous, most reliable, and most +certain knowledge we possess. All their theorems admit of the most rigid +demonstration, and the last shadow of mysticism has been removed by +Hermann Grassmann. Owing to his searching investigations we are no longer +in need of axioms which were formerly supposed to be the indispensable +basis of mathematics. + +There is however a basis of formal thought left which we cannot dispense +with; that is the idea of sameness, generally formulated as the law of +identity. Is perhaps the law of identity by which all the regularities +of nature are to be accounted for, inexplicable? Hardly! The idea of +sameness has a solid basis in the facts of experience.[78] + + +IX. + +CONCLUSION. + +The contrast between Determinism and Indeterminism is old, yet Mr. +Peirce has worked out quite a new aspect of Indeterminism and places it +upon a basis that appears to be a more solid foundation than it ever +before possessed. At the same time he succeeds in making some of its +consequences so plausible, that in this new garb it will appeal more +strongly than before to scientifically trained minds. With all deference +to the logical acuteness of Mr. Peirce and with all admiration for the +originality and depth of his thought, we cannot, however, accede to the +new philosophy which he proposes. + +Mr. Peirce’s propositions go to the core of all problems, they upset +everything that has heretofore been considered as firm ground, they +question the most fundamental concepts of the world-conception upon +which all scientific reasoning and the methods of the positive philosophy +rest. Thus they set us a-thinking and will help us to attain greater +clearness on points which are to all of us of greater concern than may +at first sight appear. For the fundamental problems of philosophy have +a deep practical importance. Their importance is less noticeable, less +obvious, but at the same time more sweeping the more fundamental they are. + +Let us here in concluding this article consider only one, but the most +striking one, of the consequences to which both views lead. + +Indeterminism leads to a conception of God which although we may call +it “mind” and place it at the beginning of the world, is pure chance or +the indeterminateness of an arbitrary sporting. Determinism on the other +hand leads to a recognition of God as that something in nature that is +as it is, that has been and will be. Science, whose method of cognising +the truth is and can only be to know in parts, attempts to describe the +partial qualities of this something in natural laws. + +It is of great consequence in practical life whether God is what the +name Jahveh intends to convey, eternal and unalterable being, immutable +sameness in the perpetual flux, irrefragable law in the changes of +evolution, or whether it is the Τυχή of the pagans, i. e. indeterminable +and absolute chance, unaccountable, irregular, capricious, and uncertain. + +The God-idea is the basis of ethics. It matters little whether we use or +avoid the name God, for the atheist has also a God-idea in his conception +of that existence in which he lives and moves and has his being. This +God-idea is always the ground from which we derive our rules of conduct; +and whenever we change, not our terminology but our idea of God, we shall +as a matter of consistency have to change our views of ethics also. + + EDITOR. + + +FOOTNOTES: + +[73] Italics are ours. + +[74] See _Fundamental Problems_, p. 55. + +[75] This is the position of the Societies for Ethical Culture which are +not confessedly but practically agnostics. Professor Adler’s position is +characterised in _The Monist_, Vol. I, No. 4, p. 567, 599, and _The Open +Court_ Nos. 225 and 234. Mr. Salter bases ethics upon “the immovable rock +of conscience.” (See his _Ethical Religion_, p. 295.) + +[76] Ernst Schroeder in his great work _Vorlesungen über die Algebra der +Logik_ adopts in the main the results of Peirce. A sketch of Mr. Peirce’s +line of thought, (his _Gedankengang_, as Schroeder calls it,) is found in +the _Einleitung_, pp. 107-118. + +[77] I laid down my views on the subject in a short monograph of only 82 +pages, entitled _Ursache, Grund und Zweck, eine philosophische Abhandlung +zur Klärung der Begriffe_ (Dresden: R. von Grumbkow, Hof. Verlag, 1883). +In all main points I maintain the same standpoint still. See also +_Fundamental Problems_, the chapter on Causality, pp. 79-91 and 96-109. + +Since the publication of my German pamphlet my confidence that we can, +(not only in the special sciences such as chemistry, mineralogy, botany, +etc., but also in philosophy) arrive at truth, has rather been confirmed +than shaken. We can create a common ground on which all philosophers +agree, as much as mathematicians agree concerning the Pythagorean +theorem. But in order to achieve this ideal, philosophers must abandon +all attempts at originality. The hankering after originality is an +inherited evil in the family of philosophers. The first philosophers +were poets, priests, and prophets; later on in the natural evolution +of human culture, a differentiation of their combined functions took +place. Originality is a virtue in the poet but a vice in his brother, +the philosopher. The philosopher’s ideal must be to free himself of all +individualism, subjectivity, and original conceptions; he must become +strictly objective. He must renounce his personal likes and dislikes, and +make his soul a mirror of nature, faithfully and correctly to represent +the facts and nothing but the facts. This is the ethics of philosophical +inquiry, and the philosophy that takes its stand on this principle we +call positivism. + +Almost all divergencies of importance in the different philosophical +systems can be traced to different conceptions or rather misconceptions +of causation. + +This last century since Kant has been the most fertile age of original +world-theories, all different in style and manner of construction, but +all alike in so far as the author of each system had strained his utmost +efforts to be original. Thus all these world-theories were so many +beautiful poems on ontology, they were so many grand air-castles produced +by the magic wand of a fairy-tale causation. The philosopher’s aspiration +must not be to present original ideas but to reach that one solution +which any other unbiassed thinker must find, to express that truth which +in the end will have to be recognised universally, to formulate facts in +objective exactness. The degree of originality in philosophic thought +marks the degree of aberration from the common aim of the one sole +solution, and the greatest source of original ideas is the confusion of +cause and reason, of _Ursache_ and _Grund_, of event and law, of fact and +truth. + +[78] I expect to discuss the problems of sameness, of chance, of +mechanicalism, and the freedom of will in the next number of _The Monist_ +under the caption _The Doctrine of Necessity: Its Basis and its Scope_. + + + + +LITERARY CORRESPONDENCE + + + + +I. + +FRANCE. + + +Professor Lombroso is unremitting in bringing up new facts in support +of his doctrines. His _Nouvelles Recherches de Psychiatrie et +d’Anthropologie criminelle_ (New Researches in Psychiatry and Criminal +Anthropology) comprise a good many, gathered from the latest works +relating to criminality. In adding psychiatry to anthropology in the +title to this volume, writes the learned author, “I return to my +starting point and to the true source of these studies, which is only +a clinical demonstration, but a more perfect one, of what is called in +old psychiatry, moral insanity and masked epilepsy.” Lombroso may be +reproached with a certain exaggeration, a certain haste, in his views +respecting criminal man: yet can we conceive of an opinionated inquirer +who would not have faith in his work, and who could resist the desire +to generalise from the facts already obtained? But I have little doubt +that the works of his school will end in producing a precise conception, +which will force itself on the attention of legislators and jurists. I +say _precise_, because one has a glimpse of the truth in criticising +the evidence offered to us in such variety, though what one perceives +sometimes vanishes. + +How can we conceive of the criminal type? This is a prime question on +which it is not useless to insist. Crime, as M. Tarde tells us, has +become a real profession in our modern societies. Although there is some +truth in it, we must not allow ourselves to be deceived by the subtle +form of this paradox. There is no want of delinquents carrying on a +business; the army of crime recruits itself from all classes, it includes +peasants and workmen, chemists and physicians, lawyers and merchants, +soldiers and poets, that is to say, subjects possessing some one at least +of the aptitudes which form a calling. We have here, then, on the one +side, wretches destitute of all aptitude for a trade, and on the other +men who do not adhere to the exercise of their profession, although +capable of making use of it. The delinquent appears to us, in short, +as stricken with some degree of professional incapacity, and if crime +has become a profession in some sort, the criminals of every category +first represent, if I may thus say, a professional or social waste. The +study of the causes and the signs of this waste is just what has been +undertaken. + +The social causes of crime have often been put in prominence. They are +numerous, and persons unacquainted with these questions are inclined to +attribute the largest proportion of crimes and offences to distress and +misery. But, according to the inquiries of Morrison, for example—and by +the confession also of M. Troal, of whom I shall speak immediately—misery +rarely produces crime, and if we examine carefully, one after the other, +the social causes of crime, we shall soon be convinced that poverty, +drunkenness, etc., feed criminality by producing degeneracy of the race, +rather than that they directly arouse the criminal.[79] We are compelled +then to seek the immediate reason for a crime in the criminal himself, +and to learn to distinguish the delinquent by means of the methods fixed +upon by anthropologists and physicians. + +At first, as we know, Lombroso recognised only one criminal type. He has +since found that there are many. The distinction between the thief and +the murderer is classical. Benedikt has described the born vagabond; +Brouardel, the feminine type. It is always necessary in describing a +type to resort to the methods of natural history, to pass in review the +emotional and intellectual characters, the physiological or functional +characters, the anatomical or morphological characters, and endeavor +to seize certain constant correlations between the signs one has been +successful in observing. The delinquent may be described as abnormal +from the emotional standpoint, and as deficient or perverted from the +intellectual point of view. We could then begin by describing exactly +certain intellectual and emotional types, and it is no exaggeration +to say that experienced magistrates in their way have done so, those +even who, with M. Proal, we shall see to be the most hostile to +anthropological theories. But they are reluctant to admit any relations +between the moral agent and physical nature, whereas the new school, on +the contrary, makes every effort to discover and determine them. + +How far is it successful? That is the question. + +If we take the ensemble of the emotional and intellectual characters, we +shall affirm with Professor Pelman (whose opinion Mr. Christian Ufer has +made known in _The Monist_) that the portrait of the imbecile traced by +Sollier corresponds strongly to that of the born criminal of Lombroso. +We shall aver also that this portrait does not answer equally well for +all kinds of delinquents, and that we pass gradually from the malignant +imbecile to the average or mediocre man. The same observation applies +when we study the physiognomical characters of which the little book of +Lombroso furnishes a great variety. We shall have evidently to consider, +with respect to physiognomical characters and physical marks, a strong +type (certainly inborn), a weak type, and, I would add, an _acquired_ +type. + +If we take functional anomalies—those of touch, sight, etc.—we shall be +struck with their number as well as with their importance, and, I may say +in passing, the alienist physicians who continue to be the adversaries +of Lombroso discover every day fresh examples of them, which could +give to the conception of the type, the reality they still deny it to +possess. The latest discovery, and certainly one of the most striking, +is that which Ottolenghi has just made, in the clinic of Lombroso +himself, respecting the visual field of epileptics and of the morally +insane. According to the researches of Ottolenghi, the visual field will +be remarkably limited, both with epileptics not in paroxysms, and with +born delinquents, but more often with the latter. They present a partial +hemiopia, vertical and heteronymous; the periphery of the field is +sinuous and irregular. This discovery tends, then, to confirm the analogy +of epilepsy with criminal tendencies; it will furnish a sign of the first +order for a well marked category of delinquents. + +Let us pass on to morphological characters. The abundance of evidence +is truly extraordinary, and one cannot abstain from remarking, in this +relation, that a certain number of the anomalies designated ought to +be found, and indeed are found, in morally healthy subjects, and that +therefore they do not alone suffice to furnish a ground of distinction +from the medium normal type. As certain functional anomalies are not +wanting either in many subjects whose morality remains perfect, it would +be necessary to aim, it seems to me, at establishing an approximate +_quantum_ for the criminal type, or rather for the _kinds_ which ought to +lead, by sensible gradations, from the most pronounced type to that which +is the least so. Some scattered elements of this work will be found in +the book of Lombroso; the studies of Clouston on the palate (deformation +of the palate existed in 19 per cent. of the general population, 61 +per cent. of imbeciles, 35 per cent. of criminals, and 33 per cent. of +madmen); the monographs of Ottolenghi and Roncoroni on the pathological +anomalies of 100 criminals, with an indication of the number and the +nature of the anomalies, etc. + +In short, it cannot be questioned that the new school holds its ground +well, since it circumscribes and makes more and more precise the object +of its researches. In my humble opinion, it is of importance for it to +get rid of hazardous or useless explanations, for it to tell us as little +as possible of remote atavism—for if heredity is constant, it is not +possible to trace it link by link as far as the deluge!—and finally for +pure anthropologists and psychiatrists to beware of themselves drawing +practical conclusions from their doctrines. The applications concern +jurists, and constitute a question of another kind, into which other +considerations also enter. + + * * * * * + +In the juridical domain, a French magistrate, M. LOUIS PROAL, has +just published a considerable work, _Le Crime et la Peine_ (Crime and +Punishment) which is truly the performance of an adversary, but not of +such an adversary as M. Tarde. M. Proal is an irreconcilable, and all +his dialectic—charged a little too much with citations of which many are +useless or prove nothing—turns on the absolute affirmation of free-will. +He flatters himself to have demonstrated freedom, in which he is wrong. +It is a matter of faith, as criticists have very well perceived. Human +science can know only determinism; it proves only what it finds.[80] + +M. Proal claims then to found on free-will the two principles of the +moral responsibility of the delinquent, and the moral character of +punishment, in opposition to the purely social point of view in which +the new criminalists place themselves. The physical anomaly of the +criminal seems to him a chimera, and he goes so far as to deny, or falls +little short of it, the relations of frenzied impulsion with degeneracy. +Willingly, perhaps, he would accept as truly mad and irresponsible only +the insane, those who are shut up forever in the asylums! + +Certainly, M. Proal possesses the experience of the magistrate, he +has erudition and triumphs easily, in details, by the defects and +deficiencies of the doctrine he combats. His objections, nevertheless, do +not touch the general conception which connects crime, in a great number +of cases, with the disorders of the living machine. He is not willing +for the criminal to differ from the honest man otherwise than by his +inclinations and will, as though will and inclinations had no dependence +on the state of our organs, and as though heredity entered for nothing +into the “personal factor” of character! He is not averse to saying that +moral and physical decadence is always the effect of criminality, as +though it was never its cause! He allows with that attenuations of moral +responsibility, resulting from physiological and physical influences, as +though a weakened responsibility was a true moral responsibility in the +sense he understands, and as though the judge had the means of deciding +at what moment morbid evolution involves irresponsibility! + +These absolute principles once established, he defines an offense “the +violation of a social duty,” and he grants that the judge “ought to take +account of the importance of the social evil resulting from the crime.” +It is sufficient for him that the _intention_ and the _responsibility_ +is appreciated, in order to attach the penalty to morality. In default +of which, writes he, there would be no more justice. It is a noble +solicitude, that of wishing to justify punishment in the eyes of the +guilty person himself, and to inflict it on him as an expiation of the +evil he has committed. But here an error is fallen into, which is, in +my opinion, to suppose that the law punishes “morally.” The law has +not the power to inflict moral chastisement. It strikes the delinquent +materially, in his goods, in his person; the rest depends not on the +judge who applies the law, but on the judge who is in ourselves, +the avenger more or less severe according to the complex incidences +of education and heredity. Moral chastisement can exist only in the +conscience of the delinquent, and, if this conscience is wanting, or +nearly so, all the affirmations of the judge cannot cause the punishment +to have the quality of moral expiation for the guilty. The criminal will +submit to it through force, and the magistrate will apply it by necessity. + +Such is, I think, the true situation. The new school of criminology +will introduce reforms in the practice of the tribunals and in the +administration of the penal laws; it will not change justice and could +not compromise morality. And now pardon me for adding to these some +further remarks, in connection with the books of which I have still to +speak. + + * * * * * + +The interests and the passions of men, habits too long acquired to alter, +can be considered as the immediate and constant motives of societies, +the _vis à tergo_ of their evolution. Political theories work on a +pre-existing social matter, and more or less in the direction of the +tendencies which have produced the state of things that they aspire to +reform or overturn. In a general manner, they possess then neither the +power necessary to create, attributed to them by utopists, nor the power +to destroy, which makes them appear so formidable to conservatives. +Without denying all efficiency to the intellectual ideal, it is +permissible to say that its action has a bearing purely conditional, +and that the revolutions of growth of social organisms never absolutely +depend on the theorist who establishes its diagnosis, and endeavors to +regulate its march. We behold, in a word, history making itself, rather +than that we make it ourselves and according to our inclination. It is +hardly possible for us to foresee the remote effects of our inventions, +of our discoveries. In sociology as well as in physics, man remains the +servant and the interpreter of nature. + +There is in this, if I am not deceived, a reason for reassuring ourselves +concerning certain alarming predictions as to the future of our +civilisation. In his book _La Civilisation et la Croyance_ (Civilisation +and Belief), the second edition of which has just appeared, M. CHARLES +SECRÉTAN estimates that our societies will sink down, at least that they +will neither return to a purified Christianity—a Christianity that has +never yet been practised—nor restore the great principles of the free +soul and of God. M. Secrétan is a brilliant writer and has a noble heart, +and his book contains at least one truth of the first order, always good +to repeat, which is that nothing durable is founded on hatred. He dare +not flatter himself, however, that his warnings will be listened to, his +lessons observed. Perhaps he exaggerates the real dangers which menace +us, because he enlarges, unknown to himself, the rôle of philosophic +doctrines, and attributes to the mind a kind of discretionary power over +the sentiments and the interests of mankind. + +Here we have the intellectualist mistake. It appears chiefly in the +revolutionist propaganda which agitates our Europe, and of which M. +J. BOURDEAU makes known the ideas and the progress, in a clear and +interesting manner, in his work _Le Socialisme allemand et le Nihilisme +russe_ (German Socialism and Russian Nihilism). It is a fact well worthy +of remark, that the genial promoter of the theories of Fourier, St. +Simon, and others—I refer to J. J. Rousseau—had had the conjecture of a +social physiology: fragments of his that have been published show well +that he did not regard the age of gold as one of savagery, and that +he foresaw the part that human nature had to do in our calculations +of government. What is found just in his writings could even well be +intimately connected with this naturalist point of view. But he lived +in the century _par excellence_ of rationalism, where such ideas could +be neither developed nor understood; he constructed the political world +according to reasoning, and I shall not be far wrong in thinking that +socialism represents in its turn, definitively, at least in its essential +features, a last offshoot from this rational school which has already, a +hundred years ago, made us the villainous present of Jacobinism. + +Absolute communism has no chance of ever realising itself. Neither Karl +Marx, nor Engels, has ventured even to indicate the possible form of +the society of which they dream. The action of the socialists, in turn, +could have as its result the substitution for our régime of excessive +individualism and of disordered democracy, a régime of corporations and +of more regular co-operation, by one of those reversions to institutions +anciently delineated that history presents to us, and which respond to a +sort of “law of oscillation” of social phenomena. There is no occasion, +however, to give it long consideration to establish that these returns +do not exclude novelty, for the apparent form of social arrangements is +of less moment than the nature of the ideas and of the relations which +sustain them, and here is what I would readily call a “law of progressive +repetition.” As to the exact sense of the evolution which there manifests +itself, the great task of disengaging it falls to the sociologists. But +the school of Marx has wished to see things only from one side, and his +theory, which is too simple, does not embrace the complexity of the +phenomena.[81] + +Without any pretension to renew the face of the world and to interpret +economic phenomena in favor of an arbitrary thesis, M. AD. COSTA, in his +opuscule _Alcoholisme ou Épargne_ (Alcoholism or Thrift) places before +us the truly immediate question of socialism, in the presence of this +“social dilemma” which reformers willingly mask in their discourses: +on one side, alcoholism, life from day to day, the unreasonable and +momentary illusion that one imbibes with stimulants, the wasting of daily +resources, finally the pauperism which leads to social servitude; on the +other side, thrift under all its forms, a provident life ordered with +intelligence, abstention from dangerous stimulants, progressive comfort +and increasing happiness, more and more freedom. Yes, here are the two +issues between which the workers have to choose. Those who read this +little book can learn there, both what milliards of salaries alcohol has +devoured, and what misery both physical and moral it engenders, and the +degradation that it brings to those who give themselves up to it. To +many this may be only the small side of a great problem. Without thrift +and the qualities which render it possible, there is neither family nor +morality. How can a man pretend to possess instruments of labor when he +deteriorates the chief of all, his own living machine? How can a social +class have the illusion to believe that a revolution ever profits him who +is neither able nor capable of preparing and conducting it? + + * * * * * + +The last work of M. E. DE LAVELEYE, _Le Gouvernement dans la Démocratie_ +(Democratic Government),[82] published a few months before his death, +treats chiefly of the organisation of public powers. This question has +importance to-day, writes the learned author, only in relation to the +great questions which will agitate the world of to-morrow, the social +question and the religious question. Conservatives make use of government +as a brake; revolutionists seek to seize hold of it as a lever. The fact +is that our Europe marches towards democracy. But will democracy give +us freedom? On what conditions can it form an acceptable régime and one +compatible with high culture? + +It is not necessary for me to explain here the reasonings and conclusions +of M. de Laveleye. His book, to speak the truth, is less a book than a +collection of Review articles and historical sketches. The politics of +action will find in it too much theory, and philosophers will regret the +absence of master-ideas. It is well to read this work for its practical +advice and the rich details that it contains; we must not look there for +a real historical or social conception. + +The sentiment which is dominant, finally, in all the writings of which +I have just spoken is inquietude, and unfortunately it is only too well +justified. We see, in our Occident, alcoholism increasing with salaries, +the hatred of classes with wealth, immorality with enfranchisement, +public burdens with political progress, the aggregation of individuals +with great industry, criminality even with education. The wealth acquired +is compensated for by new evils; it seems that all our conquests have the +result of putting social order in peril, and that the civilisation of +which we are so proud is bound, in a short time, to become bankrupt. + +We have, nevertheless, a weighty capital with which to restore ourselves, +and it is only right to say that it is beginning to be applied. But we +must give up some errors as to which it is good time to open one’s eyes. +One of the gravest, certainly, is always to place instruction before +education, and the mind before the heart. We have allowed to drop, at +the same time with religion, the difficult task of forming moral habits. +Let us understand in a word that, in a society, the most valuable thing +is neither the steam engine, nor the bank note, but the man himself, +and that in the man even it is not ability or special knowledge but +_character_. + + LUCIEN ARRÉAT. + + +FOOTNOTES: + +[79] I reserve, as well understood, the question of education, in order +to simplify matters here. + +[80] A ground of mutual understanding would be supplied by accepting +the distinction proposed by P. Carus between _constraint_, which alone +excludes freedom, and _necessity_, which leaves our will free within +the limits of our character. Already Plotinus had written: “How can it +be said of this being (he who obeys his nature) that he obeys, if he is +not constrained to follow something external?” (6th _Enn._ lib. viii.)—I +recommend to the curious on these questions the book of M. BERTAULD, +_Méthode Spiritualiste, Esprit et Liberté_. M. Bertauld places freedom +in _autonomy_, which is perfectly reconcilable with psychological +determinism; there is on the contrary, he declares, no radical +contradiction between determinism and free-will, and indeterminism is +an absurd conception. The work is well written, and I do not intend to +belittle it by mentioning it in a simple note. + +[81] In this relation, I will particularly refer to the great work, in +course of publication, of M. B. MALON, _Le Socialisme intégral_, and I +recommend at the same time the article _Justice and Socialism_ of M. +Belot, which has been much spoken of, in the number for February last of +the _Revue Philosophique_. + +[82] All the works mentioned in this article are published by F. Alcan. + + + + +II. + +GERMANY. + + +In the January number of _The Monist_ I mentioned a treatise written +by G. Ludwigs, in which the novels of Wilhelm Walloth were criticised, +and expressed my surprise that in the work discussed a personality +unquestionably diseased was stamped as a poet of almost the first order. +Much that then struck me as strange and was unclear to me, was later +rendered plain and intelligible; and the explanation was not long in +forthcoming. + +As the newspapers shortly afterwards announced, Ludwigs was simply the +pseudonym of a sixteen year old gymnasium student of Darmstadt, who had +already attracted the attention of wider circles by the poems he had +written. It happens at times that individualities of this description +bear out in the advanced years of their life the promise of their youth. +Extraordinary things were to be expected, though I cannot say _hoped_, +of Ludwigs; but the expectation was not fulfilled. He, an instance of +real decadence, yet a boy in years, voluntarily took his own life, +deeply mourned by his literary associates, the “Young Germans,” in whose +magazine _Die Gesellschaft_ a brother of the deceased is now publishing +biographical notes and literary remains—novels and poems—all more of a +psychological than literary interest. The biographical notes plainly +mark out a personality smitten with psychosis and suffering in a marked +degree with hyperæsthesia, and the literary remains reflect this mental +condition; light-sensations especially playing an important rôle. His +nervous system was too weak to assert itself permanently against the +outer world. This pressure, which objectively considered was not at all a +powerful one, did not admit of the rise of a powerful sense of life; and +especially oppressive to the precocious youth was the life of the school +in the most varied ways, and in an unexpected moment the flame of his +life went out. + +As psychologists, we should find considerable interest in the study +of this phenomenon of Ludwigs. We must admire his abilities and his +capacity for work, which not only enabled him to perform his duties as +a student of the gymnasium, but also left him time enough, in addition +to his literary work, to employ himself with the psychological writings +of Wundt and Münsterberg, which he desired to turn to account in the +field of poetry. We must mourn too his sad fate. But we have no reason to +_glorify_ such a diseased personality, as is done on many sides in the +April number of _Die Gesellschaft_. + +But this is a peculiar characteristic of the Young-German writers and +their confrères abroad, that they make the diseased take the place of +the sound, and the ugly of the beautiful, and thus help greatly to +undermine the health of the common mind. There are it is true a goodly +number of trusting souls who believe that we may regard with security and +composure, the endeavors and tendencies of the naturalistic apostles, as +our taste in literature and art—a few cases excepted—can surely not be +reversed into its opposite. On this point, perhaps, those who so think +are not wrong. But the stage may easily be reached where literary taste +no longer remains determinative, and the place of the æsthetical interest +in things is taken by the scientific, before whose judgment-seat no +difference of the beautiful and the hideous exists. + +This view is the direct outcome of philosophical materialism. The latter +doctrine may at present, it is true, be regarded in all its main points +as definitively overthrown, so far as philosophy is concerned; but in +the domain of _belles lettres_—a term not quite allowable here—the wave +which it has created still sweeps mightily onward. Two new works seek +to break its force, which have been published in the series _Gegen den +Materialismus_ edited by Dr. Schmidkunz (Stuttgart: Krabbe). The first +treatise bears the title _Materialismus und Æsthetik_ and has no less a +person as author than MORIZ CARRIÈRE; the second treats of _Materialism +in Literature_ and is the production of the northerner OLA HANSSON. I +am unable to say that these two treatises have especially satisfied me. +Both authors look at the subject too one-sidedly from the point of view +of æsthetics, and have not by far given a sufficient recognition to the +psychological aspect of the subject. I recognise indeed with Carrière, +in spite of all the apparent mutability of taste, a normative æsthetics; +but that man bears within him an ideal of life, as the seed does the +plant with its blossom and its fruit, I am unable for psychological +reasons to concede. I grant that I find with Ola Hansson psychology is so +far poorly represented in the naturalistic literature as the growth and +evolution of character is made to appear a much too simple process; and +I concede furthermore that the evolution of character in the individual +case is very far removed from anything like resemblance to an example +in mathematics, inasmuch as quantities may be lacking us in such a case +which are absolutely necessary to be taken account of for a correct +solution of the problem; but these missing quantities need not for that +reason be at all matters of mystery, in their true nature wholly unknown +to us. + +To what limits the domain of mystery has shrunk and to how great an +extent its expressions may be made intelligible and to a certain degree +even may be “regulated,” provided, equipped with thorough knowledge, we +courageously look the things in the face, is exemplified in a marked +degree by a voluminous work of the above mentioned Dr. Schmidkunz. The +so-called Suggestion passed for a long time as something wonderful +and had to rest its defence in the hands of the representatives of a +psycho-physical mysticism as opposed to a “surface”-psychology which +in the words of Du Prels occupied itself exclusively with surface work +without penetrating to the depths. SCHMIDKUNZ now points out in his +_Psychologie der Suggestion_ (Stuttgart, 1892: Ferdinand Enke) in a +very comprehensive manner what others had very plainly hinted at before +him, namely, that in the case of a very great number of phenomena we +have, exactly viewed, to deal only with some very simple and quite +explainable things which unite in the composition of what is commonly +called suggestion. The contents of the work, however, are not exhausted +with this; under the influence of a tremendous scope of reading, the +author treats the whole domain of suggestion, and if he understood more +perfectly the art of good writing, he would have earned a much greater +gratitude than that which in any event is his due. + +Schmidkunz touches repeatedly in his work upon a domain which still +belongs to the most obscure of the history of civilisation, namely +witchcraft and the trials of witches. This topic, likewise viewed from +a psychological point of view, forms the subject of a special treatise +by SNELL, entitled _Hexenprocesse und Geistesstörung_ (Munich, 1891: +J. F. Lehmann). In this book no rôle is ascribed to suggestion, but as +the title indicates the treatment centres about the question of what +significance mental disorders generally may have possessed in the trials +of witches. The author concedes that demented persons became the victims +of the trials for witchcraft either because they had rendered themselves +by their character open to the suspicion of a compact with the devil, +or because they had by self-obtrusion directly drawn upon themselves +this persecution, but asserts nevertheless, that the number of demented +persons that fell victims to the trials for witchcraft, was comparatively +very small. Mental disorder however played in so far a great rôle in the +trials for witchcraft as demented persons, especially such as suffered +from hysteria, became false witnesses and brought sound and healthy +people into the hands of the persecuting judges. + +As I am now treading the province of psychiatry, I will mention, that +WILHELM GRIESINGER’S celebrated work _Pathologie und Therapie der +psychischen Krankheiten_ has just been published in its fifth edition +under the direction of Dr. Levinstein-Schlegel, the director of the +Maison de Santé in Schöneberg (Berlin: August Hirschwald). I do not of +course specify this work solely for the sake of the physicians who may be +readers of _The Monist_, but am rather impelled to the act by a universal +psychological consideration, for Griesinger in the first edition of +the work also made a name for himself as a psychologist. It appeared +originally in 1845, and possessed a compass of 396 pages; the fifth +edition numbers 1100 pages and has increased considerably in size as +compared with the fourth. Whether the augmentations have added anything +to the value of the work is a question which must first be submitted for +answer to our physicians. In psychological respects its value has in so +far been very much increased as the experiential data have assumed much +greater proportions: the psychological analysis however has been somewhat +neglected. + +Psychological analysis in fact is not the strong side of the majority of +our psychiatrists. What Griesinger and still more so Spielmann sought +after in this direction, has been greatly forced in the background. +As a general rule our inquirers content themselves with a description +of symptoms and the construction of a more than copious nomenclature, +in the midst of which the connections are Very easy to be overlooked. +Among the commendable exceptions is to be named in this respect the +well-known Vienna professor THEODOR MEYNERT. In addition to his extensive +psychiatrical works he has also published a considerable number of +lectures and discourses partly in magazines and partly in separate +brochures. These discourses are now presented in collected form in a +book entitled _Sammlung von populärwissenschaftlichen Vorträgen über den +Bau una die Leistungen des Gehirns_ (Vienna, 1892, Wilhelm Braumüller). +The most noticeable discourses are the following: The Significance of +the Brain for the World of our Ideas; The Mechanics of the Cerebral +Structure; On the Feelings; On Illusion; On the Significance of the +Development of the Forehead; The Mechanics of Physiognomy; Brain and +Culture; The Co-operation of the Parts of the Brain; On Artificial +Disturbances of the Psychic Equilibrium. No words need be wasted in the +recommendation of the book of Meynert. + + CHR. UFER. + + + + +DIVERSE TOPICS. + + + + +PROFESSOR HAECKEL’S MONISM. + + +There are two Latin proverbs which are both good rules for +controversialists who seek for the truth on different roads. The one +reads: _In verbis simus faciles dummodo conveniamus in re_, the other +reads: _In verbis simus difficiles ut conveniamus in re_. A difference +of terms often prevents two thinkers from noticing that they actually +agree. Therefore let us be lenient in terms and never lose sight of their +meaning and purport. On the other hand terms are not indifferent, and +the selection of terms should not be regarded as arbitrary. In order to +arrive at a solid and permanent agreement, permanent because it is based +upon objectively demonstrable truth, we have to be scrupulously careful +with our terminology; and we must not allow the arbitrary employment of +terms where they are inappropriate. An inappropriate usage of terms will +lead us astray and involve us in confusion and error. + +Says Professor Haeckel: + + “The divergences which exhibit themselves in our respective + unitary conceptions of the world are in part only apparent + and in part occasioned by the divergent significances of our + fundamental ideas.” + +This seems to me very true and, indeed, I have very good evidence that it +is true. Professor Haeckel writes in his letter to me: + + “I have marked in _red_ those passages of your kind review of + my ‘Anthropogeny’ in which I agree with you and in _blue_ those + in which I differ.” + +Now I find all those passages where I should have anticipated an +objection on Professor Haeckel’s part marked red, while a blue mark +appears where in my opinion there is only a difference of terminology. It +is the following sentence on page 441: + + “Psychic life is absent so far as we can see in the primordial + world-substance as it appears in the form of a nebula; it is + absent still in the primordial state of planets. It appears + with the subjective states of awareness that rise into + existence in organised life. The subjectivity of unorganised + matter is, in comparison with man’s subjectivity, to be + considered as a blank; i. e., if there is in it a state of + awareness, which we have reasons to doubt, it is apparently + without meaning; it does not symbolise external objects; + it is no mind; it is, as it were, blind. Yet the aim of + evolution being the development of psychical life, shows that + the subjectivity of unorganised matter is spiritual in its + innermost nature.” + +This difference is probably a difference of terminology only, for I +insist most strongly on the doctrine that all nature is alive. However, I +make a difference between “life” and “soul.” Nature is alive throughout, +but it is not ensouled; the action of chemical elements and of the +falling stone are no psychical actions.[83] + +Another blue stroke appears at the following passage: + + “We grant willingly that mechanical explanations will serve + for all motions that take place in the world; even the motions + of the brain take place in strict obedience to the laws of + molar and molecular mechanics. But a mechanical explanation + is not applicable to that which is not motion. If it were + applicable it would not be desirable, for it would be of no + avail. Mechanical explanations are to be limited to mechanical + phenomena. Feeling however is not a mechanical phenomenon, + and an idea, being a special and a very complex kind of a + feeling, or rather and more accurately expressed, being the + special meaning of a very complex feeling, is not a mechanical + phenomenon either.” + +The subsequent sentences are again approved by Professor Haeckel; they +are marked red: + + “It is true that when a feeling takes place and when an + idea is thought in the brain of an organised being, that a + certain nervous action takes place. The nervous action is + a motion and this motion represents a definite amount of + energy. There is no theoretical difficulty, although there are + almost insurmountable practical difficulties, in measuring + the definite amount of potential energy that is changed into + kinetic energy when a man thinks. Yet the brain-motion is not + the idea and by a mechanical explanation of the brain-motion + we have not even touched the problem of what the nature of the + idea is, why ideas originate and how they act.” + +We do not understand how Professor Haeckel can object to the view that +ideas and feelings are no motions. We fully grant that the nervous +action that takes place when an idea is thought is a motion, and that, +considered as a brain-action, it is mechanically explainable. But by +feeling we understand not the brain-action but a state of awareness, and +states of awareness are not objective phenomena, they are subjective +phenomena; whereby we do not at all deny that there are no feelings which +must not in their objective existence at the same time be supposed to be +brain-motions. + +Feelings are not motions but ideas are still less motions. Ideas are +the meanings which certain feelings that are representative of certain +sets of experiences have acquired. Is the meaning of a word a motion? +Can the significance of words be mechanically explained? The meaning of +ideas, the significance of words, the representativeness of feelings are +phenomena which have nothing to do with motions but constitute a domain +of their own. + +Professor Haeckel in our opinion can mean only that there are no feelings +in themselves, but all our feelings are at the same time brain-motions, +and as such they are mechanical phenomena. We have to add, however, that +an explanation of the mechanism of brain-action does not as yet explain +the significance of mental operations. + +Professor Haeckel insists so strongly upon his view of monism as being +mechanicalism that this seems to mark a difference in our conceptions +which might be of consequence. + +I was very glad to notice the long strokes of red along the passages +which contain my proposition that “the evolution of organised life is a +natural process having a definite aim”; further, along the paragraphs +concerning the world-order as being moral in so far as the world-order is +the basis of morality, and also those which represent God as being that +power of the world-order obedience to which is called morality. + +Professor Haeckel’s agreement with these passages indicates that those +expressions of his to which we should take exception, and which he +employs again in his article of the present number, might not be regarded +as divergences. + +Professor Haeckel’s definition of God appears to us insufficient, and +also his definition of immortality. + +God is not only the sum-total of matter and force, God is also that +quality of the world which the naturalist describes in natural laws. +God is the life of the world, he is that feature of existence which +makes mind and knowledge possible. In addition he is that which men +call progress, the ideal of the future that lives in our souls and the +principle of evolution in nature. + +There is a deeper truth too in the doctrine of immortality. There is a +conservation of matter and energy, but there is also a preservation of +soul. Says Professor Haeckel, “the human soul is a very highly developed +vertebral soul.” If that is so, the soul of our fossil ancestors +continues to live in us. This soul has been altered, it is true, but the +alterations are not so much a loss as a gain. The alterations consist in +the additional growth of new powers and represent a higher development. +All that which was worth preserving has been preserved. + +And as it has been in the past, so we can confidently expect that it +will be in the future. All that is worth preserving of our souls will be +preserved in the ages to come. Our souls will live and develop to higher +possibilities. They will be transmitted from generation to generation, +advancing on the unlimited path of evolutionary progress. + + P. C. + + +FOOTNOTES: + +[83] We intend to express our views more fully in a special article to be +published in a subsequent number of _The Monist_. + + + + +THE RELIGION OF SCIENCE. + + +There was during the last winter great excitement in Germany, concerning +a new school-bill proposed by the chancellor Caprivi, and the late +Prussian minister of cultus, Zedlitz-Trützschler. This school-bill +proposed to take the direction of the public schools out of the hands of +scientific men and transfer it to the clergy. The idea of the Emperor +was to let the education of the young be guided in a religious spirit. He +intended to wage a war against atheism. + +Among the pamphlets which were written during the crisis, is especially +noteworthy the monograph of the late minister of cultus, Herr von Gosler, +whom we should count among the most conservative of Prussian officials. +His opposition, accordingly, is the more remarkable, and his objections +had much weight with the Emperor. + +The Emperor has withdrawn the bill. Nevertheless, the spirit of +ultra-conservatism, which shows itself in an outspoken hostility against +science, still remains strong enough, and new onslaughts upon the +progressive policy in school and church, may be expected in the future. +The question is timely still and will remain timely until there be a +common agreement concerning the principles of education, so that our +school politics may no longer be decided by and subjected to partisan +strife. + +Attacks that are made upon the very spirit of the institution of our +civilisation and the political crises following thereupon are beneficial +in one respect. They make people pause; they make them reconsider the +principles by which they allow their conduct to be regulated. They make +men conscious of the maxims that ought to underlie their lives and which +generally are accepted by the majority without much reflection. The +Prussian school-bill has indeed exercised a wholesome influence, for it +called attention to the importance of principles and roused the German +nation from religious indifference. During the conflict many scientists +and professors of universities, who as a rule interfere little with +politics, have raised their voice in warning, and many valuable ideas +were expressed that found a strong echo in the heart of the people. + +There are two articles written by German professors which have commanded +very wide attention inside and outside of Germany. The one article +was written by Professor Haeckel of Jena, in the _Freie Bühne_, the +most important passages of which appeared at the time in _The Open +Court_, No. 243. The other article was written by Friedrich Jodl, of +Prague. It appeared first in the Augsburger _Allgemeine Zeitung_, and +was republished in pamphlet form by Cotta, in Stuttgart. The former +is an enthusiastic appeal to let science, which is the basis of our +civilisation, remain the basis of our educational maxims in schools and +universities. The latter discusses the philosophical principles of the +conflict. + +We are greatly in sympathy with the spirit in which Professor Jodl +has treated his subject. Nay, more, we substantially agree with him +concerning all main facts, and also concerning the sense in which our +future development should be directed. Nevertheless there are points of +disagreement, which we consider of sufficient importance to point out and +explain. + +The ultra-conservative party stands upon the platform that there can be +no morality without religion, and no religion without dogmatism. For this +reason dogmatism should rule supreme in the schools, and science should +be subservient to religious creed. That this means curtailment of the +freedom of investigation, and the suppression of the liberty of science, +is understood by all the parties concerned. The liberals so apprehend it, +and the ultra-conservatives do not deny it. In the face of this situation +Professor Jodl proposes the question, “Is there a humanitarian morality +possible?” (p. 8 of the pamphlet “Moral, Religion, und Schule.”) He says: + + “A mere glance into the numerous anthologies of the moral + wisdom of all times and centuries, shows that the agreement + concerning moral ideas and norms is much greater, and it + recedes much more into the dim past than is usually assumed. + The writings of Laotse and Confutse, the popular literature + of Buddhism, the fragments of old Egyptian law, the didactic + poetry of Islam, contain a great wealth of moral wisdom, and + treasures of the noblest ethical sentiment which the Christian + Occident likes to regard as its own exclusive property. + Especially the ancients, whose civilisation, in spite of much + opposition, is still the basis of our civilisation, furnish us + with a series of the most beautiful moral types and ideals, + and there we find, beside many valuable features of Christian + ethics, other no less valuable gems which we seek for in vain + in the old Christian morality, and which were not recognised + until Christianity came into contact with the Teutonic nations + of northern Europe. Our ultra-conservatives argue that without + catechisms humanity would stand helpless before the question of + what is right and wrong, and what the growing generation should + be taught in order to make them useful and honorable members of + society.” + +In opposition to these views Professor Jodl urges that + + “If society of to-day can at all tolerate that such doctrines + as Christian morality are taught in our schools as the + foundation of practical conduct of life, this is possible only + because the ethics of the old biblical Christianity has, in + the course of centuries, grown to be something quite different + from what it was in the beginning. The throughout communistic, + labor-abhorring, world-hating, miracle-infatuated morality of + original Christianity, constantly dreaming of the collapse + of the world near at hand, and suited only to the demands of + the paupers of the time, could only be changed and adapted + to the conditions of later periods of radically different + conditions, with great difficulty. The Catholic church has + done much to accomplish this purpose, and in a still higher + degree Protestantism has made many concessions to humanitarian + ethics and practical reason. These concessions, however, must + appear from the historical standpoint, as adulterations of the + Christian ideas. Exactly in the degree that Christian morality + in modern times has remained a living power, it has ceased + to remain Christian in the historical sense.... The tendency + of the whole development of the modern world is to conceive + the moral norms as natural conditions of human society, and + to understand them in their connection of the individual with + the whole. This thought and sentiment must become in the child + a living power, and morality cannot expect in this respect + help from religion. Religion knows only the relation of the + individual to God, as it is expressed in the mystical ideas of + sin and mercy. Religion knows no duties and goals for humanity, + but only for the egotistic desire of salvation for the + individual. Religion knows no progress, no evolution, but only + eternal life or eternal damnation. The civilised nations of + Europe had to go through with many hard struggles in order to + arrive at the idea that there is a humanitarian, and a natural, + morality, in comparison with which all religious dogmatism must + be considered as indifferent additions. Only on the basis of + this conviction is it possible that there exist to-day so many + religious confessions of faith, and among them also those + who are religious without having any special confession. Here + lies the great duty of our time for enlightened legislation, + for our schools, to take care that the universal Christian + be developed from the narrow dogmatism, and, further, the + universal human ideal, from the universal Christian. To expect + this of the clergy of the different religious societies, would + be a mistake.... The theological spirit and the principle of + free investigation, are irreconcilable adversaries. Every + religion, of whatever denomination it may be, is stable in its + very nature. It pretends to be eternal truth, and whenever it + compromises with the idea of progress, it does so reluctantly, + and in the form of concessions.” + +We agree with Professor Jodl in his opinion that our present dogmatic +religions are entirely unfit to understand the demands of the present. +And it is true that the humanitarian ideas of morality have been slowly +developed from the crude and immature notions of the apostolic times. The +aim of our moral development must be humanitarian ethics. But we disagree +with professor Jodl that we cannot expect a further evolution of our +moral ideas from the clergy. + +It seems to me that here lies the important difference between the old +and the new world. Conditions favor religious progress in America, +while the conditions in Europe cut off all hope and produce an ominous +stagnancy. + +The clergy of the old world, in Germany as well as in England, and in +all Catholic countries, are appointed only on the condition of being +ultra-conservative in religious matters, as well as otherwise. No young +man whose enthusiasm would carry him so far as to suggest reforms on +broader humanitarian principles, would be admitted in the church as +ministers. And if he had been admitted by mistake, he would meet with +a fate similar to that of the Abbé Lamennais, whose experiences are +admirably described by George Julian Harney, in No. 213 of _The Open +Court_. + +The situation is greatly different in America. Our clergymen, our +congregations, our churches, are perhaps more orthodox in many respects, +and especially in their belief, than those of Europe. Nevertheless, they +are more liberal in principles, and they are less obstinate concerning +dogma. Most of our churches here do not even possess dogmatic creeds, or +confessions of faith. The clergy of the Baptists, the Congregationalists, +the Unitarians, are not bound by oath before taking orders; to believe +in sundry articles and to preach certain doctrines which are supposed +to be absolute truth. The Baptists, it is true, are as a rule very +orthodox and very dogmatic, but they are liberal in spite of it, open to +conviction, and not averse to going onward with the times. This attitude +of the American clergy must appear inconsistent to Europeans who can, in +ecclesiastical affairs, only judge from their own experiences. And it +may be that their position is as much inconsistent as was for instance +that of Newton, who considered the trash he wrote on some theological +questions concerning the apocalypse as infinitely superior to his +mathematical and astronomical works and did not see that the recognition +of the law of gravitation would go far toward freeing humanity from many +of those nonsensical ideas which he cherished so highly. + +In former times I was inclined to blame the clergy for the lack of +progressiveness in the churches, but I have come to the conclusion that +not the clergy are to be blamed for retarding the broadening of the +religious spirit, but the lay-members of the churches. I am personally +acquainted with several clergymen of different denominations, Christian +as well as Jewish, who conceive it their duty to point out the way of +progress and to further the spirit of a scientific world-conception in +religious matters. They advance exactly as quickly and exactly as far as +they can in working out of the narrow dogmatism of the religious views of +their flock the ideas of a broad humanitarianism. + +It has often happened that clergymen, encouraged by their congregations, +have grown too broad in the opinion of their narrower brethren, and it +was customary, in former years, to cast them out according to the old +fashion of dealing with heretics, which is still customary in European +churches. The churches have become more careful here, for, whenever such +a case happened, these liberal clergymen were, as a rule, not deserted +by their congregations. Thus every act of removing a clergyman usually +led to a schism, and it seems that, at least to some extent, the churches +have of late given up their policy of removing heretics within their +ranks. + +This much is certain, that many among the American clergy are ready to +progress with the times, and to accept the truth wherever they find it. +In Europe religion is dictated to the people from above by government and +church authority. The clergymen are servants of these authorities. Their +consciences are not bound, as they ought to be, to teach the truth and +nothing but the truth, but to teach the doctrines which their employers +bid them teach. And this policy is still considered right and natural, +even among liberal minded people. + +In America the clergy are exponents of the views of their congregations. +In Europe the congregations are separated from their pastors by a deep +gap: there is no gap between the congregation and the clergy in America. +Both are in the closest contact. Our congregations are more orthodox than +European congregations; therefore our clergy is more sincerely orthodox, +and more honestly narrow, than the European clergy. The European clergy +are more scholarly, yet at the same time there may be more hypocrites +among them in Europe who know better than they preach. But there is no +doubt that with a further development of intellectuality and scientific +insight, our congregations will become broader and more liberal and +more humanitarian, and, with the congregations, our clergy are bound to +develop in the same lines. + +European theology is much superior to American theology in scholarly +critique, in historical investigation, and in philosophical depth. +Nevertheless, we must not hope from European theologians that they +will undertake the great work of reform that is so much needed in our +churches, which is nothing less than to reconcile religion with science; +to let religion develop into a religion of science, preaching boldly and +unreservedly those humanitarian ethics which stand upon the principles +of truth; that is, of scientifically proved truth, which finds the +sanction of the moral “ought” in the facts of experience. + +Professor Jodl says: + + “The main objection of the supporters of dogmatism in school + politics is this: They propose it is not so much religion that + is needed in education; not the contents of ecclesiastical + doctrines, but to give to morality a foundation; to give it + what science calls the sanction of ethical rules.... From this + standpoint, every attempt that is liable to weaken the ethics + of religious sanction must appear equivalent to the attempt of + abolishing criminal law and penal institutes, and to deliver + the peaceful citizens into the hands of murderers and robbers.” + +Professor Jodl continues: + + “The nature of religious sanction consists in this: that the + moral rules are conceived as the behests of an all-powerful, + omniscient being, that promises to immortal man for their + fulfilment, eternal rewards, and for their non-fulfilment + eternal punishment in the life beyond.” + +In opposition to this view Professor Jodl maintains that + + “Man’s morality, on the one hand, has never been preserved from + error by an outlook into the beyond of heaven and hell, and, on + the other hand, there have never been missing those impulses + that originate in the depths of human nature working in the + line of moral ideas.” + +These impulses are, according to Professor Jodl, the purely moral +sanction of conscience. And conscience is represented as, and in another +place called, “the natural sanction of morality.” + +This view of regarding conscience as the natural sanction of morality +does not appear to us as a happy expression, and it seems to us that +Professor Jodl did not intend it as it might be understood. For Professor +Jodl speaks in another passage of “the natural impulses of morality as +having their sanction in _experience_.” + +If that be so, conscience would not be the ultimate authority, but +conscience would have to be regulated and corrected by a rationalised +experience. + +If “the natural impulses of morality have their sanction in experience,” +the ultimate authority would be the facts represented in experience; and +the facts of experience, in their totality, are nothing more or less than +the whole universe with its natural laws and conceived in its cosmical +order. The universe, the All, nature, or whatever you call it, is indeed +an omnipotent reality which man cannot resist, and in which he can live +only by adapting himself to its laws. If this ultimate authority of the +natural laws be called by the religious term “God,” we shall see at once +that the old dogmatic religions express a very deep truth in mythological +language. The ultimate sanction of morality is not our conscience, but +that omnipotent power which resides in the objective world of realities, +in the cosmical order of the universe. + +We might as well say that everybody shall regard his watch as the +ultimate standard of time as to make his conscience the criterion of +morality. May everybody use his watch wisely and regulate it well. And so +may everybody revise his conscience and investigate diligently whether +it agrees with the laws of that all-power of which we are a small part +and through which alone we exist. + +Professor Jodl praises very highly the French institution of a so-called +purely moral instruction in the public schools. Father H. Gruber, +however, points out some serious shortcomings in this system of moral +education, resulting from a lack of principle. (See _Stimmen aus +Maria-Laach_, Freiburg i. B., 1892, No. 4.) + +It is apparent that moral commands cannot be based upon purely subjective +notions or ideals, they must be based upon some objective authority which +is a power that enforces obedience. Such a power exists. It is the world +in which we live. It is that All-being of which we are a part. And that +feature of nature which enforces that conduct which we call moral is +named God in the terminology of religious language. + +A consideration like this points out the way to a reconciliation between +science and religion. There is a truth in the old religions, and this +truth need only be purified from the errors that cluster about it, hiding +its grandeur, beauty, and importance. Let the church and its authorities +recognise science and the principle of free investigation; let them +be ready to accept the scientific methods of research; let them be +willing to accept truth as it can be proved by arguments and verified by +experience as well as by experiments; and we need no longer worry about +dogmatism and the narrowness of their sectarian doctrines. All these +accidental features of religion will, then, pass away, and we shall have +a religion which the scientist and the philosopher can embrace. + +This is what we call the Religion of Science; and the Religion of Science +is bound to be the religion of the future. The Religion of Science will +not abolish the religions of the past, but it will develop them, broaden +them, perfect them, into the cosmical religion of humanitarianism. + +To teach an ethics that either has no sanction, or whose sanction is +built upon the diverging opinions of individuals, will not do. Ethics +must be based upon the sanction of some objective authority, and the +recognition of an objective authority, of a power which enforces a +certain kind of conduct, being religion, we say that no ethics can be +without a religious basis. + +The problem at present is not how to teach irreligious ethics—all such +attempts are failures at the start; but to change the mythology of +the old religions into a clear, scientific conception of the natural +conditions which demand of man that he should observe those rules which +we are wont to call moral. + + P. C. + + + + +THE FUTURE POSITION OF LOGICAL THEORY. + + +In last October’s number of _The Monist_, Professor John Dewey gives a +sketch of what in his view is “the present position of logical theory.” +According to this the basis of the position seems to be that “the only +possible thought is the reflection of the significance of fact,” and +that therefore logic, which is the science of the laws of thought, +rests in reality on an objective basis. He supports Hegel in denying +“the existence of any faculty of thought which is other than the +expression of fact itself.” Now it is doubtless the case that this is +the position at present taken up by a large number of logicians, but as +this position seems to me to be fundamentally erroneous I should like +to put before your readers what I hope will be “the future position of +logical theory.” I have elsewhere worked out in some detail a theory of +reasoning which differs from that commonly accepted chiefly in this, +that it recognises not two, but three kinds of reasoning, which I call +Objective, Subjective, and Symbolic. Reasoning is commonly divided into +two branches, denoted by various pairs of terms, such as Objective and +Subjective, Inductive and Deductive, Empirical and Formal. The lines +of division indicated by these various pairs of terms are not quite +identical; but they none of them indicate what seems to me the most +important distinction of all, namely that between real, and symbolic +argument. There _does_ exist (I will not say a “faculty of thought,” but) +a method of argument which “is other than the expression of fact itself,” +whether of objective or of subjective fact. The term “formal reasoning” +is indeed often used to denote this kind of argument, but this is a bad +name to give it, since it seems to imply, and frequently is held to +imply, that it deals with the _forms_ of objective or subjective facts, +whereas in reality it deals only with symbols, which are arbitrarily +defined, and which do not necessarily correspond to any things whatever, +whether objective or subjective. That this kind of argument not only +exists, but flourishes is evident as soon as it is grasped that pure +mathematics is nothing but a branch of symbolic logic. It may be that +there exists somewhere a fact of which any conceivable mathematical +formula might be regarded as the reflexion, but it must surely be evident +that it was not to the reflexion of such facts that mathematical formulæ +in general owe their existence or validity. It may perhaps be true “that +fact, reality is significant,” and even that thoughts are themselves such +significant realities, but it is the thoughts that are given to us first, +or rather sensations which are the elements of thoughts, and we can only +infer the realities from them, and not _vice versa_. + +The essence of my theory of logic may be briefly stated thus. The +meaning of a logical term contains two parts, its denotation and its +connotation. Either of these parts may be laid down arbitrarily as its +_definition_, leaving the other part which I call its _import_ to be +found out by experience. To understand both parts of the meaning of any +term is therefore to possess real knowledge. Pure symbolic reasoning +deals only with the definitions of terms, and is not therefore founded +on real knowledge, nor can it alone ever lead to real knowledge. Thus +if in any proposition the definitions of the terms are deducible from +one another, the proposition may be proved symbolically and is what I +call a truism: it gives no real information. But if the definitions of +the terms are independent of each other, and yet not inconsistent, the +proposition can only be intended to assert the identity of the imports +of the terms; it therefore ascribes import to the terms and gives real +information, whether true or false. If any terms in a symbolic argument +are however known to have real import, it may be ascribed to them in +real propositions, and any conclusions of the argument which contain only +such terms will _ipso facto_ be made to yield real information, which may +be new in the sense that it was not before recognised, though it was of +course implied in the real assertion or assertions which ascribed import +to the terms of the symbolic argument. + +It is in this way possible to separate any science into two branches, +one of which consists purely of symbolic argument founded on definitions +alone, while the other may be expressed in a series of propositions, +the definitions of whose terms are independent of each other, and which +ascribe real import (whether objective or subjective) to the terms of the +symbolic science, or some of them. + +This is as far as pure logic can go. The question how the truth of any +real propositions comes to be known is not, in my opinion, any part of +logical theory, but belongs to metaphysics. However that is no reason for +not discussing it here, especially as it is the chief question discussed +in Professor Dewey’s paper. + +“Truth” means some sort of consistency in a proposition. We may compare +a symbolic argument to a game with counters, the rules of which are laid +down arbitrarily, and to say that a given conclusion of such an argument +is true only means that the game has been “played fair.” But the truth of +a real proposition does not depend on any arbitrary rules. It expresses +a consistency between two real facts, either that two named groups of +things possess certain common attributes, or that certain of the things +possessing named groups of attributes are identical. The essential +element of all real knowledge is then a connecting link between a thing +and an attribute, such as is afforded by a well-understood word. + +Now the only “things” which we can apprehend directly are our subjective +sensations and conceptions. We can compare two or more sensations or +conceptions, and recognise in them common attributes. Thus I can say +of my own knowledge that the sensations I denote by “the taste of +sugar” and “the taste of lead acetate” have a common attribute, which +I call “sweetness.” This is a real assertion, for its truth is not +deducible from the definitions of its terms, and yet I know, by direct +apprehension, that it is true. But it is only a subjective truth. The +corresponding objective assertion would be sugar and acetate of lead +both produce, when tasted, the sensation of sweetness. And I have no +direct apprehension of this fact. That the tastes referred to in the +former proposition were produced by objective things denoted by the terms +sugar and acetate of lead, can only be inferred by the process called +induction, which can never lead to a positive or necessary truth. + +Thus we may from a pure symbolic science proceed one step further, to a +subjective science, by the aid of direct apprehension, and the results +of such a subjective science may in certain cases attain the position +of absolute, or necessary truths. But on the other hand, all objective +sciences must rest on induction. Now the true nature of induction is, +I am persuaded, commonly misapprehended, because it is not realised +sufficiently clearly that the prime data of induction are not themselves +objective, but subjective facts. An “objective fact” is really only +an hypothesis, postulated to account for certain of our subjective +sensations. The only justification for making such an hypothesis is +that it actually does explain certain sensations, and the measure of +its probability (for we can never assert it as a necessary certainty) +is the number and complexity of the sensations which it accounts for. +The first of all such objective hypotheses is that we have an objective +environment to whose action our sensations, or some of them, are due. +This suggests at once a more general hypothesis, commonly known as the +law of causation, namely that the conditions obtaining in the objective +universe at any one moment are the effective causes of those obtaining +at the next, and so at any subsequent moment. These two hypotheses, +together with certain subsidiary ones, do suffice to account for an +enormous number, if not all, of our sensations, and so we are justified +in entertaining them. But to leave out the notion of _effective_ +causation, and to substitute a mere rule of sequence, is to remove the +only justification we have for assuming the hypothesis of causation at +all. It is perhaps conceivable that the hypothesis may be false, that +our sensations are not “caused by” an objective environment but if so +what reason remains for believing in that environment at all? I can never +know anything whatever about an objective universe, unless some of my +sensations about which alone I know anything directly, are caused by +that universe. It is perhaps thinkable that there should be an objective +universe in which events occur which in no sense _cause_ my subjective +sensations, but to which those sensations nevertheless happen to +correspond; but if this is so the sensations afford me no ground whatever +for believing in the occurrence of the events, or the objectivity of the +universe. + +Well then, the essence of induction is the assumption of an hypothesis to +account for observed facts—first of all of directly observed sensations, +and then of facts assumed to be objective in virtue of the primary +hypothesis. That this account of induction is the true one is I think +particularly enforced by the consideration of those cases to which at +first sight it does not seem to apply. A common example of induction is +afforded by our belief that the sun will rise to-morrow. That it has +risen every morning for the last four thousand years or more is no reason +whatever for believing that it will rise to-morrow, unless it is held to +point to some explanatory hypothesis. Such an hypothesis has actually +been framed by astronomers, and no one would now pretend to found his +belief in the sun’s rising to-morrow on the mere fact that it has often +risen before, but would go on to explain that it must rise unless the +earth were to stop revolving, etc. If at Monte Carlo the red turned up +ten times running, would that be any reason for expecting it to turn up +again, the eleventh time? No, it would not unless the succession of reds +seemed to point to some explanatory hypothesis, such as a defect in the +roulette. Again, the fact that in the last fifty years the death rate +in London has been about twenty-eight per thousand would be no reason +for believing that it will be about that figure this year except on +the assumption that the constancy of the death rate indicated certain +constant causes, which we have no reason to believe have been altered +this year. + +Having once assumed that our environment is objective, and as a corollary +the hypothesis of causation, the whole of physical science follows, +step by step. Subsidiary hypotheses are introduced at each stage and +justified by the way they account for observed results. To show how a +single hypothesis is capable of explaining a large number of observed +results, the full meaning of the hypothesis is elucidated by symbolic +reasoning. By such reasoning it is for example shown that the same +hypothesis, of universal gravitation, is capable of accounting, not only +for the movements of the stars, but for the tides, the flow of rivers, +the falling of unsupported bodies, the rising of balloons, the movements +of the balance in Cavendish’s experiment, and so on. That such wide +extensions of an hypothesis are possible tends greatly to confirm, not +only the hypothesis itself, but the fundamental hypotheses of objectivity +and causation also. But it does not prove either the one or the others. +We cannot know anything about the objective universe with absolute +certainty, but we may reasonably believe a certain hypothesis about it +with any degree of conviction we think suitable; that is we may (and of +course we actually do) act on all occasions _as if_ we knew absolutely +that they were true. + +We may then believe, and I for one do believe, not only in the +objectivity of the universe, but that even my own subjective sensations +are mere bye-products of that universe. I _believe_ that objective facts +are, if I may so express it, more real than subjective sensations; that +in fact the objective universe might have existed, and might exist again +without any subjective element in it anywhere. But I cannot _know_ +this, it is with me a matter of faith. Thus I cannot agree with Hegel, +that “all possible thought is the reflexion of the significance of +fact” (except perhaps in the sense that thought is the reflexion of the +significance of certain changes in the grey matter of the brain) for +this would seem to imply that stupid or contradictory thoughts reflected +stupid or contradictory significance in certain facts. But I believe that +men of science are gradually evolving a system of thought which will +more and more faithfully reflect the significance of fact, and that thus +science is actually building up truth. But all science must begin with, +and be founded upon, subjective knowledge, and therefore any theory of +positivism contradicts itself for it must be founded on faith. Science +is thus founded on faith, faith in things not directly apprehended, just +as truly as religion is. It is only because we unconsciously acquire +this faith in our infancy, and that it is in most cases amply justified +by subsequent experience, that we do not even recognise the fact that it +is faith, in exactly the same sense that belief in God is. But just as +men have sometimes lost their faith in God, so it may happen to a man to +loose his faith in reality, and logic is quite as incapable of shaking a +man out of the one position as out of the other. + +This I take it is the key to the agnosticism of such men of science as +Mr. Huxley. I do not for a moment suppose that Mr. Huxley believes less +than most men; he probably has good grounds for believing a great deal +more. Only he rightly refuses to say that he _knows_ facts of which +he can have had no direct apprehension and which he can only infer +more or less probably, to be true. Hypotheses which as we push our +investigations are shown to be capable of explaining more and more facts, +that is, ultimately, more and more sensations, will in the end come to +be believed in without doubt or hesitation. If a man says he _knows_ the +law of gravitation to be true, he commits a logical blunder; but there +is nothing to prevent a scientific man from believing in any miracle +or prodigy, so long as the account he gives of it does not contradict +itself. Not only may two equally reasonable men form very different +estimates of the probability of the same event, even with the same +evidence before them, but one man may put his faith to a proposition with +admittedly much lower degree of probability than would be required to +convince another. Only, a scientific man will always distinguish between +what he knows and what he believes, and will admit that though he has +made up his mind to act _as if_ he knew to be true the propositions he +only believes to be so, yet another man may reasonably take a different +view of any one of them. + + EDWARD T. DIXON. + +Trin. Coll., Cambridge, Jan. 8, 1892. + + + + +COMTE AND TURGOT. + + +On page 410 of the last number of _The Monist_, it was stated that the +doctrine of the three stages of knowledge was not properly a Comtean idea +but belonged to Turgot. The following letter from Professor Schaarschmidt +of Bonn informs us of the passages in Turgot where the statement of the +doctrine is found: + + _To the Editor of The Monist_: + + To your note of inquiry of the 22d of last month I have the + honor to reply, that the Comtean theory of the _trois états_ + may be traced back to utterances of Turgot made by him in his + _Second discours sur les progrès successifs de l’esprit humain + prononcé le 2me décembre 1750_—namely in the Sorbonne. You will + find the discourse referred to in the edition of the works of + Turgot which I now have before me, namely that of Guillaumin, + Paris, 1844, in Vol. II, at pages 597 et seqq. The passage in + question is found at p. 600-601. However, it is highly probable + that the so-called _loi des trois états_ was _directly_ + transmitted to Comte by St. Simon, who reproduced the idea + of Turgot in his _Introduction aux travaux scientifiques du + XIXme Siècle_, at pages 62-63. For Comte was dependent in many + respects on St. Simon, while it is probable that he had never + studied Turgot. To St. Simon, in fact, is due the expression + “philosophie positive,” as well as the germ-notion of the + division of the Sciences, which Comte further elaborated. + + SCHAARSCHMIDT. + + + + +BOOK REVIEWS. + + +DARWIN AND AFTER DARWIN. I. THE DARWINIAN THEORY. By _George John +Romanes_, M. A., LL. D., F. R. S. London: Longmans, Green & Co. Chicago: +The Open Court Publishing Co. 1892. + +In the present work by Professor Romanes, who may be regarded as the +special exponent of Darwin’s theory of organic evolution, we have a +complete and systematic presentation of “Darwinism according to Darwin.” +It is the outcome of a course of lectures delivered by the author in 1889 +before the Royal Institution, London, and forms only part of a much more +extensive treatise on the Darwinian theory, embracing the early history +of biology, and a discussion of the further developments of the theory +subsequent to the death of the great naturalist who gave it birth. The +present part is limited to what is distinctly Darwinian, dealing with it +and with the main objections raised against the general theory of organic +evolution it enforces. + +The subject naturally divides into two parts, and Professor Romanes +accordingly deals with it in two sections, in the first of which he +considers organic evolution as a fact, stating the main evidences in +support of the doctrine, while in the second section he furnishes “the +evidences which thus far have been brought to light touching the causes +of organic evolution considered as a process.” The author points out +in his introductory remarks, that in order to establish a theory of a +continuous transmutation of species, which is what is meant by organic +evolution, it is not necessary to furnish proof of _all_ the natural +causes which have been at work. The issue is between the theory of a +supernatural cause, as operating immediately in numberless acts of +special creation, and the theory of “natural causes as a whole whether +these happen, or do not happen, to have been hitherto discovered.” +Moreover, the discussion is concerned only with the origin of species, +and not with that of life, as to which the author says with truth, +“although in the opinion of most biologists it is a question which we may +well hope will some day fall within the range of science to answer, at +present, it must be confessed, science is not in a position to furnish so +much as any suggestion upon the subject; and therefore our wisdom as men +of science is frankly to acknowledge that such is the case.” + +The idea of evolution implies continuity, and the author refers to +the fact that the uniformity of nature’s method in the production of +phenomena to which continuity is due, recognised in other fields of +science, strongly recommended the theory of organic evolution for +acceptance on merely antecedent grounds. There is another important fact, +from the antecedent point of view, to which Professor Romanes draws +attention. He states it in the words of Mr. Wallace, who lays down as a +general law that “every species has come into existence coincident both +in space and time with a pre-existing and closely allied species.” This +is a necessary consequence of natural evolution, but no reason can be +assigned for it on the theory of special creation, and the existence of +such a correlation may be regarded as a test-question between the two +theories. + +The direct evidence in favor of organic evolution brought together in +the first section of the present work is considered under the several +heads of classification, Morphology, Embryology, Palæontology, and +Geographical Distribution. As to the first of these subjects, the object +of classification has been the arranging of organisms in accordance +with their natural affinities. Organisms have been compared for the +purpose of ascertaining which of the constituent organs are of the most +invariable occurrence, and therefore of the most typical significance, +and the author shows that “all the general principles and particular +facts appertaining to the natural classification of plants and animals, +are precisely what they ought to be according to the theory of genetic +descent; while no one of them is such as might be—and indeed, used, to +be—expected upon the theory of special creation.” In connection with +the important subject of Morphology, the author, after showing that the +theory of descent with continued adaptive modification fully explains +all the known cases of divergence from the typical structure which an +organism presents, devotes himself especially to the argument from +rudimentary structures. These are of such general occurrence that they +are found in every species, and such obsolescent or vestigial structures, +as the author terms them, are of great value as evidence for the theory +of evolution, particularly those found in adult man. To human vestigial +structures the author pays particular attention, his observations being +accompanied by excellent illustrations from nature. It is noteworthy that +he abandons the flattening of the tibia in man, and the disposition of +valves in human veins, as arguments in support of man’s natural origin, +which is abundantly supported, however, by reference to other rudimentary +organs. + +The science of Embryology is of special importance, on account of the +history it affords of the _process_ of evolution, and thus supplying +evidence of the fact, although the author remarks, “the foreshortening of +developmental history which takes place in the individual lifetime may +be expected often to take place, not only in the way of condensation, +but also in the way of excision.” To understand the argument from +embryology it is necessary to trace the first beginning of individual +life in the ovum, and for this purpose to consider the phenomena +of reproduction in their most simple form. In connection with this +subject, Professor Romanes, after examining the features in which +the cell-division of protozoa differs from that of metazoa, and after +considering the grounds on which it may be concluded that there is a +physiological continuity between growth and sexual reproduction, points +out that the constructive argument in favor of evolution derived from +embryology commences with the fertilisation of the metazoal ovum. As +this first stage has not been adequately treated by any other writer, +the author deals with it at considerable length. The later stages of +individual development, including that of the vertebrata, on the lines +of Haeckel’s ideal primitive vertebrate, are more concisely treated. +The science of embryology, covers the whole field of animal life, and +it is not surprising therefore that it is considered by the author and +other evolutionists as furnishing the strongest support to the theory of +evolution. + +As to the palæontological evidence, Professor Romanes does not ascribe +to it the paramount importance which it has in popular judgment. +Nevertheless he asserts that, not only is no positive proof against the +theory of descent to be drawn from a study of palæontology, but it proves +two very important general facts in favor of it. These are that from the +earliest to the latest times there has been a constant and progressive +increase in the diversity of types both of animals and plants, and that +“through all these branching lines of ever-multiplying types, from the +first appearance of each of them to their latest known conditions, there +is overwhelming evidence of one great law of organic nature—the law of +gradual advance from the general to the special, from the low to the +high, from the simple to the complex.” These general facts are supported +by detailed consideration of fossil horns, bones, teeth and shells, which +supply four special lines of evidence. The evolution of mammalian limbs +with particular reference to the hoofed animals is treated with a fulness +its importance requires. + +As the geological argument is concerned with the distribution of species +in time, so that based on the present geographical distribution of +animal and plant species is concerned with their distribution in space. +This, although not regarded by the author as a crucial test between the +rival theories of creation and evolution, is declared to be one of the +strongest lines of evidence in favor of the latter. The general facts +relied on are, the discontinuity of distribution of certain species, the +absence of any _constant_ correlation between habitats and animals or +plants suited to live upon them, and the presence in every biological +region of species related to other species in genera, and usually also +genera related to other genera in families; this correlation between a +geographically restricted habitat and the affinities of its fauna and +flora being repeated over and over again throughout the earth’s surface. +But further, the correlation between habitats and their animals and +plants is not limited to the now existing species, that is, the dead +and living species are allied, showing that the latter are modified +descendants of the former. Moreover, where the areas of distribution are +not restricted, through species wandering away from their native homes, +the course of their wanderings is marked by the origination _en route_ of +new species. Another important consideration is that a double correlation +exists in the geographical distribution of organic types. That between +the geographical restriction and natural affinity among inhabitants of +the same areas has already been mentioned. The second is the correlation +between _degrees_ of geographical restriction and _degrees_ of natural +affinity. This is consonant with the theory of descent with modification, +as “the more distant the affinity, and therefore, _ex hypothesi_, the +larger and the older the original group of organisms, the greater must +be the chance of dispersal.” These general considerations are supported +by detailed illustrations drawn from the distribution of aquatic and +terrestrial organisms. The author shows that an examination of the +faunas and floras of oceanic islands establishes the general law “that +_wherever_ there is evidence of land-areas having been for a long time +separated from other land-areas, there we meet with a more or less +extraordinary profusion of unique species, often running up into unique +genera.” There is, moreover, a constant correlation between the _degree_ +of this peculiarity, and the time during which the fauna and flora have +been isolated. The author concludes this part of his argument by the +forcible observation that “if the doctrine of special creation is taken +to be true, then it must be further taken that the one and only principle +which has been consistently followed in the geographical disposition of +species, is that of so depositing them as to make it everywhere appear +that they were not thus deposited at all, but came into existence where +they now occur by way of genetic descent with perpetual migration and +correlative modification.” + +The second part of this work, that which treats of selection, under the +two heads of Natural Selection and Sexual Selection, although in some +respects the most important, does not need to be noticed so fully as that +which deals with the facts of natural evolution. After stating the theory +of natural selection, the author notices various fallacies connected +with it which are largely prevalent among the adherents of Darwinianism, +although nowhere fallen into by Darwin himself, and the still greater +fallacies found in the writings of his opponents. In the two following +chapters Professor Romanes, after stating the main arguments in favor +of the theory of natural selection, reviews the main objections which +have been urged against it. The first argument is that, as a matter of +observation, “the struggle for existence in nature does lead to the +extermination of forms less fitted for the struggle, and thus makes room +for forms more fitted.” The second argument, which the author considers +of overwhelming significance, is that there is not a single instance, in +either the vegetable or the animal kingdom, of a structure or an instinct +which is developed for the exclusive benefit of another species. Its +importance may be judged by the fact that Darwin considered that a single +instance to the contrary would invalidate the whole theory of natural +selection. The third argument is based on the facts connected with the +variation of animals and plants under domestication. Ocular evidence +of the value of this argument is furnished by a series of drawings +prepared for the present work representing varieties of pigeons, and of +eight other animals. As special illustrations of natural selection the +author considers the subjects of protective colouring, warning colours, +and mimicry. In referring to his treatment of the criticisms of the +natural selection theory, in the course of which he deals with the main +objections, we cannot do more than mention that based on the possession +by the skate of an electric organ, which, owing to the weakness of +its discharges, cannot apparently be of any use to the animal. This +difficulty seems to be unexplainable according to the principles of +natural selection, and Professor Romanes, in admitting the fact, remarks +that it is of a magnitude and importance “altogether unequalled by that +of any other single case—or any series of cases—which has hitherto been +encountered by the theory.” + +The last chapter of the work is devoted to the consideration of the +theory of Sexual Selection, which was suggested by Mr. Darwin to furnish +a scientific explanation of the wide generality of beauty in organic +structures. It is an observed fact that sexual selection does take place +among the higher animals, and it is inferred that, the selection has +reference to an æsthetic taste on the part of the animals themselves; +and that this cause is adequate to explain the phenomena of beauty +presented by such animals. After stating the evidence in favor of these +conclusions, the author considers at length Mr. Wallace’s views on the +subject. These constitute the objections urged against the theory of +sexual selection, of the truth of which, however, Darwin shortly before +his death expressed himself as remaining firmly convinced. + +Professor Romanes concludes his present volume with a few general remarks +on the philosophical relations of Darwinism to the facts of adaptation +on the one hand and to those of beauty on the other. In none of these, +says the author, do we meet with any independent evidence of supernatural +design, although there is abundant evidence throughout organic nature of +natural causation. And yet natural causation furnishes no disproof of the +existence of a Supreme Being. The whole of organic and inorganic nature +is made subject to one rule of government, but “the ulterior and ultimate +question touching the nature of this government as mental or non-mental, +personal or impersonal, remains exactly where it was.” Moreover, if +there be an intelligent First Cause, of whose Will all secondary causes +are the expression, their operation must be uniform, so far as the Will +is consistent, and therefore it must appear as what we call mechanical. +Thus according to the pure logic of the matter, “the proof of organic +evolution amounts to nothing more than the proof of a natural process.” + +In an appendix to Chapter V, Professor Romanes offers suggestions as to +the imperfection of the geological record, and meets various objections +against the theory of organic evolution on that ground. But we must now +leave this excellent work, which will undoubtedly answer the expectation +with which it was prepared, of being “a compendium, or handbook, adapted +to the requirements of a general reader or biological student, as +distinguished from those of a professed naturalist.” + +It is enriched by a very good portrait of Darwin, in whose footsteps +the author has sought to tread by “avoiding dogmatism on the one hand, +and undue timidity as regards general reasoning on the other.” In +his introductory observations he dwells on the remarkable influence +exercised by Darwin over the method of investigation of organic nature, +by treating the discovery or accumulation of facts, not as an end, but +as a means for generalisation, thus bringing natural history into a line +with other inductive sciences. + +The value of the work is materially increased by the addition of numerous +well executed original illustrations, besides various plates derived from +Haeckel’s works and other sources, some of them American. It has also a +good Index which will add much to its usefulness. + + Ω. + + +GRUNDRISS DER NATURLEHRE FÜR DIE OBEREN CLASSEN DER MITTELSCHULEN. Von +Dr. _E. Mach_. Ausgabe für Gymnasien. Mit 358 Abbildungen. 315 pp. Vienna +and Prague: F. Tempsky. Leipsic: G. Freytag. + +The principles that have guided Professor Mach in the preparation of +these outlines of Physics, are in the main as follows: + +The concepts and notions of physical science should not be set forth +dogmatically, but should be presented as much as possible under the +influence of the actual natural facts that lead to them. Hypotheses +and theories should be employed only when actually necessary. Long +mathematical developments and pages of formulæ only impede the scholar’s +total view of his subject and afford of themselves no insight. _Logical_ +finish should not be sought after in elementary presentations; the method +of the inculcation of truths should, so to speak, be _psychological_: the +method of their acquisition. + +From the brief statement of these guiding principles, the reader will +observe that Professor Mach’s conception of the proper form of an +elementary text-book, differs greatly from that usually entertained. +The method of presentation is not the dogmatic, the “logical,” which +sets forth a science as a ready-made and perfected, mystically created, +product; but the genetic, the historical, the natural. We are constantly +made aware, in the study of this book, of what knowledge really means +and what it does not. We are not treated, in its introductory chapter, +as we are in most of the text-books of Physics, to disquisitions on the +insolubility of the questions What is Matter, What is Energy, What is +Force, and to like professions of metaphysical ignorance, which make us +wonder how people can request us to read hundreds of pages about things +it is impossible to have knowledge of; but we are presented throughout +with a simple statement and description, in terms of facts, of what +our fundamental, as well as our derived, notions _are_, and what their +import. It is unnecessary to say that the need of such a book is very +great. And it is pleasant, constantly to discover how well its idea +has been executed. Concise, unburdened by unnecessary and self-evident +developments, it is in our judgment a model of elementary exposition. + +With characteristic modesty, Professor Mach disclaims all pretension to +having fully realised his conception, and views his performance simply as +an attempt. The book was submitted, before publication, to a number of +competent educators, whose advice in regard to alterations was frequently +acted upon. + + μκρκ. + + +NOUVELLES RECHERCHES DE PSYCHIATRIE ET D’ANTHROPOLOGIE CRIMINELLE. By _C. +Lombroso_. Paris: Félix Alcan. 1892. + +Prof. C. Lombroso’s activity reaches a climax that is almost superhuman. +He contributed to the Italian Archives of Psychiatry two articles, +one of which proves that, at least in Italy, the sense of touch is +weaker in women than in men; it is still weaker and more irregular in +criminal women than in normal women. (Archiv. di. Psichiatr. Sc. pen. +ed. Antrop. Vol. XII, 1891, p. 1-6). The other article (l. c. p. 58-108) +is an inquiry concerning thought-transmission, which contains besides a +critical review of the usual rubbish of so-called telepathic phenomena +two strange observations. The first is the case of a low-bred hysterical +lad who does not possess the faculty claimed by him to understand +telepathically the intentions of whosoever employs him, but strange +enough, if sufficiently charged with whiskey, is able to read any writing +through the envelope with closed eyes. The other case is a somnambulistic +compositor, who sets type correctly in the state of somnambulism. +Blindfolded he draws the figures drawn behind his back upon a slate, and +hypnotised he guesses the numbers which the experimenter thinks. Lombroso +is one of our greatest psychologists, but these experiments perhaps with +the same subjects should be repeated by other psychologists so as to make +sure of their correctness. Lombroso concludes that there seems to be some +foundation in thought-transmission. + +The present little volume of new researches applies Lombroso’s theories +concerning morphological abnormalities of the criminal type in the +anthropological field. It appears natural that the criminal type should +show abnormal features, but sometimes Lombroso’s eagerness to discover +abnormal features, even in political criminals such as Charlotte Corday, +is exaggerated. At least we must confess that many abnormalities appear +very frequently among peaceful and law-abiding citizens. The Corday +skull, although a trifle platycephalic, is beautifully rounded and +normal. M. Topinard finds no abnormal features but Lombroso maintains +that its platycephaly is doubly abnormal and he adds: “The capacity of +the skull is 1.360 cubic centimeters while those of Parisian women is +1.337. Must we not conclude that its capacity exceeds the average?” We +read on p. 124 and sq.: “The more our women will be forced to enter +the economical struggle for existence, the more will they become +criminals.... The result (of letting them enter public life) will be to +lower the nature of women.” + +The booklet is very instructive even to those who disagree with the +professor, for it is full of facts and valuable observations. + + κρς. + + +VORLESUNGEN ÜBER DIE ALGEBRA DER LOGIK. (Exakte Logik.) By Dr. _Ernst +Schröder_. Erster Band mit viel Figuren im Texte. Leipsic: B. G. Teubner. +1890. + +Professor Mach says, “The essence of science is economy of thought.” +If that is so, there is no discipline more imbued with the spirit of +science than algebra. When operating with algebraic symbols we cease +to think out the whole calculation at every stage, and we are enabled +to keep track of the different factors, and of their mutual relations +during the operation from the beginning to the end. In common arithmetic +these factors are lost like rivers in an ocean of homogeneous numbers +which increase and decrease without betraying the way by which they were +reached. Algebraic symbols generalise calculation, and thus we have +the advantage of calculating from the resultant formula any particular +example with machine-like exactness and without the trouble of going +over the whole operation again. The ease with which we can operate +with symbols brings it about that we sometimes out-run our thought and +the correct result may be obtained by an operator who only partially +understands the operation, just as an engineer is able to run a machine +the mechanism of which he but partially understands. + +Mathematics having gained so great advantages through the introduction of +algebraic symbols, the question suggests itself whether the same method +might not with some advantage be introduced into the other provinces of +formal science, especially in the domain of logic. The first logicians +who borrowed signs from algebra and introduced them into logic by +generalising their meanings, were two Germans, Gottfried Ploucquet and +Johann Heinrich Lambert. Ploucquet wrote “Principia de substantiis et +phaenomenis, accedit methodus calculandi in logicis ab ipso inventa, cui +praemittitur commentatio de arte characteristica universali,” Frankfort +and Leipsic, 1753, ed. II. 1764.[84] Lambert’s investigations on the +subject are found in his “Logische Abhandlungen.” Prof. Venn, in his +“Symbolic Logic,” p. xxxii, says of Lambert, “He fully recognised that +the four algebraic operations of addition, subtraction, multiplication, +and division, have each an analogue in Logic; that they may here be +respectively termed aggregation, separation, determination, abstraction, +and be symbolised by +, -, ×, :. He also perceived the _inverse_ nature +of the second and fourth as compared with the first and third; and no one +could state more clearly that we must not confound the mathematical with +the logical signification.” + +The algebra of logic which through the work of these ingenious men, +had received so favorable a start, was very soon neglected; yet it was +revived after some time in England by Boole, DeMorgan, and Jevons. It +remained for quite a while the almost exclusive property of the English +where at the present time Prof. Venn may be considered as the greatest +English authority on the subject. Venn’s works were rivalled by an +American scholar, Mr. Charles S. Peirce, the same who has contributed +several articles to _The Monist_. The algebra of logic which had been +so long neglected in Germany, is now reviving in the country of its +first birth. The author of the work, the first volume of which lies now +before us for review, is Professor of Mathematics at the Polytechnicum of +Karlsruhe in Baden. The second volume is not yet worked out in detail, +but its publication may be expected in one or two years. The whole work, +when completed, will be the most comprehensive treatise on the algebra +of logic that has as yet appeared. The plan and treatment of Professor +Schröder’s “Vorlesungen über die Algebra der Logik” exhibit that uncommon +thoroughness and exhaustiveness, for which German scholars are justly +famous. The book, in one word, will be the standard work on the algebra +of logic for a long time to come. + +It would lead us here too far to review or to sketch the main contents +of Professor Schröder’s work, which, it seems to us, is difficult to +explain without entering into the details and thus going beyond the scope +of mere review. But we shall briefly set forth the chief foundations +upon which Schröder builds his algebra of logic. Professor Schröder has +inscribed two mottos on the title page of his book, but we confess that +we suspect at least one of them is intended to be ironical; it certainly +seems to have been selected when the author was in a mood of humor. Being +conscious of the great value of theoretical speculation, he quotes from +Goethe the following Mephistophelian sentiment: + + “I say to thee, a speculative wight + Is like a beast on moorlands lean, + Led circling there by some malicious sprite + While all around lie pastures fair and green.” + +There are two kinds of speculation: first, that which attempts to find +out by pure thought a substantial extension of knowledge; and secondly, +that which investigates the methods of inquiry. The former is futile, the +latter is fruitful. The former is that which Goethe censures. To censure +the latter would be a grave mistake. The man who would try to forge bread +out of iron must meet with disappointment, but the smith who invented and +shaped the plow did more for the production of bread than many thousand +farmers taken together, although it may be he did not raise a blade of +wheat. Speculation that attempts to find out things by mere brooding +is _prima facie_ wrong; but speculation that constructs the methods of +investigation is the basis of all progress in science. + +The other motto of Schröder’s book is Goethe’s saying: “Man is not born +to solve the problem of the world, but to seek for the point where the +problem begins and then to keep within the limits of the comprehensible.” +It would be well to compare this saying of Goethe’s with another one by +the same author which is “Man should hold fast to the belief that that +which seems incomprehensible, is comprehensible. Otherwise, he would +not investigate.” Schröder follows rather the spirit of the second than +that of the first quotation. He says on p. 105 of the recent volume, +with reference to some critical remarks made by the late Professor +Lotze of Göttingen, who was more brilliant and ingenious than exact +in his philosophical views and who showed an undisguised dislike for +any severe method that has recourse to numbers, figures, schedules, or +classifications, as does the algebra of logic: “If Lotze concludes his +logic with the wish that German philosophy should rise to the attempt at +comprehending the course of the world instead of merely calculating it, +we should answer, Could we first calculate it, then we should certainly +comprehend it so far as comprehension on earth is possible.” But how +is it possible? Simply by properly limiting and defining the field of +investigation; and here we can see that the first saying of Goethe’s +should not be construed in such a way as to appear contradictory to the +second. + +Every thinker starts with certain limits of comprehension, but he extends +them so that the stock of knowledge increases in every generation, +and there is no probability that we shall ever reach the limits of an +absolutely incomprehensible. There is no solid progress to be made by +making wild raids in the domain of the unknown, a method which is pursued +only by dreamers and metaphysicians. We must start from the boundary +of the present stock of knowledge, and let our progress be confined +to single well defined and limited problems. How a solution of the +world-problem is possible in this sense, is explained by Schröder on p. +103: “The answer is given in the old parable of the bundle of arrows, +which resists all attempts at breaking it. As a whole it withstood, but +it yielded to him who untied the bundle and broke the arrows singly. The +difficulties which present themselves to the progress of knowledge can +also only be overcome singly, and in their one-sidedness. In the division +of labor thus produced, lies exactly the advantage and the strength of +the diverse disciplines,—_qui trop embrasse, mal étreint_.” + +Professor Schröder advertises his book with the following words: + +“From the title the reader will observe that here the deductive or formal +logic alone is treated. The calculative treatment of the deductive +logic, through which this discipline is redeemed from the fetters by +which through the power of habit, word-language has bound the human +mind, should deserve, more than anything else the name ‘Exact Logic’! +This method alone can give to the laws of valid inference, their most +pregnant, concise, and clear expression, and is thus enabled to reveal +numerous and important gaps,—why not mistakes,—in the older presentations +of the subject.” + +“Since the appearance of the author’s ‘Operationskreis des Logikkalkuls,’ +this method of treatment has made progress of highest importance, +especially through the works of the Americans, Mr. Charles S. Peirce and +his school. To Mr. Peirce, more than to anybody else, is due the merit +of having built a bridge from the older and purely verbal treatment +of our discipline to the new calculative method; a bridge which the +professional philosophers rightly found lacking and to which lack is well +to be ascribed the fact that the new method received only a partial and +bewildered attention. Through Mr. Peirce’s works, upon which also the +author has had some influence, the theory is now so far developed and +perfected that for the first and main part of its whole system, a final +presentation and arrangement may be obtained.” + +“Endeavoring to offer so far as possible such a final and comprehensive +presentation, the author desires to offer at the same time and in +a systematic way a handbook of the most valuable materials of the +literature of the subject which especially in the English language, is +quite considerable.” + +The book addresses two kinds of readers which are of a greatly different +turn of mind, and it will go far in reconciling the methods of both, the +mathematicians and the philosophers. + +In the preface Schröder says, “In consideration of the formulæ which +appear in the book, it may be wise to state, that no mathematical +training or any specific knowledge is presupposed to be known by the +reader. We might repeat the words of Dedekind, prefixed to one of his +books: ‘Everybody can understand this work who is in possession of what +is generally called, common-sense.’ But we may add another saying from +another author: ‘The beaux esprits certainly, who are not accustomed to +the severe demands of thought, will very soon turn away from it.’” + +The introduction is comparatively long, comprising no less than 125 +pages. But, considering that it is more than an introduction, that it +explains the foundation on which the whole work rests, it is not too +long, for it forms an essential and indeed the most important part of +the book. Schröder discusses in it the character and the limitation of +his problem. He explains induction, deduction, contradiction and valid +inference. He considers the nature of signs and names. He says, on p. +38: “Humanity, it appears, does not rise above the absolute zero of +civilisation and the level of animal life, until it develops the activity +of denotation and symbolising. And there is indeed nothing to which the +human mind owes so much for its progress as to the signs of things. + +“The sign which speaks in attitude and gesture to emotion, speaks in word +and sentence to the intellect. And it possesses, in accordance with the +laws of the association of ideas, the power of producing in the person +addressed certain ideas. + +“While the sign coalesces with the idea, it reacts upon thought itself. +Through signs the ideas which otherwise would remain confused and vague, +are analysed and they become as separate elements, a permanent possession +over which the thinking mind has forthwith free control. Through the sign +we distinguish, we fix differences and make them ready for new peculiar +combinations. The sign, is as it were, the handle by which we take hold +of the objects of thought. Through the sign only, the idea is liberated +from the elements of sense, which are attached to it, and is enabled to +rise into the sphere of generalisation. Thus thinking is on the one hand +liberated, on the other determined by the sign. + +“Further, through the sign alone which makes it possible that the same +idea the same purpose can live in many, there is _one_ will, _one_ soul, +and a community of human aspirations exists upon which is based the life +of mankind as a life of individuals in society. And this again is the +basis of our morality and civilisation. + +“The efficacy of the sign spoken is considerably increased by the +invention of writing.” + +Professor Schröder discusses those two methods of logic which are known +by the names: the Logic of Intension and the Logic of Extension. (_Logik +des Inhaltes_, and _Logik des Umfangs_.) This leads to a discussion of +definition, the categories, and conceptual writing which would find +its ideal in a system of pasigraphy, or universal language, for the +perfection of which an algebra of logic would be indispensable. + +The symbols employed by Schröder are borrowed to a great extent from +Peirce, but they are considerably improved and it is probable that +Schröder’s innovations will be universally accepted. + +We purposely refrain here from discussing the particulars of Schröder’s +work, stating only in a general way that his proposition of a new symbol +for subsumption, (he proposes to replace the old symbol [symbol] by +[symbol] to signify “equal to or subsumed under”), his treatment of the +symbols 0 and 1, the former representing an absence of certain marks, +or as it has been called their “incompossibility,” as being excluded by +the presence of other marks; the other the universe of the whole subject +under discussion, and all the other problems which he separately treats +in his lectures are admirably presented and command almost throughout +the reader’s consent. We now conclude our review with the quotation of +the last paragraph of Schröder’s introduction on p. 125. Having declared +that “logical inquiry should not be judged from the short-sighted or +narrow-minded, not to say _borné_, utilitarian standpoint,” he points out +the great practical importance of his science, saying: + +“Similarly, as with other sciences, so logic also may be expected to +realise and produce undreamed of results, which may incidentally bring +about, in a most surprising way, incalculable advantages. Let me only +point out one thing. Since the impulse which this science has of late +received, there have been already constructed three logical machines +which although we grant, scarcely deserve their name, because their +efficacy remains still very rudimentary, may be compared to Papin’s pot +that in a more advanced state became the steam-engine. Indeed, nobody can +presage whether after all a thinking machine might not be constructed, +which would be analogous to, but more perfect than the calculating +machines. The latter have relieved man of a considerable portion of much +fatiguing thought-work, just as the steam-engine has been successful in +relieving him from physical labor. + +“To be sure we must not expect to reap while we are still sowing, and +least so in such a case as this where the harvest is to be expected from +trees.” + + κρς. + + +THE GRAMMAR OF SCIENCE. By _Karl Pearson_, M. A. With 25 figures in +the text. London: Walter Scott, 24 Warwick Lane. Imported by Charles +Scribner’s Sons, New York. + +We are greatly in sympathy with the methods and principles of Professor +Karl Pearson’s “Grammar of Science.” The work is a comparatively popular +and also brief exposition of the modern ideal of scientific inquiry. +“The goal of science is clear—it is nothing short of the complete +interpretation of the universe. But that goal,” adds the author, “is an +ideal one—it marks the _direction_ in which we move and strive.” + +The best part of the book is in our opinion the introductory chapter +which sets forth “the scope and method of science” and shows the need of +a “Grammar of Science.” Says the author in the summary of this chapter: + +“The scope of science is to ascertain truth in every possible branch +of knowledge. There is no sphere of inquiry which lies outside the +legitimate field of science. To draw a distinction between the scientific +and philosophical methods is obscurantism.” + +The present generation is in a state of fermentation. While one man +finds a restlessness, a distrust of all authority, a questioning of the +basis of all social institutions and long established methods, another +pictures for us a golden age in the near future. One teacher propounds +what is flatly contradicted by a second. We require some guide in the +determination of our actions, and not for our own private but also our +public duties. “Every citizen is thrust into an appalling maze of social +and educational problems; and if his tribal conscience has any stuff +in it, he feels that these problems ought not to be settled, so far as +he has the power of settling them, by his own personal interests, by +his individual prospects of profit or loss. He is called upon to form a +judgment apart from his own feelings and emotions if it possibly may be—a +judgment in what he conceives to be the interests of society at large. + +“How is such a judgment to be formed?” The answer is by science. Such +a judgment can only be based on a clear knowledge of facts, on an +appreciation of their sequence and relative significance. The judgment +based upon them ought to be independent of the individual mind which +examines them, and this frame of mind which is that of the scientist is +an essential of good citizenship. Not as if the scientist were _eo ipso_ +a good citizen, but society has an interest in the propagation of the +methods of modern science. Sound citizenship will be promoted by training +the mind to an exact and impartial analysis of facts. + +How much a grammar of science is needed can be learned from the confusion +that prevails concerning the fundamental concepts of science. Says +Pearson: + +“Anything more hopelessly _illogical_ than the statements with regard +to force and matter current in elementary text-books of science, it is +difficult to imagine; and the author, as a result of some ten years’ +teaching and examining, has been forced to the conclusion that these +works possess little, if any, _educational_ value; they do not encourage +the growth of _logical_ clearness or form any exercise in scientific +method. + +“The views expressed in this _Grammar_ on the fundamental concepts of +science, especially on those of force and matter, have formed part of +the author’s teaching since he was first called upon to think how the +elements of dynamical science could be presented free from _metaphysics_ +to young students.” + +Professor Pearson calls attention to the danger that arises from two +modes of thought, viz. that of the metaphysician and that of the +agnostic. He says: + +“The poet is a valued member of the community, for he is known to be a +poet; his value will increase as he grows to recognise the deeper insight +into nature with which modern science provides him. The metaphysician is +a poet, often a very great one, but fortunately he is not known to be a +poet, because he clothes his poetry in the language of apparent reason, +and hence it follows that he is liable to be a dangerous member of the +community. The danger at the present time that metaphysical dogmas may +check scientific research is, perhaps, not very great.” + +Fortunately the danger that arises from metaphysicism is past. “For,” +adds Pearson, “The day has gone by when the Hegelian philosophy +threatened to strangle infant science in Germany;—that it begins to +languish at Oxford is a proof that it is practically dead in the country +of its birth. The day has gone by when philosophical or theological +dogmas of any kind can throw back, even for generations, the progress of +scientific investigation.” + +The scientist will, it is true, often have to confess: “There I am +ignorant.” But it would be absurd to restrict science to the limited +field of thought which it occupies to-day. Professor Pearson continues: + + “It is true that this view is not held by several leading + scientists, both in this country and Germany. They are not + content with saying, ‘We _are_ ignorant,’ but they add, with + regard to certain classes of facts, ‘Mankind must _always_ be + ignorant.’ Thus in England Professor Huxley has invented the + term _Agnostic_, not so much for those who are ignorant as for + those who limit the possibility of knowledge in certain fields. + In Germany Professor E. du Bois-Reymond has raised the cry: + ‘_Ignorabimus_’—‘We shall be ignorant,’ and both his brother + and he have undertaken the difficult task of demonstrating that + with regard to certain problems human knowledge is impossible. + We must, however, note that in these cases we are not concerned + with the limitation of the scientific method, but with the + denial of the possibility that any method whatever can lead to + knowledge. Now I venture to think that there is great danger in + this cry: ‘We _shall_ be ignorant.’ To cry ‘We are ignorant,’ + is safe and healthy, but the attempt to demonstrate an endless + futurity of ignorance appears a modesty which approaches + despair. Conscious of the past great achievements and the + present restless activity of science, may we not do better + to accept as our watchword that of Galilei: ‘Who is willing + to set limits to the human intellect?’—interpreting it by + what evolution has taught us of the continual growth of man’s + intellectual powers.” + +The introductory chapter presents the general plan of Professor Pearson’s +book. The following chapters contain the detailed work of the plan. +The headings of these chapters are: II, The Facts of Science; III, The +Scientific Law; IV, Cause and Effect—Probability; V, Space and Time; VI, +The Geometry of Motion; VII, Matter; VIII, The Laws of Motion; IX, Life; +X, The Classification of the Sciences. + +Professor Pearson follows Professor Ernst Mach in his expositions +(especially in Chap. II) very closely, and especially refers to the +latter’s contributions to _The Monist_. Pearson emphasises with Mach +the distinction between the conceptual and perceptual, between ideas +or noumena and sensations. He rejects, as does Professor Mach, the +assumption of unknowables beyond our groups of sense-impressions, saying: +“It is idle to postulate shadowy unknowables behind that real world of +sense-impression in which we live” (p. 88), and yet he says in another +passage on p. 134: “There is mystery enough in the chaos of sensations +and in its capacity for containing those little corners of consciousness +which project their own products, of order and law and reason, _into an +unknown and unknowable world_.” + +It appears to us that the deeper reason of this apparent inconsistency +can be traced to the author’s conception of the import of knowledge. He +follows Kirchhoff in the acceptance of the theory that scientific law is +a brief description of facts in mental shorthand. But at the same time he +follows Clifford and Mach too closely; the former in the respect that we +can know the “how” only and not the “why,” and the latter in overlooking +the fact that concepts are symbols which stand for something and have a +meaning. Pearson says on p. 145, “Science describes how they [motions] +take place, but the _why_ remains a mystery.” But should we not, we ask, +rather supplant the old and metaphysical conception of the “why” (the +sense of it as here implied) by a better and more correct conception? The +metaphysical “why” is not so much a mystery as it is the incorporation of +an illegitimate problem. The “why” of positive science demands as answer +an exhaustive description of those conditions which as the outcome of a +definite transformation inevitably produce a certain phenomenon. + +But here we must criticise Professor Pearson’s view of “description,” +as well also as his view of causation. Cause and effect are to him, as +they were to Mill, mere sequences; necessity belongs exclusively to +the conceptual realm, and is “illogically transferred to the world of +perceptions.” + +An exhaustive description will trace the process of causation, and +whenever we succeed in this we have answered the question “why” in the +only sensible meaning it possesses. Sense-impressions do _not_, as +Professor Pearson expresses it, “shut us in,” so that the beyond remains +a mystery to us. Sense-impressions represent the beyond of reality and +they represent it in such a way as to enable us to deal with it properly. +This representation is knowledge and thus the world is _not_ unknowable. +The world is full of mystery, but knowledge itself is not mysterious. +Having sense-impressions and interpreting them in our conceptual +inferences we know something of the world. + +We are not prepared to accept Professor Pearson’s views that “change is +perceptual, motion conceptual,” and also that “we are not compelled to +postulate a space outside of self for phenomena” (p. 196). We should +say that our concepts, the concepts motion and space included, represent +certain features of reality. We might give a special name to those +features of reality which are represented by the terms motion and space, +but we could not deny their objective reality without at the same time +denying the validity of the concepts. + +Says Professor Pearson, “All things move—but only in conception” (p. +385). “What moves in conception is a geometrical ideal, and it moves +because we conceive it to move.” These propositions have no meaning if +pronounced from our standpoint. Observe also that Professor Pearson +inculcates the conceptuality of motion by unnecessarily repeating the +word in the formula on page 341 which begins as follows: “Every corpuscle +in the _conceptual_ model of the universe must be _conceived_ as +moving....” When we conceive something as moving we mean that not only in +the conceptual model, but also in reality there is an action taking place +which we represent by the concept motion. To say that we have knowledge +only of changes but that we do not know whether those changes which we +describe as mechanical are really motions, appears to us idle subtlety. +The point is whether this method of describing those events enables us to +deal with them properly. If it does it answers the purpose. + +In spite of all our disagreements we feel ourselves in close contact with +the author of “The Grammar of Science,” for we agree with respect to the +principles of science and we certainly can leave the settlement of our +differences to a common test on the basis of these principles. Moreover, +the attitude of the author seems to us very much like that which we take +ourselves. We quote from a former publication of his, the following +passage[85]: + + “I set out from the standpoint that the mission of Freethought + is no longer to batter down old faiths; that has been long + ago effectively accomplished, and I, for one, am ready to put + a railing round the ruins, that they may be preserved from + desecration and serve as a landmark. Indeed I confess to have + yawned over a recent vigorous inditement of Christianity, and + I promptly disposed of my copy to a young gentleman who was + anxious that I should read a work entitled: _Natural Law in the + Spiritual World_, which he told me had given quite a new width + to the faith of his childhood.” + + κρς. + + +PHILOSOPHIE DER ARITHMETIK. Psychologische und logische Untersuchungen. +By Dr. _E. G. Husserl_. Erster Band. Halle-Saale: C. E. M. Pfeffer. 1891. + +The present volume does not pretend to be a complete system of the +philosophy of arithmetic, but it attempts to prepare, in a series of +psychological and logical investigations, the scientific foundation +for a future construction of this discipline, which would be of equal +value to the mathematician and philosopher. The first volume which is +now before us analyses in its first part the ideas plurality, unity, and +number, so far as they are directly given us and not in their indirect +symbolisation. The second part considers the symbolical representations +of plurality and number, and the author attempts to show that the fact +of our being almost throughout limited to symbolical ideas of number +determines the meaning and the purpose of that view which the author +calls “Anzahlenarithmetik.” + +The author criticises several theories which in different ways explain +the origin of plurality and unity. There is one theory which explains +the origin of the unit from the unity of consciousness; there is another +one which explains the origin of number from a succession in time. F. +A. Lange bases his theory of number upon space-conception and Bauman +declares there is something mathematical in the external world which +corresponds to the mathematical in us. The theory of difference held +by Jevons, Schuppe, and Sigwart, is declared to be superior to all +others, but even that is rejected by the author. Jevons says, “Number +is but another name for diversity. Exact identity is unity, and with +difference rises plurality.... Abstract number then, is the empty form +of difference.” Dr. Husserl objects: if numbers are all empty forms of +difference, what makes the difference between two, three, four, etc.? The +contents of these numbers are very different. The inability of defining +this difference shows the imperfection of the theory of difference. +Dr. Husserl proposes what he calls “collection” as a special method of +combination by which unities are formed. + +Although the book contains many valuable suggestions, it is very hard +reading. The author’s views are not at all clearly set forth. Neither +is the table of contents so systematically arranged as to give us a +clue to the plan of the book, nor is there any index that might give us +assistance in finding out the most characteristic passages. The reader is +supposed to read the book right through, in order to understand detached +chapters or even sentences. And even then we are not sure whether or not +we have understood the author’s propositions the consistency of which is +not as apparent as it might be expected. For, after having criticised +so many attempts at explaining and analysing the ideas, plurality, +unity and number, and after having proposed definitions, explanations, +and analyses of his own, we find on p. 130 a passage where these ideas +are incidentally declared to be incapable of definition. Speaking of +Frege’s theory, Dr. Husserl says, “As soon as we come down to elementary +concepts, all definition has an end. Such concepts as quality, intensity, +place, time, etc., cannot be defined. The same is true of elementary +relations, and of those concepts upon which they are founded. Equality, +similarity, gradation, whole and part, plurality and unity, etc., are +concepts which are utterly incapable of a formal-logical definition. +All we can do in such cases is to produce the concrete phenomena from +which they have been abstracted, and to explain the method of this +process of abstraction. One can, where it is necessary, exactly fence in +(umgrenzen) by diverse circumscriptions, the concepts in question, and +thus prevent confusion with kindred concepts.” We must confess that we do +not understand the author’s idea; what is an act of defining if not an +“umgrenzen,” a fencing in of the concept? The book contains many similar +passages, which, it seems to us, are not properly thought out by the +author. But the subject is a difficult one, and, as the author says in +the preface, “A work of this kind should, with regard to the difficulties +of the problem it treats, be judged with leniency.” + + κρς. + + +CHRISTIANITY AND INFALLIBILITY. Both or Neither. By the Rev. _Daniel +Lyons_. New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1891. Chicago: A. C. McClurg & +Co. + +This little book of Dr. Lyons’s is got up in a much more substantial +and prepossessing form than the majority of the works that come from +Catholic quarters. It contains 284 pages and is supplied with the _Nihil +obstat_ of a Catholic “censor deputatus” and with the _Imprimatur_ of the +Bishop of Denver. In this book, therefore, the reader may be sure that he +possesses a correct exposition of Catholic doctrine. + +The purpose of Dr. Lyons is to establish the thesis,—a thesis always +insisted upon by the Catholic church,—“that Christianity, to maintain +its rightful hold on the reason and conscience of men, needs a living, +infallible Witness to its truths and principles; a living, infallible +Guardian of its purity and integrity, and a living, infallible +Interpreter of its meaning.” By Christianity Dr. Lyons means “that body +of sacred truths which the Almighty revealed through the _ministry_ of +Christ and His Apostles.” + +We italicise the word “ministry,” for on this word hinges in our +judgment the main and unmistakable argument of Dr. Lyons’s advocacy. +If the results of modern Biblical criticism are at all true, the +“Church,” so-called, must have existed before the New Testament. And +in establishing the authority of the church, the Catholic theologians +regard and use the Bible merely as an “historical narrative, whose +trustworthiness (at least in the parts quoted) can be proved in the same +way as that of any other history, sacred or profane.” They take their +argument “for the institution, mission, and authority of the Church +from the Bible as a mere human record of the sayings and doings of our +Divine Lord and His Apostles.” What is the mission of the church? “_And +he said unto them. Go ye into all the world, and preach the Gospel to +every creature. He that believeth and is baptised shall be saved, but he +that believeth not shall be damned._” These are awful powers, and awful +are the sanctions placed by the same Divine letter-patent in the hands +of the institution that dispenses them. And in the face of the great +complexity and peculiar nature of the Holy writings, in view of their +recognised liability to manifold and multifarious interpretation, does +not such a great and fearful commission of power as this necessarily +and logically imply a concession of Infallibility—of infallibility, let +us add, as _technically_ understood. “Who can suppose that God would +formally commission anybody to teach in his name and command all to hear +and accept His teaching under the severest of penalties, and at the same +time not secure that teacher against the possibility of teaching error +for truth? Suppose the Church thus commissioned by God did actually teach +error, even then would not all (there is no exception made), by reason of +the divine command, be bound to believe? And in that case would not God +Himself be accountable for the erroneous belief? I conclude, therefore, +that the formal commission to teach the Gospel in God’s name, and by His +authority, joined to the express command to believe carries with it a +pledge of the divine assistance of Infallibility as a guarantee to all +men that in yielding the obedience of faith, they are perfectly secure +against all danger of error.” This inference is incorporated in a dogma, +a “Catholic dogma,” of infallibility, which is this: “that the Pope, by +virtue of a special supernatural assistance of the Holy Spirit of Truth +promised to him, in and through St. Peter, is exempt from all liability +to err when, in the discharge of his Apostolic Office of Supreme Teacher +of the Universal Church, he defines or declares, in matters of or +appertaining to Christian faith or morals, what is to be believed and +held, or what is to be rejected and condemned by the faithful throughout +the world. This definition substantially embodies the whole Catholic +teaching on the subject of Infallibility.” + +Dr. Lyons’s arguments are well put and well reasoned out. He sees +clearly where the vulnerable point of the present condition of the +Christian churches lies,—which the majority of Protestant theologians +do not see. He sees clearly, though he does not say it, that the +rococo superstructure of neo-Christian dogmatism was long and long ago +undermined by science and that it is now toppling in the minds of the +unscientific generally; and he justly advises all who have set their +hearts on the preservation of the subtle and irrelevant externalities +of religion, to forsake their ancient dwelling-place and seek a safe +and easy abode in the grandly simple and grandly spacious, Roman temple +of Papal infallibility. That edifice is safe against the artillery of +science. It has by one simple act placed itself beyond the reach of all +scientific attacks. For science, or rather the _method of science_, +directly owes its origin to the consciousness of our individual +liability to error and the consequent aspiration of man to establish an +_objective_ criterion of truth. If it attempted to demolish doctrines +of infallibility of any kind, it would simply seek to justify its own +foundations, which it has long ago done. In so far as the doctrine of +infallibility is the only logical outcome of a dilemma in which the +Christian church has, discreetly or indiscreetly, implicated itself, +science has no objection to it; or for that matter to any other +conclusion that logically results from premisses it does not grant. +The question really most worthy of the attention of the “thoughtful,” +“truth-seeking,” and “religious” mind, as Dr. Lyons styles it, is not the +doctrine of infallibility, but the questions, What is religion, What is +God, etc., etc.; and such questions the _truth_-seeking mind will find +it impossible to answer arbitrarily: it must, perforce, answer them in +conformity with that objective criterion of truth called science. And +such subjects are as much the object of science as are motion and matter. + + μκρκ. + + +DER SATZ VOM GRUNDE ALS PRINZIP DES SCHLIESSENS. By Dr. _Franz Erhardt_. +Halle a. S.: C. E. M. Pfeffer. 1891. + +This little pamphlet of fifty-six pages, written and published to +acquire for the author the _venia legendi_ at the philosophical faculty +of the University of Jena, treats the several figures of the syllogism +from the standpoint that the middle term of the premisses is, logically +considered, the consequence (_Folge_) of the subject and the reason +(_Grund_) of the predicate in the conclusion. A few remarks are added on +induction and analogy, without, however, entering into the problem as +to the rôle which the method of induction plays in the evolution of the +method of deduction. + + κρς. + + +AGNOSTICISME. Essai sur quelques Théories pessimistes de la Connaissance. +By _E. de Roberty_. Paris: Félix Alcan. + +By the publication of this little book M. de Roberty redeems a promise +made in his larger work, on the philosophy of the present century, +already reviewed in _The Monist_ (January, 1892). The pessimist +theories of knowledge of which he treats are the three systems, those +of Criticism, Positivism, and Evolutionism, to which he reduces +contemporaneous philosophy. As these systems are regarded as parallel +manifestations of a common stock of beliefs and general hypotheses, they +must equally adopt the doctrine of Agnosticism. It is the aim of the +present work to point out the several forms assumed by this doctrine and +to show its falsity by an examination of the principles on which it is +based. The author properly insists on the importance of distinguishing +between the affirmation of the unknown and that of the unknowable. The +recognition of the former is essential to all progress in knowledge, +but the latter is “the direct negation of all possibility whatever of +utilising the deficiencies of knowledge,” and leads infallibly to the +worship of ignorance. The best definition of the mental phenomenon +of agnosticism, says M. de Roberty is the _pessimism_ of the theory +of knowledge, and it is not for nothing therefore that Kant preceded +Schopenhauer in the development of idealism. + +Modern agnosticism is based on the old notion of the separation of the +phenomenon from the noumenon, and it was Kant who cleared it from its +early theological and metaphysical conceptions. He affirmed the reality +of the “thing in itself” as a fundamental postulate, and then declared +that we can know nothing of things considered in themselves. Among +the conceptions formed by the human mind through the exercise of its +imaginative faculty are three which exhaust the entire content of the +Unknowable. Thus it may be reduced to the idea of a reality other than +that of which we are sensible; to the idea of a subject which perceives +in a different manner from the real subject; and finally to the idea that +our cerebral organisation reveals the world to us under delusive colors, +all of which M. de Roberty declares to be simple fiction. His own ideas +on the subject will appear later on. + +Positivism stands towards materialism in the same relation as criticism +stands towards idealism, whose noumenon becomes the unknowable thing +in itself; as the simple matter of materialism becomes the unknown +existence about which positivism says we can neither affirm nor deny +anything. Modern agnosticism may be regarded thus as representing the +long sought synthesis of the purest materialism and the most transcendent +spiritualism, and it offers a striking demonstration of the fundamental +equivalence of the hypotheses hitherto formulated as to the origin and +essence of things. It proves also, says M. de Roberty, that the great +law of the identity of contraries is applicable directly to all our +very general conceptions. Contradictory as they seem to be, universal +postulates must, by virtue of that law, be fundamentally identical. This +introduces a discussion of the antinomies, developed but not invented +by modern criticism, which found in them ample justification for its +conclusion of the reality of the unknowable. + +The double antinomy of time and space is regarded by the author as always +presenting itself under the aspect of a long chain of contradictions +which are manifestly merely verbal. The opposition between finite and +infinite may be resolved into the distinction between concrete and +abstract, between particular and general, if infinity is taken as +synonymous with, or the perfect substitute for, general and abstract +quantity, the universal attribute of things isolated from the things +themselves. As to the problems connected with the ideas of a vacuum, +matter, force and motion, M. de Roberty supposes them to have a purely +psychological solution. Such ideas go beyond the “conceptive” capacity +of mechanics and belong to psychology considered, not as a branch of +philosophy, or as philosophy itself, but as a science of abstract +concepts. + +The philosophy of evolution, although monistic in the sense that it +recognises the law of the identity of opposites, shows itself not to +be so in reality by its doctrine of the unknowable. In this monism and +agnosticism contradict each other, as it is contrary to reason “to +affirm at the same time the identity of every phenomenon and their +unknowability. The first marks the supreme term of the second. Identity +in general serves to define knowableness. So that, if we remain on +the elevated summits of pure abstraction too long, we run the danger +anticipated by the law of identity of contraries. We fall directly +into the error of taking the apparent negation of identity or of pure +knowledge, the unknowable, for something really distinct, really +separated from the knowable.” This is the illusion of Spencer and of +all the philosophers who have undertaken the difficult task of applying +monism as a corrective of agnosticism. + +M. de Roberty concludes the present work with a discussion of the +relation between idea and reality, the thought and the object thought of, +in which he gives us his opinion on that disputed point. He says that +what philosophy calls “the object” is composed essentially of external +nature, in which is included our own organism. Very complicated systems +of motions are transmitted to the grey nuclei or opto-striated bodies +of the central regions of the brain. Here these motions determine new +motions of which the totality is described in psycho-physics by the term +“unconscious ideation.” But this internal motion, continually tending to +become again an initial or external motion, gives rise to unconscious +reflex activity. The motion passes by the white nerve-fibres to the +cortical periphery of the brain which becomes “the seat of a phenomenon, +an excitation, a motion which prolongs or repeats the immediately +preceding phenomenon, excitation, or motion, while giving it a shorter +and more steady action.” The sensations and the reflex-actions derived +from them traverse the opto-striated nuclei without retardation and +without giving rise to any system of ideas; while consciousness resides +in the systemisation or union of the same sensations and reflex-actions. +The notion of the ego results from the union or memory of certain ideas, +sensations, and actions, which before their union and preservation by +the cerebral cortex were unconscious. But before becoming unconscious +ideas, those “intellectual virtualities” were in every other part of the +organism, and in all the media which surround it, as, “manifestations +of energy or of motion, it may be objective phenomena.” Thus, says M. +de Roberty, if the universe is composed of two parts, the ego and the +non-ego, it can be affirmed that they form an uninterrupted circuit. +He supposes that when the cosmical energy has produced the phenomena +of unconscious mentality in the brain-centres, it is divided into two +currents, one of which returns to its source and becomes directly cosmic +energy again, and this will be the fate of the other current also when +the life of the organism ceases. + +This view the author supports by a consideration of the morphological +and functional difference supposed to exist between the facts which +constitute the notion of the “ego” and the primordial facts of +unconsciousness comprised under the generic denomination of the +“non-ego.” He regards conscious ideas as the telegraphic alphabet, the +stenographic writing of the cosmos. Consciousness serves to coördinate +the incoherent crowd of events which at each instant invades the normal +brain. In these we may see effects of the cause called “universe,” and +therefore its representatives and substitutes, which they could not +be unless there was identity between the two. Thus the “ego” could be +defined as the final synthesis of the “symbolic abridgments,” of the +micrographical abbreviations, of the “non-ego.” Thus the ego serves only +for the purpose of concentrating or condensing, so to say the non-ego, +which it represents in a manner more or less durable and efficient. + +This monistic theory gets rid of the unknowable and therefore is a great +improvement on that of the materialist or of the idealist. Nevertheless +it requires further elaboration. There is no difficulty in understanding +that cosmic motion may become transformed within the organism into a +feeling. This still, however, leaves unaccounted for the existence of the +organism itself. A true monism will, therefore, require that the organism +must be in some way identifiable with the cosmos. This is the true +problem that has to be solved, and its solution will be greatly aided by +the overthrow of agnosticism, against which M. de Roberty has made so +vigorous and successful an attack in the present volume. + + Ω. + + +FOOTNOTES: + +[84] See Aug. Friedr. Böck. _Sammlung von Schriften, welche den logischen +Calcul des Prof. Pl. betreffen_, Frankfort and Leipsic, 1766. + +[85] The book from which we quote, namely _The Ethic of Freethought_, +like the book here under discussion, contains much detail matter in which +we differ most emphatically from the author; (he is, for instance, in our +opinion very unjust to Martin Luther;) but it seems to us that he pursues +an aim that we have in common with him. + + + + +PERIODICALS. + + +ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR PSYCHOLOGIE UND PHYSIOLOGIE DER SINNESORGANE. Vol. III. +Nos. 2 and 3. + + UEBER DIE EMPFINDLICHKEIT DES GRÜNBLINDEN UND DES NORMALEN + AUGES GEGEN FARBENÄNDERUNG IM SPEKTRUM. By _E. Brodhun_. + + KÜRZESTE LINIEN IM FARBENSYSTEM. By _H. v. Helmholtz_. + + DIE RAUMANSCHAUUNGEN UND DIE AUGENBEWEGUNGEN. By _Th. Lipps_. + + EINE BEOBACHTUNG ÜBER DAS INDIREKTE SEHEN. By _Th. Wertheim_. + + UEBER EINIGE EIGENTÜMLICHKEITEN DES TASTSINNS. By _G. Sergi_. + + BEITRÄGE ZUR VERGLEICHENDEN PSYCHOLOGIE. I. Das Verhalten + wirbelloser Tiere auf der Drehscheibe. By _K. L. Schaefer_. + + GEGENANTWORT AUF DIE ERWIDERUNG VON O. FLÜGEL. By _J. Rehmke_. + + LITTERATURBERICHT. + +The value of the first article on the sensitiveness of the green-blind +and the normal eye in perceiving color-variations in the spectrum +consists mainly in the three diagrams that exhibit the results obtained +in the author’s experiments. + +Professor H. v. Helmholtz published in a former number his attempt at +propounding “a formula which should play the same part in the province +of color-sensations as the formula of the length of the linear element +plays in geometry.”... As geometry begins with the concept of a shortest +line between two points, so our fundamental formula in this subject shall +enable us to find that series of transitions between two given colors +for which the sum of the perceptible differences is a minimum. Helmholtz +proposes to call them “shortest color-lines” and comes to the conclusion +that the whole domain of these apparently irregular phenomena are easily +subsumed under a generalised formulation of Fechner’s law. + +Professor Th. Lipps criticises Wundt with regard to the latter’s +theory of measuring the visual field by ocular motion. Wundt’s theory, +he declares, is in need of several auxiliary hypotheses, such as the +assumption that certain ocular motions are supposed to be more difficult +than others: the visual field is said to possess the form of a spherical +surface, etc. The author maintains that ocular motions do contribute to +the construction of our space-conception, but in a different way than +Wundt assumes. The most interesting part of the article appears to be the +discussion of the genesis of the third dimension which is not given in +the data of sensation but added to them as a judgment concerning these +data. It is an interpretation of the data. There are still psychologists +who regard the third dimension as immediately given. Professor Lipps +refers as an instance to Prof. William James’s article “The Perception +of Space” in (_Mind_, Vol. XII), where the latter declares that “no +arguments in the world can prove a feeling which actually exists, to be +impossible.” While Wundt says that to the resting eye the form of the +visual field is spherical because the sky appears to us as spherical; +Lipps declares that we might just as well say that the visual field of +the resting eye is a plane, because the earth appears to us as a level +surface. We attribute to the visual field the form which certain reasons +prompt us to. Certain convergences of the eyes induce us to place certain +points at certain distances. We read, as it were, the distances out of +the convergences of the ocular axes. Accordingly, when we cease to feel +any difference in our feeling of convergency we cannot help attributing +the same “depth” throughout to all the things with respect to which such +feeling is wanting, and we place all objects beyond a certain range upon +a spherical surface. Thus Lipps interprets the spherical form of the +firmament as the result of our using both eyes, which use from habit has +become the form of monocular vision also, and not as Wundt does from the +spherical form of each visual field, which by habit has been transferred +to binocular vision. There is a strange fact that distances on the left +side are overestimated in comparison with those on the right side; and +this fact is also claimed by Professor Lipps to be incompatible with +Professor Wundt’s theory, but in favor of his own views. + +Th. Wertheim has made an observation which tends to prove that positive +as well as negative fluctuations of light-intensity, cause the +disappearance of objects indirectly seen. + +G. Sergi publishes the results of his investigations concerning the +sense of touch made in the Institute for Anthropology and Experimental +Psychology at the University of Rome. + +Karl L. Schaefer’s results of experiments with invertebrate animals +upon the rotatory table show that in the beginning a counter-rotation +takes place, but not in all animals. It does not take place in some +caterpillars; it does take place in black beetles, ants, flies, earwigs, +provided they are at the time in actual motion. There is no after-affect +from the rotation and thus they are not subject to vertigo as are the +vertebrates. (Hamburg and Leipsic: Leopold Voss.) + + κρς. + + +VIERTELJAHRSSCHRIFT FÜR WISSENSCHAFTLICHE PHILOSOPHIE. Vol. XVI. No. 2. + + BEITRÄGE ZUR LOGIK. (Zweiter Artikel. Schluss.) By _A. Riehl_. + + ERNST PLATNER’S WISSENSCHAFTLICHE STELLUNG ZU KANT IN + ERKENNTNISSTHEORIE UND MORALPHILOSOPHIE. (Zweiter Artikel. + Schluss.) By _B. Seligkowitz_. + + UEBER BEGRIFF UND GEGENSTAND. By _G. Frege_. + + BEMERKUNGEN ZU RICHARD AVENARIUS’S “KRITIK DER REINEN + ERFAHRUNG.” By _R. Willy_. + +A. Riehl discusses in the second instalment of his “Contributions to +Logic” the forms of judgment and the different kinds of conclusion. B. +Seligkowitz concludes his article on Ernst Platner’s relation to Kant, +setting forth the former’s criticism of the latter’s views of synthetic +judgments _a priori_, his moral theology, his psychological ideas, and +moral philosophy. G. Frege explains his view of “concept and object” with +reference to the idea of Benno Kerry, who does not recognise between the +two any absolute difference. (Leipsic: Reisland.) + + κρς. + + +PHILOSOPHISCHE MONATSHEFTE. Vol. XXVIII. Nos. 3 and 4. + +CONTENTS: April, 1892. No. 3. + + DIE WIRKLICHKEIT ALS PHÄNOMEN DES GEISTES. By _A. Rosinski_. + + RECENSIONEN. + + LITTERATURBERICHT. + +CONTENTS: May, 1892. No. 4. + + UEBER DAS ABSOLUTE GEHÖR. By _J. v. Kries_. + + DIE ZWEITEN PURKINJESCHEN BILDER IM SCHEMATISCHEN UND IM + WIRKLICHEN AUGE. By _L. Matthiessen_. + + BESPRECHUNGEN. + + LITTERATURBERICHT. + +Adolf Rosinski describes reality as a phenomenon of the mind and, +following Quäbicker, he regards “the real as belonging to that complex +which is given us in appearance. Being (_Wesen_) is not behind or beyond +appearance; Being, being that which exists, existence is appearance. +Appearance shows nothing but that which is in Being, and there is in +Being nothing which is not manifested.” (Berlin: Dr. R. Salinger.) + +There are but few musicians who are able to recognise directly and +without reference to another note, the pitch of a sound. This ability +is called by musicians “absolutes Gehör.” Professor Kries investigates +in a long article, the conditions of this absolute musical ear so +called, exhibiting the difficulties of an explanation without arriving +at a definite result, which, however, may be expected from further +investigations of the subject. Mr. Matthiessen’s article on the second +Perkinje-pictures, in the ideal and the real eye, consists exclusively +of measurements and calculations of the curvature of the lens. The same +number contains an appreciative and long (37 pp.) review of Prof. W. +James’s “Principles of Psychology.” (Hamburg and Leipsic: Leopold Voss.) + + κρς. + + +THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY. April, 1892. Vol. IV. No. 3. + + ON CERTAIN PECULIARITIES OF THE KNEE-JERK IN SLEEP IN A CASE OF + TERMINAL DEMENTIA. By _William Noyes_, M. D. + + THE GROWTH OF MEMORY IN SCHOOL CHILDREN. By _T. L. Bolton_, A. + B. + + STUDIES FROM THE LABORATORY OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY OF THE + UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN. By Prof. _Joseph Jastrow_, Ph. D. + + THE PSYCHOLOGICAL FOUNDATION OF REALISM. By _Alexander Fraser_, + A. B. + + PSYCHOLOGICAL LITERATURE: I. Nervous System. By Prof. _H. H. + Donaldson_, Clark University; II. Association, Reaction. By + Prof. _J. McK. Cattell_, Columbia College; III. Hypnotism and + Suggestion. By Prof. _Joseph Jastrow_, University of Wisconsin; + IV. Sight. + + LETTERS AND NOTES. + +Dr. Noyes’s investigations seem to corroborate the theory that not only +the lower but also “the higher activities of the brain are also subject +to a rhythmic rise and fall synchronous with vascular dilatation and +contraction.” Mr. Bolton publishes the results of his examination of the +span of memory in the Grammar Schools of Worcester, Mass. The memory +span measuring the power of concentrated and prolonged attention, +increases with age rather than with the growth of intelligence. The +girls have better memories than the boys. Memory can be increased by +practice. The tests made before and after school do not show that the +pupils suffer fatigue from the day’s work. Memory-images before they +are completely lost first suffer a confusion of order, then a loss of +certain of its elements which are often replaced by similar elements. +Previous ideas being one of the factors of confusion. Professor Jastrow’s +article presents a description of a series of experiments made in his +psychological laboratory. He reproduces the Zöllner figures, briefly +summarising their different interpretations by Zöllner, Hering, Aubert, +Classen, Lipps, Hoppe, Wundt, Pisco, and Helmholtz. He further presents a +study of involuntary movements of the hand on the glass plate apparatus, +and describes the experiments of time measurement in classifying ideas, +and in finding a given object within a given field. Mr. Fraser defends +the Natural Realism of the Scotch school, making the tactumotor sense the +ultimate test of reality. (Worcester, Mass.: Clark University.) + + κρς. + + +REVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE. + +CONTENTS: April, 1892. No. 196. + + LES PROCESSUS NERVEUX DANS L’ATTENTION ET LA VOLITION. By + _Charlton Bastian_. + + LA RESPONSABILITÉ. By _F. Paulhan_. + + REVUE GÉNÉRALE: LE SPIRITISME CONTEMPORAIN. By _Janet_ + (_Pierre_). + + ANALYSES ET COMPTES RENDUS: Der Positivismus vom Tode August + Comte’s bis auf unsere Tage. By _H. Gruber_. Die Psychologie + der Suggestion. By _H. Schmidkunz_. + + TRAVAUX DU LABORATOIRE DE PSYCHOLOGIE PHYSIOLOGIQUE: Etude + expérimentale sur deux cas d’audition colorée. By _Beaunis and + Binet_. Etude sur un nouveau cas d’audition colorée. By _Binet + and Philippe_. + +CONTENTS: May, 1892. No. 197. + + DU SENS DE L’INÉGALITÉ. By _G. Mauret_. + + LA RESPONSABILITÉ (concluded). By _F. Paulhan_. + + LE PROBLÈME DE LA VIE (third and last article). By _Dunan_. + + ANALYSES ET COMPTES RENDUS: Leçons cliniques sur l’hystérie + et l’hypnotisme By _Pitres_. Corps et âme. Essais sur la + philosophie de St. Thomas. By _J. Gardair_. Agnosticisme. + By _E. de Roberty_. La physique de Straton de Lampsaque. + By _Rodier_. Das Wahrnehmungsproblem vom Standpunkte des + Physikers, des Physiologen und des Philosophen. By _H. Schwarz_. + + REVUE DES PÉRIODIQUES ÉTRANGERS: Vierteljahrsschrift für + wissenschaftliche Philosophie. + + CORRESPONDANCE ET INFORMATIONS. + +The processes of attention and volition lie at the basis of all our +mental and physical activities. Mr. Charlton Bastian discusses their +nervous condition and comes to the conclusion _Voluntas et intellectus +unum et idem sunt_. M. Paulhan treats the problem of responsibility under +healthy and morbid conditions, in two consecutive articles. M. Mouret, +whose former articles on relations will be reviewed in a future number by +Mr. F. C. Russell, treats in a long article of the sense of inequality. +M. Ch. Dunan concludes his essay on the problem of life, viewing the +subject from a rather metaphysical standpoint. M. Pierre Janet presents +us with a very accurate review of the importance of the contemporary +spiritism and spiritualism. He calls attention to the fact that modern +psychology owes to the researches of the spiritualists, many new, +startling, and interesting facts. He does not share their standpoint, yet +his review is kind and sympathetic. (Paris: Félix Alcan.) + + κρς. + + +VOPROSUI FILOSOFII I PSICHOLOGII.[86] Vol. III. No. 12. March, 1892. + + POSITIVE PHILOSOPHY AND THE UNITY OF SCIENCE. (Continuation). + By _B. N. Tchitcherin_. Article crowned by the Psychological + Society of Moscow. + + HOW DOES THE MINISTRATION TO THE GENERAL GOOD OF ALL RELATE TO + THE CARE FOR THE SALVATION OF OUR OWN SOUL? A letter to the + Editor. By the _Archimandrite Antonii_. + + HUXLEY AS REPRESENTATIVE OF THE MODERN SCIENTIFIC THEORY OF THE + WORLD. + + TELEPATHY. (Concluded.) By _Petrovo-Solovo_. + + THE BASIS OF ETHICAL OBLIGATION. By _N. Grote_. + + SPECIAL DEPARTMENT. About Ethical Fragments from Democritus. By + _J. Radloff_. One of the Possible Cosmic Theories. A Study. By + _A. Wilkins_. + + CRITICISM AND BIBLIOGRAPHY. I. Review of Periodicals. II. + Review of Recent Publications. Transactions of the Moscow + Psychological Society. (Moscow, 1892.) + + +MIND. New Series. No. 2. April, 1892. + + PLEASURE AND PAIN. By _A. Bain_. + + THE CHANGES OF METHOD IN HEGEL’S DIALECTIC. II. By _J. Ellis + McTaggart_. + + THE LEIPSIC SCHOOL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY. By _E. Bradford + Titchener_. + + THE LOGICAL CALCULUS. II. By _W. E. Johnson_. + + DISCUSSIONS: Dr. Münsterberg and his Critics. By _S. Alexander_. + + CRITICAL NOTICES. + +Prof. A. Bain criticises Mr. H. R. Marshall’s theory of pleasure and +pain as being determined by the relation between the energy given out +and the energy received, saying that it leaves a very large region +untouched and inexplicable. J. Ellis McTaggart defends the Hegelian +dialectic system which, he declares, “is not so wonderful or mystic +as it has been represented to be. It makes no attempt,” he says, “to +deduce existence from essence; it does not even attempt to eliminate the +element of immediacy, in experience, and to produce a self-sufficient +and self-mediating thought.” E. Bradford Titchener gives a general +survey of the researches carried out in Wundt’s Institute, and of the +other psychological contents of the _Philosophische Studien_, from the +date of Professor Cattell’s paper on “The Psychological Laboratory at +Leipsic” to the present time. W. E. Johnson, in his paper on “The Logical +Calculus,” brings out some of the underlying principles and assumptions +which belong equally to the ordinary Formal Logic, to Symbolic Logic, +and to the so-called Logic of Relatives. Prof. S. Alexander takes +issue with Mr. Titchener’s criticism of Professor Münsterberg’s +psychological investigations. Mr. Titchener’s article which appeared +in the October number of _Mind_, 1891, leaves the impression that the +whole of the work under review is valueless. “Many of his objections,” +however, says Professor Alexander, “refer to unimportant points, and +the graver theoretical ones are really groundless,” and thus the +critic “has contrived to give a one-sided judgment by neglecting the +other considerations which give Dr. Münsterberg’s work its value and +significance.” (London: Williams & Norgate.) + + κρς. + + +THREE AMERICAN MAGAZINES. + +INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS. April, 1892. Vol. II. No. 3. + + ECONOMIC REFORM SHORT OF SOCIALISM. By _E. Benj. Andrews_. + + PLEASURE AND PAIN IN EDUCATION. By _Miss M. S. Gilliland_, + London. + + THE ESSENTIALS OF BUDDHIST DOCTRINE AND ETHICS. By Prof. + _Maurice Bloomfield_. + + THE THREE RELIGIONS. (Concluded.) By _J. S. Mackenzie_, M. A. + + DISCUSSIONS AND REVIEWS. + + THE SCHOOL OF APPLIED ETHICS. + +THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW. Vol. I. No. 3. May, 1892. + + HERBERT SPENCER’S ANIMAL ETHICS. By Prof. _Henry Calderwood_. + + THE ULTIMATE GROUND OF AUTHORITY. By Prof. _J. Macbride + Sterrett_. + + WHAT IS REALITY? By _David G. Ritchie_. + + NATURAL SCIENCE AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE. By Dr. _B. C. + Burt_. + + A MATHEMATICAL VIEW OF FREE WILL. By Prof. _J. E. Oliver_. + + DISCUSSIONS: Professor Ladd’s Criticism of James’s Psychology. + By Prof. _J. P. Gordy_. + + REVIEWS OF BOOKS AND SUMMARIES OF ARTICLES. + +THE NEW WORLD. Vol. I. No. 1. March, 1892. + + THE EVOLUTION OF CHRISTIANITY. By _Lyman Abbott_. + + THE HISTORIC AND THE IDEAL CHRIST. By _Charles Carroll Everett_. + + THE FUTURE OF LIBERAL RELIGION IN AMERICA. By _J. G. Schurmann_. + + THE COMMON, THE COMMONPLACE AND THE ROMANTIC. By _William + Rounseville Alger_. + + ABRAHAM KUENEN. By _Crawford Howell Toy_. + + THE THEISTIC EVOLUTION OF BUDDHISM. By _J. Estlin Carpenter_. + + “BETWEEN THE TESTAMENTS.” By _Thomas R. Slicer_. + + THE NEW ORTHODOXY. By _Edward H. Hall_. + + THEOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF THOMAS HILL GREEN. By + _Charles B. Upton_. + + INTRODUCTORY NOTE. + + BOOK REVIEWS. + +There have sprung up within the last two years not less than four +American magazines of progressive thought, which now compete in the +proposition of their religious and philosophical conceptions to the +world. These four magazines are, in the chronological order in which +they were founded, _The Monist_, _The International Journal of Ethics_, +_The Philosophical Review_, and _The New World_. _The Monist_ represents +that world-conception which takes its stand upon facts and systematises +facts into a unitary view. Thus it recognises the methods of science +as the methods of all knowledge, to the exclusion of supernatural +revelation, or intuitionalism, or any kind of mysticism. But _The Monist_ +does not rest satisfied with this. _The Monist_ preaches a religion; and +the prophets of this religion are not only the great ethical teachers +of mankind, but everybody who reveals truth, Kant and Comte, Kepler, +Copernicus, Darwin, and all living representatives of scientific inquiry. +Thus _The Monist_ is a magazine that points out the religious import of +science and philosophy. + +_The International Journal of Ethics_ follows in the same line in so +far only as it has nothing to say to the old orthodox conceptions of +religion. It tries to teach a higher morality, but in establishing ethics +it pursues quite another course. It is the organ of the Ethical Societies +and the leaders of the Ethical Societies are confident that they can have +ethics not only without theology but also without religion, science, or +philosophy. They consider the world-conception of a man as something +indifferent, or unessential, in ethics, and by proposing a non-committal +policy with respect to religious and philosophical views, they expect +to be the better fitted to preach good conduct. (Philadelphia: +_International Journal of Ethics_, 118 S. Twelfth Street.) + +_The Philosophical Review_ represents a philosophical conception +which has still a strong hold upon the Universities on this side of +the Atlantic. Transcendentalism, metaphysicism, and that theological +philosophy which still operates with supernatural quantities, or at +least has not discarded the dualistic features of supernaturalism, are +represented in its columns. Certainly they are well represented and by +their best upholders of the present time, and authors of more modern and +positivistic views are not excluded. Exactly so in _The Monist_, the +representatives of metaphysicism and those who still believe in the dual +existence of man, in his self, or ego, and his transcendental existence +are welcome; but there is nevertheless a fundamental difference in the +world-conception of the two magazines. (Boston, New York, Chicago: Ginn & +Co.) + +_The New World_ is the latest new-comer in the field of magazine +literature, and we welcome its appearance most cordially. There are +strongly marked differences between _The New World_ and _The Monist_, +for the former is a theological magazine that deepens religion with the +assistance of philosophy while the latter, rather the reverse, is a +philosophical magazine that widens philosophy and applies it to practical +life so as to become a religion. But for that very reason _The New World_ +seems to meet _The Monist_ half way. _The New World_ is an offshoot of +modern theology. Its contributors come largely from the ranks of the +maturest unitarian thinkers. They practically accept the principles of +criticism and scientific inquiry and thus they are approaching rapidly +that common goal of human thought, which _The Monist_ propounds as the +leading maxim of philosophy and religion, namely, to regard nature as the +only revelation and experience as our guide in life; to base religion +upon and to derive ethics from a critically-sifted statement of facts. +(Boston: Houghton, Mifflin & Co.) + + κρς. + + +FOOTNOTES: + +[86] _Questions of Philosophy and Psychology._ + + + + +APPENDIX TO THE MONIST, VOL. II, NO. 4 + + + KANT AND SPENCER + + TWO ARTICLES REPRINTED FROM NOS. 51, 52, AND 158 + OF THE OPEN COURT + + 1. THE ETHICS OF KANT + 2. KANT ON EVOLUTION + + BY + DR. PAUL CARUS + + CHICAGO: + THE OPEN COURT PUBLISHING COMPANY + + + + +THE ETHICS OF KANT. + +IN CRITICISM OF MR. HERBERT SPENCER’S PRESENTATION OF KANTISM. + + +Mr. Herbert Spencer has published in _The Popular Science Monthly_ for +August, an essay on the Ethics of Kant; a translation of this article +had appeared in the July Number of the _Revue Philosophique_, and it +cannot fail to have been widely noticed. It is to be regretted that +unfamiliarity with the German language and perhaps also with Kant’s +terminology has led Mr. Spencer into errors to which attention is called +in the following discussion.[87] + +Mr. Spencer says: + + “If, before Kant uttered that often-quoted saying in which, + with the stars of Heaven he coupled the conscience of Man, as + being the two things that excited his awe, he had known more + of Man than he did, he would probably have expressed himself + somewhat otherwise.” + +Kant, in his famous dictum that two things excited his admiration, the +starry heaven above him and the conscience within him, contrasted two +kinds of sublimity.[88] The grandeur of the Universe is that of size and +extension, while the conscience of man commands respect for its moral +dignity. The universe is wonderful in its expanse and in its order of +mechanical regularity; the conscience of man is grand, being intelligent +volition that aspires to be in harmony with universal laws. + +Mr. Spencer continues: + + “Not, indeed, that the conscience of Man is not wonderful + enough, whatever be its supposed genesis; but the wonderfulness + of it is of a different kind according as we assume it to + have been supernaturally given or infer that it has been + naturally evolved. The knowledge of Man in that large sense + which Anthropology expresses, had made, in Kant’s day, but + small advances. The books of travel were relatively few, and + the facts which they contained concerning the human mind as + existing in different races, had not been gathered together and + generalized. In our days, the conscience of Man as inductively + known has none of that universality of presence and unity of + nature which Kant’s saying tacitly assumes.” + +Mr. Spencer apparently supposes that Kant believed in a supernatural +origin of the human conscience. This, however, is erroneous. + +Mr. Spencer’s error is excusable in consideration of the fact that some +disciples of Kant have fallen into a similar error. Professor Adler, of +New York, who attempts in the Societies for Ethical Culture to carry into +effect the ethics of Pure Reason, maintains that the commandments of the +_ought_ and “the light that shines through them come from beyond, but its +beams are broken as they pass through our terrestrial medium, and the +full light in all its glory we can never see.” + +Ethics based on an unknowable power, is mysticism; and mysticism does not +essentially differ from dualism and supernaturalism. + +Kant’s reasoning is far from mysticism and from supernaturalism. He +was fully convinced that civilized man with his moral and intellectual +abilities had naturally evolved from the lower state of an animal +existence. We read in his essay, “Presumable Origin of the History +of Mankind” (Muthmasslicher Anfang der Menschengeschichte. Editio +Hartenstein, Vol. IV, p. 321): + + “From this conception of the primitive history of mankind it + follows that the departure of man from the paradise represented + to him by his reason as the earliest place of sojourn of his + race, has been nothing else than the transition from the rude + condition of a purely animal existence to the condition of a + human being; a transition from the leading-strings of instinct + to direction by reason, in a word, from the protectorate of + nature to a status of freedom.” + +The view that the conscience of man is innate, in the sense of a +non-natural, of a mysterious, or even of a supernatural origin, is +untenable. Those disciples of Kant who entertain such views have +certainly misinterpreted their great master, and the passages adduced by +Mr. Spencer from so many sources are sufficient evidence of the fact that +“there are widely different degrees” [we should rather say kinds] “of +conscience in the different races.” Mr. Spencer continues: + + “Had Kant had these and kindred facts before him, his + conception of the human mind, and consequently his ethical + conception, would scarcely have been what they were. Believing, + as he did, that one object of his awe—the stellar Universe—has + been evolved,[89] he might by evidence like the foregoing + have been led to suspect that the other object of his awe—the + human conscience—has been evolved; and has consequently a + real nature unlike its apparent nature.” ... “If, instead of + assuming that conscience is simple because it seems simple to + careless introspection he had entertained the hypothesis that + it is perhaps complex—a consolidated product of multitudinous + experiences received mainly by ancestors and added to by + self—he might have arrived at a consistent system of Ethics.” + ... + + “In brief, as already implied, had Kant, instead of his + incongruous beliefs that the celestial bodies have had an + evolutionary origin, but that the minds of living beings on + them, or at least on one of them, have had a non-evolutionary + origin, entertained the belief that both have arisen by + Evolution, he would have been saved from the impossibilities of + his Metaphysics, and the untenabilities of his Ethics.” + +Mr. Spencer believes that Kant had assumed conscience to be “simple, +because it seems simple to careless introspection.” But there is no +evidence in Kant’s works for this assumption. On the contrary, Kant +reversed the old view of so-called “rational psychology” which considered +conscience as innate and which was based on the error that consciousness +is simple. Des Cartes’s syllogism _cogito ergo sum_ is based on this +idea, which at the same time served as a philosophical evidence for +the indestructibility and immortality of the _ego_. The simplicity of +consciousness had been considered as an axiom, until Kant came and showed +that it was a fallacy, a paralogism of pure reason. Dr. Noah Porter has +written, from an apparently dualistic standpoint, a sketch entitled “The +Ethics of Kant,” in which he says: + + “The skepticism and denials of Kant’s speculative theory + in respect to noumena, both material and psychical, had + unfortunately cut him off from the possibility of recognizing + the personal _ego_ as anything more than a logical fiction.” + +Kant says in his “Critique of Pure Reason”:[90] + + “In the internal intuition there is nothing permanent, for the + _Ego_ is but the consciousness of my thought.... From all this + it is evident that rational psychology has its origin in a mere + misunderstanding. The unity of consciousness, which lies at + the basis of the categories, is considered to be an intuition + of the subject as an object; and the category of substance is + applied to the intuition. But this unity is nothing more than + the unity in _thought_, by which no object is given; to which + therefore the category of substance cannot be applied.”[91] + +Concerning the statement that Kant had believed in the non-evolutionary +origin of living beings, we quote from his essay on _The Different Races +of Men_, Chap. III, where Kant speaks of “the immediate causes of the +origin of these different races.” He says: + + “The conditions (_Gründe_) which, inhering in the constitution + of an organic body, determine a certain evolutionary process + (_Auswickelung_[92]) are called, if this process is concerned + with particular parts, _germs_; if, on the other hand, it + touches only the size or the relation of the parts to one + another, I call it _natural capabilities_ (_natürliche + Anlagen_).”[93] + +And in a foot-note Kant makes the following remark: + + “Ordinarily we accept the terms natural science + (_Naturbeschreibung_) and natural history in one and the + same sense. But it is evident that the knowledge of natural + phenomena, as they _now are_, always leaves to be desired + the knowledge of that which they _have been_ before now and + through what succession of modifications they have passed in + order to have arrived, in every respect, to their present + state. _Natural History_, which at present we almost entirely + lack, would teach us the changes that have affected the form + of the earth, likewise, the changes in the creatures of the + earth (plants and animals), that they have suffered by natural + transformations and, arising therefrom, the departures from the + prototype of the original species, that they have experienced. + It would probably trace a great number of apparently different + varieties back to species of one and the same kind and would + convert the present so intricate school-system of Natural + Science into a natural system in conformity with reason.”[94] + +Kant has nowhere, so far as we know, made any objection to the idea of +evolution. But he opposed the theory that all life should have originated +from _one single_ kind. In reviewing and epitomizing Joh. Gottfr. +Herder’s work, “_Ideen zur Geschichte der Menschheit_,” Kant says: + + ... “Book II, treats of organized matter on the earth.... The + beginnings of vegetation.... The changes suffered by man and + beast through climatic influences.... In them all we find one + prevailing form and a similar osseous structure.... These + transitional links render it not at all impossible that in + marine animals, in plants, and, indeed, possibly in so-called + inanimate substances, one and the same fundamental principle + of organization may prevail, although infinitely cruder and + more complex in operation. In the sight of eternal being, which + beholds all things in one connection, it is possible that the + structure of the ice-particle, while receiving form, and of + the snowflake, while being crystallized, bears an analogous + relation to the formation of the embryo in a mother’s womb.... + The third book compares the structure of animals and plants + with the organization of man.... It was not because man was + ordained to be a rational creature that upright stature was + given him for using his limbs according to reason; on the + contrary he acquired his reason as a consequence of his upright + stature.... From stone to crystals, from crystals to metals, + from metals to plant-creation, from thence to the animal, + and ultimately to man, we have seen the form of organization + advancing, and with it the faculties and instincts of creatures + becoming more diversified, until at last they all became united + in the human form, in so far as the latter could comprise + them.... As the body increases by food, so does the mind by + ideas; indeed, we notice here the same laws of assimilation, of + growth, and of generation. In a word, an inner spiritual man is + being formed within us, which has a nature of its own and which + employs the body as an instrument merely.... Our humanity is + merely a preliminary training, the bud of a blossom to come. + Step by step does nature cast off the ignoble and the base, + while it builds and adds to the spiritual and continues to + fashion the pure and refined with increasing niceness; thus are + we in a position to hope from the artist-hand of nature that in + that other existence our bud of humanity will also appear in + its real and true form of divine manhood.” ... + +[Herder’s idea of evolution would stand on the whole if his conception of +“the spiritual” did not imply a preternatural agent.] + + “The present state of man is probably the link of junction + between two worlds.... Yet man is not to investigate himself in + this future state; he is to believe himself into it.” + +Kant makes no objection whatever to the evolutionary ideas of Herder. +But Herder was not free from supernaturalism and from fantastic ideas +in reference to the future development of man. He had not yet dropped +the dualistic conception of the ‘duplicity’ of man and believed in the +immortality of a distinct spiritual individual within his body. Kant’s +objection, therefore, is two-fold; 1) against Herder’s supernaturalism +which leads him beyond this world; and, 2) against the descent of _all_ +species from _one and the same genus_. He says: + + “In the gradation between the different species and individuals + of a natural kingdom, nature shows us nothing else than the + fact that it abandons individuals to total destruction and + preserves the species alone.... As concerns that _invisible_ + kingdom of active and independent forces, we fail to see why + the author, after having believed he could confidently infer + from organized beings, the existence of the rational principle + in man did not rather attribute this principle directly to + him merely as spiritual nature, instead of lifting it out of + chaos through the structural form of organised matter.... As + to the gradation of organized beings, our author is not to + be too severely reproached, if the scheme has not met the + requirements of his conception, which extends so far beyond + the limits of this world; for its application even to the + natural kingdoms here on earth leads to nothing. The slight + differences exhibited when species are compared with reference + to their common points of resemblance, are, where there is + such great multiplicity, a necessary consequence of just this + multiplicity. The assumption of common kinship between them, + inasmuch as one kind would have to spring from another and all + from one original and primitive species, or from one and the + same creative source (Mutterschoss)—the assumption of such + a common kinship would lead to ideas so strange that reason + shrinks from them, and we cannot attribute this idea to the + author without doing him injustice. Concerning his suggestions + in comparative anatomy through all species down to plants, + the workers in natural science must judge for themselves + whether the hints given for new observations, will be useful + and whether they are justified.... It is desirable that our + ingenious author who in the continuation of his work will find + more _terra firma_, may somewhat restrain his bright genius, + and that philosophy (which consists rather in pruning than in + fostering luxuriant growth) may lead him to the perfection of + his labors not through hints but through definite conceptions, + not by imagination but by observation, not by a metaphysical or + emotional phantasy but by reason, broad in its plan but careful + in its work.” + +Kant rejected certain conceptions of evolution, but he did not at all +show himself averse to the idea in general. He touched upon the subject +only incidentally and it is certain that he did not especially favor or +entertain the belief in a non-evolutionary origin of living beings. + +Before proceeding to the main points of his criticism, Mr. Spencer calls +attention to what he designates as Kant’s _abnormal_ reasoning. Mr. +Spencer says: + + “Something must be said concerning abnormal reasoning as + compared with normal reasoning.” ... + + “Instead of setting out with a proposition of which the + negation is inconceivable, it sets out with a proposition of + which the affirmation is inconceivable, and therefrom proceeds + to draw conclusions” ... + + “The first sentence in Kant’s first chapter runs thus: ‘Nothing + can possibly be conceived in the world, or even out of it, + which can be called good without qualification, except a Good + Will.’” ... + + “Most fallacies result from the habit of using words without + fully rendering them into thoughts—passing them by with + recognitions of their meanings as ordinarily used, without + stopping to consider whether these meanings admit of being + given to them in the cases named. Let us not rest satisfied + with thinking vaguely of what is understood by ‘a Good Will,’ + but let us interpret the words definitely. Will implies the + consciousness of some end to be achieved. Exclude from it every + idea of purpose, and the conception of Will disappears. An + end of some kind being necessarily implied by the conception + of Will, the quality of the Will is determined by the quality + of the end contemplated. Will itself, considered apart from + any distinguishing epithet, is not cognizable by Morality at + all. It becomes cognizable by Morality only when it gains its + character as good or bad by virtue of its contemplated end as + good or bad.” ... + + “Kant tells us that a good will is one that is good in and for + itself without reference to ends.” + +It is unfortunate that Mr. Spencer misunderstood the first sentence of +Kant’s book (_Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten_). Kant does not +speak of “a good will without qualification,” nor does the expression +“without qualification” refer to “a will without reference to ends.” Kant +speaks of good will in opposition to other good things. Nothing, he +says, can without qualification (_ohne Einschränkung_) be called good, +except a good will.[95] Dr. Porter sums up the first page of Kant’s essay +in the following words: + + “The first section of the treatise opens with the memorable + and often-quoted utterance, that ‘nothing can be possibly + conceived in the world, or even out of it, which can be called + good without qualification, except a good will.’ If character + is compared with gifts of nature, as intelligence, courage, + and gifts of fortune, as riches, health, or contentment, all + these are defective, ‘if there is not a good will to correct + their possible perversion and to rectify the whole principle of + acting, and _adapt it to its end_.’[96] A man who is endowed + with every other good can never give pleasure to an impartial, + rational spectator unless he possesses a good will. ‘Thus a + good will appears to constitute the indispensable condition of + being worthy of happiness.’ ... ‘Moreover, a good will is good + not for what it effects but for what it intends, even when it + fails to accomplish its purposes, ... as when the man wills + the good of another and is impotent to promote it, or actually + effects just the opposite of what he proposes or wills.’” + +In the passages quoted by Dr. Porter, Kant speaks of “the _end_ to which +good will adapts other goods”; and in another passage of the same book, +Kant directly declares that “it is the _end_ that serves the will as +the objective ground of its self-determination.” Mr. Spencer must have +overlooked these sentences. Kant says: + + “The will is conceived as a power of determining itself to + action in accordance with the conception of certain laws. And + such a power can only be met with in rational beings. _Now it + is the END that serves the will as the objective ground of its + self-determination_, and this end, if fixed by reason alone, + must hold equally good for all rational creatures.” + + * * * * * + +Mr. Spencer interrupts his essay on the Ethics of Kant by a digression +on Kant’s conception of time and space. It would lead us too far at +present if we would follow Mr. Spencer on this ground also. A comparison +of Spencer’s remarks on the subject with Kant’s “Critique of Pure Reason” +will show that Kant’s view of space and time is radically different from +that view which Mr. Spencer represents as the Kantian conception of time +and space. + + * * * * * + +Kant rejects the idea that happiness is the end and purpose of life +and at the same time he declares that ethics must be based not on the +pursuit of happiness but on the categorical imperative or more popularly +expressed on our sense of duty. + +Mr. Spencer argues: + + “One of the propositions contained in Kant’s first chapter is + that ‘we find that the more a cultivated reason applies itself + with deliberate purpose to the enjoyment of life and happiness, + so much the more does the man fail of true satisfaction.’” ... + + “That which Kant should have said is that the _exclusive_ + pursuit of what are distinguished as pleasures and amusements + is disappointing.” ... + + “It is not, as Kant says, guidance by ‘a cultivated reason,’ + which leads to disappointment, but guidance by an uncultivated + reason.” + +The passage quoted by Mr. Spencer from Kant, reads in its context as +follows: + + “In the physical constitution of an organized being we take it + for granted[97] that no organ for any purpose will be found + in it but such as is also the fittest and best adapted for + that purpose. If in a being possessing reason and will, the + preservation, the prosperity, in a word, the happiness of that + being, constituted the actual purpose of nature, nature had + certainly adopted an extremely unwise expedient to this end, + had it made the reason of that being the executive agent of its + purposes in this matter. For all actions that it had to perform + with this end in view, and the whole rule of its conduct, would + have been far more exactly prescribed by _instinct_, and this + end would have been far more safely attained by this means than + can ever take place through the instrumentality of _reason_.” + ... + + “As a matter of fact we find that the more a cultivated + reason occupies itself with the purpose of enjoying life and + happiness, the farther does the person possessing it recede + from the state of true contentment; and hence there arises in + the case of many, and pre-eminently in the case of those most + experienced in the exercise of reason, if they are only frank + enough to confess it, a certain degree of misology or hate of + reason; for after weighing every advantage that they derive, + I will not say from the invention of all arts facilitating + ordinary luxury, but even from the sciences, (which after + all are in their eyes a luxury of the intellect,) they still + discover that virtually they have burdened themselves more with + toil and trouble than they have gained in point of happiness, + and thus, in the end, they are more apt to envy than contemn + the commoner type of men who are more immediately subject to + the guidance of natural instinct alone, and who do not suffer + their reason to influence in any great degree their acts and + omissions.” + +Kant uses the expression “cultivated reason” not in opposition to +“uncultivated reason,” but to “instinct” as that inherited faculty +which teaches a being to live in accordance with nature and its natural +conditions, without the interference of thought and reflection. + +That uncultivated reason would lead to disappointment, Kant never would +have denied. He would have added: “It does more, it leads to a speedy +ruin.” + +But if reason does not produce happiness, what then is the use of reason? +Kant answers, reason produces in man the good will. + +It is reason which enables man to form abstractions, to think in +generalizations and to conceive the import of universal laws. When his +will deliberately and consciously conforms to universal laws, it is good. +Kant says: + + “Thus will (viz. the good will) can not be the sole and whole + Good, but it must still be the highest Good and the condition + necessary to everything else, even to all desire of happiness.” + ... + + “To know what I have to do in order that my volition be good, + requires on my part no far-reaching sagacity. Unexperienced + in respect of the course of nature, unable to be prepared for + all the occurrences transpiring therein, I simply ask myself: + Can’st thou so will, that the maxim of thy conduct may become a + universal law? Where it can not become a universal law, there + the maxim of thy conduct is reprehensible, and that, too, not + by reason of any disadvantage consequent thereupon to thee or + even others, but because it is not fit to enter as a principle + into a possible enactment of universal laws.” + +If a maxim of conduct is fit to enter as a principle into a possible +enactment of universal laws, it will be found in harmony with the +cosmical laws; if not, it must come in conflict with the order of things +in the universe. It then cannot stand, and will, if persistently adhered +to, lead (perhaps slowly but inevitably) to certain ruin. + +Concerning the proposition that happiness may be regarded as the purpose +of life Kant in his review of Herder’s “Ideen zur Philosophie der +Geschichte der Menschheit” (Ed. H. IV, p. 190), speaks of the relativity +of happiness and its insufficiency as a final aim of life: + + ... “First of all the happiness of an animal, then that of a + child and of a youth, and lastly that of man! In all epochs + of human history, as well as among all classes and conditions + of the same epoch, that happiness has obtained which was in + exact conformity with the individual’s ideas and the degree + of his habituation to the conditions amid which he was + born and raised. Indeed, it is not even possible to form a + comparison of the degree of happiness nor to give precedence + to one class of men or to one generation over another.... + If this shadow-picture of happiness ... were the actual aim + of Providence, every man would have the measure of his own + happiness within him.... Does the author (Herder) think perhaps + that, if the happy inhabitants of Otaheite had never been + visited by more civilized peoples and were ordained to live + in peaceful indolence for thousands of years to come—that we + could give a satisfactory answer to the question why they + should exist at all and whether it would not have been just as + well that this island should be occupied by happy sheep and + cattle as that it should be inhabited by men who are happy only + through pure enjoyment?” + +Concerning the mission or purpose of humanity and its ultimate +realization, Kant interprets Herder’s views as follows: + + “It involves no contradiction to say that no individual + member of all the offspring of the human race, but that + only the species, fully attains its mission (Bestimmung). + The mathematician may explain the matter in his way. The + philosopher would say: the mission of the human race as a whole + is _unceasing progress_, and the perfection (Vollendung) of + this mission is a mere idea (although in every aspect a quite + useful one) of the aim towards which, in conformity with the + design of providence, we are to direct our endeavors.” + +We learn from the passages quoted from Kant that his idea of good will is +neither mystical and supernatural, nor is it vague. It is a conception +as logically and definitely defined as any mathematical definition. +Good will in the sense in which Kant defines it, is only possible in +a reasonable being by the power of its reason. The good will is the +intention of conforming to universal principles and thus of being in +harmony with the All. This good will is the corner-stone of Kant’s +ethics; it appears as the categoric imperative of duty, so to act that +the maxim of one’s conduct may be fit to become a universal law. It is +formulated in another passage: “Act so as if the maxim of thy conduct by +thy volition were to become a natural law.” + +It is easily seen that, in Kant’s conception, the _ought_ of morals (viz. +of the categoric imperative) does not stand in contradiction to the +_must_ of natural laws. Kant’s conception is monistic, not dualistic. +Kant says: + + “The moral _ought_ is man’s _inner_, _necessary_ volition as + being a member of an intelligible world and is _conceived_ by + him as an ought only in so far as he considers himself also as + a member of the sensory world.”[98] + +Our way of explaining it would be: Man _feels_ in his activity the +categoric imperative as an ought. So the snow crystal, if it were +possessed of sensation, would _feel_ its formation as an “ought.” But +both are, and to an outside observer will appear, as a “must.” + + * * * * * + +In the Spencerian system of ethics, which is utilitarianism, the moral +maxim or the idea of duty is not distinguished from the feeling of +pleasure or pain that accompanies ethical thoughts and acts, and their +consequences. This lack of distinction induces Mr. Spencer to consider +man’s pursuit of happiness as the basis of ethics. Accordingly the +aim of ethics, he maintains, is not the performance of duty, not the +realization of the good; to the utilitarian this is only the means. The +end of ethics is the greatest happiness of the greatest number. + +It is strange that Mr. Spencer’s essay contains a passage which, although +intended as a point of objection to Kant, is a corroboration of Kant’s +ethics, and a refutation of Mr. Spencer’s own views. While denying the +statement that “a cultivated reason, if applied with deliberate purpose +to the enjoyment of life and happiness, will fail to produce true +satisfaction,” Mr. Spencer says: + + “I assert that it is untrue on the strength of personal + experiences. In the course of my life there have occurred + many intervals, averaging a month each, in which the pursuit + of happiness was the sole object, and in which happiness was + successfully pursued. How successfully may be judged from the + fact that I would gladly live over again each of those periods + without change, an assertion which I certainly cannot make of + any portions of my life spent in the daily discharge of duties.” + +This statement, if it proves anything, proves that happiness is one thing +and duty is another; it proves that Kant’s theory of ethics, which is +based on the discharge of duty and not on the pursuit of happiness, is +correct, and that Mr. Spencer’s theory which identifies duty with the +pursuit of happiness, is wrong. + +However, we must in this place express our opinion that Mr. Spencer’s +statement _cannot_ be quite correct. The discharge of duty, unpleasant +though the drudgery part of it may have been, was undoubtedly accompanied +and followed by a certain satisfaction, which perhaps was less in +quantity, but certainly higher in quality than the pleasure derived from +the mere pursuit of happiness. And in the valuation of the intrinsic +and of the moral worth of pleasures, the quality alone should be taken +into consideration, not the quantity. In this sense only can an ethical +hedonism or utilitarianism be acceptable. The man whose pleasures and +pains are of a higher kind, of a nobler form, and of a better quality, is +morally and generally the more evolved man. And then, the basis of ethics +would be, not so much pleasure or happiness as the quality of pleasure or +happiness; it would be an aspiration to evolve toward a higher plane of +life, to shape our lives in nobler forms, and to enjoy nobler, greater, +and more spiritual pleasures, or, as Kant says, “unceasing progress.” + +Mr. Spencer’s assertion, if taken in the sense in which it stands, is a +contradiction of his ethical theory. But even if Mr. Spencer had declared +that the discharge of duty affords a kind of happiness or satisfaction, +as it truly does, there would still remain a deep gap between his and +Kant’s ethics. Mr. Spencer reduces ethics to mere worldly prudence; he +says that we must do the good in order to be happy, and for the sake of +its utility, and Kant says we must act so as to be in agreement with +universal law. Mr. Spencer says: + + “But now, supposing we accept Kant’s statement in full, what + is its implication? That happiness is the thing to be desired, + and, in one way or another, the thing to be achieved.” ... + + “An illustration will best show how the matter stands. To + a tyro in archery the instructor says: ‘Sir, you must not + point your arrow directly at the target; if you do, you will + inevitably miss it; you must aim high above the target, and you + may then possibly pierce the bull’s-eye.’ What now is implied + by the warning and the advice? Clearly that the purpose is + to hit the target. Otherwise there is no sense in the remark + that it will be missed if directly aimed at; and no sense in + the remark that to be hit, something higher must be aimed at. + Similarly with happiness. There is no sense in the remark that + happiness will not be found if it is directly sought, unless + happiness is a thing to be somehow or other obtained.” ... + + “So that in this professed repudiation of happiness as an end, + there lies the inavoidable implication that it _is_ the end.” + +The pursuit of happiness is by no means repudiated by Kant as wrong or +immoral; it is only maintained to be insufficient as a foundation of +ethics. Kant’s remark that happiness will not be found if it is directly +sought has no reference to his own ethics. Kant, speaking from the +standpoint of one who takes the view of utilitarianism, says that if a +cultivated reason applies itself to the sole purpose of enjoying life and +happiness, it will meet with a failure.[99] + +Any other explanation of the moral _ought_ than that from the Good Will, +Kant declares to be _heteronomy_. Will would no longer be itself, and the +principle of action would lie in something foreign to the will. Kant says: + + “Will in such a case would not be a law to itself; but the + object by its relation to the will would impose the law upon + the will.... This would admit of hypothetical imperatives + only: ‘I ought to do a certain thing, because I want something + else.’ The moral and therefore categorical imperative, on the + contrary, says: ‘I ought to act so or so, even if I had nothing + else in view.’ For instance: the hypothetical imperative + of heteronomy says: ‘I ought not to lie, if I ever wish to + preserve my honor.’ The categorical imperative says: ‘I ought + not to lie even if it would not in the least bring me to + shame.’” + +Mr. Spencer quotes the following passage from Kant: + + “I omit here all actions which are already recognized as + inconsistent with duty, although they may be useful for this + or that purpose, for with these the question whether they are + done _from duty_ can not arise at all, since they even conflict + with it. I also set aside those actions which really conform + to duty, but to which men have _no_ direct _inclination_, + performing them because they are impelled thereto by some + other inclination. For in this case we can readily distinguish + whether the action which agrees with duty is done _from + duty_, or from a selfish view. It is much harder to make this + distinction when the action accords with duty, and the subject + has besides a _direct_ inclination to it. For example, it is + always a matter of duty that a dealer should not overcharge an + inexperienced purchaser, and wherever there is much commerce + the prudent tradesman does not overcharge, but keeps a fixed + price for every one, so that a child buys of him as well as any + other. Men are thus _honestly_ served; but this is not enough + to make us believe that the tradesman has so acted from duty + and from principles of honesty: his own advantage required it; + it is out of the question in this case to suppose that he might + besides have a direct inclination in favor of the buyers, so + that, as it were, from love he should give no advantage to one + over another[!]. Accordingly the action was done neither from + duty nor from direct inclination, but merely with a selfish + view. + + “On the other hand, it is a duty to maintain one’s life, and, + in addition, every one has also a direct inclination to do + so. But on this account the often anxious care which most men + take for it has no intrinsic worth, and their maxim has no + moral import. They preserve their life _as duty requires_, no + doubt, but not _because duty requires_. On the other hand, + if adversity and hopeless sorrow have completely taken away + the relish for life; if the unfortunate one, strong in mind, + indignant at his fate rather than desponding or dejected, + wishes for death, and yet preserves his life without loving + it—not from inclination or fear, but from duty—then his maxim + has a moral worth. + + “To be beneficent when we can is a duty; and besides this, + there are many minds so sympathetically constituted that + without any other motive of vanity or self-interest, they find + a pleasure in spreading joy around them, and can take delight + in the satisfaction of others so far as it is their own work. + But I maintain that in such a case an action of this kind, + however proper, however amiable it may be, has nevertheless no + true moral worth, but is on a level with other inclinations.” + (pp. 17-19) + +Kant’s metaphysics of ethics is to practical ethics what pure mathematics +is to applied mathematics, or what logic is to grammar. Kant’s method of +reasoning _in abstracto_ everywhere shows the mathematical bent of his +mind. In a foot-note (Editio Hartenstein, IV), p. 258, he says: + + “As pure mathematics is distinguished from applied mathematics + and pure logic from applied logic, so may the pure philosophy + (the metaphysics) of ethics be distinguished from the applied + philosophy of ethics, that is, as applied to human nature. + By this distinction of terms it at once appears that ethical + principles are not based upon the peculiarities of human + nature but that they must be existent by themselves _a + priori_,—whence, for human nature, just as well as for _any_ + rational nature, practical rules can be derived.” + +Schleiermacher says: + + “A good is any agreement (“unity”) of definite sides [certain + aspects] of reason and nature.... The end of ethical praxis + is the highest good, _i. e._, the sum of all unions of nature + and reason.... The moral law may be compared to the algebraic + formula which (in analytical geometry) determines the course + [path] of a curve; the highest good may be compared to the + curve itself, and virtue, or moral power, to an instrument + arranged for the purpose of constructing the curve according to + the formula.” (Quoted from a translation of Ueberweg.) + +Kant declares in other passages that in examples taken from practical +life, it will be difficult to separate clearly and unmistakably the +sense of duty as the real moral motive from other motives, inclinations, +habits, etc. But such a distinction must be made, if the moral value of +motives is to be considered _in abstracto_. This is necessary for a clear +conception of the essential features of morality. Mr. Spencer has on +other occasions highly praised the power of generalization, which indeed +is fundamentally the same faculty, as thinking _in abstracto_; here, +however, he does not follow Kant’s argument, but declares “that the +assumed distinction between sense of duty and inclination is untenable.” +He says: + + “The very expression _sense_ of duty implies that the mental + state signified is a feeling; and if a feeling it must, + like other feelings, be gratified by acts of one kind and + offended by acts of an opposite kind. If we take the name + conscience, which is equivalent to sense of duty, we see the + same thing. The common expressions ‘a tender conscience,’ ‘a + seared conscience,’ indicate the perception that conscience + is a feeling—a feeling which has its satisfactions and + dissatisfactions, and which _inclines_ a man to acts which + yield the one and avoid the other—produces an _inclination_,” + (p. 476). + +It is quite true that every state of consciousness is a feeling, but +we can and must discriminate between consciousness or feeling and the +idea or thought which becomes conscious, in which the feeling appears, +and which is, so to speak, the special form of a certain feeling. The +consciousness and its special form, the feeling and the mental object +of feeling, are in reality one and the same. Yet they are different and +must _in abstracto_ be well distinguished. Mr. Spencer’s method is that +of generalization, but generalizing can lead to no satisfactory results, +if it is not constantly accompanied by discrimination. We must generalize +and discriminate. + +If a certain group of states of consciousness takes the form of a +logical syllogism, it must not be expected that logic will find its +explanation in feeling, although it cannot be denied that all the +states of consciousness are feelings. Not the feeling in this case is +to be explained, but logic. In our generalizations we must discriminate +_in abstracto_ between the feeling and the idea which feels. We must +positively abstract from feeling and cannot consider whether the feeling +of logical arguments is pleasant or unpleasant. Mr. Spencer’s method +of explaining ethics, if applied to logic, would be as follows: “Man’s +logical sense is a very complex feeling and has developed from simple +percepts such as can be observed in the lowest animals; percepts are +a higher evolved form of reactions against irritations such as take +place in protoplasm. The old method of explaining logic is that of +deduction, modern logic will be inductive. Formerly pure logic was +considered as a science _a priori_; but the evolution-philosophy shows +that logic is developed by steps, it appears _a priori_ to the individual +now, but it is in reality a consolidated product of multitudinous +experiences received mainly by ancestors and added to by self. Logical +sense accordingly finds its explanation in most simple feelings. Our +conceptions of logically incorrect feelings will be more and more +avoided because they will ultimately be found to be unpleasant; logical +correctness is striven for because of the feeling of satisfaction that +accompanies the conception of a logically correct conclusion.” + +Sense is feeling, there can be no doubt. Logical sense and mathematical +sense are feelings and if a person thinks a mathematical axiom or a +logical syllogism or an ethical maxim, he has a feeling. Logical sense +of reason is the product of evolution, and it cannot be denied either +that one man has a more logical or mathematical or moral sense than +another. But it does not follow that an explanation of mathematics, or +logic, or ethics, must be derived from feeling pleasure and pain, or +happiness. On the contrary we must abstract from feeling altogether and +concern ourselves with the object of feeling only, which is the idea +or the special form in which and as which feeling appears. States of +consciousness (never mind whether they are painful or pleasurable) must +be considered as moral if their mental object, _i. e._, the idea, the +thought, the motive, the form in which feeling becomes manifest, is in +harmony with the universal order of things. + + * * * * * + +Mr. Spencer declares that the world would be intolerable “if Kant’s +conception of moral worth were displayed universally in men’s acts.” +And it must be acknowledged that Kant’s ethics in their logical and +irrefutable rigidity not only impressed the literary world of his time +with the grandeur and sublimity of ethics; Kant’s ethics also astounded, +and overwhelmed his readers with awe. Virtue no longer appeared to be the +fervid enthusiasm of sentiments; it congealed into the cold idea of duty +which can be fixed in abstract rules and will operate like the correctly +calculated gear of a machine. Objections have been raised by some of +Kant’s own disciples; but it must be known that the Kantian view of +ethics does not suppress feelings, emotions and inclinations, it excludes +them only from an estimation of the moral worth of actions. Kant gave the +_coup de grace_ to all sentimentality which had taken the lead in ethical +questions too long. Mr. Spencer says: + + “If those acts only have moral worth which are done from a + sense of duty ... we must say that a man’s moral worth is + greater in proportion as the strength of his sense of duty + is such that he does the right thing not only apart from + inclination but against inclination. According to Kant, + then, the most moral man is the man ... who says of another + that which is true though he would like to injure him by a + falsehood; who lends money to his brother though he would + prefer to see him in distress.” + +Schiller, although an admirer of Kant, makes in his Xenions a similar +objection to this corollary of the ethics of pure reason. He says: + + “Willingly serve I my friends; but ’tis pity, I do it with pleasure. + And I am really vexed, that there’s no virtue in me!” + +And he answers in a second distich: + + “There is no other advice than that you try to despise friends, + And, with disgust, you will do what such a duty demands.” + +The difficulty is removed under the following consideration: A man with +good inclinations is less exposed to temptation than a man with bad +inclinations. If both act morally under conditions otherwise the same, +the latter has shown greater strength of moral purpose than the former. +The former’s character (viz., his inherited inclinations and habits which +represent the sum total of the moral energies of his ancestors,) is more +moral than that of the latter. But the latter deserves more credit than +the former for overcoming the temptation; he has in this special act +shown more moral strength of will than his more fortunate and morally +higher advanced fellow-man. To those who have accepted the Kantian view, +Mr. Spencer’s and Schiller’s objection can serve as a warning, not to +lose sight of emotions altogether. Man is not only a reasonable being, he +is at the same time a feeling creature. The instinctive faculties of man, +the so-called subconscious states, are the basis of his consciousness. +They form the roots of his soul from which spring the clear conceptions +of his reason. The more man’s habits and inclinations agree with morals, +the more strength of purpose is left for further ethical advancement and +moral progress. + +Similar objections have also been made to Kant’s mechanical explanation +of the origin of the planetary systems and milky ways. It seemed as if +the divinity of nature were replaced by the rigid law of gravity. In his +poem “The God’s of Greece,” Schiller complains: + + “Fühllos selbst für ihres Künstlers Ehre, + Gleich dem todten Schlag der Pendeluhr, + Dient sie knechtisch dem Gesetz der Schwere, + Die entgötterte Natur.” + + “Dead even to her Master’s praise, + Like lifeless pendulum’s vibration, + Lo, godless Nature now obeys, + Slave-like, the law of gravitation.”[100] + +Such objections are always raised when a scientific explanation destroys +the mystic view that a spirit or at least something unexplainable is +the supposed cause of certain phenomena. Our sentiments are so closely +connected and intimately interwoven with our errors that truth appears +hostile to sentiment, and it becomes difficult to part with errors +sanctified by emotion. Sentimentality always complains that clear thought +is an enemy of romanticism, and romanticism is the only possible poetry +to the taste of the sentimental. + +Now it cannot be denied that a one-sided knowledge not only appears +rigid, it truly _is_ so, and will be destructive of such emotions as +reverence, awe, æsthetic taste, religion and art. Criticism is a most +essential feature of science and philosophy, and how negative, how +desolate and melancholy appear the results of criticism! But the pruning +process of criticism is very wholesome, and true science will only profit +by discarding the vagueness of indistinct conceptions. Alpine lakes that +are really deep can only gain by lucidity. Thus the clearness of genuine +science and broad philosophy will only show the depth of truth into which +by all its lucidity our emotions can plunge without ever finding it +shallow or fathoming it in all its profundity. + +Kant’s doctrine of ethics is a truth that can stand the severest test. + +Ethics, in the sense of the word as used by Kant, can be found in +man only, in so far as he is a reasonable being. A truly reasonable +being does not allow himself to be guided by impulses but is led by +maxims. Inclinations and habits are remnants of instinct. Not he who +in instinctive good-naturedness acts morally, is the ethical man, but +he who deliberately and consciously considers himself a representative +of the general order of things. The man, who adopts such maxims as can +become universal principles, identifies his will with the laws of the +universe. Man’s moral dignity must not be sought in vague feelings or in +instinctive inspirations; it is based upon his reason and is developed in +so far only as he makes use of his reason. + + +FOOTNOTES: + +[87] Quotations from Mr. Spencer’s essay will be distinguished +by quotation-marks, while those from Kant will appear in hanging +indentations. + +[88] Kant distinguishes two kinds of sublimity: 1) the mathematical, and +2) the dynamical. His definitions are: 1) sublime is that in comparison +with which everything else is small; and 2) sublime is that the mere +ability to conceive which shows a power of emotion (Gemüth), the latter +transcending any measurement by the senses. [1) Erhaben ist, mit welchem +im Vergleich alles andere klein ist. 2) Erhaben ist, was auch nur denken +zu können ein Vermögen des Gemüths beweist, das jeden Maasstab der Sinne +übertrifft. Editio Hartenstein, Vol. V, pp. 257, 258.] + +[89] The stellar Universe, of course, has not been evolved; Mr. Spencer +means that according to Kant’s mechanical explanation the planetary +systems and milky ways of the stellar Universe are in a state of constant +evolution. + +[90] Translation by J. M. D. Meiklejohn, pp. 244, 249. + +[91] Compare also Kant’s “Prol. zu jeder künftigen Metaphysik,” § 46. + +[92] We call attention to Kant’s peculiar expression, in this passage, of +_Auswickelung_ which has now yielded to the term _Entwickelung_. + +[93] Die in der Natur eines organischen Körpers (Gewächses oder Thieres) +liegenden Gründe einer bestimmten Auswickelung heissen, wenn diese +Auswickelung besondere Theile betrifft, _Keime_; betrifft sie aber nur +die Grösse oder das Verhältniss der Theile unter einander, so nenne ich +sie _natürliche Anlagen_. + +[94] Wir nehmen die Benennungen _Naturbeschreibung_ und _Naturgeschichte_ +gemeiniglich in einerlei Sinne. Allein es ist klar, dass die Kenntniss +der Naturdinge, wie sie _jetzt sind_, immer noch die Erkenntniss von +demjenigen wünschen lasse, was sie ehedem _gewesen_ sind und durch +welche Reihe von Veränderungen sie durchgegangen, um an jedem Ort +in ihren gegenwärtigen Zustand zu gelangen. Die _Naturgeschichte_, +woran es uns noch fast gänzlich fehlt, würde uns die Veränderung der +Erdgestalt, imgleichen die der Erdgeschöpfe (Pflanzen und Thiere), die +sie durch natürliche Wanderungen (sic! I take it as a misprint for +_Wandelungen_) erlitten haben, und ihre daraus entsprungenen Abartungen +von dem Urbilde der Stammgattung lehren. Sie würde vermuthlich eine +grosse Menge scheinbar verschiedener Arten zu Racen ebenderselben +Gattung zurückführen, und das jetzt so weitläuftigte Schulsystem der +Naturbeschreibung in ein physisches System für den Verstand verwandeln. + +[95] The original of the first sentence reads: “Es ist überall nichts in +der Welt, ja überhaupt auch ausser derselben zu denken möglich, was ohne +Einschränkung für gut könnte gehalten werden, als allein ein guter Wille.” + +[96] _Italics are ours._ + +[97] The phrase “we take it for granted” (in the original “nehmen wir es +als Grundsatz an)” reads in the translation quoted by Mr. Spencer: “we +take it as a fundamental principle.” Mr. Spencer objects to the passage +declaring that there _are_ many organs (such as rudimentary organs) in +the construction of organized beings which serve _no_ purpose. This +however does not stand in contradiction to Kant’s assumption that organs +of organized beings serve a special purpose. The rudimentary organs have +under other conditions served a purpose for which they then were fit and +well adapted and are disappearing now because no longer used. + +[98] Das moralische Sollen ist also ein eigenes nothwendiges Wollen als +Gliedes einer intelligiblen Welt, und wird nur sofern von ihm als Sollen +gedacht, als er sich zugleich wie ein Glied der Sinnenwelt betrachtet. +Ed. Hartenstein vol. IV. p. 303. + +[99] The passage referred to is quoted in full on page 16. + +[100] Slightly altered from B. W. BALL’S translation in THE OPEN COURT, +p. 83. + + + + +KANT ON EVOLUTION. + +IN CRITICISM OF MR. HERBERT SPENCER’S PRESENTATION OF KANTISM. + + +It is very strange that Mr. Herbert Spencer will again and again attack +the philosophy and ethics of Kant for views which Kant never held.[101] +It is possible that there are disciples of Kant who deny the theory of +evolution. Yet it is certain that Kant himself is not guilty of this +mistake. Thinkers who reject the theory of evolution are in this respect +as little entitled to call themselves disciples of Kant as, for instance, +the Sadducees were to call themselves followers of Christ. Kantian +philosophy was foremost in the recognition of the need of evolution, and +that at a time when public interest was not as yet centered upon it. + +Mr. Spencer’s merits in the propagation of the theory of evolution are +undeniable, and he deserves our warmest respect and thanks for the +indefatigable zeal he has shown in the performance of this great work, +for the labors he has undergone, and the sacrifices he has made for it. +Yet recognising all that Mr. Spencer has done, we should not be blind to +the fact that Kant’s conception of evolution is even at the present day +more in conformity with the facts of natural science than Mr. Spencer’s +philosophy, although the latter commonly goes by the name of the +philosophy of evolution. + +It is painful to note that in many places where Mr. Spencer refers to +Kant’s philosophy, he does it slightingly, as though Kant were one of the +most irrational of thinkers. Kant’s reasoning is denounced as “abnormal” +and “vicious.” I find such phrases as, “It is a vice of Kant’s +philosophy ...,” “If Kant had known more of Man than he did ...,” etc. +Mr. Spencer characterises Kant’s method as follows: + + “Instead of setting out with a proposition of which the + negative is inconceivable, it sets out with a proposition of + which the affirmation is inconceivable, and proceeds to draw + conclusions therefrom.” + +These attacks of Mr. Spencer on Kant are not justifiable. Kant is not +guilty of the faults for which he is arraigned by Mr. Spencer. + + * * * * * + +It is, however, fair to state that these misunderstandings appear +excusable if the difficulties are borne in mind with which the English +student of Kant is confronted. First, Kant cannot be understood without +taking into consideration the historical development of his philosophy, +and, secondly, most translations of the fundamental terms, he employs, +are so misleading that errors can scarcely be avoided. + +Kant’s philosophy is by no means a perfected system; it rather represents +(as perhaps necessarily all philosophies do) the development of a +thinker’s mind. The “Critique of Pure Reason” especially shows traces +of the state of Kant’s mind at different periods, and thus it is that +we discover passages which closely considered will be found to be +contradictory. When reading this remarkable work we feel like travelers +walking over the petrified relics of a powerful eruption. There are +strata of ideas of the oldest formation close to the thoughts of a recent +date. There are also vestiges of intermediate phases. Here they stand +in the petrification of printed words, peacefully side by side, as +memorials of a great revolution in the development of human thought. It +is this state of things which more than anything else makes of Kant’s +writings such difficult reading. At the same time it is obvious that we +cannot simply take the results of Kant’s philosophy; we must follow him +in the paths by which he arrived at any given proposition. + +There is no philosopher that has been worse misinterpreted than Kant; +and the English interpreters of Kant have succeeded in mutilating his +best thoughts so that this hero of progress appears as a stronghold of +antiquated views. Mistranslations or misconceptions of his terms are +to a great extent the cause of this singular fate. As an instance we +mention the errors that attach to Kant’s term _Anschauung_. _Anschauung_ +is the present object of our senses; it is the impression a man has +from looking at a thing and might have been translated by “perception” +or perhaps “sensation.” It is usually translated by “intuition.” The +_Anschauung_ of objects comprises the data of knowledge, and they are +previous to our reflection upon them. An intuition in the sense of the +English Intuitionalists is defined as “a presentation which can be +given previously to all thought,” yet this presentation is supposed +to be a kind of revelation, a knowledge that comes to us without our +contemplation, a cognition the character of which is immediate as well as +mysterious; in short something that is supernatural. + +How different is Kant’s philosophy, for instance, if his position +with reference to time and space is mistaken! “Time and Space are our +_Anschauung_,” Kant says. But his English translators declare: “Kant +maintained that space and time are intuitions.” What a difference it +makes if intuition is interpreted in the sense applied to it by the +English Intuitionalist School instead of its being taken in the original +meaning of the word _Anschauung_. + + * * * * * + +Any one who knows Kant through Mr. Spencer’s representations only, must +look upon him as having the most perverse mind that could possibly +exist; and yet it is Kant from whom Spencer has indirectly derived the +most characteristic feature of his philosophy. What is Mr. Spencer’s +agnosticism but a popularisation of Kant’s view that things in themselves +are unknowable? + +We conclude from the animosity which Mr. Spencer shows toward Kant that +he does not know how much in this respect he agrees with Kant, how much +he has unconsciously imbibed from the _Zeitgeist_ which in part was +formed under the influence of this huge error of the great philosopher. + +I feel confident that any clear thinker who studies Kant and arrives +along with him at the “thing in itself” will soon free himself from this +error of Kantian thought. Kant himself suggests to us the method by which +we are to find the way out of agnosticism. As a proof I quote the views +of two independent thinkers; both influenced by Kant’s criticism but +neither a blind follower. Professor Mach says: + + “I have always felt it as a special good fortune, that early + in my life, at about the age of fifteen, I happened to find + in the library of my father Kant’s ‘Prolegomena to Any + Future Metaphysic.’ The book made at that time a powerful, + ineffaceable impression upon me that I never afterwards + experienced to the same degree in any of my philosophical + reading. Some two or three years later I suddenly discovered + the superfluous rôle that ‘the thing in itself’ plays.” _The + Monist_, Vol. I, No. 1, pp. 65 and 66. + +And Schiller guided by similar considerations says in one of his Xenions: + + “Since Metaphysics, of late, without heirs to her fathers was gathered: + Under the hammer are now ‘things in themselves’ to be sold.” + +The latest attack of Mr. Spencer upon Kantism is in the article “Our +Space-Consciousness,” in _Mind_, written in reply to Professor Watson. +Mr. Spencer there repeats his misconception of Kantism, so that I feel +urged to utter a few words of protest against his gross misrepresentation +of Kant’s views. I shall confine myself mainly to quotations from Kant’s +works—and the passages quoted will speak for themselves. Should there +indeed be any disciples of Kant who are, as Mr. Spencer says, “profoundly +averse to that evolutionary view which contemplates mind as having had a +genesis conforming to laws like those conformed to by the genesis of the +body,” these quotations will suffice to prove that they have misconstrued +the views of their master. Philosophers hostile to the theory of +evolution had better select another patron for their ideas. Kant is too +radical a mind to protect those men who in the domains of thought give +the signal for retreat. + +Mr. Spencer adopted the evolution theory as it was presented by Von Baer, +who explains “_Entwickelung_” as a progress from the homogeneous to the +heterogeneous. + +Baer’s “Developmental History of Animals” was published in 1828. Mr. +Spencer adopted the theory in 1854. But the history of the theory of +evolution is older than Von Baer’s book. Professor Baer concludes +his work with a few corollaries among which near the end we find the +following passage: + + “If we survey the contents of the whole Scholia, there + follows from them a general result. We found that the effect + of generation continues to advance from a part to a whole + [Schol. 2.]; that in development, self-dependence increases + in correspondence with its environment [Schol. 2.], as well as + the determinateness of its structure [Schol. 1.]; that in the + internal development special parts shape themselves forth from + the more general, and their differentiation increases [Schol. + 3.]; that the individual, as the possessor of a fixed organic + form, changes by degrees from more general forms into more + special [Schol. 5.]. + + “The general result of our inquiry and consideration can now + well be declared as follows: + + “That the developmental history of the individual is the + history of increasing individuality in every relation; that + is, Individualisation. + + “This general conclusion is, indeed, so plain, that it needs + no proof from observation, but seems evident _a priori_. But + we believe that this evidentness is merely the stamp of truth, + and therefore is its guarantee. Had the history of development + from the outset been perceived as just expressed, it could and + should have been inferred, that the individual of a determinate + animal type attains to this by changing from a general into + a special form. But experience teaches everywhere, that + deductions are always safer if their results are discovered + beforehand by observation. Mankind would have obtained a still + greater intellectual possession than it really has, had this + been otherwise. + + “But if this general conclusion has truth and contents, it is + _one fundamental idea_ which runs through all forms and degrees + of animal development, and governs every single relation. It is + the same idea that collected in space the distributed particles + into spheres and united them in solar systems; which caused the + disintegrated dust on the surface of our metallic planet to + grow up into living forms; but this idea is nothing else than + life itself, and the words and syllables in which it expresses + itself, are the different forms of life.” + +These corollaries were not inserted by Baer because he intended to +proclaim a new truth, but simply to excite a popular interest in a +strictly scientific work, in order to extend the circle of its readers. +Baer says in the preface: + + “So much about the first part. In order to procure for the + work readers and buyers, I have added a second part in which + I make some general remarks under the title of Scholia and + Corollaries. They are intended to be sketches of the confession + of my scientific faith concerning the development of animals, + as it was formed from the observation of the chick and by other + investigations.” + + * * * * * + +The “Encyclopædia Britannica” says of Baer that he “prepared the way for +Mr. Spencer’s generalisation of the law of organic evolution as the law +of all evolution.”[102] + +Baer declares that individualisation is “the one fundamental idea that +goes through _all_ the forms of cosmic and animal development.” The +generality of the law of evolution is clearer in the language employed +by Baer, in the full context of the Scholia than appears from the short +statement of the “Encyclopædia Britannica.” Nevertheless it is clear +enough in the quoted passage that Baer made a statement of universal +application. How can such a universal statement be made more general? + +We must add here that Mr. Spencer and his disciples overvalue the +importance of generalisation. It is not the power of generalisation that +makes the philosopher and the scientist but the power of discrimination. +The habit of generalising whatever comes under our observation is very +common among the uneducated and uncivilised, and almost nine tenths of +human errors arise from unwarranted generalisations. + +In Kant’s time the interest in the theory of evolution was confined to a +few minds. It is well known that Goethe was one of its most enthusiastic +supporters.[103] In the middle of the eighteenth century there were +three views proposed to explain the origin and the development of +organised beings: (1) Occasionalism, (2) the theory of Evolution, and +(3) the theory of Epigenesis. Occasionalism maintained that God created +on each new occasion a new animal. The word evolution was used in a +different sense from that in which it is now understood: evolutionism, as +maintained by Bonnet, Haller, and others, was the view that the sperma +contained a very small specimen of the animal that was to grow from it. +The hen’s egg was supposed to contain an excessively minute but complete +chicken. The theory of epigenesis, however, propounded in 1759 by Caspar +Friedrich Wolff in his “Theoria Generationis,” explained development +by additional growth, and it is this theory of epigenesis which later +on, after the total defeat of the old evolutionism, was called (but +improperly) the evolution theory. The word “evolution” has thus again +admitted the erroneous idea of an unfolding. + +In Kant’s time the battle between the occasionalists, the evolutionists, +and the adherents of the epigenesis theory was hot indeed; and Kant +unquestionably gave preference to the epigenesis theory. The most +important passage on the subject appears in his “Critique of Judgment.” +It is as follows: + + “If now the teleological principle of the generation of + organised beings be accepted, as it would be, we can account + for their internally adapted form either by _Occasionalism_ + or by _Prestabilism_.[104] According to the first, the + supreme world-cause would, in agreement with its idea, on the + occasion of every coition directly give the proper organic + form to the material thereby blended; according to the second, + it would have implanted into the original products of its + designing wisdom merely the power by means of which an organic + being produces its like and the species itself is constantly + maintained and likewise the death of individuals is continually + replaced by their own nature, which is operating at the same + time for their destruction. + + “If we assume occasionalism for the production of organised + beings, nature is thereby wholly discarded, and with it the use + of reasoning in determining the possibility of such kinds of + products; therefore, it cannot be supposed that this system is + accepted by any one who has had to do with philosophy.” + + “As to _Prestabilism_, it can proceed in a two-fold manner, + namely, it considers every organic being produced by its like, + either as the _educt_ or as the _product_ of the first. The + system which considers generated beings as mere _educts_ is + called that of _individual preformation_, or also the _theory + of evolution_; that which makes generated beings _products_ is + named the system of _epigenesis_. The latter can also be called + a system of _generic preformation_, because the productive + power of those generating was virtually preformed to agree with + the internal adapted arrangements that fell to the lot of their + race. The opposing theory to this view should be named that + of individual preformation, or still better, the _theory of + evolution_.” + + “The defenders of the theory of evolution, who exempt each + individual from the formative power of nature, in order to + derive the same directly from the hand of the Creator, would + not dare to permit this to happen in accordance with the + hypothesis of occasionalism, so that coition would be a mere + formality, a supreme national world-cause having decided to + form every particular fœtus by direct interference, and to + resign to the mother only its development and nourishment. + They declared themselves in favor of preformation, _as though + it were not the same to make the required forms arise in a + supernatural manner at the beginning of the world, as during + its progress_; and as if a great multitude of supernatural + arrangements would not rather be dispensed with through + occasional creation which were necessary in order that the + embryo formed at the beginning of the world should, throughout + the long period up to its development, not suffer from the + destructive forces of nature, but endure and maintain itself + intact; moreover, an immensely greater number of such preformed + beings would be made than ever would be developed, and with + them as many creations be thus rendered unnecessary and + purposeless. They still, however, resign at least something to + nature, in order not to fall in with complete hyperphysics, + which can dispense with explanation from nature. They still + held fast indeed, to their hyperphysics; even finding in + monsters (which it must be impossible to regard as designs + of nature) cases of adaptation which call for admiration, + although the only purpose of that adaptedness might be to make + an anatomist take offence at it as a purposeless adaptedness, + and have a sense of melancholy admiration. Yet they could + not well fit the generation of hybrids into the system of + preformation, but were obliged still further to endow the sperm + of male creatures with a designedly acting power, whereas they + had otherwise accorded it nothing except mechanical force to + serve as the first means of nourishment of the embryo; yet + this designedly acting force, in the case of the products of + generation between two creatures of the same kind, they would + grant to neither of them. + + “If on the contrary the great advantage was not at once + recognised which the theory of epigenesis possessed over the + former in view of the experimental foundation on which the + proof of it rested; yet reason would be especially favorably + predisposed from the outset for this mode, of explanation, + inasmuch as it regards nature—with reference to the things + which originally can be conceived as possible only in + accordance with the theory of causality and design, at least + so far as propagation is concerned—as self-producing and + not merely as developing, and thus with the least possible + employment of the supernatural, leaves all that comes + afterwards, from the very beginning on, to nature: without + concerning itself with the original beginning, with regard to + the explanation of which physics in general miscarries, try + with what chain of causes it may.” + +Kant recognises neither the stability of species nor any fixed limits +between them. And this one maxim alone suffices to prove that he was +of the same opinion as the great biologist who wrote the “Origin of +Species.” Kant says (Ed. Hart. III. p. 444): + + “_Non datur vacuum formarum_, that is, there are not different + original and primitive species, which were, so to say, isolated + and separated by an empty space from one another, but all the + manifold species are only divisions of a single, chief, and + general species; and from this principle results again this + immediate inference: _datur continuum formarum_, that is, all + differences of species border on each other, and allow no + transition to one another by a leap, but only through very + small degrees of difference, by which we can arrive at one + from another; in one word, there are no species or sub-species + which, according to reason, would be _next_ each other in + affinity, but intermediate species are always possible, whose + difference from the first and second is less than their + difference from one another.” + +In Kant’s “Critique of Judgment” (§. 80) we find the following passage: + + “The agreement of so many species of animals, with reference + to a definite, common scheme, which appears not only to be + at the foundation of their bony structure, but also of the + arrangement of their other parts, in which, by abridgment of + one and prolongation of another, by envelopment of this and + unfolding of that, a wonderful simplicity of plan has been able + to produce so great a diversity of species—this agreement casts + a ray of hope, although a weak one, in the mind, that here, + indeed, something might be accomplished with the principle of + the mechanism of nature, without which in general there can be + no physical science. + + “This analogy of forms, so far as they appear, notwithstanding + all their diversity, to be produced after the model of a common + prototype, strengthens the conjecture of a real relationship + between the same by generation from a common ancestral + source, through the gradual approach of one animal species to + another, from man, in whom the principle of design appears + to be best proved, to the polyp, from this to the moss and + lichen, and finally to the lowest stage of nature perceptible + to us, to crude matter, from which and its forces, according + to mechanical laws (like those which work in the production + of crystals), the whole technic of nature (which is so + incomprehensible to us in organised beings that we imagine + another principle is necessitated for their explanation) + appears to be derived.[105] + + “The Archæologist of nature is now free to make that great + family of beings (for such we must conceive it, if the + uninterrupted relationship is to have a foundation) arise out + of the extant vestiges of the oldest revolutions, following + every mechanism known to him or which he can suppose.” + +Kant adds in a foot-note: + + “An hypothesis of such a kind can be named a daring venture of + reason, and there may be few of the most sagacious naturalists, + through whose minds it has not sometimes passed. For it is not + absurd, as the _generatio equivoca_, by which is understood + the production of an organised being through the mechanical + action of crude unorganised matter. But it would still be + _generatio univoca_ in the common understanding of the word, + in so far only as something organic was produced out of + another organic body, although specifically distinguished + from it; for instance, if certain aquatic animals by and by + formed into amphibia, and from these after some generations + into land animals. _A priori_ this does not contradict the + judgment of pure reason. Only experience shows no example + thereof; according to it, rather, all generation which we know + is _generatio homonyma_ (not mere _univoca_ in opposition to + production out of unorganised material), that is, the bringing + forth of a product homogeneous in organisation, with the + generator; and _generatio heteronyma_, so far as our actual + experience of nature goes is nowhere met with.” + +The treatise “Presumable Origin of Humanity,” Kant sums up in the +following sentence: + + “From this representation of the earliest human history it + results, that the departure of man from what, as the first + abode of his kind, his judgment represented as Paradise, was + no other than the transition of mere animal creatures out of + barbarism into man, out of the leading-strings of instinct into + the guidance of reason, in a word, out of the guardianship of + nature into the state of freedom.” + +In his work “Upon the Different Races of Mankind,” Kant discusses the +origin of the species of man in a way which would do honor to a follower +of Darwin. It is written in a spirit which recognises the difference of +conditions as the causes that produce different species. We select a few +passages from this work. + +In a foot-note we read: + + “Ordinarily we accept the terms natural science + (_Naturbeschreibung_) and natural history in one and the + same sense. But it is evident that the knowledge of natural + phenomena, as they _now are_, always leaves to be desired + the knowledge of that which they _have been_ before now, and + through what succession of modifications they have passed in + order to have arrived, in every respect, at their present + state. _Natural History_, which at present we almost entirely + lack, would teach us the changes that have effected the form + of the earth, likewise, the changes in the creatures of the + earth (plants and animals) that they have suffered by natural + transformations and, arising therefrom, the departures from the + prototype of the original species that they have experienced. + It would probably trace a great number of apparently different + varieties back to a species of one and the same kind, and would + convert the present so intricate school-system of Natural + Science into a natural system in conformity with reason.” + +We adduce another passage, no less remarkable in clearness, which proves +that Kant has a very definite idea, not only of the gradual evolution of +man, but also of the survival of the fittest: + + “The cry which a child scarcely born utters, has not the tone + of misery, but of irritation, and violent rage; not the result + of pain, but of vexation about something; probably for the + reason that it wishes to move itself and feels its incapacity, + like a captive when freedom is taken from him. What purpose + can nature have in providing that a child shall come with a + loud cry into the world, which for it and the mother is, in the + _rude natural state_, full of danger? Since a wolf, a pig even, + would in the absence of the mother, or through her feebleness + owing to her delivery, be thus attracted to devour it. But + no animal except man as he now is announces with noise its + new-born existence; which in the wisdom of nature appears to + be arranged _in order that the species shall be preserved_. We + must also assume that in what was an early epoch of nature for + this class of animals (namely in the period of barbarism) this + outcry of the child at its birth did not exist; consequently + only later on a second epoch appeared, after both parents had + arrived at that degree of civilisation which was required for + home-life; yet without knowing how and by what interweaving + causes nature arranges such a development. This remark leads us + far; for example, to the thought whether after the same epoch, + still a third did not follow accompanied by great natural + revolutions, during which an orang-outang or a chimpanzee + perfected the organs which serve for walking, for feeling + objects, and for speech, and thus evolved the limb-structure of + man; in which animals was contained an organ for the exercise + of the function of reason, which by social cultivation was + gradually perfected and developed.” + +Kant’s view concerning the origin of the biped man from quadruped animal +ancestors is most unequivocally stated. + +In a review of Dr. Moscati’s Lecture upon the difference of structure in +animals and in men, Kant says: + + “Dr. Moscati proves that the upright walk of man is constrained + and unnatural; that he is indeed so constructed that he may + be able to maintain and move in this position, but that, + although by needful and constant habit he formed himself thus, + inconvenience and disease arise therefrom, which sufficiently + prove, that he was misled by reason and imitation to deviate + from the first animal arrangement. Man is not constructed + internally different from other animals that go on all fours. + When now he raises himself his intestines, particularly + the embryo of pregnant individuals, come into a pendulous + situation and a half reversed condition, which, if it often + alternates with the lying position or that on all-fours, cannot + precisely produce specially evil consequences, but, by constant + continuance, causes deformities and numerous diseases. Thus, + for example, the heart, because it is compelled to hang free, + elongates the blood vessels to which it is attached, assumes + an oblique position since it is supported by the diaphragm and + slides with its end against the left side—a position wherein + man, especially at full growth, differs from all other animals, + and thereby receives an inevitable inclination to aneurism, + palpitation, asthma, chest-dropsy, etc., etc. With the upright + position of man the mesentery, pulled down by the weight of the + intestines, sinks perpendicularly thereunder, is elongated and + weakened, and prepared for numerous ruptures. In the mesenteric + vein which has no valves, the blood moves slowly and with + greater difficulty (it having to ascend against the course of + gravity) than would happen with the horizontal position of the + trunk....” + + “We could add considerably to the reasons just adduced to + show that our animal nature is really quadrupedal. Among all + four-footed animals there is not a single one that could not + swim if it accidentally fell into the water. Man alone drowns, + except in cases where he has learned to swim. The reason is + because he has laid aside the habit of going on all-fours; for + it is by this motion that he would keep himself up in the water + without the exercise of any art, and by which all four-footed + creatures, who otherwise shun the water, swim....” + + “It will be seen, accordingly, that the first care of nature + was that man should be preserved as animal for _himself and + his species_, and for that end the position best adapted to + his internal structure, to the lay of the fœtus, and to his + preservation in danger, was the quadrupedal position; we see, + moreover, that a germ of reason is placed in him, whereby, + after the development of the same, he is destined for _social + intercourse_, and by the aid of which he assumes the position + which is in every case the most fitted for this, namely, the + bipedal position,—thus gaining upon the one hand infinite + advantages over animals, but also being obliged to put up with + many inconveniences that result from his holding his head so + proudly above his old companions.” + +[[106] In the double-leaded quotation on pages 43 and 44 Kant speaks +about the explanation of organised life from man down to the polyp +“according to mechanical laws like those which work in the production +of crystals,” and he adds, in organised beings the whole technic of +nature is so incomprehensible to us “that we imagine another principle is +necessitated for their explanation.” + +This “other principle” would be the principle of design, or the +teleological explanation of phenomena. In his old age Kant inclined more +to teleology than in his younger years, and it is for this reason that +Professor Ernst Haeckel accuses Kant of inconsistency. + +After having pointed out that “Kant is one of the few philosophers +that combine a well-founded knowledge of the natural sciences with +extraordinary precision and depth of speculation” and further that “he +was the first who taught ‘the principle of the struggle for existence’ +and ‘the theory of selection.’” Haeckel says in his “Natürliche +Schöpfungsgeschichte,” 8th edition, p. 91: + + “Wir würden daher unbedingt in der Geschichte der + Entwickelungslehre unserem gewaltigen Königsberger Philosophen + den ersten Platz einräumen müssen, wenn nicht leider diese + bewundernswürdigen monistischen Ideen des jungen Kant später + durch den überwältigenden Einfluss der dualistisch christlichen + Weltanschauung ganz zurückgedrängt worden wären.” + +This “influence of the dualistic Christian world-conception” is according +to Haeckel, Kant’s recognition of a teleological causation in the realm +of organised life. Haeckel says on the same place: + + “Er behauptet, dass sich im Gebiete der anorganischen Natur + unbedingt sämmtliche Erscheinungen aus mechanischen Ursachen, + aus bewegenden Kräften der Materie selbst, erklären lassen, im + Gebiete der anorganischen Natur dagegen nicht.” + +Haeckel does not stand alone in denouncing the old Kant. Schopenhauer +distinguishes between the author of the first and the author of the +second edition of the “Critique of Pure Reason,” regarding the former +only as the real Kant. These accusations are not without foundation, but +we believe with Max Müller that they have been unduly exaggerated. + +As to teleology for which Kant’s preference appears to be more strongly +marked in his later than in his younger years we should say that it is +a problem that should, in an historical investigation, as to whether or +not Kant was a consistent evolutionist, be treated independently. No one +can deny that there is an adaptation to ends in the domain of organised +life. It is not so much required to deny teleology in the domain of +organised nature as to purify and critically sift our views of teleology. +There is a kind of teleology which does not stand in contradiction to the +causation of efficient causes so called. + +Mr. Spencer’s denunciations of Kant would have some foundation, if he had +reference to the old Kant alone. But everyone who censures Kant for the +errors of his later period is bound to qualify his statement, and indeed +whenever such strictures of Kantism appear I find them expressly stated +as having reference to “the old Kant.” + +That Kant who is a living power even to-day is the young Kant, it is +the author of the first edition of the “Critique of Pure Reason.” He is +generally called “the young Kant,” although he was not young; he was, +as we say, in his best years. The old Kant who proclaimed that he “must +abolish knowledge in order to make room for faith” is a dead weight +in our colleges and universities. The young Kant is positive, the old +Kant is agnostic. The young Kant was an investigator and naturalist of +the first degree; he gave an impetus to investigation that it had never +before received from philosophy. The old Kant, I should not exactly say +reverted but certainly, neglected the principles of his younger years +and thus became the leader of a reactionary movement from which sprang +two offshoots very unlike each other but children of the same father; +the Oxford transcendentalism as represented by Green and the English +agnosticism as represented by Mr. Spencer. + +It is strange that Mr. Spencer has so little knowledge concerning the +evolution of the views he holds. If he were more familiar with the +history of the idea “that the world-problem is insolvable,” he would show +more reverence toward the old Kant and his mystical inclinations; for +Kant, whatever Mr. Spencer may say against it, is the father of modern +agnosticism.[107]] + + * * * * * + +The history of Mr. Spencer’s philosophical development shows that the +first idea which took possession of his mind and formed the centre of +crystalisation for all his later views was M. Condorcet’s optimism. +Condorcet believed in progress; he was convinced that in spite of all the +tribulations and anxieties of the present, man would at last arrive at +a state of perfection. He saw a millennium in his prophetic mind, which +alas!—if the law of evolution be true—can never be realised. Condorcet +died a martyr to his ideals. He poisoned himself in 1799 to escape death +by the Guillotine. + +The influence of Condorcet’s work _Esquisse d’un tableau historique +des progrès de l’esprit humain_ is traceable not only in Mr. Spencer’s +first book, “Social Statics,” published in 1850, but in all his later +writings. How can a true evolutionist believe in the Utopia of a state +of perfect adaptation? Does not each progress demand new adaptations? +Take as an instance the change from walking on four feet to an upright +gait. Did not this progress itself involve man in new difficulties, to +which he had to adapt himself? Let a labor-saving machine be invented, +how many laborers lose their work and how many others are in demand! The +transition from one state to the other is not easy, and as soon as it is +perfected new wants have arisen which inexorably drive humanity onward on +the infinite path of progress which can never be limited by any state of +perfection. There is a constant readjustment necessary, and if we really +could reach a state of perfect adaptation human life would drop into the +unconsciousness of mere reflex motions. + +Any one who understands the principle of evolution and its universal +applicability, will recognise that there can be no standstill in the +world, no state of perfect adaptation. Our solar system has evolved, as +Kant explained in his “General Cosmogony and Theory of the Heavens,” out +of a nebula, and is going to dissolve again into a nebular state. So our +social development consists in a constant realisation of ideals. We may +think that if we but attain our next and dearest ideal, humanity will be +satisfied forever. But as soon as we have realised that ideal, we quickly +get accustomed to its benefits. It becomes a matter of course and another +ideal higher still than that just realised appears before our mental gaze. + +Herder, in his “Ideas for a Philosophy of the History of Mankind,” not +unlike Mr. Spencer, was also under the spell of the Utopian ideal, that +humanity will reach at last a state of perfect happiness. Kant, in his +review of Herder’s book, discusses the relativity of happiness and its +insufficiency as a final aim of life. He says: + + “First of all the happiness of an animal, then that of a + child and of a youth, and lastly that of man! In all epochs + of human history, as well as among all classes and conditions + of the same epoch, that happiness has obtained which was in + exact conformity with the individual’s ideas and the degree + of his habituation to the conditions amid which he was + born and raised. Indeed, it is not even possible to form a + comparison of the degree of happiness nor to give precedence + to one class of men or to one generation over another.... + If this shadow-picture of happiness ... were the actual aim + of Providence, every man would have the measure of his own + happiness within him.... Does the author (Herder) think perhaps + that, if the happy inhabitants of Otaheiti had never been + visited by more civilised peoples and were ordained to live + in peaceful indolence for thousands of years to come—that we + could give a satisfactory answer to the question why they + should exist at all, and whether it would not have been just + as well that this island should be occupied by happy sheep and + cattle as that it should be inhabited by men who are happy only + through pure enjoyment?” + + “It involves no contradiction to say that no individual + member of all the offspring of the human race, but that + only the species, fully attains its mission (Bestimmung). + The mathematician may explain the matter in his way. The + philosopher would say: the mission of the human race as a whole + is _unceasing progress_, and the perfection (Vollendung) of + this mission is a mere idea (although in every aspect a very + useful one) of the aim towards which, in conformity with the + design of providence, we are to direct our endeavors.” + +It is indubitable that Kant’s views of evolution agree better with the +present state of scientific investigation, than does Mr. Spencer’s +philosophy, which has never been freed from Condorcet’s ingenuous +optimism. The assumption of a final state of perfection by absolute +adaptation is irreconcilable with the idea of unceasing progress, which +must be true, if evolution is a universal law of nature. + + +FOOTNOTES: + +[101] See Mr. Spencer’s article in _Mind_, No. LIX, p. 313. + +[102] The passage in the _Encyclopædia Britannica_ on Baer runs as +follows: + +“In his _Entwickelungsgeschichte der Thiere_, p. 264, he distinctly tells +us that the law of growing individuality is ‘the fundamental thought +which goes through all forms and degrees of animal development and all +single relations. It is the same thought which collected in the cosmic +space solar systems; the same which caused the weather-beaten dust on +the surface of our metallic planet to spring forth living beings.’ Von +Baer thus prepared the way for Mr. Spencer’s generalisation of the law of +organic evolution as the law of all evolution.” + +[103] See Haeckel, _Goethe on Evolution_, No. 131 of _The Open Court_. + +[104] _Præstabilismus_, that is, the theory that the phenomena of nature +are the result of pre-established law. + +[105] The proposition that Kant is no easy reading found an unexpected +and strong opposition. Immediately after the publication of this article, +Sept. 4th, 1890, Mr. Charles S. Peirce made the following incidental +remark in a letter to the author dated Sept. 6th, 1890: “I have heard +too much of Kant’s being hard reading. I think he is one of the easiest +of philosophers; for he generally knows what he wants to say, which is +more than half the battle, and he says it in terms which are very clear. +Of course, it is quite absurd to try to read Kant without preliminary +studies of Leibnizian and English philosophers, as well as of the +terminology of which Kant’s is a modification or transmogrification. But +there is a way of making out what he meant, while such writers as Hume +and J. S. Mill, the more you study them the more they puzzle you.” + +[106] This passage on pages 48, 49, and 50 which is enclosed in brackets +did not appear in _The Open Court_. It has been added since and is +published here for the first time. + +[107] In this connection we call attention to a book, _Kant und Darwin, +ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Entwickelungslehre_, Jena, 1875, by Fritz +Schultze, formerly Privat docent in Jena, now Professor of philosophy at +the Polytechnic Institute in Dresden. This little book is a collection +of the most important passages of Kant’s views concerning evolution, +the struggle for existence, and the theory of selection, and it is +astonishing to find how much Kant had to say on the subject and how +strongly he agrees with and anticipates Darwin. If Kant had not lived +before Darwin one might be tempted to conclude that he was familiar with +his _Origin of Species_ and _The Descent of Man_. + + + + +*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 76880 *** |